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Les cartes, planches, tableeux, etc., peuvent dtre fllm^s d dee taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque Ie document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clichi. 11 est f ilm6 A partir de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant ie nombre d'images ntcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mithode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) Jriis m ■ 1.3 ^ ^jPPLIED IfVMGE Ir 1653 East Main Street Rochester, New York 14609 y^k (716) 482 - 0300 - Phone (716) 288-5989 -Fox The Future of War The y. FUTURE OF WAR IN ITS TECHNICAL ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL RELATIONS IS IV AR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? BY I. STB LOCH TRANSLATED BY R. C. LONG, AND WITH A PREFATORY CONVERSATION WITH THE AUTHOR BY W. T. STEAD 1* ) TORONTO WILLIAM BRIGGS igoo u 102- Copyright, i899, by DOUBLEDAY & McCLURE CO. CONTENTS Preface: Conversations with the Author, by W. T. Stead Author's Preface PAGE vii Ixiii PART I MILITARY AND NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS CHAP. I. How W^ar will be Waged on Land II. Plans of Campaign : Possiblf and Impossible III. The Future of Naval Warfare. IV. Does Russia Need a Navy? V. What Wars have Cost in the Nineteenth Century I VI. What they will Cost in the Future . ^11. The Care of the Wounded . PAGE 3 63 93 113 128 140 146 .£ 11 CONTENrs PART II ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN TIME OF WAR CHAI'. I. II. III. IV. V. VI. VII. In Russia . In Britain In Germany In Franc f. . i>a(;b 163 . 251 266 • V7 Effect of War on the Vital Needs of Peoples 294 Probable Losses in Future Wars . .319 Militarism and its Nemesis 347 Map of Ri Map of F Point of Wj Map of Pj the V Braili Plan of In Diagram c Diagram c Diagram c Diagram 1 of the Diagram c 1874? Diagrams Diagram c Diagram c Plate sho' metre Diagram s break Plan show and > Diagram c Diagram o Plan of Ri Diagram c Plan of Ri theP( Plan of R habita Plan of Oi Diagram < Britai LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS TAGE 74 Map of Russian Defensive System Map of Paths of Advance of the Austro-German Armies from Points of Concentration to the Vistuli-Bug-Narev Theatre of War Map of Paths of Advance of the German and Austrian Armies on the Vistula-Bug-iiarev Theatre of War, from Pierron and Brailmont Plan of Invasion by Russia of Prussian Territory Diagram of Expenditure on the Crimean War .... Diagram of Expenditure on the War of 1859 .... Diagram of Expenditure by Russia on the War of 1877-78 . Diagram of Expenditure of Europe on War in the second half of the Nineteenth Century Diagram of Increase per cent, of Military Expenditure between 1874 and 1896 ......... Diagrams of Probable Daily Expenditure on a Future War 142 Diagram of Percentage Distribution of the Revenues . Diagram of Result of Firing from an ii-mil. Rifle 149 Plate showing effect of a Bullet fired from a distance of 3500 metres on the Human Tibia, and on the Bone of an Ox Diagram showing Depreciation of Russian Securities at the Out break of War Plan showing Expenditure by Russia, per Inhabitant, on Army and Navy ......... Diagram of Russian Exports and Imports (1889-94) . , Diagram of Percentage of Russian Export to Production (1890-94) Plan of Russian Grain Production per Inhabitant Diagram of Classification of Russian Imports Plan of Russian Commercial Undertakings in 1892, per 100,000 of the Population Plan of Russian Expenditure on Posts and Telegraphs per In habitant Plan of Output of Russian Factories Diagram of Percentage Comparison of Wages in Russia, Great Britain, and North America 186 77 78 89 129 130 131 132 134 -144 145 150 153 168 170 172 175 176 178 180 181 183 ^ iv LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS ^^^\l^/^l'^^'^^^Se Grov^th of Russian Population between ,885 Plan of '^A^.'rfl^'T^"'' ?^ "°"^^' '" ^ ^"««'^" Settlement .' Plan of Average Value of one Property destroyed by Fire in Russia, between 1860-87 . . ^ " uy 1 ire in ^^^"(iSetiy^ ^°''^' ^^ ^''^ '" Russia per 100 Inhabitants ^'*"(i°888l""!'''' °^ ^^'^^ ^^"'' ^" ^"''^^' P^''°°° desaytins Plan of Comparative Yields of AgriculturarCountries of Europe Diagram of Russian Harvest in 1893 Diagram of Growth of the Orthodox Population in Russia, and the General Population of other Countries, per 1000 """iTtr ct^s^o^E^^^ ^' '°°°' °f ^^^ ^°P"^^^- """iTrut tSstf^Lfop^ '^' p^^ '°°°' °^ ^^^ ^°p"'^^- """'Sltde^o'f^uro^^-P^^ "°°'°^ ^^« ^°P"^^^- °f ^he """Suges'up r's" °' ^"""°" °"^ °^ -- Children born Diagram of the Value of Human Life at Various Ages ' Plan of Outlay on Instruction in Russia in 1887, per Inhabitant " ^'^^JTin^ch?efTu?o?ea°n^ SS^ -"^^^^ ^^ ^^^'^-^ ^- ^'^S ?S K ■ ™^f' °^St"dents in Higher and Interme^ Popul2i"on ^''"''^*' *"*' Institutions, per 100,000 of the Diagram of Number of Doctors in European Countries oer^ 100,000 of the Population . ^ v^ountnes, per Diagram of Number of Quadratic Kilometres for every Doctor " Plan of Outlay on Medicine in Russia, per Inhabitant Plan of Number of Deaths from Typhus in Russia, per 1000 Cases ''"TuVean'^CotSief ^"^^'^""^^^^ ^" '^ ^'^''^^- ^ ^^^^ ''TnThi:^ lii^X co'urs^^^^ :°°'°?° °^ ^^« ^°p"'^^-" Diagram of Consumption of Spirits per 100 of the Population m chief European Countries, in 1868 and 1888 °P"'^"°" "Tl^ll'.iol.Tfusfil""'"'' "f .^-:-''<'- !»' -Jo- of .he I'AGB 18^ 191 194 199 200 201 205 207 208 208 209 210 212 214 217 -219 220 221 222 224 225 226 229 230 23X Diagrams per M pean ( Diagrams per M pean ( Diagrams i lion c Count Diagrams ( corres] Diagram o in chie Diagram Forms Diagram ol of the Diagram oj Diagram of Germa Plan of Ex bitant Plan of Pel Plan of Am Diagram of Diagram of of Grea Diagram of land Diagram of Diagram of 1864 an Diagram of Wages Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Diagram of Legacy Diagram of 1 to Occu lMS I'AGE n 1885 189 ;nt 191 ire in 194 aitants 195 aytins • 199 urope 200 iltural 201 205 1, and 207 lation 208 ation 208 f the 209 ar, in 210 born 212 214 tant. 215 Ser- 217 rme- " the 218 -219 per . 220 or . 221 222 ases 224 hief 225 ion, 226 ion, 229 a of . 230 the . 231 LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS v Diagrams of Numbers of Various Classes condemned for Murder '^^^ per Million of the corresponding Population in chief Euro- pean Countries 2^2 Diagrams of Numbers of Various Classes convicted for Theft per Million of the corresponding Population in chief Euro- pean Countries ^^ Diagrams of Numbers convicted for Highway Robbery per Mil- lion of the corresponding Population in chief European Countries ... „, . 234 Diagrams of Numbers convicted for Swindling per Million of the corresponding Population, in chief European Countries . 235 Diagram of Percentage Relation of Men and Women convicted in chief European Countries 2i6 Diagram of Percentage Increase in Russia in the Fifteen Chief Forms of Crime ^^ Diagram of Number of Convictions in Great Britain per 100 000 of the Population _ ' ^ Diagram of Comparative Convictions in France and Austria 237 Diagram of Number of Convictions per 100,000 of Population in Germany . . 23S Plan of Expenditure on Justice and Prisons in P ia per Inha- bitant .... Plan of Percentage of Grown Horses in Russia . . . ,241 Plan of Amount of Production of Iron and Steel in Russia . . 243 Diagram of Number of Native and Imported Cattle in England .* 256 Diagram of Classification by Occupation of 1000 of the Popula- of Great Britain ... o-« Diagram of Distribution of the Income of the Population of Eng- land ... „A^ _^. 260- Diagram of State of Savings in Great Britain in 1895 • • .261 Diagram of Expenditure of England on Armed Forces between 1864 and 1895 264 Diagram of Classification of Workers in Germany according to Wages .273. Diagram of Emigration from Germany to America (1891-1894) . 274 Diagram of Value of Foreign Securities stamped in Germany 276 Diagram of French Imports and Exports (18G0-1894) . . .278 Diagram of French Trade (1 860- 1 894) 279 Diagram of French Trade {1883 -1 894) 280,281 Diagram of French Revenue and Expenditure (1861-1893) • ' 281 Diagram of French Debt (1852-1895) ag* Diagram of French Savings (1869-1895) 28* Diagram of Average Value of Properties, in Francs, passing by Legacy .285 Diagram of the Distribution of the French Population according to Occupation in 1886 284. -* rt ill : ii vi LIST OF MAPS AND DIAGRAMS Diagram of Assistance given to the Poor in France in 1889 ""aSS Diagram of Number of Old Men and Children in Percentage Relation to Population in chief European Countries ^ 280 "^'To^ul^Jio^S^cSefE^ro^et^SJ^^^ ^^^^^^ - , """i^TGlrnTpe^r loo^^"^^^^ °' ^"^ ^°P"'^^-" ^ ^■-- ""^Tss ^nZm in s;ff r ^" ^'^^' ^""^^p^^" ^-"^"- '" """Sy^llf .^'s^^Ssf °^.P°P^>-*- - France and Geri ''' Diagram showing the Number of Days on which Food would be ^^^ Lacking in Time of War in chief European Counties ^.e Diagram showing the Number of Days on which Oats would be Lacking in time of War in chief European Countries ^.g ?oun?ri?s"^^''^"''^ °'' ^^^^^^"^y °f ^leat in chief European ^'""^oun^rifs"^"'.^"'*^ °' ^"^"^""^y °f Salt in chief' European ^"'^ """Tu-^opln'S^nS °^' "^^^^^'^"^^ °^ ^— « -'^Wef '°' """Spln'c^uS " ''^'^^^"^.^^ °' '^^°"^ ^-' - ^^-^ '°' ^^^ tlfnb'"'"^ Comparative Development of Socialists and Free- ^"^ t^inl^ers in Germany according to the Elections of 1891 ,12 Diagram of Percentage of Horses which would be taken for Military Purposes in chief European Countries „6 Diagram showing Amount of Living Force of a Bullet ' ,20 Diagram showing Penetrative Power of the Mauser Bullet on Numbers of Horses' Carcases Diagram of Rotation and Weight of Bullets' of various Rifles ' 322 Diagram of Zone of Effective Fire against Infantry by Chassepot and Mannhcher Rifles respectiv-ely ^ '-nassepot Diagram of Breadth of Zone of Effective Fire against Cavalry bv ^""^ the Chassepot and Mannlicher Rifles respeltively * ^ ,., Diagram of Distance of Useful Fire " ' ^'4 ''^^Sch^aS^SallSSr ^^- at Onelnfantrym'anby ''' Diagram of the Deviation of the Paskevitch Instrument ' III "S Sif^e'/en^Rtrs °' ""'''"'''' ^""^^ ^>- «"« Soldier ' Diagram of Losses in the German Army in 'the War of 1870 III Diagram showing Influence of the Quality of Firearms on fh^ Relations of Killed to Wounded ^ 'rearms on the 343 PAGE i89 288 rcentage • 289 ation to . 290 1 France • 291 ountries • 292 nd Ger- • 293 /ould be s . 296 ould be ■ 298 iropean • 304 iropean . 305 1 chief • 306 n chief . 306 i Free- 91 312 en for • 316 . 320 llet on • 321 les . 322 Lssepot • 323 ilry by • 324 ■ 325 lan by 326-327 • 327 oldier 328 irious ■ 333 336 a the • 343 i PREFACE CONVERSATIONS WITH M. BLOCH ''The Future of War'' is the title of M. de Bloch's voluminous cyclopcsdia on the ai-t of war, pasty present, and to come. But that is a mistake. For M. Block's thesis is that there is no war to come, that war indeed has already become impossible. It would really have been clearer therefore to call this translation of the sixth and concluding volume of his i77tmense book " Is War Now Impos- sible ? " — as in the English edition, — for this title gives a much clearer idea of the contents. For M. Bloch contends in all sober seriousness that war — great war in the visual acceptation of the word — has already, by the natural and normal develop- ment of the art or science of warfare, become a physical impossibility / That is what this book was written to prove. ^"i PREFACE But, before reading the chapters crammed with statistics and entering npon the arguments of the great Polish economist, the reader may find it convenient to glance over, as a preliminary intro- duction to the book, the follozving free rendering of the conversations which I have had the privi- lege of enjoying with the author at St. -Petersburg and in London. M. Bloch, I may state in a parenthesis, is a well-known banker of Warsaw, who several years ago forsook fikance, in which he had achieved no small success, in order to devote himself to the study of political economy, and to examine particu- larly the question of the future of war from a political economical standpoiiit. Eight years he devoted to the special study of which his work ''The Future of War'' is the monument. He published it in Russian two years ago. This year he has brought out editicns in German and in French. When I met him in St. Petersburg last autumn he gave me permission to publish a trans ^ lation of his book in English, in whole or in part, I hive selected the last part, the sixth volume, in which he summarises the conclusions which he had arrived at in the earlier part of the book. PREFACE ix M. Block h a man of benevolent mien, cf middle stature, and apparently betzueen fifty and sixty years of age. He paid a flying visit to London in April, and is c the present moment of writing at the Grand Hotel in Paris. His home address is Warsaw. When he is in St. Petersburg he stays at the Hotel d' Europe. I' Utopians," said M. Bloch; "and they call us Utopians, idealists, visionaries, because we believe that the end of war is in sight ? But who are the Utopians, I should like to know ? What is a Utopian, using the term as an epithet of opprobrium ? He is a man who lives in a dream of the impossible ; but what I know and am pre- pared to prove is, that the real Utopians who are living in a veritable realm of phantasy are those people who believe in war. -.War has been possible, no doubt, but it has at last become impossible, and those who are pre- paring for war, and basing all their schemes of life on the expectation of war, are visionaries of the worst kind, for war is no longer possible." - "That is good news, M. Bloch," I replied; "but is it not somewhat of a paradox ? Only last year we had the Spanish-American war ; the year before, the war between Turkey and Greece. Since when has war become impossible ? " " Oh," replied M. Bloch, with vivacity, " I do not speak of such wars. It is not to such frontier brawls, or punitive operations such as you in England, for instance, are perpetually engaging in on the frontiers of your X PREFACE extended empire, that I refer when I say that war has become impossible. When soldiers and statesmen speak about the War of the Future, they do not refer to such trumpery expeditions against semi-barbarous peoples The war of the future, the war which has become impos- sible ,s the war that has haunted the imagination of mankind for the last thirty years, the war in which great nations armed to the teeth were to fling themselves with all their resources into a struggle for life and death Ihis ,s the war that every day becomes more and more impossible. Yes, it is in preparations against that im- possible war that these so-called practical men, who are the real Utopia^ns of our time, are wasting the resources of civilisation." " Pray explain yourself more clearly, M. Bloch." "Well," said he, "I suppose you will admit "that war has practically become impossible for the minor States It IS as impossible for Denmark or for Belgium to make war to-day as it would be for you or for me to assert the right of private war, which our forefathers possessed We cannot do it. At least, we could only try to do it and then be summarily suppressed and punished for our .temerity. That is the position of the minor States. For them war is practically forbidden by their stronger neigh- bours. They are in the position of the descendants of the feudal lords, whose right of levying war has vanished owing to the growth of a strong central power whose interests and authority are incompatible with the exercise of what used to be at one time an almost universal right. For the minor States, therefore, war is impos- sible." "Admitted." I replied. "Impossible, that is to say, without the leave and licence of the great Powers." that war has itesmen speak refer to such rous peoples, ecome impos- iiagination of 1 which great mselves with e and death >re and more inst that im- nen, who are he resources loch." niit that war Jinor States, um to make to assert the i possessed, try to do it, ihed for our States. For )nger neigli- dants of the as vanished )wer whose :he exercise it universal : is inipos- is to say, ers." PREFACE xi " Precisely," said M. Bloch ; " and hence, when we discuss the queslion of future war, we always deal with it as a war between great Powers. That is to say, primarily, I the long talked-of; constantly postponed war between France and Germany for the lost provinces; and, secondly, that other war the thought of which has gradually replaced that of the single-handed duel between France and Germany, viz., a war between theTriplice and the Franco- Russian AIHance. It is that war which constantly pre- occupies the mind of statesmen and sovereigns of Europe, and it is that war which, I maintain, has become absolutely impossible." "But how impossible, M. Bloch? Do you mean morally impossible ? " " No such thing," he replied. ^" I am dealing not with moral considerations, which cannot be measured, but with hard, matter-of-fact, material things, which can be esti- mated and measured with some approximation to absolute accuracy. 1 maintain that war has become impossible alike from a military, economic, and political point of view. ^The very development that has taken place in the mechanism of war has rendered war an impracticable operation. The dimensions of modern armaments and the organisation of society have rendered its prosecution ^an economic impossibility, and, finally, if any attempt I were made to demonstrate the inaccuracy of my assertions by putting the matter to a test on a great scale, we should find the inevitable result in a catastrophe which would destroy all existing political organisations. Thus, the great war cannot be made, and any attempt to make it would result in suicide. Such, I believe, is the simple |demonstrable fact." " But where is the demonstration ? " I asked. I > ^" PREFACE M. Bloch turned and pointed to his encyclopedic work tammg I do not know how many quarto pages, which stood piled one above the other. " Read that," he said. " In that book you will find the facts upon which my demonstration rests. ' " 1 hat is all very well " I stM • " k... u M Rinoi, , . ' °"' ''°w <^an you, M. Bloch an economist and a banker, set yourself ud as an authority upon military matters ' " ^ "Oh" said M. Bloch, "you have a saying that it is often the outsider that sees most; and you mu Z::'"Jt '"^ '™'""""^ '"^'^' - "' ™'^" experts are by no means inaccessible to the general stu cut. ,„ order to form a correct idea as to the changT that have taken place in the mechanism of war "t is quite conceivable that the bystander who is no. engaged .n the actual carrying out of the evolution now in progiS may be better able to see the drift and tendency of things than those who are busily engaged in the actual detail of he operation 1 can only say that while at first hand I ha^e no authority whatever, and do not in any way pose as a military or naval expert, I have taken ali fmag^abk pains ,1, order to master the literature of warfare! es"! and the handling of armies and fleets, which have been published by the leading military authorities in he modem world. After mastering what they have written, 1 have had opportunities of discussing personally with many officers in all countries as to the conclusions t wh h have arrived, and I am glad to know that in the niain there ,s not much difTerence of opinion as to the iZ:i:jj:i """^'■^' ™"''-'°»= - - "- ««"- or I ^lopaedic work es, each con- pages, which will find the cw can you, iuiself up as ig that it is you must by mihtary the general the changes war, it is lot engaged in progress cy of things Jal detail of : first hand ly way pose imaginable rfare, espe- operations have been 2s in the ^e written, nally with lusions at that in the as to the nature of ' But do they also PREFACE agree with you," I said, " that war Xlll would be too much to has become impossible ? "No," said M. Bloch, "that .,„ ,„ expect. Otherwise Othello's occupation would be gone But as they have admitted the facts, we can draw our own conclusions." "But I see in your book you deal with every branch of the service, armaments of all kinds, manoeuvres, questions of strategy, problems of fortification-everything in fact that comes into the consideration of the actual 'conduct of modern war. Do you mean to tell me that military men generally think you have made no mistakes ?" "That would be saying too much. The book was referred by the Emperor of Russia at my request to the Mmister of War, with a request that it should be sub- jected to examination by a council of experts The results of that council were subsequently communicated to the Emperor in the shape of a report, which set forth that while in dealing with so very many questions it was impossible to avoid some mistakes, it was their opinion that the book was a very useful one, and that it was most desirable that it should be placed in the hands of all staff officers. They also added an expres- sion of opinion that no book could contribute so much to the success of the Conference or to the information of those who were to take part in its deliberations. "The one question upon which strong difference of opinion existed was that concerning the use of the bayonet. I have arrived at the conclusion, based upon a very careful examination of various authorities, that the day of the bayonet is over. In the Franco-German war the total mortality of the Germans from cold steel amounted to only one per cent. The nroDortion on th^ lii: I XIV PREFACE French side was higher, but I think it can be mathe- matically demonstrated that, in future, war will be decided at ranges which will render the use of the bayonet impos- sible. General Dragomiroff, however, a veteran of the old school, cannot tolerate this slight ujDon his favourite weapon. In his eyes the bayonet is supreme, and it is cold steel which at the last will always be the deciding factor in ♦he combats of peoples. He therefore strongly condemns that portion of my book ; but it stands on its own merits, and the reader can form his own judgment as to the probability of the bayonet being of any practical use in future war." "General Dragomiroff's devotion to the bayonet," I remarked, " reminds me of our admirals' devotion to sails in our navy. Fifteen years ago it was quite obvious that the fighting ship of the future had no need for sails — that, indeed, sails were an encumbrance and a danger ; but all the admirals of the old school attached far more importance to the smartness in furling and unfurling sail than they did to proficiency in gunnery or in any of the deciding factors in naval battles. They clung to masts and yards for years after all the younger officers in the service knew that they might as well have clung to bows and arrows ; and I suppose you will find the same thing in regard to the bayonet." "Yes," said M. Bloch, " the bayonet seems to me alto- gether out of date. No doubt it is a deadly enough weapon, if you can get within a yard of your enemy; but the problem that I have been asking myself is whether in future combatants will ever be able to get within one hundred yards of one another, let alone one yard." •' But then," I rejoined, '• if that be so, wars will be much less deadly than they were before." [IS no kin [in which [Other, w The slau I barbariai I tribes on nothing of the m( produced which mi hat befo "That, ho wrol he extin hich wi atants ^ war wou ty Lord hich he lie planel hat an £ Litton by "Yes," as made here will lan the halifa ci udyard iUfiicient < ce the fi lave learr an be mathe- /ill be decided ayonet impos- eteran of the his favourite me, and it is ; the deciding jfore strongly stands on its 1 judgment as any practical bayonet," I otion to sails : obvious that :d for sails — id a danger ; hed far more unfurling sail in any of the ang to masts fficers in the lung to bows I same thing s to me alto- ladly enough enemy ; but is whether in : within one ^ard." wars will be PREFACE XV "Yes and no," said M. Bloch ; "they will become less deadly because they have become more deadly. There |is no kind of warfare so destructive of human life as that ^"n which you have bodies of men face to face with each jther, with nothing but cold steel to settle the issue. The slaughter which took place in the old wars between jbarbarians, or between the Romans and the barbarian Itribes on their frontiers, was simply appalling. There is Jnothing like it in modern warfare, and this diminution )f the mortality in battle has been, paradoxically enough, :)roduced by the improved deadliness of the weapons with /liich men fight. They are, indeed, becoming so deadly that before long you will see they will never fight at all." "That," I replied, "was the faith of Rudyard Kipling, I'ho wrote me a few months ago saying that he relied for ^he extinction of war upon the invention of a machine /hich would infallibly slay fifty per cent, of the com- batants whenever battle was waged. 'Then,' he said, war would cease of itself.' The same idea was expressed by Lord Lytton in his novel of 'The Coming Race,' in vhkh he attributed the final disappearance of war from pie planet to the discovery of vril, a destructive so deadly [hat an army could be annihilated by the touch of a jutton by the finger of a child." "Yes," said M. Bloch; "that is so; but until mankind bas made experience of the deadliness of its weapons jhere will be terrible bloodshed. For instance, at Omdur- lan the destruction inflicted upon the forces of the khalifa came very near the fifty per cent, standard of Uidyard Kipling. That one experience was probably [ufficient even for the Dervishes. They will never again ace the fire of modern rifles. The experience which they Uve learned is rapidly becoming generalised throughout xri PREFACE armies of Christeiulorn, and although there may be •onv^ frightful sLtnes of wliolesale slaughter, one or two experiences of that kind wH rid our military authorities of any desire to come to close quarters with their adversaries. " What a paradox it is ! " I replied. " We shall end by kWMng nobody, because i; we fought at all we should kill everybody. Then you do not anticipate increased slaughter as the result of the increased precision in weapons ? " "You mistake me," said M. Bloch. "At first there will be increased slaughter— increased slaughter on so terrible a scale as to render it impossible to get troops to push the battie to a decisive issue. They will try to, thinking that they are fighting under the old conditions, and they will learn such a lesson that they will abandon the attempt for ever. Then, instead of a war fought out to the bitter end in a series of decisive battles, we shall have as a substitute a long period of continually increasing strain upon the resources of the combatants. The war, instead of being a hand-to-hand contest in which the combatants measure their physical and moral superiority, will become a kind of stalemate, in which neither army being able to get at the other, both armies will be maintained in opposition to each other, threatening each other, but never being able to deliver a final and decisive attack. It will be simply the natural evolution of the armed peace, on an aggravated scale." '• Yes," said M. Bloch, " accompanied by entire rusloca- tion of all industry and severing of all the sources o.' supply by which alone the community is enabled to bear the crushing burden of that armed peace. It will be a multi- plication of expenditure simultaneously accompanied by a (litninutii be met. famine, riations i "Now prophet a soldier " Yes,' I discovc The Liol( tueciianis own ( mankind and he hj from thos markets.' " But r and expl brought I "It is visible si| magazine covery of little prof Trafalgar you used were conti ron tube, "The i oading ca ra, which s until tl: alibre. ' there may he ;r, one or two iry authorities s with their 2 shall end hy ve should kill ite increased precision in Vt first there ughter on so get troops to ' will try to, d conditions, will abandon fought out to ve shall have !y increasing 3. The war, 1 which the I superiority, leither army lies will be itening each and decisive ation of the it ire disloca- ;es> o,' j-upply to bear the be a multi- panied by a diminution of the sources by which that expenditure can be met. That is th( future of wai not hghting, but famine, not the slaying of men, but the hinkruptcy of natiuns ai ' the break-u() of the whok .,ociaI organisation." " Now 1 begin to perceive how it is that we have as a prophet of the end of war a political econoujist, and not a soldier." " Yes," said M. Bloch, " it is as a political economist that I discovered the open secret which he who runs may read. The yoldicr by natural evolution has so perfected the meciianiJio of slaughter that he has practically secured ^*' own extinction. He has made himself so costly that mankind can no longer afford to pay for his maintenance, and he has therefore tr:. nsferred the sceptre of the world from those who govern its camps to those who control its markets." "But now, M. Bloch, will you condescend to particulars, and explain to me how this great evolution has been brought about ? " " It is very simple," said M. Bloch. " The outward and visible sign of the end of war was the introduction of the magazine rifle. For several hundred years after the dis- covery of gunpowder the construction of firearms made little progress The cannon with which you fougiit at Trafalgar differed comparatively little from those which you used against the Armada. For two centuries you were content to clap some powder behind a round ball in an Ton tube, and fire it at your enemy. y "The introduction of the needle gun and of breech- goading cannon may be said to mark the dav.'n of the new ra, which, however, was not definitely established amongst s until the invention of the magazine rifle of very small alibre. The magazine gun may also be mentioned as an mi XVlll PREFACE mi illustration of the improved deadliness of firearms ; but, as your experience at Obdurman showed, the deciding factor was not the Maxim, but the magazine rifle." "Yes," I said; "as Lord Wolseley said, it was the magazme rifle which played like a deadly hose spouting leaden bullets upon the advancing enemy." " Yes," said M. Bloch, " and the possibility of firing half a dozen bullets without having to stop to reload has transformed the conditions of modern war." " Do you not exaggerate the importance of mere rapiditv of fire?" I asked. ^ ^ " No," said M. Bloch ; " rapidity of fire does not stand alone. The modern rifle is not only a much more rapid firer than its predecessors, but it has also an immensely wider range and far greater precision of fire. To these three qualities must be added yet a fourth, which completes the revolutionary nature of the new firearm, and that is the introduction of smokeless powder." "The Spanish-American campaign," I said, "illustrated the importance of smokeless powder ; but how do you thmk the smokelessness of the new explosives will affect warfare in the future ?" " In the first case," said M. Bloch, " it demolishes the screen behind which for the last 400 years human beings have fought and died. All the last great battles have been fought more or less in the dark. After the battle is joined, friends and foes have been more or less lost to sight in the clouds of dense smoke which hung heavy over the whole battlefield. Now armies will no longer fight in the dark Every soldier in the fighting line will see with frightful distinctness the havoc which is being made in the ranks by the shot an J shell of the enemy. The veil which gun- powder spread over the worst horrors of the b-ttlefield has earms ; but, as deciding factor id, it was the hose spouting Jility of firing to reload has f mere rapidity Iocs not stand ch more rapid an immensely re. To these lich completes 1, and that is I, " illustrated how do you 'es will affect Jmolishes the luman beings leshave been ttle is joined, sight in the er the whole in the dark, /ith frightful in the ranks 1 which gun- ''ttlefieldhas PREFACE xix been withdrawn for ever. But that is not the only change. It is difficult to over-estimate the increased strain upon the nerve and mom/e of an army under action by the fact that men will fall killed and wounded without any visible or audible cause. In the old days the soldier saw the puf!' of smoke, heard the roar of the gun, and when the shell or shot ploughed its way through the ranks, he associated cause and effect, and was to a certain extent prepared for it. In the warfare of the future men will simply fall and die without either seeing or hearing anything." '• Without hearing anything, M. Bloch ? " ♦' Without hearing anything, for although the smokeless powder is not noiseless, experience has proved that the report of a rifle will not carry more than nine hundred yards, and volley-firing cannot be heard beyond a mile. But that brings us to the question of the increased range of the new projectiles. An army on march will suddenly become aware of the comparative proximity of the foe by seeing men drop killed and wounded, without any visible cause; and only after some time will they be able to discover that the invisible shafts of death were sped from a line of sharp-shooters lying invisible at a distance of a mile or more. There will be nothing along the whole line of the horizon to show from whence the death- dealing missiles have sped. It will simply be as if the bolt had come from the blue. Can you conceive of anything more trying to human nerves ? " " But what is the range of the modern rifle ? " " The modern rifle," said M. Bloch, " has a range of 3000 or 4000 metres— that is to say, from two to three miles. Of course, I do not mean to say that it will be used at such great distances. For action at long range, artillery is much more effective. But of that I will speak i s XX PREFACE I shortly But you can fairly say that for one mile or a mile and a half the magazine rifle is safe to kill anything that stands between the muzzle and its mark ; and therein, continued M. Bloch, " lies one of the greatest changes that have been effected in modern firearms lust look at this diagram" (see page i). ''It will explain better than anything I can say the change that has been brought about in the last dozen years. "In the last g-eat war, if you wished to hit a distant mark, you had to sight your rifle so as to fire high up into the air, and the ball executing a curve descended at the range at which you calculated your target stood. Between the muzzle and the target your bullet did no execution It was soaring in the air, first rising until it reached the .maxnnum height, and then descending it struck the target or the earth at one definite point some thousand yard, distant. Contrast this with the modern weapon. There IS now no need for sighting your gun so as to drop your bullet at a particular range. You aim straight at your man, and the bullet goes, as is shown in the diagram direct to its mark. There is no climbing into the air to tall again. It simply speeds, say, five feet from the earth until It meets its mark. Anything that stands between Its object and the muzzle of the rifle it passes through Hence whereas in the old gun you hit your man only if you could drop your bullet upon the square yard of ground upon which he was standing, you now hit 'him so long as you train your rifle correctly on every square yard of the thousand or two thousand which may inter- vene between the muzzle of your gun and the end of the course of the shot. That circumstance alone, even without any increase in the rapidity of the fire, must enormously add to the deadliness of the modern firearms " one mile or a kill anything mark ; and " the greatest rearms. Just will explain hat has been hit a distant high up into ended at the Dd. Between o execution. reached the :k the target Lisand yards 3on. There drop your ght at your he diagram, to the air to m the earth ds between es through, man only if re yard of hit him so ^ery square may inter- end of the lone, even fire, must firearms," PREFACE xxi " Could you give me any exact statistics as to the mcreased rapidity of fire ? " "Certainly," said M. Bloch. "That is to say, I can give you particulars up to a comparatively recent time, but the progress of the science of firearms is .^o rapid that no one can say but that my statistics may be old before you pnnt your report of this talk. The ordinary soldier will fire twelve times as many shots per minute as he was able to do in 187c, and even this is likely to be rapidly improved upon. But you may take it that what with increased rapidity of fire, greater penetrative power and the greater precision that the gun which the soldier will carry mto the battle will possess, the rifle of ^^ to-morrow will be forty times as efi^ective as the chassepot - ^as m the Franco-Prussian war. Even the present gun is five times as deadly." ''But do not you think that with this rapid firing a soldier will spend all his ammunition and have none ^' There again," said M. Bloch, "the improvement in hrearms has enormously increased the number of cart- ridges which each man can carry into action. In 1877 when we went to war with Turkey, our soldiers could only carry 84 cartridges into action. When the caHbre of the rifle was reduced to 5 mm. the number which eacli soldier was furnished with rose to 270. With a bullet of 4 mm. he will carry 380, and when we have a rifle of 3 mm. calibre he will be able to take 575 into action and not have to carry any more weight than that which ^burdened him when he carried 84, twenty years ago. |At present he carries 170 of the 7-62 mm " k^'^'" " '""' "'^ '' ' ""• ^^''''■^' ''' -^ "^^' lit xxii PREFACE " Not so far. It is true that very many countries have not yet adopted so small a bore. Your country, for instance, has between 7| and 8 mm. The United States have adopted one with 6 ; Germany is contemplating the adoption of 5 ; but the 3 mm. gun will probably be the gun of the future, for the increased impetus of the small bore and its advantage in lightness will compel its adoption." " You speak of the increased penetrative power of the bullet. Do you think this will add considerably to the deadliness of rifle-fire ? " " Oh, immensely," said M. Bloch. " As you contract the calibre of the gun you increase the force of its projectile. For instance, a rifle with a calibre of only 65 mm. has 44 per cent, more penetrative power than the shot fired by an 8 mm. rifle. Then, again, in previous wars, if a man could throw himself behind a tree he felt comparatively safe, even although the bullets were hurt- ling all round. To-day the modern bullet will pierce a tree without any difficulty. It also finds no obstacle in earthworks such as would have turned aside the larger bullets. There is therefore less shelter, and not only is there less shelter, but the excessive rapidity with which the missile travels (for it is absurd to call the slender projectile, no thicker than a lead pencil, a ball) will add enormously to the destructive power of the shot. Usually when a bullet struck a man, it found its billet, and generally stopped where it entered; but with the new bullet this will not be the case. At a near range it will pass through successive files of infantry, but what is more serious is that should it strike a bone, it is apt to fly upwards or sideways, rending and tearing everything through which it passes. The moi'aHfr will be much countries have r country, for United States contemplating II probably be mpetus of the vili compel its : power of the lerably to the you contract force of its ilibre of only e power than n, in previous a tree he felt ts were hurt- will pierce a J lO obstacle in de the larger md not only ty with which 1 the slender t)all) will add | hot. Usually s billet, and ^ith the new range it will what is more is apt to fly y everything .'ill be much xxiii PREFACE greater from this source than it has been in the past." " But is this not all very much theory ? Have you an v facts m support of your belief that the -lodern bullet wifl be so much more deadly than its predecessor? In Eng- land quite the opposite impression prevailed, owing to the experience which we gained in Jameson's raid, when many of the combatants were shot through and seemed none the worse, even although the bullet appeared to have traversed a vital part of the body." M. Bloch replied : " I do not know about the Jame- son raid. I do know what happened when the soldiers fired recently upon a crowd of riotous miners. It is true that they fired at short range, not more than thirty to eighty paces. The mob also was not advancing in loose formation, but. like most mobs, was densely packed. Only ten shots were fired, but these ten shots killed outright seven of the men and wounded twenty-five of whom six afterwards died. Others who were slightly wounded concealed their injuries, fearing prosecution. Each shot, therefore, it is fair to estimate, must have hit at least four persons. But ignoring those unreported cases, there were thirty-two persons struck by bullets Of these, thirteen died, a proportion of nearly 40 per cent which IS at least double the average mortality of persons hit by nfle-bullets in previous wars. It has also been proved by experiments made by firing shots into carcases and corpses, that when the bullet strikes a bone it acts vntually as an explosive bullet, as the point expands and issues m a kind of mushroom shape. Altogether I take a very serious view of the sufferings," continued M. Bloch, and of the mjury that will be inflicted by the new weapons." XXIV PREFACE if " Is the improvement in the cieadh"ness of weapons con- fined to small-arms ? Does it equally extend to artillery firing ? " ^ "There," said M. Bloch, "you touch upon a abject which I have dealt with at much length in my book. The fact is that if the rifle has improved, artillery has much more improved. Even before the quick-firing gun was intro- duced into the field batteries an enormous improvement had been made. So, indeed, you can form some estimate of the evolution of the cannon when I say that the French artillery to-day is held by competent authorities to be at least one hundred and sixteen times more deadly than the batteries which went into action in 1870." " How can that be ? " I asked. " They do not fire one hundred and sixteen times as fast, I presume ? " " No ; the increased improvement has been obtained in many ways. By the use of range-finders it is possible now to avoid much firing into space which formerly pre- vailed. An instrument weighing about 60 lb. will in three minutes give the range of any distance up to four miles, and even more rapid range-finders are being constructed. Then, remember, higher explosives are used ; the range has been increased, and even before quick-firing guns were introduced it was possible to fire two and a half times as fast as they did previously. The effect of artillery-fire to-day IS at least five times as deadly as it was, and being two or three times as fast, you may reckon that a battery of artillery is from twelve to fifteen times as potent an instrument of destruction as it was thirty years ago. Even in 1870 the German artillerists held that one battery was able absolutely to annihilate any force advancing along a line of fire estimated at fifteen paces in breadth for a distance of over four miles. i weapons con- J to artillery on a jbject r book. The IS much more 1 was intro- improvement 5me estimate t the French ties to be at dly than the not fire one • en obtained t is possible )rmerly pre- will in three ' four miles, :onstructed. ; the range g guns were alf times as irtillery-fire , and being It a battery potent an igo. Even )attery was ing along a r a distance PREFACE XXV -If that was so then, you can imagine how much more deadly it is now, when the range is increased and the explosive power of the shell has been enormously developed. It is estimated that if a body of 10,000 men, advancing to the attack, had to traverse a distance of a mile and a half under the fire of a single battery, they would be exposed to 1450 rounds before they crossed the I zone of fire, and the bursting of the shells fired by that m battery would scatter 275,000 bullets in fragments over he mile and a half across which they would have to march In i8;o an ordinary shell when it burst broke into from n.neteen to thirty pieces. To-day it bursts into 240. Shrapnel fire in 1870 only scattered thirty-seven death- deding missiles. Now it scatters 340. A bomb weighing about 70 lb. thirty years ago would have burst into forty! two fragments. To-day, when it is charged with peroxi- lene, it breaks up into 1200 pieces, each of which is hurled with much greater velocity than the larger lumps which were scattered by a gunpowder explosion. It is estimated that such a bomb would eff-ectively destroy all life within a range of 200 metres of the point of explosion. The artillery also benefits by the smokeless powder dlaZck^" '" "" "^"^ ^"^^''^^' '' '^ '^^' -^^-'^ ^- " What drawbacks ? " '•The fact that the artillerymen can be much more easily picked off) when they are serving their guns, by sharp-shooters than was possible when they were enve oped in a cloud of smoke of their own creation. It IS calcu .ted that one hundred sharp-shooters, who would be quit^ invisible at a range of five hundred yards, would put a battery out of action in four minutes if they could get within range of one thousand yards. At a mile's XXVI PREFACE range it might take one hundred men half an hour's shoot- ing to put a battery out of action. The most effective range for the sharp-shooter is about eight hundred paces. At this range, while concealed behind a bush or improvised earthwork, a good shot could pick off the men of any battery, or the officers, who could not avail themselves of the cover to which their men resort." " How will your modern battle begin, M. Bloch ? " " Probably with attempts on outposts made by sharp- shooters to feel and get into touch with each other. Cavalry will not be of much use fo. that purpose. A mounted man offers too good a mark to a si.arp-shooter. Then when the outposts have felt each other sufficiently to give the opposing armies knowledge of the whereabouts of their antagonists, the artillery duel will commence at a range of from four to five miles. As long as the artillery is in action it will be quite sufficient to render the nearer approach of the opposing forces impossible. If they are evenly matched, they will mutually destroy each other, after inflicting immense losses before they are put out of action. Then the turn of the rifle will come. But the power of rifle-fire is so great that it will be absolutely impossible for the combatants to get to close quarters with each other. As for any advance in force, even in the loosest of formations, on a front that is swept by the enemies' fire, that is absolutely out of the question. Flank movements may be attempted, but the increased power which a magazine rifle gives to the defence will render it impossible for such movements to have the success that they formerly had. A small company can hold its own against a superior attacking force long enough to permit of the bringing up of reinforcements. To attack any position successfully, it is estimated that the attack- bour's shoot- ost effective idred paces. ■ improvised men of any lemselves of bch ? " e by sharp- each other, urpose. A trp-shooter. sufficiently ■hereabouts mence at a hf artillery the nearer If they are ;ach other, put out of . But the absolutely e quarters e, even in ept by the n. Flank ied power ill render e success 1 hold its nough to To attack le attack- PREFACE xxvii ing force ought to outnumber the assailants at least by 8 to I. It is calculated that loo men in a trench would be able to put out of action 3^6 out of 400 who attacked them, while they were crossing a fire-zone only 300 yards wide." " What do you mean by a fire-zone ? " *• A fire-zone is the space which is swept by the fire of the men in the trench." "But you assume that they are entrenched. M Bloch ? " " Certainly, everybody will be entrenched in the next war. It will be a great war of entrenchments. The spade will be as indispensable to a soldier as his rifle. The first thing every man will have to do, if he cares for his life at all, will be to dig a hole in the ground, and throw up as strong an earthen rampart as he can to shield him from the hail of bullets which will fill the air." "Then," I said, "every battlefield will more or less come to be like Sebastopol, and t:.e front of each army can only be approached by a series of trenches and parallels? " " Well, that, perhaps, is putting it too strongly," said M. Bloch, " but you have grasped the essential principle, and that is one reason why it will be impossible for the battle of the future to be fought out rapidly. All digging work is slow work, and when you must dig a trench before you can make any advance, your progress is neces- sarily slow. Battles will last for days, and at the end it is very doubtful whether any decisive victory can be gained." "Always supposing," I said, "that the ammunition does not give out." " Ammunition will not give out. Of powder and shot there is always plenty.** t I, ^ r xxviii PREFACE " I doubt that," I replied. ■• The weak point of all (his arg,m,ent as to the impossibility of war implies that the n event "'"™'"" "' ^"' "'^'^'' '^ ""'•"= ^"ffi-i™' 'o p event armies coming into close contact, also possesses quahties of permanence, or rather of inexhaustibility. What seems much more probable is that with the excessive rap.dity of fire armies will empty their magazines, and the army that fires its last cartridge first wiTl be at the merey of the other. Then the old veteran Dragomirofl wdl rejo,ce, for the bayonet will onee more come into M. Bloch shook his head. " I do not think that armies will run short of ammuni- .on All my arguments are based upon the assumption hat the modern war is to be fought with modern .rms 1 do not take into account the possibility that there will be^a reversion to the primitive weapons of an earlier " Well, supposing that you are right, and that ammu- nition does not run short, what will happen ?" " I have quoted in my book," said M. Bloch, " the best description that I have ever seen of what uiay be expected on a modern battlefield. I will read it to you, for it seems to convey, more vividly than anything that I could say, just what we may expect :— "The distance is 6000 metres from the enemy. The artillery is in position, and the command has been passed along the batteries to 'give fire.' The enemy's artillery replies. Shells tear up the soil and burst ; in a short time the crew of every gun has ascertained the distance of the enemy. Then every projectile discharged bursts in the air over the heads of the enemy, raining down hundreds ■^ . oint of all this plies that the : sufficient to Iso possesses tibility. What the excessive agazines, and ill be at the Dragomiroft 'e come into : of ammuni- j assumption lodern /irms. at there will )f an earlier that ammu- h, " the best be expected for it seems I could say, lemy. The been passed y^'s artillery I short time ance of the rsts in the 1 hundreds PREFACE ,,j, [of fragments and bullets on his position. Men and horses I are overwhelmed by this rain of lead and iron. Guns ^destroy one another, batteries are mutually annihilated . ammunition cases are emptied. Success will be with' those whose fire does not slacken. In the. midst of this [hre the battalions will advance. "Now they are but 2000 metres away. Already the J nHc-buIlets whistle round and kill, each not only finding ja victim but penetrating files, ricocheting, and strikin^^ again. Volley succeeds volley, bullets in great handfuls constant as hail and swift as lightning, deluge the field of [battle. "The artillery having silenced the enemy is now free to deal with the enemy's battalions. On his infantry however loosely it may be formed, the guns direct thick iron ram, and soon in the position of the enemy the earth (is reddened with blood. "The firing lines will advance one after the other battalions will march after battalions; finally the reserves will follow Yet with all this movement in the two armies here will be a belt a thousand paces wide, separating them as by neutral territory, swept by the fire of both sides, a belt which no living being can stand for a moment The ammunition will be almost exhausted, millions oi cartridges, thousands of shells will cover the soil But the fire will continue until the empty ammunition' cases ■are replaced with full. " Melinite bombs will turn to dust farmhouses, villages md hamlets, destroying everything that might be used as' cover, obstacle, or refuge. "The moment will approach when half the combatants fv.ll be mowed down, dead and wounded will lie in parallel ^o^s, separated one from the other by that belt of a I I'' ^''^ PKKKACE thousand paces which will be swept by a cross fire of] shells which no hving being can pass. ^ " The battle will continue with ferocity. But still that thousand paces unchangingly separate the foes. " Who shall have gained the victory ? Neither " This picture serves to illustrate a thought whic'h, since the perfection of weapons, has occupied the minds of all thinking people. What will take place in a future war^ Such are constrained to admit that between the combatants will always be an impassable zone of fire deadly in an equal degree to both the foes. "With such conditions, in its application to the battles of the future the saying of Nrpoleon seems very question- able: 'The fate of battle is the result of one minute, of one thought, the enemies approach with different plans the battle becomes furious ; the decisive moment arrives' and a happy thought sudden as lightning decides the con- test, the most insignificant reserve sometimes being the instrument of a splendid victory.' '' It is much more probable that in the future both sides ' Will claim the victory." " Pleasant pictures, certainly ; and if that authority is right, you are indeed justified in believing that there will be no decisive battles in the war of the future." ^^ " There will be no war in the future," said M. Rloch • lor it has become impossible, now that it is clear that war means suicide." "But is not everything that you are saying an assump- t on that people will make war, and that therefore war Itself w possible?" '•No doubt," said M. Bloch ; " the nations may endeavoi.r to prove that I am wrong, but you will see what will y a cross fire of '. But still that : foes. Neither, ight which, since the minds of nil n a future war ? 1 the combatants re deadly in an to the battles of very question- one minute, of different plans, noment arrives, ecides the con- mes being the ture both sides at authority is that there will re." laid M. Rloch; t is clear tliat ig an assunip- therefore war lay endeavour ee what will PRKFACE xxxi .appen. Nothing will be demonstra... by the next war if U .s made, .n sp.te ot warnings, but the impossibility of .a .ng war, except, of course, for the purpose of sdf! lesrrucfon. I do n- >t for a moment deny that it is pus - ;le for nat.ons to p' ,„,e themselves and their neigh bous to a fngluful ser.cs of catastrophes which would p'roba y esut m the overturn of all civilised and ordered gov^n. nent. J hat ,s of course, possible ; but when we say that 'ar .s .mposs.bIewe mean that it is impossible or le ern State to carry on war under the modern cond'ion Uh any prospect of being able to carry that war to. he battlefield No decisive war is possible. Neither is ny war poss^Ie, as I proceed to show, that will no enM ' ^en upon the victorious Power, the destruction of ha would perhaps, be a more accurate way of statins le thesis of my book." vv y oi statu)g ^^,'JI jmderstand; but do you think you have proved "Certainly," said M. Bloch. "So far I have onlv poken about the improven.nts that have beenTroug u a tne greater efficiency of artillery. Taken hv th^m lo wfiether or nol we have not reached a stage when ie n,echan.sm of slaughter has been so perfectfdis ,o ::^»L™er are'"'!^ ''''''""' ■■™P-i"e;tut the coMte„,plat,„g war as a practical possibHity." ^ 1 o what are you referring ? " 1 asked. 1 1 xxxii PREFACE "Chiefly to the immensity of the modern army. The war of 1870-71 was a contest of giants, but the German armies operating in France did not exceed half a million men, whereas if war were to break out to-day, the German. would concentrate over a million men on their front, while the French would be no whit behind them in the energy with which they would concentrate all their availahk fighting men on the frontier. In a war between the Triple and the Dual Alliance there would be ten millions of men under arms." " How would you make up the total of ten million, which you say would be mobilised in case of a war between the Dual and Triple Alliance ? " " The figures in millions are briefly : Germany 1 2,500,000; Austria i 3-ioths millions; Italy, i 3-roths millions, making total of 5,100,000 for the Triple Alliance. France would mobilise 2' millions, and Russia 2,800,000, making 5,300,000—10400,000. It has yet to be proved that the human brain is capable of directing the movements and providing for the sustenance of such immense masses of human beings. The unwieldiness of the modern army has never been adequately taken into account. Remember that those millions will not be com- ■ posed of veterans accustomed to act together. More than 1 half of the German and French troops which will be con- I fronting each other on mobilisation in case of war will h drawn from the reserves. In Russia the proportion of reserves would be only three hundred and sixty, in Italy two hundred and sixty, per thousand; but even this pro- portion IS quite sufficient to indicate how large a mass of men, comparatively untrained, would find their place in the fighting front." " But have not great generals in the past commanded lern army. The but the German ed half a million iay, the Germans their front, while n in the energy their available tween the Triple millions of men of ten millions ►f a war between fly : Germany, ftaly, I 3-ioths for the Triple HIS, and Russia It has yet to of directing the ■nance of such Linwieldiness of tely taken into ill not be com- er. More than :h will be con- of war will h" proportion of sixty, in Italy even this pro- irge a mass of their place in 3t commanded PREFACE xxxiii irmies of millions ?— Xerxes, for nistance, and Tamerlane ^,nd Attila at the head of his Huns ? " ' 'No doubt," said M. Bloch, "that is quite true; but it one thing to direct a horde of men living in the simplest fashion, marching shoulder to shoulder in great masses Ind It is an altogether dif?^rent thing to manceuvr- and fupply the enormously complex machine which we call a podern army. Remember, too, that in the old days men Jought m masses, whereas the very essence of modern war IS that you must advance in loose order and never |ave too big a clump of soldiers for your enemy to fire at *Ience the battle will be spread over an enormous front ,nd every mile over which you spread your men increases |he diftculties of supply, of mutual co-operation, and of tombmed effort." "But has not the training of officers kept pace with the extension and development of modern armaments ? " ''Yes," said M. Bloch, "and no. It is true, no doubt, that an effort has been made to bring up the technical Iraining of officers to the necessary standard ; but this is ^uue impossible in all cases. A very large proportion of Ihe officers who will be in command in a general mobilisa- tion would be called from the reserve, that is to say, they ^ould be men who are not familiar with the latest develop- lents of modern tactics, and whowould find themselves sud- lenly called upon to deal with conditions of warfare that ^ere almost as different from those with which they were •ained to deal as the legionaries of C^sar would have .een If they had been suddenly summoned to face the msketeers of Frederic the Great." " Is that not an exaggeration, M Bloch ? Do you think at the art of war has changed so much ? " " Changed ? " said M. Blnrh • " ,> k.. u , . ., „„^ uwcii 3u morougijly c I xxxiv PREFACE revolutionised in the last thirty years, that if I had a son who was preparing for a military career, , wonid n^t i. him ,ead a bool< on tactics or strategy that had not J. written i„ the last fifteen years, and'even tht Two" I. is stf:r'' '"'"f " "="' ''''" P"'- -"™ 'hat plri ' It s s.mply appalhng to contemplate the spectacle of m.inonsofmen,halfof whom have been hurriedly un whole placed under command of officers not one in a hundred of whom has ever been under fire, and half o whom have been trained in a more or lesL antiquated scl^ol of tacfcs. But even then that is not thelorst What we have to recognise is the certainty that even if al officers were most efficient when the war began, the wa would not last many weeks before the majority ofl. Officers had been killed off." " But why ? " I said. "The percentage of officers killed and wounded in act.on was much greater even in 1870 than the proportion of pnvates killed and wounded. The Germans ■nstance, lost two officers killed and three wound;d to each private who was similarly disabled. But that was before the unproved weapon came into play. In the Ch.han war the proportion of officers killed was 2. per cent, and 75 per cent, wounded, whereas among the nien only 13 per cent, were killed and 60 per cent, wounded." 10 what do you attribute this?" 1 aslied "The cause is very simple. The officers are compelled o expose themselves much more than the men under thetr orders. They have to be up and about and n.oving while the men are lying in the shelter of the trenches Th,s .s so well recognised that every Continental army pays special attention to the training of sharp-shooters. »l if I had a son [ would not let t had not been then he would lin that period, e spectacle of hurriedly suni- i mine, and the not one in a re, and half of ^ss antiquated not the worst, that even if all )egan, the war ajority of t!ie wounded in he proportion jermans, for wounded to But that was lay. In the was 23 per ong the men wounded." re compelled men under and moving, le trenches, lental army rp-shooters, PREFACE whose word of command is that they should never waste a shot upon any one but an officer. Hence the general conviction on the part of the officers abroad that if the I great war broke out they would never survive to see the ^conclusion of peace." " When I was in Paris, M. Bloch, that conviction did not seem to be very general on the part of the French officers." "It is different in Germany," said M. Bloch, "and in Austria-Hungary, and the French would not be long in finding it out. Again and again officers have said to me that while they would of course do their duty if they were ordered to the front, they would take their place at the head of their men knowing that they would never return. So general is this conviction that you will find very little trace of any war party among the officers in Germany. They know too well what war would mean to them. But I am not thinking so much of the fate of the individuals as the result which will inevitably follow when this massed million of men found themselves deprived of their commanders. "An army is a very highly specialised organisa- tion. Without competent officers, accustomed to com- jmand, it degenerates into a mere mob, and of all things in the worid nothing is so helpless as a mob. It can neither march, fight, manoeuvre, nor feed itself. An army without leaders is not only a mob, but it is apt to •degenerate into a very cowardly mob. Remember that :very man ,s not naturally brave. It was said long ago hat a very good fighting army consisted of three sorts of soldiers ; only one-third of the men in the ranks were laturally brave, another third were naturally cowards ^hile the last third was capable of being brave under i) I- xxxvi PREFACE circumstances when it was well led and kept up to its work. Take away the officers, and this middle third naturally gravitate to the cowardly contingent, with results which have been seen on many a stricken field Hence, under modern conditions of warfare every army will tend mevitably to degenerate into such a mob. It is for those practical military men who persist in regard- ing war as a possibility to explain how they hope to overcome the difficulty created by the very magnitude and unwieldiness of the machine which they have created." ^ " But do not you think, M. Bloch, that if the nations discover that their armies are too big to be used, they will only fight ^vith such manageable armies as they can bring to the front, manoeuvre, feed, and supply with the munitions of war ? " M. Bloch shook his head. "The whoie drift and tendency of modern tactics," he said, " is to bring up the maximum number of men to the front in the snortest possible loss of time and to hurl them in the largest possible numbers upon the enemy's position. It is abso- | lutely necessary, if you take the offensive, to have a I superior force. It is from a military point of view an ^ impossibility to attack a superior force with an inferior" and the eff^ect of the improvement in modern weapons has been to still further enhance the necessity for superiority of force in attacking. There will, therefore, be no question of fighting with small armies. The largest possible force will be brought to the front, and this effort will inevitably result in the breakdown of the whole machine. "You must have the maximum ready to hand at the beginning. Remember the fighting force of an army I kept up to its middle third Hingent, with stricken field, •e every army a mob. It is ist in regard- they hope to ry magnitude 1 they have r the nations )e used, they 5 as they can iply with the i/e drift and bring up the the snortest 1 the largest It is abso- , to have a of view an an inferior, *veapons has • superiority ore, be no rhe largest d this effort the whole o hand at of an army XXX vii I PREFACE weakens with every mile that it advances from its base Napoleon entered Russia with 400,000 men ; but although he had only fought one battle, he had only 130,000 men with him when he entered Moscow. The Germans, when tliey were m France, employed one-sixth of their infantrv in covering their communications and defending their rear. This proportion is likely to be much increased in future wars. The opportunity for harassing the line of communications in the rear of an invading army has been enormously multipHed by the invention of smokeless powder. The franc tireur in the Franco-German war took his hfe in his hand, for the range of his gun was not .ery great in the first place, and in the second his where- abouts was promptly detected by the puff of smoke which showed his hiding-place. Now the whole line of com- munications will be exposed to dropping shots from marks- men who, from the security of thicket or hedge, will deal out sudden death without any tell-tale smoke to guide thj^ exasperated and harassed enemy to the hiding- "I have now dealt," said M. Bloch, " with the difficulties m the way of modern war, arising first from the immense improvement tha^ has been wrought in the mechanism of slaughter, and secondly with the unmanageability of the immense masses of men who will be mobilised at the out- break of war. Let us now proceed to the third, and what o my mind constitutes far the most serious obstacle in the way of modern war-viz., the economic impossibility of waging war upon the scale on which it must be waged if It IS waged at all. ® "The first thing to be borne in mind is that the next war will be a long war. It was the declared opmion of Moltke that the altered rnn^.f^ns o^ ,..-^-- 1 xxxviii PREFACE rendered ,t .mpossible to hope that any decisive result could be arrived at before two years at the least. Ihe Franco-German war lasted seven months, but there 13 no hope of any similar war being terminated so rapidly Of course this is assuming that war is to be terminated by fightmg. In reality the war of the future, if ever it famlne^'^'^' "^'^ """' ^^ ^^^''"^' '' '^^" ^^ terminated by " Why should wars be so excessively prolonged ? " "Because all wars will of necessity partake of the character of siege operations. When we invaded Turkey in 1877 we were detained for months behind the impro- vised earthworks of Plevna. If war were to break out in iLurope to-day, each combatant would find itself con- ronted, not by an isolated and improvised Plevna but by carefully prepared and elaborately fortified networks of Plevnas. It is so on all frontiers. The system of defence has been elaborated with infinite skill and abso- lute disregard of financial considerations. Whether it will be a German army endeavouring to make its way into Moscow and St. Petersburg, or a Russian army striking at Berlin or at Vienna, or a German army invading trance-in every case the invading army would find itself confronted by lines upon lines of fortresses and fortified camps, behind which would stand arrayed forces equal or superior in number to those which it could bring into the field against them. These fortresses would have to be taken or masked. nHr^T/'J'/"^'"^"'"^ '^^' ^° ''^' ' "^^d^'-" fortress adequately defended, even by superior forces, is an opera- tion which cannot be put through in less than one hundred and twenty days-that is, supposing that everything goes well with the assailants. Any reverse or any interrupt. of tl: perio have becor army eartlr fire u sharp even retard is ind( there ; drive I pletel_y war. and e base w opponc war of the res "Bu objected "Yei of the would capable majority gravitat capable tions as paigns I either cc should b PREFACE xxxlx of the siege operations would, of course, prolong this penod. But it is not merely that each fortress would have to be reduced, but every field would more or less become an improvised fortified camp. Even when an army was defeated it would retreat slowly, throwing up earthworks, behind which it would ma-ntain a harassing fire upon its pursuers; and the long line of invisible sharp-shooters, whose presence would not be revealed even by the tell-tale puff of smoke, would inevitably retard any rapid advance on the part of the victors. It IS mdeed maintained by many competent authorities that there is no prospect of the victorious army being able to drive the defeated forces from the field of battle so com- pletely as to estr ',lish itself in possession of the spoils of war. The advaiuage is always with the defending force and every mile that the assailants advance from thei; base would increase their difficulties and strengthen their opponents. Long and harassing siege operations in a war of blockade would wear out the patience and exhaust the resources of armies." objefted ^™'^^ ^^""^ ''''°'^ ^°"^ ''^^^' ^^^^'^ "°^'" ^ '' Yes " said M^Bloch, "in the past; but we are talking of the future. Do not forget that the wear and tear would be terrible, and the modern man is much less capable of bearing it than were his ancestors. The majority of the population tends more and more to gravitate to cities, and the city dweller is by no means so capable of lying out at nights in damp and exposed posi- tions as the peasant. Even in comparatively rapid cam- paigns sickness and exhaustion slay many more than euher cold steel or rifle-bullets. It is inevitable that this should be the case. In twn «r^^i,o' *.v,^ -r._.. ,. r. , ,r~^«.3 unic axici ine rrencli ■'1 it. xl PREFACE army is mobilised, it is the expectation of the best authori- ties tliat they would have 100,000 men in hospital, even if never a shot had been fired." "That I can well understand. I remember when reading Zola's 'La Debacle' feeling that if the Germans had kept out of the way altogether and had simply made the French march after then, hither and thither, the whole Napoleonic army would have gone to pieces before they ever came within firing distance of their foes." "Yes," said M. Bloch. "The strain of marching is very heavy. Remember that it is not mere marching, but marching under heavy loads. No infantry soldier should carry more than oae-third of his own weight ; but instead of the average burden of the fully accoutred private being 52 lb. it is nearer 80 lb., with m result that the mere carrying of weight probably kiiis more than fall in battle. The proportion of those who die from disease and those who lose their lives as the consequence of wounds received in fighting is usually two or three to one. In the Franco- German war there were four times as many died from sickness and exhaustion as those who lost their lives in battle. In the Russo-Turkish war the proportion was as 16 to 44. In the recent Spanish war in Cuba the propor- tion was still greater. There were ten who died from disease for one who fell in action. The average mortality from sickness tends to increase with the prolongation of the campaign. Men can stand a short campaign, but when it is long it demoralises them, destroys the spirit of self-sacrifice which sustained them at the first in the opening weeks, and produces a thoroughly bad ' spirit which reacts upon their physical health. At present there is some regard paid to humanity, if only by the provision for 3t authori- pital, even )er when Germans id simply d thither, to pieces of their irching is :hing, but er should It instead ate being the mere in battle, nd those received 2 Franco- ied from • lives in n was as i propor- ied from mortality gation of ign, but spirit of t in the id ' spirit :nt there irovision PREFACE xli of ambulancrs and the presence of hospital attendants, nurses, and doctors. But in the war of the future these humanities will go the wall." " What ! " I said, " do you think there will be no care for the wounded ?" " There will be practically no care for the wounded," said M. Bloch, " for it will be impossible to find adequate shelter for the Red Cross hospital tent or for the hospital orderlies. It will be impossible to take wounded men out of the zone of fire without exposing the Red Cross men to certain death. The consequence is they will be left to lie where they fall, and they may lie for days. Happy they will be if they are killed outright. Why, even in the last great war the provision for attendance on the wounded was shamefully inadequate. After Gravelotte there were ("or some time only four doctors to attend to 10,000 wounded men, and the state of things after Sadowa was horrible in the extreme. It is all very well to inveigh against this as inhumanity, but what are you to do when in the opinion of such a distinguished army physician as Dr. Billroth it would be necessary to have as many hos- pital attendants as there are soldiers in the fighting line ? What is much more likely to be done is that the dying and the dead will be utilised as ramparts to strengthen the shelter trenches. This was actually done at the battle of Worth, where Dr. Forth, chief military physician of the Bavarian army, reported that he found in some places in the battlefield veritable ramparts built up of soldiers who had fallen by the side of their comrades, and in order to get them out of the way they had piled them one upon the top of the other, and had taken shelter behind their bodies. Some of these unfortunates built into this terrible rampart were only wounded, but the fl ''^^ PREFACE " What a horrible story I" " Yes," said M. Blocli • " hnf t k«i- .1 "And what may those factors be ?" I asked. endu^rce'o/ ,' '"'''' °' '""^"""^ ^ -P-'^y of "d reverse an'dd"" ""'" ''"™"°"' "^ ^'""^o^ness ucr reverse and disappointment. That element in th» winv p,,,,, ,, ^-,H7;oa"dt:d::.^';rr beTbll toT" °" " '° """ '°"S 'he people at home T the popu'iation lef eh ^7 <> Ulttl ' '°"''' r '°^ wUh What they need to carry" orrdrnpaTnT "" '™"' M''B;rs,;^rh::tTit:e'^.;;-C- th raiSnrs::f-' r ----« onemoLn^whTn :: ZthrXd '°"^'''^' '°' what they are to-dav In T T ^^'"'^ "S" ^'"' .ciegraphs^ steaLVhS. lllZ ntn. f eUtr was more nr l^^o -, u "vcmea, each nation -c./:n.r LTrop?wrsT^^s:;<^r:s -; compartments. Each country sufficed for , "^"'^"^-"Sh' .rew .s own wheat, fattened i ^w^cai ^p^^^ ^^ ror ,ts own needs within its own frontieA. Mthlul PREFACE ;lievcd them war will be igli ting-men ent take far I. capacity of ubbornness tient in the r else, the t the front Then will home will It with the he second the moral )ssible for s in front t?" I at is the ^ling with isider for ago and railways, h nation ed, self- ter-tight n needs, iod itself 1 that is change. . w.th the exception of Russia and Austria th.r. .he frontiers. Y^outZ/7''''"'' '""" "^'""'^ ■lependen. upon :^;!u:z:-:f:/'z' z:'''''''''' on,, one decree worse o. .Han GerlCin ll Tpe^ ^n i«95, if the Germans had been nnnKi« . u ^^^'- wheat e«ep, that whici, was grownln h ^T, ""' they would have lacked bread for on,^ . ^ftherIand, days out of the three hundred and six y Z 1 '"' '™ the interdependence of nations npo„t"h others T - a Ha^f n,c:'tx;;,;rt: re:ef;;t %n prevails hetw^Jntthrnttiori: :^„ T:' ''"'' modities. Hence the firct ,u u ""^^^^ ^°"^- be to deprive t^ Pole'^'t ".Tit' rofln"" '° ™'.'"' of benefiting by the produM. „f f opport.nuty they were fighting " "'' """°"^ ^^ainst whom "That assumes," said M. Bloch "first th.t .u machmerv of sunnlv o„^ j- . m ' ^^ ^"^^ the bv wnr Q ^., distribution remains unaffected :.^r^ras^; Bin"— -' xHv PREFACE \\M other nations arc not so fortunate. It was proposed some t me ago I know, in Germany, that in case of war thry should endeavour to replace the loss of Russian wheat bv 'mf)ort.ng Indian wheat through the Suez Canal-an operafon which in the face of the French and Russian cru.sers might not be very easy of execution. But even supposmg that it was possible to import food, who is to pay for it ? And that is the final crux of the whole question. "But," again I objected, "has the lack of money ever prevented nations going to war ? I remember well when Lord Derby, in 1876, was quite confident that Russia vvould never go to war on behalf of Bulgaria because of the state of th^ Russian finances; but the Russo-Turkish war took place all the same, and there have been many great wars waged by nations which were bankrupt, and victories won by conquerors who had not a coin in their treasury." "You are always appealing to precedents which do not apply. Modern society, which is organised on a credit basis, and modern war, which cannot be waged excepting at a ruinous expenditure, offer no points of analogy compared with those times of which you speak. Have you calculated for one moment what it costs to maintain a soldier as an efficient fighting man in the field of battle ? Ihe estimate of tf.e best authorities is that you cannot feed him and keep him going under ten francs a ^^7'^^;^'^^^ '^""'"^^ ^ "^^y- Supposing that the Triple and Dual Alliance mobilise their armies, we should have at once confronting us an expenditure for the mere mainten- ance of troops under arms of ^4,000,000 a day falling upon the five nations. That is to say, that in one year of war under modern conditions the Powers would spend roposed some - of war they iian wheat by z Canal — an and Russian ti. But even 3d, who is to >f the whole money ever er well when that Russia ia because of isso-Turkish been many inkrupt, and oin in their I'hich do not on a credit ;d excepting of analogy eak. Have to maintain he field of is that you en francs a t the Triple uld have at re mainten- day falling one year of ould spend PREFACE xlv /r, 4^50,000 000 sterling merely in feeding their soldiers wthout reckoning all the other expenses that must be mcurred m the course of the can,paign. This figure is mterestmg as enabling us to compare the cost of modern wars with the cost of previous wars. Take all the wars that have been waged in Europe from the battle of Waterloo down to the end of the Russo-Turkish war and I the total expenditure does not amount to more than ■ i:i,250,ooo,ooo sterling, a colossal burden no doubt, but one which .s nearly ^200,000,000 less than that which would be entailed by the mere victualling of the armies that would be set on foot in the w;.r which we are supposed to be discussing. Could any of the five nations even the richest, stand that strain ? " ;; But could they not borrow and issue paper money ? " "Very well," said M. Bloch, " they would try to do so no doubt but the immediate consequence of war would be to send secunt.es all round down from 25 to so oer cent., and m such a tumbling market it would be dii^cul float loans. Recourse would therefore have to be had to forced loans and uneonvertih' ,aper money. We should be back to the days o ,e a.signats, a temporary e>jped.ent which would aggravate the dif^cultie ^ ^ _ which we have to deal. Prices, for instance, ould go up p. If all food had to be paid for in depreciated currency. But, apart from the question of paying for the necessary could b/' ''/ T'' ^"'''"" ^'^^^^^ -^h supplies could be produced, and if they could be produced [whether they could be distrihiitcJ.'' P'-ociuced, "What do you mean by ' distributed ' ? " I asked Distributed?- said M. Bloch. '< Why, how are you to get the food into the mouths of the people who want it J U f xl VI PREFACE if you had (as you would havr at the beginning of the war) taken over all the railways for military purposes ? Even within the limits of Germany or of Russia theie would be considerable difficulty in securing the transit of food-stuffs in war time, not merely to the camps, but to the great industrial centres. You do not seem to realise the extent to which the world has been changed by the mcdern industrial system. Down to the end of the last century the enormous majority of the population lived in their own fields, grew their own food, and each farm was a Httle granary. It was with individuals as it was with nations, and each homestead was a self-contained, self- providing unit. But nowadays all is changed. You have great industrial centres which produce absolutely nothing which human beings can eat. How much, for instance, do you grow in the metropolitan area for the feeding of London ? Everything has to be brought by rail or by water to your markets. So it is more or less all over the Continent, especially in Germany and France. Now it so happens (and in this I am touching upon the political side of the question) that those districts which produce least food yield more Socialists to the acre than any other part of the country. It is those districts, rife with all elements of political discontent, which would be the first to feel the pinch of high prices and of lack of food. But this is a matter on which we will speak later on." "But do you think," I said, "that the railways would be so monopolised by the military authorities that they could not distribute provisions throughout the country ? " " No," said M. Bloch. " It is not merely that they would be monopolised by their military authorities, but that they would be disorganised by the mobilisation oi troops. You forget that the whole machinery of distribu- PREFACE xlvii tion and of production would be thrown out of gear bv mobilisation ; and this brings me to the second point upon which I insist-viz, the impossibility of producing the food. At the present moment Germany, for instance just manages to produce sufficient food to feed her own population, with the aid of imports from abroad for which she is able to pay by the proceeds of her 'own industry. But in the case of war with Russia she would not be able to buy two and a half months' supply of wheat from Russia, and therefore would have to pay much more for a similar supply of food in the neutral markets, providing she could obtain it. But she would have to buy much more than two and a half months' from Russia, because the nine months' corn which she pro- duces at present is the product of the whole labour of all her able-bodied agricultural population; and how thev work you in England do not quite realise. Do you know for mstance, that after the ' BUsstag,' or day of penitence and prayer, at the beginning of what we call the farmers- year or summer season, the whole German agricultural population in some districts work unremittingly fifteen hoius a day seven days a week, without any cessation, without Sundays or holidays, until the harvest is gathered jin ; and even with all that unremitting toil they arc only able to produce nine months' supply of grain. When you have mobilised the whole German army, you will diminish at least by halt the strong hands ava-lable for labour hn the field. In Russia we should not, of course, be in any such difficulty, and in the scrupulous observance of Sunday we have a reserve which would enable us to j recoup ourselves for the loss of agricultural labour. We should lose, for instance, .7 per cent, of onr peasants; I but .f those who were left worked on Sunday, in addition I xlviii PREFACE to weekdays, we should just be able to mate up for the loss of the men who were taken to war. Germany h no such reserves, nor France ; and hence it is that, speak ng as a pohtical economist, I feel extremely dou tfu a. France to feed the.r own population, to say nothing o XZ, r'""'" """^ '"^ whoJ^achi f agncultural production had been broken up by the moM,sat>on e» masse of the whole population" But has this point never been considered by the sovereigns and statesmen of Europe ?" I inquired. You know," replied M. Bloch, " how it is with hun,-,„ death ? It ,s one of the things inevitable which no one can alter by taking thought. So it is with this questio .1 Z tr". "'""'='' " ""^™''^'"^' '"^ ^"^^ ^ Wstorv do I "r""""'"- °"'^ °"« '■> --"cnt European Government gravely to calculate the economic consequences of war under modern conditions. It T when M^ Burdeau was in the French Ministry T appointed a committee of economists for the purpose of ascerta,„,ng how the social organism would confnue to function ,n a time of war, how from day to day their 'Ztlt' ^ T" 'T' ^-^ P°P"'a.ion.'"'L.' sooner had he begun his investigation than a strong objecon was ra.sed by the military authorities, and 2 suspended"" He"" ""'"" '"^ '""'"''' ^^ '"^^«""^ suspended. Hence we are going forward blindfold pre- panng all the while for a war without recognising ,h fet that the very fundamental lirst condition of being ablet wage ,t does not exist. You might as well prepare for naval war without being sure that you have a sea i, ake up for the Germany has is that, speak- ly doubtful as " Germany or ay nothing of e machine of I up by tlie n." iered by the |uired. 3 with human e to think of ^hich no one his question. e riders shut ;e in recent le part of a he economic >ns. It was nistry. He purpose of continue to day their 'n. But no n a strong es, and out indefinitely | idfold, pre- I ing the fact | :ing able to spare for a ' a sea in PREFACE ,,i, wh,ch your ships can float as to continue to n.ake pre- parattons for a land war unless you have secure' .^ advance the means by which your population shall Ive Every great State would in thne of war he in the posi on sieges ts he factor which will decide the modern war Your soldters may fight as they please; the ul.iJa.e decision is m the liands oi /amine." "Well it is an old saying that 'armies always march upon their bellies,' " said I. " « Hunger is more terrible han .on, and the wan. of food destroys morearmi™ g^d tldi;:..'' "''"" "' '"' ''-' '^^P"'-' -'=-" "oids mucf"„fl''"'"™'"'f "• ^'"*' "' """«>' -P«='l""g ^o IS behmd the armies, which far outnumbers the armies and which IS apt tn . ,rol the policy of which the armies are but theexecu . i ::«trument. How long do you think the populations of Paris or of Berlin or of the great ma^uflt turing districts in Germany would stand the doubZg "? the price of their food, accompanied, as it would be by a great stagnation of industry and all the feverish uneer! tamty and excitement of war ? " What is the one characteristic of modern Europe ' Is ■t not the growth of nervousness and a lack of phlegmatc rorrkr,;;'"''^'''''"'^' ^-hemodemEuropeln : more keenly and ,s much more excitable and imnres s.onable than his forefathers. Upon this highly excTtaWe' sensitive population you are going to inflict the mise ^ o^ liunger and all the horrors of war. At the .^m^ wii. enormously increase their t.^es.td'aVtrsa'rtf:: also you «,1| expose your governing and directing ct.ss"s to more than decimation at the hands of ,h. .,.„T.. '^' >' ^ '!i'i « 1 PREFACE shooters. How long do you think your social fabric will ren.a.n stable under such circumstances ? Be e« " he „ore the ultimate political and social conseque.^es o^ winTtt™ T "! "'""^ -nt-Plated, the n.ore dearly . r^ '"' "'" 'f "■'■" '^ P"^^""^ "is only possible as r sa.d before, at the price of suicide " ' "From which, therefore, it .ollows, in your opinion M Bioch that the Peace Conference has not so much to' d.scuss the question of peace as to inquireinto whether not war is possible ? " -i " wnetner or "A committee of experts, chosen from the ablest repre- sentatives of the Powers sent fn n,. u .. ;/^P'* Bloch " »,n„u 1, ! Hague," replied M. Uloch, would have very little difficulty in coming to a book Th ■""""' '"'^""'^'^ ' "^-J-' -' f-'h^nn,; book. Those experts might be soldiers and political econom ,3, or the inquiry might be divided into two hd spec al s r T'""°" ''''''''" '" '"■*'-™' -""""«s specahsts. I am qu.te sure that, as the result of such a d,spass,ona,e international investigation into the aUered condmonsof the problem, they could only arrte a ton settle the,r d.sputes by appealing to the arbitrament of war has gone by : hrst, because from that tribunal no defid dec,s.on can speedily be secured ; and secondly, the co of^the process are ruinous to both the suitors " It .s rather a happy idea, that of yours, M. Bloch " said I, " that of the last Court of ADDe»l „f n=, k • hrni,o„ J u . "u" oi .fippeai ot nations havins broken down by the elaboration of its own procedure thf excessive costliness of the trial, and, what is much mo senous than anything else, the impos.sibility of securiT!' war ,s that ,t has been a tribunal capable of giving un- mtstakably a decision from which there was no Appeal." PREFACE li "Whereas, according to my contention," said M. Bloch war has become a tribunal which by the very perfectio.i' of Its own processes and the costhness of its methods can no longer render a decision of any kind. It may ruin Toitp:::" '" ''' '''''-' '' '^'^^ - '^ ^^'^'^^-^y down'' "i''"''h''' "'""''' ^'"•'^ "' ^PP^^^ '^^-'"^ b-ken down, I said, " It IS necessary to constitute another whose proceedings would not be absolutely inconsistent' with economic necessity or with the urgent need for prompt and definite decision. But if this be admitted what immense world-wide consequences would flow from' such a decision." " Yes," said M. Bloch, " the nations would no longer go on wasting ^250,000,000 sterling every year in preparing to wage a war which can only be waged at the nricf of suicide, that is to say, which cannot be waged at all for no nation willingly commits suicide. Then we may hope for some active effort to be made in the direction of amehorating the condition of the people. The fund liberated from the war-chest of the world could work marvels if it were utilised in the education of the people At present, as you will see from the tables which I have compiled in my book, the proportion of money spent on education compared with that spent on war is very small In Russia, for instance, we have an immense deal to do in that direction. In some provinces no fewer than 90 per cent of the recruits are illiterate. In fact, as vou will see from what I have written, I have been as much at- tracted to this subject from the desire to improve the con- dition of the people as from any other source. Hence my book took in part the shape of an investigation of the moral, social, and material conditions in which the mas..« & i-r i' lii PREFACE pL ure and T "" "''' "''^ '''™^- " '^ ^ P^^'f"' hearts of all those who have followed the results of my .nves„gat,o„. The condition of the mass of the people in thTsThrr"''^ "' ""* '° "^ ''"■-^' ""' «p--"y th,s the case .n n,y own country, where the resources of av,l sa .on have hardly been drawn upon for the improve ment of the condition of the peasants " was^e,;*"' "tr"' ' ""'"' ' ^"'"^^ f™"' y" 'hat Russia was better able to support a war than more highly organised nations." '"S'"y " You are quite right," said M. Bloch. " It is true that Russia can perhaps better than all other countries con .emplate the dingers or impossibilities of moder" w"- but that IS precisely because she is not so highly organTsed and so advanced or developed in civilisation'as her^^e gh- bours. Russia is the only country in Europe which oro duces sufficient food for her own pfop.e. She il n o7y able to produce enough grain to feed her own people bu^ she exports at present four millions of tons every yea A war which stopped the export trade would simply place y immense mass of food at the disposal of our own people, who would be more in danger of suffering from a atl?ht'°°'^" f™"— 'y- But nevefthrss although this ,s the case, the very backwardness of Russia renders ,t more important that she should avoid exposing her nascent civilisation to the tremendous strain of a greaf war. p,,«„^,^ ^^ „,^y ^^ invulnerable, but if, when having beaten back our invaders, we were to endeaUurn ourselves confronted by the same difficulties which make Weither ,s there any conceivable territorial or political t is a painful to touch the esults of my the people in especially is resources of the improve- that Russia nore highly is true that intries, con- lodern war; y organised J her neigh- which pro- is not only people, but every year, imply place f our own ing from a vertheless, of Russia I exposing of a great if, when ieavour in lould find lich make n possible. " political PREFACE liji result attainable by force of arms here or in Asia which would be any adequate compensation for the sacHfi es which even a victorious war would entail " "^"'^'^^^^ "All this may be true, but nations do not always count the cost before going to war." ^' " No," said M. Bloch • " if tT.«., ^-j ., seldom go to war Tak. I ^ ' ""^ "'""'^ ^^^ .■.e United ^tZor I^LT ZTv' 'T ""' "^'' '" 1 ^- • ^J'lenca. Accordmg to some calm- thpm i„c,.„j r .,.'' ^^^i ^■"' emancipated them. Instead of tak.ng tha. method of solving a daLer- ous and deltcate problem, they appealed to !he sword w..h the result that it is estimated that the war occasro„ed he country losses of one kind and another amoun'^g to wenty-five „„liards of francs, or^,,ooo,ooo,ooo t "Lg at /'2 Ja i H "°"\ °' e-nancipation thus ciphered out at^, 200 a head per slave instead of ^200 per head at which the bargain could easily have been arra!,ged The economtc condition of our peasants in many of our pro vmces,' contmued M. Bloch, "is heartrending The^ ■gnorance, their innocence, their simplicity, render them succeeded in establishing a ver-'table c=v=f^«, f ^ labour." ver.iaDie system of slave "How could that be?" I asked. "The serfs were emancipated in i86i.» sens were "Yes^" said M. Bloch, "they were emancipated, but PevtoTheTrr ^''°"' ^'"^^^'"^^ '^'^ them an 'easy A peasant, for mstance, has to pay his taxes, say in winter fme, and the Kulak will advance the t^J'Z:::Z liv PREFACE roubles whjch he may have to pay in return for what is called h.s 'summer labour.' The price of labour in Kussia in summer is twice or thrice as much as it is in wmter. The Kulak buys the summer labour at the winter rates, and then having purchased in advance the summer labour of the unfortunate peasant, he collects his chattels in droves and farms them out wherever he can dispose of them. It is veritable slavery. But even this is less terri- ble than that which can be witnessed in some provinces where parents sell their children to speculators, who buy them up and send them to St. Petersburg and Moscow as c lives are sent to market, where they are sold out for a term of years as apprentices to those who have no scruples against securing cheap labour on those terms. •' No one who has seen anything of the squalor and wretchedness, the struggle with fever and famine, in the rural districts of Russia, especially when there has been a failure of harvest, can be other than passionate to divert for the benefit of the people some of the immense volume of wealth that is spent in preparing for this impossible war The children of most Russian peasants come into the world almost like brute beasts, without any medical or skilled attendance at childbirth, and they are brought up hard m a way that fortunately you know little of in wealthy England. Can you imagine, for instance," said M Bloch speaking with great fervour and feeling, " the way in which infants are left inside the home of most Russian peasants, whose mothers have to leave ' hem to labour in the fields The child is left alone to roll about the earthen floor of the hut, and as it will cry for hunger, poultices of chewed black bread are tied round its hands and feet so that the httle creature may have something to suck at until Its mother comes back from the fields. At every stage in PREFACE Iv l.fe you find the same deplorable lack of what more prosperous nations regard as indispensable to hun.an existence. In son.e provinces we have only thirty-seven doctors per million inhabitants, and as for nurses, school- masters, and other agents of civilisation, there are whole vast tracts ,„ which they are absolutely unknown. All this makes our population hardy, no doubt-those who sttrvve ; but the infant n.ortali.y is frightful, and the life terrible.'-' '""""' "'' " ""^ "''"'"^ ^°"^'™« -ry .nZfl'""'"^"'" ";"""'" ""^ "'"' ^"«i^"« of R"«sia and^f^France are, 1 suppose, about as wide as could be " Yes," said M. Bloch. " But although the French d'ownr?'"'""* "'^'"""^ """ "^"^P'-'S '"f-" "--""ity down to a m.n.mum has some great advantages, it has great d.sadyantages. In a limited family much greater pams are taken to preserve the life of the sickly children Hence mstead of allowing them to be eliminated by na ural process, whereby the race would be preserved from de tenoratton they are sedulously kept alive, and the vitality of the nation is thereby diminished. In other respects our Russian people are very different from what you imagine. For instance, it may surprise you, but it is undoubtedly true, that the amount of spirit consumed by our people ,s very much less per head than that which is drunk m England, and also that the number of illegitimate births in Russia is lower per thousand than in an other country i„ Europe. This is due to the prevalence of early marriages, for our people marry so early that when our young men are taken for the army from 30 to 60 per cent are married before they enter the ranks. You may smile " said M. Bloch. "at me for thinking that t.oJ^ZZt. r' '^i PREFACE must be considered in a discussion of the future war ; but It IS the moral stamina of a populatioii which will uUimately decide Its survival, and I therefore could not exclude the discussion of all the elements which contribute to the well- being of a population in endeavouring to forecast the future of war." Now, M. Bloch, let us turn to another subject. We have talked hitherto about armies, and only about armies. What IS your idea about navies ? " "My idea about a navj," said M. Bloch, "is that unless you have a supreme navy, it is not worth while having one at all, and that a navy that is not supreme h only a hostage in the hands of the Power whose fleet is supreme Hence, it seems to me that for Russia to spend millions in the endeavour to create a deep-sea fleet of sea-going battleships is a great mistake. The money had much better be used for other purposes." "What ! » said I, - then, do you not think that Russia needs a navy ? " "A navy, yes," said M. Bloch, "a navy for coast defence, perhaps, and also cruisers, but a fighting fleet of battleships, no. It is a folly to attempt to create such a navy, and the sooner that is recognised the better." " But," I persisted, " do you not agree with Captain Mahan in thinking that sea-power is the dominant factor in the destiny of nations ? " " Do not let us theorise ; let us look at facts," said M Bloch. "What I see very plainly is that the navy may be almost ignored as a vital factor in a war to the death between Russia and any of her neighbours. Suppose for instance, that we had a war with Germany. What would be the good of our fleet? Suppose that it is uiferior to that of Germany, it will be either captured, or PREFACE ivii shut up in harbour, unable to go out. If it is superior to hat of Genrmny, what better are we ? Here we have htstory to guide us. We cannot hope to have such an unquestjoned superiority at sea over the Germans as the French had m the war of 1870; but wl,at use was the naval supremacy of France to the French in their death- grapple w,,h the Ge.mans? Why, so far from finding hem useful, they absolutely laid their ironclads up in Imrbour and sent their crews to Paris to assist in the defence of the capital-and they did right. Germany was string at the hear, of France when she struck a. Pans and no amount of superiority over the German fleet otj the part of the French could be counted for a moment as al«- "" "' '"" °' '"''^ ""'""• So it will utili^^'f' \°^'^"=^- """ln the pos.fon that the Itahans were in when they ost .e,r fleet at L.ssa to the Aus.rians. But what etrect had ■hat dee,s,ve naval vietory upon the fortunes of the battle of Sadowa, and all naval losses which we might meur would naturally be eh..«c. .'or in the indem.H 5 wh,ch we should impose upr. , our d. -eated enemy if wl came off vietorious and if ve .ere I eaten on land our defeat^at sea would not be a n ,,eri=a aggravation of our "But M. Bloch, do not you think that you need a s|™ng flee, in order to keep your channi of trfde voir t ""'.'""r-" ^'' out of the question) you can do nothing, and Russia fortunately being self-contained and self-supporting could n-nage to subsist better, if her oversea .'rade were at on, tJian any other country." Engi^'dV"" '""'"' """ 'PP'^ '""' ™^^°"'"« '° "England," said M. Bloch, "is in a different .ategory from all the other nations. You only grow enough bread m your own country to feed your people for three months in the year. If you do not command the seas, if you cannot bring to your narkets the food of ,1,. ,.,„-tj ..... Ix PREFACE are in the position of a huge beleaguered fortress with only three months' rations for the whole people. If you ask my opinion, I tell you frankly that I do not think your position is very enviable, not because of any danger from invasion, for I recognise the superiority of your fleet, but because it seems to me that any nation is in a very precarious position which has to depend for so much of its food upon countries across the sea. A single cruiser let loose upon one of your great trade routes would send up the price of provisions enormously, and although no one could hope to blockade the English ports, any inter- ruption in the supply of raw material, any interference with the stream of food products which are indispensable for the sustenance of your people, would endanger you far more than the loss of a pitched battle. " It is true that you are prosperous ; but there are many elements in your population the material condition of which le:..es much to be desired, and with the stress and strain of industrial stagnation, caused by the closing of markets abroad and the rise in the price of food which would be inevitable under any circumstances, you might have as considerable internal difficulties as any of those which threaten your neighbours. But, there again, if (which God forbid) England should find herself at war, the factor which will decide the issue will not be the decisive battle ; it will be pressure of want, the lack of food, in short, the economic results which must inevitably follow any great war ai the present complex state of human civilisation. "In short," said M. B'och, "I regard the economic factor as the dominant and decisive element in the matter. You canD'>t fight unless you can eat, and at the present moment you cannot feed your people and wage a great 3rtress with )le. If you ) not think any danger f your fleet, is in a very so much of igle cruiser ivould send Ithough no any inter- nterferencL' iispensable langer you e are many audition of stress and closing of bod which you might y of those : again, if slf at war, lot be the he lack of inevitably c state of economic he matter. le present je a gi-eat PREFACE Ixi war To a certain extent this is already recognised, so much so that there are a few general principles that it is worth while mentioning. First, you may take it for granted that the great war, if it ever breaks out, will not take place until after the harvest has been gathered. To mobilise in spring, or in early summer, would bring starvation too closely home to the population for any statesman to think of it. Secondly, whenever there is a bad harvest you may be sure there will be no war ' ven with a full granary it will be very difficult for any nation to feed Its troops, to say nothing of its home population. With a bad harvest it would be impossible. Hence if ever you should see a rapid buying-up of bread- ^uffs on the part of any nation, you may feel sure that there is danger ahead ; but so long as there is no attempt made to secure reserve supplies of grain, you may regard with comparative equanimity the menaces of war." f ''^*'!?' T ^^^ '^^'''^^' ^°" ^'^ '^°P^f"l concerning the future, M. Bloch ? " ® "Yes/' said he; "hopeful with the hope that is born not of fantasy or of Utopian dreaming, but from the painstaking examination of hard, disagreeable facts The soldier ,s going down and the economist is going up There is no doubt of it. Humanity has progressed beyond the stage in which war can any longer be regarded as a possible Court of Appeal. Even military service has lost much of Its fascination. At one time war appealed to the ""agination of man, and the poets and painters found no theme so tempting as depicting the heroism of the individual warrior, whose courage and might often turned t >e tide of battle and decided the destiny of nations. All that has long gone by the board. War has become more ana more a matter of mechanical arrangement. Mnd^m r "i id' Ixii PREFACE battles will be decided, so far as they can be decided at all, by men lying in improvised ditches which they have scooped out to protect themselves from the fire of a distant and invisible enemy. All the pomp and circum- stance of glorious war disappeared when smokeless powder was invented. As a profession militarism is becoming less and less attractive. There is neither booty to be gained, nor promotion, with an ever increasing certainty of a disagreeable death, should war ever take place." " The old toast in the British Army used to be," I said, " ' Bloody war and quick promotion.' " "Yes," said M. Bloch, "as long as bloody war only killed out a certain percentage it meant more rapid promotion for the rest, but if it kills out too many the attraction fails, for there is no promotion to a dead man. Side by side with the drying up of the attractiveness of a military career there has gone on an increasing agitation against the whole system, an agitation which finds its most extreme exponents among the Socialists, whose chief stock-in-trade is to dwell upon the waste of industrial resources caused by the present organisation of society on a competitive basis, which they maintain naturally and necessarily results in the excessive burdens of our armed peace. What the Governments will all come to see soon more or less clearly is that if they pers? i in squandering the resources of their people in oruer to prepare for a war which has already become impossible with'out suicic^- they will only be preparing the triumph of the socialist revolution." Iatural reveals a :osmic d In the sk line, it p lets injuri iven. upoi jpon thai In the Something )resentim growth of ("uinous b md endin [he people Is this bf a mist£ ^ystem of 3ossible c( m AUTHOR^S PREFACE Natural philosophers declare that the atmosphere reveals at times the presence of a certain so-called cosmic dust. It influences the change of colours |n the sky, it colours the sunlight with a bloody line, it penetrates our dwellings and our lungs,, kts injuriously upon living organisms, and, falling 2ven upon the summits of hills, leaves its traces upon their mantles of virgin snow. In the public and private life of modern Europe bomething of the same kind reveals itself. A bresentiment is felt that the present incessant growth of armaments must either call forth a war, j-uinous both for conqueror and for conquered,' bd ending perhaps in general anarchy, or reduce pe people to the most lamentable condition. Is this unquiet state of mind the consequence bf a mistaken or sickly condition of the nervous kstem of the modern man ? Or is it justihed by bossible contingencies ? V Ixii AUTHOR'S PREFACE Such questions cannot be answered categori- cally. All would desire that the dangers caused by armaments were but a symptom which time will destroy. But even an unanimous desire cannot have the power to change the great con- catenation of circumstances which are the cause of armaments, until the time shall come when, in the words of Von Thunen, the interests of nations and the interests of humanity shall cease to contend with one another, and culture shall have awakened a sense of the solidarity of the interests of all. Such a state of affairs is unhappily still distant h is true that the ruinousness of war under modern conditions is apparent to all. But this •gives no sufficient guarantee that war will not break forth suddenly, even in opposition to the wishes of those who take part in it. Involuntarily we call to mind the words of the great Bacon, that " in the vanity of the world a greater field of action is open for folly than for reason, and frivolity always enjoys more influence than judg- ment." To-day these words are even more apposite than in the past. For Reason itself it is harder than before to find a path in the field of circumstances which change for ever. The speed with which relations change is a character- istic feature of our time. In modern times a few 2d categon*. gers caused which time nous desire i great con- the cause of vhen, in tiie nations and to contend shall have he interests till distant, war under But this tr will not :ion to the voluntarily sat Bacon, Iter field of :ason, and than judg- ven more itself it is I the field ver. The character- mes a few! AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixv years see greater changes in the material and moral condition of masses than formerly took place in the course of centuries. This greater mobility of contemporary life is the consequence of better education, the activity of parliaments, of associations, and of the press, and the influence of improved communications. Under such influences the peoples of the world live lives not only their own, but the lives of others also ; intellectual triumphs, economic progress, materialised among one people, react at once on the condition of others; the intellectual outlook widens as we ascend, as the seascape widens from a hill, and, like the sea, the whole world of culture drifts and fluctuates eternally. Every change in conditions or disposition is affirmed only after a struggle of elements. An analysis of the history of mankind shows that from the year 1496 b.c. to the year 1 861 of our era, that is, in a cycle of 3357 years, were but 227 years of peace and 3130 years of war : in other words, were thirteen years of war for every year of peace. Considered thus, the history of the lives of peoples presents a picture of uninterrupted struggle. War, it would appear, is a normal attribute to human life. The position now has changed in much, but still the new continues to contejid with the Ixvi re! AUTHOR'S PREFACE smnants of the old. The old order has changed ' nd given place to the new. Sieyes compared the old order of things with a pyramid! standincr upon its apex, declaring that it must be given a ,. more natural position and placed upon its base, i This demand has been fblfilled ^n this sense, that | the edifice of stale has been placed upon founda- tions incomparably wider thr.n before, affirmed on the rights and wills of millions of men, the so named middle order of society. It is natural that the greater the number of voicrs influencing the course of affairs the more complev is the sum of interests to be considered. The eco? crnic revolution caused by the applica- tfon of si:eam has been the cause of entirely new and unexpected conditions between the different countries of the world arid between the classes inhabiting them, enriching and strengthening some, impoverishing and weakening others, in measure as the new conditions permitted to each participation in the new distribution of revenues, capital, and influence. With the innumerable voices which are now bound up in our public opinion, and the many different representatives of its interests, naturally appear very different views on militarism and its object, war. The propertied classes, in particular those whose importance and condition was bas changed s compared lid stanciifip- b? given a >n its base, sense, that Doii founda- affirmed on en, the so- number of > the more considered. be applica- itirely new e different :he classes iigthening others, in ed to each revenues, AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixvli estabhshed during the former distribution of power and former methods of acquisition, precisely those classes whom we call Conservatives, are inclined to confuse even the intellectual move- ment against militarism with aspirations for the subversion of social order. In this is sometimes given, they attribute, too great an importance to smgle and transitory phenomena, while no sufficient attention is turned on the dangerous fermentation of minds awakened by the present and constantly growing burdens of militarisn. On the other hand, agitators, seeking influence on the minds of the masses, having deduced from the new conditions with recklessness and even intentional misrepresentation the most extreme conclusions, deny all existing rights, and promise to the masses more than the most perfect institu- tions could give them. In striving to arouse the masses against militarism such agitators un- ceremoniously ascribe to every thinker who does not share their views selfish impulses, although in reality he may be following sincere convictions. And although the masses are slow to surrender themselves to abstract reasoning, and act usually only under the influence of passion or disaster, there can be no doubt that this agitation, cease- lessly carried on in parliaments, on platforms, and m the press, penetrates more and more deeply Ixviii AUTHOR'S PREFACE the people, and awakens in it those feelings which in the midst of the disasters called forth by war might easily lead them to action. The evil of militarism serves to-day as the chief instrument of the activity of agitators, and a tangible object for attack, while in reality these agitators strive not only for the suppression of militarism, but for the destruction of the whole social order. With such a position of affairs— that is, on the one hand, the ruinous competition in constantly increasing armaments, and, on the other, the social danger for all which grows under a general burden — ,t ,s necessary that influential and educated men should seriously attempt to mve themselves a clear account of the effect of war under modern conditions; whether it will be possible to realise the aims of war, and whether the extermination of millions of men will not be wholly without result. If, after consideration of all circumstances, we answer ourselves, " War with such conditions is impossible ; armies could not sustain those cata- clysms which a future war would call forth ; the civil population could not bear the famine and interruption of industry," then we might ask the : general question : " Why do the peoples more and more exhaust their strength in accumulating means of destruction which are valueless even to AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixix accomplish the ends for which they are pre- pared ? " It is very natural, that even a long time ago, in many Western European countries, in all ranks of society, many attempts have been made, partly theoretical and partly practical, to eliminate war from the future history of humanity. Philoso- phers and philanthropists, statesmen and revolu- tionaries, poets and artists, parliaments and congresses, more strongly and strongly every day insist upon the necessity of avoiding the blood- shed and disasters of war. A time was when it seemed protests against war were assuming practical importance. But the desire for revenge awakened by the events of 1870 turned the disposition of peoples in another direction. Nevertheless the idea remains and continues to operate on minds. The voices of scholars and the efforts of philanthropists directed against war naturally found an echo among the lower orders of populations. In the twilight of imperfect knowledge fantastic visions appeared, of which agitators took advantage. This agita- tion increased every year. In recent times war has become even more terrible than before in consequence of perfected weapons of destruction and systems of equipment and training utterly unknown in the past. What Ixx AUTHOR'S PRKFACE IS graver still, the immensity of armies and the traimny- of soldiers in entrenchment must call iorth difficulties in provisioning and defence from climaiic cordir; n It is irue .hat certain military authors think that th<" bloodshed of the b.^tlefield will be decreased in consequence of the greater distance between the combatant ' . attacks by cavalry and with the bayonet are improbable in the present conditions of firearms, while retreat will oe facilitated for a defeated army. But. even admitting this, which is by no means proved there can be no doubt that with modern firearms the impression which baide makes on armies will be incomparably greater than before, while smokeless powder will change even the nati-re of these impressions. Infantry and artillery fire will have unprecedented force, while aid to the wounded will be made more difficult by the crreat range both of small-arms and of arti^ -ry. Smoke will no longer conceal from the survivors the terrible consequences of he battle, and every advance wih ^ nude witl full api reciation of the probabilities of extermination. From this, and from the f-ict ^b.,.t the ma.-: of sokl'ers will have but recently been called from the field, the factory and the workshop, it will ..ppear that evui the psychical conditions of ar ^ ve changed 1 hus AUTHOR'S PREi aCE Ixxi s and the must call ■ence from lors think i will be r distana- )y cavalry :e in the treat will iut, even '< proved, t firearms •mies will e, while nati.'re of lery fire d to the he great Smoke /ors the d every )n of the his, and ^ill have factory, vcii the Thus in the armies of Western states the agitation against war may extend even so far as the materialisation of socialistic theories subverting the bases of monarchies. The thought of those convulsions which will be called forth by a war, and of the terrible means prepared for it, will hinder military enterprise, notwithstanding the passionate relations of the people to some of the (juestions in dispute among them. But on the other hand, the present con- ditions cannot continue to exist for ever. The peoples groan under the burdens of militarism. Europe is ever confronted with the necessity of drawing from the productive forces of the peoples new and new millions for military purposes. I hardly was the small-calibre rifle adopted when in^^^ntion made a new advance, and there can be no uoubt til at soon the Great Powers will be com- pellef' to adopt a weapon of still smaller calibre with iouble he Dresent energy, allowing soldiers to carry a ^ ater number of cartridges. At the same time we see in France and Germany pre- pa ition of new artillery to turn to the best advantage the new smokeless powder. Milli is are expended on the construction of new battle- ships and cruisers. But ev^ery year brings such radical improvements in guns, in speed, and in coal-carry iii J capacity that vessels hardly launched Ixxii AUTMOR'S PREFACE m Pi are obsolete, and others must be built to replace thr.n. In view of what we see in Germany, Italy, and Austria, we are compelled to ask, Can the present incessant demands for money from Parliament for armaments continue for ever without social )utbreaks? And will not the present difficulty of carryinjr on war at last be replaced by an absolute impossibility, at least in those countries where high culture has increased the va.ie of the life of every citizen? Thus in the war of the luture will appear not only quanti- tative differences in the number of armies but also qualitative differences which may have im- mense importance. But what is still graver are the economic and social convulsions which war will call forth in consequence of the summons under the flag of almost the whole male population, the interrup- tion of maritime communications, the stagnation in industry and trade, the increase in the price of the necessaries of life, and the destruction of credit. Will these convulsions not be so great that governments will find it impossible in the course of lime indicated by military specialists as the probable duration of war to acquire means for maintaining their armies, satisfy the requirements of budgets, and at the same time feed the desti- tute remainder of the civil population ? AUTHOR'S PREFyVCE c) replace iennany, ask, Can ley from or ever not the t last be least in ncreased Thus, in ^ quanti- lies but ave im- mic and forth in flag of titerrup- gnation price of tion of o great in the ilists as :ans for ements e desti- Ixxlii P Wlthi'n the last twenty-f^ve years such chaiii^cs have taken place in the very nature of nulitary oi)erations that the future war will in no way be like its predecessors. In consequence of tjie adoption of improved artillery, explosive shells, and smnll-arms which allow the soldier to carry an immense number of cartridges, in co/isequence of the absence of concealing smoke, in conse- quence of the immense proportions which military operations must take as a result of the vastness of armies, such unquestioned authorities on military affairs as M(jltke and Leer and many other eminent military writers declare that a future war will last many years. But with modern political, social, and economic conditions it would be strange if there did not arise in England, Italy, Austria, Russia, Germany, and France— in one country from one reason, in another from another—factors which will dis- arrange the apparatus of war and prevent its continuance before the ends desired shall have been attained. This is a question of the first gravity, yet military writers entirely ignore it, attending only to the technical side of war. In consequence of alliances conciuded, all plans of activity are founded on the combined opera- tions of allied armies. What will happen to combinations founded on united action when one Ixxiv AUTHOR'S PREFACE or another of the allies is compelled to cease operations through insufficient means for resisting the social influences of war? Thus we find that military questions are bound up wth questions of economy. But military writers look on the future war only from the point of view of attaining certain objects by destroying the armies of the enemy; the economic and social consequences of war, if they are con- sidered at all, are considered only as secondary d,rT; f ^" «^°"°"^'^'^. in consequence of the difficulty of such a question, have made no single mvestigation resulting in a complete picture^o' Xrr"^^^'^'"'^'-- B"-his is in no way Without acquaintance with the technicalities of warfare it is impossible to understand what will the : thr" ""•"""";' '"■ '° ''^«- 'he limits where the operation of defined laws will cease on y be obtained by careful study of the very nature of war in all its phenomena. Twenty years ago such a task would have been compa l! tiy^ly easy. But the last two decades havj First of all a fundamental change has taken place n the very elements which take part in war nd from which Its course depends. I„ a future wlr on tlr soldier peculic Ak war is new m sufficie other \ by me, But no of a str comple; ing in of desti inventiv The be all nations, technica minds j culture ( question Western conscripi through Reasoi writers d although to cease resisjting i bound military 3m the icts by onomic re con- on da ry : of the ' single ;ure of lo way ties of It will limits cease could very venty para- have :ions. place and war AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxv on the field of battle, instead of professional soldiers, will appear whole peoples with all their peculiar virtues and failings. A full appreciation of the conditions of a future war IS all the more difficult since on the one hand new methods of attack and defence, as yet in- sufficiently tested, will be employed, and, on the other hand, because former wars were carried on by means of long-service professional soldiers But not only will a future war take the character of a struggle of whole nations living a wide and complex life, with military problems correspond- ing in complexity, but the arms and apparatus of destruction are the very finest resuft of the inventiveness and creative activity of mankind 1 he elements contending in a future war will be all the moral and intellectual resources of nations, all the forces of modern civilisation all technical improvements, feelings, characters minds and wills— the combined fruit of the culture of the civilized world. It is thus that this question demands the attention of all society In Western states, especially from the adoption of conscription, interest in military affairs has i,pread through all ranks of society. Reasoning on the basis of future wars, military writers declare that the chief elements of warfare although only in their general character, must be *^- Ixxvi AUTHOR'S PREFACE made known to the population, which in the event of war constitutes the army, and from whose activity depends the issue of campaigns It is not enough that officers and soldiers actually on service know what they are to meet in a future war. In the ranks of armies in time of war will appear an immense proportion of officers and men from the reserves, who for many years have taken no part in military exercises. As a consequence of this, in every state appear popular compositions with the object of informing the public of the technique of modern war. all, almost without exception, neglecting the economic side of the question. Some prejudge a future war from the example of history. Such neglect, as a rule, the improvement of weapons and the in- creased complexity of strategy and tactics. Others, well informed as to the improvement of weapons, but neglecting inevitable conclusions assume that war will last but a short time, and therefore pay no attention to the financial and economic perturbation which it will cause or its effects on the moral condition of the people The late General Fadeleff very justly pointed out the danger arising from such a state of affairs. 1 he opinion of the people of their strength has immense influence on the course of politics • this opinion is often frivolous and unfounded, though from i it is g militar remain momer peace, be assi authori of the i public, often 1 To fre opinion with t\ degree direcdy present volume It is 1 and pro Europe^ wasted, millions other, ii militaris acting o mitted t possible ch in the and from campaigns, rs actually neet in a n time of of officers any years is. As a ir popular ming the .11, almost 3mic side ture war :lect, as a I the in- tactics. ement of elusions, ime, and icial and >e or its le. pointed f affairs, igth has cs; this though AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxvii from it may depend the destiny of nations. Yet it is generally agreed that even the elements of military affairs constitute a speciality which must remain unknown by the public. But when the moment comes to express its opinion on war and peace, to balance the chances of success, it may be assumed that of ten military specialists whose authority is accepted nine will adopt the opinions of the social medium in which they live. Thus a public, entirely ignorant of military questions, often becomes the deciding factor in decision! To free oneself from the influence of public opinion in such matters Is impossible." It was with the object of making accessible in some degree information accumulated on all matters directly or indirectly connected with war that the present work was undertaken, of which this volume is but an abridgment. It is but a slight service to diagnose an illness and pronounce it incurable. The position of the European world, the organic strength of which is wasted, on the one hand, in the sacrifice of millions on preparations for war, and, on the other, in a destructive agitation which finds in militarism its apology and a fit instrument for acting on the minds of the people, must be ad- mitted to be abnormal and even sickly. Is it possible that there can be no recovery from this ? Ixxviii AUTHOR'S PREFACE We are deeply persuaded that a means of recovery exists if the European states wogld but set themselves the question— in what will result these armaments and this exhaustion, what will be the nature of a future war, can resource be had to war even now for the decision of questions m dispute, and is it possible to conceive the settlement of such questions by means of the cataclysm which, with modern means of destruc- tion, a war between five Great Powers with ten millions of soldiers would cause ? Delay in the practical settlement of this ques- tion is impossible. And when a settlement is arrived at it will be sho^vn that for twenty, forty years millions have been wasted yearly on fruit- less armaments which cannot be employed, and by means of which tho decision of international disputes IS inconceivable. But then it will be too late ; the fu jh immense losses will have been sustained that Europe generally will be in a worse position than haly to-day. Then, instead of the dangers of international war, other threaten- ing symptoms will have appeared. That war will become impossible in time—this is indicated by all. Its apparatus grows more rapidly than the productiveness of European states, and preparations will continue to swallow more and more of the in ome of peoples. Mean- means of woyld but will result what will ssource be f questions iceive the ms of the ot destruc- s with ten this ques- element is snty; forty / on fruit- oyed, and ernational viW be too ave been be in a n, instead threaten- ime — this 'ws more European ' swallow Mean- AUTHOR'S PREFACE Ixxix time the relations of the nations become closer and closer, their interdependence more plain, and their solidarity in any great convulsion will con- stantly grow. That war will finally become impracticable is apparent. The question is more apposite— when will the recognition of this inevitable truth be spread among European governments and peoples ? When the impossibility of resorting to war for the decision of international quarrels is apparent to all, other means will be devised MILV PART I MILITARY AND NAVAL DEVELOPMENTS W^ 1 In forn flew ov only fo; strike i the inti prepara I2IO y field of such a find its The sulphur liberate combine tion wh empyre) force of old, anc smoke, i the posi second, which fc opinion explosiv especiall explosiv concentr the cov€ CHAPTER I HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND In former times bullets, for a great part of their course, flew over the heads of the combatants, and were effective only for an insignificant distance. The modern bullet will strike all it meets for a distance of 660 yards, and after the introduction of the more perfect arms now in course of preparation the effective distance will be as great as 1 2 10 yards. And as it is most improbable that on the field of battle it will not meet with a single living being in such a distance, we may conclude that every bullet will find its victim. The old powder was a mechanical mixture of nitre, sulphur, and charcoal, upon the ignition of which were liberated many elements which did not enter into new combinations. The new powder is a chemical combina- tion which gives scarcely any smoke and produces no empyreuma in the barrel At the same time the explosive force of the new powder is much greater than that of the old, and its quality of smokelessness or of giving little smoke, in the first place, renders it impossible to judge of the position and forces of an enemy by smoke, and, in the second, frees the marksmen from the clouds of smoke which formerly were an obstacle to aimingVAnd as in the opinion of many authorities the last word concerning explosives has not yet been said, in the war of the future, especially if it should take place some years from now' explosives of such strength will be employed that the concentration of armies in the open field, or even under the cover of fortifications, will he almost impossible, so 4 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? X X:^:^':^JLr "''"'"'' •^' ""= •'--' "- _ The improvement of small arms goes forward with incredible speed. By the almost unanimous Slvo^- competent persons, ti.e clmnge which took pla ' r?^the course of five centuries cannot be compared in impo tance ana i s;;-^ 8. The well-known specialist, Professor Cebler made a comparison, expressed in figures between difffrm modern small arms, taking as his standard oreLtiveness at lOO degrees the Mauser rifle, 1 1 mil, of iS/rOn "his basis he worked out the efrectii«>np Tfl the complete re-armament of all rTv^ rv of thP n. *'"'" ''"^'^^ ^^ "°^ P^^^^^ "Pon the rivalry of the nations in preparation for war. For the re-armament of their infantry, Germany, France Russia tiled t '"' l^^^y.^-^d, by our cal^ulaffon 'be ctm: pelled to spend the immense sum of ;^i so.Soco^X). easvlnT^ r ^"'"'^ in^Provements in arms, it is easy to see with existing improvements the following consequences: (i) The opening of battles from much greater distances than formerly; (2) the necessity of bose formation in attack ; (3) the strengthening of the defence 4) the increase in the area of the battlefield ; and (5) the increase in casualties. ^^^ It is enough here to cite somt statistics as to the action and 1877-78. Thus, the bullet of the rh;,c=.n-^ tU 7- MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) 1.0 I.I 1.25 |5A 2.8 U 1 3.2 14.0 *i u Blbu 2.5 12.2 2.0 1.8 1.6 ^ 1 /APPLIED IIVMGE !nc 1653 East Main Street Rochester, New York 14609 USA (716) 482 -0300 -Phone (716) 288- 5989 -Fax 6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? r^rtS "^ 'J'" ^'m"'^" needle-gun fired from a distance of 1760 yards could not penetrate a human skull, whereas 8.0 vi.^' ' •.r"'"'"" '^^'^'^^'^ nnes at a distance o 3«50 yaids will penetrate the hard bones of an ox but many military writers declare that the improvement m small arms will be neutralised by the fact tha't riprdky o fire will depnye the soldier of coolness and capacky to turn to account the superiority of the modern weapon Let us admit for the moment that modern long-range rlnH'^J^ wuh the.r future improvements, will noT proJe more deadly m battle than their predecessors. Such an improbable and apparently unfounded proposition Ts i8of ^T' '^ l'^ "^P^'"'^"^^ "^ ^he ChXn war of Darttv J"^^^7^'-^^,^^'-n^ifsof the Congress were armed, partly with old partly with modern weapons, and it was proven that each company of soldiers armed with rifierof a modern type put out of action 82 men in the armies of with obsolete weapons, put out of action only 34 men The absence of smoke alone must increase immensdy the rela^es'hL'at Z^T ""r" • ^'^ '^^^^^^^ °^ P^^ ^^ttle^ could nn^c ^'"^^"^t^^ ^'""'y P^"^^ combatants often could not see one another, and that their fire proved in- effective And even if long-range rifies do not prove more deadly than their predecessors, it will still be absurd to deny that a certain number of projectiles will disable a certain number of men. And as, in the wars o the present century, the number of shots fired for evei^ disabkmen has fluctuated between 8^ and 164, it is plain that the cTen' rdi:aht''ff "^ ^^"'^^ ^^^^^^ ^^^-^ --•«- ?8o rlr^r 1 ^t '^ast one opponent; while the supply of 380 cartridges with the 4-mil. rifle, and of 575 wUh the three of the enemy In other words, even supposing the effectiveness of modern arms to be in no way incre!sed From'thfsT ""', '"^^^^^-'^'^ ^wo or three of'^the ene^.y: fdZ^i ti i' ^'^'" '^'^\ ^^^" ^'^h the weapons now ;;rar:t\iautiSoT^^'^^ ^^^^^-^^ ''- ^^^^^^'y^^ n a distance ull, whereas distance of 1 ox. mprovement hat rapidity I capacity to weapon. long-range II not prove Such an 'position is lian war of vere armed, and it was ith rifles of : armies of liers armed y 34 men. lensely the >ast battles tants often proved in- not prove be absurd 1 disable a the present isablement n that the er is suffi- e supply of 5 with the le two or 50sing the increased, he enemy, pons now isibiliiy of HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 7 Such is the comparison when regard is had alone to the mcrease m the supply of cartridges arising from the reduction of the calibre of rifles. ^ But in addition we must take into account the rapidity with which modern weapons may be fired. In a given time twelve times as many shots may be fired as in 1867. while the chances of missing fire and of injury to the powder by damp have been removed. In addition to this must be borne m mind the long rarge of modern weapons, the absence of the accumulations in the barrel of the riflp the adoption by officers of instruments for precisely ascertain- ing d'stances,. the use by under-officers of field-glasses, and DoS'rAntH^''"'^"" ."''•''" °'^ P^^^^^ bysmokdess powder. All these conditions will undoubtedly increase the number of losses, and if the operation of each were sZlA'n •''%^ ^^''°' ^" multiplying past losses, we should attain alr-.ost incredible but technically and mathe- matically trustworthy figures. To this must be added the improvement, since 1870, in the instruction of soldiers in firing. In the training of soldiers every year an immense quantity of ammunition is expended In addition, mechanical means are employed to show the direction of the barrel on aiming and firing These are new conditions entirely, or in a great degree unknown in the time of the last great wars. If we take eve'rv'rZ"\h'' '''' T 5^0 cartridges are prepared for every rifle, the expenditure of which, of course, is not stinted, we are confronted with a direct denial of Jhe pos- sibility even for armies of millions of men, in the event of equal strength, to sustain such losses. In addition to small arms the power of artillery has increased in a measure incomparable with the past show! ?W ^^'^"^^J^f the development of field artillery shows that from the date of the invention of powder im- provements in arms took place very slowly. In imperfect weapons, ,t would seem, it would have been much easier Iff^^ improvements. Nevertheless, to within a recent n t^j5"^t^J^''t»»^!:y fi>-e remained very inconsiderable, in i«Qi Professor Langlois estimated the increase of 8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the power of" artillcrv fire since the war of 1870 in the following manner : Wiih an equal number of discharges modern artillery will be five times more effective than the artillery of 1870. But as modern field guns are capable of dischargmg in a given time from two to two and a half more prqectiles than the old guns, it follows that the power of artillery fire has multiplied since 1870 no less than from twelve to fifteen times. The calculations made by Professor Langlois in 1891 are already out of date. In France, in Germany, and in Russia quick-firing guns are being made, and from the testimony of such authoritative writers as General Wille Professor Pototski, and Cjiptain Moch, we find that the fire of these new guns is at least twice as powerful as that of the gun of 1891, of which Langlois speaks in the fol- lowing terms : " We have before us a whole series of improvements of the greatest importance, and must admit that munitions of war are entirely different from those in use in the past." So that in order to form some idea as to the total losses in a future war it is necessary to com- pare the action of the latest perfected arms with the action of the old guns employed up to the present time. Such a comparison only shows that, as in the case of quick-firing rifles, the past can give no precise forecast as to the effect of artillery in future wars. With the introduction of smokeless powder an^ employment of nickel steel on the one hand, an-: '- strengthening by wire of the barrels of guns on the othe." arms of tremendous power are being made. A comparison of the result of the firing of a thousand rifle bullets by soldiers attacking in loose formation with the action of shrapnel, shows that one round of shrapnel is effective over a space double the length of that covered by a thousand rifle bullets, and not less in width. Experi- ment has also shown that the fragments of shrapnel dis- perse themselves over a space 880 yards in length and 440 yards in breadth. Prince Hohenlohe, commander of the German artillery in the war of 1870, in the most emphatic manner declared that " a battery placed against on p 870 in Ihc discharges, /e than the : capable of and a half : the power than from >is in 1 89 1 ny, and in i from the sral Wille, d that the ful as that in the fol- : series of lust admit n those in ne idea as '3' to com- the action . Such a jick-firing the effect and an'^i the othe. thousand ition with irapnel is )^^ered by Experi- ipnel dis- ngth and lander of :he most ^ against KOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 9 a road fifteen paces in width might annihilate a whole mass of infantry on this road for a distance of 7700 yards, so that no one would even think of standing there." Not less are the successes attained in the improvement of projectiles. The use of steel in their manufacture permitted their being charged with a greater number of bullets. The use of explosives four times more power- ful than were formerly employed gave to each splinter and bullet immense force. The flight of bullets and splinters may be likened to the action of a sieve from which drops of water are driven. Imagine such a sieve revolving at great speed, and some idea will be gained of the manner in which the fragments of shells would be dispersed. In the war of the future, shell, which is much less effective than shrapnel, will be employed less than formerly. Shrapnel will be the chief ammunition of artillery, although if we believe French reports, it is proved that all in the vicinity of a bursting Brisant shell will be knocked dc\s m by the agitation of the atmosphere and sustain serious internal injuries, while in the case of the shell bursting in a covered space every one there will be killed either by the action of mechanical forces, or by the poisonous gases liberated by the explosion. By a comparison of the effect of artillery ammunition with the effect of that employed in 1870, it is shown that, on the average, shells burst into 240 pieces instead or 19-30 as was the case in 1870. The shrapnel employed m 1870 burst into 37 pieces, now it gives as many as 340. An iron bomb weighing 82 pounds, which, with the old powder gave 42 fragments, filled with peroxylene gives 1204 pieces. With the increase in the number of bullets and fragments, and in the forces which disperse them, increases also the area which they affect. Splinters and bullets bring death and destruction not only, as in 1870, to those in the vicinity of the explosion, but at a distance of 220 yards away, and this though fired from a distance of 3300 yards. With such improved ammnnitinn ^hp HpRtrii^ti'^" '>»-o 10 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? duced in the ranks of armies will be immense. From the statistics furnished by the Prussian General Rohne we have estimated the losses which would be sustained by a body of 10,000 men attacking in loose formation a fortilied position. From this estimate it is shown that before the attackmg party succeeded in covering 2200 yards in the direction of the defenders' trenches every mdividual composing it may be struck by bullets and fragments of shells, as the defenders' artillery in that time will have succeeded in firing 1450 rounds, scattering 275,000 bullets and fragments, of which 10.^^0 will take effect in the attacking lines. But artillery iire will be directed no. only against the attacking troops, which, when within range of the trenches may be destroyed by rifle fire, but also, to a greater extent against supporting bodies which must follow in clo^^er order, and among which, therefore, the action of artillery nre will be even more deadly. And as at the same time the quantity of artillery in all armies has considerably increased, we may well ask the question whether the nerves of short-service soldiers will stand the terrible destructiveness of its fire. .u^^u- ^^fovement, in all respects, of fire-arms, and the high degree of perfection achieved in artillery and artillery ammunition are by no means all that the mind of man has contrived as weapons of destruc- tion. The whole series of auxiliary instruments which m a future war may have immense importance has, since the last war, been improved. Velocipedes carrier pigeons, field telegraphs and telephones, appa- ratus for signalling by day and by night, and for illu- minating the field of battle, photographic apparatus for the survey of positions from great distances, means of observing the movements of armies by the use of observa- tion scaffolding, ladders, watch towers and balloons— all in a great degree do away with that insufficiency of in- formation which formerly prevented united and successful operations. As a necessary consequence of the increase in the ? ise. From nal Rohne, 2 sustained ? formation shown that ering 2200 :hes every Juliets and n that time scattering 0,330 will igainst the le trenches Iter extent, ' in closer of artillery llery in all 2II ask the Dldiers will arms, and tillery and that the f destruc- istruments mportance slocipedes, les, appa- d for illu- apparatus means of f observa- loons — all ncy of in- successful se in the HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 1 1 power of fire, we find the more frequent and more ex- tended adoption of defences, and cover for protection in attack and for hampering the enemy. Even m times of peace, positions are prepared for the defence of certain pomts of the railways and main roads and of water com- munications. In addition to this in the future war every body of men appointed for defence, and even for attack— if it is not to attack at once— must immediately entrench itself. It must dig, so to speak, in the earth its line of battle, and, if time permit, must raise a whole series of defensive points - taking advantage of natural obstacles, and perfecting them with defensive works. Sheltered behind such works, and in a position to devote all their energy to fire against the enemy, the defenders will sustain losses comparatively slight, only their heads and hands— that is, an eighth part of their height— being exposed, while the attacking bodies will be exposed to the uninterrupted fire of the defenders and deprived almost of all possibility of replying to their fire. For the construction of such trenches and earth- vyorks, each division of an army is now furnished with the requisite tools. In the opinion of competent military writers the war of the future will consist primarily of a series of battles for the possession of fortified positions. In addition to field fortifications of different kinds, the attacking army will have to deal with auxiliary obstacles which will be met with in the neighbourhood of fortifications, that is, in the very position where they will be subjected to the greatest danger from the enemy's fire— obstructions formed of beams, networks of wire, and pit-falls. To overcome these obstacles great sacrifices must be made. The part of cavalry in a future war presents this primary difference with its part in the past. At the very beginning of war, and even before the attacking army has passed the frontier, it will be sent to make irruptions on the territory of the enemy, penetrating the country as far as possible, destroying communications, depots, and telegraphs, seizing government resources, and preventing the concentration of ykJ 12 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? troops. After tins the cavalry which follows as part of Uie constitution of the regular army will be employecf in tl?e niakmg of reconnaisances. In a future war such duties vv.ll be undoubtedly more difficult than before, owing o the adoption of smokeless powder. Even after l^vin° determined the general position of an enemy/caval y w ,? hardly be in a condition to acquire any precise informat^n o determine his strength, and even' f he distance of his advanced posts. The pickets of the enemy will not stand m the open field, but under cover, behind eminences groups of trees, and hedges. From a'distance of a quarte; of a mile the fire from the concealed pickets of the enemv ^nvs•bl"'L'"^^'^^^?^^'^ P^^^^^' themselves ^nl invisible. In all probability pickets will onen fire af rh^ distance of half a mile, to prevent the closer app oach of he reconnoitring party, and as with modern arms horsemen IIuTbZ""" " fj^"-^'^, battalion shdtered behind aow tie French aT"w1n'[f'"^''' '"'° ' "''' ""^ P'^kedoff ine french at will, wliile no smoke betrayed him and several volleys failed to kill the daring marksma,^ ' Thus scoutmg parties will be forced to move with ^reat caut,on ana vvill not always be able to collect sufffc^n formafon, a I the more so because, having cot^eund" the fiie of insignificant posts, and having beln obLed tn withdraw, they will naturally not wish tl adn?it thafthev were engaged with small numbers of the enemv M„r^ precise inlormation may be attained only by Lan^of ■nfantry commands which are more easily sheltered and enemv "suT'"'";^^' """-^ ^'"^^'^ '"^ positioroVthe enemy Such a definition of the duties in reconnaissances of cavalry patrols and infantry commands is l™d dowrfn t^ch, ''"'-■"°"' '°' '"•"""'■•>' elaborated by the French technical committee: "Cavalry may obtainU?^ genera :? as part of loyed in the such duties e, owing to fter having :avalry will nformation, ince of his 1 not stand eminences, •fa quarter the enemy es will be fire at the oach of the horsemen stance, the ice of the arms and ered posi- as witness an attack lind a low picked off him, and n. vith great sufficient •me under )bliged to that they y. More means of ered, and IS of the aissances down in - French ' general, HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 13 approximate information as to the position and strength of the enemy; for the acquiring of detailed and precise information infantry must be employed." And actually, ill the French military manoeuvres, cavalry are now kept at some distance, and close reconnaissances are made by infantry. Nevertheless, the reconnoitring importance of cavalry, in the strategical sense, has increased. It must be taken into account that the territory of the enemy will be sown with a multitude of permanent and improvised fortified positions and points, and an army will not attack without having around itself, and more particularly in advance, a network of cavalry detachments split up into stiiall parts and patrols. To a large extent such cavalry will operate independently, as when crossing the frontier in the beginning of war. It must alarm the enemy, destroy or seize provisions, guard the bridges, seize despatches, collect information as to the enemy's movements, and pro- tect the communications of the army in its rear. The greater the importance played in modern war by railways, telegraphs, and improvised entrenchments, the more essential has become this strategical employment of cavalry. Military writers generally assume that the chief strength of cavalry must be sent forward for investigation, and for the protection of the advanced guards of armies' as Germans expressed by the German saying, "Die Reiterei allzeit voran I " (Horsemen always to the front). In view of the power of modern arms, and the resulting practice of dis- posing troops behind natural and artificial defences, and in view of the great network of defensive points prepared in advance, an attacking army will more than ever find it necessary to feel its way, and to reconnoitre the country into^ which it is advancing. Thus the capacity of cavalry as the "feelers" of an army has become especially important. As to the part cavalry should play in actual battle, military writers differ in a remarkable degree. Some, as the French Captain Nigot, believe that the desperate massed attacks of cavalry, which prove so effective in manoeuvres, are impossible, as with the great increase in the power of fire, cavalry will not be able to strike at infantry even when 14 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? weaKness is observed. From his calculations it appears that a battalion of 800 rifles, with one volley fired at a range of 330 yards, would unhorse 424 troopers, and if a battalion were to open fire at 880 yards, and continue hnng, at a distance of 1 10 yards 2656 men would have been put out of action, that is several battalions of cavalry attacking one after another. •^' Such is not the view of all military writers Thus one author, relying on the fact that cavalry will cover a given distance at twice the speed of infantry, contends that although cavalry is subjected to treble the possibility of disablement, yet one factor neutralises the other, and therefore the loss of cavalry will be no greater than the loss of infantry in the same distance. Of one thing there is not the slightest doubt, that is, that cavalry is threatened with treble probability of being struck In France It was shown that under equal conditions cavalry losses under fire are from two and a half to three times as great as infantry losses, and that cavalry cannot therefore, remain immovable under fire. Therefore in !< ranee it is considered proven that in time of battle cavalry must keep at a distance of not less than 3850 yards from the enemy, and may draw nearer only towards the close of the battle. Otherwise it would be swept away by rifle and artillery fire. ^ ^ -^ The speed at which cavalry may attack is taken bv some at 550 yards a minute, but most authorities limit it •i^°' !^^" .^° ^^4, yards a minute. But even if not- withstanding inequalities of the battlefield and the close ormation which lowers the general speed to the speed of the slowest horses, the speed of attack is taken as halt a mile i.i two minutes— almost racing speed- nevertheless in the course of these two minutes' exposure to effective fire before it can get to close quarters with infantry, cavalry must suffer immense losses which will force It to disperse or make its attack feeble It must be understood that for the consideration of this question we have only the opinions of different military specialists. The German author of the " Militarische IS it appears sy fired at a :!rs, and if a nd continue would have s of cavalry, ters. Thus will cover a antends that ossibility of other, and ter than the that is, that eing struck, ions cavalry three times Iry cannot, lerefore, in : of battle 3850 yards ovvards the pt away by taken by ties limit it /en if, not- I the close e speed of taken as ■ speed — ■>' exposure rters with vhich vi^ill on of this It military ilitarische i HOW WAR WILL HE WACJED ON LAND 15 Essays " says that modern conditions in no way involve the fascmation which surrounds cavalry in the traditions of the Seven Years War, and that the German army vyould enter upon war with from 30,000 to 40,000 super- lluous cavalry, which would only create difficulties in concentration and to the Commissariat. But other authori- ties declare that the smokelessness of the battlefield will be favourable for cavalry attack, since it will be easier seen at what points the enemy's infantry is weak while it will be more difficult for infantry to await from afar without the covering of smoke, the impetuous shock of masses of cavalry. This moment when weakening is observed in the enemy's infantry is relied upon by the advocates ol cavalry attack in battle. One even goes so far as to say that upon the clash of cavalry upon infantry " it will matter nothing what may be in the hands of the trembling .nfantry--maga2ine rifles, flint-locks, or simplv pitch- orks. But, as Von der Golfz observes, weakness may be very plain in the ranks of an army and yet not be seen by the enemy. Such weakness can only be seen fron. advanced positions, and while the information is being conveyed to the proper quarter and cavalry is being sent to attack, the auspicious moment may have passed. On the other hand, the movement of masses of cavalry is always visible owing to the dust it raises, and all the fire ot the enemy may be concentrated on these masses, artillery fire against cavalry being efl^ective from a long range, as the mass presents an immense target In comparison with the times of the -en Years War cavalry has itself made progress. It u furnished with stronger and swifter horses. But this improvement can in no way be compared with the increase in range and rapidity of fire. In addition to this, as the same author Observes, in former times it was sufificient to break ud thick masses of infantry and their opposition was at an end ; now infantry begins ti,e battle in loose formation, eacii individual command constitutes a unit fit for battle and even the solitary soldier will not lose his wits while a i6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? cartridge remains upon him. Thus the relations between cavalry and infantry have entirely changed. It is questionable, indeed, whether in the future cavalry will have that importance which formerly belonged to it as a force deciditig battle and afterwards completinij the overthrow of the enemy by pursuit. Even in the wars of 1870 and 1877 this importance of cavalry seemed diminished, although, on the other hand, its importance m the reconnoitring of occupied territory, the protection of armies, and its value in independent action have increased. In addition to this, a new function for cavalry has been created— immediate irruption into the territory of an enemy, and the destruction of his arrangements for mobilisation, and his communications. To what extent such action of cavalry in the moment of the declaration of war will prove successful is still to be proven by experi- ence. In the event of success such action would cause disorganisation in the enemy's arrangements, and force him to accelerate them. And as operations, considering the immensity of modern armies, may be successfully carried on only by the precise execution of strategical plans elaborated in advance, then the disorganisation caused by sudden cavalry irruptions might have the most important results. As concerns the rok of cavalry in pursuit, it is more important to consider this ro/c in the pursuit of retreating armies to their farthest movement than in the pursuit of armies in their actual retreat from the field of battle. Doubts have been expressed as to the decisiveness of future battles. It is very probable that in the majority of cases the road selected for retreat will be guarded by defences constructed in advance, the retreating army falling back upon the nearest position and offering fresh resistance to the victors, who, on their side, will be weakened by the storming of the first positions. In such case the most important role of cavalry may be to prevent the retreating army drawing reinforcement from other sections of the army which, owing to the vastness of the ons between iture cavalry longed to it, i completing I in the waii, airy seemed '> importance le protection action have ry has been itory of an fem.ents for what extent sclaration of I by experi- vould cause , and force considering successfully r strategical Drganisation t have the , it is more f retreating ; pursuit of i of battle, siveness of majority of guarded by iting army ering fresh le, will be 5. In such to prevent from other less of the now WAR WILL BK WA(,i':i) ON LAND 17 licld of battle, may find themselves at considerable clirtlance from the main army. In any case it will he seen that the duties of cavalry in war remain very important, although the luhilment or non- f ''ilment of some of the tasks appointed for ix has still to be shown by experience. Quite otherwise is the case of artillery. It is an accepted axiom that witiiout the aid of artillery it is impossible to drive infantrv, even infantry considerably weaker in numbers, out of a fortified position; and as all mlantry when acting on the defensive will be entrenched then armies in future will find themselves mainly dependent upon artillery. The successful employment of artillery will depend upon the opposition it meets from the artillery fire of the enemy Ihe artillery of the attacking side will begin by attempt- ing to silence, or at least to weaken the artillery fire oi the delenders, which object being accomplished, it will be able to turn Its attention to the enemy's infantry. The artillery ot the defending army, possessing as it will many advan- tages, will attempt to prevent this. The result of such a duel, if the defenders haveartillery of nearly equal strength and quality, in all probability will be the annihilation of the attacking artillery; while if the superiority of the attacking artillery be substantial, the result will more pro^ bably be mutual annihilation. The increase in the artillery of all armies, the improve- ment of ammunition, the adoption of smokeless powder and of new explosives, the improvement in tactics, all these must lead to such great losses in the artillery service that their action will be paralysed, or the losses in the armies will become so tremendous that war itself will be impossible. Such a conclusion may seem risky, but it is founded on the investigations of the most competent artillerists, and in the justice of their conclusions it is difficult not to concur, when we consider the changes which have taken place since the time of the last great war. As relates to the employment of artillery, it may first of B y i8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? all be noted that the adoption of new powders has changed for the worse the position of ariilJcrymen. In fornicr tmies a thick cloud of smoke hampered the aim of the artilleryman. But on the other hand it prevented the enemy's artillery and infantry from taking accurate aim As long as ordinary powder was used there was no especial need for increase in accuracy and rapidity of fire lor quick firing produced so much smoke that after a short time It was necessary to slacken fire, except on those occasions when there was a favourable wind ; and accuracy also was not as important as it is at the present day With smokeless powder it is possible to discharge more shots in a few minutes favourable for fire than were formerly discharged in a day's battle. In this connection the accuracy of modern fire must again be insisted upon Cannon at a distance of 201 1 yards has placed shot in the same hole four times in succession.* It must be borne in mind that against the enemy's artillery the defending army will make use also of sharp- shooters. Using the new powder, sharpshooters will have lull possibility to approach the batteries of the enemy and concealing themselves behind inequalities of the field of battle, with no smoke to betray them, may pick oflf all the enemy's gunners and horses. Manoeuvres in which s.nokeless powder has been used confirm the opinion that from a distance of 440 yards it IS impossible to discover marksmen hidden behind trees or bushes. But from this distance every shot of a skilful marksman will claim its victim. In addition to this all armies now possess specially organised bodies of chas- seurs trained to fire from great distances, and accustomed stealthily to approach their mark. It is plain that for such commands there can be no especial difficulty in stealing up to a battery and picking off the artillerymen. The French German, and Austrian armies dispose of sufficient numbers of such soldiers. It is well known that Germany, France Austria, and Switzerland yearly expend considerable sums * Lobell, " Militarische Jahresberichte," 1894. >, HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 19 on the encouragement of good shooting, and that among the population of those states there is a considerable number of first-rate shots. In the Russian army chasseur commands are also found with the different army divisions. According to the data of the Prussian General Rohne 100 sharpshooters will put a battery out of action, firing from a distance of — 880 yards in the course of 2.4 minutes. 1 100 .. M „ 4 1320 „ „ „ 7.5 » II II 22 1650 II II II But even if the destruction of the gunners be not accom- plished by sharpshooters, it is very probable that it will soon be done by the artillery of the enemy. The quantity and power of artillery in ?" armies has been multiplied many times. If the figures ..hich repre- sent these increased quantity and increased power be multiplied it will be shown that in comparison with 1870 the strength of the French artillery has been multiplied 1 16 times, and of the German 42 times. But after the introduction of the improved artillery now being accom- plished the strength of artillery will be again redoubled. If, to form some idea how losses in a future war from the action of artillery alone will exceed the corresponding losses in 1870-71, we multiply the figure of these latter losses by the figures which represent the increased force of modern artillery, the result would be incredible, for it would show ,that there could not be an army large enough to sustain such losses. But for the purpose of giving an idea as to the power of modern artillery these figures have a theoretical value, resulting as they do from simple arith- metical calculation. In one sense calculation will not be uninstructive. What number of soldiers will be disabled by the use of that quantity of shots which is found in the ammu- nition cases of the batteries of different countries, taking into account the conditions for marksmanship less favour- I war than in peace ? When we make this calculatio n. 20 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? on the figures of the Prussian general and well-known mihtary writer Muller, we find that the ammunition carrie.l by the batteries of the French and Russian armies, taken together, would put out of action six millions of soldiers Continunig our calculations upon the data of the same authority we find that the Franco-Russian artillery, with Its ready supply of ammunition, would be capable of with- standing the attack of double that number, or twelve millions of men. The ready supply of ammunition in the united German, Austrian and Italian armies would disable five millions of men, and successfully repulse the attack of ten millions of infantry. A writerno less authoritative, a professor of the chief artillery school in France, Colonel Langlois, speaking as to the character of future battles, expresses the opinion that tor one field-piece up to 500 rounds will be required If we estimate the quantity of artillery, and the number of fragments produced by explosion, it is shown that these are sufficient for the destruction of forces eight times stronger than the armies opposed to them. It is necessary to mention here that modern projectiles, filled with powerful explosives, will be dangerous not only to the enemy, but also to the army which employs them. The storing transport, and employment of such explosives under the whVh ^^Mi .fjw^^^"^"^"'^ may lead to catastrophes which will still further increase the horrors of war In !< ranee fougasse shells, containing 4 pounds of melinite, have been adopted. The majority of writers are agreed tha in view of the possible premature explosion of melinite pjpnf ' .tT^'t- '''1'\ ^'^ ""^'y dangerous, as in such event, the bursting of the gun seems inevitable. But the danger is not limited to the possible bursting of guns Against entrenched armies, mortars and siege artillery of great size will be employed. The projectiles of these will be filled with strong explosives, such as peroxylene and mehnite. Now these explosives are capable of exploding unexpectedly on certain changes of temperature and from other causes not yet ascertained. The agitation of the air caused by the enemy's shells may also cause explosions. well-known ition carrietl -mies, taken of soldiers, •f the same tillery, with ble of with- , or twelve ition in the )uld disable the attack 'f the chief making as to 'pinion that quired. If number of that these ight times 5 necessary h powerful :nemy, but le storing, under the tastrophes war. In r melinite, ire agreed )f melinite s in sucli But the f of guns, rtillery of these will ylene and exploding and from of the air cplosions. ^ I HOW WAR WILL BE W GED ON LAND 21 It is enough to note that exp asions are by no means uncommon during experiments, although these experiments are carried on by trained men under the supervision of picked officers. The very mystery with which not only the experiments but the accidents which arise therefrom are surrounded, proves recognition of the difficulties that arise and the uncertainty of success. England is the only country where circumstantial accounts of accidents in dealing with explosives are published. In the yearly memoranda of inspectors we usually find a long list of accidents in the making or transport of explosive sub- stances, and this, among other things, shows that notwith- standmg all measures of precaution, armies are sometimes supplied with dangerously defective ammunition. For the sake of safety in many armies explosive projectiles are painted various colours, and, in order to distinguish them at night, are given a different form. In addition to that they must be transported separately, and the very fitting of the tube into the projectile is done at the time of loading. It is very natural to find that in time of battle, when armies are in a state of tension, perfect coolness is found only among exceptional natures. During the American Civil War thousands of rifles were found upon the battle-fields doubly and trebly loaded, and sometimes charged to the very muzzle. If in such a simple matter as the loading of a rifle such mistakes are made, what is to be expected in the use of highly explosive ammunition, the safe handling of which demands the greatest precision and caution ? Even if we were able to assume that cartridges will always be furnished with explosive tubes only when operations begin, or on the very position on which they are to be employed, and that guns will always be loaded with due caution and regularity, even in that case we find the possibility of a new and even greater danger. Fougasse cartridges consist of a long steel cylinder, of which the smooth interior is filled with melinite, roburite ecrasite, or some other explosive. All these substances' differ from one another by admixtures and mode of nre- H£ 22 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? paration. It is obvious that the thinner the case of the cartridge the greater the quantity .of explosives it will contain. In the opinion of experts, the direct action of gases on explosion is limited to a comparatively small space- i6h yards-but their explosion develops such force that t'cann'o r.t'T '' "IV"'^ ^""' g"""^'-^' ^"^ horses. It cannot but be observed that if in the manufacture of the ammunition any faults were to escape detection, the very gravest consequences might ensue. In one of the latest occt urTT^'^'i" ^".^'''^"^'•y the following sentences r.T- J ^ ^^"""^'"^ °^ ^^'^'"^'■3^ ^h^"« demands great care lu order to prevent premature explosion in the barrel ol the gun. Shells must not have on their internal surface any roughness which might cause explosion." On the explosion of such a shell in the barrel of a gun the body of the latter was shattered into more than twenty bits, the carriage was completely destroyed and the wheels turned into a heap of splinters. S vidual fragments of the destroyed weapon weighed 363 pounds and were flung 99 yards forward and backward from the place on which the gun had stood, and nearly 108 yards on either side. Notwithstanding the distance ^unTwL^^nV-""^'^ explosion might embrace several guns with all their ammunition. n}!l^'^ \ 1^°"" 'u^ ^^"^"^ ammunition cases will be p aced If these be not exploded by the concussion of some of the heavy fragments which fall upon them Is there any one who can declare that all such accidents will be obviated by perfection of technical construction and, with the present constitution of armies, by the careful selection of those who are to deal with explosives ? All this leads to the conclusion that even if we do not consider the dangers proceeding from explosions, the artillery and ammunition already prepared is sufficient for nn .K J",'i'Tu°^7"'^ ^^'^^^ ^'"^'^^ than will be moved on the field of battle. But such destruction may not take place for the very simple reason that the artillery of each case of the lives it will 3f gases on all space — force that and horses, cture of the >n, the very f the latest ? sentences ands great the barrel 'nal surface arrel of a more than destroyed, ers. Indi- iighed 363 backward ind nearly e distance tee several !S will be cussion of ploded by them. Is idents will ction and, lie careful 2S ? ve do not sions, the Scient for be moved / not take y of each ' HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 23 combatant may in a very short time silence the fire of its adversary. And as the quantity of artillery, their quality, and the training of their crews will, in the opinion of most authorities, be air st equal on both sides, then common sense tells us that in the artillery duel with which battles will commence either the attacking side, having less protection, will be destroyed, or mutual exter- mination will result. Thus the problem might arise for infantry to attack without ^he support of artillery, and as this, as we shall hereafter show, is impossible without terrible losses, tactics would probably be changed, and with the remnants of its artillery the side having the advantage in the artillery duel must await the attack of the enemy ; conditions which would probably result in a repetition of the events of 1632 at Nuremburg, when Gustavus Adolphus and Wallenstein entrenched themselves and laid all their hopes of victory on the exhaustion of the enemy. As concerns the operations of infantry in the future war there is no settled opinion even on the chief question, that is, the deciding influence in battle of an infantry attack. If war were to break out to-morrow all armies in this respect would find themselves under the influence of the contradiction between instructions, manoeuvres, and the views of the more noted military writers', General Skugarevski, Muller, Von Rohne, Janson, and others. There is no reason to be surprised at this, as the introduction of smokeless powder, improved rifles ten times more effective than the rifles of the old type, better instruction of soldiers, and their equipment with 'instru- ments for the construction of earthworks have changed in every respect the conditions of war. Modern tactics are primarily the result of our experi- ence of the last great war. As long as the progress of military technical science was comparatively slow it was not difficult to rely upon the experience of the past. At the present day the state of affairs is entirely different ; in former times re-armament took place after hundreds of years, then after many decades, now it takes place in a very short time. 24 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Bui not only the change in armament will influence the action of nilanlry. The smokelessness of the bSe H the perfection ot rifles, artillery, and explosives and .f aLT'of "sho^!;^ employmein'of army h^ol^d^^Ton^^s in" !:f IdtiottTe'^ar:^?;^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ^^^^ -^-^' times ^"reL^T^^lf"/ "'^•^1':°"^ ^ ^'^^^"^^ three to four tmies greater than before inflict serious losses on attark ing troops. The killing off of the officers an?coLequen; sT^okdes? bl tTefi^H '^' !!'" ^ '''''' consequences o smokeless battlefield, and of the precision of modern Ltl tS%Snt aTS '' '-'''' '- -^^-- - Meantime, the rok which will be played by infantry has become more complex. In preliminary operations nfantry must take a far larger part than former^ The cbse reconnoitring of an enemy's position has ^become ^Ltir- '''^T'y ''°"*^' ^ho will be obliged to advance stealthily in order to obtain the information necessarv for any successful attack. Without such servicrbrinf/nt^v scouts an immense superiority would remain on fhede^en^ sive side which, having studied the locality L advance the aS o?JTI ', ^^--!."d-g position, wo Jd slpt w th For th. ^ ^^•^'''' "^''f'' ^" ''' ^••^^^ successfully rnuZ ?^''^'"^ °"' °^ ""^h reconnaissances and the salctuf Im- "'"''""' "°^ only daring but skilful and sagacious soldiers are required, and with the modern omposmon of armies it .ill be 'very difficult to find such nen. The determining of po.sitions by smoke is no longer possible ; while to determine posidonrby sound IS extraordinarily difficult. Experiments carried out on H^etlosio^ro^f ^^"\^^^^^- '^-' the sound cau'd by a far a h^t f fl'^""' P°^^^^ ^°^^ "ot penetrate as far a. tha of sulphur powder ; a single rifle shot s heard no farther than 880 yards, and volleys, accord n^ .rt "TetT' "i"^'' "%^-ther than from i32rto i 40 } ards. Yet knowledge of the strength and position of an enemy ,s much more essential than before, as the losses from an unexpected encounter will be very great :? ifliience the battlefield, ves, and at s consisting ed entirely iree to four ' on attack- consequent lences of a of modern rksmen to )y infantry operations erly. The as become to advance :essary for >y infantry the defen- i advance, imply with Jsfully. s and the kilful and 2 modern find such >ke is no by sound d out on aused by penetrate e shot is according 3 to 1540 >sition of ■, as the great. HOW WAR WILL BE WAGKD ON LAND 25 From modern infantry men much more endurance also will be required. Marches will be made in deep columns in consequence of the growth of armies ; while the number of these marches, as a consequence of the massiveness of modern armies, will increase in comparison with former times, since, owing to considerations of space and commis- sariat, modern armies must be split up and the individual sections must reunite with the main body on drawing near to an enemy superior in numbers. Thus the conditions surrounding advance to battle and battle itself have become extraordinarily complicated. Yet on mobilisation for every hundred soldiers serving with the colours under present arrangements from 26 men (Italy) to 361 men (Russia) will be drawn from the reserve. The majority of these men will have long for- gotten what they learnt during their period of service, while of their officers only a fraction will be in a high state of efficiency. With such conditions it would seem necessary that field instructions and regulations must be elaborated in time of peace, giving precise directions as to tactics in all con- tingencies. But in this very respect in every army we find deficiencies of different kinds. Theoretical instructions do not correspond to practical necessities and are consti- tuted from a limited standpoint. Colonel Mignol says that the tactics recommended in the latest French official in- structions in essence differ very little from those introduced after the invention of firearms and the adoption of bayonets, that is, when firearms were about forty times less effective than they are to-day. At that time in the first line of battle marched musketeers who opened the combat, tollowed by pikemen who carried out the actual assault! Now battle is opened by moving forward lines of riflemen, after which storming columns will advance. But are these two forms of tactics in essence the same ? Is it possible that all the progress in ballistics which has strengthened the defensive power of infantry and increased the mobility and strength of artillery, has not led to a change in the veiy nature of war ? Is it possible that war remains the 26 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? with%hV"mlre h"^' "^"'^^^hlocks, flintlocks, and ramrods with the mere difference that musketeers have been re- t&'/.' Tr'^T"' and pikemen by reserves and r.r K u '"^^^^"acy of the recommended systems IS so obvious that as soon as new instructions appear they aie submitted to criticism and changed. In truth the views concerning the duties of infantry presen" a labv'rinth 01 ^irreconcilable contradictions, one' Lr^atible^;!' The reader must not think that these contradictions are apparent only to the layman. General Luset, a ve^V ^Who t^^T''''''' 'P^""^'"^ ^f ^""^"^h tactic's. aS Who has not been astonished by the differences if view found in the text-books of our schools on question^ ouchmg the actual condition of tactics? Can we aZit agrees w th hat which they receive in the highest militarv training institutions ? The teaching of this hiSer sS ca.im. The ideas insisted upon in the teaching of the higher mihtary school change continually. Thie is a chaos ot contending ideas and principles, and outof ?he general confusion not a ray of light ^DDeais U it L7S h^ ^'^.^ ^"'^^^ ^^'' '^^^^ i'tLeu's'e" 'study.' Let teachers first agree among themselves 1 " ^ no less great But for many obvious reasons thev are expressed with greater caution. Many German mmtarv writers are restrained from a too frank adSL of the dangers and d fficulties of war under modernTondkions are constantlv ^HhI^ '"i^"'' f PPl^^^^n'^ry explanations are constantly added, and in the result of results we find When" 11° unro?"?""- '' r'"" "«^ ^^ ^'^-wt wt^en all units of infantry are furnished with trenching ools in such quantities that in the course Tf a very shor^ u"^ae?reth?r'' thrown up, each attacki^gLdy subjected to eight times the danger of their sheltered opponents. But in addition to rifl^e fire, att^ckingforces ? id ramrods e been re- serves and ed systems ppear they truth, the a labyrinth tible with tradictions >et, a very tics, asks : es of view questions we admit er schools 3t military her school 'e d' Appli- ng of the 'here is a )ut of the s. Is it r study?' lifferences they are 1 military on of the onditions lilitarism. 'lanations 3 we find therwise. trenching ery short ig body is sheltered ig forces HOW WAR Wll.L BK WAGED ON LAND 27 will be subjected to fire from the protected artillery of the defenders. -^ It is not surprising therefore that, concerning the character of the future employment of infantry, the views of different authorities present numberless and grave contradictions. A considerable number of military writers, judging from the experience of past wars, conclude that the main points in the employment of infantry in battle have not changed, ntantry will be employed in battle as in the past, but in loose formation, and the command of infantry will not be especially difficult not only for experienced officers, but even for those who have been taken from the reserve On the other hand, other writers declare that for the com- mand of infantry on the battlefield even more ability will be required than for the command of artillery and cavalrv For 300 officers who are capable of learning to command a battery or a squadron not 100 will be found in any army capable of leading infantry under fire. What, then shall we expect from the officers of the reserve ? In one thine however, all are agreed— that whatever be the tactics adopted, their successful execution will require great skill in taking advantage of cover and in overcoming obstacles knowledge when to seek shelter on the ground and to advance again at the proper moment. Will the reservists only just summoned to the colours be in a condition to fulfil these duties ? But even suppose that a considerable part will consist of perfectly trained and enduring officers and soldiers, what in such event will be their losses ? Some say that there is no reason for supposing that in a future war armies will sustain greater losses than in the past. Others no less authoritative, declare that attacks having with their object the occupation of an enemy's position m a future war will be so difficult and bloody that neither side will be in a condition to celebrate the victory. Before the defended position will be formed a belt iioo yards wide, for both sides equally inaccessible, limited by human bodies over which will fly thousands ot bullets and shells, a belt over which no living being if piij 28 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? will be able to pass to decide the battle with the bayonet. But another view is expressed. All this, some writers say, would be true in view of the small-calibre rifles and improved artillery now in use if the field of battle were a fn-^rf 7"'i n"^ ^^u^ distances were known and marksmen guaranteed that they would not be struck by the enemy's fire, and ,f the field of battle were a perfectly level spTce- but in nature such positions are rarely met with, and amies will take advantage of the shelter of woods and under- growth, eminences and depressions. Hidden behind the first fine of riflemen who will constitute the Kn^elfans the succeeduig lines will advance with much less losses folU^^Jhl'.'' ''P'k'^' u '"'" ^^ ^""^y Tor commanders to follow the approach of the enemy by means of balloons from permanent points of view and from portable obser- \TZrT' ""^'"^ ^'' '''.'^' "P ^y ^'^'y detachment ntending to occupy a position. Therefore with the ong range precision and striking power of modern artil- lery, which make i^t possible to scatter fragments and bullets to immense distances, it will be possible to shell an enemy out of woods and from behind bushes and inequalities of the ground There is no foundation for supposing that the enemy will select precisely those positions which will not give him the possibility of taking advantage of long- distance rifles and artillery. In addition to this, and fo renches and earthworks, he may prepare other obstacles for the overcoming of which the attackers from a shorr 1' f.T' '"1!"°'^ ^' ^^'' ''^"'^ '"^^^^^^ and under a con- stant fire will require no little time w-l^'/'^'j- '^ "uP"^"^ ^^""^ ^^ '^^^^ '•^"^e the losses, not- w thstanding the unquestioned improvement of the ballistic qualities of modern arms, will not be great. When the enemy IS within close range the soldiers will be nervous, they will aim badly or not at all, and modern perfected retrs^or^^ltrianl'"^^^ ''^" ^°^^^"^ ^''^^^'^ ^ Rut the soldier under cover will be subjected to very little danger. Resting his rifle upon the trench, he will fire w bullet space clevat of the iioo I very c All contin that th eftectii there z ditions defensi attacke e.xposir subject clanger enemy 1 tive, wl Even always so heav the am told tha armies one anoi rate thei making ( of one place at need to : less mut definite 1 Other shed and the gain the loss infantry ; HOW WAR WILL 3E WAGED ON LAND 29 bullet will bring death to whatever lies in its V,, ?. r space of 660 yards, while even If fi id a" ^ '^r'a "an elevation 11 will lall among the reserves. The e/perlence of the Chilian war demonstrates that at a ranee of fri.^ that the perfected rifles now the r iT d fwH be'ni^'mo^e eftect.ve than the weapons they bore in the pLt Bu s there any reason to suppose that with the favourable con d.tions for defence above indicated, soldiers acti^i^nnH?: defensive will aim badlv ? wru ' ^"'""^^^ acting on the attackers Zu hll il • ^^^' *^^"' ^^^^^^ that the attackers wil have suftcient courage to advance onenlv exposing their whole bodies, when the deSrs wHl h^ subjected to a danger eight times less ? In rS^ ev^n' h'! danger will not exist. At very short distances the fire of ^n Te^^^h^P'r ^"^ "^ ^ •""""'"g P^^- ^■" be quite ineffec- t.ve, while his rear ranks will be forced to cease fire Even if we were to admit that the defending armv will s^h^.?'tf ;"''"°'" ^"^^'■^^' "^ ^"^h case hisl^re will be he'Se's 'VoTh-'T' ^""""^^ destruction TmL^ nM f i wu ° *^'^ ^'^° a '"eply is found. We are told that the stronger the fire the farthf^r thl.r. ,^,^^^ armies will remain'from one anothe ^ w 11 ra^^^^^^^ ""^t"°^her; rivers, woods, and hills Will s^oSmessena rate them ; there will no longer be direct clashes of trn^ makingof man a bloodthirsty^east, Ind end "g „ ,^^^^^^^^^^^ nacT^t '^' conibatants. And since battlfs Jm take place at immense distances it will not be difficult hi case of need to retreat from the field. But in such even more or Snrrelrt"™^""^^" ^'^ '^^ ^^^- P'- wU^uJ .i,*5l*' J ""'^'■^ ^''™'' 'h' probability of terrible blood had and ,m„ense losses, but maintain that not thi but' los"e? maJ'be"^ 'r< '"' ™P°r^"' P°""' *'-'-- uie losses may be. The war of 1870 showed th,, mfantry ,s eapable of enduring immense losses. OtSer :\o IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLK ? \luJuf . ^I,^'" "lf^"^''y '^ ^^-'"V different from that Wh.ch fought .„ , 870. For many causes they admi a the lo!.ses will be uu ')mparably greater Modern arms not only incr*>ase the direct danger but paralyse the medical service, su. e it will be impossible organ.sc ambulance station, in positions exp7ed even the random shots of the enemy, and equally difficult to carry ofi the wounded. Modern rifles kill J two m les art. lery ,s effective at more than three and a hllf m les iter"" "°^"^''' '^"^'^^ °^ professional soldier , Sat ^f selves "dTn^'er'^Th"'" '^^^ "? '^^'^^ ^° ^^P«- '^1 seives to danger, fhe propaganda against war may turn the.r mmds in another direction. It is impossiblTto re tirtoTn '.'" '•'"''^ '"'"'^^'"^ '- sacrifice Tnd d ^r :i'- who lose si.ht"oTtr'.'%" ''"'*^' '^ "^•■'•^^•'y theorists tion^'nr'?^'^''''^',°"' °^ °P'"'°"« ^'^ "^et not only by ques- Some dec,afe"th'. Th"''' '"^ '^^" ^^ matters':>f7elan. :3ome declare that the improvement in firearms and tho adoption and application to military purposes of all he latest inventions, have cast into the'^ badcground mere njuscular strength, replacing it by military techn^ue i^wiVr'"''M""r ""^ ^'^^ "^^"^^1 training of leXs" t will be possible by means of the strategical concentra tion of marching columns at a certain point troutflanklnd' d"eSnce"'wn %?'" W'^ "^"''^ possible b^^au eh diW^r/Lervr'^"^' " consequence of the greater lo this the reply is : In order to carry out such ah operation it will be necessary to know aTuie mov t.'s of the enemy, while against sn> okeless powder ^0 ' range firearms, and against the precautions tak^-n 'or guarding the centre of an army, the obtaining of informa dSlVu't' 'thVrf'°" '' ^^ -habitants'^,, [fZTe render^ ^^n «n. . ^°"^^''"^^'0" of ,ight trenches will ZtZm - Xr ^' '"'"'"^ ^""^^ ^"^ surrounding an enem^ .. ,. ti,e constant arrival on the field of battle ,K ? on ;,i view of ent from that sy admit thai t danger but impossible to >osed even to ly difficult to It two miles, a half miles. •Idiers, but of expose them- ^ar may turn isible to rely md depriva- ary theorists 11 in western nly by ques- rs of detail, ms, and the 5 of all the "ound mere technique. ? of leaders, I concentra- )utflankand )ecause the the greater ut such an mOV ':l;rs vder, Vxii'^ tai;en for )f informa- II be more nches will jrrounding Id of battle HOW WAR WILL IE WAGKn . >y LAND „ of fresh forces, which will be fretiucni .«.-in» . inhuHon of armies over (rrcieTr.r "'"8 '" " " <''»- po...i„„ of .n„ a™, whicl.^at I,n s" 'n ? ' """"«'='• ""= T1.US we find before us a whole series o/T„ '"?''"""'• similar nsuperable ob Lies 1 f ^'"'^ """ '"'" """' all probabihUil'fot^tchan i'^,r 'p^Il^^r """'" '" it has got within ^ cl vnrH?//. V ^^^ defenders, when 3~ paces wilXve S; tlfaX f'^L 'T ''""^ '^''""''' against the defence WiVl, '"" V^^"- strength available attacking force! ^ '"" '" °"^" '° """""'"te the decla,;;t^r'r^ IXfZ ^"'".T"^' ^--^' duller, "soldiers win be comnell.H ■''™"' '°"'' ""''"■in'-'tion as much ar oss,b To st'e/bvTe' '°™''''°"' ""' 32 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? advice of General Muller, attacking troops will be^-n tn X: n;',oT^ [r ^'^ ^"^"^^'' "P '^ ^'attL^'avinl? sunerea no Joss. Let us also suppose that at that di«,fnn, the'dlreX t thl'f '"f ""^V "umbers^^eT ,*; me aerenclers m the trenches only loo men Now A-r.,,. Of t!;aS\i::^^ rr„rira-„'i;zx'"^ r^t upon the assistance of artillery at the nrpT^.^^, ?^ the quantity and quality of ar'i'ry^::^),^;^ boTh liT the same, is impossible. To obtain a superiority of^^^ fire over that of the defenders will be eauX dfffi ' u thaTtr'^Ij r T'''^^--''^ P-Ponderance oT: Lg^" that the defending army in the very moment of attack i^av find Itself m a position of complete security ^ thilfL^'"'''^" ^^"'•'^' -^^"'^^ expressed the view to this time uncontroverted, that for attack it u.ni i .' u anTtS;^ ^"^P^°^ ^"'■"^'■>- "P- '^e'e'nem; "posi on^ and this of course can only be done by the concentra hon d f:n"c:" TZ'^^'r''''' '"^r -^ ^^'^^ dis^osalor ," defence. If the rifle-pits and trenches of the defender'^ position are furnished with internal covering the as Stance Onlir^fte ZhT r' "^"•"^••^ ''' ^'-^^ destrucHon unly alter such prehminary action may the actual attack by infantry begin. But to approach an adversary in . strongly fortified position, in the face of a fire ove? LIh he distances of which have been ascertain d before land advance to the limit of the fine of fire of ?h.^ ""^ taken from the assaulting army, always ac JdingTcT thll? order the pi These which be bCj the de rorem( Nov of Gei take s liappei before central withou while 1 f the po5 I Gen< I system j cessful, conditi< assume panic-s no rigl would system cessful such }os To re of mod( the trad last ar^ in the foreign i ditions V of an ir advancec a volley B\ such decided, LE? 5 will begin to at time having it that distance 400 men and n. Now from r the distance , only 74 men lal attack with tig troops will ; paces, or that position from •ning methods ge. To rely nt day, when )n both sides iority of rifle ally difficult, strength ; so )f attack may the view, to will first be y's position, oncentration posal of the le defender's le assistance istruction. actual attack ersary in a Dver ground beforehand, ^o days to : body will he entiTiy's must send companies ng to their HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 33 Older in the ranks The advanced troops will proceed to the pouns selected, and immediately en rench then'selves Ihese selected points of defence will form a line fro^' which on the following day the storm of the position win be begun, after the opening of a strong rifle fire agains ^^^^r' ''' ^''--^ ^' ^'^ — ^-^ons inSThe^ Now here comes in the chief difficulty in the execution General Janson's plans. First of all the enemy win take such precautionary measures that it wi^f seK^ happen that the echelons advanced into the f^ ing Hne before dawn wdl be able to find natural cover on the contrary, the greater part of these echelons will reml wuhout protection, and will stand exposed for a long ime :i:f;.^j^^:^r'^ '^ --- ^^ «-• ^^ p^rg system of ^JZT ^'"'"'^^ ''/"' ^''''^ P^'-^"^^^^ that the system of attack recommended by him will prove suc- cessful, even m the majority of cases. Indeed as a condition precedent for ^he success of the attack he assumes that the defenders will be disorgani ed 'and TH^tt tr ' '' ''^ ^""^ ^'"^ ^^^-^ ^'-"'"e have no right to assume concerning the enemy what we would never admit about ourselves." Orcourse the system of attack he advocates could only prove sue! such"' ^""'"" ^°"^^' ^"^ -' alwaVeven af?er aJl'f^ "'"'P^^ °" '^/ "'"^"^^^ °^ '^^ bayonet in face of modern intensity of fire would be to judge onlv hv the tradition of those times when the bayonet was^he ;?th:\T"\'"'^"!f- I" ^he Russiararmy, fath n the bayone is still sometimes expressed. Amone foe.gn authorities it is no longer met with. The con? dtions have wholly changed. In former times the result of an infantry battle was thus decided : the combatants advanced upon one another without flinching, exchanged a volley or two, and then rushed upon oie anmher d^cide'd thTweT"'^ -^ '''' '' ^'^ ^'"'^ was quTkly decided, the weaker side gave way, and escaped without c ki^ «K" •in 34 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? difficulty if the enemy employed no cavalry. The victors sent two or three volleys after the vanquished, and the battle was over. The conditions are very different now. Before an attack with the bayonet can be made a zone of murderous fire has first to be passed. Retreat after a repulsed attack upon a fortified position, will be accomplished only after the loss of more than hal^ the attacking force. At such short ranges as will be found in bayonet attacks, almost every nfie bullet will disable one soldier, and often more than one. On a smokeless battlefield the results of such an overthrow will be visible to all. At such close ranges the present covered bullet will penetrate the cranium ; but in other parts of the body will have a shattering and tearing If we accept the opinions of the specialists cited that the defendmg troops by the force of their fire can stop the attack at some hundred yards distance, making further progress impossible, we are bound to admit that the defenders in their turn will not be able to undertake an assault, which would merely result in changing their positions with the enemy. The attainment of success, as happened in the past, and especially in the war of 1870, by means of manoeuvres and enveloping, will, in the war of the future, also be unlikely. In the first place such operations demand great superiority of force, whereas armies will be almost equal. Further, for the enveloping of an enemy's position reconnaissance under fire is necessary, and this is a very arduous task. A defending army driven from its positions, will begin to retreat by convenient roads, either finding new points of resistance prepared in advance, or again entrenching itself in suitable positions, continuing its opposition to the attacking army, and inflicting upon it new losses until reinforcements arrive. In view of the conditions of modern war the question inevitably arises : Will leaders be found gifted with sufli- cient talent to decide the problems of war, and overcome The victors hed, and the Before an 3f murderous pulsed attack ed only after ce. At such tacks, almost i often more :sults of such se ranges the nium ; but in J and tearing s cited that can stop the king further nit that the mdertake an mging their he past, and loeuvres and be unlikely. t superiority Further, for onnaissance ry arduous sitions, will finding new or again Jtinuing its ng upon it he question with suffi- i overcome HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 3s difficulties which seem almost insuperable? Year by year the mechanism of war undergoes improvement, and It must continue to become more complex. The fortifica- tion of frontiers continues, the strength of armies grows Would It not be madness to begin a war when the verv methods of attack are the subject of dispute, and the only mdisputable fact remains that every mistake, in conse- quence of the immense power of firearms, will be followed by ruinous results ? In enunciating the more important questions which arise from the new mechanism of war, we naturally meet the question : Is there not a strange contradiction in the preparation of powerful weapons of extermination, and the subjection to military service of almost the whole of the -own population in those states where the spirit of the time 13 so decidedly opposed to militarism? In order how- ever, to prepare a basis for a reply to this question we should be compelled to describe the entire action of that mechanism denominated an army of which the constituent parts are here marshalled. General Count Caprivi declared in Parliament that the people was possessed by a madness for figures. And indeed all European states from the time of the introduc- tion of universal military service have been in a position to call under the colours almost the whole of their able- bodied male population. But these men are not soldiers. They are worthless save when they are properly armed and instructed. In addition they must be commanded, and without leader- s^iip the best army in the world would be an inert mob Only men with commanders can be named soldiers. Different authorities variously estimate the strength of armies which might be placed in the field on the outbreak ot a war. To preserve impartiality we must introduce all such estimates. But the following figures, which relate to the year i8q6 appear to us the most probable. ' The military strengths of the Powers are as follows : 36 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Germany 2,«;«;oooo Austria-Hungary .... V^so.'Z ^t^^y • 1,287,000 Total . . 5,135,000 2,554,000 • • 2,800,000 5.354.000 France Russia Total To arrive at this result the governments of these coun- tries have lavished milliards. Yet it is a remarkable fact that the relative strength of armies has not changed not- withstanding the eiforts of every State to outdo its neigh- bours. ** Conscription, as at present systematised, has one good side— it bears in itself the embryo of the abolition of war On the mobilisation of the whole working population in the different cjuntries difficulties may easily arise the con- sequences of which it would be difficult to foresee. Within recent times immense sums have been laid out to ensure the rapid concentration of all possible forces as quickly as may be after the declaration of war, in positions near to the enemy, in order at once to begin a determined attack. Such arrangements in 1870 gave the Germans the most splendid results, and their necessity is now generally acknowledged. But since then the conditions have changed. The superiority which rapid concentration and mobilisation will give may be counterbalanced by the greater order which will result from less haste, and the less grave economic disorganisation which slower mobilisation will cause. There can be no doubt that the immensity of modern armies and the weight of their equipment enormously in- crease the need for endurance among the rank and file Infantry soldiers are compelled to carry a weight of from 25 to 35 kilogrammes, or from 70 to 87 pounds. To become inured gradually to this there will not be time • long marches must be undertaken at once, and not a small pro- portion of the soldiers will break down from exhaustion HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND jy The French medical authorities declare that after the first two weeks of marching the hospitals will conta^i looooo men, excluding those disabled by wounds. ' To obtain quarters for an immense number of men will be impossible, and armies in the very beginning will be deprived of the most necessary conveniences. It will be difficult to guarantee large masses of men with pro- visions, with the same speed with which those men are mobilised The loc?^ stores at the chief points of move- ment will be exhausted, and the transport of provisions from the central organisation will require time Of the consequences of mobilisation we may judge, although imperfectly, by the experience of manoeuvres. In France the manoeuvres have already revealed imperfect training of officers, and unsatisfactory fulfilment by the reservists of their military duties. At every obstacle these men broke up into formless mobs ; they fired badly, so badly, indeed that it^ was admitted that in the event of war three or four weeks training would be required before they could be sent to the front, especially upon offensive operations It 10 improbable that in other countries similar in- efficiency has not been observed ; and that this inefficiency IS not spoken of so openly may be due to greater restraint or to insufficient means of publicity. It may, indeed, be said that universal military service lor short periods presents conditions in which lie con- cealed the germs of the impossibility of war itself This impossibility lies mainly in the difficulty of providing for immense masses, as a consequence of the diminution in productiveness, the possibility of economic crises, and popular commotions, and, finally, in the extreme difficulty oi directing armies consisting of millions of men With the growth of populations armies will continue to grow, and since even now the immensity of armies and the condition of armaments and tactics make the appara- tus of war so complex that the directing, feeding, and lorcing of armies into battle has become very difficult in a not very distant future it will be more than questionable. Ihe more complex the apparatus the greater intelli- 'mil 38 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? gence will be required for its management, both in tho- extermination grow more powerful the more essential will It be to act at the psychical moment. In the network o opinions, conditions, needs, and dangers which will arise at almost every point of a struggle, in the opinion of Sirtin'hf "'''''^''"•^•^ powerfully developed intelli- gence w.l be in a position to act. The immensity of armies will cause great complexity in the whole apparatus ^.f war; but, at the same time, side by side with ?he in! crease in the size of armies, grows the power of weapons of destruction. The power of the rifle has been increased fourteen times and that of artillery forty times ^^^^'' nftVll ^^'^' T^'^'^^l "? ''^' depended upon the ability of the commander and the courage of his army. In the future, success will depend more on the ability of the commanders of individual bodies of troops, on the initiative and energy of all ofificers, on the personal example which they set to their men, and finally even "1 the condition of the soldiers themselves For the just direction of all this gigantic mechanism much experience will be required. But where will experT enced commanders be found m the future, when experience even of the present conditions is lacking ? P*^"ence The conditions of modern war are such that of necessity the directing power must pass from the hands of the older commanders not to speak of generals-from the hands of colonels and even commanders of battalions— into the hands of captains. Yet the French Professor Coum^s m his work, -La Tactique de Demain," declares that S the command of infantry on the field of battle such skill will be required that in no army will there be found 100 officers out of every 500 fit to lead a company under fire. offi I f ""^^ J"^ ^^'"^ '" ^™^ °^ P^a^e concerning the officers of standing armies, what will be th ^ state of affairs in war .-> What will the chaos be when two-thirds of the men in the ranks shall have been taken from the reserves w^ho have forgotten their duties, who do not know their officers,andto whom their men in turn are equally strangers ^ HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 39 The army will pass under the baton of the Commander-in- Lhiet as It has been made by mobilisation. Consequently the dispositions for mobilisation have greater importance than before, and defects in mobilisation cannot be remedied in time of war. In view of the colossal size of modern armies their direction in time of war will be extremely difficult even for the most gifted leaders In addition to military skill, it will be necessary that a commander-in-chief shall be a good administrator Every- where it IS recognised that the supply of an army will be a labour of Hercules, and attempts will continually be made by the enemy to destroy communications. To lead an immense modern army, to concentrate and deconcen- trate it as necessity requires, is a labour in no way easy • but to keep it in supplies will be an especially burdensome task. Before the introduction of long-range firearms, battle- helds were no larger than the exercise grounds of a modern brigade. The battlefields of the future will prove to be much greater in area than those of the past. The most powerful mind will not be able to embrace and combine all the details, requirements, and circumstances of an immense tield. 1 he receiving of information and the despatch of orders will be very difficult in the general uproar. The position vvill be all the more difficult since it will be seldom possible fully to concentrate the army for battle • often many divisions will approach at their own time. Hence it will happen that the independence of commanders of divisions will play a considerable part. The wars of the eighteenth century required one commander. The present more mobile tactics necessitate as many commanders as there are ino. ^..endent sections of an army. And yet Europe has no generals experienced in leading such masses, and none experienced in the keeping of armies supplied with provisions and ammunitions on a scale even approaching that which will be needed in the luture. If dealing with such complex problems the commander-in-chief prove incapable, tremendous losses are bound to be sustained before he can be superseded 40 IS WAR NOW IMI'OSSIBLE ? actiln n?'^=. K^''"^'''^" °^ '"P*"^"^^ command, but the S erallv f"^°r^'"^V^ conm,anclers, and of th^ officers L'!? J' . ''rT °^ ^^^ "^^y •" which troops will be scattered and of their loose relations to one another and m v,ew of the difficulty of taking advantage o? cover as a onsequence of smokeless or nearly smokeless powder has become considerably more complex, and in future oTcts'^But'tr'^"^ ^^^'°" -"'"^^ required torn itrn^e^e'aU'rrgrtTa^^^^^^^ °^ ^^^^ Every meetmg with an enemy will prove more threaten ing, and every mistake, every hesitation wil^Lve much more serious consequences than in the past, both in its material and its moral relations. A cloud of smoke wi^^l ctflLrVhe s^fd'^'^'f/ ^°"^^^''"^ theVorr^rstfTh cw K- J ^°^'^'^'' ""'" "°^ se^ the enemy, or hear ihe shot which may deprive him of hfe, bui he w HI see around him his dead companions. As a consequence of tore' win r\-'' r^^' °' ^"' - ^^^ baullsTthe rl"c:d";^ai:;"'^^^^^' ^° ' '''''''' ^"^ ^^^^-^° "-xpe- notlwe t^ 1- ""^"r J'"^"'^ •" ^^'•^^^^ i« another notable fact. Since the Franco-German war twentv-nine years have passed, and since the last Russo-Turk^s^ war twenty-two years. But even if these wars were less remote conclusions drawn from them would be inapplicabTe to modern conditions, all the more so because each o? the e wars was characterised by exceptional circumstances In Irmi's'^ere r^' ^'^ TT"" ^"^ ^^^'^'^ «^ ^he two armies were oo unequal, while the war of 1877-78 in European Turkey, presented itself chiefly in the form of the siege of a single fortress. Since then the introduction of smokeless powder, the general improvement of arms and the growth of the importance of field fortificadons have completely changed the system of tactics. ' Of officers who have studied military science not on exercise grounds but on the field of battle, there are ?ewer than there were in former wars, and in a few years thle will be none at all The absence of experience must be HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 41 replaced by scientific instruction. But military science in one important respect differ. Irom other branch^ of W Icdgeniasmucii as itr, theoretical teaching is not accom" pamed by the constant test of experiments' such as a^e niade for u^stanee in chemistry, mechanics, and n ecHcine Manoeuvres give neither complete nor truLtworthv in r' ma .on, as much that is allowed would pTove^impos s.bie .n war and moreover they lack what Bisma Ta he s.ege of Paris, called the " psychological moment " It was not without reason that General ^^0^?.!^ observed that manceuvres would be much mte Sue iv! .f^even one out of a thousand cartridges contS a Meantime a fundamental change has taken place in the very elements of war from which depend, on "he one hand us course, and on the other, its influence on all the depart ments of socal order. On the field of ba tie Sead of moderate easily supervised armies and the Preserves marchmg m deep and thick formation, elbow to elbow there will advance whole peoples up to fifty years of age' com manded for the most part (three-fourfhs) by oS from the reserve, who will have almost fc^goiten the military These immense mobs will have at their disDosal npw explosives of tremendous power, and arms wfth in oLpa^ ttLTrgrSfw\n"' '-'''''''' ''^^ ^^^-' ^- "-- The immense extent of the theatre of war • the vastnpc;^ of the field of battle; the difficulties prlsen^ed b^S natur^ T r''' ^^'^'^"^ ^"^ fortifications, and"^ 'ho e tau.hf to .u"r °" f^\b.-^^I^field which soldiers are now S of th. H !f/- ^""^ "f"'^ inevitably will be utihsed in massed ittltfi"''u ^^u'^^i^"'"" ^''' '^' impossibility of massed attacks ; finally, the duration of battles^ which mav be prolonged for several days, and which owing to he^m T.:iTi:L '"""' "^^ ^^^'^ "° ^---^ ?es'ults-^^," tnese are new cn-cumstances. thet c^ndit?nVi'^ '".'"'^'"^ importance of officers under tnese conditions, systematic attempts will be made in all 42 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? European armies to kill offthe officersoffhe enemy Exoe- ricnce even of the last wars, when it had not been adopied as a pnncple to disable the officers of the enemy, showed how possible was the rapid diminution of the number of othcers on the field of battle. At the end of the Franco- German war at the head of battalions and half battalions stood reserve officers of lower rank, and even sergeant- majors. In December 1870 in a Bavarian division there remained but one line captain. mt\Ti 'll"'VT,°" ""^ ^^'^^ ""'^y *^^l^P^" •" the future we may take the Chihan war, although only a part of the army rifles"^ combatants was armed with small-calibre The losses in two battles were as follows : Officers killed . M wounded Men killed H wounded . 23 per cent. 75 60 The high percentage of officers killed vividly illustrates the heavy cost of leading masses in war ^ ^'^sirates But the war of 1870 showed that if officers are lackinij to give example the men will not attack. If this were so in 1870 what will be the case in the future, when for every hundred soldiers in the standing army it is proposed to draw from the reserves : ^ ^ 260 men 350 »i 566 >» 573 »» 361 >» By Italy . ,, Austria ,, Germany „ France „ Russia The majority of these reservists will have forgotten colours "^Ortt "/'"^ ^'T P'"°' °' ''''''' ^^''^ the fr. !L ? i °^'^'' ''"'^ ^ ^'"^^l proportion will be trained up to date. But it is in their hands that all leader- ship will rest. Yet the percentage of officers who possess a good preparatory training is ; HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND my. Expe- en adopted ly, showed number of he Franco- battalions sergeant- ision there future we f the army lall-cahbre nt. illustrates "e lacking s were so for every jposed to forgotten with the ri will be 11 leader- ) possess In Russia „ Germany ,, Fnuice M Austria 43 41 per cent 100 M 38 il 20 II r I^Lwl "J^ experience has superseded science, we find that the officers who have been serving continuously will constitute less than half the staff; the other half will consist of officers of the reserve of all denominations, the majonty of whom will have long forgotten the military art. Of this first half almost all will be taken for the formation of new staff-s, &c., and the supply of line officers will be so exhausted that at the front there will remain in each battalion no more than eight of such officers— that is no more than a fifth part, or 20 per cent., a deficienc^ of four-fifths remaining which must be supplied partly bv retired officers, and partly by sergeant-majors and non- commissioned officers, for the greater part taken from those serving with the colours, but to some extent even from the reserve. Thus every military undertaking owing to lack of leaders will present a terrible risk, and only daring advocates of a policy of adventure would now determine to solve international questions by war. The frontiers of all states are sown with fortresses and fortified camps, and every road by which invasion might be made is prepared for defence beforehand. Even in times of peace immense forces stand at short distances from one another, and for the purpose of reinforcing them quickly strategical railroads have been built, so disposed that there can be no talk of the occupation of any country at once. A few days after mobilisation the opposing armies will almost directly confront one another In former times to hold great masses in hand, even in the case of failure, was comparatively easy. Long service and tactical exercises had turned soldiers into automata • in manoeuvres as in war, great masses of men advanced.' niiglity by their own inert obedience. In the present day armies almost always advance and act in loose formation, and with this the influence of the 44 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? mass on the individual unit disappears. It is obvious that for the attainment of success the employment of a thin line of riflemen will not be sufficient. It will be necessary to prepare for an assault by artillery fire, and then by gradually strengthening the firing line 'with reserves, alter which the position of the enemy will be finally attacked. Napoleon said that no decision in favour of battle should be taken where the chances of success were less than 70 out of 100 ; for when battle is once begun either victory or destruction must result. This rule of course remains applicable at the present day, but it must be noted that, with the immensity of modern armies and ihe vast spaces covered by the field of battle, if it be not impossible it will at least be much more difiicult to estimate chances of success and to foretell the course of events. Whatever technical improvements may exist, the first rule in battle is— obtain a superiority in numbers. The strategical problem (in the theatre of military operations) which lies in the union of forces exceeding the enemy's, corresponds in battle to the tactical problem, the acquire- ment of a preponderance at important points. Due de- fence, however, of the other points of one's position must be provided for, and the troops defending these latter points must sufficiently occupy the enemy's attention to prevent his forces from concentrating on the important point. A commander undertaking an assault must calculate the general consequences which will result from his initiative, and justly calculate as to his decisive blow, while provid- ing in the execution of his plan for those contingencies which arise in the moment of battle. Thanks to the system of furnishing troops with trenching instruments there will always be sufficient time for the construction of light earthworks, except of course on those occasions when the soil will prove frozen, marshy, or stony. A company by means of its own trenching tools may in the course of two and a quarter hours construct protection sufficient for a line of rinemen 250 paces in length. Small trenches, 100 paces long, for the protection is obvious )yment of a It will be }ry fire, and J line with :niy will be m in favour of success :tle is once . This rule day, but it of modern d of battle, lore diflicult the course 5t, the first bers. The operations) 10 enemy's, he acquire- Due de- sition must atter points to prevent t point. A Iculate tiie 1 initiative, lile provid- ntingencies 1 trenching Tie for the 36 on those narshy, or :hing tools 5 construct ) paces in protection HOW WAR WILL BK WAGED 0?. ^AND 45 of a whole company also rrquire no more than two and a quarter hours, but larger earthworks and cover for artillery need from two and a half ' , eight hours' time. A battery IS also provided with tren hin- tools, so that in the course of from two and a hnl: to eight hours, according to the magnitude of the work, it may construct protection for its guns. The chief difference between the tactics of modern and those of ancient times consists undoubtedly in the rare employment nowadays of direct attack. With modern arms and modern systems of defence generally, direct attack IS accompanied by such immense losses that com- manders, in all probability, will prefer flan' attacks, espe- cially if the enemy occupy a strongly fortified position. But for this a considerable superiority of force will be required. In the words of Von der Goltz, the growing power of resistance of every military unit will enable a single division to accept battle with an army corps if it be conhdcnt of reinforcement within a brief time by another division. Even if the first division were exhausted by battle, yet so much time would be required for its decisive defeat that it might await the arrival of strong reinforce- ments, when the course of the battle might be entirely changed. "^ As an example we may cite the case of the army manceuvres in Eastern Prussia in the presence of the Emperor in 1894. Two divisions of the First Army Corps found themselves at the distance of a day's march from one another, yet the first of them succeeded in holding out agaaist the assaults of the 17th Army Corps till the arrival of the second division, after which the defending divisions succeeded even in gaining some advantage over the enemy. In addition to this the flanking army cannot be certain that it will not meet with a fortified position on Its road, and to count upon the negligence of the enemy would be foolhardy. "^ Formerly the conditions were much more favourable for attack. Napoleon, who, as the history of his campaign shows, always had a plan of battle ready i»-:>J 46 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? nevertheless allowed a considerable margin to accidents to meet which he changed his plan in the very momcnj of action "It is necessary," he said, "to strike at the enemy and then to think what further to do." This policv answered well at a time when, although armies were very large, the commander nevertheless held in his hand all the threads of the battle, thanks to the fact that with clouds of smoke, short range weapons and the closer order of the armies, he could himself follow the course of the battle learn precisely all its events, and have ready close at hand considerable reserves. In the future such direct command will be incomparably more difficult, and, in consequence in order to preserve unity of action it will be necessary to observe more rigorously the original plan. Not only the question of supreme command, but also the action of the subordinate commanders and of officers generally, in consequence of >he loose formation of armies and of the difficulty of tal g advantage of the ground owing to smokeless powder, has become much more com- plex. In the war of 1870 one of the circumstances which helped the Germans to victory was that the German officers were much more independent and self-reliant than the I* rench. But what would the result have been if the French army had not been from the very beginning several times weaker than the German, and had been even in part well The following is the judgment of the Prussian General Janson : The characteristic features of the campaign of 1870-71 were, on the German side, a general advance and extraordinary liberty of the subordinate commanders- even down to captains. But this was accompanied by such dismemberment in the leadership that if the first attack had not succeeded there might have been the greatest danger for the attacking armies." Let us examine a modern battle. As examples we will quote two sketches, the one borrowed from the celebrated work of Von der Goltz, the other from the French Captain iNigote. Both these sketches represent the course of a to accidents, very moment strike at tlie This policy es were very hand all the ■ith clouds of order of the •r the battle, ;lose at hand Jct command isequence, in necessary to id, but also d of officers 3n of armies the ground more com- ances which man officers It than the the French veral times in part well an General ampaign of dvance and imanders — ipanied by if the first : been the les we will celebrated ch Captain ourse of a HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 47 battle in its general features, and the second shows great skill also in depicting the battle of the future— that is a probable picture of a battle under modern conditions ' Goltz describes an accidental battle, and then considers the differences between such a conflict and a battle which has formed part of the plans of the commanders-in-chief. It IS obvious that in the accidental battle the chief part will be played by the eye of the commander-in-chief his readiness in the appreciation of complex circumstances and his resolution. " In such a state of affairs," he says' '* the fortune of battle will lie with the commander who first comes to a clear decision, and who iudges better the most distant events of the battle." On the other hand in the planned battle " all is arranged in advance, althoui^h plnns may demand alteration owing to changed cir- cumstances, contingencies requiring from the commander ability to take advantage rapidly of his position. This picture gives no image of that which will happen Ihe French Colonel B. in his composition "La Poudre sans Fumee," which awakened much interest, says • Having no means of precisely judging our position, the enemy will be constrained to advance towards us in marching columns in order to deploy immediately on the discovery of our lines. But where shall he gain informa- tion ? He w!ll be struck by artillery fire from a great distance, and the position of this artillery will be extremely difficult to determine precisely. ... He will neither hear nor see enough for his purposes, and thus in a particular sense the words of Scripture may be applied : ' Eyes have tney and they see not, ears have they and they hear not ' Reconnaissances and other means may be employed to determine the position of an enemy, but after these are made, changes in disposition may have taken place, and basing his operations on information thus obtained an enemy may open fire on unoccupied points, and waste his ammunition, firing, as is said, 'at the sparrows.'" Ihus smokeless powder ensures long ignorance of positions and much search, and in consequence serious losses until the true position of things is asrertnJn^^ri if 48 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the attacking troops be opposed by a capable and active iSes ^ uncertainty may cost them immense But the battle is now in full play. We will quote here the picture of a modern battle dmwn by Captain Nigotc This picture is, of course, only the fruit of imagination as all the new instruments of extermination have not 'ye been employed in practice. But imagination has worked upon a knowledge of the subject, and Captain N™ picture has as much claim on our attention as oU.e theoretical sketches. ...-'ii^^^-'^'"^^"*'^. i^ ^^°° y^^^^ fro"^ the enemy. The artillery ,s in position, and the command has been passed along the batteries to 'give fire.' The enemy's artil erv replies. Shells tear up the soil and burst ; in a short tirnc enem V "^ Th7''^ ^"" ^""^ ascertained the distance of the airZVtb?! r^'/r^-''''''^ discharged bursts in the air over the heads of the enemy, raining down hundreds of fragments and bullets on his position.^ Men and horse are overwhelmed by this rain of lead and iron Guns destroy one another, batteries are mutually annihilated ammunition cases are emptied. Success will be wit h those whose fire does not slacken. In the midst of this nre the battalions will advance. "Now they are but 2200 yards away. Already the nfle bullets whistle around and kill, each not onl/find' ing a victim but penetrating files, ricochetting, and strik- ing again. Volley succeeds volley, bullets in great hand- of battle.''^"' ^' ^"''^""^ '"''^' ^' ^'^^''"^"^ ^"^"g^ '^'^ ^^^'d tn VA^ ^'!u^V ^^""^"^ "'^^""^^ the ^"^"^v, is now free to deal with the enemy's battalions. On "his infantry iron rl!n Z"'' '' ^'l ^' '°''."^^'' ^^^ S""« ^'^^^^ chicle' iron rain, and soon in the positions of the enemy the earth 16 reddened with blood. ^ ''The firing lines will advance one after the other bat ahons will march after battalions; finally, the reserves there will be a belt a thousand paces wide, separating rows. lie and active hem immense ^ill quote here aptain Nigote. nagination, as have not yet n has worked )tain Nigote's tion as other nemy. The been passed ny's artillery 1 a short time stance of the ursts in the I hundreds of I and horses iron. Guns annihilated, 'ill be with midst of this (Already the t only find- g, and strik- great hand- Lige the field is now free is infantry, direct thick ly the earth the other, he reserves two armies separating HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 49 them as if neutral territory, swept by the fire of both sides, a belt in which no living being can stand for a moment. '^ '* The ammunition will be almost exhausted, millions of cartridges, thousands of shells will cover the soil. Bu the fire will continue until the empty ammunition cases are replaced with full. ^ '"'uniuon cases " Melinite bombs will turn farmhouses, villages and hamlets to dust destroying everything that might be used as cover, obstacle, or refuge. b <- ^^ u^ea " The moment will approach when half the combatants will be mowed down, dead and wounded will lie in pa ahd rows, separated one from the other by that belt of a livrnTh^- P"'"' '^"P' ^^ ^ '''''' ^'^ °^^hells which no nving being can pass. " The battle will continue with ferocity. But still those thousand paces unchangingly separate the foes. Winch will have gained the victory ? Neither " This picture serves to illustrate a thought which since he perfection of weapons, has occupied fhe minds o all thinking people. What will take phce in a future war ' Such are constrained to admit that between the lorn batants will always be an impassable zone of fi e deadTy" in an equal degree to both the foes ^ the^'ful'urrl'hr"'^' -'"""''.'"J'' application to the battles of IbL 'Th. r ^ '^Vl^ °f ^'"P^'"°" ^^^"^^ ^^^y question- one ihoulh. T ""^ ''""'" '" '^' ^^^"^^ ^^ one minute, of one thought, the enemies approach with different plans he ba tie becomes furious; the decisive momenTarn ves ' t St the 'r^/ "^'^-r'^'" "' ^'^'^"^"^ ^^^^d- ^he con! tes , the most insignificant reserve sometimes beine the instrument of a splendid victory." ^ ^ It is much more probable that in the future both sides will claim the victory. Examples of indecisive batUes are found even m the war of 1870. Thus near Meu three ' g t'battle '^f f ^1' "!."^ ^^"^^^^"'^^ parts of one great battle. But which was decisively victorious at Metz "? In reality neither. The German artillery proved its supenonty ; the French infantry, armed Jth^rChlse- so IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? . pot, proved its. Notwithstanding heroic efforts on both sides neither one army nor the other gained a victory in the older and decisive sense of the word The shutting up of the French army in the fortress and Its subsequent surrender were the consequence of the cutting off of supphes, the result of the numerical supe- riority of the Germans. Theirs was not a victory of genius or military initiative— it was a victory of figures In a future war these conditions will be all the more important since the seal and sign of victory-the pursuit of the enemy-will be almost impossible. The celebrated Liebert puts the matter in a few words : '« In the oast battles were ended thus : the field was ours, the enemy turned in flight; the command to pursue was passed from lank to flank, and this crisis put strength into weary limbs; instinctively horses were spurred, all thought onlv of drawing the greatest possible profit from victory of causing the enemy even greater loss. Now matters arc very different." Infantry having sustained modern destruc- tive fire for a whole day, will be in a state of prostration, and so vast will be the space occupied by the army that even the reserves who are on the spot at the end of the battle will not be fresh As for cavalry, while rifle and ardlkry ire are powerful it must keep at a distance. Napoleon's cavalry constantly went into attack at a trot, but Seidlltz at Zorndorf ed his cavalry at a trot to within one hundred paces from the enemy, and at this distance raised it to a gallop. In the face of modern fire, cavalry must exert all Its strength to gallop across the zone of extermination In view of the difficulty of direct attack in the face of modern fire the idea naturally occurs of attacking under cover of night. Some military writers attribute immense importance to night attacks ; others, for a variety of reasons, find them inconvenient. Concerning this ques- Uon, ,t IS useful to cite the opinion of Lieutenant-General Puzuirevski as the most impartial. General Puzuirevski emphasises the laboriousness of movement by night after the work of the day, the difficulty of maintaining dis- cipline, and the difficulty of looking after the soldiers "Notwithstanding all this," says this authoritv. ^l^^i •rts on both a victory in fortress and ence of the 2rical supe- ry of genius is. H the more -the pursuit ; celebrated n the past the enemy >assed from into weary ought only victory, of natters arc rn destruc- :ration,and that even the battle id artillery "Napoleon's ut Seidlitz e hundred sed it to a t exert all nation, he face of ing under immense ^^ariety of his ques- t-General izuirevski ight after ning dis- soldiers. HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 51 nients by night are sometimes necessary in war and therefore must be reckoned with " ' Modern military history presents a remarkable example of a night attack-at Gorni Dubnak on October 12 iZl After great losses the army was unable to com nue tlfe assault, but remained on the captured positions close to the enemy's trenches, and on the approach of night rushed upon the redoubts and captured then^ with trifii fg loss General Dragomiroff emphasises the following advan- tages of night attack: The attacking body may escane observation for some time ; it may find an unexpectant enemy whose fire under such circumstances wil" be !nsil n ficant, and the bayonet may also be employed Gener! K rf'rtit'tV'l r' °P^^^^^°"^ -^he storming o Kars and he battle of Kagaretch, where the Turks pos- sessed an immense preponderance of forces a e poss^bl only by night, and that generally in view of the destru ! iveness of modern fire, it will be necessary to accu 1 etS^hiS' °"^'^"^^'- ^^"^^^' KuVpatkin llso fhlnllfu u '" ^'''''^"' °^ "'ght attacks, although he thinks they will succeed easier with small bodies of "foops and that picked men will be required ^ ' expect Ikde nrofi'^ ^?^ '•^' "^"J°"^^ ^^ ^«^^'g" writers expect little profit out of night attacks. It is true that thi^ French authority. Colonel B,*thinks that having the adUn very near to the enemy and create a panic in his ranks but the author of an article in the Neue mmJlheBl^^^^^^ as an illustration of the danger of mistakes by n ght qu^^^^^ Frerh'armlTa?'^''" "'^'^ ^'^ ^°^^' Regim^en't'cll-te rrencn army, having come into conflict by nieht with « eTuX'reYre orr^ was defeated, an^dltedttdy' he enemv H^ +^^' ^°"^^^d^«' ^^^o ""stock them for Mans^n^J,, Tl^ u'%' ^' ^^^'"Pl^ ^he battle at Le positlns h^,;'" ""^'"^J^" Germans gained possession of all positions, but in another place he expresses himself rt cidedly against night attacks, on the ground tratpaTiicsmav" easily occur in the attacking force. ^ ^^ W t " Die TafiirderlruS." pp. ./oi^'S' '''°' »• '''■ 52 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? However it may be, preparations are made in all armies for such contingencies. An illuminating bomb has been invented which burns from one to three minutes, according to calibre, and electrical projectors also which are capable ot Illuminating houses at a distance of 5500 yards and by the aid of which the smallest movement on the part ot the enemy may be observed. It is unquestionable that the possibility of anight attack will cause great anxiety in every army. In former wars there were many cases of false alarms and panics. As- suredly they will be more common in future, as the dangers ol war have increased, the nerves of modern soldiers are w-'^ker and owing to the system of short service, soldiers car.uot be mured as were the veterans of the past As tar as nerves are concerned it may be assumed that the superiority will lie with the Russian soldier. The endur- ance shown by the Russian soldiers in the passage of the Balkans in the winter of 1877-78 awakened the astonish- ment of strangers. The Prussian General Von Kahler declared that the work which they accomplished surpassed the strength of men. '^ The following well-known saying of Napoleon is no longer applicable, - When the battle is over the vanquished in reality are little weaker than the victors, but the moral result constitutes such a great difference that the appear- reTults "'"^wrh'^'"" '^"l^'°"' I' ""°"^h ^° cause great results. We have seen that such authoritative writers as the Prussian General Janson and the French Professor Langlois prophesy that battles will last several days, but a French Captain (formerly Professor) Nigote says plainly that battles may last for three or fou? days o? even for a fortnight.* Other military specialistsf and among them the well-known writer Fritz Hoenig.t think it St.r^? f ^!i '\^/ ^" ^'^ '"^"^"^"g to the epoch of s eges. Belgrade, Mantua, and Plevna may be repeated It IS very possible that the attacking armies, finding decisive victory unattainable, will attempt to enclose thf enemy in the position where they find him, and, after I ''La Bataille de Vesles," Capt. Nigote. T C^p. at. ante. E? in all armies nb has been es, according 1 are capable yards, and on the part night attack former wars ianics. As- > the dangers soldiers are ice, soldiers i past. As 2d that the The endur- sage of the rie astonisli- /on Kiihler d surpassed Dleon is no vanquished t the moral he appear- :ause great 2 writers as 1 Professor I days, but gote says ir days or alists, and ?,t think it : epoch of ; repeated. :s, finding nclose the and, after MOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 53 entrenching themselves, begin to make raids in order to prevent the piovisioning of the besieged. Such operations would be continued until the enemy are starved out. It is hard to imagine it otherwise, when we remember that, with much inferior weapons, even the badly trained French mobiles of 1870 were rarely beaten at once, a second day having usually been necessary to drive them from newly occupied positions. But the nature of the future war will be influenced by fortresses to an extent hitherto unknown. In the past fortresses were situated in the more imi)ortant strategical positions, but were only individual points equipped for passive defence. Nowadays, at all the most important thoroughfares are situated fortresses and fortified camps which contain such immense masses of troops that their turnmg is inconceivable. In addition to tliese, railways and roads are specie ,y built to ensure the rapid con- centration of troops immediately after war is declared; and, if the concentration of the enemy's troops should make it necessary, to provide for the quick transportation of troops from one spot to another. Having constructed such works on their frontiers. States consider it more than probable that they will be able with inferior forces to oppose an enemy, thus counterbalancing all the advantages which he may draw from the more rapid accomplishment of mobilisation. But, however powerful modern systems of defence may be, science has yet contrived such destructive weapons that the question has already arisen : How many fortresses in a future war will accomplish that purpose for which they are destined ? 1 his question has been the object of especial attention in military literature. For us, the question whether modern fortresses will justify the hopes placed in them has an importance of the hrst degree. If an attacking army be held upon the frontier for a long time in confiict with an enemy defending himself in fortified positions prepared beforehand, the economic consequences of war will be very dift'erent from those which would follow if the invaders were to break at once tiirough the lines of defences, and, having defeated the 54 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? defenders in the interior of their own country, were within a short t.me to occupy the greater part of thelTerritory Al examples rom the past, and even the history oHhe two last campaigns, throw little light on this ques ion Although fortress warfare in 1870-71 h.A ^ ■ ^"^®"°"- hardlv firpamf «f k . '"*^ ^", ^^/O-?^ had an importance Frlnnu f ? ^^°''^' ^^ ^^^ Germans captured fifteen French fortresses, still the methods taken frLfv campaign can hardly be applicab e to he'^uture 'S Pa'rir^Mltf r.d' BU' T '''"'' r^'''' '^^ exc:ption''"f tVpT'and Lir Ir ''''' ^^^^/^•-t'-^^sses of an obsolete type, and their defence was badly conducted. i8?7" 7s' ^'''''',^^"^' '^^ battles at Plevna, in the war of 1877-78, mainly proved the close bondL which exis alone which compelled Osman to attempt to break o^ft and Plevna fell only after all the methods^of siege Ware had been put in operation. ^ wariare m.^i""^ those days the science of fortress construction has made great advances, while, on the other hand, "he means of attack have increased proportionately. The subiect of fortress construction is very complicLd and is fnH elucidation would require detailed ^chnrcar exposition which would have too special a character. ^^P°^>^'°"' whicrarud'v"nrr''K°"'^ ^^ ^^^^^^^ concisions to wnicn a study of the best authorities leads. The more important the fortress the more difficult will t be lor the attacking army to pass it, since, if the fortress comained troops in a condition to attack they would threaten "he communications of the invader's. To seek a guarantee against such operations merely by placing aga^nsUt no ts rLl?''^'''°" IS impossible, since if the fortris contain a ? • were within territory. >tory of the s question, importance I red fifteen from this ture. Tile ^ception of n obsolete the war of hich exist as become the Turks acting on an insig- of taking as hunger )reak out, fe warfare iction has he means subject of 1 its full ^position, Jsions to rhe more e for the contained :aten the guarantee t it posts ontains a e detach- m which nies and HOW WAR Wr.L BE WAGED ON LAND 55 For the invest). lent of a modern fortress, say, with thirteen forts, with intervening distancf s of 2\ miles and with fortified batteries between the forts, would require,' according to a calculation made by Brialniont, an army of 122,000 men and a special siege corps of 50,000 men, in all 172,000 men. It may be mentioned here that the line of investment of Paris required 28 men for every 3j feet of fighting line. For the mvestment of the fortress postulated by Brialmont, according to this precedent, the investing army must be 246,400 strong, or together with a special siege corps, 296,40 3 men and not merely 172,000. In order to give some idea of the time required for the siege of a modern fortress we will cite the approximate estimate, taken from a French publication on the attack and defence of fortresses : * Period of investment, and arrival of sieg- ing weapons, &c. Attack on forts the first line. of I Defeat of the enemy's advanced lines Occupation of posi- tions for close in- vestment of the fortress . Setting in position and construction of parks / Construction and equipment of bat- teries of the first position . Artillery duels and bombardment Occupation of posi- tions for batteries of second position, &c. 8 days 10 V 30 days. 12 I 45 Successive capture of interlying defensive Attack and capture of the fortress itself 25 contiguous forts and attack on lines 20 25 Total 120 days '' Attaque et defense des places fortes ou Guerre de si^ge." Pnbhee avec le concours d'officiers de tnntes arm.es et tout le patronage de la K6union des officiers, Bruxelles 1886. 56 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? At the present day there is a conviction widely spread among military engineers and artillerists that, in view of the perfection of modern artillery, fortresses will not be subjected to siege, but will be attacked with open force The downward liring of shrapnel out of short guns and mortars will deprive the fortilication of defence ; direct fire from heavy artillery will batter the walls and open a free path for the storm of the fortress ; the introduc- tion of shells containing five and a half hundred-weight of powerful explosives, will so increase the destructive power even of individual shots that all the older construc- tions will prove worthless, and even the new fortifications defended with armour will prove little better. Even a comparatively short bombardment with such projectiles will be sufficient to make the fortifications useless to the defence. The chief upholder of such opinions is General Von Sauer, who proposes a system of shortened attack. The dililerence between systematic and accelerated attack in the exposition of General Sauer consists in the following : "Systematic or regular attack is directed mainly on one side of the fortress, while accelerated attack threatens all accessible sides. And since on the employment of the first method the besieged may devote all their strength to the defence of one side and even of one threatened point accelerated attack is calculated to prevent such concentra- tion, thus making it easier to overcome the scattered strength of the defence." Against systematic attack the measures of defence con- sist firstly in this. The front or fronts which, according to the position of the roads are the nearest to materials which might serve for the construction of batteries and which by the configuration of the country will be most threatened, will be strongly fortified in advance. Against accelerated attack, which will be founded on considerations rather tactical than technical, it will be necessary to fortify strongly all fronts, for which resources will not always be found. But it is relying precisely on this circumstance, on the mobility of modern artillery, and on the difficulty of cicly spread , in view of will not be open force, t guns and nee ; direct 5 and open e introduc- ired-weight destructive :r construc- )rtifi(ations ". Even a projectiles iless to the meral Von tack. The I attack in following : nly on one reatens all of the first igth to the ned point, concentra- scattered fence con- according materials teries and 1 be most Against iderations '• to fortify always be umstance, ifficulty of HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 57 complete protection from projectiles, that the "tactical" attack is founded— the attack, as will easily be conceived, being directed not on the strong but on the weak parts of the defence. But the defenders of a fortress will oppose the enemy with four consecutive lines of obstacles, that is, a first line of opposition, a chief defensive line, an intermediate line or line of reserves, and finally, a fortified unbroken rampart or central citadel. The capture of even the first line will require considerable effort, since this will consist of a series of field defences. The field will be strewn with numerous but small earthworks in the form of pits which the enemy cannot see from afar, and upon which artillery will have little effect, while, on the other hand, the skilful marksmen concealed in these pits may cause considerable loss. In the attack on the chief defensive line it must be remembered that the improvements made in small arms and in artillery will prove as much in favour of the defence as of the attack. The North American war of 1861-64, the Franco- Prussian war of 1870-71, and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-78 offer sufficient examples of the immense efforts and sacrifices which will be required in order finally to overcome an antagonist who has turned his circumstances to advantage in advance. What will happen in the war of the future when the defenders will have the support of a whole system of defensive works ready at hand ? Milliards have been expended in Germany and France since 1870, in Russia since 1882, and in Italy, Austria, Belgium, and Switzerland in more recent times, in attempts to render frontiers impregn;ible, and, to provide for the contingency of the frontier defences failing to stop the enemy, on other defensive points at a greater distance from the frontiers. Not only are the frontiers of all states studded with fortresses, but even in time of peace great forces stand at short distances from one another, and for the conveyance to them of reinforcements a system of railways exists so complete, that from the very outbreak of war armies will i tnJ 58 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? almost immediately confront one another, and the snace ee for movement will be very sm.Il. With these S' t.ons, m the war of the future an operation hitherto u - fron^rd'ef:; '' "y^-f^^en-namely, to break through frontier defences. In vew of the hundreds of thousands beaknr'r''^ ^>"i"^n^ediately be concentrated, the i' inl^cel^;^"''^^ ""^ ^•'■^'•^"^ ^ ^'^'^ -- -'• battles .Jt^)^^^^'"'^^'^' '^^' ^^"^''^' Leva'' will know in ad- vance the approximate position of the field of battle. They cT^ ' ^^'^ P° "'' ^'^ '^'^ ^"^"^y'« concentration, ndY cated by the position of his roads and military stores Mass attracts mass, such is the law of gravitation in wa' I he enemy will advance upon our main forces, and eve the poin s of conflict may be approximately prophesied much'ror H ^'"'^ uncertainties," of which we hear so both 'J-H^ f r'y ^58'""'%' or war will not exist, and both sides will have full possibility to fortify themsdves in corresponding positions. '="'&civeb takln'.ff ^"f armaments of all European armies may be oW-ers both '" "«^^^'^^"--' ^"^ ^'^e preparation of^the sam.. Therefore, if we set aside the capacity of the commander-in-chief, as something which cannot be fore- seen, we shall be obliged to conclude that the only element of inequality is the number of soldiers in the ra^ks Supposing equality in the numerical relation, there would IroUrj^T^ ^r'""'" '^'^^'^" '^'' ^PP°^'"g ^°r^es, and^quai probability of success on both sides From this the question naturally springs-With the equality of strength which France and Russia have as agains^the Triple Alliance, will it be possible f'or the armies of he attacking powers m the present stale of fortified frontiers to atta"n any immediate and decisive success ? Comparison with the past gives us little information in this respect. We find ourselves confronted with cT.inlH P'^rT'"^"- ^" ^" ^""'^« ^ theory is p o- daimed as to the superiority of offensive action. But meantime such strong positions have been created for id the space tliese condi- hitherto uii- eak through 'f thousands ntrated, the iesof battles tnow in ad- )attle. They ration, indi- tary stores, tion in war. s, and even prophesied. fve hear so t exist, and themselves ies may be ition of the age is the ity of the ot be fore- ily element the ranks. lere would , and equal 1 this the f strength he Triple : attacking s to attain iformation ited with •y is pro- ion. But eatcd for now WAR WU.I. BE WAGED ON I.aND „ defence that their existpnrp ror.«^» u ■ , on the course of even The w "',';? ";"'""' '"""^"« may be sai.l, will be a strul^'fer for Hed^n":'; """"■': lor time reason it n.ust be |!;tlo„ged '^°""°"'' "'"' workers, the pmducers of tlf. kT '^'^ '"'"'^^^ °^ '^^ and it may be the nrnt^^fe Jr i > , '"rth the groans people ^ ^'^^ °^ hundreds of millions of human side of the nuest on I .l^' "'^^ d'-<^^Knvd the of the condi^ot^s of a fu Z „ ""^ '"'''''" investigation cotuparative ^ili.t^ 'SnT/ „?"',': ,^r«^™ir^°,'>- exfrntThe'da^abef-^'^'T ^''^^ ^-P^"-^ "« to armies torn, cH ^^.^'•^"S «" the condition and spirit of arm.es, to consider, for instance, those impressions which "1 6o IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? will be caused on the field of battle by die absence of a thick cloud of smoke obscuring the riflemen. Speakine generally, we attempted to determine the military spirit of the various European peoples according to the character peculiar to each. We attempted to bring under considera- tion all that might be drawn from the study of former wars, in order to form an idea as to the qualities of the chief European armies. But conclusions drawn from tormer wars have but very conditional significance The spirit of armies in different countries does not always remain at the same level; after great height sometimes follow sudden fall and changes. And such changes take place m periods no greater than that which separates us from the last great European war. A remarkable feature of our time is the rapidity with which changes occur both in the material and intellectual spheres. In the course of a few years greater changes take place in social life than formerly took place in decades. In this there is no ground for surprise This great movement in life is ensured by the spread of education, the activity of parliaments, associations, the press, and means of communication. Under the influence ot these conditions the intellect of the West finds itself under constant movement. Another characteristic feature of our time is thus empha- sised by Gervinus : " Movements in our century proceed from the instinct of the masses, and it is a very remark- able fact that in modern history are rarely found examples ot the strong influence of individual personalities, rulers or private workers. In our time as in the sixteenth century peoples move in masses." . The list of great gifts decreases, while the number of moderate talents have grown to an extraordinary extent, l^ew great and exalted personalities are produced, but in the whole a great revolution in social life has taken place. It is for these reasons that the study of the spirit of armies in the future has such immense bearing upon the present work. ^ :? absence of a . Speaking tary spirit of be character :r considera- y of former lities of the drawn from !ance. The vays remain imes follow i take place ites us from ipidity with intellectual ter changes k place ill •rise. This spread of iations, the le influence finds itself hus empha- iry proceed Ty remark- d examples ties, rulers, : sixteenth number of ary extent. duced, but has taken e spirit of : upon the HOW WAR WILL BE WAGED ON LAND 6i It was necessary to ask ourselves the questions • What wi 1 be the temper of modern armies in the evem o de eat, or even of victory, if war should be prolonged ^ What W.11 be the effect of the news from the fidd of battle on theav.1 population ? What convulsions must we expec' after the conclusion of peace when millions o7excfted soldiers return to their destroyed and desolated homes ^ We attempted to collect data for the considem.on of hese questions, and with this object classified them 'n their constituent elements, resting upon precedent n^od- fied by the changes which have taken place in the const tution of armies in armaments, and in tactics. But n order to draw from these data conclusions on all the different points, it would be necessary to make a tiresome repetition of the degrees of different%ualiUes In armies and in addition, ,t would be difficult to represent in wTrds mth any precision the total of military qualities in the different armies in their twofold relationship- hat is their applicability to attack and defence. It would be necessarv %T V'fK'^"'"'-^'" ?! "^°''^^«' ^"'^"'-e. and sanitary con"^ d.tion of the various European armies. Only after such a laborious process could the system upon which we have estimated the respective values in attack and defence of the various European armies be followed. It is enough to give here the categories under which we have classified the elements which together constitute the generareffi ciency of armies : general em- (1) Susceptibility of applicaaon to the new conditions of war. (2) Composition and completenessof the corpsof officers (3) Capacity for initiative. (4) Endurance under difiiculty and privation. (5) Discipline. rri Fn^fr'^ f egoism, dangerous for the general welfare. 7 Faith ,n leaders and in companions-in-arms. {!i) bupplies and sanitary conditions 'lower 'rTnki^'^"' """"^ '"^^'''''^ ^°' ^"PP^^^^e^ting the 62 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? (lo) Conviction in the merit of armaments, (i i) Courage. As the final result we have obtained the following figures showing the comparative military efficiency of the chief European armies in attack and in defence : In Attack. ist Summons. Germany Austria . Italy . France . Russia . 95 80 65 72 88 2nd Summons, 80 68 51 59 80 In Defence. ist Summons 98 86 74 85 94 2nd Summon- 86 76 59 72 86 Of all the details in the above chapter we find most clearly m relief the threatening features which a future war must present, both as regards the sacrifices of the population, and as regards the risks which must be run by the states participating. But both these factors are explained more fully in the chapter devoted to " Plans of Military Operations." ^ i^ing figures, of the chief Defence. 2nd IS Summon-. 86 76 59 72 86 find most h a future ices of the List be run factors are "Plans of CHAPTER II PLANS OF CAMPAIGN : POSSIBLE AND IMPOSSIBLE The first consideration to he tnlr/>n .-^.f^ estimating the chances of the next grea" wa is fh'.°T' '° which has been brought about by th^eTrnpTo;", ' tZf arras and ,n the constitution of modern armies These" changes have all tended to the advantage of the de fensive and against the attacking force. Prev ous wars" under the old conditions had led to a convictYo,rof fh^ superiority of attack. The new conditions wh^h^^u tt^eo ipm'emof'r' ' " T''^' '"'' opiniL'^Ahkel" ine equipment ot t . > ..- and m the system of fortifications the changes have operated in favour of the defence ' 1806 with Ir"'.',? °^ ^^^^'"S men effective for war in i«9o with their artillery were as follows : Thousands of men. In Germany . . ^ccq „ Austria- Hungary . 1304 »' Jtaiy • . . 1281 Together 5135 M France „ Russia 2554 2800 Together 5354 Artillery. 4552 2696 1764 goi2 7320 4952 12,272 Detailed calculations lead to the following estimate of the probable distribution of the armies whidrm.^h be P aced in both theatres of war, after deducting tho^ forces which would be employed on garrison duty hi the hue o fii 64 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? of each country, and for the defence of the frontier against sudden intervention by any neutral State. In Thousands. Ger- many. Austria. Italy. 1 Total. Russia. France. Total. In the Russo- Austro-Ger- man theatre of war . . In the Franco- 690 979 1669 2539 — 2539 German the- atre of war . In the Franco- 2035 — — 2035 — 2126 2126 Italian the- i atre of war . 700 700 500 500 5165 Total . . 1 2725 i 979 i 700 1 4404 i 2539 2626 It IS obvious that all these troops could not at once be employed. The campaigns of the past were often begun with from one quarter to one-eighth part of the armies appointed for war. In the future the conditions in thts relation will have entirely changed. Speed in mobilisation as a consequence of the railways constructed specially foi^ of't't^lv^ rr'"'' '''? '"'"'^ '^'^ '^P''^ concentration ujl i ^ ""^'^ ^'''"''^'" °^ ^'^'^^> reinforcing the large armed forces maintained there even in times of nfi?r V^'" ^^^esh possible for immense armies to meet face to face. And as in every case the attacking side must exceed the defending in numbers, the question as to the disposition of armies near the frontier, and the means of transport of frontier forces to the positions which they must occupy in war, is one of the first importance But 1 does not enter into the subject at present under dis- on^Tf'^'h fi T"^ l"^"'""' ^'^'^ ^^ ^"^^^ the opinion of one of the first of modern military authorities, the Belgian E? ontier against PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 65 France. Total. _ 2539 2126 2126 500 500 5165 2626 •t at once be often begun the armies ions in this nobih'sation, specially for Jncentration n forcing the in times of E armies to tacking side estion as to the means which they ance. But under dis- ■ opinion of he Belgian General Brialmont. Brialmont estimates that France IS in a position to mobilise immediately nineteen army corps and Germany twenty, each army corps counting iorty-five to fifty thousand men. These will constitute the first line of the operating armies. The armies of the second line, according to General Brialmont, will on both sides be formed of more than half a million men. Estimating thus, General Brialmont concludes that on the theatre of the future Franco-German war the forces of both sides will be almost equal, consisting, roughly speak- ing, of about 1,500,000 men on each side. In view of the fact that four years have passed since the time of General Brialmont's estimate and that two-years' service has been introduced into Germany, we may take the strength of the army of the second line at a million men. And since owing to the numerical equality of the opposing armies and to the existence of the present fortifications, the advantage lies with the defending side, serious offensive action by Germany against France could be begun only after sending to the French frontier a great part of the German army. Under such conditions, Germany of course could not even think of contemporaneous assault upon Russia. She would be constrained, after allotting portion of her forces for strengthening Austria, to limit her remaining free forces to defensive operations. It is for this reason that we accept the strength of the Austro- Hungarian army against Russia as 1,669,000 as against 2,539,000 on the side of Russia. An examination of the views of all authorities leads to the conclusion that Germany, having possibilities for more rapid mobilisation and concentration, will aim at successes in the first operations, while Fiance will organise all her obtainable resources with the aim of retrieving the first failures. In order to consider the possibilities arising from this position we found it neces- sary to consider the conditions under which a new attack by Germany on France or by France on Germany must be begun, and first of all to sfnHv th" fr.r».fi^of; -r .l^ €6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Ill Franco-German frontier, and the probable paths of attark in Germany and France. ^ ^^^^ .Z?"^ .u *^°"«'^^e''^^'on of these conditions it clearlv appears that to pass the newly constructed frontier ifnes dr c So^ orF^'^ I"' 11"" ^^'^^« no means o att.rk n7f I r A ^'-'^"^^ ^y Germany except by the attack of fort.ded positions or the forcing of a path through narrow passages purposely left. These will ^be defend! ZZT ?"'' Z'^'r ^ ^^^^^^ ^-^^ ^^^-•- mobilisattn they do not exceed the German armies, will at least equal FreLch 'b^u't tt' '^.' ^T^"" "'""^^ ^■" ^' ^'''^' ^han the i-rench bu the estimate we have made shows the differ ence to be ins gnificant. The effectiveness of the German expr'essldT"' '"' '" ^""^^ '" ^^''-^ ^^^ ^e^us ^ ist Summons. and Summons. German . . . gc o. French . 95 ... «o Let us suppose that the German army will succeed in breaking through the frontier zone of operations anS advancmg on Paris by the routes indicated by General Bnalmont. Having calculated the result of such operatbns we come to the conclusion that at that time thrFrenS W.1 have available 1,160,000 men, while for the sfegTof Fans the Germans wi. have but 520,000 men. 1 he former German Chancellor, Count Caprivi a man corps in additio".rco"esponZgtse"vet''°nl';frv'^^^ Meanwhile our examination of the conditions in which the besieging army would find itself led us to the conclusion PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 67 that if the mih-tary strength of Germany proved sufficient tor the investment of Paris and the protection of its own rear, even then social and economic conditions would no" permit of such operations being carried to an end Gonsidenng the possibility of an invasion of Germany by the French, it may be concluded that, with the presem conditions of mobilisation and concentration of a mS such an invasion .s probable only on the supposition tha; tZTfn^A 7 '^' ^'^"-"^"^ ^^ '^' ^^^ limited^erself n the west to defensive action, relying on the strength of Metz Strasbourg, Thionville, and the Rhine forfresses and sending her offensive resources to the east. calcuTatL on the less rapid mobilisation of the Russian ^rmy ^ Jl'rUV ''^'"'''" ""^ specialists the only possible path by which France can attack Germany lies between Diamond and Longwy, with a movement thence on Mayence Bu what tremendous obstacles would have to be overcome a ff Met; pnH Th n" ^y relying upon the fortresses ot Metz and Thionville, the Moselle and the SeiUe and defeating this army, blockade Metz and Strasbourg Lke by assault the fortified positions on the Saar and tlfe stil! tronger positions in the Hartz Mountains, and fina v force a passage across the Rhine, about Mayence, Worms^ Mannheim, or Speyers. And all this would have to be ttn^hfGer'rn^an^^"^^'^ -'''' '^ ^^^ - ^- eU^en^ After considering, from all points of view, the possible invasion of Germany by a French army a million and a I'd '^"^' '^f'lf ""^''^ ^^^"^^"y would place in the field 600 000 field troops and 600,000 Landsturm k appears that the investment of Mayence and the fordn^ of a passage across the Rhine would be impo sib le Sfter allotTedT ''.'. '"'''' '" '^"^^ ^"^ °" '"^^ ^-^^^> the troops allotted for the investment of fortresses and the guarding communications, France would have available 350 (^ ^ e 72 and7' "'°" ^"^"^^ "^^ ^^ expressed' ^by'^ JZ?- ^ ' ^ Germany 350,000 of the field army, whose effectiveness m defence may be expressed bv the LTr.Z 51 'W 68 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? and in addition a Landsturm whose effectiveness for defence is expressed by the figure 86 "^"'^^"«^« ^^r But we assumed that Germany for defence woulH mii Fran.?'°^ ^^"^f^- ' ^^e sam^e supposUio„ Tpp ies " France I o complete her forces she would call un^cZ men of the territorial army, which would be empio^d^ secondary operations. Even with such condi!^ns whi h may be taken as very favourable to the French k is harS to beheve that the Rhine could be crossed. But even ff h t dv\"r^ftrtheT^'^' '" '^'j' ' p--^^ ^^^o: would ah-eady be on the side of the Germans. ^"P'"°'''>' in addition, Germany would have the Land«,fnrm reserves in number not less than 1,200000 men A pl?^ of this force might also be moved to the Rhine and Tn in consequence of the delay of immense ^fofces bvthe defensive lines and fortifications of the enemy, indwth on^ o~r the -S^^t^P-^-^^' -PPa^e^ superable ^^ii^cuity of provisioning appears in- showThat bnn' I' ^^' ''^''''''' °^ ^'■^"^^ ^"d Germany degree elentn T T'^t ^""''''^ ■" ^" ^'"^ost equa^ influencet Jwar ' W^^IT'"'^!:^^ "^^'"^^ ^^^ ^^^^^"c'ive conceive that The' t.r '""'^ '^''^^'^ons, it is difficult to undertake a wlr " '' ^' ^'™^">^ ^^"^^ PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 69 Let us turn to the other possible theatre of a Br^», European war and consider the oneraiinn^ ^r r- ^ Austria and Russia. In this theatrf Che l^tSfe lorces behind for the protection of communications The alliances concluded between Germany, Austria and I aly on the one hand, and Russia and F^rknce on ^he other, in view of the great differences which ex"st between grlT XlT'of c "^^^^^^ °' ''^'^ states 'reX pS a great variety of combinations in actual war In rnn sidering a struggle between France, Germany and I ta^ plans of mihtary operations are cimparadvely easy t^o c^diU-^-rL-et^H^^^^ ^=r^^e-s^'-^^;HHi T e tl^'/^f ''*' r'"'^"'- ""'' -onoiicStils decide a? tK ° *"'"■' "'""'"' 'hat Germany would We have given reasons for assuming that the mobili- a "e"d thfou'^h""'"'"^" 'J. ^'^ ^^^-- army would be Russian armfi ""T '^'u^''^ '^^" '^'^' «^ the French or Russian armies. I rom this it follows that so far as Russia 70 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? [s concert.ed the initiative of action will belong to German v i he German government, when demanding from the Reichstag credit for the increase of tlie army-and the Emperor Wilham himself, on every convenient occasion- declared that the reason for demanding from the people such great sacrifices lay in the fact that Germany would be compelled to carry on offensive operations on two frontiers, and that if any other course were adopted German territory might be subjected to an invasion inevitably accompanied by the most terrible disast-rs for the people But as it turned out, all the European powers immediately followed in Uu footsteps of Germany and the relationship of strength remained unchanged, so tha^ the German-Austro-ltalian alliance has not now suftcient preponderance of strength for Germany to carry on serious offensive operations on both frontiers: and considering the defensive strength of the French and Russian frontiers and also the defensive strength of the SS "'^'' '^^^'^' ^"""^ ^" ^"^""p' "^""^"^ ^^'^^y ^^^"^ With a division of forces the war would be still more prolonged, yet the immediate interest of Germany is to overthrow as quickly as possible one of its opponents, since Austria and Italy are less capable than she is of enduring the financial and social influences which would be aroused by a prolonged war. In the event of a lengthened campaign one or both of the allies of Germany might be compelkd to cease military operations before the objects of the allies were attained. In addition to this, Germany must count upon the fact that her adversaries occupy a strong position for defence, so that the occupation of their defensive lines would demand immense sacrifices ,1 !"''^' ''easons it appears most probable that Germany would direct the greatest number and the best of her troops against one of her adversaries, placing on the other frontiers only such forces as would be required to support Austria against Russia or Italy against France. Other forms of operations on the part of Germany are hard to conceive borne suppose that the chief strengih of Germany will first PLANS OI-' CAMPAIGN 7, I'h.r'Rl"- ""'' ■ '"^"''' ^' "^"""^ ^^"^'^'^-^ ^"^' "C.S powerful than Russia and not until she has broken down the oppos.t.on of France will she turn on her mori dangerous enemy, Russia. Others assume that Germany wiMake the opposue course, striking first at Russia, the nonUers o which may not be so stubbornly defended as the Vo e ^ trance, m consequence of the greater spaces, the ab ence b cretf'tT^sl"'' "^^kV""'. ""''''' "^'^-'-' '-^"d aL because of the slower mobilisation and concentration of the Russian forces. But what is more important out of fear hat Austria might be crushed at once, Germany niav be forced to begin operations first of all against Russi^ for the defence oi her Western frontier relying upon Met e'a^ he Lrns itTH vr °";'" d-efsi- created by he i\t T\u P'obabihty of such initiative is indicated also by the concentration of Germany's greatest forces on the Russian frontier. For Germany would have no need pa^etf she'Td"^?''? °i '''''^' ^" ' frontierln time of peace it she did not intend to act offensively of the General' Staff 7''' 'T' ^^" '^ ^'°^«"^' ^^^^^aref, or tne Oeneral Staff, devoted to an investigation of the reinforcement, and to a shorlt ime ,„ m»l?,h^ "",' '" P'""^"^ dfe,f o»x^' SS»"tr"='™^^^^ o7an£?— -^^^^^^^^ remains onT".' "? T'"'-^'^ ^""^ prepinderan?e remains on the side of Russia and France Adoniin., 'I.e supposition that Gernianv decides in Ihfh-^rn:- Jl'"i '«i 72 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the war to stand on the defensive against Russia, wc must ask ourselves on which of its defensive h'nes the German army will stand, on its eastern frontier or on the territory of Russia ? Major Scheibert,* of the German General Staff, supposes that the war will be begun against Russia as against France by strategical attack, l)Ut that after this, offensive oj.erations must be discontinued on one thntre of war, in order, with concentrated forces, to strike a decisive blow at the other enemy. But when attack is discontinued it will be necessary to guarantee the successes gained by extensive fortifications. If this stoppage is made in the Western Provinces of Russia, Major Scheibert thinks that without great trouble the junction-points of roads and railways may be fortified by means of armoured gun carriages which can be '^needily furnished from the German depots. He further ^loposes to fortify the occupied Russian territory by crowding the rivers with steamers of small size {die Flussnetze mit klcimn Dampjern zu bevolkern), thus protecting the territory occupied by the Germans, helping the study of the locality, and facilitating the manoeuvres of troops. He advises the organisation of communications between the different fortified points by lines of railways and steamers. In other words. Major Scheibert advocates the occupation of the kingdom of Poland. Let us criticise these proposals more closely. The kingdom of Poland forms a wedge between Prussia and Austria to such a distance that the Russian armies on the frontier may threaten Berlin, and what is more may take in flank Prussian forces sent into Eastern Prussia. But for precisely the same reason. Eastern Prussia forms a wedge between the Baltic Sea and Russian territory, bending round Poland and piercing to the Niemen, which makes it possible for the Germans to threaten the Russian forces in Poland by an advance on Brest and farther in the direction of Moscow, and also to operate directly against the second Russian defensive line of Kovno- * K Aus der militarischen gesellschaft," Berlin, 1893. PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 73 Vilna, evading the first Russian position. In the opinion of the great majority of writers the defensive systrm of Russian Poland has been brought to perfection. (See map on next pn^'e of Russian Defensive System.) In view of the strength which the Russian armies would present for the defence of the territories between the rivers Vistula, Bug, and Narev, supported by fortified positions on the Narevat Pultusk, Rozhan, Ostrolenka, and Lomza, and the fortresses of Warsaw, Novogeorgievski and Zegrze, the military writers, Generals Brialmont Pierron, and other foreign students, and Colonel Zolotarcf assume that Germany, if she were to decide at first to turn her chief forces against Russia wo.'M undertake an energetic oftensive movement into he dtp.hs of Ru^^sia through Byelostok, to Brest from th , directio,. of Warsaw occrpying the enemy with fictitious ..)erac; ms in order to cut on the main Russian forces fr. u .l,e other parts of the empire. In other words, this means to pass the fortifications of the defensive line of the Vistula- Bug- Narev district. Such an undertaking might, of course, be very advan- tageous for the attacking Austro-German armies, but its execution would be attended with extraordinary dangers It Germany and Austria could be assured that the Russian armies in this theatre of war were not in a fit state in their turn to make an attack upon vital points in the interior of Germany and Austria, or to cut the lines of communi- cation of the invading armies, then such an attempt might have equal chances of success, and the Russian armies would be compelled to attack the invaders or to retire into the interior of the country. But the threat alone that the Russian armies might invade Silesia and the rich terri- tories lying near the frontier would cause great alarm, acting all the more powerfully on public opinion in Ger- many since it would be in direct opposition to the declara- tions of the government and of the Emperor. The opinion expressed by German writers that their arniies would occupy the undefended territory on the left bank of the Vistula, which is at considerable distance from .y 74 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Map of Russian Defensive System. From Schroefer's " Die Feslungcii in der hciitujeii Kricgfiilirung." PLANS OF CAMPAIGN IS the fortresses, is therefore much more probable. In such event the losses which are demanded by attack would fall upon Russia. Further, in the case of the breaking of this line the Russian armies on the German frontier would be met by another defensive line. Between the German and Austrian armies a junction might be effected by means of the railway leading from the Vistula on the Austrian frontier through Ostrobetz to the Vistula on Prussian territory. On this railway are situated many important towns — among them Lodz with more than 300,000 inhabitants — which might furnish large resources. In view of convenience for the disposition of their armies, the Germans might usefully employ for the occupation of this line part of their older reserves, consisting of men who would be entirely unfit for field warfare and bivouac life. Nevertheless, in view of the risk of such an under- taking, it is necessary to suppose that the Austro-Ger- man armies would attempt primarily to direct their re- sources on the Vistula-Bug-Narev district, taking only defensive action against France. After investigating the resources which Germany and Austria would have at their disposal for attack on Russia, the result appears that these powers, after allotting the forces needed for garrisons and for guarantee against France, woald dispose of 2,100,000 men. Russia would have available not less than 2,380,000 men. But of course neither Austria, nor Germany, nor Russia will be in a position to employ such forces at once. From the statistics of foreign authorities it appears that Germany and Austria for immediate attack would have available 900,000 men, Russia at first having available no more than 500,000 men. But those figures Seem to us untrustworthy. Before the Austro-German armies could penetrate to the Peters- burg-Warsaw, the Moscow- Brest, and other railways by which Russian troops might be brought to the front, almost all will have been done to bring the Russian army of the first line up to its full strength. ^svM ■ih 76 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? The German army cannot attack before the Austrians and therefore as a basis we must take the greatest distance and the longest period needed for mobilisation. In Austria mobilisation and concentration will take place much more slowly than in Germany, and the distances to be traversed will be longer by at least ten days' march. Meantime the Warsaw district includes reserves of 200 000 men, the Vilna district 270,000, and the Kief district 427,000 men. Thus it will be impossible to prevent the strengthening of the Russian armies situated on the Vistula- IMiemen theatre of war to a million of men. Plans of attack by the allies on the territory watered by the rivers Niemen, Vistula, and Narev have been analysed by the French writer General Pierron, who mentions that m June 1888 he, together with French officers of the general Staff, by order of his government made a tour through the theatre of war above mentioned. From the data collected by General Pierron the probable routes of attack by the Austro-German armies from their points of concentration would appear to be those indicated by the plan opposite. The probable paths of attack by Germany and Austria have also been considered by the Belgian engineer. General Brialmont. By combining the data of Generals Pierron and Brialmont the disposition of the allied armies in their concentric movement on Warsaw and Novogeorgievsk may be presented in the plan on page 78, m which we take as points of departure, not those positions which serve as bases, but those railway stations near which, in all probability, the concentration of the armies will take place. For convenience the routes of the attacking armies are indicated by straight lines, each straight line also representing an army corps of so.ooo men. ■* ' There is no doubt that in the Russian territories the attacking Germans nnd their allies will meet with strong defensive lines, whitn, if they are inferior in anything to the iron ring of defences constructed in France, neverthe- less may be defended even against an enemy twice as strong. These Russian lines of defence include ten ? e Austrians, est distance isation. In take place distances to ays' march. 5 of 200,000 ^ief district prevent the the Vistula- watered by m analysed :ntions that :ers of the ide a tour From the e routes of ir points of ited by the Y Germany le Belgian he data of ion of the 1 Warsaw m on page not those ly stations on of the routes of lines, each of 50,000 tories the ^ith strong lything to neverthe- ' twice as elude ten PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 77 Paths 0/ Advance of the Atistro-German Armies from Points of Concentration to the Vistula-Bug-Narev Theatre of War. German Army . . Auslrian Army Russian Defensive Armies . . . Russian Operat- ii.g Armies . . .y 78 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Paths of Advance of the German and Austrian Armies on the Vistula. Bug-Narev Theatre of War, from Pierron and Brialmont. Gennan and Aus- trian Armies . . Rii=sian Defensive Armies . . . . .E? PLANS OF CAMPAIGN on the Vistula. Brialmont. 79 fortresses with fortified camps, situated on rivers, and making the passage of rivers and marshes extremely difficult. ■^ With such conditions the Russian armies supported bv internal lines of defence will, with energetic leadership and the known endurance of the Russian soldier, have full possibility of moving to every threatened point pre- ponderating forces, before the junction in superior force of the Austrian and German armies can take place The greatest numerical superiority which can be admitted as possible on the Austrian and German side would be at Kovno, 400,000 men, and at Brest, also 400,000 men, against 100,000 defending the first fortress and 250,000 the second. But Kovno and Brest are both first-class fortresses, and the troops defending them will be in strong positions, of the speedy capture of which the enemy cannot even dream. To their aid will liasten the fresh forces which will be mobilised within Russia, and the besiegers may easily find themselves in a dangerous position. ° If Plevna with its improvised fortifications was held for months against an enemy four times sti onger, by a garri- son deprived of hope of relief, how much longer may such regularly fortified camps as Kovno and Brest hold out when help must come within the fortnight which will be required for the mobilisation of 415,000 men, or, at the worst, of a considerable proportion of that number? When these 415,000 men shall have marched to the relief of Brest and Kovno, the forces of Russia will not only equal those of the allies, but will even find themselves to a certain extent superior. In addition to this must be borne in mind the difficulty of provisioning an invading army, a million strong, far trom its base, while the Russian armies defending their own territory would fight under much better conditions. Even from the point of view most favourable to the Germans- even If they succeeded in taking Ivangorod, Warsaw, and Novogeorgievsk, with all auxiliary fortifications — they would find a tremendous obstacle in Brest-L.^ovcir «i«n« 8o IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? '•W.; mi Situate i 'n the midst of a marsh it would be almost imposi •■' le to invest it closely, and in no case could it be invested speedily. It is obvious that before Brest rould be taken the Russian army garrisoned there would be re- inforced by more than 250,000 men. Even suppcsing, what is still more improbable, that the allies in opera- tions against fortresses and first linrs of defenc;;; v/ere always victorious, yet such victories would cost them so dear that the stoppage of further operations would tjeem inevitable. Estimates as to the probiible lo;>s of attacking rnd defending troops in battle and from disea^^ shoA^ that by the time the allies were In a posihon to undertake oierations against fhe second defensive lint —that Is, Brest-Litov?;;, and Kovno — the Russian forces woi;ld amount to 4,10^000 in fortresses, and 375,000 auxiliary forces acting in cciiiWination with these garrisons, a total of 815,000 mtn. o w^ich must be added ar. army of 1,264,000, newJv formed, approaching the scene of opera- tions. The allied powers would dispose of 1,588,000 men. In such event the numerical superiority of the allies over the operating Russian armies would amount to only 7/3,000 men. In the face of the Russian armies operating on internal lines and able to change front at discretion, and in face of the reinforcements daily increasing until on the arrival on the scene of action of the whole 1,264,000 of their reserved armies, the Russians would have a numerical superiority of 491,000 men, an advance into the interior of Russia would be an undertaking attended with too great risk. It is, therefore, more probable that the enemy would first invest the fortresses, and only afterwards attempt to defeat the armies of reserves. In assuming this, we again allow the most favourable supposition for the allies, for this reason, that the losses in battle and in the investment of the fortresses of the second line of defence will be as follows : The 375,000 men of the Russian operating army, acting in combination with the garrisons of the fortresses, will lose ?. V,rd of PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 8i their strength, or 125,000 men ; the lot,5es of the attack- ing armies will be twice as great, that f.s, 250,000 men. Further, we assume that only 10 percent., or, 25,000 men of the Russian army would be able to take refuge in the Ibrtress of Brest- Litovsk, the other 90 per cent., that k, .-25,000, being taken prisoners. But even under such firrumstances the German-Austrian arn?ies would not i,a»/e freedom for activity. From the estimate of General Brialmont we find that for the investment of armies shut up in fortresses, an army of (lOl ihie the strength of the besieged is necessary— that is to say, the position of the Russian and Austro-German armies after the defeat of the operating Russian army, and the investment of the fortresses, would be as follows : Russian Armies. Approaching Reserves . In fortresses .... Austro-German. Besieging armies Free for attack 1,264,000 465,000 926,000 412,000 These figures show that before the fall of the fortresses there could be no thought of any extensive advance of the allied armies into the interior of Russia. Let us admit, however, the extreme hypothesis that immediate attacks on the fortresses will prove completely successful, and that the Russian armies besieged will be compelled to surrender. Such a success apparently would in no way resemble the surrenders of the French in 1870-71. The capture of the Russian fortresses by assault could only be accomplished after terrible conflicts attended with tre- mendous losses in the ranks of the attacking armies. We will suppose — a supposition again the most favour- able to the invaders— that the losses of the allies under these circumstances were only half as great as the losses of the Russian armies in battle, that is 232,000 men, with a loss of no more than 10 per cent, from disease. In such 82 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? i^'i 1l event there would remain only 1,013,000 men in the ranks of the allies against 1,264,000 in the armies of the Russian reserve. Having gone so far, there are two questions which may well be asked. Having maintained her main forces for such a prolonged time on the Russian theatre of war, would Germany be in a position to defend herself against attack from France, and would the 70,000 men left by the allies for the guarding of Ivangorod, and the 200,000 Austrians left in Galicia be able to withstand the attack of the Russian reserves ? From the foregoing figures and arguments we must conclude that the plans of attack by Austria and Germany in Russia proposed by foreign military authorities, taking into consideration the immense strength of the fortresses of the Vistula Bug-Narev theatre of war, and afterwards of the second Russian line of defence, would be impossible to carry into effect. It is true that another opinion has been expressed as to the possibility of outflanking the Vistula-Bug-Narev posi- tions and even also that of Brest. But such an undertaking would be attended with such extraordinary and obvious dangers that it is unnecessary to consider it here. Generally, the consequences which would ensue if the German-Austrian armies were to adopt the daring plan of direct movement on Brest-Litovsk in order to cut off the Russian forces in Poland, belong to the category of vexed questions. Plans, of course, are kept scrupulously secret, but some indications nevertheless may be drawn from the opinions current in military circles. First of all it is no.i- worthy that German officers no longer speak of the project of immediately occupying Warsaw and the whole of Poland, and of fortifying themselves there. But ten years ago, when war with Russia seemed near, this view was so widespread in Prussian military circles that certain officers invited Polish ladies to a dance in Warsaw at the next carnival. The well-known military writer, Scheibert,* expressing the opinion that the Germans must limit them- * op. cit, ante. 3 we must PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 83 selves to the occupation of Poland, and fortifying themselves conhne herselt to defensive operations, while her "Eastern neighbour, mated by the independent, premature initiative peculiar to Us leaders, would try to gaii successes by means of reckless enterprises." ^y "ica.ns Nowadays, of talk of the occupation of Warsaw there remams not a trace. But it is known that in KOnLberg are col ected immense stores of sections of bridges and Ap "ettlv [he'? ^^"^^-^^'- -^ -P'- of rSlwa's Apparently, the Germans have realised the delusiveness of an undertaking having as its aim to cut off the Russian armies in Poland, and place them between two fires Such houghts correspond to the spirit of self-confidence fostered n German military circles since the great successes of exceVnce Tt'^^^^^^ ""^'"^ "'"^'^""^^ P^°^°""^ ^^'^h in the excellence of the German army, and a disposition to depre- ciate the value of other armies. ^ Thus the opinion of Scheibert that the Russian com- manders will attempt to attain successes by means^f darmg, ill-considered enterprises, is repeated in Germany uarters'staT^ t"'' ■ ^"^' J"^.^^^' ^' "^e German head^^ quarters staff is convinced that it is capable alwavs at the nght moment, to concentrate its forces, and She Rus! sian armies will not find themselves n such favourabk conditions, it may easily set itself the task of de eat^Tthe Russian armies one after another, calculating bv such operations to hasten the course of 'the war, and diminish he economic difficulties from which Germany wouldTXr But such an undertaking would be so risky that its initiation would be desired by the most competent auht mav restlt in nn' "'"^''^T^ development of operations Sn "h V- ^^ '° favourably as is relied upon in Without analysing closely the opinions we have quoted operSsThe^i^r-^'^'" .^'^'^^^ ^^^^ '^'^ P^- of operations the final objects of war could be accomplished. V^-^J^ a T%;'i,i' 84 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? All authorities on the war of the future are agreed that in order to force Russia to conclude peace on terms unfavour- wJnM°K ^'^^ ^ ^^? occupation of I>etersburg and Moscow Zol '^''"""'m ^L •' P'^'" '^^' •" ''^^^ o^' the immense, almost insuperable obstacles which separate both these cap.tasfro,nthe Av .,. u. base, tlfc allies would no have the resou- -^ . .ce ^t once upon Petersburg and Moscow as (iO I he chief fortified points remained uncaptured and ..e Russi;n "armies ;;;;^r;:ns;r:S^:;: these objects were accomphshed, too great forces would be needed for the protection of communications. Ihus the allies would be conmelJed :- choose between plans of attack either on Petersburg or on Moscow. To wait for an opportunity, in view o'" the intact Russian armies, would be impossible for the allies, because the Rus- sian ai.a-es in the Vistula-Bug-Narev district would pro- serve opai communications with the southern governments and the Kassian army might undertake a movement against' Austria which would destroy the plans of the enemy Ihe opinions expressed on this subject in military litera- ture leao to the conclusion that if the German government decided on a march into the interior of Russia the aim of P.fprir "^""^Jm' '"u^" P«-obahility. be Moscow and not Petersburg, while the consequences of any such attemot would recall the fate of Napoleon's armyf that I to 3 It would result ..1 absolute starvation ^' P.,fl°V^^ Germans to limit themselves to the conquest of .HvilV^ f'^^'" authorities advise, and co> tr upon German territory would undoubtedly cause intense alarm among the German population. ^ PLANS OF CAMPAK 85 n, since until 1 he strength .n that district of the Russ-m army which would be in a position to undertake operations against Germany we have already estimated at 650,000 men The operations of this army would be directed againsi Easter,. Prussia, in order to cut the communicftions between Berhn and the bases of attack of the Gorman a nw n Russ.a-that .s, Konigsberg. The invasion of Prussian tep itory would be facilitated by the nearness of the lines of the Narev and Bug to the Prussian frontier. But Ms evident that the Russian armies situated in that dist ict would not be strong enough to strike a decisive blow a Prussia by operations against Berlin itself The occupation by the Germans of the left undefended bank o the Vistula in Poland would require separate armies at least as strong as the acting Russian forces. There- fore, at the disposal of the German ueadquarters staff would ttio;^^^'RTssir" "^'^ '''' '""'^^ ^^^"- -^° ^^^ - If the fc rtresses of the Bug did not require investment, then Kovno, Ossovetz, Olita, and Grodno must un- doubtedly be invested, for which purpose at least 37s 000 men would be required. Thus fc^- advance into'^ «1''^ '^ ^"'''^ '^^ ^'^^"^^"^ ^o"W only dispose of 800,000 n-n, a numl>er obviously insufficient for such an undertake . Fi. m this it follows that the Germans wtu e compelled to await the approach of the Austrians, and to continue H.cir operations in combination with them r.H.f."'" ^^''' '"'"'^ ^^'^^ *^^ defences of Austria in t^o^ win'l'r^ "" ^' '' P"""^"^'^ '^^' th'^ <^°"«idera- tion will not exercise commanding influence in the ZZLTaFT^ ""^ °P^':?^'ons, for the decisive word will will h. H^m^' if '^"^ '° ^"™^"y- ^"^ ^^'^ ^hat reason it will be difficult to compel Austria to advance her forces from Russia of her Slavonic provinces. Tims the German staff ,n all probability will not decide upon invasion of the interior of Russia, but will first of all occupy itself with operations against Olita, Ossovetz, Grodna. and Kovno. iJetailed calculations show that after deducting the foices ^^ •i' 86 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? necessary to restrain Russia from active operation-, aga,nst Austna, the latter power would only have 600,0^ men free (or offensive action against Russia; thus the attacking forces of the allies may be estimated at 1,400,000 Russia would dispose of armies 2,380,000 strong which would be distributed as follows : ^' In the Vistula- Bup \arev positions „ Kovno, Grodnc. Ossobitz, Olita . „ Dubno, Kovno, Dutzke Total 650,000 250,000 200,0CX) 1,100,000 Thus for active operations Russia would possess 1,280,000 men. Of course when the Austro-German armies began operations this force of 1,280,000 mi^n no be concentrated. But as we already explained S before the enemy could i each Moscow not only thTs amv^ but mUHons more, although with little trainfn^, woutdTe ready to oppose the invaders, whose arm ics^very fifty 1^ spring.^ ""'''^'^ '"'° '^^ ^"^^"°'"' ^°"'^ ^haw as^snow In this connection the history of 18 12 may perhaps be rrrrsist^e-d^?^ ^^^^""^"^ ^' -^^- '^<^^P-ting At Smolensk I, Moscow 400,000 French 183,000 134,000 I* 180,000 Russians 120,000 „ 130,000 „ fh«^V li '^^"x.°^ investigation we must conclude that an advance on Moscow would require at least a two years campaign, while the more prolonged the war the better it would prove for Russia. Her im^mense resources gradually organised would every day be better prepared and the numerical preponderance would finally pass to Russia, while the allies, weakened by immense'^losses n be flr..H . T '""vf '' '^"^'^ ^y insufficient food, would be forced to close the war without attaining their objects PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 87 111 consequence of the absence in the markets of Trans- oceanic and Russian grain, and probably also as a result ot internal difficulties caused by the stoppage of work, and by tamine. ' Some military writers advise that operations against Russia should begin in winter, as the frozen ground would increase the difficulty of constructing earthworks, while the invaders would find greater facilities lor transport both m the sledge paths which replace in winter the bad marshy roads, and in the freezing of the rivers. This last circumstance, in their opinion, almost totally deprives rivers of their immense defensive value. But the danger of advance into Russia by winter would be still greater for the German army (consisting, as it will of four-hlths ot reserves) than it was for the army of Napo- leon, which was, for the most part, composed of veterans Such a decision on the part of the German Government is all the less probable because the roads in the frontier districts of Russia are often spoiled by thaws, as was experienced in the wars of 1S06-7, and in the Polish campaign of 183 1. Ihus after considering all possible combinations it is more than probable that an invasion of Russia would not lead to such results as would accomplish the ends of war And modern conditions are such that even Russia in the event of victory, could not attain the best results. ' The carrying on by Russia of an offensive war against Germany and Austria after driving the armies of those powers out of her territories, or in the event of those states rom the beginning restricting themselves to defence or limitmg their off'ensive operations to the occupation of certain Russian territories, would be accompanied bv great, it may be insuperable difficulties. Following on the heels of the armies which she had defeated, the Russian armies would be compelled to traverse vast territories entirely exhausted, and to draw all their provisions from an immense distance The victories already gained would, of course, have cost them dear, and reserves of necessitv would predominate 88 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE '■m both in the ranks and among the officers. With armies thus constituted success in an offensive war would be much less probable than with armies only completed from the reserve. In addition to this, in advancing on German territory the Russian armies would meet with still nunierous forces formed, it is true, mainly from the remnants of the attack- ing armies and from the Landsturm with its reserves worthless for attack, but fully reliable for defence. As relates to commissariat, transport from the interior of Russia to Prussian territory— not to speak of possible failure of the administration— would require much time and immense outlay. In the war of 1870 the Germans lived at the expense of the enemy. But such favourable circumstances will not be repeated. Rapid advances and the possibility of making requisitions demanding contribu- tions in the face of the present fortified frontiers, s^noke- less powder, and improved armaments, are inconceivable. For the invasion, by Russia, of Prussian territory military literature offers several projects. The plan oppo- site illustrates the scheme of operations which military writers consider most probable. But whatever the direction selected for attack on Prussia, it must be borne in mind that the invaders will be met by a scientific and long-prepared system of defence. Great rivers and fortresses constitute for the Germans a strong defence, while behind them a network of railways, satisfy. ing all the requirements of modern strategy, guarantees the communications of the defending armies with the interior of the country. There will be no difficulty in com- pleting the ranks of the Prussian army, for in addition to the remnants of the invading army the Landsturm with its reserves will be ready. Thus, to conquer Prussia on her own territory will be no easy task, and the danger she will be subjected to by the occupation by an enemy's forces will be far less serious than the danger which will threaten her from famine. As relates to internal revolutionary movements it can hardly be supposed that the irruption of an enemy on Prussian With armies ir would be ipleted from an territory erous forces f the attack- ts reserves, efence. As interior of of possible much time le Germans I favourable ivances and ig contribu- iers, Sinoke- :onceivable. n territory : plan oppo- ich military on Prussia, 1 be met by ice. Great ns a strong lys, satisfy- guarantees s with the ilty in corn- addition to Sturm with ;ory will be icted to by less serious amine. As can hardly n Prussian PLANS OF CAMPAIGN Plan of invasion, by Russia, of Prussian territory. 89 90 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? territory would strengthen such a movement. Invasion from Russia would in all probability have entirely different results. It is necessary to consider one more combination— namely, that Russia, in view o^ the weakness of the Austrian defence in Galicia, as compared with the defences which exist in the Eastern provinces of Prussia, would restrict herself to defence against Germany, employing her remaining forces for the invasion of Easter-> Galicia. But such a combination is improbable. The chief political question lies in the crushing of Germany. Having wasted her strength in a struggle with Austria, Russia would be still less able to force Germany to lay down her arms. According to General Brialmont two Russian armies might at the same time operate against Austria, one having as Its goal Vienna, and the other Buda-Pesth. The con- sideration of pl^ns of operation in these directions leads to the conclusion that the Russian army would have to overcome immense obstacles, and to march through a country already more or less e.xhausted. But even in the event of Russian victory the results obtained would hardly compensate for the war. For in assuming that Russia were to carry the war into the territory of one of the allies, we must consider the possibility that Germany would return Alsace-Lorraine to France, and that the Government of France might not be in a state to oppose the popular movement in favour of the conclusion of peace. If this were to happen the whole plan of attack, based upon the diversion by France of half the forces of the Triple Alliance, would have to be aban- doned. Thus in all possible combinations a European war in which Russia took part would result in complete exhaus- tion of both combatants. Nevertheless, estimates of the strength and distribution of armies, the resources for keeping them up to strength, and economic endurance, prove that Russia will be in a condition to sustain a war indefinitely. Even the occupation of one of the Russian ;t. Invasion rely different mbination — ness of the the defences jssia, would iploying her ralicia. But lief political Lving wasted ussia would 1 down her sian armies , one having The con- ations leads uld have to through a the results he war into onsider the Lorraine to light not be ivourof the I the whole mce of half to be aban- )ean war in ete exhaus- ates of the sources for endurance, stain a war le Russian PLANS OF CAMPAIGN 91 capitals, perhaps of both, would not force her to uncondi- nonal surrender. On the other hand, the advance TtL Russian armies into Prussia or Austria would not resuU in any certain success. ^ Generally it is difficult to foresee what actual strategical results would issue from this immense struggle Thowi would end. Russia, even with the failure of h^r arms in some directions, relying upon the immensity of her terri- tories and the approach of an inclement winter, would not be inchned to the conclusion of peace. As for western countries With the complexity of their economic and socTa" polity, with the mutual interdependence of all the wheels of the internal mechanism, it is difficult to form any idea how a great and prolonged war would react on the economic and social order. It is unquestionable that the tear of those uiternal agitations which would be awakened by a crisis will have great influence in dissuading govern- ments against undertaking a war. On the other hand, once war has broken out the con- clusion of peace will present great difficulties to any government, either after failure or success. At first it will seem that the results obtained in no way compensate for the sacrifices made, and grave difficulties may present themselves even m the disarmament of masses of men In the second case-that is, of failure-the stoppage of military operations without attaining the results expected might easily give rise to revolutionary movements. Even TS7?".'«'^' ^^f'. ^" '^' P^"'^"^' fortresses, the war of 1 877-78 resulted in a temporary strengthening of the revolutionary propaganda, although that propaganda peopir''' °" ^ ^" insignificant proportion of the .r.^.Tt'"^^ ?^Tl °[ oP!''ation against possible enemies are elaborated by the General Staffs of all armies. In tnese plans are unquestionably indicated the resources and time that will be required for the attainment of certain Objects. But we may doubt whether in any of such plans the economic conditions have been considered. On more than one occasion we have spoken to M. Burdeau the 92 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? French Minister of Marine, a man of the highest capacity, who frankly admitted that when M. Freycinet was Minister of War it was proposed to undertake an inquiry into the economic conditions which would accompany war, but this project had to be abandoned in consequence of the oppo- sition met with in military circles. CHAPTER III THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE Since the time of the Franco-German war certain principles liave been advocated in relation to maritime warfare which if practised, involve a return to the conditions of barbarism' I he advance which has taken place in that period in naval affairs is interesting not only in itself, but also because of the influence which it must exert on the character of war on land The possibility of the destruction of maritime towns, the interruption of oversea supplies, and the severing 01 certain states from communication with the rest of the world may awaken dangerous movements and cause the stoppage of a war on land earlier than the results expected have been attained. But a naval war between two European powers with equal fleets is improbable, since it would result m mutual destruction. With the v/ars of the past, again, no comparison could be drawn. In view of the immense influence which a naval war may exert on the economic and social conditions f ?K V^'i"^^^ ^^ expected that all questions connected with the building of warships and their operations had already been submitted to careful study and consideration. «uc It cannot be said that this has been done. In France still dreaming of vengeance, every investigation which would emphasise the ruinous consequences of maritime war in its new conditions is unpopular, since such investi- gation would unquestionably lead to the conclusion that it will he almost impossible to carry on a war on dry land «o as to realise the first hopes. In Germany, maritime warls treated of only by specialists, who restrain themselves in 94 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? the expression of views as to the ruinous results which war might involve. Exceptions to this rule are few Among their number may be found the economist Rudolf- Meyer and Admiral Werner. In Italy, the Government is generally condemned for the intolerable burdens to which the people are subjected for the maintenance of armed forces generally, and in particular for the maintenance of the fleet; and it is the interest of the Government to prevent the circulation of pessimistic views. Russia and Austria concern themselves little with maritime warfare since for them these questions are of secondary importance' Jingland is an exception, and much interest is taken there • and this IS natural, both on account of her geographical position and because her population depends directly uoon oversea supplies. '' ^ But even in England no clear idea of the recent revolu- tion in methods, and of the consequences of a naval war has yet penetrated to the masses, and the assurance of specialists is accepted that between the naval warfare of rhe present and the past no fundamental difference which would exclude comparison exists. In order to establish a contrary proposition, a searching study of the methods which have been prepared for naval warfare would be necessary. Without this it is impossible to estimate the significance of the change. But a popular description of systems of attack and defence at sea presents even greater difficulties than the description of war on land. To give an idea to laymen of the mechanism prepared for maritime war to-day, and to facilitate comparison witli the mechanism employed in the past, it is necessary to compare the growth and perfection of fleets, and the methods adopted for their utilisation by different states In such a comparison we find a peculiar circumstance which greatly increases the complexity of the subject In the comparison of armies we deal with a quantity of similar units— soldiers, artillery, and horses. But for the comparison of the fleets of the different powers at different times, we have to deal with varying units, since not only E? •esults which jle are few. 5mist Rudolf Dvernment is 2ns to which ce of armed intenance of vernment to Russia and me warfare, importance, taken there ; geographical lirectly upon :eat revolu- L naval war, ssurance of irfare of die •ence which a searching d for naval ' impossible t a popular lea presents of war on n prepared arisen with icessary to s, and the *ent states, xumstance ubject. In juantity of Jut for the It different e not only THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE 95 the armaments of ships have changed, but the very type Many suppose that a single modern ironclad, a single swift cruiser with long-range weapons, supplied with explosive shells, will be able to accomplish work for which a squadron would formerly have been needed With the adoption of steamers for naval warfare, sailing ships gradually disappeared from the composition of navies Yet as late as the beginning of the Crimean war the Black Sea fleet counted only 7 steam-frigates, of i960 steam- power, armed with 49 guns, the remainder of the fleet being composed of sailing ships. The allied fleets con- tained the following number of steamers : England 24 of 5859 steam-power ; the French 12, of 4960 steam-power. The nuniber of guns on the Russian fleet was about 2000 and on the allies 2449. The impossibility of sailing shins accepting battle with freely manoeuvring steamers was then fully demonstrated, for the greater part of the Black Sea fleet was destroyed. It is not to be wondered at that the Baltic fleet, composed of weakly constructed vessels made even a less successful show against the allies ' After the cloFe of the Crimean war the Ministry of Marine actively undertook the construction of a steam lleet lor the Baltic, as in accordance with the Treaty of Pans the destroyed Black Sea fleet was not to be rebuilt Ihis work was carried on in the spirit which generally characterises an epoch of reform. But, owing to want of experience, the new vessels did not answer requirements especially in respect to long distance steaming. The pro- gramme of construction had not been fully executed when armour began to play such an important part in the building of warships that the wooden ships then building lost their value as fighting units. At the end of 1870, when Paris was besieged by the Germans, the Russian Government, in view of the political changes taking place in Europe, declared that it no longer regarded as binding the articles in the Treaty of Paris relating to the keeping of warships in the Black Sea But the new Black Sea fleet had hardly been built before i the war of 1877 broke out, and the fleer h^H no ■1^....,.^ 96 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? 'ill on the course of operations, although the Russian sailors distinguished themselves by exploits, and destroyed several Turkish vessels. The first appearance of armoured ships dates back to the time of the Crimean war. The bombardment of Sevastopol by the combined Anglo-French fleets showed the allies that their wooden vessels might easily be set on fire and destroyed, in a battle with fortresses. The conse- quence of this discovery was an attempt to protect vessels with iron plates, and in 1854 France began the construc- tion of three armoured floating batteries destined for attack upon the Russian coast fortifications in the Black Sea. The English, with the intention of attacking Cron- stadt in 1856, constructed seven floating batteries. The Russian shells directed against these batteries only occa- sioned damage when they accidentally fell into the em- brasures. From this the conclusion was drawn that if vessels were bUilt well protected with armour, and able to manoeuvre freely in the open sea, they would be inde- structible. In 1858, by order of the Emperor Napoleon III., the building of the first armoured frigate Gloire was begun on the plan of the celebrated engineer Dupuy de Lome. This frigate, in the words of its builder, was to be " a lion in a flock of sheep." The cost of construction reached .^280,000 -that is, almost three times the cost of the greatest line-of-battle ships, but in view of the immense results that were expected, this outlay was not considered extravagant. The initiative of France was quickly imitated both by England and America. The deciding circumstance, how- ever, which led to the final supersession of wooden' ships was the American Civil War, when the exploit of the Merriniac, and the subsequent battle between the Monitor and Merrimac showed the ineffectiveness of wooden ships, and the immense power of resistance of armour. This change acted most disadvantageously for Russia; the new steam fleet had only just been completed, and the need for re-building came when, as a consequence of the THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE 97 Crimean war, the finances of the country were in a desperate state. But to delay was impossible, and fresh events emphasised the necessity for proceeding with the new construction without delay. As is well known, Russia in the sixties was threatened with a rupture with the Weste-- powers over the Polish question. In 1863 a commits, t was formed under the presidency of General-Adjutant Kruizhanovski to consider the measures necessary for placing Cronstadt in a position of defence. The general opinion of that committee was, that with the resources possessed by the enemies of Russia in 1863, Cronstadt could not be defended, and considering the skill and persistence of the enemy even the capital could not be considered safe. The committee found that by means of coast fortifications alone, without mobile defences consisting of forty floating batteries, monitors, and gunboats, the defence of Cronstadt would be im- possible. Wliile vessels of war were constructed of wood, the materials and the capacity to work them were found in Russia. The case was otherwise when iron vessels had to be built and equipped with costly machinery and weapons. Nevertheless, considering the financial diffi- culties, energetic measures were taken to construct an armoured fleet. Meantime the other maritime powers, recognising that they were almost defenceless without increase of their fleets of armoured vessels, began with feverish activity to attempt to attain what is apparently unattainable— that is, to build armoured vessels which would resist the action of the strongest artillery. Not one of the detafls of naval affairs, not even the con- struction of ships, presents such amazing results in the way of novelty and improvement as have been attained since i860 in naval ordnance. The best idea of this may be given by a contrast of the armaments of the Russian fleet of to-day with its predecessors. We will take the old 84 Prokhor and the modern Piotr Veliki which carries V V'«i%* VtXi?VXXC&t ftV \Ji its >8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? 3 i ^ guns the Piolf Veliki develops three times th^ power ol a similar discharge from the guns of the Prokltor. The whole 84 guns of the Prokhor if they could be directed at once in one directior would not cause the slightest damage to the armour of die veakest of modern armoured vessels, while every shot fired from a distance of 7000 :eet tVom the modern 12-inch rifles against the strongest of modern ironclads, will penetrate the side 3 feet thick and protected by a 13-inch plate. In addition to this, a!! four weapons of the Piotr VcUki x^\^\\\. be directed against a compara- tively small space of the ship's side. But even these guns will be powerless against some of the ironclads now under construction, which are protected by 20inch and rven 24-inch steel armour, and, in consequence, by the side of these armour-clads will be invented even more power tul guns. The more perfect the guns the stronger the armour which has been produced for protection against them. This struggle continues even at the present day. For employment against armour, steel projectiles were made, and the force of the impact increased ; thus in turn calling for stronger armour, against which still more powerful projectiles are employed. A rivalry in invention began. Sometimes armour was uppermost, sometimes projectiles. But no one listened to the voice of the eco- nomists who jg> etold the consequence of this rivalry. To illustrate this ve may cite some figures as to the cost of modern ve . .al< d war. The cost of a first-class line-of- battle ship, L^npelled by sails, did not exceed ;^i 15,000. The building of the first English ironclad Warrior in i860 entailed an outlay of ;^350,ooo. But this was but the beginning in the growth in the cost of warships. The German ironclad Koenig Wilhelm, built in 1868, cost ;^500,ooo, the Italian Duilio, in 1876, ;^70o,ooo, the Italia, 1886, ;^ 1, 000,000. Thus in twenty years the cost of iron- clads increased three times. A great part of this outlay is swallowed up by armour. Of ;^840,ooo spent on one of the latest ironclad.s, Magenta, £^i(y:),QQQ^ that is, 71 per cent., was spent upon armour. Let us examine the instruments of destruction of these :? power ot a >kltot: The directed at test damage red vessels, XD :eet from ; of modem id protected ir weapons a compara- I these guns now under and rven the side of "e powerful the armour ihem. This ctiles were lus in turn still more 1 invention sometimes f the eco- valry. To he cost of iss line-of- Varrior in is was but lips. The 868, cost the Italia, St of iron- his outlay nt on one is, yi per I of these THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE 99 mantimc giants. A battleship of the old type of the first rauk was armed with 120 guns, weighing 480 tons. The first ironclad carried only 32 guns, but these weigh 690 tons. On the in nclad J: ilia, built in 1886, ,v< e carried only 4 large -^nd 8 small gtns, yet they wcig .d nearly double as much as the 32 guns of the first ironclad, namely, 1 1 50 tons. Thus since the days of sailing ships the weight of guns has increased more than 150 times. The size and weight of ammunition has, of course, corre- spondingly increased, and also the destructive force of explosive shells. The diameter of the shells of the ironclad Warnor was approximately 6| inches, its weight 70 pounds ; on the armour-clad Italia the diameter \^ in- unds. king England creased to 17 inches, and the weight to 2(x in the course of twenty years the power of a si only its weight into account, has increased 30 t It must not be supposed that this is the limit. ^^ continues to stand at the head of the states who seek for in .rovements in weapons of destruction at sea. Some years ago English hips were armed with guns of a calibre of 12 inches, an(i armour nearly 12 inches thick. At a later time they carried guns with a calibre of 16 inches, weighing 80 tons, and throwing a shell weighing 1760 pounds. But in view of the fact that Italy had armed her ironclads Duilio and Dandolo with guns weighing 100 tons, the English consider a project of building 200-ton guns which will throw a shell of nearly three tons weight, and pierce armour 35^ inches thick. What is the outlay on the use of such weapons ? Ij- Progri's Militairc, on the basis of statistics taken from the French naval budget, makes the following estimate. The firing of a shell from a no-ton gun costs £\t6, which corresponds to a capital of ;^4i6o. This sum is thus apportioned: £16 for 990 pounds of powder, ;^I30 for the projectile, total, £\^. But this is not all. A iio-gun will stand only 93 shots, after which it becomes useless for further employment. As the cost of such a weapon amounts to ;^ 16,480 it appears that with every shot fired the value of the arm diminishes by ;^ 174, from which MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) 1.0 I.I 156 12.8 4.0 21 2.2 2.0 i.8 ^ x^PPLIEn IIVMGE Inc 1653 East Main Street Rochester, New York H609 (716) 482 - 0.300 - Ptione (716) 288 - 5989 -Fox USA lOO IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? we find that every shot fired will cost ^340. Thus with every shot is thrown away the yearly interest on a capital of ;^8500. A thousand of such shots would represent a capital of ;^8, 500,000. Passing to arms of smaller calibre it is shown that a shot fired from a 77-ton gun (the cost of which is ;^ 10,000, and which will stand 127 shots) costs ;^i84, a shot from a 45-ton gun (which costs ;^6300, and is useless after 1 50 shots have been fired) amounts to ;{^98. Only the lives of the sailors on fleets are considered as valueless. General Pestitch draws a very interesting contrast. He says : " Six Russian ships taking part in the battle of Sinope were armed with about 600 guns, out of which the 300 guns employed destroyed all that was in Sinope, yet the cost of these 300 guns, in the values of that time, did not exceed the cost of a single modern 100-ton gun. What results are to be expected from one weapon which in an hour may be fired no more than five times ? " An answer to this question it seems can be given only by a future war. The guns on modern battleships will be able to bombard ports, fortresses and towns, as many specialists declare, from a distance of nearly seven miles. But this increase of power has not been restricted to battleships alone. Many specialists consider it more advisable to build light and swift cruisers with powerful armaments, and torpedo boats which move almost unnoticed through the water with the speed of a mail train. As soon as the construction of ships was perfected to such an extent that England was able to place on the sea a con- siderable number of ironclads, armed with powerful guns, and protected by thick steel armour, the question naturally arose : Would it not be possible to direct mines underneath these immense ships, and destroy them by means of powerful explosions in the vicinity of weakly defended parts ? For a long time the application of this idea was unsuccessful, many obstacles had to be overcome, and only in recent times has the question been successfully resolved. Then began the construction of vessels specially designed for the purpose of discharging torpedoes. Ex- Thus with Dn a capital "epresent a that a shot S ;^ 1 0,000, shot from a 3 after 150 y the lives ;ss. ; contrast. the battle it of which in Sinope, that time, n loo-lon ne weapon ^e times ? " en only by ips will be , as many /en miles. :stricted to r it more 1 powerful t unnoticed ;rain. As to such an sea a con- 2rful guns, 1 naturally inderneath means of defended 5 idea was come, and iccessfully s specially loes. Ex- THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE .or perience showed that vessels discharging the torpedo ran no risk in employing a mine of 55 to 66 pounds of powder, 13 to 15 pounds of dynamite, or 22 to 27 pounds of per- oxylene, if it be not less than igh feet distant from the place of explosion, the mine being at a depth of 7 feet. Since from 19L feet distance there is little difficulty in directing a torpedo against an enemy's ship by the use of a pole the problem became simply how best to build vessels which would be unnoticed on approach. In the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, out of nine cases of attack by Russian torpedo boats the Turks lost one ironclad and two steamers, while three ironclads were injured. The loss in men is unknown On the Russian side three torpedo boats were injured also three steam sloops, while one torpedo boat was sunken Two sailors were killed and ten wounded. Similar results were obtained in the time of the French- Tonkin war of 1885. Two ordinary steam cutters, not more than 46 feet in length, armed with torpedoes, on the night of the 14-15 February, 1885, attacked a Chinese frigate of 3500 tons and sank it. This frigate was hidden in the harbour of Shein under the cover of fortifications but the French Admiral Courbet was at a distance of several knots from this harbour. Hidden in the darkness the French cutters covered the distance unnoticed, and after destroying the Chinese ship returned uninjured to the admiral's flagship. The history of the Chilian war presents a similar case when, after an attack lasting no more than seven minutes' the Congressionalist ironclad Blanco Encalada was sent to the bottom. From this is evident the immense danger with which armour-clads are threatened by torpedo-boats armed with Whitehead and other torpedoes of recent design. It must be remembered that not only torpedo-boats, but almost all ships of war are armed with such weapons of destruction to-day. It is natural that the complement of these inventions was a new system of defence against the action of torpedo- boats. A new type of war vessel, the torpedo=catchcr, was 102 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? evolved, specially adapted for dealing with torpedo-boats, powerfully armed, and steaming at ^. speed of ^2 knot>. ,ui hour. Admiral Werner declares that as soon as the price of aluminium falls so low that it may be employed for the construction of ships, the sides of ships will be so power- fully protected, in consequence of the lightness of the material, that the strongest explosive she" will r.ot penetrate them, and a battle against torpedo-boats will become mere child's play. Now the price of aluminium has lately fallen to such an extent that it is already being employed for many articles of domestic use, such as ke3s. If this prophecy be fulfilled the European powers will be compelled to disburse fresh millions on aluminium ships. This could have but one consequence. Invention, even now stimulated in most countries by manufacturers and their patrons, would seek to discover even more powerful explosive combinations. The last act in this rivalry it is impossible :o foresee. For the purpose of protection against mines, the more important parts of warships, the boilers and engines, are now being protected even under water by especial armour, and surrounded with layers of coal. In addition water-tight compartments have been adopted to ensure the unsinkability of the ships, and torpedo-nets are carried. The value of such defences will be proved in the future. But experiments carried on in England have tended to show that the protection of ^'"'•pedo-nets i? ineffective. On experiment being m^i to ascertain whether a torpedo-boat might pass throu^n an obstacle constructed of strong beams, it was sho./n that the torpedo-boat, striking the obstacle when at a speed of 20 knots, broke it and returned to harbour undamaged. A commission appointed by the United States Govern- ment for the purpose of considering the question of attack by and defence against torpedo-boats, came to the almost unanimous conclusion that torpedo-boats will certainly destroy an armour-clad if they escape destruction during the two minutes in the course of which the vessel attacked rpedo-boat?, ^2 knoto an the price of Dyed for the »e so povver- :ness of the 2" will not lo-boats will f aluminium Iready being uch as keys. wers will be inium ships. sntion, even icturers and )re powerful rivalry it is es, the more engines, are by especial In addition d to ensure :do-nets are e proved in ngland have )edo-nets is to ascertain an obstacle n that the speed of 20 laged. tes Govern- on of attack ) the alniost ill certainly ction during isel attacked THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE ,03 vnll be able to employ its quick-firing guns. But the c ectiveness of defence is weakened by the fart that in all navies the number of torpedo-boats is from three to seven times greater than the number of armour-clads, and the loss of several torpedo-boats cannot be compared in gravity with the loss of a single armour-clad carrying an mcomparably larger crew, and costing an incomparably greater sum, t" 'j It is true that the smallness of torpedo-boats and the insignificant quantity of stores they carry prevent them from se-king an enemy in the open sea. But these obstacles are overcome by the building of special vessels for the transport of torpedo-boats. In addition, all tor- pedo-boats built to-day are seagoing, develop great speed, and s eam a considerable distance with their own supply of coal, while their size is being increased or ^11 sides In any event, it is not reckless to predict in the near future the invention of subterranean torpedo-boats, 'vhich w.ll carry torpedoes of such power that even aluminium armour will not avail to save the vessel attacked A future war on sea might be considered under the following heads : Operations on the litt.ral, operations against ports and merchant ships, and battles between separate ships, squadrons, and fleets. With long-ranee modern guns and powerful projectiles, maritime towns may be threatened with a c.estruction from which they will not recover for a long time. Of the smooth-bore 12-inch mortar of the old type, the greatest range was 2500 yards • ihe modern I2^inch guns of the Canet system throw a shell weighing 986 pounds, and filled with 275 pounds of explosives to a distance of 13^ miles, so that towns may now be bombarded from a considerable distance It must be remembered that, as is shown by the practice at manoeuvres, the principle that undefended towns are not to be subjected to bombardment is not acknowledged, and ma future war no town will be spared. As evidence of this the following case may be cited. On August 24, 1880 he following letter was addressed by the commander of the Lolltngwood to the Mayor of Peterhead : I04 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? fhf'LT'^^f ''i^''^ Vice- Admiral commanding Ihe nth division of the Heet : I have to demand from yonr town a contribntion of ;f 50,000 sterhng, I reqmre yon to deliver to the bearer of this letter a guarantee of the immediate fnlfibnent of this condition I regret the necessity ot demanding such a large sum from the peace-lovmg and mdustrious population of the town, but I can it act otherwise in view of the immense contributions exacted bv your warships from the prosperous city of Belfast. I must add that in case the officers who deliver this letter do not retn within the course of two hours the town will be bu:nt, the shin pmg destroyed, and factories ruined. ^ This letter was printed in all the newspapers, and called forth no protest. On a question being raised on the subject in the House of Commons, the First Lord of the Admiralty answered evasively. It is evident then thai England will not refrain from such action when convenient and as her voice is the most important in naval matters' the other powers will certainly follow her example. To avoid such dangers, all powers have occupied them- selves with the defence of their coasts by means of fortifi- cations, and the building of railways for the transport of artillery from one point to another as the exigencies of defence demand. But the firing from coast batteries notwithstanding ingenious methods of measuring the distance of moving and hardly visible objects, would be only waste of powder and shell. A steamer moving with a speed of 13 miles an hour will in 30 seconds traverse 175 yards while a shot from coast artillery requires about five minutes. By skilful artillerymen this time might be shortened to from two to three minutes. On the other hand, in the bombardment of the immense spaces covered by coast towns almost every shell will find its sacrifice and csoh upon explosion will cause ruin over an immense space. The blockade of ports in a future war is also likely to have immense importance, since each of the combatants will consider as a main object the interruption of the maritime communications of the other, and the causing of all possible damage to trade by blockading his ships in ports and harbours. asuring the THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE ,oj ihHli'lZi Tf*'"-,"'^' "^"" '■" » '™^ «hen sails were power cruisers ^hiT.hf'^-^ ^'™°^' miraculous likrneVo h feb d ;ramT,t^hf "°™T™' "'^^ "^ ^,.A c 11 lauicu giani v/itn the seven-leaffue hnntc In the first half of the present century the effect nf shore battenes on ships, and the resultTo battks be tvveen ships themselves, were not very terrible Th. heavy shot discharged by smooth-bore gS^scared forn parfofthe'r^'"''' °'^^" -i«-d its targ'et^and he greate af hand. "'" '' """' ^^"^^ ^^ -P^"-^ ^^y -"ns biI^!/j^P'^''°" °^ ''"'^ ^""^' ^"d ^'^ shells charged with high explosives, have entirely changed the condiLns 1' io6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? war. The destruction now caused by a single well-aimed shell IS so great that in comparison the effect of red-hot shot IS but a trine. Modern shells will not merely penetrate vessels, causing a puncture their own diameter in size but will destroy whole sections of the ship, annihilating every- thing around them. Yet on modern vessels are found machinery of every kind, marine engines, dynamo-electric engines, pumping, steering, hauling, and ventilating appa- ratus. Every gun, every steam pinnace has its own com- plex machinery. Add to this miles of electric wire and a wilderness of constructions of every kind concentrated in the machinery departments, in which men by artificial hght, and in artificially induced atmosphere, in isolated groups, and cut oft from their commanders, must with full control of their business, execute immediately an : coolly orders proceeding from an unseen leader by telegraph buch, in brief, is the modern man-of-war. ' To give some idea of the role played by machinery in modern ships we may cite a comparison made by Admiral JWakarof between a wooden frigate of the old type and the modern cruiser /?^/;V/& .. "The engines and boilers of the cruiser Runk occupy 192 feet length in the widest part ot the ship. In order to understand what this means we may say that if we were to take out of the ship the engines and boilers, also the coal bunkers, and fill the vacant space with water, a frigate of the old type might easily be moored inside, with all its equipment and all its guns. Around the frigate there would be sufficient space to steer a pinnace. Within this space of 192 feet all is com- pressed to a seemingly impossible extent. . . . The engi- neer must be an acrobat, and the stoker, who with forced draught must make the boiler give twice the steam pressure that corresponds to its dimensions, must in endurance and energy give way in little to Satan him- self. With growing complexity of the mechanism the need tor intelligence has also grown. In former times when wind was the only motive power of vessels the result of battles depended much from skilful seamanship, and in THE FUTURE OF NAVAI. WARFARE 107 the end of ends was decided bv bmrrlmo- Cf ^ir^'^l -'r'^' the.e conli;n:''"f,e TolZ Ttul battle w be determined by steam alone, whatever maVb^ the d>rect.on o the wind, and it will be deddcd bvCr pcdoes, by artillery, or by the ram. In the tin'e of sai " ng ships a movement once determined upon could not be oncealed; with steam it need not be revealed unnh^ ast movement. Thus the need for leadersh ^ and de s on has grown to a remarkable decree Tli^ r^rmo ^f,^'^'.°" Manning justly remarks -As fnr J^ Pi ^"^''^''^^ cerned,\^may' be s"d"thaf ^^wh - 'JrEn^ir d" results. Here the wliole question lies in the training and a^™he":ules:frerf "^"' '''l''''''^^ and'aft^rrds in me successtui employment of technical fnrfnrc nr i^rassey and Werner, it is impossible not to conclndp hre and conflagration of the upper decks in wMrh mander In on° ^""f^^'^^l^ ^^^upies the post of com- io8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? fleet it will be possible to strike deadly blows attheeneniv when the fleets of the first line shall have been forced to leave the seas in consequence of damage sustained in battle In all probability future naval battles will present this difference from those of the past— even from recent battles —that solitary vessels will not take part, but whole squadrons consisting, as armies, of their own sort of cavalry, artillery, and infantry, that is, their swift cruisers their battleships, and, finally, of their torpedo-boats and torpedo-catchers. With this the element of accident will play such an important role that naval battles will almost resemble a game of dice in which the stakes will be millions of money and thousands of lives. It is certain that all that is not defended by armour will be swept from the decks by the shell-fire of quick-firing guns, and it remains an open question if even that portion of the crew which is in protected positions will be able to stand the (Concussion produced by the explosion of shells Attention must be called to the ease with which shells pro- duce conflagrations of decks, masts, bridges and everything inflammable. All that is near the region of explosion of a shell will be totally destroyed, a thousand steel fragments wil fly about with inconceivable rapidity, penetrating decks and corridors. Some of the shells which fall in an ironclad will immediately make a part of its guns useless and the employment of the larger guns will be impeded' since the turning of the turrets will be impeded by torn plates. Shells containing heavy charges will cause immense destruction. If a shell loaded with 22 pounds of melinite were to fall between the two decks of an iron- clad its explosion would destroy the balks supporting the deck, rend the iron sheets, pierce the deck, stretcl. the electric wires until they broke, damage the steam pipes and boilers— in one word, disable all the vital organs of the ship for a space of several yards around the region of explosion, and in addition produce suffocating fumes which would prevent approach for a quarter of an hour, however perfect might be the ventilation. It needs no evidence to prove that it is extremely THE FUTURE OF NAVAL WARFARE 109 doubtful that any one state can obtain a decided prrpon- dcrance above the others in the quality of its ships or their armament. In the present state of technical science every improvement adopted by one power is immediately adopted by all the others. The number of vessels of an obsolete type IS great, but these less effective ships are divided among the different powers in proportion. Tiie fate of future battles will therefore depend primarily on acci- dents which cannot be foreseen, and secondly on the possession at a given moment of preponderating strength But in this respect we find that in spite of all efforts the relative strength of fleets has changed but little, and the comparison made by Admiral Werner therefore seems entirely true. " A naval battle," he says, " if both adver- saries are determined and energetic, will resemble a conflict between two stags which in a moment of fury rush upon • one another, entangling their antlers, and in the end of ends destroying one another. Or if the enemies are less determined a naval battle will resemble a contest of athletes, the combatants moving backwards and forwards in serpentine lines ; both will keep up fire from a great distance until neither has enough ammunition left to strike a decisive blow." To cruisers and torpedo-boats will be allotted a duty not less ferocious-a duty which, in the Middle Ages, was fulfilled by pirates and privateers— to pursue merchant ships, fall on them by night and sink them, with passengers crews and cargoes, with the object of cutting the communi- cations and paralysing the trade of the enemy. The following passage, which we find in " Les Guerres Navale= de Demain," is an interesting illustration of this : "A war on commerce will have its regulations, precise, constant, and unconditional; the weak v'l be attacked without mercy, the strong will be evaded i y flight without any false shame. Our torpedo-boats and cruisers as soon as thev discover an English squadron from afar, or even a single battleship. It may be not exceeding them in fighting strength )nt capable of oflering even slight opposition, will be bound to disappear. no IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? From such id from declarations of passages, unquestioned authoritiei , elude that the effect of future navaf wars on future trade will be incomparably more disastrous than before. A future war on sea will also draw after itself economic and political consequences quite different from those of the past, when every state found its needs supplied within the limits of its own dominions. The general use of shells loaded with explosives which may be thrown a distance of some miles, shells, one of which falling ^nto a town or settled locality may cause the most terrible destruction ; and the speed with which vessels may be moved from one point of a coast to another, independently of weather and wind, must affect the minds of peoples, and even give rise to agitations. And such agitations, in view of the present general socialistic tendencies, may not be limited to tem- porary disorder. On preparations for naval war immense sums are yearly expended by the powers, but shipbiiilding so constantly and so rapidly advances towards perfection, that a large proportion of modern fleets is obsolete, and incapable of meeting in battle vessels of the newer types, some being unfit for employment even after the destruc- tion of the latter. All this was more or less clearly foreseen ten years ago on the appearance of smokeless powder. And in the present time, in view of the speed attained by cruisers armed with strong artillery, and also by torpedo-boats of the latest type ; in view of the improvements in the propul- sion of torpedoes, and in view of the progress made in the building of submarine boats, it may be affirmed that even vessels of the latest types, however they may be divided among the different nations, cannot guarantee the attain- ment of the ends of war. Meantime, for the improvement and increase of fleets new credits are required every day. We may well inquire what degree the discontent of peoples may attain when they learn that even the newest types of ships and the last inventions in artillery have been adopted everywhere, while requirements still continue to grow. In view of THE FUTUKF OK NAVAL WARFARK m those cicmrnts which in Western Europe to-day contend with all pohtical and social order, even more ahsurd appears the nvah;y of states in the increase of ihcir fleets, while the relation of fighting force remains the same and innncnse sums are yearly squandered which might' have been devoted to the satisfaction of social needs A comparison of the growth of expenditure on armies ami fleets is presented by the following table (counting the rouble as equal to three shillings) : Expenditure. 1874 1884 1891 1896 On Armies Millions of Roubles 615.4 . 688. 1 885.1 893.6 £ 92,325,000 103,215,000 13-. 765.000 134,040,000 On Fleets, Millions of Roul)les. 158.2 218.6 247.2 299.6 £ 23.730.000 32,790,000 37.080,000 44.940,000 To express more clearly the comparative growth of outlay on armed forces, we take the outlay of 1874 at 100 and hnd the following percentage increase : ' 1874 1884 1891 1896 Armies, 100 112 144 • • • • •• Fleets. 100 138 156 189 The comparison which we have made as to the naval resources of the different states shows that these millions can have no practical result, even if we admit that war is as unavoidable in the future as it has been in the past. Calculations made by us show that England alone in a prolonged war could obtain the mastery of the sea, forcing tne other naval powers to give way everywhere. But en the other hand, the interruption of communications at sea would cause the English such great losses as to eliminate the possibility of a prolonged war, even although they were absolutely certain of victory. The cessation of the import ot provisions would not allow of England continuing a prolonged war. Of wheat, barley, and rye England lacks supplies for 274 days and of oats for 76 days in the year 112 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Even if we agree with the baseless opinion of optimists and assume that the transport of supplies to England might be carried on under convoy, still we must bear in mind the terrible rise in prices in consequence of the risk. And side by side with this rise in prices would proceed the interruption of industry. Thus, in continuing to increase their fleets and to per- fect their armaments at immense cost the European powers are striving at aims undefined and unattainable. But the financial and social difficulties which yearly increase may result in such dangers that governments must be compelled after immense sacrifices to do what it would be wiser to do to-day, namely, to abandon a fruitless competition. Such is a brief picture of what Europe may expect from a future war. But over and above the direct sacrifices and material losses, by slaughter, fire, hunger, and disease, a war will cause to humanity a great moral evil in conse- quence of the peculiar forms which a struggle on sea will assume and of the examples of savagery which it will pre- sent at a moment when the civil order will be threatened by new theories of social revolution. What wearisome and ungrateful labour will be needed to repair the losses, to cure the wounds which a war of a single year will cause ! How many flourishing countries will be turned into wildernesses and rich cities into ruins ! How many tears will be shed, bow many will be left in beggary ! How long will it be before the voices of the best men, after such a terrible example, will preach to humanity a higher principle than " might is right " ? CHAPTER IV DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? A CHARACTERISTIC feature of our time is the technical improvement of all military apparatus. Hardly has a new nfle or a new gun been adopted before it is necessary to replace .t by fresh weapons. Within a short t^me we „.ay expect new improvements in powder, and this in hs turn these changes, consequent on new in- nions have taken P ace more and more swiftly. Of .nis, ^rhaps the build.ng of fortresses is the best example. After fabulous sums had been lavished on the building of fortresses on a new system with all the latest technical imprrvementsThe CeTses'o^fv'tolr-l ^'^^ modern st'rategrreui^e tortresses only to a limited extent, a view, the probability of which .s increased by the fact that every army wil be A similar process of change may be observed in thf» building of fleets. In the past one and the same type was employed in the course of three hundred yea^s without essential change. After this began ^hebuiK of ironclads, and in the course of thirty years he variouf types of ships may be counted by tens.^ In the pre" em time opinions change so rapidly that no sooner is a vesse launched than it is found not to come up "o the newes X un^derJhe bu7d"en'" "^'^" ""^^^ have begun to In this relation Russia especially finds herself in a 114 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? difficult position. At a time when in Western countries a powerful social initiative heaped up wealth, when towns sprang up, not as centres of local authority, but as trading and industrial centres, and when in the country free labour, full ownership of land, and the accumulation of savings ensured the erection of good and durable buildings for man and beast, the construction of good roads, the regu- lation of water communications, and the building of fac- tories, in that time in Russia the economic life of the people, their social initiative, and even the satisfaction of their necessities were paralysed by the existence of serfage. The Crimean war resulted in disorder in the finances and in the money system which had only just been brought into order, and in addition to this, shook the faith of men in the old system of government. The reform of the administrative apparatus was all the more essential owing to the subsequent emancipation of the serfs. The necessity for building roads was recognised. The peasants received their freedom and occupied themselves with the working of their fields. Savings they could not have. They lived in poverty and the conditions of their lives were most primitive. Landowners had not the capital to carry on agriculture, and were forced to let their land to the peasantry for labour or on lease. The work of the peasantry, both on their own lands and on that of the landowners, continued to be most primitive. Meeting no support from industry in the utilisation of their products, agriculturists were compelled to export them m a raw form. Russia exported grain, cattle, and phosphates to improve the soil of foreigners, while Russian soil itself constantly deteriorated. Such, briefly, was the condition of the chief part of the Russian population at a time when Western Europe was advancing in industry and prosperity by bounds. Meantime, the population rapidly grew. In a time when the population of the Empire was estimated at some hundred and ten and odd millions, the census of last year gave the figure at more than one hundred and DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? u^ twenty-nine million fo;: . This yearly growth of the popu ation, estimated . , -oximately at two millions, un! doubtedly constitutes an Increase of wealth, but on y in the event of there being sufficient resources for the feeding and training of the growing population. Otherwise it must only result in an increase of the proletariat In comparison with its revenue the Empire has an TeZTl ' ^'2^'!,°" '^" ^"^P^*"^^' Debt occupies the second place m the Budget, and is only a little less than the expenditure of the Ministry of WarifAO 800 ooo nnH ^43.200,000 in 1898). The'finances th'o^eT'a'^efi i' even before the Crimean war. After the Crimean war the position was worse, and every attempt to diminish the extraordinary expenditure proved fruitless in consequence of the war of 1877-78. Meantime, fresh expenditure was entailed by re-armament, the construction of fortresses and strategical railways. Independently of these it was necessary for the development of industry to return to the construction of railways which had been suspended m 187s, although a great part of the railways promised only to pay, or even cover their expenses, in the future. It is natural that this increase in indebtedness had as taxation ^'^"^^'^"^"^^ ^" increase in the burden of To contend with such a position was very difficult, but thanks to twenty years of peace and the energetic efforts of the Ministry of Finances, the deficits vanished from the ordinary Budget, and it seemed that money could even be ound for productive purposes. But in all circumstances the finances of a country depend on the economic con- dition of the people. We have already briefly pointed out, and shall hereafter show in greater detail, how badly Russia compares in this respect with the countries of Western Europe. The severity of the climate prevents agricultural work during a considerable part of the year and involves greater demand for clothing, dwelling food' heat and light. The great number of holidays ^nl hirther shortens production, even in the working season. With such conditions it is inevitable that savintrs w o ii6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? rainy day among the Russian people should be insignifi- cant, and such they are shown to be in reality. Every famine, even a local failure of harvest, is the cause of a veritable disaster. With such a state of affairs it is needless to point out the absolute necessity for great caution in the expenditure of money on military purposes. It is quite true that in this respect Russia cannot fall behind the other powers, but she must not follow blindly after them, and, above all,' she must not attempt to outstrip them, for such a course might lead to the most disastrous consequences. In the struggle for money the rivalry is unequal. Russia is weaker for two reasons — first, she has less reserves; fe -ondly, she gives orders abroad, pays more than other powers, and sends her money out of the country. While England, Germany, and France themselves construct and prepare all that they need at the lowest possible cost, keeping their money at home, Russia is compelled to take a less advantageous course. Thus, for instance, in ordering ships of war in England, or building them at home to a large extent with imported materials and machinery, Russia pays at least 25 per cent, more than the building of warships costs the English Government, and sends into that country money which England afterwards uses for the strengthening of her own fleet. By her orders Russia helps to keep up English shipbuilding yards, which in time of war would make it easy for England to repair quickly the losses she sustained. Every effort put forth by Russia in the strengthening of her fleet calls forth corresponding activity in foreign countries. The recent assignation of ;^ 13, 500,000 (ninety millions of roubles) to strengthen the fleet may serve as an example. As the direct consequence of this the project of the German Government to allot several millions of marks to increasing the fleet during a period of seven years, a project which had met with strong opposition in the Reichsrath, was agreed to without any further difficulty. As a natural consequence the French and Austrian Governments already demand from their DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? 117 parliaments extraordinary credits for the same purpose liius, as the final result of this rivalry, the relationship ot the naval powers will remain what it was before All this only confirms the necessity for greater caution and concentration o*- resources in the satisfying of those requirements which m a given time are most insistent Precisely as climatic conditions in every country demand a suitable distribution of agricultural labour, in military affairs a definitive plan also is essential corresponding with needs and resources. The first question which would be asked after the adoption of such a system is ; Must Russia be equally ready to carry on war on land and on sea ? In order to define the importance of naval power in a naval war two propositions must be made— first that a war impends with the Triple Alliance, in the event of which Russia has the support of France; and secondly that a war is probable with England. It is necessary! hrst of all, to observe the immense preponderance of armies and of operations on land over naval forces and possible operations at sea. The armies which would enter upon war on the Continent are numbered by millions of men. The armies of the first line of both alliances number more than six and a half millions. Ihe armies of the second line would number almost six millions. What role will be played by the fleet during the conflict ot such masses ? To this question we get the best answer by reverting to the war of 1870. Germany then possessed a tieet in no way fit to oppose the fleet of France Yet the French fleet was compelled to abandon all plans of a landing upon the German coast, and did not even make an attempt to accomplish them. From the first, Moltke was so convinced of the impossibility of such a diversion that in his plan of military operations in 1870, relying upon the numerical superiority of the German army, he declared • Ihe superiority of our forces at the point where the decisive blow will be struck will be all the greater if the Irench undertake an expedition against the xnortliern couot *% ii8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? of Germany." This is the best evidence of the disregard he paid to all projects of invasion. From that time the organisation of the armies of the great powers has gone still further, so that, even if the whole of an army and its reserves were engaged in operations on the frontier or in the territory of the enemy, it would nevertheless not be difficult to oppose a superior force to any that could be landed on the coast. From estimates made in Italy, the transport of an army corps fully equipped with provisions for a month, and corresponding train, would require a fleet with a dis- placement of 116,000 tons. Professor Deguis says that, in the first 15-20 days from the beginning of operations, France could despatch an expedition of not more than 30,000 men. But in the face of modern artillery, small arms, and coast defences, a landing could only be accom- plished with great difficulty. Only a change of wnid, a sudden storm or a thick fog is needed to interrupt the operation of landing, and to place the forces already on shore in a critical position. It is true that we hear talk of the possibility of war- ships holding the coast-line under their guns and keeping it entirely clear of the defenders' troops. In reality, it happens that warships of deep draught, in order to keep clear of rocks and shoals, are compelled to stand at a dis- tance of 1 1 00 to 1600 yards from the shore, and, incom- moded in movement by their transports, they regulate their fire with difficulty. But the enemy, relying upon long-range artille) v, does not show himself at all upon the open shore, but shelters himself behind dunes and eminences or keeps even farther in the interior. The fire from warships may be powerful, but it is scattered and for this reason cannot be effective. During the bombard- ment of the insurgents' camp in Crete the allied squadron fired seventy shells, with a resulting loss to the insurgents of three killed and fifteen wounded. We will not speak of the possibility of a Russian descent upon the coast of Germany. But let us suppose that the Germans were to land troops, of course without DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? 119 cavalry, on the Baltic coast, what could they eUcct ? We have heard of course of the possibility of the Germans landing near Riga in order to cut the communications of the Russian army situated in Lithuania, or descending near Narva in order to operate against St. Petersburg. But this is almost a phantasy. Wherever they might be landed, an enemy's forces moving into the interior would be gradually weakened by the allotment of a consider- able proportion for the purpose of preserving communi- cations. Meantime the strength of the defence would continuously grow. With the aid of the telegraph and the railway, troops might be brought to the threatened locality in a very short time. Nor could their arrival at the scene of operations be interfered with by the destruc- tion of the railways, for the invading army will be without cavalry. The success of the allied armies in the Crimea may be adduced against this argument. Such an objection has been answered by Von der Goltz in his work " Das Volk in Waffen." He says : " If the armies landed in the Crimea were victorious over the local forces the cause of this was that, however difficult communication by sea was for the allies, these conditions were more favourable than the land communications used by the defenders in their own country. If in 1854 Russia had had her present network of railways, the French, the English and the Turks, at first landing in the Crimea to the number of 120,000 men, would not have remained there long." The undertaking of a descent in considerable force is improbable, if only for the reason that it weakens the strength of the army which must defend the frontier where superiority of forces is aimed at by both sides. In certain events Germany would be compelled to carry on war on two frontiers. Her enemies would only desire that she should make the mistake which Moltke expected from France. Thus for the protection of her coasts, Russia has no need whatever to increase her fleet, for the descent of an enemy would place her in no danger whatever, even I20 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? if she did not dispose of her present fleet. This opinion IS held even in Germany. The bombardment of a coast town, however important it may be as a poHtical, industrial, or trading centre, can only cause material losses to private individuals and to the state. But such operations can have no effect on the resources which a country possesses for the purpose of carrying on war. The destruction caused can have no influence whatever on the course of the war on land, and even il all the seaports of a country were bombarded It could in no way change the course of events. The essential fact is this, that a continental war will not be carried on merely with the object of causing losses to the enemy and beginning negotiations for peace on the basis of the losses caused. A future war will be a struggle between whole peoples, and each side will have as its object the total overthrow of the enemy. Therefore such bombardments of coast towns, however wealthy and important thes ■ latter may be, would only represent so much destruction with little influence on the issue of the struggle. Even in this respect Russia is in a better position than Germany ; the Russian coast being less thickly populated the losses from bombardment would be less, and conse- quently a numerous fleet is less necessary for Russia than for Germany. With the exception of Riga, Revel, and Helsingfors, strongly fortified, there are no important towns on the Russian coast. And the Russian fleet, even as constituted now, represents a very considerable force. Even the complete destruction of a fleet could have httle influence upon a continental war. In commenting upon the experience gained from the last wars in Europe we may point first to the destruction of the Italian fleet by the Austrians at Lissa in 1866. What benefit did this naval victory bring to Austria, beaten at Sadova? In 1870 a German fleet scarcely existed, while the French fleet had full freedom to act, yet Germany sustained no damage and her naval inferiority in no way influenced the DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY ? 121 course of the war The French sailors were far more needed for the defence of Paris. It is true that the maritime trade of Germany was arrested. But whatever the number of warships may be, communications by sea will be cut. Nowadays every power has sufiicient cruisers and merchant ships which might be turned into cruisers in order to stop all trade by sea. ' Battleships against this will be of little use. In sneed they must give way to cruisers which will evade them and simply laugh at their unwieldy adversaries. Battleships will be valuable only for battle between themselves and for attack upon coasts. But let us postulate that the Russian navy had a decided preponderance over that of the enemy, sending to the bottom many more of his ships than she lost herself Even in such case the Russian lleet would at best be in the position of the French fleet in 1870, which not only gained no victories, but found no foe. The victorious flee would steam along the coast and threaten certain localities. Suppose that the Russian fleet were to act more energetically than the French fleet in 1870 and bombard mercilessly a great number of the smaller coast towns of Germany. The great German cities, Bremen, Hamburg, Stettin, Kiel, Dantzig, and KOnigsberg would remain inaccessible, standing too far from the coast But to attain results, even in the case of the less important towns, would be no easy task for a fleet of ironclads. On approaching the coast they must meet with the torpedo-boats, submarine mines, and submarine boats of the enemy, and run very great risks. Modern science has contrived a very different system of coast defence from that which obtained in 1870. But we will suppose that the Russian fleet were uninjured. Yet if the fleet does not dispose of swift cruisers, hundreds of merchant vessels will escape from harbour and the blockade will be ineffective. In this respect one cruiser may do more than a whole fleet of unwieldy battleships, which consume immense quantities of coal, a material which the Kussian fleet could obtain only with difficulty. Thus if 122 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? •«! the battleships cannot be devoted to the interruption of trade, their operations must be confined to the destructinii of peaceful settlements, the slaughter of unarmed men, women and children, leading to an increase of savagery in the relations of the contending peoples. Suppose that victory should remain on the side of Germany, acting, it might be, in co-operation with Eng- land, the results would be even less considerable, for the Russian coast is much more thinly peopled. We will even go farther and suppose that the German fleet proved victorious over the French What influence could such a result have on the events of the war on land between the two states ? In all probability no more than the superiority of the French fleet in 1870, for Germany would certainly not make the mistake of attempting a descent upon the French coast. Prince Bismarck, in one of his speeches, drew the following compaiison of the importance of successes on sea and land in a war between continental powers : " It must not be forgotten that the capture of every village represents a real success, the importance of which is immediately felt, while the capture of an enemy's vessel only goes into the general account, which must be settled at the conclusion of the war. The capture of a fortress ensures the possession of territory, while the capture even of a whole fleet at best represents only means for under- taking fresh conquests." But Russia, even if she aimed at conquests in Germany and Austria, would not need a fleet, for the land frontiers of both these countries are conterminous with hers for an immense distance. Let us consider two hypotheses : (i) That the armies of Russia were defeated, while her fleet gained a complete victory: in the final result of course Russia would be beaten. (2) That the Russian army gained complete victory while her fleet was annihilated ; the result would be that Russia would gain all the fruits of her victory on land. The conquered on land would be forced to pay contributions, and even their fleets might pass into the hands of Russia. rruption of destruction rmcd men, iavagery in le side of with Eng- 3le, for the We will eet proved uld such a :tween the superiority d certainly : upon the drew the ccesses on iwers : *' It sry village r which is ly's vessel be settled ' a fortress pture even for under- she aimed lot need a mtries are e armies of i complete would be 1 complete :sult would victory on ed to pay >s into the DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? 123 To this it may b replied that since France, Germany, and England mcrease their fleets we must do the same. Whether France is acting wisely in increasing her fleet we will not stop to consider, since France must bear in mind the possibility of a conflict with Italy, protect her interests 111 the Mediterranean and her colonial possessions and, we may observe, the greater her naval forces increase the greater will be the security of Russia, although it must be noted that in France every expedition to distant countries gives cause for complaints as to unreadiness, disorder and defects in tne personnel. It is enough to read the work of M. Lockro>, former Minister of Marine, to be convinced that the French fleet is far from being on a level with the English, and that the incessant attempts made to overtake England have only resulted in hindering the French fleet in Its efforts to be fully ready for war. Even if we allow that there is much exaggeration in the complaints which have been made, it is impossible not to conclude that as France cannot rival England in the number of her ships the French Government would do better to devote all its atten- tion to preparing the fleet in its present composition for war. For Germany an increase in the navy is not demanded by any interests in Europe, and if it had not been for the example of Japan, in all probability, the Emperor William would not have set himself so passionately to the increase of his fleet. In a very different position is England. Her funda- mental interests demand that she shall remain mistress of the seas, everywhere and against every possible enemy preserving from all danger not only the British Islands', but her maritime trade, her immense colonies in all quarters of the globe, and those communications by which the riches of the Old and New Worlds are exchanged to her advantage, and from which depend the ebb and flow of her social life. Mistress of the seas, England can be at rest, both as concerns herself and as concerns her colonies tor her the mastery of the seas is no empty word, and she has every good reason to devote all her resources to the strengthening of her fleet. m 24 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? iu ;3 turn thi*> example of England may be instructive for oth'^'" countries. England does not rely on the strength of her ai mies. A country composed of islands, having a commanding fleet is secure, nnd consequently it may wisely sacrifir^ all to the increase of its fleet. Russia i in a very different position, and her fleet can in no way p'uarantee her safety. A decisive blow can be struck onl/ on land, and for Russi. a navy has only an auxiliary importance, in proportion as it influences operations on land. If a naval war be carried on independently of these operations, and without influence upon them, it represents a mere waste of strength and money. Even in relation to England it is more importane for Russia to be strong on land than to increase her fleet, which never can be made to rival the navy of Great Britain. Not only is an increased fleet not essential for the safety of Russia, but an increase would produce very little moral effect on her possible enemies. Germany, as we have already pointed out, has no fear of a landing on her coast, and her fleet will always have the Northern Canal avail- able as a means of refuge. In England an increase in the number of Russian battleships would produce no impres- sion. There remains only Japan. But there is not one of Russia's vital interests which Japan could damage. Tiie Siberian railway is important only as a means of trans- port, and neither Japan nor China has any interest in opposing transit across Siberia. For England the competition of the Siberian railway is insignificant. The freight rate from Hankow to Odessa or to London is only about twopence per pound, and the great proportion of Asiatic trade will continue to prefer this cheaper route. It is true that transport by railway will be shorter in time, but this has little importance. The use of the Siberian railway for purposes of txv.de. cannot assume large measures for many years, i^o' :h\j. an immense development in China would be r'^ji.irca, and China is above all things a country of stagnation. In recent times Russia has made no small efforts to strengthen her fleet. In the course of the twenty years I instructive the strength is, having a itly it may Russia i 1 in no way 1 be struck ui auxiliary erations on itly of these ; represents 1 relation to : strong on m be made )r the safety Httle moral IS we have 1 her coast, ;!anal avail- *ease in the no impres- i is not one nage. The IS of trans- interest in I railway is / to Odessa nd, and the le to prefer by railway rtance. The i.de cannot *\): .'hi J an quirca, and on. II efforts to ?enty years DOES RUSSIA NEED \ NAVY? r jj, period, 1876-96, the expenditure of the Russian Mini.-,iry of Marine grew at a nuch greater va^r- than other branches of expenditure— that is, from /:4,05o,uoo to ;^9,ooo,ooo (in 1896, ;{: 1 0,050,000), or 122 per cent. In the same period the expenditure on the army increased only 50 per cent. Now the maritime trade of I^ussia for one inhabitant only amounts to fourteen shillings and three- pence — that is, the trading interests of the Russian popu- lation are twenty-two times less than those of the popula- tion of the United Kingdom, and seven times less than those of Frai'ce, Germany, and the United States. Thus man lime trade has for Russia less importance than for other countries, not only from its smaller value but owing '- her geographical position; the land frontiers of Russia being immense, while her limited coast is icebound for a great part of the year. A more important consideration lies in the fact that those very powers which could place obstacles in the way of Russian maritime trade are those which are most dependent upon it, for neither Germany nor England could manage without Russian products. The stoppage of Russian trade would cause great injury to both these countries. From this it results that the maritime trade of Russia will be defended by the very nature of things, and not by the number of her warships. Yet Russia spends for every ton displacement of her own ships more than any other European state : that is to say, £1^ 4s., while France spends £^ is. 8d., Italy ;^2 13s., Austria £1 8s., Germany ;;^i, and England only 12s. gd. Naval expenditure amounts to 7 per cent, of the total value of her maritime trade, while that of France is 6 per cent., that of England 3| per cent., and that of Germany less than 2 per cent. From this we see how insignificant are the trading interests of Russia. In the East they are quite inconsiderable. First of all it is necessary to consider what is the extent of that trade in China and Japan which so captivates the imaginations of Europeans. China imports goods of average value of ;^4 1,050,000, and exports her own *^ 126 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? products to the average value of ;^23,85o,ooo. The imports of Japan are valued at ;{;"6,750,ooo, and her exports at ;^8,700,ooo. These figures refer to a time before the war between China and Japan, since which those countries have permitted themselves such expenditure that they have undoubtedly impoverished themselves, and will not quickly recover from the consequences. In this trade the share of Russia is quite inconsider- able. Of five hundred mercantile firms trading in China ten only are Russian. In the general export and import trade of China the share of Russia is as small as 4 per cent. The number of vessels entering Chinese ports in the year 1889 was 19,100, with a displacement of 1 5,800,000 tons. Of these vessels but 44, with a displace- ment of 55,000 tons, were Russian, or less than | percent, of the total. True, we may expect that the construction of the Siberian railway will lead to the increase of Russian trade with China. But it will be safer not to have any illusions in this respect. A comparison of the present freight from Hankow to Odessa with the railway freight from Odessa to Moscow, will show what transport by the Siberian railway even with the lowest possible freights will cost. The political influence of a great fleet in the Far East may be of course adduced. We hear talk, for instance, of the acquisition of Corea. The possession of Corea could be of no possible advantage to Russia. Corea has a popu- lation of twelve millions, and the whole value of her trade, import and export, amounts to no more than ;^78o,ooo! \yith the conquest of Corea, Russia would have another distant point for the defence of which she would have to provide, and the greater the number of such weak places in the state the more its power is weakened. The immense defensive strength of Russia lies in the fact that she is a compact continent with a short coast line on which attack could be made. While Russia could draw no possible profit from the acquisition of Corea, she would suffer from the fact that the Coreans, becoming Russian subjects, would begin to DOES RUSSIA NEED A NAVY? 127 immigrate into Siberia, leading the Chinese after them When we recall the case of the United States, compelled to prohibit the immigration of Chinese coolies, it will appear plain that Russia would be compelled to take limi- tary measures against her Corean subjects, measures which would not exactly tend towards the reconciliation of the Coreans with their new position. It is not to be supposed that Russia is spending half a milliard roubles on the Siberian railway in order to facilitate the competition of Coreans and Chinese with the Russian settlers in Siberia. The settlement of Eastern Siberia with Coreans would also give rise to difficulties from the political point of view. For all such reasons the acquisition by Russia of Corea is not to be desired. In addition to this, from the direction of Japan there can be no serious danger. In her excessive armaments Japan IS making efforts to follow in the footsteps of Europe, like the frog in the fable which, seeking to rival the size of the ox, blew himself out until he burst. Something of this nature must happen with Japan. The Amur territory of Russia is a wilderness which Japan cannot threaten. It is inconceivable that she would enter upon a war with Russia even though she were possessed of a preponderance in battleships. CHAPTER V ..^.i.,. . WHAT WARS HAVE COST IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY In considering the expenditure on past wars it would be necessary to add to the direct expenditure of Treasuries the losses sustained by populations through destruction of property, shortening of production, loss of trade, and generally from economic perturbations. The total of such losses would unquestionably exceed the total of the sums directly devoted by governments to the carrying on of war. But this total, of course, can only be estimated approximately. According to M. Leroy Beaulieu the expenditure by England in consequence of the French wars of the Revolution and of the First Empire, amounted to ;^84O,O0O,ooo ; and the losses of men in Europe amounted to 2,100,000. Some authorities estimate this loss of men at a much higher figure ; Sir Francis Duver- nois finds that France alone, up to the year 1799, had lost i^ millions of men. The cost of the war with France from 1812 to 18 15, according to the accounts presented by Prince Barclay de Tolly to the Emperor, amounted to ;^23,325,ooo. Tt is interesting to note some of the larger items in this account. Thus we find that ;^ 10,650,000 were devoted to pay, ;^ 1,800,000 to provisions, ;^ 1,050,000 to the purchase of horses, and ;^ 1,200,000 to rations. In reality the expenditure caused by this war was very much greater. The issue of assignats amounted to ;^^43, 8 50,000, and debts in consequence of loans, &c., to ;{;2 2,950,000. In addition to this, Russia expended the ^ETEENTH 3 it would be f Treasuries estruction of trade, and total of such of the sums Tying on of be estimated Beaulieu the the French re, amounted I in Europe estimate this ancis Duver- 799, had lost 812 to 1815, e Barclay de 5,000. Tt is this account. Dted to pay, J purchase of /ar was very imounted to loans, &c., to ixpended the WHAT WARS HAVE COST 129 subsidies received from England, and large sums, both in money and in kind, contributed by private indi- viduals. The Crimean is the first of great wars the expenditure of which can be defined with accuracy. The extraordinary expenditure caused by this war amounted to : England . . ;C74,2oo.ooo or 1.855,000,000 francs, prance , . . 66,400,000 1,660,000,000 „ Russia . . . 160,000,000 4,000,000,000 Austria • • . 15.720,000 343,000,000 i urkey and Sardmia 25,680,000 642,000,000 Total • ^340,000,000 or 8,500,000,000 francs. Let us present these totals graphically : Expenditure on the Crimean War in Millions of Francs. Russia ...::::::: ::::::;::::;!!::::;::::::::;:::c:::::::: 4000 England ■■laaa ■■■■■I ■■■■■■■■■■«!, ■■■■■•■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■a ■■■■•■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■«a ■■■■■■•■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■I, 1855 France Turkey and Sardinia Austria 166Q Thus the Crimean war laid on Europe an additional burden of ;£"340,ooo,ooo. The total of the indirect losses caused by this war it is quite impossible to estimate. The expenditure on the war of 1859 ^s thus estimated by Lerov Beaulieu : 130 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? France Austria Sardinia ;{'i5,ooo,ooo or 375,000,000 francs. 25,400,000 635,000,000 „ 10,200,000 255,000,000 „ Total . ;{'5o,6oo,ooo or 1,265,000,000 francs. Expenditure on the War of 1859 in Millions of Francs. France 375 Austria ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•I 635 Sardinia 255 After this we come to the North American Civil War. In the course of four years the Northern States put in the field 2,656,000 volunteers, and the Southern States i,ioo,ouO. The North expended in this struggle ;^56o,ooo,ooo, and the Southern States about the same sum. In a word, this conflict cost the United States ;^ 1,000,000,000 direct outlay, and probably double that sum from destruction of property and decline in pro- duction. Estimating the average value of a slave at £40, we find that an expenditure of ;^ 160,000,000 would have been sufficient for the peaceful decision of this question. In the Danish war of 1864 the expenditure was much less. It amounted to about ;^7,200,000 for Denmark, and about the same for Prussia and Austria together. The Prussian-Austrian war of 1866 involved an expen- diture of about ;^66, 000,000. In the war of 1870 the expenditure of Germany was covered by the French indemnity. As relates to France, the following are the statistics of her losses in the war of 1 870 : From August I, 1870, to April i, 1871, France lost 3864 men through desertion, 310,449 taken prisoners, 4756 dis- ,E? 1,000 francs. 1,000 „ 1,000 „ 1,000 francs. 0/ Francs. 635 in Civil War. States put in ithern States his struggle out the same United States double that cline in pro- f a slave at X),ooo would sion of this re was much 3r Denmark, :ria together, id an expen- of 1870 the the French ollowing are [ 870 : From St 3864 men !, 4756 dis- WHAT WARS HAVE COST 131 charged from the service for inefficiency, &c., 21 4^0 ' "/to"h ''h ^^"'^fi^'^' H-398 dying from wou'nos 'and 2J3,4 10 discharged for different reasons, including sick- ness. Ihe money expenditure and losses of France amounted to : Military indemnity and pavment for outlav on occupation, ^^225,1 ,8,554 2s. 6d. ; contributions from Pans and other towns, ^10,040,000. The total expen- diture indemnity and contributions caused by the war with Germany amounted to ;^5o6,68o,ooo. To this must be added losses from interruption of communicafons and work, so that the general total of losses caused by a war over the candidature of a Hohenzollern prince amounted to aoout one thousand millions of pounds The extraordinary expenditure of Russia caused by the war of 1877-78 was as follows : ^ 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 Total £ 7,649,717 2 64.399.213 7 61,221,445 10 19,816,397 8 8,322,724 9 161,309,497 16 1075 The figures in the diagram stand for millions of roubles (a rouble being taken as equivalent to 3s.) 132 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Of the losses and expenditure of Turkey statistics are not available. But taking the losses of Turkey at half of those sustained by Russia — that is, at no more than ;^8o, 700,000, we get an expenditure on both sid- of ;^24 1, 950,000. Thus we find that from 1853 to 1878, a period of twenty-five years, the expenditure on the great wars of Europe, that is, the Crimean war, the war of 1859, the Austro- Prussian war of 1866, the Franco-Prussian war of 1870, and the war with Turkey of 1877-78, reaches the immense sum of ;^i, 22 1,360,000. Expenditure of Eiirope on War in the second half of the Nineteenth Century. Wars. 8500 1866 ■■■■I ■■■■'fe ■■■■I ■■■■■ 1870 •■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■I •■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■!■■■ 1877 ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I --'■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I ■■■■■■•■■■■•■■■I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I ■ ■■■■■■■■:aan«a«fl 12667 The figures in heavy type stand for millions of francs, the total of which amount to ;f 1,221,360,000. But heavy as is the cost of actual warfare, the burdens entailed by militarism in time of peace are no less crush- ing, and no easier to estimate precisely. The need of preparation for unforeseen events entails a growth of expenditure not only in the military and naval depart- ments, but in other departments of government. In 1883 the military expenditure of Russia is defined as statistics are :ey at half of more than th sid' of a period of eat wars of of 1859, the ssian war of reaches the alf of the lEBXBI 12667 cs, the total the burdens less crush- he need of growth of ival depart- iraent. In defined as WHAT WARS HAVE COST 133 ^30,234,693 3s., but this in no way formed the limit to the military outlays of Russia; for pensions, and out- lays by the Ministries of Internal Affairs and Ministry of Finances arising directly out of military necessities, increased this outlay by ;^3.ooo.ooo. The building and exploitation of railways further complicates such estimates In 1893 the Ministry of War expended ;^33,829,68i 7s But to these figures it would strictly be necessary to add the following expenditure. Ministry of Finances pen- sions over ;{:900,ooo ; assistance to lower ranks, £6ys, 000 • recruiting, ;^93,75o, and extraordinary expenditure by the Ministry of War in re-armament over ;^4,050,ooo This extra expenditure, with other smaller items which we omit, show that the military budget of 1893 must be increased by nearly ;{;6,ooo,ooo. But it is by no means sufficient to take into account direct expenses alone ; the diminution of the revenue in consequence of a strained economic condition is no less grave. In addition to this the interest paid by states on loans concluded to satisfy military needs must be taken into account as one of the consequences of the permanent armaments of Europe. An attempt to present in figures these losses and expenditures would lead too far. We must confine ourselves to a short comparison of military expen- diture as expressed in the budgets of different countries First of all it is interesting to see the amounts which the Great Powers, that is, Prussia, Austria, Italy, Kussia, France, and England, spent and spend yearly for the maintenance of their land and sea forces, the outlay of every thousand inhabitants, and the percentage of increase m twenty-two years. Year. 1874 1884 1891 1896 Maintenance of Armies and Navies. Burden on looo Inhabitants. 116,040,000 136,005,000 169,845,000 178,995.000 £ 432 458 530 586 3 II II 4 Increase per cent. taking 1874 as 100 per cent. 100 117 146 154 134 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? The above table shows that military and naval expendi- ture develops ceaselessly, and since 1884 more rapidly than in preceding years. Thus war budgets grow not only proportionately with the increase of the population, but in a degree much greater. In 1874 every inhabitant of these countries paid eight shillings and eightpence ; in 1 89 1 this figure had grown to ten shillings and sixpence, in 1896 almost to twelve shillings. The table opposite shows the increase in the expendi- ture on the creation and maintenance of armaments of each state separately. Increase per Cent, erf Military Expenditure between 1874 and 1896. Germany Italy Austria Miiii ii iii iiii iiii ii i i i ii im ffla 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 [ 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 I I 79 /a 27% 217o England France ■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I »■•■■■»«■■■■«■■■■■■«■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I 47% 43% Russia ■ ha ■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■«■■«■■■■■ an aam "!§!■!■!■■■■*■>**■■■■■■■■■*■■■■■■■■■>■■■■■■■«•■■■■■■ ■ ■■■■■■■■III! ■■■■«■«■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■^■■■•■■■■■■■■■l(, 75% Ui From the above diagram we see that the greatest increase in the war budget in this period took place in Germany, after which Russia follows, then England, France, Italy and Austria. If we take the period 1874-91 we will see that Germany most of all increased her arma- ments in the latter year, expending twice as much as seventeen years before. After her follows Italy, and then Russia. If we take the period 1874-84 we find Italy at the head, after her follow France, Germany, England and Austria. Russia in this period not only did not increase her war budget, but even diminished it by 4 percent. It is «3 ■ft, 5 CO 2 •5^ i 2 s WHAT WARS HAVE COST M5 ^al expendi- orc rapidly ''631 ipi.W IIO~lll!dlU03 M so «r> 00 ■+ in 3 grow not 1 1 1 population, r inhabitant ■*88' M'!'" "osuBriuioD UI asB3.i3u; -juaa iaj ^ ro 00 C30 00 It pence ; in 00 M 1 d sixpence, •t^gi qjiM uosuBduioa (^ r^ M t^ in III 9S«:9J3tlI 'lnaD jgj t^ N M ^ tv "<1- ^le expendi- :nts of each >o m 10 in 3 '3ui|j3]s spunod jo su>ji||iiu 00 0\ M in r^ t^ 00 vO 00 ON "5! UI jaSpng jb^ M N fn fO M rj- (J fO N^ fO ir> ro r^ •&< v4 7'' "" ' ' ■\ unt* loyo. S ■*88' HVf^ uosueduioo VO - S '^v. s M M ui asKaaaui juao jaj fn M in t^ N * •*^8' Ml'M uosucduioD 8 r>. >n vO t^ VO 1 It) UI asBSJDuj lusD jaj 10 N N ■^ m 'Su![j3] 'i- )d 1874-91 N N N her arma- s much as s • • • • • • ^, and then nd Italy at • • •a • • 'c3 igland and s >s •c J3 03 (ft q (S ot increase ^1 rt 9 be Ui 3 2 C( snt. It is 1 i < W Qi i; 1 136 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? 3 interesting and characteristic that in the very time when Russia's armaments were being decreased, Prince Bis- marck and his supporters attempted to spread throughout Germany and all Europe the idea that Russia was arming against Germany. It was this policy which induced the Reichsrath to consent to increased outlays on armaments, thus dragging all Europe deeper into the gulf of militarism. If we compare the two rival states of Central Europe, Germany and France, we will see that in 1874 France expended ^6,450,000 more than Germany, in 1884, ;^8,850,ooo more, in 1891, ;^2, 400,000 less, and in 1896, ;^2, 700,000 more than Germany. But general figures such as these give no clear idea of the increase of the burden on the population. It is necessary here to call attention to one circumstance, The expenditure cost of maintenance of soldiers constantly increases, in consequence of perfected technique, tlie greater knowledge required, and, at the same time, im- provement in food and quarters. From statistics showing the strength and cost of armies we have drawn up the following table showing the yearly cost of the main- tenance of a single soldier. 1874 1884 1891 1 1896 Russia . France . Germany Austria . Italy England . £ s. 33 15 37 10 39 34 I 36 60 £ s. 26 5 43 19 44 8 39 15 25 88 19 £ s. 36 12 43 19 67 19 45 18 41 II 81 3 £ i. 56 8 44 II 51 9 39 35 17 77 5 Average 40 I 49 I 52 17 50 15 Attempts have been made to estimate the comparative cost of maintenance of a cavalry soldier, an infantryman, and an artilleryman. From these calculations it appears lime when Vince Bis- throughout vas arming iduced the irmaments, militarism, al Europe, 74 France in 1884, xl in 1 896, ral figures ase ol" tlie cumstance, ) constantly nique, tlie ! time, im- cs showing wn up the the main- 1896 £ s. 56 8 44 II 51 9 39 35 17 77 5 50 15 omparative fantryman, i it appears WHAT WARS HAVE COST 137 that the cost of armament constitutes only a small per- centage of the general expenditure of maintenance. As the military value of every soldier depends largely upon the greater or less degree of perfection of his firearms, a natural consequence appears in the ceaseless endeavours of every state to improve upon the weapons of its rivals. From this rivalry springs one of the most important items of expenditure on armies. Naval forces demand even greater changes in armament. Old vessels have scarcely any fighting value, and can only be employed when the con- flict of newer types has resulted in mutual extermination. In order to give some idea of the vastness of the sums expended on fleets we quote some statistics as to the cost of the creation of the French fleet. The cost of the modern fleet of France, according to figures given in Engineering amounted to ;{^29,i72,ocx); its actual modern value is ;^ 1 8, 5 38,000, to which must be added expenditure on artillery to a sum of ;^2, 11 3,666 13s. ^d. Consequently we see that two-sevenths of the value of the French fleet is irrecoverably lost. The following table (p. 138) from the Rasvedtchik gives a detailed analysis of the expenditure of the Great Powers on armies and fleets in 1893. From this table may be seen the immense sums swallowed up in military preparations. But in addition to the ordinary expenditure on armies and fleets, the sum of which rises from ;^ 12,000,000 in Austria- Hungary to ^45,000,000 in Russia, every state makes extraordinary expenditure on the increase of its army and fleet. In 1893 such outlay in Russia and France reached the sum of ;^6,840,ooo for the army, and in the Triple Alliance ;!f 10,066,000. As concerns extraordinary outlay on fleets we have statistics only for Austria-Hungary and Germany ; in 1893 these states expended ;{;2, 2 54,000. These sums increase year by year. And they are by no means con- fined to the Great Powers. At the same time, and as an inevitable consequence, the essential requirements of the people remain unsatisfied. In Austria in 1896, ;6^ 13, 500,000 were devoted to the army T3« IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? W •c CO o 0^ M VO M PO 8 m m inoo in Q 00 fO N fn ID in t^ in\o M Q >t 3 O 5 VO I ! o g o o o M CO "*■ •^- N ►1 vO O 00 O^V 00 M t^O t^ O 00 "" O O "^ in '-' >-< i s 00 •H OivO N M PT) M eg 00 in d ■3 v28S vj r^ t^ •; ^00 00 00000 o vo vo 'n ■+ t^ d "^ dqg' _ N CT> <^00 O 1-1 M iH in fO t>- o in 0^ ^5 •^ CI O O N ri C>0 r^ CT^ t^ M On O fO ■+ r^ M N f) 00 c O O M O °v8 •o cfi in On d> Q N -l-vo r< O O N M or) 1-1 (T) 0\ O N O ^ O N I O 00 00 N in in o _ r^ (3 -- O vo vD 'C mO HH « r) N in c^o r^ n ro ro O Tf fO M O CO a\ M O 00 M 00 0> in >H d^ O O 00" vd -t' 'n -J^oo A cr •c (« MO < a X 1 00 O M SJOO TfvO O^00 00 Q ^ N 'S On tJ-O i-i O M m « w w iH N Th CO O N in d m S58 O 1^00 00 ro 8 eg O N dvd (U e -Jj • • • IS G O a • • (fl c §1 42 11 §1 2^1 i'.^ll ill § eij c s-g >^5 ^-g ^^ £^ bf ii o ''3 — c rt o) o H C '5 o OS ii ■<-i X W 5 00 I 00 o CO °°. -? o fo N s S 0) ^^ rt C d ow t •I g i X X 1^ ri l-t 8 ri 4 CO N o -1- 00 t>. 5 00 o O s a o m i-i 3 • *-< e a 13 o h .J 4 ri 00 M 00 0^ s 8'i 00 X i M m M N b == IS ^^ t be drawn This in ' to increase quick-firing ammunition ; same may ry ammuni- ladliness of he require- irations for nd destruc- le fact that constitutes lind. The mse extent, •mies ; and es. In the provide for ist on the cially when Dr fortified /ar will not WHAT WARS WILL COST 141 only involve the question of victory in the field, but also the problem of forcing the enemy into such a position as to render military operations on his part impossible, in consequence of the failure of supplies. As we have already explained, communications by sea will be interrupted at the very outbreak of war. In consequence of this those countries which do not grow sufficient; corn for the support of their populations will be compelled to expend immense sums in obtaining food. In this respect, as we shall hereafter point out in detail, England is in incomparably the worst position. The increased demand lor corn in time of war will, of course, cause an immense rise in prices. At a time when armies had but one-fifth ol their present strength, and when there was no thought of the interruption of sea communications, the authority Stein estimated that the expenditure on provisioning an army would be three times greater in time of war than in time of peace. Another authority, S. N. Kotie, considers that even in Austria, which grows a superfluity of corn, the rise in prices consequent on war would amount to from 60 per cent, to 100 per cent. But if war were to prove as prolonged as military authorities declare — that is, if it were to last for two years — the disorganisation of agriculture caused by the withdrawal from work of the majority of agriculturists, would raise the price of bread to an incon- ceivable height. There are serious reasons for doubting the proposition that a future war would be short. Thanks to railways, the period of preparatory operations would be consider- ably shortened, but in marches, manoeuvres, and battles, railways can be employed only in very rare cases, and as lines of operation the}- cannot serve. General Jung estimates that the mobilisation of the French army would require ;{; 12,000,000, and that the daily expenditure would grow from ;,^6o,ooo in time of peace to ;^36o,ooo in time of war. The LAvcnir Militaire estimates the daily expenditure in time of war at the following totals : 142 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? France Germany Italy . ;('396,88o 388,920 248,040 From detailed calculations, made on the basis of past wars, it appears that a war breaking out in 1896 would have cost daily : Germany (for an army of 2,550,000) Austria ( ,, ,, 1,304,000) Italy ( „ „ 1,281,000) Total for Triple Alliance . France (for an army of 2,554,000) Russia ( „ „ 2,800,000) . . ;f 1 ,020,000 521,600 512,400 ;^2,o54,ooo /"r, 02 1, 600 1,120,000 2,141,600 The following diagram represents this more clearly : Probable Daily Expenditure on a Future War in Millions of Francs. Germany E? ),88o 5,g20 1,040 basis of past 1896 would ,020,000 521,600 512,400 ,054,000 ,021,600 ,120,000 ,141,600 ; clearly : '■ Millions of 25.5 WHAT WARS WILL COST 143 Thus it may be said that for five of the chief European states the daily expenditure in a future war would amount approximately to i:4,200,ooo. In reality, however this sum would probably be much higher. The provision- ing of armies would be carried out not only with stores obtained from the central commissariat, but also from local products. The extent to which such a circumstanc^ raises local prices may be shown by the history of the Crimean war. In the Crimean peninsula the price of hlv?^! f"""^ ^^I '^'^ '°' '5' 16, and even 25 times, hay 1 6| times, and grain, milk, and wood from 5 to o imes ; the price of manufactured articles increased 2 and \ times, and transport from 5 to 7^ times. In the neigh- bouring southern governments prices were two and three times greater than in time of peace, and even in govern- ments distant from the seat of war they doubled themselves, ro-day the employment of railways would somewhat th f?v, 1^?"^'''°"' ^""^ '^ ^^"'^ ^^ ^ "Mistake to assume hat he whole provisioning of an army, and especially railwa s^ ^ ^'^^^' "''"^'^ ^^ ""^^^'^^ "^^ ^^ "^^^"^ of The extraordinary expenditure caused by war will bv no means be limited by these items. The following table which is based on detailed calculations, shows the extent to which governments would be compelled to come to the assistance of families left without resources on the out- break of war : Germany (783,000 families) Austria (351,000 „ ) "aly (341,000 „ ) Daily. ;^78,300 21,060 20,460 Total for Triple Alliance . ;^i 19,830 France (659,000 families) Russia (531,000 „ ) ;f52,72o 25,488 Total for Dual Alliance . ;C78,2o8 The following diagram illustrates this more plainly : 144 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? ProhabU Daily Expenditure of Goveynments on the Assistance of the Families of Soldiers in Thousands of Francs. 1.957 Probable Yearly Expenditure on War in Millions of Francs. 10,681 S .2 to Q i E? Assistance vf rancs. WHAT WAR WIL,L COST 145 For these five states the daily expenditure in assisting the resourceless part of the population would amount to 1.957 of Francs. 1 10,681 S s "^ .2 CO Q i K U H a z. bl »■ X K H X h O < n w Q z O > < O ^198,028. This sum cannot be considered exaggerated, considering the immense increase in the price of the neces- saries of life. This rise in prices, independently of the K 146 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? general economic crisis caused by war and interruption of communications, will tend towards the depreciation of paper money, to the increased issue of which governments will be compelled to resort in order to meet growing expenditure. The amount which will be required by the Great Powers of the continent to carry on war for a year may be seen from the diagram at the bottom of page 144. We may well ask the question— where will such re- sources be found ? Already militarism and public debts swallow up the greater part of the revenue of most Euro- pean states, as the diagram on page 145 shows. An examination of the foregoing statistics naturally r- >^s the question, Will it be possible to raise resources so vastly exceeding the normal revenues of states ? And what results must we expect from such extraordinary tension ? "^ IP :errupti*on of reciation of governments Jet growing reat Powers nay be seen ill such re- mblic debts most Euro- s naturally e resources ites ? And traordinary CHAPTER VII THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED I.— Effect of the Improvement in Firearms upon the Character of Wounds. The adoption of long-range artillery and quick-firing, small-calibre rifles with four times the energy of those employed in former wars, gives reason for fearing that not only the losses iu battle will be incomparably greater than in the past, but also that the assistance of the wounded will be much more difficult. It is true that many authorities do not share these pessimistic views; in their opinion the difference in the wounds caused by the old and the new weapons being in favour of the latter. The wounds inflicted by modern weapons, they say, will be more easily cured ; even when the wounded are left a long time without assistance the loss of blood will be small The number of wounded will not be so great. According to this view the losses in future battles will be determined not alone by the power of arms, but also by those tactical methods which have been adopted as a consequence of the improvements in arms. As the result of perfected weapons, armies will seek or construct cover, and will attack in loose formation, while battles will be carried on at greater distances, all of which factors must tend to the decrease in the numbrr of wounded. In addition to this every soldier will be supplied with materials for dressing wounds, while blood-poisoning will be almost wholly eliminated, and the medical staffs of armies will be much stronger than before. Such are the opinions of ootimists. 148 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? It is interesting to consider the proportions and nature of wounds in past wars in comparison with those inflicted by the weapons now in use. Injuries from Cold Steel.— Y\%\\^x estimates the pro- portion of wounds inflicted by cold steel in the war of 1 866 in the Austrian army at 4 per cent., and in the Prussian army at 5 per cent., of all wounds. In the war of 1870-71 the proportion of wounds caused by cold steel in the German army was i per cent. In the Russo- Turkish war the percentage of wounds inflicted by cold steel was 2.5 per cent, in the Russian army of the Danube. The percentage of deaths caused by cold steel is also very inconsiderable. In the last Russo-Turkish war, of the number killed in the army of the Danube only 5.3 per cent, of deaths were caused by cola steel, and in the army of the Caucasus barely i per ce:it. Injuries from Bullets and Shdls. — The mutual relations of injuries by rifle and artillery iire, both as to quantity and nature, present different results in previous wars. In a future war the differences will be still greater. In the past the wounds from shell-fire were many times more dangerous than those caused by rifle bullets ; in the present day this would appear to have changed, The bullet of a modern rifle, weighing several grammes, has such force that it may strike five or six men, and cause even greater destruction than is caused by fragments of shells. The mutual relations of injuries from bullets and shells in a future war will depend from the manner in which the war is conducted— that is, whether it be determined chiefly by open battles or take the character of sieges. Since the adoption of rifled weapons we find that casualties have been caused mainly by bullets. Thus at the battle of Inkermann 91 per cent, of all wounds were inflicted by rifle fire. At the battle of the Tchernaya the proportion of wounds from rifle fire reached 75 per cent. Similar rusults took place in the Italian war, at DUppel and at KOniggratz. In the war of 1859, 80 per cent, of all wounds were caused by rifle fire, while at the storm of Diippel the proportion of bullet wounds among the w 1? . and nature ose inflicted :es the pro the war ot' and in the In the war )y cold steel the Russo- ted by cold the Danube. is also very war, of the '"ly 5-3 per in the army ml relations to quantity s wars. In er. In the times more 1 the present bullet of a such force ven greater hells. The shells in a ich the war d chiefly by 2 find that >. Thus at ounds were lernaya the 75 per cent. , at Diippel ■ cent, of all le storm of imong the THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 149 Prussians was 8o.(/ per cent. The statistics given by Wcygand concerijing the Franco- Prussian war are as follows : Artillery fire was the cause of -^ per cent, of the losses of the French and 5 per cent, of the losses of the Germans, while rifle fire caused 70 per cent, of French and 94 per cent, of German losses. Thanks to the introduction of smokelejs powder, dimi- nution of calibres, and the covering of bullets with steel, the infantry rifle, of all arms the most important, has been so perfected that grave questioning has arisen concerning the losses in future war. Especial alarm has been caused by the increased penetrative power of the new composite bullet over that of the old. The following diagram illustrates the result of firing experiments from an ii-mil. rifle. The shots were fired against fifteen folds of cowhide, 3.6 inches of hard beech- wood, and finally pine planks i inch thick, at a distance of $2^ feet from one another. 4, 5, 6. Hard leaden bullets. 7, 8, 9. Soft bullets. From this we see that the penetrative* force of the compound bullet is many times greater. It is generally accepted that a bullet which will penetrate an inch of pine has sufficient force to kill or wound a man or horse. But even here invention has not stopped. The sketch on page 150 shows the action of a S-S-mil. bullet fired with an initial velocity of about 2600 feet against a 14-mil. steel plate. The force of this bullet was sufficient, from a distance of 81^ feet, to penetrate the plate, the bullet, on issuing from the olate takinc' the form of a mushroom. 150 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? In view of the small diameter of bullets and the force with which they penetrate the body, the Gcinian surgeons Reger and Beck, and, to some extent, Bruns, consider that wounds from the new bullets will be less terrible than those caused by the old, in consequence of which they have given to these bullets the title " humane." In an address read in 1885 by Reger to the Berlin Military Medical Society, af we find the following expression of opinion : " I welcome the new bullet with great joy and believe that if it were generally adopted by international consent, all humanity would have cause to rejoice." Similar views have been expressed by Bruns, who considers that the new bullet is not only the most effective, but also the most humane, tend- ing to decrease the horrors of war. But it must not be supposed that these views were unanimously held. As far back as the Franco-German war we find that both combatants reproached one another with the employment of explosive bullets. The foundation for :? id the force an surgeons Dnsider that e than those T have given ddress read :al Society, I welcome if it were humanity have been w bullet is lane, tend- iews were erman war other with idation for THE CARE OK THE WOUNDED kjt these accusatiuus was the fact that ordinary bullet wounds often took the character of wounds caused by explosive bullets. A closer acquaintance with facts would have prevented these accusations. Numerous experiments which have been made show that bullets fired at great initial velocity (not less than 8i2i-97S feet) cause injuries similar to those caused by "explosive bullets. Various attempts have been made to explain this cir- cumstance. The opinion most widely accepted is that an explosive effect is produced when the bullet falls in some organ rich in liquids, the liquids being cast on all sides with destructive action on the neighbouring tissues similar to that of an explosion. This theory is elaborated by Reger in particular. As modern rifles are immensely superior to those of former times, both in range, accuracy and power, it would seem natural to expect a greater proportion of mortal wounds than before. If this be so, it is difficult to see how they deserve the title ** humane." It must first of all be stated that against the immense force with which modern bullets move, the opposition of the human body has little power to arrest their movement. The experiments of Bruns, in which a bullet fired from a distance of 2600-3900 feet penetrated 2-3 human corpses one behind the other, and fired from a distance of 400 metres penetrated 4-5 bodies, even the strongest bones of the human body being shattered, have not only been confirmed but strengthened by later investigations, which showed that at any distance up to 6500 feet the penetrating force of a composite bullet was sufficient to pierce several bones. The absolute number of wounded in war, even with an equal number of combatants, must be incomparably greater than before. The causes of this are obvious : the increased quantity of ammunition expended per man, rapidity of fire, increased range, greater accuracy, smokeless powder, and greater penetrative force, thanks to which many forms of cover, formerly effectually protecting the soldier will be of no value. Professor Bardeleben draws a melancholy picture of the 152 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBI.E? action of the new weapons. I Ic agrees that the number o» wounded ni the course of a given time will increase not only because the magazine rille allows the dischari/.' of many more bullets than formerly, but because one bullet will strike three or four men, one behind the oiher, it may be even more. On the other hand, he finds that the pro- portion of killed on the field of battle will increase in con- sequence of tlie increased force of the blow. Fired from a distance at which the old bullet was stopped by the skull or the ribs, the modern bullet will penetrate to the brain and heart. The sketches of Bircher (opposite page) give some idea ot the ellect of fire at long range. These experiments were carried on in Switzerland with the 7.S-mil. bullet at a distance of 9750 feet and 11,375 feet. Such shattering of the bones at a distance of 97CO feet and 1 1,375 feet will be comparatively rare. In the zone of actual fire cases of shattered bones will be more frequent and more serious ; and the mortality will be greater in consequence of greater loss of blood resulting from direct injury to the blood-vessels. As relates to the wounds caused by artillery fire, as a great part of these wounds will be caused by the frag- ments and bullets of shrapnel, it may be assumed that the injuries they inflict will differ little from those inflicted in past wars. ^ II. — Help to the Wounded. Not only may we expect that the quantity of wounds and sickness will increase in future wars, but the assist- ance of the wounded and sick will be much more difficult than in the past. It mu^t be noted that this side of the question has received little attention. The whole atten- tion of specialists has been bent upon the increase of the deadhness of weapons of extermination, and upon the strengthening of armies. The chief physician of the Bavarian army. Forth, calls attention to this fact, and declares that the German strategists in the race after t the number will inorca.si', the cJischarj^c use one bullet other, it may that the pro- :rease in con- Fired from a by the skull : to the brain ive some idea jriments were bullet at a of 9750 feet n the zone of ore frequent >e greater in from direct :ry fire, as a by the frag- med that the e inflicted in y of wounds t the assist- lore difficult 1 side of the A'hole atten- rease of the d upon the :ian of the s fact, and i race after 2 8 k J » a: u •< k ■u B rt ^ i-> -4^ c ^ W THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED ^S3 mh. 154 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? perfection of weapons of extermination, nave left behind them all plans for the amelioration of the lot of the wounded in war. Indeed, they go even further, and refuse to grant resources for the perfection of the medical organisation, thinking that such a course would hinder military operations. Meantime, the modern weapons will cause wounds requiring, if anything, more rapid aid to the wounded than those inflicted by the old type. In recent wars provision for the wounded generally proved inadequate. Even in the war of 1870 it was impossible to make arrangements for ambulances as easily as formerly. "Bullets and shells," says Pigorof, " carried much farther than before ; it was difficult to find a safe spot in the vicinity of the field of battle, and such a position once found was quickly rendered untenable by the rapid movements of the armies. Another element of difficulty lies in the fact that all stations for dressing wounds in modern wars are quickly overcrowded owing to the rapidity of fire, whole files being stricken down at the same time ; in consequence there is no possibility of avoiding terrible overcrowding in the ambulances if the wounded are not sent off the field at once. " After the battle of Weissenburg the wounded French lay two days upon the field. In the village of Remilie lay some thousands of men wounded at Gravelotte, brought thither in two days and two nights in peasants' carts, and, to attend to these thousands of wounded (nearly io,ocx)) during the first few days only four doctors were avail- able." Similar was the experience after other battles of this war. Pigorof continues : " The wounded remaining after battle were named by our old servant ' garbage and bits,' and there they all lay, garbage and bits, scattered over the battlefield till some one lifted them up and bore them away. The rapidity and accuracy of modern fire are such that whole files fall together, and the accumula- tion of wounded in a very short time is immense." No better was the state of affairs in the war of 1877-78. Professor Botkin says that the wounded remained not only without medical aid, but even without water for days, and E? 'e left behind le lot of the further, and f the medical *vould hinder weapons will )id aid to the ed generally 1870 it was balances as ays Pigorof, fficult to find :, and such a nlenable by * element of for dressing wded owing cen down at >ossibiIity of lances if the ided French Remilie lay tte, brought /carts, and, arly io,0(X)) were avail- r battles of i remaining arbage and s, scattered p and bore modern fire 5 accumula- ise." of i87;-78. ed not only r days, and THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 155 mltter inlrm.' '°Th' ^^'' '^^' "° °"^ ^^^ ^^ought of this matter m time The position of the wounded in hosoital was also unsatisfactory. In a memorandum of the Qie Contro ler we find it plainly stated tha^ the milit^rv hospitals both in the Caucasus and in Bulearir werP characterised by great defects, especially when cTmpred with the institutions opened by thc^^Red Cross SodeTy and at the expense of private individuals. The tempo'rarv in do? str'ef tdTh"^^;;-^' '^ ^^^ commiss5"1S^ inierior stores, and the medicine-chests were lackine- in some o the most necessary remedies. The supply of^h" tuletir: S'o'f °" -P"-^-"y^ and'sUet[me resulted in a lack of medical attendance. These defi- ciencies were especially felt in the time of the outbreak of typhus at the close of the war ouioreak ot P A^ Vwf '■^P^^.^^^^ative of the Red Cross Society Mr P A. Richter, writes in his report as follows: ''Of what were the military hospitals in need ? It would be ersicr to answer this question if it were reversed, and it we e ll'^Tl /^^"""^^'•^te not those things' which u'ev wanted but those with which they were fully sZl ed " thf ^n" ;' ''^"y -'^^'^ shortsightedness and Lciiv ty of the military administration in this case cannot be placed to the account of the hospitals themselves." Among^S All society is anxious to know that such events should not be repeated in a futur, war. It is interestmg to see what miprovements have been made in this depfrtmem ot military administration. Fctiimcnc Let us take France as an example. In 1870 France ommuted the unpardonable sin of considering herself pUice whn?l 'k^'^"'',°^ arrangements to fulfil in practice what has been claimed for them. When in 1 88 1 General Farre was questioned as to the sending of Sencies^"'r'"^^"i'r'' ^''^ '" "^ ""^^P^^^^ «how cieticiencies. Jn reality it was shown that in this 156 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Mil /" r, respect nothing was ready. Notwithstanding the fact that all the necessary material was bought with a liberal hand, it did not reach its destination. It even appears that in Kef (May i88i) after numberless vain applications the officers were obliged to raise a subscription among themselves for the purchase of sugar, wine, and coffee for the sick in the improvised ambulances. In Grardi- may in May 1891 the wounded and sick of General Lozhero's column awaited for twenty days the arrival of material from the regular ambulance. In Gulletta in May and June 1881 the sick officers were compelled to live at their own expense in the wretched coffee-houses of the town ; and on the whole extent of coast from Gulletta to Philippeville the ambulances and hospitals were over- crowded to such an extent that by August no more could be admitted, and the sick from Gulletta had to be sent down to the coast and set on board ship, until finally they were again brought to Philippeville. At Pont de Fahs in October 1881, 4000 sick men of Filbert's brigade, finding themselves left to the care of a single doctor, were com- pelled, owing to the absence of transport, to await the arrival of the wretched waggons hired from the natives in order to bring them to Tunis. The state of affairs in the Italian army in the Abys- sinian war was no better. There is reason for turning attention to the aid of the wounded and sick, the more so since the new weapons have made the position of affairs infinitely worse ; increase in the number of wounded will increase proportionately the difficulties of the ambulance corps ; the time for its opera- tions is diminished, thanks to the greater accuracy, rapidity, and range of fire which sometimes must make it impossible to carry off the wounded and grant them first aid ; while there is an inevitable loss of working force caused by greater distance of the dressing stations from the fighting line which the immense range of modern fire-arms must involve. One of the most celebrated surgeons of the century, Professor Bilroth, declared that in order to give full assist- E? the fact that liberal hand, pears that in applications ption among :, and coffee In Grardi- of General he arrival of lletta in May led to live at ouses of the 11 GuUetta to were over- more could d to be sent 1 finally they It de Fahs in ;ade, finding ', were com- to await the he natives in n the Abys- he aid of the veapons have ; increase in •tionately the for its opera- er accuracy, nust make it ,nt them first working force stations from e of modern the century, ve full assist- THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 157 ance to the wounded, the sanitary corps must be equal in strength to the combatants. This is in no way an exag- geration, but merely expresses the fact that with the modern conditions of war, and the probable great length of battles, it will be almost impossible fully, immediately, and satisfactorily to give medical assistance to the wounded. The very work of removing the wounded must be carried on under fire, and will be extremely difficult. The ambulance servant must pick his way with his burden, bending down to avoid the shots if both he and the wounded man he bears are not to be killed. The work of collecting the wounded will be made even more difficult by the fact that they must be sought for in the covered positions where they lie. And delay in the carry- ing off of the wounded means an increased percentage of deaths, not only from loss of blood but even from hunger. In a time when rifle and artillery fire were beyond com- parison weaker than they are now, those who were left unhelped on the ba'' Held might hope for safety. But now, when the wh' dd of battle is covered with an uninterrupted hail oi ouilets and fragments of shells, there is little place for such hope. But even here the list of terrors of a future war does not cease. The Bavarian Chief Military Physician Forth calls attention to yet another danger which may threaten the wounded. After the battle of Worth he set out with his assistants to aid the wounded, and came across a great number of Turcos who needed assistance. After this, on entering a wood he came across great walls of corpses lying across the road. The lower parts of these walls of corpses were constructed regularly, while the upper parts were formed of corpses lying in disorder. These last, apparently, were corpses of soldiers struck by bullets after the wall had been built. Forth examined the corpses carefully in order to see if any living men were among them, but found that all were dead. *• This will easily be understood," observes Dr. Forth, " as the weight of those on top and fresh bullets had finally killed off any who had 158 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? m been placed there alive." Forth supposes that such walls of corpses will also be raised in a future war. Trenches constructed in haste have not any connecting passages behind, so that the reinforcements sent to the front will have to pass an exposed space, and hastily jumping into thje trenches may cause injuries to the wounded already lying there. When the trenches shall bave become en- cumbered with dead or those considered as dead, it will be necessary to throw these out ; they cannot be thrown out behind, since such a course would result in impeding the path of reinforcements ; they will be placed of neces- sity, in front of the trench, that is, on the side of the enemy, thus forming a breastwork. "To be cast there alive," adds Dr. Forth, " will be the best of fates, for a new bullet will shortly end all sufferings, while those wounded who are left lying in the trenches will suffer long." It is plain that the introduction of long-range rifles, the improvement of artillery, the immense increase in the strength of armies, and finally, changes in the rules of war, demand the introduction of radical reforms in the methods of assisting the wounded on the field of battle. For the benefit of the ambulance service, it would be absolutely necessary to give independence to the authority to which is subject both official and voluntary organisa- tions for aiding the wounded. Without voluntary co-operation, without public partici- pation in time of war, it would be impossible to manage, but this participation must be regulated in good time. In Russia it is especially necessary to constitute committees with authority: (i) Over the hospitals; (2) over the supply of medical stores ; (3) over the transport of the sick and wounded ; (4) over the equipment of the hos- pitals with domestic necessaries. The rational organisa- tion of such a committee would result in immense benefit. We will quote here some more evidence as to the neces- sity for improvement. Writing of the Russo-Turkish war, Pigorof says : " In the end of September, on our inspection of the hospitals we car.ie across hundreds of cases of frost-bitten feet, and in answer to our inquiries .E? lat such walls ir. Trenches ting passages the front will jumping into nded already e become en- ; dead, it will ot be thrown t in impeding ced of neces- e side of the be cast there Ltes, for a new lose wounded long." nge rifles, the rease in the the rules of iforms in the eld of battle. it would be the authority ary organisa- )ublic partici- le to manage, >od time. In e committees (2) over the isport of the ; of the hos- nal organ isa- ense benefit, to the neces- usso-Turkish Tiber, on our •< hundreds of our inquiries THE CARE OF THE WOUNDED 159 found that almost all ascriued their sufferings to wet boots, which for a long time had been worn without taking off. If valenki (felt over-boots) had been given only to half the men in a company it would have saved many from frost-bites, as it would have been possible for the soldiers to take off their boots and dry ihem." Those who control the lot of soldiers must remember that although a large increase in the ambulance service would result apparently in a loss of fighting strength, in reality it would directly result in strengthening the fight- ing forces by increasing the percentage of sick and wounded who would return to the front, by diminishing the mor- tality and by, raising the spirits of soldiers in consequence of the conviction that care would be taken of the victims. And in the present time, when in a battle between the armed forces of Europe, the mechanism of destruction is so perfect that shells may be thrown with unexampled rapidity to unheard-of distances, creating on every field a vast area of absolute destruction ; when owing to power of fire attacks can only be made in loose formation, and every soldier may shirk the battle — the spirit of armies has a much greater importance than before. END OF PART I. X EC PART II ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES IN TIME OF WAR *!' In o quen enga beinj and 1 prod expo tion I of M great comp agair whicl plans Gene dangi sity ( and J pied horse centr papei war powe insufl rathe: tion. that t ii CHAPTER I IN RUSSIA In order to understand the economic and social conse- quences which would follow a war in which Russia was engaged, it is necessary to consider the degree of well- being of the population, and the amount of its income ; and to explain how war will shorten the demand for certain products and increase the demand for others ; lessen the exports, and deprive a considerable portion of the popula- tion of their means of livelihood. In considering "Plans of Military Operations " in a struggle between the two great continental alliances we attempted to make some comparison of the endurability of the states engaged against the destructive influences of war. The conclusions which sprang from a general consideration of military plans were in accord with the following proposition of General Brialmont, that " the state io which war is least dangerous is Russia, guaranteed as she is by the immen- sity of her territories, the character of her soil and climate, and still more, by the social condition of her people, occu- pied for the greater part by agriculture." Rich in men, in horses, and in food, having many industrial and trading centres, accustomed for a century to the circulation of paper money, Russia is in a state to keep up a defensive war for some years, which the Western and Southern powers, standing on a high degree of culture, but producing insufficient food for their populations, could not do. These rather would be threatened with ruin and even disintegra- tion. The strategical superiority of Russia lies in the fact that the occupation by an enemy of all her frontier terri- 1 64 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? tories would not produce a decisive result. Even the taking of both her capitals, and the defeat of all her rca v forces, would not deprive her of the means of resistance whereas any Western state in such circums'inc? S be decisively crushed. Such are the general conclusions o which a consideration of the plans of attack on Russk formulated by foreign authorities, have led ' But in considering the effect of war on the condition of the people m Russia, we are compelled to glance Ire c osely than will be necessary in the case of other states rf^^only for the reason that the enormous extent of RusS' armies -that is. the two unquestio.K ! elements of Russian supenonty-are likely to inspire far too optimistic hopes In the opinion of foreigners, military specialists in Russia in this respect are liable to exaggeration, forgetting fhat n Russia as elsewhere war would be felt' intensely^nd n certain respects, even more disastrously, on the finances and on the general economic condition of the country It would be a mistake to think that these exaggerated views are current in all military circles in Russia.^^Bu U must be admitted that the very strength of Russia her cTnaTmindsT'^"^ ^"' ^'^ "^"' ^^-^« ^ Ss to certain minds for very natural exaggeration. That such exaggerations have their dangerous side is unques ioned by every impartial student of history, from which we learn that exaggeration has led, if not directly to military enter" tKngttf war ^ '^''''^'^ ^'''^^' -^^^^ -"Z-^- Unfortunately, the difficulty of a detailed investigation of the present condition of Russia and the future conse- quences which a war would entail for her, is very great owing to the absence of those exhaustive statistics wS are everywhere available in Western Europe in Am^ica and especially in England. In Russia the 'cimpihng of statistics began only in the reign of Nicholas I. Bu"?hat rc,«n, based solely on military-bureaucratic principles did statistics. Co-operation or advice from the side of society in IN RUSSIA 165 general was not only not looked for, but not even admitt^H and the need for comnunncating to' the puLrstadsJ^^s on which judgment might be based was consequently .^^^^^^^^^ that statistics becrL^aTaiirieto tStt" ^"^^^^^^^ L-Fall in the Funds and Influence of War on THE Finances. n„^" T^u'* ^° 5^^'er"»ine the economic durability of Russia against the influences of war, we are compelled to consider two contingencies, that is, a ^ar carried on whhThe a?m ^ hi orct'nf'" 'T"^^'' ^^^"^°''^' ^"^ ^ ^- "arri S on with onsidir wh/t'^nf ' V'"^^^ ""^' '" '^^ •^"*^'- ^^^^ als^ o cons der what forces Russia would dispose of if after the repulse of the attack, she decided to undertake a ^ountlr invasion of the territories of the enemy ph-'t of a of musf be oroTT^ '' T^''^' ^^^ perturbations ^Lh Pul" ZZVT'''^'^''^ ^^-^'-^^ in detn'cfo popular teeling, m Russia need not be considered cons^ff T'^"'^ ""^J'^'J^^ °^ ^^^ ^°^^>ers mobilised will Serested'^nolir ^? "^" °^ ^^^P^^^ "^^^^ ^r be mafnl V nffl ^'^' ^^^stions. The educated soldiers win be mainly officers, who will also, without question obey orders, and easily assimilate official declarations as to the unavoidabihty of war. The number of soldiers tVeW tV'tuTlt"'"^'^^ ^" ^"^^^^ will^:'comptl! "veiy small. But it is unquestioned that amon/ the mrrcltLh'™^'"^ """^ categoryrperuZi.^' may be called forth even more serious than those which todLtrf irf? ?"•=• P^ ^^^'^-"^ °f agricuTtnrt ha^ T,f ' w . ""^"^^ '" '^"^^'^ »re less elaborate ducatbnJTnt^ ,-°""'"?- ,°"'"6 to the absence rf eaucational institutions the knowledge and morale in **%, 1 66 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? trade and industry are low ; the women of Russia, whom, of course. mobiUsation will not directly affect, are little engageil in business; and therefore it will be more diflicult to replace the directing forces summoned under the flag than it would be in the West. Of the difficulty of satisfying demands for money for the mobilisation of the army we have already spoken. Here t is only necessary, in view of the possible occu- pation by an enemy of Russian territory, to set out the distribution of the revenue, &c., over the different parts of the Empire — in one word, to present a financial physiological picture of Russia in the present day. It needs no evidence to show that the perturbations which a future war will cause in the sphere of finance will be incomparably more serious than those caused by the war of 1877. The finances of Russia are distinguished by the fact that even in times of peace the cour c of Government securities and paper money is most variable. In a memorandum presented to the Emperor Alexander III, in 1882, M. N. H. Bunge thus defined the causes of these fluctuations (in addition to the main ^eason — unlimited issue), (i) The internal political position of the State, the danger of risings, anarchy, the absence of settled political programmes. (2) The internal economic condition of the country, famines, crises in industrial, commercial, and banking circles, caused by dishonesty, speculation, and failures, and so forth. (3) The general financial position, disproportion between revenue and expenditure, financial extravagance, deficits, and so forth. Independently of these internal elements are others — for instance, the danger that the state may be drawn into a great European war, and the risk of military failure. Such is a judgment formulated in 1882. Since then fifteen years have passed, and in that period the position has improved in many ways, but not enough to guarantee, in the event of war, that the description quoted above would not again apply in full force. We have seen that in 1870 the Prussian state and municipal loans were depreciated 25 per cent., and W' E? jssia, whom, ct, are little .'ill be more loned under • money for ady spoken, (ssible occu- set out the Terent parts a financial day. erturbations e of finance e caused by listinguished e cour; e of ost variable, lexander III. 2 causes of in "eason — position of B absence of lal economic 1 industrial, dishonesty, The general evenue and nd so forth. others — for Irawn into a ailure. Since then the position 3 guarantee, noted above I state and cent., and IN RUSSIA 167 banking, industrial, and railway shares 35 per cent. In lS;; tlie value of the Russian credit rouble (100 kopecks) fell to 56^ kopecks metal. Thanks to the arrangements of the present Ministry of Finances, statistics are yearly printed as to the value of the Government securities and the manner in which they are distributed. From these statistics it appears that on January i, 1896, there existed of such securities: Metallic rrcdit . 2249 millions of roubles* (/'337,35o,ooo) 3^^^ '» '. (Z"44y.5oo.o<^) In all 5579 „ „ (^"786,850,000) Of these in cash, in treasuries, and i;s ban'Jng institu- tions the amount of such securities war, : MetaTlic Credit . 210 millions of roucKis (^3 v 500,000) 2293 M n (Xj43.950,ooo) Thus it appears that there were in circulation, partly among private individuals in Russia, but for the greater part abroad : Metallic Loans Credit Loans 2039 millions of roubles (pTsoS.Sso.ooo) ^°i7 >, „ (ifi55»550.ooo) Now if we take the depreciation in time of war of securities guaranteed by the Government at 25 per cent., and of other securities at 35 per cent., which depreciation has already been experienced in the wars of 1870 and 1877, the immense economic perturbation which would be caused by war will be at once made plain. A deprecia- tion of 25 per cent, of the nominal value of Government securities would amount to 52,000,000 of metallic and 573,000,000 credit roubles (;^7,8oo,ooo and i;85,95o,ooo) ; a depreciation of 35 per cent, on the nominal value of securities unguaranteed by the Government would amount to 48,000,000 metallic roubles, and 404,000,000 credit roubles (;^7, 200,000 and ;^6o,6oo,ooo). Thus war would The rouble is taken as eanivalpnt tr, He. ht^a voi.io «* -»c I I '! i68 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? at once cause a depreciation of securities held within the country of 1,100,000,000 roubles (^165,000,000). Depreciation of Securities circulating in Russia at the Outbreak of War in Millions of Roubles. Metal M»— iiiiiiiiiisi;.-::::::::::;;;::;:;;: 404 573 All this leads to the conclusion that in the beginning of war there cannot even be thought of the issue of new loans, and therefore war can only be carried on by the immense issue of credit notes, the unavoidable conse- quence of which will be to shake to its foundations the nnancial condition of the country. The position in which Russia found herself in the war of 1812- 18 1 5 ,s so dif^jrent from modern conditions that o dra^y practical lessons from the experiences of that time is impossible. The extraordinary outlays caused by the Crimean war amounted to about i^ milliard of roubles (;<:225,ooo,ooo), which led to an immense increase of indebtedness and to a fall in the value of the credit rouble, although war was carried on only at one extremity of the country, and the whole of the western frontier- remained open to trade. an,o"unte7to '""' "" "'' '*""^* "'" ^^"■"'"•dinary outlay ^" 1876 • 1877 .> 1878 • • 18/9 „ 1880 50,998,114 rou' les 429,328,089 408,142,970 132,100,316 54,818,163 (^^7.649.7 1 7 2S.) (£.64,399,213 7s.) (;^6l, 221,445 lOS.) U'19.815,047 8s.) (;{'8,222,724 9s.) Total T. 075,396.652 „ (ixrH,3o8,i67 i6s.) the Outbreak >.7i7 2S.) ),2I3 7S.) .445 lOS.) .047 8s.) .724 9s.) IN RUSSIA ,6g What may be expected from a future war ? First of all Ru'^a tTf '"' '''' "^^ "'''•^-^ organisation o Russia, founded on conscription and short service not only has not dim.nished, but on the contrary has ncreased MlnSst'Torw^^-'^r''^"''" ''"^^ expenditure of tne Ministry of War in the course of the twenty vears cfuse of ;?^^- '^9,000,000 roubles ^35,850,000). The cause of this increase hes partly in the increased number of the army and partly in the better treatment of^the hlfSoTmLr: ^--/^^^«"owing figures indicL^ng rne cost ot maintenance of a single soldier : 1874 1884 1891 1896 225 roubles (£33 15J.) 175 „ ^26 5s.) 244 .. (£36 I2S.) 376 „ (£56 8s.) arn?vnnH ff ? . °" °^ expenditure by one inhabitant on n "? '^' estimated according to geographical position the char on page 170 gives a clear idea A glance at this chart will show that the satisfaction out of The ordinary revenues of the requirements of the budget in time of war W.11 be all the more difficult since the%evenue wUl be smTn 'thft ',-r^H' -^^ .^-P^"^'^"^e on popular needs is so imptsibk. ^•'"'""^'°" •" ^'"^^ °f war will be almost Russia with a mobilised army of 2,800,000 men, will daily need for their maintenance and equipment > ooimo roubles 01,050,000). In addition to this, consfdTr'a^ sums will be needed for the maintenance of famflies of so diers on service. The greater the number of married soldiers the greater will be the need for aid. But as is children in proportion to the general population is greater .n Russia than elsewhere, from which it appears tharthe expenditure in this respect must be greater It IS true that Russia will find an advantage in the fact that the proportion of soldiers withdrawn from industry is cou'ri^f f' ^.^^" ^°"?P^'-fd with the proportion in other countries, for in Russia about S^ npr n^n* ^c .u u-_ h 1 70 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? ^ Ji 73 -^ t^ O^ ^ O- ^ Oi IN RUSSIA lyi summoned to the colours will belong to the agricultural dass. This circumstance is particular^' favourable for Russia, as the agriculturist will leav behind him members of his family who can continue his labour and such families will not be threatened by a complete cessation of work But on the other handfthe Russian agricultural population, which even in times of peace lives in extreme poverty will soon exhaust its resources, and the Government will be compelled to come to its aid By exhaustive examination of the comparative degrees of well-being of the persons engaged in different occupations. It would be shown that Government will be compelled to assist the families of not less than one quarter of the soldiers engaged in agriculture, of less than half of the small traders n.lfi H ' ,^"f °^ '° P^' '^"'- °^ '^^ fr^e professions. Detailed calculations show that these number 531000 families in all. All of which shows that the expendit^ in time of war will be immense and immediate, while to coyer ,t by new taxation or by the increase of old taxes rnln^r^T/^^f ^°P"'^' '^''"g'^' ^^'^^ ""ght be taken advantage of for loans, are in Russia extremely small, and It IS very probable that in order to cover the ordinary expenditure m time of war, not to speak of extraordinary expenditure, the chief resource must inevitably be the T«.^^ /'l^^'^ T?"' ^" '^^ t^"^^ ^^ the wars of 1812, I8S7 and 1877, although financial crises occurred owing to the increased issue of assignat and credit notes, these crises were not of such a nature as to influence the con- tinuance of military operations. In all probability a future war will resemble the past in this respect. During the last war with Turkey the value of the rouble credit note was depreciated to SSh kopecks, and that this depreciation was not greater must be ascribed to exception- ally favourable circumstances. On the one hand, Russia possessed a large reserve of corn, and on the other, in consequence of scarcity abroad, the prices of corn, the Chief article of export from Russia, and many other articles 01 food, rose considerably, thus increasing the export of Kussian products. ^ 172 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? In the second chapter of this work we attempted to show the advantages which a defensive war promised to Russia, a defence which, after exhaustion and disorgani- sation of the enemy's resources, might transform itself into attack. But in the economic relation such a war would have the disadvantage that the country would be compelled to support the armies of the invader in addition to its own. We showed that it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that a defensive war would result in victory for Russia. But this cannot alter the fact that the sacrifices which the people must sustain would be incalculably great. In order to be persuaded of this, it is not enough to consider only those perturbations the immediate conse- quence of war, but to examine also, although briefly, the economic and moral condition of the country. II. — EeoNOMic Upheaval in consequence of the Interruption of Trade. On the declaration of war, the external European trade of Russia will immediately cease. The losses which this will cause must be considered. The average Russinn export and import for the six years 1889-94 are shown thus in millions of credit roubles : Russian Statistics. Export . 585 (;^87,75o,ooo) Import . 399 (;^59,85o,ooo) Foreign Statistics. 783 (/■ 1 17.450,000) 237 (;f35»550,000) Let us present this graphically : Average Export and Import, 1889-1894, in Millions of Credit Roubles. ^'^PO" Import According to Russian statistics According to Foreign statistics 237 399 attempted to promised to id disorgani- isform itself such a war :ry would be r in addition to avoid the n victory for he sacrifices ulably great, t enough to diate conse- i briefly, the OF THE opean trade which this ge Russian are shown ttistics. K5o,ooo) )5o,ooo) s of Credit Import 399 I 1 J 237 IN RUSSIA 173 If these totals are distributed among the population we will find the following export and import for one inhabitant : Years. Roubles. Per cent, rela- tion of Exnort to Imp(..c. Export. Import. 1885- 1893 1894-1895 3-52 (los. 6frf.1 3-89 (us. 8^) 2.31 (6s. iirf.) 2.87 (8s. 7\d.) 1.52 1.26 Of the four great groups under which the foreign trade of Russia may be classified, in export trade provisions predominate (57 per cent.), after which follow raw and half-dressed materials (37J per cent.), manufactures (3i per cent.), and animals {2\ per cent.). In imports predominate raw and half-dressed materials (58J percent)., after which follow manufactures (2 1 \ per cent.), provisions {20 per cent.), and animals (^ per cent.). In the number of Russian exported provisions the first place, of course, is taken by grain, the export of which, although with fluctuations, constantly increases, and in 1894 had risen to 640,000,000 poods* (205,714,295 cwts.), or 5^ poods (192 lbs.) per inhabitant. The following table illustrates with more detail the nature of this export : Millions of Pood.s (English Equivalent in millions of lbs.) Wheat. Rye. Oats. Barley. Maize. 1893-94 . 1894-95 . 1895-96 . 200 (7200) 224 (8064) 201 (7.236) 22.6 (803.6) 82.7 (2977.2) 104 (3744) 96 (3456) 56 (2016) 149 (5364) 109 (3924) 74 (2664) 33 (11 88) 24 (864) 9 (324) * A pood is really equal to 36.1127 lbs., but for purposes of our equivalents we take it as equal to 36 lbs, 174 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? We find thrt ,.he average harvest of corn for the whole world taking v. twelve years period, was 3.294,000,000 poods (1,058,000,000 cwts.), while the harvest of 1893 was 3,427,000,000 pocdo (1,101,535,715 cwts.) 1894 M 3,503,000,000 „ (1,126,000,000 „ ) i«95 „ 3,385,000,000 „ (1,088,035,715 , ) By investigations lately made it has been shown that m twelve years the yearly quantity of grain harvested in Russia increased by 1 50,000,000 poods (48, :■ .' .1,300 cwis ) and the area of sowing by 5 percent,, while ihc population in that period increased by 11 per cent. Tliis - ay T expressed m another form : the yearly increase of (lem.nd inconse luenceof the growiU of the population amouni; to 40,oov. .^w poods ^ 1 5,000,000 cwts.), ten years 400,ooo,OfX) poods (130,000,0., C..S.), while in that period tl^ (^:Z^t^''' ''''^'' '^ ^^^'^-'^ P-^« But. the export fir^r: Russia is composed only of t!,at part of the harvest which remains free after the satisfaction ot the minimum requirements of the population : English Equivalent in Millions of lbs. Average Yearly Harvest in Millions of Poods, 1890-94. Average Export. Rye. Wheat Oats Barley Percentage of Export to Average Harvest. 1059 (38,124) 455 (16,380) 552 (19,872) 286 (10,296) 2352 (84.672) 32 ("52) 156 (5616) 56 (20 F 6) III (3996) 30 34-3 10. 1 30.0 355 (12,780) 151 1 1 ..»,» Wh Oat — 1 Eaii All E? "or the whole 1,294,000,000 5t of I cwts.) » » ) ' » ) howii that in harvested in 4,300 CWliJ.), le population riiis »:iay I>: le of (iem^nd 1 amounts to 400,0C>0,(XK) period the >,ooo poods only of that : satisfaction Percentage of port to Average Harvest. 3.0 34-3 10. 1 30.0 151 IN RUSSIA Let us present these figures graphically : Percentage of Exfort to Production in 1890-1894. I ye &2^| 3.0% 175 'M;3> In the chart on page 176 we give some figures as to the production of all grains. But these figures ^give no suffi! cien material for determining the infiuence wh"ch "var would produce on the trade in corn. This influence wfll depend upon m whose hands the superfluity of corn relts whether in the hands of private proprietors or in the hanS of the peasants Among the immense majority of 1™ agncultunsts the superfluity is very considerable, wl^!e own'n'eds " ''' '"'^"^^ ^^^^^ "^^"^^ ^« satisfy ^d? K.,l* '^^^'''°"^ ^^""^ P"vate proprietors may bear the strain better than the peasants. If the export of grain be on y shortened the first will be able to dispose of Their ^ain bv such routes as remain open. But if the expon ff grain entirely cease and prices in the internal marke ^coT s^derably fall, certain landowners will sustain the cr sis by means of their reserve of capital, while those whose estates are mortgaged would in case of ^ar take adv^tage of ,^e inevitable postponement of payments into bank and in peasants will have no auxiliary resources ; and in the «: 176 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? •> ;J: ft ^ --^--^ <^ •*>* t^ ?> s 8 K ^ ~~^ « 3.2 s a .!2W •-H •s 1 V ^1 o^ S f^ <3 00 .3 '^ .E? lill /^ N -^v. IN RUSSIA lyy 7t'Zet7nrV^" '"'" *'^7 ''''' -^ insufficient for heir needb, for the payment of taxes, rent on leasehold nil. oH!;''''' of implements, salt, and clothing I, e corn, and partly from auxiliary work, of which som-— for .nstance temporary work in factori^s-in ime of war mus undergo diminution. This last circumstance wil "opulatior"''' '"*" °" ^'^ ^°"^'^-" °^ ^'^^ --try With the cessation of export, too, the demand for corn will decrease, with a consequent fall in pHces and P^asatr F ucu' r '"^°"^ '° '^ °^ landoX^ ' a^ld peasants. Fluctuations in prices will arise, since the merrunted' 'f''""""? '^ ^'^^ '^^-''' ^^'^^ "ill be mterrupted. Increased purchases for the army may to some extent compensate for the stoppage of export tremely difficult when the rolling-stock of the railways is^ occupied with the transport of troops and munitions belln^ tnTh'"'"f ^'■'•''? °^ ^^P°^* ^^^"^ R"««i^ "mainly se1dsV«v H '^'^^"^ry/^^ '^^ «•- half-dressed materials-^ seeas iiax, hemp, timber, bristles, wool : these Drodurf^ Xt" The""";-^^"n"r '° p^^ cent.:rthT^.ore result in J,^^. "^^«^tion of the export of these goods will o?the Spr o? grafr'" ^° '''' ^'^"^^^ '' ''^ --^-^ varTed !h.^\'^ °^ ^"''^' ^ °^ ^ "^^"''^ "^"^h more varied than the exports. Russia buys abroad not only finished products, such as machinery and metallic wares'^ but also raw materials, cotton, wool, silk, pig-iron pTrt'oTher"''' '"' ^^P"' ^"^^^^ "^^^ cins^dlaMe part of her imports consists of tea, coffee, and colonial products, wine, and other drinks. In the "Review o ^ssS;7in^''"'^ °^ Russia," exports and inip^oTar'i Classified in four groups: (i provisions; (2) raw and half-worked materials; (3) animals ; (4) manufa'tu ed M & •^ ^'f' 178 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Provisions , Raw and half-worked materials Animals Manufactured .articles But such a classification gives no clear idea of the influences wl.u-h would reveal themselves on tlieinterrup- tion of foreign t-ade. The following classification under pro- viMons,cl, L< ing^agricultural implements.buildingmaterials manufactured products, intellectual, various, gives a better luea I Imports into Ruma in Millions of Roubles in 1889. Provisions Clothing .... Instruments of husbandry Building material^. . Manuf.tctured prouucts . Intellectual Various ..." 5f 6 (;C8,49o,ooo) 150.2 (;f22,530,000) I3-2 (/"i, 980,000) 72.1 (/'io,8i5,ooo) 71-3 (£ '0.695,000) 6.2 (/"gso.ooo) 1'9 (;f 285,000) Classification of Imports-Raw, Half.n>orkcd, and Manufactured. Raw. Half-worked. Manufacturbd. .E? IN RUSSIA Iniiiort. i-g<. 1895. 1.70 •60 •4« 7o 18.40 5440 o 00 26.30 ■ idea of the I tlie interrup- lon under pro- lingmaterials, gives a better in i88g. ■"8,490,000) 22,530,000) ^1,980,000) 10,815,000) 1 0,695,000) (^930,000) (;^285,000) fanufactured, XUFACTURBO. 179 The first consequence of the interruption of external communications will be a considerable fall in the price of corn and other chief articles of export, and a rise in he price of articles of import, more particularly of traders" ^'^^ '^°''^^ """^ "°^ *" ^^^ ''^"^"^ °^ From the interruption of export will result a consider- able decrease in the railway traffic, and in consequence, as the majority of railways belong to the crown or are guaranteed by it, the state will sustain a loss of revenue • while, on tlic other hand, the railways, especially those going westward, at the outbreak of the war will be entirely, and afterwards to a considerable xtent occu- r /!]-i: /'^"'P°'"^ °^ ^'■^^P^ ^"d muuaions of war. Great difficulties would arise from this circumstance were It not for the taot that transport by water has been so developed that upon the stoppage of export it will be able to satisfy almost all internal needs. The interruption of export abroad, the fall of prices, irregular supply, and great ocal fiactuations-such are the factors which will strongly influe. t the '^ourse of trade. It is difficult even to foresee what .,rm they will take, and by what inrtuences prices will be det mined. When internal competition L".r^-n 1°"!'' r'T '" determining prices, those dis- L'cfi!^T,^' I^^ ^ position where competition is most highly developed, is the case in the western, southern, and metropolitan go. rnments, and in the worst position those d^tricts where monopoly obtains. As relat . to tht number of traders, it will be found that Kussia is m a less advantageous position than the western Slates Thus we hnd that while out of lo.uoo inhabitants jn hJelgium 437 are engaged in trade, in France 429 in Germany 347, and in Austria 164, in Russia only 67 are thus occupied. -^ ' Fr m the following statistics (pp. 1 80-1 81) it will be seen that at a time when the interruption of commirnica- tions by a great war would cau e famine and even social convulsions m al! western states with the exception of /iUStria in Riicciri tU^ J- __-n t . . *^ . L Austrin in Rnc.i. ti>- dar~"r --•" " ^r^^fP"^" ^^ - -" — ■ ^"- uan^cr win r.je mucn less, but i«o TS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLK :s 2 f*J 3LE ? IN RUSSIA 182 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? nevertheless will be expressed in a considerable decrease in the income of the population, and in a difficult position of trade. « III— Manufacturing Crisis in Time of War. On the manufactures and industries of Russia a great European war cannot fail to react seriously in many respects. The interruption of communications with the West will mean a cessation of the supply of raw materials. Thus the supply of American, Egyptian, and Indian cotton will be stopped. The withdrawal from work of mechanics and experienced workmen will be a factor of great dlHi- culty. The sale of manufactured articles will decrease, firstly, in consequence of the difficulty of transport on railways already occupied for military purposes, and, secondly, in consequence of a decreased demand resulting from diminished incomes and from the dislike of the moneyed classes to unnecessary outlay in a critical time. As a result of these unfavourable conditions production in certain manufactures must be decreased considerably, and in others entirely stopped. In the time of the last war with Turkey (1877-78), the entire yearly industrial production of Russia barely attained 893 million roubles (;^i33.950,ooo) ; at the present day it has risen to 1828 million roubles (;^274,2CXD,ooo), as is shown by the following table : Year. _, ,. , _ . In Millions of Credit Roubles. (English Equivalents, in Pareniheses. in Millions of Pounds Sterling.) Indiistri.il Pro- ducts nril Slll'ject to Excise. Yearly Produc- tion of Excised Articles, &c. Mines and Metal Working. Total. 1878 1892 588 (88.2) 1266 (189.9) 185 (27.75) 367 (5505) 120 (18) 195 (2925) 893 (133-95) 1828 (274.2) The distribution of this production is shown in millions of roubles in the plan on the next page : E? iblc decrease icult position F War. issia a great sly in many )ns with the iw materials, ndian cotton Df mechanics great difli- ill decrease^ ;ransport on rposes, and, nd resulting slike of the critical time, roduction in Jerably, and 577-78), the ssia barely 0); at the on roubles table : IN RUSSIA '83 Dunds Sterling.) Total. 893 (133-95) 1828 (274.2) in millions |i!' «.:: '*':■ 1 84 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? In order clearly to judge of the crisis which would be caused by war we must bear in mind the relations exist- ing between imports and home production. The following table shows tne percentage relation of import to produc- tion of some of the chief imported articles in 1876 and in 1892 : Steel . . Iron Copper . Stone Coal Machinery Glass articles . Chemicals and paints Paper Leather manufactures Cotton . Wool . . . Sugar . 1876. 90.4 36.5 64.7 44.1 40.3 40.5 79.2 24.0 12.8 24.9 77-3 4.0 31 9.: 65.6 29.4 30.8 10.3 551 14.1 4-9 30 12.1 These statistics show the greatest development in thp following industries: cotton, wool, paper, machinery chemicals and paints, leather, glass, and sugar refining In the same period the working of coal and of naphtha increased considerably, while iron smelting and the working of iron and steel also made considerable advances. From the statistics above set forth it is obvious that the crisis which wars would cause in industrial and manufac- turing circles of Russia is incomparably less than would be produced in the Western States. While in the other great European States with the exception of Italy, industry occupies a considerable part— in England the greater part —of the population, in Russia the number of workers in all industries does not exceed i| million men, out of a population of 120 millions. Further, from comparison of the average total of industrial productiveness with the number of men engaged, it appears that in Russia the turnover for every workman engaged is only about 1000 roubles (£150), and that the average factory has a yearly turnover of 50,000 roubles (^7500), and employs about 45 hands. It is obvious that very small industrial under- IN RUSSIA ich would be ations exist- fhe following rt to produc- 1876 and in 1890. 31 9.' 65.6 29.4 30.8 10.3 551 14.1 4-9 30 I3.I >ment in the machinery, far refining, of naphtha the working ces. ous that the id manufac- than would n the other ily, industry greater part workers in en, out of a nparison of s with the Russia the about 1000 as a yearly )loys about trial under- 185 takings are not included in this calculation. But such being the statistics for large and moderate-sized undertakings taken together, it is plain that in Russian industry the mechanical apparatus is much less complex and engages much less capital than in those countries where industrv predominates. From this it follows that, upon the decrease and partial interruption of Russian industry, the capital in- vested will sustain much less loss from the interruption of work than capital similarly invested in the West. But if we suppose that war is to be carried on within the limits of Russia Itself, we must bear in mind the difficulties in communication, and the decreased demand in localities occupied by the combatants. The district where military operations were carried on might be considered as lost trom the industrial point of view. Russian industry is based on internal demand, a fact which constitutes an advantage in case of war, as Russian manufactures will not, as those of England, Germany, and France, be threatened with the loss of foreign markets in consequence of interrupted communications. But this supe- riority will decrease proportionately with the increase in the area embraced by the war. And, although stoopage of work would take place in Russia on a smaller scale than in the West, It would nevertheless place in a difficult position a great number of workers. There is a general opinion that Russian factory hands, being peasants, are guaranteed by their land, and take to industry only temporarily, always reserving the possibility of returning to their farms. In recent years this opinion has been shaken by statistical investigation which undoubtedly proved the existence in Russia of a working, landless proletariat. For such workers the stoppage of production will have precisely the same consequences as in the West. Mr. E. M. Dementyeff in a recent work, on the founda- tion of a series of statistics, comes to the conclusion that the current belief as to the absence in Russia of an in- dustrial class is unfounded. There is indeed no doubt that this class is still small. But the question is not one of number, but of the conditions rapidly creating this 1 86 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? class, and of the consequences indissolubly bound ud with It. ^ The wages of workmen in Russia in comparison with those which obtain in other European states is very low and It may safely be assumed that the savings they possess are insignificant. After a detailed calculation M. Dementyeff declares that wages in En^l^nd, and particularly in America, are greater than In Russia by two, three, and even five times. The following table and diagram show th^- percentage difference in wages in these countries : Russia . England . America . Men. lOO 283 404 Women. 100 114 254 Percentage Comparison of Wages in Russia, Great Britain, ami Northern A merica. •■■•■•••••■a PSi'/' ^ But comparison of wages alone," says M. Dementyeff 'conveys no meaning, and even may lead to false conclu- sions, if the purchasing power of money in the different countries is not taken into account. Only by considering this we can form an idea as to the extent to which wages guarantee the existence of the worker." The auihor after making a calculation as to the quantity of the first neces- saries of life which a rouble will command in England and in Massachusetts, comes to the conclusion that " the in- comparably lower wages in Russia can in no way be explained by the greater cheapness of necessaries ; such an explanation could only to a certain extent be admitted even in comparison with England." E? [y bound up I pari son with is very low, lavings they i calculation in^land, and 1 Russia by ng table and ages in these 'omen. lOO 114 254 it Britain. IN RUSSIA 187 ^14 y- Dementyeff, alse conclu- the different considering /hich wages luihor, after first neces- -ngland and lat " the in- no way be aries ; such be admitted A characteristic feature of the condition of the Russian factory workers is that they do not live in thdr own lodgmgs Of the general mass of cases examined in ^Ws respect by M. Dementyeff, 57-8 per cent, lived at the factories, either in the workshops where they work or in t^n" 'H""^ '""^ ''' ^hem, while the wLers having their own lodgings constitu.«d only 18. i per cent ^ The lodgings of factory workers, in the majority of cases, are such that of the "conditions" of their iLs here cannot even be speech. - Workers from distant' localities for the most part have a sack or box with per- sonal property, such as changes of linen, and sometimes at t ^ factory— that is, workers from the neighbour^-nl country who go home on Sundays and on holidays-havf h terally nothing. In no case has either one or ^he other class any vestige of bed." The food is no better. In the majority of cases the supp y of the workmen is carried on on tl Jarfei prin iple and as far as quantity is concerned no complaint can be made, but the food is of the lowest quality-coarse mono tonous, and with a deficiency oflnima^i substance U consists of black bread, s^chi of sour cabbage, porridge of wkrl'L '^"'T' with beef fat, potatoes? soSr cabbage with hemp-oil, or kvas with cucumbers-such is the food of the workers from day to day, without the slightest variety throughout the year; onl^ on fast days, of whTch k rir i^ ^" ^he year, the beef or salt beef in the 5/2 1 replaced by herrings. &c., and the beef fat by hemp- s il lrJu.u ^' ''°'^''' ^^° ^'^^"P^' h'^-^d quarters is still worse, both as to quantity and quality. It is obvious that with such conditions there cannot even be thought of savings for a rainy day, and the cri"^ caused by war will be reflected on the life of workers in a that n^tlT; J^u ^'7 f '^''' '^"^"^°" "^"^^ ^"J ^^"^^nd Iho ,1H h ^"^^^^^'^i'f "^"^ organis..i help of the workers should be begun. But this is a qve.uon which ought to be decided in time of peace. ^ i88 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? IV. — Economic Endurability of the Population in Time of and after War. We have referred more than once to the tremendous effect which war must produce in those countries which possess a highly developed industrial system, and where the economic and social order is more complex than in Russia. It will easily be understood that the sudden summons to the colours of a great number of masters and experienced workmen will be felt especially severely in those countries where a highly developed industry absorbs large capital, and gives work to half the population. This crisis will be less severe in those states which still pre- serve a character generally agricultural, which have less complex organisation and less mutual dependence between the different forms of social and private enterprise. But from this, of course, does not follow that the poorer the country the better will it bear the strain of war. It is plain that war breaking out after several years of good harvest would have less effect than if it were to appear after a series of unfruitful years. There is a certain minimum of well-being, not only material but also moral, which will enable peoples and districts to bear the strain of war and to recover from its consequences. If we take as example a country standing on a low level of economic development, or a semi-barbarous country, we will see that there war cannot stop the turning of millions of wheels, and will not ruin great undertakings. But the economic consequences of war in such a country will be extremely sensible ; a considerable part of the population will die of hunger, and whole districts will be turned into wildernesses. In Central Asia are districts which lonnerly were flourishing oases, but which, in con- .sequence of a series of wars among a poor population, were simply covered with sand and turned into deserts. Thus, in considering the relative endurability of the Russian population in time of war and afterwards, we are bound to pay attention to the moral and material level of m oo t''30 jO H E? >ULATION IN ; tremendous intries which n, and where iplex than in the sudden f masters and y severely in ustry absorbs lation. This lich still pre- ich have less ence between •prise. ow that the the strain of several years if it were to There is a erial but also "icts to bear :onsequences. n a low level ous country, le turning of undertakings, ch a country part of the tricts will be are districts hich, in con- r population, ito deserts, ibility of the vards, we are terial level of IN RUSSIA I i . 189 n , o< o> e> -^ t & •^ o^ 1> tH M n . ^ - .0 in s 0. § • ^ ^ fa - c o -J . C I90 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? the population, and to define the differences in this level in various parts of the country in order to estimate the economic endurability not only of the whole country but of its different parts. Growth of the Population. — Modern economic science, following the statistics of biology, acknowledges that every limit placed on the production of resources neces- sary for the nourishment, education, and moral well-being of the people, is at the same time a principle inimical to its very life— that is, to its increase. Thus, when consider- ing prolonged periods, one of the first standards must be the natural growth of the population in the different parts of the kingdom. In Russia nine-tenths of the population is composed of peasants, and the general statistics of growth relate mainly to them. Following the system of M. A. Malshinski in his work on " Popular Well-Being," we adopt the following classifi- cation for determining the degree of well-being in the different governments of Russia : (i) Condition excellent, where the yearly growth of the population amounts to 20 and more in every thousand of the general population. (2) Condition very good, with an increase of from 1 5 to 20 in the thousand. (3) Condition fair, with a growth of from 10 to 15 per thousand. (4) Condition unsatisfactory, with a growth of not less than 8 per thousand. (5) Condition bad, with a growth of less than 8 per thousand. As relates to the general growth of the population in the various governments it is impossible to distinguish the natural growth from the growth which has resulted from immigration. But the chart on the preceding page illustrates the comparative growth of the population in 1885 and 1897. Distribution of the Population. — But statistics as to growth of population are in themselves insufficient to in this level ) estimate the le country but omic science, wlcdges that ources neces- ral well-being le inimical to hen consider- ards must be iifferent parts he population statistics of i in his work wing classifi- being in the growth of the re in every of from 1 5 to lo to 15 per h of not less than 8 per )opulation in ) distinguish has resulted jceding page opulation in istics as to isufficient to IN RUSSIA 191 Average h^ umber of Houses in a Settlement. fc— -I Four and less. From 5 to 9.9 I, 10 „ 19.9 >i 20 M 39-9 II 40 II 59-9 II 60 >i 79-9 II 80 „ 99.9 „ 100 „ 194.9 Over 125, 1 r 192 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? enable a judgment to be formed as to the level of well- being. It is therefore necessary to complete them with other information. The distribution of d\e population in villages IS another factor from which conclusions may be drawn. The chart on the previous page shows the average number of houses in a settlement. Fires.— Oi the comparative condition of the country population in different parts of the empire we may judge by the number of fires, and also by the losses caused. It IS generally taken as proven that the poorer the population the greater the number of fires, while the losses from fires, falling in general on a single householder, are relatively smaller. In the two charts (pp. 194-195) we show the average value of a single burned property in the villages in the period i860 and 1887 in roubles, and the average total of losses from fires in villages by every 100 inhabi- tants. From these charts it appears that wealth is greater m those governments which may be considered as the theatre of war, as the value of burnt properties is greater • while on the other hand the general loss is less owing to the smaller number of cases of fire. In foreign states the yearly losses from fire j;i:r hundred inhabitants are shown in the following table n\ metallic roubles : Great Britain France . Germany Austria . , Belgium . Holland . Sweden and Norway United States Canada . 160 (£2^) 50 (l-J 105.) 81 (£12 3s.) 63 {£9 9S.) 55 i£^ 5s.) 63 (£9 9S.) 99 (;f H 17s*) 220 (;{"33) 288 {£^1 4s.) In Russia the losses from fire in the period i860- 1887 amounted to 116 roubles {£17 8s.) per hundred inhabi- tants of the towns, and 52 roubles {£7 \6s.) per hundred inhabitants in the country, in all about 62 roubles (£g 6s ) From this we see that of all the European states only in France and Belgium do fires cause less damage than in Russia, notwithstanding the fact that the Western .E? evel of well- e them with 3opulatio!i in sions may be i shows the the rountry e may judge caused. It e population :s from fires, re relatively 'e show the the villages the average 100 inhabi- th is greater ered as the i is greater ; ss owing to n states the 3 are shown 105.) 5 3S.) gs.) 5S.) 9S.) [ 17s.) 4S.) 1 860- 1 887 red inhabi- 2r hundred es (£g 6s.) states only mage than i Wei. tern IN RCSSIA ,g, France . Gerniuiiy United States Great Britain Per Cent. 75 74 55 46 Canada Belgium Russia . Per Cent. 44 43 9 From this it will be seen that in Russia euarar Percentage Growth of Town and Country Populations to 1885 taking the Population in 1863 as 100. European Russia Poland . Austria . Germany . Prussia . Saxony . , France . Country. + + + 31 65 2.5 4.6 5-3 1-4 3-6 Towns. + 64 + 75 + 117.9 + 6i + 80.1 + 76.9 + 26.6 Sai;.«^s.--The level of deposits in the savings banks is befnf of . ^"'' ^^''' for judging of the degrfe of well! whnil K P?P"'^^»°"- B"t in Russ.a this factor cannot wholly be relied upon, as, although since the foundatfon o S% '?.'' ''' -g'--"J^-al%pulation hrbe^rto entrust to them its savings, still this practice has no^ yet become as general in Russia as abr^oad. ComLred N "'f' MICROCOPY RESOLUTiON TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) 1.0 I.I 1.25 1 5.0 1^ 2.8 m ■ 4.0 1.4 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 II 1.6 ^ APPLIED IN/MGE he S^ '653 East Main Street gys Rochester. New York 14609 USA '~~ (716) 482 -OJOO- Phone = (716) 288 - 5989 - Fax 194 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Average Value of one Property destroyed by Fire, between 1860-87, in Roubles, Ave [~:l-T'[ 199 and less From 200 to 299 .. 3<^ .. 399 ,, 400 „ 499 ., 500 ,, 649 ,, 650 .. 999 1000 and over. r ? e, between [-:L-r-| 199 and less I I From 200 to 299 ^^ 1. 3<^ .. 399 ^^ >> 400 .. 499 ,, 5CX) ,, 649 ,. 650 ,, 999 1000 and over. IN RUSSIA 195 Average Losses from Fires in the Country, in Roubles, per loo Inhabitants, between 1860-68. 196 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? with the other European states Russia in this respect occupies the last place. 'thpeci Confwn of Agriculture. ~^\,^ emancipation of the serfs thirty.five years ago could not fail to react upon he condition of agriculture. Both large and small agricuUure with the abolition of free labour, had to be refbrmed radical y on the principles of hired labour and inteTs through ransom. But the suddenness of the transfer to the new conditions operated in such a way that the majority of private landowners could not or^would not peton^f'nn'r "7 ""^'- ^""^ P^-^P'-'--^ abandoned servTC. . Pf,'''^'P^^'°." '" agriculture, and went into the services ; others continued to work, as far as was nossible on the old basis, with the difference that they nrfongei' had the advantage of free labour. It may be said tha agriculture in Russia presents a compromise between the rationrSv'ter'T "''"" ^."' "^^ recuirements of a rational system. To a considerable extent it is still carried on without won;ing capital, labour being paid fo a'mos't fnThf"" '' '^-^-^^^^^ ; and agricultur'e ^^mah^s almost in the same position as in the days of free labour lo introduce variety in cultivated products in peasant eveTmr '^ T^ ''^^''''- ^he peasants specSng ever more and more in one kind of corn, in conse- eveTTnle': ^^", °^ P^^' -^not draw from agricuTur , for red^i^n^^ °^ superfluous crops, sufficient mone; lor redemption payments, taxes, and for the purchase of necessary articles. To all these requirementf c L"!f"?' ""^'"^ ^° ^"^^ g^^wth of the popul- IS added the necessity for leasing land from pri vat -^ proprietors and from the Crown ; V evenTn th^ ca e onl^fn kind P.rr- P^P^^r^ P^yn^ent is made not ThrJ.^ ^•"k ^^^^\ '^\ by ploughing, harvesting, and n/.H f T"^"' ^^''^^ ^''° '" "^°"^y- Thus the growing need of the peasantry for money has led them into debt some'usurT^ '" '^' '"""^'^ '^^ ^^^^^^ ^^ ^ burden- The increased tendency of the peasantry in many locali- ill this respect :ipation of the > react upon the nail agriculture, be reformed »ur and intense 1 were realised the transfer to way that the t or would not ors abandoned v/ent into the s was possible, they no longer y be said that e between the Jirements of a ent it is still being paid for ulture remains f free labour. :ts in peasant s specialising rn, in conse- m agriculture, ficient money the purchase uirement?! le popui' from privat-^ 1 in the case is made not 'vesting, and the growing ;m into debt, of a burden- many locali- IN RUSSU ,5^ ties towards emigration shows that peasant agriculture h;,. been played out in consequence of the exhaustic^^"^^^^ iTth ?ht T'. •"'P-^'b'^''^ of obtaining^tney Toglh^ wi h this, the decrease in the number of cattle the absence of improvements n tillage, and the poverty of domestic hfe ments ^he greater";::!;7;hetetnt ; 'o^^ l^s^tL^" sequence' of\'".l7r'^ unsatisfactory conditions the eon- sequence ot a great war could only be to increase th^ "uTdln^e^r::.; tTzA''' ^^^^^^^^ employments. ' ^ '"""^ '^™^ "^^"^ ^"^i"ary moderatetnH '"^ '"^^^tedness, large and espec^-^lly Tasantrv r 1?/'" ^" "° ^""^^ P^^'^ion than the peasantry. Compelled to seek floatine caoital fZ Iv. moTSe °"r™e"ih""T ■andow„ers"1.aXlt ' : mortgage, irue, the advances thev received wpr^ «,o^^ ;"JaT ■rrH^'^f '^"^"'^^ '"- those^'jaTto" hi Sr han h /"'-"^ -ndebtedness is unquestionably ?if iL ,. » 'ndebtedness of the peasantry. On the thjTYjJ^^: "'" ^'"'^ "f -ongages issued by .„,Kr /J- "'''"^ institutions was 1,618,079,807 credit W403,466 5f-), and 7,101,900 German marks (^355 ooq) Although before the emancipation of the serfs a con ' s.dorabIe proportion of Russian estates was mortL^S' was trS^'^fLf'^''^ ^' '".^ '"'P-" ^TanTnl; wa^s io\\rer thm that since charged by joint-stock bank* • vet";o:th''o? Th? '"^'? "'»" "^^ nu^mterrftuK he S,Sl:d Z p'aTmenrof '^arroI'l-iTf /Tf^^ The institution of the NobTv BanklH ,1, " '°^"- sisrrf ri'' p~ -t;i.^u"edtd::ra^r edU n the koh'ir" p "'."^"""^ "P°" «he fact Z treait in the Nobihty Bank is not accessible tn »ir landowners, borrowing generally lays upon Igriiulture a 198 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? heavy burden, and can only result in advantage when the money raised is devoted to increased production, and even this depends upon satisfactory harvests. But there is reason to believe that the greater part of these loans was employed in unproductive objects, and also in provision for inheritances, so that the growth of the population acted injuriously. To such influences were added the fall in the price of corn in Europe, in consequence of trans-oceanic competi- tion, and in Russia by special local circumstances. In addition, it must be remembered that local purchasers of corn are less numerous in Russia than in other European states, owing to the relatively smaller urban and industrial population. If the production of corn did not decrease It IS due to the opening up of new laiids, and increased attention to tillage in the south and east of the country tor further extension of tillage, room remains now only in the east and in i the north. In the course of time if the present primitive methods for working the land are not improved— and for this are required those financial and intellectual forces which are now devoted to the strengthening of the military power of Russia— the pro- duction of corn will not only cease to increase, but will begin to diminish. Even now the breeding of sheep and cattle is declining. Number of Domestic Ammals.—Tht quantity of cattle raised is a chief sign of the well-being of the agriculturist Lot only because cattle represent capital, but because the very feeding of the population can be guaranteed only hv the aid of the products of cattle raising. In this respect large horned cattle take the most important place, and the quantify of these in different parts of the Empire differs and submits to fluctuations. Up to the time of the building of railways, the raising of cattle was generally looked upon as a necessary evil, for the price of such products was very low. Nevertheless as the outlav caused by the distance of the markets from the place of production, owing to primitive methods of transport, was great, proprietors of necessity had recourse to cattle ^ JLE ? tage when the ::tion> and even But there is lese loans was in provision he population in the price of eanic competi- mstances. In purchasers of ther European and industrial not decrease, and increased f the country, ains now only urse of time, ing the land hose financial voted to the 5sia — the pro- •ease, but will : of sheep and itity of cattle : agriculturist. It because the nteed only by 1 this respect It place, and ' the Empire the time of vas generally )rice of such > the outla\' the place of •ansport, was -se to cattle IN RUSSIA 200 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? breeding in order to draw some revenue from their estates. It is very natural that after the building oi railways cattle breeding in those districts where improve- ment was not valued began to decay, at the same tin.e the production of corn giving much worse results. In the o?^fn^l' the preceding page will be found the distribution ot stock in the different governments, taking as unity a head^of large cattle, or lo sheep, i^'goats.^ pigs. I^kI th^T^fu''''''^ f ''"'"' ""^ ^Sriculture.-\i is well known hf ^^ •. """^b^"* o< domestic animals we may judge of the merit of agriculture in a given locality. The more persistently agriculture is carried on, the more, with norma] conditions, it requires improvenunt of the soil, and •• consequence the quantity of domestic animals must be greater. Now the productiveness of land in Russia is much lower than in other states, as will be seen in the annexed chart. ' Yield per Desyatin (=2.70 rtcm) in Quarters. Germany. t To 10 From 10. 1 to 13 13.1 „ i6 Over 16. 1. Austria. Poland. Russia. The circumstance is not without significance that in case of war a certain area of land gives a small reserve of IBLE ? inue from their tlie building ol > where improve- t the same time results. In tlie the distribution iking as unity a >ats, 4 pigs, and is well known ive may judge of lity. The more ore, with normal the soil, and :•- nimals must be id in Russia is be seen in the ')uarters. Russia. ice that in case lall reserve of IN RUSSIA 201 bad, as will be seen from the following chart : ^ Number of Large Cattle per loo Quarters yield. To 6.9 I'ronn 7 to 9.9 ti 10 „ 19.9 Over 20. The following table is even more instructive : England . Belgium . Austria . Germany France , Average On 100 Desyatins of Land under Seed Russia has Less Cattle than • 75 per cent. • . 63 • 53 ', • 51 43 62 »> 11 >» >» The Harvest from a Desyatin of Land in Russia is Less by 73 per cent. 69 ... 38 ... 58 58 >» u 59 From which we see that in Russia ioodesyalms(27o acres^ of corn land have 62 per cent, less domestic anirnals and £ ter'srch^'"""' °"'^ ?9 P^^^^"'- '«- "a:t other cyp. vrrre^'t^ ^^^tn^ ^z:^ other states has the sm'aile'^^ p'J:;:'rtio'n" orKnd"uSr p pi 202 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? seed— precisely 26 per cent, of her area— while the other states have 43 per cent. The time in the course of which the population of each government of Russia might feed itself from its own har- vests IS shown in the chart on the next page, from which it is seen that the most unfavourable conditions in this respect would be found by an invading enemy in the governments of Vilna, Grodno, Minsk, Vitebsk, Moghilet, and Tcher- nigov. This conclusion is founded on statistics as to tlie relations of population to harvest— that is, on the extent of the superfluity of the general harvest. To give a clearer idea of this matter it is necessary to show separately the harvests on the lands of private proprietors and on the lands held by the peasantry. Private proprietors of course utilise a very insignificant proportion of the grain they raise, while the peasants chiefly live on their own corn, and sell only % small surplus, sometimes even being forced to buy. In view of the importance of this question we show in the two diagrams on page 205 the harvest of the chief grains on the lands of proprietors and peasants in millions of quarters in 1893, in fifty provinces of European Russia, and ten governments of Poland. The tillage of land by proprietors might be considered a favourable factor if it were a sign that proprietors occupy themselves with agriculture, and exploit the land in regular form. But, unhappily, facts are entirely opposed to this. In the majority of cases proprietors have no interest, under present circumstances, in working the land with their own resources, and lease it to the tenants by the desyatin* at a rent, for a proportion of the harvest, or for labour. To improve the methods of agriculturists is extremely difficult. The conditions under which the emancipation of the peasantry took place, the consequent agricultural crisis, and those measures which were taken in foreign countries for its avoidance, placed Russian agriculturists in an extremely difficult if not hopeless position. And there is no need to be a prophet * A desyatin is equivalent to 2.70 acres. IBLE ? -while the other )pulation of each 'om its own har- , from which it is s in this respect the governments ilef, and Tcher- atistics as to the on the extent of 3 give a clearer V separately the ors and on the proprietors of ion of the grain e on their own nes even being of this question, S the harvest of and peasants in :es of European t be considered hat proprietors :xploit the land 5 are entirely ses proprietors :es, in working lease it to the oportion of the le methods of )nditions under took place, the neasures which Didance, placed lifficult if not :o be a prophet :res. IN RUSSIA 203 |o foretell that the economic condition of Russia will become every year worse and worse if the present state o ;tricultura"r"". ^""'^ '^ ^ '^^^'^y -^ Exports exrts"ll ^r^^^^^^ y^' "^y ^hat very action 'she nd '"bot:^";rrir"f ^^^^ ""-^- °^ domestic?niria?s of the connfr? . ' ""^P^^'" ^^^^ ^"^^'^ ^^^^^ OUt ?/i2 0cS^^?. ;"?^ru'"°''" ^^"" 80 million roubles fiRuren'r??n 1 ""^ '^' ."'^"^ °^ '^^ ««•'• These bfSLersit i«"^h ^^'"JP''.''"^- By ^aI<^u'ations made fubess of tL '^r."'-^^' •"°''^"'" ^« '•^^^•" the fruit- tuJness of the soil it is necessary to devote to thaf purpose from 20 to ^^ ner rf-nf n^r IL • : } it yields. ^ income which A more intense system of culture is therefore for Russia a first necessity; but for this is required a c^rtahi tension of intellectual and material resources of which a deficiency is now experienced. In the '' Ajr^uhLt A^TuTi; e '"'"^''' '^ ^'^ Russia^Dep^l? me" r: Agriculture, we constantly meet the statement that the unsatisfactory harvests of Russia depend less upon chmat.c and natural conditions than upon unsatisfacto?^ methods of culture. Especially loud, Tn thif resnecT se/fs iefHrnTn'^ '° ''P'^' '^^' '^^ emancipation of the ser s eft landed proprietors, as concerns resources in the the1otT'nlt/7''"- '^^'•^ ^^^" three-quar'ters of cllT\ ^^^ °^ ^^^^^^^ ^'^^e mortgaged to the old Credit Associations, scarcely one proprietor Dossessed savings, and agriculture was carried on onrLcTuse free labour enabled proprietors to do withou. rea^y money Even agriculture carried on on a large scale in ore* caZT'Tt i™.^^-^--d the mosf%rc:nsiTerrbe" capital. But agriculture as lately carried on withonf tT^^^^'i ""^ ^"^«"^ P'-^d^-tive outlay%rn only lead to the exhaustion of the soil ^' ^ Indebtedness of the Peasantry.~As concerns the 204 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? peasantry emancipation shook flic country out of to.pitude, and introduced new conditions of life, freedom n\ activity and immediate responsibility for payments to he state. The possibility was created of buying and leasini: land, but, at the same time, arose also the need of ac- quiring bread and seed, and other objects formerly received Harvest in Millions of Quarters in 1893. Proprietors. ^•sJ 73. 64, 36, 29, Wheat Rye Oats Barley I'ea'sants Wheat ■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■iii !!!!"■■■■■■■■■■■■■■ ■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■(iiSiSS ■■>■■■■■■■ ■■■■aaiSi ■■■■■■■■■■■■r - 28, Barley ■■■■■■■•■■■■■■I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■a - ■■■■■■■ 23.0 from the proprietor, or gained by work at home. The peasants disposed of more time for work among them- selves, but, at the same time, a need arose for money ■payments instead of service. Natural agriculture was replaced by agriculture on a money basis. It was plain that money was to serve as the chief factor in the new conditions. It was from such a circumstance that the indebtedness of the peasantry arose. It is obvious that if extreme need SLE? Jntry out of f life, freedom r payments to ingand leasing c need of ac- meiiy received )3. Wheat Rye ■ Oats Barley home. The imong them- e for money iculture was It was plain r in the new lebtedness of xtreme need IN RUSSIA 205 for money were only experienced by the peasants on special occasions, they might cither take advantage of their own savings or borrow money from their neigh- bours Bijt with the absence among the people of any considerable savings, and the non-existence of popular credit, the peasants were obliged to have recourse to the so-named miroycds and usurers, on the most burdensome A systematic and comprehensive investigation of the debts of the Russian peasantry has not yet been made For this purpose it would be necessary to collect precis/ information in all governments, as has been done by the Zcmstva in those governments where statistical bureaux statistic present time we iiave only fragmentary From the statistics collected by theZemstva it is shown tha private credit costs the peasants of Great Russia from 40 to 60 roubles {£6 to £9) yearly on a loan of 100 roubles U'5;,and tins only for common loans, individuals payine the difficulty of obtaining money on any conditions," writes M. Sokolovski in his work on the subject, "the peasants have recourse to the most ruinous means— to the sale of their summer labour in advance, to the sale of corn neces- sary for their families, even to the sale of corn immediately after harvest. It may be imagined that in such conditions the very lowest prices are obtained; thus soon appear the resuTtf ^ "^"^ ^°^"'' ^""^ ^ veritable system of slavery ;• Such slavery in the Great Russia is exploited by the mroyed on a lawful basis. . . . Thus, for instance, the winter price of summer field labour is but a half or a tliird of the summer price, so that the kulak having made a loan on this basis receives from 100 to 300 per rent, on his advance. . . There exists a veritable trade in slave labour Travelling from village to village these usurers urnish the peasantry with money, binding the borrower to repay the debt by summer work ; and having thus acquired a working force, sell it at a price two to three times 206 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? higher to those who require summer labour. This system obtains as generally in the south as it does in the north. In winter time when some unfortunate peasant is threatened with an execution for non-payment of taxes, or in spring when he is threatened with starvation, the usurer buys for a trifle his summer labour, giving him in advance from 1 5 to 30 roubles {£2 $s. to £4 lOs.). In spring the usurers drive whole arle/s of labourers to field labour and to fac- tories, having sold their labour at double the price they paid. " Traders of another sort travel through the country engaged exclusively in the traffic in children. Many poor parents for a trifling sum sell their children for a certain number of years, in the course of which the children are to be left with tradesmen or artisans in the capacity of apprentices. Having bought in this manner a score of children, the trader sends them in carts to St. Petersburg, precisely as traders of another kind send calves. In St. Petersburg these children are sold to shops and factories at a profit of from 200 to 300 per cent. Such a trade in children and in adults is generally prevalent in the Moscow, Ryazan and other governments." Marriages, Births, and Deaths in Russia. — We have already considered the growth of the population in Russia, in its association with other conditions of the population. In the following table will be found a comparison of the growth of the Orthodox population of Russia with the growth of the general population of other European countries : Increase in a Thousand Inhabitants. Russia . Prussia Austria England Italy . France Belgium 1881-85. 1867-73. 150 12.6 12.0 9.1 7.1 8.8 I4.I 12.2 . 9-5 8.5 2.5 2.7 9.7 6.9 I This system in the north, t is threatened , or in spring : usurer buys advance from ng the usurers ir and to fac- he price they I the country dren. Many hildren for a )f which the r artisans in ught in this nds them in rs of another children are from 200 to d in adults is n and other I. — We have on in Russia, e population. )arison of the ssia with the er European 1867-73. 12.6 9.1 8.8 12.2 8.5 2.7 6.g IN RUSSIA Let us present this comparison graphically : 207 Growth of the Orthodox Population in Russia, and the General Population of other Countries, per Thousand. 1881-85. 1867-73. In Russia the proportion of marriages, as will be seen from the diagram at the top of the next page, immensely exceeds the proportion of other states. In the number of births a similar preponderance is shown m the case of Russia, the rate being twice as great fi! .c^ ?'"''?^^' ^""^ °"^ ^"^ a half times greater than that of England. The number of births in Russia in the period r88i- i««5 m 1000 inhabitants is expressed by the figure k6o while among the other European states the greatest birth ' 10,2 pi Number of Marnages per looo. 7 q *» - - ^- ■:. !:| /, riTTTTlr 7.7 7.5 7:5 i; ..i iiiii :::jg:::.;|: t |4i - ■ • "tHTTTrmrrprm ^ ■ y.\t ■ :g::::a f f1 ^^8 s m 1 fc i ■ iii ISi ;l ;j:- ^-t : : :: - ■■} w ■" S If ■■■■ .:"!:? m :::;:: :| | I 1^ . . , giti iaiiair ^^B bH wft ^4t^ ::i^ ii: :;::::i;i: 3::^j m < 5! tn D (4 < s Austria Q z •< > < * RANGE ^ Norway 1 Sweden I:!,! I CO Number of Births per Thousand. 05 1 I III 1 Russia §8 00 00 Cc 00 o^ CO 00. IN RUSST^ 209 rate was only 39.2 (Austria). B ; at the same timr th. jnortahty in Russia is grea/er than elsewLre Europe n the above-mentioned period it amounted to 41 h,& 1 aT^AusTdL was^'r ^^""^"^^ '''' greatest n'.inli^; rnat ot Austria, was only 3 1.4 in the thousand. In Russia the death-rate of children is esDeciallv hlcrh Prussia S2.2, and in France only 18 7 ^ ' 3 1.4 percent.; m for cign 2IO IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? countries, as is shown by the following diagram, the mor- tality of infants of under one year is higher only in Bavaria and in Wurtemburg. ■^.- Percentage Mortality of Children under One Year, 31,4 3 < Z > u ^ 2 29.8 30,2 z H a u CO Q Z u •J 2 r,i o < D z K « M Ck 0, < 5 K K H < K > 3 < < pq go The mortality of infants of this age is an important factor in judging of the degree of culture of a people and of its moral condition. There can be no doubt that eco- nomic well-being and intellectual development constitute factors opposed to a heavy infant mortality. It is obvious that in the interests of a state it is less important that children should be born than that those born should live, the consequence of which is the preservation of a greater quantity of working forces and money resources, not only in individual families, but in the whole country. Infant mortality depends mainly upon nourishment, or in other words on the degree of prosperity of the people. The investigations of Pfp'^er show that of the IBLE ? Ijagram, the mer- er only in Bavaria " One Year, 29.8 30,2 24^ y rj b — ^^ ^- =rtri=ri^ - ■= ^^:::^ ^ — < < < s < PQ 1 Wo is an important i of a people and D doubt that eco- ipment constituce y. It is obvious 3S important that born should live, tion of a greater y resources, not whole country, •n nourishment, rosperity of the show that of the IN RUSSIA 211 total number of infants dying within a year of birth [r^ctnt^foU.^"- " ^^ '- --• <^-^^^rom^To; the'^cfuirof tt'."-'f ' ^°?.' '^^^ ''' P^^'"'^' hunger, is tion of R.?L. ^t^ T''^^''y ^"^^"g the infant popula- able work ' A% ^^.^ ^?'°'^''"' Gilyarovski, in his valu- able work, A Sanitary Investigation of the Government of Novgorod » mentions the following circumstance aTan Th:^?abour: s '' ""'''^" °'^^ agricultural populat on infants behfnH /°'"^ ^° ^^'"^ ^^^^^ '^^ unweaned infants behind, and in order to prevent their death bv hunger, owing to want of milk, "employ a system which for simplicity and horror might be the method^ of Lages Having made dumplings out of masticated black bread h'l r"r/.'''"'u'° '^^ ^^"^^ ^"d f^^t of the children in the belief that the child when rolling on the floor wHn ft t!::^i\7eli''' " ^^^ -'^'' -^' -^ ^^^ -risT^ii;:: Mortality is also found to depend upon a numberof other conditions-geographical, climatic, and racial, from the occupations of a people and from iJs medical o ganration thP \u^''I factor determining mortality remains ne^er: heless the degree of economic well-being ; and thus from t^:^.^- -' -^' '^^^^y i"^^^ o^ ^^^^onZ l7Zf rf •' ^" '!!' thousand, and in theperiod 1881- 85 to 41. The growth of the population, representing the preponderance of births over deaths among^he or hodox pTo'dr88z-8r!5^^^^^' ''''-'' -^ - ^' -^ ^n the It is not surprising that the statistics of births morta- ity. the composition of the population, age, &c in Russia llLrlT:'' ^''''''^'V '"^ ^^"^P^-- wi^h those of fl. HK 1 u^ '' ^"°"^^ to emphasise the fact. iUus- both sil'^K '^"'^ ?t" '^" "^^^ P"^^' that of 1000 per ons of both sexes born in Norway, 717 attain the age of 25 years m Prussia 581, while in Russia only 508 aftain that^Se ' 212 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Number of Survivors out of icxx) Children Born, at all Ages up to 75. •^y E? n, at all »S M 19 I IN RUSSIA 2M The life of every individual represents a certain quantitv Ij^nT^ T'^^ ""r'^'^'y ^°'- '^^ 'ulfilment^ of 2 appomted work ; m other words, the hfe of every man has a definite value to the state. The value of life on the ir^tZ'i n'?"^ °K ^^' ^^'^T'^"^ ^^^«« has a value of ^5 At 5 years of age has a value of ,i " 10 n „ „ ■ ■ ■ • 5f> "" " .. :: : : : W' 20 234 It is necessary to observe that up to the age of 1 7 vears he average value of the labour of a n.an is ifwe ban the rrussia, estimated in five-year y periods seoantelv f^r Wrst^in^t ti^^^ "4' '^ g--"^^^^^^^^^^^ R f. • ' AA-^ ^ diagram on the following page. But in addition to the loss of capital, the death of everv man causes special outlay for medical t eatmen? and burLT and constitutes a direct loss to the statr The figures given in the following table, taking 1000 biths show that the number of individuals living fo a working age ^f^ Russia Sweden England . Switzerland France Germany . Italy . . To 15 years. 727 695 694 680 609 576 To 60 years. 213 440 365 362 383 320 Having examined these statistics of mortalitv it i«t mpossible not to come to the conclusion thTthe cause of he greater mortality in Russia is the poverty of itsToDu lation and the lower degree of its culture ^^ 214 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? •i->y Value of Human Life in Thousands of Thalers. Al.3.1 3.5 ar 0^ 0.4 o.t Engaged in Physical Work o I- o o o CM QC O CO IT $ o o o id If o CO U1 a: o o 00 >■ o 05 Engaged in Intellectual Work V. — Moral Condition of the Population. We have already cited a number of facts indicating the condition of poverty of the mass of the population of Russia. This question especially required enlightenment in view of the gravity of the consequences which war might call forth and which might follow in its wake. General conplusions here can only be drawn from the impartial evidence of figures, and it was this consideration I.S.S |•^; -§ Is •>! 5LE? f ThaUrs. LL ltTTfTTIlTTT r m Work o o >- in Work PULATION. ts indicating the le population of d enlightenment nces which war DW in its wake, drawn from the tiis consideration IN RUSSIA '^ '^ ^ ^ oo .^ a '^ ►< 2i6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? which impelled us in treating partly of the economic and partly of the moral condition of the country to treat also of matters which it may appear have no direct inmiediate bearing upon the contentions of this work. But this incon- sequence is only appnrent. The significance of war for Russia, as for all other countries, cannot be estimated iTierely by the number of armies which may be put in the field, the number ot shells which may be discharged in a given time, and the extent of ground which would be covered by their fragments. Many factors in the policies of peoples which in times of peace stand little in relief, in that revolution of all conditions which war may cause will acquire a special significance, and it is in the con- sideration of these factors that we find it necessary to delay. "^ Popular Education.— \n Russia popular education stands, unhappily, on a very different foundation from that which would be desired. Devoting all its resources to the satis- faction of military requirements and the payment of loans the Government has had little left to devote to education! From the chart on the preceding page, which shows the yearly outlay on education for one inhabitant, it will be seen that the expenditure on education is distributed over the country very unequally, fluctuating between 3 kopecks and 4 roubles 90 kopecks (from ^ci. to 14s. Sfci.) The low level of education in Russia is shown most clearly of all by the number of illiterates accepted for military service. It will be seen from the diagrams on the opposite page that the number in Russia is 50 times greater than in Germany, 6 times greater than in France, and 50 per cent, greater than in Italy. If we examine the distribution of illiteracy by govern- ments we shall see that in the Baltic provinces the number of illiterates, compared with the total population, is less than 5 per cent., whereas in Great Russia it is as high as 94 per cent. In the government of Moscow it is 47 per cent., and in the six contiguous governments it fluctuates between 58 per cent, in Vladimir and ;6 per cent, in Smolensk. In Kishenef and Ufa the number of illiterate recruits in the .E? economic and o treat also of ;ct immediate 3ut thisincon- 'e of war for be estimated be put in the scharged in a ch would be n the policies ittle in relief, ar may cause in the con- necessary to cation stands, n that which i to the satis- lent of loans, to education. :h shows the int, it will be tributed over sn 3 kopecks Id.) shown most accepted for jrams on the :imes greater France, and ^ by govern- i the number ition, is less is as high as 47 per cent., ates between lolensk. In cruits in the IN RUSSIA 217 period 1874-83 was 92 per cent, and 94 per cent respec- tively. *^ Such a lamentable condition of things is not confined Percentage of Illiterates accepted for Military Service. 83-24 77-95 52-62 82 2 In 18S6-1887. to the lower levels of education only. In intermediate and higher education we find a state of things relatively similar. The diagrams on pp. 218-219 give some illustra- tion of this statement. As an illustration of the deficiency of special training Ill lb WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Number of Students in Higher and Int, mediate Educational Institutions, per loo.ooo of the Population, Classified accord- it%ii to Social Condition. IN UNIVERSfTIES. Russia. 616 114 U Poland, iT)6r S 1 : :: : :: J ji t/tn i'*yj ]|[|||[[|[[t ... . , :::::||::: 1:: ; \ 1 X : It :: ; ^ J " t : ■ ; i: ■ ■'Sl'l ■iiiimJ: i:::::: 0*6 16 hL mH+H 5:::::::::: ... 31 jtiiiiiiiiim ■ ^ ■J) ■ T 36 Jews. Oj '< Educational ssified accord- IN RUSSIA 219 Number entering Universities per ,000 trained in Intermediate Schools, Russia. Poland. Numbers Receiving Special Training per 100,000 of the Population. Russia. Jews 220 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? in Russia we have constnicted the following diagram showing the number of doctors in Russia and in other states : Number of Doctors in European States per 100,000 Inhabitants From the above diagram it will be seen that the number of doctors in Russia is quite insignificant, being from 3 to 8 times less in proportion than in other European states. In the first place stand the metropolitan governments ; in the government of St. Petersburg the number of doctors for every million of the population is 557, and in the Moscow government 420. The minimum is found in the [BLE ? allowing diagram ;sia and in other 0,000 Inhabitants IN RUSSIA 221 S ^T^" n ^u^^"^^' ""'^^ 37 to the million, in Ufa qtlli^' '" O-i^nburg with 31 and in Vyatka ^ith 30 d^^am? " ^^ ^'' '^' ^^''' ^""^''•^^^^ ^y^^ following Number of Quadratic Kilometres for every Doctor. that the number being from 3 to European states, governments; in imber of doctors 557, and in the I is found in the Thus considered in relation to area we find in Russia 44 ItlVTj'^'f doctors than in Belgium, 35 less than i^ Italy and m England, 16 times less than in France, and 14 times less than in Germany and Austria. Norway alone approaches Russia in this respect. Statistics as to the out- lay on medicine are also interesting, as showing the immense disproportion of rneans of relief attainable in various parts oHhe Empire. The chart on the next page illustrates this 222 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? «LE? a o =^ ■ s M ,S M S s o *: M ^0 o o> o» o M M •^ M M M m o \r\ n H ■" " " ^ "« ■• . ' M N H H c li". 3 -»i ^ V IN RUSSIA 223 Sickftcss.—As a natural consequence of poverty, ieno- ranee and the absence of medical aid, we find a corre- spondmgly unsatisfactory state in the health of the popu- ation. In the number of serious illnesses typhus takes he first place. Although in recent times it is acknow- ledged that typhus is caused by a peculiar infectious micro-organism, still the proportion of cases of sickness to cases of death must be acknowledged as a symptom of more or less culture. In this respect Russia also finds herself in an unfavourable condition. From the statistics for the period 1887-91 (see next page) it is shown that the num- ber of cases of typhus fluctuated in various governments from 57 per 100,000 in the Astrahkan government to 014 per 100,000 in the government of Tula, and that the pro- portionate mortality from this illness was immense in certs-.n places, amounting to as much as 21 per cent in the government of Siedlicz. In other respects, as regards health, it will be found that Russia is in an equally unfavourable condition. And If unfavourable material conditions increase the liability to sickness and death of a population, these same conditions similarly react on its moral condition. It is obvious that where the general level of material prosperity is high there will appear less tendency to crime, greater softness of manners, and a stronger tendency towards education It is interesting therefore to consider some phenomena illustrating the moral condition of the country I/kgiinmcy.— Although it must be admitted that certain of the causes increasing the figures of illegitimacy must be sought outside the domain of ethics, nevertheless statistics on this subject may be considered as proving much as to the moral condition of a people. In relation to illegiti- macy Russia finds herself in a favourable position the percentage of illegitimate births being less than in any other European state, as is shown by the diagram on page 225. ® This circumstance is explained by the comparative earli- ness of marriage among the peasantry. The percentage of married soldiers accepted for military service in the period 224 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? ^ 8 BLE? o rt ^ g Hilli IN RUSSIA J anViif'thr""''"' '" '"°'"' e''^<''""'en,s over per cent Western p^olTnces ,' flu^n V" k' ''°"''"" ^^'dNorm- . 18 per cent. A-ctuates between 2 per cent, and s.a?stt^; ^e^SLfSe" .J is t"ct °" " ^°™'- u'^iue IS the consequence of Number of IllesitUnatcs in looo £»>//». 135 < S5 tfl en 5 c « Oi o < >• en < OT S D U « M o. c 1 u z 1 >• < ' i 2 < H K !2 l-H fc W SorlrSarSatir^ -^r "^'"' r"f ^"'' '•™- a^^e ^ ''"" "' "" '"<"'=^"°° °f 'he condition of From general statistics we find that the increase of 226 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? drunkenness corresponds to the increase in the number of suicides. Mulhall finds that approximately 15 per cc'. of suicides in Europe result from drunkenness. From 20 per cent, to 30 per cent, of suicides are caused by dis- Nuinber of Suicides per 100,000 Inhabitants. MfN. 645 4.6 4.5 itititittiHHMttffl z s < z a CO 3 Oi K 3 q QC a UJ ir== ^^e 1.4 satisfaction with material conditions ; from which we must conclude that unfavourable economic conditions are an im- portant factor in determining the numb t of suicides. The proportion of suicides in Russia is much smaller than in other states, as maybe seen from the above diagram, showing the number of suicides among men and women in Europe. BLE? 11 the number of ely 15 per cc'. kenness. From e caused by dis- bitiiuts. 3t,5 17.5 1 ^1 s Ul CQ 4,0 France ^ 8.4 1 which we must tions are an im- >f suicides. The smaller than in iiagram, showing )men in Europe. IN RUSSIA 227 It IS impossible not to notice the characteristic fact that the proportion of female to male suicides is greater in Russia than in other states, a fact which may be explained by the lamentable position of women in Russia. nrnnkenmss.— his y,d\ known that in Russia drunken- ness is a widespread social evil, eating away the lives of whole generations, ruining the organisms not only of men but of women and even children. Without taking into consideration those dying directly from drunkenness, drink IS the cause of serious illnesses, with all their unfortunate consequences. The victims of alcoholism, as those deprived of reason, lose all power of resisting their passions. Their actions are carried on under the influ- ence of immediate animal impulses, in no way regulated by reason. The poisoning of the brain of alcoholics does not at once react upon the physical strength, but their conduct shows no trace of a rational will. In such form they become insane or criminal, and in any case dangerous members of society both in the present and in the future In Germany, Herr Baer, chief physician of the PlOtzensee Central Prison showed on the basis of statistics, the rela- tions between drunkenness and crime. He found that out of 32,837 criminals confined in 120 German prisons, n 706 or 42 per cent., were drunkards. Investigation ^s to the Z n' fVS'^"''^ i" ^"S^^"^' ^'^""^^^ Denmark, and in tlie United States showed that approximately 14 per cent of cases were caused by drunkenness. In France msanity caused by the excessive employment of spirituous liquors grows continually. In 1836, 7 per cent, of cases of insanity were found to be caused by drunkenness. From the last available statistics we find that this percentage had increased to 21 per cent., or three limes. In HoUand m .S82, 12 per cent, of the cases of insanity weie traced to excessive drinking. Similar figures are found for other European countries. In the United states the proportion of insanity caused by alcoholism amounts to 26 per cent. ^ In Russia the use of alcohol per unit of the population »i> less than in other countries. But this depends upon 228 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the irregular use of vodka, and in no way affects the fact that m that country drunkenness is very common. Rarelv does the peasant or workman in Russia consume alcohol in small mnocuous quantities. Usually Russians eithei do not drink at all or drink to stupefaction, and often to unconsciousness. In addition to this, in the opinion of many investigators, the use of alcohol in Russia is espe- cially injurious m consequence of climatic conditions. Nevertheless, the opinion which attributes the eagerness of the peasantry for spirituous liquors ) an immoral impulse IS narrow and unfounded. That eagerness is the consequence of many elements-the lamentable conditions f i 'Au ^ ^^",''^ °^ recreation, and the very nature of the tood of the people, consisting as it does almost exclusively ot vegetable substances. It is a well-known fact that the whole aboriginal vegetarian populations of islands dis- covered by Europeans were exterminated by the rapid spread of drunkenness. ^ But whatever its causes may be, drink is undoubtedly one of the causes of crime and of impotence in the improve- ment of social conditions. In general it may be said that as long as the causes of drunkenness are not removed no restrictive or punitive measures will be effective in iut- rootmg the evil. Measures for raising the economic level of the people and the wide development of popular educa- tion are necessary first. The consumption of spirituous liquors in Russia in comparison with other countries is shown in the diagram on the opposite page. agidm The number of sacrifices to drink is shown in the dia- gram on page 230. Crime.— The. criminal statistics of every country may be taken as a factor in determining the level of material and moral well-being of its population. A comparison of the criminal statistics of Russia with those of other countries is made e.xtremely difficult owing to the irregular classifi- cation of offences, and the irregular jurisdiction of the ower courts. In consequence of this the statistics found m the Abstracts published by the Ministry of Justice have IBLE ? ly affects the fact :ommon. Rarely consume alcohol Russians eithei ion, and often to n the opinion of 1 Russia is espe- : conditions, tes the eagerness ) an immoral eagerness is the ntable conditions 'ery nature of the most exclusively )wn fact that the '< of islands dis- id by the rapid undoubtedly one in the improve- nay be said that not removed, no effective in out- : economic level f popular educa- s in Russia in in the diagram 5wn in the dia- country may be of material and nparison of the other countries regular classifi- sdiction of tlie statistics found of Justice have IN RUSSIA 229 00 00 00 00 I 8 I s •2 a 00 00 00 00 00 S M (0 a o u -a > H ♦ 230 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? little value as a basis for comparison, and incked com- parison of these statistics with those of Western European countries gives results far too optimistic and quite untrust- worthy, as a great part of the offences of the greater part of the population, which fall under the jurisdiction of the Volost courts, are omitted. An arithmetical comparison even of serious crimes cannot be safely made ; for the Number of Deaths from Drunkenness in 1,000,000 of the Population. Volost courts, through ignorance of the law and incapacity to distinguish in a single case different forms of law- breaking, very often determine criminal cases which by law are outside their competence. Information collected in three governments, Podolsk, Moghilef, and Voluinsk, has served as a basis for estimating the total number of persons convicted by the Volost courts. Adding the number of such convictions to the figures in the ordinary criminal statistics we have con- structed the following diagram, showing the proportions of crime in Russia and Poland : LE? id indeed com- stern European i quite untrust- greater part of sdiction of the cal comparison made : for the 3o,ooo of the and incapacity forms of law- ises which by ents, Podolsk, a basis for evicted by the convictions to 3 we have con- proportions of W RUSSIA 231 Average Number a/ Convictions in 2oo,cx)o ./ //,. Population (100,000 men and 100,000 women) in 1878-1885. As-izr and Civil Couris. \''>lost Courts. BO/IOCTHblMH """IMIIIK 194 I20II492 Arrest and Whipping. """ * '• Other Punishments. rrim^ in R^ to draw a comparison between the amount ot d fficn t h^"fh'^^"^^ '" foreign countries is made extremely thfl^m^u^ differences in criminal codes. To add to elate to '^P'n.V""^^^ '''^'^' ^" ^°"^^ ^^""^^'es relate to the number of accused, in some others to the convicted. But even an approximate comparison cannot be without value. The most useful information would be given by the distribution of convicts according to religbus to he' rer' •'''''^''T'''^ ^^rough the lack of^statisilS as ZchVr'^'T r^^^^'°" °f ^he peasants of the Empire, such a classification was impossible. We have therefore been con^peiied to divide the convicts in the Emph: into three groups-peasants, Jews, and others. (See dia- grams on pages 232, 233, 234, 235.) '^ It IS not without interest to consider the number of those convicted according to sex. The table at top of nnS?K^ f'^^ the percentage relations of the sexes in the number of convicts. thJin ^^^"'P'^'^^^h^^ picture it is only necessary to show the increase or diminution of crime in Russia in comparison with that of other states. In this case, irregular registra" Uon does not play so serious a part, as we are not dealing with the quantity of crime, but with its increase and diminution in a certain period. For Rus^,ia we take the periods 1878-82 and 1888-89. After examining, the 232 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? I lAl.V '^ w ^ 3 3 s O 5iO f I 1 Sl'AlN HiMJAKV Ijiliii «■•((■••>■ :i:c:::::::!n:: ir:::s::::::j::: France Al-^tria BKLCilUM 1 -| ■■■■■■■■■■■■■•a .---^ -I liiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii CO Catholics. Orthcxiox. •" Jews, Peasants, f Other Religions Jews. n Uo CO ■^mr^ LE? ARV -.ft UA UM ANV KtiD IN RUSSIA 23?7 (O 3 ^^^B N n^= P^ " _: B ♦ __ rr^jz:: =i= - r— ^--^ -r-:rr z^=m ~ w ^1 ..7t _r; ?^--^s ;=J 13 233 4407 z <" 1 Cl) tn < 3 s 0. K 1 i 0, cS 0( h I/: 3 234 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE Hi* •A Q^ .2 -o < s H O o < H < O O o> t:::::!:::::i:::|i;:j:::::;::!|:::::^ Greek Orthodox. Catholics Protestants. Jews. Catholics. Protestants. Jews. Catholics Protestant'. [ews. Catholics. Protestants. Jews. < Ui O < a a 0) Protestants. Orthodox. s::::::::::;:::;::::;:: "■::;:::::t::x:::::::::::;:9 ■■■■■■■■■■■■••••■■••■■•■■■■■■■I ■■■■«■ ■■■■■■■■■f ■■■■■■■••■■«■ I Catholics. col Jews. Peasants. I!!!!!!!lf!l!!l«!t*!!>«!!!l*>iaaaa*a«>aiaaaaaiai«a>>a>a J!!!!!!!!'!!aaa!afaaaaaiiaaiaa»ta«aaaaHii«a(iai(iaiaia aaaaaiaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaiaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaa -iaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaSaaaaaSaaaaaaaiaaaaaa! • aaaiaa»«aaaa«»aaaaaaas:«!SiliSai«aSaa:«!*»S«a!a Other Religions. Jews. LE odox. < cs nts. cs. > < K U O nts. cs. nt«. < cs. z nts. Protestants. Orthodox. Catholics. Jews. Peasants. Other Religions. Jews. IN RUSSIA Numbers Condemned for Swindling: per Million of the Corresponding Population. Russia, swindling. 235 c/} ! i Jews. Other Religions. Peasants. •0 H c w_ 7, Poland. Jews. m X > Catholics. Orthodox. " ■ ? ■ 1 Protestants. \ Si Prussia and Germany. DIFFERENT FORMS OF SWINDLING. Austria. Protestants. 236 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Percentage Relations of Men and Women Convicted. ^^ 87 ., , 89 87 Percentage Increase in the Fifeeen Chief Forms of Crime. The Empire. Poland. f U I II I III 1 1 1 1 ill J I lIiliHjj ' LE? Convicted. L_87 ■••■••■>•■■••»•■>•■> »■■••■••■ ■■■■■laBHa •■*■>■«■■ ■■••■■•«>• :;::»::; ::it!::::: ■•■!■■>•■ ■■■•■•Paaa Z u o UJ CO s of Crime. IN RUSSIA 237 statistics of fifteen of the chief forms of crime we find an increase in crime in the second period in Russia of 14 per cent, and in Poland of 46 per cent. The diagram a? the effecTvely P"^"^"*'"^ P^^^ P^^^^^'^ ^hese relations more For comparison with foreign states we will take Great Britain France, Austria, and Germany. In this respect Great Britain is in the most favourable position of all. as the tollowing diagrams shov/ : Number of Convictions in Great Britain per 100,000 Inhabitants. 1860—1869. 1870—1879 1880-1889. 1894. rn3?7^ ^""^ ^^^- ^i"*^^ ^^^ ^'^^^ '^^ the number of convicted persons in Great Britain has fallen by 109 per Jr^"^ countries where the increase of crime has been inconsiderable may be named France and Austria : Number of Convictions in Thousands. France. Austria. W\ 238 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? In Germany, on the other hand, we find tht same phenomenon as in Russia. Number of Convictions in Germany per 100,000 Inhabitants. 1883-1887. 1887—1892. 1893. 1894. 1895. It is interesting in the case of Russia to see the distri- bution of crime among the population in its relation to education. Higher education Educated . Illiterate . Empire, Per Cent. 1.2 253 73-5 Poland. Per Cent. .08 134 85.8 The chart on the opposite page shows the outlay on justice of all kinds and on prisons in 1887 per inhabitant. To fill in this brief outline of the moral condition of Russia we will cite some statistics relating to recidivism, pointing out, however, that these statistics are not quite complete. Nevertheless they may give a very fair idea of the amount of social evil caused by reversion to crime : Number of Recidivists. Percentage Growth of Recidivists. 1878. 1889. Empire . Kingdom of Poland 10,168 1.543 18,993 3.545 180 233 a c •« ^>. LE? find th« same X) Inhabitants. see the distri- its relation to Poland. Per Cent. .08 85.8 3 the outlay on per inhabitant, al condition of to recidivism, i are not quite very fair idea sion to crime : 'ercentage Growth of Recidivists. 180 ^33 IN RUSSIA I 240 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? I Those who understand the gravity of criminal recidivis m for the state will be able to judge of the significance of these figures in arriving at an estimate of the moral con- f dition of the people. VI. — Elements for the Renewal of the Army. The greater the probability of a prolonged European war, the more serious becomes the question of means and methods for the reinforcing of armies, The general con- clusion, formed from an examination of Russia's resources, was that Russia, having an almost inexhaustible reserve " men and horses, might sustain a prolonged war incom- parably better than the other states of Europe. But in this consideration we took into account only the average statistics for the whole of Russia. The question is made more complex by the fact that, in view of the immensity of Russia, the conditions for the renewal of armed forces in various districts must be very different, while in the event of a defensive war a certain portion of Russia's territory might be occupied by an enemy. In addition, with inter- rupted communications, all material for renewing armed forces must be obtained within the country itself The question therefore naturally arises : Are they sufficient ? It is evident that no deficiency can arise in men. Means of provisioning are also so abundant as lo con- stitute in the very beginning of war a great advantage for Russia. In an earlier part of our work we have given figures to show the advantage which Russia also possesses in the matter of horses. The percentage of these which might be used in war is more important in the present connection. To form some idea of this, the chart on the next page, showing the percentage and distribution of grown horses over the country, will be useful. Since 1864 an immense increase has taken place in the number of horses in the country, an inconsiderable decrease showing itself only in ten provinces, while all over the rest of the country a large increase took place, in certain provinces amounting to nearly 300 per cent. I i 3 LE? ninal recidivism significance of the moral con- THE Army. nged European 11 of means and le general con- 5sia's resources, Lustible reserve fed war incom- urope. But in ily the average lestion is made le immensity of .rmed forces in lile in the event issia's territory ion, with inter- snewing armed ry itself. The ey sufficient ? arise in men. ant as to con- t advantage for we have given 1 also possesses of these which in the present e chart on the distribution of Ful. en place in the inconsiderable inces, while all ise took place, 300 per cent. IN RUSSIA 242 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? It may be said, therefore, that no Western state will find itself in so good a position as relates to the supply of horses ; and that however great may be the area occupied by an '^nemy's forces, deficiency in horses fit for military purposes cannot arise. As relates to the supply of arms it may be assumed that no difficulty will arise in obtaining workers, owing to the stagnation caused in other industries. The working and application of iron has grown so rapidly that no diffi- culty can arise in this respect. In 1890 the pig-iron worked amounted to 55,V million poods (892,000 tons), manufactured iron to 253 million poods (412,500 tons),' while in 1895 the working of pig-iron amounted to 87 million poods (1,400,000 tons) (an increase of 57.5 per cent.), and manufactured iron to 27 million poods (434,000 tons) (an increase of 5 per cent.). On the chart given on the next page is shown the dis- tribution of the production of iron and steel. From this it may be seen that the chief resources of this material are situated in the East, and far away from those districts which might be occupied by an enemy's forces. !... VII. — Conclusions. From the above statistics the conclusion naturally springs that, while the interruption of communication will threaten with famine and social perturbations the states of Western Europe, the danger to Russia is less, although still very serious, meaning, as it would, decrease in the incomes of the population and the most lamentable results for trade and industry. The incommensurate widening of the area of production at the expense of the area of nourishment, the replacing of horned cattle by horses, and the decrease of stock- raising generally, are factors against which must be placed the systematic efforts at improvement. Otherwise, in view of the yearly export of the products of the land and of the rapid growth of the population, Russia would go farther and farther on the path to the exhaustion of her natural III" I ■I I LE? state will find the supply of : area occupied fit for military ly be assumed kers, owing to The working f that no diffi- ) the pig-iron ^92,000 tons), + 12,500 tons), nounted to 87 ease of 57.5 million poods lown the dis- 1. From this this material those districts :es. ion naturally unication will 5 the states of less, although crease in the ntable results of production the replacing ise of stock- ust be placed wise, in view id and of the Id go farther f her natural 244 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? resources and the multiplication of an agricultural pro- letariat. And thus Russia, although so far as the products of agriculture are concerned she is in a position to carry on a serious and prolonged struggle — such a struggle as could not even be dreamt of by the states of Western Europe — nevertheless is as interested as are those countries in the preservation of peace. In comparison with the income derived from agriculture the total of the income received from industries is insig- nificant. But in the event of a great war even this income must diminish to a considerable extent. In such industries as directly or indirectly relate to the supply and armament of the army there will, of course, be no stagna- tion. But the interruption of the supply of trans-oceanic cotton and various other materials, and difficulties in the supply of coal, will shorten the output of many articles. It is true that Russian industry, relying upon an internal sale, will not lose its market in consequence of interrupted communications, as English, German, and French industry will. But in time of war the demand on the internal market would undoubtedly fall, proportionately with the fall in incomes derived from agriculture and the general disruption in agricultural life. Russian industry relies mainly on the demands of the peasantry. Thus, even in times of peace every serious failure of crops causes stagnation. It is obvious that the diminution in the resources of the peasantry caused by war would react on industry and shorten production considerably. As a result of this, workers who live in poverty and absolutely without provision for the future will find themselves in a position no less terrible than that of the workers of Western Europe. Only traders, in consequence of their comparative few- ness, and usurers who take advantage of the backwardness of the agricultural population of Russia, will find that war creates favourable conditions, opening a wider path for exploitation of the popular needs. All this leads to the conclusion that, in consequence of a iLE? jricultural pro- he products of n lo carry on a uggle as could ^tern Europe — se countries in rom agriculture istries is insig- ivar even this tent. In such the supply and be no stagna- tf trans-oceanic Acuities in the many articles, on an internal : of interrupted rench industry n the internal ately with the id the general ndustry relies Thus, even in crops causes nution in the would react on irably. As a and absolutely lemselves in a le workers of nparative few- backwardness I find that war vjder path for Qsequence of a IN RUSSIA US generally unsettled agriculture, of the primitive and already 'Zn^'l ^r^'"""''^"'''^'"«'^'^d'«' absence ofVavTngs^ Zl '""''""''. ^°'^ °*' P'oprietors and of peaslnl the economic perturbations caused by war might assume •mmcnse gravity. We have pointed out some of the conditions which in Western Europe would mke a pro^ longed war impossible. But there immense capital reprT ted nil fo^c^T '' f" ?^^P'^' '"'^"^ dev^opLTof technique, force of social activity, and at the same time of private enterprise, would tend towards quicker heang o the wounds^caused by war in the popular organ isni That war 01 I87Q-7I. We may suppose that a future war able th^ti T" '""^ ^--.trously, but it is unquestion- recover h -f 7"g,^^^°"«"^'<= organism might^ rapidly ^^ oT^Xi^r ''- '--''^' -^^'^- -^ '^e activity is, the less are its dangers from war. Where accumulated riches are small and economic life simple the direct losses will not be so acutely fJt. But for a country mainly agricultural, in which both peasants and proSrs can hardly make both ends meet even in times of pelce a red'whh1oT'7pK ^"^^^^^<^-- -d in consequence have onW . JrK ^'^°!1' ' 5 "^""^'•^^ ^^^^^ ^^e finances have only lately been reduced to order, and would again be disorganised by a great issue of pape; money-for such a country the consequences of war would be especiaUv disastrous, and would result in an economic crisfs^ and ^ OSS o productive forces from which it would need a long time to recover And thus, although Russia is nof threatened with those revolutions which might be feared for^:f o7 ^\'''' ''''' ' ^'''' ^^'' y^' the'consequences for, her of such a war would be in the highest degree stIll^-n"^'^''''J. ^°' ^"""^^ "°' '° ^a" below the other states in expenditure on armaments entails on her a heavier 246 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? burden than Fiance and Germany and even Austria have to bear. In those countries the war budget, however immense it may be, constitutes only a small part of the expenditure of the state, of the municipalities, of private associations and of village communities, on productive works, on improvements in agriculture and in sanitation, on the development of communications, trade and industry, and Hnally (although this is by no means the least important item) on the spread of education. In Russia, the expendi- ture on land and sea forces constitutes a third of the whole budget ; and, if we deduct the sums devoted to interest on the Imperial debt, we find that all expenditures which might in any way be productive taken together are less than the expenditure on armaments alone. In view of all these circumstances it is impossible not to conclude that a great European war would move Russia still further back in economic relations, it may be, even for a prolonged time. And, bearing this in mind, it may well be asked whether even the most successful war could result in sufficient compensation for such sacrifices. True, facts and figures demonstrate that, thanks to her immensity and to the nature of her soil and climate, Russia is less vulnerable than other countries. There can be no doubt that with her vast population, her abundant production of food and horses, and with in- dustries guaranteeing the equipment of her army, Russia might carry on a defensive war for a long time. Even financial conditions would not operate disadvantageously at first, for Russia has for a long time been accustomed to the circulation of paper money. All these are plainly advantages for Russia in a defensive war against countries enjoying a higher degree of culture, possessed of great industries and trade, but which, through deficient pro- duction of corn for tne feeding of their populations, could not carry on war for } ears, as would certainly be possible for Russia. But in an offensive war these factors, which constitute an advantage for Russia in defence, would be turned into disadvantages. .E? ri Austria have idget, however fill part of the ties, of private on productive i in sanitation, e and industry, least important a, theexpendi- rd of the whole ted to interest nditures which ;ether are less impossible not 1 move Russia may be, even 1 mind, it may isful war could crifices, thanks to her and climate, ntries. There Dpulation, her and with in- army, Russia r time. Even dvantageously m accustomed ese are plainly ainst countries :ssed of great deficient pro- Lilations, could ly be possible lich constitute )e turned into IN RUSSIA ^47 From detailed investigation of the economic condition of different districts of Russia, we came to the conclusion that however sensibly she were to feel the occupation by an enemy of her frontier provinces, such occupation could not produce any decided result. The opposition of Russia could not be broken at once, even by the irruption of innumerable forces. In the extreme case of the Russian armies experiencing such defeats as to expose the capitals the vastness of the country and the immensity of its population would supply the means for continuing the struggle. The fragments of her defeated forces, retreating to distant centres of population,would form the nucleiofnew armies, and the struggle would burst out again with fresh fierceness— and that in the very moment when the weak- ened and exhausted invaders were compelled to retreat. But it must not be assumed from this that victory by means of pursuing the invaders and carrying the war into their own country, would be an easy task. Pursuit would have to be carried on through the ruined districts of Russia mto the exhausted territory of the enemy ; while for the successful carrying on of an offensive war new armaments war material generally, would be required, and, above all, armies would have to be supplied exclusively from purchased provisions. To this would have to be auded financial difficulties almost impossible to be ovei . ome, for the economic per- turbations produced by war would be of such gravity as to prevent the further straining of the national resources. Russia has now within the country, in circulation and on deposit, Government securities to a sum of two and a half milliard roubles U 37 5. 000,000), and other securities to a sum of 1200 midion roubles (;^ 180,000,000). On the declaration of war the depreciation of these securities would entail a loss of 1 100 millions of rcublca (;^ 165,000,000). It is obvious that the issue of new Government loans to pro- vide for the immediate necessities of war would be impos- sible. From this would inevitably result the issue of paper money in immense quantities. The history of past wars of Russia can give no idea of 248 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the economic perturbations which would be caused by war to- day, in view of the vastness of the army and the com- plexity and costliness of all military apparatus. The occupation by an enemy of the Western and Southern provinces, now in the most satisfactory economic con- dition, and the interruption of internal communications, would have a tremendous effect on the receipt of the ordinary Imperial revenues. Even the war of 18 12 cannot be compared with the irruption into Russia of armies counted by millions, while the need for money in the present composition of the army would be unpre- cedented. It is enough to repeat that for the satisfaction of military requirements in a state of war, under present conditions, Russia would be compelled to spend daily about seven millions of roubles (;^ 1,050,000). As we have pointed out (in the section devoted to " Plans of Military Activity "), it is almost impossible to admit that a war with Russia could be decided in less than two years. For such a war lasting two years five milliards would be required (;^7 50,000,000). The late N. K. Bunge, as we have already mentioned, declared that if credit notes were issued for 300 million roubles (;^45,ooo,ooo) their value would fall 25 kopecks the rouble (that is, one-fourth). With the issue of paper money in a quantity seventeen times greater it is quite impossible to see the extent of depreciation. It is very probable, however, that depreciation would reach the same level as at the beginning of the present century — that is, that paper money issued for the carrying on of war would be depreciated by three-fourths of its nominal value. Under such circumstances even the estimated five milliards might prove insufficient. The prices of all things would rise, and the Treasury, receiving taxes in depreciated credit notes, would pay a higher price for everything ; the maintenance of the army and of the fleet would require immense outlays. A con- siderable part of the population of towns and all serving in the army and in the civil service would suffer from extreme privation. ILE? ; caused by war y and the com- pparatus. The and Southern economic con- ommunications, receipt of tlic war of 1812 into Russia of ;ed for money ould be unpre- the satisfaction , under present to spend daily 0). ion devoted to t impossible to decided in less two years five 00). The late ioned, declared million roubles ; kopecks the issue of paper ater it is quite ion. It is very reach the same mtury — that is, n of war would nominal value. :d five milliards I the Treasury, s, would pay a ice of the army itlays. A con- and all serving ild suifer from IN RUSSIA 249 At the moment of the declaration of war the whole export of agricultural products will cease. A sudden fall of prices will ensue, with a proportionate diminution in the incomes both of landowners and of peasants. These phenomena will be accompanied by fluctuations in prices, for the standard of prices has always been determined by export, which will cease. When the only regulator of prices will be internal competition those districts will be m the best position where competition in trade is most highly developed, as is the case in the Metropolitan Northern, Southern and South-Western provinces and also in the Southern provinces, and in the worst position those where trade is to a great extent a monopoly. In addition to the economic shock, recovery from which will take years, many material and moral factors which we have examined in detail, which have little visible eftect in times of peace, will in the revolution which war causes have grave significance. All of which leads to the conclusion that war for Russia, whatever might be its issue, could not be less ruinous, although from other causes, than for her enemies. But this conclusion is not enough. A consideration from all points of view of the influences which war might exert on the economic condition of the country, leads to a conviction not less important— that is, that a decrease of expenditure on preparations for war is no less, and it may be even more, unavoidable in Russia than in other European states. The conversion to productive purposes of a part of the outlay now fruitlessly devoted to armaments— since there is not even a probability of war breaking out— is the first interest of the people, and is essential for the development of the vital forces of the country. These forces are needed by Russia for the carrying on of a successful struggle, not on the field of battle, but with her economic backwardness and the poverty and ignorance of her people. Progress in her internal life, and the develop- ment of productive forces are far more necessary for Russia, which, even in the case of war, would, in all 250 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBL?: ? probability, at first have to content herself with defensive operations, than the increase of armed hordes and the accumulation of implements and munitions of destruction. But if, even in times of peace, we find all possible preparations made, so that the country in time of war shall in no respect be behind its enemies, how much more necessary is it to prepare to meet those perturbations and difficulties of every kind which will be caused by war in the economic position of the country. with defensive )rdes and the of destruction, d all possible time of war )w much more ;urbations and ised by war in CHAPTER II THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF GREAT BRITAIN IN TIME OF WAR A GREAT European war must react disastrously on the economic condition of Great Britain even in the event of her taking no part in ti.at war. The interruption of maritime communications will affect disastrously, it n,av be even fatally, the industries of the country and the feeding of her popri- < -on. The immense development of bn ish industry is -.ated upon access to the markets of the whole wor..., and relies upon the uninterrupted export of products. In England every cessation of export means a stoppage of work, involving the withdrawal of the means of subsistence from the greater part of her population. The production of wheat in that country notwithstanding the increase in the population, has steadily diminished, diminished to such an extent that the stoppage of the import of wheat into England would threaten the whole population with famine. I. — Deficiency of Production. The diminution in the area devoted to the raisins of f ures " ^^'^"** "^^ ^^ illustrated by the following 252 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? 1 In Thousands of Hectares. (English Equivalents, in Parentheses, in Thousand* of Acres.) Year. Area devoted to Under Raising Grain. Meadow. Total. 1875 . . 7330 5389 ! 12,719 (18,325) (13,473) (31.798) 1880 7156 5841 12,997 (17,890) (14.603) (32,493) 1885 . . 6964 621 1 13.175 (17,410) (15.528) (32,938) 1890 6782 6485 13.267 (16,955) (16,213) (33. '68) 1895 . . . 6464 6725 13.189 (16,160) (16,813) (32.973) Thus the area of land devoted to agriculture in twenty years increased to the insignificant amount of 1175 thou- sands of acres. And not only does all this increase come under meadow, but under meadow we also find 2250 thousands of acres, that is, almost one-eighth part of the land formerly devoted to tillage. The average harvests of the United Kingdom in recent years are shown in thousands of quarters in the following table : Crop. 1893. 1894. 1895. Average 1893 95. Oats . . 21,074 23.858 21,810 22,247 Barley , 8,218 9.825 9.378 9,140 Wheat . 6,364 7.588 4.786 6,246 Beans . 608 900 703 737 Peas 594 779 591 655 ■ «il PB The average yearly harvest, expressed in kilo|;rammes is shown by the following figures : 5LE? iectares. theses, in Thousands Total. 12,719 (31.798) 12,997 (32,493) 13-175 (32,938) 13.267 (33.'68) 13.189 (32,973) ilture in twenty nt of 1 175 thou> is increase come also find 2250 hth part of the ngdom in recent in the following 89s. Average | 1893 95. ,810 .378 ,786 22,247 9,140 6,246 703 591 737 655 in kilo|^rammes IN GREAT BRITAIN Oats . Barley Wheat Beans Peas . 282,537 thousand kilos. 116,078 79.324 „ 9.360 „ 8.319 ^53 The import jnto England of bread stuffs is shown in thousands of kilogrammes in the following table : Grain — Wheat . Barley . Oats Maize . Others . Fbur — Wheaten Others . 1890. Total . 768,020 211, 811 161,633 551.662 74.511 200,317 8,420 1893. 1804. Average. 1.976,374 831.367 290,119 177,228 417.855 89.954 259,182 8,395 2,074,100 890,600 396,761 190,233 449,136 110,198 243,014 9.830 2,289,772 829,996 299.563 176,365 472,884 91,554 234,171 8,882 2,113,415 This table, in thousands of English quarters (reckoning 1 kilogramme as equal to 22 lbs.), would be as follows !^ Grain — Wheat Barley Oats , Maize Others Flour — Wheaten . Others Ibtal 1890. 60,344.4 16,642.2 12,699.7 43,345.1 5,854-6 15.739-2 662.0 155,287.2 1893. 65,321.70 22,795.07 13,925-06 32,831.50 7,067.90 20,364.30 659.00 162,964.53 Average. 65,214 23,537-13 13.857-22 37,155-3 7,193.7 18,399.3 697.8 166,054.35 254 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? From this table it is seen that the import of bread stuffs to satisfy the requirements of the population continually grows. The import of wheat is more than ten times greater than the home growth : of oats alone the home production exceeds the import in the proportion of three to two. If we calculate the number of days on which bread would be lacking in England if she were forced to rely alone upon her own harvests, it will appear that England would be without wheat for 333 days, with- out barley for 263 days, and without oats for 140 days. A more favourable result is obtained by a comparison of the growth and import of potatoes. The growth approxi- mately expressed in thousands of tons amounts to 1893 1894 1895 Average 6541 4662 7065 6089 The import of potatoes is shown by the following figures : In 1893 142 thousand tons. In 1894 135 .. As concerns meat, England is still less dependent on products from abroad. The number of head of cattle and sheep imported into England is shown by the following table : Cattle, Sheep. 1880 . • 389.724 941,121 1885 . . 373.078 750,886 1890 . . 642,596 358,458 1893 . . 340,045 62,682 1894 . • 475.440 484.597 In addition to this, England imports a quantity of carcases here set out in thousands of hundredweights : iilli ILE? t of bread stuflFs tion continually than ten times alone the home portion of three days on which ; were forced to ^ill appear that 33 days, with- t oats for 140 y a comparison growth approxi- Dunts to 6541 4662 7065 6089 ' the following isand tons. > dependent on ad of cattle and y the following Sheep. 941,121 750,886 358,458 62,682 484.597 itity of carcases ts: IN GREAT BRITAIN ^SS Bacon . . . . Beef , . . . Salt, and other sorts of fresh meat Meat dried and in pre- serve Fresh pork . 1891. 5000 2129 1760 735 300 1893. 4187 2008 2149 561 369 1894, Average 4819 2346 2484 554 405 4669 2161 2131 627 358 In order to illustrate the relation between the import and production of meat in England, we give the following totals, It being understood that, following the general principle, ten sheep or pigs or fifteen hundredweight of meat are considered as a head of cattle The number of cattle held in England are presented by the following tables : ^ In Thousands. Honied Cattle. Cows ... Sfi Thousands. Horned cattle of two years and over ?,432 » „ from one to two years . . . i,igo »» » iess than one year 1,247 Sheep and rams one year old and '^^^ ^ ^'^^^ °^f • 15,997 ^^"^•'^ 9;795 Pigs 25,792 = 2,579 2,884 = 288 9,222 .^. J^ ^ P?*"^^^ °^ reducing all stock to units we find n.f ^^ff"^ possessed in 1895, 9222 thousand head of native cattle. The import into England in 1894 was 52^ thousand head of living cattle, and 10,608 thousand hundredweight of meat of different sorts, representing nK' 256 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE .? 707 thousand head of cattle. That is to say, the import into England amounted to 1230 thousand head of cattle, or 1 3 per cent, of the number in the country. Number of Native and Imported Cattle in England in Thousands of Heads. Native. Imported. 9222 From this it appears that as far as the supply of meat is concerned England would be guaranteed, even in the event of import being interrupted ; but prices would rise immensely, as English cattle is very valuable, and meat in that country is dear even at the present day. Of other products for which the raising of cattle is necessary, England requires yearly : In Thousands of Hundredweights. Average. 1890. 1893. 1894. 1 Butter .... Margarine . . Cheese .... Tallow .... 2028 1080 2144 IS73 2327 1300 2077 1118 2595 nog 2266 1401 2310 1 163 i 2162 , 1264 ' With such an immense demand it will be no easy task to supply I le interrupted import by increased internal output. In these respects there would undoubtedly arise great difficulty in the supply of the population. A similar deficiency would exist in the supply of various colonial products. England imports : iLE ? say, the import I head of cattle, znd in Thousands 1230 supply of meat :ed, even in the rices would rise t)Ie, and meat in ng of cattle is dweights. Average. 1894. 2595 1 109 2266 I4OI 2310 1 1 163 2162 1264 ; 1 HI be no easy task :reased internal idoubtedly arise tion. A similar various colonial IN GREAT BRITAIN 257 Rice, in looo's of CWtS. lbs. cwts. lbs. cwts. M Cocoa Coft'ee Tea Sugar Rawsilk „ Molasses,, Glucose ,, Rum „ Cognac „ Other spirituous drinks (colonial and foreign), in thousands of gals. Wine (in ditto) 1890. 1893. gals. 5.957 28,112 864 223.494 9.977 15.717 563 737 6,238 3,100 3.375 16,194 5.449 32,982 827 249.546 ".550 16,032 585 1,23b 5.942 2.739 2,182 14.675 1894. Average. 5.194 39.116 731 244.311 13.945 14.306 853 1,062 6,123 3.402 2.495 14.369 5.523 33.403 807 239.117 11,824 15.352 667 1,012 6,101 3.080 2,684 15.079 A clearer picture is presented by the following table which shows the average consumption per inhabitant of the United Kingdom of imported articles of food and drink : Imported Products. (in lbs.) Bacon Beef, fresh and salted Smoked and preserved meat ,',' Mutton, fresh . Pork, fresh and salt Butter and margarine Margarine Cheese . Cocoa Coffee Wheat in grain Wheaten flour Currants and raisins Eggs Potatoes . Rice Sugar, raw (number) (in lbs.) 1892. 14.10 6.70 2. 10 499 0.98 6.^3 380 6.39 0.55 0.74 180.40 64.36 4-58 3503 8.71 8.91 47-22 '893. 11-73 5-68 1-55 5-74 1.03 6-59 3-75 5.87 0-54 0.69 188.82 58.83 502 34-39 8.14 8.54 45.68 1894. 13-29 6-59 1-49 6.62 1. 12 7.27 3-17 6.38 0.58 0.69 201.48 54-71 4.90 36.68 7.68 7.26 40.17 25* IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBI.K? I Imported ProducU. 1893. 1893. 3317 1894. Sugar, refined . , (in lbs.) 30.62 3989 Tea „ 543 541 5-52 ! Tobacco , . . . „ 1.64 1.63 1.66 Wine . (in gallons) 0.38 037 0.36 i Spirituous liquors . „ 0.21 o.ao 0.20 ! Wine and strong drinks together (imported) . „ 1.04 0.98 0.97 II. — Fall of Wages and Incomes. ni In England the cost of the first necessaries of h'fe is high, and the means for obtaining them constantly diminish. The population of the United Kingdom is engaged in the following occupations, per thousand of the population of all ages : England United aaa» and Scotland. Ireland. Wales. Kingdom. Liberal professions 32 28 44 33 Domestic service . 66 50 51 62 Trade .... 48 45 20 44 Agriculture and fish- eries .... 46 62 200 67 Industry 253 256 140 239 Without settled occu- pation . . . 555 559 545 555 1000 1000 1000 1000 In view of the importance of the question we will present these figures graphically. 5LK? 1893. 1894. 33-17 3989 541 552 1.63 1.66 037 0.36 1 0.20 0.20 ! o.gS J.97 >MES. saries of life is lem constantly n is engaged in the population Ireland. United Kingdom. 44 SI 20 200 140 545 3i 62 44 67 239 555 1000 1000 we will present IN GREAT BRITAIN CUissi/tcutioH by Ouupatwn of 1000 of the Population oj Gnat Britain. 259 555 The existence of an income tax in England has resulted in the compiling of precise statistics which give some idea of the perturbation which war would cause. We quote here some of the more apposite figures. The yearly value of the real estate, capital and earnings subject to this tax IS shown in pounds sterling in the following England Scotland Ireland . United Kingdom ;f 602,388,699 65,188,840 38,553.336 ;f 706, 130,875 Out of this total of 706 millions sterling, 263 millions arise trom the possession or lease of land and immovable property, 91 millions from pensions and salaries, and the remaining 352 millions from industrial and professional occupations. 26o IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Distribution of the Income of tht Population oj England in Millions of Pounds Sterling, From Land ai (1 Immovable Estate. 263 Ko5i 299 145 IfiMTORS l^ 246,166 ... 204,575 Thus we find that the number of proprietors of consols LE? / England m 1 263 352 he tremendous Lilting iecrease ould create in borne in mind England than i ^ed inside tife lues is held. 3 itself in the •f a very small o the distribu- are available how that the he public debt IN GREAT BRITAIN 261 i'lUhp'r^'^l'^"!.^''" *'^^ *^° ^''8*^^"^ categories, and in all the lower has decreased. It may be assumed that this phenomenon continues the same to-day. The sums deposited in the Post Office Savings Bank amount^U to In Savings Banks Total The number of depositors is : In the Post Office Savings Bank In Savings Banks Total ;f 89,266,066 43.474.904 ;fi32.740,9O4 6,108,763 1.470,946 .579.709 State of Savings in Great Brit lOMTORS IN MiLLiONS. 1895. Dkposits in Millions or Pounus STBRtma 504.575 5rs of consols However it may be, the distribution of riches in England IS more unequal than in any other country. Even in tfme of peace, with normal conditions, the stale, various philaT IsZance' to"'°"' '"f ''^'"'^ ''' ^^""-^ ^° give mot ta?y ex ent .?nhl Y^'^^'^^^^ P^rt of the population to an extent unheard of among the peoples of the Continent lu^t^T^ ^^"'■"^ .'■^^"^•"8 ^^ J^""^^y I89S show the number of poor receiving help (with the exception of tramps) from the Boards of Guardians; ^''^^P"^" ^t England and Wales Scotland . Ireland Total 817.431 126,918 101,071 1,045,420 IS all the greater since the unquiet elements crowd into 132.7 262 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the cities, and the population of the towns in Great Britain exceeds the population of the country, at the expense of which they constantly grow, as is shown by the statistics relating to Scotland, where in the decade 1881-QI the urban population increased by 324»44o, and the village population by 17,952, while the country popula- tion decreased by 52,324- , r * *• .-^^ ♦„ It is impossible owing to the absence of statistics to show in similar form the change in the distribution of the population of the entire United Kingdom. But there is sufficient indication that the position there is similar to that of Scotland. In England and Wales in 1891 the country population consisted of 8,198,248 souls, that is to sav only 28.3 per cent, of the whole, while the urban population consisted of 71 7 per cent. Thus two-thirds of the population of Great Britain resides within towns In addition to that it must be noted that the proportion of women to men in towns is 7 per cent, greater than m the country, and it is well known that in times of crises women constitute the least tranquil element. Statistics si.ow that in the towns of England is crowded an immense number who do not wish to work, and a still ereater number who cannot find work. To this idle crowd will join the workers discharged from factories and workshops on the shortening of work. An approximate idea may be formed of their number by the fact thai in the weaving industry alone 1,084,000 persons^ are employed, in the number being 428,000 men and 656,000 women. , . , . The majority of this working class is engaged in factories, of which the largest group constitutes cotton- spinning, weaving, and printing. It is this work which nmst cease in the event of the interruption of the impor of material by sea. Bj^nkruptcy in industrial circles will inevitably appear, as such factories are not guaranteed by sufficient reserves of capital. ' . The system of joint-stock companies in recent times has made poss.;.le an immense development of trade and industry. In the report of the Commission appointed by wns in Great )untry, at the s is shown by in the decade y 324,446, and ountry popula- of statistics to ribution of the But there is e is similar to ;s in 1 89 1 the ;ouls, that is to hile the urban 'hus two-thirds ; within towns. le proportion of ter than in the Df crises women land is crowded 'ork, and a still To this idle »ni factories and ^n approximate >y the fact that X) persons are en and 656,ocx) is engaged in istitutes cotton- this work which »n of the import itrial circles will •t guaranteed by recent times has It of trade and ion appointed by IN GREAT BRITAIN 263 the Board of Trade the number of joint-stock companies on the 1st of April, 1894, is given as 18,361, with a total capital of ;^i,035,029,835, while in France the total capital of such companies is ;^42o,ooo,ooo only, and in Germany from ;^2oo,ooo,cx)0 to ;^30o,ooo,ooo. in. — Conclusions. If the waters which wash the British Isles ensure a greater security than the frontiers of the Continent, nev r- theless they place the country in direct dependence from uninterrupted and regular maritime communication. The immense fleet of Great Britain, although guarding her against the attacks of an enemy, cannot guarantee the security of her merchant vessels in all the waters the world. A few swift cruisers would be enough to interrupt the maritime trade of Great Britain. And with the immense development of English industry, and the insuffi- cient local production of food stuffs, the stoppage of maritime communications would threaten England with stoppage of work, would involve a great rise in the price of provisions, and terminate in famine. In such events attempts even at revolution are probable, all the more probable because the British army is small recruited from the lowest ranks of the population and composed of hired soldiers. In the English army cases of general insubordination have been by no means rare. In addition to this, a considerable agitation in England IS carried on against the burdens enfoiced on the popula- tion by the army needed for the preservation of British power hi subject countries, and more particularly by the gigantic fleet. Yet the expenditure on armaments con- tinually grows, as the following table shows : 1864-5 1874-5 1884-5 /■25,28l,000 ^5.779»ooo 27,000,000 000 264 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Expenditure of England on A rmed Forces in Millions 0/ Pounds Sterling. Thus in the ten years period 1884- 1894 the expenditure on armaments has increased by ;^8,449,ooo sterling. In addition to this a yearly expenditure of ;^ 18,000,000 represents the result of former wars, and agitators lose no opportunity of calling attention to it. In 1727, at the death of George I. the public debt, increased in con- sequence of the Spanish war, stood at ;^52, 500,000, and the interest at ;^2, 360,000. In 1775, before the war with the American colonies, the debt was ;(^ 126,000,000 capital, and ;^4,6so,ooo interest. This vast increase was the consequence of another war with Spain over the right claimed by England of searching merchant ships, after- wards of a war with France over the Austrian legacy, and finally from the action she took during the Seven Years War. It is interesting to note that in the second of these wars England helped Maria Theresa against Frederick II., and in the last Frederick II. against Maria Theresa. In 1792, before e beginning of the long war with France, the public debt of England amounted to ;^2 3 7,400,000, paying interest at ;^9, 300,000, an increase mainly resulting from the war with her North American Colonies. And this war in reality was caused because the proprietorial classes in England, predominating in lions of Pounds 25.9 25.8 IN GREAT BRITAIN 265 27.. 354 e expenditure • sterling. In ;^ 1 8,000,000 agitators lose n 1727, at the jased in con- 1,500,000, and the war with )0,ooo capital, iase was the ver the right ships, after- m legacy, and Seven Years icond of these Frederick II., 'heresa. >ng war with amounted to 5, an increase rth American used because ominating in Parliament, desired to shift the ' -im^ ^r • taxation upon the shoulders of others °^ '"""""''"« fhhlu!^i^^\ is, the year after the battle of Waterloo— the debt of England amounted to £846 000 000 in rnn^ with yearly interest of £32. 100, o^^^'^'"^ '" "'P''"^' The war with France which cost such immense «,nm= arose from the interference of England in tTes'ru"! crs^swtrul'dE rf ^^°"' ^" "^•■'^^ thrpr'p'fed «nH?. .^ • f ^"^^^""^ '^^^ ^^"ger to their privileges and to their exploitation of the whol? country. ThlS on imported corr. set in time of war was kep in force by the landlord c ass even after the end of the war mahiTv in order to sustain the high price of corn, and irconTequence the high incomes from their property. consequence ^f r 'f^lj u ^}^ ^eg'nning of the Crimean war, the debt no way in the interests of the English oeonle fTh.^ • shf4"^fn' the%'"^'r' ^r ^"' "^ing t^^^^^^^^^^^ shares in he Suez Canal) amounted to i:658g44ooo capital, paying an interest of ;^i8,302,ooo ^''5°'944,ooo From the above statistics it is shown that as long as the aristocracy carried on war itself, and bore the expenses, a public debt did not exist. Afterwards^thanks to Its numerical preponderance in Parliament, it suceeeded m managing so that, however great might be the expenditure of the state, the sum of tax from the land should not exceed two million pounds yearly the S began to rise, and war after war followed. These wars were directly advantageous to the aristocracy as Thev increased employment in the army, and in addition resulted in raising the price of corn. " CHAPTER III ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF GERMANY IN TIME OF WAR In order to explain the economic and social consequences which would result from war in Germany, it is necessary first to examine the distribution of the population accord- ing to occupation, the height of incomes, and probability of savings, and then to consider how a war would shorten demands, decrease the sale of products, and in consequence cause stagnation in industry. We have already pointed out that the interruption of land and sea communications must cause an immense rise in the price of agricultural products, particularly in indus- trial districts. And as at the same time work will cease, the danger of disaster will be great. To a certain extent government aid may be relied upon. But whether this will bo effective or not depends upon the gravity of the crisis produced by war. The question as to satisfaction of the needs of life con- cerns only those classes which are imperfectly guaranteed — that is, to those with insufficient and moderate incomes ; the wealthy class will always be safe as regards the neces- saries of life. The following table represents the distribution of the population by occupation in 1882 : J ( Agriculture ' ( Arboriculture . Percentage of the Population. 40.75 0.65 4i.40r MANY IN 1 consequences t is necessary ilation accord- nd probability would shorten in consequence nterruption of immense rise larly in indus- ork will cease, certain extent ; whether this gravity of the :ds of life con- tly guaranteed erate incomes ; irds the neces- ■ibution of the 41.40 IN GERMANY 267 II. ^Mining . Building. Manufacture . Communications * Transport Percenttge of the Population. 2.96 6.08 2493 3i6 2-95 III. Trade 5-27 IV. Engaged in medical, educa. tionai, and religious pursuits i fis Admimstration . ',. Military . . * • i-45 ^ 1. 17 40.08 5.27 V. In service .... 4.3^ VI. Without regular occupation . 4.67 Thus we have six main classes as follows 4.27 4-30 4.67 I. II. III. Per Cent. 41.40 40.08 5-27 IV. V. VI. Per Cent. 4.27 4-30 4.67 Ihe fifth class is also comparatively secure since in consequence of mobilisation 'a deficieV" such will asle^u'r'd' ^T^ :M,ir f-^^' "^^ ^'- ^ -garded acivit. wllui-rrSri '=irat ^^^^i % W ;^ m 26B IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? of this class will suffer greatly. As the crisis entailed by war approachc=> there will be lessened activity in trade, the prices of goods will tall, and only those traders 'M;o happen to have reserves of products required for *he army, or products ':he ins port of which will be stopped, will draw advantage. Generally speaking, m conscquenre of sudden changes in prices immense difficulties will arise in trade. The second class — that is, I'lose eng,;ged in induf- trial undertakings, either as masters or servants — vill suffer the most. The greater part of th's clas& 's composed of persons occupied in factory work, and thc^e wiii sufici immense ic;.' ';:,. J^nd the proportion of this group to the general popi'hiticD of Germany is very considerable, amounting to 40.0': per cetit. It must be borne in mind that these figv* c rekte to the whole of Germany, and that in v&riouf p.irts of the country the proportions are very dilTerent. Occupied in agriculture we find ; In Saxony I a Posen 19.7 per cent, of the populaticn. 63-1 »» • »• » On the other hand, we find 16 per cent, of the popula- tion is occupied in industries in one province, and as much as 62 per cent, in others. The proportions occupied in trade in different parts of the country, excluding the great centres, fluctuate between 57 and 1 1 per cent. It will be understood that the greater the proportion occupied in industry, the greater the crisis caused by war. In some of the great industrial localities the stoppage of work may cause serious disorders such as happened in June 1848, and March 1871 in Paris. That stagnation and inevitable crisis in industry will be caused by war is inevitable, for certain reasons. The increase in the price of provisions in consequence of the interruption of communications will immediately diminish the. purchasing resources of the population, ^"n the declaration of war all state, commercial, and - -itrial securities will be r^-jpreciated, want of "^.one ■ will be ;le? •isis entailed! by :tivity in trh.de, 3se trades B w\4;o squired for *he 'ill be stopped, in constquen' e ulties will ^idse id in industrial —will suffer the s composed of iic^e viil sufit; lis group to t he y considerable, borne in mind Germany, and proportions are ; find ; population. of the popula- ovince, and as jrtions occupied ', excluding the per cent. the proportion caused by war. the stoppage of as happened in industry will be reasons. The sequence of the diately diminish ation, *" n the , and atrial '^.one will be IN GERMANY 269 seriously felt, and the rate of discount will be raised The more highly developed the trade and industry, the greater will be the perturbations caused and the more runji^rous will be cases of failure. Generally speaking Doi: only will the credit of the state, but the credit of al. private individuals in all classes of society, be im- paired. The following forms of industry will suffer most of all : Working and manufacture of metals Machine building . . . . Chemical manufacture Spinning and weaving . . [ Leather vvori» 45-2 „ n 5'3 )» The incomes of the population of Saxony are thus distributed : From landed property . 287 mill. m. (;f 14,350,000) or 22.5 % „ capital . . 220 „ „ (j^i 1,000,000) „ 17.2 ,° „ salary and wages 771 „ „ (;^38,55o,ooo) „ 60.3 „ 1278 (i;'63.9oo,ooo) „ 100 From this it will be easily seen what convulsions would be caused by the stoppage of work. The following are the figures relating to all Germany. The general income of the population estimated on the years 1893-94 auounted to 5,725,338,364 marks (;^2 86, 266,9 18 ^ '•)• This income was distributed as follows : Urban population Country „ 3878 million m, (;f 193.900,000) or 68 % 1846 „ „ (;C92.3oo,ooo) „ 32 „ In 1866 the total income amounted to 3,600,000,000 marks (;^ 180,000,000) and was distributed thus: Urban population Country „ 1620 million m. (;f 8 1,000, 000) or 45 7o 1980 „ „ (i^99,ooo,ooo) „ 55 „ Thus, when in 1866 the incomes of the urban popula- tion of Germany amounted to 45 per cent, of the general to save. The St class is only only 276 marks 3 matter let us The following In 1894 ^he f incomes was lese ,849 or 5.7% 929 „ 42,4 ., 862 „ 45.2 „ 928 „ 5.3 „ xony are thus >,ooo) or 22.5 % ),ooo) „ 17.2 „ ),ooo) „ 60.3 „ ),ooo) „ lOO „ at convulsions The following The general years 1893-94 5,266,9 1 8 ^'•)- 0,000) or 68 7o >,ooo) „ 32 „ 3,600,000,000 thus : D,ooo) or 45 % 3.000) „ 55 „ urban popula- of the general IN GERMANY 271 income, the crisis caused by war affected only ;^8 1,000 000 of the income of the people. To-day such a cris sWi^ Lur wo-?v'h'°"? "J; ;^I93.900,ooo! for nowTot a half i'dUtTandtad:' ''' ^^"^^^' '"^^"^^ ^^^^^ ^-n^ All this indicates a position by no means favourable But It IS improved by the fact that the amount of savlnLs IS considerable. Thus in Saxony in 1893 the number of pass books issued by the savings banks Vas 1,7^3 39S The average deposit was ;^i8 gs. But though U?e existence of such savings is favourable as an economic phenomenon, it could hardly serve to stave off fhe cr^ s naturally resulting from war. The average deposi iLt'.V^ '"^'"- ^" ^^^^^''^"' 't must be borS mind that the savings banks would not be in a posu[on o /S^c<^ JT'u '" '^''^ '^^'"^^ ^^"ks amount to ;t 32,900,000, of which over /"2 1; 000 nnn ic r^lo^-J mortgage and ^63,500.000 i„^fh'e7uC u„£ l.l^ obvious that to realise these raorteaffes in ^1^., .• would be impossible, while s."e sSities tn a tLeTf war could only be sold at an immense loss The arocia hoas and individuals to whom the Remainder of X money .s lent would not be able i„ a moment of crisis to repay the.r loans, and only the cash in .he offices of tt ^S. o'-fte le'^l^s'iti^s ^"' ^35o,cx»-would h? a[ -dSifsp'ead """"^ '""'"'"^ '"" P™P='g^''M<«, 0/ Worker, in Germany according to Wagi!. Women. ITT 55.2OI0 22.9OJ0 0.701a H.CH Q^jOf,j From this it will be seen that women receive much lower wages than men. Less than a fifth partTp 76 ou^ Der^^n!'^'"'"'-^ T'" '\^'' '^ ^^"""g« ^ ^^ek' while 70 half T;.''''r ^'u '^'" '^ ^^^^''^'' ^"d ^ore .aan woLn r ^^fs than 8 shillings a week. To such women, hving independently, the cost of lod ,g and m. rm 274 food IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? is not less fhan 5 shillings a week. It will he seen how little remains out of weekly earnings of 6 to 8 shillings, for clothing, against sickness, and for other unforeseen contingencies. Thus it cannot be expected that on a stoppage of work caused by wf" the workers of Germany could find any considerable i\. source in their savings. In particular this will be the case with the women workers, and it must be borne i i mind that in times of disorder women always appear as a dangerous element. The assistance which the government grants to the women whose fathers and husbando have been called away to the army will be insignificant, especially in view of the rise in the price of food of which we have above spoken. It is very probable that the condition of the working classes in Germany will constantly deteriorate. It is true that emigration to America in recent years has fallen off, as the following diagram shows. Emigration from Germany to America in Thousands. 1891 1893 1893 1894 US U2 84 39 But such a decrease took place in consequence of the difficulties with which emigration was attended. In view of the immense development of German industry, and of the raising of protective duties in other countries, Germany, in order to keep her place in the foreign BLE? ck. It will he :ly earnings of cicness, and for I a stoppage of many could find . In particular :ers, and it must r women always ssistance which ose fathers and ; army will be I in the price of of the working rate. It is true has fallen off, as Thousands, IN GERMANY 275 U5 112 sequence of the nded. In view I industry, and ither countries, in the foreign markets, has heen forced to work and sell more cheaply. The lowering in the price of manufactured goods has had its natural consequence in a fall of wages. This in itself is a misfortune. But when we add the misfortunes of war which will shorten work even at low wages, it is difficult to foresee the consequences. It is necessary also to consider how war will react on the interests of the propertied classes in Germany. Their savings are very considerable, and the German debt is almost all held in Germany. War will produce a great panic on the money market, and the value ol the securities in which are invested the savings of the propertied classes will be greatly depreciated. To carry on war it will be necessary to obtain a loan of fifty millions sterling, and, in the event of failure, it may be of several times this sum to pay contributions. And even in the event of a successful war those loans which will be issued for carrying on operations can be placed only at low prices. So early there can be no assurance of victory, while defeat might entail the disruption of the German Empire. It need hardly be pointed out that shares in industrial undertakings will fall even more than government securi- ties. But in addition to government funds and industrial securities, foreign securities are held in Germany to an immense amount. Since the introduction of a stamp duty on foreign securities, on their admission on the German Bourses, vast quantities of such securities have been acquired. Between 1882 and 1892 foreign papers were presented for stamping to the value of 20731 million marks (;^ 1,036, 5 50,000), of which 5644 millions of marks (;^28 2, 200,000; were actually stamped, that is, admitted officially on the Bourse. In thi.- number were admitted securities of countries which might take part m a wai-. Russian Italian . Austrian Turkish Servian . 1003 million marks (Ac, 150,000). 968 „ „ (^48,400,000). 000 „ „ (;f33,ooo,ooo). 200 ». .1 (£13,300,000). 57 »» M (;^2,850,000). f 276 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? We will present this graphically : v Value of Foreign Securities stamped in Germany in Millions of Marks. ^•.j Of course not all of the securities stamped in Germany remained there in circulation. But if this be so, they have been replaced by others, since local capital still continues to seek advantageous investments. The immense quantities of government and trading- industrial securities, both local and foreign, circulating in countries where the propertied classes are numerous and dispose of immense savings, increase the risk of war for such countries, and accentuate the crisis which it will cause. Thus in Germany an unsuccessful war would result in immense losses in such securities, and in those which would be issued to meet military necessities. But even in the event of a successful war, Germany would sustain great losses in the securities of those countries which had lost. 3LE? any in Millions 969 ed in Germany )e so, they have 1 still continues t and trading- , circulating in numerous and risk of war for which it will ful war would i, and in those :essities. But ermany would lose countries CHAPTER IV THE ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES OF FRANCE IN TIME OF WAR A CONSIDERATION of the economic convulsions which war would cause in Prance is not only very important in itself, but instructive in view of the fact that France has within recent times felt the whole burdens of a war. Judging by appearances it might be supposed that a future war would have precisely those consequences which the war of 1870 produced^ A detailed consideration of the results of the ?rl^I V ^r""' ^""^ ""J ^^^ ^^^'^^ °^ economic prosperity of France before and after that war, would show with what caution such a judgment must be received. The change of rule in 1871 had a favourable influence on the economic life of the country. Although for a long time it was feared that the Germans would take advantag? rlJi^' lu P'r ^""^ ^? ^^"'^"^ ^^'" ^g^i" and effectively rest.am the military development of France, these fears in no way hindered the economic regeneration of the country Disappearance of the dread of those political adventures so long carried on by Napoleon III. ; the general tenden- cies ot the new government encouraging the spread of education and economic prosperity; the keen struggles of political parties which prevented the unpunished violation 01 tne law— all these in no small measure helped the rtj.t°Jr"' °f .^'•^"^^ The very loss of Alsace-Lorraine reacted favourably on her trade and industry. In those CiJf !? , »"d"^'^y 7^« so highly developed that they furnished the rest of France with their products. With the foundation of the Republic began a great increase 278 is WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? in other localities in the production of goods formerly obtained from Alsace and Lorraine. In th's time, also, when the prosperity of foreign and especially of trans-oceanic countries increased rapidly, there began an increased demand for French articles of luxury and fashion. The following diagram illustrates the position of French trade since i860 : Imports and Exports of France in Millions of Francs. Imports. EXPOSTS. 3147 3993 4822 4803 ■■■■■■>■■ ■««■■■■■■■■■■ ■■•■■■■■■■■■■■•■•■■■«■ ■■■■■■■■«■■■•■■«■■■#«■■ 4124 Thus statistics show us that the loss of Alsace-Lorraine had no considerable influence. The exports in the period 1869-73 increased at a greater rate than in the period 1860-69, From that time the increase of exports con- tinued uninterruptedly to 1891, after which we find a decrease, caused by the protectionist policy of Europe. These fluctuations became still more noticeable if we take the average yearly increase of imports and exports in the period 1860-69 at 100, and show the corresponding figures for the following years : Absolute Figures of Absolute Figures of Increase or Decrease Increase or Decrease of Imports in of Exports in Millions of Francs. Millions of Francs. In the period i86o-6g + 150 +100 + 94 +100 „ 1865-73 + 142 + 94.7 ... + 207 + 220.2 „ 1873-91 + 41 + 27.3 ... - I - I.I „ 1891-94 -175 -1x6.7 •.. - 226 - 240.4 [BLE ? ' goods formerly y of foreign and icreased rapid!}', ranch articles of agrani illustrates ns of Francs. POSTS. Mm 3147 3993 4822 4803 4124 " Alsace-Lorraine )rts in the period in in the period of exports con- ^hich we find a alicy of Europe, ceable if we take d exports in the ssponding figures Absolute Figures of ncrease or Decrease of Exports in Millions of Francs. +•94 +IOO f 207 + 320.2 - I — I.I - 226 - 240.4 IN FRANCE 279 of !mp?r?s1nlT!>"^^^^ "'"' ^'^"^^ "^ '^^' 'he quantity follov^ng di^graT^^ ^' '"'"^ ^^^"^'^ ^"^^^^'^^ by the Trade of France in Thousands of Tons. 6773 7770 !•■•■•••■•••! :::::::::::: 4290 6847 7969 16001 14472 trade' * Th^ fT^^ ^^^ "° P^^^^^^ ^^ea as to French trade. The following table is more detailed ; iiiiili Cheese, butter, margarine (in thousands of tons) t/oal and coke Coffee ;; Cotton, raw " " Cotton manufactures " (in thousands of pounds sterling) Flax Guano and manure (in thousands of tons) Hides and fur „ Cotton yarn " " (in thousands of pounds sterling) Silk manufactures .. Woollen „ 28o IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE^ 1863. Imports. , i86g. 1873. 23 9 154 36 120 1894. Meat (in thousands of tons) Silk, raw Sugar „ Tallow, &e. „ „ Wool 8 7 236 40 63 6 8 .^01 37 108 24 II 166 32 224 172 22f0 In comparing yearly statistics it is necessLry to bear in mind that certain articles of import diminished owing to the development of industry within the country, and were partly replaced by other imports. Thus the diminished im.port of sugar is explained by the production of beet- sugar at home, whi-'h increas^ed frcm 3833 millirn kilogrs. (3.833.000 tons) in 1873-74 to 5148 million kilogrs. (5,148,000 tons) in 1893-94. The following two diagrams show the fluctuations in the external trade of France since 1883, in millions of francs : French Trade in MV lions of Francs. Import. 1883-1885. 336 S( ol P' re th th .E jrts. 1873. 1894. 23 24 9 II 154 166 36 32 120 224 xTy to bear in bed owing to itry, and were le diminished ction of beet- lillirn kilogrs. llion kilogrs. luctuations in n millions of IN FRANCE Export. 281 1724 ■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■a ■•■■■■■■■S ■■■■■■a 712 787 1759 The revenue of France, which may be considered as a SLYn^dirg?^^^^ ''' population, is Shown in^ Revenue and Expenditure 0/ France in Millions of Francs. Expenditure. 3450 senln h r^ example of financial self-sufficiency is pre- of fiv. ^-if '^!;''^; . ^'^^ ^''"' *^^ Commune, the payment oL Jc 'f "^^ U20o,ooo,ooo), the payment of the ex- S of ihl''''' *'" ---organisation of the army! the hisTennLn ^°^^^""^^"'' '" a" its departments~all thSe'T l^eH^riSi::;?^^-^' y^^ ^-- ^-^ an 282 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Debt of France in Millions of Francs. CURRBNT. Consolidated. >516 1852 . 1 1090 1871 . 12454 1084 1876 . 10009 1291 1895 . 25968 Thus since 1871 the debt of France has grown by almost 14 milliards of francs (£s^,000,OQO). All tliis sum was found within the country, and in addition, immense sums were invested in industrial undertakings and in foreign loans. As a measure of the increase of wealth in France we may take the statistics of the savings banks. The number of depositors and the amount of deposits are shown in the following table and diagram : 1869 . 1894-95 Pass Books. 2,130,000 6,314,000 Deposits. 7 1 1 ,000,000 fr. (/■28,440,ooo) 3,260,000,000 „ (;^ I 30,400,000) Savings in France. Number of Deimsitors' Books in Millions. Deposits in Millions of Francs. 6.3 1869 1894/5 711 ■l l lllll l lllll l l l lllfWWtliirH ■•■•■•■■>■■■■■•■■■■■■■•>■■■«■■«■•■■■«■■■■■■ {■■•a ■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■•■■■•■•■■■■■•■•• ■«■•■■•■ 326C r Consideration of other statistics confirms the general belief as to the increase of wealth in France. In France the transfer of estates is subjected to a duty. The following E? s. M09 25966 IS grown by o). All tins in addition, undertakings in France we The number shown in the ISItS. (/■28,440,ooo) (;fi30,40o,ooo) 326C 3 the general In France the rhe following 283 IN FRANCE 1873—1875 1890-1892 3965 ■ 6005 ■ production and sale of their goods ThV?!,?'', "'^ will become a closed market^ i„,h ^ """"":' °*^ ^-^ demand for manutaur"farticlesVm dTcrS "not o"," that ,„ France a great number of foreigners are engaged 284 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? in industry. The production of these in time of war would also cease. In certain industries the number of foreigners rises as high as 22 per cent. Another circumstance which must have a serious influence and cause great difficulties, is that a high percentage of the population will be sum- moned under ♦he colours. The following diagram illustrates the distribution by occupations of the population of France in 1886 : Distribution of the French Population according to Occupation in 1886. 4\,. Capitalists and liiduprndent Persons. Liberal Professions. Government Service. Army. Trade. Transport. Industry. Agriculture. 6.2 3.0 : 1.9 1.6 B55 ■ ■■■• ■■■■■■■■■■a ■■■■■■■■■■• II.5 :: 2.8 ■■ m il M 25.2 mi i i i mi igi '■■■a .m£ lllll l lllll 4; From this we see that nearly half the population of France is engaged in agriculture. The agricultural class of the population is divided into the following 3LE? me of war would ber of foreigners :umstance which great difficulties, an will be sum- distribution by 1886: ng to Occupation IN FRANCE I he population of rhe agricultural :o the following 285 classes : Large and small proprietors, farmers and hired labourers. Of I7,698,cxdo per? 3 belonging to this class, the labourers number about 2,7^ ,:,ooo men. In a country where landed property is distributed among a large number of families, peasant proprietors constitute the chief part of the population, and wages are comparatively low every- where excepting in those departments where large farming prevails. The struggle for existence in this class of the population is much less serious than it was twenty years ago in many departments. Although agri- cultural labourers suffer less than factory hands from uncertainty as to regular work, their life on the whole is more difficult owing to the fact that they, while knowing the extent of their earnings, are deprived of all hope of improving their position. The peasant proprietor, the corner-stone of France, is bad material for agitation but the hired labourer is in a very different position. It must not be thought, however, that in the event of war no danger for the state would arise from the agricultural class. 1 he fact IS that the agricultural population is not in a position to feed itself out of the land. Investigations made in 1882 showed that out of 5,672,007 registered agricultural properties 2,167,667 were of an area of less than a hectare (two and a half acres), and 1,865,878 were of an area of one to five hectares (from two and a half to twelve and a half acres). A detailed examination of these statistics would considerably reduce the number of small properties ; but it would still show that 1,700,000 persons of this class are little removed from the position of agricultural labourers. Still the danger to the state from the agricultural popu- lation will be small. Of other classes of the population this cannot be said. In order to be convinced of this it is only necessary to consider the distribution of the incomes of the population. 286 IS Wy>R NOW IMPOSSIBLE? I. Personal Earnings. 3434'93S agricultural labourers . 3,834,580 workers engaged in indus- try, trade, and transport . 1,132,076 serving for wages 1,950,208 domestic servants 3,700,000 small landowners, artisans, traders, porters, soldiers, sailors, lower officials, teachers, and others, whose earnings little exceed the earnings of labourers Millionit of Francs. 2,000 (;f 80,000,000) 3,()oo (/■ 1 44,000,000) 1,000 (/'40,000,000) 1,400 (2i"56,ooo,ooo) 4,000 (;f 160,000,000) II, Capitalists. 1,683,192 landed proprietors from 3| to 4^ milliards i,009,9i4manufacturers, merchants, and others, from 3^ to 4^ miUiards . 1,053,025 of private property, ren- ijtKMK, and free profes- iik,n?i, from 2^ to 3 mUHards . y 10,500 (;f420,00O,OO(^ 17.797.933 Total 22,500 (;f900,ooo,ooo) These figures, of course, are only approximately correct, jjut they may serve as a basis for determining different influences on the economic condition of the people. We see that the whole 10^ milliards (;^420,ooo,ooo) when divided among 3,746,131 capitalists represents only 2800 francs (;^ii2) the family. Leroy-Beaulieu sup- poses that in all France there are only 700 or 800 persons with incomes of 250,000 francs (2^ 10,000) or over, and from 18,000 to 20,000 with incomes of from 50,000 to 250,000 (;^2000 to ;^ 1 0,000). From statistics relating to May 1886 in a population of 38. 2 millions, the distribution by occupation was as follows : BLE? inx of ncs. X) (£"80,000,000) 00 (;f 144,000,000) X) (/"40,ooo,cx)o) X) (2i^56,ooo,ooo) K) (;f 160,000,000) 3 (;f420,000,000) (;f 900,000,000) ximately correct, mining different he people. We 1,000,000) when represents only >^-Beaulieu sup- ily 700 or 800 :s (^10,000) or icomes of from a population of pation was as IN FR/iNCE ^7 Agriculture and woods . Inrip|M't)dent persons Persons with higher duties Labourers Hotels and restaurants . Spinning and weaving . Tailoring, Sec. , 8,138,236 937.539 42.428 11158,269 164,964 376,60a 433.650 M«n. 4.777.729 3,108,625 55.407 1.613,697 325.318 414.695 i3('.999 In addition to these France has many import labour for women. In trade and in the banks ''elds of Women . Men , 503,197 or 35.6 per cent. 909,058 „ 64.4 „ In case of the ' ^erruption of the general economic life of the people the .agricultural class will feel the crisis less acutely than others. On every farm exists some reserve oi food while that part of the population whose earnings come from industry and trade, and a considerable pro- portion of those living in ser-ice, will be in a desperate position—all the more desperate since in France women, as IS seen by the above statistics, live by their own earnings laking such an active part in national work, the French woman has an extraordinarily beneficent influence on her country. It would be very interesting to consider what direction the activity of French women would take in a cntica monient of the war. But here it is impossible to enter into the question. France is generally considered to be a rich country but even if we suppose that only 5 per cent, of the population ives in poverty, ,t appears that 2,000,000 persons require n times of peace either state or private assistance In time of war the number of the needy population would, of course, increase. Indeed, the proportion of unemployed will be greater m trance than in other countries in con- sequence 01 tbe fact that the most important section of her products are articles of fashion and luxury, the sale of vNhich would of course, decrease. The number of un- employed in trance even in normal times is considerable lie MICROCOPY RESOLUTION TEST CHART (ANSI and ISO TEST CHART No. 2) 1.0 I.I 3.2 1^ 2.5 2.2 2.0 1.8 ^ APPLIED IIVMGE I nc 1653 East Main Street Rochester, New York 14609 USA (716) 482 -0300 -Phone (716) 288- 5989 -Fax 288 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? If we may believe the French Radicals the proportion out of work in France amounts to one-fifth, or at the very least to one-sixth of the population. In Paris things are even worse. In favourable times one-fifth of the working classes are without employment for three to four months, while in years of crisis 45 per cent, of the working classes are without employment — that is to say, 300,ocx) families are without the means of subsistence. In ordinary times these unemployed draw little attention upon themselves, but in time of war their number would undoubtedly grow, and all would consider they had a right to government assistance. The following diagram shows approximately the amount of assistance given to the poor in France in 1889: Assistance given to the Poor in France in 1889. Number receiving assistance (in thousands). Number of days on which assit- ance given. 1672 2654 It is easy to foresee the consequences which must result from such a state of things in a country like France, where the socialistic movement bears unerring witness to the existence of general discontent with the existing order of things. If after the war of 1870 a Commune sprang up, what must we expect now when Socialism has raised its head and created a permanent organisation, while before the war the government of Napoleon III. crushed every attempt at socialist propaganda. For another peculiar reason war would be more dis- astrous for France than for any other country. We have seen how rich is France in capital, how industrious and how economical is her people. But all these factors would not be so remarkable if it were not for a special circum o IBLE ? he proportion out 1, or at the very 1 Paris things are th of the working :e to four months, e working classes 300,000 families In ordinary times upon themselves, ndoubtedly grow. It to government ivs approximately oor in France in ce in 1889. f2 2654 vhich must result ike France, where g witness to the existing order of mune sprang up, ism has raised its ion, while before [I. crushed every -lid be more dis- untry. We have r industrious and ese factors would a special circuni o IN FRANCE 289 stance which, while being itself of a negative character has an immense influence on the growth of wealth ' As IS well known, the birth-rate^•nLnceTs consider ^he growth not only ceased, but a loss actually occun'd Number of OU Mm and CMUrm in PercUage Relation to Population. Persons over 60 years of age. 7-9 6.8 Children below ten years of age. ■■■>«■■■■ ••■■■■■■I • ■(■■•I •■■■■■ "*■■■■ mm m !!!•••■■■ •>■■■■■•■ •••■■■■•I •••■•I •«■«■■■■■( ■■■■■■■■aa ■•■■■■■■•a ■•■(■■■■■■■aaa (•■■■■■■■■■■■aaai "■•'■■■■■■■■■Baa • ■■■aaaaaavaiai a Jof 'Jn ^'^"'^ '^^ proportion of children under the cent. The relation of married and unmarried persons in 290 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? ^'■s.I Number of Bachelors in Percentage Relation to Population. 40 Years and over. ^^ Years and over. 8.3 Germany 4 Austria 4 Hungary lO.I England II.6 ' France 7-4 II-3 3-4 10.2 Germany Austria Hungary Englaisd Franc. The diagram opposite shows the unfortunate position of France in all its blackness. From this we see that in France the birth-rate is ap- proximately equal to the death-rate, while in Germany the birth-rate exceeds the death-rate by 12 in every thousand. The diagram relates only to the last ten years. But the same phenomenon may be seci rmg the whole of the present century. From the diagram on p. 292 it will be seen that 100 ; ears ago the strength of Germany was 40 per cent, lower* than that of France, while at the present day France is weaker than Germany by 20 per cent. From these statistics we must conclude that France will become weaker in com- parison with other countries where the growth of the population is more normal. The artificial measures pro- posed for ♦^^he increase of the birth-rate cannot be of much avail. Projects may be drawn up to increase the birth- rate, but to carry them out is shown to be impossible. The decrease in the birth-rate has yet this inconvenience, that more care is taken of children, the death-rate among '3-5 [BLE ? H to Population. eo Years and over. 3-4 Germany Austria Hl'NGARV England Franc. IN FRANCE Increase or Decrease of the Population 291 per Thousand. Germany. tn France and Germany France. >rtunate position birth-rate is ap- lile in Germany Dy 12 in every to the last ten be seei ring mthat lOO; ears cent, lower than Tance is weaker :se statistics we weaker in corn- growth of the I measures pro- inot be of much rease the birth- |'^"5 impossible. s inconvenience, ;ath-rate among 292 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? them is smaller, and the natural process of the elimination of weak organisms is stopped, from which the general physique of the people is bound to suffer. In France even at the present time the race is weaker than in England, Germany, or Russia. Number of Population in 1788 and x888 in Millions. 1788 1888 25 25 (J!) This unfortunate position of affairs has, however, although only temporarily, good sides, since with an incon- siderable growth of the population France has more room and a less serious struggle for the development of produc- tive forces. In addition, the people spend less money on education and save all the more ; capital is not splii up as It is in more populous states, and in consequence material prosperity increases. But these considerations [BLE ? of the elimination hich the general In France even :han in England, in Millions. 48 ((') has, however, ce with an incon- : has more room ment of produc- less money on is not split up in consequence ! considerations IN FRANCE J5 do not alter thr fact that every year the stren»th „r r tzir: ""' '"^ '," ™"">-'-" with tirofithi!™;r Value of Gromh of Population from 1788 to 1888 in MUliom of Francs. France with so many milliard-? invp^ff.H ,-» r • offeHfe :;j„tfh'4r\ruT'o? ht't'teTS^ ^^Jt'^Tr S3:?^=;Sa'"s£5Sh?S is indebted ' ""'™'' ^'°'"^ '° "'''* ^ hu-nan^ CHAPTER V EFFECT OF WAR ON THE VITAL NEEDS OF PEOPLES Difficulties in the satisfaction of the vital needs of popu- lations, interruption or stagnation in the employment of the productive forces of the population— these are the factors which will influence statesmen against undertaking war, or if war be undertaken, these are the factors which will at one moment or another decidedly veto its continu- ance. For certain states yet another danger appears (as one phantom hastens after the other in the vision of Macbeth), that is, the danger of revolutionary movements, not only political but also socialistic. In considering the effect of a future war it is essential to examine the manner in which it will react on the needs and condition of the people. If famine is not to find states unprepared, some account of the dangers which follow on war must be taken. The consideration of this question may be useful in another way. By revealing with what a tremendous influence a great war may react on the con- ditions of peoples, it must result in a tranquillising con- viction that in our time to decide on war without grave hesitation will be impossible. I. Those countries which in times of peace import large quantities of grain and other necessary products will stand in a particularly critical condition. Supply by means of railroad will be extremely difficult, and indeed there will L NEEDS OF al needs of popu- e employment of ti — these are the ainst undertaking the factors which veto its continu- mger appears (as in the vision of nary movements, ^ar it is essential iact on the needs not to find states irs which follow 1 of this question ialing with what react on the con- anquillising con- ir without grave ice import large oducts will stand ply by means of ndced there will EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 29J o Austria, while Russia will be deprived of thrposXltv tllX^hfre^^enl!::"^^ ^'^ ^-'-' ^^ ^"^-^12 Transport by sea from America, India, and Australia Home Production and Import of Wheat, Barley, and Rye. .S >/! B o .2H s>~ a o -s-s AS !! = g o 0;° , Xh 1888-91. Import in Thousands of Tons. 3 S o Germany France . England Italy . . Austria . 10,151 9.852 3.672 2,410 6,016 1254 295 721 361 2 o 853 656 2770 262 38 2e c o . uX § a,- " .s.fi 1894-95. Import in Thousands of Tons 20.7 9.6 95-0 25.8 0.5 a 5 p U III X! i> on a ° SO ^773 448 1885 535 47 1330 635 3493 83 62 V be u H . B ^ ||^ 7 30.5 II.O 146.4 25-7 1.8 Snnln?!.f '"^''^^!^' ^' '' '^ Unquestionable that in the beginning of war privateering will be carried on, inter- he'"ervTe7""f '°" ^^^' trans-oceanic countries, or at the very best making transport so difficult that freight of trlnsT"''- ^"' T ^''y ^^^^' ^"^ thus the pri e ^L I : '^^"'^ '"PPh^^ ^"J "se prohibitively. It is enough to remember that in the tiL of the Crimen price ot wheat m England rose 80 per cent. In the American Civil War the operations of a sin^e Southern I 296 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? cruiser, tho Alabama, were enough to cause a perceptible rise in the price of wheat. Thus it becomes necessary to determine the degrees of peril to which in the event of a great war the different states of Europe will be subjected in the feeding of their populations. A calculation of the times in the course of which the population of each state may exist on the local production of wheat, barley, and rye can Le mad-i from the table given on the preceding page.* If on the foundation of these figures we calculate the number cf days on which food will be lacking after the exhaustion of local products we find the following results : In Germany „ France „ England „ Italy „ Austria (1888-91) 1888-91. 1894-95. . 6q days 102 days. . 32 „ 36 „ . i7« ,, 274 M . 76 .. 75 M * .. ... 7 „ (1894-95) 178 69 1 Germamy r 1 103 32 Franck i 36 England i i 1 76 li Al.V 75 2 Austria 7 274 The greatest danger will consequently threaten England, which imports the largest quantity of grain, by far the greatest part from trans-oceanic countries. Germany and o* ?*.^*!f*^^ from "Statistisches Jahrbuch fur das Deutsche ?.®^- !• u^" ri*^^"?. Statistique de la France," " Oesterreichisches Statistisches Handbuch," "Annuario Statistico Italiano." " Obzor Vneshni Torgovli," &c. SIBLE ? cause a perceptible nine the degrees of it war the different he feeding of their >urse of which the he local production "om the table given 2s we calculate the e lacking after the ; following results : 1894-95. 102 days. 36 „ 274 „ 75 .. ••• 7 »» 02 274 threaten England, grain, by far the Germany and es h fiir das Deutsche " " Oesterreichisches 20 Itaiiano," " Obzor EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 297 Italy will find themselves in a better, although still in a d.flRcult pos.t.on. Germany imports foreign gfain or he greater part Russian, for 2-3 months, and^ It!ly for 4out 4 months. France will suffer only from a nonth^s supphe7' "''' ^"^^"^ "^^ '' --'^-<^^ - ?uily The most favourable position will be occupied bv o^nrL%tufferto?der-^^^^ T'' interrupted'^m no^ oniy not sutler rom deficiency but will possess so much superfluous gram that her population 'can fn no way suffer. The export from Russia of wheat barl^v ^rZ rye m the course of the periods coSered.^^^^^^^^ yearl3^ average of 3,967,213 tons, or a simerfiuTtv after the satu.fact,on of local requirements of si.eTe cent sidirnht'^T-'" ^^•"^'' ^^'^'y' ^"d W we find a con- siderable deficiency m oats ; for all the states of Central Europe mentioned, with the exception of Austria nrndnrt less oats than is required for local needs. ' ' Production and Import of Oats. .5 ■U ■§■ Germany France England Italy . Austria •a B o 4759 3279 3065 213 2792 1888-91. Import in Thou.sands of Tons. 1894-95 Si 183 131 426 13 o h B§ S o 4 82 262 II 8 ■z M-2 "as Import in Thousands of Tons. eJ E ° Froi Russ 3.9 6.5 22.4 "•5 263 227 625 66 From which production : appears the following deficiency of home 298 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? 1888-91. 1S94 9S. In Germany , , . iStlays 31 day§ ,, I' ranee . . • 31 .. 41 M „ England . 66 „ 76 M „ Italy . 38 M 8 „ „ Austria * • • "^ If 15 » Number 0/ Days on which Oats would be Lacking, 1888-91. X894-95, x8 21 KoJ Germany : jx: . : : to • . at to . , 3* ■ " TT : France 66 !■■■< ■■■■■■■■■■■■■••■■■■■■I ■■••■■■•■■■■■■•■■■■■•• •■■■■■■■•■■■■•■■«■■■•■ • ■•■■■■*■■■■■■■••■■■■■ 38 ■■■■■■■■■■■■I ^3i!:^ Russia, on the contrary, yearly exports 836,065 tons of oats, or a superfluity of 16.7 per cent, after the satisfaction of her own needs. Such deficiencies of grain, of course, are not everywhere the same. In each country there are locahties which pro- duce sufficient of these products. In other localities, on the other hand, the need to import grain arises immediately after harvest. The following table shows, for instance, the distribution of harvests in Germany : 5IBLE.? l8i)4 <»• 31 days 41 ... 76 8 II »i 15 •• d be Lacki '«'. 1894-95. 31 41 l l llllllllll •■■•■■•■••■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■•■■■•■■■■■■•I ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■! ■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■•■ 76 15 irts 836,065 tons of ifter the satisfaction are not everywhere ocalities which pro- other localities, on 1 arises immediately ice, the distribution EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 2 99 District. Posen Pr. Saxony Bavaria E. and W. Prussia * Hesse-Cassel Average for all Prussia Silesia Westphalia Hrandenburg (and Berlin) Hesse- Nassau . . K. Saxony . Wurtemburg . Pri. Rhine Provinces* tr. Duchy Baden Other parts of the Empire Superfluoui Local Production, Mmtwrativi ly with the Kojiiirrriieiits for One Inhabii.iMi, in Hundred weights 1.78 1.63 0.84 0.57 0.2I Deficiency of Local Produciion, [Oinpariitivuly with t le Kti|iiir<;iiiem>, for •>nc Inhubitaiit. in Hundredweights 0.4 0.65 0.624 l.HHH i.«44 2.06 2-43 2.834 2.892 2.938 J Western Prussia-fhtt s^lThf r''"™""' ^^^'"" ""d Germany near the R.'l'J r ^''^'"" terrilories of supernufty is alX^r rHeSr'casse^ "T''"'"'' parts of the Empire which for ,1?. f ^' ^l"^ '" ""'«'■ not set out separately t % ^ "Jtr°' '"'''"^ "'' visions for themselves and for ,h '•'"''" °' P™" Population it will be Vcessarv on th"""""'""": "' "'^ -n from the easte^rr Svt Tprlli^^t^,^ 300 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? surplus exists. With the declaration of war, for the reasons we have indicated, this import must cease. To rely on supplies from Austria and Roumania is out of the question when we consider local needs and decreased efficiency of the railway system resulting from military operations. To avert famine, even temporarily, the eastern provinces might be drawn upon, but in conse- quence of its proximity to the theatre of war, grain there will be bought up for the use of the army. Mr. V. 1. Hedzvetski, in a remarkable article on " The Struggle with Famine in a Future War," comes to the conclusion that in the granaries of the future base of the German army near the Russian frontier there will be but a month's or a month ?nd a halfs provisions for 960,000 men and 220,000 horses. But on the figures of General Leer we find that the number of men to be fed will amount to 1,200,000. And as armies at the theatre of war will not be in a condition to supply their needs from local sources, it is plain that the above-mentioned stores must be constantly replenished, if not for the whole number of men mentioned, at least for the greater part. Even if Posen and Eastern Prussia were in a condition after the satisfaction of military requirements to distribute part of their superfluity among the neighbouring pro- vinces which require grain, which is very unlikely in view of the demands of the commissariat, still prices must so rise that among the poorer classes famine will be inevitable. To form a general idea of the commotion which war would cause in Germany, we must take into account not only average figures of production, import and demand, but also the operation of undetermined forces, the influence of which may be disastrous. The very fear of need, owing to the impossibility of drawing supplies from the usual sources, may not only appreciably raise prices, but even call forth a panic. In the famine of 1891 we had a living example of the fact that, notwithstanding the full possibility of import of corn by sea and land, the dread of need may have immense influence on the rise of prices. BLE? of war, for the must cease. To lania is out of the Is and decreased ing from military temporarily, the on, but in conse- f war, grain there y- i article on " The r," comes to the future base of the there will be but sions for 960,000 igures of General be fed will amount eatre of war will needs from local oned stores must ; whole number of )art. ere in a condition lents to distribute leighbouring pro- y unlikely in view ill prices must so famine will be notion which war ; into account not port and demand, >rces, the influence ery fear of need, supplies from the J raise prices, but of 1891 we had a ^standing the full land, the dread of e rise of prices. EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 301 It is necessary also to take into account the fact that between the harvests of different years a considerab^ difference exists. If we take tne average yearly harvest .nthepenodi885-i889in different couLiL' in mfmons of bushels, at a hundred, then for separate years in each country we will find the following departure from the average: Average Harvest in 1885-89 in Million!, of Bushels taken at Harvest 1885-89. Russia (iermany . France Austria- H ungary Gt. Britain Italy. Romnania Servia 1725-7 701.8 701.8 693.9 312.8 221.2 140.9 25-9 Maximum. Year. Per Cent. 1887 1886 1886 1887 1885 1887 1887 1888 1 14.7 106.2 102.6 108.4 104.5 105.5 135.5 I31.9 Minimum. Year. -"S9 j9 1888 1889 1887 1888 1885-86 1885) 1886 1887 1889 Per Cent. 86.2 91.9 96.6 87.1 95-4 91.9 91.5 From these statistics we see that the departure in Germany amounts to 6 per cent, above the average and to 8 per cent, below it. In other countries the difference IS still more striking, as for instance in Russia and Austria, where m consequence of a lower culture, harvests are more unequal. In Russia this difference amounts on both sides to 14 per cent., while in Austria the differ- ence amounts to 8 per cent, on the good side and n per cent, on the bad. ^ ^ All these conditions: the small production in comparison with the demand, the cessation of import from abroad the indispensable supply of millions of soldiers who consume much more than when fed at their own expense at home 302 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? and finally, the efforts of the prosperous part of the popu- lation tc guarantee themselves by storage against the danger of famine— all these conditions must inevitably give rise to vast speculations in wheat which will cause an unprecedented rise in prices. The disasters which will take place in consequence of the want of bread in time of war have not failed to attract the attention of statesmen and economists. Still this question notwithstanding its gravity, has up till to-day remained an abstract one, and has never permeated to the minds of the people. In the German parliament the problem was raised more than once, but was not considered publicly, and each time Its solution was entrusted to the consideration of a secret committee. The Government revealed to this committee its project for furnishing Germany with corn from Egypt through the Suez Canal, through Italv by the Swiss and Austrian railways,and partly from Hungary and Roumania How vain these hopes would prove to be might easily be shown by an examination of the probable condition of maritime communications in time of war. In any case even if under the protection of the Italian and English fleets It were possible to import grain through the Suez Canal, the risk and costliness of such an undertaking would cause so great a rise in the price of bread that the difficulty would in no way be surmounted. In view of this, other means for the solution of the question have been devised. Thus the author of the hrochuTeAufderSchwelle desKriegs, on the supposition that war may break out suddenly with France, comes to the conclusion that at present only three Great Powers may be considered independent as relates to the feeding of their population— the United States, Austria-Hungary, and Russia Germany after the stoppage of the export of bread from Russia would find herself in the position of a besieged ortress. What would her position be in case of a prolonged war when home production would be diminished, and transport from oversea would be threatened by the powerful fleets of her enemies ? 5SIBLE ? )us part of the popu- storage against the )ns must inevitably :at which will cause 2 in consequence of 3t failed to attract the Still this question, to-day remained an I to the minds of the em was raised more •liciy, and each time deration of a secret to this committee its corn from Egypt y by the Swiss and gary and Roumania. ) be might easily be )bable condition of war. In any case, talian and English grain through the uch an undertaking e of bread that the :ed, he solution of the the author of the :he supposition that ince, comes to the "eat Powers may be le feeding of their :ria- Hungary, and of the export of n the position of a osition be in case duction would be ^ould be threatened EFFECT OF WAV N THE PEOPLE 303 serving as a correc?iv^ .1 . ^'"■*''^' advantage of price. corrective against exceptional rises in of glJ^inTeded 1^^\^:^T '' '^ ''^ ^"^^'^y which present themselves n,h^^ '"^ '^^ '^^ difficulties The quLtity of pro'stV wh ch'T^^^^ ^'" P'^"^^^' hold and renew would require such^rl? f necessary to that the consent of Darliamln. t ^.^ f ^^^'^^ expenditure to obtain. parliaments would be extremely difficult II. it is necessary to consider Z i r "^^l' '' '^^ ^^ief, and supply and tL quam 1 i^PO^^^^^^^^ • '^ ^°^^^ sets forth the relation : '""P^"'^^' ^he following table Trade in Meat in Tons (.000 Kilogrammes). Austria . Russia . Italy . Germany France . Import. Export. Superfluity. 328 20 123 28,787 20,262 8,820 1,623 1.443 16,721 2,016 8492 1603 1320 Deficiency. 12,066 18,246 8.5 304 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? those countries which produce sufficient grain are also guaranteed against deficiency of meat. In the event of a prolonged war, Germany and France will suffer from a deficiency in both the chief necessaries of life. It is true that both in Germany and in France the stock of cattle is so great that it seems possible by increasing the number killed to compensate for the diminution in import, but in view of the high value of the cattle raised Superfluity or Deficiency of Meat in Thousands of Tons. SuPBRFLuiTv. Deficiency. 1 ! i Austria 1.6 Russia 1.3 Italy Germaiiv France 18.2 m those countries, the cost of meat will be raised to an extreme height so as to compensate the producer. In relation to salt Russia is in a less favourable position than the Western Powers. Tr.de in Salt in Tons (1000 Kilogrammes). Import. Export. Superfluity. 10,098 178,640 191,475 Deficiei cv. Austria Germany . Italy . . . Russia , 20,967 17,246 10,098 199,607 T9I.475 7,475 i 9771 ! HBLE ? :nt grain are also In the event of a will suffer from a of life. n France the stock sible by increasing the diminution in f the cattle raised usands of Tons. flCIENCY. I2.I iSs 1 be raised to an producer, ivourable position XX3 Kilogrammes). Superfluity. Deficiei cv. 10,098 178,640 191,475 9771 EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 305 Superfluity or Deficiency of Salt in Thousands of Tons. SUPERFLUITV DsFICENCVr 9.8 But the deficiency ot salt in Russia of 0771 ton« yearly may be supplied, with but an insignificant increase in price, by the increase of local production As relates to the supply of kerosene, which has now become a product of the first importance, Russia is in an enviable position : •- > 10 m an Russia Austria . Italy . France . Germany Trade in Keiosene in Tons (looo Kilogrammes). Import. Export. 252,459 70,000 129,770 647,295 12,459 6,230 Superfluity. 12.459 Deficiency. 2,16,229 70,000 129,770 647,295 The known richness of the naphtha springs of the Caucasus makes it possible to export a considerable quan tity of kerosene Germany, Italy, and France all import kerosene from abroad. The import into Austria is aS considerable, although local production (in GaliSa) grows supplied by local production. ^ luxiy V 3o6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? Superfluity or Deficiency of Kerosene in Thousands of Tons. Supgfl FLUiTY Deficiency »2.4 "" * 647.3 1 he question of stone coal presents itself as follows. The net import, after deducting the export, is, in France, 8049 thousand tons, in Austria 1623 thousand tons, and in Russia 1525 thousand tons. The export of coal from Germany exceeds the import by 4492 thousand tons. Superfluity or Deficiency of Stone Coal in Thousands of Tons. Superfluity- Deficiencv 4.9 T IT Germany Russia ^^^| u Austria ^^^| i.6 France ^^^| ■■■■ 8.0 Thus in regard to coal Germany finds herself in the most favourable position, after her coming Austria, which [BLE ? wusands of Tons. 647.3 itself as follows, ort, is, in France, isand tons, and in Drt of coal from )usand tons. ousands of Tons. ENCV s herself in the g Austria, which EFFFXT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 307 S.^^r'^ d^^eased import by increased local workmg In Russia the supply of coal is thus obtained • From the to the stoppage of factonec a ^^ -y "'''""'sn owing Russian p'o^uieioa X 0^3 wIT; hTa L' nu? ' "' and ehere will be no difficufty 7„ this respec ^ "^ ^'' 4JS Vs'Xs ^ofbar^f rr ir and linen there will be no deficiency ' "^' v.iuul''^^ '^"^'•'°" ^''° ^"^^« whether all these countries t"ns of'wL'^inTh-'' ""^" '•^f ^^"^^"^-^^ - "- "i- guaran eed W,th /h •""^P^^^"^^ majority of states are '^£S r"^^^^^^^^^ ='^^ - - ■" - deZn^f^ater™ ""-'-P'^^, as .be followingTgtis Production in Thousands of Tons. Pig-ircn. 1881 . i8go . 460,000 908,035.7 Iron. 286,071 424,286 Steel. 287,678.6 371,250 ciem ''fof milir/ oTr'^t' "' f ""'T' ""^■'■^ *an suffi. October ,866 wZfin'^rin '° '."• '"?""'" """-^^ °f for fh. f, ,, T '"^ following directions : "To cease 'or the future to give government orders abroad "nH 3o8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? all orders, both of the Ministry of War, the Ministry of Paths and Communications, and of the other departments °f-vf^^^^. *° ^"'^^ '"Side the country, notwithstanding the difificulties and inconveniences which may arise at first." As the result of this decision there arose a large number of factories furnished with the latest mechanism and machniery for the manufacture of articles of military equipment. It is enough to mention that even in 1880 out of 686 guns on the fleet, 498 were cast in the Obukovsk factory alone, and that these guns, as was demonstrated by test agauist armour, were in every way equal to the guns of Krupp. Thus the 12-inch gun, at a distance of 7000 feet, penetrated armour of a thickness of 12.6 inches, the 9-inch gun armour of a thickness of 6.59 inches, and the 6-inch gun armour of a thickness of 3. i inches. III. It cannot be too often repeated that the disastrous con- sequences of war will be especially felt in countries with highly developed industries— that is, in Germany, France and England. With the interruption of the ordinary com- munications, with the diminution in demand, and the approach of danger, factories, mines, and workshops, with the exception of those whose products are necessary for the equipment of armies, will be forced to discontinue work- ing. The fathers of families, taken from their homes and sent to join the army at a few hours' notice, will leave their families, in the majority of cases, unprovided against the needs of the morrow. The following statistics are interesting as giving an idea how far the population of Germany is guaranteed against hunger by the income it receives in time of peace : Insufficient incomes amount to Small Limited Millions of Pounds Sterling » 16.3 22-53 13-345 Per Cent. i.e. 32.1 » 30.5 » I8.Z IBLE ? ', the Ministry of uther departments twithstanding the lay arise at first." se a large number mechanism and tides of military hat even in 1880 t in the Obukovsk ; demonstrated by qual to the guns of ance of 7000 feet, inches, the 9-inch :s, and the 6-inch e disastrous con- in countries with lermany, France, he ordinary com- emand, and the workshops, with ire necessary for liscontinue work- their homes and lotice, will leave provided against as giving an idea aranteed against )f peace : s of lerling. ^5 t.e. Per Cent. 22.1 30.5 18.I EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 309 Moderate incomes amount to Large Very large „ » /Millions of Poiind.s Sterling. Per Cent. • 1 2. 3 J i.e. 16.7 • 6-555 „ 8.9 • 2.69 „ 3.7 It IS unquestionable that these incomes "insufficient" for supplymg the first necessaries of life, and "small" and limited incomes represent the earnings on which an immense proportion of the population lives, and that the stoppage or even the diminution of income will place hl'J'°?r'°", '" ^ '"'^'^' P°''^'°"- The earnings of hose in these classes constitute more than 70 per cent of -IT'\ '"'°"^ ""^ '^'^ P'^P^^- '^^^ ^^^^^ ^hich enjoys a moderate " income can only to a small extent help those m need in the moment of danger. There remain the rich classes, and on them must fall the chief, duty of laige and very large " incomes, forms only ;^9,2Saooo or I2| per cent, of the whole income of flie peoT In what way can the incomes of the rich class com- pensate the majority of the population for the decrease by a considerable extent, a decrease of a half or even a VJ'. Uf ritS'"'"""^' °^ ^^^' "^^J°"^y ^h'^^h constitute Jn 'l.^^f"^^ ^^^t ^2i per cent, of the total income, even though it went entirely to the aid of the need^; classes, could appreciably compensate the latter for the osses to which they would be subjected (70 per cent, of the total income of the people) ? And this, when we bear in mind that the incomes of the rich themselves will be reduced in time of war ? As relates to the provision which the working classes in a time of crisis would find in their own savings, we must bear in mind that these savings are very inconsider- able. Here is the picture drawn by Dr. Von Schulze- Gavermtz in his work, "Der Grossbetrieb " (Leipzig, 1892). In the great majority of cases the earnings hardly cover expenses, and very often a deficiency appears Which IS supplied by recourse to charity, often to prostitu- jio IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? tion, while in many cases families are compelled to endure privation and even hunger." In the investigations of Chief Factory Inspector Vari- schofter, issued by the Bavarian Government, it is explained that even in large manufactures (for instance, in chemical factories) the work'TS receive barely enough to satisfy the " physiological minimum " of existence. In the great industries wages hardly suffice for necessary food, which consists chiefly of potatoes and rye bread. But these earnings are nevertheless higher than those yielded by handicrafts and work at home. Under the most favour- able circumstances the wages of workers are sufficient only for food, nothing remaining over. It is plain, there- fore, that in a critical time savings cannot be counted upon. The unfortunate fact must be noted that need will appear with especial force in those very localities in which there is a deficiency of grain, and where the supply of grain will present the greatest difficulties. In the kingdom of Saxony, as we have already seen, there is an average deficiency for each inhabitant of 267.3 lbs. of grain, or about 50 per cent, of the demand, while in that kingdom only 22.d per cent, of the population lives by agriculture, and 77.3 per cent, by trade. In the Rhine provinces we find a deficiency of 278. i lbs. kilos of grain per inhabitant, or about 60 per cent, of the demand, while 65 per cent, of the population lives on incomes derived from trade and industry. In addition, it must be borne in mind that the pro- portion of the population living by industry grows rapidly. In an inconsiderable period of time the industrial popula- tion of Germany has been quadrupled. This increase has already gone too far. The working forces newly appearing, competing ceaselessly with the old, lower the wages of the older workmen to an extreme level. Statistics witness that even now a great part of the workmen in Prussia, though working twelve or fifteen hours a day, earn extremely little. BLE ? iipelled to endure y Inspector Vari- mt, it is explained ance, in chemical jgh to satisfy the In the great isary food, which -ead. But these hose yielded by the most favour- :rs are sufficient It is plain, there- nnot be counted 1 that need will ery localities in where the supply liculties. In the ly seen, there is It of 267.3 lbs. of nd, while in that pulation lives by ency of 278. i lbs. ) per cent, of the Dulation lives on nd that the prc- ;ry grows rapidly, industrial popula- rhis increase has newly appearing, the wages of the istics witness that 1 Prussia, though , earn extremely KM'ECT OK \ AR ON THE PEOPLE j,, Indinfry. Glass and kerosene production Iron foundries . Working of iron ore .' Cotton factories Chemical factories .' Spinning . Cigar factories . Preparation of agricultnral* products' Milfing of all kinds . » ^°""«8 Weekly Wages. 15s- / F ciiiHsts ling to the EleC' ^i-'' -/ Bavaria. Saxony with Dresden. Saxuny with Leipzig. Hamburg, Alsace and Lorraine. elected ; in the shaded ist candidatures which (cialists and ^^h 'i* fulfil thtir duties }ue.stion remains: ily as armament ? impossible now. Novih considering EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE ^ly 7u^t^' '^^T'\ 'P'^"^'^ successes can compensate for ti.e dangers that hasten on the path of war. i7 7nRrZ'V^^ P°''''?" ""'" ^^ son.cwhnt better. Of 7^oS^^T''.''i'°'^'"'°"^*^' '^Scther constitute X.900,000000 almo-'it five-sixihs belong to th • class of poor people whose incomes are quite inconsiderable : Person*. Doinesiic servants ..." Small produ. ors, workers and subordl-* nates whose incomes do not appre- tiably exceed the highest wages of workmen . , fi "* 1,1 52,000 1,950,000 3,700,000 Total 10,617,000 Per Cent. i.e. 21.5 » 6.4 20.8 59-7 The incomes of the above-mentioned categories amount 2.Jri^''^''^- Ag'-'^"Jtural labourers number t'^rl'^' ''''' ^^-^ P?"" ''^"^- Their incomes, amounting to ^80,000,000, are also not guaranteed. ^ No better will be the position of England where the question of the feeding^f the people hUrecend^ s^^r f ^?'' T'""''' '^^^ ^^'^'^^"^ ^'^^'^ quotes a speech of Sir Samuel Baker, in which we find an argument which touches closely upon our subject. " To eve!?vth- ^^'"^ ''"'^^ r ^"^^"^^ accustomed to have Terru^A^ "ecessary for the support of life and unin- terrupted work arnve in our ports in due time, that we rotTh/''r\;'"!^;f ' u ^^"'"""^ P°^^^^°"- Yet there is navJ n ^^ T "^^^^^ '^^' •" '^^ ^^^"^ °f war with a naval power the price of wheat would rise greatly in England, and, reacting immediately on all hidustries FfnV.'^^^f ^5 ""P^^c^^ented catastrophe. In her presen state of defence, England has not the strength to guarantee the transport of provisions." Lord Charles of war' f' T''^/'"'^!^'' '""^^^"^^' ^^^'^^^d that in time oJrsL Jf^ """^"^ "°' '°""' "P°" '^^ «"PPJy from oversea of the necessaries of life. Admiral Hornby, 314 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? presiding at a meeting with the object of presenting a petition to the Government on the subject of the taking of precautions against the stoppage of supplies, said that if England gained several victories at sea, and the regular transport of provisions were still inter- rupted, it would be worse for the people than several defeats. ' In Russia, at first sight, the position of the people in the case of war seems enviable; 86 per cent, of the population is engaged in agriculture. But, as the price of agricultural products is very low, the agricultural class earns an income amounting only to 52 per cent, of the general income, while in Germany an agricultural population of 37 per cent, earns 35 per cent, of the income, in France 42 per cent, of agriculturists earn 40 per cent, of the total income, and in Austria 49 per cent of agriculturists earn 45 per cent, of the income. But worse than this is the fact that s-vings in Russia are inconsiderable, and thus the consequences of war for Russia might be not less terrible than for other countries Such a proposition is all the more probable since the poverty arising from war springs not only from direct losses, but from the disorganisation caused by the destruction of ordinary relations, and by the fall of values. To cover the expenditure on war all states will be compelled to take refuge in the raising of loans or the issue of paper money. The price of all the necessaries of life must grow and the purchasing power of the inconsiderable savings possessed by the people will be greatly diminished. All this leads to the conclusion that, nolens volens, governments will be forced to take on themselves the care of feeding the families of those serving with the army The results of such an undertaking cannot be foreseen. If we suppose that governments will be forced to interfere in the regulation of prices, and to support the population, we must ask, will it be easy after the war to abandon this practice and re-establish the old order ? And will not this moment of transition to the normal order of things be SIBLE ? 'ct of presenting a bject of the taking of supplies, said Dries at sea, and were still intcr- iople than several n of the people in per cent, of the But, as the price e agricultural class 2 per cent, of the ' an agricultural per cent, of the iculturists earn 40 ustria 49 per cent. : income. savings in Russia quences of war for or other countries, irobable since the only from direct caused by the d by the fall of war all states will ng of loans or the life must grow, isiderable savings diminished, at, nolens volens, lemselves the care I with the army, nnot be foreseen, forced to interfere •rt the population, r to abandon this And will not this der of things be EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE ,,< prolonged, and in theSn „f? °^'^\ °'^" '^ "■•"• be writers this is „oreS;Ul171^;'"''"^^.™ this subjective mav auot/.hr • '", "Connection with "Even U small ?ZetthrZ'"s°;'8f,'r""^' ^"'••• a continuous three years war H- '8'2-'3-i4 present needed to conquer fto ernDbv ,h. ""'•'' ""'^ ""i" be Gohz) the „,o3er„ AntLus ?„<,' ^LrPj^^r" °'J°" "" sending against him army after SmtT tT •"" ""'■"'• struggle will not be decideH h, "/ \. ^^^ 'mpending will be prolonged, it may be evi'enT'' ^^'^^ '"°«'=' •>"? opinion of the best G^man IZ i^^^'^" Such is the ists-war with Ru sTa ca'not bf /•"i!'^^ .""""^'■y ^P^<=ia'- will require se ye ral campaigns "'"' '° °"^ >"«="•. but the;w|formT^*rti^fit^r::rv^^^ ^^ ^-o mclus ve. ConsidpHno- iu . r ^^^^'^e, from i; to 4c working ageT'&^rctnd'^r'""' '^'^'"^ '^^ shown that 56 per cent of .h. ^^ ^^^^^^^ •' will be called nnder the^flag Even if w!""^'"^ '^^'' ^^" be Germans liable to se^rvice w", be TrnploS" '''^ "°^ ^" Germany proposes a^ JIl ^"^P'^Kd in war, still if carry on\S offensive war on'Zh'fron.'^ ''■''''''''' '^ necessary to withdraw from work ITu^'"' " ""'" ^^ working forces thnf fL ^- ^"^^ » quantity of be able%o accon phlh , JT^"^ will not occupies the wTo f wo^iL LT' f 'I '-'"^^^ ^^ P^^^^ reason alone produclTon i^^time of'^'^P"^"''""' ^°'' '^^' diminished ; the need for^hl^ "^^l '""^^ ^^ Sreatiy and the que'stion ofluppTy wUl Tec'otet ^^ ""^ ^^^"^ In addition to this in^nffi ^^^^^^ a hopeless one. point also to the dffficu"; "^^"^^11^1^^'"^ "^ '"^^ of horses. If we mav hi 1 Tu '^^ '" ^^^ "^^tter different states on moh?ll ^ "^'"^n"^ ^°'" ^""'^^^ in the following tabje.°" n,obihsation will be as shown in the 3i6 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? In Thousands. From each Hundred Horses — — In Time of In Time of Number of will be required Peace War will Horses in the for War Purposes : Army holds be required Country. Russia 1 60 340 25,000 1.36 France 142 308 3,000 10.26 England . 15 14 2,000 0.70 Italy . 45 75 750 lO.O Austria 77 173 4,000 4-32 Germany . 116 334 3,000 11.13 Percentage of Horses which would be taken for Military Purposes, Russia France ■■■■■I •■■■■I ■■■■■I «■■■■• ■■■■■I ■ ■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■""*""■"' Si §■■!■■!■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■"•■■■■ ■"*■■■■' ■■■■■■*■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■I •■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■*■■■■' ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■laaaaaaaaai 10.3 Italy ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■' ■■■■■■■■■■■■■«■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■•■■■••■■"' ■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■' ■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■■■■■■•■■■ Austria 10.0 k3 Germany '•■■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■•■■■•■■■■■■■•■■■■• ■■•■rsiataaa*BBBt ■■■■«■■■ ••■■■■•■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■' aaBaaaiaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaaBaaaaaaaaBaaaaaaBaaaai' iiiaBBBBBBaBBaaaBBaaBaaaaaaaaaBBaaBBBBBaaaBaBaaBii ■■BaBaaBaiBacBaaaaBaaaiBsaaaiaiiaaiaaaiBBaiBiBBBt' ■aaapaaaaaaaaaB>a««BaB«aaaaaaB««a>«>>>>>>>>«*>>>- IIj Of the 334,000 horses which will be required by Germany the majority will of course be taken from farmers, But this cannot fail to react injuriously on agriculture. It must not be forgotten that with the intense system of farming in Germany, fields never rest, one crop follows after another, and delay in working will undoubtedly cause IBLE ? From each Hundred Horses ber of will be required s in the for War Purposes ; ntry. ,000 1.36 ,000 10.26 ,000 0.70 750 lO.O ,000 4-32 ,000 II. 13 n Military Purposes* !■■■■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■ Bll !•■■■ ■ I ■ •■■ ■ ■r Illfll ■ ■ ■ ■■■ • ■• !■■■■■■■■•>■■■ ■■■■■■■■■■■■■I 10.3 ■nvnK^ fflffifflffl I0.( ill be required by taken from farmers, asly on agriculture, e intense system of 5t, one crop follows 11 undoubtedly cause EFFECT OF WAR ON THE PEOPLE 317 difficulties unknown under the more primitive systems of farmmg. As is well known, a holiday is kept in Germany at the begmnmg of field labours, the so-named Busstal (day of prayer and penitence), and after this work is carried on through the whole summer without in- termission on Sundays or holidays. In Germany, even under normal conditions, labour is so intensely utilised that to supply the labour of those serving with the army possTbTe ^^"^a'"ing labourers on holidays is im- In the German army will be found 38 per cent in he French 42 per cent, and in the Austrian 49 per cent, of the total number of agriculturists. Even if we suppose that a certain proportion of factory labour will be diverted to agriculture, it is nevertheless unquestion- ab.o that the harvests in time of war will be sensibly diminished. ■^"oiuijr in Russia this question rests on an entirely different Dasis. ihere the absence of working agriculturists will be supplied more easily than elsewhere, for an important proportion of the peasants' land is held in common It i«. easy to be an opponent of this system of agriculture and even to attribute to it the low condition of agriculture among the peasantry; but it must be acknowledged that the diversion to war of a great number of woiking hands will be borne much more easily under this system than under individual proprietorship. In general the land abandoned by the labourer who has been summoned under the flae will not remain wholly neglected. Without doubt it will be cultivated by the Mir, and the owner of the land on return will re-assume his former rights. In addition to this, agriculture carried on on a low level will suffer less from the neglect and even from the absence ot the owner than a more intense system. In the absence ot a system of progressive improvement, the agriculturist on returning to his home may be assured that he will find Hs and in much the same state as he left it when summoned to Uie front. The workers in factories and in industries in Russia do not as a rule cease their connection with the 3i8 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? village community. On the stoppage of factory work at the outbreak of war they will return to their villages and devote themselves to agriculture. In addition, it may be noted that in Russia the number of holidays is so great that, if in time of war the supreme ecclesiastical authority permitted work upon holidays, this alone would compensate for the loss of working forces through the exigencies of war. It must not be forgotten that out of the whole population between 20 and 50 years of age, the army (considering only attacking forces) will take in Germany 31 per cent. (3,000,000 men), in Austria 28 per cent., in France 47 per cent., while in Russia (3,500,000) it will take only 15 per cent. As Sundays constitute 1 5 per cent, of working time, then the lost contingent of working hands may be compensated for by Sunday labour alone, without trench- ing upon the immense number of holidays which are observed. Upon su.'vey of the facts and statistics above set forth it is impossible to avoid the following conclusions : (i) The advantage rests on the side of those states who possess sufficient means of production and who in conse- quence will be in a condition to carry on a prolonged war without the danger of internal difficulties. (2) In view of the prime importance of the feeding of the population, those states whose internal resources are deficient must see that crops have been got in before war breaks out, and only in extreme cases decide on war before harvests are over. (3) It is most probable that war will break out when the harvest of the country which intends to take the initiative is above the average ; with a bad harvest peace may be considered as guaranteed. (4) The most serious indication of approaching war will be the feverish acquisition of provisions by those states which would be endangered by their deficient internal production. (5) In time of war, and especially after it, the gravest popular commotions may appear in Western Europe. .SIBLE ? J of factory work at their villages and addition, it may be holidays is so great lesiastical authority e would compensate ti the exigencies of he whole population army (considering rmany 31 per cent. :ent., in France 47 it will take only 15 »er cent, of working ting hands may be ne, without trench- lolidays which are ics above set forth :onclusions : of those states who and who in conse- >n a prolonged war es. i of the feeding of irnal resources are ; got in before war ecide on war before break out when the t take the initiative L^est peace may be tproaching war will IS by those states deficient internal fter it, the gravest stern Europe. CHAPTER VI PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS I. — Statistics for Estimating Losses. Cold Siee/.—The use of the bayonet, the lance, and the sword have not changed. As we have shown in detail in another place the proportion of casualties caused by cold steel is insignificant. Smal/ Arms.—Smce the last great wars the power of arms has grown immensely and every day witnesses fresh improvements. Let us quote some facts as example. In Germany Austria, France, Russia, England, and Turkey a rifle with a calibre of from 7.62 to 8 mil. is employed. The distinctive feature of these weapons is the force of the blow, depending from greater initial speed and rotation of the bullet. This initial speed varies from 680 to 700 yards a second, and the number of revolutions from 2475 to 2640 a second. In the Italian, Dutch and Roumanian armies rifles have been adopted with a calibre of 6.5 mil., with an initial speed of 750 yards, and rota- tion 3830 a second. In the United States a 6-mil. rifle has been adopted. In Germany and Austria experiments with a 5 o-mil. rifle gave remarkable results. The signi- ficance ol tiiese changes may be understood from the fact that the penetrative force of the 6.5-mil. rifle is 44 per cent greater than that of the 8-mil. rifle. The effect of a rifle shot depends first of all upon the energy preserved by the bullet on reaching its target and then upon the weight of the bullet in relation to its di^niieter 320 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? and upon the speed of its night. The following diagram illustrates the diiference in power of the rifles of i8 and 1 890. Amount in Metro-Kilogrammes of Living Force of a Bullet on each (Quadratic Centimetre of its Transverse Area on Striking Ubstacles at various Ranges. ** U7 iiiiiiiiiriiiiiiiiiii lIliiMiiiiiiliiiirii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiliiilii iiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiiiii iiiiiiiiiiriii IIIIIIIIIIIIII 152 115 90-8 624 As concerns the 5-mil. bullets their striking force verv considerably exceeds that of the 7.66-mil. bullet. What will be the effect of such projectiles when employed in war by soldiers equal in equipment and training it is difficult to foretell precisely. Nevertheless such experiments and investigations as "lave been made help us to form a very vivid picture of the future battle- field. Experiments in the use of the 5-mil. Mauser rifle BLE ? bllowing diagram he rifles of i8 '' of a Bullet on each Area on Striking 6i4 iking force very bullet. rojectiles when equipment and . Nevertheless ave been made e future battle- 1. Mauser rifle PROBABLE TOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 3., the buUets penetrated c'f,',"^''°°' ''"'' "*70 yards, each case preservfn^ sMftV-^' !' '' ' ''^"''■^^ °' Worses, in extent theSw,„g^ca"t3e """^' '° """"''"' '° ^°"" Mauser 5 Mj/. Rt/le at various Ranges. Range. an effective protection for soldiers tL 1 ^ thick was calibre bullef win pene.^.feanh tl'tL^^htiTnesTof helt thin^dT tZf V'^ l"" strike thosfwho sidered t'f ' ^ote'c^ed ' t ^TaU r^ tX t^ 'Z coward took refuge behind a companion The ^.^dem h.ot:bl^ra;birti;^e:r^r.Kiti™?.?r'^^ 322 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? In considering the degree of danger in battle the number of revolutions of a bullet has great importance. The following digram shows the weight and rotation of bullets in use at various times. Rotation and Weight of Bullets of Various Rifles. Number of Revolutions. Weight of Bullets in Grammes. 3830 i 1 420 Needle Gun. il ! ' 1 1 [ 1 1 1 1 732 Berdan. 1 13.6 24 2580 New Russian : Rifle, i8yi. 1 1 j i 1 1 1 Dutch 6.5 MiN. Rifle. ; 1 10.5 This question has much importance, for upon striking something hard, such as the branch of a tree or a thick bone, the bullet takes an irregular position, and as its revolution continues it causes very serious wounds. It is for this reason that the intervention of a tree or a brick if it be insufficient to stop the bullet only makes it more dangerous. In Nirschau, in crushing the disturbances among the miners, but ten shots were fired, yet seven persons were killed and twenty-five wounded from a distance of from thirty to eighty paces. Many others slightly wounded concealed their injuries so as to escape legal prosecution. Each bullet struck from three to four men. This is explained by the thickness of the mob and the shortness of range. Of the wounded men six died, so that the percentage of death from wounds was 24 per cent., while in the war of 1870 it was only 12 per cent. The general mortality among those struck by bullets was 40.6 per cent. It cannot be doubted that the immense increase in the penetrative force of bullets, and the gravity of the injuries inflicted, will be one of the most striking characteristics of SIBLE ? iger in battle the 5 great importance, jht and rotation of arious Rifles. ght of Bullets in Grammes. il ! 1 1 1 I 1 1 ' 2i i 13.6 : 1 1 1 10.5 , for upon striking f a tree or a thick osition, and as its ous wounds. It is a tree or a brick if ily makes it more : the disturbances e fired, yet seven wounded from a :es. Many others &s so as to escape from three to four ;ss of the mob and ded men six died, I'ounds was 24 per only 12 per cent, uck by bullets was ise increase in the vity of the injuries a; characteristics of rROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 323 concerning chis we Lave'no" litSs "' ~-"'-''^'«. ""' re7pe'« td^:;tLlrs?„Li "T'^ °' «- '" '"- number of casuSr„o^°rp?rlbT;g;\\e?';''a:"^"7H^ past. The hnll^f «r *u z- ., V greater than in the range .han 750 yards Tebu;:K"''f''«"- ■^' ' «^'^'" struck soldiers on *e point of af • /, h^° "'"'°^' ."'"'^'y^ Manniicher buUet aimfd ,,,,!'. 'i**' P'^^™' '""^ "'^ so low that it would strike HIT ^"''' "^y- «'" flight. Even at a ratge of ?f^ "^ V° ■^^''''^ "^ "^ eiTenive for 62 yards %],/ fJu -^"t " ""'"''' >>= this difference more plainly """^ "'"^^"'"^ ^'«'«' «^ t;anoMs Ranges. Mannlicncr RangK Chassepot 700 324 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Breadth of Zone of Effective Fire against Cavalry (2 m. 70 cm* in height) at various Ranges Chassepot Range Mannlicheh 700 In all armies firing drill has been brought to perfection. The quantity of cartridges expended in training is incom- parably greater than before, and the most ingenious methods have been devised for showing inaccuracy of fire or nervousness. It is easy to see how these circumstances will influence future losses. At the present time the success of aim depends only upon the proper holding of the rifie. Raising the small-calibre rifle to the shoulder and firing mechanically and horizontally, at the present day the rifleman covers a space of 650 to 750 yards. Where in 1870 a special order was needed and attention had to be paid to its execution, the mere mechanical use of the weapon is now necessary. For this reason, too, the range of useful fire, which will not involve waste of cartridges, has immensely increased, as the following diagram shows : 5IBLE ? ivalry (2 m. 70 cm. 400 600 700 jght to perfection. training is incom- most ingenious inaccuracy of fire ices will influence e success of aim ng of the rifle, loulder and firing present day the y^ards. Where in ttention had to be inical use of the reason, too, the involve waste of as the following PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 325 German armies the percentages of succeIsful^?:t,St -u .u.antryman are sho«-n by the foUowing digrams'; i~ iiii nil Jtt. 326 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? Percentage of Hits in Fire at One Infantryman. French Army. Rangb. German Armv. Lying down. 17.0 •/. ■■■■■■■■■■■a 200 metres 7-1 V. ■I ■■ ■ ■ ■ ■■■ ■ laiB ■ ■■■■ ■ ■• ■■ ■ ■■ ■■ 300 3.9 •/. 400 2.3% ; 500 > U V» I 600 > 700 . 25 7, I87, 127. 87a 67, Kneeling, 24 9 V. 25 V. 337. SIBLE? nfantrymiin. :man Army. 25 7, 187. 127. 87o )7. 33 7. 25% 18 '4 13 V. 7. PKOBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 327 Percentafre of H :s in Fin at One Infantryman. French A,MV. K^^^^ German Army standing. 24.3 V. " 37 V. 32 7. Besides these improvements in weapons alJ f,^nA\r>cr , the increase of casualties, the systems o Zt ^- ^° distances have been improved at^he same rTt. Th^ improved instrument of Colonel PaskevTh IT \ 7k '^ the Russian army ten years ",inr« ^^"""^^^^ ^^ yards in three min'ute^ whTitTeigTsTss^han' yliT Deviation of the Paskevitch Instrument in Metres, At a Rantje of 1288 metres 2273 2645 3100 ■iii^^ 37.8 :as 328 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? . In later years even more accurate instruments have been constructed. The increase in the number of cartridges, aheady mentioned in another connection, carried by soldiers is another factor increasing losses. With the Berdan rifle a Russian infantryman carried 84 cartridges, with the new weapons 150 cartridges; with the 5-mil. rifle the number carried will reach 270. Number of Cartridges carried by one Soldier with Different Rifles. Berdan Modern 5-mil. ■■■■■■■■■■••■■a ■•■■■■■■■■taaaS. •■■■■••■■■••■■5 ••■■■«•■■■«■■■ 84 !i||ipijijiijjijii|n:j 27 With an even smaller calibre the number of cartridges earned will be from 380 to 575. If we assume that, without having recourse to the reserve, the number of cartridges now carried will be expended, it is easy to see how losses will be increased. The smokelessness of powder is another factor in increasing losses. But to this we have already referred more than once. On the above statistics we have constructed the follow- ing table showing how the old loss of 18 per cent, from rifle fire will be increased, in all cases the lowest conceiv- able increase having been taken : From increase of energy .... » » in revolutions and from de- formation of bullet . „ in accuracy .... improved means of observation and measuring absence of smoke. &c. increase in quantity of cartridges , 7 per cent. » » 4 18 2 12 it » » From which it appears that the general loss from rifle- with Different Rifles. >:;:•::;::::::::;::: PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 329 stated in the beginning o" t^'Z7k\^f,^^^^^^^^ gives even a higher value to the effectiveness of th' weapons ; cnectiveness of the uew Rifle of 1871 French rifle of 1886 German rifle 5-mil. rifle 100 per cent. 43i 474 ^337 ral loss from rifle- i"odrr""" """ ""' °"^ -'™"^"<'- appear very givf St Me°/ 's„cf " ,f ^^"""y «^^ '"e pas. can w nch Langlois said : " We have S: Ls a whole'reriet from that employed TUtw-.'r™'^'"^'^^^^^^ '''''""" the J^4/'r^"r ''^^ ?' ""'">' projectiles can be fired in " nr,:i^ttkTb e ^Ti^'^distr^crri^^."^ '!i-^ suns have sen. four projec.ire" imoTr^amfh^r """' A corapanson of the effect of looo r^e bunets fir.rf sta^nredi^sf 'r " -d" rsr.^ ?24" over a space twice as long as, and no. S wide .hin the' Le is are IT""'"'' '''°^ "'=" «>* fragrentVo, these shens are .hrown over a space 860 yarts long and 420 apX"u,at te ^7^, 7^f ^ ^^"^'-' " number of guns has increased from 780 to 4512. Froni 330 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? which it appears that the French artillery of 1891 was 116 times more powerful than that of 1871. When the new quick-firing guns now being prepared — which in the opinion of specialists will be twice as effective as those of 1 891 — are completed, the French artillery will be approxi- mately 232 times more effective than that employed against the Germans in 1870. It may be assumed that the losses will be correspondingly greater. The quantity of ammuni- tion carried will be twice as great as was carried with the former arms. On the estimates of Langlois, in a future battle lasting only two days, every gun will require no less than 267 rounds of ammunition, while if the battle extend over three to four days 500 rounds will be required. With the 136-140 rounds per gun in the armies of the Triple and Dual Alliances, according to the calculations of General Muller, more than ii,ooo,cxx) men might be killed and wounded. With 267 rounds per gun 22,000,000 might be killed and wounded, and with 500 rounds 41,000,000. In consequence, it appears that artillery fire alone might exterminate eight times the number of the armies which could be placed on the battlefield. These figures seem absurd. Nevertheless, they are based on the detailed calculations of Langlois. In the war of 1870 the losses from artillery fire amounted to 9 per cent, of the armies engaged. What they will be in a future war it is impossible even to guess. The quantity of artillery has increased, each gun being twenty times, and, since the introduction of the latest types, forty times more powerful than those of 1 870. Even leaving the increase in the number of guns out of account, the losses of 9 per cent, would be replaced by losses of 180 per cent., though these new guns must in a short time give way to others more perfect. If we base our estimates on these new guns the results would be absurd, not through irregularity of reasoning, but simply because they would show that instruments had been prepared capable of destroying armies many times more numerous than could be placed in the field. PROVABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 331 II.-lNFLUENCE OF MoDERN TacTICS IN INCREASING LoSSES. In consequence of the use of long-ranee weatxjns ;,nH smokeless powder armies will be obligfd ^o^rrounH then^selves, for a considerable distance, with commands enemv'd',^'.Mr' T^ 'V' ^^"^^^ reconnaissance by the enemy difficult. The discovery and destrnrtinn r.f . 7 commands will b. a task of noLalTdlffi ulty ,n L* S94lLr:TZT^' '"^ ''"■"^" ^=- '^./u men wS 5945 norses and 80 guns were employed. And sinr^ o/er'lTc S^'V'^.r/^"'^^ ^'^^^ ^P^^'^-S was somethLg over 45 5,000, it will be seen that a sixth part of the whole NevLSdes^the'r ^'V" ^'''''' communicadont i\evertheless the French sharpshooters more than once succeeded m cutting the German communLadons and causing confusion. If we bear in mind t^t ' ese/m,,^ S/rwmt""'!,^ °" 1°°^ ^"^ had^n^mil^^r; training, it will be understood what vast forces would have been required to guard communications ?rom re^u^ chasseur commands and cavalry re^^uiar In the present time, in all countries, an attempt is made to give some military training to .11 'men wh?milhTbe Required for service in time of war. Such a statl of affairs as resulted in France in 1870, when PaHs was actually besieged, and yet hundreds of' thousands of me„ ons wifnT ""'T' ^° '"^"^ to their civil occupa- tions, wil not again be seen. At the very outbrealrnf war practically all the population liable to servTce wm be erther summoned to the operating army, or appointed to serve in the second and third strategical lines^^ "" After this of course there will remain in the countrv a sufficient number of grown men for sucS work as The obtaining of information as to the enemv Lh lu burning of bridges and stores &c But generally i? c'rrtd Vt^"^' '"^^^^" partisan operatfonswif be result of h.-^^ "uT''f ^"^'^^' ""^ systematically. A 332 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? During the manoeuvres of the German army in Alsace- Lorraine attempts were made at transporting infantry in carriages for the purpose of doubling or even trebling rapidity of movement. Two experiments were made. The infantry either covered in one day a great distance, namely, 49! miles with halts for food and change of horses, or made two marches a day, one on foot and the other in carriages. Military operations will begin in the form of a little war, considerable masses of cavalry being constantly maintained on frontiers, which will be immediately crossed, upon which reconnoitring detachments from both sides will come into contact with one another. It will be most important for such detachments to have light infantry with them in carriages. Of course their move- ments will be characterised less by regularity than by speed. But the command will be given to picked, experienced officers, and as a result such bodies will be much more dangerous than the French franc tireurr of 1870. At the present day a marksman from a distance of not more than 800 paces may pick off men at will, and as smoke will no longer betray his position his fire may be very deadly. The losses suffered in attacks on fortified positions will constantly grow, side by side with improvements in arms. The attackers must advance in loose formation, taking advantage of inequalities in the ground, and of the light earthworks which they will throw up with the aid of trenching instruments. In the war of 1877 the Russian soldiers were imperfectly equipped, and ill-instructed in the making of such works. Yet, in spite of this, earth- works fully proved their value. It was such earthworks which prevented the Turks from driving the Russian army from the Shipka, notwithstanding the immense sacrifices they made. On the other hand picked Russian troops, with a numerical superiority of 25 per cent, and desperate bravery, for a long time failed to take the redoubt of Gorni Dubnyak although they got within a hundred paces of it. In the majority of unsuccessful attacks on Plevna the 5IBLE ? in army in Alsace- >porting infantry in J or even trebling nents were made. 3' a great distance, od and change of le on foot and the he form of a little being constantly I be immediately chments from both nother. It will be ts to have light ;ourse their move- egularity than by given to picked, uch bodies will be zh franc tireurr of m from a distance T men at will, and sition his fire may lified positions will •ovements in arms. formation, taking d, and of the light p with the aid of 1877 the Russian id ill-instructed in pite of this, earth- s such earthworks J the Russian army immense sacrifices ussian troops, with nt. and desperate e redoubt of Gorni indred paces of it. ;ks on Plevna the PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS ^n Russian troops, after great loss, succeeded in getting withm bayonet distance of the enemy; cases of near^ approach were very few. nearer Relying on the confidence with which the smokelessness and long range of his rifle inspire the soldier,^ommanSers wd stubbornly liold out in defensive positi^'Cselec^^g natural cover and supplementing it with artificia defences rhat earthworks will be had recourse to very often n the field IS shown bv thp firf tv,of f..., u- y"-^" '" "'c enter infn fvl .^- \ ^^ trenching instruments enter mto the equipment of a certain proportion of all mfantry. As urther evidence, we n.ight point to the instructions delivered to the Guards Corps in 1802 reco.nmend.ng defending bodies always to entrench them! selves unless special orders be given to the contrary It Number of Sappers to 100 Infantrymen. Russia (Germany Austria 1 iiiilliiiiiiniil liliiiniiilJIllllSIHIIi 3^ Italy ROUMANIA H!i»lll~lllililllil|i|llfifi[[l»Hi iliiiiiiii France 3.r 4.5 eveTi^fhef^'f" authority General Brialmont considers that even the last proportion is insufficient. He declares that SIX sappers should go to every hundred infantry n en stoTr J'""''" J""' '^T '''''''^' ^"d ^°"ld have a sapper for every thirteen infantrymen In former times every irregularity in the ground was 334 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? considered an obstacle in military operations. At the present day knowledge of how to take advantage of these irregularities is a great factor of success. This view has become so generally accepted within the last twenty-five years that all governments have undertaken theexamination and measuring of all fields where a future battle might take place. This circumstance is very important. If a Plevna could spring up suddenly upon an unexamined and unprepared spot, what will be the case in a future war when every inch of frontier territory has been prepared for defence ? In the opinion of the most competent authorities the war of the future will result primarily in a series of battles for the possession of fortified positions. In addition to field works, the attacking troops will have to overcome auxiliary obstacles of every kind near the regular fortifica- tions, that is, at the place where they will run the greatest risk from the defenders' fire. Such obstacles will be con- structed of beams, wire nets, and pitfalls. Their destruc- tion will require immense sacrifices. The effect of artillery upon such defences is insignificant. Wire nets can only be destroyed by taking them to pieces by men acquainted with the methods of construction. But for this much time will be required. Meantime the foremost of the attackers will be under strong fire from the defence, and may very easily fall under the fire of their own artillery which will be supporting the attack. Rifle fire over the heads of advancing troops will be practised more often than before, and may prove the cause of great losses. " Observe," says General Skugarevski, " the results of firing in peace time. The targets stand at some hundreds of paces away, yet bullets sometimes furrow the ground at a few decades of paces from the marksman. And this in time of peace. What will happen in war ? " Still more dangerous will prove artillery fire over the heads of troops, since want of coolness, a difficult locality, the distance of the enemy and other unfavourable circumstances may cause inaccurate fire from which advanced troops might suffer severely. ;S1BLE ? operations. At the ; advantage of these 3SS. This view has he last twenty-five iken theexamination ire battle might take •rtant. If a Plevna 1 unexamined and se in a future war has been prepared snt authorities the n a series of battles IS. In addition to have to overcome he regular fortifica- ^ill run the greatest •stacles will be con- Is. Their destruc- he effect of artillery Vire nets can only by men acquainted for this much time )st of the attackers nee, and may very artillery which will ing troops will be lay prove the cause leral Skugarevski, The targets stand bullets sometimes af paces from the What will happen prove artillery fire :oolness, a difficult Dther unfavourable fire from which PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS ^^^ of he higher officer's tCr "^' " -"--"-^ble nu^b:: under fife WUh t e Dre«n,'™'" ''?'™ ""^^ ''^^» armies can never be t^o^%'Z^TiT:i: ?^'''''"^ of new armies will so exhn no? ,h! ' ^* formation the Une that a bat al on at the rom wm'h™ °' °'^'''' "^ eight out of thirtv Th,. J r ^^^^ °° "o" than there will be tl,re/from th. . ^^'y,™^ °f ^"ch officers knowledge, in dscreZanHf'"' T"?-^"' '^ '"f'""-- '" Unskilful acticrw7l°mmedi ?,?'''''''''''''%'°~"'''''°"=- the amount of the los es Theli;''" ""fr"™'''y o" officers will be all I m,nr/f w .""^ '" '^""^ '™ned in the very begJnn ,, ^fThetm'pJ'f 1^1 '°^^ '-"'^ ItXrrui; ±lLs€ll^?J;=J =fon&^^^ this respect the Chilian war may again be taken F^ if '" lojwing iUJ ^hicJ;ruU^r :s:it;tf%\r5^^ wfs'?ccu'^:rb;\\,ra7oirv%^'"''«<= ''^ «-^^^^^^ reeiment/ n,,L company from one of our best aS a" d regain d;rsS„"^ft ""'"" ^ ^ ^ -" were obliged to capm'eTnew S' ^^r'^^^' "''''* "^ asked the men of the h,]?.^!!,' . ""* ''^'"« ^°"^> ' given up the%':'a:e;ard rZ LeZ ^h""'',.'-^™ answered naively: .^.t all our office '^■erekniedth':- Was no one to tell us wlnt tr, Ar. ^ . '^"'^a* there Th^ r^ . '^^ '° °°' so we also went oflf' " 33^ IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? 8.7 7. Losses in the German Army in the War of 1870. Killed. Wuuniled. . 361 M have forgotten what he officers also only tate of efficiency. It ns field instructions , giving precise infor- y contingency. But, , lother place, in this ificiencies of various i that in the French id twice as many in ounded as the lower 1 of destruction every lore threatening form ery delay, will have iditions of war have l&t for every hundred 'e will be taken from PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS ,„ the want of experience nftif '''''^'" ^^ ''ear in mind i Some writeTexpress th^^ "'^ conditions. i to issue generanns'reUot ''.'' ^ '"-take war, PS under certain circumstnnf .i"? ^f^^'""^ '" ^ ^"ture tion has the niost di astmu^^^^^^^ times ^hen fire was incomiL^^^^ ^^ former escape from the zone of fi,^e coufd t^^'^ ""^. ^^^^^^' ^"^ losses from nn'stakes in tTctics we ' — i'"'"^^^' '^^ such are the conditions now tLTn /"'^^fi^^nt. But tl^e extermination of a whoirbod! of""/ ' '""^ ^^"^ '^ minutes. The danger has t, n,?^ ^ ^^°°P^ ^'^hin a fe^ factors of safety h^v^ dim1nis1,.T """^f^^^ly* while the betray the posftion of n "nemo's troT'' "'" "" '°"^- ni the face of iong-ranffe rm.T^ , u°P'' '"^^onnaissance attacking troops will atfemof 'f/^^' ^' 1^^^"^^' ^"^ the to within a short distancfa^t Jhi.hT^'^'l^ '^^ ^^^^"^ers projectiles can no lo^er receTvi 1 ' ^'"'^'^^ ^""'^^^ «<" distance the deciding leaoon 7« • T^""^"^' ^"°"^ this the bayonet. ^ ^^''^''"' ^' '» former battles, being troopi ^^rJ'^^'j!':^^-^^ by attacking advance, of course! will brcarrieH.^ ^'^'""^^ ^ Thf loose formation. Such an aZ '^^"tiously and in occupying a strong posi?ronand"'ff • '^"'""^ "" ^"^"^^ distances will be extreme vH^ffl 1 ^"^^ °^^'' measured a two-days' labour ^ "^'^'"^^ ^"^ "^^^ even require babies w% tXf ^il^ef r t ^"'^^^ ^^'^ ^^- Other specialists find that ^ear^ reJ^""'" "^''^^^ ^^^«- of s.eges. Belgrade, Manturand PI. "'"^ '° ^^^ ^poch Pt IS very likely that the ItL? ''"^ "^^-^ ^e repeated. victory iiossibirwillattenTD^'to^'T' ^"^'"^ ^'^^-- he spot, entrenching rtseirand -t"'' ^^^/"^"^^ «" 33^ IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? provements in small arms and artillery, and the teaching of troops to take advantage of localities, has in- creased the sttength of defence. The modern rifle has immense power, and its use is simple and convenient. It will be extremely difficult to overcome the resistance of , infantry in sheltered positions. Driven from one position it will quickly find natural obstacles — hillocks, pits, and groups of trees — which may serve as points for fresh opposition. The zone of deadly fire is much wider than before, and battles will be more stubborn and prolonged. Of such a sudden sweeping away of an enemy in the course of a few minutes as took place at Rossbach it is absurd even to think. The power of opposition of every military unit has increased so greatly that a division may now accept battle with a whole army corps, if only it be persuaded that reinforcements are hastening to the spot. The case already cited, of the manoeuvres in Eastern Prussia, when a single division sustained an attack from a whole army corps until reinforced, is sufficient evidence of this. The scattering of immense masses over a con- siderable space means that a successful attack on one point by means of the concentration of superior forces may remain local, not resulting in any general attack on the chief forces of the defence. In former times either of the combatants quickly acknowledged that the advantage lay with the other side, and therefore refused to continue the battle. The result and the trophy of victory was the possession of the battle- field. The majority of military writers consider the attainment of such a result very questionable. From the opinions of many military writers the con- clusion is inevitable that with the increase of range and fire, and in view of the difficulties with which assault is surrounded, a decisive victory in the event of numerical equality is possible only on the failure of ammunition on one side. But in view of the number of cartridges which soldiers now carry, and the immense reserves in the ammunition carts, it seems more likely, that before all cartridges have been expended, the losses will have been 5SIBLE ? ry, and the teaching localities, has in- he modern rifle has pie and convenient, •me the resistance of en from one position i — hillocks, pits, and as points for fresh is much wider than born and prolonged, of an enemy in the :e at Rossbach it is opposition of every that a division may corps, if only it be istening to the spot, loeuvres in Eastern ined an attack from s sufficient evidence masses over a con- ssful attack on one 1 of superior forces ly general attack on combatants quickly with the other side, battle. The result session of the battle- riters consider the ionable. ry writers the con- crease of range and ith which assault is i event of numerical e of ammunition on of cartridges which se reserves in the ^ely, that before all sses will have been PROB • -i[.E LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS 339 so great as to make a continuation of battle impossible. To the argument that night will interrupt the battle we find an answer m the fact that, thanks to the adoption of t:^:^:^Z^^ ''' "^"^^" ^''' °^^^" -^'^ - In all armies attempts are made to inspire the soldiers with the conviction that a determined assault is enough to make an enemy retreat. Thus, in the French field in- roS Z '"? ;^ '''''''' '''' "cou;a™an"d resolutely led infantry may assault, under the very them""' B^,7;h'''K^*^"-'''';;'^^ earthworks and capture L^-m , ^r^ ^^"^"'^ considerations are enough to show the difficulty of such an undertaking Supposing even that the defenders begin a retreat The moment the attacking army closes its ranks for assault partisan operations on the side of the defenders will begin less powder, is primarily a partisan weapon, since armed with It even a small body of troops in a sheliered posS may inflict immense losses from a great distance. As the attackers approach, the thin flexible first line of the defence will retreat. It will annoy the enemy with its fire, forcing at"oth°er*oints ^°'"'^'^°"' ^""^ '"^^^ ^^^^^^ ^^e mancEuvre While the first line of the defenders will thus impede the assault, the main body will have opportunity to form anew and act according to circumstances. The attacking army though convinced of victory, finding that it cannol get into touch with the rear-guard of the enemy, which alternately vanishes and reappears, now on its flanks, now heart a af confidence, while the defenders will take It is obvious that, with the old powder, the smoke of which betrayed the fighting front of the enemy and even approximately indicated its strength, such manoeuvres mf.f.i, ? f^^"f rous to carry out. It would be a tTnnl l^'*''"^ '^^' ^°' '^^ ^^'*^3'"^g ^" °f such opera- tions picked troops are required. The ordinary trained soldier is quite capable. Every soldier knows that two 340 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? or three brigades cannot entirely stop the advance of an army. But seeing that the attackers may be so impeded that they will gain no more than four or five miles in a day, the defenders will have good cause to hope and wait for a favourable turn of affairs. From this it may be seen how immensely smokeless powder has increased the strength of defence. It is true that in past wars we find many examples of stubborn rear- guard actions facilitating orderly retreat. But even in those cases victory was too evident and irrevocable, and this encouraged the pursuers. The vanquished tried as quickly as possible to get out of fire. Nowadays with quick-firing and long-range guns the first few miles of retreat will prove more dangerous than the defence of a position, but the chain of marksmen covering the retreat may greatly delay the course of the attack. It was Marshal St. Cyr who declared that "a brave army consists of one-third of soldiers actually brave, one- third of those who might be brave under special circum- stances, and a remaining third consisting of cowards." ^Vith the increase of culture and prosperity nervousness has also increased, and in modern, especially in Western European armies, a considerable proportion of men will be found unaccustomed to heavy physical labour and to forced marches. To this category the majority of manufacturing labourers will belong. Nervousness will be all the more noticeable since night attacks are strongly recommended by many military writers, and undoubtedly these will be made more often than in past wars. Even the expectation of a battle by night will cause alarm and give birth to nervous excitement. This qu« tion of the influence of nervousness on losses in time of war has attracted the attention of several medical writers, and some have expressed the opinion that a considerable number of soldiers will be driven mad. The famous Prussia,! Minister of War, Von Roon, writing from Nikelsburg in 1866, said : " Increased work and the quantity and variety of impressions have so irritated my nerves that it seems as if fires were bursting out in my brain." >IBLE ? the advance of an nay be so impeded or five miles in a : to liope and wait nensely smokeless lefence. It is true 3 of stubborn rear- at. But even in d irrevocable, and nquished tried as Nowadays with first few miles of the defence of a >venng the retreat ck. :d that "a brave :tually brave, one- :r special circum- :ing of cowards." erity nervousness cially in Western ion of men will be )our and to forced of manufacturing 1 be all the more reconi mended by hese will be made expectation of a ; birth to nervous e of nervousness the attention of 'e expressed the soldiers will be 3ter of War, Von laid : " Increased iressions have so es were bursting PROBABLE LOSSES IN FUTURE WARS ,34, Wc have already rofcrrcd many times to (he i.rolwbili,v in,poreed corn w"h"u,e excemio°„ Tu '"^ "^'H Au»tria-Hunsa,y, not a Ig e cCry „ EuTJ"'' ma po.Uion .0 feed its own po%latbn % tMontercuu! of immense hordes entering UDon war Rn, ,1, ^ were generally decided by a' frblows,' fof tlere^xS iiiither rapid communications for the n„Vnr>„!!r existed ment, nor regular defensive Hues. Modern his 0^0"?'"" many instanees of prolonged wars Bu, "t musTbe "T membered that the Thirty Years' and the Seven Years- wars were not uninterrupted, and that the armils encaeed went into winter quarters where they were reeulariv nm visioned, and in spring recommenced o,«mbnsr«ulL; Thus^r/ong "^slf'^L" '''T-^'°^ °f °!-^="-"- US luc iong wars ot modern history may be reearH^H sTde wTh'.h '?"" ■;?"?»■«"- In recent Les, twe by wars we find ^^ ?'"'"■"' ""'* ^orth American Civn Ta«yaittxrri-^L'i'i?it-^'ri^^ war' whir*^' '" " '^''"'^'"^'°" ^' 'o 'he "short^ne" of and arras Su fir"!^^" ^y improved communicates evenTewar of 'arn'o-^'''';''"^'''^'' "^ *^ f''" ">« it r,rZ,Zl '«70-7i occupied seven months, although t, of course, may be considered as short having regard to InX fT'^^'u ""enti ceotibilifv li t- T \ ^"^'"S ""^ exhaustion and sus- ceptib.lity to sickness observed among the soldiers dunng >l 346 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? manoeuvres. During manoeuvres carried on by the garrison of Strasbourg no less than a third of the soldiers fell out, and the hospitals were filled with sick soldiers. It is true that this was in winter, and many cases were caused by frostbite. Basing his judgment on the war nf 1870-71, in which he took part. General Von der Goltz observes that " in a long and wearisome war armies undoubtedly deteriorate in quality. Exhaustion and weariness may be borne for several weeks, but not for many months. It is hard to remain a hero, ever ready for self-sacrifice, after daily battles and constant danger, after long marches through the mud, and nights passed on the wet earth ; all this has a bad effect on courage." jSIBLE ? tarried on by the third of the soldiers with sick soldiers. d many cases were ■ 1870-71, in which observes that " in a >ubtedly deteriorate 3 may be borne for ths. It is hard to acrifice, after daily g marches through earth ; all this has CHAPTER VII MILITARISM AND ITS NEMESIS anarchism, and .ha.t .Uary ?„tl ^^ LP^fl'^"^ Brfr.^ ""*;"« •"^'•P'™' obedience and orde? But tl ,s theory of the disciplinary inHuence of milkarv service is overthrown bv the fart th,. „ , Zu .""f'^y conscrinfinn ar„» u" '' ^'' notwithstanding peooLTrfth. w , ■? ~°='^""y spreads among thf peoples 01 the West. It even seems that bv teachin., ih. do^not'tSr so ?°'' 'T'^"^'' '" "'* P^«^="' Of-le-- 348 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? to which accident gives prominence. The public does not investigate and does not test independently, but easily gives itself up to illusions and errors. Such, for instance, IS the conception of great armies, not only as guarantors of security, but even as existing for the encouragement of those industries which equip them, and those trades which supply them, with provisions and other necessaries. It must be admitted that to decide the question whethei militarism is inevitable or not is no easy task. We con- stantly hear the argument adduced, that there always have been wars and always will be, and if in the course of all the centuries recorded in history, international disputes were settled only by means of war, how can it be possible to get along without it in the future ? To this we might reply that not only the number, equipment, training, and technical methods of armies, but the very elements from which they are constructed have essentially changed. The relations of the strength of armies in time of war to their strength in time of peace in former times was very different. Wars formerly were carried on by standing armies consisting mainly of long service soldiers. The armies employed in future wars will be composed mamly of soldiers taken directly from peaceful occupations. Among the older soldiers will be vast numbers of heads of families torn from their homes, their families and their work. The economic life of whole peoples will stand still, communications will be cut, and if war be prolonged over the greater part of a year, general bankruptcy, with famine and all its worst consequences, will ensue. To cast light on the nature of a prolonged war from all sides, military knowledge alone is not enough. The study and knowledge of economic laws and conditions which have no direct connection with military specialism is no less essential. Consideration of the question is made all the more difficult by the fact that the direction of military affairs belongs to the privileged ranks of ^.ociety. The opinions expressed by non-specialists as to the improbability of great wars in the future, are refuted b^ authorities simply SSIBLE ? . The public does pendently, but easily Such, for instance, : only as guarantors he encouragement of d those trades which ;r necessaries, he question whether :asy task. We con- at there always have in the course of all ternational disputes >w can it be possible * To this we might )ment, training, and very elements from itially changed, nies in time of war e in former times were carried on by Dng service soldiers. will be composed )eaceful occupations, numbers of heads of families and their peoples will stand if war be prolonged al bankruptcy, with es, will ensue. To nged war from all not enough. The iws and conditions military specialism made all the more 1 of military affairs ety. The opinions le improbability of r authorities simply MILITARISM AND ITS NEMESIS 349 by the declaration that laymen are ignorant of the subject Military men cannot admit to be unnecessary that which forms the object of their activity in time of peace Tl ev have been educated on the history of warfare and prac ical work develops in them energy and capacity for self-sacrifice. Nevertheless, such authorities are^ot in a iltuTwI? 'Tho' ""i^'^r Pi:^'"'-^ '' '^^ disasters o? a iJture war. Those radical changes which have tak^n place m the military art, in the Compos tion of armies and m international economy, are so vast tha? a powS imagination would be required adequately to de^pi^t the consequences of war, both on the field of battle^lnd in the lives of peoples. " Yet it cannot be denied that popular discontent with the present condition of affair, is becoming more Tnd more keen^^ noticeable. Formerly only solLr voices were raised against militarism, and their protects were Platonic. But since the adoption of conS on the interests of the army have been more closely boundu^?h the interests of society, and the disasters which Zs7be expected under modern conditions have been bettef appreciated by the people. It is impossible, therefore, net to foresee the constant growth of the anti-military propaganda, the moral founda- r?'to dlv 't "'fv'' '" indisputable in the past asThey are to-day. To this moral sentiment has lately been added a consciousness of the complexity of the business relations threatened by war, of the immense increa e of means of destruction, and of the deficiency of experienced leadership and the ignorance and cloudiness now pre- vailing on the subject of war. ^ h,n^*V^^'^*^"v .^° ""^^ '^^ P^°P^^ see i" war a misfor- une truly terrifying. And if, even in the past, it was found that the sentiments of peoples are more powerful than any force, how much more so now. when in the majority of states the masses indirectly share in the government, and when everywhere exist strong tendencies threatening the whole social order. How much more significant now are the opinions of the people both directly 350 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? as to the system of militarism and in their influence on the spirit of armies themselves I It is impossible here even to outline the energetic struggle against militarism which is being carried on in the West. It is true that the advocates of the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means have not attained any tangible success. But success, it must be admitted, they have had if the fact is taken into account that the necessity of maintaining peace has been recog- nised by governments, and that dread of the terrible disasters of war has been openly expressed by statesmen and emphasised even from the height of thrones. ' As a chief factor tending to preserve the system of mili- tarism the existence of a profess: onal military class must be considered. It is true, that the changes which have taken place under the influence of conscription and short service have given to armies a popular character. On the mobili- sation of armies a considerable proportion of officers will be taken from the reserve : these officers cannot be con- sidered professional. Nevertheless, a military professional class continues to exist, consisting mainly of officers servmg with the colours. It is natural that the existence of such a numerous and influential class, which— in Prussia, for instance— is partly hereditary, a class in which are found many men of high culture, should be one of the elements supporting the system of militarism, even independently of its other foundations. Even if the conviction were generally accepted that it is impossible to carry on war with modern methods of destruction and in view of the inevitable disasters, yet disarmament would be somewhat delayed by the existence of the military caste, which would con- tinue to declare that war is inevitable, and that even the decrease of standing armies would be accompanied by the greatest di.igers. It mus be admitted that from the nature of modern life, the power and influence of this class will tend to decrease rather than increase. The conditions of war are such that military life is much less attractive than it HifiJii )SSIBLE ? their influence on the )uth"ne the energetic 5 being carried on in ites of the settlement ful means have not success, it must be s taken into account tace has been recog- read of the terrible ressed by statesmen, of thrones. e the system of mili- nilitary class must be fes which have taken ion and short service ;ter. On the mobili- irtion of officers will icers cannot be con- military professional mainly of officers uch a numerous and r instance — is partly I many men of high !nts supporting the lently of its other on were generally on war with modern 7 of the inevitable somewhat delayed !, which would con- , and that even the accompanied by the ; nature of modern class will tend to conditions of war 5 attractive than it MILITARISM AND ITS NEMESIS 351 was of old, and in the course of a few years will be even less attractive In the far past the military class pre- ponderated m the state and the very nobility, as n Rome and a the begmning of the Middle Ages was formed of knights (Equites, Ritter, Chevaliers). The carryLron of constant wars in the period embraced by modern history But changes which have taken place in political and socal conditions, the increased importance of^nowJedge mdustry, capital, and finally, the immense numbers of tfe military class, considerably reduced its privileges fn so iety Rivalry m the acquisition of means for the satisfact^n of more complex requirements has caused the mSy of ar"e?r Xnd'fnH° Tm " ""'^^'"^ ''''''' ^" -g-'efu career. And, indeed, there is no other form of exacting activity which pays so badly as the military proSs on caSfind'ther'^^f growth of armies, ^o'vernments cannot find the means for improving the position of officers where Sk.'' ' ^ '^'^"'""^ in officers is every! fhJi"r.'"^"^''l^"^''^^°"'P^"'^ ^'" inevitably result in the military profession losing all its best forces, all the more so because the fascination for society of 'persons bearing arms has departed. The movement agaTnst m.l.tarism leads to views diametrically opposite. Modern S Tl f.^^-^l-\to sympatLe'^with in The o d Ideals of distinction in battle, and glory of conquest Everywhere the idea spreads that thetfforts of aH S mo a'l sXfn^° the lessening of the sum of physical fnd moial suffering. The immense expenditure on the main- tenance of armies and fleets and the building aa.deqm> Sn'JiWnrr'^r'' "'? P^^^^f""y i" the spreading of luc^ sentiments Everywhere we hear complaints that mill- "bior^; ''' '^' "^ ""-^^ '' »^^«^^^" --p'e^Sed, in place of ears of corn the fields produce bayonets and sabres, and shells instead of fruit grow on fhe rees" Those who adopt the military career are, of course not responsible for these conditions, which they did not create •ti 35^ IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? and which react injuriously on themselves. But popular movements do not analyse motives, and discontem with militarism IS inevitably transferred to the military class It might be replied that scholars, too, are often 'ill rewarded, notwithstanding whicli they continue their work But every scholar is sustained by the high in- terests of his work, by the hope of perpetuating his name, and finally by the chance of eVriching hfmse upon success. The position of officers is very different For an insignificant salary they bear the burden of a petty and monotonous work. Year after year the same labour continues. Hope ol distinction in war is not fornone believe in the nearness of war. For an office^ with an average education the Umit of ambition is the command of a company. The command of a battalion little improves his position. For the command of regi" STequired °^ ^'''''^'' ^"^^^™'^^1 education «.;fh"^r^".if """u^ ^ u"*'^ ^^"^'"^ ^^° *^<^"«oJe themselves with the thought that war will break out, presenting occasion for distinction, there is little hope of attaining the desired promotion. We have had many opportunities for conversing with military men of different nationalities and everywhere we were met with the conviction that in a future war few would escape. With a smokeless field of ba tie accuracy of fire the necessity for showing example to the rank and file, and the rule of killing off all the officers first, there is but httle chance of returning home uninjured. The times are passed when officers rushing on in advance led their men in a bold charge against the enemy, or when squadrons seeing an ill-defended battery galloped up to It sabred the gunners, and spiked the guns or flung them into ditches. Courage now is required no less than before, but this is the courage of restraint and self- sacrihce and no longer scenic heroism. War has taken a character more mechanical than knightly. Personal initiative is required not less than before, but it is no longer visible to all. It is true that warfare and the military profession will DSSIBLE ? •selves. But popular and discontent with ) the military class. -s, too, are often ill they continue their ned by the high in- of perpetuating his of enriching himself ers is very flifferent. ar the burden of a after year tne same :ion in war is not, war. For an officer t of ambition is the mand of a battalion e command of regi- cademical education console themselves eak out, presenting le hope of attaining 1 many opportunities fferent nationalities, conviction that in a a smokeless field of or showing example ng off all the officers ing home uninjured, ers rushing on in ; against the enemy, led battery galloped d the guns or flung quired no less than restraint and self- 1. War has taken ^nightly. Personal efore, but it is no :ary profession will MILITARISM AND ITS NEMKSIS ^53 Z'I'ITa''' P'^'*^'"^^ ^^'^''' att' actions for such restless uncurbed natures as cannot reconcile themselves on laborious and regular lif*> f!r.^.„ "'tmbcjves lo a itself. But even ffse w U find Tlfn.^h''"'"™ '" "^"^^ life and feverish ac vUy o ba"k a re' 'I'l''"™'^ "•"'""•y .y.he a„reo,e Which ^n^l'^^l^r^T.^.ToT^ the'v areThfl '^' "" ^"""S""" ^"^ ">e better educated publicly, for^his woK "neon pat ffetiflfTl"'' ^''n'''"'* it cannot escape attention tto ewrv vear feU^'' ?r''"«'' stand up in defence of its necessh7oruse "" European governmenrcan . o tnger rlTZt""'r payment of taxes for the coverinHf miHt»r„ . !?"'" The extraordinary resource wh^hhTll^ expenditure. rr:f-d^°[,;SSyi industrial unde^°aChTve t^^e^J i^S' 'Z\ vast number of joint-stock oompaniesL" been formed The Conservative classes, considered as the hVcV .""'"• of authority, foreseeing the loss of incon^ dispose of XL Government securities and invest in inTu'sS «c ^^tieT which bring a better dividend. State securi ie, t^nH , ' fall more and more into the hands of he mTdd' lasses w^J^Xhtrnet^hel^L-at^^^^ cau?erb;tfrgtjrta„'^:,rxirdt^^ experienced m the past. The fall in thecal ue of r^v r 354 IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE? losses which will be intensely felt by the middle classes and cause a panic. And, as out of the number of industrial undertakings some must reduce their production and lose their profit and others altogether cease to work, the richer classes will suffer great losses and many even ruin. A detailed c xamination of the vexed questions of Europe would lead to the conclusion that not one is of such a nature to rause a great war. France has no ally in an offensive war for the recovery of her lost provinces, and single-iianded she cannot be assured of success. From an offensive war over the Eastern question neither Russia nor Austria could draw compensatory advantages, and such a war, which in all probability wuuld involve the participation of England, France, Germany and Italy, would lead only to exhaustion of forces. C.ermany cannot think of attacking France, while out of an offensive war with Russia she could draw no profit. Of new territory in the West, Russia also has no need, and a war with Germany would involve such immense expenditure as could hardly be covered by an indemnit,, all the more so because, exhausted as she would be by a struggle with Russia, Germany could not pay an indemnity corresponding to the case. Generally, the political question for Russia lies in the Far East and not in the West. As concerns other possible pretexts for war, exa- mination would show that, in the present conditions of Europe, none are of sufficient gravity to cause a war threatening the combatants with mutual annihilation or complete exhaustion, nor need those moral misunder- standings and rivalries which exist between European states be seriously considered. It cannot be supposed that nations would determine to exterminate one another merely to show their superiority, or to avenge offences committed by individuals belonging to one nation against individuals belonging to another. Thus a consideration of all the reasonable causes of war would show that not one was probable. But even if peace were assured for an indefinite time, the very preparations made, the maintenance of armed ii MILITARISM AND ITS NEMESIS :isS forces and constant rearmaments, would require every year st.I greater and greater sacrifices. Yet every dav new needs anse and old needs are made clearer to the popular m,nd These needs remain unsatisfied, though Lnittn" of ^r^'"" , T^'""^"^ «^°-«- And t recognition of these evils by the people constitutes a serious danger for the state. «-uns,uiuics a reas"ed°to brhil""' "l"' •"'^ ""^ P^"'"^'^^' ^^^^'^ have ceased to be high mysteries accessible only to the few General military service, the spread of education and wide publicity have made the elements of the pdh es of states accessible to all. All who '„... . Jsed Ih^ough the ranks of an army have recof .ised tfat with modern weapons whole corps and squ.d.'v,ns n,,;y be dertroyeS n the first battle, and that in thi. ospe. the conauemr^ will suffer little less than the conqr -el ^^"^"erors Can It be possible that the growth of exoenditure nn armaments will continue for eve?? To thelSven veness of the human mind and the rivalry between st^s no limits exist. It IS not surprising therefore that the .mmense expenditure on military aims and the conse- quen growth of taxation are the favourite arguments of agitators, who declare that the institutions of fhe Middle Ages-when from thousands of castles armed knghs pounced upon passing merchants-were less burdenslme than modern preparations for war. "uxuensome The exact disposition of the 'masses in relation to armaments ,s shown by the increase in the number of irJaTda'Sn'G""'" ^"' ^^^^^^^^ ^' theTodlli: propaganda. In Germany in 1893, the opponents of the new mthtary project received .,0^7,000 votes more than us supporters. Between ,887 a^d ,Sgslhl oZ^thn Thus, if the present conditions continue, there can be but wo alternatives, either ruin from the Continuance of the armed peace, or a veritable catastrophe from war. Ihe question is naturally asked : What will be given to i 35^ IS WAR NOW IMPOSSIBLE ? the people after war as compensation for their immense losses ? The conquered certainly will be too exhausted to pay any money indemnity, and compensation must be taken by the retention of frontier territories which will be so mipoverished by war that their acquisition will be a loss rather than a gain. With such conditions can we hope for good sense among millions of men when but a handful of their former officers remain ? Will the armies of Western Europe where the Socialist propaganda has already spread among the masses, allow themselves to be disarmed, and if not must we not expect even greater disasters than those which marked the short-lived triumph of the Paris Commune ? The longer the present position of affairs continues the greater is the probability of such convul- sions after the close of a great war. It cannot be denied that conscription, by taking from productive occupations a greater number of men than the former conditions of service, has increased the popularity of subversive princi- ples among the masses. Formerly only Socialists were known ; now Anarchism has arisen. Not long ago the advocates of revolution were a handful ; now they have their representatives in all parliaments, and every new election increases their number in Germany, in France, in Austria, and in Italy. It is a strange coincidence tliat only in England and in the United States, where conscrip- tion IS unknown, are representative assemblies free from these elements of disintegration. Thus side by side with the growth of military burdens rise waves of popular dis- content threatening a social revolution. Such are the consequences of the so-called armed peace of Europe— slow destruction in consequence of expendi- ture on preparations for war, or swift destruction in the event of war— in both events convulsions in the social order. SIBLE ? for their immense 1 be too exhausted ipensation must be tories which will be quisition will be a pe for good sense dful of their former Western Europe, eady spread among sarmed, and if not, sasters than those iph of the Paris position of affairs y of such convui- cannot be denied :tive occupations a mer conditions of subversive princi- ily Socialists were Not long ago the il ; now they have s, and every new any, in France, in I coincidence that s, where conscrip- emblies free from side by side with 'es of popular dis- ailed armed peace lence of expend i- lestruction in the ms in the social INDEX Agricultural Class (see names of Countries) Alface'-LwSne^™^ '"' '^^'"^'^^'''^ ambulance arrangements, I5> Loss of, ultimate economic benefit to France, 277, 278 German"'^"''^' Probable efifect on, of return of provinces by Aluminium, vessels constructed with, impenetrability alleged. 102 Ambulance work (see title Wounded) k^ • *"-s Ammunition (see title Artillery) American Civil War : Armoured ships, final supersession of wooden ships. q6 Expenditure, 130 r 1 -r^ Losses, 343-345 Overcharged rifles found on field of battle, 21 Wheat, rise in price, 295 Anarchism, spread of, efifect on militarism, 347, 356 Arms, Small : ''^'^' ^^ Bayonet, reliance on, impossible in modt^rn warfare, 11, u Chassepot, effectiveness of fire compared with modern rifle, 5, Improvements in, 4 : Increased number of casualties resulting, 310-^20 Renewal in time of war, 307 &> j > o y Rifles (see that title) Russia, manufacture in, 242, 241, 107 Artillery and Artillery Ammunition : Amount eflfective for war. 61 Bombs: ^ Illuminating, used in night attack, 52 Itnprovements since Franco-Prussian war, 9 Coast batteries, fire from, ineffectiveness, 104 Destructiveness, calculations as to possibilities. 20 Electric projectile used in night attack, 52 Entrenchments, time taken in construction, 45 Explosion, premature, danger of, 20, 21, 12 ?lf!-?''!L^^^^A°^''^^*"<^!"^ troops, dangers attending. 334 xjcises, cXiciii 01 airect aciioii, 22 I 3S» INDEX V Artillery and Artillery ammunition (continued) : Guns : ' Cost of firing, 99, 100 Effect on future warfare, 8 Number of rounds required, 20 Russian factory at Obukovsk, 308 Improvements in, 7-19, 38, 329 ^tioTaf""*" °"' '" "^^^''"^ ""'^^ '''^^^y explosive ammuni. Preliminary action, before infantry attack suggested, 32 Role m future warfare, 17-23 ^ Shells : Decreased use of, in future warfare, 9 Increase in destructiveness since Franco- Prussian war o Premature explosion, danger of, 20 Shrapnel : Area of dispersal, 8 Destructiveness, 8, 9, 329 Wounds caused by artiUery fire, 148, 149, 152 Artillery, losses inflicted by, 10 Cavalry, 50 Difficulties under modern conditions. -1^7-140 Direct, rarity of, 45 ^^' ^^ European armies, comparative efficiency, 62 Infantry, defects of modern tactics, 25-34 Loose formation, 5 Night attack, 50 '' ^^l^Z^^^""^^^^ '^^^ Xriegs," statement as to food supplies in time of war, 302, 303 f h'"*;^ Austria : Agricultural Class ; Earnings, 314 Proportion of population, 317 Attack and defence, efficiency in, 62 Bachelors, percentage, 290 Coal supply, 306, 307 Crime, convictions, 232, 237 Danish war, expenditure, 130 Declaration of war improbable, 354 Drunkenness, statistics, 229, 230 Expenditure on Army and Navy, 133-138 Future wai stimates, 142, 143, 144 Fires, losses by, 192 Food supply, sufficient in event of war, 302 France, war with, expenditure on, 130 Frontier defences, expenuiiure on, 57 Grain Supplv ; Home production and import, 205, 296, 297 INDEX anco- Prussian war, 9 to food supplies in Austria icotUinued) : Grain Supply : Inequalities of harvests, 301 Oats, home production, 297, 208 Horses'Sr mn;/."' P'"^^^'"' '" ^^^"^ of war, ,4, hStJL.^'^ purposes, statistics, 316 intantry, re-armament, estimated cost ? Kerosene supply, deficiency, 305:3%' ^ Marriages, statist- -s, 208 ^' ^ Meat supply, superfluity, 303, 1504 Military strength, 36, 63 318^^ Navalexpenditure, 133,157,138 Kussian compared with, 1^5 Fo^^pXioHn^ctLPr^r'"^ ^'^°^ P-P--*-y training. 43 Old men and children, percentage, 280 R.. Jv " ^""^ """"^'■y' comparison, 193 ^ Reserve, proportion to be drawn upLn 42 «6 Revenue, distribution, 145, ,46 ^ ' ^'^' ^^^ Kifle, calibre adopted, 319 prs°ute^eXr^r3?; '-- (- '"a. «...) Sappers, number in army, yA ^ Securities held in Germany, 275, 276 BACHELORS, proportion to population in leading European States, f^^^IjS^^:^^^,^ - P-P'e of England, s^S Bardleben, Professor, on destructiv'e'nLs of modern rifles, 151 Accidental, description of, 46 Area, increased by modern conditions <; ^o Descriptions of future battles, 47, 48 ' ' ^^ Drration, prolonged, 52, 337, 338 ODen'i'nT? P'^^^^^le increase in number, 49, 338 Opening from great distance, 5 ^' "^^ S"nVT*' °^'" '^°d"" warfare impossible ^^ ,4 BeSum'" ''"'"^"'^y °^ "^°^^^" bulkts,'iso ' ' ^ Crime, statistics, 232 Drunkenness, 229, 230 Fires, losses by, 192, 193 Frontier defences, expenditure, 57 R^r/ IVP®""'«"ts with, 4 ' *^ «erdan Rifle : ^ Cartridges, number carried, ^28 War**-*--* ^r i^ >- 7 j*"^ 359 360 INDEX ^y Beresford, Lord Charles, on food supply in England, in time of war, 313 Bilroth, Professor, on aid to wounded, 156 Bircher, experiments in rifle fire, 152 Births : France, low rate, 288, 292 Illegitimate, statistics, 225 Russia, rate compared with other countries, 207, 208 Bismarck, Prince : Russian designs against Germany, report spread by, 136 Sea and land victories, statement as to comparative im- portance, 122 Black Sea Fleet, composition, 95 Blockade of ships in ports and harbours, 104, 105 Bombardment (see Naval Warfare) Bombs, 9, 52 Boots, defective, supplied in the Russo-Turkish war, 158 Bones, penetrative power of bullets, 1 53 Botkin, Professor, on defective ambulance arrangements in Russo- Turkish war, 1 54 Brest- Litousk, strategical importance, 71, 79, 80, 82 Brialmont, General, on : Fortresses, investment, 55 Franco-German War of the future, 65 Russia : F'-onomic effect of war, 163 Route of Jittack by Austro-German Army, probable, 76, 78 Sappers, number required in army, 333 Brisant shell, destructiveness, 9 Bruns, Herr, on modern bullets, 150, 151 Bullets : Penetrative power, 3, 6, 149, 319 Revolution and deformation, destructiveness affected by, 322, 328 Wounds (see title Rifle Wounds) Bunge, M. N. H,, on fluctuation in Russian securities, 166 Burdeau, M., on abandonment of investigation of economic condi- tions accompanying war, 91 Canada, losses by fires, statistics, 192, 193 Captains, importance in modern warfare, 38 Cartridges : Explosion, premature risk of, 21, 22 Supply carried by mo 'ern soldiers, 5-7, 328 Casualties, increase in, 5, 319-346 Cattle-breeding, 303, 304 England, 254-256 Russia, 198-201,303, 304 gland, in time of war, es, 207, 208 : spread by, 136 to comparative im- 105 ih war, 158 angements in Russo- 30,82 .rmy, probable, 76, 78 less affected by, 322, jcurities, 166 1 of economic condi- 28 INDEX 361 Cavalry, r61e in modem warfare, 11 Attack, 14, 50 Reconnaisances, 11, 12, 16 Rifle fire against, effectiveness, 124 Chassepot, effectiv ness of fire, c ^^ Chasseurs artillery hampered by is" 19 Chilian War : /» • ^ Losses, statistics, 343 p;fl«. ^/'^^^^ ancl men, comparison, 42, 33c. Rifles, modern deadliness proved by, 6, 29. 329 ' Torpedoes, use in, loi ' ^' "^^ China, foreign trade with, 125, 126 Coal supply of European States, comparison, ^06 ijo7 Coast batteries, ineffectiveness, 104 ' ^ ' ^^ Commander-in-Chief, position in modern warfare ^8 lo Afi Commissariat, difficulties of. 37, 300, 301. ^oTH'i ^I'J^' ^ Rise in price of provisions neven° of S ilo ^rti ,., Companies, Joint Stock, in England, 262 ' ^ ' ^'' '^^ Conscription : nSi"^!"'"?' '""ease since introduction of, 347, .qd Defects of system, 35, 36, 37 ' •'^^' ^^ Consols, holders of, statistics, 260, 261 Corea, po^sessmn of, nnde^irable for Russia, 126 127 Com supply, eftect of war on, 141, 294-3o7ur,rT.i8 Crime, statistics, 228-240 war-snips, 118 Crimean War; Armoured ships, introduction, 96 Black Sea Fleet, composition, 95 Casualties, 148, 343-345 English national debt increased by, 261; Expenditure, 129, 168 ' Provisions, rise in price, 143, 295 rron=!!.T'' ""^ '".vading fleets, Van der Goltz on. nq Cronstadt, committee to consider defence of, 97 ' ^ " Dandola," guns carried by, 99 Danish War (1864), expenditur?, 130 Death statistics, 209-213 Drunkenness, 230 ^ f^Btzx^:^^ '"'^ -*«. 34-34. Declaration of war by any Eurooean Pmv«r ; k„u, 1 •."i."-"-"auiC, j^4 362 INDEX Defence : Ar!> c ntages on side of defensive force, 63 Eni*/pean armies, comparative efificiency, 62 r engthening necessitated by modern arms, 5 Dementyeff, E. M., on condition of industrial class In Russia < i85-'87 Doctors : Army medical work (see title Wounded, aid of) Civil, statistics. Russia compared with other countries, 220, 221 DragomiroflF, General, on advantages of night attack, 51 Dreuze rifle, range of effective fire, 323 Drunkenness, crime, suicide, and insanitv resulting from, 226-228 Diippel, Battle of, casualties rt^vvlting fron rifle fire. 148 "Duilio": Cost of construction, 98 Guns carried by, 99 Duration of battle, stiuements as to, 52, 337, 338 Duration of v/fir, probably prolonged by modern condidons, J41 Economic efth-As of war, 6j, 91, 92, 348, 349, 353 England, -^.y -265 France, ^j;,'- „>',.3 Germ.iny, zb6-2y6 Nsval warfare, effects, no, 112 Russia, 163. 242, 250 Summary of effect on vital needs of people, 294-31.3 Education : Crime in relation to, statistics, 238 Expenditure, contrasted with that on war, 139 Russia, condition in, 216-219 Efficiency of armies, elements constituting, 61, 62 Electric projectile for use in night attack, 52 Emigration of Germans to America, decline in, 274 England : Bachelors, percentage, 290 Companies, Joint Stock, 262 Consols, holders of, statistics, 260, 261 Crime, convictions, 232, 237 Drunkenness, 227, 229, 230 Economic effect of war, 251 265 Expenditure on Army and Navy, 133-138, 263, 264 Russian Naval expenditure compared with, 125 Factories, large proportion <.f people engaged in, 262 Fires, losses caused by, 192, 193 Food : Production and importation, 251-218 Supply in time of war, probably inadequate, 3 ; INDEX 3 , 62 rnis, 5 trial class in Russiai^ aid of) other com;'^ries, 220, : attack, 51 lulling from, 226-228 fie fire, 148 J38 ern conditions, 341 353 le, 294-3 iS •, 139 , 62 1, i74 t, 263, 264 i with, 125 iged in, 262 equate, 3 * ^ England {continued) : Grain Supply: Harvests, inequality, 301 Meat, importation, 254-2:6 Nauona. Deb,, increase oVing .„ pa.. ,,„, ,54. ,6; Expenditure, 125, 133-138 Increase. 123, 124 ^ Pop"lat^o"n^''''' ""'"'^^ °^P«°P'- receiving, .61 Occupation, 258, 259 Wa^fab"'''' "'^Po^''' •"• »t«is.ics, 26. En.rSe„«..'"'=°™'' P'*""'^ ««•-' of war on. 358-263 Dead bodies cast out of, 157 Importance in modern warfarA !« . , Sappers, number of ,n" d?ff*T; I?i e'l ^?;"'^ Tactics in relation to, 26-1, A ' ^^^ Expenditure, Military • "^ ' ^^^ comparative statement as .0 expenditure on armies and navies p-rwarr'ir'.r"' '"^"' (See also names of Countries^ E«Plos,ves (see tit,. ArtiHery S^Artineiy Ammunition) 5^';;ir',=:ri"/'--"i^n;^si.io„onna.pendence (See also tit!«» n 363 vj-iam oi ippiy; 3^4 INDEX i\j IN Fortresses : Auxiliary obstacles used in defence, 334 Declaration of war, probably followed by immediate breaking through frontier defences, 57, 58 Losses durmg siege, probable increase, 332-334, 342 Strength of investing force, modern requirements, S5 Time probably required for siege, 55 Use in modern strategy, 52, 113 Fougasse cartridges and shells, danger of premature explosion, 20, 21, 22 France : Agricultural Class : Effect of war on, 287 Incomes, 313, 314 Percentage of population, 284, 285, 287, 317 Wages, 286 Algiers and Tunis, armies in, defective care of wounded, 155 Alliance with Russia, probable effect on of return of Alsace and Lorraine by Germany, 90 Artilleiy : Effective in event of war, amount, 63 Improvements in, 19, 329, 330 Assistance given to poor, statistics, 287, 288 Bachelors, proportion to population, 290 Coal supply, 306 Crime, statistics, 232, 236, 237 Debt, National, growth of, 281, 282 Declaration of war, improbable, 354 Drunkenness, 227, 229, 230 Economic effects of war, 277-293 Efficiency in attack and defence, comparison, 62 Estates passing by legacy and gift, statistics, 282, 283 Expenditure on war, statistics, 133-139 Future war, estimates, 142-144 Past wars, 128, 130 Revenue, distribution with regard to, 145, 146 Fires, losses by, 192, 193 Foreij^ners engaged in industry, 283 Franco-German War (see that title) Frontier defences, 57, 342 Grain Supply : Harvests, inequalities, 301 Insufficiency of local production in time of war, 296, 297 Import and home production, of wheat, barley, and rye, 295 Oats, home production insufficient, 297, 298 Horses for military service, statistics, 316 Imports and exports, 278-281, 283, 295, 303-305 Incomes, statistics, 286, 313 Insanity resulting from drunkenness, 227 INDEX y immediate breaking 332-334, 342 uirements, 55 emature explosion, 20, 287, 317 are of wounded, 155 n of return of Alsace 3 288 ison, 62 :ics, 282, 283 145, H6 ne of war, 296, 297 leat, barley, and rye, )7, 298 33-305 France {continued) : Kerosene supply, deficiency, 305. 106 Marna-es, statistics, 208 ^ Meat supply, deficiency, 303, 304 Militarism, attitude of people towards «c Military strength, statistics*^^ 36, 63 ' ^" Mobilisation of army in time nV t^^ ^ Navy : ^ ■ ^ °' ^*'^' expense estimated, 141 Armoured ships, introduction, 96 Expenditure, 133, 137, ,38 ^ Kussian compared with, 12? Increase, 123 Population : Birth-r ite, low, 288-292 Distribution according to industry, 284 Town and country, comparative growth, rg, R. JrS ^^ of growth, comparison with Germany 20^ Re-armament, estimated cost 5 cuiiauy, 293 Reserve forces, 42, 336 ' Defective training proved by manoeuvres w Revenue and Expenditure, 281 "*"'*"^'^«s, 37 Rifles : Calibre adopted, 319 Effectiveness : Comparison with other nations. 4. Diagrams illustrating, 325-^27 Russo-Austro-German war of the future (see that titl,.^ Sappers, number employed, 333 ^ ^ ""®^ Savings-banks, deposits in, 282 Socialist propaganda, 288 Tactics, delects of, 25 Tonkin War, torpedoes used in, loi Unemployed, proportion of population, 287, 288 FranroSa^S^'^^^r:?7i">'"^"' '''' ''^'^^ ^'^ Economic condition of country, improvement resulting from, Fortresses captured, 54 Improvement in arms since ■ Artillery, 9, 19, 78, 329, 330 bmall arms, 4, 5. 323, 324 Losses, statistics, 130, 131,343-345 Metz, battle indecisive, 49 ^^^ mem,7r°"'* ^'^'^ '"^"^^^ generally necessary for dislodg- Navy uniinportant part played by, 120, 121 Moltke, statement as tn im.uv^KoK.i;*,. „r _.. , German coast, 117 r- •-— ..7 ux a«ack on 3^S 3^^ INDEX s| Franro-German War (continued) : Night attacks, 51 ,^ Officers : Disablement -Irrted as principle in bal.le. 42 German : ' ^ {^-'■■l". n^ ., 33<^, 33(> Po.^. -• *"'}*«/" '"">, "» mdepenuence and self-relianre,46 Fans. SIP .e of, number of i.ien required for investment, qc Jsharpsh ' ers, important part in, 331, 332 '^ Wounded : > JJ . JJ Ambulance arrangements, defective, 154. 15c Cold steel, wounds by, perr" ■ ^g Explosive bullets, char- a:. 10 use oi; 15c Shells and bullets, wounds by, percentage. 140 Total losses, 131, 343-345 ^ Franco German War of the future, 63 Distribution of troops, 64 Efiectiveness in attack, comparison, 66 invasion of France by Germany, 65 Invasion of Germany by France, 67 Paris, siege of, difficulties attending, 66 Strength of forces, almost equal, 65 Frontier defences, 52, 57, 58 Franco r.erman, 65, 66 Russian, 73, 75 mm Gebler, Prc^>ssor, on effectiveness of modem rifle, 4, <;. 120 Oerbinus, on movements initiated by the masses, 60 Germany : ' Agricultural Class : Earnings, 314 Effict of war on, 2^7, 314, 316 Percentage of population, 26'"^ 268 Artillery: Increase i 'owei, ig Strength in 1896,63 Bachelors, proportion to population, 200 Coal supply, 306 Crime, stansiics, 2^2, 236, 338 Danish War, expenditure of Prussia on, 130 Drunkenness, 227, 229, 230 Economic effects of war, 266-276 Efficiency in attack and deff :», 62 Emigration, decline in, 274 Expenditure on future war. ( m: , 142, 143, 144 Expenditure on maintenance of Army and Navy, n 1 ^8 f ires, losses by, 192, 193 /» J J° INDEX in battle, 42 nd self-relianre, 46 i for investment, 55 132 ■..m. .55 ii, 15c jntage, 149 •n rifle, 4, 5, 329 ses, 60 30 M3- r44 Navy, 13 138 Germany {continued) . F"ranco-German War (see that title) 'jrain Supply : ^' h'ZT"' '>'!"''■"/• 298, 299, 301 Home prmlucmn and imprm 295 Insufficpency m tmc of war, 296, 297, -90 ,02 Plans for remedying, 3^2, 3^3'^' -"' ^"^ Incomes. di,.ribaZ'24%S^''r35™"' ^'■•-■^'^ Indusma,c,asses.effec,o'f„L'o„?2lg2;s ^ STZSf e^r.X" r "^ ■"^"'*''"'=' ^^' M;,;rvU:Tsr33t""'"^^'«-^^ Marriages, statistics, 208 Meai supply, in.por.s and exports ^ot i^a M ntary writers, caution of, 26 Navy : ' fv oenditnre, 125 li ease, 123 Officers : Herp :,iary class in Prussia, 350 Popul tn?*"" ' ''"'^'"^ «^°°d preparatory training, 43 G;owtri°9;>-. J^^''P^^'-' ^^6' ^68 p Old l2\Tc^sz:.%frt:^^ ?8r "'' '^3 Protiuction of necessities of Hfif If^ ' ^ • wUhdrawal of met formffiti'^'s^ ".'fr^,'" ''"" "' -"• "/ Keserve, statistics, 42, ^^6 ' ^^ Revenue, 145, 146 "'•^ Kifles : Calibre adopted, 319 Effectiveness, 4, 326, 327 Rus^an designs against, report spread by Prince Bisma pt^^r^^;;.^ ^f ^-- (- that title) l2!r^^"'"ber in ar^.;_, %] ^ 367 =k, :;= u: i^copie, inconsiderable 269, 271, 309, 310 I IJ I 368 INDEX Germany {continueil) : Securities, effect of war on, 275, 276 Socialist propaganda, activity, 271, 311, 312 Wages, low standard, ev.ls of war increased by, 308-m Women, effect of war on wage-earning . lass, 272-274 Gilyarovski, P., on condition of children in Russik 211 Gloire," construct!. .1, 96 ^ Goltz, Van der, Qiu lations from : Accidental Battle, description, 46 Deterioration of armies during long war, 346 Importanceof reinforcements, 45 Gorni-Dubnak, night attack on, 51 Gram supply, effect of war on, 141, 294-303, 310. 311 ma ,i« (sec also names of Countries) ^^ ^^' ^^' ^" Grardimay, defective ambulance arrangements. 11:6 Great Britain (see England) Gulletta, defective ambulance arrangements, 156 Field guns (see title Artillery, subheading Guns) Naval, 99, 103 * '"' HEDZVETSKi,y. I., on insufficiency of grain supply for German Army on Russian frontier, in event li war, 3^6 Hoenig, F., Quotations from : ^ Night attacks, 51 Sieges, in modern warfare, 52 Hohenlohe, Prince, on : Franco-Prussian War, incident in, 335 Shrapnel, destructiveness, 8 Holland : Fires, losses by, 192 Rifle, calibre adopted, 319 "^'ti'SIe o?;;^^'^,3" '"^"«""-'«°^y °f food supply in England in Horses, use of for military service, 315, 316 Russia, large supply available, 240-242 Bachelors, percentage, 290 Crime, statistics, 232 Grain production, 295 Population, percentage of old men and children, 289 Illuminating bomb for use in night attacks, 52 Incomes, Statistics : ^ England, 259 France, 286, 313 Germany, 269, 270, 272, 308 Russia, 314 INDEX ,31a sascd by, 308-311 • lass, 272-274 Russia, 211 «-, 346 ' 310, 3^3, 314, 318 nts, 156 , 156 ng Guns) n supply for German ar, 300 tupply in England in hildren, 289 ,52 3h Infantry .• Attacking party, number, proportion to defenders 11 Bayonet, rehance on in modem warfare iinpSc U ^a Carnages, use for rapid transport, 31a "P°""''''' ^^* 34 Cavalry, attack on, 15 "^ Enveloping, varying opinions as to, 30. u Equipment, weight, 36 ' "^ ' "^^ Losses, estimates, 14, 27-32 Marches, endurance required, 25. ^6 Officers, great ability required, 27 Reconnaissance, duties in relation to, 12. n 24 Re armament, estimated cost, 5 ^' ^ It f;sr',Se";rr"' '''• '''• '^^ ,ns.n.c.io„s as .o .aCcs, eS^.^^ ^^ ^'e 'Jo^-^^s, ^^^^^ I'Zdlf " -"""'->"«. -rking Of i„ R„,,u, ,,,_ ,,3, 3,^ Cost of construction, 98 Guns and ammunition, 98, oo Introduction, 96 Machinery, complexity, 106 Thickness of armour, ^ " Italk^'^*"""*'*^^^ compartments, 102 Cost of construction, 98 Ital ^""^ ^^ ammunition carried by, 99 Crime, statistics, 232, 236. Drunkenness, deaths from, 230 Efficiency, comparative, in attack and defence 62 Expenditure on war estimates, i ^r , xqiIT,\^ Frontier defence, expenditure, 57^ ^^' '^' '^6 Future war, distribution of troops, 64 Marriages, statistics, 208 Grain Supply : Harvests, inequalities, 301 Home production and importation, 295 Insufficient in event of war, 296 297 Oats, home productions, 297, 7,08 Horses for military service, staiisucs, si6 infantry, re-armament, cost estimated; 5 Keiosene supply, deficiency, 305, 306 Losses in war u/itV. A„„*„:-'. . --"-"^ ■Kit ^ war with Austria, 343, ^4^ supply, Superfluity, 303, 304" r 2 A 370 INDEX i'yl Italy {continued) : Military strength, total, 36, 63 Navy, exDcnditure on, 133, 138, 139 Russia compared with, IJ5 Population, rate of increase, 292 Reserve, proportion to regular army, 25, 42, 336 Revenue, distribution, 145, 146 Rifle: Calibre adopted, 319 Effectiveness, 4 Salt supply, superfluity, 304, 305 Sappers, number in army, 333 Securities held in Germany, 275, 276. JANSON, General, on : Inf ntry attack, 32 Ofiicers in Franco- Prussian War, independence of, 46 Foreign trade with, 125, 126 Russia, relations with, 124, 125, 127 Jung, General, on mobilisation of French Army in time of war, 141 Kagaretch, night attack on, 51 Kars, night attack on, 51 Kef, defective ambulance arrangements at, 156 Kerosene supply, 305, 306 Killed, proportion to wounded in modern warfare, 342-34 c Kilhchen, General, on nuniber of sappers required by army, 3x3 Koenig Wilhelm," cost of construction, 98 Kdnigsberg, sections of bridges, and materials for railways stored at, 83 ' Kotid, S. N., on effect of war on price of com in Austria. 141 Kovno, strength of fortress, 79 Kuropatkin, General, night attack advocated by, 51 ♦* La Poudre sans Fum]6e" .- Battle described in, 47 Night attack advocated m, 51 Langlois, Colonel, statements as to artillery fire : Effectiveness, 7, 8, 329, 330 T ^^^"'"ber of rounds required for one field-piece, 20 Le Mans, night attack on, 51 T ^^ ^'j^ogr^s Militaire" on cost of naval weapons, qq Leer, General, on : ^^ Duration, probable, of war with Russia, 315 German Army on Russian frontier, statistics, 300 Liebert, on difficulties of pursuit under modern conditions, 50 Si 42, 336 pendence of, 46 jmyin time of war, 141 156 arfare, 342-345 quired by army, 233 als for railways stored n in Austria, 141 i by, SI fire: -piece, 20 pons, 99 315 sties, 3 -J' -J 4 Melinite, danger of premature explosion, 20 Merrimac," exploit of, 96 Mexican war, losses in, analysis, Wi Mignol, Colonel, on French tactics, 25 Moll;:?^nr"^'°"*°' 347-356 K^nln^ ^7^ ''J ^'""^ °^ ^^'■' ^^^'^rnate of cost. 141 M 1 r^P'^i'^y of modern methods, 36, 64, 6? "Monitor," battle with "Merrimac," 96 Monteculh on effect of insufficient food upon troops ^41 Morache, analysis of losses in modern wars^^J MoSnts o?PnV° ""'T'^ possibility, in event of war, 84-87 movements of tnemy, observation of : » ■+ "/ Auxiliary instruments for, 10 Cavalry and infantry, duties in relation to, 12, 1 3 Sharpshooters, duties, 331, 332 ' ^ Muller, General, on effectiveness of modem artillery 20 11 «o Murder, convictions, statistics, 232 ""'"^ry, 20, 31, 330 Napoleon I : Moscow campaign, strength of French onH Ruc-j^n a^:- -» omoiciisk and Moscow"; 86 '" ^"■'■''•'" ^'^"^= *** 372 INDEX Napoleon I. {continued) : Plan of battle, allowance made for accidents, 45, 46 Success in battle, statement as to chances of, 44 Naval Warfare : Accident, strong element in, 108, 109 Austrian Navy, expenditure on, 133, 137, 138 Russian expenditure compared with, 125 Blockade of ports, 104 Bombardment of towns, 103, 118, 119 Undefended towns not to be bombarded, principle not acknowledged, 103 Coast batteries, ineffectiveness, 104 Cruisers : Light and swift, preference for, 100 Destructiveness, increase in, 105 English Navy (see England) Expenditure entailed, 98, 99, no, in, n3, 133-138 French Navy (see France) Future of naval warfare, 93-n2 German Navy, expenditure, 123, 125 Guns, 99, 103 Ironclads (see that title) Italian Navy, expenditure, 125, 133, 138, 139 Ordnance, improvements in, 97 Pi ivateering, 109, 295 Result of batile between fleets of equal strength, 107 Russian Navy (see title Russia) Shells : Cost of, 99, 100 Destructive power, 99, 106, 108 Social and 6' onomic results, no, 112 Steam, adoption, 95 Torpedoes, 100-103 Nerve of soldiers : Artillery fire, effect of, lo Deterioration, 52, 340 Rifle fire, effect of, 6 Strain in dealing with highly explosive ammunition, 21 Night Attack : ' Effectiveness, difference of opinion as to, 50-52 Nerves of soldiers affected by possibility of, 340 Nigote, Captain : Battle described by, 48 Duration of battles, 52 Nirschau riots, casualties caused by rifle fire, 322 Norway marriage statistics, 209 Oats, home production insufficient in Central European States, 297, 298 INDEX cidents, 45, 46 nces of, 44 37, 138 nth, 125 373 ombarded, principle not for, 100 "3, 133-138 38, 139 l1 strength, 107 ; ammunition, 21 to, 50-52 ity of, 340 e, 322 jntral European States, Obukovsk, ordnance factory at, 308 Umcers : .' > j " SSX^ort.^ c„„di.i„„^',V3i?„U, .;, 34, 37:335 Paris : |S oii'fk^^^l^r^^^l'^'or investmen,, 55 Unemployed in, 288 ^^^ ^"^"'■«' difficulties, 66 P^^ScCcV::;:iti^^^^^ •"'^^P-'^y ^- ^eavy tasks. 272 invented by, 327 ' •"'^'"'"^"* ^o"" measurmg d.stances of rifle ihl SstS'cenerT ' °^ P'^^'^f ^^^^ explosion, 20 perhtd?rombir^^^^^^ Pigorof on : threatened durmg naval manceuvres, 103 Defective care of wounded, 1C4 ;PioMn:t^' -=1^ ^^,«-ive boo., „s Pistols, Mauser, rate of fire, 4 ^^'^ J ans of campaign in future warfare 6^ Plevna, siege of, 54 anare, 63 Poland: £if f',?tatistics, 231, 236, 238 Popilace?'''' ^'^"'^'"^ ^^^« °^ ^°""ded at, 156 Attitude towards militarism, 347, 35, Port? n'^ "'^ '^^V'' ^"^^ "eeds or; 294 Pota?o.?'" ?.• "^^-^'^^^ ^^'■^ of ^o»nded, r 53 i cy P^e^srSreffe^^^^^^^^^ -^ ^^^^ ^54 Artillery, 17, 18 BSeVs^bed in iPrr^i^r, 339 Pnfa«'r";rc.t'r^f " warfara'increased, 6 Night attack aided by, 51 So«nH";V' w'!f' '^'^^"^^y increased, 12 ''ss,«.'.".':''!"-,»?*-. '09', 4' .... gu^.- tii^jLQ 0y^ gj^ yg 374 INDEX Propaganda against war, effect on minds of soldiers, 30 Prussian needle-gun (1870), range of effectual fire, 6 Psychological aspect of war, 59 Pursuit : Cavalry, role in, 16 Difficulty under modern conditions, 50 Puzuirevski, General, on night attacks, 51 Quarters for soldiers, difficulty of procuring, 37 RECON..AISSANCES : Cavalry and infantry, duties defined, 12, 13, 24 Sharpshooters, employed for prevention of, 331 Reger, Dr., ou modern bullets, 150 Reserve Soldiers s Drawbacks to employment of, 25, 27, ^7, 340 Officers, efficiency doubtful, 27, 37, 42, 335 Statistics, 42, 336 Retreat : Cavalry purtjit, 16 Dangers under modern conditions, 340 Revenue, distribution in different countries, 145, 146 Revolutionary movement', effect of w£r on, 91, 356 Rhme, probable fficulty of crossing, in Franco-German War of the Future, 6/ Richter, Professor on defective care of wounded. Ki; Rifle wounds, 148 ^^ Explosive character of bullets rired at great velocity, 150 151 increased number of casualties, 150, 152, 319 Penetrative power of bullets, 3, 149, 319 Proportion of killed to wounded, ^42 Rifles : Accuracy increase, 6, 7, 323, 324 American Civil War, over-charged rifles found on field, 21 Artillery fire, comparative dtdtructiveness, 148 Calibre, diminished, advantages, 5 Cartridges, number carried, 5-7, 328 Chilian War, deadliness of modem arms proved by, 6 Effectiveness of modem weapons, 3, 319 Diagrams illustrating, 321, 343 Rate of increase in power, 38 Fire over heads of advancing troops, dangers of, 334 Measuring distances, instrument for, 327 Penetrative power of bullets, 3, 6, 149, 319 Random shots, losses from, 29 Range of effective fire, 3, 324 Rate of fire, 4, 45 Revolution and deformation of bull-t, destructiveness effected by, 332, 328 )f soldiers, 30 tual fire, 6 INDEX 375 mg. 37 2, 13, 24 n of, 331 S7, 340 335 US, 146 91, 356 Vanco- German War of nded, 155 reat velocity, 150^ 151 2, 319 •,319 ♦2 J found on field, 21 ss, 148 IS proved by, 6 ) ngers of, 334 7 '9 estructiveness effected Rifles {continued) : ?hl-l"!?n^1'!!^' '"^''^ °^^"°y of aluminium. 4 bhrapnel hre, comparison with, 8, 329 Rohnt, General, on : Attack on fortified position, 10 bharpshooters, use of, 19 Roon, Von, on strain on nerve:;, ^40 Roumania : ^ Army, number of sappers in, 333 «T. V^'"^^^'^' inequalities, 301 'Rurik," machinery of, 106 Russia : Agricultural Class, 196-203 Ea^ntgrjlf '"""' '" ^"-""° War, .,4 Effect of war on, 249, 317 Indebtedness of peasants, 203 Arms^and ammunition, manufacture. 242, 243, 307 Illegitimate, 223, 225 r,».i^™P°''!'°"' ^o^npared with other countries 207 Cattle supply, 198-201, 303, 304 '"^^' ^°7 Character of population and country, 163, 203. 214 Children, condition of, 209-^13 ^' •'' ^ Chinese trade, 125, 126 Coal supply, 306, 307 Corea, possession of undesirable. 126. 127 Cotton, wool, skins, and linen supply Ji Crime, statistics, 228 ^ ' Crimean War (see that title) Death-rate, 209 Declaration of war improbaVle, ^4 Defensive war, advantages in, !?46 Doctors, number, comparison with other countrie« o,« Domestic animals, 198 countries, 220 Drunkenness, 227 Duration of war, probability, 31: Economic effects of war, 163 Summary, 242, 250 Education, popular, 216 Efficiency in attack and defence, a2 Expenditure on justice and prihct^s, 239 Expenditure on War : ^^ Comparison with'oiher States, nr 24c Daily, m time of .-..r, 142, 143 169 248 Decrease, probable, 249 ' ^ X UtUxc ur estimates, 142-144. 169, 248 I 376 INDEX Russia {contimied) : Expenditure on War : Iiicrease, 133, 134-139, 169 One inhabitant, expenditure by, 169, 170 One soldier, cost ol maintenance, yearly, 136, 160 Past wars, 131, 132, i68 /. J » "y Revenue, distribution, 145, 146 oTwa^' °i65°i^7f;3'';"'"''"'^°" ^°^*^^^ ^"PP°rt during time Finanres, 115 iJifficulties attending war, 247, 248 Fires, losses by, 192- J95 Food supply, sufficient, in event of war, 302 Grain Supply : Effect of war on prices, 249 Harvests, inequalities, 301 Oats, yearly exports, 298 Sufficient in time of war, 297 Horses for military service, 240, 316 Incomes of people, effect of war on, 314 Indebtedness of population, 203 Infantry, re-armament, cost estimated, 5 Iron and steel, working and manufacture of, 242. 24^ 107 Japan, danger from improbable, 127 ^' ^' Kerosene supply, 305, 306 Marnages, proportion compared with other countries, 207, Meat supply, 303, 304 Medicine, outlay on, per inhabitant, 222 Mihtary strength, 36, 63 Nav'^^°^°"*°" of population engaged in army, 318 Armoured ships, introduction, 97 Expenditure, 124, 125, 133-139 Increase, n6. 124 Need of, questioned, 113 Shipbuildmg works executed in England, 116 Steam introduction, 95 = -, Nerve of soldiers, probable superiority, 52 PopStion'?°'^'°'' possessing good preparatory training, 43 Distribution, igo Effect of war on, 188 Pnc.^''°"[*^r' i^^^' "J' '^9, ^90, 193, 206, 207, 292 Posts and Pelegraphs, expenditure on, 181 Kenewal ^l army, circumstances affecting, 240 Reserve, proportion to regular armv. 2c. 42. -xif^ INDEX >9, 170 nearly, 136, 169 ds support during time , 302 port spread by Prince e of, 242, 243, 307 other countries, 207, a army, 318 rland, 116 2 paratory training, 43 207, 292 3i J, 240 A2. llA Russia {continued) • Revenue,distribution,r4S,i46 rorK'"''^y'.''"P''ovemtnt in, 325 Calibre adopted, 319 ' Sapper-, number employed in army „, iecS:"""''*"^'"=' '«. '96 /.V"' sfe]iraS;,"-x°' ""'--- Sibenan railway, 124, ,26 sSrstaS; 2%"'""'' «-' -0" Nicholas I.. ,64 Towns, growth of, 193 Imports, 177 MlrHtT/'^lF '"''■' P*"°bable, ,82 Maritime trade, 125 wages, 186,3(4 Wounded, cd re of, reforms needed icH Alhes of Germany, weakness, 70 7, * Distribution of troops, 64 ' ^ ' ^ Defensive attitude of Germany. 72 77 Economic and social conditions afferhnc ^, France, probable change of a^fiJ,, Jl • "?' ^'' ^2 Alsace-Lorraine, 90^ ^"'^""^^ '" ^^^^ event of return of InS 0I L"s1etn'janc?a'h^' 'i' ''^ ^ Invasion of GSny''b';;^^ustt""' '"^P^^^^^'^' ^ Inva^r^rtsZ'j^prlaS^l^"^^^ only accessible, ,2, Maps and plans, 74, 7? 8, 89 ' "' '^' "^'^^^ Moscow, attempt to occupy, 74. 84 8' P^ ^/clTa?/n:^^^'-'3!%!r^',,, So. S„ 85. 86 Poland, strategical importance, 72. ?-x 82 8c &'rbaf,r^ ^"-"-^-^ -o RuJL. 86 St. Petersburg, attempt to occunv 8^ :t£-^;r '^•-"-Sfo^n. in, ,, ;6, 8, 83, 86 377 Winter, diffirujties of advance in, 8/ 378 INDEX Russo Turkish war : Entrenchments, value proved in, 332 Expenditure, 131, 132, 168 Frost-bitten feet ascribed to wet boots, 158 Industrial production of Russia at time of, 182 Losses, statistics, 343-345 Nerve of soldiers, 52 Night attack, 51 • Revolutionary movement strengthened by. gi Torpedoes, use in, loi Wounded : Cast out of trenches, 157 Defective care of, 154 Steel weapons, 148 Rustow, on probable duration of future campaign, 341 St. Cyr, Marshal, on composition of a brave army, 340 IhelmureTi; ""^" occupation possibly attempted in war of Salt supply, Russia contrasted with Western Powers, 304 Sappers, number required, 33^ » J *» Sardinia, war (1859) expenditure on, 130 Saur, General Von, on attack on fortresses, i;6 Saxony : ' Grain production, 299 Incomes, amount and distribution, 270 ^.1,.^°^?'^^°-'' ^°^" a"d country, comparative growth, 193 Scheibert, Major, on Russo-Austro-German War of tiie Future, 72, "t^lm"?^!^'^' ""'■ ''°"' '"^ ^°" ^^-d-d of wages in Scotland, population distribution, 262 Securities, Government, probable effect of war on, 353 Harvests, inequality, 301 Securities held in Germany, 275, 276 Sharpshooters : •" / j» / Aitillery-men hampered by, 18, 19 Use of in future warfare, 331, 332 Shells : Decreased use in future warfare, 9 Explosion, premature, danger of, 20 Increase of destructive power, 9 Navy, 99 Destructive power, 106, 108 Wounds caused by, 148, 149, 152 Shrapnel : Area of dispersal, 8 S T Tc Tc Tr Tu Tu Tui Typ Un] 58 r, 182 Y,9l aign, 341 'e army, 340 It tempted in war of owers, 304 e growth, 193 ir of the Future, 72, 3ard of wages in on. 353 INDEX Shrapnel {continued) • '^^^ Siberian SiLyri^Tam o^ll'"' *' ^=' Sieges (see title Fortresses) ^^ Smope, battle of, cost of fir „» juns io„ Siie of armies, difficulties nf wfjr ' !^ SIcugarevski, GenTral, ™ "'"'^ '"""=«' >>• 36 RMet^^Tf""''^''^' io^SSSt'efc of ''™<'"' Sokolovski, Mr., o„ indebtedness o[&'sian peasant. ^, Cnme, statistics, 232 c, A'V^' effectiveness, 4 Steel Weapons : Casuahies caused by, 148, 310 Russia, manufacture of, 307 ^ Mem, on provisioning of armv i^r SfeSf.J'-ess7™i-stso,diers,3,a Supporting bodies i„ attack, deadliness of artillery fi„ .o. ,o Crime, statistics, 236 fire, losses by, 192 Marriages, statistics, 108 Switzerland, frontier defences exnenw. "^es, expenditure on, 57 Tactics .- Torpedoes,' xo"-fo3 ' "'°""^= '"' '^8 5f7f""e expenditure, 745 |":o5T'.!?kTs?''x?td,.,,,, ;*.<.eat".SXSvTL^Sa,.,., United States • Chilian War (see that title 38o?69|y/ INDEX I United Statr , {continued) • FXTos;.<%:';^V'-f "■> Civil War-. Calrbre adopted, 319 . Effectiveness, 4 Universal Service : £:Sl7i;S%V';« "'"^""ion of, 34;, 356 VAMSCHOEPPKK, „sp.c.or, repo„ „„ wages i„ Germany, 3,0 ^Vages • Wura. p„p„u„-o„, proportion „f „„i„„^ ;„^^^^ ^^_ England, 258 France, 286 Germany, 272-274, 308-312 Cost of construction, 98 bhells carried by, 99 ^Sn^'dT^Sl^^f^J °f-<- -a. ^arfere, ,0, fcmS^^^!^^- careof .o„„ded a, .54 France, 287 Genuany, 272, 273 W<.r.h. bame of, dead and wounded soldiers cas. ou. of .rench^ Wounded : ' Aid to, 147, 152 Defective arrangements in recent war«i ir^. Difficulties, under modern conditions ^o^Jcfi Reforms needed, 152. icfi """'°"s, 30, 156 Artilleryfire X48,i49, /sV^^ Cha^cter of wounds, effect of improvements in firearms 0^ RittoSte" ttrSr '" '"^'^^ ^^^^-' 34. Steel weapons, casualties caused by, ,48, 3,9 EX Civil War'' time of war, 30a duction of, 34;, 356 3n wages in Germany, 310 ion of national income earned lem naval warfare, 109 F wounded at, 154 oldiers cast out of trenches' ;ent wars, 154 iditions, 30, 156 >rovements in firearms on ■ odern warfare, 342 ^ M8, 319