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(From the Proeeedinyg qfthe OayMdian Journal, iOth March, 1886).
THE CAMPAIGN OF i8i5
BY
R. E. KINGSFORD, M. A.
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THE CAMPAIGN OF 4815
BY R. E. KINSKORD, M.A.
The Rebellion of the French nation against Louis XVI. was the pro-
test of humanity against oppression. The French, that lively, courage-
ous and industrious race, deserve the w6rld's thanks for their
desperate resolution to inaugurate a new system. Their thorough-
ness in carrying out the resolve brought upon them the enmity of
almost all other nations, but those very nations profit this day by
the Revolution, to punish which they invaded France. Even the
insular English, then politically a century in advance of the Conti-
nent, found that they had much to learn. An impulse was given to
aspirations for freedom which was communicated to each of the
Continental nations in succession, and this impulse, through impeded
from time to time, has never ceased in its action. But just as, in
the case of individuals, men suffer in their own persons the con-
sequences of originality, so the French nation bitterly paid for its
generous self-sacritice on the altar of Freedom. A saci'ed cause was
defiled ; enthusiam was replaced by fanaticism ; fanaticism gave way
after a struggle to charlatanism ; charlatanism supported itself by mur-
der. The end was chaos. Out of chaos sprang Napoleon. A man of
the sword, he smote with the sword, and he crushed the vermin who,
daring to crawl on the statue of liberty, had stained it with their
filth. But the statue itself he overturned, and he placed himself on
the pedestal. From that eminence he was in turn struck down, but
he long held the position by virtue of extraordinary genius, courage
and energy. We shall see him make a supreme effort to recover him-
self, almost succeed, then sink, baffled and exhausted, into a Slough
of Despond, from which he was destined never to emerge.
We propose to give a succinct account of the military operations of
the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th of June, 1815.. A careful examina-
tion of the authorities has led us to the opinion that the popular
belief of Englishmen and men of English descent with regard to this
campaign requires revision, and that there are salient features which
have been ignored by most English writers.
■5r
Proc. Can. Inst. 3'^ Ser.
SCALE
JO MILES TO THE INCH.
MAP OP PART OF BELGIUM T
CuV2^T»A.IGN OF
COPIED FROM EDGAR Q.U I N E
Dx: LA
CAM.PAGNE DE
Vol. IV PI. II.
(•Blouvain
I
JELGIUM TO ILLUSTRATE THE
.PA.IGN OF 1815.
:dgar q.uinet's mistoire
DE LA
LPAGNE DE 1815.
-U
The general English idea is that " The Duke " drubbed the French
well, and that he never was in serious danger.
The Prussians think, on the other hand, that the English would
never have beaten the French but for their help, and that they are,
equdly with the English, entitled to the credit of victory, perhaps
more so.
The French, again, believe that their idol would have annihilated
both English and Prussians had there not been treason. They know
that the Prussians were defeated and the English surprised, and why
they themselves were ultimately beaten they have never understood.
Examination of the facts should inform us which of the two first
opinions is correct and give r ^ an explanation for the third. This
examination we projjose to make briefly, but fairly and dispassionately.
The story we have to tell may be called the " Drama of Waterloo."
It consists of a Prologue and Four Acts. We propose to narrate it
in that manner.
PROLOGUE.
Napoleon left Elba on the 26th February, 1815. He landed at
Cannes on the 1st March. He arrived at Fontainebleau on the 20th
March. That is, in three weeks he was tuaster of France. The first
prominent man who joined him was General Labedoy^re. We shall
meet his name again.
The army and the Marshals declared for the Emperor on the 22nd
of March.
But the Bourbons had been in power since the preceding May.
A few of the Marshals and a portion of the superior ofBcera remained
true to them. In the interval, also, they had broken up the old
Napoleonic organization. They had replaced the Tricouleur by the
White Lilies. They had changed the designations of the various
regiments, studious in every thing, Mrs. Partingtons as they were,
to use their feeble broom against the tide of modem feeling. But
there were with the colours on the 1st April 223,972 men, 155,000
of whom were ready to take the field.
The evidence as to the condition of these men seems to Establish
that they were well uniformed and armed. Napoleon claimed that
^hey were not so, but it seems that his statements were incoiTect on
jbhis point.
Here is afiTorded the opportunity of presenting the real obstacle in
the way of forming a fair judgment of the occurrences we are about
to relate.
Napoleon pub]ighe<l two versions of the campaign of 1815: tlie
first, by General Gourgana, in 1818; the second in 1820, as M6inoir«8
pour aervir d Vhitioire (U France en 1815, subsequently re-published
in 1830 as Volume IX. of the Memoirs dictated at St. Helena. These
volumes, according to certain French authorities, are full of mistakes,
misrepresentations and inexact statements. Por some years, how-
ever, they passed unquestioned. In 1840 the Duke of Elchingen,
second son of Marshal Vey, with the view of restoring his father's
memory, which he dee'ned unjustly assailed by Napoleon, gave the first
shock to their authority by publishing a collection of the orders and
letters of the Emi)eror to the Marshal, and also the result of enquiries
made by himself among ofiUcers then surviving as to what actually
happened. Other memoirs, such as those of Grouchy and Gerard,
were also published. Between 1839 and 1842 appeared Alison's
Europe. Siborne's account of the Waterloo Campaign, which,
although trustworthy, contains too much fulsome eulogy of the "Great
Duke," was published in 1841. The German, or Prussian, view of
the matter, as given by Von Damitz and Von Clausewitz, had been
published in 1837 and 1835. Thus conflicting materials accumulated.
At last, in 1857, there appeared the " Histoire de la Campagne tie
1815," by Lieut. -Colonel Charras, which, although not as commonly
known to English readers as it ought to be, must ever be consulted
as an elaborately minute account of the campaign. It must be read
with caution, as it is very unfair to Napoleon in many points, while
its author claims an eager desire to do him justice. A critical
examination will lead to the conviction that the desire, if it i-eally
existed, was not carried out. M. Edgar Quinet's " Hiatoire ile la
Campagne de 1815" was published in 1862. He follows in Charras'
footsteps. Thiers also gives a version of the events, which should
be read as a corrective of Charras. If Napoleon threw the blame of
the disaster upon others, a certain school of French writera, of whom
Charras and Quinet are tyjjes, have not been slack in retorting on
him. He is made responsible, as far as possible, for the unfortunate
issue of the campaign, and in his shortcomings is found some solace
to wounded French pride. In using both Charras and Quinet this
fact must be borne in mind, and even-handed justice will be forced to
modify their conclusions on many points in Napoleon's favour.
The divergence comes up first with reference to Napoleon's actions
after he had landed in France. The anti-Napoleonic school minimize
in every way what was done, but the general impression on this sub-
6
ject is that the Emperor displayed wonderful genius and enerjg;y.
Sibome says:— "Never, perhaps, in the whole course of the extra-
" ordinary career of that extraordinary man did the powerful energies
" of hia comprehensive mind shine forth with greater brilliancy and
" effect than in his truly wonderful and incredibly rapid development
*'of the national resources of France on this momentous occasion."
We caniiot here enumerate all that Napoleon effected between the -
time of his landing at Cannes in March and his taking the field in
June. A discussion of his political measures during this time is
foreign to oar purpose.
I. may be pointed out that the Fi jnch complain that Nai^oleon did
not lay before them as a nation the peril in which they stood. In
May 800,000 foreign troops were on their borders. But Napoleon
deceived the people by constant assurances of peace. His war
measures, they urge, were not taken with the determination necessary
under the circumstances. On the 25th March the Congress of Vienna
had formally declared a united war of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia
and Austria against Napoleon. He knew of this declaration, the
country should have known of it too. But Napoleon felt his per-
sonal danger. His only line of policy in his own interest was that
of not alarming the French too soon, or they would have perceived
the effects of their sudden revolution in his favour and would have
risen .'.gainst him. He therefore declared no general levy of the
National Guard. But the fact remains, that while Napoleon on the
first of March wae, an exile, on the first of June he had a thoroughly
equipped regular army of 200,000 men. He had a reserve of another
200,000. By the 15th June he would have had the conscription of
1815, producing 77,500 more, besides another hundi*ed battalions of
National Guard, or 70,000 more ; in all, 555,000 soldiers. When
in addition to these figures we take into consideration the immense
mass of material, cannon, equipment for horse and man, provided by
Napoleon during this time, the fortresses he garrisoned, besides the
thinking out and preparing for the campaign with the necessary
movements of troops, whatever some French writers may say, the world
will not .vithhold from him its adipiration. It should be remem-
bered also that nothing has been said of his complete reorganization
of the civil administration in all its aspects^ social, financial, and
political ; nor of his negotiations with foreign states, alone enough to
tax the greatest powers. The man who accomplished such results in
so ehojct a time now threw down the gauntlet to Europe,
U
ACl' 1.
i .
SCENE: CHARLEROI.
Time :— 16th June, 1816.
Nothing marks more clearly the immense progress tfce world has
made since 1815, than the advance in the means of commnnicating
intelligence. To-day, if Russia masses her Cossacks at a point on
the Indian frontier, all England knows it the same day, and expla-
nations are demanded forthwith.
In June, 1815, Napoleon threw 130,000 men on the Flemish
frontier, and neither Wellington nor Bliicher knew of it until the
blow struck them. Of his 200,000 men. Napoleon oould at this
point only avail himself of 130,000. In Alsace, Savby, the I^-
renees, and La Vend^ were 55s,800 more; the remainder oi the
200,000 wei-e in gai-rison at Paris, Lyons, and other plaees. It is
with the fortune of these 130,000 men that we have to deal. Napo-
leon, having decided to try the isanie of war in Belgium, directed his
efforts towardi? masking the movements of his troops. He had
divided his arriiy into six corps, which, on the 1st June, were at
Valenciennes, Avesnes, Rocroi, Metz, and Laon. The Guai-d was at
Coinpiegne. The total strength of the army was 128,088 men, with
344 guns. All this mass was quietly moved in such a manner .that
on the 14th of June the whole stood in front of Charleroi, ready to
strike, the emperor being personally in command. Opposed, were
tlie Anglo-allied and Prussian armies.
The Duke of Wellington had at his disposal 105,000 men and
186 guns.
Bliicher had about 120,000 men and 312 guns: in other words,
1 30,000 French and 344 guns, against 225,000 allies and 498 guns :
Napoleon against Bliicher and Wellington. The Anglo-allied and
Prussian armies lay side by side. "Hie highway between Tharleroi
and Brussels was the dividing line. It was the English left, the
Prussian right, except close to Charleroi, where the Prussians over-
lapped. From it Wellington's forces stretched to the sea. From it
Bliicher's extended to Li^ge, considerably over one hundred miles
from the sea. Wellington had named Enghien or Nivelles as his
point of concentration, as he might be attacked on his right or left
centre. Bliicher had chosen Sombref and Namur for the same pur-
pose. It will be seen that, while Wellington or Bliicher could each
concentrate his own troops on tbeir own respective centre within a
comparatively short time, yet, if they were attacked on either flank
it would take a much longer time to collect them. The readiest
mode of attacking Wellington from France was on his right, that is,
by way of Mons and Ath, as will be seen by looking at the map of
Franee and Belgium. He expected to be so attacked. His secret
orders of the 30th April, 1815, are a proof of this statement. Hav-
ing premised that he had received intelligence that Napoleon was
about to visit the northern frontier, ho proceeds : —
" In this case the enemy's Hne of attack will be either between
" the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambi'e and Scheldt, or
" by both lines."
It was neither. It was between the Sambre and the Meuse, and
on his extreme left, not on his right or left centre. But "Wellington's
mind was pre-occupied with his own idea, and even when the attack
came on his extreme left he gave orders for concentration en
Nivelles, which, fortunately for his reputp.Uon, were disobeyed. Had
they been followed, Napoleon's left wing would probably have been
in Brussels on the 1 6th of June
Napoleon struck the allies precisely where they were weak, just
at the point where it took them longest to concentrate. His strategy
deserved to succeed, and the impartial student, however" much he
may find it necessary to blame Napoleon in Lis career, can only come
to one conclusion on this master stroke. Unquestionably Napoleon
did surprise Wellington and Bliicher, his plan was well laid, ably
executed, and only miscarried aom a series of strange accidents,
which, as one reads of them, seem as if they were the result of super-^
natural interference.
The campaign being one of attack, it will bd best understood by
following the attacking force. The French army, being collected in
three divisions, advanced during the night of the 14th in three
columns, the left from Soh'e-sur-Sambre (see map) by Thuin upon
Marchiennes ; the centre from Beaumont by Ham-sur-Heure upon
Charleroi : and the right from PhilippevilJe (not on map) by Ger-
pines upon Ch&telet.
Now happened the first check. Greneral De Bourmont, a General
of Division, with some of his staff, deserted. The effect was most
depressing. The confidence of the soldiers in their ofiicers, of the
officers in each other, of Napoleon in his lieutenants, was shaken.
It is difficult to speak calmly of such an act. The strangest part of
9
the matter is that this same De Bourmont/being honored by the
Bourbons, became Minister of War under Charles X., organized the
expedition which resulted in tlie capture of Algiers, and was made a
Marshal of France. He died in 1846, having passed his latter days
in obscurity, owing to the fall of Charles X. But his reception by
sturdy old Bliicher must have shown him what honest men thought
of him. That stout old hero turned on his heel when he was pre-
sented, and when attention was called to the white cockade De
Bourmont had mounted, all he said was : Einerlei was daa Volk fiir
ein Zeichen aufsteckt. Hundafott hhiht Hunda/ott. " What has the
" cockade to do with it? The man is a scoundrel." Quinet says of
this event : " After half a century, in which we have honoured and
" crowned every man who has succeeded, this desertion is ))erhaps
" the only one which has not found apologists among us." How
different was the feeling of Berthier ! He refused to join Napoleon,
and retired to his palace at Bamberg. But when he heard the
drums of the Russian troops on their march to invade France, in an
agony of shame and remorse he threw himself from one of the palace
windows and was taken up dead.
But the advance continued. The first enemy met was by the left,
which struck part of the Prussian division of Pirch II. (so called to
distinguish him from another general of the same name, who is called
Pirch I.), belonging to Ziethen's corps, one of the four of Bliicher's
army. News of the French advance had by this time been conveyed
to Wellington and Bliicher. The latter at ten o'clock on the night
of the 14th, had ordered Ziethen to wait the attack and slowly retire
towards Fleurus. The ether three corps of the Prussian army were
ordered to -move. Billow from Li^ge to Hanniit, Pirch I. from
Namur to Sombref, Thielmann from Ciney* to Namur.
As the French divisions successively came up on the left and
centre they were pushed forward, driving the Prussians back, but
the latter stubbornly held every position, both on the Brussels and
on the Namur roads. The French had to fight their way. The
Pirch II. division was gaining time for the other divisions of
Ziethen's corps to concenti'ate at Fleurus. Charleroi was taken
by one o'clock, and the French passed through, some towards
Gosselies, others towards Gilly. At five o'clock. Marshal Ney
came up to take command on the Brussels road. On the 11th
* Liege, Hannut and Ciney are east of the limits of the map.
10
he had been in Paris. He had received a mesHage from Napoleon :
" If Ney wishes to take part in the first battle, let him be on the
13th at Avesnes (not on map), which will be my head-quarters."
He had started on the 1 3th, had arrived in Beaumont on the 14th,
was detained by want of a horse, had bought a couple from Maf'jial
Mortier on the 15th, and found Napoleon at about half-past four.
Napoleon welcomed him, put him in command of the 1st and 2nd
corps, D'Erlon's and Keilles' (44,300 men), and some cavalry, and
concluded his instructions by ordering him to adVance and drive the
enemy.
From this point commences a division of Napoleon's army, part
under N^ey on the left along the Bntssels road, the other part under
the emperor along the Namur road. Ney ordered his men to push
on. The Prussians, who were on the west of the Brussels road, had
by this time all crossed it, making for Fleai'us, and the way was
clear to Fitisne. There the advance struck the extrame left of the
Anglo-allied army. It was now half-past six. The allied troops at
Frasne were part of the first porps of Wellington's army, and be-
longed to the 2ud Dutch-Belgian division, 7,500 strong, under the
command of General Perponcher. The battalion actually in position,
about 4,000 strong, was under the command of Prince Bernhard of
Saxe- Weimar. It held its ground firmly against the attacks of such
troops as Ney brought up. The latter thought it better hot to run
any risk, and therefore resolved not to attempt anything more, but
to hold Frasne and await orders. Frasne is between five and six,
miles north of Charleroi ; Solre-sur-Sambre fifteen miles from Char-
leroi. The left had, therefore, advanced some twenty miles. They
had started at three in the morning, commenced to fight at four,
crossed the Sambre at ten, pushed on north to near Gosselies, and
there waited for orders, which they received about three o'clock, that
is, they had three or four hours rest. They then had advanced to
Frasne, where, as above stated, Ney took command about five. It
is not easy to underatand why he was now so cautious. He had the
cavalry division of Pire in hand, and Bachelus' infantry corps in
support, and some artillery. If he had pi-essed Piince Bernhard,
who had only four thousand men, he could probably have occupied
Quatre Bras, instead of Frasne, that night. If he had done so, he
would have commanded the line of communication between the Eng-
lish and PruasiftO t^'mifis. The roftd from ^amur to Nivelles crosses
11
^'
the Bi-ussels road at Quatre Bras. It was, therefore, of the greatest
consequence to Napoleon to take it, and to the allies to hold it. A
glance at the map will show that such was the case. If, then, Ney
had seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, Napoleon's tactics
would have been perfectly successful. His not doing so was the first
failure in the campaign. Charras says Ney was right in not attempt-
ing to attack Quatre Bras. The reasons he gives are cogent, but the
fact seems to be that Ney was imposed upon by tho strong front
shown by Prince Bernhard, and could, if he had pressed on, have
carried Quatre Bras with ease.
On the centre, owing to a mistake in the transmission of orders,
Yaudamme's Division, instead of marching at three in the morning,
did not march until seven o'clock. The Young Guard took their
place in the column. But the result of the delay was that the
advance guard of the centre, which appeared before Charleroi about
eight o'clock, was not supported until twelve. The Young Guard
then came up, and by their assistance Pajol, who led the advance,
entered Charleroi, passed through and pressed the Prussians, until
the latter stood firm at Fleurus. Grouchy, who subsequently came
up, halted with Napoleon's approval, and the latter returned to
Charleroi at eight o'clock, worn out with fatigue. The right, having
started later, reached Ch&telet at three o'clock, and remained in front
of that place. Such were the results of the first day's operations.
The Sambre was crossed, Charleroi taken, the French centre and
right lay on the Namuc road in front of Fleurus. Was the day suC'
cessful or not 1 The answer to this question depends on how far the
allies had made use of the time in concentrating their forces. We
have seen what Ziethen did. He concentrated his corps at Fleurus;
where he stood prepared to dispute the passage.
We have seen that orders were given by Bliicher on the night of
the 14th to his army to close up.
By midnight on the loth, Pirch I. had his whole corps (31,758
men) at Mazy, near Sombref, while Thielmann was a mile or two in
front of Namur. At ten o'clock at night of that day, Biilow was
still at Li^ge, far ofi*. Thus Bliicher by midnight of the 15th had
three corps, or nearly 80,000 men, within sixteen miles of the enemy.
What had Wellington done 1 We have seen that news of the French
advances wag sent to him on the 12th. Sir Hussey Vivian, whose
Brigade of Cavalry was near Tournai, reported to him on that day that
12
the French were preparing to attack. He made no change in his
dispositions. On the l/)th, at nine in the morning, he received a
dispatch from Ziethen, written from Charleroi, announcing that the
advanced posts on the Sambre were attacked. Still no movement
was made. The first order for concentration came from General
Constant de Rebecque, the Chief of Staff of the Prince of Orange, at
two o'clock in the afternoon. It was a partial order to the Second
Dutch-Belgian division, which was the extreme left of Wellington's
army, to concentrate at Nivelles and Quatre Bi-as. Information of
these orders was sent to Wellington at Brussels, but he still ordered
no general movement. Siborne says that the Prince of Orange, who
was in commandtfof the First Anglo-Allied Corps, also forwarded to
Wellington a report which he had received from his outi)Osts, stating
that the French had attacked the Prussian advanced posts on the
Sambre, and that this report reached Wellington at five o'clock p.m.
Between eight and nine o'clock that evening came a letter from
Bliiclier, saying that Thuin had been attacked, and that Charleroi
appeared to be menaced. Then Wellington gave his first general
order for concentration. Siborne says this order was given about
five o'clock in the afternoon, but Charras has proved conclusively that
it was not sent until between eight o'clock and half-past nine in the
evening.
There was, at the same time, a special order to the corps of the
Prince of Orange. It prescribed that the Perponcher Division, i)art
of which had been since noon disputing the Brussels road with the
French at Quatre Bras, a fact of which Wellington was unaware,
should go to Nivelles. At ten o'clock, further news had come in.
** After orders " were issued, with the view of completing the con-
centration. It was this news which bi-oke up the Duchess of Rich-
mond's ball, so well known from Byron's lines. We cannot repeat the
orders, from want of space, but they can be seen in Siborne. If they
had been carried out, the Anglo-allied army would have dniwn away
from the Prussian. The extremity of the left wing would have been
five miles west of the Brussels road, and eleven miles from Sombre",
where the Prussians were collecting.
At eleven o'clock at night, more precise intelligence came in, and
fresh and more urgent orders were sent out. But through all appears
the idea that the French would strike at Brussels, by way of Nivelles
or Braine-le-Comte, not by the Charleroi road.
13
The result of this delay and false movement of V/elUngton was
favourable to Napoleon. It left him free to deal with BlUcher alone.
He had counted justly on Wellington'^ slowness and Bliicher's rash-
ness. His coup appeared, therefore, to have all the elements of
sucoess. The heroes of the day were, however, the brave Prussians
of Ziethen s Corps, who had stopped the French at Gilly. and Prince
Bernhard and his Nassauers, who had stopped them at Frasne.
ACT II.
SCENE : — LIONY AND QUATRE BRAS.
Time:— 16th June, 1815.
At nine o'clock on the evening of the 1 5th Napoleon had returned
to Charleroi. Wearied out, he threw himself on a bed to get some
rest. About ten o'clock Ney left Gosselies, and reached Charleroi
about midnight. He and the emperor had supper together, and a
long conversation. It was two o'clock on the morning of the 16th
when they separated. Some topics, unpleasant to both, were doubt-
less avoided, and their old friendship seemed completely reestablished.
So far as anybody heard, the emperor had no reason to complain of the
marshal. The plan of campaign must necessarily have been talked
over, but no definite decision seems to have been communicated to
Ney. It would have been better for France if both Napoleon and
Ney had rested, instead of talking over old times.
In Juno the nights are short, and the day dawned shortly after
Ney went to his outposts. For the bulk of the army, military opera-
tions had ceased at seven or eight o'clock of the evening before. The
troops had had time to rest. They were, moreover, in good spirits,
and anxious to advance. On the 15th they had started at half-past
three. On the 16th the divisions in rear of the left could have been
closed up to the front very early in the morning. Ney would then
have had 22,254 men in hand, and D'Erlon's 20,000 close behind.
If he had pressed on at any hour from four o'clock in the morning
up to ten or eleven, with his 22,000 men, he would have overwhelmed
all before him. Prince Bernhard and his 4,000 Nassauera held their
position all night, and were not reinforced till about four in the
morning, when General Perponcher marched the rest of his brigade
there, making in all about 7,000 men, with sixteen guns. The
Prince of Orange, who was the general in command of the first corps,
to which Perponcher's Division belonged, arrived about six o'clock,
14
but brought no reinforcements : in fact, no more came up at all,
until three or half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The Duke oi
Wellington was on the ground at eleven o'clock, but brought no
troops. When Ney did attack, at two o'clock, he only attacked with
not quite 10,000 men of all arms. By three o'clock he had 17,615
in action, but during the whole of the rest of the day, he only had
22,000 men engaged, and of these only 16.750 were infantry, one of
his infantry divisions (Gerard's, 4,297 strong) having been withdrawn
from him by Napoleon. He made no use of D'Erlon's corps, 20,000
strong. The delay on the left was most disastrous to the French.
What was the situation elsewhere 1
We have seen that at midnight of the 15th the only Prussian
corps in the immediate front of the French centre and right was
Ziethen's - 32,692 men, less the loss of the 15th, say 1,500 — say
31 ,000 men with 96 guns. The nearest corps to Ziethen was that of
Pirch 1., three divisions of which were at Mazy, nine miles from the
front. These three divisions arrived there from Namur, in obedience
to Blucher's order of the evening of the 14th, at three in the after-
noon of the 15th, and halted at that place. They did not advance
to Sombref, face to face with the French, until about ten o'clock in
the morning of the 16th, when they were joined by their fourth
division, and that was the time when Ziethen received his first imme-
diate support. Up to that hour he had been alone in front of the
French, and subject to be attacked by Napoleon with the centre and
right of the French army, except such part as had not crossed the
Sambre. The result of such an attack could not be doubtful. The
next nearest corps to Pirch I. was that of Thielmann, but he was
close to Namur, twenty miles distant, during the whole night of the
15th, and only commenced to advance from Namur about seven
o'clock on the morning of the 16th. He arrived at Sombref about
twelve o'clock of that day.
Three cannon-shots were heard from Fleurus at half-past two in
the afternoon. They were Napoleon's signal for attack. By that
time he had to deal with 90,000 Germans. Three-fourths of Bliicher's
army were concentrated and well posted for defence.
Ney, as we have seen, had waited until two o'clock to commence
his attack on the left. What caused the delay ]
The French army was anxious and ready to fight. Everything
depended on prompt action. Had such been the case, Ney with
15
40,000 men would have overthroMrn 7,000 troops, many of whom
were doubtful, being Dutch Belgians suspected of French sympathies,
and with no supports at hand. Napoleon with 83,000 would have
had to attack 31,000, true, with another 31,000 to support them,
but that support nine miles away. The object of the sudden attack
was therefore possible of accomplishment. The question is, did
Napoleon display the energy which the crisis demanded, or did he
press the advantages so far in his favour ] It must be remembered
that fully 25,000 of the French centre and right had not crossed the
Sambre on the night of the 16th. It required two or three hours at
least to get ^hese troops over, and as they were the reserve artillery
and heavy cavalry, besides Lobau's infantry, 10,000 strong, it was
absolutely necessary tp wait for them. Again, Gerard's corps was
at Ch&telet, and had to be moved up to Fleurus, about seven miles,
while Vandamme had five miles to cover. The Guards had nine
miles to march from Charleroi to reach the front.
In view of these facts, and bearing in mind that Napoleon had to
wait for the reports of his various recounoitering parties, any charge
of too great delay on his part on the morning of the 16th appears
unreasonable and unfair. He rose at five o'clock. His orders to
his right to concentrate were sent out before eight o'clock, those
for Ney before nine o'clock. He himself reached the front about
noon. The French left and centre were in position by one o'clock,
and the attack on the Prussians began at two. It is not easy to see
how it could have begun much earlier in the day. At the same
time he was doing all he could to bring up his left without actually
going over in person. He sent Ney a dispatch early in the morning,
asking for exact information as to the position of his various corps.
As above stated, he sent a general order of movement, and also a
personal letter, giving full explanations of the plan of operations
before nine o'clock. He sent another dispatch at ten o'clock in reply
to a hesitating message from Ney. He sent another at two, and
another at three, or a little after. All were urgent expressions of
his desire that Ney should advance, and if possible manoeuvre to join
the right. But Ney, or rather Ney's subordinate. Count Reille,
for reasons satisfactory to himself, did not think fit to obey at once
the first order to advance, which reached him about half-past ten.
Having asked further instructions from Ney, the order to advance
was repeated, but he did not come into the field until one o'clock.
16
Napoleon judged correctly enough that the dispersed Anglo-allied
forces could not be collected in time for serious resistance to his own
forces properly handled, but Ney's want of perception of the necessity
for a strenuous advance lost the em{>eror the advantages which
should have been gained on the left.
Ney on the left and Napoleon on the right were simultaneously
engaged from about two o'clock. Napoleon defeated Bliicher.
What then did Ney effect ? All that can be said is that he pre-
vented Wellington from joining Bliicher. This was no small achieve-
ment. Wellington, after arriving at Quatre Bras at half-past eleven,
rode over to Bliicher and promised him that by three or so in the
afternoon the English army would join the Prussians. A vain pro-
mise never kept. The Duke found Ney in his road and the way was
barred. Could Ney have done more than he did? It has been
shewn that he could, had he acted on his orders more promptly.
But it has been shewn further that the Marshal's whole force
engaged was never more than 22,000 men, and that he made no use
of D'Erlon's Corps of 20,000 men.
This episode is the most inscrutable in the whole campaign. The
absence of these twenty thousand men alone prevented Ney from
inflicting a decisive defeat upon Wellington at Quatre Bras. Siborne, ^
who is the Duke's most uncompromising admirer, explicitly admits
this fact. How did it happen 1
It seems impossible to give a satisfactory answer. But the facts
seem to be as follows : When Ney got his orders from Napoleon at
half-past ten o'clock in the morning to advance, D'Erlon was at
Jumet. (See map.) He was ordered b> Ney, as part of the geneml
movement, to advance as far as Frasne, detaching one division to
Marbais. At twelve o'clock he commenced his march. Hearing
the action going on in front, he left his column and rode on in
advance to Frasne. He drew rein there, and while conversing with
some of the superior officers was joined by General Labedoy^re, who
had come from Napoleon. That genei*al showed D'Erlon a i)encil
note which he was taking to Ney, and which ordered the Marshal to
detach D'Erlon's Corps towards Ligny. He added that he (Labe-'
doydre) had already lyfiven the order for the change of direction of
D'Erlon's column, and pointed out to D'Erlon himself the direction
in which to go to join it.
17
Nf>y, in a letter dated the 26tli June, 1815, complains that Napo-
leon had taken away D'Erlon's Corps without notifying him (Ney),
and having, therefore, to act without D'Erlon, the battle of Quatre
Bras was lost. D'Erlon's account of the matter seems to contradict
Ney's statement. Col. Heymes, Ney's Chief of Staff, confirms
D'Erlon's account, but says that Col. Laurent, not General Labe-
doy^re, was the aide who carried the message. As D'Erlon was put
in niotiori by Ney about eleven o'clock, in obedience to Napoleon's
letter and second despatch, and as the distance from Jumet to Frasne
is a little over nine miles, and as D'Erlon galloped on in advance of
his column, he must have met General Labedoydre in about an hour
and a half, or two hours, after eleven o'clock — say one o'clock. Now
any order sent from I^apoleon to Ney by the hand of General Labedo-
y^re, and which reached Frasne by one o'clock, must have left Charle-
roi very shortly after half-past ten, as Cha,rleroi is about ten miles
from Frasne — if sent from Fleurus it would be eight miles. The order
which Labedoydre is said to have cai'ried, and to have shewn to
D'Erlon, was contradictory of Napolepn's third despatch, and not •
only of that despatch, but of the whole of the previous second des-
patch. What had happened so early in the day to induce Napoleon
to take away the first corps from Ney] The only reason which
ap]>ears at all satisfactory is, that Napoleon, as he descended from
his carriage at Fleurus, at twelve o'clock, saw that there was urgent
need in that part for D'Erlon just then. Instaad of having only a
part of the Prussian array, he found three-fourths of it in front of
him. And yet this explanation is not quite satisfactory, because
later on in the day, namely at two o'clock and three o'clock, Napo-
leon sent two more despatches to Ney. The first repeated the order
to attack, and informed Ney of the arrangements for Grouchy'si
attack at half-past two on Ligny, and stated that there was a corps
of troops (not an army) to attack. The second informed Ney that
the action was at its height, and ordered him to manoeuvre towards
the emperor. Neither of these despatches says one word about
D'Erlon, or intimates in any way that he had been withdrawn from
Ney. It could not be either of these which Labedoy^re shewed
D'Erlon, because the first says nothing about D'Erlon's moving
toward lagny, and the second was sent too late to have reached
D'Erlon at the hour he and his division were on the road to Frasne.
Again, in a despatch written by Napoleon to Ney the next day
2
18
(the 17th), Napoleon complains that the marshal had not unite<l hid
divisions. He says : " If the corps of D'Erlon and Reille had lieen
" together, not an Englishman would have escaped of the cori)8 which
" attacked you." The despatch then goes on : *' If Count D'Erlon
"had executed the movement on St. Amand which the einiHsror
" ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and
" we should have taken perhaps 30,000 prisonere."
This incident of the turning aside of D'Erlon's column is one of
the enigmas of history. We have stated all- that we have been able
to ascertain about it. We cannot accept any of the published expla-
nations as satisfactory ; and now the actors in the drama are dead,
there is no hope of any solution of the difficulty.
Where did D'Erlon go when he left his proper line of march ] If
the commencement of the incident was singular, its conclusion was
still more so. The new line of march of D'Erlon led him towards
Napoleon. The heads of his columns showed themselves in Napo-
leon's left rear about half-past five in the afternoon. They must
either have been longer on their cross-march than the length of the
march warranted, or they must have been very much later than eleven
o'clock in starting from Jumet. Whatever the truth may have been,
there is no doubt on one point : their arrival was unexpected. Nobody
knew who they were. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp off at full gallop
to find out, and postponed a threatened attack on the Prussian centre
until the messenger should return. At half-past six the aide-de-camp
came back with the information that it was D'Erlon's column, about
two miles from St. Amand, exactly where it was needed for Napoleon's
purpose. Charrassays: "Let the order be given. In an hour twenty
" thousand men of all arms will debouche on Wagnel^e, on Bry, rolling
'^ up in rear Bliichep's right wing on his centre, while he is assailed
" in front by Vandamme and Gerard, reinforced by the whole reserve.
" The plan conceived by Napoleon will be realized. There will not
" escape 20,000 Prussians. The order is not given, D'Erlon is not
" summoned." But the fact seems to be, according to the best evi-
dence, that Napoleon did summon D'Erlon more than once, but that
Ney, at the same time, also repeatedly and urgently ordered D'Erlon
to return to him, being in the very throes of his struggle at Quatre
Bras, and that D'Erlon thought it best to obey the marshal under
whose immediate command he had been placed, and not the
emperor. It seems, at fiiBt s^ht, iinUkely that such should be the
19
oase, and Charras dispiitea the fact ; but, on a fair examination of tht
whole evidence, the conclusion jufit stated is the most probable.
Instead of advancing to assist Napoleon, D'Erlon having been
summoned by Ney to return to him, countermarched his men and
arrived at Frasne too late to help Ney, as the battle of Quatre Bras
was over before he got there. Twenty thousand of Napoleon's best
troops marched and countermarched on this memorable day. Their
absence from one field robbed the French of what undoubtedly
would have been a decisive victory. Their prasence on the other
field would have turned an indecisive advantage into a complete
triumph. Ligny would have been a second Jena. It would have
been to the Prussians what Waterloo was two days afterwards to thft
French. Nai)oleon'8 calculations were correct. His left wing found
at first practically nothing to oppose them. His right wing and
centre were sufficient to defeat the Pnissians. He was not respon-
sible for the false movement which so fatally weakened both wings
without benefiting either. Had Ney swept the Brussels road clear
of the Anglo-allied army, Napoleon's anticipations of being in
Brussels that night would probably have been realized. That it was
not so was partially Ney's fault. It was not Napoleon's.
ACT III.
SCENE : — ON THE ROADS TO WATERLOO AND WAVRE.
Time :— 17th June, 1815.
The morning sun of the 17th June, 1815, rose on two ghastly
fields. At Quatre Bras over nine thousand combatants had been
either killed, wounded or missing, while at Ligny about twenty
thousand represented the loss to both sides. Perhaps altogether
.30,000 men hora de combat. We have set forth the actual results of
the previous day. Ney had blocked Wellington, Napoleon had
defeated Blucher. All had been over by ten o'clock. How had the
night been passed 1 To appreciate what took place it will be neces-
sary to consult the map. Bliicher, being forced to retire from Ligny,
had two courses open to him. He could retreat by way of Namur,
but that would separate him from Wellington, or he could retire to
Wavre, from which place it would be comparatively easy for him to
rejoin Wellington either before or behind Brussels. With desperate
tenacity he, or rather his Chief of Staff, Gneisenau, chose the latter,,
and the whole Prussian army, including Billow's corps, which came
20
r
up too late for Ligny, was massed upon Wavre by the next after-
noon after their defeat at Ligny. Their retreat was not only not
harassed by the French, but its very line was unknown to them.
That it was so was a cardinal error which led directly and con-
clusively to Napoleon's overthrow. The more the campaign is
studied, the more it appeai-s that all other mistakes on both sides are
dwarfed before this one. On 'Napoleon's side, Ney's inaction,
D'Erlon's countermarch, were almost compensated for at the end of
the 16th. On Wellington's part, his want of penetration was made
u[) for by the intelligent disobedience of General Perponcher, and the
stubborn courage of the British infantry. This error was so serious
that its consequences are plainly visible in the grand catastrophe.
We arc quice unable to account for Napoleon's course of action.
We have seen him mass, his troops on the 14th, cross the Sambre on
the 15th, fight Ligny, and urge on Ney at Quatre Bras on the 16th.
We have seen him recognize instinctively the true situation of the
Anglo-allied force, and with -juperior calmness quiet Ney's hesitation.
We have seen him hurl at the Prussian army his old guard, a thunder-
bolt which laid it prostrate. Up to this point he may be said to have
been quite successful enough to satisfy the demands of his proposed
campaign, although not so completely successful as his plans des«rved.
Why did he not press his advantage 1 There is a mournful interest
in contemplating him. We see pass before him his former glories.
The Bridge at Lodi, the Pyramids, Austerlitz, Marengo. We hear
the chant of the MarseilUise as they lead the van of the avenging
people. We see a cruel system of despotic bondage torn away,
a wakening of the fresh young life of freedom. The brave soldiers,
whose bodies lie scattered in far distant fields, come before us in
spirit. We see them approach their chief as he lies asleep, and with
mute gesture attempt to rouse and save him from his coming fate,
then pass away with dumb anguish as they perceive his lethargy.
Brave children of France ! Your zeal for liberty ofttimes outran
discretion. You were guilty of many crimes, many follies, but you
were faithful to the flag under which you fought, and to the general
who led you to trium]^ h. You came in spirit from your graves to
congratulate him on his last victory "ind vainly to warn him of his
coming defeat. There is no picture in his history so painful to our
mind as the one we contemplate. The mighty emperor, surrounded
hy his victorious array, justly proud of themselves and him, flushed
21
by success, confident of complete triumph ; and on the next day but
one, at the same hour, behold these very troops, that mighty emperor,
flying in pfmic-struck confusion before their defeated foe, now-
become a pursuing fury. Although we recognize that the result was
probably better for the human race, we cannot help feeling that
species of gnawing regret which eats at the heart when it recurs to
what might have been, but is not.
Napoleon, instead of sleeping on the field, went back to Fleurus
about eleven o'clock. It is generally admitted that before he lay
down, he gave orders to Grouchy to send Pajol's light cavalry and
Teste's infantry after the retiring Prussians. Thiers ^ays he also
sent ordei's to Ney to be under arms at daybreak, to press the Eng-
lish again. These latter orders are stated by no other author, but
are referred to in Soult's despatch of the next morning reiterating
them. Even admitting the genuineness of the other orders, those for
the pursuit of the Prussians appear to be utterly inadequate. With
every disposition to be chary of criticising such a man as Napoleon,
we must confess that the inadequacy of these prders is a mystery to
us, for which we can find no satisfactory solution. Napoleon nmst
have miscalculated the effect of the battle. Perhaps he undervalued
Bliicher. Some authors attribute his lethargy to his enfeebled bodily
condition — it seems to us very wrongly, on a fair consideration of all
Napoleon di! achieve. But whatever the reason, the fact is there
that the Prussians were allowed the whole night and the next morn-
ing to retire on Wavre, and no sufficient atteuipt was made to follow
up their traces.
Napoleon was perfectly justified in turning his whole strength
immediately against the English. His plan was to throw his centre
where it was needed, and he was (uite right to transfer it at once
from his right to his left. But why he did not ascertain more ex-
actly what his right had to do, is very difficult to explain. He
seemed to have thought that the Prussians would retire towards their
own base, namely, Namur, not towards Brussels by way of Wavre,
as they did. His first orders were to follow them towards Namur,
and there appears to be little doubt but that, in this instance, he was
mistaken in the inference he drew from his success. The person to
whom is due the credit of the masterly Prussian retreat, which un-
(^uestionably saved the campaign, is Gneisenau, whose name is com-
22
paratively unknown. Napoleon's mistake, for it seems to us that it
can be called by no other name, undoubtedly contributed to Waterloo.
The events of the day were as follows : Napoleon rose at five,
and sent off orders for Lobau's Corps to march towards the
left, followed by the Guard, and then the heavy cavalry. About
six o'clock, General Flahault returned from Ney, and reported
the result of Quatre Bras. Napoleon immediately sent a written
order thi'ough Soult to Ney, explaining the position of affairs,
and urging him to advance. Cliarras says this order was not sent
off iintil eight o'clock ; Thiers says about seven o'clock. Napo-
leon left Fleurus for the front about eight o'clock. Other orders
were sent out at the same time for a review of the troops who had
fought at Ligny. This review began about nine o'clock, and lasted
till nearly noon. Meantime Lobau, the Guard, and the heavy cav-
alry were moving to the left, and reports from the reconnaissances
were coming in. It seems to have been Napoleon's plan that Ney
should advance, on the theory that the English could not oppose
him, in view of the fftct that the Prussians were in retreat. Ney
could not advance, because Wellington was in front of him with
about forty thousand men. They were not withdrawn until about
one o'clock. By noon. Napoleon sent out an order by Soult to Ney
to advance, and followed it immediately himself. This fact, which is
important, is fixed by the despatch from Sdult to Ney, which bears
the date d midl. Before he started Napoleon gave his famous orders
to Grouchy. The latter must, then, have received them between
twelve and one. These orders were verbal. Thiers gives a version
of them which contradicts that of Grouchy. The historian appeals
to Marshal Gerard, and other witnesses, and they appear to us ex-
actly the orders which Napoleon would have given. The fons el
origo mali was undoubtedly the impression which the staff had, if
Napoleon himself did not share it, that the Prussians were in retreat
upon Namur ; and from this time to the end of the campaign we see
Grouchy wasting his strength hunting for Bliicher exactly where he
was not; and entirely ignorant as to what line he ought to take. For
the present we leave him, and follow Napoleon. The latter was
delayed in the advance by the resolute front shown by the English
cavalry, who were protecting Wellington's retreat. He retreated as
soon as he ascertained Blucher's disaster, but only to make a better
stand. The English horsemen gave the French a taste of what they
23
might expect the next day. Between the eflfect of their charge at
Genappes and a teirible thunder-storm, it was evening before Napo-
leon came face to face with Wellington at Mont St. Jean. The em-
peror deployed his cavalry and guns to feel v/hether he had a rear
guard to deal with, or Wellington's whole army. When he ascer-
tained that it was the latter, we read that he was pleased. He was
destined to be more than satisfied, but the quastion is, was he justi-
fied in his opinion that the game was now in his own hands 1 We
will endeavour to give a fair answer to this question, founded on
the statement of the position of the various armies, as stated in the
sequel.
■ ACT IV.
scene: — WATERLOO AND WAVRE.
Time:- 18th June, 1815.
It is half-past eleveu in the morning. Marshal Grouchy is sitting
at breakfast in the garden of the notary Halbaert, at Sart-les-Wal-
hain. With him are Gerard, Vandamme, Valaz^, an engineer
officer, and Baltus, in command of the artillery. Suddenly Col.
Simon Lorriere enters and says: "I hear firing." The party go
out to the garden, and there heavy reports are heard, so heavy that
the ground seems to tremble. "It is the emperor, he is fighting the
" English, let us join him," says Gerard, " We should march
" towai'ds the guns." "No," says Grouchy. "My orders are to
" move to Wavre, and to Wavre I am going." The decision was
fatal to France, disastrous to Napoleon, and damning for Grouchy 's
reputation. To correctly appreciate the situation it is necessary to
retrace our steps to the position of matters after Ligny, that is on
the evening of the day before the one of the incident above related.
We have seen that Napoleon sent out Pajol's cavalry in pursuit of
the Prussians. Pujol took the Namur road, that is eastward towards
the French right. The Prussians however were by that time in
retreat towards Wavre, that is northwards, so as to join Wellington.
There has never been so masterly a retreat, or so determined a
strategy, as that of Gneisenau. It is impossible to give the Prussian
army too much credit for their steadiness and courage during this
retrograde movement. While retiring they at the same time used
their cavalry in constant and vigilant patrolling, and in, this respect
were as active as their descendants were in 1870, while the French
24
II
were equally inactive. The resuU of their movement was that by
nightfall of the 17th the whole Prussian army of ninety thousand
men were in and around Wavre.
The Duke of Wellington only received news of the disaster at
Ligny the next morning. He then commenced his retreat, also ably
managed, from Quatre Bras about ten o'clock, and arrived at Waterloo
about five in the afternoon.
Napoleon on the 1 7th, after moving off Lobau's Corps and the
Guards from his right to his left, about one o'clock in the day, per-
haps a trifle earlier, entrusted his right wing to Grouchy, and gave
him at first verbal, then at two o'clock written orders. These latter
directed Grouchy to mai'ch to Gembloux. This dispatch is said to
have been suppi'essed by Grouchy in the controversy which arose.
It was first printed in 1842. Its closing sentence is : '* In all cases
" keep constantly your two corps of infantry united in a league of
** ground, having several avenues of retreat, and post detachments of
** cavalry intermediate between us, in order to communicate with
" headquarters."
Owing to a combination of circumstances entirely beyond Grouchy's
control, and for which he can in no way be held responsible, he with
his men on tlie evening of the 1 7th was only at Gembloux. He
.^as, moreover, quite igrorant of where the Prussians were. He had,
however, been at fault in not leaving detachments of cavalry between
himself and the enjperor, as the latter had ordered.
Napoleon himself had moved oiF to the Brussels road and followed
the advance of his troops, delayed by a tremendous thunderstorm,
which turned the country into a sea of mud, and I'eached the Caillou
farm, in front of Mont St. Jean, about half-past six, to find the
English in position and ready to give battle. He reconnoitered their
position, the reconnaissance lasting until ten o'clock, then returned to
his headquarters, which were established at the farm of Caillou above
referred to. We are now in a position to appreciate why Napoleon
was delighted that the English were going to make a stand alone.
Apparently a puzzle why it should have pleased him, it is accounted
for from his point of view. He had succeeded in his plans. He
had separated the two allies. He had beaten one, not quite so
thoroughly as he thought, but so far as he knew sufliciently to keep
him out of any fighting for some time. He had left enough of his
own army with Grouchy to watch the defeated enemy^ and*had given
i
25
him sufficiently plain instructions what to do. Now he had with
himself his whole centre and left, with superb cavalry, enormous
force in artillery, and the very ^lite of his infantry, and he was not
personally aware, although some of his generals were, what the
British soldier can do. He knew however that the Duke of
Wellington's army was a very composite one, and he had good
grounds for knowing that at least a thiz'd of it could not be trusted.
When all these considerations are taken into account, it is not
wonderful that Napoleon was glad that before him lay Wellington
alone.
On his return to his head-quartera he issued the necessary ordere
for the battle of the next. day, and, if his own stai;ement is to be
believed, he sent a special order to Grouchy. This order Gi'ouchy,
to his dying day, protested he never received. Many writers assert
that Napoleon never sent it ; but, on considering the orders known
to have been sent, and Napoleon's plan of operations, we cannot
believe but that it was sent. It was the very thing which Napoleon
would be likely to do — keep touch with his right. We also believe
that Grouchy did not receive it.
Napoleon, having retired to rest, rose again at two o'clock, and
re-commenced his reconnoitering, which he kept up during the re-
mainder of the night. The rain continued, but cleared up about four or
five o'clock. If it had been possible. Napoleon would have attacked
then, or very soon after, but the ground was wet for artillery. It was
therefore necessary to wait. Moreover, Napoleon, as he alleged, ex-
pected Grouchy to close up to him, such being the substance of the order
of the evening before, and a later one sent off about three in the morn-
ing. At ten in the morning, lie sent an aide-de-camp to Grouchy,
with a third order to the same effect. On these two considerations,
he decided to postpone the attack on the British, and after sending
off the aide-de camp to Grouchy at ten o'clock, he slept for an hour.
Then, waking at eleven, he gave the signal for attack, and at half-
past eleven the Battle of Waterloo began by the discharge of one
hundred and twenty guns. This cannonade lasted half an hour, and
these were the guns heard by Grouchy, and towards which Gerard
begged him to march.
We have thus ascertaiaed the position of Napoleon, Wellington,
and Grouchy. Where was Bliicher at this time 1
26
Communications passed between Wellington and Blucher on tlie
1 7th, in which the latter promised that he would assist "Wellington,
not only with two army corps, but with his whole army. He added
that if Napoleon did not attack on the 18th, they would attack him
on the 19th. Such was the spirit ill which the men of that day fought
for their homes. In pursuance of this promise he started his four
corps early on the 18th. Billow's was the leading; division. Its
advance reached St. Lambert (see map) about noon, but its main
body not until three o'clock. Ziethen's Corj.d had to cross the line of
Billow's march, and, owing to the delay thus caused, did not reach
Ohain (see map) until six o'clock. Pirch had to leave half his corps
for the defence of Wavre against Grouchy, and joined Biilow with
the other half about half-past seven in the evening. Thielmann was
held at Wavre by Grouchy.
Thus, at half-past eleven. Billow's was the only Prussian column
near Wellington, and he was at St. Lambert, five miles from the
fighting. From that time to half-past four, this corps was straggling
through horrible roads in the valley of the Lasne, in order to seize a
position on the French right. At that hour they entered into the
operations of the field of Waterloo,
The reader will now understand (if he consults the map) what
influence Grouchy could have had by advancing towards Planchenoit,
instead of on to Wavre. It is, perhaps, only curious speculation,
but it is worth following out, as the turning incident in the campaign.
There is not much doubt upon one point, at all events : Grouchy
could have considerably delayed, if he could not have prevented
altogether, BlUcher's junction with Wellington on the 18th. Grant-
ing that he was where he was in obedience to his orders ; granting
that Napoleon was as much responsible as he was for the waste of
strength, and useless cavalry marches on the wrong flank ; granting
all this, giving him every credit for every possible effort hitherto ; now,
at all events, he should have seen the mistake. Thei'e was the firing,
there were the Prussians plainly seen on the road towards it, — the
very privates saw what was to be done, but the general was blind.
It is useless, to fight the Battle of Waterloo over again. Thanks
to the old stubborn valour of the British soldiery, and to the tenacity of
the British commander-in-chief, who knew his men, and did not
spare them, the British held their own. They had all they could do
to manage it. It is easy to appreciate the influence which the
A ?
*l
S
■•• I
27
9,
'0 I
f
Prussians had, when we recollect that, at one o'clock, Napoleon had
to detach two divisions of cavalry ; then, somewhat later, two in-
fantry divisions — in all, over ten thousand men ; that he had to
follow these by the Young Guard, and by part of the Old Guard j
and that he was really fighting two battles at once.
The strength of the Prussian army actually engaged at "Waterloo
alone was over 51,000 men.* Their loss there was 6,998, while at
Wavre they lost in addition 2,476, in all 9,474 men. The British
loss proper was 6,936. That of the King's German Legion and other
German ti-oops under Wellington's command was 4,494. The Dutch-
Belgians lost 4,147, of which 1,627 were "missing." Exclusit^e of
the Dutch-Belgians, Wellington's total loss was 11,430. These
figures shew that the Prussians must have done as severe fighting
as the British, and prove they did not come on the field merely to
witness an English victory. If Napoleon had had his whole army,
and, what is more, his undivided attention to bestow upon Wel-
lington, it is difficult to believe that he would not have been success-
ful. Even as it was, with a large part of his force detached to one
fiank, and with his attention continually distracted to that flank, he
captured one position, La Haye Sainte, he almost annihilated "Wel-
lington's cavalry and decimated his infantry. He drove the Dutch-
Belgian contingent clear off the field. But he could not shake the
British squareii. Once more steadiness was more than a match for
dash.
Had Grouchy obeyed the dictates of common sense and good
judgment, he would probably have secured for Napoleon the oppor-
tunity of dealing with Wellington single-handed. He failed to do
so, although it seems to us he might and ought to have done so.
The result was that by eight o'clock in the evening Napoleon was
overmastered, his army was in flight. The glories of the Republic,
of the Consulate, of the Empire were for a time effaced by so crushing
a disaster. History however will be more just than contemporary
depreciation. The candid student will perceive that Napoleon was
worthy of his reputation. His general plan of operations was capable
of accomplishment, and its defeat is attributable primarily to the
useless countermarch of D'Erlon, then to the delay in following up
^ By half-post four o'clock, 15.906 men and 64 guns.
By aix o'clock, 29,244 men and 64 guns.
By seven o'clock, 51.944 men and 104 guns.
~Siborne.
.28
the Prussians, for which as General-in-Chief he must be held more than
partially accountable. But even the D'Erlon contretemps and the delays
of the 17th were remediable on the 18th. Had Grouchy been equal
to the occasion, the plan of campaign woul ". have been successfully
carried out. It was not to be. The sun of Waterloo set, " and the
" land had rest forty years."
i
THE COPr, CLARK COMPANY (LIj.:'TKD), PRINTKRS, COLBORXK STREET, TORONTO.