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 (From the Proeeedinyg qfthe OayMdian Journal, iOth March, 1886). 
 
 THE CAMPAIGN OF i8i5 
 
 BY 
 
 R. E. KINGSFORD, M. A. 
 
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 THE CAMPAIGN OF 4815 
 
 BY R. E. KINSKORD, M.A. 
 
 The Rebellion of the French nation against Louis XVI. was the pro- 
 test of humanity against oppression. The French, that lively, courage- 
 ous and industrious race, deserve the w6rld's thanks for their 
 desperate resolution to inaugurate a new system. Their thorough- 
 ness in carrying out the resolve brought upon them the enmity of 
 almost all other nations, but those very nations profit this day by 
 the Revolution, to punish which they invaded France. Even the 
 insular English, then politically a century in advance of the Conti- 
 nent, found that they had much to learn. An impulse was given to 
 aspirations for freedom which was communicated to each of the 
 Continental nations in succession, and this impulse, through impeded 
 from time to time, has never ceased in its action. But just as, in 
 the case of individuals, men suffer in their own persons the con- 
 sequences of originality, so the French nation bitterly paid for its 
 generous self-sacritice on the altar of Freedom. A saci'ed cause was 
 defiled ; enthusiam was replaced by fanaticism ; fanaticism gave way 
 after a struggle to charlatanism ; charlatanism supported itself by mur- 
 der. The end was chaos. Out of chaos sprang Napoleon. A man of 
 the sword, he smote with the sword, and he crushed the vermin who, 
 daring to crawl on the statue of liberty, had stained it with their 
 filth. But the statue itself he overturned, and he placed himself on 
 the pedestal. From that eminence he was in turn struck down, but 
 he long held the position by virtue of extraordinary genius, courage 
 and energy. We shall see him make a supreme effort to recover him- 
 self, almost succeed, then sink, baffled and exhausted, into a Slough 
 of Despond, from which he was destined never to emerge. 
 
 We propose to give a succinct account of the military operations of 
 the 15th, 16th, 17th and 18th of June, 1815.. A careful examina- 
 tion of the authorities has led us to the opinion that the popular 
 belief of Englishmen and men of English descent with regard to this 
 campaign requires revision, and that there are salient features which 
 have been ignored by most English writers. 
 
■5r 
 
 Proc. Can. Inst. 3'^ Ser. 
 
 SCALE 
 JO MILES TO THE INCH. 
 
 MAP OP PART OF BELGIUM T 
 
 CuV2^T»A.IGN OF 
 
 COPIED FROM EDGAR Q.U I N E 
 
 Dx: LA 
 CAM.PAGNE DE 
 
Vol. IV PI. II. 
 
 (•Blouvain 
 
 I 
 
 JELGIUM TO ILLUSTRATE THE 
 .PA.IGN OF 1815. 
 
 :dgar q.uinet's mistoire 
 
 DE LA 
 LPAGNE DE 1815. 
 
 -U 
 
The general English idea is that " The Duke " drubbed the French 
 well, and that he never was in serious danger. 
 
 The Prussians think, on the other hand, that the English would 
 never have beaten the French but for their help, and that they are, 
 equdly with the English, entitled to the credit of victory, perhaps 
 more so. 
 
 The French, again, believe that their idol would have annihilated 
 both English and Prussians had there not been treason. They know 
 that the Prussians were defeated and the English surprised, and why 
 they themselves were ultimately beaten they have never understood. 
 
 Examination of the facts should inform us which of the two first 
 opinions is correct and give r ^ an explanation for the third. This 
 examination we projjose to make briefly, but fairly and dispassionately. 
 
 The story we have to tell may be called the " Drama of Waterloo." 
 
 It consists of a Prologue and Four Acts. We propose to narrate it 
 
 in that manner. 
 
 PROLOGUE. 
 
 Napoleon left Elba on the 26th February, 1815. He landed at 
 Cannes on the 1st March. He arrived at Fontainebleau on the 20th 
 March. That is, in three weeks he was tuaster of France. The first 
 prominent man who joined him was General Labedoy^re. We shall 
 meet his name again. 
 
 The army and the Marshals declared for the Emperor on the 22nd 
 of March. 
 
 But the Bourbons had been in power since the preceding May. 
 A few of the Marshals and a portion of the superior ofBcera remained 
 true to them. In the interval, also, they had broken up the old 
 Napoleonic organization. They had replaced the Tricouleur by the 
 White Lilies. They had changed the designations of the various 
 regiments, studious in every thing, Mrs. Partingtons as they were, 
 to use their feeble broom against the tide of modem feeling. But 
 there were with the colours on the 1st April 223,972 men, 155,000 
 of whom were ready to take the field. 
 
 The evidence as to the condition of these men seems to Establish 
 that they were well uniformed and armed. Napoleon claimed that 
 ^hey were not so, but it seems that his statements were incoiTect on 
 jbhis point. 
 
 Here is afiTorded the opportunity of presenting the real obstacle in 
 the way of forming a fair judgment of the occurrences we are about 
 to relate. 
 
Napoleon pub]ighe<l two versions of the campaign of 1815: tlie 
 first, by General Gourgana, in 1818; the second in 1820, as M6inoir«8 
 pour aervir d Vhitioire (U France en 1815, subsequently re-published 
 in 1830 as Volume IX. of the Memoirs dictated at St. Helena. These 
 volumes, according to certain French authorities, are full of mistakes, 
 misrepresentations and inexact statements. Por some years, how- 
 ever, they passed unquestioned. In 1840 the Duke of Elchingen, 
 second son of Marshal Vey, with the view of restoring his father's 
 memory, which he dee'ned unjustly assailed by Napoleon, gave the first 
 shock to their authority by publishing a collection of the orders and 
 letters of the Emi)eror to the Marshal, and also the result of enquiries 
 made by himself among ofiUcers then surviving as to what actually 
 happened. Other memoirs, such as those of Grouchy and Gerard, 
 were also published. Between 1839 and 1842 appeared Alison's 
 Europe. Siborne's account of the Waterloo Campaign, which, 
 although trustworthy, contains too much fulsome eulogy of the "Great 
 Duke," was published in 1841. The German, or Prussian, view of 
 the matter, as given by Von Damitz and Von Clausewitz, had been 
 published in 1837 and 1835. Thus conflicting materials accumulated. 
 At last, in 1857, there appeared the " Histoire de la Campagne tie 
 1815," by Lieut. -Colonel Charras, which, although not as commonly 
 known to English readers as it ought to be, must ever be consulted 
 as an elaborately minute account of the campaign. It must be read 
 with caution, as it is very unfair to Napoleon in many points, while 
 its author claims an eager desire to do him justice. A critical 
 examination will lead to the conviction that the desire, if it i-eally 
 existed, was not carried out. M. Edgar Quinet's " Hiatoire ile la 
 Campagne de 1815" was published in 1862. He follows in Charras' 
 footsteps. Thiers also gives a version of the events, which should 
 be read as a corrective of Charras. If Napoleon threw the blame of 
 the disaster upon others, a certain school of French writera, of whom 
 Charras and Quinet are tyjjes, have not been slack in retorting on 
 him. He is made responsible, as far as possible, for the unfortunate 
 issue of the campaign, and in his shortcomings is found some solace 
 to wounded French pride. In using both Charras and Quinet this 
 fact must be borne in mind, and even-handed justice will be forced to 
 modify their conclusions on many points in Napoleon's favour. 
 
 The divergence comes up first with reference to Napoleon's actions 
 after he had landed in France. The anti-Napoleonic school minimize 
 in every way what was done, but the general impression on this sub- 
 
6 
 
 ject is that the Emperor displayed wonderful genius and enerjg;y. 
 Sibome says:— "Never, perhaps, in the whole course of the extra- 
 " ordinary career of that extraordinary man did the powerful energies 
 " of hia comprehensive mind shine forth with greater brilliancy and 
 " effect than in his truly wonderful and incredibly rapid development 
 *'of the national resources of France on this momentous occasion." 
 We caniiot here enumerate all that Napoleon effected between the - 
 time of his landing at Cannes in March and his taking the field in 
 June. A discussion of his political measures during this time is 
 foreign to oar purpose. 
 
 I. may be pointed out that the Fi jnch complain that Nai^oleon did 
 not lay before them as a nation the peril in which they stood. In 
 May 800,000 foreign troops were on their borders. But Napoleon 
 deceived the people by constant assurances of peace. His war 
 measures, they urge, were not taken with the determination necessary 
 under the circumstances. On the 25th March the Congress of Vienna 
 had formally declared a united war of Great Britain, Russia, Prussia 
 and Austria against Napoleon. He knew of this declaration, the 
 country should have known of it too. But Napoleon felt his per- 
 sonal danger. His only line of policy in his own interest was that 
 of not alarming the French too soon, or they would have perceived 
 the effects of their sudden revolution in his favour and would have 
 risen .'.gainst him. He therefore declared no general levy of the 
 National Guard. But the fact remains, that while Napoleon on the 
 first of March wae, an exile, on the first of June he had a thoroughly 
 equipped regular army of 200,000 men. He had a reserve of another 
 200,000. By the 15th June he would have had the conscription of 
 1815, producing 77,500 more, besides another hundi*ed battalions of 
 National Guard, or 70,000 more ; in all, 555,000 soldiers. When 
 in addition to these figures we take into consideration the immense 
 mass of material, cannon, equipment for horse and man, provided by 
 Napoleon during this time, the fortresses he garrisoned, besides the 
 thinking out and preparing for the campaign with the necessary 
 movements of troops, whatever some French writers may say, the world 
 will not .vithhold from him its adipiration. It should be remem- 
 bered also that nothing has been said of his complete reorganization 
 of the civil administration in all its aspects^ social, financial, and 
 political ; nor of his negotiations with foreign states, alone enough to 
 tax the greatest powers. The man who accomplished such results in 
 so ehojct a time now threw down the gauntlet to Europe, 
 
 U 
 
ACl' 1. 
 
 i . 
 
 SCENE: CHARLEROI. 
 
 Time :— 16th June, 1816. 
 
 Nothing marks more clearly the immense progress tfce world has 
 made since 1815, than the advance in the means of commnnicating 
 intelligence. To-day, if Russia masses her Cossacks at a point on 
 the Indian frontier, all England knows it the same day, and expla- 
 nations are demanded forthwith. 
 
 In June, 1815, Napoleon threw 130,000 men on the Flemish 
 frontier, and neither Wellington nor Bliicher knew of it until the 
 blow struck them. Of his 200,000 men. Napoleon oould at this 
 point only avail himself of 130,000. In Alsace, Savby, the I^- 
 renees, and La Vend^ were 55s,800 more; the remainder oi the 
 200,000 wei-e in gai-rison at Paris, Lyons, and other plaees. It is 
 with the fortune of these 130,000 men that we have to deal. Napo- 
 leon, having decided to try the isanie of war in Belgium, directed his 
 efforts towardi? masking the movements of his troops. He had 
 divided his arriiy into six corps, which, on the 1st June, were at 
 Valenciennes, Avesnes, Rocroi, Metz, and Laon. The Guai-d was at 
 Coinpiegne. The total strength of the army was 128,088 men, with 
 344 guns. All this mass was quietly moved in such a manner .that 
 on the 14th of June the whole stood in front of Charleroi, ready to 
 strike, the emperor being personally in command. Opposed, were 
 tlie Anglo-allied and Prussian armies. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington had at his disposal 105,000 men and 
 186 guns. 
 
 Bliicher had about 120,000 men and 312 guns: in other words, 
 1 30,000 French and 344 guns, against 225,000 allies and 498 guns : 
 Napoleon against Bliicher and Wellington. The Anglo-allied and 
 Prussian armies lay side by side. "Hie highway between Tharleroi 
 and Brussels was the dividing line. It was the English left, the 
 Prussian right, except close to Charleroi, where the Prussians over- 
 lapped. From it Wellington's forces stretched to the sea. From it 
 Bliicher's extended to Li^ge, considerably over one hundred miles 
 from the sea. Wellington had named Enghien or Nivelles as his 
 point of concentration, as he might be attacked on his right or left 
 centre. Bliicher had chosen Sombref and Namur for the same pur- 
 pose. It will be seen that, while Wellington or Bliicher could each 
 concentrate his own troops on tbeir own respective centre within a 
 
comparatively short time, yet, if they were attacked on either flank 
 it would take a much longer time to collect them. The readiest 
 mode of attacking Wellington from France was on his right, that is, 
 by way of Mons and Ath, as will be seen by looking at the map of 
 Franee and Belgium. He expected to be so attacked. His secret 
 orders of the 30th April, 1815, are a proof of this statement. Hav- 
 ing premised that he had received intelligence that Napoleon was 
 about to visit the northern frontier, ho proceeds : — 
 
 " In this case the enemy's Hne of attack will be either between 
 " the Lys and the Scheldt, or between the Sambi'e and Scheldt, or 
 " by both lines." 
 
 It was neither. It was between the Sambre and the Meuse, and 
 on his extreme left, not on his right or left centre. But "Wellington's 
 mind was pre-occupied with his own idea, and even when the attack 
 came on his extreme left he gave orders for concentration en 
 Nivelles, which, fortunately for his reputp.Uon, were disobeyed. Had 
 they been followed, Napoleon's left wing would probably have been 
 in Brussels on the 1 6th of June 
 
 Napoleon struck the allies precisely where they were weak, just 
 at the point where it took them longest to concentrate. His strategy 
 deserved to succeed, and the impartial student, however" much he 
 may find it necessary to blame Napoleon in Lis career, can only come 
 to one conclusion on this master stroke. Unquestionably Napoleon 
 did surprise Wellington and Bliicher, his plan was well laid, ably 
 executed, and only miscarried aom a series of strange accidents, 
 which, as one reads of them, seem as if they were the result of super-^ 
 natural interference. 
 
 The campaign being one of attack, it will bd best understood by 
 following the attacking force. The French army, being collected in 
 three divisions, advanced during the night of the 14th in three 
 columns, the left from Soh'e-sur-Sambre (see map) by Thuin upon 
 Marchiennes ; the centre from Beaumont by Ham-sur-Heure upon 
 Charleroi : and the right from PhilippevilJe (not on map) by Ger- 
 pines upon Ch&telet. 
 
 Now happened the first check. Greneral De Bourmont, a General 
 of Division, with some of his staff, deserted. The effect was most 
 depressing. The confidence of the soldiers in their ofiicers, of the 
 officers in each other, of Napoleon in his lieutenants, was shaken. 
 It is difficult to speak calmly of such an act. The strangest part of 
 
9 
 
 the matter is that this same De Bourmont/being honored by the 
 Bourbons, became Minister of War under Charles X., organized the 
 expedition which resulted in tlie capture of Algiers, and was made a 
 Marshal of France. He died in 1846, having passed his latter days 
 in obscurity, owing to the fall of Charles X. But his reception by 
 sturdy old Bliicher must have shown him what honest men thought 
 of him. That stout old hero turned on his heel when he was pre- 
 sented, and when attention was called to the white cockade De 
 Bourmont had mounted, all he said was : Einerlei was daa Volk fiir 
 ein Zeichen aufsteckt. Hundafott hhiht Hunda/ott. " What has the 
 " cockade to do with it? The man is a scoundrel." Quinet says of 
 this event : " After half a century, in which we have honoured and 
 " crowned every man who has succeeded, this desertion is ))erhaps 
 " the only one which has not found apologists among us." How 
 different was the feeling of Berthier ! He refused to join Napoleon, 
 and retired to his palace at Bamberg. But when he heard the 
 drums of the Russian troops on their march to invade France, in an 
 agony of shame and remorse he threw himself from one of the palace 
 windows and was taken up dead. 
 
 But the advance continued. The first enemy met was by the left, 
 which struck part of the Prussian division of Pirch II. (so called to 
 distinguish him from another general of the same name, who is called 
 Pirch I.), belonging to Ziethen's corps, one of the four of Bliicher's 
 army. News of the French advance had by this time been conveyed 
 to Wellington and Bliicher. The latter at ten o'clock on the night 
 of the 14th, had ordered Ziethen to wait the attack and slowly retire 
 towards Fleurus. The ether three corps of the Prussian army were 
 ordered to -move. Billow from Li^ge to Hanniit, Pirch I. from 
 Namur to Sombref, Thielmann from Ciney* to Namur. 
 
 As the French divisions successively came up on the left and 
 centre they were pushed forward, driving the Prussians back, but 
 the latter stubbornly held every position, both on the Brussels and 
 on the Namur roads. The French had to fight their way. The 
 Pirch II. division was gaining time for the other divisions of 
 Ziethen's corps to concenti'ate at Fleurus. Charleroi was taken 
 by one o'clock, and the French passed through, some towards 
 Gosselies, others towards Gilly. At five o'clock. Marshal Ney 
 came up to take command on the Brussels road. On the 11th 
 
 * Liege, Hannut and Ciney are east of the limits of the map. 
 
10 
 
 he had been in Paris. He had received a mesHage from Napoleon : 
 " If Ney wishes to take part in the first battle, let him be on the 
 13th at Avesnes (not on map), which will be my head-quarters." 
 He had started on the 1 3th, had arrived in Beaumont on the 14th, 
 was detained by want of a horse, had bought a couple from Maf'jial 
 Mortier on the 15th, and found Napoleon at about half-past four. 
 Napoleon welcomed him, put him in command of the 1st and 2nd 
 corps, D'Erlon's and Keilles' (44,300 men), and some cavalry, and 
 concluded his instructions by ordering him to adVance and drive the 
 enemy. 
 
 From this point commences a division of Napoleon's army, part 
 under N^ey on the left along the Bntssels road, the other part under 
 the emperor along the Namur road. Ney ordered his men to push 
 on. The Prussians, who were on the west of the Brussels road, had 
 by this time all crossed it, making for Fleai'us, and the way was 
 clear to Fitisne. There the advance struck the extrame left of the 
 Anglo-allied army. It was now half-past six. The allied troops at 
 Frasne were part of the first porps of Wellington's army, and be- 
 longed to the 2ud Dutch-Belgian division, 7,500 strong, under the 
 command of General Perponcher. The battalion actually in position, 
 about 4,000 strong, was under the command of Prince Bernhard of 
 Saxe- Weimar. It held its ground firmly against the attacks of such 
 troops as Ney brought up. The latter thought it better hot to run 
 any risk, and therefore resolved not to attempt anything more, but 
 to hold Frasne and await orders. Frasne is between five and six, 
 miles north of Charleroi ; Solre-sur-Sambre fifteen miles from Char- 
 leroi. The left had, therefore, advanced some twenty miles. They 
 had started at three in the morning, commenced to fight at four, 
 crossed the Sambre at ten, pushed on north to near Gosselies, and 
 there waited for orders, which they received about three o'clock, that 
 is, they had three or four hours rest. They then had advanced to 
 Frasne, where, as above stated, Ney took command about five. It 
 is not easy to underatand why he was now so cautious. He had the 
 cavalry division of Pire in hand, and Bachelus' infantry corps in 
 support, and some artillery. If he had pi-essed Piince Bernhard, 
 who had only four thousand men, he could probably have occupied 
 Quatre Bras, instead of Frasne, that night. If he had done so, he 
 would have commanded the line of communication between the Eng- 
 lish and PruasiftO t^'mifis. The roftd from ^amur to Nivelles crosses 
 
11 
 
 ^' 
 
 the Bi-ussels road at Quatre Bras. It was, therefore, of the greatest 
 consequence to Napoleon to take it, and to the allies to hold it. A 
 glance at the map will show that such was the case. If, then, Ney 
 had seized Quatre Bras on the evening of the 15th, Napoleon's tactics 
 would have been perfectly successful. His not doing so was the first 
 failure in the campaign. Charras says Ney was right in not attempt- 
 ing to attack Quatre Bras. The reasons he gives are cogent, but the 
 fact seems to be that Ney was imposed upon by tho strong front 
 shown by Prince Bernhard, and could, if he had pressed on, have 
 carried Quatre Bras with ease. 
 
 On the centre, owing to a mistake in the transmission of orders, 
 Yaudamme's Division, instead of marching at three in the morning, 
 did not march until seven o'clock. The Young Guard took their 
 place in the column. But the result of the delay was that the 
 advance guard of the centre, which appeared before Charleroi about 
 eight o'clock, was not supported until twelve. The Young Guard 
 then came up, and by their assistance Pajol, who led the advance, 
 entered Charleroi, passed through and pressed the Prussians, until 
 the latter stood firm at Fleurus. Grouchy, who subsequently came 
 up, halted with Napoleon's approval, and the latter returned to 
 Charleroi at eight o'clock, worn out with fatigue. The right, having 
 started later, reached Ch&telet at three o'clock, and remained in front 
 of that place. Such were the results of the first day's operations. 
 The Sambre was crossed, Charleroi taken, the French centre and 
 right lay on the Namuc road in front of Fleurus. Was the day suC' 
 cessful or not 1 The answer to this question depends on how far the 
 allies had made use of the time in concentrating their forces. We 
 have seen what Ziethen did. He concentrated his corps at Fleurus; 
 where he stood prepared to dispute the passage. 
 
 We have seen that orders were given by Bliicher on the night of 
 the 14th to his army to close up. 
 
 By midnight on the loth, Pirch I. had his whole corps (31,758 
 men) at Mazy, near Sombref, while Thielmann was a mile or two in 
 front of Namur. At ten o'clock at night of that day, Biilow was 
 still at Li^ge, far ofi*. Thus Bliicher by midnight of the 15th had 
 three corps, or nearly 80,000 men, within sixteen miles of the enemy. 
 What had Wellington done 1 We have seen that news of the French 
 advances wag sent to him on the 12th. Sir Hussey Vivian, whose 
 Brigade of Cavalry was near Tournai, reported to him on that day that 
 
12 
 
 the French were preparing to attack. He made no change in his 
 dispositions. On the l/)th, at nine in the morning, he received a 
 dispatch from Ziethen, written from Charleroi, announcing that the 
 advanced posts on the Sambre were attacked. Still no movement 
 was made. The first order for concentration came from General 
 Constant de Rebecque, the Chief of Staff of the Prince of Orange, at 
 two o'clock in the afternoon. It was a partial order to the Second 
 Dutch-Belgian division, which was the extreme left of Wellington's 
 army, to concentrate at Nivelles and Quatre Bi-as. Information of 
 these orders was sent to Wellington at Brussels, but he still ordered 
 no general movement. Siborne says that the Prince of Orange, who 
 was in commandtfof the First Anglo-Allied Corps, also forwarded to 
 Wellington a report which he had received from his outi)Osts, stating 
 that the French had attacked the Prussian advanced posts on the 
 Sambre, and that this report reached Wellington at five o'clock p.m. 
 
 Between eight and nine o'clock that evening came a letter from 
 Bliiclier, saying that Thuin had been attacked, and that Charleroi 
 appeared to be menaced. Then Wellington gave his first general 
 order for concentration. Siborne says this order was given about 
 five o'clock in the afternoon, but Charras has proved conclusively that 
 it was not sent until between eight o'clock and half-past nine in the 
 evening. 
 
 There was, at the same time, a special order to the corps of the 
 Prince of Orange. It prescribed that the Perponcher Division, i)art 
 of which had been since noon disputing the Brussels road with the 
 French at Quatre Bras, a fact of which Wellington was unaware, 
 should go to Nivelles. At ten o'clock, further news had come in. 
 ** After orders " were issued, with the view of completing the con- 
 centration. It was this news which bi-oke up the Duchess of Rich- 
 mond's ball, so well known from Byron's lines. We cannot repeat the 
 orders, from want of space, but they can be seen in Siborne. If they 
 had been carried out, the Anglo-allied army would have dniwn away 
 from the Prussian. The extremity of the left wing would have been 
 five miles west of the Brussels road, and eleven miles from Sombre", 
 where the Prussians were collecting. 
 
 At eleven o'clock at night, more precise intelligence came in, and 
 fresh and more urgent orders were sent out. But through all appears 
 the idea that the French would strike at Brussels, by way of Nivelles 
 or Braine-le-Comte, not by the Charleroi road. 
 
13 
 
 The result of this delay and false movement of V/elUngton was 
 favourable to Napoleon. It left him free to deal with BlUcher alone. 
 He had counted justly on Wellington'^ slowness and Bliicher's rash- 
 ness. His coup appeared, therefore, to have all the elements of 
 sucoess. The heroes of the day were, however, the brave Prussians 
 of Ziethen s Corps, who had stopped the French at Gilly. and Prince 
 Bernhard and his Nassauers, who had stopped them at Frasne. 
 
 ACT II. 
 
 SCENE : — LIONY AND QUATRE BRAS. 
 
 Time:— 16th June, 1815. 
 
 At nine o'clock on the evening of the 1 5th Napoleon had returned 
 to Charleroi. Wearied out, he threw himself on a bed to get some 
 rest. About ten o'clock Ney left Gosselies, and reached Charleroi 
 about midnight. He and the emperor had supper together, and a 
 long conversation. It was two o'clock on the morning of the 16th 
 when they separated. Some topics, unpleasant to both, were doubt- 
 less avoided, and their old friendship seemed completely reestablished. 
 So far as anybody heard, the emperor had no reason to complain of the 
 marshal. The plan of campaign must necessarily have been talked 
 over, but no definite decision seems to have been communicated to 
 Ney. It would have been better for France if both Napoleon and 
 Ney had rested, instead of talking over old times. 
 
 In Juno the nights are short, and the day dawned shortly after 
 Ney went to his outposts. For the bulk of the army, military opera- 
 tions had ceased at seven or eight o'clock of the evening before. The 
 troops had had time to rest. They were, moreover, in good spirits, 
 and anxious to advance. On the 15th they had started at half-past 
 three. On the 16th the divisions in rear of the left could have been 
 closed up to the front very early in the morning. Ney would then 
 have had 22,254 men in hand, and D'Erlon's 20,000 close behind. 
 If he had pressed on at any hour from four o'clock in the morning 
 up to ten or eleven, with his 22,000 men, he would have overwhelmed 
 all before him. Prince Bernhard and his 4,000 Nassauera held their 
 position all night, and were not reinforced till about four in the 
 morning, when General Perponcher marched the rest of his brigade 
 there, making in all about 7,000 men, with sixteen guns. The 
 Prince of Orange, who was the general in command of the first corps, 
 to which Perponcher's Division belonged, arrived about six o'clock, 
 
14 
 
 but brought no reinforcements : in fact, no more came up at all, 
 until three or half-past three o'clock in the afternoon. The Duke oi 
 Wellington was on the ground at eleven o'clock, but brought no 
 troops. When Ney did attack, at two o'clock, he only attacked with 
 not quite 10,000 men of all arms. By three o'clock he had 17,615 
 in action, but during the whole of the rest of the day, he only had 
 22,000 men engaged, and of these only 16.750 were infantry, one of 
 his infantry divisions (Gerard's, 4,297 strong) having been withdrawn 
 from him by Napoleon. He made no use of D'Erlon's corps, 20,000 
 strong. The delay on the left was most disastrous to the French. 
 What was the situation elsewhere 1 
 
 We have seen that at midnight of the 15th the only Prussian 
 corps in the immediate front of the French centre and right was 
 Ziethen's - 32,692 men, less the loss of the 15th, say 1,500 — say 
 31 ,000 men with 96 guns. The nearest corps to Ziethen was that of 
 Pirch 1., three divisions of which were at Mazy, nine miles from the 
 front. These three divisions arrived there from Namur, in obedience 
 to Blucher's order of the evening of the 14th, at three in the after- 
 noon of the 15th, and halted at that place. They did not advance 
 to Sombref, face to face with the French, until about ten o'clock in 
 the morning of the 16th, when they were joined by their fourth 
 division, and that was the time when Ziethen received his first imme- 
 diate support. Up to that hour he had been alone in front of the 
 French, and subject to be attacked by Napoleon with the centre and 
 right of the French army, except such part as had not crossed the 
 Sambre. The result of such an attack could not be doubtful. The 
 next nearest corps to Pirch I. was that of Thielmann, but he was 
 close to Namur, twenty miles distant, during the whole night of the 
 15th, and only commenced to advance from Namur about seven 
 o'clock on the morning of the 16th. He arrived at Sombref about 
 twelve o'clock of that day. 
 
 Three cannon-shots were heard from Fleurus at half-past two in 
 the afternoon. They were Napoleon's signal for attack. By that 
 time he had to deal with 90,000 Germans. Three-fourths of Bliicher's 
 army were concentrated and well posted for defence. 
 
 Ney, as we have seen, had waited until two o'clock to commence 
 his attack on the left. What caused the delay ] 
 
 The French army was anxious and ready to fight. Everything 
 depended on prompt action. Had such been the case, Ney with 
 
15 
 
 40,000 men would have overthroMrn 7,000 troops, many of whom 
 were doubtful, being Dutch Belgians suspected of French sympathies, 
 and with no supports at hand. Napoleon with 83,000 would have 
 had to attack 31,000, true, with another 31,000 to support them, 
 but that support nine miles away. The object of the sudden attack 
 was therefore possible of accomplishment. The question is, did 
 Napoleon display the energy which the crisis demanded, or did he 
 press the advantages so far in his favour ] It must be remembered 
 that fully 25,000 of the French centre and right had not crossed the 
 Sambre on the night of the 16th. It required two or three hours at 
 least to get ^hese troops over, and as they were the reserve artillery 
 and heavy cavalry, besides Lobau's infantry, 10,000 strong, it was 
 absolutely necessary tp wait for them. Again, Gerard's corps was 
 at Ch&telet, and had to be moved up to Fleurus, about seven miles, 
 while Vandamme had five miles to cover. The Guards had nine 
 miles to march from Charleroi to reach the front. 
 
 In view of these facts, and bearing in mind that Napoleon had to 
 wait for the reports of his various recounoitering parties, any charge 
 of too great delay on his part on the morning of the 16th appears 
 unreasonable and unfair. He rose at five o'clock. His orders to 
 his right to concentrate were sent out before eight o'clock, those 
 for Ney before nine o'clock. He himself reached the front about 
 noon. The French left and centre were in position by one o'clock, 
 and the attack on the Prussians began at two. It is not easy to see 
 how it could have begun much earlier in the day. At the same 
 time he was doing all he could to bring up his left without actually 
 going over in person. He sent Ney a dispatch early in the morning, 
 asking for exact information as to the position of his various corps. 
 As above stated, he sent a general order of movement, and also a 
 personal letter, giving full explanations of the plan of operations 
 before nine o'clock. He sent another dispatch at ten o'clock in reply 
 to a hesitating message from Ney. He sent another at two, and 
 another at three, or a little after. All were urgent expressions of 
 his desire that Ney should advance, and if possible manoeuvre to join 
 the right. But Ney, or rather Ney's subordinate. Count Reille, 
 for reasons satisfactory to himself, did not think fit to obey at once 
 the first order to advance, which reached him about half-past ten. 
 Having asked further instructions from Ney, the order to advance 
 was repeated, but he did not come into the field until one o'clock. 
 
16 
 
 Napoleon judged correctly enough that the dispersed Anglo-allied 
 forces could not be collected in time for serious resistance to his own 
 forces properly handled, but Ney's want of perception of the necessity 
 for a strenuous advance lost the em{>eror the advantages which 
 should have been gained on the left. 
 
 Ney on the left and Napoleon on the right were simultaneously 
 engaged from about two o'clock. Napoleon defeated Bliicher. 
 What then did Ney effect ? All that can be said is that he pre- 
 vented Wellington from joining Bliicher. This was no small achieve- 
 ment. Wellington, after arriving at Quatre Bras at half-past eleven, 
 rode over to Bliicher and promised him that by three or so in the 
 afternoon the English army would join the Prussians. A vain pro- 
 mise never kept. The Duke found Ney in his road and the way was 
 barred. Could Ney have done more than he did? It has been 
 shewn that he could, had he acted on his orders more promptly. 
 But it has been shewn further that the Marshal's whole force 
 engaged was never more than 22,000 men, and that he made no use 
 of D'Erlon's Corps of 20,000 men. 
 
 This episode is the most inscrutable in the whole campaign. The 
 absence of these twenty thousand men alone prevented Ney from 
 inflicting a decisive defeat upon Wellington at Quatre Bras. Siborne, ^ 
 who is the Duke's most uncompromising admirer, explicitly admits 
 this fact. How did it happen 1 
 
 It seems impossible to give a satisfactory answer. But the facts 
 seem to be as follows : When Ney got his orders from Napoleon at 
 half-past ten o'clock in the morning to advance, D'Erlon was at 
 Jumet. (See map.) He was ordered b> Ney, as part of the geneml 
 movement, to advance as far as Frasne, detaching one division to 
 Marbais. At twelve o'clock he commenced his march. Hearing 
 the action going on in front, he left his column and rode on in 
 advance to Frasne. He drew rein there, and while conversing with 
 some of the superior officers was joined by General Labedoy^re, who 
 had come from Napoleon. That genei*al showed D'Erlon a i)encil 
 note which he was taking to Ney, and which ordered the Marshal to 
 detach D'Erlon's Corps towards Ligny. He added that he (Labe-' 
 doydre) had already lyfiven the order for the change of direction of 
 D'Erlon's column, and pointed out to D'Erlon himself the direction 
 in which to go to join it. 
 
17 
 
 Nf>y, in a letter dated the 26tli June, 1815, complains that Napo- 
 leon had taken away D'Erlon's Corps without notifying him (Ney), 
 and having, therefore, to act without D'Erlon, the battle of Quatre 
 Bras was lost. D'Erlon's account of the matter seems to contradict 
 Ney's statement. Col. Heymes, Ney's Chief of Staff, confirms 
 D'Erlon's account, but says that Col. Laurent, not General Labe- 
 doy^re, was the aide who carried the message. As D'Erlon was put 
 in niotiori by Ney about eleven o'clock, in obedience to Napoleon's 
 letter and second despatch, and as the distance from Jumet to Frasne 
 is a little over nine miles, and as D'Erlon galloped on in advance of 
 his column, he must have met General Labedoydre in about an hour 
 and a half, or two hours, after eleven o'clock — say one o'clock. Now 
 any order sent from I^apoleon to Ney by the hand of General Labedo- 
 y^re, and which reached Frasne by one o'clock, must have left Charle- 
 roi very shortly after half-past ten, as Cha,rleroi is about ten miles 
 from Frasne — if sent from Fleurus it would be eight miles. The order 
 which Labedoydre is said to have cai'ried, and to have shewn to 
 D'Erlon, was contradictory of Napolepn's third despatch, and not • 
 only of that despatch, but of the whole of the previous second des- 
 patch. What had happened so early in the day to induce Napoleon 
 to take away the first corps from Ney] The only reason which 
 ap]>ears at all satisfactory is, that Napoleon, as he descended from 
 his carriage at Fleurus, at twelve o'clock, saw that there was urgent 
 need in that part for D'Erlon just then. Instaad of having only a 
 part of the Prussian array, he found three-fourths of it in front of 
 him. And yet this explanation is not quite satisfactory, because 
 later on in the day, namely at two o'clock and three o'clock, Napo- 
 leon sent two more despatches to Ney. The first repeated the order 
 to attack, and informed Ney of the arrangements for Grouchy'si 
 attack at half-past two on Ligny, and stated that there was a corps 
 of troops (not an army) to attack. The second informed Ney that 
 the action was at its height, and ordered him to manoeuvre towards 
 the emperor. Neither of these despatches says one word about 
 D'Erlon, or intimates in any way that he had been withdrawn from 
 Ney. It could not be either of these which Labedoy^re shewed 
 D'Erlon, because the first says nothing about D'Erlon's moving 
 toward lagny, and the second was sent too late to have reached 
 D'Erlon at the hour he and his division were on the road to Frasne. 
 
 Again, in a despatch written by Napoleon to Ney the next day 
 2 
 
18 
 
 (the 17th), Napoleon complains that the marshal had not unite<l hid 
 divisions. He says : " If the corps of D'Erlon and Reille had lieen 
 " together, not an Englishman would have escaped of the cori)8 which 
 " attacked you." The despatch then goes on : *' If Count D'Erlon 
 "had executed the movement on St. Amand which the einiHsror 
 " ordered, the Prussian army would have been totally destroyed, and 
 " we should have taken perhaps 30,000 prisonere." 
 
 This incident of the turning aside of D'Erlon's column is one of 
 the enigmas of history. We have stated all- that we have been able 
 to ascertain about it. We cannot accept any of the published expla- 
 nations as satisfactory ; and now the actors in the drama are dead, 
 there is no hope of any solution of the difficulty. 
 
 Where did D'Erlon go when he left his proper line of march ] If 
 the commencement of the incident was singular, its conclusion was 
 still more so. The new line of march of D'Erlon led him towards 
 Napoleon. The heads of his columns showed themselves in Napo- 
 leon's left rear about half-past five in the afternoon. They must 
 either have been longer on their cross-march than the length of the 
 march warranted, or they must have been very much later than eleven 
 o'clock in starting from Jumet. Whatever the truth may have been, 
 there is no doubt on one point : their arrival was unexpected. Nobody 
 knew who they were. Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp off at full gallop 
 to find out, and postponed a threatened attack on the Prussian centre 
 until the messenger should return. At half-past six the aide-de-camp 
 came back with the information that it was D'Erlon's column, about 
 two miles from St. Amand, exactly where it was needed for Napoleon's 
 purpose. Charrassays: "Let the order be given. In an hour twenty 
 " thousand men of all arms will debouche on Wagnel^e, on Bry, rolling 
 '^ up in rear Bliichep's right wing on his centre, while he is assailed 
 " in front by Vandamme and Gerard, reinforced by the whole reserve. 
 " The plan conceived by Napoleon will be realized. There will not 
 " escape 20,000 Prussians. The order is not given, D'Erlon is not 
 " summoned." But the fact seems to be, according to the best evi- 
 dence, that Napoleon did summon D'Erlon more than once, but that 
 Ney, at the same time, also repeatedly and urgently ordered D'Erlon 
 to return to him, being in the very throes of his struggle at Quatre 
 Bras, and that D'Erlon thought it best to obey the marshal under 
 whose immediate command he had been placed, and not the 
 emperor. It seems, at fiiBt s^ht, iinUkely that such should be the 
 
19 
 
 oase, and Charras dispiitea the fact ; but, on a fair examination of tht 
 whole evidence, the conclusion jufit stated is the most probable. 
 
 Instead of advancing to assist Napoleon, D'Erlon having been 
 summoned by Ney to return to him, countermarched his men and 
 arrived at Frasne too late to help Ney, as the battle of Quatre Bras 
 was over before he got there. Twenty thousand of Napoleon's best 
 troops marched and countermarched on this memorable day. Their 
 absence from one field robbed the French of what undoubtedly 
 would have been a decisive victory. Their prasence on the other 
 field would have turned an indecisive advantage into a complete 
 triumph. Ligny would have been a second Jena. It would have 
 been to the Prussians what Waterloo was two days afterwards to thft 
 French. Nai)oleon'8 calculations were correct. His left wing found 
 at first practically nothing to oppose them. His right wing and 
 centre were sufficient to defeat the Pnissians. He was not respon- 
 sible for the false movement which so fatally weakened both wings 
 without benefiting either. Had Ney swept the Brussels road clear 
 of the Anglo-allied army, Napoleon's anticipations of being in 
 Brussels that night would probably have been realized. That it was 
 not so was partially Ney's fault. It was not Napoleon's. 
 
 ACT III. 
 
 SCENE : — ON THE ROADS TO WATERLOO AND WAVRE. 
 
 Time :— 17th June, 1815. 
 
 The morning sun of the 17th June, 1815, rose on two ghastly 
 fields. At Quatre Bras over nine thousand combatants had been 
 either killed, wounded or missing, while at Ligny about twenty 
 thousand represented the loss to both sides. Perhaps altogether 
 .30,000 men hora de combat. We have set forth the actual results of 
 the previous day. Ney had blocked Wellington, Napoleon had 
 defeated Blucher. All had been over by ten o'clock. How had the 
 night been passed 1 To appreciate what took place it will be neces- 
 sary to consult the map. Bliicher, being forced to retire from Ligny, 
 had two courses open to him. He could retreat by way of Namur, 
 but that would separate him from Wellington, or he could retire to 
 Wavre, from which place it would be comparatively easy for him to 
 rejoin Wellington either before or behind Brussels. With desperate 
 tenacity he, or rather his Chief of Staff, Gneisenau, chose the latter,, 
 and the whole Prussian army, including Billow's corps, which came 
 
20 
 
 r 
 
 up too late for Ligny, was massed upon Wavre by the next after- 
 noon after their defeat at Ligny. Their retreat was not only not 
 harassed by the French, but its very line was unknown to them. 
 That it was so was a cardinal error which led directly and con- 
 clusively to Napoleon's overthrow. The more the campaign is 
 studied, the more it appeai-s that all other mistakes on both sides are 
 dwarfed before this one. On 'Napoleon's side, Ney's inaction, 
 D'Erlon's countermarch, were almost compensated for at the end of 
 the 16th. On Wellington's part, his want of penetration was made 
 u[) for by the intelligent disobedience of General Perponcher, and the 
 stubborn courage of the British infantry. This error was so serious 
 that its consequences are plainly visible in the grand catastrophe. 
 We arc quice unable to account for Napoleon's course of action. 
 We have seen him mass, his troops on the 14th, cross the Sambre on 
 the 15th, fight Ligny, and urge on Ney at Quatre Bras on the 16th. 
 We have seen him recognize instinctively the true situation of the 
 Anglo-allied force, and with -juperior calmness quiet Ney's hesitation. 
 We have seen him hurl at the Prussian army his old guard, a thunder- 
 bolt which laid it prostrate. Up to this point he may be said to have 
 been quite successful enough to satisfy the demands of his proposed 
 campaign, although not so completely successful as his plans des«rved. 
 Why did he not press his advantage 1 There is a mournful interest 
 in contemplating him. We see pass before him his former glories. 
 The Bridge at Lodi, the Pyramids, Austerlitz, Marengo. We hear 
 the chant of the MarseilUise as they lead the van of the avenging 
 people. We see a cruel system of despotic bondage torn away, 
 a wakening of the fresh young life of freedom. The brave soldiers, 
 whose bodies lie scattered in far distant fields, come before us in 
 spirit. We see them approach their chief as he lies asleep, and with 
 mute gesture attempt to rouse and save him from his coming fate, 
 then pass away with dumb anguish as they perceive his lethargy. 
 Brave children of France ! Your zeal for liberty ofttimes outran 
 discretion. You were guilty of many crimes, many follies, but you 
 were faithful to the flag under which you fought, and to the general 
 who led you to trium]^ h. You came in spirit from your graves to 
 congratulate him on his last victory "ind vainly to warn him of his 
 coming defeat. There is no picture in his history so painful to our 
 mind as the one we contemplate. The mighty emperor, surrounded 
 hy his victorious array, justly proud of themselves and him, flushed 
 
21 
 
 by success, confident of complete triumph ; and on the next day but 
 one, at the same hour, behold these very troops, that mighty emperor, 
 flying in pfmic-struck confusion before their defeated foe, now- 
 become a pursuing fury. Although we recognize that the result was 
 probably better for the human race, we cannot help feeling that 
 species of gnawing regret which eats at the heart when it recurs to 
 what might have been, but is not. 
 
 Napoleon, instead of sleeping on the field, went back to Fleurus 
 about eleven o'clock. It is generally admitted that before he lay 
 down, he gave orders to Grouchy to send Pajol's light cavalry and 
 Teste's infantry after the retiring Prussians. Thiers ^ays he also 
 sent ordei's to Ney to be under arms at daybreak, to press the Eng- 
 lish again. These latter orders are stated by no other author, but 
 are referred to in Soult's despatch of the next morning reiterating 
 them. Even admitting the genuineness of the other orders, those for 
 the pursuit of the Prussians appear to be utterly inadequate. With 
 every disposition to be chary of criticising such a man as Napoleon, 
 we must confess that the inadequacy of these prders is a mystery to 
 us, for which we can find no satisfactory solution. Napoleon nmst 
 have miscalculated the effect of the battle. Perhaps he undervalued 
 Bliicher. Some authors attribute his lethargy to his enfeebled bodily 
 condition — it seems to us very wrongly, on a fair consideration of all 
 Napoleon di! achieve. But whatever the reason, the fact is there 
 that the Prussians were allowed the whole night and the next morn- 
 ing to retire on Wavre, and no sufficient atteuipt was made to follow 
 up their traces. 
 
 Napoleon was perfectly justified in turning his whole strength 
 immediately against the English. His plan was to throw his centre 
 where it was needed, and he was (uite right to transfer it at once 
 from his right to his left. But why he did not ascertain more ex- 
 actly what his right had to do, is very difficult to explain. He 
 seemed to have thought that the Prussians would retire towards their 
 own base, namely, Namur, not towards Brussels by way of Wavre, 
 as they did. His first orders were to follow them towards Namur, 
 and there appears to be little doubt but that, in this instance, he was 
 mistaken in the inference he drew from his success. The person to 
 whom is due the credit of the masterly Prussian retreat, which un- 
 (^uestionably saved the campaign, is Gneisenau, whose name is com- 
 
22 
 
 paratively unknown. Napoleon's mistake, for it seems to us that it 
 can be called by no other name, undoubtedly contributed to Waterloo. 
 The events of the day were as follows : Napoleon rose at five, 
 and sent off orders for Lobau's Corps to march towards the 
 left, followed by the Guard, and then the heavy cavalry. About 
 six o'clock, General Flahault returned from Ney, and reported 
 the result of Quatre Bras. Napoleon immediately sent a written 
 order thi'ough Soult to Ney, explaining the position of affairs, 
 and urging him to advance. Cliarras says this order was not sent 
 off iintil eight o'clock ; Thiers says about seven o'clock. Napo- 
 leon left Fleurus for the front about eight o'clock. Other orders 
 were sent out at the same time for a review of the troops who had 
 fought at Ligny. This review began about nine o'clock, and lasted 
 till nearly noon. Meantime Lobau, the Guard, and the heavy cav- 
 alry were moving to the left, and reports from the reconnaissances 
 were coming in. It seems to have been Napoleon's plan that Ney 
 should advance, on the theory that the English could not oppose 
 him, in view of the fftct that the Prussians were in retreat. Ney 
 could not advance, because Wellington was in front of him with 
 about forty thousand men. They were not withdrawn until about 
 one o'clock. By noon. Napoleon sent out an order by Soult to Ney 
 to advance, and followed it immediately himself. This fact, which is 
 important, is fixed by the despatch from Sdult to Ney, which bears 
 the date d midl. Before he started Napoleon gave his famous orders 
 to Grouchy. The latter must, then, have received them between 
 twelve and one. These orders were verbal. Thiers gives a version 
 of them which contradicts that of Grouchy. The historian appeals 
 to Marshal Gerard, and other witnesses, and they appear to us ex- 
 actly the orders which Napoleon would have given. The fons el 
 origo mali was undoubtedly the impression which the staff had, if 
 Napoleon himself did not share it, that the Prussians were in retreat 
 upon Namur ; and from this time to the end of the campaign we see 
 Grouchy wasting his strength hunting for Bliicher exactly where he 
 was not; and entirely ignorant as to what line he ought to take. For 
 the present we leave him, and follow Napoleon. The latter was 
 delayed in the advance by the resolute front shown by the English 
 cavalry, who were protecting Wellington's retreat. He retreated as 
 soon as he ascertained Blucher's disaster, but only to make a better 
 stand. The English horsemen gave the French a taste of what they 
 
23 
 
 might expect the next day. Between the eflfect of their charge at 
 Genappes and a teirible thunder-storm, it was evening before Napo- 
 leon came face to face with Wellington at Mont St. Jean. The em- 
 peror deployed his cavalry and guns to feel v/hether he had a rear 
 guard to deal with, or Wellington's whole army. When he ascer- 
 tained that it was the latter, we read that he was pleased. He was 
 destined to be more than satisfied, but the quastion is, was he justi- 
 fied in his opinion that the game was now in his own hands 1 We 
 will endeavour to give a fair answer to this question, founded on 
 the statement of the position of the various armies, as stated in the 
 sequel. 
 
 ■ ACT IV. 
 
 scene: — WATERLOO AND WAVRE. 
 
 Time:- 18th June, 1815. 
 
 It is half-past eleveu in the morning. Marshal Grouchy is sitting 
 at breakfast in the garden of the notary Halbaert, at Sart-les-Wal- 
 hain. With him are Gerard, Vandamme, Valaz^, an engineer 
 officer, and Baltus, in command of the artillery. Suddenly Col. 
 Simon Lorriere enters and says: "I hear firing." The party go 
 out to the garden, and there heavy reports are heard, so heavy that 
 the ground seems to tremble. "It is the emperor, he is fighting the 
 " English, let us join him," says Gerard, " We should march 
 " towai'ds the guns." "No," says Grouchy. "My orders are to 
 " move to Wavre, and to Wavre I am going." The decision was 
 fatal to France, disastrous to Napoleon, and damning for Grouchy 's 
 reputation. To correctly appreciate the situation it is necessary to 
 retrace our steps to the position of matters after Ligny, that is on 
 the evening of the day before the one of the incident above related. 
 
 We have seen that Napoleon sent out Pajol's cavalry in pursuit of 
 the Prussians. Pujol took the Namur road, that is eastward towards 
 the French right. The Prussians however were by that time in 
 retreat towards Wavre, that is northwards, so as to join Wellington. 
 There has never been so masterly a retreat, or so determined a 
 strategy, as that of Gneisenau. It is impossible to give the Prussian 
 army too much credit for their steadiness and courage during this 
 retrograde movement. While retiring they at the same time used 
 their cavalry in constant and vigilant patrolling, and in, this respect 
 were as active as their descendants were in 1870, while the French 
 
24 
 
 II 
 
 were equally inactive. The resuU of their movement was that by 
 nightfall of the 17th the whole Prussian army of ninety thousand 
 men were in and around Wavre. 
 
 The Duke of Wellington only received news of the disaster at 
 Ligny the next morning. He then commenced his retreat, also ably 
 managed, from Quatre Bras about ten o'clock, and arrived at Waterloo 
 about five in the afternoon. 
 
 Napoleon on the 1 7th, after moving off Lobau's Corps and the 
 Guards from his right to his left, about one o'clock in the day, per- 
 haps a trifle earlier, entrusted his right wing to Grouchy, and gave 
 him at first verbal, then at two o'clock written orders. These latter 
 directed Grouchy to mai'ch to Gembloux. This dispatch is said to 
 have been suppi'essed by Grouchy in the controversy which arose. 
 It was first printed in 1842. Its closing sentence is : '* In all cases 
 " keep constantly your two corps of infantry united in a league of 
 ** ground, having several avenues of retreat, and post detachments of 
 ** cavalry intermediate between us, in order to communicate with 
 " headquarters." 
 
 Owing to a combination of circumstances entirely beyond Grouchy's 
 control, and for which he can in no way be held responsible, he with 
 his men on tlie evening of the 1 7th was only at Gembloux. He 
 .^as, moreover, quite igrorant of where the Prussians were. He had, 
 however, been at fault in not leaving detachments of cavalry between 
 himself and the enjperor, as the latter had ordered. 
 
 Napoleon himself had moved oiF to the Brussels road and followed 
 the advance of his troops, delayed by a tremendous thunderstorm, 
 which turned the country into a sea of mud, and I'eached the Caillou 
 farm, in front of Mont St. Jean, about half-past six, to find the 
 English in position and ready to give battle. He reconnoitered their 
 position, the reconnaissance lasting until ten o'clock, then returned to 
 his headquarters, which were established at the farm of Caillou above 
 referred to. We are now in a position to appreciate why Napoleon 
 was delighted that the English were going to make a stand alone. 
 Apparently a puzzle why it should have pleased him, it is accounted 
 for from his point of view. He had succeeded in his plans. He 
 had separated the two allies. He had beaten one, not quite so 
 thoroughly as he thought, but so far as he knew sufliciently to keep 
 him out of any fighting for some time. He had left enough of his 
 own army with Grouchy to watch the defeated enemy^ and*had given 
 
 i 
 
25 
 
 him sufficiently plain instructions what to do. Now he had with 
 himself his whole centre and left, with superb cavalry, enormous 
 force in artillery, and the very ^lite of his infantry, and he was not 
 personally aware, although some of his generals were, what the 
 British soldier can do. He knew however that the Duke of 
 Wellington's army was a very composite one, and he had good 
 grounds for knowing that at least a thiz'd of it could not be trusted. 
 When all these considerations are taken into account, it is not 
 wonderful that Napoleon was glad that before him lay Wellington 
 alone. 
 
 On his return to his head-quartera he issued the necessary ordere 
 for the battle of the next. day, and, if his own stai;ement is to be 
 believed, he sent a special order to Grouchy. This order Gi'ouchy, 
 to his dying day, protested he never received. Many writers assert 
 that Napoleon never sent it ; but, on considering the orders known 
 to have been sent, and Napoleon's plan of operations, we cannot 
 believe but that it was sent. It was the very thing which Napoleon 
 would be likely to do — keep touch with his right. We also believe 
 that Grouchy did not receive it. 
 
 Napoleon, having retired to rest, rose again at two o'clock, and 
 re-commenced his reconnoitering, which he kept up during the re- 
 mainder of the night. The rain continued, but cleared up about four or 
 five o'clock. If it had been possible. Napoleon would have attacked 
 then, or very soon after, but the ground was wet for artillery. It was 
 therefore necessary to wait. Moreover, Napoleon, as he alleged, ex- 
 pected Grouchy to close up to him, such being the substance of the order 
 of the evening before, and a later one sent off about three in the morn- 
 ing. At ten in the morning, lie sent an aide-de-camp to Grouchy, 
 with a third order to the same effect. On these two considerations, 
 he decided to postpone the attack on the British, and after sending 
 off the aide-de camp to Grouchy at ten o'clock, he slept for an hour. 
 Then, waking at eleven, he gave the signal for attack, and at half- 
 past eleven the Battle of Waterloo began by the discharge of one 
 hundred and twenty guns. This cannonade lasted half an hour, and 
 these were the guns heard by Grouchy, and towards which Gerard 
 begged him to march. 
 
 We have thus ascertaiaed the position of Napoleon, Wellington, 
 and Grouchy. Where was Bliicher at this time 1 
 
26 
 
 Communications passed between Wellington and Blucher on tlie 
 1 7th, in which the latter promised that he would assist "Wellington, 
 not only with two army corps, but with his whole army. He added 
 that if Napoleon did not attack on the 18th, they would attack him 
 on the 19th. Such was the spirit ill which the men of that day fought 
 for their homes. In pursuance of this promise he started his four 
 corps early on the 18th. Billow's was the leading; division. Its 
 advance reached St. Lambert (see map) about noon, but its main 
 body not until three o'clock. Ziethen's Corj.d had to cross the line of 
 Billow's march, and, owing to the delay thus caused, did not reach 
 Ohain (see map) until six o'clock. Pirch had to leave half his corps 
 for the defence of Wavre against Grouchy, and joined Biilow with 
 the other half about half-past seven in the evening. Thielmann was 
 held at Wavre by Grouchy. 
 
 Thus, at half-past eleven. Billow's was the only Prussian column 
 near Wellington, and he was at St. Lambert, five miles from the 
 fighting. From that time to half-past four, this corps was straggling 
 through horrible roads in the valley of the Lasne, in order to seize a 
 position on the French right. At that hour they entered into the 
 operations of the field of Waterloo, 
 
 The reader will now understand (if he consults the map) what 
 influence Grouchy could have had by advancing towards Planchenoit, 
 instead of on to Wavre. It is, perhaps, only curious speculation, 
 but it is worth following out, as the turning incident in the campaign. 
 There is not much doubt upon one point, at all events : Grouchy 
 could have considerably delayed, if he could not have prevented 
 altogether, BlUcher's junction with Wellington on the 18th. Grant- 
 ing that he was where he was in obedience to his orders ; granting 
 that Napoleon was as much responsible as he was for the waste of 
 strength, and useless cavalry marches on the wrong flank ; granting 
 all this, giving him every credit for every possible effort hitherto ; now, 
 at all events, he should have seen the mistake. Thei'e was the firing, 
 there were the Prussians plainly seen on the road towards it, — the 
 very privates saw what was to be done, but the general was blind. 
 
 It is useless, to fight the Battle of Waterloo over again. Thanks 
 to the old stubborn valour of the British soldiery, and to the tenacity of 
 the British commander-in-chief, who knew his men, and did not 
 spare them, the British held their own. They had all they could do 
 to manage it. It is easy to appreciate the influence which the 
 
 A ? 
 
 *l 
 
 S 
 
 ■•• I 
 
27 
 
 9, 
 
 '0 I 
 
 f 
 
 Prussians had, when we recollect that, at one o'clock, Napoleon had 
 to detach two divisions of cavalry ; then, somewhat later, two in- 
 fantry divisions — in all, over ten thousand men ; that he had to 
 follow these by the Young Guard, and by part of the Old Guard j 
 and that he was really fighting two battles at once. 
 
 The strength of the Prussian army actually engaged at "Waterloo 
 alone was over 51,000 men.* Their loss there was 6,998, while at 
 Wavre they lost in addition 2,476, in all 9,474 men. The British 
 loss proper was 6,936. That of the King's German Legion and other 
 German ti-oops under Wellington's command was 4,494. The Dutch- 
 Belgians lost 4,147, of which 1,627 were "missing." Exclusit^e of 
 the Dutch-Belgians, Wellington's total loss was 11,430. These 
 figures shew that the Prussians must have done as severe fighting 
 as the British, and prove they did not come on the field merely to 
 witness an English victory. If Napoleon had had his whole army, 
 and, what is more, his undivided attention to bestow upon Wel- 
 lington, it is difficult to believe that he would not have been success- 
 ful. Even as it was, with a large part of his force detached to one 
 fiank, and with his attention continually distracted to that flank, he 
 captured one position, La Haye Sainte, he almost annihilated "Wel- 
 lington's cavalry and decimated his infantry. He drove the Dutch- 
 Belgian contingent clear off the field. But he could not shake the 
 British squareii. Once more steadiness was more than a match for 
 dash. 
 
 Had Grouchy obeyed the dictates of common sense and good 
 judgment, he would probably have secured for Napoleon the oppor- 
 tunity of dealing with Wellington single-handed. He failed to do 
 so, although it seems to us he might and ought to have done so. 
 The result was that by eight o'clock in the evening Napoleon was 
 overmastered, his army was in flight. The glories of the Republic, 
 of the Consulate, of the Empire were for a time effaced by so crushing 
 a disaster. History however will be more just than contemporary 
 depreciation. The candid student will perceive that Napoleon was 
 worthy of his reputation. His general plan of operations was capable 
 of accomplishment, and its defeat is attributable primarily to the 
 useless countermarch of D'Erlon, then to the delay in following up 
 
 ^ By half-post four o'clock, 15.906 men and 64 guns. 
 By aix o'clock, 29,244 men and 64 guns. 
 By seven o'clock, 51.944 men and 104 guns. 
 
 ~Siborne. 
 
.28 
 
 the Prussians, for which as General-in-Chief he must be held more than 
 partially accountable. But even the D'Erlon contretemps and the delays 
 of the 17th were remediable on the 18th. Had Grouchy been equal 
 to the occasion, the plan of campaign woul ". have been successfully 
 carried out. It was not to be. The sun of Waterloo set, " and the 
 " land had rest forty years." 
 
 i 
 
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