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 10th December, 1894. 
 
 ■/ 
 
 1^ Lt.-Colonel F. C. Denison, M. P., C. M. G., President, in the chair. 
 
 CflNADfl's Maritime Position and 
 Responsibilities. 
 
 BY H. J. WICKHAM, (Late Sub-Lieut., St. N.) 
 
 Before entering upon a discussion of Canada's present maritime 
 position it may be inter< sting to note a few facts in connection with 
 the early history of shipbuilding in this country. We learn from 
 the Year Book that as early as 1723 shipbuilding was a branch of 
 industry in Canada, six merchant ships and two men-of-war having 
 been built in the colony during that year. In 1752 a 74-gun ship 
 was built at Cape Di; mond, Quebec, but it was wrecked in the 
 launching. In 1810 no less than 26 vessels, having an aggregate 
 tonnage of 5,836 tons, were built in the provinces. In 1812, 37 ves- 
 sels were built at Quebec. In 1830-31, the " Royal William," the 
 first steam-driven vessel that ever crossed the Atlantic, was con- 
 structed in the "Cove," Quebec, and supplied with machinery in 
 Montreal. The archives say that the King's ship, " L'Orignal," was 
 launched on the 2d September, 1750, and that "Le Canada," a 500- ton 
 transport, was launched 4th June, 1742. "Le Caribou" and "Le 
 Castor" were launched in May, 1844 and 1845, respectively. Work 
 was also conmienced upon a 22-gun frigate, the "St. Laurent." Since 
 Confederation the increase in the numlter of Canadian steamers has 
 been remarkable, rising from 335, with a tonnage of 45,776 tons in 
 1867 to 1,538 in 1893, with a gross tonnage of 241,172 tons. The 
 steamers were more in ttmnage in 1886 than they have been since, 
 and this is probably accounted for by noting the transfer of ocean 
 steamers from the Canadian to the British registry, a process which 
 goes ori from year to year, more or less, and in some years more than 
 in others, unaccompanied, however, by change in ownership. 
 
 Taking steamei'S and sailing ships together, the years 1878 and 
 1879 saw the culmination of the development of ouv marine. In 
 1878 there were 7,469 vessels, with 1,333,015 tons, and in 1879 there 
 were 7,471 vessels, with 1,332,094 tons, since which time it has fallen oft 
 consi«lerably both in number and tonnage. The Government of Can- 
 
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 » « 
 
 ada have since Confederation done a o-reat deal towards improving 
 navigation, both by increasing the nund)er of lighthouses, light sta- 
 tions, fof>' whistles, automatic fog horns, buoys, etc., and also by the 
 building of graving docks. On 81st July, 186G, the Dominion Gov- 
 ernment took over from the Imperial Government the lighthouse at 
 Cape Race, in Newfoundland. There are four graving docks in 
 Canada, three belonging to the Federal Government and one owned 
 by a company. The three dock: owned by the Government are at 
 Es(|uimalt, Kingston and Levis, whilst th<^ largest on this continent,that 
 at Halifax, is o^^•ned by a subsidized company. It can take in a 
 vessel 601 feet in length. The " Teutonic " is 582 feet, whilst the 
 "Campania" and " Lucania" are each (j20 feet. In the matter of 
 docking accommodation, Canada compares favorablj' Avith the other 
 leading maritime nations. Since Confederation Canada has expended 
 over twenty millions of dollars in improving navigation, etc. Of the 
 natural advantages which Canada possesses it will be sufficient here 
 to mention that the fact of her possessing not only good harbours 
 upon the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, but also large coal deposits on 
 both coasts, places her at once in a position of the tirst importance, 
 whilst the occupation of her maritime population in connection with 
 the fisheries on both coasts ensures in itself a reserve from which a 
 constant supjjl}' of har(h' seamen can be drawn, either for the man- 
 ning of merchantmen in times of peace, or tighting-vessels in times 
 of war. 
 
 A brief enquir}- into the present conditions of the carrjnng 
 trade of Canada will be necessarj' in order to form a just conception 
 of what wo ha\e at stake at sea. Canada stands fifth in tlie coun- 
 tries of tlie world in the tonnage of her vessels, that tonnage being 
 larger than the toiniage of either France, Italy, Russia, Spain, Aus- 
 tralasia, the Netherlands, Austria-Hungary, Turke}-, China or Japan. 
 If registered tonnage alone were taken Canada would rank fourth, 
 as the tonnage of the United States as given in the Year Book 
 includes licensed and enrolled vessels. In the last three years in the 
 shipping of the world, wooden vessels have decreased from 32^ to 2G% 
 of the wiiole, whilst iron and steel .'^hips have increased from 6<S°/ to 
 74°/. Now, it is a very wearisome thing to keep quoting figures and 
 statistics from 1)1 ue books, and therefore I shall not trespass nnich 
 further upon your patience i)i this respect, but I would ask you to 
 take particular notice of the fact that whilst the ocean-borne inter- 
 ests of Canada have been becoming greater year after year, whilst 
 the amount of merchandise which she iuiports, whether in tlie shape 
 of raw material or manufactured goods for consum]:)tion, lias 
 been steadily increasing, and whilst the (|uantity and value of her 
 exports (principalh' clieese, butter and cattle,) have Ijeen increasing to 
 an enormous extent, the figures prove conclusively tiiat the proper- 
 
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 tion of British and Canadian tonnage doing that carrying trade lias 
 been steadily decreasing, and the proportion of foreign sliips employed 
 has been steadily increasing. The proportion of British and Canadian 
 ships has decreased from 77.8*^ to 58.1^, and the employment of 
 foreign shipping has increased from 22.2% to 41.9%, or nearly doubled 
 between the live-year ^leriods 1869-73 and 1889-98. Several reasons 
 have been assigned for this decline, and amongst others it is suggested 
 that quite a number of Canadian ships have been transferred to 
 foreign registers to avoid the very stringent regulations of the British 
 Board of Trade. The "Shipping Register" a month ago announced 
 that 21 vessels had been transferred to foreign registers, and it is 
 believed that a good many Canadians are amongst them. It is also 
 «aid that the increase in the German lines has had a good deal to do 
 with the crowding ort of Canadian Itottoms. Just a few more figures 
 to give some idea of the magnitude of Canada's (jver-sea connnerce 
 and what she would have exposed to destruction in the event of 
 Great Britain becomini>- involved in war witli one or more naval 
 antagonists, whose commerce destroyers might succeed in eluding, 
 even for a time, the vigilance of the cruisers which Great Britain 
 could spare over the number recpiired as adjuncts to the fighting line 
 of battle for scouting purposes. The amount in value of Canada's 
 ocean-borne connnerce, exports and imports during the year 1893, 
 exclusive of her trade with the United States, amounted to over 
 $145,000,000. 
 
 In view^ of the mamitude of the interests involved, and lea\in£f 
 aside for the moment the question of the material benefits to be 
 derived by Canada from the adoption of a more progressive maritime 
 polic}^ I think I show an excellent reason why Canada should take 
 more than a passive interest in seeing that the means provided fo)- 
 the efficient protection of her shipping in case of war are reasonabh- 
 adequate to possible re(|uiriiments. HiM'e it becomes necessary to re- 
 mark that a large numl)er of Canada's wooden vessels, having Ijeen 
 displaced in the Canadian carr3'ing ti'ade by more suitable i)'on and 
 .steam vessels, find em|)loyment in port to port traffic in distant ])arts 
 of the world. Of course no account is kei)t of this trade in Cana<lian 
 returns, but the value of these ships hav« to be added to the sum (jf 
 Canada's interest at sea. 
 
 Canada, by spanning the British North American continent with 
 railways, and by the impi-ovement of her inland navigation, lias 
 •secured internal counnunicatiou from east to west : it now i'em;uns 
 for her by a vigourous and aggressive maritime [)olicy to persist in 
 extending her counnunications east and west to feed her railway 
 .systems a.id develop her I'esoiirces. Few people foresaw, when the 
 Canadian Pacific Railwav was first decided ur-on, that a lary-e amount 
 of its earnings would acciue from carrying tea from China across the 
 
continent, and it nia}'^ safely be predicted that in a few years the 
 volume cf the Pacific trade from Australia, New Zealand and other 
 points will, if Canada seizes her opportunity, reach equally astonish- 
 ing proportions. 
 
 Before we proceed to a consideration of the probable mode of 
 attack by an enemy upon Britain's mercantile marine, and 
 measures to repel the same, it would be well to put forward some of 
 the principles which Captain Mahan deduces from the teachings of 
 the effect of sea-power on history. He establishes that whilst the 
 weapons and means of offence and defence and of propulsion, &c., may 
 change from time to time owing to the march of science, that never- 
 theless there are certain principles which underlie the growth and 
 development of sea-power which are immutable. He points out how 
 some nations, such as Holland, with few natural advantages in the 
 way of internal resources, have through the wisdom of their govern- 
 ments and the energy and enterprise of their people, acting upon 
 these principles, established themselves as sea-powers and become 
 rich and powerful, whilst others, whose wealth of internal resources 
 haVS been the means of distracting their population from giving the 
 necessary attention to their maritime interests, have lost and suffered 
 from such neglect. In the conclusion which he draws as to the effect 
 of the influence a government may have upon the sea career of its 
 people, he says, "first, that in peace the government by its policy can 
 "favour the natural growth of a people's industries and its tendencies, 
 "to seek adventure and gain Ijy way of the sea; or it can try to 
 "develop such industries and such sea going bent, when they do not 
 "naturally exist, or on the other hand the government may by mis- 
 " taken action check and fetter the progress which the people left to 
 "themselves would make. In any one of these ways the influence of 
 "the government will be felt, making or marring the sea-power of 
 •'the country in the matter of peaceful commerce, upon which alone 
 "it cannot bo too often insisted a thoroughly strong navy can be 
 "ba.sed." "Secondly, for war, the influence of the government will be 
 "felt in the most legitimate manner in maintaining an armed navy, 
 "of a size connnensurate with the growth of its shipping and the im- 
 "portance of the interests connected with it." 
 
 On all 8i<les we find the nations awakening to the necessity of 
 pa\ing increased attention to the development of their maritime 
 power, and for that purpose they are adopting a liberal system of 
 subsidization. This is more especially true of France. One writer 
 there lays it down that a maritime company can be assimilated to a 
 railway company, the one or the other having the charge of serving 
 a certain route. By subsidizing the maritime companies the state 
 does not overstep in a greater degree the rational powers which all 
 economists allow it, than when it creates gratuitously a national 
 
5 
 
 route at the expense of the community. The country where the 
 largest number of these routes converge will be the most prosperous 
 by its industry and its commerce. The flag which the most rapidly 
 and the most economically performs its transport duties will have the 
 advantage over all the others. Premiums on speed are advocated in- 
 stead of premiums on tonnage. He says, "Let us insist on this com- 
 "mercial truth — one of the highest importance: the speed of ships 
 "has the precious faculty of multiplying the productiveness of floating 
 "capital: it is conseijuently one of the most powerful elements which 
 "make for wealth." " An3'one can understand the importance of con- 
 "stituting a commercial navy, composed of swift ships, in order to have 
 "under our hand in time of war ships capable of cruising and forming 
 "blockades." If Canada is to maintain her maritime position amongst 
 the nations of the world, there is one conclusion which must be forced 
 upon the mind of e\-eryone who reads Captain Mahan's book, and it 
 is, that, independently "^of all other considerations, Canada's welfare as 
 a sea-power is indissolubly mixed up with that of the mother country. 
 As a powerful and efficient na\*y is a necessary adjunct to a numerous 
 mercantile marine, so must a numerous and powerful mercantile 
 marine form the reserve from which an effective navy can be forth- 
 coming. And when we further consider that Great Britain already 
 possesses those resting places and coaling stations necessary for the 
 due protection and convenience of commerce in all parts of the world, 
 ready to hand so to speak, and which no other nation possesses, how 
 suicidal, from self-interested motives only, would be a policy looking 
 towards independence, which would involve the abandonment of, I 
 may say, practically all these advantages. 
 
 To be in a position, at all events, to speculate upon the line of 
 action which would probably be taken by an enemy, let us pass 
 briefly in review the present constitution of the two most powerful 
 of the European Navies. 
 
 Great Britain, according to Secretary Herbert's report just pub- 
 lished, has : 
 
 Armoured. In Service. Building. 
 
 Battleships 43 10 
 
 Coast defence vessels 12 
 
 Cruisers 18 . . 
 
 V3 10 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 Battleships 18 12 
 
 ■Coast defence vessels. . . a 21 1 
 
 Cruisers 4 7 
 
 43 20 
 
6 
 
 
 GREAT BRITAIN. 
 
 Unarmoured. 
 
 Cruisers, protected 59 
 
 Cruisers 85 
 
 Gun vessels 60 
 
 Torpedo vessels 34 
 
 FRANCE. 
 
 Cruisers, protected 
 
 Cruisers, protected 
 
 Gun vessels 
 
 Torpedo vessels 
 
 238 
 
 10 
 35 
 
 80 
 16 
 
 147 
 
 3a 
 15 
 
 48 
 
 14 
 1 
 5 
 
 4 
 
 24 
 
 The relative strength of each cannot of course be measured by 
 numbers. Even in assigning a ship ^to a particular class as above 
 designated, the authorities are frequently accused of misleading the 
 public, for instance in describing a vessel as armoured which has not 
 a sufficiently armoured citadel to prevent her from capsizing or sinking 
 if the unarinoured ends were shot aw^ay or filled with water. Heated 
 controversies have waged from time to time between different naval 
 experts in England, chiefly on the amount of thick armour belting 
 just above and below the water line which a battleship should carry. 
 Both navies as they exist to-day are made up in tlie aggregate of a 
 number of successive experiments, and to-day we have on the list of 
 armoured cruisers, for example, such ships as the Black Prince, which 
 was one of the first iron armoured ships built in the Royal Navy, 30 
 years ago. 
 
 In the construction of battleships the French, up to about six 
 years ago, at all events, had given heavy armour belting protection at 
 the water line to a greater extent than had the English in their battle- 
 ships ; the latter had relied more upon the protective deck and sub- 
 division of ends for stability, thus enabling the carrying of heavier 
 armour and guns at the citadel. Nothing short of actual test in war- 
 fare can decide the relative merits of the two schools. Nor nmst the 
 capsizing of the "Victoria" be relied upon to condemn the subdivision 
 plan, inasmuch as the bulkheads were not closed, as they undoubtedly 
 would have been before going into action. The following are the 
 battleships at present building by Great Britain : The Csesar, Han- 
 nibal, Illustrious, Jupiter, Magnificent, Majestic, Mars, Prince George, 
 Renown and Victorious. These are firstclass battleships, having 
 (except the Renown, whicli is somewhat smaller,) a displacement of 
 14,900, 1. H. P. 10,000, F. D. 12,000. 
 
In looking through Secretary Herbert's report, however, I do 
 not lincl that he says anything about England's torpedo boat 
 destroyers of the Havock class. A reference to the July navy list 
 will show that there are 32 of these vessels under construction. 
 
 As to what France might be expected to do upon a declaration 
 of war, Admiral Aube, Minister of Marine, has been kind enough to 
 give us a fair warning, and we find that <[nite recently Vice Admiral 
 Cavi^lier de Cuverville in the Revue Maritime et Coloniale, March, 
 1898, njakes use of the following language: "France should have, in 
 "onr opinion, a certain number of ocean cruisers of great speed and 
 "range of action, always ready to be launched on the routes of com- 
 "merce in pursuit of the enemy's trading ships." He then proceeds 
 to describe the U. S. S. Columbia and concludes as follows: "In order 
 "to ensure peace with our neighbors and to dissuade them from join- 
 "ing the Triple Alliance, Admiral Aube asked for 20 cruisers of the 
 "first rank, and he was quite right." 
 
 My principal purpose in giving a somewhat detailed description 
 of the British and French navies is to sliow that if Britain had to 
 reckon with France alone, her navy, Ijoth the line of battle and most 
 of the cruisers, would tind their w^ork cut out for them in European 
 waters. This would be the case to a greater extent if England found 
 two European powers against her instead of on(.'. Another French 
 naval authority (Contre Admiral Reveillere) after reviewing the 
 forces tliat would be opposed to each other in the case of war between 
 England and France, concludes by saying : 
 
 " We can damao-e Enfjland : 
 
 " 1. — By preventing her merchant ships fetching their ports by 
 " means of small ships of high speed ; by stationing torpilleurs and 
 " aviso-mortar vessels at Brest ,and in the channel and by launching 
 "them from our ports, making them, when pursued, take refuge in the 
 " numerous bays of our coast. 
 
 " 2. — By keeping the English ports and coasts under a continual 
 " menace of bombardment by means of aviso-mortar vessels. 
 
 " 8. — By cutting the commercial connnunications of Great Britain 
 " with Suez, by means of cruisers and torpilleurs stationed on the coasts 
 " of Provence and Alji'eria. 
 
 " 4. — By means of our submarine torpedo boats carrying pan- 
 " clastite we can play our enemy some very bad tm^ns in our road- 
 " steads and off the entrance to our harbours. 
 
 " 5. — By converting all our fast merchant steamers into cruisers." 
 
 Lieutenant Crutchley estimates that out of 1000 merchant steam- 
 ships belonging to Finance and Russia it would be reasonable to 
 suppose that at least 80 very fast ones could be equipped for the pur- 
 pose of connnerce destroying. The subject of partially arming the 
 mercantile marine is not by any means a new one : it has recently 
 
8 
 
 been (liscussed by naval men, both in the theatre of the Royal United 
 Service Institution and in the press. It comes up naturally in con- 
 nection with measures for the protection of the trade I'outes. Some 
 doubt has been cast upon the right of merchant ships to fight in self- 
 defence to avoid capture, and the better opinion would seem to ))e 
 that a captain of a uierchant vessel who tires a gun would at all 
 events be liable to have his ship sunk and nobody picked up by the 
 enemy's boats. Some have gone so far as to say that since the Declara- 
 tion of Paris the crew might be treated as piratvis. The mercantile 
 marin«; of Britain, however, occupies an exceptional position and 
 rec{uires exceptional measures for its protectiori. In round numl)ers 
 it may be said that British shipping does about 70% of the whole 
 trade of the world, and with such immenne interests at stake it will 
 not do for Great Britain to frame her policy too much in deference io 
 the susc(;ptibilities of foreign powers. It has been said that the 
 British fleet W(;ul<l be prepared to make a torpedo attack on an 
 enemy's fleet and liarbours the first night after war is declared I If 
 we pro}iose to move so (juickly we must at least be prepared to give 
 the enemy credit for o-reat activity about the same time. No matter 
 how complete a system of organization we ma}' have, it goes without 
 saying, that for a considerable time after the declaration of war a 
 laj'ge proportion of our merchant shipping would remain ignorant of 
 the fact, and that in the meantime an enemj', whose cruisers are so 
 constructed as to carry n coal supply sufficient to take them round the 
 world, would be able to do incalculal)le damage, unless at all })oints 
 the means are found to drive them off the sea. In most of the dis- 
 cussions that have taken place upon this subject it has been usual to 
 cite the case of the Alabama as illustrating the damage which a 
 single cruiser can do to the mercantile marine of an enemy. It is 
 true that since her day conditions have changed, and it may be 
 argued that owing to the development of telegraphic communication, 
 the want of coaling stations by nations other than Great Britain, and 
 other circumstances, that it would not now be possible for an enemj^'s 
 cruiser to work such dire havoc upon our merchant vessels as did the 
 Alabama upon the ships of the American mercantile marine. Whilst 
 on the subject of telegraphic communication, it may be noticed that 
 there is some divergence of opinion as to whether or not submarine 
 cables could be easily cut by an enemy, and a leading article in, I 
 think, the Army and Navy Gazette, not long ago, expressed the opinion 
 that it would not be so easy to cut cables as some people imagine, 
 basing this opinion upon the fact that cable repairing vessels, with all 
 their equipments and men trained to the work, often took several 
 weeks in grappling and repairing a cable, but the writer of that 
 article evidently had not present to his mind that the process of 
 grappling a cable for the purpose of repairing is a long one, owing to 
 
 1 
 
a 
 
 the necessity for jjnKlimlly ijiisin^ the bij^^ht at <litte)'ent points and 
 buovMno- it until sutficient slack is obtained to brin;; it to the surface. 
 A ship dra^i^ing foi- a cable for the purpose of cutting it only would 
 not be hampered \)y any such considerations, an<l the t^rapnol used 
 would be so constructed as to cut the cable directly it was cau^lit. 
 Then ai^ain, the destruction of the cables would undoubtly tell ajjfainst 
 us far more than aj^^.ainst any enemy at sea. Another matter which 
 would affect most seriously British trade, is the power to keep open 
 the Suez Canal. Upon tliis point also opinion seems to be <livided, 
 though a large majority of those whose opinions I have been able to 
 gather think that it would be impossible to keep it open. One 
 speaker described what occurred at Port Said, when, from tiie ground- 
 ing of a ship in the canal, it became blocked for 2-4- hours. He said 
 that the next morning there had arisen in the harbour at Port Said a 
 perfect forest oi funnels, and there was hardly standing room, so to 
 speak, in.side. The speaker, H. S. H. Prince Louis of Battenberg, 
 says: '"I take it, the canal would be effectually blocked at the out- 
 set, probably bv'fore war was actually declared." This becomes all 
 the more important wh i we remember that, for the purposes of 
 British trade, the Suez i^ansd connnences at Gibraltar and ends at 
 Aden. The traffic with the East, wliich would thus be completely 
 obstructed in its usual channel, would be diverted either to the Cape 
 or trans-Canadian route, and this alone should make Canadians 
 anxious to see that every Cxibrt possible should be made to render the 
 latter route secure. Aft jr reading the various discussions which have 
 tt-ken place between eminent naval authorities as to i^iie methods 
 which could be adopted to protect our merchant vessels, and the 
 means at hand wherewith to protect them, one is forced to the con- 
 clusion that unless Great Britain so effectually crushed her enemies 
 at sea at the outset, and so crippled their fighting fleets as to .set a 
 large part of the British fleet free to be employed for the purposes of 
 commerce protection, Great Britain has not, nor under the present 
 system does it seem possible that she can have, a sufficient number of 
 armed cruisers, over and above what would be reijuired for scouting 
 purposes in connection with the fighting line of battle, to adecjuately 
 protect our trade routes. In fact, in a recent discussion which took 
 place in the theatre of the R. U. S. I., this proposition was assmned at 
 the commencement and its correctness was not denied by any of the 
 distinguished naval officers present. And would it not obviously be 
 the tactics of any of England's po.ssible enemies in the first place to 
 engage the attention of her whole fleet in keeping the enemies' line 
 of battle blockaded in its own ports, so that their commerce destroyers 
 might have the best possible chance of attacking Britain in her most 
 vulnerable point in all parts of the world. Admiral Nicholson, who 
 had given this subject a great deal of thought, says in this connec- 
 
10 
 
 ; : 
 
 tion, "I think, as regards the first ({uostion, there can be very little 
 "doubt that any attempt tv patrol these vast routes will only lead to 
 "failure. Suppose we had twice the number of fast cruisera that our 
 "enemibci had, and that I think is taking a very extreme view, what 
 "would be the mission that these cruisers would have thrust on 
 "them ? There would be the enemy's cruisers, who would lurk about 
 "at certain points of the trade route, with his engines stopped, his 
 "iires ready undoubtedly, but his engines stopped, watching for his 
 "prey, waiting for days or even months, with but little expenditure 
 " of coal. On the other hand what would our cruisei's have to do ? 
 "They would have to be racing up and down, patrolling the trade 
 "route, to tind the enemy's cruiser and attack it. I believe that I 
 "shall be quite in limits if I say that the consumption of coal on the 
 "ship that has to patrol would be in excess of the coal used by the 
 "other by about three to one ; and, as I think you will all admit that 
 "the power of the cruiser is the limit of coal endurance, we shall 
 "not liave to provide twice as many ships, which I previously sup- 
 " posed to be a fair proportion, but we must mv' ply this number by 
 "three, because they will use three times as mu. coal. Therefore, to 
 "put us in a decent state of security we nmst be prepared to put on 
 "theae trade routes six times the number of cruisera possessed by the 
 "enemy. That is a very serious matter." And he goes on to point 
 out that in order to provide enough cruisers for this purpose it would 
 be necessary to ask the people for a sum of money that would be 
 impossible. It is said that, as matters stand at present, and taking for 
 instance the P. & O. S. S. Co., that one-fourth of the entire number of 
 officers employed l)y that company belong to the Royal Naval Re- 
 serve, together with a large number of the men, and the absurdity is 
 pointed out of sending to sea, ships inanned by officers and men, upon 
 whom we hiive largely to rely for the manning of fighting ships 
 directly on the outbreak of war, and yet have the very ships upon 
 whicli these men are employed liable to become a prey and captured 
 by a wretchedly armed enemy for tlie want of carrying adecjuate 
 means of defence. Of course, until a war does actually break out, 
 specrdate as we may upon probable events, it is impossible to foresee 
 what may happen, but we may be reasonably certain that the first 
 advantage, which counts for a great deal nowadays, will fall to the 
 Hide that is best prepared. There seems to be a widespread idea that 
 the British Admiralty have well worked out plans for the arming of 
 certain ships in the eN ent of war, but what these plans are, or what 
 their scope may be, not even naval officers of high standing seem to 
 know. Admiral Nicholson, speaking above on the general (j[ue.stion of 
 larming merchantmen, («iys that it may })ossibly be that this matter 
 has )een thoroughly worked out, but he thinks it is very important 
 that such plans as do exist should be given to the nation at large. He 
 
11 
 
 admits that they cannot be g^ven to the nation without «^iving them 
 also to others who might at some time be our enemies, but he thinks 
 the advantage would be very much on our side, because what we have 
 so greatly to fear is the panic and disorganization which will seize 
 upon the whole mercantile population at the first outbreak of war. 
 From some items which have appeared in the newspapers we may 
 conclude that the British Admiralty have, since the date of the 
 above mentioned discussion, had under their consideration plans on 
 this very subject. 
 
 From the opinions of naval officere upon the subject of com- 
 merce protection alreadj' cited, and from what appears to ])e tacitly 
 admitted by most naval authorities, we may safely assume, what was. 
 in fact assumed for the purposes of the argument and discussion 
 thereon I have before referred to : 
 
 1. — That men-of-war cruisers at present are not in excess of 
 our requirements for lilockade and scouting purposes, and also for 
 keeping clear of enemies the entrance and innnediate approaches to 
 our home and principal ports. 
 
 2. — That there are therefore not enough of these vessels to 
 patrol with any approach to efficiency the main trade routes of the 
 world. 
 
 In addition to the men-of-war cruisers then, let us see what we 
 have of merchant steamers, under subvention from the Admiralty, and 
 fitted or partially fitted so that they may be used as cruisers. On 
 the list given in Lord Brassey's Annual for lH[)4i we find there are 
 only ten of these, namely, the "Etruria" and "Umbria" of the Cunard 
 Line, the "Majestic" and "Teutonic" of the White Star, the "Victoria," 
 "Britannia," and "Oceana," of the Peninsular and Oriental S. S. Co., and 
 the "Empress of Lidia," "Empress of China," and "Empress of Japan," of 
 the C. P. R. Company. The"Umbria" and "Etruria," it will be ol)served, 
 are still kept on the list as receiving the subvention, although the 
 "Camjiania" and "Lucania" are much larger ships, and I have heard it 
 stated are also liable to be used as cruisers. On looking at their plans, 
 however, it will by seen that a large amount of their manli'nery, in- 
 cluding portions of the main cylinders, are considerably above 
 the water line, but it is elsewhere stated that • they are 
 classed as armed cruisers, for service when recjuired by the 
 Admiralty, and they have also been Iniilt to comply with 
 the re(|uired conditions and coal endurance. They have, among-st 
 other provisions, water-tight coal bunkers at the side of and 
 over the top of the boiler compartments, forming a protection 
 against the modern (juick firing gun. The "Etruria" and "LTmbria" are 
 classed as having a speed of 19.5 knots, with an indicated horse-power 
 of 14,500. The three Canadian Pacific llaihva}- Company's siiips are 
 classed as having a speed of 16 knots only, as have also the three ships 
 
, . ,,-, 12 
 
 belonging to the Peninsular and Oriental S. S. Co. I am leaving the 
 "Teutonic" till last, as I wish to go as fully as possible into her con- 
 struction. In a<l(lition to the ten above named there are 12 others 
 held at the disposition of the Admiralty belonging to the White Star, 
 the Cunard and the Peni.sular and Oriental Companies. The fastest 
 is the "Servia," with a speed of 10.5 knt)ts. The rest range from 14 to 
 16 knots. India has 8 gunboats: The "A.ssaye" and "Plassy," .steel, 
 twin screws, built at Elswick in 1891 : 735 tons, and have a speed of 
 21 knots. They each carry two guns. The third is a paddle despatch 
 vessel. - i 
 
 The Australian Navy consists of five special secondclass cruisers, 
 viz.: The "Wallaroo," the "Tanranga," the "Ringaroonui," the "Mildura," 
 and the " Katoomba." These vessels are built of steel, 2,575 tons, 
 speed 19 knots ; they have protective decks of 2-in. steel on the 
 slopes and 1-in.on top, and carry eight 4.7-in.Q.F., eight l>-pdr.Q.F.,four 
 machine guns, and one light gun under 15 cwt. ; they also cany two 
 fixed or 1)0W tubes for discharging Fish torpedoes and two launching 
 carriages for Fish torpedoes. They carry 300 tons of coal, sufficient 
 to steam 4800 knots at a 10 knot speed ; two firstclass torpedo, gun- 
 boats of the "Sharpshooter" class, i. e., of steel, 735 tons ; speed 20 
 knots, with two 4.7-in. Q. F. and four 3-pdr. Q. F., and five torpedo 
 tubes. They carry sufficient coal to steam 2500 knots at a 10 knot 
 speed. Victoria has also two twin screw steel gunboats, the " V^ictoria" 
 and " Albert, ' of 12 knot speed, and four iron gunboats, the " Batman," 
 " Fawker," " Gannet," and " Lady Loch," which carry one 6 in. 4 ton 
 gun each. Queensland has two twin screw steel gunboats, the "Gay- 
 undah" and " Paluma," similar to the "Victoria" and " Albert," and 
 three small steel gunboats, the "Otter," "Bonito," and "Stingaree," carry- 
 ing one 64-pdr. nuizzle-loading rifle gun each. South Australia has 
 one twin screw gunboat, the " Protector," like the " Victoria." In 
 addition, the " Cerberus," a turret coast defence vessel of 3,480 tons, 
 is maintained at Melbourne. 
 
 The "Teutonic" was the first specially constructed mercantile 
 armed cruiser. Proposals were maile by Mr. Ismay of the firm of 
 Ismay, Imrie & Co., the m; naging owners of the White Star Line, as 
 far back a.s 1878, when hi u^ged upon the attention of the Admiralty 
 that a fast mail or passen r steamer may be as efficient a factor in a 
 naval war as an ordinary war cruiser, and offered to make an agree- 
 ment to hokl at the disposal of the Admiralty, upon terms then 
 specified, certain ships for the purposes of the State in time of war. 
 I'he matter lay dormant until August, 1880, when Messrs. Ismay, 
 Imrie & Co. revived it by offering, on behalf of the White Star Line, 
 to build two ships, to be approved by the Admiralty, of a speed and 
 strength superior to any merchant ship afloat, with engines and 
 boilers below water, complete subdivision by bulkheads, fittings for 
 
 »a '^ 
 
13 
 
 gims built in during construction, and manned by half crews of 
 Naval reserve men. An agreement was come to, and the plans for 
 these ships were submitted to and approved by the Admiraltj' from 
 their very inception. The "Teutonic" is so arranged that 12 guns can 
 be mounted within 48 hours after arrival in port. Her length is 582 
 feet (capable of being docked at Halifax, as before mentioned,) beam 
 57 feet, and depth of hold 39 feet 4 inches. She is fitted with triple 
 expansion engines, one for each screw, of 17,000 I. H. P. The manner 
 in which the hulls of the "Teutonic" and her sister ship, the '-Majestic," 
 have been put together is not only novel, but marks a great improve-, 
 ment in marine naval construction so far as increased strength is con- 
 cerned. In the first place, the plates used for their outer shells are of 
 unusual dimensions, being three feet in width and many of them 
 twenty-four and twehty-eight feet in length — dimensions not possible 
 if steel had not been used in making them. Instead of being put 
 together end to end and butt-riveted, they are laid on the steel frame 
 so as to overlap each other vertically, and then trebly, quadruply and 
 even (juintuply riveted together. In fact, unless '^velded together the 
 plates of the hull could not be more compactly united. 
 
 The vessels have each four decks, made by covering strong steel 
 beams with plates of the same material trebly riveted together. In 
 addition to the se\enteen transverse bulkheads which hold the sides 
 of the vessel in a rigid grip, there is a longitudinal bulkhead running 
 through the centre of tho ship for three-fourths of its length from 
 the keelson to the main deck, which, like a huge lmckl»one, locks all 
 the parts of the hull together. The twin screws are fitted to overlap 
 at the tips, the starboard screw being carried some feet further aft 
 than the other in order to get clearance. No outside stern tulies, in 
 the proper acceptance of the term, are used, for the propeller shafts 
 are carried out in what are reall}- protuberances of the hull in the run 
 of the vessel. The two sets of engines in the "Teutonic" are not only 
 divided from each other, but, according to tlie re(|uirenients of the 
 Admiralty, are placed well below the water line. The "Teutonic" and 
 the "Majestic" when armed carry 12 Armstrong guns, 8 on tlie 
 upper and promenade decks and 2 eacli on the turtle backs. These 
 guns are (luick-firing and capable of discharging 12 shots a minute, 
 and are fitted with oil bufiers which absorb the recoil. Tlie value of 
 these vessels as troopships will be readily understood from the fol- 
 lowing facts : Acconnnodation on each of them can be provided for 
 1000 cavahy and their horses, or for 2000 infantry. The}' could 
 reach Halifax in 5 days and Cape Town in 12| daj-s ; via the Suez 
 Canal they could land trtwps at Bombay in 14 days, at Calcutta in 
 17|, at Hong Kong in 21, and at Sydney hi 22 days. Their coal 
 supply is sufficient for 17 days steaming at full speed, or at half 
 speed for three months. In case, therefore, of the Canal being closed, 
 
they could steam to Bombay via the Cape, 10,733 knots, in 22 days, 
 without coaling on the way. 
 
 Having now given as accurate a description as I have been able 
 to obtain of the " Teutonic," which I regard as the type of the most 
 ettective mercantile cruiser we have, I propose to describe two Adndr- 
 alty cruisers now building, the " Terrible " and " Powerful." The 
 description of these two cruisers is taken from a Parliamentary paper 
 quoted in Lord Brassey's Naval Annual, 1894 : "The designs for the 
 two firstclass cruisers, "Powerful" and "Terrible," for which provision is 
 made in the Navy Estimates for 1893-4, have not yet been completed, 
 and the dimensions must therefore be considered as still open to some 
 modification." The principal dimensions as now settled are as follows: 
 length, 500 feet; breadth, 71 feet; mean draught with keel, about 27 
 feet ; displacement about 14,200 tons. "The continuous sea speed fol* 
 smooth water steaming and with a clejin bottom is to be 20 knots 
 On an eight hours' natural draught contractors' trial the speed will be 
 about 22 knots. The steel hull will be wood-sheathed and coppered, 
 so that the vessels may keep the sea for long periods without serious 
 loss of speed. A coal-bunker for capacity of about three thousand 
 tons will be provided, and, at the above-stated draught and displace- 
 ment, about half tliat weight will be carried. The armament will in- 
 clude two 9.2-in. guns, mounted as bow and stern chaser, twelve G-in. 
 ([uick-tirers (four of which will be capable of tiring right ahcarl and 
 four others right astern), eigliteen 12-pounder (^ick-tirers, twelve 3- 
 pounders, besides smaller machine guns. Armour protection will be 
 provided for all the 9.2-in. and ()-in. guns, and the 12-pounder guns 
 on the upper deck will be furnished witli strong shields, revolving 
 with the guns. The torpedo armament includes four submerged 
 torpedo discharges, placed in two separate rooms. The engines, 
 boilers, magazines and other vital portions of the ship will be placed 
 below a strong curved steel deck, having a thickness of four inches 
 for a large proportion of the lengtli, with a slight reduction of thick- 
 ness towards the extremities. This deck will be associated with 
 minutely subdivided coal- bunkers extending up to the height of the 
 main deck, these features of protection being identical with those 
 which have been adopted for other firstclass cruisers of the Royal 
 Navy. Most careful study has been bestowed upon all matters re- 
 lating to the protection of the armament and the guns' crews, and 
 the transport of the annnunition from the magazines to the fighting 
 positions of the guns. An armoured ctmning tower, placed at the 
 after end of the forecastle, will give protection in action to the com- 
 manding officer. A great height of freeboard has been provided in 
 association with a long poop and forecastle, upon which the bow and 
 stern chase guns will be carried. This will secure not merely the 
 power of fighting the guns in heavy weather, but also that of main- 
 
15 
 
 i 
 
 taining the speed at sea. In order to secure the sea-speed above 
 mentioned, it has been necessary to provide for engines and boilers 
 capable of developing a very large horse-power. After full consider- 
 ation it has been decided to adhere to twin screws and not to adopt 
 triple screws; experience in the "Blake" and the "Blenheim," sis well as. 
 in the large twin screw steamers of the mercantile marine, having 
 established the complete efficiency of such propellers within the 
 limits of power and draught contemplated. 
 
 We learn from Enf/ineeriuf/ that the contracts have now been let 
 for the construction of the hulls of these vessels at £838,000 and 
 £345,000 respectively^ and the same journal informs us that the 
 engines and boilers will cost about £100,000 each set. 
 
 We have in the "Campania' a high speed mercantile vessel which 
 compares in tonnage and speed \ery closely with the "Powerful" and 
 "Terrible" class. The "Terrible" class will be superior in fighting 
 and resisting quality to any regular armed cruiser now afloat, and it 
 remains to be seen what cargo-cany ing capacity could be given them 
 by somewhat reducing the weij,dit of their armour and diminishing 
 their guns to such a number as vrould be carried in times of peace by 
 the class of cruisers I am advocating. The published figures of the 
 "Powerful" and "Terrible" give them a 4-in. protective steel deck, the 
 weight of which with the armament would be about 2000 tons. If 
 the weight of armament and in-otectod deck is reduced one-half and 
 the coal carried is reduced to the amount which suffices the " Cam- 
 pania" for one high speed trip across the Atlantic, namely, 2000 tons, 
 we have left 2000 tons apparently available for cargo, figures which 
 compare favorably with the 1000 tonscargo capacity of the "Campania." 
 It would therefore seem not too much to say that, on a route in which 
 the passenger traffic is nt)t so prominent a feature as it is in the 
 transatlantic trade,the "Campania" mightretain at least the same cargo- 
 carrying capacit}^ and have added sufficient armament, offensive and 
 defensive, at the expense of reducing the passenger acconunodation. 
 We have also the cost of the hull and the machinery of the "Powerful" 
 and " Terrible," £438,000 each. So that £500,000 each would be a 
 liberal figure to assign as the cost of an oi'dinary passenger and fast 
 freight steamer of the same tonnage and speed. 
 
 The Huddart scheme of four 20 knot vessels on the Atlantic 
 service and five 16 knot vessels on the Pacific services is to involve 
 a capital of £3,000,000. Nii»e vessels of the size and capacity of 
 the "Powerful" class, as slunvn above, would cost about £4,500,000. 
 
 The details and tonnage of the Huddart vessels are not pub- 
 lished, but they would probaljly compare very closely with the pre- 
 sent C. P. R. "Empress" ships of about 5,900 tons and 16 knots. It 
 seems a very fair assumption that the 50/^ greater cost of the nine 
 mercantile "Terrible" class is more than met by 50/^ greater 
 
16 
 
 •capacity. I have instituted these comparisons not as advocating ships 
 •of the size and description of the "Terrible" as best suited to our 
 needs all round, but as giving a reason for the faith that is in me, 
 that, by the application of modern science, ships can be designed of 
 sizes varying to suit circumstances which meet the requirements of 
 modern fast freight and passenger ships, which in times of peace need 
 not carry their whole armament, but which on the declaration of war 
 may rapidly be transformed into cruisers as efficient as need be. In 
 designing modern men-of-war cruisers, great reserve coal carryiiig 
 capacity is provided to give great range of actioi}. The prii'iciple 
 winch I ivisli to einpltasize is that that reserve space shoidd he 'utilized 
 for cargo carrying in mercantile cruisers in peace times. 
 
 Referi'ing to the discussion that took place at the Ottawa con- 
 ference, we find at pp. 278 et seq. of the printed report, some very 
 interesting information as to what is going forward with regard to 
 subsidizing fast steamship lines upon the Atlantic and the Pacific. 
 It is stated that the Dominion Government are prepared to subsidize 
 to the extent of three-fourths of a million dollars per annum two 
 complete fast services, a weekly one on the Atlantic and a fortnightly 
 one on the Pacific : in fact tiiat the Dominion Government have 
 already made a conditional contract with Mr. Huddart on those lines, 
 the condition being that within a specified time Mr. Huddart shall 
 complete his arrangements with the other governments interested. 
 Mr. Foster says that after thej^ get the consent of Parliament to that 
 $750,000 subsid}' Mr. Huddart has three months to complete his 
 iScheme. Lord Jersey points out that the subsidy asked for by Mr. 
 Huddart, £300,000 per annum from all the Governments interested, 
 amounts to 10% on the capital refjuired to e.stablish the line, and 
 further remarks that this recpiest being a very "strong", one, he is 
 inclined to think that the British Government will require very full 
 information before they would accede to such a request. 
 
 It was further pointed out at the conference that most of the 
 mail subsidies granted by the British Government fall in within the 
 next few years, and the Imperial Delegate, Lord Jersey, intimated that 
 in granting new subsidies the British Government wish to consider 
 not merely one particular line but the whole question. I feel con- 
 vinced that Great Britain and her great self-governing colonies, ))y 
 uniting in a well considered and comprehensive scheme for the liberal 
 subsidization of fast steamship lines of the class I advocate between 
 the various parts of the Empire, to be manned and officered ex- 
 •clusively by trained men of the Roj'al Naval Reserve, and always 
 ready for an emergency, will secure the means whereby our trade 
 routes will receive adequate protection, and the means adopted, by 
 facilitating and stimulating inter-imperial and inter-colonial trade, will 
 build up and solidify the Empire. 
 
m 
 
 Such a policy will give to Canada a spleiuliJ opportunity for 
 developing her ship building resources. The Province of Nova Scotia 
 possesses such large deposits of iron ore, coal antl flux, in close proximity 
 to each other and to ship harbours, that capital and skill should find 
 a splendid opening for successful enterprise. 
 
 The establishment of Naval Reserve ships at Halifax and Van- 
 couver for the training of Naval Reserve men would do much to 
 foster and promote that maritime spirit which has made Great Britain 
 what she is to-day. 
 
 It may be interesting to hear what Vice Admiral Meade saya 
 at a recent meeting of the Society of Naval Architects and Marine. 
 Engineers. 
 
 On November 15th, at New York, on the subject of the swift 
 cruisers recently added to the American Navy, such as the "Columbia," 
 "Minneapolis" and "Detroit," he says, "And they are unsatisfactory for 
 these reasons : The smaller vessels cannot cruise in time of war ex- 
 cept in home w^aters; and as to the larger ones, such as the 'Columbia,' 
 it is feared that vessels like the 'Majestic' and 'Teutonic,' for instance, 
 may laugh at our three screw racers which cannot cross the ocean at 
 the same speed these commercial greyhounds maintain year in and 
 year out. Moreover, as to the question of fighting, I doubt very much 
 the superiority of the 'Columbia' over the American liner 'New York,' 
 with the latter suitably armed, as she would be in the service of the 
 Government, while as to coal capacity the 'New York' and 'Paris' are 
 by far her superiors." 
 
 The whole question of the protection of the trade routes and 
 commerce generally is one which would seem to demand reorganiza- 
 tion, to avoid confusion at the outbreak of war. In the history of 
 convoy many interesting and instructive lessons may be gained, but 
 the subject is too large a one to be more than briefly touched upon. 
 In olden times the duty of protecting convoys was naturally very 
 distasteful to captains of British men-of-war, who always preferred 
 meeting and fighting the enemy to having to avoid him. It is the 
 concensus of opinion that in the early days of a great naval war 
 there would be a demand for connnerce-protectors unparalleled in 
 the annals of the world. 
 
 The intercolonial conference held at Ottawa last year, in which 
 we may say Canada was the prime mover, will, it is hoped, do much 
 towards removing obstacles in the way of closer union between the 
 different parts of the Empire in connnercial matters. The question of 
 the due protection of the trade routes may well form the subject for 
 arrangement at another such conference at an early date. A solution 
 of the problem would seem to lie in the direction of separating, to 
 some extent, the duty of commerce protection, from that of the 
 fighting line of battle, and placing the responsibility therefor under 
 
18 
 
 a distinct department of the Admiralty. Naval Reserve ships should 
 be stationed at the principal Colonial ports, in which the officers and 
 men who will man our mercantile cruisers will be kept constantly 
 drilled in the use of the weapons they will have to use. The cap- 
 tains of these cruisers would hold doi'mant commissions, which would 
 come into effect upon a declaration of war. At the Ottawa con- 
 ference a complete system of telegraphic comnumication, with cables 
 touching only British territor}-, was discussed, and one of the most 
 valuable services which such a system of cruisers could render would 
 be the protection of our telegraphic communication. 
 
 The captain of one of the C. P. R. "Empress" ships informed me 
 that there were many young seamen in the Coloni- s and elsewhere 
 who were anxious to ioin the Roval Naval Resers e, but thev found 
 it impossible to do so without going to England for that purpose and 
 becoming enrolled tliere. Here is a matter Avhich undoubtedly should 
 receive the attention of the Admiralty. 
 
 One great advantage of the scheme above indicated for equipping 
 a commerce ]irotective na^'y, coniposeil of mercantile cruisers, is that 
 it is suscept , > )le of gradual development. What is M'anted is intelli- 
 gent co-operation on a well matured plan. 
 
 There is no reason why the friends of Preferential Trade amongst 
 Imperial Federationists should relax their efforts, although the goal 
 they seek to attain appears as ^^et to be ver^- far off. In the mean- 
 time, to the extent to which the means of inter-comniunication and 
 traffic between Great Britain and her \'arious colonies are developed 
 Vjy state aid, to that extent is an advantage in trade obtained over 
 foreign nations. 
 
 There is no doubt but that the Colonies should contribute towards 
 the protection of theii- commerce, but tlie amount of such contribu- 
 tion or the manner in which its expenditure should be controlled can- 
 not be settled in the easv, rule of three, manner, sup;t>ested bv our 
 friends of the Imperial Federation (Defence) Connnittee. In the first 
 place, the strength of the Bi-itish Navy, as it exists to-daj', is deter- 
 mined by the armament from time to time maintained by France and 
 other European nations. Great Britain nuist at all times keep com- 
 mand of the seas, otherwise her sources of supplies, botli for food and 
 raw matei'ial, would be lial)le to be cut off, and if cut off for only a 
 short time it would mean her ruin. Therefore, come what ma}', the 
 British Navy must be kepc up to a strength to cope with any two of 
 the Navies of Europe, and that quite irrespective of the size and 
 importance of colonial trade. If the naval scares which ha\e taken 
 place in England recently mean anything, they mean that the English 
 people are fipprehensive that their navy is not being kept up to the 
 standard which will ensure the safety of the British Isles. A 
 perusal of the Naval Defence Series published for the Council of the 
 
19 
 
 London Chamber of Commerce would seem to show that, so late at 
 all events as 1(S93, this apprehension was well grounded. So far as 
 one can judge, if it comes to a war with a first-rate power, every 
 available ship not required to actively engage the enemy or watch his 
 ports will be re(}uired, not to protect colonial trade in the distant 
 parts of the world, but to ensure a supply of food and raw materials 
 for the inhabitants of the British Isles, and that being the ease it is 
 only reasonable, if the colonies a^j to be called upon to contribute to 
 the expense of the British Navj', that a plan shall be worked out 
 that will ensure their interests being properly safe guarded.