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TI
THE RATIONALISM
OF
METAPHYSICS.
ts^
V .■
^fff
1 1
I I.
J» , -
I
I \ \
• i
SUPPLEMENT
TO
THEOLOGY
AND
Science of Government.
-'^^"\^'
Bein^ a "Review of a Booh
DT
IMMANUEL KANT.
CALLED
CRITIQUE OF PURE REASON.
' <•» ■
BT
KUKLOS
{JOHN HAJtniS.)
filontxtalt
PRINTED BT THE LOVELL PRINTING AND PUBLISHING 00.
ST. NICHOLAS STREET.
October 1874.
\J
'^^ll<>^. w'b
Entered according to the Act of Parliament of the Don.inion of
Canada, in the year one thousand eight hundred and seventy -four,
by John Harris, in the Office of the Minister of Agriculture and
Statistics at Ottawa.
N/
SUPPLEMENT
TO THEOLOGY AND THE SCIENCE OF
GOVERNMENT.
ON THE RATIOXALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
Being a review of a book called ICvnt's Cntique of Pure R&ison.^
In noticing this book, bringing it again, pciliaps,
prominently before the public, and calling attention
particularly to certain passages in it ; we do so under
protest. We protest against any supposition that the
book in a correct sense belongs to science ; or that it
has in itself any value to recommend its reconsideration
by the public. On the contrary, we hold it to be a
harmful, baneful book wliich has been and still is, directly
and indirectly, potent for mischief.
In examining and objecting to this book, however, it
is not to it only, but to the class of books, doctrines,
and opinions which belong to it and to which it belongs.
We do not suppose that the ordinary student, or the man
of ordinary education, is in much risk of directly con-
founding himself by tiie serious endeavour to study and
com[)rehend this work as a part of legitimate science.
, We feel sure that tlie perusal of a few pages by a person
whose mind is in a naturally healthy condition must
usually produce a degree of mental nausea sulUcient to
protect the ordinary individual from direct injury ; but
it by no means follows that such person is not indi-
vidually interested in the book, and that he may not
receive injury of the most serious description from it.
* Criiiqne of Pure Reason,
BT Imhanubl Kant,
Henry G. Bohn, London, 1860.
}
Translated from the German
Bv J. M. D. Meiklejohn.
15466
4 TIIK RATIONALISM OF WETAPI1VSIC8.
Let us consider, with some ntteiition, one way out of
several in wliieh he may receive serious injury. A
teachiir of some department of knowledge, siu'h as
pi»ysi"al science, luis by the evi(hince of superior ability,
by tlie clearness of his explanations, by his sincerity, in-
dustry, skill and sagacity, gained the conlidence of a
number of persons, it may be, of all the membtu-s of a
scientilic society, or, perhaps, his reputation may liave ex-
tended throughout the town or, even, the whole country
to wliich he belongs, or, it may be, that he has earned
a world-wide renown, and his name has become re-
coiruized throujifhout tiie world of education ami civi-
llzation as of a man whose teaching is authoritativ(;,
whose credentials are such as to place his propositions
almost above controversy, and such that his certitied
examination and approval of a doctrine is sullicieut of
itself to strongly recommend to the student the accept-
ance of that doctrine.
Let us suppose that such teacher has directed his
attention especially to one department of Natural Science,
to physics, for instance, or some other one department,
but has investigated and acquired knowledge in other
departments of Natural Science also. Having attained
his reputation as a teacher of great ability, he becomes
desirous to still further extend the area of his knowledge
and thereby his ability to instruct : and he proceeds to
commence the study of Ideal Science, to which he has
hitherto paid scarcely any attention. Now comes the
important question. . . Does his science securely rest
upon the fundamental basis of sound science ; that is,
upon the primary facts of natural and revealed theology ?
If not, we say that such an one is in even ureater dan-
ger than the intelligent young lad eager for the acquisi-
tion of knowledge whose mind is allowed to wander, un-
wuided and unprotected, amongst the snares and pitfalls
of unsound ideal science. When such a man brings his
mind deliberately to the consideration of some system
THE RATIONALtSM OF METAPHYSICfJ.
•of metapliysics, vvliotlier it bo a modification of K.iiit's
transc«Mi(l('Jitiil systoin or sonio other, he will not allow
liis iiiiiul to 1)0 repelled from the study by u iiumv repug-
nance or distaste in the first instance. And besides, his
previously acnpiired knowledge and experience s[>;ire.s
iiim the necessity of much of the labour which would
have to be underyono by the ine.\[>erienced stiident, for
the latter toassimilate the iitrange (loctrines,and to become
possessed (»f them as a part <»f his own knowledge.
lint the man is u justly renowned teacher. The false
and mischievous doctrincjs, having mingled in the alembic
of liis ndnd with the truths ;ind facts of Natural Science, do
not ccnne forth in the same nauseous state in which they
are pniseated in such a work as Kant's Criti(|U(! ; they
•now hav<; all the advantages of the i»orsuasivt! speech,
trained skill, earnestness and experience of the teacher
himself, and thus the noxious <loctrines, disguised l)y
truths to which they seem to Ixnong, are rendered .iccep-
tablo to the unguarded mind of the student.
Wo will connntMice with an analytical examination of
that which, assuming the work to have any pretensictu to
scientific arrangement, must be considered the com-
mencement proper of the treatise. This will be found at
page 212, under the following heading :
" Of Pure Reason, the seat of the Transcendental Illnso-
ry appearance
, "
OF REASON IN GENERAL.
"All our knowledge begins with sense, proceeds thence tu luiilei-
standing, and ends with reason, beyond which nothing higher can be
discovered in tlie hunian mind for elaborating the matter of intuition
and subjecting it to the liigliest unity of thought. At this stage of our
«nquiry it is my duty to give an explanation of this, tiie highest
faculty of cognition, and I confess I (hid myself here in some diffi-
culty. Of reason, as of the understanding, there is a merely formal,
that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction of all content of
6
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
cognition; but there is also a real use, inasmuch as it contains in
itself the Hource of certain conceptions and principles, which it does
not borrow either from the senses or the understanding. The
former faculty has been long defined oy logicians as the faculty
of mediate conclusion in contradistinction to immediate conclusions
(rniiseqnentke immediatfr,.) But the nature of the latter, which
ittJclf generates conceptions, is not to be understood from this de-
finition. Now, as a division of reason into a logical and a tran-
scendental faculty presents itself here, it becomes necessary to seek
for a higher conception of this source of cognition which shall com-
l)reheiid both conceptions. In tiiis we may expect, according to the
analogy of the conceptions of the understanding, that the logical con-
ception will give us the key to the transcendental, and that the table
of the functions of the former will present us with the clue to the
conceptions of reason.
"In the former part of our transcendental logic, we defined the
understanding ti,> be the faculty uf rules ; reason maybe distinguished
Irom uiHJerstanding as the J'acul/i/ of jitinciples,
" Tiie te'-m principle is ambiguous, and commonly signitie.s merely
a cognition that maybe employed as a principle ; aUhough it is not
in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled to the distinction.
Every gener.'il proposition, even if derived from experience Ijy the
process of induction, may serve as the major in a svliogism ; but it
is not for that reason a principle. Mathematical a.xioms (for example,
there can be only one straight line between two points,) are geiKM'al d
2>riori cognitions, and are therefore rigiitly dononiiiuvted principles,
relatively to the cases which can be subsumed under tiiem. But I
cannot, for this reason, suy that I cognize tiiis property uf a straight
line frum principles. I cognize it only in j)ure intuition.
" Cognition from pi iples, then, is that cogniti(jn in wiiieli I cog-
nize the particular in the general by nieans of conceptions. Thus
every syllogism is a form of the deduction ot a cogiiiti<Mi Ironi a prin-
ciple. For the major always gives a conce})tion througii whi(;li every
thing that is subsumed under the condition thereof, is cognized
according to a principle. Now, as every general cognition may serve
as the nmjor in a syllogism, and the understanding presents us with
such general <l prion propositions, they may be termed principles, in
respect of their possible use.
" But if we consider these principles of the pure understanding in
I
THK RATlOWAL.dM OF METAPHYSICS.
I
relrition to their orijrin, we sliall find thoiii to be anythir; atlier tliaii
coj;nitioii8 from conceptions. For they would not even lie ))ossihle i)
j)rioi'i, if we conM not rely on the as.sifltiince of pu"e intuition (in
maiheniaticH), or on that of the conditions of a pos«ihle experience.
That everythinj; that liappens ha^ a canse, cannot be conchided from
the jieneral conception of that which happens; on tlie contrary, the
principle of causality instructs us as to the mode of oblaininn from
that which happens a determinate empirical conception.
«' Synthetical cognitions fronj conceptions the understanding cannot
supply, and they alone are entitled to be called principles. At the
same time, all general propositions may be termed comparative prin-
ciples.
«' It has been along-cherished wish that, (who knows how late) may
one day be happily accompli -ili.d— that the principles of the endless
variety of civil laws should Ue investigated and exposed; for in iKis
way alone can we find 'he secret of simrlifying legislation. But in
this cj,..e, laws are noi.iing more tliP'- limitations of our freedom upon
conditions under which it sn'isists in perfect harmony with itself;
they consequently have w,v 1'ieir object that which is completely our
own work, and of which we ourselves may be the cause by means of
these conceptions. But how objects, as things in themselves— how
the nature of things is subordinated to prinoiplf's nid is to be deter-
mined according to conceptions, is a question which it seems well
nigh impossible to answer. Be this, however, as it may— for on this
point our investigation is yet to be made— it is at least numifcrtl from
what we have said, that cognition trom principles is something very
different from cognition by means of the understanding, which may
indeed precede other cognitions in the form of a principle, but in itself
—so far as it is synthetical— is neither based upon mere thought, nor
contams a general proposition drawn from conceptions alone.
" The understanding may be a faculty for the production of unity
of phenomena by virtue of rules ; the reason is a faculty for the pro-
duction of unity of rules (of the understanding) under rinciplos.
Reason, therefore, never applies directly to experience, or to any sen-
suous object; its object is, on the contrary, the understanding, to the
manifold cognition of which it gives a unity d priori hj means of
conceptions — a unity which may be called' rational unity, iind which
is of a nature very different from that of the unity j^roduced by the
•UDderataixding.
8
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
" The al)Ove is tlie general conception of the faculty of reason, in so
far as it has been possible to make it comprehensible in the absence'
of examples. These will be given in the aecpiel."
The very first piirt of the first sentence ^^ all our know-
ledge begins with sense " jippc^uTs to be in violer-t contra-
diction to the general teaching of the work, which
sometimes assumes and sometimes purports to demon-
strate that knowledge is quite independent of sense,
and that sense itself belongs only to one class of effects
or consequents, to which intuitions, conceptions, and
cognitions, stand in the relation of causes or antece-
dents.
In the second \tt\Yt of this first sentence, " proceeds
thence to understanding, and ends with reason," beyond
which nothing can be discovered in the human miiul for
elaborating the matter of intuition, nmhrsUindimf as a
mental process or faculty is made to precede reason.
Xow, this appears to be evidently eiToneous in the sense
which Kant indirectly attaches to those expressions.
Reason is described as the mental process or a part of
the process by which the matter of intuition is elaboratiul,
but knowledge (all knowledge is necessarily compound,)
whether it be in the form of a statement, proposition
or conclusion, camiot be understood unless its elements
be first arranged by the intellectual faculty of the mind.
We neither affirm nor admit that there are any two
such distinct processes as reason and understanding, as
supposed by Kant ; but we say that the meaning of the
term understanding, whether it be considered a process, a
faculty or anything else, implies thiit it is suI>seqiu,Mit to
that process of the intellectual faculty by which the ele-
ments of the knowledge are arranged, for it is not an in-
coherent and disorderly collection of ideas, but the clear
and distinct statement which is said to be understood as
a cognition by the mind. When (compound) knowledge
is understood by the mind, the whole process of elaborat-
ing the matter of intuition (which we tliink is preferably
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPUYSICS. 9
expressed as the process of arranging and combining the
elements of knowledge) has been completed. It is trne
the knowledge may be unsound, the process of arranging
may have been badly or incompletely performed and the
conclusion or cognition, being disapproved by the judg-
ment (reason), may require to be rearranged ; but this is
to undo and to repeat the process, not to elaborate or to
carry further the process. We opine, for otu-selves, that
tmdcntandlwj is a term appli(!able only to compound
knowledge, and its use is to express appreciation l)y the
mind that theelements of such compourd knowledge have
been logically and cohennitly arranged. If the elements
were sullicicnt and of su.',h kind as to be capable of com-
bining together, then, if the process of arrangement has
been complete and perfect, the knowledge (conclusion or
cognition) is completely, clearly, and distinctly iimlcr-
stood by tlie mind. This is quite an end of the process
of elaboration which Kant is iiere treating of ; although
it by no nutans follows that such knowledge is sound,
is such that the mind may lawfully accept it, or that,
having accepted, may retain it. But this considera-
tion belongs to the relati(msinp between knowledge and
the mind ; and applies e([ually to compound knowledge,
already combined and complete, presented from without
for acceptfince by the mind. It is quite a distinct con-
sideration from that of the process of conipouniling the
knowledge from its elenuMits which alone is here brought
under consideration by Kant.
Wherefore if reason were a process or a part of the
process by which the nnnd compounds tlie eh'ments or
elaborates the elementary matter of knowledge, reason-
ing would necessarily precede understanding, not follow
it.
The last part of the sentence, " subjecting it to the
highest unity of thought," can oidy become intelligible
by a definition of the meaning which it is intended to
express by " the highest unity of thought." In the ab-
10
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHTSICS,
sence ot any definition, we would suggest judgment or
reason as the coiTect expression ; but then if Kant means
judgment why does he say ' the highest unity of thought '?
and reason he has described as something, less high,
which has already operated and performed its func-
tion before the elaborated matter of intuition is subjected
to the highest unity of thought.
" At this stage of our inquiry, it is my duty to give an
explanation of this the highest faculty of cognition, "
After some consideration it appears that the word tJds
is intended to apply to reason, we have therefore the defini-
tion of reason that it is the highest fiiculty of cognition.
Now we say that reason is manifestly not a faculty of
cognition ; it may be said to be related to or to belong to
cognition, but its function is to supervise cognition, to
guide, direct and advise the mind in respect to its cogni-
tions. A proposition or conclusion which has been cog-
nized, and is distinctly understood by the mind, may,
nevertheless, be unreasonable ; therefore reason is not a
part of cognition and not a necessity to cognition, but it
is quite necessary to the mind in order that the quality
and character of its cognitions may be determined ; an
unreasonable, false, or unsound conclusion in the mind,
is a compound cognition which is disapproved by rea-
son.
" Of reason, as of the und-^rstanding, there is a merely
formal, that is, logical use, in which it makes abstraction
of all content of cognition ; but there is also a real use,
inasmuch as it contains in itself the source of certain
conceptions and principles, which it does not borrow
either from the senses or the understandinii." That is to
say, putting the definition of reason just previously given
in its place, the highest faculty of cognition mak«'s ab-
straction of all content of cognition ; that is, when used
logically but it also has a real use ^inasmuch as it
contains in itself the source of certain conceptions and
principles.' There seems to lurk beneath this phrase a
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
11
confusion of the elements of knowledge with mental pro-
cesses operating upon those elements. The elements of
knowledge have been spoken of as tlie matter of intui-
tion, and reason has been described as a faculty of the
mind by which this matter is elaborated ; are we now to
understand that the faculty itself is also the source of the
matter (eh>ments) upon which it operates? We say that
reason is distinct from the mind, is the intellectual guide
and director of the mind, and being such may supply
knowledge, or the elements of knowledge, to the mind;
but this is very diflerent i'rom affirming reason to be a
part of tiie mental organization, namely a faculty thereof
by whicli the mind ehiborates the matter of intuition,
and then supposing that the faculty itself generates that
matter.
" The former faculty has been long defined by logi-
cians as the faculty of mediate conclusion in contradis-
tinction to immediate conclusions (consequent ire mmedi-
atife) ; but the nature of the latter, which itself generates
conceptions, is not to be understood from tliisdelinition."
The former of which two faculties ? There has been but
one faculty spoken of— namely, the highest fiiculty of
cognition, of which a logical use and a real use have
been just noted. Putting this difficulty aside, we are told
that "the nature of the latter faculty" (qy, the real use
of reason) " is not to be understood from this definition.
What definition ? The mediate conclusion ? With respect
totiie latter faculty, to the nature of which this definition
doesnot apply, we now have the distinct statement that
it generates conceptions (The reader may note that
this is almost the only distinct statement as yet made.)
We will suggest, that perhaps what Kant is here trying
to explain, without having first apprehended the condi-
tions of the case himself, is that in the process of
compounding knowledge, the intellectual faculty of the
mind having combined certain elements into a simple
cognition or conclusion, may then take this simple con-
■
12
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
elusion as mi cloment together with other elements, and
therewith continue the process of compounding .... thus
obt.iining, from the simple-compound, the compound-
compound- or complex, and so on.
" Now, as a division of reason into a logical
and a transcendental faculty presents itself here, "
We lia<l at liist one faculty with a particular use. We
were next told of two uses of this one faculty, then we
found two faculties, and we now have the faculty dividing
itself into two, namely, into a logical and transcendental.
" It becomes necessary to se<!k for a liigher conception
of this source of cognition which shall comprehend both
conceptions." AVhat source of cognition I reason ? ])ut
reason has been defined to be a taculty, one 2»hase or
form of which generates conceptions, and which faculty
has divided itself into two, the logical and transcen-
dental. Bearing this in mind it is not apparent to us
what conception is referred to by tiie words 'it is neces-
sary to see'k for a higher conception ;' surely a faculty
which ehiborates the matter of intuition, and includes a
sub-faculty which generates conceptions, cannot be
itself a conception. Yes, it appears that it is, for
according to tlie end of the sentence, the logical and
transcendental faculties are both of them conceptions.
" In this we may expect, according to tlie analogy of
the conc«!ptions of the understanding, that the logical
conc(!ption will give us the key to the transcendental,
and that the table of the functions of the former will
present us with the clue to the conceptions of reason."
The statement of this expectation assumes (appa-
rently) that the understanding is strictly analogous to
reason- and divides itself into two faculties each of which
is a couc(^ption, but further than this we are entirely at a
loss; why the logical conception, which is one of the
divisions of the faculty of reason, should give us the key
to tlie transcendental conception, which is the other
division of the same faculty, we are not told ) and, even
■
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
13
if we liatl the table of the functions of the looical con-
ceptions of the faculty, we should not be liopefnl of
obtaining thereby a clue to tlie conceptions of reason,
whicli lias been itself reduced to a conception; for,
reason was first defined to be a certain iiiculty, and that
faculty is afterwards spoken of as a conception.
By attributing some defniite meaning to the various
phrases here made use of, these last statements might be
made intelligible, and in such a manner a number of
persons might understand them as conveying a variety
of meanings, each person -obtaining a meaning depen-
dent on tlie sense wliicli he thinks pro]»er to attribute to
those expressions. But we do not think tliat tliese
statements, as tliey are put before the reader, can be
fairly considered to convey any dcifinite intelligible
meaning ; it is not sulHcient to say that other parts of
the work may define the sense in which these statements
are to be understood because tliey are, many of them,
inconsistent witli each otlier, in any sense, incolierent
and almost contradictory.
" In the former part of onr transcendental logic, we
defined the understanding to be the facidty «.f rules ;
reason may be distinguislied from understanding as the
faculiii of pruicii)Jcs.^^
We certainly lioped for the moment that we had here
a more intelHgible definition of what Kant vmderstood
by reason, but on looking a little further to find out
whetlier tlie expression principle was itself defined ; we
find by the very next sentence that '' tlie term principle
is ambiguous and commonly signifies merely a cogni-
tion ; which may be employed as a principle although it
is not in itself, and as regards its proper origin, entitled
to the distinction." We are afraid the only interpreta-
tion this admits of is that it means, or may be used to
mean, just any thing that it suits the metaphysician at
tlie moment to employ it as meaning. We note that here
the natural relationship of reasoh and understanding is in
14
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
verted. However vague and indefinite the s»?nse attached
by Kant to the expression ' principh; ' may be, it must
be sometliing of the character of a proposition. Now
when the question is of reason and understanding, tlie
compound expression 'rules of rensoning' is a sound
couibination of words and (piite intelhgiWe ; so, also ' a
proposition imderstood,' or 'a proposition misunder-
stood' is intelligible, but, the rules of understanding' ,
or ' a propositionj-easoned ' are false verbal combinations
belonging to unsense. •
"Every general propositiou, even if derived from ex-
perience by the process of induction, nuiy serve as the
major in a syllogism ; but it is not for that reason a prin-
ciple." No ? If it was we should at least have a distinct
definition of a principle, and thence anotlier defmition of
reason wiiich would then become a faculty of general
propositions, but this would not very well harnmnize
with the previous definitions as elaborating tiie matter of
intuition, &c., &c. " Mathematical axioms (for exauiple :
there can be only only one straight line between two
points) are general a priori cognitions, and are tlierefore
rightly denominated principles, relatively to the cases
which can be subsumed under them. But I cannot for
this reason say that I cognize this property of a straight
line from principles — I cognize it only iu pure intui-
tion."
Giving Kant the benefit of a doubt, we are inclined to
think this is a confused statement of that wiiich is essen-
tially correct ; if, however, we correctly ap[)reciate his
meaning in this statement we should prefer to ex[»ress it
somewhat in this manner. * ]\[athematical axioms (for ex-
am[de : there can be only one straight line betvv<:.'jn two
points) are compound facts, that is, they are self-demon-
strated propositions the absolute truth of which is at
once manifest to the mind ; they are presented to the
mind and accepted by it as a whole with the approval of
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
15
reason and without the necessity of any rearrangornent
or adjustment of their elements.'
" Cognition from principles, then, is that cognition in
which I cognize tlie particular in the general by means
of conceptions." But since a principle is an u priori
cognition, what necessity is there for the conceptions ?
and where do the conceptions come in I " Thus every
syllogism is a form of the deduction of a cognition from
a principle." A few sentences back we were told that
" cotniitions are rightly denominated principles," there-
fore the syllogism is merely the form of a deduction of a
principle from a principle. '' For tlic major always gives
a conception, through which everything that is subsumed
under the condition thereof is cognized according to a
principle."
This statement is too hopelessly vague to allow it to
be supposed that Kant himself could have attached any
distinct meaning to such combination of words : the rea-
der may, however, here note a glaring instance of the
misuse (perversion) of language— namely, "for the major
always givci a conception." Now a conception belongs
to the internal operation of the mind ; it belongs to the
imagination and to the inner consciousness ; a simple con-
ception is a simple idea conceived by the imagination in
the mental organization ; a compound conception is com-
pounded of ideas generated within the mind; if received
from without, as a (compound) cognition, it is not gene-
rated within ; or, if generated within,* it cannot be receiv-
ed from without. "Through wliich every thing that is sub-
sumed under the condition thereof is cognized according
to a principle." But what is a principle ? We have been
told the term is ambigious but have not been told what
meaning it is intended to convey. By the next sentence it
tippt'ars that principles are general propositions presented
* That is, if compounded vrithia the mind from conceptioaa by the inner
consciousaesa.
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
to US by the uiulorstanding ; but for flie undcrstiiuding to
do this, oitlu'v they must bo first prosented to the under-
standing or else they must be genenited (conceived) with-
in the understanding, and on this point, namely, whether
the principles have any origin outside the understanding,
we are uninformed. In this coimection we must not
forget the definition of understaiidtny and reason given a
few sentences back. — that : understandhig is the fnculty
of rules and reason the faculty of principles. We have
therefore, a relationship between reason and uiiderstiuid-
ing here suggested of a very peculiar character, namely ;
that the ficulty of rules conceives principles of which
reason is tlie faculty. " Now as every general cognition
may serve as the major in a syllogism, and tlie under-
standing presents us with such g«Mieral a priori proposi-
tions, they nuiy be termed principles, in respect of their
possible use." This sentence agiiin nppears to din'ctly
contradict the statement made shortl)'^ before that a gen-
eral proposition which may serve as the major of a
syllogism was not for that reason a principle ; it seems to
be now asserted that it is a principle for that very rea-
son, namely, " in respect to its possible use as the major
of a syllogism.'' It is sufficiently evident that the term
principle is indeed very ambiguous.
" But if we consider these principles of the pure under-
standing in relation to their origin, we shall find them to
be anything rather than cognitions from conceptions."
But we have not been informed as to that origin in re-
lation to which we are to consider them ; we were told
just now that they are presented to us by the under-
standing : therefore whence does the understanding get
them ? Because if this origin be in the understanding,
they must be conceptions by the understanding ; and if
they be cognitions it would seem to follow that they
must be cognitions from conceptions ; but we are told
that we shall find them to be anything rather than cogni-
tions from conceptions.
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
It
" For they would not even be possible a priori if we
could not rely on the assistance of pure intuition (in
matheniatii's) or in that of the conditions of a possible
experience."
The meaning which seemed to be attached to the ex-
pression pure intuition, when last used, was that faculty
by whicii the mind at once cognizes or recognizes the
truth of a manifest fact when presented to it; but if this
be the meaning we do not see why it should not apply
to a cognition from a conception ; for if a manifest ideal
fact be conceived by the inner consciousness, it will be
cognized or recognized by tlie mind just as certaiidy as if
presented from without ; the very meaning of tiie expres-
sion ' manifest ' is the necessary and unhesitating accep-
tance of the proposition, as true, by the mind. "That
everything that happens has a cause, cannot be conclud-
ed from the general conception of that which happens;
on the contrary the principle of causality instructs us as
to the mode of obtaining from that which happens a de-
temiinate empirical conception."
This statement does not seem consistent with sense ;
if we are not to conclude that everything that happens
has a cause from the general conception (cognition) of that
which happens whence are we to so conclude I The
conclusion is in fiict a cognition (or recognition) of that
relationship known as cause and effect. And it is empi-
rical because a generalization of experience, the general
result of common observation in numberless cases—
that every known eftect has a cause. The principle of
causality or as it is usually and preferably written ' the
law of causality,' expresses the conclusion that such re-
lationship of cause to eifect is a necessary and univer-
sal relationship. All conceptions of the mind, or, pro-
perly speaking, by the imagination in the mind, if true,
real, and sound, must hannonize with sound knowledge
received (cognized) by the mind from without ; and all
18
THE KATIONAIiISM OP METAPHYSICS.
such conceptions are empirical iti the sense that the germ
of such conception, that is of the knowledge so conceiv-
ed, must hiive been firstcognized (i.e., received from with-
out) by the mind. We do not say that all cognition must
be ordinary cognition, on the contrary we believe that
knowledge may be introduced into the human mind
at any time by the Creator directly by spiritual
agency, and which we should term an exti'aordinary
cognition of that knowledge by the mind, but what we
deny is tliat the mind or mental organization can generate
knowledge within itself, of wLich the germ has not been
first introduced into it
The spontaneous generation of animals and vegetables
(of animal and vegetable existence) has not been as yet
demonstrated ; it is now universally, or almost univer-
sally rejected by men of science as an imdemonstrated
theory and most improbable conjecture ; in which esti-
mate we quite concur ; but the spontaneous generation
of knowledge within the mental-organization of man is
certainly yet more improbable ; indeed the one impro-
bability is so related to the other, that any one beli( -
ing or admitting the spontaneous generation of know-
ledge in the human mind cannot consistently deny the
spontaneous generation of animal life ; for, if the first
supposition were true, the last would be at least extreme-
ly probable, if indeed not (piite a certamty.
The proposition of the spontaneous generation of
knowledge if din.'ctly presented to the perceptive fiiculty
of the educated mind, as a bare and distinct statement,
would be rejected as absurd (in the sense in which that
expression is used by Euiilid). Therefore any one who,
having become unawares possessed of this notion and,
having constructed an elaborate system of theories and
hypotheses, finds that the whole scheme rests upon this
supposition as its basis, must either relinquish the whole
as false and untenable or else he must disguise the unreal
and chimerical character of his basis. This is what we
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
19
incline to think is the actual purpose of the cxtivniely
ambiguous, incoherent, and, for the most part, sciin-c^ly
intelligible propositions and statements we have just put
before tlie reader. We do not intend to sjiy that Kfint is
here wilfully and purposely deceiving the studiMit ; there
is manifold evidence in the work that he is quite sinct're
in the supposition, not only that his (so-called) system
is really something belonging to knowledge iind 1o
science, but that it possesses value assucli in a vi'ry high
degreee. The appearance of syst<.'m under whirli this
vaguenes and incoherency is presented to tin; student
indicates the work of Unreason, to which Kant hns sub-
jected himself. Deceit and treachery in the most insi-
dious guise are therefore to be expected. The student ^s
to be attracted by an appearance of definitenessand logi-
cal distinctness, is then to be led on by a desire for the
profound knowledge and wisdom of which these state-
ments are supposed to be the vehicle ; and when he has
become entangled in a maze of inconsistencies and utterly
bewildered in a labyrinth of paths which, continually in-
tersecting each other, have no ax)parent commencement or
termimis, the fundamental proposition of the spontaneous
generation of knowledge is made to present itself again
and again with increasing distinctness to his mental vision
as the only intelligible mode of egress.
We do not, however, intend these remarks to apply
exclusively to the passages now examined, nor yet exclu-
sively to the book now under consideration, but we be-
lieve them to apply with more or less force to all (so called)
systematic treatises purporting to teach metaphysics.
It might be supposed that in passages such as we have
just now examined, the unsense must be so manifest as
to deprive them of the power of mischief; but history
and experiehce show that such is not the case ; there is
much ground for believing that this very work has been
the means of partially wasting the lives of many educated
men and, probably, of perverting the intellects of some
20
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
'1
men of great ability, and through them of exercising a
pernicious influence over a great part of the domain of
human knowledge.
Let us proceed with the examination.
" Synthetical cognitions from conceptions the under-
standing cannot supply, and they alone are entitled to be
called principles ". This seems to be a wholly gratuitous
statement, without the support of evidence of any kind ;
we do not opine that the term understanding can be cor-
rectly applied to denote an active faculty or organ for
supplying the mind with anything. The true iise of the
expression, as already stated, is to denote the distinct cog-
nition by the mind of knowledge which may have been
presented to it and accepted in a complete state — as an
axiom or as a compound demonstrated proposition, for
instance — or which may have been arranged by the reason
and compounded within the mental organization itself.
If, however, it wei^ admissible to consider it an inde-
pendent active faculty or organ for supplying cognitions
to the mind, its function, we should suppose, would bejust
that which Kant here says it is not — namely, it would
be to supply cognitions harmoniously and regularly com-
pounded of simple conceptions or of elementary cogni-
tions. We say that the authorized meaning of the term un-
derstanding belongs to compound knowledge distinctly cog-
nized by the mind,because compounded in such wise as to
be intelligible. Dr. Johnson's dictionary will show that to
the English word understanding this characteristic meaning
fundamentally and essentially belongs, and any good Ger-
man dictionary will show that the same sense belongs to
itsGeiinan equivalent (Verstandung). " And they alone
are entitled to be called principles." Only a little way
back we were told that any general proposition which
may serve as the major in a syllogism is entitled to be
called a principle ; " at the same time all general pro-
positions may be termed comparative principles " ; that
is to say, in other words, we may no longer term gene-
TBI RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
21
ral propositions principles (which only a little while be-
fore we were told we might do) but we are not debarred
from culling them co.'ipurative priciplea.
"It has been a long-cherislied wish that, (who knows
how late,) may one day be happily accomplished — tliat the
principles of the endless variety of civil laws sliould be
investigated and exposed, for in this way alone can we
find tlie secret of simplifying legislation. " The princi-
ples of all just civil laws were long since written by the
finger of God on tables of stone, and brotight down from
moiuit Sinai by IMoses, expressly for the information of
men, and to furnish them with a sound, reliable and suffi-
cient basis for all human legislation.
" But in this case, laws are nothing more than limitations
of our freedom, upon conditions under whicli it 8ul)8ists
in perfect harmony with itself; they, consequently, iiave
for their object that which is completely our own work,
and of which we ourselves may be the cause by nunuis of
these conceptions'" We are aware that all history and
experience teach that men, whose passions and wilfulness
are not restrained and limited by obedience to just law,
are liable to quarrel with each other ; but tluit, freedom
is liable to quarrel with itself, or that it can subsist
otherwise than in perfect harmony with itself, is what
we are not prepared to believe. Perfectly just human laws
must be in perfect harmony with the will of the Supreme
Governor of the Earth; with the will of Ilini, whose
service is perfect freedom, because, if the harmony be
perfect and the obedience be complete and perfectly will-
ing, the freedom will then be perfect.
** But how objects as things in themselves — how the
nature of things is subordinated to principles and is to
be determined according to conceptions, is a question
wrhich it seems well-nigh impossible to answer." Assu-
ming the objects as things in themselves ( we don't see
how they can be otherwise) a question suggests itself
as to whether the nature of things be indeed subordinated
22
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHYSICS.
to principles ? And if this be shown, then, what are
the principles to which nature is subordinated ? The last
definition we have of 'principles' is that they are synthe-
tical cognitions from conceptions. Now if the nature of
things be subordinated to these, it would seem to follow
that there must be a great uncertainty about the nature
of things.
" Be this however as it may — for on this point our
investigation is yet to be made-it is at least manifest from
what we have said, that cognition from principles is
something very different from cognition by means of the
understiinding, which may indeed precede other cogni-
tions in the form of a principle ; but in itself — in so far as
it is synthetical — is neither based upon mere thought,
nor contains a general proposition drawn from concep-
tions alone." If we assume that this is intended to
convey some definite meaning, and make a guess as to
what it might mean if put into intelligible language : we
would suggest, that the result of inductive combination
(reasoning) carried on within the mind itself may difl'er
much from knowledge, such as a proposition (tlie ele-
ments of which are derived from a source outside the
mind) which is presented to the mind as a whole and
complete combination. But whether Kant has here
intended to say something to this effect, we cannot be at
all sure.
" The understanding may be a faculty for the produc-
tion of unity of phenomena by virtue of rules; the rea-
son is a faculty for the production of unity of rules (of
the understanding) under principles." The understiinding
was at first defined as a faculty of rules. Now, ' it may
be a fliculty for the production of unity of phenomena by
virtue of rules' ; and reason which was formerly the
faculty of principles has now become ' a faculty for the
production of unity of rules (of the imderstanding)
under principles.'
"Keason, therefore, never applies directly to expe-
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS; Z5
rience, or to any sensuous object ; its object is, on the
contrary, the understanding, to the manifold cognition ot
which it gives a unity d priori by means of conceptions
a unity which may be called rational unity, and which
is of a nature very diiferent from that of the unity pro-
duced by the understanding." On the contrary, reason
applies constantly to experience ; for the frequent obser-
vations and cognitions by the mind of evidence is expe-
rience, and such is particularly the material (so to speak)
with which reason works. From the experience of a
number of particular cases reason conducts the mind to
the general conclusion or judgment. We should say
that the carefully observed result of a chemical experi-
ment clearly belongs to experience, and that the subject
of chemical science investigated by means of the expe-
riment would belong to sensuous objects. On the other
hand, to say that reason has the understanding for its
object is to confound language, because the understand-
ing belongs to the mental organization and is that analy-
tical perceptive faculty of the mind by which it distinctly
cognizes knowledge. This last paragraph, however, sug-
gests that when Kant writes Hhe understanding,' he may
perhaps mean ' the imagination'. <■ The application of the
reason to the manifold conceptions of the imagination'
would be a phrase quite intelligible.
In works of this description three classes of offences
are exhibited :
1. Disregard of verbal science.
2. Disregarrl of the rules of reason.
3. Disregard of the primary laws of theology.
Each of these is intellectually a very grave offence. The
first and second, however, arise primarily from the third ;
although apparf ntly the second, i.e., disregard of the
rules of reason, is the immediate cause of the mischief.
The rules of reason, in their application to human
knowledge, are stated, explained, and taught under two
sysiflms 5 one of them belonging to the older civiliza
24
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHTSIOS.
tion, the other to the modem, namely : Euclid's Ideal
Philosophy, taught and illustrated in the work called
Euclid's Elements of Geometry, and the Inductive Sys-
tem of Bacon.
These two systems, as we have already explained else-
where*, when correctly taught, harmonize perfectly, and
are, in fact, merely different methods of illustrating and
explaining, the same invariable and unchangeable rules.
In Euchds Treatise the application of the system being
confined to the subjects of one science only, that of
'jForm and Magnitude,' and being applied to those sub-
jects with a close and rigorous adherence to method, the
injurious consequences which would arise from even a
very slight neglect of the rules of reason, are therein
very readily perceptible; for it is evident that, had
Euclid left some of his definitions ambiguous and vague,
some of his axioms open to doubt and controversy, and
his postulates such that the mind woula have rejected or
hesitated to accept them, the demonstrations would have
been imperfect and everything would have been left in
uncertainty.
In the practical application of the rules of reason
to other departments of Natural Science, the necessity
of attention and close adherence to those rules is
not so immediately evident. It was, however, clearly
shown by "Francis Bacon" that the same necessity
did exist in each and all of the Natural Sciences,
and that necessity has now been for a long time past
distinctly and universally recognized as belonging to
the successful prosecution of scientific research in the
cultivation of all the departments of Natural Science.
But,notwithstanding that the application of Ideal Philo-
sophy to Natural Science has been for so long a time un-
derstood, the necessity for its application to Ideal Science
has not been, even to the present time, distinctly realized.
Introduction to the " Circle and Straight Line."
I
THE RATIOSALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
Si
In consequence of the non-recognition of this necessity,
writers on certain subjects of Ideal-Science more
particularly on psychology and spiritual philosophy, who
assume the title and authority of teachers of Science,
consider themselves at liberty each to apply rules and
methods of his own contrivance. The result is now the
same in respect to Ideal Science as it was formerly in
respect to Natural Science at the time previous to the ap-
plication of the inductive system namely, no real
progress is made; each apparent advance is followed
after a short time by a falling back almost to the starting
place ; an occasional increase in volume which seems to
promise an unlimited expansion suddenly terminates in a
collapse and subsidence to the old level.
One fault, which almost suffices of itself to deprive the
works of many of these wiiters of any real and perma-
nent value, is a neglect to recognize the claim which
Science has upon tvords, and the especial duty which
belongs to Science to protect and preserve words from
being tampered with and misused. All nouns substan-
tive belong to General Science, each of them is the re-
presentative of a reality, either of a natural or an ideal
reality. In the first instance any one word might be
chosen to represent any particular reality, but having
been selected,and the choice having been ratified and au-
thorized 'hj Science, that word then becomes definitiely
related to that particular reality, and the relationship
being authorized and guaranteed by Science must not be
violated or disturbed. So important is the observance of
this rule that, not only the existence of Science but ulti-
mately of all definite knowledge, is dependent upon it,
and, if it were not to some extent universally observed and
insisted upon, the intercommunication of meaning by
language would become difficult and uncertain. But,
notwithstanding that the imperative necessity of this
strict regard to the inviolability of words is obvious to
persons educated in even a very slight degree, so long aa
26
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
H!
\^ -.,
those words are used on subjects to which language
is ordinarily applied, it seems to be 'Considered that, on
subjects of the most difficult, important and serious
character, regard to the definite and authorized meaning
of the words is no longer necessary.
We may, perhaps, safely assume that the reader will
be satisfied from the examination of tlie part of Kant's
Critique, which we have put before him, that these
remarks apply to that treatise. If that be so, the reader
may accept our positive statement and assurance that
they apply also to all the other metaphysical treatises,
and treatises on metaphysics. Some of them are writi^en
with a superficial appearance of greater clearness and
coherence, but they are not on that account less deceitful
and dangerous : quite the contrary.
We have said that the second offence committed by
this work (Kant's Treatise) is disregard to the rules of
reason. In fact as a reasonable work it has no beginning
and no parts, nothing is substantiated, no proposition or
statement is demonstrated anywhere throughout the
book, and no endeavour, even, to demonstrate anything
in a reasonable sense is made, for the necessity to do so
is not recognized. It is true that the word demonstrate
is used in this book, indeed it is a singularity of this as
a metaphysical treatise that a word peculiarly obnoxious
to metaphysicians is here brought into service. We find
an intention to demonstrate is stated as part of the plan
of the book, and occasionally afterwards an assumption
that something has been demonstrated ; but the word is
used in a metaphysical sense, that is to say it becomes
an expression so vague and indefinite as to have no par-
ticular and distinct meaning. There is no natural
sequence of parts or coherence from inter-relation and
dependence of the parts between and upon each other.
The book for aught we can see might be separated into
divisional parts, and these be arranged in a number of
THE RATIONALISM OP METAPHrSICS.
m
different ways, without essentially injuring or improving
the book as a whole.
The offence of disregard to verbal science may be said
to arise from disregard to the rules of reason, because, if
the latter had been recognized, the inviolable and exclu-
sive right of each word, expression and phrase, to that
essential meaning allotted to it by Science, would have
become apparent.
But the great offence — that which is fundamental to
the others and out of which they have, at least in great
measure, arisen— is disregarded to the primary laws of
theology. A practical disbelief in the living God, in the
Creator, as the Supreme Ruler over the men that He
has made, the worid that He has created, and the science
that He has arranged. If the positive beUef had been
possessed by the mind and active therein, reason would
have made it plain that many of the subjects which it
proposed to investigate were not subjects proper for
unauthorized human investigation; and that the plan of
the book in regard to its objects was unreasonable and
unlawful : imreasonable because unnecessary and certain
to be unsuccessful, and unlawful because irreverent and,
by implication, rebellious towards God. Moreover, such
a practical belief, even though only rudimentary, would
have suggested and necessitated the recognition of the
probability of some particular revelation of God, and of
His relationship to men ; consequently any alleged par-
ticular revelation believed in by other educated men
would have had its claim reasonably investigated and
attentively considered.
On reference to Johnson's dictionary we find the mean-
ing of the word — blasphemous — " impiously irreverent
with regard to God."
Now wliat can be said of the character of a book in
which whole sections are headed thus:—" Of the htipos-
sihility of a Cosmohgical proof of the existence of GodP
" Of the wqwssihility of a physico-theohgical xn-oof'' " Cri-
28
THE RATIONALISM OF METAPHYSICS.
I
/
i! '
tique of all theology based upon speculative principles of
Reason.*^ If Kant had professed pure Atheism, denied
the existence of God, disputed the facts of Creation as
such, and based his system distinctly upon the spontane-
ous generation of knowledge, of reason, of animal exist-
ence, and of every thing else, the impious irreverence
would not have been so manifest — ^but neither would it
have been so harmful. For a man to acknowledge a Su-
preme Intellectual Being as his Creator and God, a.d
then, quietly setting aside all considerations of reverence,
to set himself to argue whether there be or be not a ne-
cessity for any such Being ; whether man might not get
on just as well without ; whether we are not essentially
self-existent, owing whatever we have mainly to our-
selves and to our own exertions ; and whether, after all,
the existence of any Supreme Being may not be a mere
superstitious notion with which ignorance has infested our
minds, or which our imagination has conjured up. We say
that such arguments in themselves, whatever the profess-
ed result of them may be, constitute a sort of intellectual
deliberate blasphemy which cannot reasonably be con-
sidered otherwise than as blasphemy of the worst type,
far worse and more offensive towards God than any vio-
lent and passionate outbreak of rebelhon against His au-
thority and government.
So far as a verbal professsion may go, Kant himself,
almost at the close of his work, declares his belief not
only in the existence but even in the particular revelation
of God. It does seem indeed that he has, or is under
the impression that he has, retained such a belief as a
sort of extraordinary belief. In one place he expresses a
recognition of the importance to himself of retaining this
extraordinary belief; that without it he would feel dissa-
tisfied and uncomfortable ; and, he states with some degree
of distinctness, that he finds his metaphysical philosophy
a vain thing to trust to. We have no right or desire to
pass any judgement upon Kant as an individual man.
THE RATIONALISM Or METAPHYSICS. 89
We hope and think that this extraordinary belief may-
have been of real value and comfort to him ; but we
must point out that such professions of religious belief
introduced into metaphysical works have the effect only
of making them more dangerous and harmful. The stu-
dent, whose mind is unguarded and unsettled, is thereby
led on into the slough. The belief itself appears, per-
haps, as an inconsequential conclusion to some vague
reasoning, and, at best, the truth is contaminated and
defiled by the unsense with which it is mingled. Many
persons, we believe, who on the whole disapprove, per-
haps much disapprove, such works, are disposed to give
them a partial approbation. They express sympathy
with the industry and natural ability displayed in them
and the evident desire to impart knowledge. But it
should be considered that unlawful industry is evil indus-
try, and that wilfulness and lawlessness are at tiie very
root of such works ; they (wilfulness and lawlessness) may
indeed be considered fundamental to the disbelief in the
facts of theology, for it is they which have ejected, or
prevented the mind fiom laying hold of, such belief.
There are apparent evidences in the work that Kant
was gifted with talents and ability of high order, it may
be of the highest. It is certain that, amongst his pre-
decessors, one at least of the most profound and grandest
human intellects the world has ever seen was not less fear-
fully confounded, and that he is responsible in a higher
degi-ee than Kant for the baneful consequences of per-
verted ability and misapplied industry: consequences which
now impede and render well-nigh impossible the acqui-
sition of sound knowledge, by which civilization is endan-
gered, and the intellectual well-being of the human-race
collectively placed in jeopardy.
30 THB RATIONALISM OF M!!TAPBTSI08.
The particular subject of Kant's work is professeclly
Reason From the <»-»«»''«"'»**» *''f.*"*l as to
■ „ver seems to have occurred to him that-as the
intellectual Guide provided by the Create, for man
and as the medium of communion betweei. man and
God, through whom only the kno'-ledge of God can
be at first obtained and afterwards perfected - the
^pilal and sacred character of the -iivne natoe be-
tags likewise to the immediate '<^V'^'<'"^^''^^J^^^
therefore, reverence and obedience, as well as trustfulness
and reliance, are also especially due to Eeason.-
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