IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I ■tt lii 12.2 £^ Uo 12.0 I 1.25 III U ,,.6 41 6" ► % 7^ /: ^l^^ w W:.^ "^^ V /A '/ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. MSSO (716) S72-4S03 ^ "^W^ ^v^ ^ CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHIVl/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes tbchniques et bibliographiques The institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographicaily unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly changfe^^ the usual method of filming, are checked below. D D D D D D Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur I I Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagde Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaur^e et/ou peiiicul^e □ Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque I I Coloured maps/ Cartes g6ographiques en couleur Coloured init (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) I I Coloured plates and/or Illustrations/ □ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur Bound with other material/ Reli6 avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La re liure serr6e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge int6rieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certalnes pages blanches ajout^es lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais. lorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont pas dtd film^es. Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppidmentaires; The tot L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a At6 possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du point de vue bibliographique. qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite. ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la methods normale de filmage sont indiquds ci-dessous. I I Coloured pages/ D Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommagies Pages restored and/oi Pages restaurdes et/ou pellicul6es Pages discoloured, stained or foxe( Pages d6color6es. tachet6es ou piqudes Pages detached/ Pages ddtachdes Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of prin Quality indgale de I'impression Includes supplementary materit Comprend du matdriel suppl6mentaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible I — I Pages damaged/ I — I Pages restored and/or laminated/ I — I Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ I I Pages detached/ r~j Showthrough/ rn Quality of print varies/ I I Includes supplementary material/ I — I Only edition available/ The pos oft Ori] beg the sior othi first sior or 11 The she TIN whi Mai diff enti beg righ reqi met Pages wholly or partiiily obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible Image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6ti fiim^es A nouveau de fagon d obtenir la meilleure image possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est fWtni au taux de reduction indiqu6 ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X y 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X aire details ues du I modifier ger une I f ilmage The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: National Library of Canada The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. L'exemplaire filmA fut reproduit grAce A la giniroslt^ de: BibliothAque natlcnale du Canada Las images suivantes ont At4 reproduites avec le plus grand soin. compte tenu de la condition et de la nettetA de l'exemplaire fiim6. et en conformity avec ies conditions du contrat de filmage. jdes Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or Illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or Illustrated Impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. Lee exemplalres originaux dont la couverture en papier est ImprimAe sent film6s en commenpant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernlAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'Impression ou d'iilustration, solt par le second plat, salon le cas. Tous Ies autres exemplalres originaux sont filmfo en commen^ant par la premiere page qui comporte une empreinte d'Impression ou d'iiiustretion et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol — »- (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol y (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Un das symboies suivants apparaltra sur ia dernldre image de cheque microfiche, selon ie cas: ie symbols —► signifie "A SUIVRE ', le symbols V signifie "FIN". ire IVIaps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction retios. Those too large to b» entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre filmis d des taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seui cliche, il est fiim6 d partir de Tangle sup6rleur gauche, de gauche & droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mithode. )y errata ed to mt me peiure, agon d 1 2 3 32X 1 2 3 4 5 6 /■\- I i K'' n /8 c^' :U C ■U 40*. !.♦*<, £^j G ^ ^,W4'^*^ ' ^^OOt: ^■MMilk if^^ltt itftettlfeh ^||i|i^*th -«M>^>*Ml». JJBliiMiMk jf^^ffc y CONSIDERATIONS O N T H E ^ E;spEDiENcy OF A SPANISH WAR, &c. K' ^ *^<>4f''t&>^r<«M<''tMin6.^infeM^^ ( Price ONE SHILtlNG. J »,i «, H*— ,i 4 I ^ V ' v^ i ■,i«*, 4 \ ^ i V Vx CONSIDERATIONS O N T H E EXPEDIENCY O F A SPAN I S H WAR: CONTAINING REFLECTIONS i O N T H E Late Demands of SPAIN5 And on the NEGOCIATIONS O F MonC B U S S Y. LONDON: Printed for R. Griffiths in the Strand, 1761. • . ■ X -^ V ^ t . -Z 1 Yk .1 v « / CONSIDERATIONS O N T H E ■ r XPEDIENCY O F A ,t \ * -» -« (t S P A N I S H W A R,' ^f. V v )K)iX^)O()0()K)K)K;«^^>)J(^)9()K)0(^^)K)«)^ F)^"*IHERE has not been any poli- S T w tkal report (ince the beginning of 5^)5()j(j{ the prefent war, that has occa- fioned more converfation or furprizc, than the late rumour, that we are on the brink of having one with Sj>am ; it is now the '^ lubjedt ■«. ■ 1 » ' • ( 6 ) fubjedl of debate In every cofrec-houfe In London : politicians harangue on it, and even the ininifters themfelves drop very broad hints, ******** » * * Perhaps it w^ill not be thought either impertinent or unfeafonable to make a few enquiries on a point at once fo inviting and important. ^ I It cannot be fuppofed that a nation, which has hitlierto prefervcd a gr^at cha- radler for the juflnefs of its politics, will rufh into a war without feme view in fo doing ', it may be falfe — and under the prefent tirciiinftances of affairs, it is my intention to fliew that it really is fo. Some people, either from difaffedion to our go- vernment, or from a love of fingularity, pretend to pronounce this nation ruined if the Spaniards undertake a war againftus:- they tell us, that prolonging the war alone, even ihongh it might prove fuccef- ful, muft, in t' e end, beggar ns ; and that d.is iS the view of the court of Spain; and its motive the) afcribe to a jealoufy ,-^ I ^ i ^ I (7) ofoi.rprefcm formidable fituation \n Ame- rica, It muft be owned, that when the ba- lance of power is in danger, it is the wifcfl: precaution for neutral nations to throw heir weight into the finking fcale ; but this maxim can then only be defended in point of prudence, when fuch neutral nations have fome profpedl of fucceeding in their intention. Great Britain may at prefent be truly eflcemed the moft powerful monarchy in Europe j and her power is of that kind which muft be the moft formidable to Spain, A war therefore between thele two kingdoms will necefTarily be a naval one, in which we have every thing to expccil to gain, and the Spaniards every tiling to lofe. Our marine was never fo powerful, and has very little to do. In ihe Ecjl In- dies ^ our enemies the French are demol idl- ed ; fo that a fmall fquadron is fufficient for that ftation. In the IVeJi Indies ^ our only view is to protect: our own trade, and dw'ftroy that of the French, who iiave no neet ( 8 ) fleet to oppofe us. In Europe^ their ma- rine is ruined ; and if we now and then hear of a little parade of a naval equipment at Breji or Toulon, we very well know it is ail puff, and that they have no failors to man the few rotten fhips which have ef- capcd our men of war^ As the French have therefore no force to oppofe to ours, we can with little or no addition of ex- pence employ it againft the Spaniards. It is very well known that much the greaceft part of the revenue of that crown arifes from the Kin[';'s Ihare of the gold and (ilver which is dgg in their mines of South America ; and that thefe treafures are brought home in fquadrons they call their Flota of galleons. Thefe have a long voyage to make before they reach 0/J Spain ; a?id confequently are liable to the chance of being intercepted and feized by any nation fuperior to themfelves at fea. That we polfefs this fuperiority is well known j for allhoni^h the Spamjh navy is confidcrable amongit the other maritime powers /' •>»•' r ■ (9) powers q{ E'lrope, yet it is nothing whca compared with the fleets of Grciit Britain. ' Another plain renfon agahid: their enter- ing into a wnr with us, is the weak- nef; of their mofl vahiable Tettlenients in America. Their i Hands are ah-noH: open to our fleets; and expeditions againrt: them at piLfent would be much eaiier to us than at the opening of a war : as we have a vafl force in North America readv to be tranf- ported on any new fervice, and a fleet ready to co-operate. The expedition in the lafl war under Lord An/on, to the South Seas^ is a proof how weak the Spcniianis are in that quarter, and widi how much cafe a fqua- dron of enemy's {hips would there throw them into the greatcft difordcr. It may perhaps be replied that commodore Anjon did not find that voyage io very pra(5li- cable ; but it is very well known that the calamities which attended it were meerly owing to the not timing it properly ; a miiforrunc of which we Ihould now reap B an ( JO ) an advantage; as the x^ery ingenious writer of the account of that voyage, has laid down particular dircdions for conducing a fleet the fame way; diredions founded on deai -bought experience in that memo- rable expedition. When once they had paffed thofe fatal ftreights, all obftacles were removed, and nothing gave them lefs trou- ble than the refiflance of the enemy. As to the Spanijh trade in Europe it would be very ibon deflroyed by our pri- vateers ; and the wealthy part of that na- tion thereby foon involved in poverty. It may be faid that we fhould experience the fame inconveniences from a wrar ; but in anfwer to that ; we may be very well af- furcd, that we fhould have greatly the ad- vantage, and for this reafon ; we have at prefent a multitude of privateers ready fitted out for the fea ; not only thofe built by ourfelves, but a vafl number that vvc have •iken from the French; whereas the enemy would have all thofe preparations to make . . . winch i f 1 "^ ■# X which we already pofTefs : and muft greatly damage their trade themfelves in converting merchants (hips into privateers. Being before-hand is a very great point in fuch undertakings as thefe ; and all this advantage would be entirely on our fide. In refpedl to the deftroying each other's trade, both nations would certainly fuffer greatly, but furely there would be no fort of proportion between them : Our navy fo immenfely fuperior to that of the ene- my ; ready for adtion on a day's warning; our privateers in the fame readinefs, would certainly give us a vaft advantage. But if fuccefs in this refpe(5l was to be equal, a fuppofttion which can hardly be allowed, yet we could much better carry on a naval war, equal in its circumftanccs, than the enemy. * Great Britain is a kingdom that does not only fubfift on an immenfe foreign trade, but, in a very great meafure, oh the landed intereft of the nation, in its B 2 manu- ( 12 ) manufadtures, and inland trade ; which is not the cafe with Spain. Manufadlures they have few or none : no inland trade j and the landed inttrefl in Spain h very poor ; but few of their taxes being laid on that body of the people. The wealth of that kingdom depends almoft entirely on its American colonies, and on its trade to Great Britain, Under thefe circum- fiances, it is very evident, which nation muil feel moil the lofs of its trade. But to wave a fuppofirion which my argument has no fort of reafon to allow, as it is founded on impollibility -, how will the Spaniards be able to carry on a naval war with us, without this proportion in the lofTes of the two nations ? Our vafl marine is too . formidable for their's to hazard an engage- ment 5 and when that is the cafe, their iieets mud keep their ports, and their en- deavours muft be directed ta prote6t their . trade ; a tallv which v/ill be utterly impof- fible, wdien they have to contend with fuph a force as ours. .4... ...Ml uu la ^. 3 ) • m In the prefcnt flatc of affairs in Ifafy, it is more than poiTible, that the court of Spain may be in fear for the eftabhfhments jfliu has there procured for her young Princes. The Emprefs Queen has an un- doubted right to the dutchies of Parma, Placentia, and Guafialla ; and when fhe has got clear of the prefent war in Ger- tnany, fhe may very pofTibly afTcrt that right, ■ and attack the pi efent pofTeflbr : in fuch a war, the king of SardiJiiay it is to be fuppofed, would not aflifl the caufe of Spain, for reafons which mufl be evident to every one ; and when the Britijh fleets are maflers of the Mediterranean, and his Sardinian Majefly of the pafTage inio Italy bv land, in what manner can the court of Spain aliiil her allies in that country. If we confider the prefent fituation of affairs in Italjy there will appear great rea- fon to expedl a war foon in that quarter. When one^pov^er keeps poireiTion of terri- tories, which, by right, buong to another, '' . and and that other power ftrong enough to dif- piite the ufurpation, we may depend upon it, that a war is not at a great diflance; par- ticular circumftances may prevent any mo- narch from aflerting his rights, the mo- ment they are invaded ; but when thofe ^ircumftances no longer fubfift, we gene- rally find, that Princes feldom give up their pretenlions, when they are founded in juftice. But, not to injfift on general tnaJcims, is the En prefs Queen a likely princefs to prove fo tame in this affair, ■when (he has finifhed her prefent war ^ith his Prujian Majefty ? is (he not rat her very ambitious, and jealous to the laft ll I I' ( s8 ) fortune of the war has thrown the whole advantage into our hands, and we have fecured our colonies by the conqueft of thofe which the French poffelTed there ; and her very neighbourhood was what endangered ours before. — And fliall we now be fo mad as to lay the foundations of a future war by yielding up our con* quefts at a peace ? Our fetdements can- not pofTibly be of half the value to us while another nation is in pofTcffion of the back country. Their iituation will always enable them to command the inland trade of all North America-, and what is of more confequence, they will command the /«- diam of the whole country : by their means they will at any time be able to make war on us without appearing in it themfelves, and confequently without apparently breaking any treaties. An In- dian war immediately defolat&s all our back-fettleinents, and the produce of many hundred miles of territory is loft at once. It is a ilroke of policy in our government, and \' with (29 ) and it is alfo jiifl, to prevent the colonies manufadtures that may interfere thole of their mother country. Now no reftridions will fo thoroughly prevent this, as keeping pofTefTion of all North America-, and for a very evident reafon. Minufadtures require a great number of hands, colledted in a fmall compafs 'y and uiiiverfally thrive heft in kingdoms of fmall extent. In North Ame^ rica, adjoining to our fettlements, are immenfe unculti /ated tradls of land, very- proper for producing the fame articles, as thofe we already cultivate: if there was no enemy to ftop the planters progrefs, thefe lands would very foon be overfpread with planters from our fettlements ; and when every man might have as much land as he pleafed for nothing, it would be anabfclute impofTibility to raife a fingle manufadure. All mankind, when the choice is before them, prefer freedom to fervitude ; every man, as foon as he had raifed a trifling furii, would turn planter. The workmen of ■ { 3° ) of a manufadlure mufl neceffarily have good wages. The amount of thefe alone, would foon ruin the work, as the men would continually be turning planters. It \s unknown, but eafily conjedlured, what a vaft quantity of our manufadlures would be expended thioughout thtfe immenfe re- gions, if they were once begun to be planted. This advantage will be entirely Jgil, if we yield them up to the French, ^i' ■ The advocates for this fata! meafure, give, as a reafon for their opinion, the danger there would be of our North Ame^ rican colonies throwing off the yoke of their mother country, if fuch an immenfe ^ccefTion of territory was to be added to what they already poflcfs. But the infuffi- ciency of this argument is anfwered in a moment. I may fafely venture an aflerti- on, which, upon confideration, will be found true ; that there is more danger of this happening now, than if all North America was to be added to them at a ^ / * peace ; ( 30 peace ; and for the fame reafon that they would not be able to raife manufactures. To throw off the yoke, if it can be called one, would require a very deep laid confpl- racy, and an union among all the govern- ments there. Nov/ it is very well known, how difficult it would be, to form a con* fpiracy in a country that has no towns, ex- cept a few fca ports j and where all, or at leall, much the greatefl part of the inhabi- tants, are flattered over fuch an immcnfc continent ; is not the very idea of fuch z revolt abfurd to the lafl degree ? And the danger, if there was any, is greater kow ; becaufe the inhabitants are more colleded. Another thing which would make fuch an affair impoPilble, is the nature of the different governments of our colonies ; all of them jealous, and envious of one another to the greateft degree. We have the ftrongeft proofs w^hich experience can give, how little they could be united at the beginning of this war againll: a com- mon enemy that was at their very door5. I ll ' ( 32 ) We know that they all cafl tlie mcft jea- lous eye on their governors, and in fhort are, in their own policy, quite divided into tribes of feparate people ; yet thefe are all to unite at once againft their mo- ther country, to bring down forces from tlie moon, to form confpiracies by the ibrcc of magic, in order to revolt from the firft maritime power in the univerfe. ^ Is there not much greater dangp** of tlie Spanijh colonies revolting, than of ours ? Do not their's abound wiih gold and lilver, w^hich will purchafe t-very ^in^'ig elib^ Are not all their immenfe dominions united under one government ? is not the treatment they receive from their mother country, much more fevcre, tb.an any thing ofthut kindf.lt by ours ? Why, there- fore, do not they revolt? Becaufe the court of Spai?i puts ii entirely out of their power, by taking a lew plain and iimple precau- tions ', die) change their v ccroys every three years_^; ciicy ehan^e ihc troops they . , ' ' employ ^ ( 33 ) employ there frequently, and feldom let them reniain long at one place. Does not this clearly prove that we may very eafily enfure the fidelity of onr colonies, by changing our governors, or, in fadl, by letting the feveral governments remain on their prefent footing ? I think, therefore, that the notion of letting the French re- main in North America y on this pretence, is founded on ♦no reafon that has even the appearance of truth. The next article which the court of Spain is fo jjjodcji as to expedt we fhould agree to, is letting the French continue to pofTefs a (hare in the Newfoundland fifiery, to which they have no fort of right, and all which they would be fure to ' ufurp. It is very plain that the true intereft of Great Britain is to prevent the French from ever becoming a maritime power. We cannot pofTibly hinder their building fhips, but we have it now In our power to prevent their raifing failors. The great "^ ' ' nurfery ,1.1 If • ( 34 ) nurfcry for them is this fifhcry, which conflantly, before the war, maintained France 20,000 annually, befides their gaining a million and a half of our money. The prodigious importance of this filheiy mud therefore appear at once towards raifing a naval power. The Frenchy by treaty, had only r. right to a fhare of it ; but by means of the near neighbourhv od of Louijhurg they uiiirped very near the whole, and by that means gained all the principal markets in Europe from us. A naval power depends entirely on trade, and that trade is the mod advantaoreous which employs the moft feamen. The advan- tage e^' the poilefiion of this fifliery there- fore will very clearly appear; and the bad policy of yielding again to France a fliare in it, is {0 evident, that no confideration whatever fliould induce us to fuch a con- ccflion. •» •: As to the demand of the court of Spain, for a fliare of this iifhery for tbejnjehes, it V . . ,. ^ " • .,^ is \ ( 35 ) IS a demand not founded on any righf ; tot the Efiglijh were in poflclHon of the fouthern parts of tliis ifland long before the Spaniards ever thought of ftfhing there. In the treaty of 1713, they en- deavoured to ellabUni their pretended right, but could only get this claufe in- ferted, which left the right jufl: where it was b.'.fore : ** And as on the part of Spai?!, it is infifted, that the BtfcaynerSy and other fubjeds of his Catholic Majefly, have •' an undoubted right of fi filing on li.e «* banks of Neivfou?idland, her Majefly of ** Great Britain confents and agrees, that all privileges ivhich can jiijlly be claimed i be prefcrved inviolable to the Bifcayners, " and other inhabitants of Spain,'* The Spaniards fince that time have never profe- cuted a cod-fijloeryy nor have their pretended rights ever been more folidly el^ablifhed by treaty. The granting them their de- mands now, would therefore only raife up tiioo rivals in this valuable commerce a^ainfl: ourfelyes, which would be of E 2 much i( t.c (C (( ( 36 { much worfe confcquencc than could pof- fibly refult from a war with Spain, I fhall not enquire into their right to rhe logwood- trade, as I make very httlc doubt but that point might be fettled with great cafej but the others are of a more important nature, and which we cannot give up while we retain the leafl regard for our own in- tercfl. The advocates for our agreeing to the terms required by the court of Spam, tell us, that the Spanijh miniflry delaying a war with us, till we were on the verge of a peace with France, adled very politi- cally, as their view was to reduce our over- grown power; — for now, by entering into the war, they will, in all probability, protradl it till we, by our 31 eat ex- pences, ihall be undone ^ and the end which muft be anfwercd will, in a very great meafure, pay them for their lolTes. This politic fcheme, which we credit them with, has been urged more than r.- I ' . i» once. ( 37 ) once, and it is amazing that any people, not absolute enemies to thcirxouiitry, can endeavour at turning and twiiling an ar- gument about till it gain an appearance of reafon, only to delude us into pufillani- mous meafures. Taxes and expences can only be called great and oppreffive, when they are out of proportion to the general riches of a na- tion. To fay a government raifcs twenty millions . every year, is proving nothing, till the ftate of the national ftrength and riches is explained. With the pofifcffion of fome particular branches of trade, this kingdom is more able to bear a national debt of 1 00,000,000 /. than it is to bear half that debt without fuch trade. If we encreafe our national debt coniiderably, and by fo doing gain a proportional in- creafe of trade, we (hall, at the end, be as rich, or perhaps richer, than wz were with a fmaller debt. The cafe, indeed, would be fomewhat different if the money % ! . we mM ( 38 ) ■ we fpent was to circuLite into foreign countries, like our fubfidies to German Princes j but when all of it is fpent among ourfelves, this objed:ion vanifhes. A Spa- nijh war cannot impoverifli this nation, becaufe it muft be a naval one; and all the charge of our navy is paid to oiirfehes. The nation will be as rich at the end as at the beginning of fuch a war, as all the expence of it alternately circulates from the government to the people, and back again. This therefore is a clear proof that a naval war is, in its confcquences to us, extremely different from a land one, and much lefs detrimental in its eifedts. • But what can be faid againft entering into fuch a war, when we have the grreateft profpedl of fuccefs that is poffibic ? When we do it meerly to preferve fome important branches of our commerce that are ot more worth to us than the mines of Pent are to the Spaniards? When wc mud: eir her give up all the advantages we have gained in a w " bloody V-: ( 39 ) bloody war, or tamely agree to the dictates of the court of Madrid f I mufc be permitted to call the pofTef- fion of North America an article of the ut- mofl importance, with regard to our com- merce \ iince the confumption of our ma- nufadlures in thofe regions is already im- menfe ; much more fo than could be con- ceived in fo {hort a time from their con- queft ; but which will not appear won- derful if we confider the vaft tribes of /«- dians^ which are now entirely fupplied from us. There is nothing which can en- rich us more than a great demand for our manufactures ^ and confequently our in- creafe of ^rade arifing from the poffeilion of all North America^ will very well repay us for any cxpence we can be at in referv- ing it to ourfelves. Confided ng the vaft force we have on foot ready to employ againft the Spaniards if they go to war with us, we may very reafonably ., »•«»•«*►"«« '•frnmrnt^ ( 40 )' reafonably hope not only to prefervc the acquifitions we have already made from Fra?2cey but in that cafe to add more to them. The Spaniards are in polTeffion of the iiland of Cuba, and half of Hifpaniola ; thefe iilands, I am credibly informed, are very acceiTible ', much more fo than Guar- ' daloitpe ', and it is not very prefumptuous to fay, that our arms w^ould probably be crowned with fome conqueft in this part of the world that would extremely well help to reimburfe us for the expences of the war. The Philippines iflands^in the Eaji^ Indies at prefent yield the Spajiiards little or no profit ; but it is well known that this is their own fault : for their value, if well managed, is prodigious. They are weak and expofed to a degree that is fur- prizing, conlidering their importance. A llrong Britijh fquadron would hardly fail of making fome imprefllon here, that mi2"ht be of the greateft advantao;e to this kingdom. In fhort, the dominions of Spain are fo fcattered, fo unweildy, and yet fo va- ' - -f . luable. \; [• i: v/ )^^^* ■■-^,. ,**(^' "^sf" ^ W^' 41 ) iuable, that we could not po/Tibly quarrel with any "power, with ajgreater probability of advantage* t' A Spanijh war at this period, would be attended with fewer ill confequenceb than t at any other time. At prefent it would , involve us with no other nation ; but were cwe at peace with France^ we fhould in all ": probability fee her join the Spaniards -, and . fuch a power coming frefh into a war with us, in the fituation which France was in ..before the prefent troubles, would be ex- ntremely different from Spain s joining France at prefent. The court of Madrid %€Ould not have chofen a more impolitic, a linore unfavorable moment to attack us : fhe can now have no afllftance that will be of any fervice to her. In the lafl war the French were in a very diiferent fitua- tion from what they are in at prefent. .^Then their fleets in a great meafure pro- tedled the coafts of Spain ; but how are the times changed! Now the fleets of ; •/ F Spain 1 ■\ 1 • ( 42 ) . Spain muft protcdt the coafts of France : a taik which I believe they will find much too arduous for their power to effedt. That the maintaining the prefent peace in the ftridleft and moft honourable mai?-- ner, is the true intereft of the Spamjh 'nation, no body, I believe, will deny. What an ingenious politician fays of the . fubjed, will flill be the cafe if the court of ^ Madrid thinks of adling fo contrary to their real interefts, <* But after all, fays he, the *''' capital and moft dangerous inconvenience ** is, their court's not being governed by ** Spantfh counfels j for all true politicians «' will agree, that no curfe can be fo heavy «* upon a people, as to be made tools and ^^* bcafts of burthen to any other people. ♦* For the firfl twenty years after the ac- *« ceffion of the late king Philip, Spain ** was in eifedl no better than a province ** to France i and her condition for more ** than twenty years fince that, has been «* much worfe^ ihe is become a province to «< thofe > -^ ?' v#',>. 2i(.. 44 U €( St At .*< €€ how utterly imprudent it would :bfe In Great Briimini tp give up any of ^the important advantagea Hie has gained in the prcfent glorious war, through fear • of a rupture with Spain ; as fuch an event ^muft turn put, in all human probability, very much to the di&dvaotage of the . latter^ and be produ '■■■,■ ■««1 c..:il ^', f 1' .1 .' '^.