^.'^^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT 3) ^. «^ /. .T MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. US80 (716) S; 2-4503 2 ^ «... '% /y y< OF THE PUBLIC LIFE SOME ACCOUNT i OF THE LATE LI EUTENANT-GENERAL SIR GEORGE PREVOST, BART. PARTICULARLY OF I IIS SERVICES IN THE CANADAS; INCLUDING A REPLY TO THE STRICTDRES ON HIS MILITARY CHARACTER, CONTAINED IN AN ARTICLE IN THE QUARTERLY REVIEW FOR OCTOBER, 1828. " Either this is envy in you, folly, or mistaking ; the very stream of his life, and the business he hath helmed, must upon a warranted need give him a better proclamation. Let him be but testimonied in his own bring- ings forth, and he shall appear a statesman and a soldier. Therefore you speak unskilfully ; or if your knowledge be more, it is much darK- ened in your malice." mf.asure for measure. LONDON: PRINTED FOR T. CADELL, STRAND', ANU T. EGERTON, WHITEHALL. 1823. i J, M'Creery, Piiuter, Tooks Court, Chancery Lane. ERRATA. Page 6, line 6, for 28tli read 25th. — P« 99i 1. 4, /tor order, read ardour. i SOME ACCOUNT or THE PUBLIC LIFE OF THE LATE LIEUT. -GENERAL Sir GEORGE PREVOST, Bart. 8fc. Sfc. The character and conduct of individuals in high and responsible situations, will naturally and necessarily be the subject of free and open discussion. The conduct of a soldier is more particularly exposed to this scrutiny. His suc- cess or his failure is a matter of such powerful interest to his country, that he generally re- ceives even more than his fi.ll measure of appro- bation or of blame. Notwithstanding all the difficulties of forming a correct judgment on the merits of military operations, there is perhaps no subject upon which public opinion expresses itself so quickly and so decidedly. Disappoint- ed in the sanguine hopes which they had enter- tained, and mortified by the consciousness of defeat, the public too frequently imagine cause for censure, and without a competent know- ledge of the facts necessary to enable them to form a sound and satisfactory judgment, unhe- sitatingly condemn those who have perhaps 2 passed in their service a long life of anxiety and labour. 15ut while, in the moment of irritation, they are thus disposed to impugn the conduct of their military servants, they are no less ready, on more deliberate inquiry, and a fuller understanding of the facts, to grant them a can- did and generous acquittal. These observations are peculiarly applicable to the case of the late Lieutenant-Cieneral Sir George Prevost, who, after having devoted to his country thirty-five of the best years of his life ; after having dis- tinguished himself in many gallant actions; and after having preserved to the crown of Great Britain some of its most valuable foreign pos- sessions, was called upon, at the close of his honourable career, to answer charges which vi- tally affected his reputation, and which he was prevented by death from fully and clearly re- futing. Painful as it was to the friends of Sir George Prevost to allow a single stain to rest upon the memory of so brave and distinguished a sol- dier, more especially when they possessed the means of removing every doubt as to his con- duct, they yet considered an appeal to the can- dour and justice of his country as unnecessary. The violent prejudices which at one period ex- isted against the late Commander of the Forces in the Canadas were gradually wearing away ; his memory had been honored by a just tribute he in- 7- es KT * V ' 'I i t of his Sovereign's rot^ret and approbation ; and the scenes in which lie had been so conspicuous an actor, had ceased to be a matter of genend interest. Under these circumstance's, the rehi- tives of Sir (ieorge Prevost would confi(k'ntly liave entrusted his reputation to tlie unpreju- diced judgment of ])()sterity, had they not seen, with equal regret and indignation, a late attempt to revive the almost exploded calunmics and misrepresentati(ms of which he liad been the victim. That the Quarterly Review* should have lent its pages to an attack like this, will, upon the perusal of the present volume, excite the surprise of every candid person; and it is chiefly for the purpose of correcting the mis- statements into which the Reviewer has been led, that the following pages are presented to the public. Before entering more particularly upon the subject of Sir George Prevost's conduct, so wantonly attacked in the article above alluded to, it may not be thought improper briefly to advert to his father's services and to his own early history. From his military career, pre- vious to his appointment to the chief command in British North America, it will clearly appear that he was not without reason selected by his * Vide the Quarterly Review for'- Oo^ n b w;.. \H22, p. K).>. B 2 !' «' Hi 4 Majesty's Government for the discharge of that important trust. Major-General Augustin Prevost, the father of the late ^ir George Prevost, was by birth a citizen of Geneva : he entered the British ser- vice as a Cornet in the Earl of Albemarle's re- giment of Horse Guards, and was present at the battle of Fontenoy, where he was wounded. Having attained the rank of Major in the 60th regiment in 1759, he had the honor of serving under General Wolfe, and received a se- vere wound in the head, whilst gallantly forcing a landing, twenty miles above Quebec, under the immediate command of General Carleton, afterwards Lord Dorchester. Upon the reduc- tion of Canada, Major Prevost was promoted to the rank of Lieutenant-Colonel, and served with reputation at the capture of Martinique and the Havannah. In 1775, he was appointed to the command in East Florida, and, in 1778, he emi- nently distinguished himself by his defence of Savannah, against the attack of a very superior force of French and Americans, under the Comte d'Estaing and General Lincoln. The garrison consisted of only 2,300 men, while the force of the besiegers amounted to 8,000, supported by a fleet of twenty-two sail of the line. Such, however, was the determined energy of Major- General Prevost, and of the British soldiers and 5 sailors under his command, that the enemy were compelled to abandon the entcrprize, after thir- ty-three days' close siege.* In 1780, Major-General Prevost, after having served twenty-two years in North America and the West Indies, returned to England, to enjoy the pleasing consciousness of having always dis- charged his duty with zeal and effect. His health was much impaired by a long residence in climates unfavorable to an European consti- tution, and, on the 6th May, 1'786, he died, at Greenhill Grove, near Barnet, in the sixty-third year of his age. In 1765, Major-General Prevost married, at Lausanne, a daughter of M. Grand, of that place ;f and, on her husband's departure to Ame- rica, Mrs. Prevost accompanied him thither. George, their eldest son, was born while General Prevost was stationed in the province of New Jersey, on the 19th May, 1767. Being designed by his father for the military profession, he was * Vide Beatson's ** Naval and Military Memoirs," vol. iv, p. 518, Appendix, No. I. f Mr. Gibbon to Mr. Holroyd. — " Let me tell you a piece of Lausanne news. Nanette Grand is married to Lieutenant- Colonel Prevost. Grand wrote to me ; and by the next post I congratulated both father and daughter. There is exactness for you. — Beriton, Oct. Qlst, 176.5."' Vide Gibbon's Miscella- neous Works, vol. i. p. 439. B placed with that view at Lochee's academy, at Chelsea, and his education was finished at Col- mar, on the continent. He obtained his first commission in the 60th regiment, and being re- moved upon promotion to the 28th foot, he joined that corps at Gibraltar in 1784. He ob- tained his majority in 1790, and early in 1791, he took the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at Antigua. In March, 1794, he was promoted to a Lieutenant-Colonelcy in the 60th, and, in 1795, he proceeded to Demerara, and from thence to St. Vincent's, at that time attacked by the French. He was there active- ly employed in suppressing the Carib insurrec- tion, and in resisting the French invasion, and at the storming of the Vigie he commanded a column. In October, 1795, he was ordered to Dominica, to relieve Lieutenant-Colonel Mad- den in the command of the troops in that island; but in January, 1796, he resumed the command of the 3d battalion of the 60th regiment at St. Vincent's, where he was twice severely wounded in successfully resisting the enemy's progress towards the capital of the colony, after the de- feat of Major-General Stewart at Colonary. In consequence of his wounds, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost obtained leave to return to England. The sense which the inhabitants of St. Vincent's entertained of his services was warmly expressed in an address from the Council and House of Representatives in that island.* On his arrival in England, Lieutenant-Colonel Prevost was appointed Inspecting Field Officer. In January, 1798, he obtained the rank of Co- lonel, and proceeded in the same year to the West Indies as Brigadier-General. In 1798, he was removed from the command of the troops at Barbadoes to St. Lucie, as Commandant, where he was afterwards appointed Lieutenant- Governor, in compliance with a request from the inhabitants.f Brigadier-General Prevost continued to per- form the duties of Governor of St. Lucie until the peace of 1802, when that colony was re- stored to the French. The address which he received from the inhabitants of the island on his departure, fully evinces the popularity which he had acquired; J while the letters addressed to him, and to Colonel Brownrigg, Secretary to H. R. H. the Commander in Chief, by Sir Tho- mas Trigge, at that time Commander of the Forces in the West Indies, satisfactorily prove that he merited the confidence reposed in him by Government.§ d. * See Appendix, No. II. f Vide Letter from the Duke of Portland, Appen. No. III. J Vide Appendix, No. IV. § Vide Appendix, No. V. 8 In July, Brigadier-General Prevost arrived in England, when the government of Dominica was immediately offered to him by Lord Ho- bart. Having accepted the appointment, he em- barked for that island in the following Novem- ber, and landed there on the 25th of December, 1802. In the following year, he volunteered his ser- vices on the expedition against St. Lucie and Tobago, and served as second in command under Lieutenant-General Grenfield, who in his general order, after the capture of Morne For- tunee, thus mentions his conduct upon that occasion : — " To the cool and determined conduct of Brigadier-general Prevost and Brigadier-Gene- ral Brereton, who led the two columns of at- tack, may be attributed the success of the ac- tion ; but to Brigadier-General Prevost it must be acknowledged, that to his counsel and ar- rangements the Commander of the forces attri- butes the glory of the day."'* The imporcant services of Brigadier-General Prevost upon this expedition, received nume- rous tributes of approbation from distinguished military characters ;f and even the French *4 ■i 'I * Vide accounts of the capture of St. Lucie and Tobago, from the Annual Register, Appendix, No. VI. f Vide extracts from letters, Appendix, No. VII. ■fc 9 leral ime- shed inch Ibago, Commander could not refrain from expressing the esteem and admiration with which lie re- garded his generous enemy.* Upon the suc- cessful termination of this affair, Brigadier-Ge- neral Prevost returned to his Government at Dominica, where nothing worthy of notice oc- curred until the 22d Fehruary, 1805, when an unexpected attack was made by a French squad- ron from Rochefort. The result of that attack was highly creditable to the valour and military talents of the Governor, who after having, with the few troops under his command, disputed inch by inch the landing of the French force, amounting to 4,000 men, and covered by an overwhelming fire from the ships, succeeded in effecting a retreat to the fort of Prince Rupert. The French Commander in Chief, after vainly summoning him to surrender, reimbarked the whole of his troops, and sailed to Guadaloupe.f The terms in which H. R. H. the Comman- der in Chief was pleased to express his sense of General Prevost's conduct upon this occasion, were highly gratifying to his feelings. J In con- sequence of his gallant and successful defence * Vide Appendix, No. VIII. f Vide account of this expedition from the Annual Regis- ter, Appendix, No. IX. Also the public despatches and letters, No. X. X Vide letter from H. R. H. the Duke of York to the Earl of Camden, Appendix, No. XI. 10 ! Ill of the Colony, General Prevost received a com- munication from the Speaker of the House of Assembly;* conveying to him the thanks of that body, and informing him that a Thousand Guineas had been voted by them for the pur- chase of a sword and a service of plate, to be presented to him in testimony of their gratitude and approbition.f A similar testimonial to the conduct of General Prevost upon this occasion vvras given by the Patriotic Fund, who voted him a sword of the value of one hundred pounds, and a piece of plate, of the value of two hundred pounds, " for the distinguished gallantry and military talents which he had dis- played." J From the West India Planters and Merchants General Prevost likewise received a piece of plate to the value of three hundred guineas.§ In July, 1805, General Prevost returned to England. 1 1 Soon after his arrival he was cre- ated a Baronet, and was subsequently appointed Lieutenant-Governor of Portsmouth. In February, 1808, he was selected to com- * Vide Appendix, No. XII. t Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XIII. J Vide the resolutions, and t!ie letter of the chairman to general Prevost, Appendix, No. XIV. , § Vide the resolutions, Appendix, No. XV. II Vide extract from the Dominica Journal, Appendix, No. XVI. 11 3oin- m e of m ^ ^^ 9 isand S pur- 1 to be itude 3 othe 1 asion ^ voted ndred iue of lished id dis- :s and ived a ndred led to M Is ere- ^ Linted i com- Iman to lix, No. mand a brigade destined to reinforce Nova Scotia, where he succeeded Sir John Went- worth as Governor, and in December, 1808, he left Hahfax, in order to assist in the reduction of Mai .inique. The expedition sailed from Bar- badoes on the 28th of January, 1809, and on the 30th, the troops were landed on the island of Martinique. Sir George Prevost was second in command under General Sir George Beck- with, and to him the management of all the active operations was confided. The result of this expedition was, that the French troops were driven into Fort Bourbon, where they held out until the 24th of February, when the sur- render of that fort completed the conquest of the island.* Upon the conclusion of this short but brilliant campaign, Sir George Prevost passed a few days at Dominica, where he was received with many demonstrations of joy. Addresses were upon this occasion presented to him by the House of Assembly of Dominica, and by the merchants and inhabitants of St. Christophers.f In the month of April the army returned to Halifax, and from this period until his appoint- ment to the chief civil and military command in * Vide the public despatches, and letters from Lord Castlc- reagh, Appendix, No. XVII. t Vide the addresses and answer. Appendix, No. XVIII. Ij 12 British North America, in 1811, upon the re- signation of Sir James Craig, Sir George Pre- vost remained in Nova Scotia, esteemed and be- loved ])y all ranks of the inhabitants. On his departure for his new government, he received the most gratifying addresses from the inhabi- tants of Halifax,* and from the clergy of Nova Scotia, &c. 8rc.f Upon the arrival of Sir George Prevost at Quebec in 1811, he found much dissatisfaction and discontent existing in the Lower Province. The inhabitants were divided into two parties, termed the English and the Canadian, and the feelings of hostility with which they viewed each other, had unfortunately not been allayed by the policy which the late Governor in Chief, Sir James Craig, had thought it necessary to adopt during his administration. To such a degree had this party spirit been carried, and so doubtful had he been of the disposition of the Canadians, that it had been thought inexpedient to call out the militia, lest they should make an improper use of the arms to be intrusted to them. Under these circumstances, it was evidently the duty of Sir George Prevost to conciliate, by every means in his power, the confidence and affection of the Canadians, more particularly as in case * Vide Appendix, No. XIX. t Vide Appendix, No. XX. •■i Ms ^ e re- Pre- id be- lli his ;eived ihabi- Nova ost at action >vince. larties, nd the id each by the ef. Sir adopt eehad (ubtful idians, all out roper Under e duty every ection case 18 of hostilities with America, it would have been impossible to preserve Lower Canada with- out the cordial support of its inhabitants. Sir George Prevost therefore did not hesitate to adopt a system which the true interest of the Province seemed so imperiously to require. He i anxiously endeavoured to unite the two adverse parties, and to soothe the irritation which not I only threatened the tranquillity of his govern- ment, but even the safety of the colony itself. In the distribution of the patronage which he enjoyed, he resolved to be guided solely by a consideration of the public good, and when of- fices became vacant, he bestowed them, with a due regard to the merits of the individuals, indif- ferently upon the English and the Canadians. The beneficial effects of these measures be- came every day more apparent. The Governor in Chief speedily acquired the confidence of all ranks of people, who submitted with cheerful- ness to the privations and sacrifices which they were soon afterwards called upon to endure. In numerous instances he received from the inha- bitants, both collectively and individually, the strongest proofs of their zeal ; and he had the sa- tisfaction of seeing them united in their attach- ment to his government, at a time when the pre- servation of the colony depended upon such feelings. Having thus given a brief sketch of the situ- ll it' 14 ation in which the Governor in Chief found the Province of Lower Canada upon his arrival, and of the views and objects which he entertained respecting it, we shall proceed to point out the conduct which he pursued, when, from the as- pect of affairs, it became evident that hostilities with America could not be long delayed. No sooner had Sir George Prevost assumed the chief command of the Canadas, than he became sens'ble of the necessity of placing those pro- vinces in the most efficient state of defence; and he therefore applied himself with the utmost vi- gour and vigilance to call forth all their re- sources. It is difficult to believe that the un- wearied exertions of Sir George Prevost, with a view to this important object, should have been altogether unknown to the writer in the Quar- terly Review. But supposing him to have been ignorant of them, yet without access to the pri- vate and confidential correspondence which took place between Sir George Prevost and his Ma- jesty's Government, or to the communications which passed between him and the officers un- der his command, it was impossible that the Re- viewer could form a correct opinion upon the subject. And yet he has not hesitated boldly to assert, that " in the winters of 1811 and 1812, although the designs upon the Canadas were openly avowed in the American Congress, ex- cept the embodying of the militia of the Lower i Ml! I !l I! 4 15 Province, Sir George Prevost made not the slightest preparation for defence!'* The fol- lowing statement will show the degree of credit to which this assertion of the Reviewer is entitled. In the month of September, 1811, Sir George Prevost arrived in Canada, and in the same month, proceeding from Quebec to the district of Montreal, he inspected the different forts and military positions in that neighbourhood, and on the American frontier. Soon after his re- turn to Quebec in the November following, he communicated confidentially with the Adjutant- General of the forces in England, upon the ap- prehended hostilities with America. In De- cember he proposed to Lord Liverpool, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, the raising a corps of Fencibles, from the Glengarry set- tlement in Upper Canada ; and in his cor- respondence with Admiral Sawyer, who com- manded on the Halifax station, he requested that a ship of war might be sent, on the opening of the navigation, to the St. Lawrence. In the month of February, 1812, another communica- tion was made to the Secretary of State's Office, in which Sir George Prevost expressed a hope, that the proceedings in Washington would jus- tify him, in making preparations to repel the Vide Review, page 413. 1 w III threatened attack. Those preparations had been commenced as early as November, 1811, by forwarding arms and annnunition to the Upper Province. During the winter of 1811 and 1812, and the spring of the latter year, frequent comnumications passed between the Commander of the forces and Major-General Brock, who commanded in Upper Canada, re- specting the preparations which would be ne- cessary in the event of a war. It was proposed to reinforce Amherstburgh, and Fort George; and supplies of provisions, cavalry-arms, accou- trements and money, were directed to be con- veyed to Upper Canada. Accoutrements and clothing for the militia in the Canadas, were re- quested from the British Government. Another schooner was directed to be built, to increase our marine on Lake Erie. Captain Gray, De- puty Assistant-Quarter-Master-General, was des- patched to the Upper Province, in order to assist in forwarding these defensive preparations ; and Captain Dixon, of the Royal Engineers, was di- rected to proceed to Amherstburgh, to inspect the works of that fort, which the Commander of the forces had ordered to be put in a tenable state. The propriety of strengthening and for- tifying York was submitted to Government; and the commanding engineer was directed to make the repairs, which his report on the dif- ferent forts and posts in Upper Canada, had 17 H had 1811, :o the • 1811 year, ;n the [oneral [la, re- be ne- aposed eorgo ; accou- e con- ts and ere re- inother icrease ty, De- ^asdes- ) assist is; and kvas di- nspect ider of enable id for- ment; ted to le dif- a, had \ stated to be necessary. In addition to these measures, a reinforcement from the 41st reg.- ment, and five companies of the Newfoundland Fencibles, left Quebec in the montli of May for the Upper Province. On tlie .'Jlst March, Sir CJeorpje Prevost ad- dressed a j)ri vate and confidential letter to Major- General Hrock, in which his sentiments re- spectin«jf the approaching war, and the policy to be adopted in meeting it, were clearly detailed. One passage in this letter merits a more parti- cular notice, since it is highly important, not only as repelling the accusation of the Reviewer respecting the want of preparation for the war, but also as containing an answer to another charge, which will afterwards be noticed. The paragraph in the letter is as follows : " You are nevertheless to persevere in your preparations for defence, and in such arrangements as may, upon a change in the state of affairs, enable you to employ any disposeable part of your force (offensively against the common enemy." Independently of all these various communi- cations w^ith the officer commanding in Upper Canada, respecting the measures to be pursued in the event of war, and of the supplies of men, arms, money, stores, and provisions, which, with a view to that event, had been afforded to Upper Canada; much correspondence had previously taken place, and many difficulties had been re- c i.ii ii; > li I 111 ll 1 ',1 :■ li ■' :;i ''Iff ! I' i illl 18 moved with regard to the supply and transport of the Indian presents to the Upper Province, upon the due furnishing of which very mate- rially depended the support which we might expect to receive from the Indians, in case of a rupture with America. From this statement, drawn from the original correspondence, and from official documents, it is evident, that even in contemplation of hosti- lif^es, an event by no means certain, and which the British Government were so far from thinking probable, that they discouraged any measure of extraordinary expense to meet it, the Commander of the forces did, as far as rested wit. him, during the winter of 1811 and 1812, and for months prior to the declaration of war, make every preparation for defence, consistent with the means which he possessed. All the requi- sitions of Major-General Brock which the Com- mander of the forces had the power to grant, were promptly complied with; nor was the slightest intimation ever given by that invalu- able officer, that any measure, either suggested by himself or which ought to have occurred to the Commander of the forces, for the preserva- tion of the Upper Province, in the event of its being attacked, had been overlooked or neg- lected. The same vigilant foresight will be found to mark the conduct of Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province. One of the first mea- m 19 'JW sures of his government, in contemplation of war, was an application to the Icgishitiire of Lower Canada, in February, 1812, i'or an act to new model the militia laws, and which might enable him to call forth a proportion of the population into active service. Averse as the Canadians had hitherto been to grant any power of this description to former Governors, and repugnant as many of the clauses which it was intended to introduce into the bill, were to the habits and feelings of tlic people, such was the deserved popularity acquired by Sir George Prevost, from the conciliatory policy, which, as before stated, he had adopted towards the Ca- nadians, immediately upon his arrival amongst them, that he obtained from the Legislature nearly all that he had required. Before the end of May, 1812, a sum exceeding 60,000/. was placed at his disposal for the militia service; and he was authorized to embody 2,000 Bache- lors, between the age of eighteen and twenty- five years, for three months in the year ; and in case of invasion, or imminent danger of it, to retain them for a year. In case of war, he was empowered to embody if necessary, the whole militia of the Province. Under that law, a force of 2,000 men, from the finest and most efficient class of the militia, was embodied on the 13th May, so to remain for thi3e months, unless the then stf.te of affairs should render it c 2 20 Hii expedient to retain them longer. A corps of Ca- nadian voltigeurs, under the command of Major De Salaberry, of the 60th regiment, consisting of between 300 and 400 men, had likewise been raised and disciplined ; and 400 recruits for the Glengarry Fencibles, had, before the 1st June, been assembled at Three Rivers, in Lower Ca- nada. The advantages arising from thus em- bodying the militia prior to the war, were incalculable, and it may be confidently asserted, materially contributed to the preservation of the Canadas. The American Government, deceived by the erroneous information which they had received respecting the disaffection of the Canadian po- pulation to Great Britain, had calculated upon meeting with considerable support from the people in their invasion of the Province. They had been told, and they believed, that the militia would not serve, or, if embodied, would be worse than useless. The embodying, arming, and training of 2,000 of the most active portion of the population, for several weeks before the war was declared, was a severe disappoint- ment to the American Government; and was one of the causes of that determined resistance, which they afterwards experienced in every at- tempt to penetrate into that Province. This militia force also enabled the Commander of the forces to detach a larger portion of the regular III! 21 troops, than he could otherwise have been jus- tified in parting with, to the Upper Province ; while, at the same time, it afforded liim the means, on the breaking out of the war, of guard- ing the different passes and roads into Lower Canada, with ? description of men perfectly well acquainted with the nature of the country, and with tl e mode of warfare necessary for its defence. The line of frontier in the Lower Province was thus most effectually guarded by Sir George Prevost's able disposition of this new force, together with the assistance of the regular troops; and every prudent precaution consistent with his means, and with the instruc- tions he was constantly receiving from England, to avoid all unnecessary expense, was taken. The precautionary measures which were pur- sued upon tnis occasion, by the Commander of the forces, met with the full approbation of His Majesty's Government, expressed in a despatch from Lord Bathurst, of the 6th November, 1812, in which his Lordship ...formed Sir George Prevost, that " the preparations for de- fence which he had made upon the first intiina- tion of eventual hostility with America, and which he had since so vigorously continued, had met with the Prince Regent's entire ap- probation." After charging Sir George Prevost with neg- ligence, in not preparing to meet the threatened oo hostilities, the Reviewer proceeds to hazard an opinion, that the occupation and fortifying of Coteau de Lac, and Isle aux Noix, which he terms the keys of Lower Canada, was a mea- sure which Sir George Prevost ought to have adopted, in preference to all others; but which he entirely overlooked and neglected.* The fact is, that the occupation of Coteau du Lac, as is well known to every military man acquainted with the Canadas, could only be useful as against the enemy advancing from Lake On- tario, or the shores of the St. Lawrence, above Montreal. No such force could be expected to descend the river from the lake, so long as we had the command of it, as we undoubtedly had, not only at the commencement of the war, but for several months afterwards ; and as little was it to be apprehended as collecting on the shores of the river. The information which the Com- mander of the forces was constantly receiving of the intended movements of the enemy, and of the real and immediate object of their attack, was too correct to leave him in any doubt as to their attempting the Lower Province in that direction, or to induce him to diminish the small means he possessed, for the defence of more im- portant points, by the occupation of posts which at that period could afford him no adui clonal * Vide Quarterly Review, p. 413. 23 security. Coteau du Lac, was not therefore occupied as a post, either before the war or for several months afterwards, but its real impor- tance was neither overlooked nor disregarded, as the Reviewer has stated. It was examined and reported upon by different officers, sent to inspect the line of frontier extending from Lower Canada to Lake Ontario, immediately after the declaration of war, and particularly by Colonel Lethbridge, who was afterwards in command there. In possession of Kingston, and commanding the waters of the lake, and with the knowledge possessed by Sir George Prevost, of the force and designs of the enemy, no military man in the Canadas, would have thought it necessary, in the then state of affairs, that Coteau du Lac should be occupied. When subsequent events clearly shewed the intentions of the enemy to invade Lower Canada from Lake Ontario, and when the means of Sir George Prevost were better adapted for de- fending the whole line of that frontier, Coteau du Lac was occupied and fortified; and had it not been for the defeat which part of General Dear- bom's army met with from Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison's division in descending the St. Law- rence, that post would have presented a for- midable obstacle to the advance o*" the enemy. The importance of Isle aux Noix, as a post. < t ^i II"' 7 24 has been considerably lessened* since the de- fence of the Canadas by the French, in conse- quence of the facility with which Lower Canada ma^ now be entered by the various routes which the intercourse between that Province and the United States has created. Isle aux Noix had long ceased to be either the only, or principal barrier between the two countries. The occu- pation of this post was not therefore deemed necessary as a precautionary measure before the war ; nor was it until some time afterwards that Sir George Prevost was enabled to put it in a state of defence. As soon, however, as the re- inforcements and supplies from England gave him the means of more effectually guarding all the avenues to the Lower Province, Isle aux Noix became the object of his consideration. In consequence of the condition in which it was then placed, and of the force stationed there, two armed schooners of the enemy fell into our possession, and laid the foundation of the marine which was afterwards formed for carrying forward the operations on Lake Cham- plain. There cannot be a stronger proof of the little importance which the enemy themselves attached to this post in the early part of the contest, than their never making the slightest attempt to obtain possession of it. * Review, p. 413. i il 25 Having thus stated what Sir George Prevost did not do, by way of preparation for the de- fence of the Canadas before the war, the Re- viewer proceeds to point out what ivas done by liim after the commencement of hostilities. And liere we find the same want of candour which distinguislies the remarks to which we have al- ready adverted.* In order to form a correct opinion of Sir George Prevost's conduct at this period, it will be necessary to advert to the system which he adopted on the commencement of the war, and to the motives which induced him to pursue it. The declaration of war by the United States of America, it is well known, was finally carried in Congress, after long debate, and a most vio- lent opposition, by a comparatively small majo- rity. The northern and eastern states, whose interests, it was acknowledged, were most af- fected by the British orders in council, the ostensible and avowed cause of the war, were constantly and strenuously opposed to hostile measures. It was apparent to every person at all conversant with what was passing in the United States at this time, that a contest under- taken in opposition to the sentiments and wishes of so considerable a portion of the Union, and for an object which Great Britain might, with- * Review, p. 413. "26 1:1 il< 11,11 out any sacrifice of nation*«l honor, so easily con- cede, as she was, in fact, about to do, at that very period, must necessarily be of short dura- tion. This was the opinion entertained by the most sensible and well informed men in the northern and eastern states, as well as in the Canadas, and in that opinion Sir George Pre- vost concurred. It will likewise be seen, that the sentiments of His Majesty's Government on this head were in unison with those of the Com- mander of the forces. Under these circum- stances, and with these impressions, it became the obvious policy of Sir George Prevost, upon the breaking out of the war, to avoid whatever might tend to widen the breach between the two countries, and to pursue a line of conduct, which, while it should effectually tend to defeat the object of the American Government in their attack upon the Canadas, should also serve still further to increase the dislike and opposition of the northern and eastern states, to those mea- sures of aggression against the British Pro- vinces, which they had constantly predicted would be attended with discomfiture and dis- grace. In his adherence to this defensive sys- tem. Sir George Prevost was encouraged and supported, as it will speedily be shewn, not only by the approbation of the British Government, but likewise by the concurrence of those who were best qualified by their knowledge and si- iliji 'Ife 27 si- tuation to form a correct judgment on the pro- priety of the measures which he was pursuing. This policy was also the more necessary, in con- sequence of the inadequacy of the means pos- sessed by the Commander of the forces to repel the threatened attack of the Americans at the commencement of the contest. The whole of the regular force at that time in the Canadas did not amount to 5,000 men ; the law for em- bodying the militia had only been recently pas- sed ; and the population, which had been pre- viously considered as not well affected, had neither been armed nor accustomed to disci- pline for many years. The military chest was exhausted, and there was little prospect, that for some months at least, considering the exertions which Great Britain was then called upon to make in Europe, any supplies either of men or money could be afforded for the defence of her Dominions in North America. These difficul- ties neither depressed nor discouraged the ar- dent and active spirit of Sir George Prevost. Although he fully coincided in opinion with that able and judicious officer Sir James Craig, that in the event of a war with America, Que- bec should be the object of primary considera- tion ; yet the defence of the whole line of fron- tier between the Canadas and the United States, occupied his early and serious consideration. That frontier comprehended a distance of more sir 28 than noo miles, every part of which he deter- mined to dispute inch by inch, and to defend by every means in his power. It was in pursuance of the defensive line of j)olicy which had been so wisely determined upon, as well with reference to his own re- sources, and the character of the enemy with whom he had to contend, as to the views and instructions of the British Government, that the Commander of the forces immediately after the commencement of the war, gave general instruc- tions to those in command under him, to ab- stain from any unnecessary and uncalled for act of hostility upon the American territory. Not- withstanding these general instructions, much was of course left to the discretion of those who received them, in availing themselves of any fair opportunity of retaliating upon the enemy the aggressive warfare they might at- tempt, by attacking, wherever it might be done with any reasonable prospect of success, the contiguous forts and possessions of the Ame- ricans. The private letter of 31st March, 1812, to Major-General Brock, from which an extract has already been made, evidently shews, that Sir George Prevost never meant to restrain the officers in command under him from acting upon the offensive, whenever circumstances were such as would justify their departure from the S9 defensive system. Of tliese circumstances they were the best judges. That this was the liglit in which Sir George Prevost's instructions were viewed by Major-General Brock, appears by tlie following extract from a letter addressed by him to the Commander of the forces, on the 3rd July, 1812, at which time he was fully aware of the defensive line of policy which had been adopted : " The account received, first through a mer- cantile channel, and soon after repeated from various quarters, of war having been declared by the United States against Great Britain, would have justified, in my opinion, offensive operations. But the reflexion, that at Detroit and St. Joseph's, the weak state of the garrisons would prevent the Commanders from attempt- ing any essential service connected in any de- gree with their future security, and that my only means of annoyance on this communica- tion, was limited to the reduction of Fort Nia- gara, which could be battered at any future pe- riod, I relinquished my original intentions, and attended only to defensive measures." That Captain Roberts, the commanding of- ficer at Fort St. Joseph's, acted from a sense of this discretion thus entrusted to him, there can- not be a doubt, as in his official letter to the Adjutant-General, announcing the capture of Michilimachinac, he does not allude in the 80 slightest degree to his liiiving .acted contrary to his orders. Tlte approval of his conduct in general orders is likewise a convincing proof that Sir George I'rcvost considered that he had acted up to the spirit of his instructions what- ever they might have l)een, and that he had used a sound discretion respecting tliem. It liowever clearly ap])ears hy the ahove letter, that Captain Roherts acted altogether from the orders he received from Major-Ceneral Brock, who was fully aware, as it has been already shewn, of the sentiments of Sir George Pre- vost, and who did not hesitate to give Captain Roberts the discretionary order, which led to the attack and capture of the fort. It will be seen from the preceding pages, that the approaching hostilities with America had been the subject of frequent communication be- tween Sir George Prevost and Major-general Brock, for several months prior to the com- mencement of the war ; and that, in more than one letter to which reference has been made, the precautions necessary to be taken, and the system and line of (?:efence to be adopted in the event of war, had been clearly and distinctly pointed out. Possessed then, as Sir George Prevost knew General Brock to be, of his senti- ments on this subject, and aware that he would receive from the North West company, from whom he had himself derived the information. 4 ni the eurliost intelligence of the actual declaration of war, an immediate further communication of his sentiments was unnecessary. On the day, however, on which the intelligence of that event reached Quehec, the 25th June, 1812, a letter was despatched to Major-(ileneral Brock from the Adjutant-General, conununicatingthe infor- mation ; and as soon as the important arrange- ments respecting the Lower Province, and par- ticularly those for the defence of Quebec had been completed. Sir Cieorge I'revost proceeded to Montreal. Uj)on his receiving at that place a despatch from Mr. Foster, our late minister at Washington, with an ollicial notification of the war, he immediately afterwards, (on 7th July,) and within a fortnight after the first intelligence of it had reached him at Quebec, sent off his first despatch to Major-General Brock. This was followed by another on the 10th of the same month by Colonel Lethbridge, who was sent to take the command at Kingston ; and in both these letters every instruction and in- formation which Sir George Prevost's situation afforded, or enabled him to give, were sent to the Major-General. That these despatches did not reach General Brock until the 29th of the month was owing to circumstances over which Sir George Prevost had no control. It must be observed, however, that General Brock re- ceived the despatches several days before he set *,i 32 oif to join the army opposed to General Hull, although the Reviewer* gives his readers to understand that it did not arrive until after General Hull's capture. The above statement will afford a full and sa- tisfacto./ answer to the misrepresentations of the Quarterly Reviewer,f and to the unwarrant- able inh:inuation by which they are accompanied, if indeed any answer were w anting to assertions in which the v/riter has directly contradicted himself. The Reviewer states, " that Sir George Prevost sent vo instructions whatever to General Brock for some weeks after he re- ceived intimation of the war :" — and further, " that he. General Broc^ , was only restrained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara, di^ the perplexity of his situation, in Ldng left without orders." It is singular that the writer should have forgotten, that only five pages be- fore, he had stated J that " on the receipt of the intelligence of the American declaration of war, Major-General Brock, who commanded the troops in the Upper Province i:.imediately des- patched DISCRETIONARY ordcis to the British officer in charge of Fort St. Joseph's, to act either offensively or otherwise against the ene- my at Michilimachinac, as he should find advis- able." If General Brock was justified in giving Revfew, p. 414. f Ibid. p. 413. X Ibid. p. 40J). J ,•« 33 JS- kt le- is- ig these discretionary orders to act offensively a^ circumstances might require, it follows that lie must have considered a similar line of conduct open to himself; and yet, in the face of this statement, the Reviewer gravely endeavours to persuade his readers, that General Brock was in perplexity with regard to the measures which he should pursue. The Reviewer's insinuation, that Sir G. Pr e- vost sent no instructions to General Brock for seme weeks after he received intimation of the war, with the intention of leaving that officer to act on his own responsibility, cannot be passed over in silence. It has been already proved, by incontrovertible facts, that the contemptible mo- tives thus attributed to the Commander of the forces, could not possibly have existed in his mind; and the attempt to impute to him a con- duct so dishonorable ough. therefore to be marked with the severest reprobation. No two persons could more sincerely respect and esteem each other than these gallant and high-minded indivi- duals. Sir George Prevost had early evinced his opinion of General Brock's merits and talents, in a private communication to him of the 22d Jan. 1812, several months before the war ; and the reply of General Brock to that communication, was sufficient evidence of the sentiments he en- tertained towards the Commander, under whom he expressed himself to be so desirous of serving. D 34 'I !:i |i iii':' Indeed, the utmost confidence and cordiality prevailed between these officers, as is amply manifested in the correspondence before referred to; and wherever a difference of opinion did exist, General Brock never hesitated to yield to what he expressed and considered the superior knowledge and experience of the Commander in Chief. The conduct of Sir George Prevost in his communications with General Brock, after re- ceiving intelligence of the war, was not attended with any of those consequences which the Re- viewer has asserted. Upon this head General Brock's correspondence with the Commandei " the forces is conclusive. The first letter from that officer, after the re- ceipt of the intelligence of the war, is I'ated the 3d July, at Fort George ; the extract fiom whiclt, already given, is a convincing proof, that whatever might have been his intention in mov- ing from York to Fort George, he was not re- strained from the measure of attacking Fort Niagara by any deficiency of instructions from the Commander of the Forces. The next letter from General Brock is from Fort George, dated 12th July, and states that the enemy were constructing batteries at the dif- ferent points of the frontier ; that he was mak- ing exertions to counteract their views; and that the arrival, that morning, of the Royal 35 George and the vessels under convoy, bringing various pieces of ordnance, would give him a decided superiority. Not a single word is said in this despatch of any wish or intention on the part of the Major-General to invade the Ameri- can territory. Major-General Brock's next let- ter of the 20th July states, that the enemy had evidently diminished his force, and appeared to have no intention of making an immediate at- tack. This letter also communicated the intel- ligence of General Hull's invasion of the Pro- vince. It likewise contained details of General Brock's means of defensive warfare, and ex- pressed some apprehension for the fate of the troops under his command, should the commu- r* .ation be cut off between Kingston and Mon- treal; which apprehension was entertained by him on the supposition, as he stated, that " the slender means possessed by Sir G. Prevost tvould not admit of diminution, and consequently that he could not look fc reinforcements." The same letter acknowledged the receipt of the Adjutant General's communication from Que- jec, of 25th June, of the declaration of war. in the succeeding despatch from General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, dated 26th July, from Fort George, that officer writes as follows : " I have not deemed it of sufficient importance to com- mence active operations on this line by an at- tack on Fort Niagara; it can be demolished, d2 4 ■ - I if-' ; 36 i ; ,1!! when found necessary, in half an liour, and there my means of annoyance would cease. To enable the militia to acquire some degree of discipline y without interruption, is of far greater conse- quence than such a conquest'' The next letter from the Major-General, dated from York, the 28th July, principally re- lates to the approaching meeting of the legisla- ture, and mentions his intention of detaching a force for the relief of Amherstburg. A letter from the same place, written on the following day, ' " • 1 11 ni rates the surrender of Michilima- chinac, id particularly acknowledges the re- ceipt of Sir George Prevost's despatches of the 7th and 10th July, written after the declaration of war, and before alluded to. General Brock also states his intention of embarking immedi- ately in the Prince Regent, (the vessel which had been built and equipped since the month of March preceding), for Fort George, from whence he should speedily return to York. On the 4th August, a short letter was addressed by General Brock to Sir G. Prevost, from York, principally upon the proceeding of the legisla- ture, regarding the militia laws, and on the fol- lowing day he set off for Amherstburg, from whence he did not return until after the glorious termination of Hull's invasion. It was, there- fore, from a consideration of the nature of his resources, and of the necessity of maturing and '^ 37 husbanding them, and from a conviction that Niagara would easily fall whenever he shoiild be inclined to attack it, and not from any doubt arising from want of instructions, that General Brock abandoned the attempt. It was in further pursuance of the line of po- licy adopted at the commencement of the war, that Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of despatches from Mr. Foster, acquainting him with the proposed repeal of the Orders in Coun- cil by the British Government, immediately opened a communication with Major-General Dearborn, commanding the American forces on the frontier of Lower Canada, for the purpose of concluding an armistice, until the Congress should determine upon the proposals trans- mitted to them by Mr. Foster. An armistice of about three weeks did accordingly take place ; and whatever might be the advantage arising from it to the American commanders and their troops, from the time and opportu- nity it afforded them of increasing their means of attacking the Canadas, it is obvious that the cessation of hostilities was of far more impor- tance to Sir George Prevost, by enabling him to mature his preparations for defence. In fact, at the very time the armistice was negociating, a regiment had arrived in the river from the West Indies ; and after the conclusion, and dur- ing the continuance of it, considerable rein- m'' 38 :• ,). forcements of men and supplies were forwarded to Upper Canada, where they arrived before the resuming of hostilities, and materially contri- buted towards defeating the attempts which the enemy afterwards made to invade that province. Intelligence of the conclusion of the armis- tice was despatched to General Brock on the 12th August, by Brigade-Major Sheckleton, and must have reached him at Amherstburg before he left that place for Fort George, where he ar- rived the fith September ; but, whatever may have been General Brock's opinion of the po- licy of the measure, we do not find in his letter of the 7th September to Sir George Prevost, that the receipt of that intelligence had at all interfered with any intention he had previ- ously entertained of " sweeping" (according to the Reviewer's assertion) "the Niagara line of the American garrisons, which he knew were then unprepared for vigorous resistance."* In fact, as that letter states, the armistice was to terminate the 7iext day ; and so far was General Brock from being in a situation to act offen- sively, that he states his expectation of an al- most immediate attack, and of his having sent to Amherstburg to Colonel Proctor, as well as to Colonel Vincent at Kingston, for reinforce- ments, to enable him to meet it ; expressing at * Review, p. 410. ■m I!! ii llililli 39 rce- at 'i J :'& the same time his hope, that if he could conti- nue to maintain his position for six weeks longer, the campaign would terminate in a manner little expected in the United States. Upon the expiration of the armistice, Sir George Prevost resolved to continue, for a time at least, and until his resources would better enable him to pursue a contrary line of conduct, the same defensive system which he had pre- viously determined upon ; and which he had been originally induced to adopt, in conse- quence of the peculiar circumstances in which he was placed at the commencement of hosti- lities, and of the war having been undertaken, on the part of the United States, so much in opposition to the opinions and wishes of a con- siderable portion of its population. In a pri- vate letter from Sir George Prevost to General Brock, of the 2d August, 1812, upon the sub- ject of the proposed armistice, he particularly refers to the opinion of Mr. Foster, respecting the policy of the defensive system. " Mr. Foster," he says, " submits the propriety of our abstain- ing from an invasion of the United States* terri- tory, as only in such event could the American government he empowered to order the militia out of the States." As a further ground for this line of conduct, and a confirmation of the pro- priety of his own opinion in adopting it, he quotes in a subsequent communication to Ge- ■ '■**■ ■ [ m\ 40 I neral Brock, of 30th August, 1812, the opinion of his Majesty's Government on the subject. *' The King's Government having most unequi- vocally expressed to me their desire to preserve peace with the United States, that they might uninterruptedly pursue, with the whole dispose- able force of the country, the great interests committed to them in Europe, I have endea- voured to be instrumental in the accomplish- ment of those views ; but I consider it most fortunate to have been enabled to do so without intertiering with your operations on the Detroit. I have sent you meti, moneys and stores of every kind'* It cannot be matter of surprise that Sir George Prevost should persevere in his defen- sive system, even after the termination of the armistice, and when from the manner in which the Government of the United States had re- ceived the commnnication of the repeal of the Orders in Council, it was evident that they meant to continue the war for other objects; for it ought to be considered, that up to that period, the only reinforcements of troops re- ceived by him were the 103d, nearly a boy-re- giment, and the first battalion of the Royals from the West Indies, the latter incomplete, from the captm'e of part of their numbers, on board of one of the transports, by an American frigate. In consequence, however, of this addi- liion to th? force in the Lower Province; Sir :m ■.§■ I ■'ft* M ** < 41 George Prevost was enabled immediately to strengthen the army in Upper Canada, by detach- ments from the 49th regiment, Royal Newfound- land Fencibles, and Royal Veterans ; but it must be evident thjit the total accession of strength in both Provinces was not sufficient to warrant a departure from a system, which had been adopted after the fullest deliberation, and upon a just calculation of the means neces!^:ary to meet the American warfare. The grounds of Sir George Prevost 's opinion on this head had been stated to General Brock, in his letters to him of the 7th and 10th July, before referred to ; and as a further confirmation of the neces- sity of adhering to it, in his rommuniration to General Brock, of the 17th September, Sir George Prevost acquaints him, that in his last despatches from Lord Bathurst, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated 4th July, 1812, he is told by him, " That his Majesty's Govern- ment trusts he will be enabled to suspend, with perfect safety, all extraordinary preparations for defence, which he may have been induced to make, in consequence of the precarious state of the relations between Great Britain and the United States." — As this opinion of the British Government was evidently founded upon their belief, that the revocation of the Orders in Council would either prevent war, if not de- clared, or lead to an immediate peace, had hos- I M II 1 li. 42 tilities commenced, it was plain that no further reinforcements could be expected to be even ordered from England, until accounts should arrive there of the reception which the intelli- gence of the revocation of the Orders in Coun- cil had met with from the Government of the United States. As this could not well be before the end of September, there was not the slight- est prospect of any addition being afforded to the force in the Canadas before the ensuing year ; and it was therefore certain, that the Commander of the forces would until that pe- riod be completely left to his own resources for the defence of those Provinces. To hiishnnd those resources became, under these circumstances, his imperious duty. The posture of affairs in Lower Canada, as he had stated to General Brock, in his letter of the 17th September, particularly on the frontier of Mon- treal, required every soldier in that Province, and no further reinforcements could be sent by him to the other. Not aware of any advantage which could arise from offensive operations against America, to compensate for the loss they might occasion, and for the consequent in- security to the Provinces which he was defend- ing. Sir George Prevost continued to urge upon General Brock, and after his death, upon his successor. General Sheaffe, the necessity of ad- hering to a defensive system ; nor does it ap- 4.1 pear from any part of the correspondence between these officers and Sir George Provost, that they had any particular object in view, which that policy restrained them from pur- suing. Previous to the armistice, and to the capture of Hull's army at Detroit, General Brock had in his letters of 3d and 26th July, 1812, before referred to, given his reasons, which were evidently independent of the con- sideration of any instructions from Sir George Prevost, why he did not meditate offensive operations against the American frontier ; and subsequent to the capture of Detroit, and after his arrival at Fort George in September, it has been clearly shewn, that his situation and means precluded him from such measures, except at a great risk, and for the accomplishment of in- adequate objects. The correctness of this statement appears from a letter addressed by General Brock, to Sir George Prevost, on the 13th September, 1812, from Fort George; in which he says, " that although he had learnt from deserters, (but which information he had reason after- wards to think, as he acknowledged, was not altogether correct), that great dissatisfaction prevailed amongst the American troops on the Niagara frontier, and that therefore much might be effected against such a body at that Vi\ \- moment ; that keeping in mind his excellency's instructions, and aware of the policy of per- mitlintr such a force to dwindle away by it's own inefficient means, he did not contemplate any IMMEDIATE ATTACK." Two vStrong infcrcnces naturally arise from this letter — the one, that General Brock must have considered the in- structions received from Sir George Prevost, as to defensive measures not positive, as the Re- viewer has thought fit to state them to have been, but discretionary; the other, that Ge- neral Brock himself, was convinced of the policy of abstaining from offensive operations against an enemy circumstanced as the Americans then were. That this policy was a wise one, was manifest from the result. Had any attack be^ made on Fort Niagara, or had that geneit** sweeping of the American garrisons on the frontier, (which the critic seems to think so easy an achievement) been attempted, there can- not be a doubt but that this invasion of the American territory, before the enemy had made an attack upon our own frontier, would have united the whole population, not only of the states bordering upon that line, but of every other part of the union, in the prosecution of the war. The militia already assembled upon that frontier, and who were known to be dis- satisfied, and anxious to return to their homes* 45 would in the event of an attack upon their ter- ritory, not only have cheerfully iemained to re- pel the aggression, ))ut would have been further obliged to pass the frontier, for the invasion of Canada; which, without such an attack on our part, they could not have been compelled to do. Aware of this circumstance, it was the policy of the American Government, to hold out lures to our officers, commanding on the frontiers, to induce them to commence an offensive warfare. Sir George Prevost, however, saw through their design, and fortunately disappointed it. The consequence was, that finding their militia could no longer be kept together, and that the season was fast approaching, when aU offensive opera- tions must cease, the American commanders urged the troops on that line, to that ill-con- certed expedition, which ended in the battle of Queenstown, and which, though attended with the irreparable loss to the British forces of their gallant Commander, terminated in the disgrace and defeat of the American army; and was thus the means of preserving, at least for that campaign, the Province of Upper Canada. Brilliant as had been the success of our arms at the battle of Queenstown, and complete as had been the overthrow of the enemy, they still remained in sufficient force on the opposite territory, to make an immediate attack upon their frontier, notwithstanding the dismay with I ! 46 I r\ } w\ which the critic seems to think the Americans were filled,* something more than hazardous. Out of the small force of less than 900 legular troops which we had on the field that day, nearly 100 of them were killed or wounded, and many were necessarily engaged in guarding the pri- soners, whose numbers amounted to more than our own regular force. The enemy had received reinforcements in their line during the day of the action, and others were constantly arrivmg. Under these circumstances is it to be wondered at, that Major-General Shealfe should not have listened to the suggestions of any of his officers, if such were made, and the fact is more than doubtful, to cross over immediately after the action, when according to the Reviewer's saga- cious opinion, " Fort Niagara might have been taken, and the whole of the Niagara line cleared of the American troops !" Such an attempt might indeed have averted the insinuation levelled by the critic against Ge- neral SheafFe and Sir George Prevost as lovers of armistices, but would have evinced great want of military judgment and prudence in Ge- neral Sheaffe, and have hazarded all the ad- vantages gained by the gallant and able con- duct of his lamented predecessor, and streng- thened and confirmed at Queenstown by him- * Review, p. 411. 47 self. Greneral Sheaffe wab, therefore, wisely con- tented with having foiled a second attempt of a superior force to invade the Province ; and, anxi- ous to secure its future preservation, he will- ingly acceded to a proposal for an armistice, which he knew, under the circumstances of his situation, would be of incalculably more benefit to himself than to the enemy. It must be evident to every one at all conversant with military sub- jects, that to those who are carrying on a defen- sive warfare, which their ir.fcrir.rity of force and means of every description has obliged thenr to adopt, a suspension of hostilities must be infi- nitely more beneficial than to the opposite party. General Sheaffe was fully aware of the import- ance of this measure to the safety of the pro- vince, which on the death of General Brock was entrusted to him, -^mce he wps in daily expecta- tion of receiving supplies of clothing, and other articles which were indispensable for the militia, who had become much dissatisfied from the want of those articles. Reinforcements of troops were also on their way to him ; and, in fact, these supplies and reinforcements did arrive during the continuance of the armistice, and ma- terially contributed to foil the further efforts of the enemy to invade the Province. It may also be added, that the armistice was further expe- dient in the first instance, when its duration was limited to three days, for the purpose of afforci- 48 ■I I!; ing time for carrying into effect the proposed exchange of prisoners, the removal of those that were wounded, and the passing over to the ene- my's side the militia paroles. Some portion of time was also necessary for performing, without any hostile interruption, the last tribute of re- spect to the memory of the gallant Commander who had then lately fallen. The subsequent prolongation of the armistice to an indefinite period, although it was in the power of either party to terminate the same by thirty hours notice, perfectly coincided with Major-General Sheaffe's system of defensive warfare, and per- mitted him to leave Fort George for a short time, and proceed to York, where his presence was indispensable for the purpose of being sworn in, and assuming the civil government. It has been thought necessary to say thus much in vindication of this measure, from a sense of justice to a gallant and meritorious of- ficer, although it was adopted without any re- ference to, and without the consent or appro- bation of Sir George Prevost. The Reviewer has indeed thought fit to characterize the armis- tice* as one for which no reason, civil or mili- tary, was ever assigned ; whereas it was noto- rious to the army employed on the Niagara line that General Sheaife was influenced in this 'ii * Review, p. 411. \t.- ■.;>t.'l'!; 49 step by the motives and circumstances already stated, all of which were immediately communi- cated by him to Sir George Trevost. If any thing further were necessary to be adduced in vindication of the policy of the defensive system, of which these armistices formed a part, and which the Reviewer has thought fit so ground- lessly to denominate short-sighted and ill-judged, although attended with results so favourable to the safety of both Provinces, it will be found in the complete approbation expressed by his Ma- jesty's Government. In Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1812, written before the intelligence of the declara- tion of war, by America, had reached England, his Lordship says, " The instructions given by you to Major-General Brock and Sir John Sher- brooke, cautioning them against any premature measures of hostility, or any deviation from a line of conduct strictly defensive, meets with the full approbation of his F val Highness the Prince Regent/' In a subsequent despatch of the 10th Aug., Lord Bathurst approves of the general princi- ples upon which Sir George Prevost intendt d to conduct the operations of the war, by maK- ing the defence of Quebec paramount to every other consideration, in the event of invasion. In a later despatch of the date of the 1st October, 1812, his Lordship says, " I have it in command £ iiM 'Vifi iiir 1 11 it !;li ■ i^': 'Ml (1 nil HI m :iii 50 from his Royal Highness the Prince Regent, to convey to you his most unqualified approbation of the measures which you have adopted for de- fending the Provinces under your charge, and of those to ,vhich you have had recourse for de- ferring, if not altogether preventing, any resort to actual hostility." On the subject of the ar- mistice, he adds, " The desire which you have unceasingly manifested to avoid hostilities, with the subjects of the United States, is not more in conformity with your own feelings, than with the wishes and intentions of his Majesty's Go- vernment, and therefore your correspondence with General Dearborn cannot fail to receive their cordial concurrence.'* In a further despatch from Lord Bathurst, dated the 10th October, 1812, acknowledging the receipt of the letter from Sir George Pre- vost, which announced the surrender of General Hull, with his army, to General Brock, and communicating his Royal Highness the Prince Regent's approbation of the conduct of General Brock, his officers and troops, on that occasion, his Lordship adds — " I am further commanded by his Royal Highness to say, that in giving every credit to Major-General Brock, and the army under his command, he is fully sensible how much your exertions and arrangements have contributed to the fortunate conclusion of the campaign in Upper Canada." In Lord Bathurst's i 51 despatch of the 16th November following, he says, " The measures which you have taken for obstructing the navigation of the Richelieu, by the erection of works on the Isle Aux Noix, ap- pear well calculated to impede the advance of the enemy in that quarter." Testimonials like these, so highly honorable to the zeal and ability displayed by Sir George Prevost, are sufficient of themselves to afford a complete answer to the Reviewer's assertions. That writer's remark, with regard to " the prac- tical illustration of the tendency"* of Sir George Prevost s defensive system, is directly in oppo- sition to the facts, both as respects the conduct of Colonel Procter, in consequence of his or- ders, and the effect 'Droduced by that conduct upon the minds of the Indians. In proof of this assertion, it is only necessary to advert to the two ^'xpeaitions, of Captain Muir to Fort Wayne, in September, 1812, and of Lieute- nant Dewar to the Fort of the Rapids of the Miami, in October following. The former of these expeditions tended, for some time at least, to retard the preparations which the enemy were making for their second advance to the Detroit frontier, which terminated in the defeat and capture of General Winchester and his army, while both expeditions afforded to the Indians * Review, p. 414. E 2 52 il: i i r ' tl!i a strong proof of our desire to co-operate with them, as far as was consistent with the security of our own Provinces, and of the Michigan ter- ritory. Neither of these expeditions would have been undertaken, had not Colonel Procter's orders been discretionary instead of positive. It is certainly true, that Sir George Prevost did wish to discourage the employment of the regular troops under Colonel Procter, in offen- sive operations jointly with the Indians; be- cause such a course of proceeding was neither consistent with the instructions he had received from his Majesty's Government, nor compatible with the military resources of his command. At the same time he merely recommended to Colonel Procter a cautious line of conduct, chiefly directed to the preservation of the dis- trict committed to his charge ; and it is evident that Colonel Procter's use of the discretion thus entrusted to him, had the effect of retain- ing the willing services of the Indians during the whole period of our remaining in posses- sion of the Michigan territory, and up to the time of the unfortunate retreat and consequent capture of Colonel Procter's detachment at the Moravian village. Having thus briefly adverted to the principal occurrences of the first campaign in Upper Canada, it becomes necessary to say a few words with regard to those of the Lower Pro- 53 vince, during the same period; and which, being under the immediate direction of Sir George Prevost, the Reviewer has thought proper to characterize as utterly insignijicant.'* Almost immediately after intelligence of the war had arrived ?* Quebec, Sir George Prevost re- paired to Montreal, for the purpose of pro- viding for the defence of that frontier; and having established a cordon of troops in the situations most exposed to attack, between the St. Lawrence and the Richelieu rivers, consisting of all the flank companies of the 49th and 100th regiments, together with three battalions of embodied militia, and one of Ca- nadian voltigeurs, which last four corps had been raised and disciplined previous to the war, he returned to Quebec, in order to meet the Provincial Parliament. The legislature had been summoned, principally, for the purpose of obtaining from them an act authorizing the circulation of anny bills, a measure to which from his deserved popularity with that body, they did not hesitate to accede, and with- out which, from the want of specie, it would scarcely have been possible to carry on the public service. To many of the arrangements and measures of Sir George Prevost, for rein- forcing and strengthening Upper Canada, as * Review, p. 411. 54 M liiU ! I' 1: I) I,'" well as for guarding the approaches to the Lower Province, reference has already been made. The whole summer had been unceas- ingly employed in these important objects, and the greatest exertions had been made to trans- port and convey to Kingston, by the tedious route of the St. Lawrence, against the current, and along a frontier much exposed to the enemy, the various supplies which the exigencies of the Upper Province demanded ; all of which, by the judicious and able arrangements made by him for that purpose, arrived safe and without loss, or with very inconsiderable molestation. In the month of August Sir George Prevost again repaired to Montreal, in order that he might be ready to take the field, should the movements of General Dearborn, who com- manded the enemy's forces on that frontier, in- dicate any Jntention of attacking our line of de- fence, which had been entrusted to the charge of Major-General de Rottenburg. General Dearborn having, on the 16th November, ad- vanced from Plattsburg to Champlain town, close upon our frontier line, thereby threatening the front of Major-General de Rottenburg's po- sition. Sir George Prevost, upon the receipt of this intelligence, crossed the St. Lawrence with a considerable proportion of the force then at Montreal, in order to strengthen the point thus threatened, and established his head-quarters at 55 i i Chambly, where he remained for several weeks. Whether this movement on the part of General Dearborn was made in the expectation of finding that no effectual resistance would be offered by the Canadian population to his further advance into the Province, or with the view of prevent- ing the sending of reinforcements from the Lower to the Upper Province, he was equally disappointed in both these objects. The able measures adopted by Sir George Prevost in the disposition of the regular troops, as well as of the militia, who displayed the most ardent spirit of loyalty, and the most resolute determination to repel every attempt of the enemy to invade the Colony, induced the American Commander in Chief to abandon any further intention of advancing. After pushing forward a few recon- noitring parties which were invariably forced to retreat without effecting their object, he was ultimately compelled, by the advanced season of the year, to close the campaign, and to put the army into winter quarters. . The result of the first campaign was highly honorable to the military talents of the Com- mander of the forces. The enemy, notwith- standing their superior resources, were foiled in every attempt which they made to invade the Provinces, with the loss in one instance of the whole of their army, together with the Com- mander; while, in the other, their troops suffered m\ Mil 56 ifl I ' 31 ''I \W, i 'Mil i W'^^ a total defeat, attended with the capture of a General Oilicer, and upwards of 700 men. Hut wliile thus engaged in his military duties, Sir George Prevost was not unmindful of the importance of our naval superiority upon the Lakes, though in this as in every other part of his conduct, he has fallen under the indiscrimi- nate censure of the Quarterly Reviewer,* who has accused him of neglecting to preserve the naval ascendancy which we enjoyed on Lakes Erie and Ontario, at the commencement of the contest. As early as the month of December, 1811, as appears from a letter addressed by Sir George Prevost to General Brock, he had directed his attention towards our marine on Lake Erie, and had given directions for the building of a schooner at Amherstburg. Our force on the Lake, at that period, consisted of the ship Queen Charlotte, and Hunter schooner, both of which were armed and actually employed. The Ame- ricans possessed at the same period a brig, the Detroit, and a sloop, the former a very fine vessel, and in readiness for any service, although then laid up at Presque Isle. During the whole of the campaign of 1812, our vessels navigated the Lake without any attempt on the part of the enemy to interrupt them, and materially contri- * Review, p. 414. 57 buted to the success of our arms in that quar- ter, by the countenance and protection aff'ordcd by them to the garrison at Amherstl)urg, and by the transportation from Fort Eric of such stores, provisions, and supplies as were indis- pensable for the security of the former post. In direct variance with the Reviewers assertion,* thai " not one effort was made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine at that period;" it is a remarkable fact that the schooner, Lady Prevost, which he had ordered to be built in December, 1811, was launched and fitted out, and was actually employed on the Lake within a month after the declaration of war, and essen- tially assisted in the transport of the arms, pro- visions, &c. before mentioned, during nearly the whole of the first campaign. Of the force which the enemy then possessed on this Lake, consist- ing of the Detroit and a schooner, the former fell into our possession upon the surrender of General Hull with his army ; and, although she was recaptured in the October following, under circumstances which, considering the superiority of the enemy, reflected no discredit upon the officer commanding her, and the men under him, she made no accession to their strength, as she was burnt the day afterwards by our troops, and the Caledonia, a private vessel, cap- * Review, p. 415. IB> il' ■ 1 ' '1 Ir 1' 1 1; i| il ■ ill 1 i: ii' i 1| 1 f : iIImII!'; 1 ■> 58 tured with lier, was rendered a mere wreck by the fire from our fort and batteries. On Lake Erie, therefore, during tlie whole of the cam- paign of 1812, our naval ascendancy was deci- sive ; to strengthen and preserve which, the efforts of Sir George Prevost materially contri- buted. On Lake Ontario, our superiority, as well at the commencement of hostilities, as long prior and subsequent to that period, was still more apparent and efficient. In March, 1812, our force on that Lake consisted of the Royal George ship of 24 guns, the brig Moira of 16 guns, and two schooners ; whilst that of the enemy was composed of a single brig laid up at Sackett's Plarbour. But the importance of main- taining this great superiority over the enemy was not lost sight of by Sir George Prevost. As early as January, 1812, Captain Gray, an able officer of the Quarter-Master-General's depart- ment, under which the marine was placed, was despatched to York for the purpose, amongst other services, of consulting with Major-General Brock, upon the best means of preserving the ascendancy which we possessed upon Lake On- tario. In consequence of Captain Gray's sug- gestion, the building of a very fine schooner, called the Prince Regent, was commenced at York in the following March, which was launched, equipped, and employed upon the Lake in con- veying supplies of great importance on the 3d 50 July, immediately after notice of the declara- tion of war had l)een received in Upper Canada. This fact furnishes a full contradiction to the as- sertion of the Reviewer,* that " after slumbering away the sununer and autunm without one effort to increase our marine in amount or efficiency, Sir George Prevost suddenly awoke, in the depth of winter, to a sense of the condition to w hich his supineness had reduced the British cause, and the building of two frigates commenced with con- vulsive activity." That Sir George Prevost, with so decided a naval ascendancy on both Lakes at the commencement of the war, should not have thought himself justified in any extraordinary exertions to increase that ascendancy, is not to be wondered, at when it is considered, that for every purpose of the defensive system which he had adopted, the British force upon the Lakes was amply sufficient, and that Government would not have approved, in the then state of affairs, of the expense which such a measure must una- voidably have occasioned. Aware, however, as Sir George Prevost was of the important advan- tages which the dominion of the Lakes afforded for the preservation of the Canadas, he had, both long before, and immediately after the com- mencement of the war, called the attention of His Majesty's Government to that subject. He * Review, p. 413. mi ;;!> |:-"1'! ■ I'" ,1 ■ ■■ ■ 1 60 had also in his communication with General Brock, and particularly by the Deputy Assis- tant Quarter-Master-General, invited his con- sideration of the same matter. It certainly af- fords a strong proof of the conviction of that gallant and able officer, that our force on those waters needed no extraordinary exertion at that time to increase it beyond what had been al- ready made; that, excepting In his letter before referred to, of 2d December, 1811, he never once mentioned the subject of our marine in his various different communications with Sir George Prevost, respecting the means of de- fending the Upper Province, until in his des- patch of the 11th October, 1812, he acquainted the Commandei of the forces with the recapture of the brig Detroit by the enemy. Previous, however, to this period, and as soon as Sir George Prevost had reason to suppose from the refusal of the American Government to accede to the Armistice, or to consider the revocation of the Orders in Council a sufficient ground for pacification, that the war would be continued, and that renewed efforts would be made for the invasion of the Canadas, he had strongly re- presented to His Majesty's Government the absolute necessity of experienced officers and able seamen being sent to him, to enable him to preserve the ascendancy which our marine then enjoyed. In a letter addressed to General Brock, ■•■■.fi ' •*; I 61 on the 19th October, 1812, he authorized that officer to take whatever measures he might deem necessary for the accomplishment of the same object, without further reference to himself It was not ascertained, until towards the end of October, that any extraordinary exertions were making by the enemy to equip and fit out a squadron at Sackett's Harbour. The arrival of Commodore Chauncey, with a number of ship- wrights and seamen, making their intentions evident, Captain Gray, of the Quarter-Master- General's department, was sent to Kingston, to direct the laying down of the keels of two fri- gates, the one at that place, and the other at York; and in the month of December, more than 120 shipwrights, together with 30 seamen, engaged at Quebec, arrived in the Upper Pro- vince, and the building of the two frigates im- mediately commenced. In the same month, di- rections were given for the building of a ship, of the dimensions and tonnage of the Queen Charlotte, together with several gun-boats at Amherstburg, on Lake Erie. During the whole of the summer after the declaration of war, the superiority of our fleet on Lake Ontario, had enabled us uninterruptedly to transport from Kingston to York and Fort George, all the supplies of stores, provisions, and reinforce- ments of men, necessary for the defence of Upper Canada ; nor was it until the month of i| y) W I ¥■■ '■ \^' ■i 62 November, when those services had been com- pleted, and our vessels were on the point of being laid up for the winter, that with all the great advantages which they derived from the immediate vicinity of their resources, particu- larly of officers and men, seconded by the stren- uous exertions which they made, the Americans were able to do more than to fit out the Oneida, a vessel perfectly ready for any service at the com- mencement of the war, and six small schooners, carrying one or two heavy guns each. With this force they ventured out for the first time on the Lake in the beginning of November, under the command of Commodore Chauncey; and availing themselves of the absence of the Moira brig, and our three schooners, at the head of the Lake, to make on the 11th an inef- fectual attack upon the Royal George, under the batteries of Kingston, they retired to Sack- ett's Harbour, without attempting to interrupt our vessels on their return to Kingston ; nor did they again shew themselves upon the Lake until the following year. Up to the month of November, therefore, which may be called the conclusion of the first campaign, as far as re- spected our means of defending the Province, our ascendancy on Lake Ontario had been pre- served. To this object, the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost, by the building of the Prince Regent, and the supply of officers and iiHUi 63 men furnished to our marine after the com- mencement of the war, essentially contributed. The superior advantages enjoyed by the enemy, in being able to obtain shipwrights and seamen to an unlimited amount, together with the proxi- mity of all their means for the building and equip- ment of vessels, had enabled them to launch a frigate at Sackett's Harbour, before the end of the year 1812, and to fit out a squadron, which at the commencement of 1813, gave them a tempo- rary ascendancy on Lake Ontario, before officers and seamen could be sent to Canada from Eng- land. This ascendancy on their part was, how- ever, of short duration, for we shall find in pur- suing this subject, that the measures planned by Sir George Prevost during the summer of 1812, and carried into effect during the autumn and winter, were such as in their consequence secured to us a full equality, and occasionally the superiority on that Lake, during the two remain- ing campaigns. Of the nature and extent of the exertions thus made by Sir George Prevost to increase our marine on Lake Ontario, the Re- viewer has himself furnished the most abundant proof. " Such," he says, " were the zeal and exertions of Sir James Yeo and his followers on their arrival at Kingston, that before the end of May they were prepared to take the Lake with the British fleet,* now composed of two * Review, p. 418. 64 «i ' i Mil iiilt IN ^^'':!'J.- ships of 2/i- and 22 guns, a brig of 14, and two schooners of 12 and 10 guns." Sir James Yeo did not arrive at Quebec with his seamen, until tlie 5th May, and it was not until after the 16th that he reached Kingston ; to which place Sir George Prevost had accom- panied him from Montreal. The state of for- wardness in which he then found the fleet was such, that he was enabled to complete its equipment, and actually to set sail on the 27th of the same month, within little more than a week after his arrival at Kingston. The pre- vious exertion requisite to accomplish the build- ing of the Wolfe, a ship carrying 24 guns, the altering and refitting the brig Moira, and the making of the various repairs and alterations in the othei vessels, while at the same time a ship of a large class had been built at York, and was nearly ready to be launched in April, and a ship and several gun-boats were in a state of great forwardness at Amherstburg, may be easily conjectured ; particularly, when it is con- sidered that the stores and supplies of almost every description, necessary for the armament and equipment of these vessels, had been trans- ported to the Upper Province from Quebec and Montreal, the greater part of them during the winter, and through roads before deemed impas- sable for many of the heavy articles required. These difficulties were, however, soon sur- 65 mounted by the energetic measures of Sir George Prevost ; and he had the satisfaction to find on his arrival at Kingston, that the important object of having a fleet ready to take the Lake as early as it was probable that officers and sea- men could be sent from England to command and man it, had been accomplished. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival, as already mentioned, not more than ten days were requisite to put the squadron into a complete state of equipment, and from the period of its appearance on the Lake, the enemy ceased to enjoy the temporary ascendancy which their superior resources of men and supplies had enabled them, during the preceding month, to acquire. The Reviewer has confidently asserted, that these exertions to increase our marine ought to have been earlier made ; and that had they been so made, our ascendancy on the Lake would have been retained, and York, together with the ship which was there building, might have been saved. The answer to this has already been partly given. Any extraordinary exertions to increase a ma- rine so decidedly superior to that of the enemy, before the probable continuation of the war was clearly ascertained, and before any steps were taken by the Americans to rival us in that respect, would not have been justified, by the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was then placed. It was not until the beginning of F 66 'I n J ''I September, that the termination of the armistice manifested the intention of the American Go- vernment to continue the war, nor were any ef- fectual steps taken by them for a material in- crease of their naval forces at Sackett's Harbour, until the month of October following, when Commodore Chauncey and his seamen arrived at that place. It is evident, therefore, that except in the construction of new vessels, and the for- warding of the supplies necessary for their equip- ment, nothing further could have been done at that period, to enable us to keep pace with the exertions of the enemy ; and that without officers and men, who could not be expected be- fore the spring, any -lumber or description of vessels must have been useless. Sir George Prevost, soon after the declara- tion of war, had called the attention of Govern- ment, as well as that of the Admiral on the Ha- lifax station, to this subject. He had, therefore, every reason to expect that either from Eng- land or from Halifax, he should early in the year receive officers and seamen sufficient to fit out and man a fleet equal at least, if not superior, to any that the enemy might at that time be able to prepare. In this expectation Sir George Prevost was not disappointed ; and although the Admiral on the Halifax station had only been able to afford to his strong solicitations on this head. Lieutenants Barclay and Fennis, to act ()7 as captains, and four petty officers for lieute- nants, who arrived over land from New Bruns- wick at the end of April, this small supply of able and spirited officers being immediately des- patched to Kingston, materially contributed, by their active services, to put the Fleet into the forward condition in which it was found by Sir Jame^ Yeo on his arrival. Notwithstanding the active measures which were thus taken by Sir George Prevost to maintain our ascendancy upon the Lakes, the Quarterly Reviewer has thought proper to ob- serve, that it is perfectly inconceivable how any man, in Sir George Prevost's situation, could have been so infatuated, as to disregard the im- portance of maintaining his superiority. The gross injustice of this charge will be best proved by citing the words of Sir George Prevost him- self, in a letter of the 3rd February, 1813, ad- dressed to General Sheaffe. " The extreme anxiety I experienced respecting the naval force to be employed on Lake Ontario, in the spring of this year, has rendered the proceedings in the dock-yards at Kingston and York, subjects highly interesting to me. You may therefore suppose I shall expect to find the exertions at both these places to have fully corresponded with the magnitude of the object and the diffi- culties surmounted in forwarding from hence the numerous supplies required for that service." f2 t. ! ^ 1 ; 1 { j , i i 1 . -'' I i f 1 ;: • ' ■ 1 w ii:j li'S C8 Much has been said by the Reviewer upon the incompetency of the person commanding, and of the other officers belonging to our Pro- vincial marine on Lake Ontario.* Whatever might have been the want of energy and enter- prise on the part of Earle, in the instance to which the critic has alluded, and the circum- stances of which he has greatly exaggerated, Sir George Prevost did not think it incumbent upon him, on that account, to deprive himself of the services of that officer, who was acknow- ledged to be a tried and skilful navigator of the Lake, at a period when those services were particularly required for the transport of the various supplies destined for the upper parts of the Province. He was, therefore, retained in the command, not only as being highly useful for the purposes for which he was wanted, but because no person could then be found adequate to supply his place. That the captain of the Tartarus sloop of war, then at Quebec, needed but a hint from Sir George Prevost f to pro- ceed with his crew to Lake Ontario, and super- sede Earle and his feeble followers, may well be doubted, when we consider the state of the squadron to which he belonged, and the ser- vices required from it at the commencement of the war. Whether such a plan was beyond Sir * R evievv, p. 414. f Ibid. p. 415. G9 George's capacity ^^ may be left for tlie reader to determine. Had he, however, adopted it, he would certainly have evinced a great want of consistency and judgment. He was, at that period, in the act of negociating with General Dearborn for the armistice, which afterwards took place, with the reasonable expectation that the revocation of the Orders in Council would lead to a return of peace between Great Britain and America. Our force at that time on Lake Ontario v/as so decidedly superior, not only to what the enemy possessed on those waters, but to any which they could hope for several months to fit out, that an addition, either to its amount or efficiency, seemed to be uncalled for and un- necessary. Offensive operations of any descrip- tion, on our part, were not in contemplation ; and to every purpose of defensive warfare our means on the Lake were amply competent. To have deprived the Admiral, on the Halifax sta- tion, of the services of the Tartarus, when every ship was required by him for the protection of our trade from the numerous cruizers of the enemy, without any adequate object in view, would have been altogether unjustifiable on the part of Sir George Prevost. Whether, if the captain and seamen of the Tartarus had been sent to Lake Ontario, the enemy's flotilla, pre- * .Review, p. 415. 1 . * r t f il ' i I jlj! II' 70 paring at Sackett's Harbour * could have been destroyed; or whether, if ship-carpenters had, at the commencement of tlic war, been sent to Kingston, we coukl have built as rapidly as the enemy, cannot be proved, as neither course was attempted : nor is it material to the present discussion that it should be proved; the only question being, whether Sir George Prevost, in the then state of affairs, ought to have adopted either measure. From the preceding state- ment, it appears that he would not have been warranted in so doing. The observation of the Reviewer,^ that the common-place attempt to hire, at Quebec, sailors for the Lake at one-half the wages which merchant ere giving at the same moment, was the only exertion used to strengthen our flotilla, would not merit notice, if it were not for the purpose of exposing the writer's disingenuousness and want of candour. He must have known, when he made the asser- tion, that the merchants at Quebec hire their sailors for what is called the run-home (to Eng- land), and that for this purpose double and triple the amount of the common wages is frequently given; one-half, therefore, of that amount for a permanency, and on the Lake establishment, which held out many advantages to the men, was, as it proved, a sufficient inducement for * Review, p. 415. t Ibid. 71 ? them to enter into that service, and as many of the description required as could be found at Quebec, were procured by active and intelli- gent officers sent for that purpose. To these were added some valuable and experienced sea- men from two transports then in the river St. Lawrence ; and this supply of seamen, together with an additional number of shipwrights and other workmen, was during the winter forwarded to Kingston and York. The situation of York for the building of one of the frigates laid down in December, as before stated, has been censured by the Reviewer,* as holding out to the enemy an invitation to de- stroy it, from the defenceless state of that fort. Long before the first certain intelligence had been received by Sir George Prevost, of the building of a new ship at Sackett's Harbour, or of the fitting out of their flotilla there, Captain Gray, as already mentioned, one of the most intelligent officers of the Quarter-Master-Gene- ral's department, had been sent to the Upper Province, to ascertain the fittest situation for the construction of new vessels, whenever such a measure should become necessary. It was in consequence of the communication which that officer had with Major-General Brock, who had the highest confidence in his abilities, that it * Review, pp. 415, 41G. '!! ii i m i i j „ 4 ■i 1 il. L. 72 was decided that one ship should be built at York and the other at Kingston. Both places were alike exposed to attack t'roni their unforti- fied state. York was certainly the weakest, al- thoupfh (General IJrock had recommended that place as the fittest and most secure, if strength- ened, for a naval dock-yard on Lake Ontario. In determining to build at both places, it was thought most prudent not to run the hazard of losing both vessels from the possibility of a suc- cessful attempt of the enemy to destroy them, should they both be constructed at either of those places. The most effectual measures, on the part of Sir George Prevost and of those act- ing under him in the Upper Province, were taken to strengthen and fortify both York and Kingston, and it was expected that the enemy would be repelled in any attack upon either. It was not doubted, but that if York should be attacked and taken, the ship >vhich was build- ing there, might be, as she in fact was, destroyed, and thus be prevented from increasing the strength of the enemy, whilst Kingston might in the mean time be made too strong to occasion any fear for the safety of the fleet in that port. The result shewed the wisdom of this determi- nation, and the capture of York, which consi- dering the overwhelming force of the enemy, was not to be prevented, evidently preserved Kingston. 73 The only advantage which the Americans de- rived in this attack, as respected oiir marine, was tiie destruction of the new sliip, and the capture of an inconsiderahle quantity of stores designed for her, together witli the (jrh)ucester schooner, then lying a mere liulk, under repairs for a transpcH't. It may in this place he proper briefly to notice another assertion of tlie Re- viewer, respecting our marine — that the enemy commanded the waters of Lake (Muimphiin* with a flotilla, before the JJritish (commander in Chief had directed the construction of a single gun- boat to oppose them. That this should have been the fact, will not appear at all remarkable, when it is known that the waters of that Lake belong exclusively to the Americans, who enjoyed the most abundant means and resources for fitting out a fleet, from the number of vessels con- stantly navigating it for the purposes of trade. It was only necessary to arm and equip some of the vessels of that description, and their com- mand of the water would be undisputed. At the commencement of the war, and for some time afterwards, we neither did nor could pos- sess any force capable of meeting them ; but that this subject was not viewed with indifference by Sir George Prevost, notwithstanding the I' I ' t i * Review, p. 412. m 74 h I P"! lifv i! 1. 1. Ih-:! l|8i' variety of other and more important concerns which commanded his attention, may he inferred from the fact, that in June, 1813, in less than twelve months after the commencement of the war, our force of gun-hoats on the Richelieu river, communicating with Lake Champlain, was such, that in conjunction with our troops at Isle aux Noix, they were sufficient for the capture of two fine schooners of the enemy, each carrying 11 guns, and 45 men. To have attempted to create any other force, except gun-hoats, for the purpose of defending the Richelieu, would, when no offensive operations were contemplated, have been an useless waste of those means which were required and employed for the increase of our marine on the other Lakes. These observations upon Sir George Pre- vost's conduct with respect to our marine on the Lakes, may be concluded by a reference to the opinion of the public bodies in Upper Canada, with regard to the exertions of the Commander of the forces, ir preserving our naval ascendancy on those waters. These documents afford a strong proof of the sentiments almost universally entertained on this head, by persons most capable, from their know- ledge of, and interest in the subject, of appreci- ating the merits of Sir George Prevost's exer- tions. 75 In the address of the House of Assembly of Upper Canada,* in answer to the President's speech at the opening of the Provincial Parlia- ment, 27th February, 1813, they say, " We learn, with the highest satisfaction, that the most vi- gorous measures have been adopted under the direction of the Commander of the forces, and are now in operation, to strengthen the Provin- cial Marine, and preserve the superiority of the Lakes so essential to the ^irosperity of this Pro- vince." The same expressions occur in the ad- dress of the Legislative Council, and in March following, on Sir George Prevost's arrival in Upper Canada, the House of Assembly and town of York addressed him in similar terms. The campaign of 1813 opened, on the part of the Americans, with the attack and capture of York. The squadron under Commander Chaun- cey employed on this expedition, after landing part of the force at the Niagara frontier, re- turned to Sackett's Harbour, from whence it again sailed towards the end of May, with ano- ther strong force collected from that place and its neighbourhoc ' for the purpose of uniting with the troops on the Niagara frontier, in an attack upon Fort George. In this attack, which took place on the 27th May, the overwhelming numbers of the enemy prevailed, and the small 1 ( . ^■i Vide the Addresses in the Appondix, No. XXI. mi /() Tbut gallant band of about 1,500 men, under Bri- gadier-General Vincent, which had, for more than two hours, opposed nearly 5,000 of the Ameri- cans, a-fter evacuating Fort George, spiking the guns, and destroying the ammunition, retreated towards the head of the Lake, General Vincent having first called in all the detachments from the different Posts on that frontier. The enemy, pursuing his advantages, pushed forwards a force of between 3,000 and 4,000 infantry and cavalry, with nine pieces of artil- lery, to attack the position which General Vin- cent occupied at Burlington. Previous, how- ever, to their reaching that point, a well-con- certed, daring, and spirited attack was made upon their camp in the night, ty a party of Ge- neral Vincent's force, and under his command, which proved completely successful as a sur- prise, and Generals Winder and Chandler, the two senior officers, together with 100 prisoners, and four field-pieces being taken, the enemy, after destroying their stores and provisions, &c. precipitately retreated, until they joined the main body of their army. While these opera- tions were proceeding, the most active measures were taking at Kingston to fit out and equip a fleet which might be able to dispute with the enemy the temporary ascendancy which they had gained on the Lake ; but whatever efforts might be made to construct vessels and prepare 'r'-t 77 them for service, it must be obvious that no ad- vantage could be derived from any number or description of vessels without officers and sea- men. The only reinforcement which up to this period, the end of April, Sir George Prevost had been able to obtain from the Admiral com- manding on the Halifax station, consisted of the three lieutenants, and four petty officers, whose arrival at Kingston has been already mentioned, and whose active services had very much acce- lerated the equipment of our squadron before Sir James Yeo took the command of it. Pre- vious to the arrival of Sir George Prevost at that place in May, his extreme anxiety re- specting the naval forc^e preparing on both Lakes, had induced him, during the depth of winter, to proceed in the m(mth of February, from the Lower Province to Kingston, York, and Fort George, where his presence must have essen- tially contributed to impart increased activity to the preparations then making for the open- ing of the next campaign. The zeal and energy thus displayed by him in his indefatigable en- deavours to promote the public service, although justly appreciated by the inhabitants of both provinces, could not protect him from the un- founded accusations of the Reviewer,* who in- forms his readers that Sir George Prevost had Review, p, 417. 78 § \A '■'' m ill ' iii excited the expectations of the Canadian public, " that he had designed an attack upon Sackett's Harbour, where the shipping was known to be very indifferently protected, by marching over the ice, which was stronger at that time than had been known for many years." — And that " the anxious inhabitants of the Provinces who had witnessed his previous inactivity, with ij-Joomy foreboding, were again doomed to be disap- pointed." What the opinion of the inhabitants of the Provinces was, with regard to Sir George Prevost s "' previous inactivity,'' has clearly beoi shewn from the different addresses presented Ito him at the period alluded to. That Sackett s Harbour could at that time, or at any other period of the winter, have been attacked with the smallest prospect of success, may be confidently denied. So far from the shipping, which by the Reviewer's* own show- ing, was a formidable squadron, commanded by an experienced officer, and manned by more than 500 able seamen, being, as he has asserted, indifferently protected, the enemy had con- structed batteries for their defence, and it was known that a very consideraible force had been assembled at that post, and in its neighbour- hood, in order to be ready for embarkation as soon as the season would permit the fleet to i * Review, p. 411. 79 take the Lake. To have attempted with the small force which then garrisoned Kingston, and which was scarcely sufficient for its defence, an expedition against an enemy's position, capable of a determined resistance, when it is considered that the troops would have been obliged to march several miles over the ice before they could reach the American territory, from whence they would still have been 15 miles distant from the object of their attack, and exposed during the whole of their approach to the concealed fire of the enemy's troops in the woods, would have been, under the circumstances in which Sir George Prevost was placed, with regard to his resources for defending Kingston, the Key, as it has been termed, to the Lower Province, little short of madness. Nothing but a deter- mination to attach blame to the conduct of Sir George Prevost could have induced the Re- viewer to hazard so groundless and unmilitary a stricture. That Sir George was alive to the importance of attacking this place, ^.nd of de- stroying the means there possessed ^>y I'le enemy for increasing their marine, nnd for carrying on from thence their offensive operations, will ap- pear -evident from the measure which will be immediately adverted to, and which has drawn upon the Commander of the forces the acrimo- nious censure of the Reviewer. In December, 1812, Sir George Prevost, aware I i ! . f 80 n < i of the importance of strengthening himself against the threatened attempts upon the Ca- nadas, in the interval which would elapse before any reinforcements could by possibility arrive from Europe, had directed Lieutenant-General Sir John Sherbrooke, and Major-General Smyth, to make arrangements for forwarding to him, during the winter, by land, the 104th regiment, then in New Brunswick. This arduous march, which had not before been attempted, and which was thought extremely hazardous, if not altoge- ther impracticable, was effected in the month of March without the loss of a single man, and by the end of April six companies of that regiment arrived at Kingston. This accession to the strength of that garrison enabled Sir George Prevost, who, as already stated, reached King- ston with Sir James Yeo about the middle of May, to avail himself of the opportunity afforded by the sailing of the American fleet for the head of the Lake, to attempt a diversion in favour of the points threatened by the enemy on the Nia- gara frontier. The expedition against Sackett's Harbour was accordingly resolved upon, the mo- ment the absence of the enemy's squadron was ascertained. The circumstances which attended this expedition, have been misrepresented in the most extraordinary manner by the Quarterly Reviewer,* who, instead of ascribing the failure Review, pp. 418, 419, 420. 81 of the enterprise to its real and natural causes, as given in the official report of Colonel Baynes,* and which will now be more particularly de- tailed, has not scrupled to attribute that failure to the indecision and misconduct of the Com- mander of the forces. As the whole force, which could be mustered for this service, hardly ex- ceeded 700 men, consisting of the greater part of the garrison of Kingston, it must be obvious that means so inadequate could justify an attempt to carry Sackett's Harbour only by surprise. This, in fact, was the sole object in view; and the troops being embarked, together with two field-pieces, on board of our squadron, sailed in the evening of the 27th May, under the imme- diate command of Colonel, now Major-General Baynes. Sanguine hopes were entertained of reaching the enemy's post in the course of the night, when the surprise would have been com- plete, and our success infallible ; but owing to light and baffling winds, it was not until between 10 and 11 o'clock on the following morning, the 28th, that our Heet was able to approach within 12 or 15 miles of Sackett's Harbour. Previously to this, and as soon as our squadron had been discovered from the port, alarm-guns had been fired, and boats were seen filled with armed men. :; I I ;. * Vide the Report in the Appendix, No. X\II. G 82 III ? I:*; i continually passing down the shpres of the Lake, from Oswego towards Sackett's Harbour, to as- sist in its defence. In the mean time, the troops on board the fleet were held in readiness for landing in the boats, as soon as the vessels should have approached sufficiently near to the shore for that purpose, as well as for insuring their co- operation in the attack. At this period, unfor- tunately, the wind, which had been rather fair, though light, altogether failed, and shortly after- wards the breeze came almost immediately from the point which the fleet was endeavouring to ap- proach. To have attempted a landing in boats, at the distance of fifteen miles from the object of at- tack, would have been a most tedious and hazard- ous undertaking, exposed, as the men must have been, to the fire of musketry and field-pieces from the shore, and to the direct enfilade of all the heavy cannon in the enemy's forts and batteries. The day was too far advanced to leave any hope of completing the service before dark ; and without the efficient co-operation of the fleet, which, from the state of the wind, could not be obtained, the most gallant exertions of the troops, as was afterwards proved, would have been ineffectual. From these circumstances, it was the unani- mous opinion of the principal officers of the ex- pedition under Colonel Baynes, who, together with Sir James Yeo, had been consulted by him as to the expediency of persevering in the en- M 83 terprise, that the attempt should be abandoned, and orders were accordingly given tor the return of the squadron to Kingston. The incident of the surrender of the cavalry oflicer and his party, which is stated by the Reviewer with his usual incorrectness, did certainly lead to the de- termination, which was subsequently taken, of persisting in the expedition ; but it was the in- formation obtained from those persons, with re- gard to the force of the enemy, and their means of defence, which principally influenced that de- termination. It appearing probable, from the state of the wind, which towards evening again became favourable for approaching Sackett':^ Harbour, that the men might be brought under cover of the night to the point of attack, in which they would be supported by the active co-operation of the fleet, it was resolved to make the attack at day-break the following morning. In order to favour the belief that we had abandoned the attempt, the ships' heads were kept towards Kingston unt il the evening commenced, when the squadron stood in for the shore. The troops were in tlie boats at ten o'clock, and confident hopes were indulged that, on the approach to the landing at day-break, they would be assisted by the artillery, and re- ceive the effectual support and co-operation of the fleet, which was judged most essential to the success of the undertaking. The landing took G 2 ■1 84 I : h. place as was intended, nearly at day-break ; and, considering the local impediments, was effected in a style highly creditable to the military skill of Colonel Uaynes. Notwithstanding the want of our artillery, which being on board of a schooner, towed by the boats of the squadron, was still at a considerable distance, and the state of the wind, which prevented the squadron from approaching the shore, our troops, after land- ing and taking possession of one of their field- pieces and a tumbril, had, by a spirited advance, driven the enemy before them, at the point of the bayonet, through the woods, which were most obstinately maintained by them, and had forced them to retire towards their works and loop- holed barracks. But these works were found to be of such strength, as to render it next to im- possible for our small force, unprovided with heavy cannon, to make any impression upon them. The men had been now engaged for se- veral hours, and had sustained a . considerable loss. It was at this period that Sir George Pre- vost, who had landed shortly after the troops, and who had followed their course and progress, came up with the main body engaged with the enemy ; and it was then that he received from the officer commanding the expedition, the re- port of the manner in which the enemy had been driven towards their works and loop-holed bar- racks, and of the difficulty, if not impossibility, of 85 forcing them without tlie aid of our artillery and the co-operation of our fleet. The former, with all the exertions made in towing the schooner, had not been landed ; and the latter, from the state of the wind, could not approach sufficiently near for their guns to bear upon the enemy's batteries. The Commander of the forces then, for the first time, interfered, so as to give any orders respecting the e.cpedition. Though there was scarcely a hope of success, yet he determined not to abandon the enterprise whilst a possibility of attaining his ob- ject remained. He accordingly directed Colonel Baynes to concentrate his scattered force, and to advance upon the enemy, who were posted in considerable numbers in front of and behind their loop-holed barracks. Not more than from 300 to 400 men could be assembled for this last at- tack. It was, however, made by this small band with intrepid gaUantry. The enemy, though superior in numbei s were Iriven from their po- sition, and forced to take shelter in the town ; but in the further attempt to approach the works, our troops were met by such a galling and destructive fir*, of grape and musketry, both in front and flank, that th<'y wer« compelled to abandon a contest to which their numbers were so uneq^.. ' The force of the enemy, at this period, couisted, by their own acknowledg- ment, exciii^ive of their killed and wounded, of y-, i! 'I n i>. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. ..<^' .<^ % ^" «/. t/j f/> 1.0 I.I l^|28 |2.5 |J0 i""^" ll^s 2.0 1.8 1.25 1.4 1.6 -m 6" — ' ► v] <^ / 'c^ J>> %:*^^'^ V \\ % V '^.y. 6^ ^tsi p..''<^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WLBSTER.N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ) Ua •^ f> 8(> i^ I upwards of 1,100 men, including 14:1 artillery- men. They were strongly posted in I'ort Tomp- kins, armed with heavy guns, and in their block- houses and loop-holed barracks, the very situa- tion which renders the youngest American re- cruit (a marksman from his youth), more than a match for the most experienced veteran. Our force was reduced to nearly one-third of its effective strength from the casualties of the field, and from the absence of those who had withdrawn to the rear with the wounded and prisoners. We possessed not a single field-piece, the artillery not having yet been landed. Colonel Young had retired from exhaustion, in conse- quence of previous illness. All the other field- oflicers, one excepted, were wounded, together with most of the captains and subalterns. Cap- tain Mulcaster coTtimanding the gun-boat, made every exertion in his power ; but there was no hope of assistance from the fleet, in conrequence of the state of the wind. Under such circum- stances, that so small a band, exhausted by pre- vious exertion, should have attacked and car- ried Fort Tompkins, the block-houses, and the remaining loop-holed barracks of the enemy, so numerously defended as they were, might pro- bably be expected by such experienced war- riors as the Quarterly Reviewer, and those upon whose authority he relies ; but it was ap- parent to every officer and man who was pre- 87 se P- e- sent, that success was impossible. Such being the conviction of the Commander of the forces, who had witnessed with feehngs of poignant re- gret th'j last gallant though unavailing exertions of his troops, he reluctantly ordered their re- embarkation, which was effected in the most perfect order, and without the slightest precipita- tion, the enemy not attempting to offer the least molestation. This expedition, though certainly attended with a considerable loss on our part, was not unproductive of advantage to us, or of damage and serious inconvenience to our ad- versaries. Their apprehensions of the result of the last attack, ignorant as they were of the trifling force by which it was made, induced them to set fire to their new ship and naval arsenal; and although, afterwards, when their fear subsided, from a more perfect knowledge of the state of our force, they succeeded in ex- tinguishing the fire on board the ship, before it had got to any height, yet, by their own acknow- ledgment, they lost their arsenal, with a large quantity of valuable stores ; while one field-piece, and upwards of 200 prisoners were brought away, together with some camp-equipage, and another field-piece was rendered useless. Their loss, also, in killed and wounded was, by their own admis- sion, upwards of 150 men. From this detail of facts, to the truth of which there are abun- dant living witnesses to vouch, it must be ob- 88 vious that the main object of the expedition failed principally from the smallness of our num- bers, compared with the superior force of the enemy; from the want of our artillery, which could not be landed in time ; and particularly from the little assistance which, from the state of the wind, the squadron could afford in taking off the fire of the forts. So far from nearly two days being lost, as the Reviewer has stated,* it is notorious to every person who was em- ployed in that expedition, that the fleet sailed on the evening of the 27th May from Kingston, and did not arrive at Sackett's Harbour until the morning of the 28th, when the intended attack WPS prevented solely by the impossibility of ap- proaching the shore from the state of the M'ind, and that it did in fact take place on the follow- ing morning, the 29th, within 24 hours after the fleet had appeared off the place. It is a fact equally well known to every person engaged in this enterprise, that Sir George Prevost did not take the personal command of it, in the sense in which the Reviewer f would have it understood. That he accompanied the expedition was never denied, or attempted to be concealed. His zea- lous and anxious feelings prompted him to that measure, to prevent any delay in the contem- plated service, should a reference to him become * Review, p. 419. t Review, p. 41B. 80 necessary. It is freely admitted, that when pre- sent he could not divesi himself of his autho- rity, or responsibility as Commander of the for- ces. But independently of its being contrary to all military usage, for the Governor in Chief and Commander of the forces in British North America, to assume the immediate command* of so inconsiderable a force, no instance of his interference took place until the period of the last attack, which certainly produced the great- est damage that the enemy sustained. The order to retreat was neither precipitate,f nor one which the gallant officers " believed with difficulty." J They were ail convinced, not excepting the naval commander, Sir James Yeo, that it was im- possible longer to contend with any prospect of success, and with our diminished means, against * Review, p. 420. t There cannot be a stronger contradiction to the Reviewer's assertion, that the order to retreat was precipitate, than the fact which was known to every officer engaged in the expedi- tion, that after the last assault, and before any order was given for the retreat or re-embarkation of the troops, a flag of truce was sent into the town, with a summons for the surrender of the place, and that some time necessarily elapsed before a re- fusal was received to that demand. It was not until after the return of the officer with that refusal, and when all hope of the co-operation of the fleet had been relinquished, the artillery still not having been landed, that the order was given for the re-embarkation of the troops. X Review, p. 410. 11 I i:n 90 the superior numbers and resources of the enemy. It may indeed be confidently asserted, in direct opposition to the Reviewer's statement, that although " the troops withdrew to their boats in disappointment," at their not having been able to accomplish their object, they felt no dis- grace in retiring from a contest which they had so long and so bravely supported ; nor did either officers or men experience any indignation or shame at a retreat which, after the most gallant, though unavailing exertions, they knew to be indispensable for their own preservation. It may here be observed, that the situation of our troops at the time of the retreat was most criti- cal. At that very period, a reinforcement of 600 men, under Colonel Tuttle, reached Sack- ett's Harbour. With the overwhelming superio- rity which this accession to their force gave the enemy, it is obvious that with very moderate pretensions to either skill or enterprise, they might have opposed most formidable obstacles to our re-embarkation. A further persever- ance in the attack on our part, or the least delay in the retreat, would probably have ended in the capture or destruction of the whole of our troops. Fortunately, the coolness and delibera- tion with which that measure was executed, served to deceive the enemy with regard to our numbers and losses ; and the re-embarkation being effected without opposition, the troops re- 91 turned the same day to Kingston with the field- piece, camp-equipage, and prisoners which they had taken. On the following morning the American squa- dron, which had been recalled from the head of the Lake to the assistance of Sackett's Harbour, appeared off Kingston, and it was a most fortu- nate circumstance that they did not fall in with our fleet, encumbered as it was with troops and wounded men. One material advantage imme- diately accrued from this expedition, by the reci) of the enemy's fleet to Sackett's Harbour. Sir George Prevost lost not a moment in availing himself of the opportunity of their being in port, to embark the 49th regiment on board the squa- dron, and to despatch it to the head of the Lake to reinforce Brigadier-General Vincent, who was then hard pressed by the enemy, and to whose small force that regiment proved an important accession of strength at a very critical period. Sir James Yeo accordingly sailed with, and safely landed them, and from that time our full equality at least, if not our ascendancy, was esta- blished on Lake Ontario. In reviewing the events that took place du- ring the campaign of 1813, it will be necessary to notice the operations on the Detroit frontier, and on Lake Erie, more especially as the Com- mander of the forces has been accused of ne- 92 i' h glecting the representations of Colonel Procter, who commanded in that quarter. The battle of Frenchtown, in which the Ame- ricans were totally defeated, and their General captured, was highly creditable to the talents of Colonel Procter, who certainly, until the retreat from Anilierstburgh, was entitled to the reputa- tion of a zealous and active officer. It is said by the Quarterly Reviewer, that at this period Colonel Procter was positively re- strained by Sir George Prevost from any offen- sive operations. The nature of the instructions given by the Commander of the forces to that officer has been already shewn ; and will further appear by a reference to the letters* of Sir George Prevost to Colonel, now become Briga- dier-General Proctei, in answer to the despatches received from him, announcing the different operations which had taken place in the Mi- chigan territory. These operations, though not always attended with success on the part of General Procter, and though they occasioned a considerable diminution of his small force from his repeated losses, were yet favourably viewed by Sir George Prevost, who, as it appears from the correspondence already referred to, was always disposed to give him full credit for his exertions. Vide Appendix, No. XXIII. 93 i and to put the most favourable construction upon his failures. That Sir George Prevost was fully aware of the importance of General Procter's position, and of the necessity of strengthening it by every means in his power, will now be shewn by the testimony of General Procter himself. The letters of that officer fully prove, in con- tradiction to the assertion of the Reviewer, who has attributed to the Commander of the forces, the neglect (if any took place) in forwarding to him the reinforcements which he had so strongly solicited, that no such neglect is imputable to Sir George Prevost. As early as the month of March, 1813, a con- fidential letter was addressed by Sir George Pre- vost to General Procter, upon the subject of the reinforcements he had soli* ited, and Captain M'Douall, one of the Commander of the forces' Aias-de-camp, was sent for the purpose of ascer- taining General Procter's wants, and the best mode of relieving them. In the correspondence between the Commander of the forces and Ge- neral Vincent, the situation of General Procter was constantly alluded to, and the former officer was desired to pay his particular attention to the subject. On the 20th June, Sir George Prevost acquainted General Procter that Ge- neral de Rottenburg, who had been appointed to the command of the forces serving in Upper i:\. :i II 1 ¥ Canada, had received his directions to push on the remainder of the 41st regiment, from the head of Lake Ontario to Amherstburgh. And in his subsequent letters to General Procter, of the 11th and 12th July, after stating that his wants of money, clothing, &c. had been supplied as far as lay in the power of the Conunandcr of the forces, and that those articles were then on their passage to him, he informed him that the whole of the 41st regiment were cither on their way, or would be with him before that letter could arrive. This assurance was given by Sir George Prevost, in the full confidence that the orders which he had sent to the officer commanding in Upper Canada, for the immediate forwarding of the remainder of that regiment to Amherstburgh, had been complied with. That they were not complied with as early as Sir George Prevost intended they should be, was owing to circum- stances over which the Commander of the forces had no control. The force under Major-Ge- neral de Rottenburg, from which the 41st regi- ment was to be detached, was then before an enemy greatly superior in numbers and resources, and he was very unwilling to weaken it by send- ing off the remainder of that regiment, until other reinforcements which were on their way to him should arrive. It appears, however, by his letter to Sir George Prevost, of 9th July, 1813, that he had, on the 6th of that month. 95 sent forward 120 men of that regiment to Long Point, in order that thence they might be trans- ported by means of the fleet to Amherstburgli, and that it was his intention to send the re- mainder of the regiment to General Procter, as soon as the Royals, then daily expected, should arrive. In a subsequent letter from Sir George Prevost to Major-General de Rottenburg, dated 23d' July, 1813, in which his high opinion of General Procter's merits and conduct is point- edly expressed, he says, " I trust the reinforce- ments and supplies, which, in consequence of my orders to you, must be near him," &c. From these letters it is evident that it was Sir George Prevost's intention that General Procter should be reinforced to the extent he had required, and that the commanding officers in Upper Canada, who from the peculiar circum- stances in which they were placed at the time, thought themselves justified, as they really were, in so doing> were the persons who delayed the forwarding of such reinforcements. That to this cause the delay was attributed by General Procter himself, is unequivocally proved by his correspondence respecting it with the Commander of the forces. The letter to Sir George Prevost, of the 4th July, 1813, to which the Reviewer has referred,* commences .|..i * Review, p. 425. ' 90 in a way little to be expected, from the extract which that writer has given from it. He says, " I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 4th ult. and am fully sensible that this district has received a due share of your Excellency's attention. 1 beg to add, that if I had received from, the Line the reinforce- ments which you had directed should he sent, I should by this time," &c. It must not be forgotten that this letter was before the Reviewer,, and that he must there- fore have designedly suppressed that portion of it, which completely exonerates Sir George Pre- vost from any charge of neglect. In General Procter's next letter to the Com- mander of the forces, of the 1 1th July, he says, " I beg leave to add, that we are fully confident of every aid from your Excellency, and of the fortunate result of the contest, if tve are alloived the benefit of your consideration of us; but I am unfortunately so situated, that your best inten- tions towards me are of no avail. If the means were afforded me, and which were no more than what your Excellency has repeatedly directed, &c." — In his next letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 13th July, he says, " The rein- forcements which have been reluctantly afforded me, notwithstanding your Excellency' s intentions. have been so sparingly and tardily sent me, as in a considerable degree to defeat the purpose of 97 their being sent. I liave no hopes of any aid from the centre division, where our situation is little understood, or has ever been a seeondary consideration.'" — These extraets clearly shew that (jreneral Procter ascribed the delay in for- warding to him the remainder of the 41st re- giment, not to the Commander of the forces, but to General de Rottenburg, who then com- manded the centre division in Upper Canada. Notwithstanding the Reviewer must have known this to have been the fact, from the very correspondence he was ciuoting, he has had the hardihood to say, " that although Sir George Prevost fully acknow ledged, in his letter of the 12th July, his immediate ability to grant the re- inforcement General Procter had asked for, in his letter of the 4th of that month, it will scarcely be credited, that even after this, he should have suffered above Jive tveeks to elapse before he despatched the small amount of regular troops, &c."* Now it appears from General de Rotten- burg's letter, before referred to, that 120 men of the 4 1st, had been despatched to Amherstburgh on the 6th July ; and by a return made to the Mi- litary Secretary's Office, by Captain Chambers, Deputy-Quarter-Master-General with General Procter's army, dated Amherstburgh, 13th Au- ■i if f * Vide Review, p. 42f>, H h 98 vm M gust, 1813, it further appears, that up to the iOlh August, more than 300 rank and file of the 41st, and 41 rank and file of the Royal New- foundland Regiment, v/ith nearly 50 officers and non-commissioned officers, had arrived at that post, which was further strengthened, within ten days afterwards, by a detachment of 50 provin- cial dragoons. The cavalry and men of the Newfoundland Regiment were particularly re- quested, by General Procter, in his correspond- ence with the Commander of the forces, to be sent to him. It may here be observed, that General Proc- ter appears to have attached by far too much importance to his own command, and not to have made proper allowances for the critical si- tuation of the centre division, from which his reinforcements were expected. Upon the safety of that division his own altogether depended; for had they been defeated, or obliged to retire from the Upper Province, he would have been cut off from all supplies and assistance, and his capture would have been inevitable. Whereas, as afterwards happened, a disaster to the force under General Procter, and the capture of Am- herstburgh, would not necessarily involve in it the safety of the centre division. These reasons, without doubt, weighed with General de Rot- tenburg, in retaining the remainder of the 41st regiment, until they could be despatched to Ge- 99 neral Procter, without injury to the more im- portant service for which they were required on the Niagara frontier. Having thus proved that, as far as depended upon Sir George Prevost, General Procter's re- quisitions, of every description, had been com- plied with, we now proceed to shew that he did not neglect our marine on Lake Erie. The Quarterly Reviewer, indeed, has not he- sitated to say, " that in the whole course of that vacillation and error, which unhappily distin- guished the administration of Sir George Pre- vost,* his imbecility of judgment and action was most flagrant and palpable, in the circumstances which led to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie." These censures, unfounded as they are, may perhaps be thought to require a more particular and detailed reply. To the exertions made by Sir George Prevost, both before the war and after its commencement, to preserve our naval ascendancy on Lake Erie, we have already had occasion to refer. From these statements it will appear, that, indepen- dently of the new schooner. Lady Prevost, launched, armed, equipped, and upon the Lake, before the month of August, 1812, the Detroit, a ship to carry 18 guns, which the Reviewer wou,id have bis readers believe was only laid ■ifi * Review, p. 427. h2 100 down after Captain Barclays arrival at Am- herslburgh in June* had been commenced build- ing before the month of March preceding, toge- ther with several gun-boats. The latter were launched in April. The ship was, in fact, in a state of considerable forwardness, when Cap- tain Barclay assumed the command on the Lake. Upon the declaration of war, we had only one ship and a schooner on Lake Erie ; and, within little more than a year afterwards, our fleet there consisted of two ships, a brig, a schooner, and two small vessels. In order properly to appre- ciate the efforts made for the construction and armament of this squadron, it must be borne in mind that the whole of the supplies necessary for that purpose, with the exception perhaps of the timber alone, were to be transported from the Lower to the Upper Province, by the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario, and from thence to Lake Erie, where the superiority of our marine enabled us to convey them to Amherstburgh. As the efficiency of this squadron necessarily depended upon the number and discipline of the crews with which it was manned, the subject of a supply of able seamen, for that service, early engaged the attention of Sir George Prevost. Upon Sir James Yeo's arrival at Kingston, and the appointment by him of Captain Barclay, to 1 * Review, p. 4*25. 101 M 't take the naval command on Lake Erie, the Commander of the forces urgently requested Sir James to supply that officer with a greater num- ber of seamen than he was disposed, from his own wants, to allow him. As the obtaining the naval ascendancy, on Lake Ontario, was a pri- mary consideration, and as the seamen whom Sir James Yeo brought with him were not sufficient adequately to man his own ships. Captain Barclay was obliged to proceed with a very scanty sup- ply of men. The Commander of the forces was in hopes that there might be other opportuni- ties of increasing Captain Barclay's force, and that, in the mean time, the remforcements which he intended, and immediately afterwards di- rected, should be sent to General Procter, would enable him to spare a sufficient number of sol- diers for the use of the squadron on Lake Erie, until Captain Barclay's wants could be more ef- ficiently supplied. The first letter from Captain Barclay, upon the subject of these wants, was addressed to Brigadier-General Vincent, who then commanded on the Niagara frontier, and was dated 17th June, 1813. The principal ob- ject of that letter was to obtain a reinforcement of troops for General Procter, in order to enable him to co-operate with Captain Barclay, in an attack upon the enemy's naval establishment at Presqu' isle, and in that letter he expressly states that he was making an application for seamen to )!• „ n 102 Sir James Yeo. This communication was for- warded to the Commander of the forces by Ge- neral Vincent, with an intimation that he should immediately push forward the remainder of the 41st regiment, (a company of the regiment having been sent by him the preceding month) in order to assist in the proposed attack upon the enemy's fleet. Before the above letter either was or could be received by Sir George Prevost, he had ap- pointed Major-General de Rottenburg to the command of the forces in Upper Canada, and had given him particular directions for supply- ing General Procter's wants, and for immedi- ately despatching to him the remainder of the 41st regiment. The Reviewer has asserted,* that " Captain Barclay stated the wants of his squadron in men, stores, and guns, with the same truth and earnestness as General Procter had repeatedly expressed; but the onli/ reply of Sir George Prevost, to his statements, was a cold and general promise, in a letter to General Proc- ter, that some petty officers and seamen, for Lake Erie, should be sent forward on the first oppor- tunity." Captain Barclay's wants were particularly de- tailed by him to the Commander of the forces, in the only letter he addressed to him on the subject, dated Long Point, 16th July, 1813. Review, p. 427. 103 The receipt of this letter was acknowledged by Sir George Prevost, on the 21st of the same month, he having the day before sent an extract from it, with a strong letter of representation upon the subject, to Lord Bathurst. In this letter to Captain Barclay, Sir George Prevost states, that he is fully aware of all that officer's difficulties, and that he should endeavour to re- lieve his wants, as far as was in his power, ex- plaining to him the reasons which prevented him from so doing to the extent required. He re- peats, also, what he had before said to General Procter, that Captain Barclay must endeavour to obtain his naval stores from the enemy, but that being satisfied that such a measure could not be effected without an addition to his pre- sent strength, he had strongly pressed upon Sir James Yeo the necessity of immediately sending forward to him a supply of petty officers and seamen, and that he (Sir J. Yeo), had assured the Commander of the forces that he would do so without delay : that he had also given positive directions for the remainder of the 41st regiment to be sent to General Procter, and hoped that the arrival of these reinforcements would afford the timely means of attempting something against the enemy's flotilla, before it should be in a state to venture out upon the Lake. — With this as- surance from Sir James Yeo, that seamen and officers should be supplied to Captain Barclay, and 11 104 in the hope that his repeated orders for the reinforcement of General Procter, with the re- mainder of the 41st regiment, had been complied with. Sir George Prevost might with justice point out to Captain Barclay the necessity of supplying his further wants from the enemy's resources,* more especially as General Procter had repeatedly declared that a supply of troops alone would be sufficient to enable him to suc- ceed in an attack upon Presqu' isle. Subsequent to Captain Barclay's letter to the Commander of the forces, of the 16th July, all further representations respecting the supply of seamen for Lake Erie, were made by General Procter, in his letters to Sir George Prevost. The several answers to these representations the Reviewer has not thought proper to notice, con- tenting himself with giving a partial and imma- terial extract from Sir George Prevost's letter to General Procter, of the 22nd August, evi- dently for the purpose of introducing what he is pleased to term a tau7it, but which was in fact neither designed as such by Sir George, nor so considered by the gallant Captain Barclay. After stating that General Procter had, in his letter of the 18th August, 1813, announced to the Com- mander of the forces, that the Detroit was launched, and that, if he had seamen, a few hours - * Review j p. 427. 105 woold place that district in security, the R,e- viewer adds, ** but instead of replying to this application, with an immediate reiii/orccment of seamen, the Commander-in-chief answered it as usual, on the 22nd of August, with mere pro- mises." Without dwelling upon the Reviewer's error in supposing that Sir George Prevost, who had no control whatever over the seamen belonging to the squadron on Lake Ontario, who were ex- clusively under the orders of Sir James Yeo, could by any possibility immediately have sent forward to Captain Barclay the reinforcement of seamen required, we shall shew that Sir George Prevost's answer to the application was not one of mere promises, but that the reinforce- ment required, and which had been previously provided by him, was then actually on its way to its destination. Within two days after the date of the letter of the Commander of the forces to Captain Barclay before referred to, he ac- quainted General Procter that Sir James Yeo had assured him, that as many petty officers and seamen as could be spared, should be forwarded to Captain Barclay without delay, but that he. Sir George Prevost, much feared they would, as to numbers, fall short of his expectations. That he was, however, endeavouring to obtain a further supply from Quebec, which he meant should be exclusively appropriated for the ser- 106 1 - ' vice of Lake Erie. This letter, which was an answer to that of General Procter, of the date of 13th July,* referred to by the Reviewer, has been altogether suppressed by him, as well as the material fact that almost immediately after the letter of 13th July was written. General Procter relinquished the intended expedition against Presqu'isle, although 120 men of the 41st had been sent forward to Long Point, to be there taken on board by Captain Barclay for that purpose, and employed the whole of his dispos- able force in an unsuccessful expedition to Forts Meigs and Sandusky, by which proceeding that force was considerably diminished. In his an- swer of the 22d to General Procter's letter of the 18th August, before referred to, an extract from which is given in the note. Sir George Prevost expressed his opinion of that expedi- tion, and stated the measures he was taking to remedy the inconveniences which might arise from it.t After mentioning the reinforcements * Keview, p. 427. f " I have had the honor to receive your letters of the 9th and 18th inst. The first I received at York on my way to the centre division, and I cannot refrain from expressing my regret at your having allowed the clamour of the Indian warriors to induce you to commit a part of your force in an unequal and hopeless combat. " You cannot be ignorant of the limited nature of the force at my disposal for the defence of our extensive frontier, and ought, therefore, not to count too largely upon my disposition to strengthen the right division." 107 which he intended to send forward to Genera! Procter, he informed him, that, of the three troop-ships which had arrived at Quebec with De Meuron's regiment, two had conveyed to Hali- fax 500 American prisoners of war, and the third, the Dover, had been laid up in consequence of his having directed three-fourths of the officers and seamen to he landed and sent forward for the naval service on the Lakes ; and that he had the satisfaction to inform General Procter, that the first Lieutenant of that ship, with 50 or 60 seamen, were then at Kingston, from whence they were to be forwarded, without delay, to Amherstburgh. This circumstance Sir George Prevost requested might be made known to Captain Barclay. This portion of the letter, which so clearly shews the exertions Sir George Prevost had made, and was then making, to send a supply of seamen to Lake Erie, the Reviewer, with the whole letter before him. has thought proper to omit, and in lieu of it, to insert as the only reply given by Sir George Prevost to Ge- neral Procter's request for further assistance, a passage in the letter* which was evidently meant as a compliment to the bravery of General Proc- ter's troops, and an encouragement to him to persevere under the difficulties of his situation, assured, as he must have been, that every en- * Review, p. 428. lOS '.mi deavour was making to relieve him. On the 26th August, four days after the date of the last letter, the Military Secretary informed General Procter that Colonel Talbot had been sent to the head of the Lake to await the arrival of the seamen mentioned in his letter of the 25th, and to forward them to Amherstburgh with all pos- sible despatch. He was further informed, that 1 2 241b. carronades for the new ship, the Detroit, were expected in the fleet at Burlington Bay, and General Procter was desired to request Cap- tain Barclay, on his arrival at Long Point, to send off' an express to the officer commanding at Burlington Heights, to say when he would be ready to receive them on board. In this letter, the Military Secretary, Captain Freer says, " His Excellency trusts, that upon the arrival of the seamen. Captain Barclay will be able to make his appearance on the Lake to meet the enemy." From all that has been stated upon this sub- ject, it must satisfactorily appear, that every exertion in the power of Sir George Prevost was made by him to supply the wants of Cap- tain Barclay and the squadron, both with seamen and stores, and that at the very period when the action was fought, more men were on their way to him. The truth of the Reviewer's assertion, that the conduct of Sir George Prevost contributed to the destruction of our marine on Lake Erie, I 109 will be best ascertained by a reference to ('ap- tain Barclay himself; and the following letter from that officer to the present Sir George Pre- vost, will clearly shew how imwarrantably the character of the Commander of the forces in the Canadas has been attacked on this occasion. Sir, Edinburgh, \ 4th January, 1023. " I have had the honor to receive a letter from Miss Prevost, acquainting me that the fa- mily of the late Lieut.-General Sir George Pre- vost are preparing a pamphlet, in vindication of his memory and conduct, so ungenerously and cruelly aspersed in the Quarterly Review for October, 1822, and appealing to me for the truth or falsehood of that portion of the article, which attributes the defeat and capture of His Majesty's squadron on Lake Erie, then under my command, to the imbecility of his conduct, and general in- attention to our necessities. " I most deeply lament that an article so un- generous and severe, should have been written, when the object of its hostility has been so long in his grave, which must not only lacerate most deeply the feelings of his family, but which also tends to open again a controversy which I had hoped was at rest. " Agitated, however, as the question again is, by this anonymous publication ; appealed to as I am for its truth or falsehood, I declare that as \ ; no !|i ilil 11' far as relates to Luke Erie, notliiiif^ can be more false and groundless. So contrary indeed is the Tact, that 1 can say, the only conununication which was made by me direct to the Commander of the forces, and which I was only induced to make by the extreme urgency of the case, was answered by his ordering a reinforcement of sea- men from Quebec;, and which I am confident would have been larger, had U been possible lo have waited for them. " It is also but justice in me to declare, that I ever considered liis peremptory order* to risk a battle, (which, however, did not arrive till after the battle was over,) arose from his firm convic- tion of the paramount necessity of a strenuous exertion on the part of the navy for the preser- vation of the post, and from a generous desire on his part, to share with me the responsibility of a measure so hazardous, should the issue prove unsuccessful. I have the honor to be, Sir, Your most obedient servant, R. H. Barclay. ** Sir George Prevost, Bart. Oriel College, Oxford." * The order here alhided to by Capt. Barclay, is contained in a letter from the Adjutant-General, Col. Baynes, to General Procter, dated the 18th Sept. 1813, nine days after the naval action had taken place, and before the account of it had Ill The subjoined extract of u letter from Sir ♦lames Yeo to Sir (ieorge l^revosv, will also shew that the Navftl Commander on the Lukes entertained a very different opinion on this sub- ject from the Reviewer. •' KimjiitoH, 23U 114 such charges^ must be obvious to the lowest capacity. General Procter had, of course, the opportunity of availing himself of those services before the Court-martial, and that he did so the nature of the sentence would lead us to sup- pose. But it surely cannot be inferred from the opinion of the Court, that Sir George Prevost had any other motive in preferring the charges, than the good of the service, and obedience to the commands of his superiors. Whether, under these circumstances, and with the knowledge of Sir George Prevost's military life, which the Reviewer must have possessed, he is justified in making the gross insinuation with which he con- cludes his strictures on this subject, will be left to the candid reade^ to determine. The greater part of the troops under General Procter having been captured. General Vincent was compelled immediately to retreat to Bur- lington Heights, a measure which the informa- tion received by that officer of the extent of Ge- neral Procter's loss, and the probable immediate advance of the enemy, seemed to render indis- pensable. The first intelligence received of General Procter's defeat was through a Staff-Adjutant, who had escaped from the field of battle, and who, by exaggerated accounts of this disaster, and of the consequences to be expected from it, spread terror and dismay through the country as he ■v.- i ' 115 passed rapidly along to Kingston, where be ar- rived on the 12th October. In the mean time, General Vincent, whom these reports ^lad reach- ed, and who had also on the 8th received from General Procter intelligence of the action, had begun his retreat from the four-mile creek, and had halted at the twelve-mile creek, when a communication from Colonel Young, at ^'jur- lington, induced him immediately to fall back upon that place as a post where he might with less difficulty maintain himself if attacked, and where he might wait for instructions from Ge- neral de Rottenburg, the officer commanding in Upper Canada. General de Rottenburg, who was on his way from York to Kingston, when the intelligence of General Procter's defeat overtook him on the road, immediately sent to General Vincent, di- recting him, in his despatch of the 10th Octo- ber, if he did not consider himself sufficiently strong to hold out against the superior force of the enemy, to destroy the stores, &c. and to fall back on Kingston. These directions, it is to be observed, were given under the impression created by the Staff-Adjutant's account, which, in a very short time was discovered to be greatly exaggerated ; and it appears from General Vin- cent's letter to General de Rottenburg, previous to the receipt of the despatch last mentioned, as well as from the one in answer to it, that I 2 1 1' ' .(. !.■ I • t; I. !: 1 If 1\\ li I f) I 1'^^ 116 he had no immediate intention of retreating from the position he then occupied, although he thought circumstances might afterwards render such a measure necessary. In the mean time the same exaggerated accounts of the action at the Moravian village, which had heen carried to Kingston, having been received at Montreal by the Commander of the forces, together with General de Rottenburg's despatches, communi- cating the orders he had sent to General Vin- cent in conseauence of that intelligence. Sir George Prevost in his letter to General de Rot- tenburg of the 18th October, approved of those orders, and directed them to be carried into ex- ecution. On the 18th October, the very day on which this last despatch was dated. General de Rot- tenburg informed Sir George Prevost, by letter, that the Staff- Adjutant's account, by which he had been induced to give the directions to Ge- neral Vincent to retreat to York, preparatory to falling back on Kingston, was false and scan- dalous. As soon as it was thus ascertained at head-quiirters at Montreal, what the real nature of General Procter's disaster was, the Com- mander of the forces having also reason to be- lieve, from the information t ansmitted to him by General de Rottenburg, that the enemy had designs upon York from Sackett's Harbour, in- structions, dated the 29th October, were sent 117 to that officer, directing him to prevent General Vincent's further retreat, and to order him to occupy both Burlington and York with the force under his command. The orders, which were accordingly sent from General de Rotten- burg to General Vincent to that effect on the 1st November, were received by him on the 4th, and he in consequence remained in the position he then occupied at Burlington Heights, which undoubtedly led afterwards to the recovery of the Niagara frontier. From the above correspondence it incontro- vertibly appears, that the orders transmitted from the Commander of the forces, through Ge- neral de Rottenburg to Major-General Vincent, were the real and only cause of that officer's not retreating to York, and of his continuing to hold his position at Burlington ; which, as appears by his own lettel* of the 27th October, before re- ferred to, he was preparing to leave on the 1st November. Sir George Prevost's orders to General Vin- cent, to fall back upon Kingston, had not reach- ed him on the 23rd October ; previous to which, his orders to retreat had been discretionary. On the 27th he was preparing to obey them, and on the 4th of November he received orders to re- main where he was. There cannot, therefore, be a doubt of the gross incorrectness of all the Reviewer's state- Li SI ll i !' !■ 'Hi' 01 118 ments,* of the repeated peremptory orders to retreat ; of the advice which the firmness of Ge- neral Procter and others had induced them to give General Vincent to disobey those orders, and of his being persuaded upon their respon- sibility to adopt it. It was, in fact, the prompt and decided mea- sures of Sir George Prevost, as soon as the truth, with regard to General Procter's defeat, was made known to him, that alone prevented Gene- ral Vincent from continuing his retreat, and that led to those offensive operations which followed shortly afterwards on the Niagara frontier, and which, notwithstanding the attempt made by the Reviewer to give the sole credit of them to Ge- neral Vincent and Colonel Murray, originated in the instructions which the former officer had received from General de Rottenburg, then com- manding in Upper Canada. Even the attack upon Fort Niagara had previously been pressed upon the consideration of Major-Generals de Rottenburg and Sheaffe, by the Commander of the forces, as desirable, whenever circumstances might render such a measure practicable. In summing up the events of the campaign of 1813, the Reviewer observes,^ " that on the British side, the occurrences of the year, on the part of the subordinate commanders and troops, * Review, pp. 433, 434. f Ibid, pp. 438, 439. 119 presented a brilliant series of achievements, the greater number of which were rendered nuga- tory or imperfect in result, from the absence of all energy, talent, and enterprise, in their Com- mander-in-Chief." In support of this opinion, which is sufficiently singular, considering what the Reviewer has him- self stated to have been the result of the cam- paign, he adds, that the successes obtained by General Vincent and Colonel Harvey, by General Procter, Colonel Murray, and Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison, were all obtained either against the positive commands of Sir George Prevost, or without any instructions from him ; and that in the only measure which could be ascribed to him, he endeavoured to wrest the merit from Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, because he hap- pened to arrive when the enemy were beaten. The following observations will afford a full answer to this unfounded and disgraceful attack upon the character and reputation of Sir George Prevost. The brilliant affair at Stoney Creek, under Major-General Vincent and Colonel Har- vey, and the equally successful operation on the Michigan frontier, when General Procter de- feated the forces of Winchester and Clay, arose out of the circumstances of the moment, of which those officers immediately, with great judgment and gallantry, availed themselves. There could, therefore, be no time for communication with i:! Ii It Mi U: M! M n 120 the Commander of the forces, and consequently the operations in question could not have taken place in direct opposition to commands which were never received. With regard to the gene- ral instructions under which the subordinate Commanders acted, it has already been shewn that Geneidl Procter had discretionary orders from Sir George Prevost to act on the defensive or otherwise, as circumstances might require ; so likewise had General Vincent ; and the marked approbation expressed, both in general orders, and in the despatches to the Secretary of State announcing these events, is a further strong proof that the conduct of those officers was in perfect accordance with the orders and instructions which they had received from the Commander of the forces. Colonel Murray's expedition against Plattsburg was, as appears by the despatch to Lord Bathurst, of the 1st August, 1813, planned altogether by Sir George Prevost, who had pre- viously endeavoured to place our marine on the Richelieu, which had been increased by the cap- ture of the two schooners from the enemy, on a respectable footing; first, by the appointment of Captain Pring to the naval command there, and subsequently by obtaining the services of Cap- tain Everard, and the officers and seamen of the Wasp sloop of war, then lately arrived at Que- bec from Halifax, to man these vessels and the gun-boats. Colonel Murray was the officer par- r.:-; : ; 121 ticularly selected by Sir George Prevost to com- mand on this expedition, from the opinion he entertained of his zeal and energy. The event amply justified his expectations, and this enter- prise, undertaken by the orders and under the instructions of the C.'ommander of the forces, was in every respect successful. The daring exploit which was subsequently achieved by Colonel Murray, in the capture of Fort Niagara, so far from being in opposition to Sir George Prevost's orders, or in the absence of any instructions respecting it, was the conse- quence of the verbal instructions given by Sir George Prevost to Lieutenant-General Drum- mond, previous to his assuming the command in Upper Canada, and confirmed in his letter to him of the 3rd December, 1813. Lieutenant-Colonel Morrison had been detached from Kingston with the 49th, the 2nd battalion of the 89th, and the Voltigeurs, as a corps of observation, to follow the motions of General Wilkinson's army, then threatening Montreal from Sackett's Harbour, in consequence of the express orders and directions of Sir George Prevost ; a fact established by his despatch to Lord Bathurst of the 15th Novem- ber, 1813. The foresight of the Commander of the forces in providing this force to watch the enemy, and his judgment in the selection of Lieut.-Colonel Morrison to command it, led beyond all doubt. ii ^»j m ! ■ t I 1*1-; in lir ■: iil 122 to the defeat which General Boyd received at Chrystler's farm, and ultimately, by the interrup- tions thus occasioned to General Wilkinson's plans, to the safety of Lower Canada. That the measures adopted by Sir George Prevost might in some degree have contributed to the success which attended Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry's defence of his position at Chateaugay, the Re- viewer seems most unwillingly to admit, while at the same time he imputes to him the base and unworthy attempt of endeavouring to as- sume to himself the merit which on that occa- sion was alone due to Colonel De Salaberry. In Sir George Prevost's despatch to Lord Bathurst on this subject, of the date of 30th October, 1813, he expresses himself fortunate at having arrived at the scene of action shortly after it commenced, as it enabled him personally to witness the conduct of the officers and men engaged in it, and to form a proper judgment of their merits, which he then severally details in his letter. The unqualified praise which he be- stows upon the officer immediately command- ing, (Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry) is of itself a sufficient refutation of this libel on the part of the Reviewer.* The checks thus received by the forces under Generals Wilkinson and Hampton, from Lieut.- 1! * Vide General Orders, Appendix, No. XXVI. u 123 Colonel Morrison, and Licut.-Coloncl Dc Salii- berry, were, without doubt, no inconsiderable causes oi' their repulse in the attem])t upon Lower Canada ; but it was also the duty of the Reviewer to have noticed the prompt and judicious mea- sures adopted by Sir George Prevost, as soon as he had ascertained that (General Wilkinson was descending the St. Lawrence to attack Mon- treal, for the defence of that place, by calling out the whole militia of the district, and by col- lecting all his disposable force at La Chine, where he commanded in person. The formida- ble defences which he had prepared both at Coteau du Lac, and at the Cedars, together with the imposing force of militia which had been assembled at a very short notice, must have convinced General Wilkinson that he could not hope to make any impression upon a people who shewed so much zeal and alacrity in de- fending themselves, and who were commanded by one who possessed their entire confidence and affection. Under these circumstances, and from the opposition already experienced to his attempt, the American Commander resolved to abandon it as impracticable, more particularly as he found himself without support from Ge- neral Hampton, who had retired towards Lake Champlain. In detailing the events of the campaign of 1814, the Reviewer has again not scrupled, in <( 'I ( '< til i l-2i his account of Captain Pring's expedition to Vergcnncs, to distort the truth, lor the purpose of attaching the !)hune of this faihire to Sir George I'revost. So far from the Commander of the forces refusing to Captain Pring the as- sistance of the troops stationed at Isle aux Noix, as the Reviewer asserts,* a strong detachment of the marines then in garrison at that post, was embarked on board of his scjuadron, and the des- patch to Lord Bathurst from Sir George Pre- vost, of the 18th of May, 181 4,f proves that this expedition was pUumed and directed by the Commander of the forces, and probably failed from the circumstance alone of Captain Pring being prevented by baffling winds for four days from reaching his destination, before the enemy had time to mature their preparations for de- fer r'c. A similar degree of incorrectness prevails in the Reviewer's statements with regard to the force retained by Sir George Prevost in Lower Canada. That Lower Canada, in the middle of April, 1£14, J had nothing to dread, may be con- fidently denied. On the 22d and 30th March, two attempts had been made by General Wilk- inson to penetrate into that Province by the I s ni r * Review, p. 440. t Vide E3?;tract8 in the Appendix, No. XXVII. J Review, p. 441. 125 IMoiitrcal frontier, and in the latter inHtante, in considerable force. Though he was repulsed in both cases, and in the latter with severe loss, he still continued to keep a considerable body of men on the frontier line, from which he did not withdraw until towards the middle of May.* Sackett's IFarbour, instead of being weakly gar- risoned, had been strengthened by two regiments from General Wilkinson's army, besides other reinforcements ; and our fleet on Lake Ontario was so far from being at that period ready for sea, that it was not until the 14th of April, that the two ships, which were to constitute its prin- cipal strength, had been launched, nor was our squadron in a situation to take the Lake until the beginning of May. The only reinforcements which, up to this period in 1814, and even until the begimung of June, had arrived in Lower Canada, were the 'id battalion of the 8th regiment, which the foresight of the Commander of the forces had induced him to draw in the depth of winter by land from New Brunswick, whence they arrived in the month of March, together with 200 picked seamen from Admiral Griffiths for the fleet on Lake Ontario, without a single accident. This regiment is enumerated by the Reviewer amongst his nine regular regiments of infantry, with three squadrons of dragoons, six ,...4' * Review, pp. 440, 441. 126 y i strong battalions of militia, and a numerous di- vision cf artillery, the tvhole of which he has untruly asserted, were crowded together in in- activity at Chambly, behind a strong frontier, without an enemy to oppose them;* adding, that although reinforcements were daily arriving or expected, not a man was sent to strengthen the inadequate force on the Niagara frontier, until the middle of July, when only two of th(^ Pen- insular regiments were reluctantly yielded for that service Of the nine regular regiments of infantry, of which the Reviewer speaks, one was De Meuron's foreign corps, another the Cana- dian Fencible , a third a battalion of Marines, a forrth the Canadian Voltigeurs, militia-men, sub- ject to militia law, and whose force at the ut- most was 450 men. Of the real regular regi- ments, viz. the 8th, 13th, 16th, 49th, an^". 70th, the 16th did not arrive until June, together with two companies of artillery. This regiment was almost immediately stationed at Montreal, where it remained the whole of July, and in August was despatched to Upper Canada. The 70th garrisoned Quebec, with a portion of aHilltry, and a small corps, 'composed of the rocruits of the otiier regiments in the Province. Ihe 13th was in advance at St. John, and La Cole Mill, and the battalion of marines garrisoned Isle aux i i * Review, p. 441 . 127 Noix. Of the six battalions of embodied militia, one was at La Prairie, and another, if not two of tlie others, at different parts of the frontier ; tlie Voltigeurs were also in advance, and part of the Canadian fencibles were at Coteau du Lac. From t^is statement, made out from documents, the authenticity of which cannot be doubted, it will appear that the troops under Sir George Prevost in the Lower Province, which were barely adequate to its defence, in lieu of being all assembled at Chambly, were stationed in dif- ferent parts of the Province, where their ser- vices v/ere most required, and that thov did not at any time, collectively form the camp of in- struction of which the Reviewer speaks. Pre- vious even to the 1st of May \vhen the Reviewer has stated that Sir James Yeo was ready with his fleet for any operation, no part of this force could, consistently with the safety of Lower Canada, have been despatched for the reinforcement of General Drummond. Still less could a sufficient portion of it have been spared, to have enabled that officer, with any prospect of success, to attempt an attack on Sackett's Harbour. Ge- neral Drummond was, in fact, aware that, from the period of the first attack on that place, in May, 1813, the enemy had been indefatigable in fortifying it, and that it was at all times guarded by a large body of regular troops and militia, to- gether with a number of able and experienced I ■ rti f i if I s •to i ' 128 seamen. Nothing, tlierefore, short of the full co- operation of a superior fleet, and a large body of troops, could have afforded him a well-grounded expectation of succeeding. General Drummond well knew that, up to May, 1814, and for some time afterwards, no force of this description could be spared from the liower Province. However desirable he might have thought it, to destroy the naval depot at Sackett's Harbour, he knew that no adequate means were within his power, or that of the Commander of the forces; and until, by fresh reinforcemeiits from England, those means should be acquired, h'= w t obliged to content himself with operation' l 0:.L^atible with his resources. We accordingly find that, as soon as the fleet was in readiness to take the Lake, General Drummond, in consequence of the previous comnmnication which had taken pia:;e between Sir George Prevost and himself, under- took the expedition against Oswego, which ter- minated in the capture of that place, together with a quantity of stores, provisions, and or^^- nance, most of which being designed for ^*r squadron at Sackett's Harbour, must have ma- terially delayed its equipment. Of this enter- prise the Reviewer has thought proper to &ay nothing, because he knew that it might in a great degree be attributed to the measures of Sir George Prevost. For a similar reason he has altogether omitted to notice the extraordhfa-y 11 id. 129 and energetic measures which had been adopted by the Commander of the forces, for relieving Michilimachinac, and affording to that garrison an important reinforcement of troops, seamen, and provisions, under the command of an able and experienced officer, who afterwards gave ample proofs of his courage and talents in his successful defence of that post against a power- ful attack of the enemy. The reinforcement of thpt distant position, whilst the enemy were in possession of the whole of the Michigan terri- tory, and by a route never before attempted, re- flected the greatest credit upon the Commander of the forces who directed, and upon Lieu- tenant Colonel M'Douall, who executed, this arduous enterprise, which was highly impor- tant in its consequences as respected our In- dian allies, and the safety of the Upper Pro- vince. Independently of this reinforcement to the troops in Upper Canada, we shall find that Sir G*^orge Prevost continued mindful of Lieu- tenant-General Drummond's situation, and de- sirous of assisting him, as soon as the means of doing so were placed within his power. It has been already shewn, that out of the ff ce which the Commander of the forces possessed for the defence of Lower Canada, and of which the Re- viewer has given so incorrect a statement, the 2nd battalion of the 8th arrived from New Bruns- wick in March, and the 16th with two compa- K I m i»' t m 130 nies of artillery in June. It was not until the month of July that the next reinforrements, con- sisting of the 90th regiment, from the West In- dies, and the 6th tind 82nd from the army un- der the Duke of Wellington, reached Montreal. These three regiments were imnediately sent forward to the Niagara frontier. The despatch to the Secretary of State, announcing the arrival of these troops, sufficiently and satisfactorily explained the reasons which had hitherto pre- vented Sir George Prevost from strengthening General Drummond's force in the Upper Pro- ince. In the beginning of June, and previously to the arrival of these reinforcements. Sir James Yeo had retired into port after blockading Sack- ett's Harbour ; and from that period, until Oc- tober, the enemy had the ascendancy on Lake Ontario. Our operations in Upper Canada were, therefore, necessarily confined to the defensive ; and although the superior numbers of the enenxy gave them at times an advantage over us, and occasioned a considerable loss of valuable lives> the efforts made by the Commander of the forces, to supply these losses, enabled General Drum- mond successfully to maintain the contest, and to prevent the Americans from gaining any per- manent footing in the Province. Upon the ar- rival of the Nova Scotia Fencibles, a battalion of the Royals, and the 97th regiment towards the end of July, the latter regiment was imme- , a, 131 diately sent to Kingston, and Sir George Pre- vost continued to make evei-y exertion to rein- force the army on the Niagara frontier. Before we proceed to the consideration of the much misrepresented affair of Plattsburg, the orders under which Sir George Prevost acted, and the plan of operations proposed upon the arrival of the reinforcements from the Duke of Wellington's army, it will be necessary to ex- pose the perverted statement with which the Quarterly Reviewer has introduced his account of this expedition. " In June and July" he says, " a numerous fleet arrived in the St. Lawrence from Bourdeaux, with the flower of the Duke of Wellington's army."* Now connecting this pa- ragraph with the one that follows soon after- wards — " that the Peninsular troops were suf- fered to ascend no higher than the ill-fated camp of Chambly, where they were detained during the whole month of August"^ — it is evident that the Reviewer meant his readers to believe that the brigades, under Generals Robinson, Bris- bane, Power, and Kempt, had arrived in Canada in June and July, so as to enable Sir Georg6 Prevost to assemble them for any service at Chambly by the beginning of August, and yet that he kept them the whole of that month un- employed. It appears, however, from Sir George :'! * Review, p. 442. t Ibid. p. 443. K 2 (; III 132 Prevost's despatches to Lord Bathurst, dated 28th June, 1814, that the only part of the Duke of Wellington's army, which arrived in June, were the 6th and 82nd regiments. The trans- ports having those regiments on board passed Quebec for Montreal, about the 26th of that month, but did not reach the latter place until the first or second week in July, from whence they were immediately pushed forward to rein- force Lieutenant-General Drununond on the Ni- agara frontier. The brigade under Major-Ge- neral Power, which was accompanied by Major- General Brisbane, did not arrive at Quebec un- til late in July ; indeed so late, that Sir George Prevost, in his despatch to Lord Bathurst an- nouncing their arrival, states, that they would scarcely be able to arrive at Montreal, with every exertion, before the 20t/t of August, The two last brigades, under Generals Kempt and Robin- son, arrived still later ; and Sir George Prevost's despatch of the 5th August, 1814, announcing their approach to Quebec, stated that it would be impossible, with every exertion, to collect the whole force, viz. all the brigades in the neigh- bourhood of Montreal, before the end of that month. In fact, it was not until towards the end of August, that two of the brigades above mentioned were assembled at Chambly, and in the neighbourhood; the other brigade, imder Major-Gen eral Kempt, being stationed partly at 133 Montreal, and partly in advance towards King- ston, in order to be in readiness for the service for which it was designed, whenever our ascen- dancy on Lake Ontario should be icquired. In his next observations, the Reviewer has confounded both dates and facts, in order to make it appear that Sir George Prevost knew not how to dispose of the succours which had reached him; with which, in the Reviewer's opi- nion,* he ought instantly to have made a rapid movement towards Lake Ontario, for the pur- pose of attacking Sackett's Harbour ; an attempt which, it is stated, should have been made whilst Sir James Yeo was blockading that place, instead of wasting some of the most valuable months of the summer in the camp at Chambly :f and fur- ther, that the march of General Izzard to Sack- ett's Harbour, with 3,000 or 4,000 regular troops, was a proof that the American Government felt (although our Commander did not), that all ob- jects on the frontier were insignificant, in com- parison with the protection of the numerous squadron which was blockaded in their ports on Lake Ontario. Unfortunately for the Reviewer's consistency, he had previously stated, that in consequence of Commodore Chauncey having prepared two new frigates for sea. Sir James Yeo disconti- I M, ♦ Review, p. 443. t Ibid. f i- i^^ w m m If- liii imed his blockade of Sackett's Harbour, and retired to Kingston, to await the equipment of the St. Lawrence, and that during the months of August and September, Chauncey held the Lake. General Izzard was despatched to Sackett's Harbour about the end of August, or \st of September, and consequently the American Go- vernment, from the Reviewer's own shewing, could not at that time have any apprehensions for their numerous squadron, blockaded in their Port on Lake Ontario. So far indeed from the American squadron being at this time in danger, Kingston, and Sir James Yeo's numerous squa- dron, were actually at the period of General Iz- zard's march to Sackett's Harbour, most rigo- rously blockaded by Chauncey, and so continued for nearly six weeks afterwards. Sackett's Har- bour was in fact only blockaded by Sir James Yeo, from the beginning of May to the begin- ning of June, at which latter period he relin- quished the blockade, and did not make his appearance on the Lake until the middle of Oc- tober following. It has been already shewn what Sir George Prevost's force really consisted of, in the Lower Province, during the period of this blockade, and until the month of July, when the first reinforce- ments from France reached him. These rein- forcements were immediately sent to the Upper 135 Province. It is consequently most evident that he did not then possess the means of attacking Sackett's Harbour, and that after the blockade had ceased, tenfold the means he possessed would not have sufficed for the service, without the co-operation of the fleet.* It is in the highest degree improbable, that any man in Sir George Prevost's army, or in the Provinces, possessing a knowledge of these facts, which were within the reach of all, should have thought it possible that on the arrival of the troops from Bourdeaux, Sackett's Harbour was or could be the point of attack, so long as our squadron was not able to take the Lake. It will, it is apprehended, tend very materially to elucidate the subsequent operations of the war, to state the views which probably influ- enced His Majesty's Government in sending so large a force from the Duke of Wellington's army to Canada, and the manner in which it was directed to be employed. The circumstances under which the war had been commenced on the part of the Americans, and the refusal of their Government to consider the revocation o^ the Orders in Council, the ostensible ground of * As a confirmation of this statement, the reader is referred to an extract from a Letter addressed by Major-General Kempt to Sir George Prevost upon the subject of the intended attack on Sackett's Harbour, of which General Kempt was to have taken the personal command. Appendix, No. XXVIII. ! m; 11: I I. I* i I 13(> war as a cause for pacification, had justly offended both the Government and people of Great Bri- tain. The efforts, however, which they were called upon to make in Europe, had, until the termination of the contest by the abdication of Buonaparte, prevented the British Government from furnishing any other reinforcements for the army in the Canadas, than such as were barely sufficient, aided by the bravery of the troops, and the talents, zeal, and energy of their Com- mander, for the defen(!e of the country from the repeated attacks of the enemy. As soon, how- ever, as the peace with France placed a larger force at their disposal, His Majesty's Govern- ment resolved to avail themselves of a portion of it, in order to retaliate upon America her un- just aggressions, and to carry the war into such parts of her territory as might prove most assailable. In consequence of this determina- tion, the expeditions to the Chesapeake and the Mississipi were planned; and with the same views three brigades were ordered from Bour- deaux to Canada. The objects contemplated in sending this reinforcement to Canada, will be best understood by a reference to Lord Bathurst's despatch to Sir George Prevost, of the 3d June, 1814, in which it is said, " The object of your operations will be. First, To give immediate protection, secondly, to obtain, if possible, ultimate security, to His Majesty's 137 possessions in America. The entire destruc- tion of Sac'kett's Harbour, and the naval esta- blishment on Lake Eric and Lake Champlain, come under the first description." — " Should there be any advanced position on that part of our frontier which extends towards Lake Champ- lain, the occupation of which would materially tend to the security of the Province, you will, if you deem it expedient, expel the enemy from it, and occupy it by detachments of the troops under your command, always, however, taking care not to expose his Majesty's troops to being cut off by too extended a line of advance' — " At the same time, it is by no means the intention of His Majesty's Government to encourage such forward movements into the interior of the Ame- rican territory, as might commit the safety of the force placed uftder your command.'* It must be evident to every person in the least ac- quainted with the territories of America bor- dering upon the Canadas, that none of the ob- jects of offensive warfare contemplated in the foregoing despatch could be undertaken with- out the aid and co-operation of a fleet able to contend with that of the enemy. That His Ma- jesty's Government might be aware of the im- possibility of complying with the views and wishes above described, until the naval ascend- ancy should be secured on Lakes Ontario and Champlain, Sir George Prevost, in his despatch u I '. m It'- f i to Lord Bathiirst, of the i 2th July, before re- ferred to, expresses his opinion on this head, stating that he did not expect from the reports he had received from Sir James Yeo, and the oiTicer commanding our naval forces on the Richelieu, that their fleets would be in readi- ness before the middle of September. Upon the arrival of the troops from France, and upon their being assembled as before stated in the neighbourhood of Montreal towards the end of August, it was ascertained that the new ship at Kingston would not be launched until towards the middle of September, and conse- quently, that Sir James Yeo would not be ready to take the Lake, at the earliest, until the beginning of October. All, theief that could be done with regard to the projected expedition against Sackett's Harbour, was to make such a disposition of the troops designed for the service, that they might be in readiness for it, whenever it might be deemed advisable to make the at- tempt. Major-General Sir James Kempt, who was to have the command, was accordingly dis- patched to Kingston, and two brigades were quartered partly at Montreal and partly in ad- vance, wherever he judged they might be best placed, with a view to the ultimate service for which they were designed. The employment of the remainder of the force from France next became the subject of Sir George Prevost's ii »t 139 consideration. The enemy had at that time a stronji^ s(|uadron on Lake Champlain, and their naval depot at Vergennes furnished them with the means of continually adding to it. They had also since the first attack fortified Platts- burg, a position whicli, provided we had the as- cendancy on the Lake, it might be expedient for us to occupy for the security of the Lower Province. Should, therefore, our squadron, equipping in the Richelieu, be ready to co- operate with the army before the season was too far advanced for offensive operations, it was clear that one of the objects contemplated by Government might be undertaken with every prospect of sik cess. The enemy's fleet, if they waited the attack upon them in Plattsburg bay, or elsewhere, might be destroyed, or the dep6t at Vergennes might fall into our hands by the occupation of Plattsburg, and the further ad- vance of the army aided by the fleet. That the enemy were not assailable m any dther quarter, (Sackett's Harbour being out of the question from what has been before stated,) it can scarcely be necessary to mention, nor has it ever been pretended that they were. The State of Vermont on the east shore of the Lake might, indeed, have been entered from St. Amand, and our townships on that frontier, without the assistance of our squadron. But ! If UO independently of there not being any object of sufficient consequence in that quarter to make an attack upon it advisable., it was deemed highly imprudent to molest that State by a mere predatory expedition, whilst two-thirds of the supplies of fresh meat for the army in Canada were furnished by American contractors, and whilst droves of cattle, as well as large sums of money in specie were constantly passing by that route from the United States into Canada ; a fact which is not generally known, and which strongly marks the wisdom of that policy which Sir George Prevost purrued during the Ame- rican warfare. As the destruction of the ene- my's naval depot on Lake Champlain was then the only operation contemplated by His Ma- jesty's Government, which could be undertaken with any prospect of succeso. Sir George Pre- vost with a view to that obj'^ct, had, imme- diately after the receipt of the despatch of the 3rd June, above referred to, used every possi- ble exertion to accelerate the building of the new ship ai Isle aux Noix, and the efficient arming and equipment of the squadron there, for the service in which it was proposed to be em^ ployed. Some time previous to this period it appears from Sir George Prevost's correspond- ence with Sir James Yeo, that he had repeatedly called the particular attention of tha' office^ to HI tile manning of the squadron for Lake Cham- plain.* In addition to this, his correspondence with Captain Fisher, and Vice Admiral Otway, tends to establish the fact of his unwearied and successful exertions to accomplish that ob- ject. The Confiance was launched on the 26th of August, and Sir George Prevost having reason to believe that the efforts which were making for her equipment would enable Captain Fisher to take the Lake in the course of a few days, proceeded, on the 30th, to inspect the first bri- gade of troops quartered at Chambly ; and on the 31st. established his head-quarters at Odell Town, close upon the enemy's frontier. Hav- ing here received information that General Iz- zard had suddenly quitted his position at Cham- plain Town, and had marched with a body of troops in the direction of Niagara, evidently for the purpose of joining General Brown, who had established a footing on the Niagara fron- tier, and was pressing upon Lieutenant General Drummond, Sir George Prevost determined to lose no time in entering the enemy's territory, (even though our fleet was not ready to co- operate,) in the ho .)e by this movement of check- * The extract from a letter addressed by Sir James Yeo, to Sir George Prevost, given in the Appendix, No. XXIX. will shew his opinion of the manner in which the Lake Cham- plain Squadron was manned. * ?.. It2 T ing General Izzard's progress, and of thus mak- ing a diversion in favour of General Drum- mond. Our troops accordingly crossed the fron- tier line, and on the 3d of September took pos- session of Champlain Town, which the enemy had abandoned on their approach. Our forces advanced the following day to Chazy and Simp- son's Inn, about eight miles from Plattsburg, where they halted on the 5th. Previously to this advance Captain Fisher, who had superin- tended the building of the Confiance, and whose local knowledge would have rendered his ser- vices peculiarly useful in the joint operations contemplated, had been suddenly and unex- pectedly superseded by Sir James Yeo in the command of our naval force on the Richelieu, and Captain Downie had been appointed to succeed him. This officer did not arrive at Montreal from Lake Ontario until the 3rd Sep- tember, and on the following day repaired to Isle aux Noix to superintend the equipment of the new ship. On the 5th of September, the day on which the troops halted at Simpson's Inn, an interview took place between Sir George Prevost and Captain Downie, when the latter assured the Commander of the forces, that his flotilla would be ready to co-operate with the army in less than forty-eight hours ; that he had correctly ascertained the state and condition of the enemy's fleet ; and that in consequence he f 143 entertained no apprehensions of the result of an nction. Sir George Prevost then explained to Captain Downie the reason of his having pressed forward before the latter was ready. On the following day, the 6th September, the army ad- vanced to Plattsburg, and took possession of that part of it situate on the northern side of the Saranac, the enemy's troops having retreated thence to the south side, and to their fortified position on the crest of the hills. No sooner had this position been taken, than Sir George Prevost, conceiving that the enemy, on the first approach of our troops, might not be fully prepared to receive them, proposed that the works should be immediately attacked ;* but it being represented to him that one of the brigades was extremely harassed, having been brought forward from Chazy with great cele- rity, and that after allowing the men a reason- able time to st, the afternoon would be too far advanced to attempt an operation for which it was desirable to haw daylight, as the move- ment was to be made through so thick and in- I -i • The following is the Reviewer's mode of stating this : — •* Had the Commander-in-Chief suffered these works to be as- saulted as was eagerly proposed to him on be same evening, there is no question but they must have fallen with scarcely an effort before a single brigade." — p. 445. 144 III m m ii tricate a country. Sir George was induced to acquiesce in this reasoning ; and being likewise satisfied, from the assurance given him, by Cap- tain Downie, that the fleet would be ready to co-operate in a day or two at farthest, he finally resolved to defer the attack until the junction of the squadron. The enemy's fleet had retired from the mouth of the Chazy (where it was placed, when our troops entered the American territory), to Plattsburg Bay, and there, on the arrival of our army, it was found anchored; their gun-boats, which had been employed to interrupt the march of our army on the Lake road, being placed so as to manifest a determi- nation to support their troops and position on the south side of the Saranac. On the morning of the 7th, it was discovered that the enemy's flotilla had changed their position since the pre- ceding evening, and had moved further into the bay, out of the range of cannon from the shore, evidently with the object of avoiding the fire from the works, in case they should be attacked and carried. As soon as Sir George Prevost had, by a thorough ret )nnoitring of the enemy's position, on shore and in the bay, satisfied his own mind that their fleet was moored too far from the shore to receive any support from their own batteries, or any injury from ours, he commu- 145 nicated the enemy's force and situation to Cap- tain Downie, by a letter* dated the 7th Septem- ber, seven o'clock a. m., and stated, that if Captain Downie felt the vessels under his command equal to the contest, the present moment afforded ad- vantages that might not again occur, requesting, at the same time, his decision on the subject. This letter was delivered by Major Fulton, Aid- de-Camp to Sir George Prevost, who was or- dered particularly to explain to Captain Downie the position of the enemy's squadron, and that they were, in his opinion, anchored out of range of shot from the shore. Major Fulton's state- ment f on this subject, shews most clearly the views i^hicli Captain Downie then entertained, and the confidence which he felt in the result of the contest, for which he declared he would be ready in 24 hours. Captain Downie's letter, in reply to Sir George Prevost's communica- tion, although more guarded in expression, con- tained in substance what he had said to Major Fulton, and confirmed the expectation of his * Vide the whole of this Correspondence in the Appendix, No. XXX. \ This statement and those of the General and other offi- cers, subsequently referred to, all of which are under the hand, and many of them attested by the oaths of the parties, contain the facts relative to the expedition against Plattsburg, to which those officers would have been ready to depose before a Court- Mar tial. L 146 i^ m m m m Mil- mi I !'li being able to meet the enemy in a day or two. On the 8th of September Sir George Prevost again despatched a letter to Captain Downie, stating that he had sent his Aid-de-Camp, Major Coore, to give him correct information with re- gard to the enemy's naval force in the bay, and that he. Sir George Prevost, only waited the ar- rival of Captain Downie to proceed against Ge- neral Macomb's position. In this letter he par- ticularly points out the co-operation which he expected from Captain Downie. That officer's answer, dated on the same day, states, " that his ship was not ready, and that until she should hCy it was his duty not to hazard her before the enemy;' and this determination of Captain Downie's appears to have been still more strongly expressed by him in his conversation with Ma- jor Coore. Hitherto, therefore it may be as- sumed as an incontrovertible fact, that nothing had been either said or written by Sir George Prevost to Captain Downie which might lead the latter to expect any assistance in his ap- proaching contest with the American fleet, from the forces on shore, or that any simultaneous at- tack was to be made upon the enemy's works, with a view to afford such aid or support. Being thus perfectly aware of the number, force, and position of the enemy's fleet, and finding himself ready for a conflict, of the successful issue of w hich we may be assured that he had not a doubt. 147 Captain Downie, on the 9th of September, wrote to Sir George Prevost, informing him that it was his intention to weigh and proceed with his squadron, so as to approach Plattsburg Bay at day-break on the 10th, and to commence an im- mediate attack on t'le enemy's squadron, if it should be found anchored in a position to afford any chance of success. Immediately upon the receipt of this letter. Sir George Prevost gave orders for the troops to be held in readiness to assault the enemy's works at the same time that the naval action should commence. On the 10th, the fleet not making its appearance. Sir George Prevost addressed a letter to Captain Downie, acknowledging the receipt of his com- munication of the 9th, and acquainting him that, in consequence of it, the troops had been held in readiness since six o'clock in the morning, to storm tlie enemy's works at nearly the same mo- ment Sib the naval action should commence in the bay; that he ascribed the disappointment he had experienced to the unfortunate change of wind, and should rejoice to learn from him that his expectations had been frustrated by no other cause. At day-break, on the 11th, Sir George Prevost proceeded to the quarters of Lieutenant- General de Rottenburg, (who was second in com- mand,) in company with the Adjutant-General, and acquainted him that, as the wind was then fair, the fleet, unlei^s prevented by accident, might L 2 • 1 ^' I w ' t I I' m\- 148 soon be expected, and therefore directed him im- mediately to circulate the orders for the troops to hold themselves in readiness, as directed on the preceding day. This was immediately done by Captain Burke, Assistant-Adjutant-General, who personally delivered these orders to Major-Gene- rals Brisbane, Robinson, and Power, viz. to cook, and hold then" selves in readiness as on the pre- ceding day. These orders were so delivered by Captain Burke before the fleet had made its ap- pearancej and before the scaling of their guns tvas heard. It seems by the time on shore to have been about eight o'clock when the fleet was first discovered, and about nine when it rounded Cumberland head, and stood into the Bay. Orders having been given by the Com- mander of the forces that the batteries should open upon the enemy's works, the moment the naval action should commence, they were ac- cordingly opened, and actually commenced the fire a full quarter of an hour before the Confi- ance had fired a shot at the enemy's vessels. The fire from our shore-battery was so well served, that the enemy's Lake battery, the only one which could possibly annoy our squadron, or afford protection to that of the enemy (but from which not a shot was fired in the direction of the Lake) was very soon silenced, and the men driven from it to seek shelter in the higher redoubt. Almost immediately upon the com- 149 mencemcnt of the naval action, orders were des- patche^i tor the troops to take their allotted positions for the assault of the enemy's works. In consequence of these orders, the two brigades under Major-Generals Robinson and Power, pro- ceeded in the rear of their Bivouacs, to approach the ford of the Saranac, which it was intended they should cross and proceed through the wood, in order to conceal their movements from the enemy, whose position it was then contemplated to attack in reverse, the ground being broken and uneven, and the works much too strong to be attempted in front. Whilst these movements were making by our troops, which from their nature, must have been equally concealed from the fleet on the Lake, and from the enemy, Ma- jor-Gei eial Brisbane's brigade had formed, and was ready to force the bridge of the Saranac, on the right of the enemy's position, as soon as the troops under Generals Robinson and Power should have passed the ford, and made their appearance before the enemy's works. These movements must necessarily have required time for their completion, but no person in the army for an instant doubted that the duration of the naval action would enable the troops to accomplish the design of penetrating, by the ford, and through the road, to the foot of the works which were the object of attack. Un- fortunately, during this period, and whilst the ■■ <> T lii 1 m I 1%: U2 J 50 two fleets were still engaged, a wrong direction, by the mistake of the guides, was taken through the wood which led to the ford of the Saranac. As soon as the error was discovered, the troops were counter-marched, but before they could re- cover the right direction, full three-quarters of an hour, and perhaps an hour was lost — an invalu- able portion of time, which, had not the mistake occurred, must have brought the troops to the very foot of the enemy's position. On ap- proaching the ford, it was found to be guarded by a strong force of the enemy on the other side. At this period cheers were distinctly heard, which General Robinson supposed to proceed, either from our squadron that had been successful, or from General Brisbane's brigade advancing to the assault. Major Cochrane was therefore de- spatched to head-quarters to ascertain the fact, and to learn whether there were any further orders. Upon his arrival there, the fleet having at that time surrendered. Sir George Prevost most reluctantly gave the order for the recal of the troops from the attack of the forts, and it is well known to those who were in his confidence, with what poignant regret he thus sacrificed his private feelings to what he considered his para- mount public duty. Upon Major Cochrane's return with these orders, he found that the troops had only been enabled to force the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the act of advancing 151 through the wood to the enemy's position. Under these circumstances. General Robinson felt him- self bound to obey the orders, and the forces retired from the attack. Having thus given a full and correct state- ment of the circumstances which attended the enterprise against Plattsburg, it is necessary to notice the animadversions which have been made upon the military character of Sir George Prevost, in consequence of the unfortunate re- sult of that expedition. In no instance has the conduct of Sir George Prevost been attacked with more virulence and injustice, than by the writer in the Quarterly Review, whose repre- sentations are, as the reader must already have perceived, in the highest degree incorrect. The charges which have been brought for- ward by the Reviewer and by others are, that Sir George Prevost improperly urged Captain Downie into action before his ship was ade- quately prepared ; that he disregarded the signal for the supposed co-operation between the army and the fleet, as solemnly agreed upon by him- self and Captain Downie, and neglected to as- sault the fort when our fleet was engaged with the enemy; and lastly, that he did not, after the defeat of our squadron, persist in his attack upon the fort, by which it is pretended, that our fleet might still have been saved. With regard to the accusation, that Captain i 111 152 IN ill !'i' I I Downic was prematurely hurried, against his better judgment, into an unequal contest with the enemy, the correspondence between that officer and Sir George Prevost already referred to, fully negatives any such supposition. The co-operation of the fleet being deemed essen- tially necessary to the success of the land-forces. Sir George Prevost was naturally anxious that Captain Downie should be prepared as early as possible to meet the enemy. It has been seen, that upon the 7th of September, Captain Dow- nie informed the Commander of the forces, that it would take a day or two at least, before the Confiance would be in an efficient state, and that the engagement did not take place till the 11th, four days after the above communication. So far was Sir George Prevost from attemp' *ng by " taunt and inuendo"* improperly to hnny the fleet into action, that in his letter to Cap- tain Downie, of the 9th of September, he says, " I need not dwell with you on the evils result- ing to both services from delay, as I am well convinced you have done every thing in your power to accelerate the armament and equipment of your squadron, and I am also satisfied that nothing will prevent its coming off Plattsburg the mo- ment it is ready." On the same day Captain Downie announced his intention of commencing * Review, p. 446. 153 an attack on the enemy's squadron the onKuinpj morning. Up to this time, therefore, it appears that however anxious Sir George Prevost was to make an immediate attack upon Phittshurg, for which purpose tlie assistance of the fleet was requisite, he never urged Captain Downie to engage the enemy while unprepared, hut on the contrary, expressed his confidence that the mo- ment the fleet was ready, it would appear before Plattshurg. An expression in Sir George Prevost's letter, of the 10th, has indeed been construed by the Quar- terly Reviewer into a " taunt," which is supposed to have driven Captain Downie to an engagement against his cooler judgment. In that letter the Commander of the forces, after informing Cap- tain Downie that in consequence of his commu- nication of the 9th, the troops had been held in readiness since six in the morning to storm the enemy's works : thus continues, " I ascribe the disappointment I have experienced to the un- fortunate change of wind, and shall rejoice to learn that my expectations have been frustrated by no other cause." It must be obvious that many other causes, independent of the wind, might have prevented Captain Downie from sailing as he had intended to do on the 9th, al- though the state of the wind was in fact the real cause of the delay. In consequence of the despatch used in equipping his ship, articles 154. ll- might have been overlooked or omitted, which at the last moment only might have been dis- covered to be indispensably necessary; accidents might have happened to different parts of the squadron in their progress, and even the rein- forcements of soldiers from the 39th, although they had been immediately ordered upon his re- quisition, might not, from various circumstances, have been supplied in time. All, or any of these causes might, as they naturally did, suggest themselves to the mind of the Commander of the forces, and his anxiety to be correctly in- formed upon the subject, as naturally induced him to express himself to Captain Downie in the terms above stated. It is in the highest degree improbable, that Captain Downie could for a moment construe those expressions in an unfavourable sense. But whatever might have been his impression, it is evident, that a letter written on the 10th, could not have influenced the determination which he took on the 9th, of engaging the enemy the following morning. Nor will the assertion, that Sir George Pre- vost disregarded the supposed signal of co-ope- ration, and neglected to attack the fort accord- ing to his promise, be more difficult to disprove. No such signal was in fact ever arranged, nor was any such promise ever given. The destruc- tion of the enemy's fleet being the primary ob- ject of the expedition, and until that was effected. 155 the ulterior operations not being practicable, Sir George Prevost resolved not to assault the fort until he was satisfied that our squadron was actually proceeding to attack the enemy. Of the result of the action when the fleets were once engaged, neither the Commander of the forces, nor any one in our army allowed them- selves to entertain a single doubt. That Sir George Prevost intended to assault the enemy's works simultaneously, or nearly so, with the commencement of the naval action, and that Captain Downie was aware of that determina- tion, appears from the correspondence between those officers. But that Captain Downie should have gathered from these communications any thing like a promise or agreement on the part of the Commander of the forces to support, as- sist, or co-operate with him during the naval engagement, is quite impossible. Sir George Prevost had satisfied himself by personal obser- vation, and by the most accurate intelligence, that the American fleet was anchored out of range of the batteries, and he must therefore have known that it was out of his power to offer any support to Captain Downie. To have held forth to that officer any hope or promise of as- sistance was consequently out of the question. It was of the first importance, with a view to the success of Sir George Prevost's operations, that the fleet should be engaged at the same time, or 156 before the fort was assaulted, but of no con^ sequence whatever to Captain Downie, that the fort should be attacked simultaneously with the naval force. Sir George Prevost, therefore, in his communications with the naval Com- mander, and particularly in his letter of the 10th, mentioned his intention of making nearly a si- multaneous attack, as part of his own plan of operations, with which it was necessary that Captain Downie should be acquainted. It is highly probable, that Captain Downie inferred from this communication, that the attack on the fort which Sir George Prevost had been in rea- diness to make on the morning of the 10th, would be made at the time when the fleets should en- gage, but there is not the slightest ground for be- lieving that this expectation led him to place any reliance upon the land attack, as a co-operation in support of the naval force, or that it induced him to hasten into action, at a time when he felt unequal to it, or unprepared for the contest. Had he considered the expressions used by Sir George Prevost, in his letter of the 10th, as im- porting an agreement to assist him by a simul- taneous attack on shore, he would certainly have answered that communication, and have availed himself of the services of Captain Watson, who was left with him for that purpose, to express to the Commander of the forces his reliance on the promised aid, and his assurance that it was the 157 state of the wind alone, which had prevented him from appearing with the fleet on the morn- ing of the 10th, as he had intended. At the time when this letter was written hy the Com- mander of the forces, he was ignorant of the causes which had delayed the fleet, and he was ignorant, likewise, of Captain Downie's further intentions, with regard to the time when he would be prepared to attack the enemy's squadron. Had Captain Downle, therefore, relied, in the slightest degree, on the co-operation of the land forces, he would have informed Sir George Pre- vost of the exact time when he contemplated an engagement, that the troops on shore might be prcDared to second his efforts. No reply, how- ever, was despatched by him to the Commander of the forces, who thus remained in uncertainty with regard to the actual state and condition of the squadron, and the intentions ct its com- mander. Captain Watson, whose directions were to proceed immediately to head-quarters, with intelligence of the sailing of the squadron, should not Captain Downie have previously despatched him, did not arrive until after the fleet had made its appearance. It has, indeed, been asserted, by the Quarterly Reviewer, that the scaling of the guns of our squadron was to be the signal for the advance of the columns of attack. This mis- statement appears to have arisen out of the evi- dence which was given before the Court-Martial ■•I. ; I 158 on Captain Pring ; for in no other place is any allusion to such a fact to he discovered. The error of that statement, which, without doubt, was unintentional, is manifest. The signal in question is said to have been concerted with Major Coore on the 10th, when, in fact, no in- terview or communication whatever took place between him and Captain Downie on that day ; and that no such signal was mentioned to the former on the 8th, the day on which he did see Captain Downie, is a fact to which the Major (now Colonel Coore) is ready to bear witness. In all probability Captain Watson, who was with Cap- tain Downie on the 10th, was the person who was mistaken for Major Coore, and to him Cap- tain Downie might have communicated his in- tention of scaling his guns, prev ious to rounding Cumberland Head, in order to announce to the Commander of the forces the approach of the squadron. Whatever may have been the nature of Captain Downie's communication by Captain Watson, it is certain that it never reached Sir George Prevost. It has thus been shewn, that there was not even an understanding between Sir George Pre- vost and Captain Downie, that the attack by land and sea should take place simultaneously, for the purpose of affording protection or sup- port to our squadron, much less that there ex- isted any "solemn agreement" to that effect. 159 It must also be evident, from the previous state- ment, that the attack on shore did actually take place at the commencement of the naval action, and that the sudden and unexpected termination of the latter engagement alone prevented the prosecution of the military operations. Orders, as we have already shewn, had been given by Sir George Prevost, on the 9th, for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack of the enemy's works on the morning of the 10th, and those orders were accompanied, as every military man knows, and as the Reviewer* him- self must have known, is usual, by an order to cook, when the time will admit.f It has also been shewn, that early on the morning of the 11th, and before the fleet was in sight, or the scaling of their guns was heard, similar orders were circulated for the troops to hold themselves in readiness for the attack, and so well prepared were the forces on shore to make the attack, that almost at the same moment when the Con- fiance began to engage the enemy, the troops were in motion for the assault. Our batteries, * Review, p. 446. f In the celebrated action between our fleets commanded by Lord Howe, and that of the French, on the 1st of June, 1794, whilst they were in sight of each other, and preparing for ac- tion, the order was given for our men to go to breakfast. See Brenton's Naval History, vol, i. p. 272—307, 160 i n as mentioned above, opened on the enemy's works some time before the commencement of the naval action on the part of the Confiance. Until confidently assured that the fleets would engage (and many circumstances might have in- tervened to prevent it even after the appearance of our squadron) Sir George Prevost felt that it would be highly imprudent in him to commence the attack; but the moment he learned that Captain Downie was actually in contact with the enemy, the troops were immediately ordered to take their position for the assault. Although our naval official accounts of the transaction state the engagement to have lasted for two hours and a half, that is from eight o'clock in the morning until half-past ten, when the Con- fiance struck, the American naval account, which is corroborated by the testimony of all who wit- nessed the action from the shore, represents the engagement to have terminated in about an hour and a half The American account also cor- responds with the statements of our officers on shore, that our fleet did not round Cumberland Head until between eight and nine o'clock, be- fore which time all the statements of persons on shore agree in admitting that the action did not begin on the part of our fleet. With regard to the period when the engagement terminated, all the accounts appear to coincide. It has al- ready been shewn, that notwithstanding the un- 161 fortunate mistake of the attacking columns tak- ing a wrong route, they had at that very period forced the ford of the Saranac, and were then in the vicinity of the enemy's works, and prepared to make an instant assauU, and that the unex- pected result of the naval action was the sole cause which induced Sir George Prevost to countermand that assault. It now remains to explain more fully the reasons of the Commander of the forces for giving those orders, which will afford an answer to the last charge brought against him. It has been often and confidently asserted, that both the enemy's squadron and our own were within reach of the guns of the works. It is not, therefore, surprising that an unfavourable impression should have been made upon the minds of many persons with regard to the policy of not persevering in an attack, which might, under such circumstances, have led to the reco- very of our own fleet, or the destruction of that of the enemy. The fact of the relative situation of the two squadrons and of the enemy's works, has, like most of the other facts connected with this expedition, been grossly misrepresented. Had an opportunity been offered by a public investigation of the transaction, it could and would have been satisfactorily proved, that nei- ther of the fleets was within the range of the enemy's guns from any part of their works, and i 102 that their own squadron was anchored more than a mile and a half from the shore. The grounds of the Reviewer's statement upon this subject it is impossible to ascertain ; but, in opposition to what he affirms* on the testimony of Captain Pring, and *' numerous other eye-witnesses" it can be proved by testi- mony from on board the Confiance, as well as by officers without number on shore, that she was taken possession of within half an hour after she struck ; and it can also be proved, in opposition to the decided opinion of the num- ber of officers, who are stated to have visited Plattsburg after the peace, that the anchorage of the American squadron was not within range of the forts. The evidence of the greater part of the Ge- neral Officers accompanying the expedition to Plattsburg, who viewed the naval action ; of the commanding officer, and others of the Artillery ; of naval men on board of our fleet, and of va- rious other persons on shore, could and would have been produced upon the trial of the ques- tion, had it taken place, in proof of the fact as here stated. But independently of all opinion upon the subject, is it probable or credible that the American naval Commander would have placed his squadron in such a situation, that by * Review, p. 448. 163 possibility they could be annoyed or injured from works which he saw it was the evident in- tention of Sir George Prevost to attack, and which he must have felt convinced would in such a case have fallen ? That he was aware of the danger to which his squadron was exposed by its vicinity to the forts, appears from the cir- cumstance before adverted to, of his havi:ig moved further into the Bay from the station which he occupied on the 6th, the day of the arrival of our troops before Plattsburg. The position which the American Commander thus took, was one in which, according to his judg- ment, he could not have been annoyed by the fall of the works on shore, an event for which he was prepared. This opinion was expressed in the presence of a British officer who had been made prisoner during the naval action. The same opinion was entertained by Captain Hen- ley, of the American brig, Eagle, who had him- self reconnoitred the position in which the fleet was anchored, and which upon his report was selected by the American Commander, because it was evidently out of the range of the guns from the shore. If any thing more were want- ing in confirmation of this fact, it will be amply supplied by the opinions of the two officers most capable of forming a correct judgment on the subject. The following letters of Commodore Macdonough and General Macomb, the Ameri- M 2 !| m 164 can Naval and Military Commanders, will, it is apprehended, set the question at rest in the mind of every unprejudiced person. ** Portsmouth, Ncv Hampshire, July a, 1815. " Dear Sir, Your letter of the 26th ult. came to hand yesterday ; the letter you addressed to me at Washington has not been received, or it assuredly should have been attended to. In reply to yours of the 26th ult. it is my opinion that our squadron was anchored one mile and a half from the batteries at Plattsburg, during the contest between it and the British squadron on t e 11th September, 1814. I am, with much respect. Your obedient servant, (Signed) J. Macdonough." " Cadwr. Colden, Esq.'' IP; <( « Sir, City of Ne\o York, June 15, 1815. I should have replied earlier to your letter of the 26th ultimo, had it not been mislaid amidst a mass of communications on the subject of the army. With respect to the distance of the American squadron from the batteries at Plattsburg, I will 165 state th ' it is my decided opinion that the squadron was moored beyond the effectual range of the batteries, and this I know from a fruit- less attempt made to elevate our guns so as to bear on the British squadron during the action of the 11th of September last. No guns, how- ever, were fired, all being convinced that the vessels were beyond their reach. This opinion was strengthened by observations on the actual range of the guns of the Confiance — her heaviest metal falling several hundred yards short of the shore when closely engaged with our vessels. With a hope that this reply will be satisfac- tory, I subscribe myself, Sir, Your most obedient servant, (Signed) Alex. Macomb." *' Cadwr. R. Colden, Esq" ir Id Jt <( Sir, " New Y&rk, August 1, 1815. In reply to your letter of the 30th ult. asking the distance of the American squa- dron from the batteries of Plattsburg, on the 11th day of September, 1814, while engaged with the British squadron, I will state that it js my decided opinion that the American squa- dron was upwards of three thousand yards dis- i I m tant from the battericH, being eonfirmcd in that belief from observations made on the aetual range of the heaviest guns of the British ship, Con- fiance, w hen fired towards the batteries, the balls falling short upwards of five hundred yards. With respectful consideration, I am. Sir, Your obedient servant, (Signed) Alex. Macomb." " To Cadwr. R. Coldcn, Enq." If therefore our squadron could not have been recovered, or that of the enemy annoyed or in- jured by the capture of their works on shore, it may be asked, what advantages could have re- sulted from persevering in the attack ? It has been already shewn that the primary object of this expedition was the destruction of the enemy's flotilla on the Lake. Had that object been ac- complished, Plattsburg might have been occu- pied by our troops, and from thence, with the assistance of our squadron, they might have been transported to other parts of the Lake for the further annoyance of the enemy. The loss of our squadron, however, immediately rendered all these important operations impracticable. Without the assistance of a fleet, nothing be- yond the occupation of Plattsburg could have been accomplished. That Plattsburg would have fallen, neither the Commander of the forces, nor 107 a man under him, could have entertained a doubt. The enemy were indeed strongly entrenched, and under works, which afforded complete shel- ter to several thousand expert marksmen, from whose fire our troops nmst have suffered most severely ; but granting, that after a considerable loss, we had carried the enemy's works, what adequate advantages should we have gained ? To retain Plattsburg was not possible without the assistance of a fleet, which would have been necessary to the provisioning of our army; a retreat, therefore, after destroying all we could not carry away, would have been indispensable. Such was, however, the state of the season and of the weather, that 24 hours delay in retiring with our troops to Canada, would not only have made such a measure dangerous, from the advance of the enemy in every direction, but would have rendered the conveyance of our ordnance and stores exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. The militia of the state of New York and Vermont were turning out, and ra- pidly increasing in numbers; and although in the open field our troops would justly have despised them, they would have proved most formidable in the woods, and hanging upon the flank and rear of a retreating army. Sir George Prevost knew that he had only to give the word, and that his gallant troops would accomplish 168 all his wishes,* but he knew at the same time how useless the acquisition would be, and how costly the sacrifice at which it was probable it would be made. He was also bound to bear in mind the instructions of His Majesty's Govern- ment, with regard to the committal of the force under him, so necessary for the preservation of the Provinces entrusted to his care. He therefore wisely determined to retreat, whilst retreat was practicable, and whilst it could be effected with the least possible loss. The or- der was accordingly given for that purpose, and such was the energy and promptitude of the ex- ecution, that the retreat was conducted without the smallest molestation from the enemy, who, in fact, were not aware of it until it was nearly completed. Notwithstanding the almost im- passable state of the roads, from the rains which were falling, not a gun was left behind ; and, although the subject has been much exagge- rated, yet in fact only a very small quantity * Notwithstanding the opinion entertained by Sir George Prevost and the array regarding the probable fall of Platts- bur:^, it must be recollected that failure was possible, and that nearly at this very period we had been disappointed in our attempts both upon Baltimore and New Orleans. The opinion of the Americans themselves upon this subject, will be found well expressed in an extract from a Burlington paper (State of Vermont) of that period, given in the Appendix, No. XXXI. 169 of provisions and stores, together with fifteen wounded men in hospital, was left to the enemy. Of deserters, the utmost amount was under 300 men, which was the consequence, not as has been falsely asserted, of the retreaty* but of the advance, many of them having deserted upon our entry, and as we afterwards penetrated into the American territory; a consequence which almost invariably attended every attack upon their frontier, and was most strongly manifested in Colonel Scott's expedition, in December, 1813, against part of General Wilkinson's army, when, out of a force of not more than 500 men, he lost upwards of 90 by desertion. The exaggerated account of this retreat hav- ing induced his Majesty's government to call upon Sir George Prevost for a more particular detail of the losses attending it, it appears, by Sir George Prevost's reply to Lord Bathurst's despatch on the subject, together with the do- cuments accompanying it, that the whole loss in killed, wounded, prisoners, and deserters, from the time of the army entering the American ter- ritory, until it was withdrawn, did not amount to 500 men. This affords a complete answer to one of the Reviewer's concluding mis-state- ments, that when Sir George Prevost wrote the despatch from Montreal, though dated at Platts- Review, p, 447. 170 It m ;il'|^W ->' > ■J 1 burg,* " he knew tliat the desertion of 800 men had attended his shameful defeat." The unfortunate loss of our fleet, and the con- sequent withdrawing of our troops from the Ame- rican territory, afforded an opportunity to the party opposed to Sir George Prevost's civil ad- ministration in Canada, of which they immedi- ately and eagerly availed themselves, of circu- lating the most unfounded statements, and the most exaggerated accounts, with respect to both those transactions. These were industriously transmitted to England by a private ship be- longing to one of Sir George Prevosts most violent opponents, and upon their arrival, and in the absence of any official accounts of the transactions to which they referred, they created a general belief that the disastrous result of the naval action had been occasioned by a want of co-operation from the shore; that the retreat had been conducted in a precipitate and dis- graceful manner ; that a severe loss of men, guns, stores, and provisions, had been the consequence of it; and that the whole army was indignant at the conduct of their commander. The arrival of Sir George Prevost's despatches, together with the explanations afforded, as well by them as by the person to whom they had been given in charge, could not fail to undeceive His Ma- * Review, p. 448. 171 \n jesty's Government on this subject, and to con- vince them of tlie grossness of the misrepresen- tations which had gone forth. Had not some expressions in Sir James Yeo's letter, accom- panying the account of the naval action, heen construed into charges against Sir George Pre- vost, which, in justice to him, as well as to the public, it was deemed proper to call upon him to answer, there cannot be a doubt but that the further management of the war in the Canadas would still have been entrusted to the Com- mander who had hitherto so successfully con- ducted it. Even if the subsequent conduct of Sir James Yeo did not afford ample proof of the fact, there is not wanting other evidence to shew that the letter in question was written by him under the irritation of the moment, and in con- sequence of Captain Pring s communication to him of the result of the naval action, but with- out any intention of making a charge against Sir George Prevost, and without the most distant idea that it could be so construed. Sir James Yeo must have possessed too honourable a mind to become a guest in Sir George Prevost 's fa- mily, and to partake of his attention and hospi- tality, had he for a moment supposed that his public letter, on the subject of the naval action at Plattsburg, could have been construed into a formal accusation. Had he really meant it as such, he would most undoubtedly, in a manly and open if'i ilk' >\ i 172 ■M '■■^,1: manner, have communicated the proceeding he had adopted to the party accused ; and, under such circumstances, would, no less certainly, have refused the kindness and attention of the person of whom lie had publicly expressed so unfavour- able an opinion. That this must have been the case may further be inferred, from the circum- stance that, although Sir George Prevost was recalled to answer the charges, amounting to three in number, supposed to be contained in Sir James Yeo's letter, it was not until more than four months after both these officers ar- rived in England, that the precis* charges upon which he was to take his trial, were officially communicated to him, and which charges differed materially from those in Sir James Yeo's letter. Whether, under these circumstances. Sir James Yeo would have supported the charges, had the investigation taken place, cannot now be deter- mined ; but a confident appeal may be made to the intelligent reader, whether, upon the facts disclosed in these pages being made known, such an attempt must not have utterly failed. With regard to the naval action on T^nki Champlain, we me unwilling to say more than may be neceaarvvy t^i" the vindication of the cha- racter and conduct of Sir George P#evost. The veal causes of the disastrous result of that af- fair, were such as particularly belong to naval actions, and which, when they do occur, must 173 materially influence the issue of the conflict. It is not a little remarkable, that the naval Court- martial on Captain Pring and his officers, should have overlooked or disregarded these causes; and it is greatly to be regretted, that they should have thought themselves justified in ascribing the disaster to the conduct of Sir George Pre- vost, and in passing so severe a censure upon an officer of another service, of whose orders and instructions they must necessarily have been ig- norant, and who was neither present to defend himself, nor amenable to their jurisdiction. It is clear that it was Captain Downie's intention, on going into action, to lay his own ship, in the size and strength of which he seemed to place great confidence, along side of the American Commo- dore ; but the unfortunate failure of the wind, be- fore he could accomplish this object, obliged him to anchor at a distance of more than half a mile from his opponent ; the same circumstance also induced Captain Pring, in the Linnet, to take his situation still fartK immense fatigues, joined (ieneral Prevost in the evening of the Kith, with 500 nun ; and the remainder of his detachment arrived about noon the next daj'. As he found the enemy in possession of the ship-channel, the Colonel had been obliged to come round Dawfnskie, ami land on the marshes ; and after dragging his boats (empty) through a cut. got into the Savannah river above the French frigates, and from that came down to the town. A Council of War was he'd, in which it was determined to defend the place to the laiit extremity : and notice of this resolution v, as sent to the besieging Generals. To this M. d'Estaing returned an answer. Hostilities immediat«'ly rerommenced: and the Bri- tish tars could not refrain from givifig three hu/zas from their batteries. Both sides now exerted themselves with the ut- most assiduity. When the town was first summoned, there were not above eight or ten guns mounted ; but so indefati- gable were the exertions of Captain Moncriefte, the senior engineer in the place, in putting it in a proper state of de- fence, that, by adding the guns landed from the ships to those which were in store, he had, in the course of a few days, nearly 90 pieces of cannon ready to oppose to the enemy, as soon as their batteries should open. He had likewise erected many redoubts, batteries, and other works, to retard their progress. In all these operations, the soldiers and sailors, with the utmost cheerfulness, worked day and night in the face of hostile troops flushed with conquest : the enemy were greatly astonished at the activity of the garrison. From the accounts given to M. d'Estaing, of the situation of things at Savannah, he considered his success against it as certain. He had made repeated declarations to the Ame- ricans, that, as the season of the year was so far advanced, he could not remam more than ten or fifteen days on shore, lest his fleet should be injured on such a dangerous coast. The reinforcement which the garrison had received, reduced APPENDIX, NO. I. the besiegers to tlic alternative of cither storming or Ixsiog- ing the town of Savannah. The hittor plan was adopted, and they took their measures accordingly. As it was apprehended, that the enemy's ships miglit come too near the town, aiip a n!H|)('(;tablo (Ibtanco. Two sallies, one of them on the 24th, cominandcil by Major (•rahain, of the HMh rci^imeiit ; and aiiothtron th(>'i7th, coiu- ninndcd by Major IM'Arthiir, of the Tlst i(>}];iiii('nt; were ad- mirably well cotidiicted, did the enemy considerable mischief, and killiMl and wounded a great many of their best troops, while the losfi on our side was very inconsiderable. In thu first sally, lUajor (Iraham urtfidly drew the enemy into a snare, by which tin; IVencli and (he rebt-ls fired on each other, and had near 50 men killed before the mistake was discovered. The batteries played on every place where the enemy were perceived to be at work ; and more than once oblij^ed them to discontinue their labour. It was the 3rd of October, be- fore they opened any of their batteries : and then, about mid- night they began to bombard from nine mortars of eight and ten inches, and continued the bombardment about two hours. At day-light, their fire commenced again from the nine mor- tars, and also from 37 pieces of cannon from the land side, and 10 from their shipping: ond in this they persisted with little variation during several days. The execution done by this heavy Hre,was much less than could have been imagined. It consisted in killing a i'ew helpless women and children, and some few negroes and horses in the town, and on the com- mon. On the 0th, the enemy threw some carcasses into the town, which burnt one wooden house : and about 11 o'clock, the General sent a letter, by a flag of truce, to M. d'Estaing, requesting permission to send the women and children out of the place, on board of ships and down the river, under the protection of a French ship of war, until the siege should be ended. After three hours, and a deal of intermediate cannon shot and shells, an insulting answer was returned by Messrs. Lincoln and d'Estaing, in which they refused to comply with this reasonable and humane demand. AI'l'ENDIX, NO. I. Tho garrison, undiHinayL'd by this Itnitul ro> •liict .1.1 the part of their oppuiuiiits, kept up 11 sniurt tirr ii^uitist them ; and (luring the night wetu cxtronicly liiisty in addini; Ut thoir worlcH, and in repairing; such ut' th(>ni us had sustiiinod da- mage. ThuH things went on until the morning ut' the Uth; when, a little before day-break, after a heavy, and as usual, incessant cannonaih; and bumbardnit iit, the enemy attacked General PrevoMt's lines. The attack being upon the left of his centre, in front of the French; and very soun after, upon his left and right. It wat yet dark, and the darkness was increased by a very thick fog, which made it impossible to determine with precision, where the real attack was to be made, or how nuiny assaults were intended. No reinforcements therefore were sent; but every thing was kept in readiness for that purpose, and the troops waited with the greatest coolness in their diHTerent posts, for the ap|>roach of the enemy. Those in the lines were prepared to charge them, wherever they should attempt to penetrate : and the General had the greatest hopes, that the fire of the field artillery, which was placed to support the advanced redoubts, would enable him, while the enemy were entangled among these, to throw them into some confusion ; and, perhaps, with a good prospect of success, to order his corps de reserve to sally forth and charge tliem. The ground toward both his tlanks, owing to its natural defects, which the utmost efi'orts of Captain M oncriefi'e had been unable ef- fectually to remove, was but too favourable for an enemy. On the right was a swampy hollow, by which they could approach under cover to within fifty yards of his principal works, and in some places still nearer ; and there, he sup- posed, that the rebels would make their assault. On the left, the approach was neither so well covered, nor of so great an extent as that on the right; but as it was sufficiently large to admit troops to act, as the ground was firm und clear, and as it was near their encampment, he expected that the French regulars would make their attack there : but in w 8 APPENDIX, NO. I. i t [if ' 7p l: this he was mistaken. A real attack did take plar^e there : but the principal attack, composed of the flower of the French and rebel armies, and led by the Compte d'Estaing in per- son, assisted by all the principal ofllicers of both, was made upon his light. Under cover of the hollow, they advanced in three columns ; but, owing to the darkness, took a wider circuit than they needed or intended to have done, and went deeper into the bog. These circumstances prevented them from beginning the attack so soon as they had concerted ; and besides occasioning a loss of critical time, produced con- sidera' le disorder in their ranks. The attack, however, was very spirited, and for some time obstinately maintained ; par- ticularly at a redoubt on the Ebenezer road, which was a scene of hot action, great loss, and consummate bravery. Two stand of colours were actually planted, and several of the assailants killed upon the paiapet; but they met so de- termined a resistance, that they could not, with all their ef- forts, force an entrance. It was now, that the skill and de- sign of the defences raised by Captain Moncrieflt'e, were fully displayed; for, while the conflict was still dubious and bloody, the field-pieces, from three batteries which were manned by the sailors, took them in every direction, and made such havock in their ranks, that they were thrown into confusion, and compelled to make a pause. At this critical moment, Major Glacier, of the 60th regiment, with the grenadiers of that corps and the marines, advanced rapidly from the lines ; in the most impetuous manner, charged the enemy with their fixed bayonets ; and plunging among them, into the ditches and works, drove them, in an instant, from the ditches of the redoubt, and from a battery a little to the right of it. Fol- lowing up the blow, they forced them o fly, in great confu- sion, over the abatis, and into the swamp. On this occasion. Captain Wickham, of the 2d battalion of the 60th grenadiers, greatly distinguished himself. When the grenadiers advanced, three companies of the second battalion of the 71st regiment were ordered to sustain them : and although they were posted Pill APPENDIX, NO. I. 9 at no considerable distance, and marched forward with the usual ardour of that corps, uch was the rapidity with which the grenadiers had made their attack, and so precipitate was the enemy's retreat, that they could not come in for a share of the victory. One of the enemy's columns a little more to their left, in every attempt which it made to come out of the hollow, was repulsed by the brisk ar.d well directed fire of a redoubt, where the militia were posted, aided by Hamilton's small corps of North Carolinians, who were on the right, and moved there with a field-piece to bear obliquely against it, while one of the seamen's batteries took it directly in fiank. It was now day- light: bt . the fog was not sufficiently cleared off, to enable General Prevost to judge with any degree of certainty of the strength, disposition, or further intentions of the enemy on the right. On the left, and in the centre, the fog, with the addition of the smoke, was still impenetrably close : and a smart firing being still kept up there, the Ge- neral thought it would be improper to draw from it a num- ber of troops sufficient to make a respectable sortie. By these means, an opportunity was lost of taking complete ad- vantage of the confusion of the enemy, by charging them in their retreat; but they did not get off without being se- verely cannonaded by the batteries and field-pieces, as long as they were in sight, or judged to be within reach. They were every where repulsed : and those on the left were only heard, being concealed from view by the thickness of the fog. Lieutenant-Colonel de Porbeck, of Weissenbeck's Hessian regiment, was field-officer of the right wing : and being in the redoubt when the attack began, had an opportunity, which he well improved, of signalizing himself in a most gallant manner. It would not be doing justice to the difl"erent corps who defended the redoubt, if we neglected to mention them. They were part of the South Carolina Royalists ; and the light dragoons dismounted, and commanded (by special order) 10 APPENDIX, NO. I. by Captain Tawse, a good and gallant officer, who nobly fell with his sword in the bu Jy of the third man he had killed with his own hand. The loss on the part of the British in this battle, consisted of one captain, and fifteen rank and fi'c killed; one captain, three subalterns, and thirty-five rank and file wounded. The loss sustained by the enemy, as ac- knowledged by the French, was about a thousand or twelve hundred men killed and wounded ; of these, they lost forty- four ofHcers and seven hundred men : and the deserters, of whom there were a gr jat many, all declared, that the loss on the part of the rebels was not less than four hundred men. Among the wounded was M. d'Estaing, (in two places) M. de Fontange, Major-Gcneral ; and several others of distinc- tion. Count Polaski, (who has been mentioned in the course of these Memoirs), a Colonel of cavalry in the rebel service, in making a desperate push at the British lines, was mortally wounded. About ten o'clock, the enemy requested a truce, and leave to bury their dead, and carry off their wounded men. This was granted for those who lay at a distance from the lines, or out of sight of them : but those within or near the abatis were interred by the British. Their numbers were on the right, two hundred and three : on the left, twenty- eight. One hundred and sixteen prisoners, most of them mortally wounded, were delivered to the enemy. To this loss, considerable of itself, must be added, the numbers buried by them, the num- bers who perished in the swamp, and many who were carried oflF by them when they retreated. From this time to the 18th, nothing very material hap- pened. Several flags of truce were sent during that period by the enemy, and a great deal of civility passed mutually between the French and British. Many apologies were made for their refusal to allow the women and children to be sent out of town : and the blame of this base conduct was laid, bv a French Colonel, Compte O'Duin, entirely on the scoun- APPENDIX, NO. I. 11 drel Lincoln, and the Americans.* The offer was then made with great earnestness, that the ladies and children should be received by the Chevalier du ^lomaia, on board of the Chiraere ; but the answer given to it was blunt and soldierly, that what had once been refused, and that in terms of insuU, was not in any circumstances deemed \vorth acceptance. All the French otfiL .rs seemed quite ashamed of this affair. As it was with them oidy, that the British had any intercourse after the . ^|)ulse on the 9th, the sentiments of the Americans could not be so well known. But, as the letter was signed by d'Estaing, as well as by Lincoln, their imputing this harsh, cruel, and unprecedented refusal, entirely to the brutality of the American General, may serve to shew their conscious- ness, that it was altogether indefensible; but is by no means sufficient to exculpate the French Commander, from his share of the blame and disgrace, inseparable from it. An author,t who is extremely partial to the American cause, endeavours to defend this measure from motives of policy : " The com- bined army (says he) was so confident of success, that it was suspected, that the request of sending away the women and children, pioceeded from a desire of secreting the plunder lately taken from the South Carolinians, and artfully covered under the specious veil of humanity. That the Commanders were suspicious, considering the stratagem Prevost had prac- tised after being summoned, is not "'-ange. It was also presumed, that a refusal would expedite a surrender." There does not seem to have been much cordiality between the French and Americans in this enterprise. M. d'Estaing would have been well pleased to have done the business without them, by summoning the place to surrender to his Most Christian Majesty. This, the latter took much amiss, as they considered themselver as principals, and the French * Compte O'Duin's own expression, t Goi'doD, Author of the History of the American Revolution, vol. iii. p. 328, &c. 12 APPENDIX, NO. I. J; I only as auxiliaries : and for this piece of presumption, some concessions were made. When the time assigned by M. d'Estaing for this expedition had elapsed, aud still more was required by the engineers, if it was expected that the garri- son should be compelled to surrender by regular approaches, he became extremely impatient to bring matters to a quick decision, and urged giving the assault to the place. This measure, says Mr. Gordon, was forced on M. d'Estaing by his naval otficers, who had remonstrated against his con- tinuing to risk so valuable a fleet in its present unrepaired condition, on such a dangerous coast in the hurricane season ; and at so great a distance from the shore, that it might be surprised. These remonstrances were enforced, by the pro- bability of their being attacked by the British fleet completely repaired, with their f>ill complement of men, soldiers, and artillery on board, w'len the ships of his Most Christian Ma- jesty were weakened, by the absence of a considerable part of their crews, artillery, and officers, employed at the siege of Savannah. These reasons had great weight with M. d'Estaing : and he prevailed on General Lincoln to storm the place without farther loss of time. The Americans seemed to think, that by a little more patience and perseverance, the town must have submitted ; as in a few v-^ays, the lines of the besiegers would h'^ve been carried quite close to the works of the besieged. Their allies, however, judged themselves to be in so critical a situation, that they acquiesced in M. d'Estaing's proposal ; for, if the French had retired to their ships, the siege must have been raised, so that there remained only one alternative for them to adopt. The repulse which they had received, was not followed by mutual accusations of want of courage or conduct in either party; but the French, in all their conversations, spoke of the Americans with the greatest contempt. It was not perceived until the 18th, that the enemy had raised the siege; but, the fog clearing up in the morning of that day, it was found that they had moved off. For some APPENDIX, NO. II. 13 Days previous to this, they had been bufy in drawing oft' their cannon and mortars, and in embarking their sick and wounded, of whom they had a great number. General Prevost imme- diately detached parties in pursuit of them; but th'ey had got to such distance before it was discovered they had retreated, that they could not overtake them : the enemy m their march having broken down all the bridges. The French embarked in Augustine creek, and the rebels crossed the river Savan- nah, at Zubley's ferry, and got into South Carolina. The enemy's fleet quitted the coast on the 2Gth October, and their frigates and galleys on the 2d of November, as soon as an exchange of prisoners had taken place. The balance of pri- soners was in the enemy's favour : for while they were off this coast, on the 11th of September, his Majesty's ship, Ariel, of 24 guns, was taken by the French frigate, the Ama- zon, of 36 guns ; and besides taking the Experiment, they took also the Myrtle, navy victualler ; and Champion, store- ship. The last of these was a prize of considerable import- ance to them, for their fleet was very badly manned, their crews sickly, their ships in bad condition, short of anchors and cables, and no running rigging to reeve, but this ship afforded them a supply. She had been sent from New York, with naval stores for the ships and vessels, under the com- mand of Captain Henry. No. 11. Address from the Council and House of Representatives of St. Vincents to Lieut. -Col. Prevost, p. 7. " Sir, The Committee of His Majesty's Council, and of the Representatives of the Inhabitants of St. Vincents, deeply impressed with the many and eminent services you have ren- dered this colony, beg leave to offer their most grateful thanks 14 APPENDIX, NO. III. }' to you, not only on their own account, but on that of the coramunity at larg^e. It might be irksome to you to minutely particularize these services : the Committee, however, cannot forbear mentioning your voluntary and unsolicited return to the defence of the Colony, and to par^oipate in a most laborious and perilous war, against an inglorious enemy. Such zeal, Sir, strongly characterizes the soldier. The happy conse- quences to the public cause, although unfortunate to your- self, of your late gallant attack on the enemy's advanced post, demand the warmest acknowledgments, and the uni- versal wish that you may speedily recover from your wounds, and that our gracious Sovei-eign may discern, and properly reward such distinguished merit. " 10th March, 1796." No. III. Letter from the Duke of Portland to Brigadier-General Prevost, p, 7. « Sir, " Whitehall, '29th April, 1801. " The satisfactory manner in which you have con- ducted the Administration of Public Affairs in St. Lucie, and the representations made to the King in your behalf by the Members of the Court of Appeal, have induced His Majesty to appoint you Lieutenant-Governor of that Island. I transmit to you inclosed His Majesty's Commission ; and I have only to add, that I am persuaded that your conduct in the administration of your Government will continue to justify the very flattering and favorable intentions of the Court of Appeal, to contribute to the support of the respect- ability of your civU station. " I am. Sir, ** Your most obedient humble servant, (Signed) " Portland." APPENDIX, NO. IV. 16 No. IV. Address to Brigadier-General Prevost from the Inliahi- tants of St. Lucie J />. 7. / ^ '^ Z Les Habitans de I'lslc dc St. Lucie, \ Son Excellence Mon- sieur le Brigadier-General George Prevost, lieut.-Gou- verneur de cette Isle, &c. Monsieur le Gouverneur, LoRSQUE la paix, objet de tous les voeux, fait ren- trer I'Isle de Saintc Lucie sous la domination Fran9aise, c'est un hommage bien legitime que de vous rendre au nom de tous les Colons un temoignage public de I'amour, du respect^ et de la reconnoissance que votre gouvernement doux et patemel, et votre sage administration, ont fait naitre dans tous les coeurs. Les avantages sans nombre dont vous avez fait jouir la Colonic, depuis que vous en avez pris Ic Comman dement, I'attachent hautement. En effet, M. le Gou* verneur, I'amour constant que vous avez manifest^ pour le bien public ; les soins infinies que vous avez pris pour rendre et faire rendre la justice dans un terns oii toutes les loix 6taient en oubli ; le z^le infatigable avec lequel vous vous ^tes occup6 des discussions et des int^rets des Colons ; votre gouvernement paternel,qui, en vous conciliant tous les esprits, k detruit les divisions qui pouvaient exciter, a fait regner I'union et la concorde parmi les habitans, et a fait renaitre la confiance, et la prosperity. Enfin, votre gouvernement tute- lair, qui a fait cherir I'authorit^ de sa Majeste dans la v6tre, sont autant de bienfaits dont vous avez fait jouir les habitans de la Colonic, et dont ils conserveront eternellement le sou- venir. Mais il en 6tait un plus grand que le z^le et I'amour du bien public, qui vous animaient, reservoit ^ la Colonic ; c'est votre sollicitude paternelle qui a cmploi^ et obtenue, pour nous, de sa Majesty, qu'elle nous rendit nos loix, nos tribu- 16 APPENDIX, NO. V. naux, nos magistrals, c'est-i-dire, :o t^'moignage le plus con- vain^ant qu'elle pr^ferait au droit de nous trailer comnie un peuplc conquis, la douceur dc nous adopter pour ses enfans, et de nous rendre les objets de sa tendresse. Nous en sonimes tellement convaincus, M. le Gouverneur, que nos infortunes ont 6t^ adoueis, et que nous en avons ressentis les plus grands effels. Le bonheur, la tranquillity, et la prosp^rile dont les habitans de la Colonie ont jouis jusqu'il present, ils les tiennent de la bont6 du Roi, et de voire administration paternelle, M . le Gouverneur; etsi noire reconnoissance ne trotive pas d'ex- pressions assez forte pour vous pcindre aussi vivement que nous le sentons, noire admiration pour vos talens, notre v6- n^ration pour vos vertus, et notre amour profonde pour voire personne, — daignez permetlre que la Colonie vous pr^sente, comme un foible t^moignage, une 6p6e, sur la lame de laquelle seront grave ces mots : — La Colonie de St. Lucie reconnois- sante. Jouissez, M. le Gouverneur, du bien que vous avez fait a la Colonie; etlesvceux des Colons pour voire gloire et voire bonheur vous suivront ik voire patrie. No. V. u^ . ' Letters from Sir Thomas Trigge, Commander of the Forces in the West Indies ^ p. 7. " SlE, " I HAVE the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 14th inst., and feel very great regret, that your state of health is such as to render your return- ing to England necessary, by that means depriving His Ma- jesty and myself of your services in this country. You may rely I shall not fail to express my sentiments on this subject vehen I write home, as in rendering this tribute of justice to your character, I shall discharge the most pleasing and gra- " i APPENDIX, NO. V. 17 tifying part of my duty. I h(>|ir you will bo pleased to signify to the council, that in consequence of your absence, I have appointed Brigadier-dleneral (i. H. Vansittart, to succeed to the civil and military command of the Island of St. Lucie, per interim, in order that lie may be reco<>nised accordingly, and take upon him the functions and authorities of that situa- tion. ** I have now, Sir, to take my leave, and to offer my best wishes for your welfare and happiness; entertaining the firm- est hope and assurance, that you will meet on your arrival in England those marks of approbation, which in every instance you have so highly and eminently merited. " With sentiments of the purest esteem and regard, I have the honor to be. Sir, " Your most obedient and faithful humble servant, (Signed) Thos. Trigge, Lieut-General." Sir Thomas Trigge to Colonel Brownrigg, (< Sir, " The return of Brigadier-General Prevost to Eng- land, calls on me to express to His Royal Highness, the Commander-in-Chief, the opinion with which his conduct has impressed me, both in his civil and military capacities during his command in the island of St. Lucie, as, did I fail to point out those officers who are deserving of His Royal Highness's countenance and support, I should be as wanting in justice to the individual, as deficient in point of duty to the Commander-in-Chief. " I cannot but view with infinite regret Brigadier-General Prevost's departure from this country, as he has invariably conducted his command in the most satisfactory manner. The zeal and unremitting exertion which he has on every occasion shewn, and the exact attention which he has paid to the se- veral duties of his situation, point him out as a distinguished and excellent officer, and whom it is my duty to recommend in b 18 APPENDIX, NO. VI. (i- iM^f the strongest terms to His Majesty, and to the Commander- in-Chief. " I hare the honor to be, Sir, &c. &c. (Signed) «' Thos. Trioge, Lieut.-General." No. VI. Account of the Capture of St. Lucie and Tohago,from the Annual Register for 1803,/;. 8. "On the 22nd June, the island of St. Lucie was taken by General Grinfield and Commodore Head. The French Commander, General Nagues, refused to capitulate, and the expectation of approaching rains rendered it necessary to get possession of the Morne Fortunee with as little delay as pos- sible. It was therefore determined to attack it by storm; the defence was gallant ; yet, by the determined bravery of the British soldiers and seamen, the works were carried in about half an hour, not without some loss, chiefly among the ofli- cers. This conquest was of considerable importance as a naval station. The island as a colony is valuable, but the climate is unhealthy. " The British commanders lost no time in pursuing their victorious career; and on the 25th, they sailed for To- bago, which they reached on the 30th. It was defended by General Berthier, an officer of note in the French service ; but being apprised of the number of the British, and of the gallantry they had displayed at St. Lucie, he did not think it prudent to risk an engagement. A capitulation was agreed to on the same day, upon the most liberal terms, the garrison marching out with the honours of war, and to be sent back to their native country." — Annual Register for 1803, p. 283. APPENDIX, NO. VII. 19 No. VII. Extract of a Letter from Major-Gen. Grinfield relative to the expedition against St. Lucie and Tobago^ p. 8. " It is with real satisfaction I send you the enclosed ex- tract from Colonel Clinton's letter to me." Extract of a Letter from Colonel Clinton to Lieutenant- General Grinfeld, dated " Horse Guards, 3rd Sept. 1803. ** This despatch, addressed to the Commander-in-Chief, bears testimony, in the handsomest terms, to the meritorious services of Brigadier-General Prevost; and to the zealous promptitude with which he left his government of Dominica, to fulfil your wishes. In reply, I am directed to acquaint you, that His Royal Highness is perfectly sensible of the zeal, which induced Brigadier-General Prevost to volunteer his service on the late occasion, under your command ; a cir- cumstance which redounds much to his credit; and which, on a proper opportunity. His Royal Highness will not fail to mention to His Majesty." Extract of a Letter from Lord Hobart to Brigadier-General Prevost. " I cannot omit to congratulate you upon the complete success of the expeditions against St. Lucie and Tobago, in which you were so actively and honourably engaged ; and I have the satisfaction of acquainting you, that His Majesty has been graciously pleased to notice, with particular appro- bation, your conduct upon those services." h '2 11 20 Al'lMCNUlX, NO. VIII. No. VIII. Letter to Brigadier-General Pre vast from General Nagitcs, p. \). •' Dkpuis la prise dii Morno I'ortunfc, je ne ccssr dV'prouvcr de la part dii (i{>n6ral on Chof des 6gardfi (iiicj'ait! dfi attri- bucr ^ iiti c;aract(>rii^'ral (iriiiticld. *• Mais je n'ignore pas, G6n6ral, tpraiiinu' des nieines priii- cipes, jo dois i\ vos dispositions particulieres une partie des proc6des g^n^'rcux dont jc nie suis vu coinble. Avant de vous tcmoigner touto lua reconnoissanco, laissez nioi,je vous prie, m'arreter sur un fait (jui vous est personnel, je vcux parler de riiuniainc prevoyance que vous avez eue de placer, il voire arrivC'e au Morne, une Sauve (iarde i\ I'hopital mili- taire pour la surete de nos inalades. Citer un pareil trait c'est assez dire pour le (lUerrier qu'il honore et distingue. Je viens maintenant, (lieneral, aux scntimens que vous in'avez inspir6, et je vous ^»ne de oroire que je n'y niets point de re- serve. Veuillez done bien m'agrC'er rhonunage, et recevoir mes tres humbles salutations. (Signed) " NaoUes."* " Caseuge, le G McHshlor, an 11." • " On the 9tli January, iDOt', died General Nagues, first Aide-de-Camp, &C.&C. Mis loss was stronj^ly ti It. Tliis (Jeneral had conciliated the esteem of the public by his inclination to do good, his attention to his duty, and his strict probity. Before he entered into the service of Holland, he had been Governor of St. Lucie, which he had defended as a brave soldier, and where he acquired tlie affection of tlie Planters." — Historical Documents und Ue- flections on the Government of Holland, by Louis Bonaparte, vol. ii. p. 214, APPENDIX, NO. IX, 31 No. IX. Account of the Attdvit tt/wn Dominica by a French Squudront p. 9. " It may easily lie siipiioscd tliiit \\\\\v\\ uliirin pn-viiiltid at home, when it was known that twu snch Ibiniiihihlu tleets* of the tnciny wore artnally iit sea, nn' 30 APPENDIX, NO. XII. culiar protection, from the military spirit and knowledge which he displayed in the late affair with the enemy at Dominica, and I request your lordship will be persuaded of the high sense I entertain of the services and exertions of Major-General Prevost, and that I shall be happy in availing myself of any opportunity to recommend him for a mark of His Majesty's favor. " I remain, my dear Lord, " Yours sincerely, ** Frederick." " To the Earl of Camden, K. G. ^c. 4-c. ^c." No. XII. Letter from the Speaker of the House of Assembbj of Dominica to General Prevost, p, 10. " Sir, " Dominica, nth May, 1805. *' I HAVE the honor of transmitting to your Excel- lency, by desire of the House of Assembly, a copy of their Resolutions of the 2d instant, expressive of their thanks of your late gallant defence of the colony against a French force so very superior, and appropriating the sum of 1,000 guineas for the purchase of a Sword, and a service of Plate to be presented to you in testimony of their gratitude and appro- bation. It affords me a peculiar gratification to be the organ of the House on the present occasion, because I am thus furnished with au opportunity of expressing the high esteem I entertain for your Excellency's character, not only as a brave, judi- cious, and experienced oflScer, in which capacity your merit has long stood conspicuous, but as a man of strict probity, and as a Governor whose public measures have uniformly been directed by views of general utility. When I say that APPENDIX, NO. XII. 31 it is with the deepest regret I contemplate the departure of your Excellency from this colony, I speak the language of every respectable member of the community — but you go to reap in the approbation of your Sovereign, and the applauses of your country, the well-earned reward of your unremitting vigilance and indefatigable exertions, and I am persuaded that you carry with you from hence the earnest wishes of all good men for the happiness and prosperity of yourself and your family. *' I have the honor to be, " With the highest rccpeci, &c. &c. (Signed) " J. Lucas, ** Speaker." The Governor's Reply. " Sir, " Prince Ruperts, 3rf June. " You have conveyed to me, in terms most flatter- ing, the thanks of the Houte of Assembly for my endeavours to save this colony from the misery of a foreign and oppres- sive yoke. As the organ of that body you have expressed its partial sentiments with a friendly zeal, that has made on my mind an impression not to be effaced. Allow me. Sir, through you, to offer to the House of As- sembly my unfeigned thanks for the token I have received of its partial consideration of my services. That unanimity which has been our strength, uninterrupted, may render Do- minica, even in the present perilous moment,* almost invul- nerable. Whilst danger exists, I will never abandon my post ; nor shall I ever cease to entertain a grateful recollec- tion of the sentiments the occasion has called forth. So much of the resolutions of the House as are not per- sonal to myself, I have caused to be given out in General Orders, to the Regular and Militia Forces. " I have the honor to be, &c. (Signed) " G. Prevost." * A French Squadron was in the West Indies. 32 APPENDIX, NO. XIV. No. XIII. pa t I ,1 His Honor the President and Councii, and the Speaker and Gentleman of the Assembly, to His Excellency the Governor in Chief, p. 10. TnF<: Board iuul Mouse.' Iiaviug come to tlio t'ollowiii;; Re- solution of votirijr the' hiiiii ot" 1, to be prcsorited to his Excellency (iovernor Prevost, in the name of the Colony, as a token of its gratitude for the gallant defence thereof hy his Excellency on the memorable 1'h\ rcbruary last, Also a Slim not exceeding 300/. sterling, for defraying the expense of a Monument to the memory of tlu; late Major Nunn who gallantly fill on tin; same memorable occasion, Also the sum of 100 guineas for the purchase of a Sword to be presented to Major O'Connell, And 300/. sterling to be presented to Captain James, commanding the 4Uth regiment, to be laid out in the purchase of a Service of Plate for the use of the otficers' Mess of that regiment — request your Excellency's assent thereto, and that you will issue your warrants to the Treasurer accordingly. T. Metcalf, President. J. Lucas, Speaker. Council Chamber, Vlth May, 1«05. House of Assembly, I5th May, 1005. M No. XIV. Resolutions of the Patriotic Club, and Letter of the Chairman to General Prevost, p. 10. Patriotic Fund, Lloyd's, May 14, 1805. At a Special General Meeting of the Committee held this day, Joseph Marry at, Esq. in the Chair, APPENDIX, NO. XIV. 33 Read, from the London Gazette of the 7th of May, a letter from liieut.-General Sir William Myers, Bart, commanding His Majesty's troops in the Windward and Leeward IshuuU, to Earl Camden, one of his Majesty's principal Secretaries of Slate, inclosinf!^ a letter from Brigadier-Cieneral I*revost, Governor of Dominica, relating to the vigorous and gallant resistance made by the troops and militia under his com- mand, against the very superior force w ith which the French landed at Roseau, on the 22d of February last; his retreat to the fort at Prince Ruperts; and the resolution ho ex- pressed, in answer to the summons of General Lagrange, of defending it to the last extremity ; in consequence of which the enemy abandoned the enterprise, and evacuated the Island. Resolved, That a Sword of the value of 100/., and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 200/., with appropriate inscriptions, be presented to Rrigadier-General Prevost, for the distin- guished gallantry and military talents he displayed on that occasion, by which the sovereignty of the Island was pre- served to Flis Majesty's arms. That a Sword of Fifty Pounds value, and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 100/., with appropriate inscriptions, or that sum in money, at his option, be presented to Major Nunn, wounded while faithfully executing the orders of Ge- neral Prevost, " Not to yield to the enemy one inch of ground." That a Sword of 50/. value, and a Piece of Plate, of the value of 100/,, with appropriate inscriptions, or that sum in money, at his option, be presented to Captain O'Connell, whose wound did not induce him to forego the honour of the command to which he succeeded on Major Nunn being dis- abled ; and in which he resisted the repeated charges of the enemy, notwithstanding their great superiority in numbers, till he obliged them to retire with great slaughter. That the sum of 100/. be presented to Captain Colin Camp- bell, wounded. in It 34 Al»FKNl)IX, NO. XIV, '3 "•"* i" I'liut thu 8UII1 uf 40/. each bo given to Uic men whose woundii have been attended with disability or loss of Umb. I'hat the sum of 20/. each be given to tlie other men se- verely wounded. And the sum of 10/. each, to the men slightly wounded, including the Militia of the Island. That Brigadier-General Prevost be requested to advise the Committee of the mode in which the Resolutions respect^ ing himself, Major Nunn, and Captain O'Connell, can be most acceptably carried into effect — to distribute the sums voted to the men wounded, and draw for the amount — fur- nishing the Committee with the names of the parties, and the sums respectively paid them — and to forward to the Com- mittee the best information he can procure respecting the families of the men killed, including the Militia of the Island, that relief may be afforded to such widows, orphans, and aged parents, as depended upon them for support. Joseph Marry at, Chairman. (Copy.) « Sir, London, May 15, 1806. " I have the honor to inclose you the resolutions of the Committee of the Patriotic Fund, on their taking into consideration the official account of the gallant and success- ful defence, made by you, and the brave men under your command, against the very superior force with which the enemy invested Dominica, on the 22d February last. That the sovereignty of the Island was preserved to the British Crown, must be in a great degree ascribed, under Divine Providence, to the talents with which you conducted the mi- litary operations ; to the confidence which those who served under you had in tliose talents ; and the animation with which they were inspired by your example. •* The primary object of this Fund being the relief of the wounded, and the families of those killed in the service of their country, the Committee, on every occasion, restrict APPENDIX, NO. XIV. 35 their votes of honorary marks of distinction for gallant coH' duct, to the commanding oHicurs. This, they trnut, will satisfactorily explain to those bruvc othcers, to whose merit you bear such honorable testimony, the reason of their not being noticed in these resolutions. " The Committee cannot but remark the very distinguished manner in which the inhabitants of Dominica have displayed those gallant exertions against the enemy, to which they so readily came forward to animate others, by contributing to this fund. The Committee trust, that in attending to the other objects of the inclosed resolutions, you will be parti- cularly careful to recommend to their consideration, the dis- tressed relatives which any of the Militia of the Colony may have left unprovided for. Your bills, at three days sight, on Sir Francis Baring, Bart., Chairman of the Patriotic Fund, at Lloyds, for the amount of the sums voted to the wounv beg leave to inclose the special reports of the General Officers commanding divisions, and of Brigadier- General Hoghton, whose brigade was in action upon the 1st; with separate returns of our loss upon the 1st and 2nd, which, I am inclined to believe, will terminate our operations in the field. — The lower fort, formerly Fort Edward, was taken pos- session of before day-break in the morning of the lUh, by Major Henderson, commanding the Royal York Rangers, with that regiment, without resistance, and we now occupy that work. St. Pierre surrendered to Lieutenant-Colonel Barnes, of the 46th, the day before yesterday ; and I have not yet received the details. In the course of all these ser- vices, where the co-operation of the navy was practicable, the greatest exertions have been made by the Rear-admiral; and the important advantages rendered on shore by that ex- cellent officer, Commodore Cockburn, in the reduction of Pigeon Island, and C landing cannon, mortars, and amm'* nition at Point Negroe, and conveying them to the several batteries on that side, have been of the highest importance to the King's se vice. " Geo. Beckwith, Com. Forces." Sir, " Martinique, Heights of Surirey, Feb, 2. " In conformity with your orders, I disembarked on the 30th ult. with the Fuzileer brigade of the 1st division of the army, at MalgreTout, in the Bay Robert, at four o'clock, p. m. and proceeded from thence to De Manceau's estate, where I arrived late, in consequence of the difficulties of the country, and the unfavourable state of the roads for the move- ment of cannon. Before the dawn of the next day, I reach- ed Papin's, and proceeded from thence with the auvance, composed of the Royal Fusileer regiment, and the grenadier 42 APPENDIX, NO. XVII. El 1^' > company of the 1st West India regiment. The enemy re- tiring before me, I reached the heights of De Bork'!» estate towards evening, where I was joined at day-light on the 1st inst. by Brigadier General Hoghton, with the 23rd regiment and the light infantry battalion, under the command of Major Campbell, of the Royal West India Rangers. 1 lost no time after this junction, and pushed forwards the Hon. Lieutenant- Colonel Pakenham, with the Royal Fusileers, to possess himself of Morne Bruno; this movement I supported by the light infantry battalion, under Brigadier-General Hoghton, who was ordered, after uniting the two corps, to proceed to force the heights of Desfourneaux, whilst I held the Royal Welsh Fusileers in reserve, to strengthen such points of at- tack as might require it. On my coming on the heights of Surirey, I had innumerable proofs of the valour and judgment of the Hon. Lieutenant-Colonel Pakenham, of the excellence of the Fusileer brigade, and of the spirited and judicious ex- ertions of Lieutenant-Colonel Ellis, and Majors Pearson and Ostley, of the 23rd or Royal Welsh Fusileers ; also of the bravery of Major Campbell and the light infantry battalion; all of which have enabled me to retain this valuable position without artillery, within 300 yards of the enemy's intrenched camp, covered with guns. The officers belonging to my staff distinguished themselves by their zeal and activity during the heat of the action. I have to lament the loss of Captain Taylor, Acting Deputy-Quarter-Master-General, who was severely wounded whilst rendering effectual services to his country. — I cannot omit acknowledging, that to Lieutenant Hobbs, of the Royal Engineers, I am indebted for the ra- pidity of our movements, and ultimate success, from his ac- quaintance with this country, which enabled him to guide and direct our movements. " Geo. Prevost, Lieut. -Gen." APPENDIX, NO. XVIII. 43 (Private.) " Downing-street, May 26M, 1809. *' Dear Sir, " I beg to congratulate you on the successful ter- iDiDatioc '^ the operations in Martinique, in which you bore so distinguished a part. I hope that this will find you safely returned to Nova Scotia, without having suffered in your health from your West India campaign. " I remain, dear Sir, " Your faithful and obedient servant, " Castlereagh." " Lieut-Gen. Sir G. Prevost, 4-c. ^c. 4-c." No. XVIII. Addresses presented to Sir George Prevost, on his Ar- rival at t/te Islands of Dominica and St. Christoplier, p.\h To His Excellency Lieut. -Gen. Sir George Prevost, Bart. i^c. Sfc. 8fc. " May it please your Excellency, " We, His Majesty's loyal subjects, the Members of the House of Assembly of the Island of Dominica, avail ourselves of the occasion of your Excellency's visit to your late government, to repeat to you the assurances of the high esteem which we have ever entertained for the character of your Excellency, and to express our most grateful sense of the unabated zeal which your Excellency has evinced, on every occasion, to promote the welfare and prosperity of this colony, as well as to add glory to the arms of your couqtry. " With every anniversary of the 22nd Eebruary, will the services rendered by your Excellency recur to our memory. i' if 44 APPENDIX, NO. XVIII. • i '"^'^B 'i^^H t ■ ^' "■' , ., k. not only from the gallantry displayed by your Excellency upon that occasion, when opposed to so superior a force, but for your subsecjuent exertions in favour of the unfortunate suft'crers by the fire, to which may be chiefly attributed the relief afforded them by the mother country. " We beg leave to congratulate your Excellency upon the brilliant result of the operations against the enemy's most im- portant colonial possession, and by which, an opportunity has been afforded you, of acquiring fresh laurels, in addition to those which already grace your Excellency. " We most heartily and sincerely wish your Excellency a prosperous and pleasant passage to your government, and we anticipate that reward which awaits you (ever most pleasing to a soldier) — the approbation of your sovereign. " Jno. Hy. Hobson, " House of Assembly, Speaker." \bth March, 180})." Reply of Sir George Prevost. '* Mr. Speaker, and " Gentlemen of the House of Assembly, " I feel flattered by your expressions of personal consideration, and highly gratified that my exertions in fa- vour of the sufferers on the memorable 22d of February, 1805, were attended by some success. '* I thank you for your congratulations on the favourable termination of a short, but brilliant campaign. " George Prevost." " Government- House, 15th March, 1809." To His Excellency Lieut. -Gen. Sir George Prevost, Bart. <^c. 8fc. Sfc. " May it please your Excellency, " We the merchants and inhabitants of this His Majesty's Island of Saint Christopher, beg leave to approach APPENDIX, NO. XVIII. 45 your Excellency with the warmest congratulations on your arrival in this colony ; uiul to assure your Excellency that could any circumstaace enhance the satisfaction we receive upon this occasion, it must proceiid from the happy contem- plation of the recent success v, hich has crowned the exer- tions to which you have so pre-eminently contributed in the reduction of the Island of Martinicpie to His Majesty's arms: a conquest which has at once given additional splendour to the British name, and added another signal example of your merit, perseverance, and intrepidity. " Although pre-eminent as your Excellency is viewed, by every class of your heroic brothers in arms, we cannot, how- ever, but assure your Excellency, that the high and general estimation which every inhabitant of the sister colony (hitherto entrusted to your command), feels toward you, (and which colony you so gallantly defended against a superior foice), contributes most powerfully to endear you to every individual of this island, in the united character of a brave soldier and a good citizen. " We trust your Exc 'Ucncy's stay amongst us will be pro- tracted for a time equal o the wishes of this community, who anxiously express the most ardent desire of offering to your Excellency every testimony of the high consideration they entertain of you, and the brave soldiers under your com- mand. " A great and good King, who can appreciate merit and bestow reward, will add stability to our expressions, and pro- nounce to the world, by his commendations, that we have not presumed to announce your merits, but from the truest heralds of your fame — men who have shared your dangers and received your smiles — the British soldiery." ** Basseterre, March 2lst, 1809." 40 APPENDIX, NO. XIX. Reply of Sir George Prevott. To the Merchants and Inhabitants of tlie Island of St, Christopher. " Gentlemen, " Highly flattered as I feel by the address of the merchants and inhabitants of Uis Majesty's Island of St. Christopher; the gratification I derive from this testimony of their consideration, increases my very sincere regret that the interest of the public service deprives me of the opportunity of indulging my private feelings in making a longer stay than my duty will in the present instance permit ; — I shall ever most eagerly and joyfully avail myself of every occasion of testifying to this island, my sincerest and best wishes for its welfare and prosperity. (Signed) " George Prevost." " Basseterre, March 21s/, 1809." I n No. XIX. Address from the Inhabitants of Halifax, p. 12. To His Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bart. Sfc. Sfc. ^c. « Sir, " Your Excellency intending shortly to leave this Province, the inhabitants of Halifax cannot omit expressing to you their unfeigned regret on the occasion, and, at the same time, testifying their gratitude for the many real bene- fits which the province has derived from your short admini- stration of the government. " We have often been induced to come forward to mani- fest our esteem for many valuable and respectable characters, who have filled high stations in this country, for it has been our good fortune to have had many men of tried worth at the head of the civil, naval, and military departments here ; but APPENDIX, NO. XIX. 47 believe us, Sir, wc use not tho language of flattery, when we fay, that we have never felt more sinccrn regret, than for your departure from us. " Equity has been tho ruling principle of your administra* tion, and the most unremitting attention to public business its invariable practice : your indefatigable zral carried you into the most remote parts of the province, and you became early acquainted with our situation and our wants. The con- fidence with which you inspired tlu; legislative body, induced them to provide ample supplies for the different branches of the public service. Thr wisdom with which they have been appropriated, e(iuals the liberality with which they were granted, and must produce extensive and permanent benefits to the country at large. ** Your ears have been open to the petitioners of every class, and your ready attention to their wants and their claims, has left no cause for complaint. With the sentiments of af- fectionate and respectful regard which you have excited in our breasts — while we deplore our loss, we cannot but derive consolation from the justly merited honours that cause your removal. ** We consider your appointment to the supreme command of British North America, as an earnest of the blessing which His Majesty's subjects, on the western side of the Atlantic, are to enjoy under the government of the august personage, the anniversary of whose birth we this day assemble to com- memorate. At this critical period, when the prejudices and misguided councils of a neighbouring nation render it not im- probable that we may be called upon to defend the invalu- able privileges of Englishmen, it must be a source of satisfac- tion to every loyal subject, that His Boyal Highness, in the name of our venerable sovereign, has entrusted the defence of these colonies to an officer, who has so frequently proved himself worthy of commanding British colonies. May he eyer. Sir, be thus influenced in his nominations to oflUces of great trust and high responsibility, by the merit of those qj^ 4« APPKNDIX, NO. XX. whom thoy are to be conferred. We thank you for your con- descension in permitting; your portrait to be taken and left with UM. It will hv 11 perpetniil memorial of a perHonagc, whoso public conduct and private virtues have been so be- neticial and endearing to His Majesty's subjects in this pro- vince. " You go, Sir, to a more exalted station ; but you cannot go where; you will be more beloved or respected. In taking our leave of you, permit us to assure you of our warmest wishes, that every blessing may be yours, and every happi- ness attend your amiable and exemplary lady, and each in- dividual of your excellent family. " Halifax, I2th August, 1811." No. XX. 5f Addresses from the Clergy of Nova Scotia^ 8fc. Sfc. to Lieutenant -General Sir George Prevost, Bart. 8fc. ^c. 8fc. p, 12. " Sir, ** Although the clergy of the established church of Nova Scotia most cordially join in the general tribute of respect, which is now offered to your Excellency ; and very largely share in the sincere regret, so universally excited by your intended departure from this province ; the important benefits which you have rendered to the sacred objects of our profession, by your Excellency's exertions in their behalf, im- pel us to a more particular expression of our gratitude, and our grief. " Your Excellency has a claim upon the best acknow- ledgments we can offer, for every mark of respect to our office, and every condescending attention to ourselves, that it; APPENDIX, NO. XX. 49 vra could rocoivo at your Imnth ; acrunipaniod l>y continuul c>n(leavours to promote tliu causu of lituraturu uuil religion in this colony. *' Through your Exccjllency's attentive kindness, an;y in all classes of his Majesty's subjects, and encourage them to continue their zealous co-operation in the common cause ; and we trust that under the judicious arrangement which has been made by your Excellency's orders, Divine Providence will continue to crown our exertions in defence of the Pro- vince against his Majesty's enemies with the same success by which they have been hitherto happily distinguished. " Kingston, March 7, 1013." Address from the Inhabitants of the Eastern District of Upper Canada to Sir Georye Prevost. " To his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Knight and Ba- ronet, Captain General, <&c. &c. &c. The loyal address of the Inhabitants of the Eastern District. '* We, his Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects, inhabitants of the Eastern District of Upper Canada, beg leave to pre- sent to your Excellency our unfeigned, and heartfelt congra- tulations on your safe return from your long and fatiguing journey to the upper parts of this Province, which your ar- dent zeal for the service of your king and country, and pa- ternal solicitude for the security of this portion of his Majesty's dominions only could induce you to undertake. " We thank heaven for having preserved your Excellency's person from all the dangers to which you have been exposed, not only from the enemy in the long line of frontiers through which you had to pass, but from the contagious diseases, which rage through many parts of these Provinces, and other dangers incidental to a journey of upwards of a thousand miles in a country like this, still destitute of inns, and proper accommodations for travellers, and at the most inclement season of the year. 60 APPENDIX, NO. XXI. •' So illustrious an example of despising danger and sacri- ficing personal ease and comfort, exiiibitud by the represen- tative of our beloved Hoven!it>;n, both cltears and animates us to bear with resignation our individual privations in the glorious cause in which we have to struggle. We now ex- perience the truth which we have so often heard with won- der from others, that your Excellency's prudence carries with it an irresistible attraction and confidence among all classes of people, wherever you go. Wt; should consider it criminal to complain of the hardships to which the present state of warfare has subjected us, in common with all our fellow-sub- jects in this Province ; perfectly convinced, as we are, of your Excellency's earnest wish and readiness to alleviate our suf- ferings as much as lies in your power. " The auspicious event which, in the late brilliant success of His Majesty's arms at Ogdensburg, so closely followed the arrival of your Excellency in Uppor Canada, Hatters us with the hope that this will be but i^ of the happy conse- quences of your visit. We cannot express to your Excel- lency in terms sufficiently strong, our satisfaction in thus having an opportunity of teaching the enemy that their re- peated insults, and wanton attacks upon our shores, are not to be borne with impunity. " Toyour Excellency's active and fertde mind we look up with much confidence for the vigorous and energetic mea- sures, to prosecute a war, into which the insidious policy of a faithless and inveterate enemy has involved our country and ourselves, and in which are feared every thing which can render life desirable at stake. " We are determined to stand or fall by the parent country, and to defend the crown and dignity of our revered sove- reign, our families and our properties, with the last drop of our blood. We know that justice is on our side, and we trust that the God of battles will continue to favour our cause as he has hitherto done. Indeed we do not allow ourselves to entertain the smallest doubt of a glorious termination of APPENDIX, NO. XXII. G\ the contest iiiulcr your 1? .ojUency's government and Hea- ven's protection. " Glvnyary, March H, 1H13/' No. XXII. Official Ih'port of Col, Baynes, />. 81. Extract of a Letter from liieut.-Generul Sir George Prevost to Earl Batlnirst, dated Head-Quarters, Kingston, Jtuic 1, 1813. '• Although as your Lordship will perceive by the report of Colonel Baynes, which I have the honour herewith to transmit, the < xpedition has not been attended with the com- plete success which was expected from it, I have great sa- tisfaction in informing your Lordship that the courage and patience of the small band of troops employed on this occa- sion, under circumstances of peculiar hardship and privation, have been exceeded only by their intrepid conduct in the field, forcing a passage at the point of the bayonet through a thickly wooded country, atfording constant shelter and strong positions to the enemy; but not a single spot of cleared ground favourable to the operations of disciplined soldiers." <( Sir, *' Kingston, May 30, 1813. " I hare the honour to report to your Excellency, that in conformity to an arranged plan of operations with Commodore Sir James Yeo, the fleet of boats assembled astern of his ship, at 10 o'clock in the night of the 28th inst., with the troops placed under my command, and led by a gun-boat under the direction of Captain Mulcaster, Royal Navy, proceeded towards Sackett's Harbour in the order prescribed to the troops, in case the detachment was obliged 62 APPENDIX, NO. XXU. to march in column, viz. the Grenadier Company, l(K)lh, with one section of the Royal Scots, two Companies of the Uth, or King's, four of the lOUh, two of the Canadian Voltigcurs. Two Mix-pounders, with their gunners, and a Cunipuny of (ilengary lii^ht Infantry, were embarked on board a light schooner, which was projiosed to be towed under the direc- tion of OtHcers of the Navy, so as to insure the guns being landed in time to support the advance of the troops. Al- though the night was dark with rain, the boats assembled in the vicinity of Sackett's Harbour, by one o'clock, in com- pact and regular order ; and in this position it was intended to remain until the day broke, in the hope of cft*ecting a land- ing before the enemy could be prepared to line the woods with troops which surround the coast ; but unfortunately, a strong current drifted the boats considerably, while the dark- ness of the night and ignorance of the coast, prevented them from recovering the proper station until the day dawned, when the whole pulled for the point of debarkation. It was .ay intention to have landed iu the cove formed by Horse Island, but on approaching it, we discovered that the enemy were fully prepared by a very heavy fire of musketry, from the surrounding woods which were filled with Infantry, sup- ported with a field-piece. I directed the boats to pull round to the other side of the Island, where a landing was effected in good order and with little loss, although executed in the face of a corps formed with a field-piece in the wood, and under the enfilade of a heavy gun of the enemy's principal battery. The advance was led by the Grenadiers of the 100th regiment, with undaunted gallantry which no obstacle could arrest; a narrow causeway, in many places under water, not more than four feet wide, and about four hundred paces in length, which connected the Island with the main- land, was occupied by the enemy in great force with a six- pounder. It was forced and carried in the most spirited manner, and the gun taken before a second discharge could be made from it : a tumbrU, with a few rounds of ammuni- f APPENDIX, NO. XXII. OS tion was found ; but, unfortunately, tin* artillerymen were Ntill behind, tlic Hchooner not having been able to gut up in time : and the troops were expoMcd to so heiivy and Killing a fire, from a numerous but almost invisiljU" Ute, as to render it impossible to halt for the artillery to come up. At this »pot two paths lele to their own finding of Guilt, which can alone be ascribed to the Court having been induced, by a reference to the general good character and conduct of Major-General Procter, to forget, through a humane, but mistaken lenity, what was due from them to the Service. Under all the circumstances of the case, however, and particularly those which render it impossible to have recourse to the otherwise expedient measure of re-assembling the Court, for the revisal of their proceedings, the Prince Regent has been pleased to acquiesce in, and confirm so much of the Sentence as adjudges the prisoner to be publicly repri- manded, and in carrying the same into execution, His Royal Highness has directed the General Officer commanding in Canada, to convey to Major-General Procter, His Royal Highness's high disapprobation of his conduct, together with the expression of His Royal Highness's regret, that any officer of the length of service, and of the exalted rank which he has attained, should be so extremely wanting in profes- sional knowledge, and so deficient in those active and ener- getic qualities, which must be required of every officer, but especially of one in the responsible situation in which the Major-General was placed. His Royal Highness the Commander-in-Chief directs that the foregoing Charges preferred against Major-General Proc- AIM'ENUIX, NO. XXVI, 76 ter, together with the riiuling and Sentence of the Court, and the l*rince Regent's pleasure thereon, shall bo entered in the (General Order Boolt, and read at the Head of every Ueuunent in His Majesty's Service. J}y Command of His Royal Highness, The Commander-in-Chief, Harry Calvert, Adjutant-Cienerul. No. XXVI. p. \22. Adjutant-GcneraVs Officr, Head Quarters, QucUc, ^Gth March, 1014. General Orders, His Excellency the (iovernor-in-Chief and Com- mander of the Forces feels the highest gratification in obeying the Commands of His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, transmitted in a letter from the Right Hon. the Earl Rathurst, one of His Maj< sty's Principal Secretaries of State, of which the following is ^ Copy, and which His Excellency directs to be published General Orders, and read at the Head of all Corps in this i >mmand : " His Royal Hif;hness has observed with the grt satisfaction the skill and g;illantiy so conspicuously disf , ^ by the otiicers and men who composed the detachmem of troops opposed t(> General Hampton'-^ .irmy. By the resist- ance which they successfully made to an enemy so vastly disproportionate, the ronfid i»,:e of lie enemy has been low- ered, their plans disconcerted, and the safety of that part of the Cr -'dian frontier ensured. It gives His Royal High- ness pe<: ,.;ar pleasure to find, that His Majesty's Canadian subjt^ii'. f^ave at length had the opportunity (which His Royal Highness has been long anxious should be anorded ^r ,.^.. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) / O s" .^ 1.0 I.I ■ 50 ""^^ IHIIsS ■lUI* mil 1-8 1.25 1.4 1.6 ^ 6" — ► p;^ ^ /a %^ ^ A ^^^ > •^y ^ >^ '^ '/ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 871-4503 ^ 6"^ Is 76 APPENDIX, NO. XXVII. I them) of refuting, by their own brilliant exertions in defence of their country, that calumnious charge of ilisaffection and disloyalty with which the enemy prefaced his first invasion of the Province. " To Lieut.-Colonel De Salaberry, in particular, and to all the ofHcors and men under his command in general, you will not fail to express His Royal Highness's Most Gracious Approbation of their meritorious and distinguished services. His Royal Highness has commanded me to forward to you by the first safe opportunity, the Colours which you have solicited for the embodied Battalions of the Militia, feeling that they have evinced an ability and disposition to secure them from insult, which gives them the best title to such a mark of distinction. " By His Excellency's Command, Edvv^ard Baynes, Adjutant-General, N. A." No. xxvn. m Extract J rom Sir George Prevoxfs Despatch to Earl Bathurst, dated Wh Mat/, 1814,^. 135. " The principal objects in the attack upon Oswego, being to cripple the resources of the enemy, in fitting out their squadron, and particularly their new ship at Sackett's Har- bour, their guns and stores of every description being drawn from the former post, and thus to delay, if not altogether to prevent, the sailing of the fleet, I determined to pursue the same policy on Lake Champlain, and therefore directed Cap- tain Pring to proceed with his squadron, on board of which I had placed a strong detachment of the 1st battalion of the marines, towards Vergennes, for the purpose, if practicable, of destroying the new vessels lately launched there, and of APPENDIX, NO. XXVIII. 77 intercepting and capturing the stores and supplies for their armament and equipment. Captain Pring accordingly sailed on the 9ih, and with the force mentioned in the margin, hav- ing been prevented by contra"y winds from reaching his des- tination until the 14th instant, he found, on arriving oft'Otter Creek, the enemy so fully prepared to receive him, their ves- sels so strongly defended by batteries, and a considerable body of troops, that after a cannonading with some effect from his gun-boats, he judged it most advisable to abandon his intended plan of attacking them, and return to Isle aux Noix. " The appearance of our squadron on the Lake has been productive of great confusion and alarm at Burlington, and other places, along its shores, and the whole of the popula- tion appeared to be turned out for their defence." No. XXVIII. Extract of a Letter from Major-General Sir James Kempt to Sir George Prevost, respecting the intended Attack upon Sackett's Harbour, dated " Sir, " Kingston, 18th Sept. 1814. t< w^iTH all due deference to your Excellency's superior judgment, it appears to mc, that an operation of this magni- tude, and probable duration, should not be undertaken with- out the most ample means, and at the very best season of the year; that not less than 8,000 infantry, with a strong effi- cient corps of artillery and engineers, should be employed on this service ; that Watertown and Brownville should be oc- cupied in force by strong corps of observation, capable of covering the operations ; that there should be an interme- diate rendezvous for the assembly of the troops and stores, between tliis and the place of debarkation ; and, that above 78 APPENDIX, NO. XXIX. all, we should have the decided superiority on the Lake, before the service is undertaken. " I have the honour to be, with great respect, " Your Excellency's most obedient " And most humble servant, " James Kempt. Lieut.-Gen." I kl w i' No. XXIX. Extract of a Letter from Sir J. L. Yeo to Sir George Prevost, dated 29th Aug. 1814, p. 141. " I HAVE this dny received a correct statement of all the officers and men belonging to the establishment on Lake Champlain. " I enclose your Excellency a scale of the complement of each vessel, agreeable to the A dmiralty order, by which you will perceive that, after '^ach complement is complete, there will remain 97 seamen over and above. Your Excellency must be aware, that when this squadron proceeds up the Lake, I shall be under the necessity of taking the seamen out of the gun-boats ; neither will the number ot seamen we have in this country, afford a sufficient number of men to man the guo-boats on Lake Champlain, independent of the ships." No. XXX. Correspondence between Sir George Prevost and Capt. Downie, p. 145. " Head-Quarters, Plattsburg, Wednesday, 7 o. m. 1th Sept. 1814. " Sir, " The enemy's force in the Bay consists of a ship, inferior to the Confiance, a brig, a large schooner, a sloop, and seven or eight gun-boats. When the gun-boats are APPENDIX, NO. XXX. 70 manned, the remaining craft appear to have but tew men left on board. If you feel that the vessels under your command are equal to a contest with those I have described, you will find the present moment ofiurs many advantages which may not again occur. " As my ulterior movements depend on your decision, you will have the goodness to favour me with it, with all pos- sible proinptitude. " In the event of your coming forward immediately, you will furnish conveyance for the two 8-inch mortars, ordered from Isle aux Noix, with their stores, provided you can do so, without delaying the sailing of your squadron. " I have the honour to be, &c. (Signed) " G. Prevost." " To Captain Dovonie, ^c^ " H. M. S. Confance, off La Cole, " Sir, 1th Sept. 4 p. m. 1814. " I have the honour of your Excellency's letter of this morning. " I am aware of the comparative force of the two squa- drons, and am thus far on my way to find the enemy, con- ceiving that the moment I can put this si ip into a state for action, I shall be able to meet them. " The Confiance at this moment is in such a state, as to require at least a day* or two to make her efficient before the enemy ; but with all the exertion I can use, it will pro- bably be that time at least, before it will be possible to get her up to Chazy, where I shall be happy to receive any fur- her communication from your Excellency. " I have the honour to be, Sir, " Your most obedient servant, ' His Excellency Lieut.-Gcn. " Geo. Downie." Sir G. Prevost, Bart. Sfc. Sfc." * The action was fo'.>ght on the 11th. 80 Pi ;» in V- " Sir, APPKNDIX, NO. XXX. " Ih'ad-Qnartns, Plutlslmrg, Thursday Mominy, Qth Sept. 1814. " I have just received your reply to my communi- catioiii of yesteiday. '• As it is of the highest importance the ship, vessels, and gun-boats, under your command, should commence a co- operation with the division of the army, now occupying Plattsburg, 1 have sent my Aid-de-Camp, Major Coorc, with this letter, in order that you may obtain from him correct in- formation of the disposition made by the enemy of his naval force in this bay. " I only wait for your arrival to proceeint- lind, No. XXXI. Extract fvom Vermont Paper, dated Burlington, Sept, 1814,/;. 168. " The articles in your paper of last week, republished from the Montreal papers, are interesting, as they evinci' the spirit of our Canada neighbours, and the high hopes tluty had entertained from their late expedition. " That the result is not such as they could have wished we believe, but that its failure should be ascribed entirely to the misconduct of Gov. Prevost is wholly unaccountable. It is not our business or desire to shield Gov. Prevost from the censure of his subjects, but after the decision of the contest between the hostile fleets, we can perceive no object of na- tional importance which could have justified the further ope- rations of the army. " It is possible that an army of 12,000 men might have carried the works at Plattsburg, but the positive asseitions on this subject betray great ignorance of our resources, and the spirit of our people. Grant, that after much hard fight- ing, and the loss of many valuable lives, they had succeeded in taking the forts, do they suppose they cou' J have retained them against all the forces we can bring against them ? If they do, we can only say, that they are grossly mistaken. " Do they suppose that an army of 12,000 men can march through a country, every county of which contains more than that number of souls; or do they suppose their prognss would not be obstructed ? /2 84 APPENDIX, NO. XXXIl. li VJi: " A large proportion of our citizens are opposed to the present war, and from principles the most noble and virtu- ous. They will not, under existing? circumstances, consent to aid in offensive operations against their lunghbuurs. But let no one suppose their love of peace will destroy tht ir love of country, and that they can make war upon us without danger. We will not willingly molest them, but they must not disturb us. He is unworthy any country who would not protect his own from invasion ; and we are happy to know that this country is inhabited by men who need no addi- tional inducement to protect their rights and privileges at every hazard. " People." •* Messrs. Uinckkij and Fish.^' &1* No. XXXll. An Extract from the Address of the House of Assem- bly, at the opening of the Session, 30th Jan. 1815, to His Excellency Sir George Prevost, p. 176. " The operations contemplated on the shores of Lake Ghamplain, we are led to believe, by our confidence in your Excellency's judgment, were planned in consequence of wise combinations, and our proximity to the scene of action has enabled us to acquire a perfect conviction, that they were frustrated by causes beyond your Excellency's control. We are equally convinced that the failure of our naval means rendered necessary at the very onset, an immediate aban- donment of the enterprize. ** The protecting hand of His Majesty's government has been agreeably felt in the reinforcements received by your Excellency, for the diminution of the pressure of the war on the inhabitants of this province. The testimiony which your Excellency is pleased to bear to the zeal and alacrity with which their services have been rendered, cannot but be more APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. 85 flattering to their feelings and demands through their repre- sentatives, their warmest acknowledgments. It is under your Kxcellency':^ wise and just administration that their character and conduct have been justly appreciated ; and whatever merit their services may be eutilU'd to, a large portion of it is unquestionably due to your Excellency, whose well founded confidence in them, has enabled them, by those services, to testify their faithful, loyal, and patriotic adherence to His Majesty: of which, under your Excellency's administration, they hope many opportunities, during a long time to come, will be afforded them to give additional proofs." jake rour ^ise has rere iWe ians ian- Extract from an Address from the House of Assembly of Lower Canada, to Sir Geo. Prevost, 20//t March, 1815. " We take this opportunity of repeating the expression of our sentiments of gratitude to your Excellency, for having, by your prudence, by the wisdom of your measures, and by your ability, preserved to the empire these important pro- vinces, and for the paternal solicitude with which your Ex- cellency has watched over the welfare of His Majesty's sub- jects, and to pray your Excellency to rest assured, that those benefits will ever remain deeply engraven on the hearts of the Canadians." Extract from the Resolutions of the House of Assembly of Lower Canada, 2\st March, 1815. " According to order, the resolutions of the Committee of the whole House, to consider whether it would be expedient to give to his Excellency the Governor-in-Chief, some mark of gratitude for his distinguished services in this province, were reported to the House, agreed to, and ordered to be engrossed. " The said resolutions are as follows : " Resolved, *' That this House entertains the highest veneration and respect, for the character of his Excellency Sir George 'Mi APPKNDIX, NO. XXXII. f*n.'vo»t, C»overnor-in-Chi«'f, whose administration, under cir- ciinifllancos of peculiar novelty and devotion of that brave und loyal, yet unjustly (uiluinniutrd (x opK , resources suHicient tor diy.concertin|i^ the plans of coixpust, devised by a foe at once numerous und elatt; with contidence. Itrin- tbrcements were suhsetjuently received; and the blood of the sons uf Canada has flowed mingled with that of the brave soldiers sent to its defence. Multiplied proofs of the etlica- cious and powt^rful protection of the mother country, and of the inviolable loyalty of the people of this province, strengthen their claim to the preservation und free exerciso of all the benefits which are secured to them by their existing consti- tution and laws." id e, is .d Addresses to Sir Geo. Prevost,from the Inhabitants of Quebec and Montreal, 'Alst March. To His Excellency Sir George Prevosf, Bart. Captain-Gene- rat and Govcnior-in- Chief, in and over the Provinces of Lower Canada, S)'c. Sfc. Sfc. " May it please your Excellency, ** We the inhabitants of the city of Quebec, most respectfully approach your Excellency, at the moment of your departure for England, to express the sentiments which we entertain, of a most profound regard for your Excellency's person and character, and a lively gratitude for the benefits, which, in common w ith our fellow subjects throughout the province, we have derived from your Excellency's admini- stration. " At the period of your Excellency's arrival in this country, on the eve of a war with America, you found the majority of its inhabitants irritated by the unfortunate effects of misun- derstandings of a long duration. Your Excellency, consult- •A I 88 APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. ji ii fj V . i :m ing only the general welfare by a strict adherence to justice and a well-timed confidence, soon allayed every discontent, and rallied the whole population for the common defence. Under the happy ■ ifluence of harmony thus restored, the mi- litia was assembled and trained, and an exhausted treasury replenished. The additional means which you thereby de- rived f.ora the colony committed to your particular care, enabled your Excellency to extend the handful of British troops at your disposal, to the most distant parts of the Upper Province, where the long meditated attacks of the enemy were met at the onset, and his forces repeatedly overthrown with disgrace — the happy precursor of the fate which awaited all his attempts on this province. " If the smallness of the regular army with which your Excellency was left to withstand the whole efforts of the United States for two years, and the insufficiency of the naval force on the Lakes, have exposed His Majesty's arms to some reverses, it is nevertheless, true, that under the auspices of your Excellency, the British arms nave acquired new lau- rels, amidst circumstances of extraordinary difficulty, unpre- cedented in European warfare ; the name of the people of this country has been rendered illustrious, and a vast extent of territory protected from the ravages of war and preserved to the empire. " Your Excellency's name and services will ever be held in veneration and grateful remembrance by the inhabitants of Quebec. The whole province has assured you of its grati- tude ; and the imperishable evidences of your Excellency's merits, though they could not appease, will easily overcome your enemies. " May your Excellency's voyage be prosperous, and its results correspond vith your wishes. The citizens of Quebec will hail the day of your Excellency's return to yc jr govern- ment, rewarded with the full approbation of a gracious Prince, as one of the happiest in the annals of Ganadc. [Signed by 1420 persons.] " (^ebec, 31«« March, 1816." APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. 89 To which his Excellency was pleased to return the follow- ing Answer: To the Inhabitants of the City of Quebec. " Gentlemen, " I thank you for those sentiments of kiudness which now, as at all times, I have had the gratification to receive from the inhabitants of the city of Quebec. It is at the mo- ment of separation that such expressions appeal most forcibly to the heart. " If under the authority which His Majesty has deemed proper to place in my hands, you have been prosperous and happy, the objects of all my exertions, and my mo^t earnest solicitude has been attained. " The time I have spent in your society has taught me at once to appreciate its worth, and to regret the loss of it ; and, be assured, the testimony of regard you have now given me, will be treasured up among recollections the most grateful to my feelings," M lof i- 's le Ks On Monday last, at twelve o'clock, the Address of the Citizens of Montreal was presented to his Excellency Sir George Prevost, by their Deputies, J. M. Mondel^t and John M'Donald, Esquires, which Address is as follows : To his Excellency Sir George Prevost, Bar*. Captain- General and Governor-in-Chief in and over the Province of Lower Canada, Upper Canada, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and their Dependencies, Vice- Admiral of the same, Lieutenant- General and Commander of all His Majesty's Forces in the said Provinces, and in the Islands of Newfoundland, Prince Edward Cape Breton, and Bermuda, Sfc. Sfc. Sfc. " May it please your Excellency, " We His Majesty's dutiful and loyal subjects, in- habitants of the city of Montreal and the Qeighbouring Pa- \ > 00 APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. iik'^ lishcs, have learnt with extreme regret that your Excellency is unexpectedly about to leave this province. " We hasten, before your Excellency separates yourself from us, to convey to your Excellency the expression of our sorrow for your departure, of our gratitude for the benefits conferred on us, in common with our fellow subjects, by your Excellency's administration, and our ardent wish that your Excellency's absence from this province may be of short du- ration. " These sentiments are naturally produced in our minds by the recollection of the public and private virtues which have been displayed by your Excellency in your exalted station, and by the advantages we have experienced from your Ex- cellency's wisdom and justice in peace, and your protecting care in war. " In your Excellency's civil administration, we have seen conspicuously evinced an anxious desire to dispense equal justice to His Majesty's subjects, to obliterate unjust and impolitic distinctions between the inhabitants of this province, of dift'erent origin, and to unite them as members of one com- munity with the same rights and interests, for the promotion of their common welfare. Influenced by this wise and just policy, your Excellency has been enabled to form a correct estimate of the character and disposition of the population of Canada : and, by reposing in the loyalty and bravery of His Majesty's Canadian subjects that confidence which they fully merited, your Excellency has afforded praetical evidence of their devoted attachment to His Majesty's government, and their capacity to yield it effectual support. " While exposed to the pressure of the late unjust and un- provoked war waged by the United States of America against His Majesty, we experienced the security derived from your Excellency's indefatigable exertions for the defence of this Province, and have reason to ascribe its preservation, as well as that of the Upper Province, to the judicious distri- APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. 91 bution and arrangement of the Public Force made by your Excellency, by which the attempts of the enemy were frus- trated, and the honourable character, with the rights and ad- vantages of British subjects has been secured to the Inhabi- tants of the Canadas. ** Having the greatest confidence in the skill and judg- ment of your Excellency, and being fully convinced of the ability and prudence with which your Excellency has dis- charged the military as well as civil duties of your high office, we anticipate, from the investigation for which your Excellency is preparing, a result honourable to your Excel- lency's character, by which your well-earned reputation will be confirmed, the voice of calumny and detraction silenced, and your Excellency's merits conclusively established. We persuade ourselves also that the important services rendered in this country by your Excellency to His Majesty's Govern- ment will be duly appreciated by His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, of whose discernment and justice we have had so many proofs, and will procure for your Excellency deserved approbation, and the high rewards reserved for distinguished merit. " We shall not cease to take the warmest interest in the fortunes of your Excellency ; and in expressing our ardent wishes for your prosperity and that of your family, we join in the general sentiment of the country, whose affection and unalterable attachment your Excellency will carry with you, and whose greatest felicity would be experienced in the speedy return of your Excellency to resume the reins of Government." (Signed by 1610 persons.) _a 92 APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. His Excellency was pleased to make the following answer : To the Inhabitants of the City of Montreal, and the neigh- bouring Parishes, " Gentlemen, " The alacrity with which you have hastened to prevent the distance of your residence from being an obstacle to the expression of your kind wishes on my sudden and unexpected departure, gives to them all the additional value of eager sincerity. " Your good will is to me a most acceptable offering : and as I am now content if your good opinion of my services during my Administration is proportioned to my desire to promote your welfare, so shall I ever be ambitious that your estimate of my exertions may be found as correct as the favourable judgment which I early formed of His Majesty's subjects in Canada, which experience has now fully justified." t i, IS ' Letter from M. de Salaberry to Sir George Prevost. A son Excellence Sir George Prevost, &c. &c, Qu'il plaise ^ voire Excellence, Me permettre d'ecrire, puisque je ne peux sortir. J'en suis emp6ch6 par une maladie opini&tre et apparemment dangereuse, puisqu'encore hier j'ai tomb6 sans connaissance sur le plancher. Je suis bien pein6 d'etre priv6 par les acci- dens d'aller vous rendre mes respects, avant que vous vous laissiez. Sir George, vous portez pour vous justifier — Quoi! une justification de vous I Qui pouvait s'yattendre? Mais s'il en faut une, la voici d'un mot; Le Canada est encore a l'Angleterre. Cela repond h. tout. Le r^sultat est tout, il est frappant, 11 est grand. Voil^ un fait, ce\\n-\k : on ne pent le nier. Devant lui doivent disparaitre les vaines pa- roles, les accusations sophistiques; sous lui doivent succomber les efforts de la malveillance, Tenvie, les passions haineuses ; APPENDIX, NO. XXXII. 93 r : h- to ile id ue ^^■ es to ur lie I » mais le m^rite et la vertu sont sujets ^ la pers^cutioD. Vous en triompherez glorieuseinent : j'6se vous le pr6dire avec assi^rance, et je la souhaite du profond de mon coeur, comme je souhaite aussi tous les bonheurs pour vous, Sir George, et pour ce qui vous est cher. Avec ces vrais sentimens, et ceux du plus grand respect, j'ai I'honneur de mc souscrire, Mon General, De votre Excellence, Le tr^s-humble, tr^s-ob6issant Et tr^s devou6 serviteur, L. de Salaberry, Col. M. Quebec. A Beauport, 28 Mars, 1815. P. S. Oui, les Canadas sont encore k I'Angleterre, mais n'y serraient plus sans un effort perseverant de prudence, d'activit6, de patience courageuse, et d'habilit6 consommee, dans un commandement et un genre de guerre aussi difliciles, dont la conduite 6xige un art tant particulier. Voil^ ce qu'a- voueront tous ceux qui ont de vraies connaissances de la na- ture de ces pays de situations si extraordinaires, h des pro- digieuses distances, k travers des for^ts immenses. Ce ne sont pas des guerres d^Europe, oh sous un beau ciel et dans des riches plaines cultiv^es, toutes les parties d'ar- m^es se touchent, oil sont toujours a-portee, de se douner la main, dans des localites rapproch^es et dont les communi- cations sont si faciles. Daignez, mon General, traiter mes reflexions avec indulgence, puis qu'elles viennent d'un vieux et loyal soldat, qui a commence k faire la guerre il y a pr^- cisement quarante ans cette ann6e. Si M W'-'m 94 APPENDIX, NO. XXXIII. No. XXXIII. Extract from Christies Memoirs of the Administration | of the Colonial Government of Lower Canada, by Sir 1 James Henry Craig, and Sir George Prevost. 1 ** The administration of the Civil Government of Lower Canada under Sir George Prevost, was mild, equitable, and unquestionably popular among the entire mass of the Cana- dian population, in whose loyalty from the commencement^ he placed the most implicit confidence. To their fidelity, and to the prudent and conciliating policy of this Governor, Great Britain is indebted for the preservation of the Canadas, unavoidably left destitute of money and troops at the outset of hostilities with America, by reason of the urgent demands of the war in Spain. The Provincial Legislature, by giving a currency to Army Bills and guaranteeing their redemption, effectually removed all apprehensions of a deficiency in the financial resources of the Colonial Government. The orga- nization of a respectable force of embodied Militia, and the power delegated to the Governor, of turning out the whole of the effective male population of the Province, in cases of emergency, enabled him to withstand the efforts of the United States, during two successive campaigns, with scarcely any other resources than those derived from the Colony. They who had been pa.tial to the preceding Administration, and who probably may have been instrumental in the arbitrary measures with which it is reproached, were, as might be ex- pected, adverse to the policy of the present Governor, and spar«^d no pains to represent in England the affairs of the Colony in the falsest colours. The disappointments experi- enced at Sackett's Harbour and Plattsburg, gave occasion to his enemies to discredit his military character : but what- ever may have been his capacity as a general, (which we APPENDIX, NO. XXXIII. 95 leave to the judgment of military men) it must be admitted, that as a civil governor, at the head of a people irritated by arbitrary measures under the preceding Administration, he judiciously explored his way through a period of unprece- dented embarrasr nents and danger, without a recurrence to Martial Law, or the least exertion of arbitrary power. His manners are represented by those who were familiarly ac- quainted with him as unassuming and social. Uis public speeches or addresses partook of even classical elegance. His smooth and easy temper placed him beyond the ordinary passions of men in power, and though aware of the intrigues of unprincipled and implacable enemies labouring at his de- struction, and loaded with the obloquy of the press, he is known to have harboured no resentment against the former, and to have reasoned with that coolness and unconcern with respect to the latter, which can only spring from a virtuous and ingenuous mind." Extract from Bmichcttes Topographical Account of Lower Canada, p. 121. *' At a time when the military resources of the Province were so greatly curtailed by the most arduous continental warfare that ever Great Britain was engaged in, it is a matter of surprise that so much could have been effected with such slender means. An enemy, emboldened by possessing an ample force, and inspired by the prospect of obtaining a fer- tile country, long the object of inordinate desire, could only be successfully opposed by a union of the greatest energy with the most active measures ; that such was presented to him is incontrovertible, and the credit of having brought them into action by unceasing perseverance, will attach to the judicious dispositions of the Governor-General, Sir George Prevost, and for his strenuous efforts in turning the enthu- siasm of the people into a bulwark stronger, and more impe- netrable than entrenchments or fortresses against an invader." 96 APPENDIX, NO. XXXIV. li t The following Extract from Jameis Naval Memoirt, />. 411, ihewing the opinion of the American Naval Commander, as to the result of the action on Lake Champlain, was intended to form a note to page 175. *' Commodore Macdonough, taking ^lieutenant Robertson, when presenting his sword, for the British Commanding Officer, spoke to him as follows : — ' You owe it. Sir, to the shameful conduct of your gur.-boats and cutters, that you are performing this office to roe ; for, had they done their duty, you must have perceived, from the situation of the Saratoga, that I could hold out no longer : and indeed, no- thing induced roe to keep up her colours, but seeing, from the united fire of all the rest of my squadron on the Con- fiance, and her unsupported situation, that she must ulti- mately surrender.' — Here is an acknowledgment, candid and honourable in the extreme." ?■: 1 1 5 I-' k 'i ¥ 5 1; 1 No. XXXIV. Inscription on the Monument erected to the Memory of Sir George Prevost in Winchester Cathedral, p. 177. Sacred to the Memory Of Lieutenant-General Sir George Prevost, Baronet, of Belmont, in this County, Governor-General and Commander-in-Chief of the British Forces in North America ; In which command, by his wise and energetic measures, And with a very inferior force, He preserved the Canadas to the British Crown, From the repeated invasions of a powerful Enemy. His Constitution at length sunk Under incessant bodily and mental exertions. APPENDIX, NO. XXXIV. 97 In discharging the duties of that arduou*? station, And having returned to Enghind, He died shortly afterwards in London, on the 5th Jan. 1816, Aged forty-eight years ; Thirty-four of which had been devoted To the service of his Country. He was interred near the remains of his Father, Major-General Augustin Prevost, At East Barnet, in Middlesex. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent, To evince in an especial manner the sense he entertained Of his distinguished conduct and services, During a long period of constant active employment. In situations of great trust, both military and civil, Was pleased to ordain. As a lasting memorial of His Majesty's Royal favour, That the names of the Countries, Where his courage and abilities had been most signally displayed, The West Indies and Canada, Should be inscribed on the banners of the supporters, Granted to be borne by his Family and his descendants. In Testimony of his private worth. His piety, integrity, and benevolence, And all those tender, domestic virtues Which endeared him To his Family, his Children, his Friends and Dependants, As well as to prove her unfeigned love, gratitude and respect, Catharine Ann Prevost, His afflicted Widow, Caused this Monument to be erected, Anno Domini, 1818. 90 APPENDIX, NO. XXXV. J1' 11., No. XXXV. Private Despatch from Sir George Prevost to Earl Bathurst, p. 179. (Private.) " Mmtreal, 2Ut Sept. 1814. " My Lord, "In my despatch from Plattsburg, of the 11th inst. I reported to your Lordship the unfortunate event which induced me to withdraw the troops with which I had advanced into the enemy's territory. My reasons for that measure I can more fully explain to your Lordship in a private commu- nication than it might be proper to do in a public letter. " Your Lordship must have been aware from my previous despatches, that no offensive operations could be carried on, within the enemy's territory, for the destruction of his Naval Establisliments, without naval support. Having ascertained that our flotilla was in every respect equal to the enemy's, and having received from Captain Downie the assurance, not only of his readiness, but of his ability to co-operate with the army, I did not hesitate in advancing to Plattsburg, and con- fidently relying upon the successful exertions of the squadron, I made my arrangements for the assault of the enemy's works the moment it should appear. " The disastrous and unlooked for result of the naval con- test, by depriving me of the only means by which I could avail myself of any advantage I might gain, rendered a per- severance in the attack of the enemy's position highly impru- dent, as well as hazardous. From the state of the roads, each day's delay at Plattsburg rendered my retreat more difficult. The enemy's Militia was raising en masse around me, desertion increasing, and our supply of provisions scanty. " Excluded from the use of water communication, and that by roads passing through woods and over swamps, APPENDIX, NO. XXXV. 99 becoming, from the state of the weather, an well nn from th« obstructions made by the enemy, nearly impassable — under these circumstances, I had to determine whether I shouhi consider my own fame, by gratifying the order of the troops in persevering in the attack, or consult the more substantial interests of my country, by withdrawing the army which was yet uncrippled, for the security of these provinces; in adopt- ng the latter measure, I feel that I have accorded with the ▼iews of His Majesty's Government, and that a contrary conduct would have been attended with immediate and im- minent danger to this Province. " The moat ample success on shore, after the loss of the fleet, could not have justified the sacrifice I must have made to obtain it. Had I failed, and such an event was possible, after the American army had been cheared by the sight of a naval victory, the destruction of a great part of our troops must have been the consequence, and with the remainder 1 should have had to make a precipitate and embarrassed re- treat, one very different from that which I have made. " These are considerations which, without doubt, will have their due weight with your Lordship, and induce you, I trust, to view the measures I have adopted as those best calculated to promote, as well the honour of His Majesty's arms, as the safety of this part of his dominions. ** I herewith transmit a comparative state of the force of the two squadrons, in order that your Lordship may be satis- fied with my reasons for not discouraging a Naval Engage- ment, in which, if all had done their duty, I should have had a very different report to make. *' I have the honour to be," Sec. " The Right Hon. Earl Bathurst." J. M'Cre«y, PrinUr, Tooks Court, Chtucery Lane.