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AND A PLAN OF ACCOMMODATION' WITH M E R I C A. 4m> BY A MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT. THE SECOND EDITION, WITH CORRECTIONS. L O N I) O N: PRINTED FOR J. ALMON. OPPOSITE BURLINGTON- HOUS£» PICCADILLY. MDCCLXXIX. npii ■■^ i4. d'V AN EXAMINATION ': .Imo {he Conduct of tht Frefent ADMlNlSTftAtlON, Sfc. THE ft^te of the cotite# mih our Norrh American Colonies, and the com- mencement of hoftilities with France; mud afford a melancholy profj^edl lo evety well* wi{her of Great Britain. Our bad fucceis, daring the profi^refs of that contefti has» by many people, beeu afcribed to the want of public virtue among us, and ta that luxury and diflipation which are fo univerfally pre- valent. But wh9ever confiders the vigo- rous exertions* made by Great Britain, during the laft wary will hardly fuppofe^ that in a period of le^ than twenty years, ^e could have undergone fo total a change of mannersi, as to have produced Aich di^erent fortune in the prefent. Thi« confideration, I am afraid, will lead us to impute fome part, at lead, of our prefent mis^fortunes to the condu^of Miniftry; the ftile and charadlcr of which appear fo very B different (a ) difT^rent froin that w^^ich was exhibited in the laflf war. In thiS view of the matter^^ an enquiry into the conduct of Adminidra- tion, at this critical period, together with fome reflections on the prcfent ftate of af- fa^rSf may, it is hoped, require, no apo? I6gy. It is almoft needlefs to go farther back in the hidory of the- -American queftion, than the beginning of the prefent Parlia- ment. The only meafure of the lad Par- liament, which 1 ihall take notice of, is tfie Bofton Port Bill, and this Bill feemed fo proper a retaliation for the offence, that it ilruck no party, either as very abfurd or very fevere *, It was a punifhment too which was at an end whenever the offenders fhould ceafe to offend, and make repara- tion ', but it was a punifhnient which could not fail to irritate the New England pro- vinces at Icaft, and therefore ihould have been followed either by a force fufli- cicnt to have conquered their obflinacy, or by a total derelidion of the claim which caufed the difference between this country and America. Neither of thefe ways being < ■''"... • There was no debate in Parliament at the commence- ment of this BiU, and not much in the courfe of it. In fo much that Mr. R— — , whofe memory retains faft hold of all fuch Minority flips, has not been backward in putting Qp . ppfition in mind that they forgo^ their friends at that time. purfued, 'a j^urflied, the event has proved as hurtful to the purie, as it has been mortifying to the fpirit of the nation. At the beginning of this Parliament, a humber of papers, containing faAs with- but opinions, were laid before both Houfes^ and, After due time given to perufe them, refolutions were formed, as the ground**- work of oUr cojiduft with refped to Ame- rica. Thefe refolutions, however, were adhered to but for a moment ; and while Adniiniflration were holding forth all tne terrors of prohibitions to trade, prohi- bitions to fifhing, and alteration of char-^ ters *, with bne hand, they dealt out with the other a fyftem of reconciliation^ com- pletely nugatot-y in its end, by giving up the idea of taxation, upon a quibble, and neceffarily ruinous in its confequences, hf conveying to the Colonies the ftrongeft iymptoms of our fear and irrefolution. The hopeft of any good effed from this conciliatory plan wtre foon at an end, and the reception it met with in America, was exadtly what any prudent Minifter ought to have forefeen. This reception banilhed • Never was a meafore of State worfe timed than the MaflAchtiflet's Charter Bill. It rhight have been necefTary when America had fubmitted, but in the midft of popular tumuh, to enrage, b;r changing the moft favoured fyftem of Coloi^ government, was furely bad policy. ■ 4.%4,:,..w B all ( 4 > ^1} our ideas of reconciliation, and it he^ ^jitne neceflary that the riebts of this coun- try over America (hould be decided and maintained by the fword. How far ouf Gondud in the fiekl has been fupecior to |)hat in the fenate^ I will leave the event to declare. I pretend not to^ any knowledge in niilitacy a^airs, and^ wiU not be ra(b enough ta coadenan any Generai unheard ^ but 1 cannot help thinking, that there i? fu6icienl reafon t» affirm, that want of vi^ gour and decifion in our councils,^ was tho* Fift9T and. great cs^ujGb of our misfortunes* in America^ Since the firft dawning of regubr litierty in this country, thofe who took any con-^ cern in> public aiFairs have been divided into^ parti es^ ; and it has uniformly been imputed) to that party which was out of power, that their oppofition to Government proceeded from their dedre of obtaining the places of thofe who dircded affairs. But wbatevec may he the juilice of this impaction, it is to be obfervedf that the party which oppofed^ Adminiflrationhavie generally fiaunded their oppoiition ^pon popular topics, aiiid have fe- cured the voice of the nation upon their fide: iand unlefs when the people have been flat- tered by the glory of a fucceffif^l war, there are but few examples, in the hiiftory of this country, of unfacceftful* Minifters and an -. i - unpopular •e s < 5 > iainp0|:fular Oppofition. Even with this aid'^ they have often been baffied ; but without k, they have never been fuccefsful-. In thi^ manner the ruin of Lord Godolphin and the Duke of Marlborough, with the cfta- blifhment of Harley and St. John, was accompUfhed. The fame aid helped to' ruin them in their turn. To this we may' afcribe the fate of Sir Robert Walpole^ though, like Samfon, he contrived tp puU the edifice about the ears of thofe who had plotted his ruia ; and to thi$ alfo we muft attribui^e the appointment of Lord Chathanv to that fituation, which enabled him to acquire fo much glory to the name of Bri-.- tain and the name of Pitt. It was rcferved for the prefent Oppofition to rejedt the po- licy of their predeceflbrs, and adopt a lyf^- tem the reverie of what has been mention- ed. That, in common with the reft oi mankind, it is their ambition to get into power, it were folly to difpute ; that the/ have erred in the means, it were blindnels Aot to fee. That they may have been con« icientious in their intentions, their negle(f^* ing the proper methods to enfure fuccefs may be confidered as a proof. That the^ end has been unfortunate, not to fay worfe of it, the fituation of this countrir muft for ever teft^fy. It has been acknovy^ ledged, by the moil fangulne among thetii, V V that ( 6 ) ; tliat the defenceof Aifierican literty was uii'a popular *, yet they have uniformly perfc- vered in declaiming in favour of that liberty j and while the torrent of popular rage wa^ ready; at every ttiomefnt, to burft out againfl our Minifters for their ill condud, the people could repofe no confidence in the Minority^ whofe principles they difllked. Had the importance of the names of Wentworth and Cavendifh, aided by the abilities of a Fox and a 3urke, overlooked the ab* flra£t queflion of American taxation, and coniidered merdy the condudl of the war; had they thought means, perhaps not per- fectly confillent with their opinion, jufti- £ablyufed in removing men, whofe cori- dudt they deemed hurtful to the Conftitu* tion ; they might, before this time, have given a final blow to the power of an irrc- folute and unfuccefsful Adminiflration. At the beginning of the fourth fcffion of this Parliament, the news of the defeat and furrender of Burgoyne's army arrived. The difmay that was painted on every countenance on the news of this event, is hardly to be defcribed. It wasy perhaps-, not unnatural, but it exhibited an ill omen of our national fpirit. Britain has feeh the * Mr. Fox has again and again allowed that the American ^eitioivv^s unpopular, • v^- -^ day »« M 7 ) day when her expreflions of grief would: have been otherwife. She would h^ve felt fpr the brave and generous men who fufFercd the difgrace of a fufrender in her eaufe j but (he would have ftrove, with a flern and iindaunted countenance, to have avenged her-p felf upon the enemy. Nor wfts the difmay Dpon this occafion confined to the multt^ tude, who, unaccuftomed to refources ^nd expedients, are eafily elated, and eaiily de- preffed. On the evening when that intel- ligence was made public in the Houfe of Commons, his Majefly's Minifters betrayed as much dejedtion as the mod: inexpe- rienced and ignorant member of that Houfev IJe mud b^ hard-hearted and unfeeling in- deed, who will d^ny that this difafter was a fit fubjedt of concern. But he muft be equally unikilled in the fymptoms of vigour in a ilate, who will afTert, that the lofs of ^ve thoufand men was matter of difmay and dejedion to the firfl IVliniders of Great Britain, who ought to be.acanainted with ,the refources of the country they govern. The caufe of this inexcufealple excefs of terror 9nd apprehenfion mq(t lie either iit their ignorance of the refources of this country, or in their own chara<5ters. Their ignorance of the refources of Great Britain on this occafion, may be fairly pre« fumed, when we confidcr the want of in- formation flH-m^lion which they have be^irayefd iurin^ the whole courfe of the Americai) con ted. Tp go ao 'JPtarther back in the hiftory of the prefent Admin iilratioil th^n the &r{k di«-< flurbunces at Bo(lon, and the fubfequent' opi nions ttpoxi thofe ' diiV^nr bances . Did th e^ Minidry fortii m idea to themfelves, that that riot was a iymptom of diiTatisfadlion in the minds of the people* which was to be' conquered only by 4 rsfolute and early ap*.> pllcfttioil of forf this Parliament to enad. That no offer of conceiHon (hould have come from this country at any time, and in any circumftance, has been the opinion of many. That lefs might have been exadted than what vtre originally de« manded from America, had (he propofed an accommodation with us, appears hishly reafonable. But if ever an offer was to nave been made by this country to America, that it (hould not have been made in the hour of difafler, cannot, I think, be difputed. The proper occafion for any fuch offer would have been when fome fignal fuccefs iuAi- fied our mercy, not when a fignal misfor* tune operated upon our fears. All thefe views, however, were difregarded^ and after ( »3 ) after an ezpesce of blood and treafure, that muA, for ever, bear heavy on this country t the whole objedl: of the war was to be yielded up at the Angle moment when it muft appear the efieS of force and terror. And the men who were to * J^avi America 4t tbdrfiet^ who were to accept of nothing lefs than "f unconditionaiJuhfiJSdnt were the men who had the confidences to prop(^ this fyftenE) of ahfilutt coneefian. It is an unpleafant tafk to difcover addi- tional misfortunes to thofe who are already unfortunate, but it muft be the tafk of any perfon who pretends to examine into the prefent ftate of public affairs. That the lofa of America is lufficient to fill up the mea«> fureof misfortune to this country, every one will readily allow. That an encroach* ment^ hovrever, upon the moft facred and moft necefifary rules of the Conftitution, is yet a worfe evil than the lo^s of the trade and territory of America, will hardly be doubted. As far as freedom is preferable to riches and extent of territory, fo far is the lofs of America an evil inferior to the ruin of the Conditution. It is univeffally underftood, that it is the bufinefs of the Minifter to condud the • Lord North's expreffion. \ Lord George Germaine's. executive ti. in ( 14 ) ex^uthre part of Government, without th© intervention of Parliament, Nothing can be more wife, becaufc nothing can be at«^ tended with greater fafety than this rule* The Miniiler is anfwerable for his condud: to the nation ; the dcead of a parliamentary impeachment keeps him in awe^ and it is therefore the bufinefs of Parliament not lo fcreen him from puni{hment, by a pre-^- Yious approbation of his meafures. . When a meafure is laid before Parlia* ment by the Miniiler, their opinions, eoii'» cernmg the expediency of it, mud, in a great meafure, be formed according to his leprefentation of the matter; becaufe it cannot be fupppfed that the members have received fufficient information from any ether quarter. The approbation of Parlia- ment, therefore, (even without any fuppo* £tion of undue influence) may be gene- rally expeded as a thing of courfe ; and while it removes from the Minifter all ap- prehenfion of a future enquiry, it can af- ford, to the nation, no fecurity with refpcdt to the propriety of the meafures approved of. During the American conted, however, tiie Minifter has had iddrefs enough to make every meafure of ordinary execution, a meafure of legifiation. If we had had a \yar with France, or any foreign nation, would ( 15 ) would an application* have been made- ta Parliament to fandify every ilep tha^ may have been expedient, and while we protend the Mmifter in hist condud, riiined^ther €au(e by delay, f Nobody ever thought.it iiece0ai7 that perfons ihould be appointed by Parliament to treat concerning a peaces with a foreign power; yet the comtniilion* to Lord Howe and his -brother received a parliamentary fandlion* They might» .with the fame pro|)riety» have brought- a bill into Parliameat to appoint our Generals and Admiralfi. Tbi»; condu A I look upon as' highly dan«« ^erousy and as deviating from one of thoie rules of Government moft ef&ntial to the. Conftitutiom> It is t;rue that there is ao law* to prevent the . M inifier f(t)m coming to Parlianient in this manner, as there is.a law to prevent troops being raifed in the time of peace, without the confent of Par«^ liamcnt ; but it is the more neceifary, on that account, fort Parliament to rejedt all fuch applications. . . ' Befides the greater caution is necefTaryin guarding againft this abufe, becaufe it is introduced upon plaulible pretenceis. Foe while the Minifter is ccmnteradting the ufual forms; of Government, he is jflattering the power to which he applies. It looks like a deference- upon the part of the txecutivc ,:,i.i power V •' T i V fc-> |! ( 16 ) power to the jadgtnent of the legiflative* which muft be agreeable to the latter. In the prefent cafe» the flattery has gone ftill farther. It has been (aid, that the difpute with America was peculiarly the caufe of Pariitinent. The Americans had not call* ed in queflion the power of the Crown. but had Fcf( "^d to fubmit to the l^iilative authori^. it became, therefore, both de* cent and requi£te, that Parliament (bould be confulted in every ftep, both legiilativtt and executive* But I hope Parliament, upon future occafions, will fee the matter in a di^erent light, and will give no con- currence to a mode of procedure fb dan* gerous to the Conftitution ; as the dread of parliamentary enquiry is the only e£Fedtual circumAance to fecure a ptoper and prudent exertion of the executive power. Another circumftance refpe^ing the con« dudt of the prefent Minlftry, fbems worthy of particular attention. From the earlieft periods of our hiftorjTr the Minifter has uniformly been looked upon as accountable for the whole executive part of Govern* ment. Since the enjayment of a certain and well regul^ited liberty, wlieA a fyftem of public meadimahas been to be changed, the prelude has always been a chai^ of Minifters. It has been regarded' as impro^ per for the fame^meato uofoUKwhat they themfelves i ( »7 ) themfelves have been doing, and as con^ trary to the intereft of the country, for thofe men to remain in power, who have been, in their own acknowledgments, act- ing to the hurt of the community. When peace was to be made, at the beginning pf this century, the power of Marlborough and Godolphin gave wjay to that of Oxford and Bqlingbroke. When war was to be conducted with vigour, the timid and peaceful conduct of Walpole, was forced to give way to. the warlike difpofition of his opponents. During the early difputes refpeding America, they were not th^ fame men who enaded and repealed the Stamp Ad *. It was referved for the pre* fent Miniflers to 0iew a new example of effrontery to the world» to change in a moment their favourite fyftem, without a dngle change in the councils of his Ma-» jefty, and to remain in the plenitude of power* while they adopted the very Jan* guage of oppofition* When a feries of blunders had reduced them to defpair of carrying. their fyftem into execution^ thej^ -■< . . , • . .• . * I do not mean to fay, that no 0ate intrigue and privatp machination had any place in thefe changes, nor that a Mi- niRer whohasconduftei a war is ttnfittoreftore peace; all I want to prove, my propolition is, that till aided by a change of public meafuresi thofe machinations have been inefiiB^laal. ., D ^ ihewcd. Vr ( -»8 ) fhewed, that rather than quit the contemp- tible emoluments of office, they would give the lie to all their former condudt. That nothing but the emoluments of office could have induced them to have changed their opinion and kept their places, all who faw and heard them, on the day their new proportions were uffiered into the Houfe of Commons, as well as on all fu- ture days of debate on that fubjeft, can teftify. To thofe who did not fee or hear them, fome explanation may be neceiTary. The Premier began with an aukward ex- plaining away of former adertions, and liniffied with a total recantation of former principles. The unfeemly appearance which he exhibited, while he afforded fuch mat- ter of (hame to his adherents, and triumph to the oppoiite party, may be cafily con- ceived. For four y^ars together had that noble Lord been talking high of Britiffi dig- nity, and the neceffity of American depen- dence, upon a very ffiort warning, moved by a difafter that might have been eafily re- paired *, with only the bare fufpicion of a French treaty being concluded-f-j did he un- dertake to propofe to the mod crouded au- dience, a renunciation of all his former prin- • Burgoyne's rnrrender. 1 1 always take his own declarations in the Houfe of Com- mons. ciplesy ( 19 ) cipleSy condemning either his opinions, as ill-founded, impolitic, and impracticable* or his conduct as the worfl defigned, the word directed, and the mod inadequate to < his end. Upon that night, no perfon of his party had courage enough to fecond his propofitions, or virtue enough to oppofe them. Upon a future occafion, the fame aukward appearance was made by fome of his coadjutors, while others were contented to retain their emoluments, without ex- poiing their change of fentiments. The noble Lord, who prelided over the Ameri- can department, was particularly obferved to fit filent for many days, nor was he pre- vailed upon till goaded by Oppofition, and incited by Adminiflration, to make a fimilar recantation of all his former opinions ; which perhaps was more aukward in him, hecaufe his opinions had been more violent than thofe of the Minider. By this wavering condudt our national dignity mud have been impaired in the eyes of all the world. If Great Britain, when ihe totally changed her public mea-.- fures, had alfo changed her Miniders, (he would no longer have appeared rcfponfible for the opinions or fydems of men whom fhe had difcarded from her fervice. By coming under the diredlion of a new Mini- ftfy, (he might have been fuppofed fenfible D z of I- • m ( ao ) of the blunders of the former^ and might have afforded tli;^ profped of being a^uated by a new fpirit. Luc by retaining her old diredors, at the fame time that (he entirely changed her fyflem of actions, (he was made tc adopt all their inron(iftencie8 : (ho was, in feme meafure, involved in their dif» grace; and (he gave her enemies reafon to expert, that for the future (he would difcover the fame feeblenefs, and fluctua- tion of meafuresy by which her pafl con<* du£t had been di(lingui(hed. With refped to the meafure of concef- fion propofed on this occafion, if it ought ever to have been adopted, it was not at this time, for the reafons I have given above. But it was not at this time for an- other reafon ; becaufe, without vidlory on our fide, it was in vain to expe^ that Ame- rica would agree to our terms. Elated with the hopes of a free and independent Empire, by having baffled all our at- tempts for four campaigns ; having form- ed a Government which anfwered all the purpofes of the (late of warfare^, in which they were placed; finding refources be-r yond their expectations, and in the daily hope of fupport from a great power, hos- tile in every feeling to Great Britain, was it to be expected, that they who had raifed objects ( «I ) objeds of ambition to themfelves, which they looked forward to with all the fervour of an imagination heated by political fchemes, would admit of thofe hopes being at once blaftedi and their independence an- nihilated in a moment ? Every thinking man might have feen that it would be the buiinefs of Congrefs to prevent thofe who might incline to it> from daring to make an offer of accommodation. And every informed man might have known, that in that country, the whole power is in the hands of the Congrefs. The favourite fyC' tem of dividing America was therefore vain; and that timid and pitiful policy which has governed Adminiftration during the whole of this queflion, was now to be baffled a third time *. That the event has been prccifely anfwerable to this con« dudl, the world is now fufficiently apprifed. So that Great Britain* after having become an humble fuppliant at the feet of her Co- lonies, after having debafed herfelf be- yond all example or precedent ; after hav- ing feen her Con^itution violated in mod elTential articles, her blood and treafure la- vifhed with the utmo(l prodigality, is now farther frjm the point Oie aimed at, than (he has been during any period of the war. During the early periods of the Admini- • • The firft attempt by the Conciliatory Bill j the fecond \fy appointing the How^s Commiflioners. ilratioa ( 22 ) Nation of our prefent Premier, a fuccefsful attempt to get the better of popular com- motion, gave the nation a high opinion of his abilities. At that time the whole world was at peace, and Great Britain, after a vigorous and fuccefsful war, which had raif- ed the glory of her name to unrivalled great- nefs, had, by extending commerce abroad, and improving the arts at home, encreafed that greatnefi to a degree hitherto unknown and unequalled in any age or country. The conilitutional queftions, which had for fome time been agitated, were now forgotten, and the commotions which had arifen upon that account, had entirely lubfided. The people of Kngland, cherifticd in the lap of profpcrity, fatisfied with the cafe and tran- quility in which they lived, and unalarmed about any encroachments upon tiie Confti- tution, faw nothing to apprehend but the age of the Earl of Guildford, which pre- fcnted a profped: of calling from his proper fituation, the Minifter, whofe rank, inte^ grity, and abilities, rendered him the fitteft perfon to advife his Sovereign, und diredt the nation. With all thefe fplendid and profperous circumftances around, a dorm began to gather in the weftern hemifphere, which threatened to difturb the ferenity of the Britifli fky. The caufes of that gloom, and theconfequences neceflarily arilingfron^ it, feemed to call for the attention, and ought in) ought to have prompted the exertion of this illuftrious Statefman. Hov well that per- fon, and thofe whom he had before, and has (ince added, as coadjutors in office, have acquitted themfelves of that tafk, the dark, the diftrefled fituation of this country can befl demonftrate. In the year 1 774, we were in poffeffion of the whole Continent of America. The firft blood that was fpilt at Lexington be- gan this fatal hiftory. With what luftre the conduct of a Britifh General (hone forth in that affair, the Gazette can tell. The , remainder of that fummer was wafted with- in the walls of Bofton, with the Angle exception of the adion at Bunker's Hill ; by it the extent of our territory was en- larged, and we were allowed to come as far as that neck of land, over which the rebels (hould not have been allowed to re- pafs, if our fhips had been managed with common prudence. In the fpring of 1 776, after having fpent a miferable winter in Bofton, our troops were obliged to put to fea, and jailed for the port of Halifax. The fummer of that year commenced with fail- ing for Ne'v» York. Upon our arrival in that bay, Statcn Ifland was the only poft we could occupy j the campaign, however, began and ended with glory to us, and dif- grace to our adverfaries. The taking of • Long Ifland and New- York Ifland, follow- ed I 11 > ( 24 ) f d each other as fajfl as we could march to take poffeffion of them j from thence wo drove the rebels from the flrong and advan- tageous poft of King's Bridge to the Jer- lics, and from thence acrofs the Delaware, with fuch rapidity^ that it was nicknamed by the army. The Jerfey Hunt. They little thought, that with the intervention only of another campaign, they were to be hunt- ed acrofs the fame country in their turn, by the men they had fo much defpifed. The beginning of the campaign, 1777, was didinguifhed by the march of General Howe to take a view of General Wa(hing- ton at Bound Brooke, who, after looking at his right, then at his left, and then at his center, law no po^Tibility of at- tacking him; quitting that fituation, and covering Lord Cornwallis, who would otherwife have found it difficult to retire, the whole army embarked, and all bis Majcfly's MiniAers, from the Firft Lord to the loweft runner of the Treafury, declared themfclves equally ignorant of their deflination *. After many weeks of • It is obfervable that their ignorance was entirely feigned ; lor a letter from Sir William Howe co Lord George Ger- main, dated New- York, 2d April, 1777, and received 8th May, inclofing one from Sir William Howe to General Carleton, fays, •• As I (hall poflibly be in Pennfylvtnia, when the corps is ready co tdvance into this province* it will not be in my power tocoir.municate with the officer com- manding it, fo foon ai I could Wi(h." }t is not the bufinefs of r 2s ) of fufpence, we heard of their landing in Cheefapeak Bay. With the fame fuperiority of military difcipline that difplayed itfelf in the campaign of 1776, they made themfclves mafters of Philadelphia and the adjacent country ; and had they had a few hours more day-lighl at Brandywine *, the whole rebel army muft have furrender- ed to them. After keeping pofleffioii of Philadelphia a whole winter, the policy of our Minifters, perhaps very wifely -|-, re- quired, that they (hould quit that flation and go to New- York, That the General difplayed great abilities, the troops great bravery, and great fortitude, every one muft allow 5 yet, after all, it deferves the name of a retreat, nay the enemy have come off fo as to conftrue the adtion they had with our troops into a vidtory, and the Congrefs of thefe thou£;hts to determine whether Howe fliould have waited for General Burgoyne, and co-operated with him. If I am to give an opinion, it is, that wifdom fhould have direded his ilay ; but it is no apology for the Minifler's per- filling in a fhabby falfehood for months, the apol '"v that Miniltcrs ihould not di£latc to a. Commander in Chie.. is at an end ; they havedidated to General Clinton. * See the Gazette account. f It furely was a fortunate, perhaps a wife order, that made our army quit Philadelphia at the time it did : had it remained a (hort time longer, it muft inevitably have fal- len a prey to D'Eftaing. Yet I can never attribute any de- gree of merit to the Miniftry for taking fo obvious a ftep : ic was the only one that remained, after having allowed of a poflibility of D'Kllaing's vifiting that coaft. iJ ^/■ E have ( *6 ) have publicly thanked General Wa(hing- ton on the occaiion. Is there a man that would believe that the troops that fpread themfelves over the Jerfies, from Eliza* bcth-Town to Trenton, in 1776, were to be obliged to march acrofs that country, in the manner of a retreat, and with difficulty fave their baggage, in the year 1778, for ought Miniftry knew, to run the riik of being cooped up in New-York in the fame manner tney were in Bofton, without a poflibility of adting decifively, or perhaps, what might be more prudent, of quitting the country with fecurity ? If fuch has been the fate of a war, waged againft a people who were not yet formed into a nation, whofe arts of government were yet to learn, and whofe refources were unknown and uncertain, what are we to hope from the fame men waging a war againft a great and powerful Empire, old in every art of government, acquainted 'vvith every mode of refource, fkilled in every means of at- tack and principle of defence ? But the abettors of minifterial manage- ment will fay, the queftion with America was very different from the queflion with France ; the delicacy and novelty of the former cafe made it necefTary to be extreme- ly cautious, left we fhould irritate thofe into revolt whom we only meant to chaflife for difobedience. ( «7 ) difobedlence. Without entering into the merit or demerit of this fort of policy (which I have already in fome meafure dif- cuffed) or endeavouring to (hew, what muft immediately occur to every one 5 that if it was the proper fyftem at the beginning, it could not continue fo in every f; -- ceflive campaign in America. I (hall, af- ter having examined the condudt with re- fpedfc to America for four fucceffive years, beg leave to touch upon the conduit with relpe<5t to France in hardly a greater num- ber of months. Without entering into the inexcufable ignorance of the French treaty, I (hall proceed to what more properly re- lates to their condudt refpedting the war. It appears, from the papers laid before the Houfe of Commons, that the moft perfect information was given to Mini- itry relative to the fitting out and fail- ing of the Toulon fquadron. Such in- formation as might have warranted them to take fteps that might have effcdually prevented that fquadron from croffing the Streights of Gibraltar, and perhaps have cruftied the American treaty in its earlieft bud. Yet, inftead of taking this obvious method of checking, in the beginning, all attempts of the French to fuccour America, they chofe to let that fleet fail, upon the idea that they might punilh them in the Atlantic, whom they did not chufe to ftop li 2 in i. 1)1 hi- m i ( *8 ) - in the Mediterranejin ; and inftead of pre- venting the mifchief they were to do, to call them to account for the mifchief they (hould have done. That this is unlike the prac- tice of all former Minifters, few people will venture to deny. When an enemy was certainly to be met with in a calm and placid fea, where any addition to his flrength could eafily be prevented, where there was no rifk in the voyage, and no difficulty in fupplying a fleet with every requifite for that voyage ; it was furely ob- vious, that our fleet (hould have been fent to the Mediterranean, to check Monfieur D'Eflaing in the beginning, not to the Atlantic, where there was an uncertainty of flnding him ; a probability, or rather a certainty, of his being joined by additional numbers, where the ocean was boiflerous, and the neceiraries for the voyage very con- fiderable ; and where the prefence of our fleet could not be infured, till every thing for oUi deflrudtion, and the advantage of our enemies, might have been compleated. fiut I {hall be told upon this occafion, has not D'Eflaign been baflled in all his attempts to fuccour America, and is not our fleet and army fl:ill exifting in fafcty on that coafl ? It is upon this ilate of the queftion I wifti to argue. i How does the fad fland upon the laft account from America ? Lord Howe fails - for ( 29 ) for the prote<5li6n of Rhode-Ifland, whither D'Eftaign had gone to favour an attack of the rebels upon that quarter. What en- fues ? D'Eltaign quits the harbour of Rhode-Ifland on the appearance of the Englifh fleet ; Lord Howe finding that the French fleet is too ftrong for him to attack, without having the weather-gage of them, very wifely attempts to gain it. During this attempt a fl:orm arifes : both fleets are difperfed : and after having given an op- portunity of proving what all the world allows, and what cncreafes a thoufand fold the guilt of our Minifters, that Britifh fea- men are the moft brave and intrepid cha- ra public F duty* i l!?' ( 34 ) duty; And tlv^ they are luMind to oxcrl diAJC virtue, that fQCtitude> that pcribve* t^ncc, to (iipport the Conftitution. which thekanceftois exerted to ralie the hbriz. Let them €Qiif[>le themfehes with thi& re- fk^on, that if. they a£t with the virtue and 6rmnpfs of Englilhmen^ there, is yet enough of ftrengthlefc in this country to refque ua from the prefent emergency, and perhaps to re-eftabhlh ns in that power. and. dignity which has,, in better days, rendered the name of Bxiiain revered tncoughout the V!wW^ ... Iimay le aiked, at this pesriod of the ^bje^f and in this fituatioa of a^^rst wlvit .0u)jald he done now i We have tried» without fucce6, to reduce America by force* OAd onr endeaviours to reconcile her by con«eSQn« have been equally ineffeduaU Are we to enter into a new war with Ame«. rica I Are.wc to declare them independent ^ one of their alternatives ; or, are we to- withdjraw. our tro<^ ? which is their other alternative. If their exifted in this country a. fingle man» who£t pre^emioftnce in expe/* rience, wifdoyav aad hstnfis&f pointed hinii out to the general fenie o£ mpjtkind, as a: fit perfon to take the guidance of afifairs iota, hia hands, whofe former condudb hadihewnt : the vigo^of bi&.mtndiini every action, and' whoie enterprises had been ^niveriaUy £3r-» tunate WW ( 35 :) tunate^ who had heaped glory upoA hi^ oationi bv the ruperiority« with which he CQn4u^^« her aiFair« i< who diijplayed in hio^feif tha^ peculiarity ot chirader Which l^a|Hed misfortune* becaufc; he rejoiced id di^(;ultie$ ; whofe perfotial character d«id bfiiliant eloquence made every fubordinate intrude;r tremble at his nod, and whofc avowed ryllem it was to make every inferior department fubrdrvient to the bufine{9 of th w|io was^ in (hort, fingulariy fitted to make a Minifter for a war : I fhould have thought ijt incumbent on this nation to call .t^t man f^rjthifilo their fefviee. But LORD CHATHAM is no more ^ and I am afraid th^ prefent age does not furni(h oift a man capable of carrying any idea of his laft fpeech into execution* That great man did, in the beginning, tend to raift the qombqi^ioa, that has no^ well nigh con- iumed this nation i but, perhaps, he was, for that among othe^r reaibi;is, beft calculated to extinguiih the flame. What his plan would have jbeeni for carrying on the war, the world hafr never had unfolded to them ; what it ought to have been^ may eafifly be conceived. It ought to have been con<* dudted wkb fuch vigour as to have made the enemy feel the feyerities of war. In* iiead of permitting what every body allows ■ *'■-• ' "'-.;. >-^^- :•'■ it ^"1^3 ft ( 36 ) it to be, the finefl: and mod high fpirited army that ever was led into a field, to Ian** guifh in quarters, they /hould have em-' ployed it in fuch a manneir as would have forced General Washington to come to aa adion upon equal terms. In that cafe/ what the event would have been, the few battles we have had in America, upon dif-^ advantageous ground, clearly proves. But ought we, at this period, to pfurfue that method of frventy, when France has declared herfelf the Protestor of Af)nerican rights, and is ready to occupy fo great a portion of our national ftrength and national credit, and when the laft of thefe two ar^^i tides is fo very low ? I confefs that, 2ea«* lous as I am for maintaining the fupremacy of Great Britain over America, I look upon^ this at prefent as impracticable. Would you then declare the Americans indepen-* dent, in hopes of fecuring ♦heir weight ia the fcale againft France ? Having already ftooped fo low, it may be fuppofed ftand*^ i*>g on foolifh punctilio not to go fo far as* they wifti : yet, foolifh as it may be, I confefs I am for (landing on that pundilio.* I think no governing State (hould ever, by* its own zQi, declare any of its dependencies ^ independent : it is fo contrary to the nature of a governing power, fo humbling to the* pride of great nation, it muft tend fo en-- ( 37 ) tirely to annihilate the ipirit of a people, and deprive them of that indefctibablc Jometbing that fupports and cherishes them, that it is a ftep never to be taken, if it can be avoided. But is it avoidable now ? Ara not France, Spain, and America, too pow-« erful for Great Britain ? And would not Great Britain, in alliance with America* be a match for the other two ? Is any cnc fo credulous as to believe, that a Declara- tion of American Independence would pro^ duce this alliance * ? Is it not probable ra->^ ther, that, exulting in having forced you to this lad ftep of humiliation, they would tell you. You areftill too late. The King, of France, our great and good ally, is not to be forfaken by us. He who afilfted us in our diilrefs, and brought about the com*, pletion of our freedom, can we affift you with our arms againft him ? You who have attempted to tread upon our pri- vilejg^es, and who have harraffed us by every adb of civil and military oppreflion. . We can never think your offer worthy of * Kea4 the anfwers of the yongrefs and the Commif- fioners. They do not fay. Declare us independent, and we will unite with you again/l France ; but declare us inde- pendent, or withdraw your troops, and then we will treat with you ; before that, we will nave no correfpendence witli the Commiflioners of Great Britain. Suppofe them declared independent ; fuppofe the Comroinioners received, is there a probability the/ would enter into an alliAnce with Great Britain \ our !,. I' m ( sH ) c^€ con^er^tion, becauib that which yo^ pffet wtB already pofler^. We arc indepen- dent I nbt becauic Gre^t Britain declares uf fo, but becaufe we can mainti|iln our Inde- pendcpce m fpitc of all your exertions, Toii are -therefore to exped no conceflion (rovi us for granting to us dejure^ what we alrefl;4y poffefs iefadh *. J(t may be faio by tHofe who have more regJMrd to the iafeiy than to the dignity of • '*'*"" ''t . r ... * "Irtie re&liitibn of Congreti, Kov. 3C» i777» before any idei of i. French trethr exifted, may lead us to form ai' vfr jT proiHiMQ oOnje4ki|reor i^hat their Itttguage will b pm ■ ■ ■ /» C p N a J^ ^ S $, Nov. t7. . . Coanefs having recdivea inf|»rinaUon» that the infidious •Mtiiel Of the United Statel df AmeHca havfc eAdeaVoilred: to ffDMKatc falfe and gntaodlers reports, that a trcatv had befphela between the Cpngrels and the Commiffionels of the Kiitg of Great Britain* By which it was probaUe that i reooiiciliadoii would tak± place t Be it dealarcd ^d relolved, ** That the Commiffioners f^the ^aid tJnited States at the feveral Courts in Europe, be aVrtdioriz^ to reprefent to the different Courts at which the/ refpefiivelyMfiatk that no tr?«ty vrhaiever hat been held between the Kiu^ of Gre«t Britain, or any of his (;ominif>, fiAlters, and the l&ldliidcpehdeilt States, fince the Dedara" tion of lAdebcnkieace.'* HENRY LAURENS,. PreHdent, /» CONGRESS, Uov, 22, Refclrtd, •* That all propofals for a treaty between the Kitttfof Great Britain, or any of his CommiflJoners, and the United States of America, inconfjftcnt with the fnde- pendente of the faid States, or with fuch treaties and alli- aiices as (hall be formed under their authority, will be re« ]<«ed ty Corgrcfs." ^ HENRY LAURENS, Prcfident. thMou!d' b^e^ the cafei I cannot {tty\ but if it were to bo' fb, the exigence at whith it mnft be pur** chafed is roch, as^ this nation can never* fupport. Shall Greaft Britain calmly abandon all thofe claims over her Colonies^ which- Ibe lately held forth to the world ; sbndf after they have fpiH'ned her authority with' every circumllance of infalt and difdain^, fubmit to the law which France has beei» pleafed to dictate '^ This may be agreeable to the fordid and pecuniary intereft of Great firitain» but it never can be confiftent tvith- th"*. rank which fhe has long held among the powers of Europe. If fhe fubmits to this. .be v'ill fufFer the finiftiing ftroke of abafti* 1*1 Sfe and upon every frivolous occafiaii' iht : fifty exped to be trampled upon by hor- neighbours, while every future exertiori will be damped by her prefent dilgrace,, I know that of late the queftion of Ame- rica ha« made one porty treat national' dignity f ■ \ 1 m * \W' < 40 ) dignity wltli ridicule, as infignificaht and ideal ; yet that party difavows that rea^ ibning when the queilion is changed from America to France s and what may have been ill-founded pride with our Colonies, is juil and folid dignity with our enemy. Taking it then for a maxim in politics, from which the nation is never to fwerve. That the dignity of the nation is eflential to its exiftence, I mud conclude, that a Declaration of Independence to America, Involving in it Peace with France as a con* dition, is nevei li thought of. Having thus fak ken the point of ho* nour into confideration, let us now confider the queftion of intereil, and determine from thence what effei^ American Ifii/e^ fendence and Separation would produce upon this country. Firft, In point of population. Secondly, In poinL of territory and trade. Thirdly, With refped to pre-eminence as a naval power, I. It appears almofl a nece/Tary confe* quence, that if ever America (hall pofTefs equal political advantages with this coun- try, it mud drain this country of people. In America the price of labour is very high, and the price of land, as well as of providons very low ; nor will there be any confiderable taxes to dimini(h the ad- yantages of the one, or increafe the difad- vantages ( 4« > vantages of the other. A fettlement there Is eafily and readily made, and every com- fort of life eafily and plentifully obtained. In this fituation it is hardly to be doubted, that the labouring and manufacturing part of Great Britain will flock in crowds to America ; inticed not only by the advan- tages already enumerated, but by the fame language and religion, and by the enjoy- ment of civil and political freedom, fimilar to what this country profefles, without any of the burthens ui.der which it labours. Nor would the evil, great as it may prove* refl here. Many of thofe whofe eflates are moveable would be induced to follow the example of the labourer and manufa^urer. They would focn learn that their capital would be employed much more advantage- oufly in the new than in the old world ; that there money is a rare commodity, af- fording a high intereft if lent out, a great profit if employed in the cultivation of land, and an equally great, or greater, if employed in trade. The extenfive coafl, the number of fea-ports, and of navigable rivers capable of receiving (hips of all bur- thens ; the eafy rate at which materials can be had for building them , the various commodities, the production of fuch va- rious climates s all thefe circumflances mutl combine to induce thofe whofe capital is moveable to go to America. Befides G thefe ijK 'if « ^1 I hi If* 1^ m ( 43 > thefe pecuniary advantages, their ambitron and vanity would prompt men to partake of the illuftrious fituation they might attain to in this new republic. In this country, the different ranks that have been long eftab- lifhed, and the inequality of fortune that ufually accompanies thofe ranks, has made a high degree of political power, and di- ilindion attainable by very few. The fmall number whom fortune, or accident, brings forth to public notice, or to extenfive in- fluence, are generally themfelves either men of rank and fortune, or connected with men of rank and fortune. What would be reckoned only a competency in this coun- try^ would in America be efteemed affln'-nce, and the polTefTor of it would be enti .a to all the rank and confideration that aRiuencc beftows. The natural tendency, therefore, of the Independence of America, and its total feparation from Britain, will be not only to deprive this country of the manu- facturer whole labour produces capital, but of the capital which in its turn gives em- ployment to the manufadkurer; and though this may not take place by one fudden ftroke, it eannot fail to be fenfibly feh in a Courfe of years. In what number of years this will happen, the wifeft and beft cal- culator will not take upon him to decide ; but the (hallo weft politician may eafily "; "cs '-.^r "-• forefec ( +3 ) forefee that this country is to feel a dimi- nution of men and capital in an increafing ratio, though that ratio may not be the fubje(5l of accurate calculation : and in the end, this country may be left with little more ftock than the cultivation of land, and the confumption of thofe who cultivate it can employ -, certainly with no more people than the employment of that ftock can maintain. When it fhall arrive at this ilate, or rather in the courfe of its advane- ing towards it, the evils which Britain may fu^er can hardly be enumerated. The di^ minution of ftock and the diminution of people, muft neceflarily be followed by a diminution of confumption j the natural confequences of which muft be to lower the value of land ; and when the value of land is thus lowered, it is impoftible that it can maintain the fame induftry, or, in other words, employ the fame ftock it did originally ; fo that the efFedl of American Independance and SeparatiQn is not only to deprive us of our ufcful inhabitants and moveable capital, but to lower the value of our land, and weaken the inducements to cultivate it. The confequence of this, with regard to the profperity of the nation, is too fatal and too evident to make me with to dwell upon it. It muft fo weaken and deprefs us, both in point of men and I ?.. . J G 2 money, I ■ ■' i m ( 44 ) money, as t': render us, if not an cafy prey to arv foit'i^n power, at leaft unable to maintain i y pre-eminence or dignity, lie Enghjhmen will relifli the near prof- peft of this, I leave Englijhmen to de- termine. 2. In point of territory and trade. It appears likewife a neccffaryconfequence of American Independence and Separation^ that we fhould lofe our Weft-India Colonies, and be deprived of Quebec and our Newfoundland fifheries. The vicinity of America to thofe pofTefiions would furely operate, in fome refpeft, to- wards bringing about that event. Befides, with refpeft to the Weft-Indies, America is, if not the only country that can afford lumber, the country that can afford it cheapeft, and it will afford it cheaper and cheaper, in proportion as it (hall encreafe in numbers of people ; becaufe the more land there is to clear, the more lumber they muft be able to afford. If the population of America goes on, and the induftry of the people bears a proportion to it, they will be able to fupply the Weft-India market with many commodities ; a fhort carriage will render them cheap, and this connexion will have its influence in producing an union between them and America. Befides this circumftance, it is fo much in the power of America to harrafs the Weft-India trade, ^ ^ that ( 45 ) that our iflands will be happy to (hare in a Government that renders them fafe and independent, rather than to remain with this country unfafe and dependent ; cfpe- cially if a reduction of the ilrcngth of this country is to be the confequence of Ame- rican Independence, and a confequent in- ability to aflifl them againft America, What the efFedts of this alienation of our Weft-India Colonies will be, I confefs my- felf too ignorant of the particulars of that trade to be able to calculate. I own I am far from thinking it would be one of the greateft evils attending the Independence and Separation of America ; yet it would be fuch a one as the prefent fituation of this country is ill calculated to bear. It would withdraw or annihilate the capital of many merchants, who are now engaged in that trade, which, befides diftrefling the individual merchants, would annihilate the proportion of induftry, that capital kept in motion. The manufacturers, therefore, whofe commodities fupplied the Weft-India market, muft either be deprived of bread, or feek a new vent for their manufa£lure. And here let me obferve again, that every thing confpires to render a Declaration of Independence and Separation in the higheft degree favourable to America, and equally unfavourable to us. The lofs of the Weft- Indies, \ m MPs: h mi' m ( 46 ) Indics» by depriving our manufadurers of bread, fo far as they were employed in fcrving that market, muft induce them to feek for employment elfewhere. While America, independint and feparated, holds out to them every gratification of free go-f vcrnment, a ready market, and a high price for their labour. With regard to oiir Newfoundland fi(he- ries, the arguments that apply to the Weft- Indies, apply likewife to them, viz. that our fifheries are fubjed to conftant depredations from the American navy, without the pof- fibility of our giving conftant afliftance. The feas, for a confiderable part of the year, prevent us from remaining in that quarter; and if we have no port in the neighbourhood to which we can go, a con- fiderable time muft be loft before we can return to the ftation ; befides, the inhabi- tants of New-Plngland did formerly carry on the greatcft part of that trade, and their vicinity renders them again ready to feize upon the firft opportunity to drive us from it. As this trade has always been efteemed. one of our principal nurleries for feamen, its lofs muft be very feverely felt by a na- tion, whofe principal greatnefs depends upon her naval force. It is farther probable, from fimilar reafons, that Quebec would be loft to this country. 1-he inhabitants of . that ( 47 ) that country are, by all accounts, far from being real friends to Great Britain. They have (hewn themfelves ready, on all occa- iions, to join the party that was like to prevail. If, therefore, America (hould fuc- cecd^ in forming herfelf into a feparate State, there is little doubt but Canada will declare in her favour. Whether Great Britain is able to overawe fuch a declara- tion, it is hard to fay j if ihe were, fhe would hold the dependence of Canada upon a very precarious tenure. If we lofe America, we may ftiil, perhaps, retain a channel, through which to circulate our manufadlures to the reft ot the Continent, by retaining Quebec ; and that fertile and extenfive province may remain for fome time, a valuable depen- dence of this country. At the fame time I greatly dread, that the moment it be- comes really valuable, it will have ftrength enough, with the allifl nee of its neigh- bours, to break the chains in which this country may hold it. 3. With regard t® our pre-eminence, as a maritime power, it is not neceflary here to prove, that Great Britain is the firft ma- ritime povyer of the world ', or to remark, that to this pre-eminence, fhe owes hef , former gfeatnefs. All the world acknow- ledges this truth, and every Briton feels it. It has ever been, and mult always be the policy ^ iH fl :, W, ( 4« ) policy of this country to maintain a fupe-* riority at fea. Without thi*^. flie never can be deemed a formidable nation ; and if any other country (hall arife, whofe exertions in that way (hall outdo thofe of Great Bri- tain, (he may, from that moment, date her fall. If America acquires Independence, and e(labli(hes herfelf as a feparate and pow- erful nation, there can be little doubt (he will in time outdo Great Britain in all her exer- tions by fea. In everv article but one, (he has the advantage of (lis country. The (ingle one I allude to, is the price of labour. But when we coniider that America po(re(res, within herfelf, all the materials for ,(hip building, it will not be difHcuh to conceive, that thefe advantages will infinitely over- balance the fingle difadvantage under which (he labours *. The fea-coaft of America, from Florida to Canada, is filled with bays, rivers, and creeks, calculated to admit of the fined harbours in the known world, and there are already upon that coaft many ports fit for the con- ftrudion of the firft rate men of war. Tim- ber abounds there to a much greater degree * It is to be obfcrved coo, that emigrations from this conn- try will gradually reduce the price of labour, by bringing more labour into the naarket ; for labour, like any other commodity, is iii^her or lower according to plenty or fear- dty. than t 49 ) thia in^ny other part of thie globe^ and pitch and tar can be produced in the utmoft abundance. Hemp is the natural growth of the foiU and iron (lone is to be found ia great quantities in many parts of that Con- tinent. When unreftrained by the laws of this country, the inhabitants will find but little difficulty in eredting founderies for the making of cannon* and forges for making anchors. Convenient fituations for water are not wanting, and charcoal may be had at a very eafy rate *• With all thefe ad- vantages, who can doiibt that, in process •f time, America, if feparated from us, inuft outdo this country m every maritime exertion, and be ready, on every occafion^ to outftrip the fplendour of the British navy, once fo formidable to every hoftile power* What then is to be done I How is Great Britain* in her prefent fituation, to extri- cate herfelf from the difficulties that fur- round her f There feem to be here but two methods remaining* i. Either to attempt fo to deprefs America, as to render it impradlicable for her to raife her head againft this country. Or^ 2. To give up all hoftility againft America for the prefent, and bend our whole force againft France* * Such eilablifliinchts would redound to the advantage o^ America doitblv, he nothing dean the land fo much at ifoa works of both kindiy by ihe eonfumptiflnof wood* H A» I! I 1 m i ' As to tlie firfl, there is in k a^gree of !^^id(y, to which cfae moftrefiilufie mxiidtGaii.^ ll^rdly bring themittlvet/ and which noftbing^ but 'tie la(l necedky §tould nt^e uk adopts Thtk^cndt therefore, ieem&to be th|a ciiji^ mesfis we have leftf how (mc it wiUb he & p toper ftep» we muf €0»fe6»m vrith st ^onfiderable degvee of probabiix^t; IBut b^^foTe I proceeit totdnts^onjedtuii^ I (hallt fv'^ry (horily lay down nbrnodc ia wliiiih I ihtnk k ought to b^( done. ' WeottghttoretnoveourtroopK^fhrai^ever^ ^rt of Americft, with the cxcepliotsoi Hat- MFax, Quebec, »nd Se. Aug«lliiir» The irii f6 protei!t our fidierios*. and ts «&) exceW^ lent port to tendevous^ in, and /or nfitting our fhips^ Quebec k>r the pitfpaie».aibo«S!- mefitioned, m an ialeC for omr Biaiiilu£u> tar^f to America I and Sti Aogsftkic as a nesr andf convenient poet for otic operatioaa }iY (he We^-^ndicii. Upon withdrowii^' the troops, I w6ii}d at the hmatiwac wstb- draw the CotanMoaeps ^ ; and 1 ^wooli pti{i!tc!jr declare a ftfr|«R6pn f^ all haflili<«> ties with Britifli Artiel^ca, both by lea. and fandi and that t.idJF mty trader withoaft mohftation. to what part of the globe they pleafe, unlefs they diall attempt to xialcft ^ Uatm thde. that thf IP tW prdt, iti u tjn«IcvAoo4 upobclmretitiu captures . ( 5« ) f^aptnres upon our trade;, m 'whkh calc #« &eiild rftalitte. After haviidg pubU'Oied a £ii{pciS^n of tiollilities, and Annulled the CoaMniOTion, it qiYdlbn oGCuss, Whether we iihould rtefMeal ihe feiii^ral Adtt of Pariitment, that Imht^ fone by the D«ine of the ConciUtloiy £Ulk** lere, with all the crriguial difpo^ikm t^at Mny body could poflefs lo tax America* I Am clearly of optnioo, that xho£s A^^ikoaH oof again he repealed. FitA^ becauii^ wc ought to apply the ivhob ftrengthand reiburces of this country agamft France. At the fame time that wc retain at home a ferce* isqual to what we maintained laft luminer* to prerent every whifper of iQVA<* fion* we (hould» with the army we have in Aai6rica# gjarriibn our own Weft^India iflaada» and makit deicente upon the French^ all the reft of our exertions ought to be made by fea. £xpre& orders ought to be given to all Commanders to engage the Frencii^ * The Bill empowcriag hli Majcfty to appoiut Comniir- (9onersci(piretoariie iftof JiiKT, I779» Ha wherever •wa ( 5« y wherever there is a jprobahility of fuccefsi together with an abiolute authority to take every merchant (hip belonging to them. If me public exertions upon the fea^ equal, or nearly eaual, thofe that have been made by individuals, I can have little doubt» but the French will foon become tired of 4 war where they mud fuffer almoft on every occafion. For in fpite of the a^ion, in the Bay of Bifcay, of laft fumniery I m^ft ilill cohfider this country as infinitely fupetipr to the French at fea : and though neithei* our Minifterst nor the Commanders appointe4 by o^r Minifters, have much to boaft of, yet, the great exertions of individuals have clearly demonflrated what this nation is capable of doing, if it had men at its head poflefTed either of fpirit or capacity to con-* du£k it. I take it for granted then, that if a naval war is conduced with vigour on the part of this country againft France^ there is little, doubt of our being vi^orious, and of our reducing that country in a very (hort t*me to the neceflity of fuing for peace. When that time (hall come, it is not to be doubted, that the firft condition ought to be a renunciation of the Ameri* can treaty, and an exprefs declaration upon the part of France, properly guarantied to Great Britain, that (he is never again to interfere on ' e part of America. Till (his (hall be procured, nothing ought t9 be 11 'ii ( S3 ) hp done to Ameripa» but the quedion left implicitly at reft. When it (hall be pro*? pured, I have not a dqubt th^t the matter will be brought into as defire^ble a fitua-!> fion as we can now expert. Americs^ will offer to agree with Grpat Britain upon termfi fuch as Great Britain maj accept ; for it cannot ^dmit of a doubt, that Great Britain can« with dignity and propriety, ai^cept of much lefs when of- fered by America than (hfi can with dignity and propriety offer in the iirff: inffance to America. Having laid down what I would recommend ^s the mode of proceeding, I think I can venture to con-f jedture with fome degree of probability, that terms will be offered by America. When the troops of Great Britain (hall be withdrawn, when the objefb that occupied them ffiall ceafe to exiff, it is more than probable ihgt diferences will take place between diffierent Colqnies, and m..^ en find their w^y into the Congrefs itfelf. In this fituation it is hardly to be doubted, that finding their great |ind good ally, the French King, unable to ^flifl them any longer, attributing (with that change of fentinienty which a change of fortune ge- nerally begets, efpecially jn the midft of popular tumult) all theif evils to his inter- vention and to his intrigue, they willchace |wa^ his AmbaffaclQr witl^ indignation, equal :i! ( 54 ) «qcj i^- /ceivcd him, and will be hap]»y to ttfcc jpe- fttge once more in the arm* of Britain. Upon thi« fuppofition, it may be propet to confidcr upon what t^rms Great Britaiii iOBght to clofc with Ameiiea. • • Great Bfitain has, by th« Conciliatory Biilfiy given up the ori^iiul fttbjeQ df conteft between her and America, and ihofe, 1 fisppofe, ^e does not mean to repeal. The only qucftion that remains is with Tcfpedt to a nominaji dependence. If America then (hould offer to come hato fuch terms as would aToid a total feparation, and fecure a confta«t and re- ciprocal fupport between the' two cdan*. tries, fo that the flrcngth of the one couit^ try, fhould be the ftrength of tlie other, und their interefts fo clofely united, that nothing coald feparftte them I would give up the nominal dependency to procure fuch an union. Taxation nobody now thinks of; and the article of altering their Government is equally given up. Why then diould wc hcfitatc at their retaining the form of Government tlicy themfelvcs have eftabli(hed, providing they agree to the union of interefts above hinted at ? What I would propofe to unite their ihtc- irefts, I (liall pioc9:d to flate. That the natives of /America (hould be natives of Great Britain, and upon coming to this *-^'P^ ... ■ ^ ' * country, ( 51 ) cotrntry, ihoviM enpy all; the privileges o^* firiti£hifub}e^s as they did fornacrly. That in the fame manner, /the natives of Great Britain £hould» upoi^ going to Ai^ierica, be entitled to all the privileges of American fiibjedb. That the ports of the one nation flioBld be reciprocally open to the others and the Weft«>Indieay upon the footing they ^ood at the commencemeMof theie diHurba^cej?. That the prerogative pf declaring peat^e and war ^ould remain ia theKing.of Great l^ri* tain ; every other fi>vereign power wit^ia America being allowed to remain in Con- grefs> tapon the footing in \yhiqh it n(M$ ftandsy, viz. the rntern;al defence of Af^^-* rica» by which the army and navy reiiMin» kr their power; the ippoisj'tment of every civil and^ military o&cer;. and, in (lusrCy the whole power of fupporting an^ re- gulating their Govern mentt with the Sngle exception: above;-mentioned. By this meana the dreadful addition of influence whicb the Crown would have got with the patronage of America will be totally a^'oidH cd« If this regulation (hould take. place, 1 Ibould'tbiiik a Council, or Agents, ought ta be appounited by the King to rc^fide in Ame- ffica» to take care o£ "he intereila of this country in America; and in the fame man* iKr» a CounciU or Agents (hould be ap- pointed by the Congrefs to refide in. Great Pritain, to take care of the intereAs of ici. here» with competent falaries, ap- pointed ( 5« ) • jointed by their refpedtive countries. Sy this means the ftrength of Great Britain vouM become the Arength of America* and the ftrength of America would be the ilrength of Great Britain. That dread and terror which cbnftantly hangs over my mind, that America is to ruin us by draw- ing away our people, getting pofTeffion of the Weft-Indies, Newfoundland, and Que- bec, and becoming more powerful than us at fea, would be ir« a great meafure, if not entirely, removed. But even if matters were brought to that point, where fuch regula-^ tions could be made, there muft ftill re- main great difficulty in the arrangement of particulars. Nothing is attended with greater nicety than new regulations of Government, and no meafure ought to be taken with greater diffidence. Even where iimilar cir- cumftances give authority for fimilar infti* tutiohs, there are fo many fmall variations imperceptible to human penetration, that the effcQ: of them can hardly be foretold* When the iituation is entirely new, and neither the knowledge of paft events, nor a variety of adual experience, can furniib out inftances of the lame nature, it mufl encreafe the difficulty to fuch a degree, as to render the boldeft politician timorous. This laft is fo much the iituation of tha prefent fubjed, that it is with the utmoft diSdcnce ( 57 ) diffidence fubmit my thoughts to thd public. As probable conjecture of whai may be the enedt of thefe regulations is all we can arrive at, I am fenfible that it will be very eafy to ofifer fuch objections to thii fcheme of Union as may prevent its ever receiving a ferious confideration. Many of thefe ob^'e£tions readily occur to myfelf j partial I may befuppof^d to be to my own plan, yet to moft of them, I think, I can give a fatisfaCtory anfwer. I . It has been faid, that America, France^ and Spain, will prove too (Irong for Great Britain ; that Great Britain was vidorious in the lad war ; but to what did (he owd her victories ? To the affiflance and fupport fhe received from her Colonies. Without difputing the laf): part of the propofition, which I think too might be difputed, I fhall confider the firfl: part of it. If by this is me<)nt, that Great Britain will not be able to cope with America, France, and Spain, while Oie continues to make an ex- penfivs war upon the continent of America, that I can eafily allow, becaufe the expence of that war alone, from its didance, and from its being in an enemy's country, is immenfe ; and that expence muft now be greatly encreafed by the additional rxiks to which we are expofed from the depre- dations of the French, fiut if we do not I continue ( s* ) « • • • . ' c(mitinue hoftilities in tlid American Col6- nies, there iy no rcafon to apprehend that France, Spain and America, will be an over-Thatch for Great Britain. The fame annual expence, which was iaid out in the American quarrel, will be fufficient to carry on the naval war propofed, and enable us to out-number oat adverfaiies in (hips of the line ; and' I am apt to think that the depredations of our King's (hips and pri« vateers, if they do not fupply us with funds, will certainly fupply us with (pirit to pur- fue it. We know very well from former trials what France and Spain can effed; and the a(ri(lance of America in fuch a war, confidering her prefent circumftances, will be of little importance : they have no (hips of great (ize, and are not yet ih a eoiiditioh to fit them out; befides, when they learn 6ur intention of giving no didurbahce to their trade, it is probable that, in their prefent cxh'auded conditio^, they will yield but a feeble aflidaiice to their allies. 2. It may be fuppofed that the Ameri* cans will not yield up that material point of fovereignty to the King of Great Britain, the power of ttiaktng peace and war ; and that they will not choofe to be involved in every quarrel in which our Sovereign may chooie to be engaged. It is likely* how«- cvcr, that after fo long a courfe of warfare, , America k 59 ) America will be incHne4 to rcHnqui(h this point, efpccially if they find that France is no longer able to protcd them ; befidcs, they can hardly fu and may iptp the bargain be .able ^o make defcents upon ,l^e , dependencies .of ^^lernei^bpurs, eiti^er ifprth^ (a^ of terror " I 2 . -pr ' a; X| m ift- ( 60 ) or diverfion. As to a Continental war, I never wi(h to fee us engaged in it ; and» therefore, never can think Ic eaepedient to provide for it. Befides, if America has ^ mutual intereft with this country in the Wed-India iflands and our fifheries, and provides her proportion for the defence of them, the interefls of the two countries will Jlill be more clofely united, and nei- ther England nor America will dare to allow each other to be molefled by fo- reign powers, without running the rifque of ruining their intereil in thofe valuable pof- ieflions. But it may be faid by America, that if (he (hall be injured in her property by foreign nations, the King of Great Bri- tain, by not declaring war* may avoid avenging her injuries for the fake of (paring Great Britain. Tq this I would anfwer firft of all ; the American Council will al- ways have it in their power to reprefent the affairs of America, and it would be an odious meafure fdr Britain to refufc their a(Crtance upon ia proper reprefentation. In the next place, it is the intcreft of Great Britain to affift America in every fuch cafe, for the fame reafon that it is theintereft of America to affift Great Britain. The ene- mies of both will, tiy depredations upon the nation that fh all incline to be neuter^ force them to defend tjidmfelves. The Americans might farther fay. Why piay we not have a*\fhare, at Icaft, in the powe^ m • ( 6i ) power of making peace and war ? Might not our Congrefs have a connmunlcation of that Sovereignty ? But how is it poflible, at the diflance at which we are fituated, to fall upon any method, by which to communi- cate this power, and how could a Council ever be appointed to manage that matter, without fuch jarring and abfurdity as would render their interference inadequate and ridi- culous. It mud alfo occur, that a numerous body, like the Congrefs, can never be fo fit for this part of execution as a iingle perfon. 3. The third objedlion is. That giving the natives of this country the privileges of Ame- ricans, upon going to that country, will ope- rate like a bounty upon emigration from this country, and induce the inhabitants of Great Britain to fettle in America more rapidly than if that country was difunited and hoftile. This, I make no doubt, would, in part, be the effedl of fuch a union, and for that reafon, I think it might operate as an inducement to America to enter into it with cordiality. Nor can an er creafe of emigration, in this event, be fo great an evil, as an inferior emigration, in cafe of the two countn.es being totally feparated, fince the people who leave Britain to fettle in America, may ftill be confidercdas apart of our ftrcngth. 4. There yet remains to this mode of fcttlcn^ent, an objc M (hi VfhoCt Writings have excited the public at- tention. As the reafoning of thofe emi- nent writers is well known, it would be a trefpafs apon the reader's time, if I was to ilate their arguments at full length . I /hall only flate in few words, the refult of what they appeared to me to have completely proved. I. 1*here feems great reafon to doubt, whether the trade of America was ever fo beneficial to Great Britain as has been com- monly imagined. That the advancenient of Britain, as a commercial country, has kept pace with her progrefs in the fettling the American Colonies, cannot I think bo denied. But it feems alfo evident, that wLen thofe Colonies became confiderablc, our merchants were induced, by the prof- ped of monopoly to quit the trade of Eu- rope, in which they had been formerly en- gaged^ and to turn their capitals into that of America; and though this latter trade was evidently more profitable to the mer- chant, there is good ground to fufpedl that . it was not fo to the nation ; becaufe, as it yielded a more diilant return of commodi- celved opinions, upon many points ; and in fpite of all that has been written upon political (economy, he has greatly im- proved and added to that important fcienpe. If the reader, who is unacquainted with this work, fhali find me dark and unintelligible, h^ ha» only to confult it, B. 4. C. vii^ part 3, to receive pcdciX lausfa^on and great iniUuflion. ties. 'I r^ ( 64 ) ties, it could not fupport Co great a degree of indudry at home. No proportion appears bettor founded than this, that a near trade, which affords quick returns, is, if other circumflances are equal, calculated to pro- duce the greatefl: quantity of manufadtures, and, therefore, to give the greateO: employ- ment to induftiy. No trade, however* has yielded flower returns than that of America. 2. Admitting the trade of America to have been ever fo beneficial to Great Bri- tain, it ieems evident that by far the greatefl and mod beneficial part of this trade would remain, though the reftridtive laws with refpedt to it were totally removed. The befl part of the trade between Britain and America, confifls in the exchange of thofe articles which are produced by the tv/o countries cheaper and better than in any other part of the world. In the greater part of manufa commonly Aippofed, and which appeal^ upon a ftridt examination, to have proceed-, cd from narrow prejudices, and partial mo- tives of interelt, rather than from any extenlive and liberal views of policy. If the objedions which occur to the mode of union propofed, are in any degree obviated, let us confider next what material advantages this union will produce to both countries ; for unlefs the advantages are mutual, we need not hope to find advocates for it on either fide of the Atlantic. With refpeprized oftheni. yryrjuX'^'' t 68. ) ed* Ameriw rll^m cliijfray, tkc jWfp^nco'of every cftabli(hir-Rn^, C^T^ an4 il«}ifs^ry ; apdr Gre^t Britai, ^JL^efides thjc tca^qf w n^ay have with Am<;riqa^ in comnEioi^ ,i¥it)il;he reil of the wo^l4t ^d perhaps in preference tp it« hecaufe i^f h^ heea thcQwjt^ by iho American monppty^ jntQ t^aiTufi^urea adapted to the American piarl^^tt will havQ all the ilren^k ojF Americs^ to afliil hev vpon ^vcry emergency. ..,^„ ,, . , But, however beneficial t^$, agreement may b hope of reaping any advantage from the dif- pofal of places in America, If the objeftions to this propofed plan are obviated, and the plan itfelf fliould pleafe, whether the neceflary ftep to carry It into execution (the beating the French at fca, the ruining their trade, and molefting their polTeffions in the Weft-Indies) is prac- ticable, or what means will make it pradi- cable, is the only queftion that now remains* When I contemplate the ipirit of the nation, and refleA on the adtions of individuals, for ihefc laft five months, I cannot entertain a doubt of our fuccefs in thefe particulars. When I look back upon the condud of out Minifters, for thefe laft five years, every thing appears fo dark and uncertain, that it is difficult to fay to what fide we fhould turn for relief. FINIS. J ■ ■'