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WICKHAM BEFORE THE TORONTO B^tANCH OF THE CANADIAN NAVy LEAGUE. i TORONTO: MURRAY PRINTING COMPANY, GLOBE BUILDING 1896. / *z\ ,v<l .. I f Naval Defence of Canada. The following address on " Naval Defence for Canada " was delivered recently before members of the Navy League branch formed in this city : — 1 I Some time has now elapsed since the formation of the Toronto branch of the Navy League. The objects for which the parent league In England is estab- lished, as» laid down In Its constitution, are obviously in a large measure ad- dressed to the people of the United Kingdom, and thp expression "to spread information showing the vital importance to the British Empire of naval supremacy," although very com- prehensive, leads at once to the ques- tion, How is it proposed that the col- onies shall assist in the work of the parent league ? Branches which started In some parts of the empire began by advocating dir- ect contributions on the part of the colonies to the British navy ; the delay which has taken place in Canada has been caused by correspondence which has been going on, between this branch and the head oflfice, in which It was pointed out that owing to constitution- al difficulties which are as yet in the way of direct contribution on the part of the colonies, it was necessary that the parent league should define for the information of the branches, more precisely than had heretofore been done, the lines upon which colonial branches might work In order to for- ward the general cause of the league. In consequence of this correspondence a circular has been issued in which suggestions are made by the parent league as to the manner in which the colonies may thus assist. This circular will be referred to hereafter. One great effort which the Navy League should make is to impress up- on the public mind the necessity for each part of the empire looking be- yond its own limits, and realizing that each is only a part of a great oceanic empire, held together by the command of the sea, and that should Britain's naval supremacy be successfully chal- lenged in any part of the world the dis- aster will be felt equally by all parts of the empire, wherever situate. We live in an age of organization and con- solidation. We find that In all busi- ness matters it pays to be methodical. The man who has his business best or- ganized is, other things being equal, the one who succeeds best. We all recognize these principles in everyday life, and yet when we come to apply them to national affairs we are apt to let what is everyone's business be no one's business. Events, however, are crowding upon us, and unless we desire ourselves to be compared with the pro- verbial ostrich, we. In common with our colonial brethren tho world over, must be up and doing. In view of recent expressions of public sentiment there can be no doubt that Canadians have fully made up their mind to re- main an integral part of the British Empire. If we desire to reap the ben- efit of this wise conclusion, we must cease to confine our mental vision to matters purely local and Canadian, and we must tiake a survey of the entire empire to which we belong, and shape our policy in matters of defence, and generally having regard to our posi- tion in that empire. The United Kingdom has in the transaction of her own business here- tofore acted upon tolerably well-flxed principles, one of which is, that to se- cure her trade, she must be supreme at pea. The merchants and financiers of England are a hard-headed lot, and they recognize as a business principle, that money spent upon the British Navy and everything necessary to retain the command of the sea, is money laid out to the best advantage. In fact they regard it as nothing more or less than national Insurance, and therefore as such, is as much essential to their business requirements, as the insurance of houses or goods against risk of fire, they consequently Insist upon their sea-going Interests being adequately protested. The financiers of Great Britain are constantly look- ing about "-hem for new fields in which to invest their surplus capital. We all know that large sums have been Invested In various enterprises In the United States ; we also remember the '•tumble" which these securities took not long ago. What English capital- ists want is a field for profitable in- vestment, having due regard to the safety of the security. That being the case, and If we try for a moment to place ourselves Jn the position of the money lenders In England, does It not seem reasonable to suppose, that granted a desire on the part of the British people to-day to draw closer to the colonies in commercial matters, the financiers of the old country will be apt to invest, their money more readily. In the developing of such of her colonies, as In a practical manner recognize the soundness of Great Brit- ain's policy of national Insurance against risk from war by following her example In that respect. Thus It may be demonstrated, that every dol- lar spent by Canadians in placing their country in an adequate state of defence is, from a national point of view, the very best Investment they can make. It will draw to this coun- try, on the best poiisble terms, exact- ly what we most want, namely, the means of developing our Immense na- tural resources. We do not need to be reminded that In England, as else- where, politicians are ever apt to prac- tise economy at the expense of national security. It Is this tendency, in fact, which has called the Navy League in- to existence. It would seem that in Canada there is ample room for an Army League as well as a Navy Lea- gue. In December last upon a well- defined war scare presenting Itself, It was found necessary to send our Quar- ter Master-General scurrying to Eng- land to bvy rifies, which should have been on the spot. It has been clearly shown that there is plenty of work for the Navy League, both at home and in the colonies, and that our or- ganization should serve a useful pur- pose, but in order to do so we must recognize that there is a limit to our sphere of action, and that by over- stepping that limit, we shall be pro- bably doing more harm than good. The Navy League In Canada should first ascertain what are Canada's re- quirements from a naval point of view, and. having made up our mind on this matter, we must set to work to impress our views on the public at large, and particularly on men occupy- ing public positions. To begin with, it must be remembered, that Canada has already, in establishing and main- taining a militia, acted upon the prin- ciple that some measures of local de- fense are necessary.. The circular to which I shall refer points out that It is not proposed to establish separate colonial navies. It is true that in the case of Australia a local navy has been established, but it Is thought by many that the principle is vicious. Involving as it does, some degree of divided eon- M } < —5- I trol. No doubt It would be best If we could jump at once Into the position of maintalninsr an Imperal army and navy, In which the colonies, as contrl- butaries, should have a voice In the control: but although our minds are open as to the possibility of our ulti- mately achieving this desideratum, we think that in the meantime there are many ways In which Canada, as a col- ony, may and should strengthen her- self by the application of naval science without in any way creating the dif- ficulties incidental to a divided control of the forces employed. It will be necessary, pending the working out of a complete Imperial system, for each colony to improvise such local means as may be useful, so that, as Indicated in the league's cir- cular, each may add to the naval strength of the whole. In devising such means we must look as far ahead as possible, so that the means employed may hereafter be capable of being ex- panded into a comprehensive Imperial system. In illustration of what I mean by this I will say that I believe it will be found necessary, owing to Inherent defects, in the near future to completely reorganize the present system of Royal naval reserve. The present force will be employed, but under changed con- ditions to suit a more Imperial system, bv which the trade routes of the em- pire will be directly protected by, as it were, an auxiliary navy, composed of naval reserve cruisers (improved "Teutonics"), manned and officered ex- clusively by naval reserve men. In or- ganizing a naval reserve force for Can- ada regard should be had to such a contingency. The regulations as to age and fitness upon entry should be as stringent and great attention paid to matters of discipline, so that our re- serve may be fully able to take its place in an Imperial system and be an improvement upon the existing force of the Royal Naval Resei-ve. If we look at the frontier and coast line of Canada, which we should have to defend in case Great Britain should become Involved In war, wUh any mar- itime power capable of detaching raid- ing cruisers. It does not need the knowledge of an expert to see that purely military, as distinguished from naval science, would be wholly inade- quate for our protection. Those who have studied the questloa at all must realize the danger to which the seaport towns and coasts of the colonies generally ^would be exposed to improvised cruisers, which would no doubt be sent against us at the first outbreak of a maritime war, and, not- withstanding the immense fleet which Great Britain possesses, it would be simply impossible for her, having re- gard to the number of mercantile In- terests and trade routes which she would hav'j to guard In different parts of the world, to spare a sufficient num- ber of men-of-war to patrol our coasts. All European countries have realized the necessity of providing complete systems of coast defence by means of torpedo warfare. The knowledge that Canada possesses such a system would have a decidedly deterrent effect on would-be raiders. At this point I will set out that part of the circular above referred to which deals directlj with the duties of the colonial branches. " How can our colonies best assist the attainment of a condition essential to the existence of the British Empire? The Navy League does not presi'me to more than suggest what can be done by them. It does not urge direct con- tributions towards the cost of the Im- perial navy, nor the creation of inde- pendent colonial fleets. The direction of naval affairs, and the control of our fleets must be under one authority. A number of separate organizations would, have *'^e weakness which has ever been observed in the tem.porary alliance of foreign powers at sea. There are, however, other ways In which our MMMMMMMMHM -6— colonies may sensibly augment the na- val ttrength of the empire, and sup- port the objects of th" Navy League. The operations of modern fleets are much facilitated by the possession of good harbors, with moderate local de- fences, and the necessary appliances for rapidly coaling and refitting ships of war. Adequate docks are an Import- ant adjunct to all ports used as naval bases. When ships of war put Into port during hostilities to replenish and refit, perhaps disabled after an ac- tion, It Is essential that the completion of what Is necessary should be carried out in the shortest possible lime, with- out a great demand upon the crew, probably much In need of rest, and per- haps seriously diminished m numbers. " The question of how to replace men killed and wounded in ahlps on a for- eign station at short notice has not yet been considered. It might be feasible for our colonies to train the seafaring population on that coast, and so afford a valuable navrl reserve of this na- ture. " A training ship, with staff and boats for such a purpose, at the prin- cipal ports, would be a useful contri- bution to Imperial defence. Men might be enrolled as a nava' reserve under conditions appropriate to each colony, with a liability to serve in the fleet on the station when required. Such a body could also provide for local de- fence " For this to be efficient, the various weapons which it comprises — guns, mines, and torpedo boats— should form one organization under a single head. To meet an attack from the sea, such weapons as are best served by seamen who can discern the character of ap- proaching vessels. " These are only a few indications of the methods iby which the colonies can contribute to our maritime strength. The first thing is to form branches of the Navy League, wnich should devote themselves to spreading and maintaining sound opinions on de- fence and its real source, a preponder- ating navy. The more active meas- ures would follow, and, acting in con- cert with the Imperial Government, our colonies wou.d thus become a valu- able source of naval strength, and be more closely connected with the great work of Imperial defence." I now propose shortly to discuss these suggestions, bringing to bear some In- formation which I have been able to collect, as affecting the questions we now have under consideration, and I shall also submit certain propositions which I hope to hear discussed, so that we may be in a position to baje anpropriatc resolutions defining the ob- jects sought to be attained by this branch of the Navy League. In considering /hat steps should be taken to supplement our present mili- tary organization, with appropiiate naval forces, we may profitably take into account the experience which olher countries have had in providing and maintaining naval reserve forces. Our main object should be, as busi- ness people, to see that for any money we may expend In this direction, we get the best possible results, and that any force which we may provide shall be, so far as it is possible to make it so, an efllclent force. For the sake of conven'ence I will set out under separate heads the proposals which it has occurred to me should be made, so that these proposals may be dis- cussed clause by clause : (1) The appointment of a naval of- ficer (preferably a torpedo officer) to a position analogous to that of the Major-Greneral commanding the forces in Canada, to consult and co-operate with the latter. (2) Providing necessary material for coast defence, such a.s torpedo boats, systems of mines and a few gun boats for coast and lake defence to be used by the reserve men for target prac- tice. 1 -7— of- to the •ces ■ate for Its. ats sed ac- (3) """he establishment of torpedo schools on both coasts with a limited number of duly qualified instructors. These establishments to train a force limited In point of number, to be used for the torpedo defence of the coast and water frontier, and to be analoo ous to our Royal Schools of Cavalry, Infantry and Artillery. (4) The establishment of a naval reserve force analogous to our mili- tia, and the means whereby the "lame may be trained to a state of effi- ciency. (6) Adapting our present system of coast signal service and our present fisheries protective service to the re- quirements of coast defence. (6) Providing training ships for boys in different parts of Canada, so that Canadian youths may be trained and qualified to take positions in the Brit- ish Navy and in the British Mercan- tile Marint, (1) In reference t' the first sug gestlon, that a na' ai cfflcer should be appointed to act with the Major- General commanding the forcefi,I would couple It with the remark that it would be well if the Canadian Gov- ernment should in the first place ap- point a commission consisting of duly qualified naval and military offlcers, who, In conjunction with offlcers of our own departments, should inquire into the whole subject of naval de- fence for Canada and make a report thereon with recommendations based on the results of their inquiries. It is impossible for a country in Canada's position to prosecute experiments in naval science necessary to keep abreast of the times. Happily it is not necessary for her to do so ; the appointment oi a naval orflcei to oe replaced every three of four years, would ensure our naval requirement* being looked after by an officer with the most recent technical knowledge. (2) With regard to material neces- sary for coast defence, we may pro- bably follow with advantage In our general arrangements the examples of France and Germany by supplyiiig ourselves with a sufficient number of (a) torpedo boats for operation on both coasts. To this I would add a limited number of (b) torpedo gun vessels of great speed, capable of choosing their own distance In attacking by daylight any war vessels of the enemy In our own waters, (c) The buildings, etc., necessary for a torpedo school on each coast, (d) Naval barracks and batter- ies at St. John, Halifax, Vancouver, Victoria, Quebec, Montreal and To- ronto, in which Canadian Naval Re- servemen may be drilled, (e) Such fixed defences in addition to those al- ready in existence as may be neces- sary to command the eutrances to our principal harbors. (3) It has been found that only picked men, trained to a high state of efficien- cy, can be usee' for torpedo warfare to man torpedo boai.3. I would, therefore, recommend that In the first place a limited number of properly qualified torpedo instructors should be engaged by the Canadian Govemmt^nt for ser- vice at the torpedo schools to be dstab- lished on each copst. Great care should be exercised in selecting candi- dates for the torpedo service ; they should be engaged as continuous ser- vice men for a term of years after hav- ing qualified. In order to secure the best results it will be necessary that these men receive the same pay and benefit as those who occupy similar positions In the British navy. Canadians should be encouraged more and more than they arc at pre- sent to enter the royal navy as offl- cers, and in this way they would be able to fill the positions of command which would be created by such a force. In the meantime we should have to rely upon obtaining the services of retired torpedo offlcers of t^ie royal navy. (4) In approaching the q'aestion of a ■ipp .^- naval reserve force for Canada, I may say that it is hi possible wlJ'.hln tho limit of this paper to fully describe the various syssLems which are adopt- ed by tlie different European countries. I cannot more than briefly g'^'e the re- sult of my investigations. Great Brit- ain is the only power who relies ex- clusively on volunteers, France and Germany demand the services of ev- ery able-bodied man between certain agef, to serve the country, either In the army or in the navy. For this rea- son both France and Germany have a reserve force of men largely in excess (proportionally with their require- ments) of those of Great Britain, I shall, however, deal with the subject of the Royal Naval Reserve, r.o at pre- sent existing in England, because in any system vhich we may adopt for Canada we should have to see that it harmonizes with existing conditions within the empire. In a paper which I read before the Canadian Militpry Institute about eight months ago, I drew attention to the fact that colonial seamen were ex- clr.ded from enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve. Through the press I have also agitated for an extension of the privileges to colonial seamen, pointing out the abundance of good material we have to draw from. It may be a coincldenoe, but I have recently received a copy of an act now before the British Parliament permitting th.i Admiralty to enroll men for the Royal Naval Reserve outside of the British Isles. The present system of Royal Naval Reserve came into being in 1859. Until 1870 it was composed exclusively of men who had ii^rved in the mercantile nmrine, but since that time there has existed a second class, composed of men who are engaged in fishing, coast- ing, and other seafaring pursuits. Still later a third class, composed of boys of the mercantile training ships, has been allowed : also a clacs of firemen. In order to secure the services of Roy- al Naval Reservemen the Britisl. ad- miralty pay a premium to such officers and men who come uo to the stand- ard of qualifications laid down in the legulations, which will be found in the navy list. Both ofllcers and men put in about a month's drill each year at whatever battery or naval reserve drill ship may happen to be convenient. Jt is impossible, within the limits of this paper, to give full details, but a care- ful consideration of the system leaves no room for doubt that it has many and grave defects. Naval officers hav> stated to me that when naval reservemen come on board a man-of-war they have to be ^^ut among the idlersj. Their qurvliflcationa ap able seamen find no scope, for the modern fighting ship is mastless, and requires, in addition to the engine room force, only the men to direct the ship and operate the gun torpedo and elec- tric r.rmament. Their training is of little vai for they have no perma- nent or. ^Ization, no permanent of- flcerc whom they know and 1o whom they are accustomed. No uniform sys- tem of instruction has oeen given them, and the weapons with which they have been in the habit of going through their annual drill are mostly obsolete. The short r^eiiods of training with strange comrades, strange officers, var- ied weapons and unfamiliar surround- ings, owing to their constantly charg- ing the place at which they take tiieir drill, cannot possibly give them the discipline and systematic way of per- forming their duties so necessary to the fighting efficieiio of that complicated machine, the warchip of the present day. The full strength of the corps can never be available on short notice, for it is much scattered, not only over the United Kingdom, but over ihe face of tho world, and it would be a liberal es- timate to state that within a fortnight after being called out not more than one-third of the enrolled strength could i » i» »j j|f iTi -9- present themselves at the rendezvous, and these might find themselves drafted to a class of .essel with which they were totally unfamiliar and stationed at a type of gun they had never seen. In case I should be misunderstood I desire to emphasize che fact that it Is ..le system, and not the ma- terial, which is at fault. It must be obvious that there is no opportunity for the creation of that esprit de corps which goes so far towards making ef- ficient a fighting force, whether naval ji" military. This esprit de corps can only exist where men are banded to- prether, and the circumstances under which the British Naval Reserve men acquire what little training ihey now get prevent them from being associ- ated with each other to any extant In outliring a scheme for Canada 1 have sought to correct this defect by havinr *he force localized. In this way i-ii? reserve belonging to each seaport town or city would have its separate existence and entity. The other defect in the R. N. R., which is caused by the men being detached all over the world, and the impossibility of their being collected in a short space of time at one rendezvous. I have sought to obviate by drawing upon the fisherman rather than the sailors ot the Mercantile Marine. It may be said that l have not indicated In any way th»^ number of men I would propose to have in such a force as I have outUned. The only answer which can be made to this is that It muet be dependent upon the fundc ap- propriated for the purpose, and in any dytem which may be adopted care should be taken to have a force small In number, but efficient, rather than large In number and correspondingly inefficient. I shall briefly notice another force which ha-s (1st April, 1892) been dis- banded. The "Royal Naval Artillery Volunteers." This force w^as composed of men not professionally seafaring. but with a taste for and a certain fa- miliarity with nautical pursuits. In 1888 it numbered 1,477 men and 65 of- ficers. The late Sir George Tryon was the chairman of a commission appoint- ed to Inquire whether this force could be relied upon to fulfil duties in con- nection with naval defence. And alter a careful and exhaustive inquiry in which all the commanding ofllcers were examined, the commission re- ported that whilst they appreciated the zeal which ran through the ent're force they were forced reluctantly to come to the conclusion that their con- tinued existence did not warrant the expenditure of public money. It may here be remarked that the United States, in organizing their present force of local naval militia, have largely adopted the Royal Naval Ar- tillery Volunteers as a pattern. Looking, then, at the matter of a Ca- nadian naval reserve as a practical questicTi, we should seek to steer clear, as far as possible, of the defects which have been found to exist in other sys- tems. A force chiefly drawn from our fish- ing population would have the advan- tage of being always close at hand. It has been shown that seamanship, ir. the sense of a practical knowledge of handling sails and spars, is no longer essential to the fighting sailor. The statistics show that in 1894 70,719 men were engaged in the fishing Industry of these about 30,000 received th^ boun- ty- It Is not necessary to analyze these figures. There is no doubt whatever that we have ample naterial to draw from. The winter affords an excellent oportunlty for drills. I would favor the erection of naval reserve barracks at the principal seaport towns, at which during the winter a certain number of enrolled men should qualify in cunnery. It would not be necessary that they be Instrrcted In the use of every class of weapon witi; which a modern man- of-war is equipped. Each station -10- \\ should have a 4.7 or 6 Inch Q. F. gun. This gun should be so located as to defend the entrance of some harbor, so as to be of practical value in time of need. It should be housed so that men could drill at it in cold weather. All its appointments should be the same as on shipboard. Each station should also be supplied with a few machine guns; also rifles, cutlasses, and a drill shed, with a competent staff of instructors. The force should be commanded by oiTl- cers from the Royal Navy on the re- tired lists. These appointments should not be permanent, but should be changed every two or three years to ensure a proper standard of techni- cal qualification being maintained. To commence with, a certain number of gunboats, of a size allowable under the agreement with the United States for the upper lakes, should be provided, so that each summer a certain number of men should have an opportunity of target practice and of obtaining an ex- tra degree of efficiency for which a premium should be paid. The reserve should consist of two classes. Upon enrollment a man to belong to the first class, in which he should remain for a period of five years, putting in at least two months' steady drill each winter under pay. In this way a certain numbe ' of our fishermen would find remunerative employment at a season of the year when they are unable to follow their usual avocation. Every year a number equal to one- fifth of the whole force should after the completion of five years' service go into the second class for another period of five years, doing a limited amount of drill each winter. Both lasses should be liable to be called it in case of war. Upon declaratioi f war the en- tire force 6'hould ibe placed under the direct control of the British Admiralty. Time and space forbid my going into any more details, but I have endeavor- ed to sketch in outline an organiza- tion for naval defence, which I believe to be suited to our requirements. Another subject which should engage public attention is tne escablishment of suitable training ships for boys, so that Canadian youths may be facilitat- ed in acquiring an early training, which will make them fit either for the Royal Navy as seamen or for ser- vice in the mercantile marine In a similar capacity. It has often occurred to me. and I am sure to all those who have thought upon the subject, that there is a want of some tie of a per- sonal nature, which will make for the unity of the empire, I cannot conceive a stronger bond of union than would result from Canadians entering both the British Navy and Army as sailors and soldiers. The fact of Canadian parents having their sons serving as blue Jackets all over the world in British men-of-war, would give the whole people such a personal interest in the British Na^'y as would go very far in cementing the empire. I do not think too much stress can possibly be laid upon this point Shortly after the establishment of the Toronto branch, I comnunicated with the Secretary of the League hi London, requesting him to furnish me vvlth full particulars, so that I might be in X position to answer the Inquiries which are from time to time addressed to me by parents, as to what they are to do In order to get their boys Into the Navy. In response to my request, the Secretary of the League In London, has, in conjunction with the Colonial Committee, been at very great pains to procure and formulate Information upon this head. These gentlemen have also communicated with the Admiralty, and as a consequence of their repre- sentations the Admiralty have issued a "Ircular dated April, 1896, entitled, " Pay, Position, and Prospects of Sea- men and Boys of the Royal Navy." This circular presents In a f^ondansed form, the conditions, etc., which have to be complied t»ith by those who wish to enter the Royal Navy as boys, and If' I <l 4 1 1 ' II »j,if* ^.-v^ T»^^i-\,.VaM(sHLI —Il- ly'' also, as its title indicates, gives a full outline of the prospects held out by a career as a seaman in the Royal Navy. A glance at this circular will serve to show that the life of a blue-Jacket to-day, is very different from the popu- lar Ideu, which associates "Jack" with rum and tobacco, and the squandering of his money when " paid off." A few copies of this circular have been sent to me for distribution. In England most of the training ships for boys are maintained as private in- stitutions. Amongst those of which detaiib nave been furnished to me ard the Grampian a* Belfast, the Warspite in the Thames and the Mercury at Hamble on Southampton water. I have been furnished with full details as to the expense of maintenance and the general scheme of government regulat- ing these vesels. They do grand work in furnishing seamen for the British navy. It seems to me that the ques- tion of training shlDS for boys should come under the head of education, and ag such be forwarded to a large extend by the various Provincial Govern- ments. For instance. I think that a training brig in connection with Lhe Industrial School at Mimico, like those used at Portsmouth and Plymouth for training boys in seamanship, would be a step in the righi direction on the part of the Provincial Government. A brig for the training of boys in seamanship would in no way affect the question of agreement between the United States and Great Britain as to the mainten- ance of war vessels on these lakes. It would not be necessary that they should carry guns at ail. They might be simply used for the purpose of in- struction in seamanship. At Plymouth and Portsmouth these brigs get under way at daybreak and cruise outside the harbor each evening and anchoring for the night. The strict discipline of a man-of-war is rigidly enforced on board, and thus the boys receive an early training which leaA'^es its stamp upon their lives. A similar vessel fully equipped with the necessary staff, up- on which a certain number of boys from the Industrial School at Mimico should be trained, would not be a very heavy matter of expense. In fact, the expense would be a mere bagatelle in view of the great benefit which would be done by opening up, £.s it were, a new channel of employment to Can- adian youths. The Grampian at Belfast was for- merly H.M.S. Gibraltar. I served in her as t, midshipman in her first and only corumission in the Mediterranean from 1863 to 1867. She was a sister ship of the Duncan. These two veseels were the largest two-deckers ever launched In the British navy, and they were aoout the two last in the commission. I would suggest that a sub-committee be struck to draft such resolutions as may be considered by the branch best calculated to express our view r.s to the manner in which Canadians should act In supporting the general policy of the Navy League. I have communicated with the May- ors of various maritime cities In Can- ada, and have received assurance of the support of these cities just as soon as we formulate a definite line of ac- tion. I think we should call upon the Government to appoint a commission to inquire ir:to the whole subject and report with as little delay as possible. Vi ff^^S^Rl^^ fffl Pt?^ *^ OBJECTS OF THE NAVY LEAGUE IN CANADA. Why the League should be supported by all loyal Canadians. The Navy League is in no sense a political organization. It works for the welfare of the Empire, the preservation of peace, au.l the prosperity of the British Community. Here in Canada its objects are : 1. To bring home to Canadians a sense of their de- pendence on and interest in the naval strength of the p]mpire. 2. To press upon public attention the need for a Canadian Naval Defence force. 8. To show how (^anada can best help the Royal Navy — locally — in time of war. 4. As " knowledge is power," so want of knowledge is weakness. This Lea<jfue seeks to remedy the prevailing lack of information on naval matters by distributing literature on the subject to its members and the public press, and by proinoting the teaching of Naval history in schools. Aildress for further information the lioii. Secrctar}', H. J. WICKHAM, ^^ :: ^ : "V Room 81 & 82 Canada Life Bldg-, -_ ._^^ TORONTO. — Annual Membership Fee for Toronto Branch, #2.00. ^ THE NAVY LEAGUE Ifl CANADA [7Wo7if,o Brnnch.l At the Annual Meeting of this Branch held at Toronto, on Monday, 21st March, 1898, the following resolution was unanimously adopted : "Re.olved, that whereas the sailors and fishermen of the Dominion of Canada form excellent material from which to recruit men for the Roval Naval Reserve : •' And whereas, under the Imperial law as it now stands, Canadian seamen and others are debarred from enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve unless serving on board vessels registered in the United Kingdom ; " Therefore the Toronto branch of the Navy League are of the opinion that it would make for the strength and unity of the Empire if the said law were amended so as to permit of the enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve of seamen employed upon Canadian registered vessels or in the fishing industries of Canada. " This branch of the Navy Lea<,'ue are further of opinion that, for the purpose of enrolling and drilling Canadians for the Royal Naval Reserve, at least two sea-going cruisers of modern type of the Royal Navy should be permanently stationed, one on the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific coast of the Do- minion. " And this Branch of the Navy League are further of the opinion that in consideration of an annual sum to be paid by the Dominion of Canada to the Home authorities, the aforesaid vessels should be available for the purpose of training and drilling a local Canadian naval force to be raided under the provisions of the Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865."