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 Naval Defence of 
 
 Canada 
 
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 A Paper Read by Mr. H. J. Wickham 
 before the Toronto Branch of the 
 Canadian Navy Leagrue 
 
m 
 
Naval Defence of 
 
 Canada 
 
 M JP/\F»ER 
 
 KBAD BY 
 
 MR. H. J. WICKHAM 
 
 BEFORE THE TORONTO B^tANCH OF THE 
 CANADIAN NAVy LEAGUE. 
 
 i TORONTO: 
 
 MURRAY PRINTING COMPANY, GLOBE BUILDING 
 
 1896. 
 
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Naval Defence of Canada. 
 
 The following address on " Naval Defence for Canada " was delivered recently 
 before members of the Navy League branch formed in this city : — 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 
 Some time has now elapsed since the 
 formation of the Toronto branch of the 
 Navy League. The objects for which 
 the parent league In England is estab- 
 lished, as» laid down In Its constitution, 
 are obviously in a large measure ad- 
 dressed to the people of the United 
 Kingdom, and thp expression "to 
 spread information showing the vital 
 importance to the British Empire of 
 naval supremacy," although very com- 
 prehensive, leads at once to the ques- 
 tion, How is it proposed that the col- 
 onies shall assist in the work of the 
 parent league ? 
 
 Branches which started In some parts 
 of the empire began by advocating dir- 
 ect contributions on the part of the 
 colonies to the British navy ; the delay 
 which has taken place in Canada has 
 been caused by correspondence which 
 has been going on, between this branch 
 and the head oflfice, in which It was 
 pointed out that owing to constitution- 
 al difficulties which are as yet in the 
 way of direct contribution on the part 
 of the colonies, it was necessary that 
 the parent league should define for 
 the information of the branches, more 
 precisely than had heretofore been 
 done, the lines upon which colonial 
 branches might work In order to for- 
 ward the general cause of the league. 
 In consequence of this correspondence 
 a circular has been issued in which 
 suggestions are made by the parent 
 league as to the manner in which the 
 colonies may thus assist. This circular 
 will be referred to hereafter. 
 
 One great effort which the Navy 
 League should make is to impress up- 
 on the public mind the necessity for 
 each part of the empire looking be- 
 yond its own limits, and realizing that 
 each is only a part of a great oceanic 
 empire, held together by the command 
 of the sea, and that should Britain's 
 naval supremacy be successfully chal- 
 lenged in any part of the world the dis- 
 aster will be felt equally by all parts 
 of the empire, wherever situate. We 
 live in an age of organization and con- 
 solidation. We find that In all busi- 
 ness matters it pays to be methodical. 
 The man who has his business best or- 
 ganized is, other things being equal, 
 the one who succeeds best. We all 
 recognize these principles in everyday 
 life, and yet when we come to apply 
 them to national affairs we are apt 
 to let what is everyone's business be 
 no one's business. Events, however, are 
 crowding upon us, and unless we desire 
 ourselves to be compared with the pro- 
 verbial ostrich, we. In common with 
 our colonial brethren tho world over, 
 must be up and doing. In view of 
 recent expressions of public sentiment 
 there can be no doubt that Canadians 
 have fully made up their mind to re- 
 main an integral part of the British 
 Empire. If we desire to reap the ben- 
 efit of this wise conclusion, we must 
 cease to confine our mental vision to 
 matters purely local and Canadian, and 
 we must tiake a survey of the entire 
 empire to which we belong, and shape 
 our policy in matters of defence, and 
 
generally having regard to our posi- 
 tion in that empire. 
 
 The United Kingdom has in the 
 transaction of her own business here- 
 tofore acted upon tolerably well-flxed 
 principles, one of which is, that to se- 
 cure her trade, she must be supreme 
 at pea. 
 
 The merchants and financiers of 
 England are a hard-headed lot, and 
 they recognize as a business principle, 
 that money spent upon the British 
 Navy and everything necessary to 
 retain the command of the sea, is 
 money laid out to the best advantage. 
 In fact they regard it as nothing more 
 or less than national Insurance, and 
 therefore as such, is as much essential 
 to their business requirements, as the 
 insurance of houses or goods against 
 risk of fire, they consequently Insist 
 upon their sea-going Interests being 
 adequately protested. The financiers 
 of Great Britain are constantly look- 
 ing about "-hem for new fields in which 
 to invest their surplus capital. We 
 all know that large sums have been 
 Invested In various enterprises In the 
 United States ; we also remember the 
 '•tumble" which these securities took 
 not long ago. What English capital- 
 ists want is a field for profitable in- 
 vestment, having due regard to the 
 safety of the security. That being the 
 case, and If we try for a moment to 
 place ourselves Jn the position of the 
 money lenders In England, does It not 
 seem reasonable to suppose, that 
 granted a desire on the part of the 
 British people to-day to draw closer 
 to the colonies in commercial matters, 
 the financiers of the old country will 
 be apt to invest, their money more 
 readily. In the developing of such of 
 her colonies, as In a practical manner 
 recognize the soundness of Great Brit- 
 ain's policy of national Insurance 
 against risk from war by following 
 her example In that respect. Thus It 
 may be demonstrated, that every dol- 
 lar spent by Canadians in placing 
 
 their country in an adequate state of 
 defence is, from a national point of 
 view, the very best Investment they 
 can make. It will draw to this coun- 
 try, on the best poiisble terms, exact- 
 ly what we most want, namely, the 
 means of developing our Immense na- 
 tural resources. We do not need to be 
 reminded that In England, as else- 
 where, politicians are ever apt to prac- 
 tise economy at the expense of national 
 security. It Is this tendency, in fact, 
 which has called the Navy League in- 
 to existence. It would seem that in 
 Canada there is ample room for an 
 Army League as well as a Navy Lea- 
 gue. In December last upon a well- 
 defined war scare presenting Itself, It 
 was found necessary to send our Quar- 
 ter Master-General scurrying to Eng- 
 land to bvy rifies, which should have 
 been on the spot. It has been clearly 
 shown that there is plenty of work 
 for the Navy League, both at home 
 and in the colonies, and that our or- 
 ganization should serve a useful pur- 
 pose, but in order to do so we must 
 recognize that there is a limit to our 
 sphere of action, and that by over- 
 stepping that limit, we shall be pro- 
 bably doing more harm than good. 
 
 The Navy League In Canada should 
 first ascertain what are Canada's re- 
 quirements from a naval point of 
 view, and. having made up our mind 
 on this matter, we must set to work to 
 impress our views on the public at 
 large, and particularly on men occupy- 
 ing public positions. To begin with, 
 it must be remembered, that Canada 
 has already, in establishing and main- 
 taining a militia, acted upon the prin- 
 ciple that some measures of local de- 
 fense are necessary.. The circular to 
 which I shall refer points out that It 
 is not proposed to establish separate 
 colonial navies. It is true that in the 
 case of Australia a local navy has been 
 established, but it Is thought by many 
 that the principle is vicious. Involving 
 as it does, some degree of divided eon- 
 
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 I 
 
 trol. No doubt It would be best If we 
 could jump at once Into the position 
 of maintalninsr an Imperal army and 
 navy, In which the colonies, as contrl- 
 butaries, should have a voice In the 
 control: but although our minds are 
 open as to the possibility of our ulti- 
 mately achieving this desideratum, we 
 think that in the meantime there are 
 many ways In which Canada, as a col- 
 ony, may and should strengthen her- 
 self by the application of naval science 
 without in any way creating the dif- 
 ficulties incidental to a divided control 
 of the forces employed. 
 
 It will be necessary, pending the 
 working out of a complete Imperial 
 system, for each colony to improvise 
 such local means as may be useful, so 
 that, as Indicated in the league's cir- 
 cular, each may add to the naval 
 strength of the whole. In devising such 
 means we must look as far ahead as 
 possible, so that the means employed 
 may hereafter be capable of being ex- 
 panded into a comprehensive Imperial 
 system. In illustration of what I mean 
 by this I will say that I believe it will 
 be found necessary, owing to Inherent 
 defects, in the near future to completely 
 reorganize the present system of Royal 
 naval reserve. The present force will 
 be employed, but under changed con- 
 ditions to suit a more Imperial system, 
 bv which the trade routes of the em- 
 pire will be directly protected by, as it 
 were, an auxiliary navy, composed of 
 naval reserve cruisers (improved 
 "Teutonics"), manned and officered ex- 
 clusively by naval reserve men. In or- 
 ganizing a naval reserve force for Can- 
 ada regard should be had to such a 
 contingency. The regulations as to age 
 and fitness upon entry should be as 
 stringent and great attention paid to 
 matters of discipline, so that our re- 
 serve may be fully able to take its 
 place in an Imperial system and be an 
 improvement upon the existing force 
 of the Royal Naval Resei-ve. 
 
 If we look at the frontier and coast 
 line of Canada, which we should have 
 to defend in case Great Britain should 
 become Involved In war, wUh any mar- 
 itime power capable of detaching raid- 
 ing cruisers. It does not need the 
 knowledge of an expert to see that 
 purely military, as distinguished from 
 naval science, would be wholly inade- 
 quate for our protection. 
 
 Those who have studied the questloa 
 at all must realize the danger to which 
 the seaport towns and coasts of the 
 colonies generally ^would be exposed to 
 improvised cruisers, which would no 
 doubt be sent against us at the first 
 outbreak of a maritime war, and, not- 
 withstanding the immense fleet which 
 Great Britain possesses, it would be 
 simply impossible for her, having re- 
 gard to the number of mercantile In- 
 terests and trade routes which she 
 would hav'j to guard In different parts 
 of the world, to spare a sufficient num- 
 ber of men-of-war to patrol our coasts. 
 All European countries have realized 
 the necessity of providing complete 
 systems of coast defence by means of 
 torpedo warfare. The knowledge that 
 Canada possesses such a system would 
 have a decidedly deterrent effect on 
 would-be raiders. At this point I will 
 set out that part of the circular above 
 referred to which deals directlj with 
 the duties of the colonial branches. 
 
 " How can our colonies best assist 
 the attainment of a condition essential 
 to the existence of the British Empire? 
 The Navy League does not presi'me to 
 more than suggest what can be done 
 by them. It does not urge direct con- 
 tributions towards the cost of the Im- 
 perial navy, nor the creation of inde- 
 pendent colonial fleets. The direction 
 of naval affairs, and the control of our 
 fleets must be under one authority. A 
 number of separate organizations 
 would, have *'^e weakness which has 
 ever been observed in the tem.porary 
 alliance of foreign powers at sea. There 
 are, however, other ways In which our 
 
 
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 colonies may sensibly augment the na- 
 val ttrength of the empire, and sup- 
 port the objects of th" Navy League. 
 The operations of modern fleets are 
 much facilitated by the possession of 
 good harbors, with moderate local de- 
 fences, and the necessary appliances 
 for rapidly coaling and refitting ships 
 of war. Adequate docks are an Import- 
 ant adjunct to all ports used as naval 
 bases. When ships of war put Into 
 port during hostilities to replenish and 
 refit, perhaps disabled after an ac- 
 tion, It Is essential that the completion 
 of what Is necessary should be carried 
 out in the shortest possible lime, with- 
 out a great demand upon the crew, 
 probably much In need of rest, and per- 
 haps seriously diminished m numbers. 
 
 " The question of how to replace men 
 killed and wounded in ahlps on a for- 
 eign station at short notice has not yet 
 been considered. It might be feasible 
 for our colonies to train the seafaring 
 population on that coast, and so afford 
 a valuable navrl reserve of this na- 
 ture. 
 
 " A training ship, with staff and 
 boats for such a purpose, at the prin- 
 cipal ports, would be a useful contri- 
 bution to Imperial defence. Men might 
 be enrolled as a nava' reserve under 
 conditions appropriate to each colony, 
 with a liability to serve in the fleet 
 on the station when required. Such a 
 body could also provide for local de- 
 fence 
 
 " For this to be efficient, the various 
 weapons which it comprises — guns, 
 mines, and torpedo boats— should form 
 one organization under a single head. 
 To meet an attack from the sea, such 
 weapons as are best served by seamen 
 who can discern the character of ap- 
 proaching vessels. 
 
 " These are only a few indications 
 of the methods iby which the colonies 
 can contribute to our maritime 
 strength. The first thing is to form 
 branches of the Navy League, wnich 
 should devote themselves to spreading 
 
 and maintaining sound opinions on de- 
 fence and its real source, a preponder- 
 ating navy. The more active meas- 
 ures would follow, and, acting in con- 
 cert with the Imperial Government, 
 our colonies wou.d thus become a valu- 
 able source of naval strength, and be 
 more closely connected with the great 
 work of Imperial defence." 
 
 I now propose shortly to discuss these 
 suggestions, bringing to bear some In- 
 formation which I have been able to 
 collect, as affecting the questions we 
 now have under consideration, and I 
 shall also submit certain propositions 
 which I hope to hear discussed, so 
 that we may be in a position to baje 
 anpropriatc resolutions defining the ob- 
 jects sought to be attained by this 
 branch of the Navy League. 
 
 In considering /hat steps should be 
 taken to supplement our present mili- 
 tary organization, with appropiiate 
 naval forces, we may profitably take 
 into account the experience which 
 olher countries have had in providing 
 and maintaining naval reserve forces. 
 Our main object should be, as busi- 
 ness people, to see that for any money 
 we may expend In this direction, we 
 get the best possible results, and that 
 any force which we may provide shall 
 be, so far as it is possible to make it 
 so, an efllclent force. For the sake 
 of conven'ence I will set out under 
 separate heads the proposals which it 
 has occurred to me should be made, 
 so that these proposals may be dis- 
 cussed clause by clause : 
 
 (1) The appointment of a naval of- 
 ficer (preferably a torpedo officer) to 
 a position analogous to that of the 
 Major-Greneral commanding the forces 
 in Canada, to consult and co-operate 
 with the latter. 
 
 (2) Providing necessary material for 
 coast defence, such a.s torpedo boats, 
 systems of mines and a few gun boats 
 for coast and lake defence to be used 
 by the reserve men for target prac- 
 tice. 
 
 1 
 
 
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 of- 
 to 
 the 
 •ces 
 ■ate 
 
 for 
 Its. 
 ats 
 sed 
 ac- 
 
 (3) """he establishment of torpedo 
 schools on both coasts with a limited 
 number of duly qualified instructors. 
 These establishments to train a force 
 limited In point of number, to be used 
 for the torpedo defence of the coast 
 and water frontier, and to be analoo 
 ous to our Royal Schools of Cavalry, 
 Infantry and Artillery. 
 
 (4) The establishment of a naval 
 reserve force analogous to our mili- 
 tia, and the means whereby the "lame 
 may be trained to a state of effi- 
 ciency. 
 
 (6) Adapting our present system of 
 coast signal service and our present 
 fisheries protective service to the re- 
 quirements of coast defence. 
 
 (6) Providing training ships for boys 
 in different parts of Canada, so that 
 Canadian youths may be trained and 
 qualified to take positions in the Brit- 
 ish Navy and in the British Mercan- 
 tile Marint, 
 
 (1) In reference t' the first sug 
 gestlon, that a na' ai cfflcer should 
 be appointed to act with the Major- 
 General commanding the forcefi,I would 
 couple It with the remark that it 
 would be well if the Canadian Gov- 
 ernment should in the first place ap- 
 point a commission consisting of duly 
 qualified naval and military offlcers, 
 who, In conjunction with offlcers of 
 our own departments, should inquire 
 into the whole subject of naval de- 
 fence for Canada and make a report 
 thereon with recommendations based 
 on the results of their inquiries. It 
 is impossible for a country in Canada's 
 position to prosecute experiments 
 in naval science necessary to keep 
 abreast of the times. Happily it is 
 not necessary for her to do so ; the 
 appointment oi a naval orflcei to oe 
 replaced every three of four years, 
 would ensure our naval requirement* 
 being looked after by an officer with 
 the most recent technical knowledge. 
 
 (2) With regard to material neces- 
 sary for coast defence, we may pro- 
 
 bably follow with advantage In our 
 general arrangements the examples 
 of France and Germany by supplyiiig 
 ourselves with a sufficient number of 
 (a) torpedo boats for operation on both 
 coasts. To this I would add a limited 
 number of (b) torpedo gun vessels of 
 great speed, capable of choosing their 
 own distance In attacking by daylight 
 any war vessels of the enemy In our 
 own waters, (c) The buildings, etc., 
 necessary for a torpedo school on each 
 coast, (d) Naval barracks and batter- 
 ies at St. John, Halifax, Vancouver, 
 Victoria, Quebec, Montreal and To- 
 ronto, in which Canadian Naval Re- 
 servemen may be drilled, (e) Such 
 fixed defences in addition to those al- 
 ready in existence as may be neces- 
 sary to command the eutrances to 
 our principal harbors. 
 
 (3) It has been found that only picked 
 men, trained to a high state of efficien- 
 cy, can be usee' for torpedo warfare to 
 man torpedo boai.3. I would, therefore, 
 recommend that In the first place a 
 limited number of properly qualified 
 torpedo instructors should be engaged 
 by the Canadian Govemmt^nt for ser- 
 vice at the torpedo schools to be dstab- 
 lished on each copst. Great care 
 should be exercised in selecting candi- 
 dates for the torpedo service ; they 
 should be engaged as continuous ser- 
 vice men for a term of years after hav- 
 ing qualified. In order to secure the 
 best results it will be necessary that 
 these men receive the same pay and 
 benefit as those who occupy similar 
 positions In the British navy. 
 
 Canadians should be encouraged 
 more and more than they arc at pre- 
 sent to enter the royal navy as offl- 
 cers, and in this way they would be 
 able to fill the positions of command 
 which would be created by such a 
 force. In the meantime we should have 
 to rely upon obtaining the services of 
 retired torpedo offlcers of t^ie royal 
 navy. 
 
 (4) In approaching the q'aestion of a 
 
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 naval reserve force for Canada, I may 
 say that it is hi possible wlJ'.hln tho 
 limit of this paper to fully describe 
 the various syssLems which are adopt- 
 ed by tlie different European countries. 
 I cannot more than briefly g'^'e the re- 
 sult of my investigations. Great Brit- 
 ain is the only power who relies ex- 
 clusively on volunteers, France and 
 Germany demand the services of ev- 
 ery able-bodied man between certain 
 agef, to serve the country, either In 
 the army or in the navy. For this rea- 
 son both France and Germany have a 
 reserve force of men largely in excess 
 (proportionally with their require- 
 ments) of those of Great Britain, I 
 shall, however, deal with the subject 
 of the Royal Naval Reserve, r.o at pre- 
 sent existing in England, because in 
 any system vhich we may adopt for 
 Canada we should have to see that it 
 harmonizes with existing conditions 
 within the empire. 
 
 In a paper which I read before the 
 Canadian Militpry Institute about 
 eight months ago, I drew attention to 
 the fact that colonial seamen were ex- 
 clr.ded from enrolment in the Royal 
 Naval Reserve. Through the press I 
 have also agitated for an extension of 
 the privileges to colonial seamen, 
 pointing out the abundance of good 
 material we have to draw from. It may 
 be a coincldenoe, but I have recently 
 received a copy of an act now before 
 the British Parliament permitting th.i 
 Admiralty to enroll men for the Royal 
 Naval Reserve outside of the British 
 Isles. 
 
 The present system of Royal Naval 
 Reserve came into being in 1859. Until 
 1870 it was composed exclusively of 
 men who had ii^rved in the mercantile 
 nmrine, but since that time there has 
 existed a second class, composed of 
 men who are engaged in fishing, coast- 
 ing, and other seafaring pursuits. Still 
 later a third class, composed of boys 
 of the mercantile training ships, has 
 been allowed : also a clacs of firemen. 
 
 In order to secure the services of Roy- 
 al Naval Reservemen the Britisl. ad- 
 miralty pay a premium to such officers 
 and men who come uo to the stand- 
 ard of qualifications laid down in the 
 legulations, which will be found in the 
 navy list. Both ofllcers and men put in 
 about a month's drill each year at 
 whatever battery or naval reserve drill 
 ship may happen to be convenient. Jt 
 is impossible, within the limits of this 
 paper, to give full details, but a care- 
 ful consideration of the system leaves 
 no room for doubt that it has many 
 and grave defects. 
 
 Naval officers hav> stated to me that 
 when naval reservemen come on board 
 a man-of-war they have to be ^^ut 
 among the idlersj. Their qurvliflcationa 
 ap able seamen find no scope, for the 
 modern fighting ship is mastless, and 
 requires, in addition to the engine room 
 force, only the men to direct the ship 
 and operate the gun torpedo and elec- 
 tric r.rmament. Their training is of 
 little vai for they have no perma- 
 nent or. ^Ization, no permanent of- 
 flcerc whom they know and 1o whom 
 they are accustomed. No uniform sys- 
 tem of instruction has oeen given them, 
 and the weapons with which they have 
 been in the habit of going through 
 their annual drill are mostly obsolete. 
 The short r^eiiods of training with 
 strange comrades, strange officers, var- 
 ied weapons and unfamiliar surround- 
 ings, owing to their constantly charg- 
 ing the place at which they take tiieir 
 drill, cannot possibly give them the 
 discipline and systematic way of per- 
 forming their duties so necessary to the 
 fighting efficieiio of that complicated 
 machine, the warchip of the present 
 day. The full strength of the corps can 
 never be available on short notice, for 
 it is much scattered, not only over the 
 United Kingdom, but over ihe face of 
 tho world, and it would be a liberal es- 
 timate to state that within a fortnight 
 after being called out not more than 
 one-third of the enrolled strength could 
 
 
 i » i» »j j|f 
 
iTi 
 
 -9- 
 
 present themselves at the rendezvous, 
 and these might find themselves drafted 
 to a class of .essel with which they 
 were totally unfamiliar and stationed 
 at a type of gun they had never seen. 
 
 In case I should be misunderstood 
 I desire to emphasize che fact that 
 it Is ..le system, and not the ma- 
 terial, which is at fault. It must be 
 obvious that there is no opportunity 
 for the creation of that esprit de corps 
 which goes so far towards making ef- 
 ficient a fighting force, whether naval 
 ji" military. This esprit de corps can 
 only exist where men are banded to- 
 prether, and the circumstances under 
 which the British Naval Reserve men 
 acquire what little training ihey now 
 get prevent them from being associ- 
 ated with each other to any extant 
 In outliring a scheme for Canada 1 
 have sought to correct this defect by 
 havinr *he force localized. In this 
 way i-ii? reserve belonging to each 
 seaport town or city would have its 
 separate existence and entity. The 
 other defect in the R. N. R., which is 
 caused by the men being detached all 
 over the world, and the impossibility 
 of their being collected in a short 
 space of time at one rendezvous. I 
 have sought to obviate by drawing 
 upon the fisherman rather than the 
 sailors ot the Mercantile Marine. It 
 may be said that l have not indicated 
 In any way th»^ number of men I 
 would propose to have in such a force 
 as I have outUned. The only answer 
 which can be made to this is that It 
 muet be dependent upon the fundc ap- 
 propriated for the purpose, and in any 
 dytem which may be adopted care 
 should be taken to have a force small 
 In number, but efficient, rather than 
 large In number and correspondingly 
 inefficient. 
 
 I shall briefly notice another force 
 which ha-s (1st April, 1892) been dis- 
 banded. The "Royal Naval Artillery 
 Volunteers." This force w^as composed 
 of men not professionally seafaring. 
 
 but with a taste for and a certain fa- 
 miliarity with nautical pursuits. In 
 1888 it numbered 1,477 men and 65 of- 
 ficers. The late Sir George Tryon was 
 the chairman of a commission appoint- 
 ed to Inquire whether this force could 
 be relied upon to fulfil duties in con- 
 nection with naval defence. And alter 
 a careful and exhaustive inquiry in 
 which all the commanding ofllcers 
 were examined, the commission re- 
 ported that whilst they appreciated 
 the zeal which ran through the ent're 
 force they were forced reluctantly to 
 come to the conclusion that their con- 
 tinued existence did not warrant the 
 expenditure of public money. It may 
 here be remarked that the United 
 States, in organizing their present 
 force of local naval militia, have 
 largely adopted the Royal Naval Ar- 
 tillery Volunteers as a pattern. 
 
 Looking, then, at the matter of a Ca- 
 nadian naval reserve as a practical 
 questicTi, we should seek to steer clear, 
 as far as possible, of the defects which 
 have been found to exist in other sys- 
 tems. 
 
 A force chiefly drawn from our fish- 
 ing population would have the advan- 
 tage of being always close at hand. It 
 has been shown that seamanship, ir. 
 the sense of a practical knowledge of 
 handling sails and spars, is no longer 
 essential to the fighting sailor. The 
 statistics show that in 1894 70,719 men 
 were engaged in the fishing Industry 
 of these about 30,000 received th^ boun- 
 ty- 
 
 It Is not necessary to analyze these 
 figures. There is no doubt whatever 
 that we have ample naterial to draw 
 from. The winter affords an excellent 
 oportunlty for drills. I would favor the 
 erection of naval reserve barracks at 
 the principal seaport towns, at which 
 during the winter a certain number of 
 enrolled men should qualify in cunnery. 
 It would not be necessary that they be 
 Instrrcted In the use of every class 
 of weapon witi; which a modern man- 
 of-war is equipped. Each station 
 
-10- 
 
 \\ 
 
 should have a 4.7 or 6 Inch Q. F. gun. 
 This gun should be so located as to 
 defend the entrance of some harbor, 
 so as to be of practical value in time of 
 need. It should be housed so that men 
 could drill at it in cold weather. All its 
 appointments should be the same as 
 on shipboard. Each station should also 
 be supplied with a few machine guns; 
 also rifles, cutlasses, and a drill shed, 
 with a competent staff of instructors. 
 The force should be commanded by oiTl- 
 cers from the Royal Navy on the re- 
 tired lists. These appointments 
 should not be permanent, but should 
 be changed every two or three years 
 to ensure a proper standard of techni- 
 cal qualification being maintained. To 
 commence with, a certain number of 
 gunboats, of a size allowable under the 
 agreement with the United States for 
 the upper lakes, should be provided, 
 so that each summer a certain number 
 of men should have an opportunity of 
 target practice and of obtaining an ex- 
 tra degree of efficiency for which a 
 premium should be paid. The reserve 
 should consist of two classes. Upon 
 enrollment a man to belong to the first 
 class, in which he should remain for 
 a period of five years, putting in at 
 least two months' steady drill each 
 winter under pay. In this way a certain 
 numbe ' of our fishermen would find 
 remunerative employment at a season 
 of the year when they are unable to 
 follow their usual avocation. 
 Every year a number equal to one- 
 fifth of the whole force should after the 
 completion of five years' service go into 
 the second class for another period of 
 five years, doing a limited amount of 
 drill each winter. Both lasses should 
 be liable to be called it in case of 
 war. Upon declaratioi f war the en- 
 tire force 6'hould ibe placed under the 
 direct control of the British Admiralty. 
 Time and space forbid my going into 
 any more details, but I have endeavor- 
 ed to sketch in outline an organiza- 
 tion for naval defence, which I believe 
 to be suited to our requirements. 
 
 Another subject which should engage 
 public attention is tne escablishment of 
 suitable training ships for boys, so 
 that Canadian youths may be facilitat- 
 ed in acquiring an early training, 
 which will make them fit either for 
 the Royal Navy as seamen or for ser- 
 vice in the mercantile marine In a 
 similar capacity. It has often occurred 
 to me. and I am sure to all those who 
 have thought upon the subject, that 
 there is a want of some tie of a per- 
 sonal nature, which will make for the 
 unity of the empire, I cannot conceive 
 a stronger bond of union than would 
 result from Canadians entering both 
 the British Navy and Army as sailors 
 and soldiers. The fact of Canadian 
 parents having their sons serving as 
 blue Jackets all over the world in 
 British men-of-war, would give the 
 whole people such a personal interest 
 in the British Na^'y as would go very 
 far in cementing the empire. I do not 
 think too much stress can possibly be 
 laid upon this point 
 
 Shortly after the establishment of 
 the Toronto branch, I comnunicated 
 with the Secretary of the League hi 
 London, requesting him to furnish me 
 vvlth full particulars, so that I might 
 be in X position to answer the Inquiries 
 which are from time to time addressed 
 to me by parents, as to what they are 
 to do In order to get their boys Into 
 the Navy. In response to my request, 
 the Secretary of the League In London, 
 has, in conjunction with the Colonial 
 Committee, been at very great pains 
 to procure and formulate Information 
 upon this head. These gentlemen have 
 also communicated with the Admiralty, 
 and as a consequence of their repre- 
 sentations the Admiralty have issued 
 a "Ircular dated April, 1896, entitled, 
 " Pay, Position, and Prospects of Sea- 
 men and Boys of the Royal Navy." 
 This circular presents In a f^ondansed 
 form, the conditions, etc., which have 
 to be complied t»ith by those who wish 
 to enter the Royal Navy as boys, and 
 
 If' 
 
 I <l 
 
 4 
 
 1 1 
 ' II 
 
 »j,if* 
 
 ^.-v^ 
 
 T»^^i-\,.VaM(sHLI 
 
—Il- 
 
 ly'' 
 
 also, as its title indicates, gives a full 
 outline of the prospects held out by a 
 career as a seaman in the Royal Navy. 
 A glance at this circular will serve 
 to show that the life of a blue-Jacket 
 to-day, is very different from the popu- 
 lar Ideu, which associates "Jack" with 
 rum and tobacco, and the squandering 
 of his money when " paid off." A few 
 copies of this circular have been sent 
 to me for distribution. 
 
 In England most of the training ships 
 for boys are maintained as private in- 
 stitutions. Amongst those of which 
 detaiib nave been furnished to me ard 
 the Grampian a* Belfast, the Warspite 
 in the Thames and the Mercury at 
 Hamble on Southampton water. I have 
 been furnished with full details as to 
 the expense of maintenance and the 
 general scheme of government regulat- 
 ing these vesels. They do grand work 
 in furnishing seamen for the British 
 navy. It seems to me that the ques- 
 tion of training shlDS for boys should 
 come under the head of education, and 
 ag such be forwarded to a large extend 
 by the various Provincial Govern- 
 ments. For instance. I think that a 
 training brig in connection with Lhe 
 Industrial School at Mimico, like those 
 used at Portsmouth and Plymouth for 
 training boys in seamanship, would be 
 a step in the righi direction on the part 
 of the Provincial Government. A brig 
 for the training of boys in seamanship 
 would in no way affect the question of 
 agreement between the United States 
 and Great Britain as to the mainten- 
 ance of war vessels on these lakes. It 
 would not be necessary that they 
 should carry guns at ail. They might 
 be simply used for the purpose of in- 
 struction in seamanship. At Plymouth 
 
 and Portsmouth these brigs get under 
 way at daybreak and cruise outside the 
 harbor each evening and anchoring for 
 the night. The strict discipline of 
 a man-of-war is rigidly enforced on 
 board, and thus the boys receive an 
 early training which leaA'^es its stamp 
 upon their lives. A similar vessel fully 
 equipped with the necessary staff, up- 
 on which a certain number of boys 
 from the Industrial School at Mimico 
 should be trained, would not be a very 
 heavy matter of expense. In fact, the 
 expense would be a mere bagatelle in 
 view of the great benefit which would 
 be done by opening up, £.s it were, a 
 new channel of employment to Can- 
 adian youths. 
 
 The Grampian at Belfast was for- 
 merly H.M.S. Gibraltar. I served in 
 her as t, midshipman in her first and 
 only corumission in the Mediterranean 
 from 1863 to 1867. She was a sister ship 
 of the Duncan. These two veseels were 
 the largest two-deckers ever launched 
 In the British navy, and they were 
 aoout the two last in the commission. 
 
 I would suggest that a sub-committee 
 be struck to draft such resolutions as 
 may be considered by the branch best 
 calculated to express our view r.s to 
 the manner in which Canadians should 
 act In supporting the general policy of 
 the Navy League. 
 
 I have communicated with the May- 
 ors of various maritime cities In Can- 
 ada, and have received assurance of 
 the support of these cities just as soon 
 as we formulate a definite line of ac- 
 tion. I think we should call upon the 
 Government to appoint a commission 
 to inquire ir:to the whole subject and 
 report with as little delay as possible. 
 
Vi 
 
 ff^^S^Rl^^ fffl Pt?^ *^ 
 
OBJECTS OF THE NAVY LEAGUE 
 
 IN CANADA. 
 
 Why the League should be supported by all loyal Canadians. 
 
 The Navy League is in no sense a political organization. 
 It works for the welfare of the Empire, the preservation of 
 peace, au.l the prosperity of the British Community. 
 
 Here in Canada its objects are : 
 
 1. To bring home to Canadians a sense of their de- 
 
 pendence on and interest in the naval strength 
 of the p]mpire. 
 
 2. To press upon public attention the need for a 
 
 Canadian Naval Defence force. 
 
 8. To show how (^anada can best help the Royal 
 Navy — locally — in time of war. 
 
 4. As " knowledge is power," so want of knowledge is 
 weakness. This Lea<jfue seeks to remedy the 
 prevailing lack of information on naval matters 
 by distributing literature on the subject to its 
 members and the public press, and by proinoting 
 the teaching of Naval history in schools. 
 
 Aildress for further information the lioii. Secrctar}', 
 
 H. J. WICKHAM, 
 ^^ :: ^ : "V Room 81 & 82 Canada Life Bldg-, 
 
 -_ ._^^ TORONTO. — 
 
 Annual Membership Fee for Toronto Branch, #2.00. ^ 
 
THE NAVY LEAGUE Ifl CANADA 
 
 [7Wo7if,o Brnnch.l 
 
 At the Annual Meeting of this Branch held at 
 Toronto, on Monday, 21st March, 1898, the following 
 resolution was unanimously adopted : 
 
 "Re.olved, that whereas the sailors and fishermen of the 
 Dominion of Canada form excellent material from which to 
 recruit men for the Roval Naval Reserve : 
 
 •' And whereas, under the Imperial law as it now stands, 
 Canadian seamen and others are debarred from enrolment 
 in the Royal Naval Reserve unless serving on board vessels 
 registered in the United Kingdom ; 
 
 " Therefore the Toronto branch of the Navy League are of 
 the opinion that it would make for the strength and unity of the 
 Empire if the said law were amended so as to permit of the 
 enrolment in the Royal Naval Reserve of seamen employed upon 
 Canadian registered vessels or in the fishing industries of 
 Canada. 
 
 " This branch of the Navy Lea<,'ue are further of opinion 
 that, for the purpose of enrolling and drilling Canadians for the 
 Royal Naval Reserve, at least two sea-going cruisers of modern 
 type of the Royal Navy should be permanently stationed, one on 
 the Atlantic and the other on the Pacific coast of the Do- 
 minion. 
 
 " And this Branch of the Navy League are further of the 
 opinion that in consideration of an annual sum to be paid by the 
 Dominion of Canada to the Home authorities, the aforesaid 
 vessels should be available for the purpose of training and drilling 
 a local Canadian naval force to be raided under the provisions of 
 the Colonial Naval Defence Act, 1865."