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Laa diagrammea auivanta iliuatrent la mAthoda. )y errata ad to int mo paluro, ■con A 32X 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 8 6 I 1 VII I The Effect of the War of i 8 i 2 UPON THE Consolidation of tlie Union : n T JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY STUDIES IN Historical and Political Science HERBERT B. ADAMS, Editor History la past Politics and Politics present History— JVeeman FIFTH SERIES VII The Effect of the War of 1 8 1 2 UPON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION Bv NICHOLAS MURRAY BUTLER, Ph. D. IkUor in Philosophy in Columbia College President of the InduilrUU Education Asiociation's College /or the li-aining (if Teacheri BALTIMORE PCBUCATtON AOBNCT OF THE JOUMS HOFKIMS UNIVBRaiTT JULY, 1887 COPTBIGHT, 1887, BY N. MURRAT. I t JOHN MUBPHT * 00., PRIMTXBS BALTWOBB. ! THE EFFECT OF THE WAR OF 1812 UPON THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE UNION. The two great motive forces in American politics during the first century of the national existence were the questions of state sovereignty and of slavery. The pressure of the first was al most wholly, yet but temporarily, relieved by the second war with Great Britain, and it was reserved for the great civil war of 1861-0 to put an effectual quietus upon both. The course of the conflict over these questions shows that until the war of 1812 that of state sovereignty, pure and sim- ple, occupied the foremost place in the nation's political activity. From the conclusion of that war period until 1861 the question of slavery, with all its far-reaching collateral issues, asserted its preeminence, and in its disastrous overthrow and complete downfall carried the state sovereignty heresy with it to a common ruin. The concrete question with which we are to deal at present is the effect of the war of 1812 on the consolidation of the Union. To understand this intelligently we must acquaint ourselves with the positions taken in rieference to the state- sovereignty dispute down to the time when war was declared, and with the condition of the Union at that time in respect to real unity. We must examine the political character and motives of the war itself, and discover the status of the 6 6 The Effect of the War of 1812 upon the [252 li • national unity in the years immediately succeeding the war. When all this is done we shall be entitled to pronounce upon the effect of the war of 1812 on the consolidation of the Union. It is probable that in the light of historical fact, and the full discussion which the question has since received, culmi- nating in the irrevocable verdict of a terrible civil war, no one will care to deny that the Declaration of Independence of July 4th, 1776, was the act of an ethnographically and geograph- ically unified nation, and not the separate though synchronous deed of thirteen constituent parts of that nation. Moreover, the authority of the Continental Congreas as a revolutionary body cannot be questioned. It was this Congress that drew up and adopted the Articles of Confederation of 1781. But even at the time of the original adoption of these Articles by Con- gress, November 14th, 1777, the enthusiasm of 1776 was abated ; the national ardor had cooled and had been superseded by more particularistic and selfish feelings. Thus the infant nation of 1776, even before it had risen from its cradle, seemed sickening to its death. " The preponderance of the anti-national tendencies during the early life of the Union undoubtedly had its origin in the political and social development of the states, in their want of political connection before the Revolution, in the little intercourse, commercial and other, between them, and lastly in various differences in their natural situation which rendered a rapid intergrowth of the several States impossible and the collisions attendant thereon unavoidable." ^ When the time came to form a national government it was but natural that two opposing views should be taken as to the extent of the powers to be conferred upon that government. To begin with, the very nature of the question provoked, if it did not require, the formation of two opposing parties ; ' Von Hoist, The Constitutional and Political History of the United States, Chicago, 1877, Vol. I. pp. 106, 107. \ [252 B war. 3 upon of the nd the culmi- no one )f July (graph- ironous ►reover, itionary Irew up ut even )y Con- 76 was )erseded e infant , seemed 5 during n in the sir want le little lastly 'endered and the [t it was en as to jrnment. rovoked, parties ; [ted States, 253] OonadidoHon of the Union, then, the selfish feelings of a particular state or states, loth to give up natural advantages to the common weal, would oppose a strong central government, and in any such move- ment as the American Revolution, an ultra-democratic party, lai^e or small as the case may be, is sure to develop. But in this case fact proved more powerful than theory. The stern necessities of the case and the ably-defended opinions of Ham- ilton, Madison, and their coadjutors, in spite of the technical provisions of the Articles of Confederation, carried through the proposition for the Philadelphia Convention of 1787, and in it sounder political science prevailed. As a result our present Constitution was promulgated. The great Constitutional Party, as we may appropriately describe the Federalists, immediately after the organization of the government under the instrument of 1787, put forth by word and deed a theory of government deduced from their interpretation of the Constitution, which in reality they had framed. The occasion of the crystallization of the ele- ments of this party into an unified whole was the struggle for the adoption and adjustment of the system of 1787. Their theory was, in brief, that the government was based on a national popular sovereignty, that the central government should be independent in all its machinery of the local gov- ernments, exercising all general powers and interpreting by its own constituted agents what was local and what was gen- eral, under such limitations as were put upon it in the Con- stitution itself by the national popular sovereignty. But in the struggle this party was obliged to give up, if indeed it ever distinctly held, a wholly national doctrine and ground itself for the purpose of victory on a federal system, midway between confederation and nationalism, though strongly lean- ing toward the latter. This federal system, though still hold- ing to the sovereignty of the people of the United States as ultimate, yet admitted that a system of local commonwealth governments was fundamental in our political system. In other words, it allowed that the Union was one of states, but not of state governments. I I i I The Effect of the War of 1812 ujxm the [264 The original opponents of this doctrine cannot be dignified with the name party. Their nucleus was a few extremists of the Kousseau stamp, who believed or pretended to believe that the state of nature was the only perfect state and that all society had originated in a social compact ; that government, which is in its very nature tyrannical and oppressive, had grown up from an exaggemtion of powers originally relin- quished by the individual in the compact. Around such men and opinions as these the opposition to Federalism began to collect. It acquired strength and definiteness by the debates on the Funding^ and Assumption^ bills, the Slavery Peti- tion' debate of 1790, the Excise Tax,* the National Bank bill,* and from the complications in foreign affairs in which the administration became involved. In addition "the French Revolution introduced from abroad an element which, inde- pendent of the actual condition of affairs and partly in conflict with it, kept excitement at the boiling point during many years.' The French Revolution was at first hailed with delight by all parties in the United States ; when, however, after the death of Mirabeau, the impossibility of control and the mis- takes of the helpless court transferred the preponderance of power to the radicals and when the anarchical elements daily grew bolder, the Federalists began to turn away. The anti- ' Von Hoist, 1. 85, 86. Hildreth, History of the United States of America. New York, Harper and Brothers, 1851, Vol. IV. 152-171, 213-220. This and most of the following references to Hildreth are given to show where fuller information on the subjects referred to may be found. •Hildreth, IV. 171-174, 213-220. ' Von Hoist, I. 89-93; Hildreth, IV. 174-204. In this debate the threat of civil war was uttered on the floor of the House of Representatives for perhaps the first time. The speaker was Tucker of South Carolina, and his words were : " Do these men expect a general emancipation by law ? This would never be submitted to by the Southern States without a civil war." See Benton, Abridgment of the Debates of Congress, I. 208. * Von Hoist, I. 94, 95; Hildretli, IV. 253-256. » Von Hoist, I. 104-106; Hildreth, IV. 256-267. •Hildreth, IV. 411-413. ill! il I [254 dignified emiste of lieve that i that all rernment, sive, had lly relin- such men I began to le debates rery Peti- )nal Bank i in which the French hich, inde- in conflict ping many rith delight r, after the d the mis- ideranoe of lents daily The anti- of America. ;20. This and where fuller ate the threat laentatives for olina, and his >ylaw? This a civil war." 255] Qmaoiidation of the Union. 9 Federalists on the other hand clung more dearly to it than ever. The farther France proceeded, by the adoption of brutal measures, in the direction of political idealism, the more rank was the growth in the United States of the most radical doo- trinarianism ; the more attentively the legislators of France listened to Danton's voice of thunder and Marat's fierce cry for blood, the more boldly did demagogism in its most repul- sive form rage in the United States." ^ Many of the objections to the Federalist measures were closely bordering on the ridiculous, while but a few were defensible. " But no reasoning was too absurd to find credu- lous hearers when the rights of the States were alleged to be in danger and the services of the phantom * consolidation * were required. The politicians would not, however, in a matter of such importance have dared to wage so strong a war of opposition and they could not have carried it on for ten years and have finally conquered, if they had not had as a broad and firm foundation to build upon, the anti-national- istic tendencies which prevailed among the people." * The word anti-nationalistic is used advisedly ; for by it is meant that among the people there was a strong feeling that any dissatisfied state or number of states might secede or withdraw at pleasure from the Union. Nor was this idea by any means confined to the anti-Federalists or to that section of the country in which their strength mainly lay. It is also a mistake to suppose that these feelings never found vent in words until the great slavery contest, many years later. In point of fact, as early as 1793, when peace with England was endangered by Genet's machinations and their consequences,* there were those in the New England States who in no covert language urged that a dissolution of the Union was preferable to war with Great Britain. Here are the words of Th. Dwight, > Von Hoist, 1. 107. • Von Hoist, 1. 106. •Von Hoist, 1. 112-118; Hildreth, IV. 412-440, 477, 478. I 1 10 The Effect of the War o/ 1812 upm the [256 writing at this time to Wolcott : "A Mar with Great Britain, we, at Icjwt in New Enghmd, will not enter into. Sooner wouhl ninety-nine ont of one hnndred of our inhabitants sep- arate from the Union than plnngc thenist^lves into an abyss of misery." ' Heneii it is evident that the geographical grotiping of the friends and enemies of the Jay treaty '^ did not eseajje them in spite of appearances whicli were at first deceptive. Going beyond the limits of tlie -l-J8; HlKlrotli, IV. 488, 53y-ooG, 590-016. Hiibbs, A[oni. of Waloott, I. '224. * Von Hol^t, I. 14-2; Jlililivtii, V. 210, 225-228. " Von llolst, I. 143. [256 ,t Britain, . Sooner tants scp- 11 abyH8 of grouping capi! them 0. Going consitlera- two great ni to 1)0 a . Wolcott 5: "I am, icrn states ; I tear our . Indeed ation with >3 a of 1798* leclaration itu(!ky and •eto passed iires. But lisruptiou 1798, the of esc!apc ut, whieh in Taylor id " it was ' Virginia xisteiice."* 1st, 1798, 257] Consolidation of (lie Union. 11 that it Mould not be wise to proeced immcth'ately to a dis- ruption of the Union when party passion was at such a lieight. ' The Kentneky Kesolutions* of November 10th, 1798, and November 14th, 1799, really sounded the keynote of the Federalists' opponents, who had now come to be cjiIUkI Re- publicans. In brief their position was that the Constitution was a compact to which the states were integral parties, and that each party had an equal right to judge for itself as well of infractions of that compact as of the mode and measures of redress; and that the rightful renie Washington, Works, XI. 389. • Von Hoist, I. 161, note. 'Tucker's Blackstone, Philadelphia, 1803, 1., Part 1, Appendix, p. 187. *The Jubilee of the Constitution, a discourse delivered at the request of the New York Historical Society on Tuesday, the 30th of April, 1831), being the fiftieth anniversary of the inauguration of George Washington as Presi- dent of the United States, New York, 1839, p. oo. 1 I ! I [258 259] OmaoUdation of the Union, 13 pursued luce coer- «s of the ;re boldly >peared in ippears to communi- rheir sub- its engage- litcd. Its le in which they have still sover- lie occasion n the most that marks !!!onstitution n; nothing lonwealths. of a large i anew the ramers, we that " the iiig neces- ually been forever by that party idix, p. 187. the request of il, 1839, being gton as Prcsi- had controlled the executive, the judiciary, and the Senate, although the House of Representatives had on several occasions contained an opposition majority. The accession of Jefferson to power was the death-knell of the Federalist party, and from 1800 until their final dissolution they were an ineffective and vacillating minority. The downfall of the Federalist party explains in a great measure the security which the continuance of the Union enjoyed during the two following decades.^ The party which represented particularistic and nullifying tendencies was in power and had an overwhelming majority, both legislative and popular, behind it. But although the possibility of a disruption was thus very small, yet the essence of the internal struggle remained the same. Indeed its character was placed in a clearer light by the facts that the parts played by each party were changed, so far as the question of right was con- cerned, and that the opposition, in spite of its weakness, was not satisfied with wishes and threats of separation, but began in earnest to devise plans of dissolution. These mutterings were first heard in connection with the purchase of Louisiana in 1803.* The New England states especially opposed its consummation as affording to the south- ern states a source of power with which to become predom- inant in the Union for all future time ; and they feared that the incorporation of the western territory into the Union and its economic development would prove injurious to their own commerce. These two elements together had weight enough to draw from them the declaration that they would be "^forced to a separation from the Union. Plumer of New Hampshire declared in the Senate : " Admit this western world into the Union, and you destroy at once the weight and importance of the eastern states, and compel them to establish a separate » Hildreth, V. 414-418. » Von Hoist, I. 183-187 ; Hildreth, V. 478-481. I f! !! i [lilli II 1 I 'iiti i: I I ) ill ^ I ; \ , ji I I'l 14 Tlui I^Jffed of tJie War o/ 1812 upm the [260 1 1 in<1o|H>n(1(mt onipirc." ' And also Griswold of Conncctiout, the lu^knowlcdgixl loador of the FedomlistH, dcM^liirwl in the HouHo, Octolier 25th, ISO.'J: "Tlio viwt unmanageable extent which the accoKsion of Louisiana will give to the United States, the consequent dis[)orsion of our population, and the distri- bution of the balance which it is so important to maintain iH'twocn the eastern and the western states, threatens at no very distant day, the subversion of our Union.'" And although chronologically out of \)\mv, it will not l)c amiss to recall the s|H»och of Josiah (iuinty, delivered in the House of Represen- tatives, January 14th, 1811, on the bill "To enable the People of the Territory of Orleans to form a Constitution and state (iiovcrnment, and for the admission of such st4ite into the Union."'' Mr. Quincy did not hold that a state had either a (,H)nstitutioual or a natimil right to withdraw from the Union when it thought such a course best for it« own interests; but he did maintain that suc^h a violation of the fundamental compact might l)e nuule that the moral obligation to maintain it w^ascnl and the right of revolution attached. His words are : " — I am compelled to dwlare it as my deliberate opinion that, if this bill passers, the Ixinds of this Union are virtually diasolveUtical partnership, where the admisisiou of new associates, without previous authority, is so pregnant with obvious dangei*s and evils. . . . This bill. 'Von Hoist. I. 187, note. * Von Hoist, I. 187, note. MliUlroth. VI. 2(50. Mj [260 261] Consolidcd'um of the Union, 16 [Connecticut, larwl in the mblc extent nitf Represen- e the People on and state ate into the e had cither ni the Union utcrests; but fiuulaniental I to maintain His words rate opinion arc virtually free from right of all, Initcly for a must. . . . lip and ten out the wn- eir option to mcnt of their where the thoritv, is so This bill, if it passes, is a death-blow to the Constitution. It may afterwards linpjcr; but lingering, its fate will, at no very distant |)eriod be con8Uinmateart of the (country. " The planters' staple articles, principally tobacco and (!otton, renuiined unsold, but the planters themselves suf- fered relatively but little damage. Their products woidd keep and they were sure of finding a market again as soon as th(! harbors were open. The farmers sold a considerable portion of their products in the country itself, but the rest was a total loss. The productive industry of the New England fisliermen. ' An abHtrnet of this celebrated speech and an aoconnt of tlie olrcimistanros attending its delivery will be found in the " Life of Josiah (iuinoy," by IiIh son, Etlinund Qnincy, Boston, 1807. Pp. 205-U18. "Von Hoist, I. 198-199. •Vonllolst, I. 201-217. ! I 16 The Effect of the War of 1812 upm the [262 ship-builders, ship-owners, importers and exporters, and all who were dependent on them, ceased almost entirely." * " In this dispute also it is impossible not to recognize a division of parties arising from diverse interests produced by geographical position, and every struggle in which this played any part became in consequence doubly bitter. The South, which held the balance of power in the reigning party and so was primarily responsible for the embargo, would have least to suffer from it. The powerless minority of the New England states, the consideration of whose interests, it was pretended, dictatal the measures of the administration, had greatest cause for complaint. The middle states occupied a position betokened by their name ; their interests unquestionably inclined them more toward the North, but they wavered from one side to the other." ^ Nowhere here do we see any disposition to consult each other's interests as if the good of one were the advantage of the whole. No such advanced idea of the national unity then existed. The investigation of the information bought by Madison from the British spy, Henry,' discloses still further the fact that at this time secession was regarded as the panacea for all real or fancied oppressions. Henry's mission confessedly was to find out and report to his chief. Sir James Craig, Governor of Canada, how far the Federalists would feel inclined to look to England for support in case of a disruption of the Union. One of the most distinguished sons of Massachusetts was of opinion that Henry would find support enough for his opera- tions, if the Administration's policy was not changed. As early as Noveml)er, 1808, John Quincy Adams expressed the fear that this might lead to civil war. Later he claimed to have unequivocal evidence to prove that there was a systematic >Von HoUt, I. 209. Cf. Benton, Ab. Debates of Congress, III. 692; IV, 64. * Von Hoist, I. 209, 210. 3 Von Hoist, I. 221, 222 ; Hildreth, VI. 284-287, 390. ! \l'K I 1^ the [262 ■ters, and all ■ely."^ ) recognize a produced by h this played The South, party and so Id have least S'ew England as pretended, greatest cause ion betokened nclined them ne side to the ion to consult the advantage lational unity I by Madison •ther the fact anacea for all nfessedly was lig. Governor 3lined to look »f the Union, usetts was of for his opera- langed. As expressed the le claimed to a systematic reas, III. 692; 263] Omsolidaiion of tlie Union. attempt making to dissolve the Union. In his opinion New England would have undoubtedly made sure of the assistance of Great Britain if the Administration had made civil war inevitable by an effort to overcome the resistance to the embargo by foroe or by extending it farther.* In this hasty glance at the salient points in the history of tlie country from 1789 to 1811, in so far as it bears upon our subject, we find nationalization nowhere, decentralization every- where. Secession, so far from being regarded as unconstitu- tional or unjustifiable under any circumstances, was the club with which every minority on any important question strove to beat the majority to terms. It mattered not what opinions as to ultimate sovereignty the parties held. Such considera- tions as this were lost sight of in the strifes of sectional preju- dices and the clash of material interests. " Judged from an impartial standpoint, the fact that the possibility of civil war or a division of the Union were so frequently and on relatively insignificant occasions, thought of on both sides, may be fairly taken as a measure of the degree of consolidation which the Union had attained at that time. The actual condition of affairs presented so unusual a complication of positive and negative factors so peculiarly grouped, that it was no easy matter to determine their sum total."* It is interesting to read here the following words, uttered in 1828:^ "It is a melancholy reflection — a subject that excites our best and inmost feelings — that projects or speculations as to a dissolu- tion have been so frequently indulged. That leading men in Virginia looked to a dismemberment in 1798-9, when the armory was built ; that Burr and his confederates had an eye to the establishment of a western government in 1806-6; that many contemplated a building up of the 'Nation of New England' from 1808 to 1815, seems to us undoubted; but > Von Hoist, I. 222, 223. • Von Hoist, I. 220, 221. 'See Niles' llegisster, XXXV. p. 210. , i I i ii IIP !i 18 The Effed of (he War of 1812 upm the [264 the lengths to which either party proceeded rest very much on conjecture or depend on opinion. . . . But whatever have been the designs of individuals, we have always believed that the vast body of the people have ever been warmly attached to the Union." In view of our discussion the last sentiment, however desirable, certainly seems unwarranted, and at the declaration of war in June of 1812 we have the spectacle of a government composed of eighteen^ sovereign integers, each looking to its own interest alone, never consulting the general weal, and claiming the right and the duty to secede from the so-called Union whenever such a course might seem most favorable to its individual interests. What effect the war with Great Britain was to have upon the consolidation of the Union, we can now understandingly inquire. Into a detailed account of the course of events abroad which brought about the war of 1812 we must not here enter. But we must examine the causes and character of the war in so far as they have a direct bearing upon parties and sections in the United States. The beginning of 1808 saw the Berlin and Milan decrees of Napoleon and the Orders in Council of England all in force,' and Jefferson, his second term nearing its close, at the helm of state in the United States. To his Administration five courses of action were open, some one of which must be adopted as its own and worked out to its logical conclusion. This choice lay between (1) doing nothing and allowing the individual ship-owners to help themselves as best they might; or (2) attempting a further negotiation with England; or (3) sus- pending all commerce with the outside world ; or (4) granting ' In addition to tlie original thirteen states the following had been admit- ted into the Union : Vermont, March 4th, 1791 ; Kentucky, June Ist, 1792; Tennessee, June Ist, 1796 ; Ohio, November 29th, 1802 ; Louisiana, April 8th, 1812. « Hildreth, VI. 32-35. The Berlin decree was dated November 21st, 1806, and the Milan decree, December 17th, 1807. The Orders in Council were of the date of May 16th, 1806 and November 11th, 1807, respectively. ni bl a» h 1' 'i It I I : i ' I i i lllll the [264 265] Consolidation of the Union'. 19 very much on vhatever have i believed that ily attached to ast sentiment, d, and at the ! spectacle of a integers, each ng the general cede from the tit seem most it the war with of the Union, 1 abroad which •e enter. But B war in so far ections in the ilan decrees of i all in force,'' it the helm of )n five courses adopted as its This choice he individual light J or (2) ; or (3) sus- • (4) granting lad been odinit- Junelst, 1792; jouiaiana, April mber2l8t, 1806, n Council were spectively. letters of marque and reprisal to American ship-owners ; or (5) declaring war upon England immediately. Of these pos- sible lines of policy, entrance upon the fourth or fifth was precluded, for a time at least, by a wholesome fear of the British navy ; the first was shut off by a feeling for the national honor; the third was the choice of the Administration; but the second had recommended itself as the most natural and as having precedents iiji the country's history. Indeed it had been tried, resulting in the treaty which was agreed upon in December, 1806, but to which Jefferson had refused his assent without ever submitting it to the Senate. This step having thus failed, the Administration had been free to pursue its chosen policy, and to the Tenth Congress, October 26th, 1807, the President recommended an embargo.* His recom- mendation was dutifully accepted by his party followers in Congress, and the embargo became a law before the end of the year. The Federalists upon whose New England constitu- encies the measure bore heaviest, opposed the measure both on economic and on constitutional grounds, and their discussion of this question presents us with what was destined to be but one of many mortifying exhibitions of the old party of the Constitution. But on the constitutional objection it was over- matched and was forced to fall back to the vantage ground of the economic argument. And this in turn was little heeded by the party in power, so long as it did not come directly home to themselves. But when it began to touch their own pockets, as it did a few months later, then human nature proved to be too strong for party sentiment.'* So evident did this become that Nicholas, of Virginia, the Administration leader on the floor of the House of Representatives, himself introduced, January 25th, 1809, a resolution favoring the repeal of the embargo and the defence of our maritime rights against all belligerents.^ After some haggling as to the date on which > Hildretli, VI. 55, 56. »Hilclreth, VI. 96-100. » Von Hoist, T. 214; Hildroth, VI. 125-130. fl 1, ' •1; 1 -f' ,11 !.! 1 i' ii ; ill r ! I M I ' I ! I i I , 20 The Effect of the War of 1812 upm the [266 the Embargo Act should expire, March 15th, 1809, was agreed upon as a compromise and the resohitions were passed. This virtually threw the United States back to the position in which it was when confronted by five possible courses of action, while two of the five, — those by further negotiation and cutting off all intercourse with the outside world — proved useless by the failure of the treaty and of the embargo. The prospect of an amicable solution of the difficulty by a further treaty was poor indeed, if we consider the spirit of the British Government and the hostility of the llepublican j)arty to everything British. In Great Britain Mr. Fox was dead and a new Administration had come into power strongly retrograde in policy and having George Canning for its soul. Great Britain was determined to recover her commerce and to take back her seamen, and the United States had no alternative but to submit or fight. The resumption of commerce and its defence, referred to in the Nicholas resolutions, must then be bv war. The Eleventh Congress at its first session voted the con- tinuance of the non-intercourse Act with Great Britain, and then two years passed during which the latter continued the execution of her offensive orders and decrees against neutral commerce. But when the Twelfth Congress assembled in November, 1811, it was felt that some decisive action would soon be taken.* The leadership of the dominant party had been assumed by younger and more impetuous men ; and with Clay as Speaker of the House, Calhoun standing second on the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Crawford and Grundy acting with them, war was certain within the year.^ The move was quick and emphatic. On November 29th Calhoun's committee reportal a resolution declaring " For- bearance has ceased to be a virtue. . . . The period has arrived when in the opinion of your committee it is the sacreil • For the personal and party constitution of the Twelftli Congress, see llildretli, VI. 259, t2G0. •■'Von Hoist, I. i22G. dl til til mniii: ! iiiili , , iilil' IJ ! '■ III!:! Ill i! life m the [266 809, was agreed e ]>assed. Tina »osition in which of action, wliile and cutting off d useless by the Ej prospect of an treaty was poor jovernment and •ything British. Administration ►licy and having was determined seamen, and the t or fight. The erred to in the voted the con- at Britain, and r continued the against neutral IS assembled in e action would ant party had ous men ; and tanding second Crawford and thin the year.'^ ovember 29th khvri mg (( For- pie period has lit is the sacred Iftli Congress, see \ 267] Conaolidation of the Union. 21 duty of Congress to call forth the resources and patriotism of the country."' In addition the committee recommended that the standing army be increased by 10,000 men and that the President be authorized to call 50,000 volunteers under arms. This was all acceded to without any delay by an overwhelm- ing majority. But such resolutions were inoperative without the coopera- tion of the President, and he was for peace. Fortune, how- ever, favored the war jiarty. A presidential election would take place in the following autumn and Madison was anxious for a second term. In this the leaders of the war faction saw their opportunity. They waited upon Madison and plainly told him that the condition sine qud non of their support in the coming campaign was his acceptance of their war policy. Madison knew very well that both Monroe and Gerry were ready and willing to accept the presidential nomination on a war platform. This determined his action, and he gave in his adherence to the war party.* On April 3rd he wrote to Jefferson that the action of the British government in refusing to repeal the Orders in Council had left the United States no option but to prepare for war, and that an embargo of sixty days duration had been recommended.' This recommendation had already been sent in on April let. It was acted upon by Congress, but the war party could not wait. They drove Madison on, and on June 1st he sent in his mes- sage recommending a declaration of war.* Two days after- ward Calhoun reported on it from his committee, and the declaration was carried in the House by a vote of 79 to 49. The Senate was more deliberate, and after two weeks' delay it passed the declaration, June 17th, by a vote of 17 to 13. An analysis of this vote is interesting as showing the sec- tional character of the war party and of the opposition to it. > Von Hoist, I. 22f)-227 ; IliUli-etli, VI. 2()2-2f.5. « Von Ilolbt, I. 230-232; Hildreth, VI. 289-291. ' Hildreth, VI, 291-294. * Von Hoist, I. 232, 233 ; Hildreth, VI. 303-300. -. I i :i. \\\' liihi ' li'iM ; 22 The J§ect of the War o/ 1812 upm the [268 Louisinnn, nmkinjiif the oijj;htcenth state, had Just IxK^n admitted, and tlio House contained 177 meml)er8 apiK)rtioned in tlic ratio of one to every thirty-tive thousand inliabitants. There were 8G nicmhers of the Senate, thus making a total of 213 in lM)tli liouses, not inchiding the Vice-President who was presiding in the Senate. The New York delegation of 27 was then for the first time more numerous than that of every other state. Pennsylvania was second with 23 memlwrs, and Virginia third with 22. The meml)ers from New Hampshire, most of those from Massachusetts (which then included what is now the state of Maine), those from C'Onnecticut, Rhode Island, New Jersey and Delaware, with several from New York, some from Virginia and North Carolina, one from IVnnsylvania and three from Maryland, opposed the war. The members from Vermont, some from New York, all but one from Pennsylvania, most of them from Maryland, Vir- ginia and North Carolina, all from South Carolina, Georgia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and Louisiana, supportelaware were represented by senators who nposed the war. IMassachusctts and Maryland were divided, while Vermont, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Geoi'gia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Ohio, and I^ouisi- ana were represented by senators who supporto;' the war. Of the large sea-board cities, Boston and New York were represented by members found in the minority. The dele- gations from Philadelphia, Baltimore, Charleston, and New Orlejins were with the majori*^y. The ctvstern states as a rule opposeil the war; the western states were all for it, with the southern and middle states divided. The practical feature was that the war administration could (•omnuuid a inajority of nearly forty votes in the House and one of four or five votes in the Senate. Taking the reasoning portion of the community as the judge, probably the declaration of war was mostly condemned; but the instinctive patriotism of the young men of the country enthusias- n the [268 269] Consolidation of the Union. 23 k Ix-'cn admitted, )neil in the i-utio s. There were of 2 13 ill lK)th • was presiding 17 was then for cry other state, and Virginia impshirc, most 'hided what is ecticnt, Rhode ;ral from New lina, one from )0sed the war. York, all hut laryland, Vir- olina, Georgia, supported it. , New York, who pposed ivided, while irolina. South and Louisi- rto;' the war. York were The dele- on, and New states as a all for it, The practical command a one of four as the judge, nned; but the trv enthusias- rV tioally maintaineil it. Few denied that sufficient muse for the war existetl, but the time and mode of its declaration were con- demned. Defensive though the war appeared to be, yet it was offensive in that it was voluntarily undertaken by the United States to compel Great Britain by the invasion and conquest of her North American dependencies, to respect our maritime rights as neutrals. A united sentiment on the part of the people, more esiie- cially those from whom men and money must principally be drawn, would have excused in a great measure the haste and lack of preparation with which the war had been declared and would soon have filled up the ranks of the army and the coffers of the treasury. But any such unanimity was entirely wanting. The policy of the old Republicans, with the exception of the small class of Francomaniacs, as well as of the Federalists, had been alike neutrality and jicace. But however peaceful might have been the intentions of Jeffei'son and his close followers, there had always been a faction, more or less large, which was determined to bring about a war with Great Britjiin. This faction had scrvetl as the nuMeus about which variou8,forces and tendencies had caused the now trium- phant war party to crystallize. But that the war wjis a })arty one was too evident to l)e denied even by its warmest advocates. In the first place we have the important address to their constituents by thirty- four membei*s of the minority in the House of Representa- tivcs.' This address hold, in substance, that the United States was a nation (sic) composed of eighteen independent sovereignties united by a moral obligation only. It went on to say : " — above all, it apj)eared to the undersigned from signs not to be mistaken, that if we entered upon this war, wo did it as a divided people ; not only from a sense of the inadequacy of our means to success, but from moral and political objections of groat weight and very general infiu- enco." Those " nu)ral and political objections " were con- i Niles' Register, 11. 309-315. il:i M :■ i- ' 24 The Effect of ihe War of 1812 upon the [270 sidered by the authors of the address to have the greatest weight, and to their words the next presidential election gave a peculiar emphasis. The war was the live issue of the cam- paign and the result showed more plainly than had been done in many years before, the geographical separation of parties. All the New England states excepting Vermont, together with New York, New Jersey and Delaware cast their elec- toral vote solidly for De Witt Clinton. Maryland was divided, while Pennsylvania and all the southern and mcs- tern states voted unanimously for Madison.^ Aside from what such a separation as this too plainly indicates, the proof that the war was a sectional one is cumulative. Six months before the declaration was made, Macon of North Carolina, one of the most distinguished of the war party, said : " And here, sir, permit me to say that I hope this is to be no partv war, but a national war. . . . Such a war, if war wo shall have, can alone, in my judgment, obtain the end for which we mean to contend, without any disgrace."^ And two years later Webster in his forcible rhetoric declared : " The truth is, sir, that party support is not the kind of sup- port necessary to sustain the country through a long, expen- sive, and bloody contest ; and this should have been considered before the war was declared. The cause, to be successful, must be upheld by other sentiments and higher motives. It must draw to itself the sober approbation of the great mass of the people. It must enlist, not their temporary or party feelings, but their steady patriotism and their constant zeal. Unlike the old nations of Eurojie, there are in this country no dregs of population fit only to supply the constant waste of war and out of which an army can be raised for hire at any tini(' and for any pnrpose. Armies of any magnitude can be here noth- ing but the ])eo]ile embodied ; and if the object be one for which the people will not embody there can be no armies."'^ ' Noted by \'i>n Hoist, I. 'JM<1. " Benton, Ab. l>ebiites of ( Joiigress, IV. 4")'2. "Benton, Ab. Debates of Congress, V. l.'W. ; P w le ci oi a the [270 271] OmsoUdaiion of the Union. 25 ve the greatest il election gave >ue of the caiu- had been done tion of parties, mont, together jast their elec- Maryland was (lern and Aves- ' Aside from indicates, the iiulative. Six icon of North he war party, I hope this is Such a war, ent, obtain the my disgrace."" orie leclared : i kind of sup- 1 long, expen- een considered iccessful, must es. It must it mass of the arty feelings, !cal. Unlike ntry no dregs te of war and any time; and be here noth- one for which nies.""'' i But previously, in his celebrated Fourth of July oration at Portsmouth, in 1812,^ Webster had taken the ground that the war was unjustifiable in political economy, but that it was now legally declared and had become the law of the land, and all citizens, including those of New England, although they saw that their personal interests had been disregarded, should pay their share of the expenses and render personal service to the full and just extent of their constitutional liability. Here the old question again arose. Who is to decide what that consti- tutional liability includes? And here again is seen the absurd and disgraceful position of the once-honored Federalists. All of the New England legislatures, excepting that of Vermont, as well as that of New Jersey, planted themselves upon the ground marked out for them by Webster, with the further and, in the light of the past history of the men engaged in the movement, ludicrously extreme position taken by the Su{)reme Court of Massachusetts and the military commander of Rhode Island. The outgrowth of this doctrine was the refusal of militia aid by New England and, a little later, the Hartford Convention." Upon the history and work of the Hartford Convention we need not dwell longer than to recall the fact that the states in sending delegates to the Convention were committing an extra- constitutional and, to say the least, highly unnational act, that their rej)ort read like a revised edition of Madison's Virginia llesolutions, that they urged specific constitutional amend- ments, some of which — notably tho?o calling for the prohibi- tion of commercial intercourse, the admission of new states, and the declaration of war by a two-thirds majority only of both houses of Congress — sound strangely like process under the old Confederation regime, 1781-7. As showing the anti- ■ Curtis, I/ift' of Daniel Webster, I. 105. Cf. Welister's Spcecli in the IIotiHo of Keprcseiitativcs, Jniiiiiiry lltii, 1814, IJeriton, Ab. Debutes of Con- greut under our much attached all, too much State objects, ional feelings !n and which more general and political ins ; they feel ermanency of he old battle one of prin- Iverett, Janu- act that the the late war, nations and on than the Jeiferson writes to Gallatin, May 18th, 1816, in reference to the lack of political dissension in Virginia, and says : " This spontaneous and universal concurrence of sentiment has not been artificially produced. I consider this as presenting an element of character in our people which must constitute the basis of every estimate of the solidity and duration of our government." ^ Strange words these to come from the pen which drew up the Kentucky resolutions ! Crawford, in a letter to Gallatin, bearing the date of Octo- ber 27th, 1817, writes: "The President's tour through the East has produced something like a political jubilee. They were in the land of steady habits, at least for the lime, * all Federalists, all Republicans.' A general absolution of politi- cal sins seems to have been mutually agreed upon." ^ The war had ruined the particularists ; it had made all nationalists, if we may use the word. The bonds of the early days of the revolution were forged anew and the nation's heart beat as one. Patriotism and national pride had conquered sectionalism and personal selfishness. The era of good feeling had dawned.^ But it was the ominous calm that precedes the tempest. With this position gained and all foreign entanglements re- moved by Waterloo and its consequences, the United States was thrown back on itself and the fire of slavery which had l)cen smoldering in its bosom now found an opportunity to burst forth afresh and kindle the conflagration from which buse of Repre- 1803 to 1811. , see IlihJreth, iter, A History tlie Civil Wnr. -32!), 350, 303- ' Adams, Writings of Albert Gallatin, I. 705. * Adams, Writings of Albert Gallatin, II. 65 ; Ilildreth, VI. G23. ^ Owing to the fact that this essay was written before the excellent His- tory of the United States of America under the Constitution, by James Sciiouler, Washington, 1886, was published, no references to that work are made. Volumes 1. and II. of Mr. Schouler's History, embracing the period discussed in this monograpli, are particularly important for the proper understanding of the influences at work in it. In Vol. II. 452-454, it is gratifying to iind the author taking the view of the cH'ect of the War of 1812 that is developed in this essay. Il!< iliii 30 The Effect of the War of 1812. [276 the camp-fires of the great civil war forty years later were to be lighted. But because the good effect of the second war with Great Britain was soon swept away by the slavery dispute, we must not overlook the fact that such an effect existed. The country entered the war distracted, indifferent, and particularistic ; it emerged from it united, enthusiastic, and national. But the ebb was to be greater than the flow, and half a century was to elapse before the conditions of national unity which existed in the years immediately following the war of 1812 were again to be plainly observed in our political history. i r: ''J I [276 ra later were r with Great ute, we must The country cularistic; it al. But the ntury was to ch existed in I were again