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Les diagrammes sulvants illustrent la mAthode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 i '1 Pi^ "^: (f- 1 .4- •v-%. %i' ■f '4 ti ^Sk^^fMi^ * ^ CM» l^RENCH Influence, UPON ENGLISH Counsel % DEMON STRAtEP, -f'^ "^^"iS "^^ IIP T^IP^IPIP ^^^T T, t-' Price is. %r *%?* .•»-*^n,J i ■'**'«; -m^ *"« "ft" ' ■•«-Hi!'«i |H;Ji u ■ m p,.^ tj •s? # # A. A. ■i' '^ • ir *= U d i Vi. r FRENCH Influence UPON ENGLISH Counsels DEMONSTRATED F R O M A N Impartial Examination O F O U R Measures for Twenty Years paft. From whence is fhewn The Neccffity of excluding efFedlually, moft Placemen, and all Pensioners, from having Seats in the Houfe of COMMONS, 'i ■ With a PosTsc R i p t , confaining Remarks upon the French Declaration lately publifh'd. LONDON: Printed for T. Cooper, at the Glohe in Paier- nqfter-Row. MDCCXL. .V 1 \. Owiiw',jniii xL \j v^ v\ Ji .1. >I r^ T u V.-X. E ■Sj. . L ^ J - VX J. <-• t . V ■ i ^ J. ■.;:.'^iv'^\ VtAvvv;' <^ r s ( o FRENCH Influence, UPON ENGLISH Counsels, DEMONSTRATED. AS I have often employed my Pen in explaining the true Intere/l, and alTerting the juft Rights of my Country, againft Minijferial Writers, and Mintjhrial Meafures ; and as I (hall always think it both my Honour and Duty to do io, as often as I have the Misfortune to think it ncceflary, I could not look with Indifference upon a vile Attempt lately made in the Ga- zetteer , to . juftify the French joining with Spain againft us in the prefent War. The Gazetteer I mean is that of September the 29th, in which is inferted, what is there cal- led the Extract of a Letter from Paris, the' I am convinced that it was, like moft of the other political foreign Letters, publiflied in our News- Papers, forged upon the Minifte- rial Anvil fet up in this Kingdom, or upon fome fuch Anvil lately fet up Abroad; and that it was publifh'd here, with a Defign to convince the People of this Kingdom, that we can attempt to make no Conqucfts upon A Spain "% ) f 2 ) Spain in the IVeJl-hidics^ witliout giving France a Right to declare againll us. As this Gazetteer has probably, long before this Time, incurred the general Fate of all the Pamphlets and Papers that come from the fame Quarter, and may not therefore be now ealily met with, I (hall beg leave to tranfcribe this Letter entire, that the French Agents and Advocates here may have no Rcafon to fay, I have mifreprefented the Arguments they make ufe of. The Extradl of this Letter, as publifh'd here, was as follows, viz. Extradi of a Letter frotn Paris, Sep. igtb. There is not a Method which the Cardi- nal de Fleury has not try'd, nor an Effort which he has not made, amicably to divert the Englijh from diredling their formidable Armaments againft the Spanijh Dominions in America. His Eminency declar'd a hundred times to my Lord Waldegrave, that as Great- Britain could not execute her Defigns upon SpaniJJo America, without doing an infinite Prejudice to France and her Subjects, his moft Chriftian Majejiy would be indifpenfa^ bly oblig'd to oppofe the Execution of it, and that moreover, as fhe was Guarantee of the Treaty of Utrecht, fhe would be oblig*d to take care of the Prefervation of the Spanijh Dominions^ and of the Balance of Power in thofe fiilft'fiBii T II iiiiii»i% . ^ 3 ). thofe Parts, which was infeparablc from it, in order at the lame time to protedl: the law- ful Commerce of all Nations in the Spa- nifti Dcjminions in ylmerica. But fo far were thofe Remonftrances from havinc; the Efted: which was hcp'd tor, that E;i!g-/^;zir/ only ha- flen'd and incrcas'd her Armaments the more, declaring publickly, that they were del'ign'd againft Spajtijh America ; which has oblig'd tlie King at length to fend his Fleets to that Country, purfuant to the Declarations made by his Eminence to the Britijb Miniller. However, the Commadores of thofe Squadrons are order'd to commit no Hoflilitv againft ei^,her of the two Powers at War, and only to hinder them from making Conquefts upon one another, and from turning things out of their prefent Channel. At this Jiin- 6lure our Court could not adt more wifely or juftly, fmce 'tis neither for the Advantage ncn- Difad vantage of one of the two Powers at War more than of the other; and fmce the King, by exerting his utmoft to dilcharge the En- gagement he is under as Guarantee of the Treaty of Utrecht^ prevents any Innovation in the Syftem of the New World, and keeps things there on the Footing they ought to be for the common Benefit of all the Nations trading in America. 'Twas not poflible to contrive any other Method for equally an- fwering all thofe important Ends, and fo well adapted for reftoring Peace ; efpecially if the A 2 other % k . \ \: '\ « ! t . s-* ( 4 ) Other Powers concern'd as well as we In this publick Caufe do not delay to fecond the pa- cifick Intentions of his Majcfty. If the for- midable Armaments of the Englijh againft America were to have been let go without any Difpofitions to obfcrve them, and to check their Defigns, it might have been in their Power to have feiz'd thofe vaft Dominions, of which when once they had been the Ma- iler, it would have been a difficult Tafk to have difpoflefs'd them, and flill more diffi- cult to have perfuaded them to have given them up by a I'reaty of Peace, any more than they did the other Conquefts formerly made by them in that Country, or thofe which they made from Spain in Europe. TheRea- fon which induc'd France^ England^ and 7/o/- land to guarantee the Spcmijh Pofleflions in America at the Treaty oiUtrechth^% fubfifted hitherto, and does fo flill j it being a Reafon confiftent with the common Benefit of the Nations interefled in the Commerce j which would ceafe to be common the Moment that it (hould pais from the Hands of the Spaniards to thofe of the Englifj' From this Letter it appears, that his moll ChriJIian Majejiy has now openly declared, that he will not permit us to take from the SpaJiiards any Part of their Dominions in America, and that he has fent his Squadrons into thofe Seas to join with the Spaniards in 4 repelling^ ^MiV" mmm ( 5 ) repelling us, in cafe we fliould make any fuch Attempt; a fid at the fame time to protctl the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the Spanilh ■Dominions in America. Hy thefe laft Words we may fee, that the Franh mean fomething more than proteding the Spanijh Dominions in yJmcrica ; they like wife mean to protedl the lawful Commerce of all Nations in thofc Dominions: That is to fiy, if the Court oi Spain fhould give Licence to a French Ship, or F'ieet of F/r/?6/> Ships, to carry on the Trade between their Dominions in Europe and thofc in America, we muft not pretend to interrupt them. Thus we are in a pretty Situation ; Spain has infulted and plunder'd us for thefe twenty Years; we have at lad mod juflly declared War; but France now comes and tells us. We miijl carry this War on in fuch a Marnier alone, as may enable Spain to do m great Injury, without being liable to receive any Injury from us ; for this will be the Cafe, if we muft neither attack their Dominions at Land, nor interrupt any neutral VefTel that fliall be employed in carrying on a Trade be- tween one part of their Dominions and ano- ther. Is this a Declaration that any Minifter of England could hear with Patience ? Is it a Law or Rule of War that any Britifi Subjed: can fubmit to, as long as he has Money in his Purfe, or Vigour in his Nerves ? It is a moft haughty, a moft contemptuous Decla- ration ; ■\ ;*; 6 ration ; and if it was made as infinuatcd in this Letter, before the Sailing of the French Squadrons, I am fure we ought to have been ready, as we had it in our Power, to have funk every Ship of them as foon as they launch'd out into the open Sea. But now let us examine into the Argu- ments advanc'd by our Fre?ichijyd Gazetteer for this French Declaration. The Chief of them are, That his moll Chriftian Majefty, as Guarantee of the Treaty af Utrecht, is ob- liged to take Care of the Prefervation of the Spanifh Fiominions ; and of the Balance of Power in thofe Parts, which is infe par able from it, in order at the fame Time to protc6i the lawful Commerce of' all Nations in the Spanirti Dominions in America. That as Great- Britain could not execute her Defigns upon Spanifh America, without doing an infinite Prejudice to France and her Sub- jeSis, his moft Chriftian Majefty would be in- difpenfably cbligd to oppufe the Execution of thofe Defigns, And, That, as the Commodores of their Squadrons had Orders to commit no Hoftility againfi either of the Two Powers at War, and only to hinder them from making Conquefis upon one another, and from turning Things out of their prefent Channel ; they could not aB more wifely or jufily, fince it was neither for the Advan- tage or Dif advantage of one of the two Powers 4it War J more than of' the other ; a fit th their h the E?2^ of the ^ vation kept Tk he, for trading The Order \ to the France of XJtn tradlors the Ob prefs ai Place, juftly Guaran mon St of ever] upon t War, c carryin tion ca Guarar tered ii Nation of anot ofPeai ad inju *Grot Subd. 2. Farag. 4 Ltr (7) their Kmgy by exerting his utmoft to difcharge the Engagemennts he was imdtr as Guarantee of the T'reaty ^/V/, and for creating a new Breach between Spain and the Emperor. All this (he efFedted by the means of her Jlgents here, and is it pofli- ble to think, that all this could be owing to our Ignorance or Imprudence alone ? In the firft Place, France^ by her Agents here, per- fuaded his late Majefty, that by fome fecret Articlesof this Alliance between xh^ Emperor and Spain^ they had agreed to fet the Pre- tender upon the Throne of thefe Kingdomo, and had concerted fuch Meafures together, as would ruin our Trade. The Emperor and King ofSpainy by their Minifters here, pro- tefted the contrary: They communicated the ( 25 ) the Treaties : Invited his Majedy to accede* nnd proteftcd, there were no fccret Articles. It fignified nothing! To our Misfortune: To the Misfortuiie of Europe^ the Frefich Jjgents here had greater Credit with his late Majefly, or with fome that had great Credit with him, than the moft.folcmn Declarati- ons both of the Emperor and King of Spain ; and by this means, he was prevail'd on to join in a defenfive Alliance with France by the Treaty concluded at Hanover the 3d of September 1725, in which the King of Priijpa was prevailed on by the French to join, under Pretence that they would affifl: him in re- venging the Malfacre of the Proteftants at ^horn^ and in re-eftablifhing the Froteltant Religion in that City ; which was and after- wards proved to be as falfe a Pretence as that they made ufe of for prevailing with his late Majefly to join with them in this Alli- ance If there had been any Truth in what was alledg'd by the French Agents againft the Al- liance between the Emperor and Spain, or if there had been fo much as a Probabilitv of its being true, the Treaty of Hanover ^ as it was only defenfive, might perhaps have been reafonable, becaufe, in that Cale, it would have been necefTary to have provided for the Defence of Hanover^ tho' I cannot think, that even for this Purpofe, France D was 1 I ( 26 ) was a neceflary or proper Ally ; but in my Opinion, it was not fo much as proba- ble that the Emperor and Spain had fuch Intentions as were imputed to them ; be- caufe neither of them had at that Time any Difpute with this Nation, and becaufe it would have been impoflible for them both joined together, to have carried fuch Deligns into Execution againft us, tho' we had at that Time been, as we are now, without one Ally in the Univerfe, that could have given us effediual Aljifiance, If the Emperor and Spaitiy when they entered into that Alliance, had an offenfive Defign in view againft any Power on Earth, it was againft France', and if they had any fuch, I am fure, it was none of our Bufinefs to have prevented their carrying their Delign into Execution ; becaufe fuch a War would have ruined, or at leaft fuf- pended all the French commercial Views, and would have been of great Advantage to the Trade and Manufactures oi Britain -,^^6. by under-hand aliiftiug the weaker Side, we might have made it laft almoft as long as we had pleafed. But the preventing of any Defigns the Emperor and Spain had againft France ^ was not the only Thing the French had in view. This they effedtually did by the Treaty of Hanover-, and for this Purpoie, nothing farther would have been neceflary : But they had a mind to convince Spain^ that the -.j^^iii'v^ (27) the Emperor was not fuch an Ally as could defend, them when they had Occalion for it ; and for this Purpofe it became neceffary to prevail with us to make fome fort of Attack upon Spain ; becaufe we were the only Peo- ple in Europe, again ft whom the Emperor could give the Spaniards no Atliftance. One would think, this was a difficult Point to be gained, becaufe we were no way o- bliged by the Treaty of Hanover to begin the Attack. We had not the leaft Occa- fion to put ourfelves to any Expence even in providing for our Defence, unlefs the Em- peror and Spain had begun to prepare for put- ting fome of thofe Defigns in Execution with which we had been frightned. But no- thing, it feems, is in this Country difficult for French Addrefs. Before either the Em- peror or Spain began fo much as to prepare for any warlike Expedition, we fent one Fleet, in a hojiile Manner, to the Coafts of Spain, and another to block up their Gal^ leons at Porto-Bello, which the Spaniards looked upon as a Declaration of War, and acccordingly began Hoftilities againft us, in which the Emperor could give them no Affiftance. In the mean time, the French took fpe- cial care not to do any Thing that might difo- blige the Spaniards, nor to allow us to do any Thing that might really hurt them ; and we may believe, they made great Merit D 2 of m r. s ! :[ W { 28 ) of this at the Court of Spain, by which they entirely reconciled themfelves to that Court. Thus they gained two of their chief Ends, and now the third was to be thought on, which was that of making a new Breach between the Emperor and Spain. For this Pijipofe, after they had thus made a Breach, they then became Mediators between Spain and US; and by the fame means, I fuppofe, which they had before fo fuccelsfully made ufe of, they prevailed upon us to conclude the famous Treaty at Stville, which finifh- cd the French Dcfign, and laid a certain Foundation for a Breach between the £;;/- peror i\nd Sfyain 'y and what was ftill more, by that Treaty they got us joined in an Al- liance with them and Spain, the certain Confequence of which would have been a War gain ft the Emperor, if we had not pre- vented it by the Treaty we codcluded with him in the Year 173 i. Bv this Treaty it feemed as if we had ^ot out of French Leading'JJri?igs ; but from wliat afterwards happened, it may be fup- pofcd, that this was only a Piece of French Fitiejje, in order to prevent their j^gents or "Tools here from being brought to Juftice by an undeceived Parliament, or tore to Pieces by an enraged Populace, which probably would have been the Cafe, if they had en- gaged us in an open War, jointly with France and Spain, againft the Emperor, We ( 29 ) We thereby, it is true, guaranty'd, in the moft exprefs and folemn Manner, the Progmatick Sandi'wn ; but whatever the French might pretend, it is probable, they privately connived at this, becaufe they knew it would fignify nothing, and becaufe the Court of Spain^ now their fincere Friends, got their Son into the immediate PofTeflioii of Parma and Placentia, and their Troops into the ftrong Places of T^ufcany, The French and Spaniards being thus a- gain firmly united, and French Infiuence got again to its Zenith at the Court of Spain^ the latter begun to fhew lefs regard to this Na- tion than it had ever done before, and in a Manner laughed at us when we defired Per- formance of the little that was ftipulated in our Favour by the Treaty of Seville. But in order to give the Spaniards a full Licence to interrupt our Trade, and the French a full Power to prefcribe Laws to the other Princes and States of Europe; one Thing more was neceffary, and that was to break the Alliance between us and the Emperor, which the latter thought had been fmcerely eftablifhed by our Treaty with him in the Year 173 1. For this Purpofe it was neceffary to find a Pretext for attacking the Emperor^ and for prevailing upon us to leave him in the lurch. This was furniflied by the forcible Oppofi- tion made by the Miifcovites to the Eledion of # I i VI '■'\ .1 *l if ( 30 ) ef Stanijlaus as King of Poland. Tho* the Mufcovites had a Right by Treaties to make that forcible Oppofition, tho' the Emperor no way joined in or countenanced it ; yet from this the French took Occaiion to at- tack the Emperor^ becaufe he happened to be at that Time in an Alliance with Mufcovy ; and we were told, and our French Jlgents and Tools made us believe, that we were un- der no Obligation to perform our Guaranty, becaufe the Emperor had drawn this Attack upon himfclf. I believe cveiy Man will now confefs, I am fure the French, who now pretend being obliged to aflill Spain \n Con- icquence of the Utrecht Guaranty, muft now confefs, that we were under the ftridt- cft Obligation to aflift the Emperor upon that Occafion. But fuppofe we had not, confider- ing the Circumftances we were then in with regard to Spainy our own Intereft, our own Prefervation, ought to have prevailed with us. Spain had refufed to perform the little ihe was obliged to by the Treaty of Sevillcy the' we had on our Part performed the whole, and more than the whole: Spain had continued to plunder our Merchants, and interrupt our Trade in the JVeJi-Indies : Spain had continued to debar our People cutting Logwood in the Bay of Campeach)\ befidcs many other Injuries; and therefore we ought to have taken that Opportunity to balanceAccomp-s with that haughty and faith- j lefs ( 31 ) Icfs Court. But French Influence prevailed over all Confiderations, and we left the Em*- peror a Prey to France and Spain^ when we might, and ought to have faved him, tho' we muft have even then forefeen, that we ourfelves, in all human Probability, would be the very next. The French having now got all they wifti- ed for, except that of reducing this Nation to the lowed Degree of Poverty, Impotency, and Contempt ; and having likewife, by their late Favour done to Spain^ got the en- tire Management of that Court ; they pre- vailed with that Nation to redouble their Depredations upon us in the Weft-Indies, Thcfe we tamely fubmitted to for fome Years ; and if we had allowed ourfelves to have been as abfolutely diredled by French Agents or I'oohy as we had been for many Years before, we fliould have been ftill fuhmitting and negotiating ; but the Cries of our plundered Merchants and Seamen at laft awakened the Spirit of the Nation, and this brought our French Agents a fecond Time into the Danger of being tere to Pieces by the Populace, or brought to Juftice by a re- lenting Parliament. They had then nothing left for it but to feem to give way to the Torrent, and then to take care that this Torrent {hould not bear away fome princi- pal Part' of the Monarchy oi Spain^ before the French could come to the Afliftance of that ( 32 ) that impotent, ill conncded, and ill govern- ed Monarchy. That we might have done this: That we might have been long before now in PolTef- iion of fome of the Spnn'/p Settlements in America^ our brave Admiral Vernon has fully demonftrated to the World. If we had fent along with that Admiral, orfoon after him, but 3 or 4000 veteran Land Sol- diers, which we might eafily have fpared, we might long fince have been in PoUeflion of Portobely Panama^ and Veracruz -y and if we had been once in Pofleflion of any Part of the Kingdom o^ Mexico, as it is a health- ful Climate, and fruitful Soil, we might have poured in Troops and Men there at ail Times of the Year. Tliere they might have been fupported, and might have lived health- fully ; and there they would have been at hand, and ready to be fent upon any Expe- dition we thought proper to undertake. If we had done this, I am convinced the French would not have dared to interfere by their Arms, whatever they might have done by a fincere and impartial Mediation, be- tween Spain and us. The Land Forces of Frmice and Spain can be of very little Signification to them in a War with this Nation alone. It is their naval Force only that can be of any effedual Service J and their united Naval Force is not as yet equal, at the Beginning of this War • It ( 33 ) it was far from beino; near equal, to the Na* val Force of this Kingdom ; therefore we could not fuppofc that France wouKi engage againft us at the very Beginning of the War. Even as yet, and notwithftnnding the h'ttle Care wc have taken, fince the Commence- ment of the War, to increafe our Number of Seamen, it w^ould be impoffible for Fr^wr^ and Spain to fit out a Naval Force equal to ours J and therefore it would be ridiculous in us to defire any of our Friends upon the Continent to engage in the Quarrel, unlefs we could form fuch a Confederacy as would be near equal to the united Land Force of France and Spain ; becaufe if we fhould en- gage any one of our Friends, if we have any upon the Continent that may be attack- ed by Land, for Example the Dtitch^ it would coft us more to aflift in defending them at Land, than any Benefit we could reap from their Afliftance at Sea. This muft (hew, that it was neither the Bufinefs of France, nor had Hie it in her Power, with any Safety to her own Poflef- fions in America, to join with Spain at the firft breaking out of the War. I believe no true French Politician can as yet think fo. Ido not imagine, they canfuppofe, we are as yet {o weak or fo poor, as that they may, without Danger, make ufe of open Force a- gainft us. As our Trade mufl fuffer by the Continuance of the War, and as it will fiif- E fer in i, t? f'i ( 3+ ) for more by a dirtionourable and precarious ] Vacc, fincc France found that her Agents Ikic could no longer prevail with us to fub- mlt tamely to the Depredations of Sfain^ it was her Bufinefs to get us to carry on the War in fuch a Manner as might moft expofe and injure our own Trade, and leaft hurt the Enemy ; and if (lie could do this, it was then her Buhnefs, and is fo ftill, to get the War continued as long as file can; becaufe durii g its Continuance, the Trade and Riches of this Country, muft be daily decrealing, and the Trade and Riches oi France increaf- ing in Proportion, till at laft it muft of courfe come to be in her Power, to join in the War againft us without Danger, or to make us accept of whatever Terms of Peace ihc may have a mind to prefcribe. This, I f ;y, was the Bufniefs of FrancCy and whether her Agents here have exa<5lly followed her Dircdions, I fliall now take the liberty 'o enquire. As the Spaniards have no Trade, nor any Ships, but that Avhich is carried on, or thofe which fail from one part of their own Dominions to an- other ; and as this Trade mav, with their Leave, be carried on in neutral Ships, and in the Name of Foreigners, it was ridiculous in us to think of getting any Advantage, or of compcllini; tlicm to fubmit to reafonable Terms, by the Method of Rcprifals alone ; becaule in this way we ihould generally have ( 35 J have been Lofers upon the annual Balance, and therefore the Spamards would in this way have continued in War with us to all Eternity, or at leafl as long they were under French Irifluencey rather than fubmit to rea- fonable Terms. Yet this was the way our French Agents advifed us to carry on the War, and in this way we fhould probably have carried it on to this Day, if a Blunder of the French themfelves, in complaining of their Ships being fearched for contraband Goods, had not compelled us to declare War, in fpite of all could be done or faid by their Agents here. I have laid, that all the Trade the Spa- fiiardi have, may, by their Leave, be carried on by neutral Ships, and in the Name ol* Foreigners ; to which I mufl; add, that there now appears to be fuch a Dcfigii, from what is faid by our Fre?ich Advocate in the Gazetteer above-mentioned. By him we find, the lawful Commerce of all Nations in the Spanijh Dominions in America, made ufe of as one of the Rcafons for Frances being obliged to take care of the Prefervation of thofe Dominions. I fliould be glad to know from this, or any other French Advo- cate, what lawful Commerce anv Nation in Europe^ belides ourfelves, has in the Spanijh Dominions in America. That the French and other Foreigners have Goods on board the Fpanip Galleons, Flota^ and Regi/ler E 2 i/'//';, Mi r i f I i c: U'h I, i H f { 36) SbipSy I know, but that thefe Goods rnuft be loaded on board, and entered at landing, in the Name of Spaniards^ I likewife know ; and therefore, by the Law of Nations, they are good Prize, whatever our Frejich Ad- n}ocatcs may fayagainft it, if the Ship (hould happen to fi\ll into our Hands. I fliall grant, indeed, that the Spaniards may lay open the Trade in their American Dominions to all the Nations in Europe^ and may, by that Pre- tence, have even the Trade of their own Subjtdts carried on by neutral Ships, and in the Name of Foreigners, without its being in our Power, by the Law of Nations, to prevent it, except with regard to contraband Goods, under which I mull: particularly take notice, that Gold and Siker is not compre- hended, nor any Thing that belongs to the fuflaining: and nourifhing of Life, unlefs the Ships be bound to a Town or Place befieged, blocked up, or fur rounded. This, I believe, will be done, in cafe the War between us and Spai?i fliould laft for a- .ny Time, and we, perfuadcd by French Cmnjcls, or fright ned by French Menace Sy from carrying it on by any other Method than that of Rrprijals alone. I believe the Spaniards will open the Trade to America^ and in that cafe Spain may and will carry on the War v/ith us as long we pleafe, be- caufe we muft either give up entirely our Trade, or at leaft our mercantile Naviga- tion, I "Ti ' .. fi II the irry be- ( 37 ) tion, or otherwife they will be every Year taking fomething from us, and we can take nothing from them. This fhews the Ridicu- loufnefs of carrying on the War in that Me- thod, which our French Agents firfl advifed us to, and to which alone the French^ by their Squadrons, feem now refolved to confine our future Hoftilities againfl Spain. Having our Eyes thus opened, as I have faid, by a French Blunder, or at lead by their imagining that their Age?its here would have been able to have prevented our declaring War, and at the fame Time to have prevail- ed with us not to vilit any foreign Ship bound to or from Spain -, and the War being de- clared by us in Form, and with great So- lemnity, every one expe ,\ \i K ( 38 ) vented from beginning the War in this Manner, when we did declare War, we ought to have fent out fuch an Expedition as foon after as pofiible ; we ought to have been preparing for it before hand ; and as we had Troops enough on foot, Men of War enough in CommilHon, and incredible Num- bers of Merchant Ships lying idle in the Ri- ver, we could neither want Troops, nor Ships ; and no Country in the World can fo quickly vidual a Fleet as we can, if our Go- vernment a(5t with any Forefight or Alacri- ty. If the Fleet defigned for fuch an Expe- dition had failed in November, it would have been in the IVeJi-Indies time enough to have flript the Spaniards of fome of their molt valuable PofTeflions, before the extreme hot Seafon came on ; and the Northern Parts of Mexico we may attack, our Troops may there keep the Field at any Time of the Year, if it does not happen to be a very hot Seafon. But inftead of this, we v/erc amufed and terrified by our French Agents here, with an Invafion, tho' we were never more united amongft ourfelves, and tho' no Power on Earth had at that Time a Fleet, nor could in fx Months time prepare a Fleet fufficient for making a dangerous Invafion upon this Nation : And by thefe Terrors we were made to think of nothing but how to defend ourfelves, when our chief Thoughts ought to md an ted on uld ent this 'ere ;nd ;ht to ( 39 ) have been, how to offend the Enemy, in or- der to obtain fome fignal Advantage over them, before they could provide for their own Defence, or. obtain any AfTiftance from their Friends the French. At laft die Spirit of the Nation grew violent for attacking the Enemy in -the IVeft-Indiei-, and in order to allay, or at lead to amufe this Spirit, an Ex- pedition was refolved on, and Preparations begun to be made for it : But how were they made ? in the moft public and a very tedious Manner; whereas they ought certainly to have been made in the moft fecret and expe- ditious Manner that was poffible ; and inftead of making the Rendezvous at Cork in Ire- land, which is the moft proper Port we have for that Purpofe, the Rendezvous was ap- pointed, and the Soldiers put on board, at the Ifle of Wight, where they were almoft fure of being detained by wejhrly Winds, which generally blow at that Seafon, which is the moft proper for failing upon fuch an Expedition ; and accordingly the Fleet was there detained for feveral Months, tho' fome People are of Opinion that, if they had been at firft fully provided, they might have failed at leaft two Months fooner than thev did. I know fome Objedions may be made againft appointing the Rendezvous of our Fleet at Cork in Ireland. It may be faid, that the Tranfports and Men of War miift liave t *j \ m \ ) ( 40 ) have all failed firfl from the Downs or Portfmouthy and therefore might have been detained there by contrary Winds as long as the whole Fleet was j but there was no Ne- ceffity for fending our Men of War and Tranfports thither all at once, they ought to have been fent thither in fmall Numbers, a Man of War and two or three Tranfports at a Time, for Secrecy as well as Conveniency j and a Man of War with two or three Mer- chant Ships well manned, may, by tack- ing, eafily turn down the Channel even a- gainft the Wind, unlefs it blows very hard, which a large Squadron and a numerous Fleet of Tranfports cannot eafily do. In the next place it may be faid, that we could not have vidlualled our Fleet at Cork j but might not a great part of the Vidtual- ing have been fent from hence, and the reft eafily found there? I (hall grant, that the Irijh Beef is not fo good as the beft Englijh^ nor will it keep fo long ; but it is, I believe, as good as moft of the Englijh Beef provided for this Expedition; and every one knows, it is good enough, and will keep 'long e- nough for a Weft-India Voyage, efpecially when Provifions are to be laid in for the out- ward bound Voyage only. Lajily^ It may be faid, that it would have been troublefom, expenlive and dan- gerous, to have tranfported the Land Forces frora Britain to Cork ; but what Neceflity was C 41 ) was there for bringing any Regiments from Ireland at firft. If we had kept all the Re- giments in Ireland that were there when we firft began to prepare for War, or ra- ther for that new Sort of War called Repri- I'ah^ and had ordered two or three of our new Regiments, mofl prepofteroully called Marines ^ to be raifed in Ireland^ or fent thither as foon as raifed here, we might have fpared Land Forces enough from Ire- land^ to have been fent upon this Expedition ; and if an Attack upon the Enemy be really defigned, I am fure, fome of the old Regi- ments we had in Ireland would have been more fit for the Service than new arKl un- difciplin'd Troops. The chief Argument made ufe of for thefe twenty Years, in favour of a numerous Stand- ing Army, has been, That new-raised Troops are not fit for immediate Service ; and now thofe who have been fo long mak- ing ufe of this Argument, have made the beft and ftrongeft Anfwer that was ever made to it ; for now that we have Occafion for im- mediate Service, the only Troops they have fent upon that Service are our new-raifed Troops. As I muft from thence conclude, that they have changed their Way of Think- ing, I hope, when this War is at an End, if they can ever bring it to an End, they will difband every Regiment in the Service ; al- low the Soldiers to return to Labour, in F which \ \k s \ f 42 ) which they may be uief'ul, and no way ex- penfive to their Country ; and keep thcOrti- cers, at lead fuch of them as cannot other- wile fupport themfelves, upon Half Pay, by which means they will be fully as ufeful, and much lefs expenfive, to their Country, than they can otherwife be in Time of Peace. Thus, I hope, I have made it appear, that by the Influence of French Agents^ we have been hitherto prevented from doing any real Injury to ^pciin ; for what our brave Ad- miral Vernon has done, I am convinced, did not proceed from any Refolutions taken here at Home. When he failed from hence, we had not come to a Refolution to declare War J we had refolved only to begin Re- frifah ; and therefore I am convinced, that Admiral had no exprefs Inftrudions to at- tack the Spaniards^ who were not then for- mally declared our Enemies, at Land -, but as he had Orders, as our public Orders for Re- prifah authori/ed him to feize the Goods as well as Ships of the King and Subjeds of Spain^ he had a Power to attack them wherever he thought proper 3 and luckily for the Honour of this Nation, he put that Senfe upon his Orders which our Injuries required, tho' it was not That the French Agents defigned. Nay even after we had declared War, no Orders were fent him to attack the Enemy at Land j for if I can depend upon the In- formation y t, , .- ' i :^ • r -B « /ay ex- ile Orti- t other- \ay, by ufeful, 'ountry, 'ime of appear, 'nts^ we ing any ave Ad- :ed, did s taken n hence, ) declare :gin Re- ed, that ns to at- hen for- nd } but s for Re- is as well >f Spain^ rever he Honour ipon his , tho' it defigned. ^ar, no I Enemy \ the In- ^rmation I f 43 ) formation I have had from Gentlemen that came from Jamaica in May lafl, which was after he had taken and deftroyed Fort-Chagre^ he had not then received any frefh Orders or Inftrudtions from the Time of our declaring War to that very Day ; and indeed, I am apt to believe it ; for he was not then, nor is he yet, provided with a Force that was thought fufficient for attacking the Spa?iiards at Land, by thofe whofe Bufinefs it was to fend him frefh Orders, if we may judge of their Opi- nion from what they have themfclves declared upon a very Solemn Occalion ; fo that it would have been moft unwife in them, to fend him Orders to do what they themfelves thought they had not enabled him to do j and for attacking the Spaniards at Sea, the Or- ders he carried along with him were fufficient. But the Weft-Indies was not the only Place where we might have hurt the Spaniards, Tho it was not our Bufmefs to have attempted to make any Conquefls in Europe^ yet furely in order to diftrefs them, and prevent their interrupting our Trade, or fending any Sup- ply of Troops to the Weft-Indies^ it was our Bulinefs to have made frequent Incurfions upon the Coafts of Spain^ and to have burnt their Ships of all forts in their Harbours, wherever we could at any Rilk have come at them. For this purpofe, our Squadron in thofe Seas ought to have had c or 6000 of our beft Troops along with it, and a confi- i »i F 2 derable ( i* ( 44 ) dcrable Number of Bomb'Ve[feh and Fire' Ships. With this fmall Number of Troops we might have done them infinite Prejudice, becaufe it is impoflible for them to have 5 or 6oco regular Troops at every Place where an iinem)' may land ; and as we were Ma- ilers at Sea, and as a Squadron may fail much fafler than a Body of Troops can march, our . I'roops, asfoon as any large Body of the E- nemy's Troops were approaching, might have re-imbark'd with their Booty, and might have failed to make an Incurfion, perhaps upon that very Place from whence the Enemy's Troops had marched to attack them. Thus we might have plundered the Country, and IiaraiTed their Troops, in fuch a Manner as might probably have produced a Mutiny, con^ fidering the wretched Condition their Troops i'.re at prefcnt reduced to by their want of Pay, and by the Dearnefs and Scarcity of Pro- vifions in that beggarly Country. Ill this manner we might have diftrefled their Country j and with regard to their Ship- jng, there are but very few Ports in Spain where we might not, by means of Fire- flips and Bomb-Vefcls^ have burnt every Miip and Boat in their Harbour. Even at Ciidiz itfclf, tho' we could not, without a great Land Force, have taken the Town, yet inflead of blocking up their Squadron that was thereat the Beginning of the War, if our 5,qiiadroii had been properly provided— and I and ( 45 ) and properly inftruded, it might have gone in within the Piintals in fpite of all their Forts, and might have burnt or deftroyed every Ship in that Harbour. And with re- gard to the Fortifications and Batteries they have been of late Years permitted to raife a- gainft our Town and Bay of Gibraltar^ we might very probably have found an Oppor- tunity to deftroy them. Nay, I am furpriz'd, the Garrifon itfelf has not done it, if it be true that thefe Fortifications and Batteries have, fometimes lince the War begun, had not above two Regiments to defend them. Thefe Things we might have done, or at leaft attempted j and thefe Things we had the more Reafon to do, becaufe we knew that France was preparing to aflift the Spaniards^ or prefcribe Laws to us. Therefore, to force Spain to a Peace, or to weaken them as much a? poflible, and efpecially to deftroy their Men of War before France could come to their AfUftance, we fhould have begun and carried on the War in the moft vigorous and adive Manner. But our French Agents perfuaded us we were in Danger at Home, and this has I am aftraid, made us carry on the War in languid and dilatory Manner Abroad. I am fenfible it will be faid, that a power. ful Squadron was prepared, and intended to fail upon a glorious Expedition againft Old Spain itfelf, but was prevented by contrary Winds. I am forry that Squadron met with I fuch V • ■y- Il* 11 ^ - ( 46 ) fuch a Difappointment ; but I mull ohferve, that moft People are of Opinion, this Squa- dron might have been ready to fail much more early in theSeafon, and before the Winds be- gan to fet in againfl it; • and I muft farther obferve, that it was very extraordinary to order fuch a Squadron to fail as Convoy to a large Fleet of Merchant Ships ; for molt Sea- men are of Opinion, that this Squadron, if not retarded by fomething not yet heard of, might have got out of the Channel, and might have proceeded on its intended Voyage, if it had not been oblig'd to fail as Convoy to a great number of Merchant Ships. One Thing is certain, that feveral of the Mer- chant Ships, that failed from Torlfay with this Squadron, did proceed upon their Voyage, and notwithftanding the contrary Winds got fafe to L'/hon^ and to fome of the Ports in the Mediterranean, Therefore I muft fup- pofe, that the Backwardnefs in fitting out this Squadron, and the Orders given to it for failing as Convoy to a large Fleet of Merchant Ships, likewife proceeded from fome fort of French Influence ; becaufe the French were not ready in the Beginning of the Seafon, to fend out a fufRcient Squadron for oppofing its Defigns. Having thus {hewn the Succefs of our French Agents in preventing our hurting the Enemy : I fliall now endeavour to point out their Succefs in perfuading us to begin and carry f 47 ) carry on the War, in that manner wliich mod expofcd and injured our own Trade. As in Time of Peace, none of our Seamen can get Imployment but fuch as arc employ'd in tlic Merchant Service, or on board the few Guard-Ships kept in Coniniiflion, all the reft that have been bred Seamen in time of War, muil either go Abroad, or betake themfclves to fome other Imployment j and in a few Years, this fuperuimerary Numb. :*, either by Death, or by being well fettled in ibme eafy and profitable Bufinefs at Lan 1, become quite extindl, without any Supply; {o that after a few Years Peace we can never have a greater number of Seamen, than is barely fufficient for carr)'ing on our Trade, and therefore, at the beginning of every War, we muft be in ereat Diftrefs, and muftdraw the Seamen away from our Trade. This is an Inconvenience we muft labour under at the Beginning of every War : It is ridiculous to think of preventing it by a Regijler alone, or any fuch ^ack Method. There is no way of preventing it, but by keeping 20 or 30,000 experienc'd Seamen always in Pay> and taking care that they fhall every now and then, and by turns, go a Voyage in the Mer- chant Service, when the publick Service has no Occafion for them, in order to keep them expert in their Bufinefs. This could not but have been forefeen by thofe who conlider the Situation, the natural Strength, and the true Intereft I- •' \^v \i i.-4f-- 1/ f ( 48 ) Intereft of this Kingdom ; hut in/lead of keeping a greater Number of Seamen in Pay than we had Occafion for in time of Peace, we have for thefe twenty Years been advifed to keep a great and dangerous Number of Land Forces in continual Pay, and entirely to negled the Difcipline of our Militia ; tho* every one knows, that the natural Strength of this Nation, as long as we preferveour Li- berties, muft always confiftin the Number of o!ir Seamen and Ships of War, and the good Difcipline of our Militia. Bv this Manao-ement we were at the Be- ginning ofthis War under a Neceffity of draw- ing the Seamen away from our Trade, or of imploying a great number of Landmen on board our Ships of War. One of thefe two Methods we were oblig'd to chufe j but then from the Nature of the War, from the Cir, cumftances of the Enemy we had to deal with, we had this Advantage, that we might without Danger have cholen the latter. Spain was an Enemy that could not cope with us at Sea, and France could not declare again ft us without having fome time, a Year at lea ft, to repair and augment their Navy. We could therefore be under no Apprehenfions of being engaged in any dangerous Sea-Fight, for one Twelve month at leaft. For this Reafon, we had no Occafion for any greater Number of expert Seamen on board any of our Ships of War, than was barely fufticicnt for navigat- ing & li.^ f^tH*f ittjr*.' ( 49 ) ing and working the Ship, which is never above One fourth of her Complement. The reft might have been filled up by able bodied Landmen ; and if we had given proper En- couragement to Landmen to enter, and had accepted of all the able bodied Vagrants that might and would have been fent in from the feveral Counties in this Kingdom and in Ire» land, confidering that we had during the pre- ceding Year at lead 12,000 Seamen in the publick Service, I dare be bold to fay, we might have fitted out more War Ships and Sloops than we did, without drawing a Man away from the Merchant, Fi{hing, or Coaft- ing Service ; or at leaft we might have done io, without any Preffing or Embargo, This was the Method we ought to have taken for Manning our Navy, in order to prepare for the prefent War, and this Method we ought the rather to have chofen, becaufc we had great Reafon to liifped, that France would declare againft us, in cafe we ihould not be able to force the Spaniards to a Peace, before the F7'ench could venture to declare publickly in their favour. If we had taken this Method, moft of the Landmen employed in the Sea Service would have become expert Sea- men before France could repair and augment her Navyj and if Frajice had .at laft ventured to declare againft us, or prefcribe openly to us, as ftie now does, we could then have ta- ken a frefti Number of Landmen on board, G and Vs^S^^^" -^k .i.j^r^"' ■' M » (50) and might have thereby fo increafed our Na- val Force, as to leave no room for our hav- ing any Thing to apprehend from the infult- ing Menaces, or open Violence of the French. But as this Management would have been diredlly contrary to all the Views France could have againfl our Trade and Naval Force, her Agents here took Care to advife us to take all the Methods they could think of for dillreffing our Trade by PreJ^ fmg. Embargoes, and drawing all the Seamen away from the Merchant, Fifhing, and Coafting Service ; and fuch Care did they take to prevent our endeavouring to increafe the Number of our Seamen, by taking Land- men into the Service, that no Reward was oflfered for Landmen to engage ; nor would the Regulating Captains, for the moft part, accept of any but expert Seamen. Thus our Trade was diftrefled as much as we could by ourfelves, and now I (hall fliew how it was left to be diftrefled by the Ene- my. It is certain we had nothing to fear from Spain but their fitting out Privateers to intercept and feize our Merchant Ships ; and from hence we had more to fear at the Beginning of the War, before our Merchant Ships could be apprifed of the Rupture, than at any future Time; therefore, before we publiflied Reprifah^ or began open Ho- ftilities, we ought to have prepared, and ought to have had the Coafls of Spain al- moft ">v: ■- ' Na- hav- ifult- thc vould fltVfS ', and re to could Prefi ;amen and \ they icreafe Land- d was would \ part, uch as I fliew ; Ene- o fear vateers Ships ; at the rchant ipture, before n Ho- and ]^m al- moft (5' ) moft furrounded, or at lealT: all the Ports from whence they could have fitted out Pri- vateers, blocked up, by Jifth and fixth Rate Men of War and armed Sloops. But this would have been contrary to the two prin- cipal Views of France. It would have pre- vented our Trade's being diftrefTed, which is their View in all the peaceable and warlike Hoftilities they have prevailed with Spain to commit againft this Nation ; and it would have prevented the 'Subjeds of Spain from getting any Thing by the War ; the Confe- quence of which would probably have been, that when they found themfelves daily fufFer- ing, without feeing or hearingof any Advan- tage, it would have raifed fuch a general Difcon- tent among the People, as would have forced the Court of Spain, notwithftanding its ab- folute Power, to accept of reafonable Terms, before it was convenient for the Court of France to declare openly in their Favour. Therefore, our French Agents took care that no new War Sloops or Twenty Gun Ships fhould be built, nor any other Prepa- rations made by us, for protedling our Trade again ft Spanifi Privateers, before xh^Repri- Jals were publifhed : Nay even the fifth and fixth Rates and War Sloops belonging to his Majefty's Navy, were not all fitted out for Service ; and what Care has fince been taken to have proper Cruijers, either upon our own Coafts, or the Coafts of Spai?iy or to provide our Merchant Ships with G 2 Con- ^1 I ^■^j^^jgiffi m,. ..4«*«=- - *'-— tl ( 52 ) Convoys as foon as wanted, I (hall leave to the Confiderationof thofe whofe Duty it is to take notice of it. Thus by French Influence, or French Ar- tifice^ I think, I have (hev^^n, that we have been prevented from hurting the Enemy; and prevailed on to begin and carry on the War in a Manner which has greatly expof- ed and interrupted our Trade, and at the lame Time prevented any great Increafe in our Number of Seamen. In the mean time the French were openly repairing and augmenting their Navy as faft as they could, and it fcems, or at leaft as they pretend, in- fultingly declaring, that if we attempted to carry on the War in that Manner in which lilone we could put a fpeedy or honourable End to it, or in any Manner other than that in which we mufl always be certain Lofers as long we have any foreign Trade or mercantile Navigation left; nay as long as wc have any Trade or mercantile Navigation from one Part of our Dominions to another : In either of thefe Cafes, I fay, they declared, it feems, that they would interfere in the War; and being encouraged by our having io long carried on the War, with fo little Etfedt, againft Spain alone, and by the little Care we had taken to increafe the Number of our Seamen, they at lall ordered their Squadrons to fail to the Weft-Indies^ and by means of fome of their Tools here, they told \ ave to Y it is hAr- have lemy; on the expof- at the :afe in mean ng and could, id, in- smpted which lirable Ir than certain Vade or long as ligation [lother : eclared, in the having little he little dumber d their and by ?, they told r ( S3 ) told us in the mod infulting Manner, nay publiflied it, as I have mentioned, in one of our Gazetteers^ that they had ordered their Squadrons to fail, in order to give a Check to our Armaments or Defigns againfi Spain in the Weft-Indies, Moft infulting Declaration! Could any Britijh Miniltcr hear it without Refentment ? Could any one but a Tool of France, or the Tool of a Tool of France, publifh it, with all the Reafons for juftifying it, |in one of our own News Papers, and that without the leaft Remark or Refledion? Such a Me- thod of Publication feems to infinuate, as if the Publisher approved of thofe Reafons ; but whatever Effedl thofe Reafons might have upon the Publifier, or the Patron of this Paper, I hope they will have a good Efted upon the Nation, and make us refolve to remove far from our Councils, every Man that feems to be (if there be any fuch) under any Sort of French Injluence, or under any Sort of Dependance upon France, I (hall not fay, that we ought to have declared War againft France as foon as fhe made any fuch Declaration to us ; but fuch a Declaration ought to have induced us to make the beft ufe of our Time againft Spain, in order to have weakened her, and ftrength- ened ourfelves, as much as poflible, before France could coiriC to her Afliftance ; and now that France has openly declared her In- tentions, inftead of being frightned, we ought to {''• «\ -■a?^^- 'H • ( 5+ ) to ad with the more Vigour and Alacrity, and fend immediately fuch a Naval Force, and fuch a Number of good Troops, to the Wejl-Indiesy as may be able to carry our Deligns into Execution, in fpite of all that both France and Spain can do to oppofe them. But this, I am convinced, will not be done, as long as the Friends or Agents of France can prevent it. It is not yet the Bulinefs of France to declare openly and di- reftly againft us. It is ftill her Bufinefs to protrad: the War, and for that End to frighten us from doing any Thing that may bring it to a fpeedy Conclufion ; or other- wife to frighten us into a didio.iourable and ruinous Peace j and as fhe ftill hopes to have the fame Influence upon our Meafures that ihe feems to have had for almoft thefe fivenfy Years paft, this, I believe, is the true Intention of her fending her Squa- drons to the Weft-Indies. She thereby in- tends no more than to furnifli her Agents here with Arguments for frightning us into her Views. If they fhould fucceed, I ihall cxpedl no vigorous or ofFenfive Meafures. Our intended Expedition may, I believe, proceed to the JVe ft- Indies-, becaufe, like many former Expeditions or expenfive Pre- parations, it will ferve for a Parliamentary Amufement. It will be a moft excellent Ex- pedient for carrying us through next Seflion oF Parliament ; and like our lafl Prepara- tions (**■' ( 55 ) tions againft France and Spain when they attacked tht Emperor^ it may be of great ufc at our next General Eledlions for a new Par- liament. But if we be under French Influ- ence, I am fure no real and hearty Attack will be made upon any of the Spanijh Do- minions in America j and when the General Eledtions are over, our Fleet, or a great part of it, may probably return, and the War will be continued as it has hitherto been, by Way of Reprifah only, or a new Convention clapt up, perhaps worfe than the laft we concluded with Spain, Far be it from me to endeavour to point out where thefe French Agents lie concealed, or how they exert their dark and baneful Influence j but that our Meafures for near thefe twenty Years paft have been, and are ftill under fome fuch Influence appears evi- dent, I think, from its Eflfedts. I have mentioned but fome of the principal of them j but I could mention a great many more ; and if it be true, as I have heard, that when a certain Perfon was once in Danger of being removed, the French Minifter declared, that if he (hould be removed, the Prime Minifter of France could no longer anfwer for pre- ferving the Peace between the two Nations : If this, I fay, be true, we may guefs how thefe Agents exert their Influence, tho* it may be abfolutely impofllble to come at any legal Proofs? but in Parlia- ment ^ -i \-r^. »;»-.: ,-■♦*.< (56 ) ment, we know, that Proofs may be convin- cing, the* they are far from being legal or convidling. -f* Whatever may be the Caufe, it is certain ^ that this Nation is at prefent in the mod un- lucky Circum (lances, and the Liberties of Europe in the moft extreme Danger. The prefent clofe Union between France and Spain i the DifTolution of the ancient Con- federacy between the Houfe of Aujiria^ Britain^ and Holland \ and the unexpedted Death of the Emperor, have really ren- dered the Affairs of Europe almoft irretriev- able, and have, I am afraid, put it in the Power of France to raife whom Ihe will to the //"^z/m^/ Dignity, and upon what Con- ditions (he may pleafe to prefcrlbe. Nothing but a popular, a wife, and a vigorous Ad- miniftration in this Kingdom can prevent it. This it is in the Power of next Seflion of Parliament to eftablifh, but for any future Seflion it will be too late ; and therefore, I hope, every Gentleman that wifhes well to the Liberties of his own Country, or the Liberties of £«ro^^; every Gentleman ^^that abhors being a Slave to France^ will in this enfuing Seffion of Parliament, lay afide all felfifh Confiderations, and refolve to agree to every Method that may be proper for ob- viating the Danger to which this Nation, •f- A notable DiJiinSiion made ufe of hyan Hon, Per/on in a late Parliamentary Profecution, with \ 1* •»*?»v (57) vvith the reft of Europe, lies at {irefent tk- pofed. If any of our late Meafures have been di- reded by French Councils i if we have been advifed by any Perfon under the Infuence of French Artifice , or under a Dependance upon French Power, we now fmart for it, Europe fmarts for it ; butj I hope^ it will be a Warning to us, to take the proper Method for preventing the like in future Times, which can only be done by taking care, that , no future Parliament (hall be under any Sort oi corrupt Dependance upon the Crown, or any of the Favourites of the Crown. We have had a King entirely governed by a Spanifi Minifler ; and another very much go- verned by a French Miftrefs. By the fornier we loft the great Sir Walter Rawleigh j and tlie Palatinate was loft to its Jiatural Prince^ and to the Protefiant Religion : By the latter we had a ruinous War with the Dutch, and very much contributed to that French Grandeur, which afterwards coft us fo much Blood and Treafure to reduce. We may hereafter have a King entirely governed by one fole Minifier, and that file Minifier a Penfioner, a T^ool^ ox a Dupe oi France. If it fliould be in the Power oi xhsXfiole Minifier, by means of the Places and Penfions he has to beftow, to have both Houfes of Parlia- ment always under a corrupt Dependance Upon him, the Intereft of this Nation would H be V 1( .' { t f 58 ) be dally facrificed to the Intereft of France, Of this the whole Nation, except thofe who depend upon the Minifler, might be long fenfiblc, and yet during the Joint-Lives of that King and that Minijler^ there could be no legal Redrefs : Whereas an independent Parliament would immediately, and in a legal Way, rid the King of fuch a treache- rous Minifler, and the People of fuch a weak and mercenary Adminiftration. I know, one of the mercenary Writ- ers again ft the Place Bill has wifely faid. That our Members of Parliament ought to be under a Dependance upon Minifters for the Places they polTefs or expedt, in order to prevent their falling under a corrupt Depen- dance upon France*. To fuppofe that France could ever get any confiderable corrupt In- fluence over our Parliaments, any other Way than by firft corrupting our Minifters, is an Imagination that can never proceed from any Thing but a wrong Head or falfe Heart. It is an Attempt the Court of France knows to be impradlicable and impoflible ; for as this Influence can be got by nothing but ready Money j and, as a fufficient Sum, in proportion to the value each Man puts upon his Honour, muft be given not only to every Member of Parliament, but to every indivi- dual Eledtor, fo far at leaft as to form a Majority of each, it would be impoflible even * An Impartial Entity f &C. frinuifor Roberts 1739. ces be per yance, who long res of lid be indent in a sache- ich a Writ- ' faid, ght to :ers for rder to Oepen- France iipt In- srWay 5, is an d from I Heart, knows for as ing but )um, in Its upon to every indivi- form a ipoffible even 1739- (59) even for the Crown of France to fpare fuch a Sum as would be fufficient for this Pur- pofe. But if any one of our Minifters fhould get the fole and entire Guidance of our King, and thereby the Difpofal of all the public Money, and of all the Pen (ions, Ports, and Offices, which the Crown has in its Power to beflow, the yearly Revenue and Profits of which, in the whole, I could fhew to be aboveyJix: Millions Sterling, fuch a Minifter by means of thefe Penfions, Pofts, and Offices, might get a corrupt hi- fluence not only over a Majority in each Houfe of Parliament, but over a Majority at moft of the Eledions in the Kingdom ; and if this fhould ever come to be our Cafe, the Court of France might, and certainly would endeavour to gain that Minifter, either by a large Sum of Money, or by pro- mifing him their Protedion, in cafe he fhould by any Turn of Fortune be in Danger of meeting with that Fate, which, thank God, moft fole and prime Minifters have hitherto met with in this Kingdom. And if the Crown of France fhould by either of thefe means gain a corrupt Influence over that Minifter, the Penfions, Poft^, and Offi- ces he had in his Power to beftow, would be brought in Aid of the French Influence upon him, and then our King, our Admini- ftration, and our Parliament might be pro- perly faid to be under a corrupt Dependance H 2 upon v,v; A'- ( 60 ) Vipon the Crown oi France, This is a Dan- ger we ought to guard againft, and it can be guarded againft no other way but by pre- ferving the Freedom and Independency of pur Parliaments. To pretend that our Parliaments were un- der a corrupt Influence from France during all King WilUam'% Reign, is a moft ridicu- lous Chimera. The Reverend Prelate whom this Author quotes as his Authority, was cer- tainly miftaken, when he fuppofed the Par- liament mentioned by him * to be bribed by France. If we confidcr the Circumftances and Tranfa(5lions of Europe from the Conclu- (ion of the Treaty of Ryjwick^ to the Time ^his Selfion of Parliament began, we muft al- low, that both the Partition Treaties were Snares laid for King tVilliam by the Artifice of France. Thefe Snares he unluckily fell into, not by the Advice of his Parliament, nor even by the Advice of his Privy Council, but by the Advice of a few Favourites, or ra- ther of one Favourite Minifter ; and therefore, if any extraordinary Sums came at that Time over from France^ we may mofl reafonably fuppofe, they were the Price paid hy France to our Minifters or Minifter, for the wrong Advice they gave to their Sovereign ; and that thofe Minifters, or this Minifter, was cun- ning enough not to bring it over at the very time it was paid, left it (hould have occafion- ed ♦ 5«rffrt's Hiftory, Vol. II. p. 257. t« *4^-0^ )an- mbe pre- cy of e un- uring dicu- vhom s cer- Par- )ed by lances onclu- Time uflal- s were rtifice iy fell ament, ouncil, or ra- irefore, tTime bnably France wrong nd that IS cun- le very cafion- ed ( 6i ) td a Sufpiclon againft him. But fuppofc, that thele extraordinary Remittances were adually made with a defign to attempt brib- ing that Parliament, the Behavic^ir of that very ParHament is a Proof upon Record, that the Fr^;7f^ failed in their Attempt; and their Failure at that time has convinced them of the Ridiculoufnefs of the Attempt ; for, I think, no Hiftorian has fince dreamed of their hav- ing made a Second upon our Parliaments, whatever they may have done with regard to our Miniflers. We have indeed, great Rcafon to dread any extraordinary Remittances from France : They are generally ominous to this Nation ; and I muft obferve, that in the Year 1733, there were fuch great Remittances from France, that moft of the French Merchants upon Change took Notice of it ; but what oc- cafioned them muft be left to time to difcover : I (hall only take Notice, that towards the End of that Year, the War broke out between France and the Emperor. But whatever may be in the Arguments for or againft excluding effedually moft Place- men, and all Penlioners, from having Seats in the Houfe ef Commons, it is now become peceflary to pafs fome fuch Bills, in order to reftore that Influence and Weight which this Nation ought to have upon the Counfels of Europe, It is certain that this Nation never }iad mugh Influence Abroad, but when it was governed I I ■ (62) governed by a popular Adminiftration ; and therefore, in order to reconcile the Minds of the People to our Adminiftration, it is become abfolutely neceflary to pafs not only the Place and Penfion BillSy bu" feveral other Bills that are proper for fecuri ig our Confti- tution. There is not now a IV an in the Na- tion, not poffefTed of a Penfion or Place un- der the Crown, but is perfuaded, that the Freedom and Independency of Parliament, and confequendy the Liberties and Conftitu- tion of this Kingdom, are in the moft immi- nent Danger. The Place and Penfion Bills are look'd on by all as the moft obvious Ex- pedients for avoiding this Danger j and it is necefTary to give the People Satisfadtion in this Point, if we have a mind topreferve the Independency of this Nation, or the Liberties of Europe. The prefent Conjundlure is the moft extraordinary, the moft critical, and the moft dangerous, this Nation ever faw, therefore it is abfolutely neceflary to have Men at the Helm who have not only great Authority at Home, but alfo fome Character Abroad. We muft make fome Steps towards fecuring our own Liberties, before we can do any Thing for fecuring, or rather reftoring the Liberties of Europe. Thofe who have difapproved of thefe Bills. Thofe who have conftantly approved of all our publick Meafures, are hitherto excufa- ble, and they may fee, by feveral late In- ftances. BUB wm* "" ' ** **" (63 ) ftances, how ready the People are to forgive. In Queftions of a very complex Nature, which all political Queftions are, the wifeft, the moft impartial may be miflaken -, and when a Gentleman's private Advantage or Emolument is engaged on one Side of the Queftion, as every Gentleman's muft be who has or expeds a Place or Penlion from the Crown, it is natural for him to judge that Side to be right, and to think he judges im- partially. He muft have a very clear Head, as well as a very honeft Heart, who judges one Side of any complexed Queftion to be right, when there is an Argument of 1000 1. or 1 0,000 1. a Year upon the other fide of the Queftion. Of this we muft now be convin- ced from Experience. We now feel the Ef- fedts, Europe feels the EfFedts of the Influ- ence we have been under, and France rejoices and triumphs. Can the Nation now approve of fuch Meafures? Can any one True Briton now approve of them ? But of all Things it would be moft amazing, ftiould fuch Mea- fures be now approved of and fupported by any one of that Family which owes its Great- nefs to that Glorious Englijh General, who but lately recovered the Liberties of Europe from the Jaws oiFrance^ and made her Grand Monarque tremble upon his Throne. The Glory of that Family, or even its Exiftence, is abfolutely inconfiftent with the Glory of France J and therefore its utterExtin^ion muft: X be I i (64) be the certain Confequencc of the Confum- mation of ir^«^^ Power, Every Man mufl now be fenfible, that we ought to have held a Condud: very different from that we have held for thefe 20 Years part. Every impartial Man muft be fenfible, that none of the Treaties orMeafures, I have menti- oned, could have met with the Approbation of a Britijh Parliament abfolutely free from Preju- dice as well as Dependance. Yet they were all approved of and applauded. I am far from fay- ing, that any of thofe that did fo then judged them to be wrong : No, They imagined at the refped:ive Times they gave their Approba- tion, every one of thofe Treaties and Meafures to be in itfelf wife and right : But Experience muft now convince them of the contrary j and from hence they muft grant, that, as they held or expedted Places or Penfions under the Crown, they were prejudiced in favour of every Thing that was done by the Minifters of the Crown. Therefore, I hope, they will now join in taking Care, that neither them- felvcs, nor any ortheir SuccefTors in Parlia- ment, fliall ever hereafter be under the like Prejudice. had I P S T-^ ^ Ml *^Jt'^ (65 ) POSTSCRI P T. e f s 11 O^i/ E French King^s Declaration^ containing his Reafons for fitting out the Breft and Toulon Squadrons, and for fotiifying Dunkirk [and Port L'Orient, having now appeared in Print, I think my felf obliged, by Way of Poftfcript, to make a few Remarks upon it. §. I. — 'To make known clearly the Principles of his Majeftfs Conduct to this Day^ and the End he propofes. In the preceding Sheets I have clear- ly fhewn the Principles of French Condu6l ever fince the Treaty of Utrecht, and the End they propofe. §. 2. — The opening of the Conferences at Ma- drid gave fome hope of Accommodation -, out the unforefeen breaking up of thofe Conferences gave Sufpicion that England was remote from every pacific Sentiment. Doe? not every one know, does it not appear from the Reafons given by the Kingof 5p«f« himfelf for not paying the 95000/. that we did not break off the Conferences, nor begin any Hoftilities, till his Catholick Majefty had adlually refilled to pay this 95000/. (o exprefsly Itipulared by the Convention, and had likewife refufcd to acknowledge our Right to a free Navigation in the American Seas ? Does not this fliew, that it was not England but Spain that was remote from every pacific Sentiment ? §. Ditto. — And the Hoftilities which the Englifli Nation began in America, before the Declaration of War could be there known, left no Room to I dotilt \ • I (66) doubt any longer of its Intentions. This really feems to have been didated by thofe French ylgents here, who advifed us to begin the War with the Publication of Repri/als only , and arc therefore angry with Admiral Vernon for carrying Hoftilities farther than they intended ; but what Intentions could thefe Hoftilities leave no room to doubt of ? The French Court had heard, 1 be- lieve, to their great Mortification, of our declar- ing War in the moft folemn Manner : They had an Account of it, long before thefe Hoftilities were committed ; and an Attack upon fome Part of the Enemy's Dominions, has always hitherto been tlie Intention of a Declaration of War, and by the late Example of France it felf ought to be the immediate Confequence : The French^ therefore, long before they heard of thefe Hofti- lities, could not doubt of our intending to attack the Spanijh Dominions in America^ unlefs they had Aflurances from fome Perfons here, that what we ought to do fhould not be done ; nor can they fay, that thefe Hoftilities were begun ia America, before the Declaration of War could be there known, unlefs they have better Intelli- gence here than they ought to have •, becaufe, if ■we a»5led prudently, we refolved upon declaring War long before we did : We probably refolved upon declaring War as foon as the Spanijh Mini- fter departed from hence, which was the 5th of September ; and who told the French Court, that we did not then fend Advice to Admiral Vernon, that War would be declared here on the 23d of O^ober, and at the fame Time fend him Orders to begin Hoftilities as foon after that Day as pofTible? If we did, and I am fure it was what we ought to have done, Admiral Vernon might have w» **':*v-/ '"■^'sjr- rying what room Ibc- edar- y had tilities ePart therto War, ight to Hofti- attack fs they ?, that :; nor :gun in could Intelli- lufc, if daring efolved i> Mini- : 5th of rt, that Vernon^ 23d of Orders Day as /as what n might have (67 ) have had thofe Advices and Orders fome Time before he failed from Jamaica upon his Expedi- tion againft Porto Bello. §. 3. — There was room to thinks that the fVarmth of People's Minds had hajiened its Mea- fures \ tbaty at the Bottom^ it had no other aim but to do itfelfjufticefor the pretended Vexations of the Spaniih Guarda Coftas ; and that after this firfi Fermentation, both Parties would refume the Methods of Negotiation. Here we may fee the Impartiality of France, This War is not on our Parts owing to a juft Refentment, but to the Warmth of People's Minds : The Depredations and Cruelties of SpaniJJj Guarda Cojlas are by the French called by the foft Name o{ Vexations^ as if thofe Pirates had only given our Ships a little Trouble in their Navigation ; and even thefe Vexations are faid only to be pretended, tho* their Depredations were notorious, and in leveral Cafes allowed to be unjufl-, even by the Court of Spain it felf. Therefore the French hope, that in order to obtain Juitice, we will, as foon as the firft Heat is over, return to the Method of Negotiation, tho' we have already negotiated for twenty Years in vain. I hope to fee them dif- appointed : I am fure our Trade will be undone, if they arc not. §.4. — It was not that France had not on her Side Grievances againft England, ^c. I believe it will be eafy to give them an Anfwer, when they come to explain thefe Grievances. I am fure we can balance Accompts with them, if tjjcy will pleafe to come to a fair Reckoning. Thcfc Paragraphs I thought it neceffary to make particular Remarks upon: As for what they lay about our intending to make Conquelts, I 2 and w . ( 68 ) and difturb the Commerce of all Nations in J- , merica, I have, in the foregoing Sheers, already fufficiently anfwered it •, and as to the Manifejio given Lord Cathcart^ if they mean that which has been publifhed, I have given a good Reafon for thinking it fpurious •, therefore I fhall only add fome Remarks upon the 9th Paragraph which relates to the Precautions taken by his mod Chriftian Majefty at Port VOnent and at Dun- kirk. Here we may fee a Piece of French Fi- tiejfe, in joining thcfe two Places together, as if they had as good a Right to eredt Batteries at Dunkirk^ as they have to eredb Batteries at Port VOrienL To Ihew that they have no Right to ereft Batteries or any other Sort of Fortification, or to make a Port for any Shipping, at Dunkirk j I can take no better Metliod than giving my Readers the 9th Article of the Treaty of Peace at Utncht, which was as follows, viz. » The moft Chriftian King Ihall take Care that all the Fortifications of the City of Dun- kirk be razed, that the Harbour be filled up, and that the Sluices or Moles which ferve to cleanfe the Harbour, be levelled, and that at the faid King's own Expence, within the Space of five Months after the Conditions of Peace are concluded and figned ; that is to fay, the Fortifications towards the Sea, within the Space of two Months, and thofe towards the Land, together with the faid Banks, within three Months; on this exprefs Condition alfo^ that the faid Fortifications^ Harbour^ Moles or Sluices^ be never repaired again. All which fhall not however be begun to be ruined, till after every Thing is put into his Chriftian Majefty's Hands, which is to be given him in- ftead thcreofj or as an Equivalent.' And i^ ^ *^Jt-^ 1 n J- eady ifejlo hich eafon ll only graph Is mod Bun- ch Fi- as if eries at It Port ghtto cation, unkirky ng my *eace at :c Care of Dun- illed up, ferve to I that at be Space Df Peace fay, the thin the rards the , within ion alfo^ Moles or 1 which ned, till ^hriftian I him in- And V (69 ) And the 4th Article of the Treaty of Alliance between Great Britain^ France^ and Holland, 1 717, which was as follows, viz. * IV. And the moft Chriftian King being fincere- ' ly defirous, that every thing heretofore agreed on * with the Crown of France concerning the Town « of Dunkirk , may be fully executed, and thatno- * thing be omitted which the King of Great-BrU * tain may think neceffary for the entire Deftruc- ' tion of the Port of Dunkirk^ and to prevent all * manner of Sufpicion that there is an Intention to » make a new Port at the Canal of Mar dyke ^ and * to put it to fome other Ufe than draining off the ' Waters which might drown the Country, and * carrying on the Commerce neceflary tor the » fubfiftencc and maintenance of the People of that * part of the Netherlands^ which is only to be * carry*d on by fmall Boats, that are not allow'd ' to be above 16 foot wide*, his moft Chriftian « Majcfty doth engage, and promife to caufe * every thing to be executed, which the Sieur ' d'lhberville his moft Chriftian Majefty*s Envoy * having full Power for that purpofe, did agree » to at Hampton-Court, as is contain'd in a Mc- ' morial of thei^th of November, 17 16, fign'd * by the Sieur d' Ibberville, and by the Lord Vif- ' count Townjhend, and Mr. Methuen, Secretarits « of State for Great- Britain, which is as follows. An Explanation ofivhatfiou*d be inftrtedin the IVih Article of the Treaty concerning the Canal and Sluices o/*Mardyke. * I. HP HAT the Great PaflTage of the new Sluice ' of Mardyke, which is 44 Foot wide, fhall ' be demoliih'd from top to bottom, that is to fay, « by ( ■li ! ( 70 ) by taking away its * BajoyerSy Planks * Buiks^ * Longerinesy and • TraverftneSy from one end to the other -, and by taking off the Gates, the Wood and Iron.work of which (hall be taken to pieces, and all thefe Materials be employ'd elfe- where to fuch Uies as his moftChriftian Majefty fhall think Bt ; provided neverthelefs, that they be never made ufe of for any Port, Haven or Sluice at Dunkirk or Mardyke^ or in any other Place whatfoever, within two Leagues from ei- ther of thofe two Places : it being the Intention of the contracting Parties, and the End they propofe to themfelves by this Treaty, that no Port, Haven, Fortification, Sluice or Bafin, be made or built at Dunkirk^ the Sluice of Mar- dykcy or any other Place whatever along the Shore, at fuch Diftance upon that Coaft. *■ 2. That the little Sluice fhall remain as it is at prefent, with refpeft to its Depth, provided the Breadth thereof be reduc'd to 16 Foot i that is to fay, by advancing the Bajoyer de la Pille ten Foot on the Weftfide, aher having taken away 6 Foot of the Flooring, and the Bulks of the * Radier all along on the fame fide, the remain- ing four Foot of Plank or Flooring being ne- ceffary to ferve for the Foundation of a new * Bajoyer \ and forafmuch as the faid Bajoyer muft be advanc'd ten Foot towards the Eaft-fide, there (hall likewife be demolilh'd ten Foot of the fame Pile on the Weft-fide from the Foundation, to the end diat the prefent Radier may never ferve for a Sluice of 26 Foot broad, as this is at prefent. * 3. The Jettees and Fafcine-Work from the * Downs^ * Thefe are Ternu for Beams, ^r. wliich caoiuc be ren- dered into Englifilf. X. ,.**■, "*>^ .V !#■ •**^l»''' (71 ) * Downs, or the Place where the Tide rifes upon « the Strand, when 'tis High Water, down to * lowed Ebb, (hall be demolifh'd on both fides « of the new Canal, and made level with the * Shore *, and the Stones and Fafcine- Work that * are above the faid Level, may be carry'd away * and employ'd to fuch ufe as his moft Chriftian * Majefty (hall think fit ; provided however, that * they be never made ufe of for any Port or Ha- * yen at Dunkirk, or Mardyke, or any other Place * whatfoever, wichin two Leagues from either of * thofe two Places : the Intention of the Parties * contrafting, and the End they propofe to them- ' felves by this Treaty being, that no more Jettees < or Fafcine- Work (hall ever be made again upon * the Shore of this Coaft, within that diftance on * either fide. « 4. 'Tisalfoftipu]ated,thatimmediately after the * Ratification of this prefent Treaty, a fufficient « number of Workmen (hall be employ'd in the * Demolition of the faid Jettees along the new * Canal, to the end that they may be raz'd-, and « the Work finifh'd, if po(rible, within two « Months after the Ratification. But for as much * as it has been reprefented, that becaufe the Sca- ' fon is fo far advanc'd, they cannot begin tonar- ' row the Radier of the fmall Paflage, nor demo-- * lilh the great Radier till next Spring, it is agreed * that this Work (hall be begun dr^lll and en- Jlprtlit, May 5 tirely perfedled if pofTible, in the manner above- mention'd by the end of June^ ^7^7' « 5. The Demolition of the Jettees or Peers on both fides of the old Canal or Port of Dunkirk^ (hall be entirely finifh'd an-i made level with the Ground, all the way from the loweft Ebb, as far as within the Town o{ Dunkirk; and if there 3 * (hall i u 8 • '\ ,» ^ ii ' 1 I ; f 7? ) ■ fhall remain any pieccsrOf J^rt Blanc, Cbatsau Verd, and 5o««^ Efper^e^ i\;ity fhall be totally laid flat to the Groi^nd.. . » When this Trffi|t)^ihall be ratify'd, the King of Great- Britain znd the Lords the States Gene- ral ohhc United Provinces may fend Commifllo^ ners to the Spotj to be Eye-witnefles of the Ex- ecution of this Article. » We have fign'd this Article provifionally, and upon condition that it be approved by his moft Chriftian Majefty, his Britnnnick Majefty, and the Lords the States General of the 17;///^'^ Pro- vinces. At Hampton Court the 4^th of Septem- ber in the Year 1716. Sign*d by D* Ibberville^ Townjhend^ and P. Methuen. By thefe Articles we may fee, that his moft Chriftian Majefty has no Right to make a Port or Fortifications at Dunkirk \ and yet he has been fathered to make a Port there, and we have made ufe of that Port for feveral Years paft, as appears by our Cuftom houfe Books; and now he has publiftied a Declaration, the very Title of which is, Reafons for fortifying Dunkirk, What our Minifters have faid to this, what our Parliament will fay to it, muft be left to Time to difcover. It is, in my Opinion, paft Time to fay, I hope, it is not paft Time to do. FINIS. > c .1 1 k A «f WJK^ l4..WJiH - Tf*? '■^-. r \