IM^GE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) V "'//\ // s\%^ i^ Sm & III 1.0 I.I •^ 1^ 1112.2 t 1^ i^a lllllio 1.8 125 1.4 1.6 ^ 6" — ► V] ^i ^;. ■' ^ o 7 w Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREF.T WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 &>- CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques O' Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes tochniques et bibliographiqces The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographicaily unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. L'Institut a microfilm6 ie meilleur exemplaire qu'il iui a 6t6 possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la m^thode normale de filmage sont indiquds ci-dessous. V n Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagee Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaur^e et/ou pelliculie Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque □ Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur j I Pages damaged/ Pages endommagdes Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages restaurdes et/ou pellicul^es Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages d6color6es, tachetdes ou piqudes □ Coloured maps/ Cartes g^ographiqucs en couleur □ Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de cculeur (i.e. autre que bleus ou noire) □ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur C] Botnd with other material/ J Relie avec d'autres documents y Pages detached/ Pages dStach^es D n Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La reliure serree peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge int^rieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutdes lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, torsque cela 6:ait possible, ces pages n'ont pas et6 film§es. □ Showthrough/ Transparence □ Quality of print vaiies/ Qualit4 in^gale de I'impression I j Includes supplementary material/ D D Comprend du materiel supplementaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6t6 film^es i nouveau de facon d obtenir la meilleure image possible, D Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppl6mentaires: This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est film6 au taux de reduction indiqud oi-dessous. 14X 18X 22X 10X c 12X 16X / 20X 26X 30X 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: La Bibliothdque de la Ville de Montreal L'exemplaire f\\m6 fut reproduit grdce d la g6n6rosit6 de: La Bibliothdque de la Ville de Montrial The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol —►(meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettetd de l'exemplaire filmd, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprim^e sont filmds en commenpant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont film^s en commenpant par la premidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la dernidre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbole — ► signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbole V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre fil;n6s d des taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, il est filmd d partir de Tangle sMp6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m^thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 SAliE OAOH(^ ^'-/ Spiritnalized Happiness- Theory; OR li NEW UTILITARIANISM. A Lecture before the Farmington School of Philosophy, June, 1890» BY W. D. LIGHTHALL, M.A., B.C.L. \ ttfmmtMtammmi l'Wmi^K% ■ '-<. itm H t^^i»~i'^ ■■ ! « : '' ~^M »; ^•|ir H' >? t i i ' .1 » .* i : ^ ■ # ■f Mf N f ^ * I i ^' 'i c^ b^'t i < r>? * 4 e -Vi'i'^j;' yfj- 3 S" tt ■, ^ SPIRITUALIZED HAPPINESS-THEORY; OR, NEW UTILITARIANISM. A LECTURE BEFOKE THE FAHMINGTON SCHOOL OF rillLOSOrilY, JUNE, 1890, BY W. a). LIGHTHALL, M.A., B.C.L. MONTKEAL : "WITNESS" PMNTING HOUSE, 323 ST. JAMES STREET. 1890. 87178 rilEFACE. The present publication is a brief systeniMtization of a theory, of which more or less undigested notes have been published, under the titles of "An Analysis of the Altruistic Act," and " Sketch of a Xew Uiilitorianisni." Its present shape is that of a lecture, read June 20th, 1890, before the Farniington School of Philosophy, and is connected with an exaniiiuition of the Ethical System of tiie late Thomas Hill (Jreen, in relation to rtilitarianism. The author desires to dedicate this i.sue to The Philosophy Club, of Montreal, an earnest, little circle, of which he lias the lionor of l>eing a member. MONTKEAL, August, 1890, mmmmmmm mmmmm SPIRITUALIZED IIAPPINESS-TIIEOKY. I. — KANTS ETHIC. A century ago (1785-88), Immanuel Kant, living liis quaint but momontops life at Koenigsberg, arrived at a profound tluiory of etliics. Confusedly and contradictorily expressed it was, like much other of his thinking, as he lumself acknowledged;* but as we disentangle the phrases, get U> tlie meaning of the obscurities, and understand from the context how to interpret his contradictions, we find that Kant's theoiy arrived at the deepest and most nearly consistent view of morality which the knowledge of that age would permit to any thoory. J^eside it, the ethics of llunie, and those of his contempor- aries Price and Reid, were but rudimentary. Kant's theory of Moral Obligation is condensed in his dictum : " Act ^0 tliat the maxim of thy will might be made a principle of universal legislation." It was in tlie miivermlif// of the moral command, not in anything in the content, that, he insisted, lay its distinct cliaracter. Doin^^ scientifically what the ancient Stoics had unscieulifically done, he ascribed this universality to our faculty of universals, the Reason, and insisted on its deep spiritual origin and its superiority to chance desires. Condemning personal pleasure and interest as aims, he urges man to listen to nothing but the call of Universality— to seek only " the interest of Reason." As has been frequently pointed out, the vulnerable point in Kant's statement was that it is abstract. Were we to interpret it strictly, we should miss a warm, real end, and should be forced to ask the further (luestion, " What kind of a universal is it we are called to seek 1 " and also, " Why does it commend itself ? " questions which Kant never answered clearly. The reason I attribute is, that the age was not ripe for him to be able to do so. Kant studied in a day when modern discovery and * Preface to 2nd ed. K. of P. R. ' ~ " mmmmmm 6 . discussion hail not yet brouglit togetlier the vast store of infonnatiun which in our time is added to the stock-in-trade of ethical tli inkers. It was only later that the KvolutionistH .sn[>]ilie(l those wonderfiil facts concerning the related world of conscious creatures which have increased our lights upon Ethics almost as much as upon any other science. It wa.s only later that Kant's own metaj>hysic had time for development into the great and fruitiul systems of his famous " chil- dren," Fichte, Schelling, Schopenhauer and Hegel. And Jeremy IJentham and John Stuart Mill had not as yet itiaugurated tlie keen Utilitarian discussion on the place of pleasure and pain. II. — (iREEN S ETHIO. Thomas Hill (Ireen's Ethic stands at thi^ day in its point of view no further advanced than the theory of Kant, That is not saying little, it should be said, ior in point of c/earnenti and (h'rrfnpincnf he has given a value to Kant's theory almost equal to producing a second original. To do so, he has added great improvements from Hegel, and has made minor ones of his own. You are familiar, no doubt, with the manner in which he discloses the nature and action of the unifying power in our consciousness, and, from it, arrives at the conclusion that " a common spiritual source " must be the basis both of our knowhidge and of nature ; that this mysterious source must be a world-consciousness, of which ours is a limited mode ; that man is, in so far as he is the expression of this world-consciousness, " iree " in the sense of not subject to a blind course of nature ; that it ex- hibits a unifying and governing power upon his imnte as well as his knowledge, and impels him to consciously seek as an ol)ject his com- pletest sdf-satit^fadkm, so leading him on to the ideal of " a better Gtate of himself as yet unattained." In Green's own words (>5ll5*) : "The ground upon which, rightly or wrongly, the reducibility of moral conduct to a series of natural phenomena, and with it the possibility of a physical science of ethics, is here denied .... lies in the view that in all conduct to which moral predicates are applicable, a man is an object to himself ; that such conduct, equally, whether virtuous or vicious, expresses a motive consisting in an idea of personal good which the man seeks to realize by action ; and that the presentation of such an idea is not explicable Of his " Prologornena to Ethics." by any scries of events in tini<', but iniplies the action of an eternal consciouonoss which makes tlio processes of animal life orj,'anic to a particular reproihiction of itself ia num." He goes on to consider the relation of Will to Desire, and agrees wilh the doctrine that the Will is tin- Htr(twi<'d ih\un\ with tlu! .ptali- Heation that it is " the man an th-ftinn;/ or putting himself forth in desire for the realization of some object present to him in idea." Will and Intellect are thus practically found working together, liut are different phases of the self. " Will is ecpuilly and indistinguish- ubly desire and thought,"— not meffi desire or mcir thought, but " the will is simply the man. Any act of will is the expression of the man as he at the time is." In fhe Hpucijic diffrrnre of tlio objects of williw/ lies the ditlerence between good and bad will— the difference, for example, between pleasure as an object, and a vocation conceived as given by God. The Utilitarian alhrms that the moral act is one done intentionallij, and that intention judged Ijy the measure of pleasure and pain in the results. The Kantian —with Green— on the contrary holds that the goodness of the will does not depenil on anyth'ng extrinsic such as pleasure or pain, but on itself as an absolute en^>^, neither on the one side a phenomenon of mind, nor on the other of matter or form, hut capable of interacting between the tico, and forming a connection betioeen them, ivorks iiere. It belongs to a realm other than the physical and ike mental. There is, there- fore, such a third, sphere in man ; and out of it comes ethical action. At first I would not give a name to this bond, or source, or power, which acts with such meaning in providing for us happiyiess and averting from us pain. At length the name which seemed most fitting was " The Mysterious Power." In tracing through t!ie facts of the universe the relatives of the tjpical act of will, which, with apologies to Green, for a moment I shall define, as the co-ordination of a mechanical series towards a residt of pleasure, I found the 11 Mysterious Power governing everything for progress towards happi- ness. Unconscious function (for example, the play of the lungs in breathing) showed its presence and provtd itself but a form of this co-ordination of a mechanical series to the service of a happiness. Instinct, conscious of the way but not of the plan, contained it. It also was the co-ordination of a mechanical series to the ser ice of a happy result. Animal communities, where each individual, by his nature, tends to contribute to the happiness of the whole, and where, in fact, wu get out of the individual, into the sphere of a group^ showed it. Conscious Egoism, the pursuit of one's own happiness, was the type of it in small. In Altruism, where the individual con- sciously prefers another's good to his own, instinctive as all tho keenest psychologists, in one phrase or another, agree it to be, the quiet Power sliifts the happiness sought from the man's own to that of others, and leads him mysteriously to a higher pinnacle. Evolu- tion, with this key. became one great, long-continued act of will. That it was the principle of all the vital units of which each man is made, gave a fundamental reason for faith in men as they are, and in the future of human history. They must obey this law, for it is the law of their being. It explained the meaning and limits of human freedom. Looking farther and broader than man and nis places and arjos into the universe itself, it gave confidence in universe- history and in immortality. Lastly, and not least of the gifts, it gave what I believe to be the one complete and demonstrable teleology — the teleology of happiness- facts, speaking with simple certainty in the typical voluntary act itself, for here clearly is a something i i the universe acting with an unmistakeable meaning and proving universal purpose. Though I hesitate to institute a comparison between these con- clusions and the great thinking of Green, yet he arrives, I think it will be seen, by a far more laborious method at no more than the same results so far as they go. The Eternal or Universal Con- sciousness unifying our knowledge and loants is the same as The Mysterious Power. I did not name its understanding a " conscious- ness " for the same reason that Spencer hesitated to apply the term to his " Unknowable," namely, that it is so far above us that it may no more be described in terms of man'a consciousness " than man's con- sciousness in terms ol that of a plant." The practical matter to us, m howovei", is tliat it acts in our sphere in a manner which is equivalent to that of a consciousness. Next to the nature of the source of Willing comes the question of the nature of the IMoral Ideal. What is . the end sought by the agent in a moral act 1 Is it, as Green concludes, " his satisfaction or good in objects conceived as desirable because contrihuting to the best sta!;e or perfection of man ; " '' the fulfilment of a vocation conceived as given by the divine mind in his self-consciousness 1 " Or is it, in some form, pleasure? As to the word "pleasure" in such discussions, it is used, of course, in a broader sense than its vulgar acceptation, and includes escape from pain, as well as every sort of agreeable consciousness up to the most refined happiness, a!id on to infinite bliss. It is to be wished that the word "Feeling, " which conveniently covers both pleasure and pain, had been used in that sense by Green, lie applies it, instead, to mere indifferent perceptive sensation, contrary to our current usage and in a manner productive of some confusion. In combating it strenuously like all Kantists, he certainly has the advantage of the Utilitarians in the matter of logical consistency. (See, e.g., ^^ 162-170, attack on J. S. Mill.) Mill was forced to admit what Green urges, that the liighest results have been obtained by the actions of men who set pleasure as a conscious aim aside. The distinctive principles of Utilitarianism are : — That Pleasure or Happiness is the only real good, and suffering the only real evil. That what one ought to regard in an aim is its ultimate value in pleasure — its "utility." That each ought to seek the greatest good of the greatest number : — or, in better phrase, to produce Uie greatest quantity of happiness (impersonally considered.) Now, what it is proper to demand of the Utilitarian, is to find in the constitution of the individual a principle or principles logically sufficient to explain why, if the pursuit of pleasure be the only intel- ligible principle, he was ever bound to prefer that of others to his own, as he feels that he is in Altruistic action. Sympathy can only account for it partly. Benthum tried the introduction of sanctions, such as the pains of law, the esteem of fellow-men, etc. Mill, after reviewing the sanctions, concludes to " a natural basis of se7itiment for Utilitarian morality," a " desire to be in unity with our fellow- r I 13 r creatures." He admits all that is clainiotl for the noble character of the facts of disinterested action, and says of the martyrs, '• Their im- pulse was a divine enthusirtsm. — a self-forgetting devotion to an idea." In admitting this, however, his own case is gone. His arguments from sanctions (indirect calculations) might hold good up to a certain point ; hut Mahtyrdom is the crucial test. For if a man allows any moment of exaltation to destroy all the goods of livintr, he should be from the personal point of view the chiefest of miscalculators, the most unreasonable of men. Even if you suggest that had he lived, his life afterwards would have been too painful to be a good : we have to reply that if he were a reasonable man, neither he himself nor any other could reproach him. Something was wanting, and this Mill's associates and followers have never succeeded in supplying. The reason of the failure is, that they held a doctrine in psychology which precluded their doing so — the doctrine that the complex mental phenomena were sufficiently explainable by mere associations of the simpler, in other words, the doctrine of Associationalism, which had descended from Hai tley. Associationalism claimed " to be neither materialistic nor idealistic, to have nothing to do with mind or matter, in themselves