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'W(»r

A LETTER

Archbishop Lynch

■ *

■^^Sr-

ttl

/ -^ —

\ ' A CRITIQUE

<Mf

CARDINAL NEWMAN'S

ExposilioD of tbo Illative

EMBODIED IN

A LETTER

ARCHBISHOP LYNCH

T Arnold Haultain M A

TORONTO
WILLIAMSON & CO

SucoesBors to Willing & WilliamHoa
1885

To the Most Reverend

JOHN JOSEPH LYNCH, D.D.,

ARCHBISHOP OF TORONTO, PRBr.ATB ASSiaTANT OF THE PONTIFICAL THUmNk,

Your (iHA( k:

You liave m often, both by published writing and pulpit
\itterance, taken upon yourself the defence of the denomination
in which you hold so exalted a position, that 1 venture to address
to you a letter embodying a criticism of a doctrine promulgat^'d
by one of the most eminent of the Cardinals of that denomhia-
t!on. The doctrine to which I refer is that of the possibility of
attaining to certitude by means of an illative sense. I shall
proceed without further delay to place l>efore you my reasons
for not believing in such possibility.

„

IfioX yap Soffci, & ^utKpartK, ircp2 rSiv roiovrav ttna^ wnrtp mii croi ri

/itv tragic ciSci'ai iv t^ vvv )3u() y dSiVoTOV elvat ^ frayVMAcfrdv tj.— ^N^

Plato, Fhado, 83, c. /

IT is now more than thirteen years since the first
publication of Mr, Froude's criticism of Cardinal
Newman's Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent.
During this time religious discussion has been so rife
that we may unhesitatingly say that it has formed an
essential feature of the greater part of our heavier
periodical literature. I need not, then, I think, hesi-
tate to call your attention to a portion of this famous
work — and that an exceedingly important portion —
which Mr. Froude has left altogether untouched. Es-
pecially too, as it is the boast of the Church of which
the author of that work is so illustrious a representa-
tive, and of which, so far at all events as England and
Ireland are concerned, he is so deservedly revered a
spokesman, that it is her system that supereminently
stands confronting the attacks of those agnostic
theories which one of her latest defenders sums up in
the word "Naturalism." '''It is her glory," writes
this brilliant apologist, ** that among the multitudinous
religions of men, she is specially singled out by the
anti-Christian movement as its irreconcilable foe."
*' The Catholic Church is in "^e forefront of the
battle." <"

It will be generally conceded that, of all the reli-
gions which profess to exhibit a rational and coherent
exposition of the 'origin and end of man, and which de-
clare that either certain unique and unalterable depositay
or certain infallible formularies, contain this exposition,

I. W. S. Lilly. "The Religious Future of the World."- Contemporary Review^
Fehruary, 1883.

• 6

the Boman Catholio Church has most coDspioaously
sacoeeded in moulding herself to the varying progres-
sion and retrocession of human sagacity, and the vicis-
situdes of popular sympathy or distrust. It is in this
supreme endeavour to conform to the spirit of the

age, that there is likely to lurk the most serious
source of error. To glance at one of the most fluctu-
ating of religious questions : that of the province of
reason in the attainment of theological truths, we
shall find that she has invariably adjusted her posi-
tion to the force of extraneous opposition or support.
And at the present day, more, perhaps, than ever
before, seeing that reason in all extra-religious matters
holds a position inexpugnable, and evinces an ever-
encroaching power, she is wont to descend somewhat
from the stand she has occasionally taken, and to
allow, with certain reservations, its claim to be the
touchstone of human knowledge.

In harmony, apparently, with this tendency, Cardi-
nal Newman, striving to bring certain religious princi-
ples within the grasp of those who deny the possibil-
ity of a supernatural perception of the reality of
Christianity, and recognizing the fruitlessness of
attempting to prove that the reasoning powers alone
can obtaia for us that absolute assurance which, in
matters eternal, all seek, falls back upon the illative
sense. It is in this, and that an exceedingly momen-
tous, doctrine of the Cardinal's, that I hope to show
there lies concealed a grave and radical defect.

That this attainment of certitude is the office as-
signed to the illative sense as explained in chapter ix.
of the work mentioned, the following quotations will
prove : — " In any inquiry about things in the concrete

men differ from eaoh other, not so much in the sonnd-
ness of their reasoning as in the principles which
govern its exercise, . . . those principles are of
a personal character, . . . where there is no com-
mon measure of minds, there is no common measure
of arguments, and . . . the validity of proof is
determined, not by any scientific test, but by the
illative sense.'**"' •* I follow him [Amort] in holding,
that ... we are not justified, in the case of con-
crete reasoning, and especially of religious inquiry, in
waiting till . . logical demonstration is ours, but
on the contrary are bound in conscience to seek truth
and to look for certainty by modes of proof, which,
when reduced to the shape of formal propositions,
fail to satisfy the severe requisitions of science."*^'
What, then, is this illative sense ? It is a ^' mental
faculty " to which " is committed " " the sole and
final judgment on the validity of an inference in con-
crete matter."**' Not the process of reasoning, but the
** regulating principle of all reasoning ; " '< concerned
with the soundness of the reasoning."''' " Any inves-
tigation whatever . . , will sufl&ce to show how
impossible it is to apply the cumbrous apparatus of
verbal reasoning to its continuous necessities, and how
imperative it is to fall back upon that native good
sense (that is, the action of our illative judgment upon
our personal view of things) which legitimately trusts
itself because there is nothing else given it to trust."*®'
*^ It determines what science cannot determine,[<tbe
limit of converging probabilities, and the reasons
sufficient for a proof."^'' These are the most definite

2. Ofi cit , Part II. Cb. X S a. 5- ^b. ix § 3.

3. I&id. 6. Cb. ix § a.

4. Cb. ix. 7. /Aid.

ufcfceraaoes that oan be culled from the explanation of
the subject ; bat they are not more vague than is the
object of such explanation itself shadowy and intangi-
ble, and as such I intend to treat it.

I. Anyone, hearing of an apparition, would consider
that there was, prima faciey evidence against the fact
of its objective existence, because it is contrary to
all recognized notions of the law of the uniformity of
nature ; in other words, the probabilities are in favour
of believing, that all so-called spectral phenonema
can be explained away on a purely natural foundation.

I£. If, mdeed, the unearthly visitor can be person-
ally examined, and can show credentials intelligible to
mundane minds of its supernal, infernal, or merely
immaterial source, we need go no farther.

III. But if all its actions can be shown to be nob
without the sphere of an ordinary mortal, a strong
chain of condemnatory evidence is forthcoming.

lY. If the particular individual who personated the
ghost can be discovered, all doubt is at an end.

Let us apply thia to Cardinal Newman^s illative
sense.

I. Seeing that " certitude does not admit of an in-
terior immediate test, sufficient to discriminate it
from false certitude ; "^** that, " for genuine proof iu
concrete matter we require an organon more delicate,
versatile, and elastic than verbal argumentation ; "^^^
that "inference, considered in the shape of verbal
argumentation, determines neither our principles, nor
our ultimate judgments, — that it is neither the teat

& Ch. vii. §a.

9. Ch. viii. ii.

of truth nor the adequate basis of assent ; "^''^ His
Eminence has recourse to an '* unscientific reasoning,"
which '''has a higher source than logical rule," which
is born, not made, ^"^ analogous to phronesis in mat-
ters of coDduct, to taste in the fine, and to skill in
the economic, arts. ^"^ Beguiled by the extreme
subtlety of the processes of the mind, he must assert
the existence of an unknown and undemonstrablo
entity as the source of such phenonema. That is to
say, believing himself to possess, "^nd believing that
all can possess, an assurance which, he perceives, ia
not the product of the ordinarily classified intellec-
tual powers,, he conceives of a power superior to all
these powers i not that of reasoning, but one that su-
persedes and controla reason ; not the process of draw-
ing conclusions, but an authority that dictates whe-
ther or not conclusions shall be accepted; not any-
thing that entered into the universally preconceived
conceptions of the laws of mind, but a separate, dis-
tinct, and auxiliary faculty. On the face of it, this:
theory is highly suspicious, and, as such, should be
subjected to the severest scrutiny.

II. Let us, however, granting, despite its unfavour-
ablo aspect, the reality of this spectral sense, examine
its credentials. There are three different points of
view from which it may be considered: —

A. Can the " higher source " signify a divine source ?
Are we to understand, that, in the exercise of the mind
in the search for religious truth, the natural faculties.
are aided by a Spiritual illumination, a specific and
divinely-granted adjunct to a weak and faltering

Ko. Hid, II Ch. viii. %^. I2. Ch. ix. ^z.

reason ? No ; this, a view perfectly legitimate, and con-
taining in it no inconsistencies if certain not rare pre.
mises are pcaited, cannot be the interpretation of Car-
dinal Newman's position. Were it so, he could not
possibly have omitted somewhere to have so categori-
cally asserted. And yet we find that he strenuously
avoids the application of even the epithet " moral " to
the certitude springing from the utilisation of this
sense, and oaly once, after much hesitation, does he so
make use of it. Perfectly easily too, might wo have
so construed his elucidation, had he given us the slight-
est encouragement. For it is not, as far as I know, a
doctrine alien to the church he has joined. The fol-
lowing sentences from one who has, I believe, gone
through a very similar process of thought, culminating,
in like manner, in a secession from Anglo- to Boman-
Catholicism, seems to imply a belief that some such
coalition exists : — " We do not assent, then, to these
dogmatic truths of revelation, whatever they may be,
because we see them — because they are evident . . ,
it would be forced assent . . . and all merit would
consequently cease." ''* God's grace is ever invisibly
working with us on our journey towards faith." ^^'^
Doubtless the learned Cardinal — to whom indeed the
last-mentioned author dedicates the volume quoted
from — holds a like view ; indeed he himself thus
writes : ^' It must be recollected that theological rea-
soning professes to be sustained by a more than human
power, and be guaranteed by a more than human au-
thority." '^** But certain it is, that the illative sense
is not the explanation of the workings of such power,

13. Sermons by Fathers of the Society of Jam Vol. i<. by Rev. T< Haider, S. J.
Sermon y.

14. Op.tit.Q.\x, ix.83.

nor the evidences of such guarantee. But, after all,
were this the true explanation, the possession of such
certitude would be vMlueless, for — the owner being
powerless to transfer so superhumanly implanted, and
so purely subjective, a gift — the certitude becomes as
useless to others as the water of crystallization in a
Sahara rock to a parched Aiab, or the latent heat of an
ice-floe to a freezing Lap.

B. From certain expressions used with reference to
the nature of this illative sense — expressions such as a
** present imagination " which " reaches to conclusions
above and beyond" " methodical processes of infer-
ence; " ^^"^ a " natural, uncultivated faculty, sometimes
approaching to a gift ; " ^^^^ a ** native good sense ; " ^"^
a ** personal gift ; " <^^^ or "habit ; " ^^^^ etc.y we might
very pardonably conjecture that this sense was a sort
of logical clairvoyance, which overleapt the bounds
of ordinary reasoning, and was only saved from the
epithet of irrational by the fact that its exploits were
utterly inconceivable. True, we do sometimes appear
to avail ourselves of an indefinable power of choice.

" It lies not in our power to love or hate,
For will in us is over-ruled by fate,
When two are stript, long ere the course begin,
We wish that one should lose, the other win ;
And one especially do we affect
Of two gold ingots, like in each respect.
The reason no man knows ; let it suffice.
What we behold is censured by our eyes."(20)

But if I may be allowed the saying ridentem dicere

verum quid vetat ? I can compare such lawless per

saltum conclusion to nothing better than to the trick

of projecting a coin into the air to determine which of

15. Cb. viii. § a. 18. Ch. vii'« §3.

16 Ch. viii. § 3 19. Ch. viii. § 2.

17. Cb. ix. §3 20. Hero and Leander, Marlowe, ist Seitiad.

two courses shall be adopted when the recommeBda-
tions of each seem in equipoise, and therefore unfit; to
take upon itself the high duties imposed by the Cardi-
nal on his illative sense.

C. A cursory and uncritical examination of the
nature of tbis sense, might lead one to suppose that it
is identical il its operation with that to which logi-
cians have given the name * anticipation ' — the faculty,
which, bj a glorious guess as it were, seizes a truth
prior to the proper perception of its proofs. Such was
Newton's law, which saw in the revolutions of the
planets, the action of the same force that governs a
falling apple. Such too, probably, was Darwin's grand
generalization explaining the origin of species in the
animal kingdom. That this, however, is by no means
the pro"vince of the illative sense, the following brief
comparison will establish : —

a Anticipation is an attempt to discover hidden
causes ; the illative sense determines which of several
causes already found shall be accepted.

h Anticipation is verified by subsequent ordinary
proofs ; the illative sense over-rides, and is not amen*
able to, ordinary proofs.

c Anticipation, per gey is not trustworthy ; trust-
worthiness is the peculiar property of the illative sense,

There ought, properly, next to be considered tbe

analogies stated to exist between the illative sense and
phronesiSf taste, and skill. I am not, however, at all
desirous of discovering any discrepancies in such analo-
gies, in as much as this will depend upon the general
outline of my line of argument. But when we read on

the one h&nd ot phronesis, that it is " the faculty which

guides the mind in matters of conduct ; " that it is
''the directing, controlling, and determining principle
in such matters ; " that it is ** seated in ^he mind of
the individual, who is thus his own law, his own
teacher, and his own judge in those special cases of
duty which are personal to him ;"^^' and when we road
on the other hand of conscience, that it ''is not a
judgment upon any speculative truth, any abstract
doctrine, but bears immediately on conduct, on some-
thing to be done or not done ;" that it is " the practi-
cal judgment or dictate o^ reason, by which we judge
what liic et nunc is to be done as being good, or to be
avoided as evil;" ^'^'^ we are very forcibly struck with
the identity of conscience andphronesis. But of con-
science we are told that it " is a messenger from Him,
who . . . speaks to us behind a veil ... is
the aboriginal Vicar of Christ;" " the voice of con-
science is the Divine Authority." ^^'^ So that if — as
appears — conscience SLudphronesis are one and the same
thing, may we not justly ask if it is ri^ht to draw an
analogy between the illative sense and this one thing
by whatever name we call it ? Does not the divine
nature of this mentor nullify its comparison to any
purely natural power ?

On the subject of taste, indeed, it is impossible so
definitively to maintain the existence of any discre-
pancy, because, unfortunately, despite the extreme
variety of the views that have been urged as regards
taste, the learned prelate has omitted to vouchsafe to
us any clue by which to discover the peculiar signifi-

21 Op cit. Ch. IX. § 2.

22. Dr. John Henry Newman's Reply to Mr. Gladstones Pamphlet, § 5.

23. Ibid, — I have of coursfl. as Your Grace will notice, been careful to quote
ftom Cardinal Newmao himself throughout this argument.

14.

cation he himself attaches to the term. There is, in-
deed, one extremely high authority on this subject to
whom His Eminence might have appealed as seeming
to substantiate the aptness of the analogy between
taste and the illative sense. Mr, Ruskin thus writes :
** The differences in the accuracy of the lines of the
Torso of the Vatican . , . iiory those in one of
M. Angelo's finest works, . . . restb on points of
such traceless and refined delicacy, that, though we
feel them in the result, we cannot follow them in the
details. . . . But suppose that the best sculptor
in the world, possessing the most entire appreciation
of the excellence of the Torso, were to sit down, pen
in hand, to try and tell us wherein the peculiar truth
of each line consisted. Could any words that he could
use make us feel the hairbreadth of depth and distance
on which all depends ?" Yet to me it seems that
there is this ineradicable distinction between taste in
the fine arts and the illative sense, which completely
extirpates the seeming appositeness of the analogy.
Although the mind may not always be able distinctly
to state the grounds of the superiority of any one piece
of sculpture, architecture, painting, or music to another,
the educated eye or ear gan. One important element
of good taste is a keen and appreciative organ of
sense. With purely mental processes the case is dif-
ferent ; there is here nothing but a mind to think and
judgments to be weighed. In the one case, superadded
to all that appeals to the intellect, the object of con-
templation contains form, colour, or sound ; in the
other case, the object of contemplation contains only
a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion.
So with skill ; one of its chief factors is a high develop-

ment of a purely physiological operation, viz., the oo-
ordiuatioD of muscular movement.

If we grant this, then, we cannot allow that any
analogies can he drawn betv/een such dissimilar pro-
oesRGS as those of the illative sense tind taste and skill.

I may not, perhaps, have been as explicit in this
part of my criticism as I could wish jO have heen
What I am trying to show is that, if indeed by these
analogies His Eminence wishes to teach us nothing
more than the fact that, just as taste and skill are, to a
certain extent, natural gifts, so there are men who
excel :n argumentative ability, my strictures will not,
of course, lie. But if he means that, just as a good
ear can detect a false note, and a good eye will ap-
preciate a beautiful combination of form and colour,
so there is a faculty in the mind that intuitively grasps
truth and eschews error, then I cannot but maintain
that no such analogy exists. But for the proof of this,
as I have remarked, I must rely upon my general line
of argument. . .

III. We are forced, then, to the conclusion that the
credentials of this shadowy sense are spurious ; we
shall further find that all its actions are explicable on
other and well-known grounds.

We are told that it is an '^extra-logical" faculty,
a faculty superior to the ''apparatus of verbal reason-
ing." But what are we to understand by this decrial
of " verbal reasoning ?" I fail to appreciate the de-
precation of this reasoniug, until it is shown to be
other than that which the mind spontaneously per-
forms reduced to scientific forms. And this the Cardi- 1

nal omits to do. The science of logic is not a mere
empty phantasm of the brain, but a methodical arrange-
ment of the way in which the mind thinks ; not — to
explain it by analogy — a " Siren " which, by the turning
of a handle, is made to imitate certain sounds, but the
science of akoustics, which explains what sound is fmd
how produced. To say that logic does not exhibit
the whole process by which a conclusion is reached is
scarcely correct ; **the laws of thought themselves are
few in number, and lie, in examples of perpetual
occurrence, under every thinking man*s observation."''"^
That the majority of mankind draw conclusions by
processes which they are unable to put down in black
and whito, docs not vitiate the theory. M. Jourdain
was astonished to learn that he talked prose. If, how-
ever, it is His Eminence's opinion that logic is want-
ing in this direction — that it fails to cover the range
usually attributed to it, he might have treated us to
an excursus to that effect. At the very least, he ought
explicitly to have shown why it is that in simple
trains of thought, common logic is amply sufficient,
while, in complex ones, it entirely breaks down.
That it is " cumbrous" does not prove it invalid
But to say that it is in concrete cases that the office
of the illative sense lies ; in long and complex dis-
cussions ; when the ordinary method of reasoning
would be cumbrous ; when there are many converg-
ing probabilities, are suspicious phrases. When an
artery is lost to sight in its capillaries, the dissector
does not immediately promulgate a new theory of the
circulatory system. And surely the most abstract

24. An Ouilint of the Nece^ary Laws of Thought Abp. ThanabOD, lutro . \ 4.

theory is built upon, and contains nothing foreign to,
concrete facts.

But the simplest way of showing that all the func-
tions of the illative sense are performed by this
maligned logic, is to take the Cardinal's own example
of its exercise. Speaking of the various contra-

dictions that exist amongst the different historians of
the pre-historic period of G' ece and Rome, " We see,"
he remarks, "how a controversy ... is carried
on from starting points, and with collateral aids, not
formally proved, but more or less assumed, the process
of assumption lying in the action of the Illative sense,
applied to primary elements of thought respectively
congenial to the disputants." And he adds, " Should
it be objected, apropos of this particular case, that
the instinctive reasoning on which I have been
dwehing, is not worth much, since it has not brought
the disputants into agreement, I answer that I profess
to be stating facts, not devising an optimism."
** Moreover," he says, ** it must be recollected, that
the controversy is still in its beginnings ; and there
is no reason for deciding that it will not lead in the
event to a unanimous conclusion of some kind, that
is, either to an assent to one particular view of the
history as the true one, or else to a conviction that
no true view is attainable." <^' That is to say, a
juster estimate, and one on which more reliance may
be placed, of this portion of history will accrue, if
all the disputants but one merge their illative senses
in deference to the illative sense of that one ; or, better
still, when, without exception, they eliminate their

25, op. cit. Ch. ix. § 3.

illative senses altoG^etber, and rely sultjly upon *' the
existing data for proof." Its value varies inversely as
its employment, and the more nearly its exercise ap-
proaches zero^ the nearer shall we be to l^he attainment
of truth ; or, if truth is beyond our reach, the more
certain shall we be that it is so. If it is urged that it
is the accumulation of fresh facts that places the
illative sense in abeyance, I answer that no one will
hesitate to accede to the proposition that the accumu-
lation of fresh facts is the surest road to an indisputa-
ble conclusion, and, therefore, tho greater the abeyance
the better. At all events, who shall decide at what
point we shall cease to collect facts and rely on the
illative sense?

Again, as the Cardinal himself suggests, we may
very properly urge that it is worth absolutely nothing,
when we see its employment resulting in such con-
trarieties of opinion. What difference, for example,
can we discover between the "high path of divination"
by which we are told ** Niebuhr does consciously pro-
ceed," ''^^ (which is given as a sample of that ** colla-
teral aid, not formally proved but more or less assumed,
the process of assumption lying in the action of the
illative sense,") and the ^' part de divination et de
conjecture,^' which Renan thinks " doit Hre permise "
in a criticism of the Gospels ? ^^^ And if they are one
and the same thing, and this identical with the faculty
upon which our author relies, and we find it demolish-
ing in one case all that it has built up in the other,
who will, after such evidence, trust himself to so in-
constant and ineflBcient a branch of the architectonic

26. Of. cit. Ch. ix. § 3.

27. VieJt fisusy p. 55. Paris: 1867,

1»

faculty ? And the Cardinal himself tells us that he
arrived once at a wrong conclusion — not because he
did not use his illative sense, but because his illative
sense acted ** on mistaken elements of thought."^'"' So
that it appears we had better be quite sure of our
" elements of thought," whatever they may be, before
utilising our illative senses.

IV. We find, then, (1) that since the illative sense,
avowedly transcends logical processes, the assertion of
its existence may legitimately be deemed obnoxious
to discredit ; (2) tliat, since it is not a divine illumina-
tion, nor a logical second-sight, nor anticipation, it
fails to vindicate the exalted position allotted to it ;
(3) that, when all the functions assigned to it are rele-
gated to ordinary methods of ratiocination, with a
greater amount of confidence may the ultimate conclu-
sion be accepted. Nevertheless, as with all ghostly
phenomena, even after their rational explanation, there
remains in the mind an impression that such negative
evidence is, after all, unsatisfactory, it is necessary
for the perfect clearing up of the mystery, to seize,
and personally to interrogate, the individual, who, we
conclude, must have simulated its actions.

" Men's opinions, accordingly, on what is laudable
or blameable" (I quote from the Essay on Liberty f)
" are affected by all the multifarious causes which
influence their wishes in regard to the conduct of
others, and which are as numerous as those which
determine their wishes on any other subject. Some-
times their reason — at other times their prejudices or
superstitions : often their sS^l affections, not sel-

28. (7/ a/- Cb. U. I 3. (4),

X 20

dom their antisocial ones, their envy or jealousy, their
arrogaDce dr oontemptuousness : but most commonly,
their desires or fears for themjielves — their legitimate
or illegitimate self-interest."'"' So, too, is it with men's
opinions on what is true or false. Not even were
we able to unify this multifariousness, and to define
exactly what it is that leads men to accept and re-
tain with the utmost obstinacy, any one position in
defianoe of the claims of all others, and which, in
ordinary language, goes by the phrase of ** being
certain," but which very commonly means being led
by natural propensity or prejudication, not even then, '
couid we call the object of such definition the ** illa-
tive sense." But, indeed, it is absurd so to at-
tempt to unify such intricate influences. Even when
we have to the best of our ability banished
prejudice, — to the best of our ability, for is it
possible ever entirely to do so, except perhaps
in the matter of some abstract or wholly
impersonal science ? — and acted upon, as far
as we see, purely rational grounds, our opinions are de-
termined, not, surely, by an illative sense, but by the
combined effect of all those impressions which previous
observation and reflection have left upon the mind,
the several links of which, though so entangled by
oblivion that no power can exhibit their natural
sequence, yet retain, despite perchance some little rust,
an invincible force. And the certitude that results does
not fulfil the duties of the Keverend, Doctor's illative
sense ; such influences merely bring about that sort of
assurance which suffices for common things and every-

ag. On Liberty. John Stuart Mill. Ch. I.

day life, and whether they lead to assents that are
genuine or aasentb that are not genuine, there is no-
iihing hy vhieh to discover.
., Whf^ti iGardinal Newman attempts to dc ia' td^iohase
beyond th^.ppnfines of the- ^erra firma of logic, a 'btight
findi attractive light that shall illuminate all the
mysteriousness of the terra.: incognita beydnd the
senses. But is it not an ignis fatuut ? He tells us it
leads to certitude, and he tells us that '* it is the char-
acteristic of certitude that its object is a truth," <^>
but he forgets that " truth is one and eterual," ^^^^
and that so-called ''* truths" ere mere links in a chain,
the ends of which are invisible to the human intellect ;
no li^ak of which can possibly be grasped or compre-
hended independently of its relation to all the rest.

And this i6 beyond us.' Glimpses are all we get.
Knowledge is a stream. No stream ever flows, or can
^ow, entirely round any point. We must in this life
^remain satisfied With a limited, one-sided view. Ahd
a limited, one-sid«d view never results in certitude.
It is this partial view that Cardinal Newman strives
to surmount. But in this attempt he soars above that
stream only to a region whose vapours cloud a land-
scape already not too clear.

In this experiment: in thus trying to point out to
us lipw we may attain to a certitude suited to the
eternalness of things divine — indefectible and un-
changing, he has fou^d himself on what to-day is the
great campus philosophorum. Rejecting, apparently,
the extreme view of the bolder doctrine, that to those
who, in seeking eterual truth, are ** pure in heart,"

30. Oji. cit. Ch. vii. §2.

31. Institutes of Law. Lurimer. Bk. I., cb. xii., § c.

shall be given a power to **see God;*' '3») and reject-^
ing, I presume, the theory of the impossibility of
obtaining positive knowledge of the hypo-phenomenal,
the absolute, His Eminence essays a compromise by
trying to prove that the mind itself contains that by
which it can transcend itself. " =

32. S. Matthew.ch. V. V 8.

These, your Grace, are my arguments for disbeliev-
ing in the existence of an illative sense. You may
ask : ** How do they concern me ?" Thus : If these
arguments be valid, one of the corner stones of your
church, erected by one of its greatest supporters,
crumbles away. You, as the head of this archbishopric,
may reasonably be expected to attempt their refuta-
tion. .,-[:-.' :■: .■;;: <'^.', ■: .'

. , I have the honour to be

> , ' ■ ' ■■:■(-■'• , ■ - . -i". .

,■ ■ "■ ■ - , ' i' ■ I'lf.. ' i i' ■ i '.'"■' '/ ' : ' ,, - r /'",,■..• '■

* , Your Grace's humble servant, .,

■■"'"''■'"■''•;'■"■'■, ' ' "■ "' "'v ■'/'■ The Author.
University College, Toronto, Canada. : '