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AN 
 
 
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 S if A T E 
 
 O F T H E 
 
 EXPEDITTON 
 
 A 
 
 FROM 
 
 N A 
 
 AS LAIB BEFORE THE 
 
 D A, 
 
 HOUSE OF COMMONS, 
 
 6 Y 
 
 LIEUTENANT - GENERAL BURCtOYNE, 
 
 AND VERIFIED BY EVlpENCEj 
 
 WITH A 
 
 COLLECTION OF AIJI HEN'lIC DOCUMENTS, 
 
 AND 
 
 An addition of many circumstances which were prevented 
 
 from appearing before the house by the 
 
 prorogation of parliament. 
 
 WRITTEN AND COLLECTED BY HIMSELF, 
 
 A N O ' 
 
 PEDICATED TO THE OFFICERS OF T^HE ARMY HE COMMANDED, 
 THE SECOND EDITION. 
 
 f!i. 
 
 LONDON: 
 PRINTED FOR J. ALMON, OPPOSITE BURLINGTON-HOUSE, PICCADILLY^ 
 
 MDCCLXXX. 
 
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 ■> ' A'S'*l'*>»tr ,,♦!,.,, 4 
 
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 T O 
 
 MAJOR GENERAL PHILLIPS, 
 
 
 AND THE 
 
 OTHER OFFICERS 
 
 WHO SEiriD IN THE ARMY COMMANDED BY 
 
 LIEUTENANT GENERAL BURGOYNE, 
 
 UPON AN 
 
 EXPEDITION FROM CANADA. 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 It." y • 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 ROPRIETY and affeftion alike incline me 
 ^0 infcribe to you the following undertaking. 
 We are mutual and peculiar fufferers by the 
 fvent of the campaign in 1777. You were 
 'itnefles and judges of my actions ; but I owed 
 rou an account of the principles which direded 
 |hem. 
 
 Another motive for this Addrefs is to avail 
 lyfelf of a proper public opportunity to repeat 
 you, what I have omitted no occalion of ex- 
 [reffing in Parliament, in correfpondence, and 
 converfation — the fuUeft approbation of your 
 krvices. My errors may have been numberlefs ; 
 [oilir condu^ has been miform — faithful, gal- 
 
 A 2 lant 
 
 Jit 
 
 
 I'^X-'^a 
 
lant nnd inclcfntigahlc. Dcbarreil of the power 
 of doing you julVice before the King, thefe tcfti- 
 monics are the only means to which my cftecm 
 and gratitude can retort. 
 
 After vindicating niyfelf as a comn^anding 
 officer from any inattention to your iniercft or 
 finii', 1 ncJtt throw m>lclf upon your judgment 
 for my conduct as a friend. 
 
 You will find by this publication, and fomc 
 others, which though not addrefled to you will 
 probably engage your curiofity, that I have 
 been accufed of flirinking from the common 
 captivity. 
 
 I have been fupported under that afperfion by 
 the confcioufncfs I did not deferve it, and the 
 confidence that you (to whom chiefly upon that 
 t harge I was refponfible) would not adopt it. 
 After the fortunes we have run together, it is 
 not furely unworthy of belief, that I fiiould 
 rather have defired, than avoided to partake the 
 doling fcene : uniting with a due fenfe of per- 
 fonal attachments, the prefervation of my mili- 
 tary fortune, and a retreat from the diftra£lions 
 of my country. The defence of your honour 
 and my own, at one time, and refiftance to an 
 alTront * which my nature could not bear, at an- 
 other, alone detained me here. 
 
 « In 
 
 * The part of my treatment which I call an affront upon this 
 flnd other occalions, is the refufal of my fervice in this country, 
 even at the head of my own regiment, or as a volunteer, in the 
 tiT.c of ejtigency, and when other officers prtcifely in my oivn 
 jhuaiioH were employed. My complaint of this partiality has never 
 bet-n uthcially anfwered ; it has only been evaded by anonymous 
 writers, who have laid it down as a pofition, that I meant to allude 
 to the example of Lord Harrington (with which it certainly has 
 nuihmg to do) and then have taken a merit in refuting me. The 
 
 particular 
 
 i\* 
 

 [ V J 
 
 In regard to my political tranfa£tIon«, 1 hflve 
 flatcJ them, and i vvifii them to be confidcrcd bv 
 mv friends, apart from my military conduct, I 
 bear very high rcfpe^fl to fomc eminent and ill- 
 treated chara^ers in our profcilion, who in de- 
 ference to the tranquility of government, have 
 filently refigned the Nations which they could no 
 longer hold with fecurity to their honour, or 
 benefit to the ftate. But the option is not left to 
 thofe, who having a voice in Parliament arc 
 obliged to a£t as citizens as well as foldiers. The 
 number of officers altogether of the army and 
 navy, who with known love to their country 
 and profeffional fpirit equally confpicuous, have 
 voluntarily withdrawn themfelves from employ- 
 ment within thefe two years, exceeds all prece^ 
 dent. 1 do not place my namp in the lift with 
 the fiime pretenfions; but it is not arrogant to 
 emulate where we cannot compare ; and I am 
 defirous of following the high examples before 
 me in no point more than in that of avoiding 
 to difturb the zeal of thofe who arc now em- 
 ployed. The officers who have held it their 
 duty to take part in opppfition, have a(Sled open- 
 ly and dire£lly in their place in Parliament; bu^ 
 they may defy malice to (hew an inftancc wherein 
 
 paitlcular example to which I appeal id that of Lieutenant Colonel 
 Kin^don, of the 86rh regiment, appointed to that regiment, em> 
 ployed in it for the defence of Plymouth, and actually now em- 
 barking with it for foreign fervice, under the fame terms of the 
 convention, and the fame terms of parole to the Congrefs verhatini 
 with m) felf. Other objedionsj and of a nature that cpuld not be 
 afterwards fupported, were tried againft the Duke of Kutlaail't 
 recommendation of this excellent officer : but the objection of 
 parole, though fully known to be prccifely the fame with that which 
 was fo peremptorily urged againll my prctenQoni} was never 
 pientioned. 
 
 A 3 they 
 
 
 tm 
 
[ vi ] 
 
 they have not encouraged ardour in their pro- 
 feflion. They contemplate with one and the lame 
 fcntiment the great fupply of honourable men to 
 occupy their places. 
 
 You, Gentlemen, ftand highjin that defcrip- 
 tion; your trials have made you of fterling value; 
 and perhaps it will be better difcerned by men in 
 power, when no longer viewed through the un- 
 favourable medium of my friendfhip. If my 
 exhortations retain their former weight, let mc 
 be permitted earneftly to apply them upon this 
 occalion. The examples of generals or admirals 
 who decline employment, refpeft only fimilar 
 cafes ; your honour is fecure : look not at 
 profeffional difappointments ; but point all 
 your views to the true glory of your King and 
 country, and truft for the reward. 
 • O focit (neque enim ignarijumus ante Malorum) 
 O paffi graviora : dabit Deus his quoqiie finem. 
 This paflTage will bring to the remembrance 
 of fome among you a hard hour when we be- 
 fore quoted it together, and not without fome 
 cheer of mind, May the end of your endur- 
 ing be near I And with every other wifli and 
 fcntiment that can denote efteem, 1 have the 
 honour to be, 
 
 Gentlemen, 
 
 Your mod faithful and mod obedient 
 humble fervant, 
 
 J, BURGOYNE. 
 
 Hertford'Strcety 
 Jan. I, 1780. 
 
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INTRODUCTION. 
 
 1) 
 
 W TIEN it becomes npceflliry for men wlio 
 have aftcd critical pnrfs in public ftations to make 
 an appeal to the world in their own j unification, 
 there are many prudential confiderations which 
 miiibt lend them to commit the care of it to 
 friends, or, which is in many refpedls the fame 
 thitig. to defend themfirlves under an afliimed cha-? 
 radcr, 1 he charge of vanity ufiially made on 
 cgotihn is thus eluded : a fuller fcope may be 
 given to felf-love and particular refentment : even 
 the lower vexations which attend an author are 
 to a great degree avoided : the ill-nature of cri- 
 ticiini is feldom awakened by anonymous writ- 
 ings, and the venal pens of party iufe half their 
 gail when the objedl of it is not perfonally and 
 diiedly in quelVion. 
 
 But there are fituations, in which, not only 
 general alient feems to juftify ^ man in fpeaking 
 of himfelf, but in which alio no little confider- 
 ation ought to be admitted to the mind. Such 
 will be the cafe, if 1 am not deceived, when the 
 interelts of the public are blended with thofe of 
 the individual ; and when Jiis very errors may 
 ferve as inftruclion to others. Misfortunes which 
 awaken fenfibility will be a further, and a per- 
 fuafive call, upon the attention of the public ; and 
 X it 
 
)N. 
 
 tn wlio 
 3 make 
 ication, 
 
 which 
 f it to 
 c fame 
 ed cha-f 
 ade on 
 nav be 
 
 : even 
 lor are 
 of cri- 
 s writ- 
 If their 
 lly and 
 
 »t only 
 eaking 
 nlider- 
 Such 
 len the 
 »ofe of 
 ; may 
 which 
 a per- 
 |c; and 
 it 
 
 [ vill ] 
 
 it will amount to a claim tJpon \\\q\\' jiijllce^ if 
 he can fhew that he has been injnrloudy treared. 
 
 Upon maturely weighing thefe and fivcral 
 other circumftances, after I had been denied a pro- 
 feflional examination of my conduct, and difap- 
 pointed of a parliamentary oh/, I diitermined to 
 ly before the public a ftate of the expedition frdnt 
 Canada, in 1777, in my own name. And my 
 firft defign was to do it under the title, and U'itli 
 the latitude of Memoirs ; as a mode by which I 
 could beft open the principles of my aclions, 
 and introduce, with moft pnopriety, collateral 
 charaders, incidents, and difcuffions, as they 
 might occafionaily tend to illuftrate the main 
 fubje6t. 
 
 However, in the laft feflion of Parliament, 
 the enquiry which had not been agreed to the 
 year before, took place. 1 had preiied it, an,d 
 I entered into it under all the difidvantages which 
 attend a ftruggle with power, and the prejudice 
 that power can raife again ft the perfons it means 
 to deftroy. The utmoft tliat power could do was 
 done ; the Parliament was prorogued pending the 
 proceedings. But though by this contrivance, a 
 final and formal adjudication by that auguft af- 
 fcmbly was avoided, their minutes ftnnd a facred 
 record of truth and juftice, and the moft fatisfac- 
 tory reliance to which my wifhes could aipire, 
 in offering my aclions to the judgment of my 
 country at large. 
 
 From that time, therefore, I refolved to pub- 
 lifh, inftead of iMenioirs, the Proceedings precifcly 
 as they pafled in Parliament, and to continue my 
 defence by fuch Obfcrvations and Comments upon 
 the Evidence, a^j 1 (hould have had a right, and 
 
 was 
 
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 was prepared t^ make, had the proceedings in the 
 houfe continued.* 
 
 Poflibly in this latter part fome colour of my 
 original defign may remain. The fcenes 1 have 
 been engaged in are uncommon, and it is a natu- 
 ral defire to place tliem in a full light. The in- 
 terefts concerned make that defire more urgent ; 
 and I dare believe ihey will be bett guarded by- 
 being moil explained. 
 
 ■* The order in which the committe in the Houfe of Commons 
 proceeded wa«, to hear Sir William Howe's Narrative, refpe£tinj^ 
 his condu<5t whilft in command in America, and fuch evidence as 
 he thought proper to bring in fupport of ir. They next heard my 
 Narrative and Evidence, refp-cting the conduft of the expedition 
 from Canada. Lord George Germain then opened a defence on 
 his part, and fummoned witnefles to fupport it. According to the 
 arrangement made by the committee, Sir William Howe and myfelf 
 were afterwards to he heard in reply ; but the proceedings were 
 ended by the prorogation of Parliament before the examination of 
 Lord George's fecond witnefs, Mr. Galloway, was clofed, and 
 there were lixteen or eighteen more upon his lift. The order in 
 which the following papers are placed is — ift. The Prefatory 
 Speech, ad. The Narrative, ^d. Minutes of the verbal evidence. 
 4th. Review of the evidence, with Remaiks and Explanations, &c. 
 5th. An Appendix, containing the written evidence. 
 

 A D V E R T I S E M E N T. 
 
 In Plan IV. the third and fourth pofitions of the army 
 the engagement of 19th of September may appear up- 
 ) a curlbry view to want precifion. The inequalities 
 the ground could not be diftindtiy marked upon fo 
 lall a fcale j and the continual fhift of the pofitions of 
 parate corps, as they were attacked by corps of the 
 icmy, which frequently, from the thicknefs of the 
 ood, they did not fee, made it equally difficult to mark 
 gularly the poHtionof the whole at any one time. 
 The pofition of the armies on the 8th of September in 
 Hate V. requires alfo fome explanation. From the 
 allnefs of the fcale, the pofition of the enemy could 
 ly be (hewn upon the plain near the river ; but it is 
 be obierved, it extended over the ground of General 
 urgoync's former encampment, and in front of the 
 doubts upon the hill. 
 
■ 
 
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 The SpEEcir of Lieutenant General Burgoync, 
 prefatory to lils Narrativk. 
 
 Mr. Montagu, 
 
 BEFORE I enter upon the narrative, which the 
 precedent of your late proceedings autliorifes me 
 to lay before you, I think it a duty to the comniitlce, 
 to promilc that 1 Ihall trouble them with little other 
 matter than llich as may be neceflary to cludicate the 
 tranladions of the campaign 1777, in that quarter 
 where I commanded. 
 
 I Ihall keep in mind, that to explain the caufcs of 
 the difaftcr at Saratoga is the principal jioint to which 
 all my evidence ought tu lead : but at ilic liiiuc time, 
 I fliall take confidence in the juftice and benevolence 
 of my hearers, that where arguments in exculpation 
 of the commander can aptly be combined with a 
 faithful rcprefentation of fafts, they will not be 
 deemed foreign to the main object under their con- 
 fidcration* 
 
 Upon thefe ideas, though fome introdii(ftory ex- 
 planations are rtxiuilite, I fliall fupprefs the inclinaLion 
 I at firlt conceived, of ftating my condud: from the 
 time, when, conjointly with my honourable friend 
 who took the lead in this inquiry,* I was called to 
 the unfolicited and unwelcome fervice in America : 
 nor will I enumerate the complicated circumllancea 
 i of private misfortune and ill health under which I 
 purlbed it. Prudence, as well as other propriety, is, 
 I confefs, confulted in this fuppreffion ; for were ic 
 leen, that an officer had blended with the rcfpe<^ due 
 
 B to 
 
 * Sir William Howe. 
 
 m-^^W 
 
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Sep Ap- 
 j'fndix 
 No. I. 
 
 P II E F A 1' O R Y S V E F, C IT. 
 
 to avuhority, warm, though difintcrcftrd perfoniil at- 
 tachments', that iiiulcr a pciluafion of the honour and 
 inrc'giity of the king's Icrvants, lie had united to his 
 zeal tor the pubhc caiile an intcrcft in their private 
 crecHt and ambition •, would it not be conceived, tliat 
 his guilt mult have been atrocious, beyond all excufe 
 or palliation, to induce the very men to whom Iiis en- 
 deavours, and his faculties, luch as they were, had 
 been tlv-!s devoted, not only compleatly to dtlert hin), 
 hut to preclude him, as tar as in them lay, from every 
 means of defence, and if poffible, to ruin hiui in the 
 opinion of the king, the army, and the country ? 
 
 An earnelt defire to fave, as much as pofiible, the 
 time of the committee, would alfo difluade me from 
 recurring to any points previous to my inltruflions 
 wliich have been difcufled upon former occafions •, but 
 I find that great Itrefs is ftill laid to my prejudice upon 
 a paper w hicii found its way to the houfe during my 
 abiep.ce : 1 mean the private letter to the noble lord, 
 ibcretary for the x\merican department, dated ift 
 January, 1777.* 
 
 The noble lord has frequently ftated that letter to 
 have flipped inadvertently into the parcel dcftined for 
 the houle, and I give credit in that particular to his 
 aircTCion ; becaufe, whatever other imprellions he might 
 have found it his interert to make refpeding me, he 
 certainly would not have thought that the imputation 
 on mc which that letter tended to fix, a p.oper one 
 for /v,;/ to put forward : it is a notorious fadt, or I 
 would not mention it, that it has been held a reflec- 
 tion upon my character (by the part of the public 
 with w horn the noble lord is unpopular) that I ad- 
 drelTed him as a patron and friend. 
 
 This is an imputation to which I mull plead guilty •, 
 for at the time 1 wrote that letter, I certainly did hold 
 that noble lord as my friend, and I had afted to de- 
 ierve he fhould be fo. The next ill tendency of that 
 paper was, as the noble lord well knows, to imprefs 
 tiie public with an opinion, that I was endeavouring 
 
 to 
 
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 to his 
 private 
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 excure 
 his cn- 
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 a every 
 in the 
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 )le, the 
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 •uftions 
 IS-, but 
 :e upon 
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 le lord, 
 .ted lit 
 
 iter to 
 pcd for 
 Ir to his 
 might 
 ime, he 
 )utation 
 ler one 
 or I 
 reflcc- 
 public 
 It I ad- 
 guilt)' -, 
 lid hold 
 to de- 
 lof that 
 Lmprcfs 
 souring 
 
 to s 
 
 PREFATORY SPEECH. i 
 
 to fupplant Sir Guy Carleton in the command cf the 
 northern army — an a6i\on abhorrent to the honour of 
 an officer and the liberality of a gentleman ; and of 
 which, thank God, I can prove the falfehood, by ir- 
 refragable evidence upon your table, and in a very 
 fmall compafs. I need only refer to the dilpatches to 
 Sir Guy Carleton by his aid de-camp, dated aid 
 Auguft, 1776,* four months before I came home, to ^ 
 flicw that it was at that time determined, rliat Sir Guv ^^ ,.^* 
 Carleton fliould remain in Canada; and that detcrini-[^o. jj, 
 nation was made, as I have been informeil, not only 
 upon the political reafoning which appears in that dil- 
 patch, but alio, upon great law o])inions, that he 
 could not, under the commilfion he then held under 
 the great feal, pais the frontiers of his province. Sir, 
 this confutation was urged by me lalt year ; and were 
 collateral proof neceflary to my j unification upon this 
 fubjeft, I could bring to your bar a tribe of gentlemen^ 
 who had imbibed impreffuins not very favourable to the 
 military proceedings of Sir Guy Carleton in the cam- 
 paign of 1776: I could (hew that I Icized numberlefs, 
 indeed I feized every pofiible occafion to vindicate the 
 judgment, the alTiduity, the adlivity of that highly rc- 
 fpec'.able officer, carelcfs how ill I paid my court, 
 earned to meet every attack againft his fame. 
 
 I beg leave alfo to call the attention of the com- 
 mittee very particularly to one other paper, the date 
 of which is previous to my departure from England : 
 it is entitled, " Thoughts for conducing the War 
 ** from the Side of Canada, by Lieutenant General 
 " Burgoyne."* Sir, it will be in the rccolleflion of « 
 the committee, whether, when the condu(5l of the war No. IIL 
 was under confideration laft year in my abfence, it was 
 not underftood, that the plan of the northern expe- 
 dition was formed upon that paper as produced upon 
 your table ? If fo, I muft afk the noble lord, why he 
 lufFered that error to prevail ? The noble lord knew, 
 (and it was peculiarly his duty to declare it) that the 
 two propofals, the firft of turning the expedition even- 
 
 B2 
 
 tually 
 
<'i\h 
 
 PREFATORY SPEECH. 
 
 tiuiUy towards Conneifticut j and the fecond, of em- 
 barking the army on the river St. Lawrence, in order 
 to tiYcd: a juncflion with Sir William Howe by Tea, in 
 cafe the attempt by land appeared " impradticablc, or 
 " too hazardous," were erafcd while the paper was in 
 his lordlhip's hands. 
 
 From that paper, as it appeared without erafurcs, 
 naturally arofe the conclufion, that the plan I had to 
 execute was completely my own ; upon that paper 
 were founded, a: naturally, the doubts which have 
 been entertained upon the peremptory tenor of my 
 inrtrudlions. I muft again alk the noble lord, upon 
 what principle of juftice he fuffered thofe impreffions 
 to exill in this houfe ? Why, in a debate in which he 
 took a part, did he cor:ccal, that the circumftances in 
 reality were totally different from thofe upon which 
 gentlemen rcafoned ; that the difcretion referved in the 
 paper before the houfe was taken away, and confe- 
 quently, that my orders were rendered abfolute in the 
 liricleii fenfe by his own alterations ? 
 
 Let any gentleman who has fuppofed I had an im- 
 plied latitude for my condu6l, now compare this cir- 
 cumftancc with the wording of the letter to Sir Guy 
 Carleton, dated March 26, 1777, with a copy of which 
 I was furninied, and extrafts from which were after- 
 wards the only orders I had to z6t upon.* 
 
 I fhall take no particular notice of what is called the 
 faving claufe, in the latter part of the orders, except 
 No, IV. to give the flatteft contradidlion to the fuppofition that 
 I dictated it — a fuppofition that I know is not yet 
 abandoned by the men who firft fuggeited it. I have 
 fpoke to it very fully upon a former occafion ;-|- and I 
 do not wiili, when it can be avoided, to enforce or re- 
 iterate the charges of duplicity and treachery which 
 mud enuie, if that claufe could be fuppofed to have 
 reference to any conduct previous to my arrival at 
 
 See Ap 
 pendix 
 
 J 
 
 
 -j- The debate upon Mr, Vyner*s motion, May a8, 1778; the 
 
 r[jeccli was publiflied. 
 
 Albany. 
 
 • it ' 
 
IS cir- 
 
 iir Guy 
 
 which 
 
 after- 
 
 ed the 
 
 PREFATORY SPEECH. 
 
 Albany. The circumflance of forbidding me the I.tti- 
 tude in the two particulars I had propofed in my plan, 
 and many other circumftances, clearly indicated the 
 decided intentions and expedations of the minillcrs, 
 rendered the fenfe of tlie whole order taken together 
 clear and dillindt, and Ihewed that the claufe which is 
 pretended to have left me a difcretion as to my main 
 object, had no Ibrt of relation to that object. That 
 claufe evidently related not to my forcing my way, or 
 not forcing it, to Albany, the place of my deftination, 
 but to fuch collateral and eventual operations as might 
 be advifeable in the courfe of my march. It related 
 to the making imprefllon upon the rebels, and bring- 
 ing them to obedience, in fuch manner as exigencies 
 might require, and in my judgment might feem molt 
 proper, previous to receiving orders from Sir William 
 Howe, " of my junction with whom I was never to 
 " lofe view.'* 
 
 Notwithftanding there has been (o much difcufTlon 
 in debate and print upon the interpretation of abfolute 
 orders, the committee, I am confident, will abfolve 
 me, though, at the expence of a few moments more, 
 1 fhould continue a fubjeft upon which the merit or 
 blame of the future proceedings in great meafure refts. 
 
 I do not admit the pofition, that there can be no 
 cafe in which an officer ailing at a diftance is bound at 
 every hazard to purfue orders, that appear abfolute 
 and decifivc. It is eafy to conceive cireumllances, 
 which might juftify a (late in hazarding an army, for 
 the fake of facilitating great and decifive objects. 
 Gentlemen, converfant in military hiitory, will recoi- 
 led many examples of this principle : upon a former 
 occafion, I Itated a fuppofed cafe •,* and I now entreat 
 
 B 3 leave 
 
 * The cafe alluded to was put in a former debate, as follo-.vs": 
 fuppofe the Britifli ariViy that invaded Britany in 175S, had j/ained 
 a complete vidorv over the Duke D'Aiguillon : to have marched 
 rapidly towards Paris, abandoning the communication with the 
 fleet, expofing the army poffibly to great want of provifion, and to 
 the impradicability of retreat, would certainly have been a mL-jifure 
 
 COH" 
 
 mm 
 m 
 
 A'Si/ '!■ 5L., 
 
 
 if 
 
r R V. V A T O i; Y S V V. V. C 1 1. 
 
 If.ivc to ;uKI ;i rc.ii rxnir.plc of pfrernpiory ordrri, 
 whuli happ< lU'tl ill thf («niik' ot tny own Urvuc i 
 luvi' cvci iTt.iiiicil tlir iiiiprt ll'mn, that tlic ciri iiiull.iiut: 
 1 ;im } oin;!, lo tcl.itc, ui.ulc upon my niiiul at the lituc \ 
 ;iiul lo iholi* (cvv wito may ilill think, that in anv part 
 ol my n)iuliii'l, I ralhly rilki-d my pcaa\ n^y iMicn.ll or 
 iny taiiu', lo Ibrwanl ilw vvillu's ot oihcrs, i!us pir- 
 polUllion may in lomc lucaliiie account lor, anil cx- 
 iulo, my impnulcncc. 
 
 In (lie campaign of 1762, in l'ortn[;al, llir Count 
 I ,a l.ippo, a name, whicli, il ir t'lnds a due liilloiian, 
 will ilanil amonj; tlit* lii ll in miiilaiy fame, was placed 
 at the head of abi)ut Oooo Uiitilli troops, and a I'omi- 
 [Uielc aiiwy, the p,reati r part of which was little better 
 than nominal, to dcleiid an cxtenlive frontier a|.?,ainll 
 the whole lorcc of vSpain, aiul a latfcjc boily of the 
 vrteran troops of I'r.tnee. I he lalvation of l*ortU{;al 
 liep luls loiely on the capacity ol tiiat |!,reat man, which 
 united the de( [h'II political icaloning with c\(|uilitc 
 military ailtiieis. 
 
 I had the honour to be cntrunril witli the defence 
 of tJK nioll important pals upon the Ta^us, and my 
 orders were peremptory to maintain it againll any 
 numbers, and to tiie lall man, 
 
 A lekv't corps of tlie enemy, {.\rcatly luperior to 
 mine, were cnc; 
 
 ned 
 
 10 h 
 
 the river, and our advanced polls were within half 
 mufcjuet Ihot. 
 
 In this fituation, I received intelliivcncc from Coinit 
 La Lippe, of a dc Hyi of tlie enemy to pal's the Tai^us 
 
 confunituatcly drfptMatc ami iiiiUiflifi iMc, if tried upon mllitarv 
 fvtU'iii: \ct, will any tuiin Uv, iliat it that mcafurc imill cvidcnliy 
 have pri>(.iiKC.l liuh alanu :md conlufion in the lioari of France, 
 :is to li.ive e-iiupcUcii ilic" jcc.iU oi hrr whole force trom GeoiKuiv, 
 111- lu.h part ol it, asi u oultl have given uncontrouled Icope to the 
 jinnies uiu'iCr the Kinj; of i*ruliia and Prince Ferdinand, that the 
 miirultr ol Eiii;latul wi vild not have been judicious, tlunip,h at the 
 paliablc lilk ol the arniy, as far as capture was conccincd, in 
 prdvri -g the general to proceed by the moil •vigorous cxotionsy and 
 Ip ibrcc ius \v.iy to J'aris i 
 
 in 
 
 ■H 
 
 in 
 
 1(1 
 CO 
 ill 
 
 ex 
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 (( 
 
 ti 
 
 (( 
 
 (( 
 
 t( 
 
 ti 
 
 t( 
 
 (4 
 
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 (( 
 
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 W'CI 
 
 v\\\v 
 \\y\\ 
 
 ti 
 
(( 
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 it 
 
 r !i KF A TO U Y SI' I. F C II. 
 
 in Ail*-*", about i'lK rniics al)ovt' nic, antl to take pof- 
 Idlii^ii ol llic vi-itn ttniiuiy in my rear, with a hirgc 
 routs ol cavalry, l»y uliicli iiumiiJi ail coininuiiicalion, 
 Jii|>|>ly, or late irtitat, would Ix* ( ut od'. 
 
 J oi^tilitr wiiii tiiiK in[t lli}',cruc, tlic Count's i.ttcr 
 cxjiulicil, *' 1 iiat cv<My tltlay to tlic enemy in j^ctting 
 ♦' pofic llion ot t\\t pals J {;iiarili(l, was lo material to 
 ** his other |)hins anil opcrtiions, that it julliHed a 
 *' ilcvialion iroin lyilcniatic rules i tli.it, thcret'ore, 
 after takin|; timely precaiiriuiiK to lecurc the retreat 
 of niy (.ivalry, I mull abide the eonle([uencc with 
 the inl.uury j that at the lalL extrenjity, 1 n u(l 
 abandon my cannon, eanij), hr. and with lucli 
 provilion ;is the men could tarry upufi their backs, 
 tiirow mylelt* into llie mcujiuairis upc^n my lelt, and 
 endeavour, by Imall anil ilil])eriei| |>ariies, lo [^ain 
 a remlc/vous at the northern [)art oi ii»e provinee.'* 
 I mull oblervc, that \n hrn thele peremptory oniets 
 were given, the commandir was at a dillancc that 
 maile all timely (omniunii ation of circumllanecs as 
 iin|)oHil)le, as if the Atlantic had been between us ; 
 and I cannot dole the exam|)le without mentiunin^^ 
 the concluding part of Coimt La Lip])e's letter. " Mc 
 ** participated," he laid " in tlic feelings with which 
 *' an olliccr would be llriick for his reputation, ia 
 *' lullerin}^ himleir to be cut, and reduced to facntko 
 *' his ca:iip, his baf2;gaj^e, and twenty pieces of can- 
 **■ non. But />e at cdjc^' continued that frreat and 
 <->;enerous man, '* / ivill take the nieafurc ouirely upon 
 *'• ffixji'if : pojcrere as 1 have dire^fcd^ and be confident 
 " of my dtjeme anU proltci'wny Ihis was a lavin<^ 
 claufe of a nature very ditlerent from thole it is the 
 praclice in the prefcnt day to pen \ and if any man 
 doubts the quotation, 1 can brinj» polkive evidence to 
 the truth of it verbatim. 
 
 Thus much. Sir, I thought it incutnbent upon me 
 to (late in argument againll the pcfition that has been 
 infilled upon, that no orders can be worded lb pe- 
 remptorily at a diilance, as not to admit of an iin- 
 
 B 4 plied 
 
 7 
 
 P 
 
 if 
 
ifi 
 
 ^!ls 
 
 8 
 
 NARRA- 
 TIVE. 
 
 NARRATIVE. 
 
 plied latitude, in cafe of unforefeen and infurmountable 
 difficulties : but to prevent all future cavil upon this 
 fubjed:, I requeft the committee to recoileft, what I 
 have again and again repeated j that I by no means 
 put my defence, in pafling the Hudfon's River, folely 
 upon this reafoning. On the contrary, fuppofing for 
 the argument's fake, I lliould concede (which I never 
 have done, nor mean to do) to the noble Lord, and to 
 every other gentleman, all they can defire to aflume 
 upon implied latitude in given cafes, I fhould equally 
 prove that no luch cafe did exift, as would have jufti- 
 fied me upon their own principle, in departing from 
 the letter of the orders under which I aded. 
 
 Having thus cleared my way to the timi:! of my 
 leaving England, to take upon me the command of 
 the Northern expedition j I fhall now lay before the 
 committee a narrative of its progrefs, in as concile and 
 fimpl'j terms, as the nature of tiie fubjed will allow, 
 endeavouring to imitate the pcrfpicuity of the honour- 
 able gentleman who took the lead in this bufinels, and 
 not without hope of my endeavours producing the 
 fame effe<5t -, and that, in tlie opinion of the houfe, my 
 language, as has been exprcfied of his, will be deemed 
 the language of truth. 
 
 NARRATIVE. 
 
 IT is my intention, for the more ready comprehen- 
 fion of the whole fubjeft, to divide it into three 
 periods. The firll, from my appointment to the com- 
 mand, to the end of my purluit of the enemy from 
 Ticonc'croga ^ tlie fecond, from that time to the paf- 
 fage of the Mudfon's River ; and the third to the figning 
 the convention. 
 
 I left 
 
NARRATIVE. 
 
 I left London on the 27th of March, and upon my 
 departure from Plymouth, finding the Albion man of 
 war ready to fail for New- York, I wrote to Sir W. 
 Howe by that conveyance, upon the fubjcct of my 
 expedition, and the nature of my orders. 1 arrived at 
 Qiiebec the 6th of May. Sir Guy Carleton imme- 
 diately put under my command the troops deftincd for 
 the expedition, and committed to my management the 
 preparatory arrangements. From thence I wrote a 
 fecond letter to' Sir William Howe, wherein I repeat- 
 ed that I was entrufted with the command of the 
 army deftined to march from Canada, and tliat my 
 orders were to force a jun6lion with his excellency. 
 
 I exprefled alfo my wilhes, " that a latitude had 
 ** been left me for a diverfion towards Connedicur, 
 " but that fuch an idea being out of queilion, by 
 " my orders being precife to force the junction, it was 
 " only mentioned to introduce the idea ftill refting 
 " upon my mind ; viz. to give the change to the 
 " enemy if I could, and by every feint in my power 
 " to eftablifh a fuipicioi., that I itill pointed towards 
 " Connefticut." 
 
 " But," I repeated, " that under the prefent pre- 
 " cifion of my orders, I fliould really have no view 
 
 but that of joining him, nor think niyfelf juftified 
 
 by any temptation to delay the moit expeditious 
 " means I could find to effect that purpofe." 
 
 I proceeded to Montreal on the 1 2th, and as my 
 letters, lately laid before tlie houfe from that place,* * 
 and from Quebec, will lliew the itate of things, I ^^^ /^'^* 
 fliould not reft a moment upon this period, were it jsjy^ y^ 
 not to add one more public teftimony, to thofc I ani 
 not confcious of having omitted upon any occalion, of 
 the afliduous and cordial manner in v.hich the different 
 fervices were forwarded by Sir Guy Carleton. I fhould 
 think it as diflionourable to feek, as I know it would 
 be impoffible to find, excule for any fault of mine in 
 any failure on the part of Sir Guy Carleton, or of any 
 pcrfons who aftcd under him, in any matter refpcdting 
 
 the 
 
 (( 
 
 (( 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 
II. 
 
 JO 
 
 f'tc Aj->. 
 jcnti X 
 
 No, VI. 
 
 N A II II A r I V E. 
 
 the expedition. Had that officer lK*en adin[.» for hinvjlTiu' fn 
 kh\ or i\)Y his brother, he could not have Ihewn moiciHlbiicrs 
 indefatipblc zeal than he did, to comply wiih and tx-Bluiro}) 
 pedite iny rcquifitions and dcfires. I J)ur 
 
 Certain parts of the cxpcCled force, nevcrthcfs, tlllHpentra 
 fliort. The Canadian troops, itatcd in tht plan at 2000, J Howe 
 
 tdlit 
 c>:pc 
 vot 
 clil-c^ 
 650( 
 ton 
 be 
 not 
 com 
 dXed 
 to 
 
 perk 
 ot L 
 that 
 flina 
 I lla 
 merely 
 my oru( 
 :i 
 a fixed 
 my co!i 
 For 
 ftatc ai 
 Point, 
 
 " r 
 
 cnen 
 
 pedi 
 profj 
 cult 
 arm 
 
 n 
 
 <( 
 
 (( 
 
 (C 
 
 li 
 
 conlilled only of three companies, intended to be of 
 100 men each, but in reality not amounting to mote 
 than 15c upon the whole-, nor coulil they be augment- 
 ed. The corvtTs, which are detachments of proviiv 
 cials witliout arms, to repair roads, convey provifions, 
 or any other temporary employment tor the king's fer- 
 vice, could not be obtained in luHicient number, nor| 
 kept to their employments, although Sir Guy CarletonI 
 viled every poliible exertion and encouragement for thcil 
 purpofe. Drivers for the proviiion carts, and otiicr 
 carriages, could not be fully fupplit^d by the contrac 
 tor, though no cxpence was ipared •, i cJrcuinllance 
 which occafioned much inconvenience afterwards. 
 
 To thefe unavoidable dilappointments were added 
 the difficulties occafioned by bad weather, which renW *' 
 dercd the roads almolt impra«5licablc at the carrying! 
 places, and conit^juently the paflage of the bateaux, 
 artillery, and baggage exceedingly dilatory : we hadf 
 befide a great deal of contrary wind. NotwithftandingJ an exc 
 all impediments, the army affembled between the 17th. 
 and 20th of June, at Cumberland Toint, upon Takci 
 Champlain. | 
 
 On thciifi: I held a conference with the Iroquois,^ 
 Algonchins, Abenckies, and Outawas, Indians, in alU 
 about four hundred. 
 
 Tliis conference appears in your papers*. I thought :« 
 at the time that the cordiality of the Indians overii 
 the \\ hole continent might be depended upon, and 
 their firif operations tended to perluade me into a be- 
 lief of their utility. 1 he priefl to whom they feemed| 
 devoted, and the Britifli oiiicers employed to condud' 
 them, and to whofe controul tliey engaged to lubmir, 
 gained advantages, a.nd fprcad terror without barbarity. 
 
 The 
 
 bring i 
 jliew tl 
 
^^>; 
 
 
 (C 
 
 li 
 
 N A R R A IM V i: . 
 
 The fnfl party lent out inadc levcral of the enemy ])ri. 
 loners in t!ic heat of adlion, and treated them with 
 luHopcan humanity. 
 
 J)urmg the movement of the diirercnt corps to this 
 peneral renilezvoiis, I wrote a tliird letter to Sir William 
 Howe. Ihe chief piwport of it was ro ^ivc him " in- 
 " telligence oi' n\y (ituation at the time, .'ind of my 
 " expedation ol heinn; before J icondero'-ja l)ctween tlie: 
 *' '^oth and 2 ah inllant ■, that 1 did not apprehend tlic 
 ' clfecHive iirenfj^ih of the army would amount to above 
 6500 men •, that I meant to a))ply to Sir Guy Carle- 
 ton 10 lend a garrilon to Ticonderofra when it fhould 
 be reiiu( ed, but thai I was apprehenfivc he would 
 " not think himlelf auiliorited by the Kinp/s orders to 
 comply*, that whenever, therefore, I mi<dit be able m 
 elfed tl'.e junclion. Sir William wnuld not exj)ecl mc 
 to brinjj, near ilie ori<!;ijial number. 1 repeated my 
 pevieverance in the iilea ol f^iving jealouly on the fide 
 ol Connediciir, and at the lan;e lime my aiuirances, 
 " that I Ihould nu.ke no manoeuvre that could ])rocra- 
 " (lin.ite thei;reat objecl of a jun(^i.ion." 
 
 I lluLe theie diirerent letters to Sir Williiim I fowe 
 merely to li,e>.v that my eonception of the preciiion of 
 my orders \v,;s nor iip')n afti-r-thought, and taken u]) a:i 
 an ex'ciile when I fouiul the cxptdaioii had failed ; but 
 a fixed tlecided fcntiment coeval with my knowledge of 
 my cotnmand. 
 
 For a fur'd^er proof of the fame fafl', I beer leave to 
 (late an extracl from my (.)rders to the army at Crown 
 Point, June 30th. The words were thrfe : 
 
 " Ihc army embarks to-morrow to approach the 
 enemy. '1 he fervices re(|uired of this particular ex- 
 pedition are critical and confpicuous. Durinnr our 
 progrefs occafions may occur, in which, nor diffi- 
 culty, nor labour, nor life are to be regarded. 'This 
 army mull not retreat." Were it necelfar^', I could 
 bring abundant collateral proof to the fame effe6l, and 
 (liew that the idea of forcing a way to Albany by vi- 
 gorous 
 
 tl 
 
 m 
 
 
 H^ 
 
 i' 
 
 VK.ni 
 
 
 
H 
 
 12 
 
 N A R R A 1' I V E. 
 
 See Ap 
 
 fijorous exertions againll any ^ppofition we mi<;Iit mectj 
 was [general and fixt through the wliole army. 
 
 My proceedings from the rune of aflembling the arinyl 
 as before defcribed, to the date of my public difpatchi 
 from Skeneiborough, comprehending the inanGeuvresI 
 which forced the enemy from Ticonderoga, and thel 
 actions at Skeneiborough, Hubcrton, and Fort AnneJ 
 are related at full in tliat difpatch.* 
 
 It is the lefs neceilary to give the Committee further! 
 No. VU. trouble upon this fubjedl, becaufe I believe no encmyj 
 can be found to arraign my condud in thofe days ofj 
 fucceis i or if there were one, lue could not deprive mej 
 of the confolation, that I had his Majtity's full appro- 
 bation and applaufe, of which it is known to many, lj 
 had a very honourable and ditlinguiflied proof. 
 
 All therefore that is necefiary before I quit this fnill 
 period of the campaign, is to give a precife Hate off 
 the cfFedivc ftrength of the army, at the time it af- 
 fembled. 
 
 On the ill July, the day we encamped before Ticon«. 
 deroga, the troops confiiled of 
 
 Brkifti rank and file -^ 37^-4 
 
 German ditto - S'^'^ 
 
 6740 regulars, exclu-! 
 five of artil-i 
 
 Canadians and Provincials, about 250 lery-mcn. 
 Indians about - 400 
 
 650 
 
 In regard to the artillcrv, I think this the proper place 
 to redify the mifreprefe'ications that have prevailed re- 
 Ipccling the quantity employed. It has been Hated as 
 far beyond the ncccliary proportion for the number ofl 
 troops, an incumbrance to their movements, and one 
 caule of what has been called the fluv/ progrels of the 
 expedition. 
 
 In order to iuHify this charge, a view of the whole 
 mat's has been prefentcd to the public witiiout any ex- 
 planation 
 
NARRATIVE. 
 
 lanationof its dillinft allotments •, and many have been 
 al to believe, that the whole was attaciied to the army 
 hroLighoiit the campaign, and fell into the enemy's 
 ands at lall — The intention of this reprefentation is 
 bvious : the allegation is falfc. 
 
 T!\e fai^ls, as I lliall prove them to the committee, are 
 Irs follow : The whole original train furniflied by Sir 
 Guy Carlcton confuted of fixteen heavy tv^'enty-four 
 pounders; ten heavy twelve-pounders-, eight medium 
 twelve-pounders ; two light twenty-four pounders ; one 
 light twelve-pounder ; twenty-fix light fix-pounders i 
 feventeen light three-pounders-, fix eight-inch howitzers-, 
 fix five and a half inch howitzers ; two thirteen-inch 
 mortars ; two ten-inch mortars •, fix eiglit-inch mortars ; 
 twelve five and a half-inch mortars -, and twenty-four 
 four and two fifth-inch mortars. Ot-' thcfe, two heavy 
 twenty-four pounders were fent on board a fliip for the 
 detcnce of Lake Champlain, and the other fourteen 
 were fent back to St. John's. OF the heavy twelve- 
 pounders, fix were left at Ticonderoga, four chtto in 
 the Royal George -, four medium twelve-pounders ac 
 Fort George ; one light twelve-pounder at Ticonderoga ; 
 two light fix-pounders at Tort George -, four light fix- 
 pounders at St. John's -, four light three-pounders at 
 Ticonderoga; five light three-pounders at St Jolin's -, 
 two eight-inch howitzers at Fort George •, t^v.) ditto at 
 St. John's J two five and a half-inch howitzers at Fort 
 George j two thirteen-inch mortars in the Royal Georo-e -, 
 two ten-inch mortars in ditto-, four eight-inch mortars 
 in ditto-, four five and a half-inch mortars at Ticonde- 
 roga -, four royal mortars in t!ie Royal George ; twelves 
 cohorns at Ticonderoga -, and eight cohorns in the Royal 
 George. 
 
 The field- train therefore that proceeded with the 
 army confilted of four medium twelve-pounders ; two 
 light twenty-four pounders; eighteen light fix-pounders ; 
 fix light three- pounders ; two eight-inch howitzers-, 
 four five and a half-inch howitzers ; two eirdit-inch 
 mortars, and lour royals. 
 
 4 The 
 
 «5 
 
 ^r 
 
 \<i 
 
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 yUliM 
 
 m^l 
 
 •^ 
 
 
 'tV> 
 
 ftV^f 
 
 
N A K R A T I V 1',. 
 
 Th.' r.inviiH', llw' iwcnty four pounders (thiMifrli tl>ry. 
 wcK" l>ni two) Ii;is Inrn (j'okrii ol ;is ;ii\ rnor, atul itj 
 IS iHMH'ir.iiv llu'rrtorc lo iiifon.; the conmirtcc lliiit they 
 wvw ol i\ ( onilnuMioM li,»Jitcr In pij'ju Inmdrrtl wciphtj 
 tl\;in inniuiin (wclvrs, aiul to all intents anil [itnpulb 
 licKl aviillciy. 
 
 This aii.illet V was (lilirihtitrj as follows : 
 
 I'vaUr's eorps, ellimatal at titi'cc hatialionJs 
 'l*r:i piacs, vi/. 
 I'\nir lip.ht rix-potiiulcrs. 
 
 I'oin- li[',!tt: rhtrc poimilcrs, oonlb'uilcil Tor hrin^j oc-i 
 califinallv eavriod on horlchaek. 
 
 I wo roval howii/.crs. 
 Gciiuan iclorvc, under Colonel l?teyn>an, cllitnatcd ;it| 
 
 two battalions, 
 'J'w(> li|\ht lix-poiind(MS. 
 
 Two lijrht three-poiinders, and fcrved liy llic Hcirc 
 llanau artillery men. 
 
 Ihe lin» ot" r)ritilli, fonr hatMlions, 
 Ciernians, live battalions. 
 'I'otal, nine battallions. 
 I'lifcc lirigades ot" artillcrv, of four fix piiinde;'? 
 raeii ; viz. otic brigade tor caeh wing, and one for the 
 center. 
 
 iM-oin hence it aj>pears that to fourteen battalions there 4 
 weic allotted twenty-fix j^ieces of li!',ht artillery. The 1 
 cuttoivia'v alU)ttncnt is two pieces per battalion, conlc- 
 qtiently the proportion of artillery was Icls than upon 
 common fcrviccs. 
 
 I'he forming; artillery into brigades, in preference to | 
 detachin}.T two puns to each battalion, has been con- 
 iVantlv pradilcd in moil ierviccs during lall war under 
 the ablell nicn, and it is produrtivc of many advantages, 
 ns the brigades by that means, either finolv or united, 
 fall under the command of a proportionable number of 
 otticers. The fervice is carried on witli greater regula- 
 rity, and the ctYct\ of the fire becomes much more for- 
 midable than when fcattered along the front of the line. 
 
 This 
 
)f, .ind It 
 
 tliiU rhcy 
 
 'i.\ weight 
 
 piirpoln 
 
 )n«i, 
 
 brin^^ oc- 
 
 itnarcJ at 
 :I)C r Idle 
 
 i'>undcr'i 
 c lor the 
 
 ons their 
 The 
 , coil le- 
 an upon 
 
 y 
 
 :rcncc to 
 en con- 
 ar uiuler 
 ''antagcs, 
 r united, 
 inber of 
 • regula- 
 10 re tor- 
 c line. 
 This 
 
 N A II R A r I V I',. 
 
 This mode ol I'crvicc was rcconinunded by Major- 
 (Mieral I'hillips, and adoptcxi without hc/itation by inr, 
 ly own iud<j;nicnt bcinjr conrnmed by an o/liccr of his 
 rear IkiJI and experience. 
 The park artillery eonlifted of ten peices, viz. 
 2 lifrjit twenty Ibvir jxiunders. 
 4 niedivini iwclve-pounders. 
 I ci'/jit-ineh howitzers. 
 '/. rovai Iiowitzers. 
 I under flood this pioporiion of field artillery to be 
 he liinie as that propolcd by Sir (iuy Carleton had he 
 ommanded ; it was the j)roportion recommcndeil by Ge- 
 icial Philips, and I lornied my opinion conlbrmably to 
 he li-ntiments of thole relped-hible otticers upon the 
 bllowing reaibns, viz. that artillery was extreiiu ly fbr- 
 lidable to raw troops ; that in a country of polls it 
 ivas elfentially neceHary ap;ainil the bell troops •, that it 
 as yet more applicable to the enemy we were to combat, 
 ecaule tlic mode of defence they invariably adopted, 
 lid at which they were beyond all other nations expert, 
 as that of entrenchment covered with llronf? abbiiii*^, 
 •niind which the cannon, of the natuie of the lieavielt 
 '.bovc dcfcribed, and howitzers, mij.dit often be efiec- 
 tiul, when to dillod{.',e them by any other means might 
 be attended with continued and imj/(;rtant loffes. 
 
 In thele general ideas of the ule of artillery againrt: 
 the rebel forces, I have the happinefs to oblijrve, fiom 
 the papers before you, the concurrence of Sir William 
 Howe, who Rates fimilar ideas very fully in one of his 
 requilhions to the I'ecretary of (late : but further rea- 
 lons for not diminiiliing the proportion of guns of 
 fuperior calibre to fix-pounders in this train, were, firll, 
 their uie againil block-houles (a fpecics of foitihcation 
 leeuliar to America) ; fccondly, a probability that tjun- 
 3oats might be re(][uifite for the lecurity of the water 
 traniport, on fome part of the Hudlon's River; but 
 principally the intention of fortifying a camp at Albany, 
 in cafe I Ihould reach that place, fhould meet with a 
 llifficicncy of provifion there (as I was led to expeifl) 
 1 and 
 
 >$ 
 
 
 >^'-.3 
 
 mi. 
 
 IP'S 
 
 y;.»2?*^l 
 
i^ 
 
 tS NARRATIVE. 
 
 and lliould find it expedient to pafs tlic winter there,] 
 without comnninication with New-York. 
 
 With rcfpcdt to the quantity of ammunition at- 
 tached to this artillery, it is to be oblervcd, that thc| 
 number ot* rounds accompanying the light pieces, am 
 wiiich were carried in fmall carts, were not more than! 
 fuflicient ior a day's action. 
 
 Light fix-pounders — 1 24 rounds each. 
 Light three-pounders — 300 rounds. 
 Royal how rzcrs -— 90 rounds. 
 
 The different referves of ammunition were chieflyl 
 conveyed by water in fcows and bateaux : it certainly 
 would not have been advidible, after a communication 
 with Canada was at an end, to depend upon precarious 
 lupplies from the fouthward, and therefore it became 
 neceftary (as far as the fervice would allow) to carry 
 forward luch ftores, as there was every appearance of 
 an abfolute want of, during the courle of an adlivcj 
 campaign. 
 
 Llad the enemy eflablifhed thcmfelves in force upon! 
 the idands at tlic moudi of the Mohawk River, or on 
 other ground equally advantageous, to have difputcd 
 the pafliige of that, or of the lludlbn's River, or had 
 they even waited an alTault in their works at Still- 
 water, it i'^ probable, that rccourfe mult have been! 
 had to artillery of the heavier nature ; in the latter cafe I 
 elperialiy tliey mud have been ufed, in order to derive I 
 any advantage from our icizing a pofl" upon their left 
 flank : 1 have fincc known, that they had iron twelve] 
 and nme-poimders mounted upon thole works, which 
 were in orh.er refpefts very formidable. 
 
 'J'he Britifn arti!lery-men, rank and file, were 245 
 
 Recruits, under command of Lieutenant Nutt, 
 of the 2^i\ regiment, attached to the fervice 
 of the artillery — — 150 
 
 Heilian aitiDery-men, rank and file — * 78 
 
 473 
 Add 
 
N A R R A T I V E. 
 
 Add thefw numbers to the former (late of tlic army, 
 anil it will be found, that the regular Ilrength when at 
 the greatelt con filled of 7213. 
 
 I come now to the fecond period of the campaign, 
 comprehending the iranfadtions from the time the pur- 
 fuit of the enemy from Ticonderoga cealecl, and tl<c 
 corps of Brigadier-general Frafer, and the 9th regiment, 
 rejoined the army, after the refpeiftive adtions of Hu- 
 berton and Fort Anne, to the time when the army 
 pafled the Iludfon's River to nttack. the enemy near 
 Stillwater. 
 
 It had proved impofTible immediately to follow the 
 (.juick retreat of the enemy farther, from the nature of 
 the country, and the necelTity of waiting a frefii fupply 
 of provifions. But it appeared evident to me, tfiac 
 could a ra[)id progrefs towards Albany be eHcded, 
 during their difperfion and panic, it would be dccifive 
 on the fucccfs of the expedition, 
 
 Qiicilion has been made by thofe who began at this 
 period to arraign my military conduifl, whether it would 
 not have been more ex[)etlienc for the purpole of n pi- 
 dity, to have fallen back to Ticonderoga, in order to 
 take the convenient route by Lake George, than to iiave 
 perfevered in the laborious and uiHicuk courle b^ land 
 to Fort Edward ? My motives for preferring the latter 
 Were thefe : I confidered not only the general impref- 
 fions which a retrograde motion is apt to make upon 
 the minds both of enemies and friends, but alfo, that 
 the natural conduft of the enemy in that rale would be 
 to remain at Fort Georre, as their retrc .it could not then 
 be cut off, in order to oblige me to open trenche^;, and 
 coniequently to delay me, ai.d in the mean time they 
 would have ccftroyed the road from Fort George to 
 Fort Edward. On the other hand, by perlifting to ' 
 penetrate by the Ihcrt cut from Fort Anne, of wiiich 
 I was then mafter, to F'ort Edward, though it was at- 
 tended with great labour, and many alert fituations, the 
 troops were improved in the very eficntial ])ointof v/ood 
 fervicei I effedually diflodged the enemy from Fort 
 
 C George 
 
 '7 
 
 {^: 
 
 ?■ ' ■'■t'. ) '-'ifi 
 
 mm 
 
 i. ■'•*>!. WW*?* *\ 
 
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 I''!'"'' 
 
 m 
 
 i8 NARRATIVE. 
 
 George without a blow: and Icciiij^ me mailer of one 
 communication, they did not think it worth while to 
 ddlroy the other. 
 
 The great number of boats alio, which mull necef- 
 farily have been employed for the tranfport of the troops 
 over Lake George, were by this courfe fpared for the 
 tranfport of the provifion, artillery, and ammunition. 
 
 The fuccefs aniwered this realbning in every point; 
 for by the vigilance of General Phillips, to whom I 
 had committed the important part of forwarding all the 
 necefTaries from Ticonderoga, a great embarkation ar- 
 rived at Fort George on July 29th. I took poflcffion 
 of the country near Fort Edward on the fame day, 
 and independently of other advantages, I found myfelf 
 much more forv/ard in point of time than I could pof- 
 fibly have been by the other route. 
 
 Another material motive, which could not be known 
 by ftrangcrs who have reafoned upon this movement, 
 was, that during the time my army was employed in 
 clearing Wook-Creek and cutting roads, and the corps 
 under Major-general Phillips was working to pals the 
 tranfports over Lake George, I was enabled to detach a 
 large corps to my left, under Major-general Reidelel, 
 and thereby affill my purpofe of giving jealoufy to 
 Connedicut, and keeping in check the whole country 
 called the Hamplhire Grants. 
 
 It was at this time Major-general Reidefel conceived 
 the purpofe of mounting his regiment of dragoons. 
 In the country he traverfed during his detached com- 
 mand, he found the people frightened and fubmiffive. 
 He was induftrious and expert in procuring intelligence 
 in parts of the country more remote than Bennington, 
 and entertained no doubt of fuccefs, were an expedi- 
 tion formed under the command of Lieutenant-colonel 
 Baume. 
 
 On the arrival of the army at Fort Edward, the 
 
 great object of attention was the tranfports from Fort 
 
 George. The diftance was about fixteen miles, the 
 
 roads v/anting great repair, the weather unfavourable, 
 
 3 thfti 
 
 Kll^r 
 
NARRATIVE. 
 
 the cattle and carriage"; fcarce •, part of the latter inoon- 
 venicncc was occafioned by tlie number of both that 
 were neceflTarily detained at Ticondcroga, for the pur- 
 pofe of dragging the boats and the provifions over the 
 carrying-places, between Lake Champlain and Lake 
 Georg : another part of the inconvenience was caufcd 
 by the unavoidable delays, in bringing the different 
 divifions of horfes, as they were collcfted in Canada, 
 through the defart, for fuch moft of the country is, 
 between St. John's and Ticondcroga, 
 
 It was foon found, that in the fituation of the tranf- 
 port fervice at that time, the army could barely be 
 viftualled from day to day, and that there was no pro- 
 Ipeft of eftablifhing a magazine in due time for pur- 
 fuing prefent advantages. The idea of the expedition 
 to Bennington originated upon this difficulty, combined 
 with the intelligence reported by General lleidcfel, and 
 with all I had otherwife received. 
 
 I knew that Bennington was the great dcpofit of 
 corn, flour, and (tore cattle-, that it was guarded only 
 by militia -, and every day's account tended to confirm 
 the perfuafion of the loyalty of one defcription of the 
 inhabitants and the panic of the other. Thofe who 
 knew the country bed were the moft fanguine in this 
 perfuafion. 
 
 Had my intelligence been worfe founded, I fhould 
 not have hefitated to try this expedition with fuch troops, 
 and under fuch inftrud:ions, as I gave to the command- 
 ing officer, for fo great a purpofe as that of a fupply 
 fullicient to enable the army to follow at the heels of a 
 broken and difconcerted enemy. The German troops 
 employed were of the beft I had of that nation. The 
 number of Britilh was fmall •, but it was the feledl light 
 corps of the army, compofed of chofen men from all 
 the regiments, and commanded by Captain Frafcr, one 
 of the moft diftinguiflied officers in his line of fervice 
 that ever 1 met with. The inftrudlions recommended 
 the utmoft caution refpedting poits and fccurity of re- 
 treat, attention againft expoling the folid part of the 
 
 C 2 detachment 
 
 »9 
 
 >.', 
 
 
 'I I 
 
 
 
I 
 
 i ■ 
 
 20) 
 
 * 
 Src Ap- 
 
 IX. 
 
 N A li R A T 1 V h, 
 
 iletac hincnt lo alliont, or connniuinp; it in any iiiflancp, 
 wirlunit a moral ccriainly of kiccds. I louih wiifi 
 tcndcrfu'ls and witli yjv.xi rdiidancc |){)ints iljit relate 
 to ilic ilcail. My (IckMcc compels mc to lay, niy 
 cautions were not oblirvcti, nor the rcinforcrnKnt ad- 
 vanced wiih ilicalaciiry I havl a riojit to cx|k\M. 'I'Iw 
 nicti who commanded in hotli Inllances wen.* brave 
 diK\ c\;;fritiK"cd otiiiors. 1 have ever imputed their 
 tailurc partly to delulion in relpec'l to the enemy, and 
 partly to Turpi ile and conl'cqucnt cont'uiiun in the 
 troopis. 
 
 I'or further explanation of mv motives, and the 
 cirenmnances attending the rondud of the expedition, 
 1 beg leave to refer tlie committee to the letter laiil be- 
 fore the I'mle lafV year, and more particularly to the 
 fjMivate Utter laid before the houfe lately.* 
 
 I he fame letter vvill fliew the only refource that rr- 
 niniiicj lor j'Toeeeding towaids Albany, after the dif- 
 appointn-.ent of this expedition, viz. to prefs forward 
 A necclVary fupply of provilion, and other inilifpenfibK- 
 artieles, iVom Fort George. I fliall bring proof to 
 your bar ro this point, and I trult 1 ihall Ihew, beyond a 
 doubt, that no poHiblc exertion was omitted. It is not 
 vmcoinmon for gentlemen, unactjuainted with the pecu- 
 liarities oi the country to which I atn alluding, to cal- 
 culate tlie tranl'port of magazines, by mealuring the 
 diilaiKe upon a map, and then applying the rcfourees 
 of caniage, as pradifed in other countries. I rcqucft 
 permilllon to lliew their miftake. The firll llage troni 
 Fort (jcorge to Fort Edward is by land. The diftancc 
 and the roads were defcribed before. At Fort Edward 
 the Hudlon's River becomes navigable for a certain ex- 
 rent, anci it is the conftant pradice in all tianfports 
 ro relume the water carriage. Were it not, new impe- 
 diments would ariie from hills, worfe roads, and Rich 
 an incrcafed diftance, as would prevent the cattle re- 
 turning to Fort George the fame day. About fix miles 
 bciow Fort Edward lie the falls of F'ort Miller, where 
 there is another carrying-place, which, though of no 
 
 confiderable 
 
N A R R A T I V r: . 
 
 mnfitlrriWc Icnpth, makes it nccrll'iry ro mil )ail thr 
 boat.% to pliicc llic CDiUfiiis in (arts, ami to u jjI.u.c 
 thrm in tr< Ih boats, at ilie jilace the river Uf^ain admifs 
 of* navi|;nfi()n. The l>f)iit'i unloaikil, return to I'oit 
 I'llw.inl nirainft a rapid Ilrcaru. 
 
 Upon this fhort flare of fails, p^cntU'mcn will jiKli';e 
 of our cniljarrallincnts. In the firll place, it was ne- 
 c( llary to brin<^ forward to I'ort Kdward touinorc or 4 
 hiindra! boats, as nu'rc carriaj^c-vcllcl.s for the provi- 
 finns, each boat nia^lc a hard day's work for fjxor more 
 horli's, inclutlinp;thc rtturriof the horlVs. At tlie ncxc 
 carryingplnrc, as above defcribcil, it was neccilary to 
 phue a confiilcrabic relay of hojfcs to draw over, lirll, 
 a portion of carriage- boats, and afterwards tlie provi- 
 fion, as it arri\'cd. I have not mentioned the «^reac 
 niimbtr of other boats nectlfaiy to be brou'dit forward, 
 to form bridges, to carry bap«/,a<^e and ammuniti(in, and 
 the number of r.arriai;es frameil to tranfport the boats 
 thcn)ii.ivcs at the cnfuing tarryin[»;-plaees, as we flioiild 
 ])rocced to Albany. I'his will be fliewn in detail at 
 the bar, if the committee chule to hear it •, and I pledge 
 niyfeif, it will appear, that the diligence in this Icrvice 
 was extreme; that it was performed in the moll expe- 
 ditious manner polTible, regard being had to our rc- 
 fourccs, and that no delay was occafioned by the artillery, 
 bccaufe the horfes appropriated to it werefupernumerary 
 to thofe for which we had carts, and the artillery, not 
 already with the army, at lalt was all brought up by 
 its own horfes in two days. 
 
 On the 13th of September, the flore of provifion.. 
 amounting to about thirty days' confumption, was conj- 
 pleted. 1 have Hated, in my letter to the fecretary of 
 llate, my reafons againft proceeding with lefs quantity. 
 And it is now time to enter upon the confideration of 
 that objeft, which is held by I'ome to be conclufivc 
 upon the executive part of the campaign, the palFage 
 of the Hudfon's River. 
 
 Two errors, refpedling this paflage, though of op- 
 pofitc and incompatible natures, are fuppofed to have 
 
 C 3 contributed 
 
 II 
 
 •J, 'r-'-\ >M 
 
 '•-, '/ '! ■-. 
 
 tiii' '■;■■ :. 
 
 ■ ■ ■ ■*' .i-t,.' 
 
 v. ,•■•■;. i'-fv \\ 
 
«9 
 
 21 
 
 * 
 
 See Ap- 
 
 ?cndix 
 lo. IX. 
 
 NARRATIVE. 
 
 cnptiibutcd to the ih fiicccfs that enfucd ; the onr, the 
 ciYor of delay, the otlur, that of precipitation. In 
 defence againft the fiifl, I refer to my effort at Hcnning- 
 ton to procure fupplies, and to the impediments, I have 
 juftnow dated, after the effort failed. Againft the lat- 
 ter, I refer to the reafojis laid down in my private letter 
 totlie fecretarj' of dale, dated 20th of Augutl. * 'I'hc 
 ftatc of things at this important cnfis, and my reafoning 
 upon ir, are expreflcd flill more at large in my difpatch 
 from Albany •, I will nov/ only touch them Ihortly. 
 On the one liand, my communications were at an end ; 
 my retreat wa.i infecure ; the enemy was collct^tcd in 
 force , they were flongly pofled •, Colonel St. I.egcr 
 was retiring from Fort Stanwix*. 'rhefe were dilficul- 
 ties, but none of them infurmountabk'. On the other 
 hand, I had difidged the enemy repeatedly, when 
 in force, and more ftrongly polled ; my army was 
 confcious of having the fuperiority, and eager to ad- 
 vance ; I cxpcdcd co-operation -, no letters from Sir 
 "William Howe removed that expcftation ; that to Sir 
 Guy Carleton had never weighed upon my mind, be- 
 cauic it was dated early in April, and confequenily 
 long b'jfore the fecretary of ftaie's inftrudlions, which 
 I mull have fuppofed to relate to co-operation, could 
 * be received. The letter of 1 7th of July,* mentioned that 
 r^o.X. Qeneral's return to my alTillance, Ihould VVaihington 
 turn his force towards me j indicated, as I thought, an 
 expetflation of my arrival at Albany j and informed me, 
 that Sir Henry Clinton was left at New- York, and 
 would adl as occurrences might direft. I did mt know 
 Sir Henry Clinton's force. I ^/^ know, that confider- 
 ablc reinforcement might be then cxpef^ed at New- 
 York from Fngland, After all, fhould co-operation 
 from below faif. tiie whole force of Colonel St. Leger, 
 and Sir William Johnfon, was to be expefted from 
 above, in time to facilitate a retreat, though not in 
 time to aflifl: my advance. Under thefe different fug- 
 geftions, and thofe that are more copioufly ftated in the 
 difpatch, to which I have referred, I read again my 
 
 orders 
 
N /. R R A T I V E. 
 
 orders (I believe for an hundredth time) and I was de- 
 cided. 
 
 And I am flill convinced, that no proof that could 
 have been brought from appearances, intelligence or 
 reafoning, could have jullificd me to my country, iiavc 
 laved nic from the condemnation of my profefTion, or 
 produced pardon within my own breaft, had I not ad- 
 vanced, and tried a battle with the enemy. 
 
 I will conclude this fubjec^l, with again afl'erting upon 
 my honour, what I hope to fupport by evidence, thouo;h 
 it is imj)oinble to bring polltivc proof to a negative, 
 that neither General Fralcr, nor General Phillips, ever 
 offered, as has been reported, nor can be luppoled to 
 have conceived any objedlion againit the paflage of the 
 Hudfon*s River. 
 
 This relblution being taken, I truft, the manner of 
 approaching the enemy, when explained by witnefles, 
 will not be diigraceful to me as a ibkiicr. The action, 
 which enfued on the 19th of September, verined my 
 opinion of the valour of my army ; and I mull, in 
 truth, acknowledge, a very refpcdable fliare of that 
 quality in the army of the enemy. To the general 
 defcription given in my difpatch, it will be fit to add, 
 by evidence, the peculiar merits of the troops in that 
 adion. The honour of three Britifli regiments, in con- 
 tinual and clofe fire for four hours, all of them fuflTer- 
 ing confiderable lofs, and one remaining with lefs than 
 fixty men, and four or five officers, ought not to lofe 
 its due applaufe, becaufe it is faid, their opponents v^ere 
 irregulars and militia. 
 
 A viflory was at lafl obtained, but the clofe of day 
 unavoidably prevented any immediate advantages. On 
 the day following, it was known from prifoners and de- 
 fertcrs, that the enemy were in a poft (trongly fortified ; 
 but from the thicknefs of the wood, it was impofTible 
 to catch a view of any part of their pofition. All that 
 could be done, therefore, was to take up ground as near 
 them, as the nature of the country would admit with 
 regard to military arrangement. It appears from the 
 
 dilpatch 
 
 W%^.' 
 
 23 
 
 tm4 
 
 ay. «.'/■!■ 
 
 
 II 
 
 
 
■\\^ 
 
 m 
 
 U N A R RATI V E. 
 
 difpntch already alluded to, that the army remained In 
 this politinn till the 9th or Odtober, when the lecond 
 aflion cnfr.ed, employed in fortifying their camp, and 
 watciruKT the enemv, whofc numbers it w?s now known, 
 had been greatly lupcrior to ours in tlie aftion. 
 
 It may here be aikcd, why, as loon as it became 
 palpable tliat no ufe could be made of the vielory, I 
 did not retreat ? 
 
 It will be fhevvn, that on the fecond day after the 
 aftion, I rec'ivcd intelligence from Sir Henry Clinton, 
 of his intention to attack the higlilands about that 
 time, and 1 was hourly in cxpedation, I thought a 
 juftly founded one, of that meafure operating to dif- 
 lodoe Mr. Gates entirely, or to oblige him to detach 
 a large portion of his force. Either of thefe cafes 
 would probably have opened my way to Albany. In 
 thefe circumftances, could the preference upon thefe 
 alternatives admit of a mofrent's refle(5lion ? To wait 
 lb fair a profpeft of efi'e(^ing at laft the great purpofe 
 of the campaign, or to put a vi<5lorious army, under 
 ?11 the difadvantages of a beaten one, by a difficult 
 and difgraceful retreat-, rclinquiiliing the long-expedlcd 
 co-operation, in the very hour of its promile, and 
 leaving Sir Henry Clinton's army, and probably Sir 
 William Howe's, expofcd, with fo much of the feafon 
 of the campaign to run, to the whole force of Mr. 
 Gates, after he fliould have fcen me on the other fide 
 of Hudfon*s River. 
 
 Some of the fame confiderations, and other conco- 
 mitant circumfcances, will, in part, fcrvc to account 
 for my not af.icking the enemy during this interval ; 
 for in this fituation, as in former ones, my conduft 
 has been arraigned upon oppofite principles. 
 
 The committee will oblerve, that after receiving 
 intelligence of Sir Henry Clinton's defign, diffl^rent 
 meflTengers were difpatched by different routes, to in- 
 form that officer of my fituation, and of the time I 
 tiiought I could continue in it. To have hazarded a 
 fcpuUe, under fo rcafonablc an expedation of a power- 
 ful 
 
N A R 11 A T I V E, 
 
 ful diverfion, woukl, in my opinion, have been very 
 uiijultifiable j but when 1 acid, that from the bacl;- 
 vvardncfs, or defection, of the few Indians t. at re- 
 inaincd, the numbers of rifle-men, and other irregulars 
 employed on the enemy's out-polts, and the llrcngth 
 nnd darknefs of the furrounding woods, it had not 
 yet been practicable to gain any competent knowledge 
 of their poficion, I truft every man will po with n)c 
 in the lentiment, that all thcfe circumftances confi- 
 dered, an attack would have been conlunimate ralli- 
 ncis. 
 
 Another very powerful reafon, that operated on the 
 fide of delay, was the ftate of my fick and wounded. 
 Numbers of the latttr were recovering fait -, many eX' 
 cdlent officers in particular •, and the more 1 delayed 
 the Ilronger I grew. The time alio entitled me to 
 cxpedl Lieutenant Colonel St. Legtr's corps would be 
 arrived at '1 iconderoga, and fccret means had been long 
 concerted to enabje him to make an elfort to join me, 
 with probability of luccefs. 
 
 Upon mature confideration of thefe and other cir- 
 cumllances attending this period, come to my know- 
 k'di-e li nee, I am clearly of opinion, that had the re- 
 inforcements from ^'n land arrived in time, to have 
 enabled Sir Henry Clinton to have effected the itroke 
 he aftcrwardo lb gallantly made in the highlands, any 
 time between the two atftions, I flioukl have made my 
 I way. 
 
 The dlfpatch alluded to, proceeds to ftate the 
 reafon that induced me to make the movement on the 
 yih of O6lober. I fhall only add, to obviate a ibp- 
 poled error, in not advancing my wiiole line, that the 
 part remaining in my camp, Oj)cratcd as efiectually to 
 kv^ep the enemy's right wing in check, from fiipport- 
 jing their left, as if it had moved, with this additional 
 advantage, that it prevented the danger of their ad- 
 vancing by the plain, near the river, and falling upon 
 my rear. 
 
 I have 
 
 H 
 
 mm 
 
 m 
 
 &M^/ 
 
 m 
 
 ■i*,!l 
 
 M 
 
 
 y;tii 
 
 iim 
 
 \J: 
 
 h-^r 
 
 h 
 
 '«. 
 
 
 
 ■■■:*■''. <!f 
 
i' 
 
 f 
 
 s6 NARRATIVE. 
 
 I have reafon to believe my difiippointment on that 
 day proceeded from an uncommon circuinftance in the 
 conduct: of" the enemy. Mr. Gates, as I have ban 
 informed, had determined to receive the attack in hisj 
 lines; Mr. Arnold, who commanded on the left, for- 
 feeing tiic ilanger of beinn; turned, advanced without I 
 conlultaiion wiili his general, and gave, inftead of re- 
 ceiving battle. The flrokc might have been fatal on 
 his part had he failed. But confident I am, upon 
 minute examination of the ground fincc, that had the 
 other itiea been purfued, I fliould in a few hours have 
 gained a pofition, that in Ipite of tlic enemy's num-| 
 bers, would have put them in my power. 
 
 Difagreeabic as is the neceduy, I mufl here again,! 
 in jullice to my own army, recur to the vigour andl 
 obllinacy with which they were fought by tiie enemy.l 
 A more determined jicrleverance than they Ihcwed inl 
 the attack upon the lines, though they were finallyj 
 repulfed by the corps under Lord Balcarras, I believe, 
 is not in any officer's experience. It will be the bufincfsj 
 of evidence to prove, that in the part, where Coloncll 
 Brcyman was killed, and the enemy penetrated, thel 
 mifchief could not be repaired, nor under it the campl 
 be lono;er tenable. 
 
 Ihe tranfidions of the enfuing night, the day ofl 
 the eighth, and the whole progrcfs ot the retreat to[ 
 S.iratoga, will be laid before the committee minutelyl 
 in the courfe of my evidence, as well as every circun>[ 
 ilance, from the time the army arrived there to tlicl 
 figning the convention. I have only to prcmife, that! 
 I trull, 1 fliall be able to prove, to the fatisfaflion d] 
 the committee, that even in this fituation, I had the 
 char.ce oF a favourable event. The enemy had inl 
 tended to attack by the plain of Saratoga. On thi 
 morninLi: of the nth, a confiderable column hal 
 actually pafled the Fiih Kill for that purpofe during 
 the fog, which at that feaibn was regular till fome-l 
 tin^e after fun-rife. The intention was prevented 
 
 taking 
 
NARRATIVE. 
 
 Itaking place- by intelligence one of their generals 
 ireceivcd frjiw a deferter, that I had a line formed 
 behind the brufh-wood, to fujiport the pofl of artil- 
 lery, which was their immediate objcd of attack. 
 The general inftantly retreated his column, and pre- 
 vented a general action, wiiich my pofition, compared 
 with the propofed one of the enemy, gave me reafon 
 to hope would have been to my advantage. 
 
 1 have likewife a fatisfaftory confidence, that I fliall 
 Idemonftrate that the intelligence I ftatcd to the councils 
 of war, relpeding the flrength of the enemy, did not 
 fall Ihort in any part, and in fome parts mucli exceeded 
 niy own belief, particularly on the only poOible routes 
 I of my retreat j and that thofe pofts were not taken up 
 during my itay at Saratoga, as has been reported, but 
 fome of ihem previous to the adion of the 7di, and 
 the reft iiii mediately after it. 
 
 I Ihall clofe the whole of this by delivering at your 
 table, from the hands of my fecretary, an authen- 
 ticated return of the force of General Gates, figned 
 by himfelf, and the truth of it will be fupported from 
 ocular teftimony, by every o/Bcer of the Britifh army. 
 Many of them are now in England, and after what 
 has been infinuated, not to fay charged in this Houfe, 
 it becomes the duty of the acculers, not only to ex- 
 amine clofely the officers I have called, but to pro- 
 duce any other witnefles, that in their thoughts may 
 be qualified to fpeak to the good or bad order of the 
 rebel troop?, when they marched by in their prefence, 
 to their behaviour, when oppofed to our troops in 
 a(^ion. 
 
 I cannot clofe this long trefpafs upon the patience of 
 the committee, without exprcffing one humble hope, 
 that in forming a judgment upon the whole, or any 
 diftinft part of thefe tranfaftions, they will be confi- 
 dered as tliey muft have appeared at the time ; for, I 
 believe, where war is concerned, few men in command 
 would Hand acquitted, if any after-knowledge of fads 
 
 and 
 
 
 s 
 
 .H*^' 
 
 m 
 
 
 » -.Iff'! I'' Sf. 
 
 ■I 'f-''ft ''M 
 
 fJC^-'d 
 
!'■ 
 
 si N A R n A T T V F. 
 
 rnd circumrt.iiiccs were brouf;lu in argumrnr ng.iinfrl 
 dccifions of the moment, and apparent exigencies oi 
 llic occ.ifion. 
 
 I lubmit all T have faid, fomc of it, I fear, noti 
 fiiftn iently prepared or arranf!;cd, with true refpecfb fol 
 the committee. I lliall not mention nH t!ic diradvaiif 
 lages, inulcr which I have prelfed this bufincr"! ujioiil 
 tlieir attention. I have caufe to rep;rct the abfencc ol| 
 ^a moll cnnlidential friend in Major General Phiilipsjl 
 zealous advocates, 1 trufl, in Major General KeidcHi 
 and Bri^r.adicr I iamilton. Much of iriy vindication iJ 
 in the grave with CJeneral I'Vafer •, much with Colondl 
 iXekland your late member. I trull my zeal, in prol 
 moting this cmpjiry, as 1 have done, will be one mark! 
 of the liiile I bear of the general charadler of thijl 
 houie i tluit however men may be biaflcd by politic.il| 
 attachments upon common occafions, when the ho- 
 nour of an individual is committed to their handiij 
 they will alone be guided by truth and juftice. Andl 
 tlie next inference I flioiild wifh to be drawn, from niyl 
 carnellneCs for a public appeal, is this ; that howevcrl 
 others may impute errors to my condudl, I am iny'I 
 felf confcious of the rcdlitudc of my intentions. 
 
 EVIDENCE 
 
[ 29 J 
 
 I. 
 
 EVIDENCE. 
 
 'JuVtl 20* die Afuijy 1779. 
 
 Committee to confulcr of the fcvcral Papers which were pre- 
 fctitcd to the lloufc by Mr. De (ircy, upon the 19th Day 
 of March hift, purfuant to their Adtlrcfs to his Majefty. 
 
 Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair. 
 
 |iK Guy Carleton was called in and examined by Ge- 
 neral Hurgoync as fullows : 
 
 r^O yon rcrolleft having received a letter from the fc- 
 crctary of flatc, mentioning the reaCons that made 
 expedient for you to remain in the province of QiJcbec ? 
 A. Yes, very well. 
 
 Q. What was the date of it ? 2, 
 
 A. I think the I2th of Auguft, 1776 — I amfure it was in 
 Uigufl. 
 
 Q^ Was not the date of that letter long before rhc return 3. 
 |f Cicneral Burgoync from Canada to Great Britain ? 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. During the winter, preceding the campaign of 1777, 4* 
 fas not the artillery prepared at Montreal for field fervice, 
 Ipon the fuppoiition that you was to command the army be- 
 joiid the frontiers of the province ? 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. Was the proportion allotted to General Burgoync for ^, 
 d(l fcrvice more than was intended, had you fo commanded ? 
 A. I don't precifely recollc£l that — It docs not (Irike mu 
 icre was any great diftcrcnce. 
 
 Q. Was the quantity of artillery decided on in concert ft, 
 [ith Major-General Phillips, and on his recommendation ? 
 
 A. The artillery 1 had prepared for the campaign, on a 
 bpolition that 1 was to go myfelf, was in concert with Gc- 
 Eiral Phillips. That department, as well as others, was put 
 idcr the command of General Burgoync on his arrival ; 
 aJ, I I'uppol'c, he followed the fame method fo far as regard- 
 ' the artillery. 
 
 Q. Did 
 
 
 i 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 !»^ 
 
 '^mX' 
 
 U4- 
 
 Wi 
 
 •ill. 
 
 M : 
 
 ft- *I* "^i "* ' 
 
 ' '■-. ** } V2 
 
 y.';^ 
 
.J? 
 
 to. 
 
 tr, 
 
 V. V I n r: n c v.. fsiri;. caiict(.n.| 
 
 Q. Old (irnrnl Ilut}',t>yiV' apply to yon for fidops fioinl 
 Ciiiiiul;i to r,,inilou ricDniliMoi^ii wlu n lu- atlvaiKCil i 
 
 A. Hr.li.l. 
 
 (>^ \Vlial was the p\nport of vo\ir anTwcr ? 
 
 A. 'Vliar I iliil nol lliink mylilt jiillilicti to f\\;\n\ it liy myl 
 ovdois — My aiilwcr will npptitr lumc piciildy hy a ti)py oil 
 my aniwcr fo (icnri.i1 lJuri;oync. 
 
 C^ Do yoii rc< ollc*^ that (irnn.«l Hurfroynr inforiupd ymil 
 of llic mot i von on which ho prorcoilcd hom Skrncll>oroii|i;lil 
 to I'ovt V'Mwatfl by huul in preference lo ihc route hy Ticoii{ 
 ilcrnjvi ami I^akc Cioorj;o ? 
 
 A. I (\o. 
 
 (V Did yfi" oonrvir in his frntinirnls ? 
 
 A. I icniciuhcr my anhvcr was an anfwer of appro!)a« 
 
 tUMI. 
 
 (^ D<> vou know oi any ciiciunftanoc of Cicncral Bnr«| 
 goync's military londvifl, while uiulcr your coinniaml, ihiil 
 yon tlilappvovcd ? 
 
 A. I had no rrafoit to difapprovc of any part of his ronJ 
 (\\^^ while under my rommnid. [//7//v/> w| 
 
 j'fi;<}in i.i'i'rJ in, <vi,i rx.nnnt.-.i ly aOvy Mt-mher^ of iJir (InmititUii 
 H. (^ Whether, when y<Mi propoled to take tliat train of .ir| 
 tillery with you that you have nientioneil, it was with 
 view to the icihuMion ol the forts at Tieonderoj^ra ; or vvhcl 
 thcr yo»i propoled to have taken with you the lantc train m 
 artillerv in ea!"c you haii marched forward in the country to-l 
 wanl Albany ? 
 
 A. It was with an intention to reduce the forts and lines all 
 Tlcondcroga ; the train of artillery was calculated for tliati 
 fcrvicc. 
 
 Tj Fy Cc- Q: Whether vou know what proportion of artillery vvaj 
 t<tvA\ Bur- earned I'orward hy the aimy nndcr (jencral liuri];oync'scoiii] 
 *^>"'' niand after the rcvhiRion of 'I'icondero[\a ? 
 
 A. f don't recollert. 
 
 Q. Would you not, in cafe you had reduced Ticondero] 
 C;a and marched forwanls towards Albany, h.ive carried vvitl 
 vou a train of licUl artillery ? 
 
 A. 1 probably iliouUI have l.tken artillery wltli nic. 
 
 Q. Had you torcfcen a neccllity of fi>rri tying a camp all 
 Albany, would you not have carried tome guns of the call] 
 bre of twelve pounders and light twenty -ft>urs ? 
 
 A. Tt is really a very didicult matter off hanil to run Intol 
 all the minute operations of a campaign ; every meafurc ol 
 that fort muU have been a ntattcr of confidcralion and dclibe| 
 
 ration 
 
 H. 
 
 »5- 
 
»7- 
 
 l„ c;. Cail.-tmi.J K V I I) i: N C F.. 
 
 jiinn, ami tlinc arc a lliouliuvl tiirtinifl mh ci tlmt mi|',l)t' 
 \nvr il'tciiniii'il nv n|'nn ilic (j)f»t —I dmi'i Willi lo « otici-al 
 
 in ilii'i I I'tiili' ;iny tliiiic, ili.il. I wmiM imvr (Ioik; — hur I Ijopo 
 
 ifv will fniiliir r, ili;it every fTcmlcinan iiifiy li;ivc (liffercnt 
 
 ;)('in (if ilic Il.Ur ;ui(l liiii;iii(4ii ( F the army, ;ts cxprdlcf! hy 
 
 ic(ni(lli<Mi iilkvil, aiiij tin: Icill iii,H(iii;i( •' mT ('X|»rcHi')ii on 
 
 ■)V part lu.iy < "lury i(|(Mq very «lilforriit Iroiii vvhiit I could 
 
 i\\h — 111 penciiil, ((> »<)iiri(|ri;il)le a eorps as that was, very 
 
 tJilDiii iiKncs without artillery, hut flic precilc iiumher itiufl. 
 
 Icpeiiil on a variety of cirruinftaucfs, which tlie difcrctioti 
 
 LikI juilgmcnt ol ihc ofliccr wIk^ toitiinands imifl dctcr- 
 
 Iiinc. 
 
 ()^ \V\;rc not the orders you received from povcrniTicnt ifj, 
 oliiivc, lor Ciencial l!urp;( yne to inarch to Albany ? 
 
 A. The orders h.ivc hecn puMilhcd I uiulcrllind — I'iveiy 
 :atlciu.in in this Ilfjule rnuil he a jutl^^o ol' iholc orders 
 ifju'tlicr they were polilive or not. 
 
 Q^ Did you not reieivc a letter, dated the 5th of April, 
 oin Sir VVilliam llowe, inforininfr you that he could not 
 tnti ;uiy force to aMill the operations of Cicneral Hurgoync's 
 I my ? 
 
 A. I received a letter from Sir Williatn IIowc rel;itivn tfj 
 operations, a copy of whi( h was fent to ( iencral IJnr- 
 iyne—1 think it was not juft in tholb terms, hut a copy 
 [f the letter is on the tahle. 
 
 Q. Whether on that information, you confidcrcd that you jg. 
 Lid any difcrctionary power to detain ( iencral Wurtjoync 
 ftcr that itiformation ? 
 
 A. Ccr«'.inly not. 
 
 Q^ Whether in cafe of any dilliculty tint General might iq. 
 ncct with on his march, there was any l.ititude given him 
 1 iencral liurpoync) to retreat ? 
 
 A. I faid helore, that the orders were before the lloufc, 
 iflinare competent to judj;e on that point. 
 
 Ch Did you yourlclf undcrfland iholc orders to General 
 lurgoyne to he poiitivc ? 
 
 A. That is givin^; an o|)if)ion upon what jicrhaps may be a 
 lucllion in the Moufe ; uhcKas I have already laid, the 
 fc are as comt 
 
 20, 
 
 ipclt 
 
 .P 
 
 Qi Is the Committee to undcrfland from that anfwer, that 
 
 Jou Ik 
 
 21. 
 
 ivc any objection ot giving your opinion on that 
 liicftion? 
 A. 1 have an objeftion to give an opinion on almofl all 
 }ints. 
 
 Q; Did 
 
 3< 
 
 
 l".W.'. ■ V i 
 
 mi 
 

 3C» t, V I I) k N (' r. |S'ii (i. Cnlrl. 
 
 a, 0^« ' '''^ VfMI |^>ivc il in iMilr|<! Ill ( iriKial Mlir'MiVil'', 
 
 i';ilo It'' tni I \N III) .WW ilillii ultti s ilniuu> Ins in.iii li in Cnnai'i] 
 
 undi I votii loMMn.iMil, i\ol Inpnnrril ' 
 
 lit 
 
 » i<if iliiil t Miifial Hmp^MVil'* III' 
 \\\\\\ tio ilidu uliii .H ii\ his inaitli in i'ltn.ida; noi do I \V( 
 
 •^ (^. N\ laic \\o tlip honiulrtiici ol tlir prm iiur of C'aiii' 
 inil ^ 
 
 A. Uclwccn ilu' lHint<if< niul Point ww ft r* 
 
 Q^ \s tlu" l<Miu.|sol 1 uondcioj;^ in Cuiada ? 
 
 A. No. 
 
 (.\ Old \ <Mir M'nin\iitii<n, n<! ctMnm milcr in i hie I' n( tt 
 
 tinr]»s 111 ilu' n >ii1\ciM tiiviiMMi) cMcnd I'cyoiul tlic Imuiiu'J 
 
 5S. 
 
 I lis ^^ 
 
 I C .m.ida i<> 
 
 iiHMUii rot. 
 
 ,a? 
 
 A. Ih.il toruniliinn a-^ loinniahdri iiWhid, I ninlnnoi 
 i^iilrxiiiul (o l.u ; luH hv llic onlit's alrrady nlliidtd to, J 
 1-y \.\u'\c whi.h i »i in ral l<\Uf;oviU linni}.\hl oiM in ihr Ipnri 
 i777, 1 niidciilood iliai ntv roininand w.i^ n lliaiiicd lot! 
 litniis f>l il\o piovnuc, and llial In-iur.il IUnfM»ynr \va'< di 
 liivly tn)iu vmdor i\w lomnund, as loon as In* imIIvJ llic lij 
 nut', v)l' \])c pioviiu .'. 
 sO. i^ Did )on apj>lv ti^ tho (riiclaiy oi llatr for a Icinlon 
 inoni of" 4000 nun, as ivicll.u v tor \\w r.vmpaijMi of t ; 
 
 A. I va'oiU'i\ wluMv (i'MU lal nnij^oyni- was roininj^ 1\m|iiI 
 in \\\c fall ol' 1776, .'s I wis piilri'lly (ati^iiicd wiili 
 conduv'l in ihc |>rcvrdin<', . ampaign, I talked over wiili li 
 in rontidciuc, what 1 thonplM n(\cll.i\v loi the ItiUowiiuM ml 
 |>ai M1 ; anioin; v^thcr things 1 drlmd hiin to luako a \\w\m 
 
 raiuluiu lo I'upian 
 
 ,1 4 
 
 ^co M)rn, as a rcinlon cnunt foi \\ 
 
 cnuun' 
 
 ainpav'n. or at Iratl for tour iMttali 
 
 Otis. 
 
 I 111 
 
 27. 
 
 1 hue Itcn thol<^ nuMuovandnms were avciiratily ilaled 
 
 laivl 1h {\>ic tho 1 io\it'e. 
 
 Q^ \\ hat part ot (hat 4000 ilvn whith \o\\ tho\ioht 
 ilaiv loi iho ianipai(;n ot '777, w.is a»;\ually Itiit. ovili 
 
 CanaiU in 
 
 thai 
 
 year 
 
 •\. I 
 
 tio not 
 
 !2^ 
 
 avcuvatdv rcMncnilni how many — 1 thinkj 
 vcrv tmall jvut — You may have a very prceitc acct)uni ti 
 ih.c vctuii>. 
 
 Q; Ot" \hAX I'nip.U part lent in 1777, divl not a certain pi«J'.^ ,1 
 jx-irtion anoc very late in ihr year f 
 
 A. V 
 
 cs, a }>avt airived hue 
 
 a^v Q. Alter vou had leccived ycnr orders from the lecn 
 of ilatc, did vou anprclieail llut Ciencral oiir;',<iync, as 
 as he was wulna tlie proviiKC ot Canada, was pohiivul 
 
 J.ir (<.( 
 A. \ 
 
 tMllll, I 
 hill iIh 
 
 If piop- 
 
 ir.ivi out 
 roiiiinan 
 h;iiv lui 
 Jill' I V, ill 
 Uhniild r\ 
 imrjii li' 
 jwli.il oi( 
 
 IllcIllVf il 
 
 (). \\ 
 
 tlir wind' 
 
 A. I U 
 
 li.ur nil (I 
 (). If 
 
 hlln iiliii" 
 ".iiiada, V 
 
 IMV nidn 
 
 ^lllIN il to 
 
 \in\ ol 11, 
 
 A. Mac 
 
 lavc I'jveii 
 
 (I. I lav 
 
 ind having 
 
 inj; their | 
 
 :lioii_i;lu. y( 
 
 Jill iroy lie, 
 
 |iontu'is ol 
 
 A. I icii 
 
 [ttiid not a 
 
 jit's. J doi 
 
 [t tjie eou 
 
 Ion delay, 
 
 [collies iio 
 
 p'U'dit niy 
 
 ^■i'K' y' 
 
 11-' I'lovini 
 
 link, that 
 
 gieat as I 
 
 '■ til at P,CM 
 
 louiidt jull 
 
 undci- vour coainand 
 
 A. \ 
 
1 , 1 
 
 i;,r(f.CaiI<'»'>" 
 
 ) r: V I I) I, N (• r 
 
 oynf, 
 
 I V.'in\.ii')] 
 
 IV 11'" n'l 
 (In I \\(,i 
 
 MM 
 
 /\, Vt r, I iliil : n% Iniij' ;»s lir u,is ill III'- provitif r of C;i 
 
 I;, I Iniih il nt) liiiii lit li' |i(i|il I VI Iv iiinlri my « dmiiikui.I 
 I |>iit till' l"i>*l «'* 'I'^' t'^I't'iliiifii licinf; (in Ins llimildctB, I tlioiipjit 
 It |'i"|"i 
 
 r 
 
 Iriiiii 
 
 il).i» li' , in iill llimi'.'J (IimmIiI dinYl ; nml tlu-K lore I 
 
 VI (Mil ninnrtli.'tir oi(I( )■!, tlmi imi culy iIk ti'>n|i, Ii" w;t«i t'l 
 
 iiiiniil out III tlir piMv Ml' «', liiit ;i|| iIm il' |i;ti hiinits II' I f (■ 
 
 jn V liir t'lc •illil' in/', his cx|i( iliti'in, Ihniilil * iiMi|My niiiiM 'li 
 y, iiii'l wiili'Mit (Kl.iy, Willi cvfry k i|iiirni'iii mid (udi i If 
 
 hliiiiild tMvr 
 
 linir. 
 
 '11 
 
 if K.ilnn <il I'ly ddiii," In w;i<!, fli;il no tiiiir 
 
 In 1.1 jnll. I (inly ifijiniid ilmt flu y (IkhiM i!'|i')it \n mc* 
 
 I 
 
 '] 
 
 iti «^ 
 
 kvli.n Ptdrmlluy h;i'l icir-ivnl lidin i n iv i.il |{uij',nyii' 
 jjiclnvf tliolf (iiilcis j'lf ;d!(i (in IJii- liiMr. 
 I |H ( >. Will y«in cxpl, nn \n ilit (.'fiMimitlcr what ymt tnenn liv nrj 
 
 Imuiih 
 
 lie wortN, iofid of ihi- r\j><,l/(i'in l\i< y^ 'iii dniciiil lUifg'yiir.i 
 
 '(I f»((((> > 
 
 ninri \'oi 
 
 (Kil to, 
 
 the Ipunl 
 
 ncil to I'l 
 
 ili^.ii the l| 
 
 \ Ic'inltMK 
 
 \\ i>f t 
 
 \M\\\\ l»"11 
 
 ,1 With 111 
 
 r witli liii'i 
 
 owiiu', « uii 
 
 c a MU-mo| 
 
 ritt loi ' 
 
 li.) 
 
 A. I I'^'l i>" |'''»>'>' 'dii incMinn!; ; tiny ,iic words I Ilnjiild 
 \r iilid on any t XjicdilKin ol iin|>oil.in( f. 
 
 ( ). Il (.11 nil 
 
 »l li 
 
 ni 
 
 jfoyiu' li.id iiitl Willi very tolifidc raMc v| 
 
 t» 
 
 :lilii{ iiltirs to im|H"dc' Ins |Miif;i(ls witiiiii llw |>if»vin'C of 
 ',n\iul,i, would you liavr tlinni'lil ydinldl jullilnlilc ni «'ivin 
 nv oidn'^ to t Miu'i .il llmjMiynr, dilliirnl lioin t IidIV; liaii(. 
 iiitnl to ( irnual l{iir|',oy nc, llimnj'Ji yon, Ikjih tho (ff.rc- 
 
 liirv ol llalc ? 
 
 A. Mad till IT linn any dillii iilt its in (Canada, I would not 
 \,\yy [Mvin linn np the » omin.nid. 
 (^. llaviii!', r,iv(n ti)» tlic (omniand tf» ( iencral T«nrr';oynr, -12 
 ml liavin^; orJorrd all the troops to (they liim, only icpnit- 
 |m'. tluir procrnlings to yon, would you alter that, loivj 
 
 ^linni'Jit yt)Uiiilt jnllihalilc to <hanj',c the order to Cicrn ral 
 
 JiMi'oyne, \ipon his ineeiint; with jncat dillicullics on the 
 
 1 ^ .Bminuis of ihc nci};hb()urin}', proviiucs ? 
 
 !, I jM A. I ically did not mean to evade the (pirflion in the lean. 
 
 |i ilul not appear to Uic polllhlc that thcie t onld he any dilli' iil- 
 
 [u's. 1 ilon'l mean to lay there coukl not, from the nature 
 
 \\ tl)o eountry, be ilillieultics in the march that mi^,ht occa- 
 
 Ion delay, hut hy the nature of the (pK ftion I un(Ierlto(3d flif- 
 
 1 ti,;„iB^"l''i''' iiom the enemy. In that ealo I IhouUI not have 
 
 kouni iH 
 
 linnniit I" 
 lent, ovili 
 
 Dimij'hr mylelt julliliahle in ,i:;ivin[; up tlic eominand 
 
 33 
 
 0. 
 
 :cvtain |)vfl 
 
 lie tecvt 
 
 it you had heard, that on the frontiers, and within o-- 
 piovinec of Canada, there was the grcatcll; rcafon to 
 
 ik, that th 
 
 'Mh 
 
 if (. 
 
 tl 11 
 
 l\c. 
 
 Is po 
 
 as i> 
 
 UllVvJ 
 
 hurijoyne s army wa» 
 1 i;v(.'at as to make it, in your opinion, exiecJingly difficult 
 Dv that n;cncral to force his way to Albany, would you think. 
 |ourl(.U jullifiablc in giving diilcreut ordeis \,q General liur- 
 
 D 
 
 goyne, 
 
 
 'V 
 
 
 
 .■sw 
 
 ^^ 
 
 A. ^ 
 
m\ 
 
 34 
 
 o:> 
 
 34 E V I D E N C E. [SirG.Carlcton 
 
 goync, from tliofc f;ivcn by tlic fccrctary of ftatc ; or would 
 you have thought the fccrctary of rtatc's orders lor General 
 Ikirgoync's army fo peremptory that it would not be proper 
 for you to int«rfcrc ? 
 
 A. If I underftood the (jucftlon as it now (lands, it ii| 
 what I would have done, had the province been invaded, ot 
 clofc on the point of being invaded, and the enemy cntcrinj 
 the province. 
 
 Qi The (]urrtion docs not mean an invading army, but i| 
 rcfiftancc fioin the enemy to the progrcfs of (icncral BurJ 
 goync's army, in the cafe ftatcd in the laft qucftion ? 
 
 /\. Intliatcafe, that an enemy fliould be found (within! 
 the limits of mv command) I ihould have ordered all thej 
 troops dcftincd for the defence of tlic province, to have ini- 
 mediately joined thole deftincd for Cieneral Burgoyne, andl 
 liavc rcallumcd the command of all, until thofc obftruftionif 
 had been removed, within the limits of my authority. 
 
 Q; Siippofe no enemy within the province of Canadaj 
 but poded in fuch a manner upon the line of communicationl 
 with Albany, as to make it exceeding difficult for General 
 Burgoyne to obey the orders given to him, would youthinlT 
 yourfelf juflifiablc in giving dilFcrent orders to General Burl 
 !;oyne, from thofe given by the fccrctary of flate ; or woulJ 
 you have thought the fccrctary of ftatc's orders for Gcncraf 
 Burgoyne's army fo peremptory that it would not be propc 
 for you to interfere ? 
 
 A. I could not change General Burgoyne's orders onj 
 tittle, that was my opinion ; he received his orders from tl-i 
 fame power that gave me my authority ; when once he pai 
 fed the limits of my command, I neither could give him orl 
 dcrs, nor would he be juftified in obeying them, 
 3"* Qi Lio you mean the latter part of that anfwer as an anj 
 fwcr to a qucftion whli:h fuppofes General Burgoyne withif 
 the limits of the province of Canada ? 
 
 A. No: while he was within the limits of the province! 
 Canada, I would have given General Burgoyne orders in al 
 cafes of difiiculty and danger. There being no fuch caT 
 when General Burgoyne arrived iii Canada, in 1777, nor 
 poffibility of an event of that fort, I put the troops n: 
 all things under his commuid, which concerned his cxpd 
 tion, that he might arrr.ngc and combine their motions ?.i 
 cording to his own plan of operation for the campaign, tlia 
 no time might be loll by any unnecelfary applications to inj 
 
 whicl 
 
 • ■' L'i 
 
5^> 
 
 ► v. 
 
 SirG. Carlcton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 wHiili the ftrift forms of my command might othcrwire 
 rcq'iirc, [^Ulthdrcw, 
 
 /lya'in called in, 
 Q. "^hoiilcl yon, if you had been in General Burgoync's 37^ 
 fitii.iiiori, aiul .ifting under the orders which you know he 
 irccivcd, I'.ave thought yourfclf bound to purfuc them im- 
 plif.iilv, o*^ it liberty to deviate from them ? 
 
 i\. I Iliould h:ivc certainly thought inyfclf bound to have 
 obcyal ;lu m to the utnioft of my power ; but, to fay as a mi- 
 litary man, that in all cafes polfiblc, 1 muft have gone on, is a 
 very nice thing to (ay'indccd ; it muft have thrown me, and I 
 fuppole every otiiccr, into a moft unplcalant and anxious lltu- 
 ation, to iiavc debated within himfclf, whether he was or 
 was not to go on. Every man muft decide for himfclf, 
 \V'hat I would have done, 1 really don't know ; the particu- 
 lar iiluation, and a man's own particular feelings, muft de- 
 termine the point, if I might be indulged, I would beg 
 leave to fay, that I did not mean to evade any queftion ; T 
 meant to anfwer direftly ; yet cjueftions may be put to 
 me, of fo delicate a nature, and perhaps no mnn in the 
 world is in a more delicate fituation, with rcl'peft to the 
 Iprcfcnt cafe in queftion, and the bufmcfs of this Committee, 
 [than I am ; when fuch qucftions are put to me, I fliall pray 
 the indulgence of the Committee, to be cxcufcd anfwcring 
 thcin, but I will not evade them. As 1 now underftand 
 the meaning of the right honourable member in the former 
 qucftions to be, Whether I fhould have taken upon me to 
 Ifupcrfede the King's orders, fuppoiing I knew of any unfur- 
 jmountable difficulties in the way, as that I had information 
 lof 20,000 men at Ticonderoga, before General Burgoyne 
 llcft the province of Canada, 1 lliould have told General 
 iBurgoync my information ? But it was General Burgoyna 
 Iwho was to carry the orders into execution, and not me, 
 land therefore it was upon his own judgment he was to de- 
 Itermine ; I ihould have given him my opinion, but 1 think 
 had no right to give him orders under thofe circumftances. 
 Q. Who was it that made the arrangement and diftribu- og, 
 lion ofthe troops that were to be left for the defence of Ca- 
 uda, independent of thofe under the command of General 
 3urgoyne ? 
 A. The orders that are before the Houfe are very full, and 
 thought very clear. The Committee will fee in thofe or- 
 ders tlie troops that were dcftined for General Burgoyne*t 
 
 D 3 expeditions 
 
 35 
 
 m 
 m 
 
 '^^■:^ 
 
 •w 'IT 
 • ■»*' A* 
 
 
'T '.■ ^ 
 
 3^ 
 
 39- 
 40. 
 
 41. 
 
 43 
 
 EVIDENCE. [SirG. Carlcton. 
 
 expedition, and ihc troops that were to remain tor the defence 
 of tlic province. 
 
 Q^ Wlio made that dillrilnition ? 
 A. It came to inc froni the iVcictarv of flalc. 
 Q^ Did not Uk- ordcis from the llcrctai y of ftatc go to tlic 
 detail of the linallcrt pods vviiliin the province ? 
 A. The letter is licforc the Committee. 
 Qiicfi:ion repeated. 
 
 A. I riiouKl beg for the letter to lie read ; I don't wJfh to 
 avoid any queftion, hut 1 uiHi to he accurate. 
 
 Q^ ^^'as the dillributioiiof the troops prcfcrihcd to you by 
 the fccrctary of Hale, or left to your ditcrction } 
 
 A. In mcnticnino; ihc number of troops which were to re. 
 main in that province, it was there laid, that thofc troo|)« 
 woukl h'C fuiiicient for garrifoning I'uch and fuch places, par- 
 tici'.lan/.inp^ them. 
 
 Q_. Dill you ever know a;i inHnnce, in your military life, 
 of n minillcr making a dillribution of troops for the defence 
 of a province, without taking the opinion or leaving a great 
 deal to the difcrction, of the governor of that j^rovince, that] 
 governor being an a6ting military olhccr of very high rank r 
 
 A. I never had the lionour to corrcfpond with a lecretaryl 
 of ftate, till I was appointed to the commandof that province.l 
 Q. Whether you was conlultcd upon the pradicability oti 
 penetrating from t!ic frontiers of Canada to Albany by force, 
 with the ftrength allotted to Ciencral Burgoync for that pur- 
 pofe ? 
 
 A. No ; 1 was not. 
 4:^. Q^ Arc you acquainted with tlic palfage from New Yorkl 
 to Canada by the iiudfon's river ? 
 A. I have gone that w<iy. 
 
 46. Qi Have you obleivcd it with a view to military opera- 
 tions r 
 
 A. No ; 1 never made the tour having any military opera- 
 tions in View. 
 
 47. Qi Are yoi; acquainted with tlic forces wliich Sir WilHaraj 
 Howe had under his immediate command at and about Ncw| 
 York, on the 17th of July, 1777 ? 
 
 A. 1 am not. 
 
 48. O^ Suppofmg SirWillian^ilIowc had 1 2,000 cflc^lve mcnJ 
 bcfidcs a fufncicnt force lodged in New York, Slaten IflanilJ 
 ;md Long Illand, to defend them againfl General Wafluni;! 
 .ton's army, fuppofmg (icneral \i alhipgton's army in thd 
 Jellies, near Quibble Town, and that ^iir W'illiani Howa 
 
 ^^4 
 
 iu...... 
 
kton. 
 cfcncc 
 
 to tl\c 
 
 fh to 
 
 wi 
 
 i you by 
 
 •e to re- 
 c troop* 
 :cs, par. 
 
 tary life,! 
 ; defence I 
 T a great I 
 I nee, that I 
 h rank r 
 Iccretaryl 
 province. I 
 ability of 
 \w force, I 
 that pur- 
 
 icw 
 
 Yovk' 
 
 >cra- 
 
 ry Of 
 
 i\y opera-] 
 
 WiUiaral 
 30ut Ncwl 
 
 tive menl 
 
 |(;n \{\M-\i\ 
 
 ly in IM 
 lain llowi 
 
 SirG. Cirlcton.] K V I D E N C E, 
 
 had received accounts of Cicncral Kurgoyne's fuccefs at 
 Ticoiulcroga, and was acc]uaintcd with the orderj under 
 which General Burgoyne allied, is it your opinion that the 
 bcft movement Sir VViiliam Howe could have made for the 
 purpolei of forwarding the execution of the ordors, under 
 which ('Cnc^ral Kurgoyne afted, would have been to have 
 failed with his army from New York to Clict'apeak I'ay ? 
 
 A. Hid I had the honour to have commanded on that fide, 
 I do not know what I Ihould have done myftlf. 
 
 Q_ After you received the letter from Sir William Howe, a^^ 
 informing you of Ins intended expedition to the iouthvvard, 
 whctlicr you did txpecl that Sir, William Jriowc's arn)y could 
 co-opcrarc on the Hudfon's River with the northern army 
 that fcrlbn ? 
 
 A. 1 don't know. 
 
 Q. Wlicther you tlioiight, after the receipt of that letter, ^o. 
 that it was probable there would be a co-operation from the 
 fouthc'.n anny ? 
 
 A. I took it (ov grant d, that Sir William Howe knew 
 what liC was about, and would do what he thought bell for 
 the public i'ervicc. I really was lb little informed of all the 
 pavticular circumilancefi of his fituarion and of the provinces 
 under his commaml, that I could form no judgment of the 
 j)i(ipriety or impropriety of his conduft, or of the etfcfts of 
 his meaiuics. 
 
 Q_. Dill your informralon lead vou to believe, that the in- 51, 
 habitants betvvecn Saratoga and Albanv, wcic lo well affefted 
 to his Majcfty and (ireat Britain, as that there would be 
 much idvantaiic derived from their alUllance to the Kind's 
 army m the profccution of General Burgoyne s expedition ? 
 
 A. I had frequent accounts from that part of the country, 
 [that there were numbers ready to take arms and join the 
 King's troops if they lliould penetrate To far. 
 
 Q; Do you mean, by penetrating Jo far , to Albany, or to 52. 
 [the length the army got ? 
 
 A. The whole extent of the inhabited country, according 
 |to the information brought to me. 
 
 Qi Had you no information that a formidable militia 53. 
 Imight be raifed in that country to oppofc his Majcrty's arms ? 
 
 A. Yes; I had inch inttMination. 
 
 Qj^ Did you think that the force which General Rurgoync 54. 
 [carried with him from Ticonderogu towards Albany was 
 Ifufficicnt lo oppofc I'uch /orce ? 
 
 I") 3 A. I 
 
 37 
 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 m 
 
 w 
 
 m 
 
 hmt 
 
 
 ■ *'^''<a 
 
I 
 
 33 
 
 S6. 
 
 EVIDENCE. [EarlofBalcamg. 
 
 A. I really muft beg leave to be excufed anfwering that 
 queftion. 
 ce, Q; If- you had been confulted rcfpefting General Bur- 
 goyne's expedition, knowing the nature of that country, 
 and the force General Burgoyne had, would you or not have 
 advifed fuch an entcrprize ? 
 
 A. If I had had the honour to command in that campaign 
 as I had in the former, I don't precifcly know what I fhould 
 have done myfelf. 
 
 Qj Did you give any advice for employing the favagcs ? 
 
 A. I don't recollc£l that I faid any thing about them. 
 
 Jovis 27° die Maii, 1779. 
 
 Earl of Balc arras called in and examined by General 
 
 Burgoyne. 
 
 1, Q. IN what flation did your Lordfhip fervc in the cam-» 
 paigns in America, in 1776, and in 1777 ? 
 
 A. I commanded the Britifli light infantry, 
 
 2. Qj ^as the Britilh light infantry continually attached to 
 the corps under the command of Brigadier General Frafer ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 2. Qi Had you occafion to obfcrve that General Burgoyne 
 and General Frafer lived together in fricndfhip and confi- 
 dence ? 
 
 A. Yes ; I had. 
 4, Q. Had you reafon to believe that General Frafer was 
 confulted by General Burgoyne in all material operations? 
 
 A. I had reafon to believe that General Frafer was con- 
 fulted in many material operations, 
 c. Q. Does your Lordfliip know or believe that the proper 
 tion of artillery, attached to General Frafer's corps through 
 the whole campaign, was according to his requifitions and 
 defires ? 
 
 A. I undcrftood from General Frafer, that the proportion 
 of artillery allotted to him was agreeable to his own rcqui 
 (itions. 
 
 6. Qi Do you recollcft the number of killed and wounded in 
 General Frafei's corps, at the affair of Huberton ? 
 
 A. I d(,n't rccolicft exactly ; I think it was about 150. 
 
 7. Qi What was your opinion of the behaviour of the enemy 
 on that day ? 
 
 A. Cir 
 
icarras, 
 ng that 
 
 al Bur- 
 ountry, 
 lot have 
 
 impaign 
 I ihould 
 
 vagcs i 
 ''ithdrcu;, 
 
 General 
 
 the cam- 
 
 itached toj 
 Frafer ? 
 
 Jurgoynel 
 nd confi* 
 
 frafer was] 
 itions ? 
 was con- 1 
 
 ke propor- 
 Is through 
 
 itions a 
 
 nd 
 
 on 
 
 iroporti 
 Iwn rcqui' 
 
 founded in| 
 
 It 150. 
 
 |Lhc cncinyl 
 
 A. Cir 
 
 iEarlof Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 A. Circumftanced as the enemy was, as an army very 
 hard prefled in their retreat, they certainly behaved with 
 great gallantry. 
 
 Q. Was it prafticable, the nature of the country, the 8. 
 fati<^ue of the King's troops, the care of the wounded, and 
 oihcr circumftances confidcrcd, to have purfued the enemy 
 farther after that action ? 
 A. It was not. 
 
 Q^ Do you recoUeft on what day General Frafcr's corps q, 
 rejoined the army at Skenefborough ? 
 A. On the 9th of July ; I think that it was on that day. 
 Q. On what day was the aft ion at Hubcrton ? 10. 
 
 A. On the 7th of July. 
 
 Q, Do you recolleft the difficulties of removing then. 
 .\vounded from Huberton to the hofpital at Ticonderoga ? 
 I A. From the diftance and badnefs of the roads, the diffi- 
 culties attending the removing of the hofpital muft have been 
 very great. 
 
 Q. Was II prafticable, unlefs the wounded had been left 12, 
 cxpofed to the enemy, to have rejoined the army fooner ? 
 A. It was not. 
 
 Q^ Does your Lordfliip rccoUeft how the army was em- 13, 
 ployed between that time and the march to Fort Edward ? 
 
 A. The Britilh were employed in opening the country 
 and making roads to Fort Anne ; the Germans under General 
 Rcidclel were detached about fourteen miles to the left. 
 
 CK Do you recolleft the poll the enemy abancloncd upon 14, 
 the afccnt from the Low Country to the Pitch Pine Plains, 
 in the march from Fort Anne to i' ort Edward ? 
 A. I do recolleft fuch a place. 
 
 Q. Had the enemy maintained their ground on that pofl, i - 
 do you apprehend that a confiderable portion of artillery 
 would have been neceflary to diflodge them ? 
 
 A. Artillery would certainly have been of great ufe to 
 iliflodgc the enemy. 
 
 Q. Did you ever fee an Inftance, during your fcrvice in jg, 
 America, that the rebels continued twenty-four hours on the 
 fnne place without entrenching ; and was it not alio their 
 general praftice to add abbaties to their entrenchments ? 
 
 A, 1 he rebels were always indefatigable in Itcuring them- 
 felves by entrenchments, and in general they added an ab- 
 batis to thofe entrenchments. 
 Q. Do you remember the pofition the enemy abandoned 17. 
 t Schuyler's llland ? 
 
 D 4 A. I 
 
 39 
 
 ♦'IS 
 
 m 
 
 ■iCiC 
 
 wm 
 
 .id: 
 
 
 Am 
 
 
% 
 
 40 
 
 m 
 
 EVIDENCE. [Earl of Balcarra-,. 
 
 A. 1 do remember to have p.ifTcd fxuh .1 pod once. 
 
 18. Q;. Does your Lonilliip think that pofition could have 
 been forced without a numerous artillery or heavy lol's ? 
 
 A. 1 do not think ii coukl. 
 
 19. Qi 1' rom the nature ol" that country, do you think that j 
 poft conlil i;avc been lurntd ? 
 
 A. Not without greatly rifquing the boats and portable! 
 irin;.i,a/incs. 
 
 20. Qi Is it pofTiblc at any time in that country, and with a 
 finall army, to (juit the navi-a!)le rivers, without leaving thci 
 bt)ats anJ ponable in:'.r;:i/incs cxpofed ? 
 
 A. I iuinginc it is lu't. 
 5.1. C^ Did y<»u bvi.- in habits of intimacy and communication] 
 with (.icneral I'raler ? 
 A. I (lid. 
 
 22. Qj Was General Frafcr of a warinih and oprnnefs rfj 
 temper that generally made him communicative of his (cnti- 
 nrcnts, when they diirered from the I'cntiments of thole withl 
 whom he ailed ? 
 
 A. General Frafcr's temper was warm, open, and com- 
 jTiimioativc, but reiervcd in matters ol" ccjnficiencc. 
 
 23. Qi Did you ever hear General Fra^l-r exprcfs dirappro!)a- 
 tion of the meafure of pailinr Mudfon's River ? 
 
 A. 1 never did. 
 
 24. Qi Was not a bridge conftru£\cd of rafts, and fome boatsl 
 thrown over that river, a little before the time of the attack| 
 on Bennington } 
 
 A. There wac. 
 
 25. Q. Did not Ciencral Frafer's corps pafs the river by tliatj 
 bridge, and take poft on the heights of Saratoga ? 
 
 A. It did. 
 
 26. Qi Do you remember that bridge being carried away h\'\ 
 the torrents and bad weather, whereby the communication! 
 was cut off between that corps and the main body of thel 
 army ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 27. Q, Was (^icncral Frafer's corps recalled after that aflion,^ 
 and obliged to repals the river in boats and fcowls ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 28. Q. Do you remember General Frafer cxprcfling his forrowl 
 for being oliliged to return back over the Hudlbn's River ? 
 
 A. 1 rcaiember (icneral Frafcr mentioning it with regret. 
 2<). (^ Had the rear guard of Cieneral Frafer's corps Ixt-nl 
 attacked during that paliage over the river, would not a| 
 
 powcrlull 
 
iiunicatioiii 
 
 Pari of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 iiowcrful fire of artillery froir. the oppoUte Oiore !-.av 1)ccn 
 ot" neat u!"c, If nni tlic only inciuis of protcftlnj^ tltcm ? 
 
 A. If the enemy had att-^cktil Ciencial I'ral'cr, they 
 woulil have found him in a very had jiofturc ; it was iinpol- 
 ilhlc to take a better, and, as ihey could not be fupported 
 by the line, the only means of i'afety mull h:ive been to get 
 under cover of the fire of our artillery. 
 
 Q^ Was tlurc not an expectation and impatience of the 30. 
 troops in general topaii lludfon's Kivcr, and advance on the 
 enemy ? 
 
 A. There was. 
 
 Q. Was there not a general conhdence and alacrity on -^r. 
 the occahon ? 
 
 A. Tlu;rc was. 
 
 C)^ From thele circiimflanccs, and your other knowledge 22. 
 of the army, do you not believe that to have made- no fur- 
 ther aricmj):. on the enemy would have cauUu dilappointment 
 and dcic£>ion in the troops, and reileft ons 0:1 the general ? 
 
 A. 'l"h« troops were in the highcft Ipirlts, and vvilhed to 
 be led on. 
 
 Q. Does your Lordfliip recoiled the march np to the 33. 
 enemy on the morning of the lyth of September ? 
 
 A. 1 do. 
 
 Q^ Was the combination of the march fuch, as, that 34. 
 notwithftanding the palfage of the ravines and the thitknefs 
 of the wo(h1s, the column of (icncral Krafcr's march, and 
 that of the llritilli line, led by General Burgoync, were 
 in a fituation to ru|)iK)rt each other, and l'i)eedily to 
 form in line of battle, at the time the enemy began the 
 attack ? 
 
 A. After the columns had pafTed the ravines, they arrived 
 at their refpcflivc pofls with great precilion in point of time, 
 and every fortunate circumftaiice attended the forming of 
 the line. 
 
 Q^ How long did that af^ion laft ? 35. 
 
 A. 'l"he Uritifli were attacked partially about one o'clock. 
 The aif^ion was general at tlnec, ant! ended at Icven o'clock. 
 
 Q^ hrom the nature of the country, was it poflible to 36, 
 difcern the enemy's polition or movements, to form any judg- 
 ment what attacks were in force, and what were feints } 
 
 A. I think not. 
 
 Q^ Did we remaiQ mailers of the field of batt'c e 
 
 ^. Wc did. 
 
 Q^ Had 
 
 01* 
 
 m 
 
 t:!i 
 
 m 
 
4* 
 
 ■f 
 
 I': 
 
 38. 
 
 EVIDENCE. [EarlofBalcarrai. 
 Q. Had the field of battle been well difputed by the 
 
 ii' 
 
 enemy ? 
 
 A. The enemy behaved vviiU great obftlnacy and courage, 
 39* Q. Was it too dark to purluc with efFedt at the time the 
 a£tion ended ? 
 A. It was. 
 
 40. Q. Did the King's troops take up ground nesrer to the 
 enemy, the morning after the a£tion ? 
 
 A. It was rather nearer the enemy. 
 
 41. Q^ How near were the out-pofts of General Frafer's corps 
 to the cut- ports of ijie enemy from that time to the a£^ion of 
 the 7th of Odober ? 
 
 A. I fhould imacrine within half a mile. 
 
 42. Q. From the nature of the country, and the fituation of 
 the enemy's out-pofts, was it pofliblc to reconnoitre their 
 pciition ? 
 
 A. From the nature of the country, the difficulties at- 
 tending the reconnoitering muft have been very great. 
 
 43. Qj^ Were not the riflemen, and other irregulars, employ?d 
 by the enemy at out-pofi:s and on fcouis, an overmatch for 
 the Indian or provincial troops that were with the army at 
 that lime ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 
 44. Q. Was not General Frafcr's corps continually at work 
 during the interval above-mentioned, in fecuring their own 
 poils, and opening the front to oppofe the enemy ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 45' Q; After General Frafer received his wound, on the 7tk 
 of 0£tober, on whom did the command of his corps devolve ? 
 A. On me. 
 46. Q. Was you in a fituation on that day, to obferve tke 
 general difpolltion of the army, made by General Burgoyne, 
 previous to the aftion ? 
 
 A. I remember two redoubts having been ere£\ed on the 
 left, to cover the boats and provifions to enable General 
 iiurgoync to make a detachment from his army. 
 47* Q: ^^^^^ y^^ in a fituation to obferve the dilpofition made 
 . immediately before the attack by the eneivy ? 
 
 A. I only recollcdl the fituation of the two battalions of 
 the advanced corps. 
 43. Qj After the retreat to the lines, were the lines attacked, 
 and with what dejfrec of vigour ? 
 
 A. 1 he lines were attacked, and with as much fury as 
 the lire of fmall arms c.in admit, 
 
 Q^ Docs 
 
lEnrlof Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Q. Docs yeur Lordfhip remember that part of the lines 49. 
 I where you commanded, being vifited by General Burgoyne 
 I during the attack? 
 
 A. I don't recoUcft to have feen General Burgoyne. 
 Q. Was tlie cannon of great ulb in the repull'e of the 50. 
 enemy in your pofl ? 
 A. Ot very gr.at ufe. 
 
 Q. Do you think that pod would have been tenable next 51, 
 niorning, the enemy having pofleflion of Colonel Briemen's 
 
 poft? 
 
 A. r do not think it would. 
 
 Q. Would the pofleflion of the poft by the enemy, toge- 52, 
 thcr with the pofleflion of Colonel Briemen's ports, have 
 laid open the flank and rear of the camp of the line ? 
 
 A. It would. 
 
 Q. Was the retreat in the night, and the new dirpofltion5J. 
 of the whole army made in good order and without lofs ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. Did the army remain under arms, and in momentary 54. 
 cxpcftation of battle, the whole of the day of the 8th ? 
 
 A. It did. 
 
 Q. Do you remember the confufion and difficulties at- 55. 
 tending the line of baggage in the retreat, in the night of 
 the 8th ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 Q. Was not the retreat ncvcrthelefs made in good order ^6. 
 by the troops, and without lofs ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q. Does your Lordfliip remember the weather, the ftate57, 
 of the roads, the ftate of the cattle, and the difficulty of 
 pafling the Fifti Kill, in the retreat to Saratoga, in the day 
 and night of the 9th ? 
 
 A. It rained inceflantly, confequcntly the roads were bad ; 
 the cattle were nearly ftarved for want of forage, and the 
 bridge over the Filh Kill had been deftroycd by the enemy; 
 the troops were obliged to ford tiie river. 
 
 Q. Had there been no enemy to oppofe us, or no bridge 58. 
 or roads to repair, would it have been poflil)le, from the ftate 
 of the fatigue of the troops, to have continued the march 
 farther immediately after the arrival at Saratoga ? 
 
 A. The troops were greatly fatigued, and the artillery 
 had been left on the other fide of the Fifli Kill. 
 
 Q. Why were they left on the other fide of the Fifh Kill ? 50. 
 
 A. The 
 
 43 
 
 mi 
 
 m 
 
 E^;l 
 
 m 
 
 '^1 
 
44 ^' V r T) K N' C K. {Vat] n( U.,lc.vras. 
 
 A,' Tlir iMliIirc h.nl been (Icflmvctl by ilic nirmy ; it w.^; 
 
 cxcrctlini; (I.nk, ii:u| I do no; 1 mow whctlui llic ImiJ wajl 
 
 ])all.iMc lor ilir .imliiiv without I'cinL', llrfl cKp.niinci!. 
 60. ^-' ' ^*' V'Hi nnu'mlur tin* civmy opiMiip!'- ;' |i;i»" ry on tlicl 
 
 oppoliic litlc <)( lliullon's kivci, a.iJ ihc t;;!iviiu!l.'.iKi's ;ii. I 
 
 Itiuliiii', iIk" oiK-iiip" lii.it Iiatti ly ' 
 
 A. I lir roij's 1 lonun.uuKcl v\.k at t!»;it lins'' poflfi!, nndi 
 
 thry llutl o\\ us •,\\ lliai nine, Im-.I 1 i\o not. know tr'>iu wli.iil 
 
 <lirc»f\i<^n. 
 6i. ^.\' I ^01 s Noi:r I .oidfliij) I "iiu-nilirr (!v" Hiol iVom tlml: bnt- 
 
 trrv I'ouu' cvci the t.iMc wlicu voa aiv! I<:vcr.il ol!u:(.is were 
 
 at iliniu'v ? 
 
 A. I did no*- diiir uiih ( icnc;- 'I I5iir";nYnr \W,\\ d;(y — I rc- 
 
 rolUd hr.uinj:; .1 r.\iinon Ihoi h.i.l »hli oiuj)()li'(.l iho company' 
 
 at the p,i'nt ral's t.iiilc. 
 63. U- ^.'on.njvit ntlv n-.ull iu>r tl\nt battery have commanded 
 
 {\\i lord over the llr.dlbn's Rivu } 
 
 A. I l>i'li(\c I laid, I dhl not Ki-ollcil fiivn what dirci^VKMi 
 
 the Ihol came, l>ul ihcv had a lialU'iv which commanded 
 
 ihat ford. 
 
 63. C^ Po yon iTcolktfl on wlnt day you was calh-d, with 
 other eommanders of corps, to the In ll covmcil ot' war 1 
 
 A. On the I .jth ot C)i't»)l'er. 
 
 64. (^ Was tluic ;i Ipot in the whole pcti'illon to Ur Cound for 
 hoKhn',; that covmcil, which was not cxpoletl to cannon or 
 rille-fltot ? 
 
 A. Wc wove not ("o i'oitunntc as to i'lnd one. 
 
 (J^ I Vi \ou \\\(.A\vy\ thai (.icncral l)Ur';ovr,e, rftcr flatlnr; 
 to tlie covmeil the chlhevdties of the lit nation, tleehiied, tliat 
 nothing; conhl induce hun to j-rop(>'c terms to the enemy 
 without the i.\eneral eoneui lenee of the generals' ami Ticld ol- 
 ilccrs if the army, anvl that he was ready to take the lead in 
 any mcnhive they fliouKl think lor the honour of the J>rilllh 
 arm."!, (>i; words \o that cil'c^ ? 
 
 A. 1 remember words to that efle»5l. 
 
 Q^ Was the concurrence unanimous for treating on ho- 
 noinal^lv" tei ins • 
 
 A. I liojic I Ih.'.ll ftand jiillilied with the tncmbers of that 
 cou'tcil, when I have the honom- to diH-lare to tiiis Houfe, 
 that our litnation appeared to them i'o decided as not to ad- 
 mit of one I'.ilicntinG; voice, 
 f'i- ^-^ W'hcii Colonel K.in-;rton brought back ih.c fn-ft propo- 
 lition, wherein it was rpecitieil by Major ( ieneral (lates, that 
 the army ihcnld lay down iiicir arms in tlicir intrcnchinents 
 
 and 
 
 ^- 
 
 66 
 
aniion or 
 
 1 
 
 I'.arlnf i';il«.irrns.J t", V I I) K N C K. 
 
 and rmrcptlci* jnl loners of war, docs your f.ordHiip rrincm- 
 |irr, iliiit ticntM.ll iiLiri',()ync', wlu :i he read tliirm lo tlic toun- 
 ril, (Icclari'd, he would not iet hin Iiaiid to lliolc ujiuli lions, 
 or WiMils to that vi]\:(\ } 
 
 A. J think liK- words of thr propolal from Cicncral (iatcs 
 were, '1 liat I'.f iSiitilh army IhoiiKI he onlcrcd, hy word of 
 roivuaiid from their ndjutaiit general, to hiy ilrnvn their arms 
 In llic cMircnchinciits. It was rtjcdtcd with (hMain liy (ic- 
 jicral iiurj^oyiir, and the coimcil concurred in Ins indigna- 
 tion. 
 
 Q. Were: the countcr-propolals, penned hy 'v/cncral Bur- 68. 
 govno, iinanimoully approved of t 
 
 A. They W(.rc. 
 
 ()^ \V hen thole propol.'.K liad hccn rnirccd to oy Grncral ^q. 
 Clat'-s. Imt copi(.s noL i'.'.'ncd iiy either parry, do yon rciucm- 
 bcr (»i-iHral l>iir;',(^y.!e inOirminj; thr coMiinl fW irit', llii^encc 
 lie liad K'ccivfd fron> a f| y in the niidit, and Ivihinitrmf^ to 
 their ronlidf.Mvtlion, v hctiicr ir w;is f<.id;fic*nt with puhlic 
 faith, anil if lo, txpcdieiil lo lui'pend the exenition of ihc 
 treaty and trull to events } 
 
 A. 1 <!o rciiunili'M- ii. 
 
 ()^. Does your Lorth'hlj) ;ccnlh.;(fV v\hat was ihc rcfult of 70. 
 tliat coniiili r.itiou ? 
 
 A. 'Ihc (h'tcrminntion "f the eoMn( il, on th'^ fjucAiom 
 being put, was, that the piibiie faith WW's bona Julf [^hsdittd. 
 
 Q. 'I'liou^h tiiat was the opinion ol" the majoiity, was 71. 
 there not adillirv-nec of opmion in the council ? 
 
 A. There was. 
 
 <^ Were the opinions of the fevcral commandinp; oiTiccrs 72. 
 nikcd ref|icftinr;; the condition of their relptiPlive corps, and 
 wliai n/ight be cxpttltd from Uicni fcvcrally in dcfpcratc 
 tails ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 (^ Was there not on that queflion alfo difTcrencc of opi- 73, 
 nion ? 
 
 A. There was. 
 
 Q_. After the Convention took place, did your Lordftiip 74. 
 fee the army of General Gates pafs in review before General 
 Burgovne and General Phillips ? 
 
 A. l did. 
 
 Q. I'rom the manner and iViencc of tlicir march, the or- 75. 
 dcrohfervcd in kcej)ing their divifions, and an apparent at- 
 tention to their ofliccrs, did that army a]::pcar difciplined ? 
 
 A. Tlicy marched in good order and were lilcat, and 
 'I iccnicd 
 
 4^ 
 
 m 
 
 
 i 
 
 H'j 
 
 
 m 
 
 
 ■ n 
 
 1 ■ ■ f^u\ 
 
 ^m 
 
 ■^ 
 
wm 
 
 '',f. 
 
 46 EVIDENCE. [Earl of BalcarrajJ 
 
 fecmcd to pay attention to their officers. Thefe are clicn- 
 tial points of cliiciplinc, but I faw nothing farther of it. 
 
 76. Q: I* rom the general behaviour of the rebel troops in the 
 different ai>ions in which you was prefent in the courfe of 
 the campaign, did you think them difciplincd and refpe£ta« 
 blc troops ? 
 
 A. When I anfwcrcd the laft queftion, I fpoke to the man. 
 ccuvre 1 law upon the fpot. At all times when I was op- 
 pofcd to the rebels, they fought with great courage and ob- 
 ftinacy. 
 
 77* Q. Judging by your eye, and the time the relicl army 
 was marching m review, did you form any judgment of their 
 numl)cr ? 
 
 A. It requires great experience to make a computation of 
 numbers by I'eeing them pafs : as far as I could judge on the 
 occalion, they Itemed to itJe to amount to thirteen or four- 
 teen thoufand rank and file under arms. 
 
 78. Q. Has your Lordlhip rcafon to know or believe, that 
 the troops that palled in review were exclufive of thole corps 
 that had been pofted on the other fide of the Hudlbn's River ? 
 
 A. They were exclufive of thofc corps. 
 
 Examined by other Members of the ('ommitteey and by 
 General Burgoyne occojioually. 
 
 79. Q. What was the general opinion of the army of General 
 Burg()yne*s behaviour in action and in diiliculty ? 
 
 A. It appeared tome, that General Burgoync always pof- 
 fcfl'cd himlclf in every iituation of danger and difficulty, and 
 I may venture to fay, it appeared fo to the army. 
 
 80. Q. Had General Burgoync the confidence of the army ? 
 A. He had. 
 
 81. Q. After the arrival of the troops at Cambridge, were the 
 officers and foldicrs of the army latisfied with the general's 
 efforts to contribute to llieir comfort, and redrcfs their grie- 
 vances ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 
 82. Q. Was the army fiuisficd witli the general's behaviour 
 at the court-martial held on Colonel Henley ? 
 
 A. He carried on that prol'ecution in perfon, and as fuch 
 they were fatisficd witli him. 
 
 83. Q^ Did your Lordihip ever hear any officer or foldier of 
 that army exprefs any diffatisfaftion at the general's return- 
 ing to England ? 
 
 A. I did not. 
 
 84. Q. Does your Lordfhip think that the officers of that ar- 
 
 my 
 
 Earl of E 
 
 my 
 
 wifh 
 
 rcign, I 
 manding 
 A. It 
 fhould gc 
 but the c 
 Q. D( 
 General 
 and with( 
 ftinguilln 
 folation 
 
 A. Ge 
 anil afllid 
 as fuch 
 wouUl ha 
 with ever 
 Q, Yo 
 tained the 
 the Pitch 
 Fort Edw 
 lodge ther 
 of what ( 
 pole ? 
 
 A. An 
 
 the Houfe 
 
 queftion tl 
 
 Q. Did 
 
 A. I th 
 
 Q. Wii 
 
 A. I fp( 
 
 Q^ We 
 
 A. I do 
 
 Q. Iftl 
 
 barked, ai 
 
 have been 
 
 pine Plain 
 
 A. The 
 
 tachment > 
 
 fupport hi; 
 
 the 9th or 
 
 Q. Was 
 
 in order to 
 
 A. The 
 
 a Mig 
 
 A 
 
that ar- 
 my 
 
 Earl of Balcarras.] EVIDENCE. 47 
 
 my wifh to have their refpef^ive merits ftatctl to their Sove- 
 reign, by the general in perlbn vvlio had the honour of com- 
 manding them ? 
 
 A. It was the wifli of that army that General Burgoyne 
 fliould go to Europe, to juftify not only his own condu£V, 
 but the condut^t of the army he conimanded. 
 
 Q. Docs your Lordlhip apprehend, that the return of 85. 
 General Hurgoyne to that army, under perfonal difgrace, 
 and without any diftribulion of preferment among the di- 
 ftinguilhed ofliccrs of that army, would be any fort of coa- 
 folation to the troops under captivity ? 
 
 A. General Burgoyne, at all times, fhartd the dangers 
 anJ aflliflions of tluit army in common with jvery foldier ; 
 as fuch they looked on him as their friend, and certainly 
 would have received him in pcrfon, or any accounts of him, 
 with every mark of afFcdlion. 
 
 Q_. Your I.ordfhip having fiiid that if the rebels had main- 86. 
 tained their poft, at the afcent from the Low Countries to 
 the Pitch Pine Plains, in the march from Fort Anne to 
 Fort Edward, artillery would have been of great ufe to dif- 
 lo<igc them ; will your Lordfhip fay what kind of artillery, 
 of what calibre, would have been nccdlary for tiiat pur- 
 pofe ? 
 
 A. Any of the artillery officers now under the order of 
 the Houfe can give a much more fatisfaftory anfwer to that 
 qutllion than 1 poflibly can. 
 
 Q. Did you fee that poft ? 87. 
 
 A. I think I faid I did fee it. 
 
 Q. With what kind of work was that poft fortified ? 88. 
 
 A. I fpoke of it merely from its fituaiion. 
 
 Q. Were there then any works or noiie ? 89, 
 
 A. I don't recolleft there were any works. 
 
 Q. If the army, after taking Ticonderoga, had been cm- go. 
 barked, and proceeded direitly to South Bay, would there 
 have been any occalion to have attacked the poft at Pitch 
 pine Plains at all ? 
 
 A. The army did proceed by South Bay, excepting a de- 
 tachment of General Frafer's corps, and fome Germans to 
 fupport him ; and the army aft'embled at Skenefborough on 
 the 9th or loth of July. 
 
 Q. Was it neceflary to go to the poft at Pitch Pine Plains, 91. 
 in order to go to South Bay ? 
 
 A. They had no fort of conne£tion with each other, 
 
 Q. Might not the army have proceeded to Fort Edward, 92. 
 4 and 
 
 
 
 mm 
 
 
 
 1,- , ^/J -^ - 1 
 
■;♦' 
 
 9j 
 
 y 
 
 r. V T D !•: N C r. [K.a.lof r5.,K-ar,,„l 
 
 and om'ufcd tlir nftaiK of that pais, iuppoling it iiiul Itccn 
 meant \o he (li:fi'iuli.il ? 
 
 A. riure Wire two rmiirs to Vnr\ I'.iKvniil. (iriuijll 
 PtJiiiidvnc luii'ltt llill vn ilu'lainc route uillxiut aiw midli'v 
 of aitaikini; that poll, as there inii;hi h.tvr Ikui maiiv till'- 
 fcuMit ways of uillo(l^;in;.'j the ciu-my Iroiii that poU without 
 atta< kill"; it. 
 
 (>^ li\ how tuany inllaiircs do von rcinottihcr the i\\k\A 
 tlclinilintj thi ir iiUitnchrucMts after ihcy h:ul n\aJc tluiii ? 
 
 A. \Vc iK'ver iTot a vit w of any of ilieir intreiKliiDciittl 
 hut (urh IS th V h.iij \ol\intaiiIv al.aiiih'Mcd, 
 
 Q. U it then to be ^iiiuicillooii that they ticver i!cfenJcj| 
 pny iM»V'.'i'( bin -nts ? 
 
 A. 'I !•« V i.iver .'iil. 
 
 (). I )i 1 you ever hc.ir ( irnrral I'lafer cxpi'cls bis appro.] 
 bat ion <:l '.Ik- p.'.;i;i:', the 1 luillo;»'s Kivcf ? 
 
 A. 1 wrwr llill. 
 <)"• (^. ni'l you tvcr hear (iennal Frafor cxpicfs his appo- 
 batu^u of" the r«runin;^ron cxjudition ? 
 
 A. That <!cindiitient was made, aiul the bvilitirrs eon- 
 rbidod, bctiv.e 1 ever b(..i;\l of the )uo)e».'\ oi- exceutioii. 
 <^7- Q_. Have you ocoalion to know, when the iiiA dctndi- 
 !n> nt w. s ',cu\ rut tinder C'oloiu-1 Maunic, wheic they Wfrc| 
 ordereil to nj in ( iineral IbMi^ovne, after they hati per- 
 ioruieil tb» forvicc thev were Iv iti on ? 
 
 A. 1 div.i'i know. 
 
 Q_. Wiutiur, in \ (Hir i,o; libip'< <ipi!iioti, after the lofJ 
 
 n^ 
 
 05 
 
 9S. 
 
 99. 
 
 the It. 1 els hac' lullaiiiid over ni;;l>i, in the artion of the iqtlii 
 (>f September, if thev had been attaeked brilkly at break oil 
 <li\, the nc:;t day, tl.ere was a prol:ai)ility that tluy conUf 
 have Uc»ni| ti^eir i';iound ? 
 
 A. 1 ha\c uiU lul'iiatcd to j;i\c ;'n opinion upon ruppo!'cJ| 
 Mattcr>;, which u\n\\ iiavc bven aiteuvkd with rvident anjj 
 tlemonrtialMv ccnlcijuenees ; but I W:'^ the indulgence of tl;:l 
 Houfo in deelininu; to give any opuuon upon any <pieftion| 
 Tcbitive to I'peculaiion or jvidginent. 1\m\ anv general of- 
 fieer of tluit army umler (ieueral l'ui:i;ovne been prclcnt inl 
 th.s countrv. I Ibould have eoufinc»l inyfclf merely to thcl 
 m.iiKi^uvres of l.ic corps I coiutiianded. As there is no ge- 
 neral otliocr hero, I wilh to give iiiis Moule every infortna- 
 lion conliilcnt with my rank in the armv. 
 
 Q_. ILui vou any i iforuKiiion that might indicate to youj 
 tint ihc rebels were prepared to decamp after the aftion otj 
 tlic i9Lh of September ? 
 
 A. II 
 
Irnrlof n.Knna..] F, V 1 1) i: N C E. 
 
 A. I was i';m)i;int oi.iny fiu h iiitc lli'nncc I)('lnf» rrrrivtd. 
 
 (^ I lail ytui any inromuilioij ol llicir lia[^t;a[;c bcin^; pack- |qq, 
 
 A. I h.ivc alic.'uly nnrwci rd, that T had riu infuiinaliDn at 
 ill .ilioiit ir. 
 
 Q_. In \\\v union tifthi; 7th of OeloIxT, on which Tide did lor, 
 Ihf kItIs InriT our li IK'S a. id riial/ a Uxlipiunf ? 
 
 A. 'I'lic liiu'8 to the liyjii uoic Aornv I and carried. 
 
 Q^ W ere the linrs :Ut;i( la .1 lo tii-; hit ? IQ2, 
 
 A. 'lo the left of that pcfl they v.xii-, liut not to the left 
 )f thr iirniy. 
 
 C^ Did not the )K>!]liIi()n of Fort F.dward, and tlic conn- iq-?, 
 Lv tlioicahouts, nit oil'ihc rclicatof any gurri((;n that inigiit 
 
 lavc h'lMl in l''t)ll ( icor!;o ? 
 
 A. It iini!ou!)tcdly tlid ? 
 
 (^. Had the anny procccdrd to l''ort George hy Ticondc- 104, 
 kiga and Lake Cicorge, inicdit not llic enemy have remained 
 kt ["ort (u'orin' till ilu; trendies were opened, and have dill 
 jail tlicir retreat I'ciurc ? 
 
 A. That is a matter of opini(m upon fpcculaiion. 
 
 Q. Do you not thiuk that the Hritilh army, bcinf; well 105, 
 brovidcrl vvitii ariillriy, was a probable reafon for their not 
 Bcfcuilini:; eniitnchnients ? 
 
 A. Tlie reafon they ilid not defend their cntrenclinicnts 
 llMs, that ihcy always marehcd out of them and allatk- 
 
 I us. 
 
 C^. D()C« your Lordlhip llilnk it would have been ad- 106. 
 Iifalilc, in point of pru.knee, or juft to brave troops, vho 
 pi liitfoiecl icverc lol's, to attack an enemy the morning; af- 
 rr that lol's, ported within cntrenclinicnts, which it was im- 
 ofliiile to reconnoitre ? 
 
 A. That attempt was tried on the 7th of O£lobcr, and 
 |ii! not fuccecd. 
 
 Q. Were not the enemy reinforced between the 19th of 107. 
 |cj)'cinbcr and the 7tli of O^^obrr ? 
 
 A. 1 think it is likely they were. 
 
 Q^ Were they likely to be in better fpirits to repel an at- 108. 
 lick the day after they had been ri^pulfed with ;^vciit lorj;, or 
 men they liad been ruinfr,-ccd, and I'ecn an army lie three 
 [ceks inaftivc in their cam|) ? 
 
 A. I do not jud<!;e of the fplrlt of the enemy but when I 
 hsoppuled to them myfclf. 
 
 Q; On the firll day of the action, when the enemy was jqq, 
 
 £ rcpulfed 
 
 49 
 
 ill; 
 
 ''1' a 
 
 A' 'I * ... ''yi 
 
 
 
I 
 
 M itrr ovdf r, (\-i 
 
 50 1", V 1 n 1". N r r.. [r.avl of PrtUanA.. 
 
 ffpnlfcd on thf j«)tli v\ Soptrinltii, li.ul not mui a\ruy(ui. 
 fnrd very (■c'i\ruKi iihlv ? 
 
 /\. I l\rv iMlliHil \nv * onltdci ,iMr Ids. 
 \\<^> <^. \\ ;!'< 110I (Iv.'aiiny irii\iM(il, ;\n«l in 
 tlif "'th of (>c\oIhi, ihaii they \V( u- on (lie 
 l-n ? 
 
 A. Nuinl'crs p1 the niri\ wholi.vl lutn woiunlc' and dila 
 McaI in the a(J\u>n of llic »»)lli, ioiiml tluir lorps on «lic. ;i 
 of()ao)>«r. 
 
 (>^. \V IS tlio Iirh.ivioiir ^^f llir ciKmy, op}H)(cd to v< 
 I.cMtllhip, in \hc ;«^\ions \«>u h.ivc Ictn, Inih as to ni;ik:j 
 ihrn^ t(Mit( lupliMc ii\ tlic lyc ol a loldui ? 
 
 A. 1 h.wc alrcuiv incniioncjl, tint tluv l"o\ir1>t at all tmifj 
 with to\iia!'T and olilliiuny. 
 
 (^. W h(",U( v the b( havioiir <>l tlir riirinv w.t; Auli a« 
 maki' ad\ ,>iila;;rs ol't.iuicil by ihcm ovii liis Nl.inlly's tmop 
 more Innuiliaiing and dii",va( cfnl to the Hrililli arnn than 
 lame advantages obtained l«y an etjual nninhir ol any ollicj 
 troops - 
 
 A. 1 tuvlelt ft It juoie luimdiation until I lonfidcrcd I 
 
 \ 1 1 
 
 1 1 
 
 thol 
 
 e adv.inla«;c« pvoiee 
 
 Ir. 
 lied troni the nature vi the ronntnl 
 
 and not from the want of /.cal or JMavcry in ihc I^iitiii 
 troops ? 
 1 1 T,. Q^ \\ hether the enemy's troops were (\i« h bad troops as 1 
 make it Tiioie ddrraiefuJ to have an advantare olitainrd I 
 thejn over the Kint^'s troops than h\ the like nviitd^er of ;ii 
 other cncmv over a like nvunlnr of his Majcfty's troops 
 the lame einumrtaitoes oi country ? 
 
 A. The av!varitai;cs r.ained bv tht rebels over the I'liiifi 
 troc^ps jMoeecJed from their local litiiation, and not from t' 
 want «>f courage in the Hritilli trot^ps. Vve were taught 
 experience that neither llieii attacks nor rciillaiu c was to 
 drtpr.CvK 
 
 1 14. Q^ Old you ever ferve ngainfl any other troops ? 
 A. \ commenced tny Icrvicc in America . 
 
 115. Q. \\ hether the army under (icncral P»ur'.M)ynr, In <;? 
 ncral, expcded co-opcration in their ellortsto go to Albauyj 
 from tiie armv under the coti.\mand of Sir W illiam Howe? 
 
 A. k 
 
 icneral l>urg(n ne gave ii out in general orders, 
 
 1 ord< 
 
 tlial 
 
 he had every rcalbn to believe that powerful armies wcr! 
 atf^ing in co-operation with the army he had the honour 
 
 comnv 
 
 J 16. Q^ IX) you knovv at what time that order w;.s given 
 
 OVlt 
 
 A. '11 
 
BaU ariA*. 
 
 aiiuv I 
 
 III. 
 
 (11 (in, 
 
 \ S(i>t 
 
 |>uni. 
 
 Il.ulrf n..I.arrn^] K V f D r, N C I-:. 
 
 A. rlir :\(livUiim ;;rmi.irs bcutkn uill Ihcw it : I think it 
 
 \\\\\S ill'Dllt llu '^'l Ol ( )l'l(>l>l|. 
 
 Q. |)iH'< y*"" I .<M(ll|ii|) [("licvc that il the r-rtny nn(I<rii7' 
 ItioruMal llfiwc hail co (i|h intrd up tht: North Kivti with the 
 iinv niuKr(icnnal lluifV'Y"f'. 'hat \\\r army under (inic- 
 
 ^> 
 
 ' ami (lilaB''''' Ihufvyi'*' noull \\i\f Ikim (ihlii^ctl to have, made the con- 
 
 on »hc ;i 
 
 hcii'ioii I' uiil r 
 
 1 t 
 
 n \< 
 
 ^\ a 
 
 A. III. It !•; a matt* 1 nl iiid[rnirnt. 'Ilir aitny looked for- 
 
 Iwiiid I" ill at (()-<i|ioi at i' 111, whu h iluy wri' |rd to nnd' iHand, 
 
 to I, ,;,)^jjSli\ tin' orders (.fcncial liuijMiyiK; had givdnnit, wnh pI'-aliiiT. 
 
 O. What was the };fiK ral fipinion fil thr (t||i<(is ol the ''^• 
 n liitifiH''""y '" ^^'"'^'' )'"" I'L'ivcd, (Ml lli.it luhjcH of (() opcr.ilion ? 
 
 fvul 
 
 ly 
 
 1 asi 
 
 5 trnon 
 
 A. I do not think my tank in the army entitles mc to give 
 V n|iiiiiou on that luliitA.1 ; I lltall dill Ids prcliime U) i;ivc 
 
 Ini 
 
 Itli.U ol oliici'.. 
 
 ll'tihilrcw. 
 
 WK than I'' 
 
 [lien ho was ( ilJcd m at;ain, ami hvcral jiarts ol ihe rx- 
 
 anv oilitBj""""''^'""' |'i»i tu iilarly '!iat whuh immediately follows the 
 
 Mi'l.ttL whcic It is (aid thai his I,ord(lnp was examined l>y other 
 
 (u\ 
 
 cied tli.1 
 
 liucniln IS ol the C!ommiite( , wi re read, and then the hfl: 
 
 l(]iutlion whuh was put to his t.ordlliip immediately lietoic 
 
 the HiiliiW'^ withdrew, was repeated, wiih this addition, *' I'o the 
 
 le coniU'vl 
 
 I 19. 
 
 vooiis as 
 
 ^1 
 ibtaine* 
 
 1. 
 
 l)Cll ol yoin I' eoUcflion and information 
 
 A. I have already declined anlwcimg that (picflion 
 
 (^. \\ hen did yoii hill know that tlicic was tt) Ix no eo- T '-'.O 
 
 her ol ■■iBppcra'.ioii from (.Jdieral Ijowe's army, and that Sir William 
 
 's lro(>ps 
 
 tire Ihitif 
 ol t ron\ \ 
 : taii[;lit 
 
 was 
 
 to ^ 
 
 nr, in ?(\ 
 to Alhaiiv 
 
 liowe had ( airird his army to Chelapeak Hay ? 
 
 A. I did not ku(jw that we were to cxpcdl no co-operation, 
 iiUil ali'-r the i (»iiv( nlioii was (ij^iied. 
 
 (^ When did yon liill hear that Sir William Howe wa', I2I, 
 koiK" to the l()uthwaid '•' 
 
 A. It was reported to in the nnny n!)Oiit the hcgmniiij'; of 
 klu' 1 .iinpaii'i', belorc vvecrollcd the iiver. 
 
 (,\ When was that icpoil iird eonliiiiKd fo as to make it 127. 
 matter ol hiliet - 
 
 A. 1 never knew il was confirmed at all. 
 
 ()_. Wheiher you yoiiriell was not (urpriicd or difappoint- 123. 
 
 1 
 
 Uowe?»''» ^" '"'l''» when you lird lUKleifhiod i!iat theie w.is nor to 
 ^0 any eo-oper.uioii from Sir William liuwe, iiui that Sir 
 
 rilers, 
 nnics wcrJ 
 honour 
 
 riven o;it 
 
 liVilliam IIowc'n army was [;onc to CJIielaptak ]{ay } 
 
 /i 
 
 Pjiin ra, 
 
 lied 
 
 ytkithdrrM. 
 
 in. 
 
 Q. Whether you yoiirklF was furpnled or dira[jpointcd, j?^. 
 
 A. 'rkB"" ''^^^^^ wlien you 111 11 heard thai iiir VV'illiaiu iiuWw's lumy 
 
 goni; to CJhci'.ipcaN liay 
 
 E I 
 
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 52 
 
 K V T 1) i: N C i:. [i-.irlof nalcarr.rJ 
 
 A. I ncithiT knew ili'j (>l>iv6\ of the carnp.iit^n nor itscxJ 
 pc5lation<;, and ihctxi'oii- t mnot jpcak to any inaiKcuvrc of 
 which I couUl not know the tcmlcncy. 
 
 J 25. Q_. T)ul the arniv in j';cncrnl cxpni's tlicmfclvcs plcafcd p,t 
 tlic news of Sir William Howe's hcing L'^or.c to Chclaptak 
 Bay ? . r 
 
 A. The anfwcr to tiic iaft (]ucft'i()n, as It relates to ine in 
 pavticul.Tr, relates to ihcm in general. 
 
 126. Q. Wiicther your Lordliiip, as a matter of dd:, in the 
 conriilcration vou had in the army, on tlic news of Sir WilJ 
 liain Howe's in-in;^ gcmc to Chelapcak l')av, luarJ there vcj 
 converil-d with exprel's thrnifclvcs j^lcafed, or talk of that ex- 
 pedition to Chefapeak, as a powerful co-operation with <,;:. 
 neral l)urr;oyne ? 
 
 A. I thinlv that qucflion is fully anrwercl in the two nn. 
 
 ccciinp; ones. 
 
 12' 
 
 
 i 1 ■ 
 
 Q. W iuihcr von did not thi t^ (lencral Howe's fightin^l 
 (leneral W'alhington's grand army at the battle of Brandy-I 
 wine, was a very cajiital to-')peration wiih the army undcrj 
 Cicneral liurr;oync ? 
 
 A. I was not at Brandywine, 
 228. Q.-. ^Vluther you was not iurprifcd when you rcturncdl 
 Jiome to this country, to learn that the Secretary of ftatc fo:[ 
 the American dcp-irtmcnt, had information from (jcnenll 
 Howe, of his mtentii^ns of going to the fouthward, l)efovel 
 General Burt^oyne departed from this count.y, and ncveil 
 communicated that information to General Burgoync bcforJ 
 Ills depavture for Canada ? I 
 
 A. I have the honour tofland before this Houfe as a niili-| 
 tary man, an.l not as a politician, and cannot anlwer anvl 
 cjuefiion bur ihofc relative tomv own prolVHion. 
 2 20. ^ A\ hat was your Lordlhip's opinion of the fpirit oi 
 your own corps ? , 
 
 A. The opinion I gave in the council of war, relative ta 
 the fpirit of the curps 1 commanded was, that they were wil- 
 ling and '/calous to unilcrtake any cntcrprifc that GcncraJ 
 Burgoync would plcal'e to employ them upon. I 
 
 130. Qi When advice was received that Sir Henry Clinton wasj 
 coming up the North River, did you apprchencl the treaty ot| 
 convention had gone To f.ir that it covdd not lie broken ? 
 
 A. My Oi)inion was, with rclpcft to that queflion, that! 
 all military ncp;otiations weie fair and jultiiiabic, to niakl 
 delays and to gain time ; I therefore thought and dcclaredl 
 my Icntiments, that General Burgoyne was at full liberty tol 
 
 bi-caJ 
 
Halcnrr.'u.Hli 
 
 rci 
 
 npt. Money.] EVIDENCE. 53 
 
 .ireak off that treaty in the ftngc it then was ; and I roiihl 
 not conceive that the piihlic faith \v;is engaj^cd, until the 
 ;rc:ity was a6>iially liifncd and cx(han{;(<I. 
 
 O. Whether the opinion of (iencral i;urp;oync, of Cjcnc- tS'. 
 
 ll^hillips, of i{rii;;jdicr Hamilton, and H-vtr-A other olh- J^ ';'■""■•' 
 
 is, ilid not coincide wich your opinion in all the niuttcis "'*'"5'"*' 
 oinprifed in the hnfl ([ucflion ? 
 
 A. As Gent'ral iinrgoyne (ecms dcfirous that I fhouUl an- 
 swer that ijueftion, I dcchire his Icniimcnts were the (imc; 
 ivith thole J have now delivered, I hope th.it tlu- other 
 lincnil)crs of that council will ioon he in a lltuation to Hand 
 [forward and to declare the opinion thai they gave on that 
 ami every other (im-nion. 
 
 Q. When the (jucftion relative to the point of pviblic faith 132. 
 ..as decided, by the majority of the council, was not the *^y ^^••"er«l 
 concurrence for figning the convention unanimous ? urgoyne. 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 Q_ What day was it firfl known that Sir Henry Clinton 133. 
 ad taken the highlands, and was coming up the North Ri- 
 
 Jvcr ? 
 
 A. In the night of the 16th of Oflober. 
 
 \ IP'uhdren:, 
 
 Captain Monlv called in and examined by General 
 
 Burgoync. 
 
 Q. WAS not you deputy quarter mafter general of tJie i. 
 army under General Burgoyne, in 1777 ? 
 A. I was. 
 
 CK After Lieutenant Colonel Carleton returned to Cana- 2. 
 Jn, was you the fuperior olficer in that department ? 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q_. As fuch, did you make it your bufinefs from the be- 3. 
 linning of the campaign to get a knowledge of the country ? 
 A. Whenever there was any oceafion to obtain tliC know- 
 ledge of any particular part of the country, a part) was al- 
 i'ays fcnt witli me for that purpofe, but the woods were lb 
 ithick that it was impoiliblc to go without a party. 
 
 Q; \Vas you well acquainted with the country between 4, 
 ISkenefboroutdi and Fort Edward ? 
 A. 1 was. 
 
 Q^. How long was the army employed in making the roads 5. 
 )ra6ticablc between Skcnefborough uud Fort h.dward ? 
 
 A. About Tix or Teven days in making the road l>etween 
 iSkcuclborough and Fort Anne, and between Fort Anne and 
 
 E 3 FoiC 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
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 54 K V I D E N C K. [\'.ax\ of nalc;irr«.| 
 
 Vort EdwnriV 1 ilo not lulicvc the nrniv was (lcln)c<l 
 hour oil that aKoimt ; there w.is ;i very ^^ocjii lo.ul madi 
 the icbeK the year before, lietwceii I'ort Anne and I oiV 
 I'Alwaid, II) whuii road the reluls had i\ii «li)\\ n i<Miu I iv 
 trees whKh took ihc priwinciuls in our army loinc lew hoi:, 
 to dear. 
 6. O. Pots not the polllllion of the couiitw In the ncl-li. 
 bouihood il I'ori I'.dward luixil.inly picvcnl the iciicai ut ij 
 v^aiiilon tl.it ipirju he in 1 oil (ieoij^t; ? 
 
 A. It I'lcvents the !:;cttinii; oil' any artillery or (lores ; Imtl 
 a !i.irnioM iniL',hl "ot. thn)in;li the vvt)i>d>, in la'e \\e \srw uJ 
 
 the I 
 
 I'd 
 
 u> 
 
 llcH 
 
 lO 
 
 u of ihc ground in the ncij^iihouihood ol 
 
 ■>irtl 
 
 W.Ui 
 
 7" Q. Did not the pani'on of h'ort Cieorpc evacuate the U 
 upon the ajiproach of ihc King's troops toward 1 cut ]. 
 
 waul 
 
 A, I heard they liiil ; I wa^ nni near c non;di to lee. 
 ^' ^^ l\>\<.\ theaiMiv takep tiuii route in' Svuiih liay, 'I'i o\]. 
 deroi^a, an-I I ,ake (ieou'^e, imw inanv bakaux do you iiii;!- 
 •Miie il would have t.u>en to e.iriy il\- troipii folely over Lukcl 
 <.ie(>ri',r, exeluiivc ci prtvifions and llore. ^ 
 
 A. I tiiink iHiucen three and lour liundicJ, whiihha 
 traux mufl liavc been earned up out oi Lakj Cl'.aiuplain tj 
 l.,akc ( ieiM-<H\ 
 *-h C- ^Vhal tiir.e wouKl it iiavo taken, as you imagine, i;i 
 ha\c drawn tlu^fe hateavix over the laiul, hctween l,nU| 
 C^hamplain and Lake Cieorge, with ihc horlcs then at 1 
 conderoga r 
 
 A. 1 iuppole a fortnight — l^'our hundred Iiateaux. 
 \o. (^ T'liough llicic wuo no Iroi^ps palled over [,ake (ieorp;cJ 
 
 how long iliil it take before the full iranlport of provil 
 arrivcvl at hort (ieorg\ 
 
 1011)1 
 
 A. I 
 
 ran r rceo 
 
 Ilea 
 
 nccia; 
 
 y 
 
 11. Q. Conlldering the U ngth of time it took to tianfporl tin 
 provilions, without the troop>, over Lake Cicorge, was ii.i;| 
 the army Ibrwardcr in their way to Albany, in point of tinn 
 Ly the route ihey took, than they could have l)ccn by il 
 route of Ticondcroga and Lake Cicorsrc ? 
 
 A. I liavc already laid, that it would take a fortnight tol 
 traniport the 400 bateaux from Lake Champlain to Lakt 
 (icorgc ; it therefore would have delayed the army a fort- 
 night longer than they were delayed to have returned frcnil 
 Skeiulborough by Ticondcroga, and gone acrofs Lsk: 
 Gcorsre, 
 
 Q. W»l 
 
'I 
 
 \i 
 
 K.irl of Ihlcirrns. I E V [ 1) E N C K. 
 
 Q. \V:'s yoii cQinmiflary o^ liorlb, as well as deputy 12. 
 (ju.uur luaHcr «;ciiual } 
 
 \. I was. 
 
 Q. What is i!i<' n.itnrc of iliat dcpnrrmcnt > 1 j, 
 
 A. It was to take ' Irari'c <'f all the Iidi;' • fiirtiin,"!! by 
 rontiirt lor Ciciicral liarciyp.'s nnny, hy • '"V Ifftir of in- 
 fliuilions Iroin C icncral iinrgoyiic. I .i;;! riirc^'^J to piv^ 
 itioiKT oiilv I -. ail I diictilioiis to tli'- <!rivt;H, lninillicd !iy that 
 coiitratl, loi tii(.' purpoll; f't trar.lj'onlnjr provMions and lU)ic9 
 bn)iir,l\t to Tort CicorfTc for the vili- ol tht arm v. 
 
 O. Oil \i)u rcpoit tVom tiim* to tituc to Major Cicncial X4« 
 ]'liii!!|);, ami lake orders from hini, as well ab fiom General 
 J)iur,oyiicr 
 
 A. Vfs. 
 
 Q. \V( rr not the ordirs irotn hoth thcj^cnerals invarialile, ^5* 
 prccil", and picliiiiir, f^ir iirin<r all poliiMc diiigcni-C in fur- 
 vvarciiM'^ th': tr.wtipoil of nrovilions ? 
 
 \. They Wv.rr. Tht re was one order whiih I wil! read, 
 as H will hdlv anlwcr that (jucltion : it is dated A'.iii;u(l the 
 181I1, Ducr-C'ainp, aiul is in theic words ; '' It havinc; been 
 *' a pradlicc tor o(li^^:l■^ to oickr to he taken from the provi- 
 " iion train, in the l(.rvi( c of the Kinii; for this army, the 
 *' carls and !iorr('<--, for the carrvinj; l)a)::L';aj';o and otlicr pnr- 
 " |)()ies, to avoid tor the future the dani^cr \\\\i\ inconve- 
 *' nienres to the Icrviee, it is in the moll politive manner 
 *' ordered, that no cart or horfe are to be ulcd but for the 
 *' |Miblie tranlpoit of the army ; nor is anv ofliter, aeci- 
 *' dentally cjmin^;; to any |)articul,-\r poll, to intcrtcre wiili 
 ♦' the provilion train, in any other manner than to give it 
 " cvci aid and alliitance, which he ib on all occalions to 
 
 i( 
 
 do. 
 
 C\ Wa-? not tJic tranfport of merchandize, and even fut- i6, 
 Icrs' (lores, as well as ol oliin-rs' baggage, politivcly forbid 
 till the tr-n!port ot pKrvillon fhonld be over ? 
 
 A. There was lueh an order, atid a fci/ure made of two 
 barrels of Madeira, aiul two barrels of rum, whicli were or- 
 dered to tl.e holpiial. 
 
 Q. Do you rctollc<5\: Cicncral Hurgoyne's cxprcflinc^, at 17. 
 feveral times, particular anxiety on the lubjcdl of expediting 
 the tranlport of provillons ? 
 
 A. 1 do re(nend)er once to have heard Cnncral P.uryovnc 
 exprefs his concern at our not beini; aide 10 lirint; rorward 
 a greater quantity of provilion to en;'.ble him to prucecd with 
 the army,— 1 do recollect to have hcaid him lay vviiii very 
 
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46 
 
 EVIDENCE. [Captain MonryJ 
 
 prcat carncflncfs to General Phillips an<l Colonel Cailctdnj 
 
 that one luonlli's provilicni at ihat panicuii'.r time (it waij 
 
 aliovit I he latter eml of Aiigufl) wouKl he worth iOO,oool.[ 
 
 to ( ireat lliitain ? 
 iH. Q_. Do you think that the eoniiniirarv of'tiie wag'^ons, nriiii 
 
 other eania^^is, was authoriKd to buy or hire <^\-lean»s whcrJ 
 
 ever llicy could he h.ul, Aud thai all dr "ij;!\i cattle lakenJ 
 
 were appiopriated to ihe tranlpoit ? 
 A. lie reecive*.! lueh <liie(fli.)ns. 
 19' Q; I low nKiny cait.i and o\-icanis could he inuflercd A 
 
 any one liinie ' 
 
 A. I think (Mily 180 eart^; eovdd at any one time \^c \^^\\. 
 
 flercvl ; the nuiiiher ul' o\-i.ails 1 le.illy ltiri;el, hut 1 l)clit\c| 
 
 l)ct\vten io and r^o, 
 
 20. ^X: Ahoul luivv m>ny davs' provifion lor ihc troops, nn!| 
 all other perlinis led tioin the Kini;'s llores, could llial num- 
 her ol i'.MriaL;cs eo^vey ? 
 
 A. M'iicre never u, is anv trial made, hut if 1 may pvr- 
 fume to iuilt;e I'rom the proportii^n i.roui;ht forwani, ovtl 
 and ahove the daily conlvuiiptiou of the aimv, Ihould lu|i-[ 
 pofe all thofe earri.i<:!;es would not carry more than iour (la\s| 
 provilion at moil, i an; Ipeakin:; at ja'ndom, as no trial w, 
 made. 
 
 21. Qj Did it not nMuctimos happen, fiom accidents of wc.v 
 iher, and rond<, ami tlic died ilate oi the cattle, th.it notl 
 irore titan one day's provilion could he hrout'Jit forward ini 
 a day ? 
 
 A. It did. 
 
 22. Q. How many hours did it take, one hour with another,] 
 to dr.iw a hateau Irom iort Cieoiiie to 1 ort l>Kvard ? 
 
 A. In general ahoui iix. 
 
 Q. Was not the unloailing the carts at Fort Edward, a 
 
 eml.>arkinf' llie cont; iits in haleaux, unloadinir the hateauxk 
 ^ . * . r 
 
 at the upper tails o{' Fort Milh'i, ami a lecond time unliKui- 
 jng them at the lower falh, dilatory as it was, a more expe- 
 ditious method than it woultl have been to have carried t.Lc| 
 provifions ihe whole way in carts ? 
 
 A. I do api)rehcnd ir was not poilihle, in the feeble flatcl 
 1 found the horics furnllhed by contra6V, to have brouglitl 
 forward the daily conlun^prion of provilions for that armyj 
 <lown to }'"ort Miller. In the month of Auguft, in the lat- 
 ter end of that monlh, at which time I was appointed i| 
 fommiirary [general of liorfe, I made, on the firft of Sep- 
 
 tcmh-eijl 
 
 
 n,1 
 
.Captain Money.] E VIDE N C E. 
 
 irnilxr, a p;rncj-al muftcr, and fmnul 30 liorfcs unfcivlcca- 
 \[^\c fVoin fatU!,wc and hard lal/our. 
 lOOjOOol.M (>. Was the tranljioit (if proNifKins at any time impelled 24. 
 hv tin brini^ins; (orvvanl the artillery (loin jort (ic()i|',e ? 
 
 'a. The arlillei y had a lejjaralc cuiiir;n5t lor liorlcb, vviili 
 jvliiih ilicy broii<.dit Iciwartl ihclr nvvti llores. I ilon't reeol- 
 hci'l th;if any part of the provilion-traln was ever employed 
 [ill luinj'.ing forward aridiery or artillery (lores. 
 I (^. Was it poflihle, with the means we had, to colleft a 25. 
 uftered it^jnonili's flore ol'provilions luoncr than it was eolledtcd ? 
 
 A. I lelieve not, without the utter ruin of the liorfes fur- 
 c be niii-Mj^il)^[.,| |,v contrail for ilie purjifife of tranljxirting (lores. 
 It 1 I)cIr\cB, (). Was you prelent in the adlion of the K^lli of Scptcni- 26. 
 
 1) 
 
 A. T 
 
 was. 
 
 iliat nuiu-H (^, DiJ il,c enemy difputc the field that day with ohRl- 27. 
 |liary ? 
 
 A. They did, aiul the fire was nmoli heavier than ever I 
 faw it any where, unkis at the allairof I'ljrt Anne. 
 
 C. I)o you know how lonir the reciiments of the Hritilli 28. 
 
 line wci 
 
 re under tliat fiie ? 
 
 \. 'J'hc three Hriiini rctnmcnts (the 20th, ?. iff, and GiA) 
 
 clock in the aft( 
 
 l^^.ly,l.l.l iiuiu lunA. v; ci>iv,i\. HI die altcrnoon till fevtn hi 
 ihc eveniiv.'; ; and wlulll I was a priHiner I heard the rebel 
 qiKuUr-m;dler {general <ay, they had nine dincrent rer^iments 
 Sn the iield, o])poled to the three Briiilh I have named. 
 
 (^ Do you know the lofs the three iirililli regiments fuf- 29. 
 lained r 
 A. I can't fay. 
 
 Q_. Do you remember the (Irenglh of the Old regiment 30. 
 kvhen they came out of the adHon ? 
 
 A. 1 can't fpcak to the particular Rrenr^th of the regiment 
 ihciithcy came out of adlion; but 1 hca;d tliat they were 
 ut 100 rank ami ii!e. 
 
 O- How many otficcrs were left in tliat reirimcnt at the •21. 
 ^nd of the action ? 
 A. 1 ( an't anfwer tliat (jneflion. 
 
 Q. From the j^^cneral flate of the three .Hiitifh regiments, 32. 
 io you think that they would have been in a proper condition 
 lo have attacked tlie enemy the next morning ? 
 
 A. Certainly not; nor to go on any krvicc whatever. 
 (^. About what time of the day did the enemy finally give 33. 
 vay ? 
 
 A. They 
 
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 F V I D K N C K. [Ciptain Monry.B C.pt.iin 
 
 \] 
 
 A. Thrv p,avc way vciy ollon ; linally about (Ivc 
 
 n in 
 
 If fVrtMl)!' 
 
 14- <^- \^ .ts it pi.nlic aMr, .It tIt.Tt time of the cvci\i:ig, ami in 
 
 tli.it kiivi of »iMii\tiv, to l»,i\i" puilurtl ? 
 A. 1 llioiilii iliMiU ncf. 
 ;S'. ^^. W'.i"- viMi i\i<i (>ricii rtMpUnciI, Kiiwron il»c <!.iv (;l ili.iti 
 
 acMioit, ;in.I llic ;uli()i\ ol the Vlh ol C)(>M()lici-, to ici'oiuunlit ) 
 
 A. r 
 
 \v ,1 -; . 
 
 36. (2.' ^^ •i'^ y*H» iiliic to »>I>i.»iii 4 \i'vv ot the iiiciny's p() 
 tion r 
 
 A, I ohtaiiic'l :» vii-w of the pol'iiion o\ the \\<.\\\\. ol ihcl 
 rebel I iit\('i\t limrnt*;. 
 ■>7' ^--« ^Vh.lt u.is the naltiiT (»r their poiuion {n liic livji 
 with irr, lul to ciitrciirhmcMt"' ^ 
 
 A. I 1m V UATc polli.l (Ml ;i hill th;it «Mmc vrry nfir f! 
 riviT. ()ii llic lop ul l!i( hill u;i. .1 llroii:', liu'.iil wim k, , 
 tlu' to, it ;in iihh.ilis. 
 
 ;S. (^ I )ul It appc.ir to ytui th.ii that win;; ot the ciicniy 
 
 .\tta^ Is.iMc } " 
 
 wnil 
 
 A. It is ;i «]inflion tint i> iianclv in luy line of (iMvicc t.i 
 anTurr ; Imt as tluMC arc no iii'Mcial olliicrs nor older oiliicr! 
 
 lhann\)liil, wlu* Ins cil nmlcr ( m •''!:) 1 r»nt<;oNn(', I h>'|'i.- iioi 
 uulitiry man will iliipk inc prt Innutu; i<< «;;\ i.- inv opininn cal 
 tliat Ui!>i(il. I t'o ihink ihii u ;• coiihl noi l«i,i\c' alLukiv 
 ♦ lir rij;lit wini; (W thr i\'!k K'niK-n 'hnu-nts willuuit lilkini; tlie| 
 lofs o[' ihi" whole aimv, anil with little inooability ol 1 
 
 IK- 
 
 re 
 
 ir. < y ( ".Milil v»ui o'M.tin a y'\v\ <>! l!u 1 'li win" of tlir oncinv'l 
 
 A. I 
 
 r>\ir law tlu 
 
 win!\ «it tlir cucniV s fntiiinl 
 
 in 
 
 cuts til! I was tr.kcn jtmoncr ami coivlutllcl ihion;'Ji ih 
 
 WO" 
 
 40. (^. (^i\ the ; th oi (X'lohcr w:is yon in a i'.Uialion to U 
 the i-iuuu a>i\aiuin'; \o the attavk. ot vomkii ? 
 
 A. Vcs. 
 
 41. C^ 1 )ul tluv ailvaiitf luulcr a well rcrvcd lire of L;rapc-llii 
 I'rcini {>ui" ail iIUtv - 
 
 A. I 
 
 \'as in a iiiiiation tiiat r.avi' nu" an o;iportunitv 0: 
 
 fcclni: thc{l;rc«.'lions » r tlu" uli. Is' cohunns ; an 
 
 .1 1 
 
 was vi'ivl 
 
 nnuh aOonillicil to I-.;-av thf tliol 1r(>in the fneiny llv lo| 
 tail k, atior (v.n- vanntMunlc hail lailcd :\ (juaitcr ot' an hour 
 4;. Q; \\ lun the l^riiilh grcnauii.rs wcic iorcal lad iroiiij 
 their poll, what enlncd r 
 
 A. 1 ilid not fee the Hiitilli c;'cnatlirrs forced haik. I lai^l 
 tlicm en iluir luaivh, as I app.- heiulcd, takini^ adillcrcnt poj 
 
(even ir,| 
 
 C.pt.V.n Money.] K V ID I', N C F.. 
 
 (Ml 
 
 f' 
 
 OH l<" 
 
 it that llinc IivciaI of lli< tii \m\c iluir rani <;, Tut 
 
 •lill (III t .IIM|)'. (.lUinjMO lllCIll lol 
 
 .iini', t') cc>iiliiiiic 
 
 ' and tnB tlirii i.i>l<> 'I^y in.innul ;i\vay to llnir ll.iiioM in {'odiI or- 
 t\ 1 aiLiluMi of I'liMilw'ukci'' til at wiic nii llif I. ft of the 
 
 ii I , 
 
 vof llinrl 
 
 HUUMtK H 
 
 ly's poll- 
 \l of ilicl 
 ihc ii:',li*,| 
 nrav t!i 
 
 ■WCllv, ,l'| 
 
 ariill>'V •niitt'.il tlttir {^rotnivl a. l(if)n ,is ili'' tiling I»'g;:i', and, 
 to til' lull of my rccolU fli<»ii, I il'ul net Il>.' ih.y Idt a man 
 1. I. ill. I tluin t>n iIk' |;r<)ii|i'I, 1 v.dwlti a.lJ, tl at after iconic 
 (I'.irKiiiiv that liaiialmn was l,i()ii",lil to ntakc a lland in thi: 
 
 M.iro! tlic ariilkry, Iml in no onlcr. 
 
 (^. V/a:inot that battalion l)r(j.i;dit tolhat rivind l)y ihi: ac-42. 
 tivity anil rxhoilation ol Maj^r ( icncral l<ciilffcl ? 
 
 A. I dill not !ci' (iinciil Kililtitl endeavour to ftop tho 
 hati.dio.t ; 1 ut I law an aid dti (..ni'i) of his and a brigade 
 ina")tM, with their drawn iwords, lsCci)injT, them up. I did Ice 
 (luural Kridrlcl immediately aftc rwaid-i, on iht ripjit t)f the 
 aiiill'-r^ , with the hallalion ptrfuJtly formed, and in ^Mj(jd 
 i);\!ir. 
 icmv \v:»H Q.« D" vou inia;;inc tliat the {-jiving, way of tlie battalion 44* 
 
 forvifc till 
 
 lor oiru\ri| 
 
 I h. •[•(.• rol 
 
 ,M''.nioii lal 
 
 \i)ii iiift d> leribcd was tlic < a-afe that the ai 1 illcry on that fjVit 
 uas lal.LMi, and yon lelt and Major VV'illiam>i beinif maile pii- 
 lont-is r 
 
 A. 1 believe it roiirri!)nled, iti h>W2 meariire, towards the 
 jols of the adii)n on that day ; but before Sir 1 rands Claikc 
 
 dofhi 
 
 s wo 
 
 un 1 w he lold mc that he received hi 
 
 s wonih! Ill 
 
 ;e eneinv 
 entrenvl 
 'h i1k 
 
 )V1 
 
 i.'H'\ t.) 
 
 attaeUlV.M llli.ll wi ms wumin, 
 
 ilkiiv.; tlu'B hiini;a)i; t>rdeis for the ariiUtry and tlie whol; of the delaeli- 
 liy i>i uii-HiiKitt to leturn to eninj); and to the fireumllance of Sir 
 i'raneis Clarke's biiiv, wound.ed, 1 do ;.triib\itc liic lols of 
 the artdlery, if I'lOl the lol"'. of the whole army. 
 
 (^ Had you an oppcjrtuniiy, after you was prifoncr, to fee 45. 
 the let"*, of the enemy's enirenehmenls ? 
 A. I had. 
 
 (^. Was the f!;r(nintl witinn eannon fliot of tiic left open 46. 
 ami eomf.iandiiu.!; it r 
 
 A. All the t;round I law was ilcarcd and entrenched. 
 -11u'.B Q. \\asiheie not ground within cannon fhot that would 47. 
 Invc commandctl that entrenehment on the left ? 
 Irtunitv o:H A. 'J'hcrc was. 
 
 ll was VcwB (^. Had we gained pollcllion of that ground, and been 48* 
 llv loBablc to ere(Si batteries of our htavieft guii.s, wou.d not the 
 hour. Hwhole line of the enemy have been cidihickd r 
 latl tioffiB A. 'I'hc ground alluded to was entrenehed, ami coinmandcd 
 the whole of the rebel eamp and linei. If the army h.al "ot 
 I fa\BpolIbflion of that ground, I do not belicTC ihc rebels would 
 Verent VoBhavc {laid one hour in their camp. 
 
 iiiionB Q^ Dill 
 
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 E V ! D 1: N C E. [Captain Money. 
 
 Q. Did you ever hear, in convcrfation with the rchcl of- 
 ficers, that General Arnold, forcfccin;^ that inconvenience, 
 had marched out of his lines, and attacked, without orders 
 from General (iates ? 
 
 A. I did hear that General Arnold had marchr-d out on the 
 7th of 0£^uhcr, wiiiiour orders from (jcncral ( i Ues, 1 did 
 alfo hear that he adviied the fi;oing out to m.-et Cicncral Hur- 
 goync on his march, and en^^atrini; him before he approaclicd 
 their lines; ;ukI the reafon he gave was this : If Gcnvral 
 Burgoyne Ihould ever come near enough their lines to be aMc 
 to make u!*e of his artillery, that ho would certainly })olIcli 
 hiir.felfof their camp; that their troop? in that cafe would 
 never ftand any whire ; but if, oi\ tlic other hand, the rebels I 
 fhould be debated in thr, woods, the troops would, after | 
 that, have conlidcnce in t!,eir works, for which reafon At- 
 iiold adviicd riiking an nf.ion in the wot)ds before Geneul 
 Burgoync came near enough to fee their works. 
 
 Examin'd by nhi" members of the Committee ^ and by 
 (jencral Buy^fyync cccaJtcnaHv. 
 
 Q. Did not your liruation, as deputy quarter mailer qc 
 neral, lead you to mix very much with the dilFcrent othecr$| 
 of the ariiiy t 
 
 A. It did. 
 
 Qi V/hatdo you apprcliend to have been the general opi' 
 nion of the oflicers of General iJuriovne's condutft, as well 
 
 ' • . i 
 
 in acti:!n as in the m:iny f/yiiv/ oeealioas which have been 
 nated by you at the bar r 
 
 A. They cn'.eitained a very high opinion of General Bur- 
 goyne's conduct. 
 
 (^ Had General l>urgoyne the full confidence of the armyl 
 under liis commantl to tue laft nioment } 
 
 A. He certainly had. 
 
 (!^ What was the army's 0])lnion of the rebels after thcirl 
 retreat from Ticonderoga ? 
 
 A. The army in general did not think, after they hnji 
 evacuated Ticonderoga, that they would make a ftand any 
 where. 
 
 Q. What was the reafon given in your army for the ex- 
 pedition to Bennington ? 
 
 A. I believe I cannot anfwer that queflion better than byl 
 .^eading an abftra6l of the General's orders the day after! 
 that a«^ion. " -^-'g!']^ I7> Duer Cam^\ 
 
 *' It was endeavoured, among other objefli, by the cxpe- 
 ** dilion which marched to the left, to pro? ide iuch a fupply ofl 
 
 *' catdsf 
 
 'f;.. 
 

 ([Captain Money. E V I DK N C 1!. 
 
 *< rattle as wonlti have cnaMed the army to jiroccctl without 
 " wailini^ the arrival of the mat^a/nics. That attciiijit 
 ♦» having failed of hicccrs, throut;h ihe ilinncf'. of war, the 
 I" troops inuft ncccliarily luilt foiiu; clays for bringing forward 
 •« thw" rranlports." 
 
 Q^ \Vh.y did the army remain from the i6th of Aupfufl to ^^^ 
 the r^th of Scptemhcr, before they crolltd the Hudlbn's 
 Rivcr'to cnf^nge tlic rebels at Stillwater } 
 
 A. To bring forward a fufruii nt (juantity of provifions and 
 artillery, to enable the general to give up his commuuica- 
 
 Ition. 
 
 (I. What was the opinion of the army on their crofling 56. 
 I the lluilfon's River ? 
 
 A. They did think it was their indifpenfiblc duty to proceed 
 forward and ilght the rebels, which \\c heard were then at 
 I Stillwater. 
 
 Q. Did you ever forajrc to the right of Cicncral !• rafcr's 57, 
 Icanip before the 7th of Augull } 
 
 A. VVc never foraged to ;he rifi^t of the ^ nmp at Frcc- 
 Iwan's Farm, at any one tim'-; ; on the 7th of Odlctbcr, while 
 Ithc troops were in the field, Gencr:il l-rnll r ordercl all the 
 Ibatmcn and dri\'er>, bclotjging to his brigade, to coiiic and 
 (forage In the rear of the troops. 
 
 Q. Do vou know what was G.'ner.d Frafcr's opinion on -« 
 lyour toragmg to tlic rii'lit r 
 
 I A. 1 do know that Ou-nrral Fraier tv.cntioned to tnc, on 
 [the 5th of October, tint there wr.s forage on the rlr;ht of 
 Ihiscamp; but at that time the ground on whiih tliat torage 
 Iwas to be met with v/as in pulleliion of the rebels' advanced 
 port. 
 
 Q. Do you think your army would have been loft, if j-g^ 
 Even the expedition from New York had taken place a few 
 Relays fooner ? 
 
 A. If the troops had arrived at New York foon enough to 
 Ihavc enabled Sir Henry Clin'on to iiave made Iii.- cxpLdition 
 lup the North River a week fooner, I iio conceive that our 
 larmy would not have been loll. 
 
 Q. What was the opinion of the rebels on Sir William (^^ 
 lowe's going to the fouihward ? 
 
 A. I was not acquainted enough with the rebel leader^;, to 
 hear their opinion on that cjueilion. I do not think that • 
 llie peafants of the country vvcre jud^jcs of the propriety of 
 ^ir William Howe's conduct, 
 
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 62 EVIDENCE. [Captain Monej. 
 
 61. Oi V/hat was the opinion of the oili-.ers of General Bur. 
 goy lie's army, after it was lofl, lelativc lo the crofling Hud- 
 ion's River > 
 
 A. 'I'hey did think that the alternative of retreating with 
 their army to Canada, or proccjJing to Stillwater, under the 
 neccnicy of giving up his communication to be an unfortu- 
 nate fituation ; but I never heard any officers fay that thev 
 thought General J>argoync had done wrong; r.uny faiJ, 
 that if they had retreated without ri iking au action, at tlie 
 time Sir Henry Clinton was coming up the North River, 
 the army would never have forgiven him, nor would he evt:: 
 have forgiven him:i.lF, 
 
 62. Q:, ^^'^'^ ^'^^*^ -^^ New York aftjr the lofs of General 
 Burgoync's army ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 (>7. Q: What was the opinion or tbc language of the military 
 at that place, relative to Sir William Howe's expedition to 
 Penfylvania ? 
 
 A. Whatever opinion was fornicd of Sir William Howe's 
 expedition to Penfylvanla, or is formed i)revious to this en- 
 quiry, fuch an opinion muft have been ill-founded, as Si: 
 William Hovvc's rcafons were not known, nor his inftrudtior,' 
 conuTiunicated to the pu'llc. 
 64. Q_^ From your lafl: anfwer, is the Committee to undcrftanJ 
 that the opinions that were formed reft)c6ling Sir Williani 
 Howe's expedition to Philadelphia, before this enquiry, 
 were not in favour of that expedition ? 
 
 Queftion objecled '.o. [^IVithdrc:^. 
 
 jlgnln cr.ikd in, 
 ^r. Q^ You have faid that the army thought it their indifpen- 
 fiblc duty to pafs over Hudfon's River — Why did they thinl; 
 that that meafure was particniarly their indifpenfible duty ? 
 
 A. If the Hudfon's River had not been there, the arniyl 
 would have thought it their indifpenfible duty to have gonji 
 and riiked an adlion before they returned to Canada. If I re-r 
 collcft right, i faid, that if the army had returned to Canada,! 
 without lighting, that the army v/ouid never have forgiveni 
 the general, nor the gener;'.! have forgiven liimlelf. I 
 
 66. Qi Do you know the nature of tlie country, between thel 
 place wher3 we palled the Hudfon's River and Albany, onlliil 
 caft Tide of the river ? 
 
 A. Yes, I do. 
 
 67. Qi Coulvl the army have taken that route, in order tol 
 j^afs the river oppofite or near to Albany ? 
 
 A. The army could not have taken that route, as part oil 
 
 m 
 
 'route ? 
 A. I 
 
 if the a 
 
 fthey CO I 
 
 I tiieir pr 
 
 ' of the ri 
 
 : Q, E 
 
 Ipronch t 
 
 I Sir Will 
 
 \ A. T 
 
 given O^ 
 
 1 " T^' 
 ;*' are a( 
 
 *' tliougi 
 
 1'^ highly 
 
 ^" that tl 
 
 *' brinq;ii 
 ;;" tion 
 f pound, 
 I Q. Ar 
 jYork to J 
 I A. I a 
 ;. Qi He 
 if no inu 
 A. Ic; 
 that a bri( 
 
 in fomc p 
 
 ort Edv\ 
 llie troops 
 
 Q:Ist 
 5any, tha 
 to fupport 
 
 A. Ccr 
 'dvvard, \ 
 'rovifions 
 
 Q: Wa! 
 >any, that 
 
 A. It V 
 'rmly, tha 
 

 \ MoncTi 
 
 eral Bur- 
 .ng Hud- 1 
 
 tini^ with I 
 under t,hs| 
 unfortu- 
 that they I 
 any fuicU 
 )n, at the 
 :\\ River,! 
 Id he ever I 
 
 Captain Money.] E V I D E N C E. 
 
 ♦he wav was a fwamp, and on the right of the rebel entrench- 
 ments was a movintain very rueged, and not pallablc nearer 
 
 [than two miles t.om the river. 
 
 Q^ Was it not a nccefl'ary confcquence then, tliat the boats 68. 
 
 [muft have been abandoned, if the army had taken that 
 
 1 route ? _ 
 
 A. I think I have laid the army could not take tliat route ; 
 
 I if the army had marched on the eaft of the Hudlbn's River, 
 they could not have nuLrclrjd nc;u' enough to have covered 
 their prov"" 
 
 63 
 
 ifion bateaux from i!ie rebel force, on the wed fida 
 
 I of the river ? 
 
 Q. Did the army un^'cr General Burgoync, on their ap- 69. 
 Hpronch to Albany, expert a co-operation of the army under 
 "^Bsir William Howe, upon the North River ? 
 
 A. They did ; ancl this is tire oidcr of Cjcneral Burgoyne, 
 given 06fober the 3d at Freeman's Farm : 
 
 " There is rcalbn to be allured, that other powerful armies 
 "are aftually in co-operation with thefc troops; and al- 
 <' though :he prelcnt lupply of proviiion is ample, it is 
 " highly defirable, to prepare for any continuance in the licld 
 " that the King's I'ervice may require, without the delay of 
 *' bringing forward further llores for thofe purpoles ; the ra- 
 *' tion of bread or Hour is, for the prefent, fixed at one 
 " pound." 
 
 Q^ Are you acquainted with the North River, from New 70. 
 lYork to Albany ? 
 A. I am not. 
 
 Q^ How many days march from Fort Edward to Albany, ji. 
 f no interruption from an enemy ? 
 
 A. I cannot anfwer that queflion, unlefs I am to fuppofe 
 hat a bridge was ready formed for the troops to pafs over, 
 1 fome part of Hudfon's. River, bctv^reen Batten Kill and 
 ort Edward, or that there were vellels ready to tranlport 
 he troops over Hudlbn's River. 
 Q. Is the diflancc fo great between Fort Edward and Al- y2, 
 ^any, that the army could not carry provilions with them 
 to CanadamQ fupport them during the march ? 
 
 e forgivea^ ^^ Certainly Albany is not at fo great a diftance from Fort 
 -dward, but that a corps of troops might certainly carry 
 rovlfions fufficient for the march to Albany. 
 Q. Was it not underflood, that if you had arrived at Al- 73, 
 'any, that the army would find plenty of provifions theic ? 
 A. It was generally believed, and I believe it mylelf 
 rmly, that if the army had got to Albany, we fliould have 
 
 fOvind 
 
 f Gene 
 
 le military 
 edition to 
 
 rm Howe'; 
 
 to this en- 
 
 led, as Sir 
 
 nftrudiom 
 
 underftanJ 
 William 
 ; enquiry, 
 
 ir indifpca 
 they think' 
 
 pie duty ? 
 the army 
 I have gon: 
 
 Ja. If Ire- 
 
 ;twecn thel 
 on th«l 
 
 lany, 
 
 order tol 
 
 ,« '■■■!; 
 
 
 
 
 as part 
 
 1 
 
Tf^ 
 
 04 
 
 in- 
 
 I; I 
 
 EVIDENCE. [Earlof Harringto.^, 
 
 found a number of loyal fuhjcfts, tliat wouiJ have joined and 
 
 done everything in their power to have eitablilhcd the armyl 
 
 at thit place. 
 74. Q^ Muft not the army, to march from Fort Edward to I 
 
 Albany, have nccellarllv carried a number of boats to form I 
 
 a bridge to pals the nvcr ? 
 
 A. There was no paliing the river well without a bridge of I 
 
 boats, and there were notfcouls enough on that river, to makef 
 
 a bridge. 
 75' Q; ^^^ould not the neceflary delay, arillng from carrying! 
 
 forward thofe bo;it?, and throwing a bridge, fit to pais anl 
 
 army, have confumed more time than it »//as pofiible for rhitl 
 
 nrmy to fubfift with fuch provifion as they could carry wltlil 
 
 them ? 
 
 A. I (hould think it would. 
 
 76. Qi You will give the Committee what information yojl 
 can, rcfpe£ling a road from Fort Edward to Albany on tlicj 
 left fide of the river. 
 
 A. I have anfwcred that fully. 
 
 77. Q. Whether by taking a pretty largo circuit, the armvl 
 would have reached Albany^ and avoided the fwamps yoiil 
 mentioned ? 
 
 A. Certainly not on the cad fide of the river, bccaufe t!i:j 
 enemy being on the oppofite (bore, ".vould certainly have op- 
 pofed General Burgoyne's army crolMng the Hudfon's Rivel 
 at Albany, the river being three times the width it is al 
 
 [fVitbdml 
 
 ( 
 
 Saratoga. 
 
 Mar lis 1^ die Jumi, 1779. 
 
 Mr. F. Montagu in the Chair. 
 
 Earl of Harrington called in and examined by Ge- 
 neral Burgoyne. 
 
 1. Q. IN what capacity did your Lordfliip ferve in Americij 
 in the campaign 1777 ? 
 
 A. I was captain in the 29th regiment of foot, and wenll 
 on the expedition with General Burgoyne, with the comrr)an(| 
 of the grenadier company ; I v\'as afterwards appointed lii] 
 pernumerary aid du camp to the general. 
 
 2. Q^ While afting as captain of the grenadier companyJ 
 was you at the aftion of Huberton ? 
 
 A, I was. 
 
 3. Q; What was the behaviour of the enemy on that day ? 
 
 3 A. Theil 
 
J." .' '' I' , ' 
 
 .1 
 
 rington. 
 
 ned and I 
 he army 
 
 ward to I 
 to form 
 
 Dric 
 
 ]<ic of 
 to make 
 
 carrying! 
 I pal's an I 
 e for thntl 
 \rry with 
 
 at ion yojl 
 ny on ta:! 
 
 , the ar;nyl 
 ramps yoji 
 
 lecaufe 
 
 tl;:| 
 y haveoj 
 
 Eari of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 A. They behaved in the beginning of the aftlon, .vith a 
 [great deal of fpiritj but on the Britifh troops rufhing on 
 jthem with their bayonets, they gave way in great confudon. 
 
 Q. From the nature of the country, was it practicable 104, 
 Ipurlue the enemy further than they were purfued on tliat oc* 
 Icalion? 
 
 A. Certainly not, — I think we ran fome rifque even in 
 Ipurfuing them fo far. 
 
 I Q. At what time of the campaign was it that Generals, 
 IBurgoyne requefted your Lcrdfliip to aft as his aid du camp ? 
 
 A. I think about the 12th of July. 
 
 Q. Was you prefent a few days after that time, at a coun-g, 
 ell held with the Indians of the remote nations, then juit 
 irrived, under the conduct of Major Campbell and Mr. St. 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Was you prefent at a former council of the Indians y^ 
 eld at Lake Champlain ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. What was the tenor of General Burgoyne's fpeeches g,- 
 ni injunftions at both thofe councils refpefting the reflraint 
 bf barbarities ? 
 
 A. He abfolutely forbid their fcalping, except their dead 
 Irllbners, which they infifted on doing, and he held out re- 
 
 II: 
 
 i 
 
 Ion's Rivd 
 
 th it is atl 
 iVithdr 
 
 ards to them for bringing in prifoners, and enjoined them 
 treat them well. 
 
 Q. Do you remember being with General Burgoyne, foon9, 
 "tcr the laft council, upon a vifit to an out-poft near Fort 
 nne ? 
 
 A. I perfeftly recolle£l it. 
 
 Q. Had General Burgoyne a conliderable efcort of Indi- io« 
 s with him ? 
 A. He had. 
 ed by Gc-J Q. Did part of that efcort, on a fcout from that pofl:, fall it« 
 with and take a part of the enemy, who were laid in am- 
 fh for the purpofe of killing or taking the general, and 
 lofe who were with him ? 
 A. They did. 
 
 What were the fentiments of the captain taken on I2* 
 t occafion refpedling his treatment from the Indians ? 
 A. He faid he was treated with much humanity, and I 
 feftly remember that prifoners brought in on many other 
 afions by the Indians, declared that they had been ufecl 
 the fame degree of humanity. 
 
 F Q. Do«i 
 
 in America 
 
 and wcni 
 commana 
 
 Ipoi 
 
 nted 111' 
 
 companyJ 
 
 Ihat day ? 
 A. Thei 
 
 ■ ri. ■ . ■ ■ ■ li 
 
 •Tk 
 
 i« 
 
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 ■ . .' '. • ' 
 
 ■ i • • . .'■ 
 
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 r> 
 
 
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 ■■''?,:■« 
 
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 -*.':'-■>■- 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■,,v 
 
 
 
 
tvJ 
 
 ceiving at 
 
 EVIDENCE. [EarlofHarvlnsion 
 
 :neral Rurgoync's re- 
 ort Anne, tUc news of flic murder of Mil$| 
 
 13. Qj_ Does your Lordfhip remember General Rurgoync's re 
 ■ ' _ It F 
 M'Rea ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 14, Q, Did General Burgoyne repair immecliarely to the InJ 
 
 dian camp, and call them to council, ailiftcd by Bngadierj 
 
 General Frafer ? 
 
 A. He did. 
 
 IS* Qi What paiTed at thnt council ? 
 
 A. General Burgoyne threatened the culprit with dcit!;! 
 infiftcd that he fliould be delivered up ; and there were many! 
 > gentlemen of the army, and T own 1 was of the number| 
 who feared that he would put that threat in execuiiocJ 
 Motives of policy, I believe alone, prevented him from it| 
 and if he had not pardoned tliC man, which he did, I bclicvJ 
 the total dcfcdlion of the Indians would have enfued, ar.l 
 the confequenccs, on their return through Canada, migrJ 
 have been dreadful ; not to ipcak of tlie weight they woull 
 have thrown into the op]"«ofite fcale, had they gone over tj 
 the enemy, which I raihcr imagine would have been t;[ 
 cafe. 
 
 s6. Q;, Do you remember General Burgoync's reftraining ij 
 
 Indian panics from going out without a Britifli officer J 
 
 proper conduftor, who were to be refponfible for their bl 
 
 haviour r 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 i7. Qi Do you remember Mr. St. Luc's reporting difcontcrj 
 amongft the Indians, foon after our arrival at Fort E| 
 ward ? 
 A. I do. 
 ■l3. Qi. How long was that after enforcing the rellraints abcj 
 mentioned ? 
 
 A. I can't cxaftly fav ; I fliould imacfine about tld 
 ' • weeks or a month. 
 
 jQ» Q:„ Does your Lordfliip rccoUeft General Burgoyne'si 
 ling Mr. St. Luc, that he had rather lofc every Indiij 
 than connive at their enormities, or uling language toi 
 cffcft ? 
 * • A. I do. 
 
 2o». Qi Does your Lordfliip remember what pafled in coul 
 with the Indians at Fort Edward ? 
 
 ; A. '.To the heft of my recolleftioh, much the fame ex!i 
 t^tioh to a6l with humanity, and much the fame rcwJ 
 wcte offered for faving their prifoncrs. 
 
 '*':„, 
 
arnngton 
 
 ^oync's re. I 
 -r of Mils 
 
 to tlic In.j 
 
 Bngadicrl 
 
 rah clcr.tl;] 
 were oinnyl 
 c number, 
 executionJ 
 in from itJ 
 d, I bclicvJ 
 :nfued, ar.J 
 lada, migiJ 
 they wou.'l 
 one over 
 vc been tij 
 
 training til 
 h officer 
 for their b:| 
 
 5 difccntcri 
 t Fort El 
 
 traints abcl 
 
 about tlir 
 
 rgoyne'stl 
 ^ery India 
 uage to til 
 
 d In coK 
 
 fame exiij 
 ime red 
 
 EarlofH-urlngton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 O. Do you rccolle£l the circumflance of the Indians de- Si. 
 firing to return home at that time ? 
 
 A. I do, j)crfcftly well. 
 
 Qs. Do you remember tliat many quitted the army without 22. 
 leave ? _ 
 
 A. I do, immediately after the council, and the next morn- 
 
 67 
 
 *v,' 
 
 ing. 
 
 Qi Was it not the general opinion that the defe£lIon 25,. 
 of the Indians, th?n and afterwards, was caufed by the re- 
 ilraint upon their cruelties and habits of plunder ? 
 A. h was. 
 
 Q^ Had you reafon to believe that the expedition to Ben- 24, 
 rington vras much dcfircd by General Reidefel, and that it 
 was his 'villi to have it conducted by Lieutenant Colonel 
 Baumc ? 
 
 A. It was alvc^ays imagined in the army, that it was his 
 wifh, and that Colonel Baume was appointed to the com- 
 mand of it in compliment to him. 
 
 Q^ Did you know the corps of Britifli, commanded by 2 c, 
 Captain Fralcr, which made part of that expedition ? 
 
 A. I'hey were volunteers Irom the Biitifli regiments, and 
 alfo flood very high in the opinion of the army, from their 
 gallant behaviour on all occafions. 
 
 Q;^ Do you remember General Burgoyne's vifiting the 26, 
 detachment after it was aflemblcd, and conferring with Co- 
 lonel Baume ? 
 A. I do. 
 
 Qj^ Did Colonel Baume appear fatisfied with the Ilrength 27, 
 of his corps ? 
 
 A. I converfed with Colonel Baume, and with feveral 
 officers under his command, and they appeared perfectly fa- 
 tisfied, at leaft I heard no complaint from them ; the only 
 anxiety they exprefTcd was, left the deftination of that corps 
 fliould become known to the enemy. 
 
 Q. Does your Lordfliip remember General Burgoyne's re- gg^ 
 ceiving, in the night, a letter from Lieutenant Colonel 
 Baume, exprefllng he found the enemy in greater force than 
 he expedled ? 
 A. I do. 
 
 Qi Do you remember Sir Francis Clarke, General Bur- 29, 
 goyne's aid du camp, being fent with orders to Colonel 
 Breyman to march immediately to fupf jxt him ? 
 A. I do. 
 
 Fa Q. Did 
 
 '.fc 
 
 • •♦ 
 
 
 /'fH 
 
 I , -''I 
 
 (', ■ t ; ■ 
 
 '•■ ^ ■ '-4. 
 
 , ■•'7' J ' 
 
 
 P 
 
 §"■■' ' U 
 .*:•■■' ■ 4'; ' 
 
 ■ ■ ■'■I 1-- ■ ■" 
 
 ■ ,^/; U ^x ; ■ 
 
 
 t '■■■ -tr-y. • ' 
 
 ■■'■•'■ :^^ 
 
 *^:m 
 
 ^l^mk 
 
68 EVIDENCE. [Eail of Harrington.' 
 
 •30. Qi ^i^' y"" communicate the Tame order to Gcncial 
 Rcitlciel at the fame time ? 
 
 A. I did. 
 
 31. Q:_ Was Colonel Rrcyman's the nearcfl corps for the pur«| 
 pofc of that^ fiipport ? 
 
 A. It was. 
 
 52, Qi Did Brigadier General Frafer at all times treat your 
 Lordfliip with great conlidcncc ? 
 
 A. I was often with General Frafer, and he frequently 
 talked without rcferve upon matters which he was not par- 
 ticularly bound to conceal. There were certain matters of 
 intelligence which it would have been improper for him to 
 mention to any body. In this cafe I cannot boaft fo much 
 of his confidence, as to fuppofc that he would have opened 
 his mind to me on matters which he would have concealed 
 from the reft of his friends. 
 ^^^ Q. Have you not frequently been prefcntwhenGener.il 
 *^ Burgoyne and General Frafer difcuflfed the objeiEl of the 
 campaign, and converfcd freely on the circumftances of the 
 time ? 
 
 A. I have. 
 e^. Q. Did your Lordfhip ever, in prefence or abfencc of 
 '•^ General Burgoyne, hear General Frafer txprefs a difappro- 
 balion of pafling the Hudfon's River ? 
 
 A. I never did. 
 
 Q. Do you know or believe that the idea of forcing our 
 way to Albany was prevalent throughout the army ? 
 
 A. In every convcrfation I had with different officers of 
 tTie army, I never remember once to have heard it doubted, 
 but that we were to force our way. 
 
 Q. Did the army pais the Hudfon's River with alacrity } 
 
 A. It is impo/fible for any army to have been in higher 
 fpirits than they were at that time, or more defiious of com- 
 ing to an engagement with the enemy. 
 
 Q. Do you not conceive, that to have remained pofted 
 behind the Hudfon's River, at the time the army palFed it 
 and advanced, would have caft a damp on the fpirits of that 
 army and a reflexion on their General ? 
 
 A. From the eagernefs of the army to advance, and the 
 great uneafinefs that was difcernible through it on every de- 
 lay, I apprehended that it could not have been otherwife ; 
 and I think that Cieneral Burgoyne's charafter would not 
 have flood very high either with the army, this country, or 
 the enemy, had he halted at Fort Edward. 
 
 Q. Do 
 
 35- 
 
 36. 
 
 37- 
 
 tarl of I-] 
 
 Q, Dol 
 
 ith of Sl 
 
 [a. I doi 
 
 Q. Will 
 
 Ia. Thcl 
 
 flanki] 
 [ the rivel 
 Irifion; til 
 [ICC throi] 
 jnt.al Fr 
 |try of tl 
 3ugh the 
 imn. £ 
 |d, flank 
 Was 
 cfted wit 
 It was 
 Whicl 
 The a 
 Iccntre c 
 of Ma 
 in was 1 
 c, pofted 
 ^d, and a 
 in the 1 
 round 1 
 cd to ret 
 Was th 
 formec 
 's corps 
 i General 
 detach 
 flpjuft a 
 [ancc th 
 fh, quit 
 liately a 
 rcgula 
 ., I do 
 
 N of ( 
 
 aftion 1 
 low loi 
 ' rom tl 
 low loi 
 
 ;'»,;.- ',!!/ill. 
 
inciter, 
 Jcncial 
 
 W^ 
 
 ■v.'. 
 
 lie pur* 
 
 it your 
 
 quently 
 ot par- 
 tters of 
 him to 
 b much 
 opened 
 )ncealcd 
 
 Gcner.ll 
 : of the 
 s of the 
 
 V 
 
 I D E N C E. 
 
 fence ot 
 lilappro- 
 
 Ing our 
 
 iccrs of 
 loubtcd, 
 
 icrity ? 
 higher 
 )f com- 
 
 pofted 
 iired it 
 >f that 
 
 Ind the 
 [ry de- 
 Irwife ; 
 lid not 
 Iry, or 
 
 Do 
 
 ^arl of Harrington.] 
 
 Q. Do you recollefl the march up to the enemy on the 38. 
 ith of September ? 
 I A. I do. 
 
 Q. Will you plcafc to defcribc it ? -o, 
 
 |A. The army marched in three divifions ; the German 
 flanking, tnc artillery and baggage purfucd the courfe 
 I the river throudi the meadows, and formed the left hand 
 Ifilion; the Dritifli line marched parallel to it at fomc di- 
 ucc through the woods, and formed the center divifion ; 
 Int.'al Fralcr's corps, with the grenadiers and light in- 
 of the Germans, were obliged to make a large detour 
 ju'gh the woods, and formed the right hand divifion or 
 Beyond this, on the right, there were, as I under- 
 flanking parties of light infantry and Provincials? 
 Was the country, over which the army pafled, in- 40* 
 cfted with a deep ravine ? 
 It was one of the deepeft I ever faw. 
 Which column was firft attacked ? 41, 
 
 The advanced parly, conlifting cf the picquets of 
 Iccntre column, being fent forwards, under the com- 
 of Major Forbes, to explore the way by which that 
 in was to pafs, fell in with a confiderable body of the 
 polled in a houfc and behind fences, which they at- 
 
 ■"£3* 
 
 imn. 
 
 re, the detachment nearly 
 on finding that the woods 
 
 id, and after a great deal of 
 in the body of rebels : but 
 
 round them were filled with the enemy, they were 
 d to retire to the main body. 
 
 Was the march fo performed that when General Bur- 12. 
 formed the line of the Britifli infantry, General 
 's corps were ready upon their right to fupport them ? 
 General Frafer, on hearing the iire of Major Forbes*s 
 
 detached two companies to fupport them, which 
 pjuft after that engagement was over; and on their 
 ancc the enemy finding that our troops were in 
 h, quitted the poft they had before occupied, and, 
 lately after this, the whole line was formed with the 
 
 regularity. I would explain, that when I fpeak of 
 
 I I do not include the left hand column which was 
 
 "ed of Germans, and which did not come into the line 
 
 ftion till late in the day. 
 
 low long did the aftion laft ? 
 
 ''rom three o'clock, I think, till very near eight. 
 
 low long were the aoth, 21ft, and 62d regiments en- 
 
 43. 
 
 44. 
 
 69 
 
 
 i,"'. 
 
 
 'M-M 
 
 ". '■■'■> r 
 
 
 ■■••■■; ;Vt;"V 
 
 ■ : >■: in;';!.!- 
 
 
 A. Duri 
 
 n§ 
 
Il 
 
 ^m 
 
 70 
 
 45- 
 46. 
 
 47. 
 
 EVIDENCE. [Earl of Hanlngto 
 
 A. During the grcateft part of th.it time. 
 Q. Was the a(5>ion well dirjnitcd by the enemy ? 
 A. It was, very obflinatcly. 
 
 Q. Was your Lordfliip.near the perfon of Crcneral ?>v, 
 
 goyne duriu;^ that action, except when you were cmplo}., 
 
 to carry orders ? 
 
 A. Yfcs. 
 
 Q. Were not different attempts made by the Gencr; 
 orders to charge tlic enemy with bayonets, and did not t!: 
 attempts fail by the heaviacls of the enemy's tire and tli> 
 ncfs of the woods ? 
 
 A. There were many attempts made for that purpofc, 
 they all failed except the laft, when the Britifli troops ii:, 
 drove them out of the iicld. 
 4^« Q. When part of the German troops did get into ac. 
 that day under General Rcidelel, how did they behave 
 A. I heard their behaviour fpokc of in the hiohell V: 
 they marched 1.0 to the enemy with great cooliieis and ;";; 
 jiefs, and gave them, as I w-s toUl, three voUies by \\c 
 command from their officers. 
 
 Q; Can your Lordfiiip fpcak to the lofs fuflained Iv 
 three Britifli regiments, the 62d in particular ? 
 
 A. The lofs was very confiderable ; but I don't rcc: 
 the numbers. 
 
 Q. Were thofe three Hritifli regiments in a condit:! 
 have attacked the enemy the next morning? 
 
 A. Their numbers were fo reduced, that I apprchcr. 
 were not. 
 
 Q. From the lofs of killed and wounded, particul: 
 officers, would it have been dcfirable to have brought 
 three regiments into action for the next ten days ? 
 
 A. In lefs than ten days the ftatc of thofe regimcr 
 tainly would not have been much mended ; I therefore 
 hend, that if they v^'ere not in a condition to be brouj: 
 afllon the next morning, their inability would have t. 
 tinued for thofe ten days. 
 
 Q. Had the army made a movement to gain the lett 
 enemy's entrenchments before the redoubts were coni: 
 that commanded the plain near the river, would not 
 bateaux, ftores, and hofpitals have been cxpofcd toai: 
 A. It certainly would have been fo. 
 ^ Q. Do you recollcft the fcarcity of forage on tl 
 *^^' fide of the river. 
 
 A> I do perfcdlly, 
 
 Q. 
 
 49 
 
 50 
 
 5i- 
 
 52. 
 
 A. 
 
 Q: 
 
 A. 
 
 Q: 
 
 A. 
 
 polt fif 
 regime! 
 order, 
 of Ger 
 protcftj 
 tire thil 
 The 
 at the 
 
 ibon ai 
 with a 
 mitted 
 camp, 
 our retl 
 tacked 
 cm 
 the 
 
 ployi 
 m tf 
 
( ■ 
 
 •^.■i ' 
 1 ' 
 
 Eail of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Q. Would not the b'idge of boats, conftruftctl for the ^, 
 purpofc of ft.aging to tlic caft-iide, have alio been cxpofccl 
 before the redoubts, above mentioned, were railed ? 
 
 A. They certainly would, had it not been for thofc re- 
 doubts and a work called the Ti'tc du polity which was railed 
 for the protcftion of the bridge. 
 
 Q. Uo you rccollcft how lonpj it took to rnile thofc re- <--', 
 doubts, to throw the bridge, and raifc the Tcu du pout r' 
 
 A. if I rccollc(5l rigiit, the bridge itfelf was liniflicd in 
 one night; the making and complcating the other v,ork« 
 took foin'j days. 
 
 Q. Docs your Lordfiiip remember (jcncral IJurgoyne ,/: 
 mentioning to you in confidence, the receipt of a Ictrer fro.n ^ 
 Sir Henry Clinton, and liis hourly expectation of his at- 
 tacking the highlands, and his opinion that his fucccfs there 
 mufl dillodge the enemy, without attacking their entrench- 
 ments ? 
 
 A. I perfeftly recoiled the General's mentioning all this 
 to me. 
 
 Q^ Was you near General Burgoync in the a£lion of the 57, 
 7th of Ot^ober ? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 Q. Do you rccolleft what orders you carried ? m 
 
 a: I do. "5'5- 
 
 Q. What were they ? eg, 
 
 A. The iirft orders I recoiled to have carried, were to 
 poll fifty men under the command of a captain of the 20th 
 regiment, to the left of the detachment of the army, ia 
 order, in fomc meal'ure, to join them to the advanced works 
 of General Frafcr's camp, and, in cafe of any accident, to 
 protcft the detachment, fliould they find it ntceflary, to re- 
 tire thither. 
 
 The next orders I carried were to Major General Phillips, 
 at the end of the aflion, acquainting him, that as that de- 
 tachment feemcd much dilbrdered from the enemy liaving 
 turned both their flanks, that it was neceflarv to draw it as 
 foon as poffiblc back to the camp, which iccmed menaced 
 with an attack; the care of this General Burgoync com- 
 mitted to General Phillips, while he himfelf returned to the 
 camp, in order to take proper meafures for its defence. Oa 
 our return thither the works of the camp were aftually at- 
 tacked as General Burgoyne had forfeen, and I was tlien 
 employed to collefl what troops I fliould meet, and to order 
 thein to thofe part« where they were moft wantedt Soon 
 
 F 4 after 
 
 7^ 
 
 • .1= 
 
 • * 
 
 t 
 
 
 ,; 
 
 -r '■. 
 
 
 1 
 
 ■ '> 
 
 
 ,'..' 
 
 'ri 
 
 m 
 
 n 
 
 
 -■i 
 
 
 mo-' 
 
 .:■,,,.;.• .; ,. 
 
 ■>:' i^\,{i 
 
 
 
 1 •■!&-• M.i.-v ,J 
 
 
jt EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington. ['Jarlof 
 
 after this, the enemy having got round the right of our 
 camp, we cxpcftcd an attack upon our rear, and I then was 
 difjiatchcd with orders from General Burgoync to Hrig.idicr 
 General Hamilton, for all the works in the rear of the camp, 
 which had been previoufly conftru£>ed, to be manned by fuch 
 foldiers as he could Iparc from the defence of the front. 
 60. Q: I^"^s yo^^*" Lordfliip know what orders Sir Francis 
 Clarke was charged with, at the time he received his 
 wound ? 
 
 A. I met Sir Francis Clarke as T was fearching for Ge. 
 ncral Phillips, and acquainted him with my orders, telling 
 him at the fame time, that as the thickncfs of the wood 
 miglit prevent my finding Cicncral Phillips diredtly, I vvifh- 
 ed he would afiift me, in order that no time might be lofl in 
 delivering thofe orders ; that was the lafl time I faw Sir 
 Francis Clarke, and I believe that foon afterwards he re- 
 ceived ti.e wound of which he died ? 
 61. Q. Was it dark before General Burgoync had a certainty 
 that Col. Breyman was killed, and his poft carried by the 
 enemy ? 
 
 A. It was fo dark that the officer, who I believe firft 
 brought the intelligence of it, Iccing a number of men 
 round the fires of that camp, took them for Germans, and 
 was not convinced of his error till he was fired upon by 
 them, as they prov d to be a part of the enemy who had 
 forced the works. 
 62. Qj ^'*^ General Burgoyne ufe any efforts to rally the 
 Germans who vyere returning from the aftion, and to pcr- 
 fuade them to recover Colonel Breyman's poft ? 
 
 A. He certainly did his utmoft endeavours for that pur- 
 pofe, which however were incfFeftual from the darknefs of 
 the night, and the entire confufion in which they were. 
 62 Q: Were any other troops at hand that could have been 
 ^' fpared for that purpofe ? 
 
 A. There certainly were not ; every regiment was oc- 
 cupied in defence of its owr^ lines which were not certainly 
 overmanned. 
 
 64. Q. In the heat of the aftion do you recolleft feeing Ge- 
 neral Reidefcl about the time that the Germans, on the left 
 of tho Brililh artillery, were giving way ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 65. Qi Was not General Reidefel exerting himfelf to rcftore 
 order in his troops ? 
 
 A. General Reidefel appeared to mc to have behaved, on 
 
 that 
 
I ■ 
 
 ngton. 
 
 of our 
 en was 
 Ig.idicr 
 ; camp, 
 ^y fuch 
 It. 
 
 Francis 
 icd his 
 
 for Gc 
 
 telling 
 le wood 
 I wilU- 
 e loft iu 
 faw Sir 
 i he rc- 
 
 :ertainty 
 
 I by the 1 
 
 ieve firft 
 
 of men 
 
 ans, and 
 
 [upon by 
 
 who had 
 
 rally the 
 to pcr- 
 
 [hat pur- 
 rkncfs of 
 
 *re. 
 
 ivc been 
 
 Iwas oc- 
 :ertainly 
 
 ting Ge- 
 thc left 
 
 rcftorc 
 
 [ved, on 
 that 
 
 »rl of Harrington. J EVIDENCE. 73 
 
 mt occafion, in every way as became a brave and Intelligent 
 ficcr. ^ 
 
 Q. Was the retreat of the army in the night of the 7th ^0. 
 A(\c in good order, and a new polition taken by the time it 
 as day-light ? 
 
 A. It certainly was. 67. 
 
 Q. Was the army under arms tlie whole day of the 8lh, 
 {1 in continual expectation of a£tu , ? 
 A. They were, and indeed were cannonaded dvring the 
 Tiatcft part of that day, and the advanced corps iit par- 
 cular, who were poftod on a hill, were under alu.oil a con- 
 nual fire from the riflemen of the enemy. 
 Q. Do you recollcft the circumftancc of CJcncral Frafer's 68. 
 ncral on chc afternoon of that day ? 
 
 ' A. I do, pcrfcdly well ; the redoubt in which he was 
 lined was very heavily cannonaded during the ceremony, 
 cl even previous to this they fired at thole who attended 
 c corpfc on its way thither, which T fuppolc was accidental, 
 (1 proceeded from the enemy's feeing a number of people 
 igcther. 
 
 Q. Who were the chief perfons who attended that fune- 60. 
 1? 
 
 A. All the generals of the army, their aid du camps, and 
 believe all thole who were not attached to any particular 
 ft, which at that time were very few. 
 
 Q^ Was the retreat of the army on the night of the 8th, 70, 
 (1 on the day and part of the night of the 9th, made in 
 od order ? 
 
 A. It was made in perfeft good order. 
 
 Q. What was the weather on the day of the 9th ? 71, 
 
 A. Exceeding wet. 
 
 CK What was the ftate of the troops, in point of fatigue, 72. 
 en they arrived at Saratoga ? 
 
 A. They certainly muft have been much fatigued, from 
 length of time they had been under arms, and more par- 
 ularly fo from the badnefs of the roads occalioned by the 
 ns. 
 
 Q. When it was day-light the next morning, did you fee 73» 
 ly part of the enemy upon the plain at Saratoga, on the 
 und where our artillery was afterwards pofled t 
 ^. I don't recolledt. 
 
 Q. Does your Lordfhip recoiled feeing a corps of the mA 
 ^my on the other fide the Hudfon's River oppofxte to Sara- 
 a? 
 
 A. Perfeaiy 
 
 % ' 
 
 1 . 
 
 1 
 
 
 ■I|;, 
 
 '1 . .1 , • 
 
 
 *■>■: 
 
 ^H 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 1 . J 
 
 .;■ V ■' ^ 
 . : r 
 
 •.,V. '••'!'i--<'. 
 
u 
 
 n 
 
 i,:, 
 
 73 
 
 76. 
 
 77 
 
 79 
 
 E V I D E N C E. [Earl of Harrington 
 
 A. Perfc£lly well ; and they feenicc! in force. 
 Qj^ Do you remember tlie circumlliince of a battery. opcJ 
 ing from that corps ? 
 
 A. I do perfectly well. The general, General Phillipd 
 and feveral other gentlemen were at dinner. Wc were aJ 
 obliged to remove, from linding ourfelvcs in the rango (M 
 that battery. 
 
 Q. Wc being in the range of that battery, muft it nci 
 nccellarily have commanded the ford on the Hudfon's Ri 
 ver ? 
 
 A. It certainly did command that ford. 
 
 Q. Do you recollefl Lieut. Col. Sutherland being fcJ 
 
 with a detachment cf regulars and provincials from S;irij 
 
 toga, to cover a party of workmen employed to repa 
 
 bridges, and render the road pradicablc ? 
 
 A. I perfedlly recollc(5l it. 
 
 78. Q. Do you recolleiH for what reafon Colonel Sutherlrj 
 
 and the regulars were recalled ? I 
 
 A. I undcrftood it was on the apprehcnlioi. of an aftlosi 
 
 Q. Does your Lordfliip recoUcft difTcrent fcouts brini;i.l 
 
 reports of the enemy's being in poircllion of the cou:rJ 
 
 between Saratoga and Fort Edward, on both iulcs of i| 
 
 river ? 
 
 A. i do. 
 
 Q. Do you remember General Burgoync's mcnticnirj 
 in confidence to you, different ideas of forcing the ford o'| 
 Hudfon's River ; of cutting away by the enemy's righr, A 
 attempting a rapid march to Albany ; or hy a night ni,:.| 
 to gain the fords above Fort Edward ? 
 
 A. T do perfeftly remember that he mentioned to ir.ci 
 thofe ideas. 
 
 Q. Did you ever hear of an offer made by C;cnjj 
 Phillips to make his way to Ticonderoga with a body' 
 troops ? 
 A. No. 
 
 Q. In the intimacy in which you lived with Major (1 
 ncral Phillips, myfelf, and the ofHcers In (ien^ral Philii: 
 family, do you not think you fliould have heard of fuchl 
 offer had it been made ? 
 
 A. I apprehend that I fhould have heard of it. 
 
 Q. Did your Lordfliip hear of General Phillips offeij 
 
 * to attempt an cfcape through the woods, with one cri 
 
 guides, for the purpofe of putting himfclf at the headl 
 
 80. 
 
 81. 
 
 82. 
 
 
HarringtoiiJ 
 
 illipj 
 
 cral Ph 
 Wc were aj 
 the range t\ 
 
 muft it 
 rludlbn's RJ 
 
 c! being fd 
 s from S;iril 
 'Ccl to rcpj 
 
 lel Sutherh: 
 
 of an aftionj 
 roots brin:;;:! 
 t* the coii;;;! 
 1 iides ot":J 
 
 s mention!,! 
 ; the ford ( 
 y's righr, 
 1 night nia;i 
 
 oncd to inc 
 
 : by Cicnei 
 th a boc!v[ 
 
 ih Major Ij 
 firal Philii| 
 rd of fuchi 
 
 it. 
 
 lillips offer] 
 1 one or 
 the headl 
 
 Earl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 ^.opcilH ^^'^ troops at Ticonderoga, for the future defence of that 
 
 1 ■r^ til i>i;ire ? 
 
 ])iacc 
 
 A. I heard it mentioned llnce I came to England, in fomc 
 common convcrfation ; but 1 never heard it hinted at while I 
 was in America. 
 
 Q. The day before the councils of the generals and field g 4.. 
 oHiccrs was eallcd, can your Lordfl^ip fpcak of the flate of 
 things in general at Saratoga ? 
 
 A. The ftate of our army was certainly as bad as pofTiblc. 
 Their numbers were iew, their provillons ihort, and tlieir 
 pofition not a good one, owing to the nature of the country, 
 which roib to the diflance of fome milts, one hill overtopping 
 that whicli was next to it. 
 
 (^ Do you know any officer of that army who, in that S5. 
 fituation, thought we had a right to more than honourable 
 terms ? 
 
 A. Our fituation, in tlic apprchenlion of every one tJierc 
 with whom I converfcd, did not entitle us to more. 
 
 Q. Did the army in general look, on the terms obtained, 86, 
 namely, the power of iervaig tiieir country in other phices, 
 to be advantagco-'.s as well as honourable, and more than 
 they had a riglit to expedl ? 
 
 A. I believe they certainly did ; and that few perfons 
 in the army cxpe(5lcd fo good terms as thofe wiiich were 
 qranted. 
 
 Examined by other jMimhcrs of the Committee, and by General 
 
 Btir^oync occajknally. 
 
 Q. Did the Indians leave the anwy till after the baalc of gy. 
 Bennington ? 
 
 A. Great numbers did, and at many dlffcrcnr times. 
 
 Q. Were not Ibme Indians on the expedition to Ben- 8S, 
 nino-ton ? 
 
 A. There were. 
 
 Q^ Was the expedition originally fent out toRennington ? 80. 
 
 A. My lituation in the army not entitling me to be ia 
 the council of war, and not being employed on that expe- 
 dition, I was of courfe not cntruiled with ihe orders that 
 were eiven to Col. Baume. 
 
 Q. Have you reafon to fuppofe that General Reidefel or _ 
 Colonel Baume had a paiticular knowledge of that part ot ' 
 the country, lb as to make it particularly proper to give 
 Colonel Baume the command of that expedition. 
 
 A. I believe there was no ofiicer in that army of fufficicnt 
 
 rank 
 
 iir 
 
 .''• 
 
 , . -.1 ■ • ' 
 
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If^ EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harrington. 
 
 rank to have commanded fuch an expedition, who ever had 
 been in that particular part of the country. 
 
 9 1' Qi The intention of the expedition being, as appears by 
 the papers on the table, to found the difpontion of the peo- 
 ple of that country, was that part of the country peopled 
 with Germans, as many other parts of the country are ? 
 
 A. I can't exadlly fpeak to the defcription of the people 
 of that country, as I was never there myfelf ; but there 
 were employed on that expedition numbers of provincials, 
 many of whom were of th:*- very country; and I apprehend 
 that the common foldiers of a regular army arc not the im- 
 mediate people who are expected to found the minds of any 
 country to wh"ch they are fent, 
 
 92. Q. As your Lordfnip mentioned the alacrity with which 
 the army pafled the Hudfon's River, did the army in gene- 
 ral think, themfelves at that time inadequate to the purpofe of 
 forcing their way to Albany ? 
 
 A. The opinions of an army, who cannot be acquainted 
 with the intelligence that has been received, are often errone- 
 ous. The army was in high fpirils, and did not, I believe, 
 doubt of reaching Albany. 
 
 93* Q. Did the General then doubt of reaching Albany ? 
 A. I '•eally don't know. 
 
 94. Q. Were the rebels' entrenchments completed on the 19th 
 of September ? 
 
 A. I never faw the entrenchments at all. 
 
 95. Q^ How was our army employed between the 19th of 
 September and the 7th of Oftober ? 
 
 A. The army itfclf was employed in ftrengthening its 
 pofition. 
 
 96. Q. Did it take the army eighteen days to llrengthen its 
 poiition before it made any movement ? 
 
 A. I can't exaftly fay. They were working all the time, 
 
 97. Q. What works were executed in that time ? 
 
 A. There were numbers of redoubts erefted ; the tete- 
 du-pont ; lines before the camp ; outworks to the lines, in 
 which guards and picquets were placed ; and batteries. 
 1; 98. CL How many redoubts were erefted ? 
 
 A. I think in all there muft have been five or fix. 
 99. Qi ^^^^ tl^^ erefting thofe works full employment for 
 eighteen days ? 
 
 A. I am not an engineer, or I certainly fliould endeavour 
 to anuver that qucftion, 
 
 Q. Were 
 
 irl of 
 
 arm^ 
 
 A. 
 
 ?ithin \\ 
 id beir 
 
 neceliJ 
 A. I ell 
 
 jt I ha| 
 
 ioyed or 
 
 Mivinced 
 
 bat the > 
 lA. My| 
 
 Ive that! 
 im me 
 ice, m'' 
 Wa^ 
 py reed 
 the ytl 
 The' 
 ifpires ; I 
 ling. 
 Was 
 greatd 
 Ber? 
 It was 
 Was J 
 engag( 
 I don' 
 Was « 
 a cond 
 [had fuf 
 The r 
 fequally 
 What 
 Jonfiftec 
 I ahva 
 ^heii 1 
 Was ] 
 [Thofe 
 in wl 
 [Was i 
 empt 
 the ai 
 
•-rl of Harrington.] EVIDENCE 
 
 a Were all thofe works n^rp/T 
 .lar'I'y that meant to march for Wanc^^ fonoo 
 
 A. They were neceflirv in Z7t\, """.^^^ ^^^ enemy > 
 
 «t r have been aiway ' oM K^" '' "f '.^ ''""ification wa, 
 
 A. My fituation in thif -r„ j-, 
 
 »ve that intelligence. When aL '1 ?°' '""'"'-' "^ to re- 
 ™ me ,h.t he had been empJoTed '*" ^-^^ t" me toh. 
 
 ,^vL^z-■-^n^K 
 
 ■^J^i^rtC'a---.^^^^^^^^^^^ 
 
 It was. " 
 
 e^q^*-""'— eaHy. He., .0,, „,.,,„,, 
 
 ,- vKX^' f;^^S''i^/^<"^ - not engaged 
 h condition on the -.o^ofi /"'V' Wrehenfion, i„ aj ,„« 
 W 'uflered much more ; ^''"^'"'>" ^= the rebel'aly "^^ 
 } ine rebel arniv wic r« 
 fey felt with IZT '° "™^'-™« "«t their loft was 
 
 I J;-:, numbers exaflly ^ ^"^ ""r "'-""^tous. I „ever 
 
 ■A. r never ' 
 
 yf 
 
 
 
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 5' ,5ft: : »(»«;i:','' 
 
 it: 
 
 
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!f^;|. 
 
 I' 
 
 I i 
 
 i-'^ 
 
 110. 
 
 Ill 
 
 112. 
 
 1^3' 
 
 7^ K V I D E N C E. [Earlof HarringtJ 
 
 A. I never heard that the Jiorfes in our army were thou? 
 too numerous. On all occallons a icarcity of them wascc 
 plained of. 
 
 Q^ Do you know liow many horfes were allowed for 
 baggage ot each regiment ? 
 
 A. I dnn't know. 
 
 Q^ Does your Lordfliip know how many horfes wcrecJ 
 ployed ahout the train of artillery? 
 .. A. I don't recol]e6l ; but the returns are on tlie table. 
 
 Q^ Was the heavy artillery brought back from StillwatJ 
 on. the retreat of the army to Saratoga? 
 
 A. We had loft fome fmall part of it, and the rell iij 
 bjncugjlit to Saratoga. 
 
 C^ Did the bringing back of that artillery delay that lew 
 or not ? 
 
 A. An army with cannon certainly cannot march foj 
 pidly .as one v/irliout cannon; but cannon always en; ,t J 
 dejay which armies have been content to put up with. 
 
 114. Q^ Was it neceflln-y, in your opinion, in the fituatinJ 
 .-which the army retreated, to make their retreat as expcdiril 
 as pofnble ? 
 
 A. Tlie army appeared to me that it did make its re:] 
 as expeditious as poffible. 
 
 115. Q._ Would the le;iving of heavy artillery behind, in 
 opinion have made a difference of four miles in the niJ 
 
 A. I can't conceive tl'.at it \vo\ild. The enemy vv\:J 
 . ■ force behind us ; not having numbers to contend with; 
 it would have been a very defperatecircumllanceto havei 
 doned our cannon, in cale of an attack. 
 ji6. Q^ Were the heavy artillery, in elFe61:, of any ufe laj 
 retreat ? 
 
 A. I don't recoUecl: as it happened, that they w-creofl 
 other ufe than that of their not being turned ap-ainll: u.l 
 
 117. Q^ Might not thofe c;ii;r,on have been fpiked, aiiiil 
 , • trunnions have been knocked oif, to have tendered the» 
 
 ' iefs ? 
 
 A.' I underftand that the fpikes in cannon are ealilj 
 moved, and that it is not an eafy matter, I believe almf 
 impofTibility, with any tools that are curried in an an; 
 knock off the trunnions of bral's cannon. 
 
 118. Q^ Might not the retreat have been accelerated byl 
 behind a great part of the baggage? 
 
 A. I don't think it would, i do not remember tli 
 were flopt on account of any particular impedinient.j 
 

 ,rl of Harrington.] E V I T> E N C E. ^> 
 
 Q, Does your Lord/hip know at what time intelligence iig. 
 tas received in Gencnil Burgoyne's army ot the failure of 
 Colonel St. Leger's expedition f 
 
 ^, 1 think it muft have lieen in the month^f Augiift. 
 
 Q. Was not that hefore the pafTingof HiuHon's river ? 120. 
 
 A. I don't recoiled: the exadt date of receiving that inlel- 
 Sgence. 
 
 Qi Was it in the month of Aiigiifl ? 121. 
 
 A. I cannot tell. 1 heard of it fome tii.ie after by acci- 
 
 tnt. 
 
 O. Was there any heavy artillery with thr: army, properly I22« 
 , c^led ? 
 
 A. There was none of the heavy fort ; we had medium 
 iretve-pounders, and two twenty-four pounders, which we 
 look from the enemy at Quebec, which were very much 
 lighter than thofe twelve-pounders. 
 Q^ From tlie flate of the fatigue of the troops, when they 123, 
 rrived at Saratoga, do you apprehend they could have con- ^ y Ci«ncrj« 
 firmed their march though there had been no artillery ? Cmgoyne. 
 
 A. The army was certainly very mucli fatigued. I believe 
 :1iey could have got but very little further. They certainly 
 t'ere not in a ftate for a long inarch. 
 
 Q. If the battle expciStcd at Saratoga had been on the plain, ^ 24 
 • ■ • ' •■■ ."-•.. . .. lij (J 
 
 Burgiiyiic, 
 
 ouldnotthe hcavieli artillery we hud have been one of our '^^ <-^'^'"''a"» 
 >il dependencies ? 
 
 A. It certainly would ; it would have given us a manifeft 
 jfuperiority in that particular. 
 Q^ If the army h:./ :\ot been provided with the number of 125. 
 orCes they liad, by what means would their provifions or ^y *^'^"*="' 
 bateaux have been tranfported in places where the river was "''^°^°** 
 lot navigable ? 
 
 A, The tranfportation of the bateaux and provifions could 
 lot certainly have been carried on. , 
 
 CX Were there not fuch places on the Hudfon's River be- r"?j\ 
 tween Fort Edward and Albany ? Burgoync.^ 
 
 A. There were. 
 
 Q^ Is it not at any rate a principal obie6l: with every ar- 127. 
 Itny, and of a retreating one in particular, to preferve their By oiher 
 lartiUery if 'i be poifible, even at the expence of fome labour ^*'"^"*' 
 bnd delay ; and for the ufe thev might be of to them after- 
 jwards, as well as on the retreat ? 
 
 A. I apprehend the cannon are feldom abandoned, but 
 [through abfolute neceflity. 
 
 Q^ Whether in general you can inform the committee, 128, 
 IVhether the army had a confidence in the general? 
 
 A. They 
 
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 Vf'. 
 
 
 
 
 
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 r,. 
 
 129. 
 
 k''' : 
 
 130. 
 
 n^ 
 
 
 132. 
 
 »33- 
 
 134- 
 
 »35- 
 
 136. 
 
 «37- 
 
 EVIDENCE. [Earl of Harringt^ 
 
 A. They certainly had a confidence in the general, andj 
 do not helieve that they have altered their opinion. 
 
 Q^ Did the army then in general, and the officers in pat| 
 ticular, entertain a favourable opinion of the general's conj 
 duel, capacity, and attachment to them in the various fcenei, 
 in which he was engaged, and more particularly on very trv] 
 ing occaiions ? '] 
 
 A. I don't reco]lc(5l that any officer, with whom I havJ 
 had converfation, has ever exprefled himfelf in different terinJ 
 and I believe there never was an army more defervedly pleafai 
 with the condu^l of their general. 
 
 Q_ Whether the army exprefled any difTatisfadllon at thegeJ 
 neral's return home ; that is, whether they thought he "^arail 
 with any purpofes not friendly to them, or looked on them] 
 felves as dcfertcd by him ? 
 
 A. I was not with the army when General BurgoynJ 
 came away ; but I have converfed with many officers whol 
 have come from it, and they exprefs no diiiatisfaflion oj 
 that head, much lefs looked on or confidered General BurJ 
 goyne's intentions as inimical to them. 
 
 Q^ What was the ftate of the American artillery, andl 
 how was it ferved ? 
 
 A. Except on a few occafions, I do not remember theiil 
 having made much ufe of their cannon ; I thought on thol'l 
 occafions that they ferved them flowly, but not ill. 
 
 Qj^ Whether, all circumllances confidered at the time oil 
 the affair of Saratoga, the retreat of the army was pradlica] 
 ble, either with or without artillery ? 
 
 A. I thought it was impracticable. 
 
 Q^ Whether after :he convention at Saratoga you went tol 
 Albany ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q^ Whether you had any opportunity of obferving thenaJ 
 ture of the country, if it was ftrong or woody, clear oropeni 
 
 A. Very ftrong and woody, and a great number of hills. 
 
 Q^ What was the diftance ? 
 
 A. I don't exa<5lly recolledl ; about thirty-two miles. 
 
 Q^ Was the fituation of Albany a ftrong fituation, or wasj 
 it commanded by hills round it ? 
 
 A. The fituation of Albany was in a bottom very muclil 
 commanded. 
 
 Q^ If the army had penetrated to Albany, from whence! 
 might they have drawn their fubfiftence, if the country bail 
 been againft them ? 
 
 A. I don't know enough of the country to anfwer that queftion.l 
 
 ^ ^ 4 MuH 
 

 laior Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Q. Muft tliey not have drawn their fubfiftence from New 138. 
 
 A. I apprehend fo, if they were not maflcrs of the Mo- 
 
 lawk country. 
 
 (\ Had you any opportunity of obferving the extent of 139. 
 ear or cultivated country round Albany ? 
 
 A. I can't very juftly dcfcribe it, not having gone out of 
 Le town of Albany, from the time I came into it, till I em- 
 »rked for New York. 
 
 Q. Do you think that, circumftanced as the army was 140* 
 Iter the engagement of the 19th of September, it would 
 ave been more advantageous to have returned than to have 
 ayed and fortified the camp ? 
 
 A. As matters have tunied out, it certainly might ; but I 
 klicve no one ihought fo at that time. [^IVithdrew, 
 
 81 
 
 ■•v 
 
 ' ," ,1 1 v ■ 
 
 •i'i ^''^K' 
 
 ' " A: : ■ '.* k_ . 
 
 )m whence 
 |ountry hail 
 
 latqueftion, 
 (i Mull' 
 
 Iajor Forbes called in, and examined by General 
 
 BurG;oyne. 
 
 Q. WAS you m?'^or of the 9th regiment, and prefcnti. 
 [ith that regiment in the aftion near Fort Anne ? 
 A. 1 was. 
 
 Qj^ What was the behaviour of the enemy on that oc- 2. 
 ifion ? 
 
 A. At half paft ten in the morning, they attacked us in 
 
 mt with a heavy and well dire£led fire ; a large body of 
 
 iem palfed the creek on the left, fired from a thick wood 
 
 irofs the creek on the left flank of the regiment ; they then 
 
 [gan to re-crofs the creek, and attack us in the rear : we 
 
 en found it neceflary to change our ground, to prevent the 
 
 ;iments being furroundcd ; wc took jjoft on the top of a 
 
 A\ hill to our right. As foon as we had taken poll, the 
 
 jcmy made a very vigorous attack, which continued for 
 
 iward of two hours ; and they certainly would have forced 
 
 had it not been for fome Indians that arrived and gave 
 
 Indian whoop, which we anfwered with three cheers ; 
 
 rebels ibon after that gave way. 
 IQ. What command had you on the iQth of September ? 3. 
 A. I commanded the picquets of the Hiitini. 
 Q. Was you attacked on the march, and with what degree 4» 
 
 vigour ? 
 [A. I was attacked with great vigour from behind railed 
 
 ices, and a houle, by a body of riflemen and light in- 
 
 itrv. 
 
 G Was 
 
 
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 niml^-\''. |l 
 
 
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 5- 
 C. 
 
 8. 
 
 r. V I D E N C E. [Major Eorlf, 
 
 (^ Was you woiitvlccl in that aflVir ? 
 
 A. Very early in the ilay. 
 
 (^ I X) you rcnicinlKr General Hurgoync bringing \ip(|,j 
 Krilijh line to liipport you, and furiMint; at the liifl. ojKiiicj 
 of the wood ? 
 
 A, 1 tlo. 
 
 Q^ Did (icncral Erafcr's corps arrive prccifcly in tlincii 
 occupy the heights on the right of the nrililh line wliciiiy 
 ;id\ion he 12, an ? 
 
 A. It ilid, ami two companies of light infantry canicj 
 my fuppori. 
 
 Q. Where did (Jencral Hurgoync pod the qth reginicnt!! 
 
 A, As foon as liicy ranic out of the wood, they iilcd olTJ 
 the right, and were ihawn ofF at a (iuall ilillancc fioinilJ 
 \c\\ of ( Tencr.d Fraler's corps, wiih orders to occupy \% 
 houlls, one company in each, and defend them to thcljl 
 extremity. 
 
 Q. Mad you an opportunity in tliat fituation to obfcn 
 the ilrels of the aiVion ? 
 
 A. I had while \vc remained in that pofition, 
 
 Q^ What was the progrefs of it ? 
 
 A. The twcnty-lirfl: and fixty-fccond regiments wtj 
 drawn vip on our left, and were attacked about three o'cli 
 on the lame ground where tlic picijuets had been attackfJ 
 About that lime 1 hea^rtl a great deal of firing to my xA 
 with the advanced corps ; an olhcer came up to Gcnd 
 Bvirgoync, and acquainted him that the enemy were cndJ 
 vo\ning to turn the left of the iixty-fccond regiment, 
 wliich he tlifpatchcd an aid-dc-camp with orders to 
 twentieth regiment to form on the left of the fixty-feconJ 
 immediately after, fomc companies of ligiit infantry cm 
 to occupy the ground the nintii were drawn upon ; the nis 
 were then ordiicd behind a deep ravine, to form a corps- 
 rcfcrvc. I faw nothinj^ of the aftion after that. 
 
 Q. What was the nrength of the ninth regiment onil 
 day before they fuftaincd any lofs ? 
 
 A. On the 15th of the month the weekly return was gii^ 
 in, and, to the beft of my recolledion, they were two hi 
 dred and fifty and odd rank and file fit for duty. 
 12. Qi What was the ftrcngth of the other regiments ini 
 Briiilh line ? 
 
 A. I cannot ipeak with any certainty, as I did not fctii 
 returns ; but on talking with different commanding oliiciif 
 
 10. 
 
 1 1 
 
, 1 
 
 jor V 
 
 orb 
 
 ufl. o\Kim 
 
 y in timet 
 nc whciuiJ 
 
 itry 
 
 came 5 
 
 rcp,imciM>l 
 •y fvlal oil J 
 ncc t'loinilJ 
 occvi))y tj 
 :m to ihcl 
 
 m to obfcn 
 
 [Timcnts w^ 
 ^ three o'cla 
 iccn attadtJ 
 to my rid 
 I to Gcntif 
 were cniltf 
 regiment, 
 >rdcrs to \i 
 [iixty-iecon^ 
 infantry a 
 )n ; the nii| 
 ^u a corps- 
 
 ^iment oni\ 
 
 lurn was ^^\ 
 vcrc two hi; 
 
 jiments iat 
 
 llid not fee i 
 uling oM 
 
 lajor Forbes.] E V I D E N C \L 
 
 ie four ilrltifh regiments were about one thoufRnd onchun- 
 ed anfltlic advanced corps about one thoufand two liundrcd. 
 
 In Where was the twenty-fourth reginient ? 
 
 I A. With the advaii(e<I t orps. 
 
 \(X Where was the forty-fcvcnth regiment ? 
 
 !j\. six companies of tlie forty levenih regiment that were 
 
 |lh tliiir army, were employed as a guard to the bateaux 
 
 prftvifions, and two witli the advanced corps. 
 [). Where were the other two companies of that regi- i^, 
 
 intkft? 
 
 One at Fort Get)rge, and another on an illand in Eakc 
 
 »3« 
 14. 
 
 
 Of the eleven hundred vvliich compofed the line on i(3, 
 t day, do you know how many were loft and dilablcd ia 
 
 aif-tion ? 
 
 »;• 
 
 1 have heard the fiiigcon of thehofpltal fay, that there 
 \ec more than five luunlrcd of the whole in the hofpital, 
 I can't fpcak to how many of the line. 
 
 Can you fay how many were killed ? 
 
 I can't. 
 
 Can you fay how many ofTiccrs were kill d and 18. 
 anclcd ? 
 
 I. I can't immediately, 
 
 _ Were the Britifli troops in a condition to have attacked 1 9. 
 tnemy in intrcnchmcnts after the adbion ? 
 L After the action of the iQth, I went to the hofpital to 
 Imy wounds drtlfed, and did not join the regiment till 
 5th of Of^ober ; I can't therefore give an opinion of my 
 
 hut I have heard fevcral officers fiiy, they did not 
 
 it would have been prudent or right from the lofs they 
 Ifuftained the day l)cfore. 
 
 T Did the regiments begin to be cncrcafed in their 20. 
 jigth from the recovered men to any confiderable degree in 
 pan eight or ten days ? 
 
 Not that I know of. I was not at the hofpital at t^e 
 
 L Being in the hofpital, had you occafion to know that2i^ 
 [regiments were ftrongcr from the receipt of their 
 tered men on the 7th of Oftohcr, than they were at 
 time between the 19th of Sej)tember and that day ? 
 
 ,1 know that fcveral men were difcharged from the ho- 
 [sfotar recovered as to enable them to do their duty. 
 
 At what time did the troops arrive at Saratoga ? 22. 
 
 About eight o'clock at ni^ht on the oth. 
 
 G a Q.D0 
 
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 r, V I D E N C n. [Major rorj 
 
 n^, Q^ Do you kr.ow how long the troops had then bccnu; 
 arms, aiiil wiihjiit rcpofc or regular rcfrdhincnt ? 
 
 A. 1' roin lie 7ih in the morning. 
 24. Q: Had they l)c;n in a£lion, or in continual cxpc(!l;it 
 of a6\ion, during that whole lime } 
 
 A. I was in tnc front of the ;mny, and I heard ai;r| 
 
 cical of fuing in the rear, arid wc conllanily cxpcdlcj/ 
 
 looked for an attack. 
 
 2r, Q. Did the battery of the enrniy on tlie other fide of I 
 
 river at Saratoga coininaud the fori on that river ? 
 
 A. It did. 
 
 26. Q: ^V'asihc ground fueh on our fide as would have cmJ 
 our artillery to liave fdenced that battery ? 
 
 A. It did not ap])ear to nic that it could. 
 2j, Q^ Mad the palfagc of the ford been cfTeAcd, arc] 
 army have proceeded tf)wards Fort Kdw.ird, on the ciil 
 of the river, mufl they not necelUudy have pailal iiij 
 Kill ? 
 
 A. Undoubtedly. 
 
 Q^ Do you remember the ford al Batten-Kill ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Would it have been pofliblc for the army toll 
 paiVed that ford without artillery to cover them, anl 
 enemy ported on the other fule ? 
 
 A. Certainly not. I had an opportunity of fccifiJ 
 twentieth regiment pafs that ford without an enemy t( 
 pofo them, and they took a confidcrablc time, owini;i 
 depth of the water, the rapidity of the current, ani 
 floncs being remarkable flippery, fo that fcveral of tlieJ 
 into the river. 
 
 30. Qi Was you prcfcnt at all the councils of war to 1 
 the field oflicers of the army were called at Saratoga? 
 
 A. I was. 
 
 31. Qi Do yon «cmember whether General Burgoyne 
 the difllcultlcs of the tunc, and that he mentioned liiiii 
 ncfs to undertake any meafure they fliould think fl 
 honour of the Britifli arms ? 
 
 A. I do -emcmber it, 
 
 Qi Was tne council unanimous to treat with the cneij 
 honourable terms ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 
 Q^ When the firft terms propofed by General Gatfj 
 read to them, were they unanimous to reject them ? 
 
 A. They were. 
 
 28. 
 29, 
 
 32. 
 
 33' 
 
 
*j;^^'*' 
 
 []or Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 ^ After it was dociilcd by a majority of the council tliat 34. 
 tre:'ty <^f^"''' ""^ ^^^ fufpcndccl without breach of faith, 
 1 cxncf^t^B'^ not the council then unanimous to fiyn it on that (hiy ? 
 ' ^■\. As tl.v, mnjority of the council had given it as their 
 iiion that the public faith was plcdgctl, the council thought 
 t there was no time to be loft, and that it ought to be 
 kil iuiineihatcly. 
 
 prnlncd by Other Jl /embers of the Commltlee ami by General 
 Bur^oyne (jccojionally. 
 
 Do you know or apprehend that the rebel camp was 3^. 
 ^iilctily entrenched on the 19th of September ? 
 
 I don't know. 
 
 Had you any n^afon to believe from information that 36. 
 completed their entrenchments afterwards ? 
 . I undcrftood they iiad — I don't Ipeak from authority. 
 \. Had you reafon to think that the rebels received con- 37, 
 iihlc reinforcements between the igtli of September aud 
 hth of Ofto!)cr ? 
 
 I did not hear that they had. 
 
 Suppollnj; tiic rebels to have received reinforcements, 38. 
 
 any acicilion of ftrength to cur army from the recovery 
 by number you can fuppofe of the 500 that were in the 
 
 1, be equal to a reinforcement ot even 500 men re- 
 ed by the enemy ? 
 1. I cannot take upon me to fay. 
 
 From being in the hofpital yourfelf, how many of the 39, 
 [do you judge joined the army ? 
 L I can't pretend to fay. 
 
 j. Do you judge in your own opinion, putting all the 40. 
 pmftances you can together, whether the enemy were 
 
 likely to be forced on the 27th of September or a day . 
 ^0 after, than on \\\c 71)1 of Oftobe^- ? 
 
 It is impofFiblc for me to judge — I did not know their 
 [th on the 19th of September, or what reinforcements 
 [received before the 7th of Oftober. 
 
 Did you apprehend the army might have made their 41, 
 it good to Canada immediately after the aftion of the 
 of September ? 
 
 Tiiat depended entirely on circumftances. 
 
 Judging from the circumftances you then knew, what 42. 
 Jr opinion ? 
 
 Gl A. I 
 
 H 
 
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 fticmbers. 
 
 i'!tl 
 
 6d- EVIDENCE. [Major Fo 
 
 A. T was not more acquainted with tlie circumftanfci 
 the 19th of September than wilh thole ot" the 7tli of Oti 
 ber, 
 
 43. Qi If the army had had three vMCcks more provifionsw! 
 they began their retreat, would not that have been a mate 
 circumftance to them towards making t^ood tlicir retreat 
 A. The army could have defended thcmlclvcs lonj;ri 
 their entrenchments at Saratoga if they huil had more- 
 vifions. 
 44.. (^ Had you known, immciliatily after the a£\ ion of 
 By Central j g^j^ q^ ScptembcT, that a letter had been received froir 
 "•"£;")"»«• HcnryClinion, mentioning his intention to attack th'> 
 lands about that time, would you have thought cif'iK . 
 treat or an immediate attack on the enemy adviicaLlc > 
 A. Certainly not. 
 
 Qj^ Do you know whether a council of w:'.r \va« 
 the 2pih of September, or immediately after the engage,: 
 of the iQth of Sej)tcmhei ? 
 
 A. I don't know that there was, 
 46. C^ Did the army in whirh vou fcrvcd, in its approa 
 Alb.in., eyptfl a co-operation from Sir William Howt| 
 the North River ? 
 A. We did. 
 47* Q; ^^^ y^" bclicvcif the armyunder SIrWilliam Howtj 
 flead of going by lea up the Chefapcak to I^hiladelphis, 
 operated upon the North River to efleft a jundion 
 General Burgoyne's army, confulering alfo the panic du; 
 vailed after ihc taking of Ticondcroga, that the army 
 Gertral Burgoyne would have been made prifoncrs ? 
 A. I fliould think not, 
 4?. Q. Did you cxpc£l any great oppofition from the 
 army after the taking Ticondcroga ? 
 A. I did not. 
 49. CL Upon what grounds did you fo pofitively cxp 
 co-operation wilh Sir- William Howe's army ? 
 A. From General BurgoVne's orders. 
 5^. Q. Did you ever Tec General Burgoyne's orders? 
 
 A. Every day during the campaign. 
 ^f. Q; By what orders of General 13urgoyne did youei 
 a co-operation ? 
 
 A. Early in October Gener:\l Burgoyne gave itci 
 orders that there were powerful armies of the King's! 
 co-operating wilh ours. 
 
 0:1 
 
 ■■^.};i 
 
Ujor Forbes.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Q, Did not thofc orclcw givcfpirits to General Burgoync's 52. 
 
 my ? 
 
 A. Situated as our army was, every profpeft of reinforce- 
 ment mull certainly give us fpirits. 
 
 Q. Did you ever hear of any co-operation before thofc S> 
 rckis of General Burgoync's in OfVober ? 
 
 A. It was generally talked of in the army, but not by 
 ithority. 
 
 Q. Whether, if the operations of Sir Henry Clinton on S4» 
 ie North Kivcr had taken place in time, it would not have 
 Ecn looked on as a very advantageous co-operation with 
 general Hurgoync''s army ? 
 
 A. It might have been attended with very good confe- 
 jcnccs. 
 
 Q^ What lituation in j^eneral, and particularly with re- 55* 
 iril to provifions, was (ieneral Burgoync's army in, at tiic 
 |nie you mentioned thofc encouraging hopes of co-operation 
 I his orders ? 
 
 A. The army was nut on fho-.-t allowance at that time. 
 
 Qj^ Whether in military aliairs a powerful diverlion, if 56, 
 lell executed, is not known often to anfwcr very etfeftually 
 lie purpoics of co-operation I 
 
 A. Certainly very good cfTcfts have accrued from power- 
 jl divertions. 
 
 Q. If there had been a council of war on the 20th of 57. 
 tptcmber, or immediately after the engagement of the 19th, 
 iouUl you have known of it ? 
 
 A. I think I muft have heard of it. 
 
 Q. Whether, cor*fidering the circumftances of SirWll-58. 
 
 »m Howe's having carried his army to Chefapeak Bay, 
 
 )u fuppofcd, or ever heard it fuppofed, that SSir Henry 
 
 linton would have attempted his operations up the North 
 
 liver fooner than he did, or previous to the arrival of Iiis 
 
 jiinforeement from Europe ? 
 
 A. Not knowing Sir Henry Clinton's ftrength, or his 
 :rs, nor the force the enemy had to oppole him, it is 
 
 ipoffible for me to anfwer that queftion. 
 
 Q. What efFeft had it on the fpirits of General Bur- 59, 
 Jyne's army when they found there was to be no co-operation 
 stween that army and the army of Sir William Howe ? 
 
 A. We never knew but that there was to he a co- 
 
 [Jcration ? [PVithdrew, 
 
 «7 
 
 G4 
 
 Captain 
 
 
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 [::: 
 
 5R EVIDENCE. [Capt. BloomflelJ 
 
 Captain Bloomfield, of the Artillery, called in, an 
 examined by General Burgoyne. 
 
 1. Q. IN what capacity did you ferve in the campaigniJ 
 America in 1776 and 1777 ? 
 
 A I was m.(jor of brigade of the royal artillery. 
 
 2. Q; Was you employed by General Phillip-;, on yourrJ 
 turn 10 Eni;!andj after the campaigQ of 1776, to foliciti 
 further fupply of artillery for the fervicc of the cnlV.irj 
 campaign ? 
 
 A. On my leaving General Phillips at St. John's, intcJ 
 month of N 'Vcmher, 1776, I was charged with a letter t 
 Sir Cioy Carleton, wherein he recommended it to make] 
 demand of a further fupply of artillery and ftores fortM 
 complete equipment of an additional number of gun-boJ 
 for the fervice of Lake Cliamplain in the enfuing campaigpj 
 andlikewilc for the boats themfclves to be fent out in franifl 
 work. Sir Guy Carleton, on perufing the letter, difapprovtl 
 of the boats being fent out, but approved of the demand cj 
 thr ftores and artillery agreeable to General Phillips's rtj 
 queft, and they were accordingly fent out in the beginnitj 
 of the year 1777. 
 2 (^ At what time did you join the army in the campald 
 'of 1777 ? 
 
 A. I joined the army at Ticonderoga on the 23d of Jukj 
 
 ^^ Q. Did you live in the family of General Phillips, arJ 
 
 had yoil occafion to know his fentiments refpeding the artil] 
 
 ., Icry department ? 
 
 A. I did chiefly live with the general, and had frequcri 
 
 occafion to know his fentiments on the fubjedl of the artillcn 
 
 in the courfe of my duty as brigade-major. 
 
 j.^ Q^ Did you know, or had you reafon to believe, that tlJ 
 
 '^ proportion of artillery employed that campaign wasaccordii 
 
 to the opinion and recommendation of General Phillips ? 
 
 A. I tan have no doubt but that an officer of General Phil 
 lips's rank and extenfive experience mufl have determin!J 
 that point. 
 
 6. Q:. W'lat was the diflribution of the artillery after llij 
 encuiy evacuated Ticonderoga ? 
 
 A. The light brigade of artillery proceeded with theard 
 bv the way of Skenelborough ; the park brigade and Itor^ 
 were conveyed acrofs Lake George in bateaux. 
 
ICapt. BloomfieW.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Q. Was not a confidcrablc portion of artillery of the 7, 
 hcavieft kind cither left at St. John's, fent back from Ticon- 
 <!croc;a, ordifpofal of in veflels ? 
 
 A. It was : tliere iverc left at Ticonderoga fix heavy 
 twclve-poundcrs, one light tvvclve-poundcr, four light three- 
 nounders, four royal mortars and twelve cohorns. Left on 
 board the Royal George, two heavy twenty- four pounders, 
 two thirtcen-inch mortars, two ten- inch mortars, four eight- 
 inch mortars, four royal mortars and eight cohorns. Sent 
 back to St. John's in the Radau, fourteen heavy twenty- 
 Jour pounders, two eight-inch howitzers. Left at Fort 
 George, four medium twelve-pounders, two light fix- 
 pounders, two eight-inch howitzers, two royal howitzers. 
 With Colonel St. Lcger's expedition to Fort Stanwix were 
 fent two light fix-pounders, two light three-pounders, four 
 coliorns. Left at St. John's, four light iix-pounders, iivc 
 light three-pounders, four cohorn mortars : that was the 
 dirtribution of artillery that remained after the army had 
 quitted Fort George. The quantity of artillery brought 
 forward with the army were four medium twelve-pounders, 
 two light twenty-four-pounders, eighteen light fix-pounders, 
 fix light three-pounders, two eighteen-inch howitzers, four 
 royal howitzers, two eight-inch mortars, four royal mortars. 
 
 Q^ Was not that park artillery, though conlilting of fome 3^ 
 twcnty-four-poundcrs and fome twclve-poundcrs, properly 
 field artillery ? 
 
 A. They certainly were, and have ever been confidered as 
 fiich on all field fervices. Heavy artillery is of a diftinft 
 nature, and conliderably heavier than guns of the fame cali- 
 bre which we had in the army. 
 
 Q. Have you ever known a lefs proportion than the bri- cj. 
 gadcd artillery, which was attached to the line and to the 
 advanced corps, allotted to the fame number of troops ? 
 
 A. The proportion of field artillery certainly (hould vary 
 both in quantity and nature according to the variety of cir- 
 cumfuinces under which the army is to a£l ; the ufual allot- 
 ment of light field pieces are two to each battalion ; and from 
 a calculation of the number and ftrength of Cieneral Bur- 
 goyne's army, I do not conceive that our light field artillery 
 exceeded that proportion. 
 
 Q. Wliat do you apprehend was the propofed ufe of artll. 10. 
 Icry in the country in which we were to aft ? 
 
 A. To diflodge the enemy from fuch polls as every where 
 prefcnt themfelvcs in that part of the country, and from 
 
 which 
 
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 14 
 
 9^^ EVIDENCE. (iCapr. BloomfiddJ 
 
 which it may be impolfiblc to diflodge them without artillery 
 of a more confiderablc calibre than light fix-pounders, 
 
 11. Q: Do you remember the pofition which the enemy cva- 
 cviated at Schuyler's Ifland ? 
 
 A. I do pcrlcflly. 
 
 12, Or H***^^ that pofition been maintained, would not artillery 
 of the heavieft nature we had have been particularly Icrvicc- 
 able ? 
 
 A. Provided the pofl: could not have been turned, and the 
 enemy had made ul'c of every advantage which the ground 
 gave them, 1 have no doubt but the park artillery would 
 have been abfolutcly ncc'-frTy, 
 
 Q. Had the paflai^c of the Hudfon's River, or of Batten] 
 Kill been difputcd^ would artillery of that nature have beiii 
 licrviccablc ? 
 
 A. Donbtlefs it would. 
 
 Q. Had ilic enemy taken a pofition at the Forks of rhsl 
 Mohawk Hivcr, would artillery of that natnrc have bcoij 
 ferviceablc ? 
 
 A. From the impcrfcft manner In which I faw that ground, 
 if appeared capable of being made extremely defonfihic, and, 
 ©f courfc, that fort of artillery would have been ferviceable. 
 ir, Q. Had the army reached Albany, and it had been found] 
 expedient to fortify 1 camp there for the winter, would ar- 
 tillery of that nature have been neceliary ? 
 
 A. There can be no doubt of it. 
 
 16. Q* What do you apprehend to be the chief ufe of howlt-l 
 zers anil fmall mortars in the field ? 
 
 A. I apprehend they are of infinite fervlce againft all kind. I 
 of log work, abbatis, and againft entrenchments. 'I'he fmall | 
 mortars are jiarticub'-ly uleful againft redoubts and oiher 
 works where the enemy are confined within a fmall fpacc. 
 
 17. Q. Arc not log- works a fpccics of fortification peculiar to I 
 that country ? 
 
 A. I never faw any elfewherc. 
 
 18. Q. Was the carrying forward the artillery from Lake I 
 George to the place where the army croffed the Hudfon's Ri- 
 ver any impediment to the tranlport of provifions ? 
 
 A. The tranfport of our artillery and ftores was conftani- 
 ly made by horl.s attached to our department, and therefore I 
 I do not conceive it did in any manner interfere with 
 the tranlport of provifions — I mean to confine myfclf in this 
 anfwcr to the tranfport from Fort George to the Hudfon's 
 Ri\xr; for after crofling the river wc had fome oxen and I 
 
 horl'ejl 
 
t 
 
 m^'' 
 
 t-'' 
 
 Capt. Bloornfieia.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 Horfcs attached to the fervice 6f the artillery, which I bc- 
 Jiev;; were before employed irt bringing forward provifioas 
 and bateaux. 
 
 Qj^ What time did it take to bring forward the park artil- 19. 
 Jcry from Fort George to the bridge of boats over the Hud- 
 fon's River ? 
 
 A. The light brigade and die artillery of the park, with 
 their proper proportion of florcs and ammunition, had their 
 horfcs, Cr^.rriages, and drivers conftantly attached to them ; 
 it therefore required no more time to carry thofe ftores than 
 was nccefiary for the carriages themfclves to pafs from Fort 
 George to the Hudfon's River; but with refptft to the rc- 
 fcrve which was afterwards tranfported by water in bateaux, 
 I believe two days with all our carriages would cafily have 
 conveyed them to the Hudfon's River, 
 
 Q. Do you remember the pofition of the King's troops 20. 
 from the time of the attack on the 19th of September to the 
 attack on the 7th of Odtober ? 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q^ Had the army made a movement to gain the left of 21. 
 the enemy's entrenchments without previouily conftrufting 
 redoubts on the heights that commanded the plain, would 
 not the bateaiix, proviiions and Hofpital have b:cn left open 
 to an attack from the enemy's right ? 
 
 A. They would have been left expofed undoubtedly. 
 
 Q. Were not the largeft guns we had the propereft pieces 22. 
 of artillery for thofe redoubts ? 
 
 A. I think it was a fervice that was exaftly adapted to 
 jhem. 
 
 Q. Do you remember the difpofition made by General 23. 
 Burgoyne on the 7th of Oftober ? 
 
 A. I do. 
 
 Q. At what time was you wounded in that attack ? 24. 
 
 A. I believe in about twenty minutes after it commenced. 
 
 Q, What circumftance of the a£lion did you obfervc be- 25. 
 fore you \Vas wounded^ particularly refpe£\ing the artillery 
 and the enemy's advancing under the fire of the artillery, and 
 what happened to the troops pofted immediately on the left 
 of the artillery ? 
 
 A. The ground on which the artillery was pofted was a 
 clear fpot, in a great meafure furrounded by woods, the 
 Ikirts of which on our left was diftant about two hundred 
 yards where the attack firft began. The two medium twelve- 
 pounders were pofted on a fmall eminence, nearly in the cen- 
 
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 9* EVIDENCE. [Cajpf. BIoomfieH^ 
 
 ter uf this cleared Tpot between German picquets and 
 a detachment of the Hclfe Hanau regiment. On the ene- 
 my's column appronching, the fire of the twelve-pounders 
 art's the four fixes was immediately dire«Sled towards the ene- 
 my's column, notwilhftanding which, they drew up along 
 the fkirts of the wood behind trees, and after driving in the 
 Germans, kept a pretty warm tire of mulketry on the guns 
 and the troops pofted about them ; foon after this 1 heard a 
 firing on the right towards a cleared fpot, feparated from us 
 by a wood on \vhich the light infantry were pofted on very 
 commanding ground. On their retreating, as alio the twen- 
 ty-fourth regiment who was drawn up in the wood on our 
 right, the eneiny mavlc their appearance on an eminence on 
 our right, and cut ofT the retreat uf the artillery — At this 
 moment I received my wound, and therefore can j^ive no 
 farther account of the circumftances of that day's aftion. 
 Examined by other Members oj the Committee. 
 
 26. Q. What was the number of horfcs in general employed 
 for the arti'lery after the march from Ticondcr(5ga ? 
 
 A. The whole number of horfes detached with the Britifli 
 art Ucry, p'^'vious to the palling the Hudlon's River, was 
 about four hundred. 
 
 27. Q. How many would have been neceffary for the field 
 pieces attached to the battalions ouly ? 
 
 A. Eighteen fix pounders at four horfes each; fix three- 
 pounders at three horlcs each, and two royal howitzers at 
 three horfes each : the remainder were for park artillery, 
 amtnunition, and (lores of all kinds to accommodate the army 
 on its march. 
 
 28. Q^ Was the forage for thefc horfes procured in the coun- 
 try on their march, or brought from a diftance ? 
 
 A. A quantity of oats was brought forward from Canada, 
 but with re'pefl to^ other forage they were under the ne- 
 ceflity of coUeding it in the neighbourhood of the encamp- 
 ment. 
 
 29. Q. How many waggons might the bringing on that quan- 
 titv of oats employ t 
 
 A. I believe the quantity of oats after paffing Fort Ed- 
 ward was lb trifling that 1 don't believe it loaded one wag- 
 gon. 
 
 30. v.). After the army arrived at Fort Edward, did any de- 
 lay or not arile to its forward progrcis from bringing on the 
 park aitillcry, waiting for hories and drivers for that purpofe, 
 or to provide forage ? 
 
 A. The 
 

 Capt. Bloomfield.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 A. The park artillery remained at F(?rt Edward no longer 
 than was neccllary during the time the army renialned in 
 that neighbourhood : I do not know of any dtlay whatever 
 from the want of horles and drivers. Hnd the park artillery 
 moved forwards fooncr, no end could have been anlwcred by 
 it, beforf' the bridge was thrown over the Hudfon's River. 
 
 Q. Were there any gun-boats lent out to Quebec for the 31. 
 campaign 1776? 
 
 A. There were. 
 
 Q. Were there a fufficient number fent out, in your opl- 3^* 
 rion ? ^ 
 
 A. It appeared that the naval force was fuperiorto that of / 
 the rebels, from the event of that engagement ; and there- 
 fore I conclude, ihat for the ules of that campaign there were 
 a fufficient number. 
 
 Q. Did you apprehend, before the event of the action on 33. 
 the lakes, that the number was lufficient, and went out in 
 time ? 
 
 A. We had received very exaggerated accounts of the re- 
 bel force on the lakes, and therefore uncommon exertions 
 were ufed to render our force as formidable as pollible ; and 
 probably Ibme time was loft, and the campaign in fome 
 degree retarded, from that circumftance. 
 
 Q_. Would tlie campaign have been retarded fo long If a 34, 
 greater number of gun-boats had been fent out ? 
 
 A. Certainly not. 
 
 Q^ What number of artificers were fent to Canada for the 35, 
 campaign in 1776 ? 
 
 A. I don't immediately recolle£l the exa£l number : but 
 I think Colonel Chriftie engaged about two hundred. I 
 know of no others being fent our. 
 
 Q. Do you know of more being aflced for by the artillery 36. 
 or engineers, as neceflary for the campaign ? 
 
 A. I did hear of fome fuch intention ; but at this diflance 
 of time I cannot particularly anfwer that queflion. 
 
 Q^ Whether the number of artificers fent out for that 37, 
 campaign were, in any degree, fufficient for the purpofc of 
 carrying it on ? 
 
 A. Certainly not. We '^vere under the neccfTity of col- 
 lefting all the artificers that could be met with in Canada for 
 the armament of St. John's only, mofl of the bateaux being 
 built by private contraft. 
 
 Qj Were not the operations of that campaign confiJerably 3^, 
 
 returJed, 
 
 93 
 
 
 
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 •4"f' '.'.Hi' 
 
 J, *-■,.■■ .■ f' ,-' . 
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 tcrrupttd 
 foing into 
 ihe detail. 
 
 40 
 
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 y:}- ■■■'■ M'! -i'-' 
 
 94 EVIDENCE. [L. C. Kingflon. 
 
 retarded, for want of the number of artificers that were 
 aiked for and not ^.ranted ? 
 
 A. Had the number of artificers been greater, there can 
 be no doubt but the work would have gone on much fafter, 
 With reipeft to the artificers being demanded, I have already 
 faid I do not recollect the number. 
 39, Q. Were there not horfcs ncceflfary for conveying the ftorcs 
 and ammunition necefifary for the field train ; and how many } 
 
 A. The bed anlvvcr to that queftion will, I apprehend, be 
 a flate of the number of horfes aftually attached to the feve- 
 ral brigades of artillery, fince the allotment of {lores and 
 ammunition were exadlly proportioned to the number of 
 Anfwfr in- pieces which they accompanied.—— 
 
 [The brigade attached to the advanced corps of light ar- 
 tillery confifted of eighty-five——] 
 
 Qj How many horfes might have been fpared, if the 
 heavy park of artillery had not attended the army ? 
 
 A. It would have made a difference of two hundred and 
 thirty feven horfes. 
 41. Qi Was the army furnifhed with carts to have, employed 
 thofe two hundred and thirty-feven horfes ? 
 
 A. I really cannot anfwer that queftion of my own know- 
 ledge. {^IVuhdrew, 
 
 Jovis 3' die Junii, 1779. 
 
 Lieutenant Colonel Kingston called, in and ex- 
 amined by General Burgoyne. 
 
 X. Qi IN what capacity did you aft in the campaign of 
 1777""? 
 
 A. As deputy adjutant general of the province of Que- 
 bec; I afted as adjutant general of the army under General 
 Burgoyne, and alfo as fecretary to General Burgoyne. 
 
 2. Cjj^ Did not that double capacity, and the confidence with 
 which General Burgoyne treated you, lead you to the know- 
 ledge of the material circumftances attending that cam- 
 paign ? 
 
 A. I looked on myfelf to be in the entire confidence of 
 the general. 
 
 3, Q. Did General Burgoyne give any orders for the aug- 
 mentation of artillery deftincd for this expeiiition, after his 
 arrival in Canada ? 
 
 A. There was no fuch order went through me ; nor did I 
 hear of any fuch order being given, 
 
 Q. Have 
 
 tillcry < 
 Ration ' 
 A. 1 
 Ijn Genl 
 Ithe prl 
 iGeneral 
 Iknow a 
 Ithat hel 
 
 I ^1 
 
 Icampail 
 
 ■ [Tbe\ 
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 „ C. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 0^ Have you reafon to believe that the proportion of ar- 4, 
 fillcry employed was according to the opinion and recommen- 
 dation of Major General Phillips ? 
 
 A. I believe General Burgoyne had the greatefl confidence 
 Ijn General Phillips's knowledge and abilities ; and I believe 
 Ithe proportion of artillery to have been arranged between 
 IGcncral Phillips and Sir Guy Carleton, becaufe I don't 
 Iknow of any direftions given by General Burgoyne upon 
 [that head. 
 
 Qj^ What were the orders given, at the opening of th« 5- 
 Icampaign, refpefting the incumbrances of baggage ? 
 
 [The witnejs refers to the orderly hook, which he had with him."] 
 
 Read the orders. 
 
 They are the original orders, writteu by myfelf at the 
 fimc. 
 
 [Reads."] ** Extrafts from orders iflucd by Lieutenant Gene- 
 ral Burgoyne at Montreal, dated 30th May, 1777. 
 
 " The regiments dcftlned for the expedition under Gene- 
 ** ral Burgoyne are to leave in their refpeftive ftores their 
 " blanket coats, legging, and all baggage that can be fparcd 
 ** during the fummer months ; the officers are depended on 
 *' not to encumber the fervice with more baggage than fhall 
 ** be abfolutely ncceffary for a campaign where the mcvc- 
 ments may be expefted to be fudden and alert ; the por- 
 tion of bateaux to each regiment will be regulated on thofe , 
 principles." 
 
 Qi Were thofe orders afterwards enforced ? 6. 
 
 A. Orders were iliued again to the fame purport, dated 
 Skenefborough Houfe, July 12. 
 
 [Reads.'\ ** It is obfervcd that the injunftlon given, before 
 ** the army took the field, relative to the baggage of olficers, 
 has not been complied with ; and thai Lhe regiments in. 
 general are encumbered with much more baggage than they 
 can pofliblybe fupplied wilhmeansof conveymg, when they 
 quit the lake and rivers ; warning is therefore again given 
 to the officers, to convey by the bateaux, which will foon 
 return to Ticonderoga, the baggage that is not indifpcn- 
 fibly necefl'arv to them ; or upon the firft fudden move- 
 ment, it muft inevitably be left upon the ground. Such 
 gentlemen as ferved in America the laft war may remember 
 " that the officers took up with ibldiers' tents and often coa- 
 '* tined their baggage to a knapfack *or months together." 
 
 Q^ Have 
 
 it 
 
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 96 
 
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 8. 
 
 EVIDENCE. [L. C» KlngftotJ 
 
 O. Have you a letter from General Burgoyne to Gencrd 
 Rcidefel, on the lubjcft of the incumbrance of baggage ? 
 
 A. I have an cxtr;ift of it, taken from the original lcttet| 
 in the letter-book. It is as follows : 
 
 ExiracJ of a Letter from Lieut, Gen. Burgoyne to Major Centra 
 Mcidejcl, dated Head Quarters at Skenejlorougby the lUiij 
 
 ** Je vous fupplic de faire en forte, que l*efprit de TorJ 
 *' drc par rapport a le renvoye des baggages des offi.| 
 *' cicrs a Ticonderoga aye lieu. 
 
 '* Lcs baggages des oliiciers Britaniques font deja ren-l 
 ** voycs> et jl n'en refte a plufieurs qu'une petite tentel 
 <* et un valife. C'eft reelement pour I'intercft de roffij 
 ** cier a la fin, que je fuis {i portc a cct article," 
 
 TRANSLATION. 
 
 (C 
 
 
 I requeft you to take meafures that the fpirlt of 
 ** the order refpcfting the fending back officers' baggagt 
 ** to Ticonderoga may have due force. 
 
 " The baggage of the Britifh officers is already gone, 
 
 ** and many of them have only retained a fmall tent am! 
 
 *• one cloak bag. It is really for the intereft of tht 
 
 *' officers, in the end, that I am fo preffing upon this 
 
 «« fubjeft." 
 
 o. Q: When the contraft was made for horfes and carts at 
 
 Montreal, was it the general opinion of the pcrfons of beft 
 
 intelligence confultcd, that the number was more or lefs than 
 
 neccffary for the fervice on which we were going ? 
 
 A. In general converfation on that fubjcft 1 remember to 
 
 have heard it faid, that tliough they were infufficient, wc 
 
 might expeft to find additional fupplies in the country. I 
 
 have extraftsof letters here that palled bet'veen General Bur« 
 
 g , goyne and General Phillips on that fubje£V. They are ex- 
 
 Appendix, trailed from the original letter copy-book. 
 
 10. Qi Have you the returns, or extrafVs of the returns, of 
 the Itrength of the army at all the different periods of the 
 campaign ? 
 
 A. I haveextrafts from the returns. 
 
 11. Qjr What was the ftrength of the regular troops, at the 
 higheft, at the opening of the campaign, rank and file, fill 
 for duty ? 
 
 A. The firft returns I received on the firft of July. 
 
 Thai 
 
f- » 
 
 C. Kin^^f^on.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 The Brltlfh were 
 Gcmiana 
 
 3576 fit for duty, 
 2919 do. 
 
 6489 
 
 fpcrk folcly of the army under Lieutenant General Bur- 
 
 nvnc. 
 
 Q^ What were the numbers of the artillery, and the corps i2» 
 In'cr Lieutenant Nutr, attached to the lervice of the artil- 
 
 i.y 
 
 Britifh artillery 257 
 
 Germans lOO 
 
 Recruits under Lieilt. Nutt 154 
 
 Q, Were there any other troops in the army that could be I3» 
 lalktl rc'j;ulars ? 
 
 A. llicre were Canadians, Provincials, and Indians ; but 
 
 never confidered them as regulars, becaufe they were not 
 lifciplincd. 
 
 Q. Can you flate about what was the number of the Ca- 14. 
 hadians ? 
 
 A. The Canadians were 14H the higheft number. 
 
 Q. The Provincials ? 1 5. 
 
 A. T would he undcrftood to fpeak to the opening of the 
 lani])aign the firlt of July. They were low then, and en- 
 rcnial afterwac;]. They were then 83. 
 
 Qj The Indians ? 16. 
 
 A. Between three and four hundred. It was very dilHcult 
 
 icolleft what their number was exa£tly. 
 
 (^ Was the army ever lb high in numbers, Provincials 17. 
 Intl Indians excepted, as at that period ? 
 I A. I believe it nevfr was. On the 3d of September ad- 
 Bitional comp:Hiies joined the Britifh, to the amount of about 
 BOO men ; but from killed and wounded, and the garrifon 
 eft ;ir Ticondcroga, the army was at no time equal to its firll 
 number. 
 
 Q. What was the force left <^t Ticonderoga ? 18, 
 
 A. 1 he fir ' c;arrii(^n conhfted of 462 Briti(h, rank and 
 Blc ; 448 Germans, rank antl fih', making 910 in the whole. 
 
 Q. Do you rememl)crrhe MfncuUles which attended mov- 19. 
 Ino; the wounded to I'icondcroga, after the aftion at Huber- 
 10 n ? 
 
 A. I remember to have heard they were very great. Dif- 
 
 jFercnt propofii. ns were made for the removing them, !uch 
 
 IS biers and haiul-barrovvs, which were fo very incommodi- 
 
 as, that I remember to have been told that the wounded 
 
 H would 
 
 97 
 
 
 I , 
 
 
 *'r ' 
 
 '.«' 1 
 
 • ^ 
 
 1 ' ■ 
 
 
 ' V ■ 
 
 • * 
 
 • '■.' ■ 
 
 ' /' ■ 
 
 
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 >■ "I-, -. 
 
 
 > 1 
 
 ■'ii 
 
 «4 
 
 i',"f,i , * ; 
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 I 
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 >•';:;•:* 
 
 
 
^ 
 
 p 
 
 21 
 
 22. 
 
 Set Appen 
 dix. 
 
 ■li 
 
 EVIDENCE. [U C. Kingfto^, 
 
 would rather be left where they were than move in the thtJ 
 ftate of their wounds by fuch conveyances. 
 20. Qi Do you know what were General Burgoyne's motivj 
 for detaching General Reidefcl with a large corps of troopi 
 to the country in the neighbourhood of Caftlcton ? 
 
 A. I don't remember to have been prcfent when Generji 
 Reidefcl received his orders or inftruftions ; but I undcrftoo( 
 it was to create an alarm towards the Conne£licut, togivecni 
 couragement to the loyal inhabitants, if any fuch there wcrtj 
 and to protc£l thofc that were wounded at Hubertonor there] 
 abouts. 
 
 Q. W;." the removal of thofc wounded efFefted long bel 
 fore General Reidefcl was recalled from Cai\lston ? 
 
 A. I believe not ; for I am not quite certain that thJ 
 whole were moved when General Reidefcl returned to tw 
 army at Skenefborough, a day or two before the firft divifioil 
 of the army moved towards Fort Anne, 
 
 Q. Have you any papers written by General Burgoywj 
 between the time he was at Montreal and the time he letl 
 Skenefborough, explanatory of the motives on which M 
 afted ? 
 
 A. I have. They are extracts from the original letter] 
 book. 
 
 Q. Are you acquainted with any fafts that will afcerJ 
 tain whether, on the army's arriving at Fort Edward, it wJ 
 forwarder in its progrefs towards Albany, in point of timJ 
 than it would have been had it taken the route by Ticondcro] 
 ga and Lake George ? 
 
 A. In anfwer to that queftlon I have to fay, the army, bjl 
 taking that route, was a-head of the tranfport of provilionJ 
 which, for the greater part, went from Ticonderoga by th!| 
 route of Lake George ? 
 
 Q. At our firft arrival at Fort Edward, and previous to| 
 the roads being mended, in what proportion did provifion 
 arrive at our camp ? 
 
 A. Very little more than for the immediate confumptionJ 
 
 Q. Have you the memorandum-books of Sir Francii| 
 Clarke ! 
 
 A. Yes. 
 
 Q. Do you know them to be his hand-writing ? 
 
 A. I am fully convinced of it, having feen him enter iiian|| 
 of the articles in thefe books. 
 27» Q. Has there been any alteration or addition (ince you hadl 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 
 26. 
 
 them i 
 
 A. Nona 
 
C':-\ 
 
 \, Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. 99 
 
 None. 
 
 What was the charafter of Sir Francis Clarke rcfpeft- 28. 
 lis accuracy ? 
 
 I never faw an officer more attentive to the duties of 
 Ition than Sir Francis Clarke, and always found him 
 lingly accurate in the remarks he made. 
 [Are there any memorandums refpefting the arrival of 29. 
 tons at that time ? 
 [There are feveral. 
 IYou will read two or three ? 
 
 l[/2^a^i.] *' Fifth Auguft. — Viftuallingof the army ^o. 
 I this day, and from difficulties of the roads and tranf- 
 Is, no provifion came in this night," 
 fixth Auguft. — At ten o'clock this morning, not quite 
 
 iigh provifions arrived for the confumption of two 
 
 ^as it in general underflood, from the combined in- 31, 
 Bce received by General Reidefel, while he was detach- 
 [Caftleton, and that received by General Burgoyne 
 le Provincials in his camp, that there were many well 
 
 inhabitants towards Bennington, who would (hew 
 Ives on the approach of troops; and that there was 
 U and fubmiffion among the party attached to the 
 Is in that country ? 
 
 did hear feveral reports to that purpofe. 
 lave you the original rough draft of the expedition to 32. 
 ««n, as prefentcd to General Burgoyne from General 
 
 ,; with General Burgoyne's alterations and addi- 
 
 have the original rough draft of the propofals for the 
 Ion to Bennington ; but not being prefent at the time, 
 fay whether thofe propofals were delivered by Gene- 
 iefel or not ; but I know of alterat.ns made in 
 )pofals by General Burgoyne, from a knowledge of 
 ■writing. 
 
 The witnefs delivered in to the Committee the origi- See Appen- 
 rough draft of the Inftruftions, with a fair copy, <*>*• 
 
 Whether you have reafon to know that all the erafures 33. 
 ^rations in that plan were made before the expedition 
 ce ? 
 
 believe they were, from the reading of it, 
 you remember taking this plan to General Phillips 34, 
 H a the 
 
 i 
 
 ■ i- <^ r I 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 i'1 
 
 V,- 
 
 :'« 
 
 
 
 'i.-^::-;4:;:W;:,?, \ 
 
 ' I' 
 
w 
 
 \: 
 
 100 E V I D E N C K. [L. C. K'r 
 
 r 
 
 the c!ay Ciencral Piurfroyne went to Fort Gcor^u' lo i-j 
 the tranfport of provilion? } 
 
 A. 1 do remember it very well j it was the roi- h 
 I took. 
 2S* Qi What were Gcr.cral Phillips's ftntimcnt:: tipnn it?! 
 
 A. 1 remember General Phillips and \ had a lon^rcj 
 fation on the flowiiel's of the arrival of the iranrport ot] 
 vifions ; and he <;iid he looked on this as a very goodi 
 that he faw no ol)je6\ion, and alkcd me if I knew of arl 
 
 36. Q. Do you remember Ihevving the plan to General \i\ 
 A. I do very well. 
 
 37. Q. What did he exprefs on thisfubjc£l ? 
 
 A. He defired mc to leave it with him till the aftcrno 
 his confideration. He came himl'clf to my tent thtl 
 morning early ; he exprelled himfclf to me in a manntij 
 conveyed a difiipprobation of the (iermans being cmpi 
 in it. 1 think I obl'crved to him thatfince the honoui J 
 by the advanced corps at Huberton, I believed Generaij 
 defel was defirous of having the Germans employed. 1 
 tioned to General Frafer my ideas of provifions being ( 
 cd by that expedition, and the army thereby enabled 
 quicker on to Albany than waiting for the flow tranrporil 
 Fort George. General Frafer faid fomething about GeJ 
 which 1 don't recolleft ; which brought this remark fro/ 
 I defired General Frafer, from the friendlTiip he had fcl 
 neral Burgoyiie, if he faw any real objeftion to thisj 
 to exprefj himfelf fully and freely to General Bun 
 himfelf ; that the fcouts of the army and the guides] 
 attached to his the advanced corps, and he might, ttl 
 them, perhaps know more of the nature of the countrJ 
 I did ; and th;iefore I preflfed him to mention his obicf 
 if he Had any, to General Burgoyne, I think he laiJ 
 am not ^^uite certain, ** the Germans are not a very] 
 ** people ; but it may do." I preffed hioi at partingj 
 to General Burgoyne, if he thought it would not de, 
 faid No, and went off. 
 
 38. Q. Were not many of the Pi-ovincials in the armyj 
 country about Bennington, and towards the Connefticj 
 
 A. I can't pretend to fay they were from that ccJ 
 but I underftood many of them were well acquaintei 
 that country. 
 
 39. Q. Do you remember Captain Sherwood in partlcdl 
 A. I do very well. 
 
 40. Q. Was he of that country I 
 
/. ; .; 
 
 t.K:i\£!r-<^n.] EVIDENCE. l«t 
 
 I un Icrftood he was of th:\t nciglibourhood, 
 IJid von ever lieiT Coloiit-l Skccne, or any oilier Pro-^j, 
 L\ conVuUccI on an cxpcilition imo tliat country, cxprcfs 
 ipurc'i-nlion ot" ii» fucccls ? 
 
 t ncvti (lid. S.r Francis Clarke told mc he had re- 
 fj tivouraiile accounts from Culcntl Skccnc ; and 1 bc- 
 ahcr part of the expediiion had taken place. 
 Arc there any mcmnranJiiins of Sir Francis Clarke's, 4^. 
 filing the expedition to licnningion ? 
 I Yo. 
 
 r [s thcic any that marks the dlHance between Batten 4J, 
 [aiui Bennington ? 
 Yes ; it is his hand-writing. 
 
 t-.ids.^ " From the mouth of Batten Kill, Eaft, for 
 niHcs ; ihtn ftrikc off South Laft for about fifteen 
 lies to Cambridge ; and fo on about twelve niiles to 
 jennington." 
 
 Ij Have you the original letters, written from Colonel 44. 
 le .J General Burgoyne, while he was on the cxpe- 
 
 See the 
 1. Tlicy are here. [He defivered them in to the Committee. Appendix. 
 
 Y Is there any memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke's, 45, 
 
 ling the time when Colonel Breyman was ordered to 
 
 ch to I'lipport Colonel I'aume ? 
 
 |. [Reacii,'] " I5ih Auguft. Errprcfs arrived from 
 
 incoick, at five in the morning; corps de referve or- 
 
 trcd to march. 
 
 16th Auguit. During the night, cxprefs arrived from 
 
 incoic. 
 
 with an account of the rcpulfe this evening of a 
 
 ttachmcnt of ours on expedition. 
 Sunday, 17th of Auguft. The general went up to 
 tc twentieth regiment, advanced on the road to Sancoick, 
 Bd met the corps de referve, the men of that expedition 
 kturning all day." 
 
 k Do you recolle£l what time of the day it was Gene- 4"» 
 IBurgoyne met Colonel Breyman on his return on the 
 
 I think it was fometimc between one and three 
 t)ck. 
 
 ^ Have you the inftru£Vions given by General Bur- 47* 
 le to Colonel Skeene on that expedition ? Awlndix; 
 
 L Here is a copy of them. ^8, 
 
 ]. Is there any memoraudum of Sir Francis Clarke's, of 
 
 H 3 any 
 
 wm 
 
 i, ■ 
 
 \ ■: « 
 
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 ■ 1 
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 1 • ' 
 
 M 
 
 '.'•■■ 'i'l 
 
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 mm 
 
 
 
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 mh 
 
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 m- 
 
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 102 E V I D E N C E. [L. C. Kir; 
 
 any intelligence received from Colonel St. Leger abocj 
 time ? 
 
 A. There is of the 12th of Auguft. 
 
 [RcaJs.'] ** This morning received intelligence c| 
 ** a£tion near Fort Stanwix." 
 49. Q^ After the failure of the expedition to Bennir.1 
 can you fpeak to the efforts made for forwaitiing; 
 vilions ? 
 
 A. I know that very great efforts were made both (J 
 
 and after. I underflood that General Burgoyne and Gt] 
 
 Phillips had been both at different times at Fort GccrJ 
 
 forward the provifions, and I believe fubfequent to ti 
 
 news from Bennington. The quarter-mai^er-generj 
 
 mean Captain Money) was fcnt by General Eurgovs 
 
 Fort Edward, and 1 believe to Fort George, to coliJ 
 
 horfes and teams poflible, and to make every cxerti/ 
 
 bring forward the provifions. 
 
 -Q Q! Have you the calculation, made by the con^m'il 
 
 See the * general, of the carriages and horfes neccfTary for diffJ 
 
 Appendix, gjvcn quantities of provifions ? 
 
 A. It is here. I believe it is the original. 
 , Q. Did the march of the artillery from Fort Geor{ 
 the bridge of boats over Hudfon^s River, interfere wiijj 
 tranfport of provifions ? 
 
 A. I have had many converfations with General Plij 
 and the quarter-mafter-general about the tranfport off 
 vifions, and never remember to have heard from theii 
 any other perfon, that the march of the artillery inteil 
 in any manner with the tranfport of provifions ? 
 
 Q. About what time did the additional compi 
 arrive ? 
 
 A. The 3d of September. 
 
 Q: What was the ftate of the army when wc paffeil 
 Hudfon's River ? 
 
 A. My return goes to the flrfl of September. 
 
 Britifh, fit for duty under arms, 2635 rank and fll(,| 
 Germans — 171 1 
 
 The 3C.0 additional did not join thft army till the 
 September, fo that this return is exclufive of them. 
 54. Qj What was the flrength of the artillery and Lieutd 
 Nutt's corps at that time ? 
 
 A. I believe there was very little variation in eilhtj 
 them from the former return. 
 55. Qi Have you General Burgoyne's application to Sir] 
 
 Carl 
 
 5i« 
 
 52- 
 
 S3' 
 
 ' 
 
 V ' -v 
 
'/-•^v 
 
 ^^m 
 
 ,. C. Kingfton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 X03 
 
 Jarlcton for a garrifon from Canada forTiconderoga, before 
 ic parted the Hudlbn's River ? 
 
 A. I have extrafts from letters of General Burgoync to 
 Sir Guy Carleton, the nth of July, 1777, and on the 29th See the 
 
 )f fuiy, 1777* . . Appendix. 
 
 Q^ Was there any confiderable alteration in the ftrcngth 56. 
 Lf the army between the return of the ift of September, 
 ind the a^lion on the 19th ? 
 A. There was a ikirmifli or two, but the lofs was not 
 material in that interval. 
 
 Q. In the courfc of the fcrvicc, did you ever know any 57, 
 jftancc of a day of aftion, where there was not fome de- 
 tion from the effeftlvc ftrength upon paper, for baggage 
 luards, bat-men, care of the hck, and other indifpenhblc 
 egiiiiental contingencies ? 
 A. I apprehend there muft always be deductions of that 
 )rt ? 
 
 Q. In the fervice of our campaign, was there not a con- 58. 
 jciable additional deduction for the care and defence of the 
 itcaux and moveable magazines ? 
 
 A. It mufl of courfe make an additional drain from the 
 ^my. 
 
 Q. Was not all we had of the forty-feventh regiment ap- 59 
 bpriated for that particular fervice ? 
 
 A. It generally was ; I believe always fo. 6o, 
 
 Q. Thefc dedudlions confidered, about what number do 
 )u compute the Britifh line to have conilded of on the day 
 [ the aftion of the 19th ? 
 
 [A. I believe the four regiments of the line engaged that 
 amounted to little more than one thoufand one hundred 
 tn on the fpot under arms in the a£lion. 
 
 |Q. What lots did the Britifh fuflain in that aftion ? 61, 
 
 i. Killed, wounded, and prifoners, rather more than lefs 
 m five hundred. 
 
 ^ Can you fptak particularly to the lofs of the line ? 62. 
 i. I believe about feventy-lix killed rank and file, and 
 twecn two hundred and forty and two hundred and fifty 
 inded, and about twenty-eight or thirty miffing and 
 loners. 
 
 Do you recolleft the ftrength of the 20th regiment 62, 
 en they made their laft charge on the enemy ? 
 \. 1 do very well. I was by General Phillips when the 
 lers were given for that charge ; he was then in the front 
 the hnc : the ranks appeatcd to be very thin, the rogi- 
 
 mcnt 
 
 W^^'. 
 
 J-f 
 
 •:-v-f^ ■:! 
 
 
 ■■.rf'i'-) ■ -if 
 
 ■ •■.-.'■ , , r 
 ■ 'f-',* 11 
 
 ■ ■ V; 
 
 " * •' f 
 "r 
 
 
 
 >■ ■ -4 1..' i 
 
 ('!>;;; J 
 
m 
 
 I 
 
 fci. 
 
 104 EVIDENCE. [L. C. Kmgflcjl^ 
 
 ment were much fatigued with the length of the a^ftion, U 
 moved on to the charge with fplrit. 
 
 64. Qi Do you remember General IJurgovne going up \o i}\ 
 fixty-feconcl regiment immediately after the firinf' c^^4 
 and ihe report that was made t-) him by the commandi,- 
 oiriccr of the ftatc of that ren-imen: ? 
 
 A. I remember It, and the officer reporting tlie great lo; 
 they had fuflained in tho ..£lii)n ; I .aw th-.-m, and ilij 
 appeared to be very confi.IeriMy reduced in number ? 
 
 65. Qi JJo you remember the officer mcntioiiing that thcylijj 
 not above i;Fty or fixty men in ih: r'-giment ? 
 
 A. I can't Ipcak ijofniveiy to that; but in my ownjutlj 
 mcnt they did not exceed that number. 
 
 06, Q^ Were not both the field -officers wounded ? 
 
 A. Colonel Anftruther and iVU)jor Harna^e were hvi 
 wounvlcd, and a great m my other officers were killed a:l 
 wounded, and (he legimcnt luirered greatly. 
 
 67. Q; 'i'o what degree did the men of the artillery fufTnJ 
 that adlion ? 
 
 A. I think, but am not quite certain, tl-.nt the nnir.hl 
 that were with four guns amounted to foity-cighi. I 
 Captain Jones who was a very galhait man, and commani'tj 
 thole four guns, killed, and fome other oflicers wounded, a:J 
 I Delieve about thirty -fix of the men were killed and wourJ 
 cd. 1 fliould in juftice to 'Jie artillery fay, t^at I think \[\ 
 iwt in the power of men to keep a better fire, both of iciiJ 
 and grape- ihot, than was fucccffively maintained for fevtJ 
 hours that day. 
 
 ^'^* Q. Irom your experience in the fervicc, do you conceiJ 
 it would have occurred to any officer, to eng;igc troops, if J 
 could pcfiibly avoid it, in the fituntion in which the Bnq 
 line was the day after that atiiion ? 
 
 A. The experience of an officer of my Inferior rank ccl 
 not lead to jnuch ; but I fliould have been lorry to hi 
 given orders to thofe regimenis, after the gallant lufFeriiii 
 of that day, to have attacked an army reported, both Inj 
 our fpies and our prilbners, to !^c very near if not more tri 
 four times the nuinber of our whole force : add to this, 
 country was a very thick wood, and the fituation of the n.\ 
 camp, I believe, could not by any means be reconnoitrJ 
 wiihln that fpace of time. 
 
 69. Q^ Do you remember General Burgoyne receiving a It] 
 ter from Sir Henry Clinton the day but one after that adioi 
 
 informiij 
 
.. C. Klngfton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 inforniinc; liini, that he intended about that time an attack on 
 
 ■Oil Monigoinery ? , _ 
 
 \^ I 'o icmcmbcr his reccivinc; a letter from Sir Henry 
 ICln''^on about that time ; ii was tht- 22cl of Scprcmher? 
 
 Q: Do v;;u i'ungiuj tiiat anv officer knowing of that let- 70. 
 It^r \vould live cnr_,iL\rncd thoughts of immediately renew- 
 ing aii ..irr.ck upon the enemy ? 
 
 I A. A • t^r ?..■ an opinion of an officer of my inferior rank 
 rocs. 1 lliouici not have tliought oi it, nor did I hear any 
 [officer of any rr.nk exj)rers fuch an idea at that time. 
 
 Q, p'roin what yt^u knew^ of the country, did you not be- 7'- 
 lllr.vc- t lat a ruccefiful attack from Sir Henry Clinton during 
 tiic liin-; we h\y at that camp, would either have diflodged 
 Cjcncr.il Gates entirely, or have obliged him to detach con- 
 Ifidcrahly from his army ? 
 
 A. 1 rctncnibcr our fcouts giving information, that a bridge 
 was laid over the Hnli'on's River, very near the enemy's 
 camp; and it was the opinion of fomc very confidential m^a 
 that were e:nploycd in that army in that capacity, and were 
 much under the dire(^"kion of General Frafer, that on the 
 approach of Sir Henry Clinton's army, the army of Mr, 
 Chic-' could not {land us, but would crofs the river, and go 
 towards New England. Whether the idea was right or 
 wrong, I can't tell. 
 
 Q. i^id you ever hear {\ich perfons, or any others, ex- -7^, 
 prcfs an idea, that the enemy would have taken the fame 
 nieainre, on our advancing to attack them, without that co- 
 operation ? 
 
 A. I don't remember to have heard any fuch thing. 
 
 Q. Do you imagine that any officer knowing of Sir 73» 
 Henry Clinton's letters, would have thought it proper to 
 retreat after the aftion of the 19th of September? 
 
 A. I never heard any officer cxprefs an idea of that fort. 
 1 don't know what officers might be within the knowledge of 
 fuch a letter ; but I lived intimately with General Phillips, 
 General Frafer, and with Mr. Tvvifs, the engineer ; wlisther 
 the letter was in their knowledge or not, I don't know : but I 
 never heard them exprefs fuch an idea. 
 
 Q. Did you ever hear any officer of that army, though 74' 
 unacquainted with the letter, behire or fmce the time, ex- 
 prels a difapprobation of the meafure of remaining in that 
 camp without either attacking or retreating ? 
 
 A. Neither then or at any time while I remained in America, 
 and of courfe not lince. 
 
 Q. From 
 
 X05 
 
 
 I -. 
 
 
 
 
 jm 
 
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 M 11 
 
 ffi'.,. 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
io6 
 
 "1 " 
 
 
 EVIDENCE. [L. C. Kingftor, 
 
 75. Q. From your convcrfation witli the chief engineer, an! : 
 from other circuniftanccs, have you rcafon to know, thii 
 every poflible means were ufet! after the ad\ion of the Kjtli 
 to obtain a knowledge of the ground on the enemy's !efi ; 
 
 A. I had frequent corvcilations wiih the chief engineer 
 on that fuhjefl, I believe his attention was given to that 
 point alnioll every day, and a knowledge of that ground 1 
 \inderftood to l)c very diHicult to be obtaineil. 
 
 76. Q, Was not the right of the enemy deemed imprac- 
 ticable ? 
 
 A. I had no opportunity myfclf of feeing the right of tjic 
 enemy ; but I underftood fom others, that I'le pofition was 
 too flrong to be attacked with any profpefl of Uicccfs. 
 
 Q. Were there not frequent conful cations held between 
 General Burgoync, General Pliillips and General Fialcr, 
 previous to tlic movement up to the enemy on the 7th of 
 Oftober ? 
 
 A. 1 undcrftood there was fcarce a day pafTed without fiich 
 confultation ; 1 believe no day after the a£\ion of the 19th. 
 78. Q. Did you conceive that the chief purpole of that move- 
 ment was to attain a knowledge of the left of the enemy's 
 polition, and ii expedient to attack lliem there ? 
 
 A. I undcrflood it was. 
 
 Q. Did it appear to you, that the force left in camp, 
 under Cieneral Hamilton, was more than fuflicient to keep 
 the encir-y in check ? 
 
 A 1 don't think it wa*;. 
 
 80. Q^ From the intimacy and confidence in which you lived 
 with Cicneral Burgoyne and General F'rafer, do you imagine 
 any difagreement of opinion could have fubiifled between 
 them without your knowledge ? 
 
 A. I think 1 mull have hcanl of it. 
 
 81. Q^ Do you know any inftance, but more cfpccially re. 
 fpefting the periods of palling the Hudlbn's River, the 
 a£llon of the 19th of September, and that of the 7th of 
 Oflober, wherein General Frafer exprellcd a difapprobation 
 of General Burgoyne's mea'ures ? 
 
 A. I do not : but I would beg leave to obferve, that upon 
 the plan to Bennington, General Frafer had exprefled a dif- 
 ferent opinion, with refpefl to employing the Germans. At 
 the time of paffing the Hudfon's River, and after it was 
 crofied, I had a great deal of converfation with General 
 Frafer : he feemed to exprcfs fatisfaflion in the manner in 
 which the troops had paiTed. 
 
 Q,In 
 
 79 
 
 fav 
 
 acl 
 
 trol 
 
 ftaJ 
 
 thai 
 
-" KingflonJ I 
 
 igincer, an! 
 
 know, \hii>\% 
 )( the i()tli 
 ly's lefi; ' 
 icf engineer 
 vcn to that 
 at groumll 
 
 cd 
 
 nnprac- 
 
 right of the 
 wfition was 
 :c(s. 
 
 :ld between 
 ral Fiiilcr, 
 the 7th of 
 
 ithout fiich 
 
 I lie 19th. 
 
 that uiovc- 
 
 hc enemy's 
 
 t in camp, 
 nt to kcip 
 
 
 you lived 
 imagine 
 between 
 
 cially re. 
 iveri the 
 le 7th of 
 probation 
 
 that upon 
 ed a dif- 
 
 ans. At 
 ■ it was 
 General 
 Banner in 
 
 Q. In 
 
 L.C.Kingfton.] E V I D E N C E. 
 
 Q. In the aflion of tlic 7lh of Odobcr, after the Gov- 82. 
 man troops on the left of the artillery had given way, did 
 you obferve Cieneral Phillips and Cfcncral Ivcidefel in perfon ^ 
 
 A. I was with (Jeneral Phillips at dillcrent times, and I 
 faw General Reidefcl more than onec; they were both very 
 aclivc, and exerted themlelves very much to form the broken 
 troops, and to make the retreat as rtgulat as the circum- 
 ftances would permit. 
 
 Q^ W hat was the laft time you favv Sir Francis Clarke in 83. 
 that aftion, and do you know what orders he was carrying ? 
 
 A. It was after the retreat was become very general. Sir 
 Francis Clarke ajlced me, if I had given any orders to the 
 artillery to retreat ? I told him, that as there was a major- 
 general of the artillery in the field, who was confeflld by 
 the army to be a very excellent officer, 1 would not take on 
 niyfelf, as adjutant-general, to give orders to any part of the 
 artillery. Sir Francis Clarke told me, that a difpolition had 
 been made for a general retreat, and that he was going with 
 orders from General Burgoync to bring ofF the artillery. 
 About the inftant we were parting, a very heavy fire came 
 upon us from the enemy, and I have I'lnce had reafon to be- 
 lieve, that Sir Francis Clarke received his wound at that 
 time. 
 
 Q. On t'le day of the 8th, do you remember the enemy 84. 
 forming a line in the meadows, and making a dcmonftration 
 of s^ttacking us ? 
 
 A. I do remember it very well, and that there was a great 
 deal of cannonading from the enemy. 
 
 Q^ Do you alfo remember a cannonading in the afternoon, 85. 
 about the time of General Frafer's funeral ? 
 
 A. I think I fliall never forget that circumftance. Gene- 
 ral Frafer, 1 underftood, had dclired to b buried privately, 
 in one of the redoubts that had been raifed for the protection 
 of our magazines and llores ; as the corpfe was pafling by. 
 General Burgoyne, General Phillips, and I believe General 
 Reidefel, and feveral other officers, out of refpeft to Gene- 
 ral Frafer's memory, and to do him honour in the' eyes of 
 the army, notwithnanding his rcqueft, attended his funeral 
 into the redoubt. The enemy were in this inftance, I 
 thought, very dcfeflive in point of humanity ; they pointed 
 a gun or two at that very redoubt, and kept up a brifk can- 
 nonade during the whole of the funeral fervice, which was 
 performed with great folemnity and very deliberately by 
 
 Mr. 
 
 107 
 
 t' , ■ i. r- • 
 
 "'■ v.* 
 
 r.S 
 
 i- fi:'S 'M 
 
 V . .- 
 
 ' •' 
 
 I ■• ■ ■ 
 
 < i • 
 
 ^ '■ 
 
 i 1 
 
 
 
 v' 
 
 ■ 'Ut 
 
 k^^ 
 
 ?>? 
 
 
 •V.'. 
 
 
 
 ■•iv- 
 
 '■■. 1( 
 
 ,i 
 
 
 ^' 
 

 '»r' 
 
 1 
 
 i::^i 
 
 », 4.'i, 
 
 ^i 
 
 108 
 
 EVIDENCE. [L. Col Kingfton. 
 
 Mr. Brudcncl, the chaplain. I never law fo afFc^ling a 
 
 fight. 
 86. Qi Do you remember on the march to Saratoga feeing a 
 
 corps of the enemy at work on the plain of Sarau<cvi ? 
 
 A. I do very well; a working party, and wh.tt appeared 
 
 to be a battal'.c n or more drawn up as a covering p.uty. 
 S7. Q. Was Uiat the corps that afterwards took poft on the 
 
 oppofite fide of the river ! 
 
 A. I believe it wa^ 'he aine corps I faw afterwards pafling 
 
 the ford. 
 
 88. Q. After the arrival of the army at Saratoga, was Lieute- 
 nant Colonel Sutherland detached with a command to cov. i a 
 party of workmen to repair bridges and roads, in order to 
 continue the retreat on the weft fide of the river ? 
 
 A. He was ordered with a party to repair bridges and roads 
 on the weft fide. 
 
 89. Qi Do you remember on v/hat account Colonel Sutherland 
 and the party were recalled ? 
 
 A. I believe it was on infoi malion given by oiir fcouts, 
 that the enemy were preparing lo .atack us in great lorcc. 
 50. Q. Have you further realbn to know that a general attack 
 on that day was really intended by the enemy? 
 
 A. There was privticuhir caution lent round to all the 
 troops to be prepared for that attack, as it was expeflcd it 
 would be attempted under cover ol a very tliick fog then 
 prevailing. After the convention had taken I'acc-, a general 
 oificcr in the rebel fervice acquainted nc, that 'wch an attack 
 was intended, and from informr.ti.!\, I believe from deierters, 
 or from their own Icouts, that our army was exceedingly 
 W'ell prepared to receive them, thnt they would be very mu^h 
 expofcd when they came on the plain to our artillery, he not 
 only retreated with his command, but fent word to another 
 general officer to retreat alib. The other general officer was his 
 fenior; but he had taken that upon him, from the fear of 
 the confequences of fuch an attack, of which he fent word 
 to General Gates, who approved and confirmed his order. 
 
 gi. Qi Previous to the council of war towhich the field officers 
 were called, do you remember it being determined in the 
 council of the generals, to try a night march, abandoning 
 the carriages and baggage, and orders being given for the 
 delivery of as much provifions as the men could carry ? 
 A. i do remember fuch a determination very well. 
 
 02. Q, What prevented the executioiiof it ? 
 
 ^ A. I 
 
 I A 
 
 I 
 
 
 L. 
 
 tha 
 
 hot 
 
Kingfton. - 
 ilfcding a 
 
 ^.1 (ecing a 
 
 ;v' ? 
 
 r a |i pea red . 
 
 ity. 
 
 'oft on ilic 
 
 ■^V 1,1* 
 
 rds pafTing 
 
 as Liciitc- 
 to cov. I a 
 1 order to 
 
 and roads 
 
 lutherland 
 
 iiir (couts, 
 
 force. 
 r.il attack 
 
 to all the 
 
 [pt-ftcd it 
 
 log then 
 
 a general 
 
 an attack 
 
 del'crlers, 
 
 cccdiniilv 
 
 ery mu.h 
 
 y, he not 
 
 another 
 er was liis 
 le fear of 
 lent word 
 order. 
 
 Id officers 
 :d in the 
 andoning 
 
 1 for the 
 ry ? 
 
 [1. 
 
 A.I 
 
 I 
 
 I,.C. Kingflon.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 A. 1 undcrftood tlicre were fuch dlificultlcs in getting out 
 
 the piovilions, thit tlie delivery of the neccilary provifions 
 
 toiild not be ac(()ni|)lillicd. 
 Q. Mad we intelligence the next day from different icouts, g^^ 
 
 that the enemy was in p()ircfTi(Mi of tiic country in force, on 
 
 both lidesthe Hudion's River, between us and Fort Edward ? 
 A. I undcrftood, from i'omc of the fcouts tiiat we had 
 
 been nccufloincd mod to depend on, tliat the enemy were (o 
 
 ported. 
 Q. Have you rcafon to know that tJie intcllif^cncc General 04, 
 
 Burgoync Hated to the council of war on this lubjeft was 
 
 true ? 
 
 A. I was afTured by one of the general officers who ron- 
 
 diiftcd us towards ])oflon, that troops of theirs were in the 
 
 pofition that our fcouts iiad given us information of. 
 
 Q^ Did you learn at the fame time at what period thofc 95* 
 
 poffs were taken up by the enemy, whether before or after 
 
 our arrival at Saratoga ? 
 
 A. I have extracts of minutes made at that time, from 
 
 the mouth of the general ofFicer I mentioned. 
 
 [Reads.'] — " When the kinf','s army wa-; returning to Sara- 
 toga, a brigade of fifteen hundred men were pofled on the 
 
 109 
 
 «( 
 
 
 
 ^mm~ 
 
 '. .);• 
 
 
 :■>- 
 
 m ^ 
 
 *' eaft fide of the Hudfon's River, to difputc the ford, and 
 " two ihoufand men more were ported between us and Fort 
 *' Edward, on the fame fide of the river.** — Fourteen hun- 
 dred more were alio ported oppofite to Saratoga, a little above 
 the other party I mentioned before, to prevent our palling the 
 Hudfon's River. Fifteen hundred uf thole I have mentioned 
 were ported on or betbre the 5th of Oftobcr. The others, I 
 remember very well now to have heard, were ported previous 
 to the 7th of Odlober. 
 
 Q. Have you an cxtrafl of the lart council of war at 96. 
 which the field officers allirtcd ? 
 
 A, The cxtraft is true, excepting the names of the officers, 
 and the votes they gave. I have the original paper, with 
 the names of the officers that compol'ed the council ; and I See Appen- ,;^;.' 
 believe their opinions. C^^^ cxtracJ produced. '^'*' 
 
 Q. Did you ever hear of a propofal made by General 97» 
 Phillips, to make a way from Saratoga to Ticondcroga with 
 a body of troops ? 
 
 A. Never with a body of troops ; but I remember to have 
 heard General Phillips make an offer, which I thought a 
 very fpirited one, to rilk his life in attempting, with one or 
 two of our bert; guides, to find a palfage to Ticondcroga, 
 
 and 
 
 ;..:i^ 
 
 'H^\ 
 
 .^•1 
 
 -•J 
 
 
 ■>■< 
 
 &4 
 
 
 
 M 
 
I 
 
 tio V V 1 n T: N r r. ft.. C\ KinrJIon. 
 
 nn«l «lo Ww \^\^\^oi\ lor the tlrfimc «>l lN;»l )\;mi(on, n» .m\ 
 r^nillrvy oHiuM, ihooM tlu* (Utiny an.\»k tlul loittihnUci 
 the »oi\vonn«M> (houM like pl;itr. 
 <5S. O. Havc ymi tin- vi'tuin ol iicnci.ll i inters aiiny, fij^nrd 
 h\ huuUH - 
 
 A. I \\n\c ; Inn I have forgot to bting the on{;iiial. 1 Iiavc 
 the cxti.iv'>, 
 
 •^"•^ ''^^ ""• [AV<7//i."| ** Coyy (\o\n (ioncr;\l Ciilr'.'n vrtnm, from Wm 
 
 f>n»\ If 
 Imn, ler 
 the Apprn 
 •<it. No. 
 XVI. 
 
 camp HI S;u;Uoj;n ; idih of C)iMtilKi, 1777. 
 
 99' 
 
 "C'oi.MuU 
 
 " l,io\U('o.int i'«>I.MU'ls 
 
 *' Majois • 
 
 *' (.'Apl.1Ul!» 
 
 *' lull I.UMitniiUMs 
 *' SiotMul l.iciucnants 
 
 ** I-.nlijMU 
 
 " C'hnpl.nns 
 
 •' /\«ii\U,inis 
 
 ** r.ivmalUvs 
 
 *' Svui'-oons 
 
 *' Males 
 
 '* Sci jrams 
 
 " l)nin>nirrs 
 
 12 
 
 M 
 4S 
 49 
 
 34S 
 
 S 
 
 4« 
 
 44 
 
 30 
 
 ■ 37 
 
 43 
 
 '3'H- 
 h ^6 
 
 *' Pn lent lit for fixity 13,216.' 
 
 I nriklcrrtan*] tlicfo laft arc rank mu\ file, hccauic the otlici'S 
 
 arc mentioned Ixloro, 
 
 *' Sick prolcnt 
 " ^iek ahlcnt 
 *' On v'oivniand 
 *' On luilow 
 
 ()lt 
 
 73» 
 3«7? 
 180." 
 
 1 IkUcvc that the men on conMiiaml were explained to mc 
 by Cnncral Ciares to liave l^ecn di taohed iVoni his army, in 
 the rear and upon the llanks of llic kini;;'s troops, previous 
 to the convention. 
 
 CV 1X1 vovi apprebend that that return includes the corps 
 that were on the other I'ule of the Hudlon's River, iin- 
 mediatclv oppolirc to Saratoga ? 
 
 A. I do reooUcft the name of one of the general officer* 
 who was on llic other iidc of iha lludlbn's River, included 
 
 in 
 
 iIh 
 iCMii<*ii 
 
 A. r 
 
\\i% 
 
 OtllCt'S 
 
 corps 
 im- 
 
 fliccra 
 :ludcd 
 in 
 
 i. ('. Kii>!;ll<'n.| I-'. VII) )•, N C I',. 
 
 • Ml. < i;i(( s's irtiiii), ;inil ili< tdctir I iiiciiMiir llir inrn iiiidrr 
 M» »"'•'""•'"'' •'"" MK Itiilnl :il(n. VVIini I l.iy oiir, I (|(MU»t 
 
 r.iii to Ikiv nmlcinnoil llial llir oilin tvvn iMMicr«l oIlKrr^, 
 
 ,- (inc who \v.\<* HiUiiMKil vxiili ii |».uly «>|t|mliir t(» S»ri«lo}/ii, 
 
 ,1 \\\r onr \vli(» wns (hilioiKil on tlir l.niii (nlc «»l llir watrr, 
 
 ivvrrn iH i\Mil I' nit l,ilw:ii:l, Hio not hIIo iiii jndcil in ( •ciic* 
 
 I ( iatfs's K !iiin. 
 
 (V !)(» llir iciiMin t(» \vlii( li y«ni rrfriirfl, of our army, loo. 
 
 t( llic rllr^livc lli(Hj;tli, al llic liiiif ol lif'.nmj^ llio cou- 
 nt ion ) 
 
 A. 'I'lirv tin flair llir khii'Ji nniiilur, Milhi'lcd Mt that 
 
 1)0, i)i null piclcnt iiixl iindi i aiiM<i. 
 
 Q, Siatr ilu- iHimluTs. loi. 
 
 A. Tin- \\\\\ lit apinaicd loliavr Ihtii »'/"? 
 
 (iciinaiiN I ij»y4 
 
 I (Mn'i lie anlvvoralijc (or ilic ronriMnclHor ilioir iminlirrs, 
 
 ilicy wcic taken in a ^n at luiny. 
 
 (>. Can tlurc p«»HiMy l>c a tnillakr of many Iinndrrds > I07,. 
 
 A. I can llatr Itom a niontldy irtiiin ol llic inil of 
 
 [((vrinlMT, til ltd- d\il v, 
 
 Hiltilh 5»r)H6 1 ,, , , - , 
 
 , \ Kaiik and Idc, 
 ( f( inianij — .^ ''M'^ J 
 
 I'riu'ic iniid»t 1)( people trroveied tiom ilieir wontid'? wlio 
 
 tie dildiarged Iroin the holpilal, and ha<l i'lint-d ihr (oiiis; 
 
 there inij'Jit have. Itren a niillake in the irtum, jiiO Iv lore 
 
 |f (onvention, in the conlidictn ol the army at that liii,c. 
 (^ Do yon know what palled rrlp(Ylin(i; the military ehcft, loj. 
 le the treaty of Saiatni-a was dependin!; ? 
 
 \A. I tio vemendier that it was llronMly ic( ommended to the 
 
 Inunnndiin^ oHiecrR ol (orps to take Inms ol money from 
 
 payniadcr general, on acioimt of riiMifleiK e then due to 
 
 fir ri|;iments ; and I heiieve a ^real deal ol money was (o 
 
 hihvited, and rrjMilaily a< eounteil for to the paymallcr 
 
 jticial on the lvd)le<picnl lettlement of the pa / of llic arnjy. 
 
 U^ What hccamc of the roll of the money in llic military 104. 
 
 IA. It was taken hy the paym .ftcr j:;cncral to Alhany. 
 jQ. D'ld any part of it fall into the hands of the enemy > jqc. 
 \A. Not a Ihillingthal I ever heard of. 
 ^^ Was any pioporlion (d it h)l^, emhc/,7elcd,or ferreted ? jofj. 
 
 If any Inch thin^; had h:ippeii'j(l, I think tiie j)aymaftci- 
 
 kral would have applicil to me immediately. Never hav- 
 
 hcard, tjicn or at any lime after, of uny lofi ljivin;;5 
 
 I f I 
 
 .! 
 
 .i. 
 
 
 ■ i 
 
 t > 
 
 >■' 
 
 
 I . 
 
 ,'!■ -w 
 
 
 •"J 
 
 ■V- ::\ 
 
 ,'-f 
 
 
 
 i'^.h 
 
I 
 
 ti« r. V 1 n \ N (' r,. p c r 
 
 firrn ("nrt.iiuril, I ilo no! lulirvi- llu ir \\;»s any |ium dil' 
 
 li>). ^}. W .<< <'u* (riiii Irrvit r nt I I'nni, t!m inp, tie ( ;ii 
 U« p( l<v, von > 
 
 iiic'd, 
 
 Ci 
 
 I'm,, 
 
 ,\. \ 
 
 1 W :\<:. 
 
 t( 
 
 I I 
 
 ;l, ( ). i'oiilil V0.1 pu^tlvHC llu' It'Vrctl :nlli la («| tll.\t 
 
 \i I alK 'I IM\ tiM M ^ 
 
 A. 1 l\ |\ I' I llhri ,1 rnpv I'T it ill ln'in-' n( tMV i'\\\ 
 
 fviMn ihi- pnvnnlli i !\( im i.il, 
 
 t\ pill iu'nti.il Unijinnr m ci ;i|»pi n|M tut r ;MM|'iii] 
 
 too- 
 
 \\\M o>()irn»ltnn( ii» ihr I Ml .ii'iiliiin H s nl Ins i>\vn i X|<in, 
 
 t>\ lo :<nv othiM |inipiM(' dn Ins own \i|t' i^ 
 A. N<'\ CI (li.ii I kn<>\v o\ . 
 tie. Q- MviO ni'i voo h.ivo Ivnmvn u H ii ii.ti! jiccn (o J 
 A. t\"ii;nnl\ . 
 
 (^V V\«ic till 10 lu ( («i cirMMVi wlu'ir (irnn;il I'uiivi 
 piiil, li.MU lir. t)\vi\ |>ni(i\ I \|'i n« i • lli;\l, n\ llu' 0|Mliioii| 
 
 oilins, he nMii,hl h.wo Imn ivilli(\*Al \\\ pl.u tnf> t»t thr |m 
 
 1 1 1 
 
 a« 1 oun 
 
 \ > 
 
 ritKj 
 'I (11 
 
 A. \ mnrnilKM to h.wc l^nn (oM liy oilin |>rnr 
 \h.\\ rxpcHivs ol lluil <oil ^,n'nii:\l UiMi\oynr li.ul I 
 our hi to h;\\ f l'v< n vliiiu'<"ii Mt lh;\r n\,nuu r. 
 12, <^. ^^ h^\ u.»«; ihr niOnn' o( tholo ir\| iiii r< -'^ 
 
 A. '\'\u\ \\i\( iMilrnt"; to |«i opl.- w Iki |\;\,| ililliniMiiH 
 tl\cn^ii'l\Ts, .mil til ;tvMs ol thiMOv li> Monicn who l\,i,! 
 lliriv h\ill>.Tnih-, :uvl othn Oi . ,\ln>\i<; whh h it \\',\<* vctv |m 
 f<M .1 ^cnri;\l otUocr U) [;ivf, ;UKi vnv piopcr lo pui miij 
 
 1 1 
 
 puMu Avrovmt. 
 
 (.^. n.l>l rot (irnci,;l l^i;!vovi1(, Innii his liui.it 
 the ospniros .uti-tuhin: n V.\Mnn^;ini!i r ni Chu-l ? 
 
 1011, 
 
 A. IK'icit.nnU hiul, troin hrinj; »>hh;-xil to krrp n p;*! 
 t.iMctovlhr ciUoitainnn lU nuvl Vvtrdhnunt o| »»flii cv an '>>:) 
 O^tuing to ht'.ul «|ii.nlciv. o\\ v!m(v oi- ImiIohis ; .m\>' I .; 
 thotv" ( \poiHTs tx>ha\i' ini n \n\ .-uiit. liom the (S.ui 
 high pritcot" all tho ,u-jiv'k'< o| lilv.- in th;it p4\i o( \\iC\w 
 X14. Qj P;«l iivMUMul lnu_J^^^nl- cvcv uwivc inoictl\.»n ilw 
 
 its- 
 
 pomtuK nt ct a 1 cutcnaiU goiicr.il ? 
 A. \fvci. 
 
 O. Was th.orc lu^t n ho;u\1 ol gc.-n'ial <>(li.rn npivinlw 
 
 v'.ini)' 
 
 CsnihvlJrr, to inliHx^l nil the ;u-ivnnns oi ih 
 
 an< 
 
 1 vUvi not (.icncr.U luiigovno ivgvil.Ui.' the payimiU oi 
 
 battalions hv the vcpon o\ thn hoaivl 
 
 A. 'Vlicic was i\u-h ;^ ho;u\l. and the paytnciUs 
 guUieU rtccouimg to ihc icpoii o;" thai boaal, 
 
 wc 
 
 Q:' 
 
»f. 
 
 CI 
 
 Mil' 
 
 |i ii'i Mir VKV 
 
 Il>" i ;\inii,ii< 
 
 1 tll.lt 
 
 ■I I ni; 
 
 im 
 
 I mv i'\v 
 
 n. 
 
 c. Kitirn-M.] y V I I) K rj c k. 
 
 (). |'|>oil llu' wli"1r nf uli;i' ynii hn'W of (irffiil Hur- n^. 
 
 If^ 
 
 |rin Mf •< 
 
 K ( ri|'l'4 ;iiiil (X|<in<<s, iio ^nti liflii vi- lir w,(-i, iii Ins 
 sun |Hiiif, !i I'uinn <m .t IuIIi-m r in tlic « iiin|»!iifrri i-jyi ^ 
 
 \. Ill illv htlicvf lim ;ip|)i)iMliiit.'tits Were not cjiial to hii 
 ^>|.,'iii cs III ili.il ( iiiiipni}'!!. 
 
 IxiViiinfJ l<y "tf'ft Afrmhrii nf fhr f'linitftittrr nthl hy ('iinfral 
 linni'iyilf n(ctt/iritt//y, 
 
 (). What vvnc ilic niimli'-M mI tlw < iVi'Wv Miitlfli, nf tlif i ty, 
 
 tM\\\<\'\ nl (lie t .mi|i:ll^ll I/"/'/, Mil liwllllj', ollli CIS ;ltl(| IKXI- 
 
 itr ;inv |<:ii|^K(Mnillilli"ll''i| (till' ns 
 
 »>\vn fs 
 
 piiii'^l A. I liiivc iHtt iIhiIc itliiiti'i; lull lliry vvcic (riit to fhft 
 inmaii'U'i in C'liiuf, iuiil my rxiiii^ls arc Ini ili'- tank .ind 
 
 ■i^ 
 
 irvn 
 
 (i, J ^B (). Cm yon iuilvvci lliai <|mnioii vviili tr(jt(fl to tlie (icr- iiH. 
 
 \ri;)l U\ni'i'\l 
 
 Hi 
 
 \i\ fn'tiilniKJ 
 
 ill 
 
 III dilliniMi 
 
 en \v 
 
 li;nv. 
 
 /\. Mv ixliaiMs aic lliL' lanu' l)Mt|i for the llritilli and the 
 
 the i>|<u)ii'ii^Hirnn;ill<^. 
 
 to the p.l^^B (>. \N li It was ihc |Mi:itr|l iniiidiri uf Provincials ill tlio I Ky. 
 
 krmy al any tiinr in the ( aiii|tai} 
 
 \, I ii'-litvc ih'- onlv <|iunion that h.is luTn nfkcd rolprft- 
 
 m |i.ul iMdi^Jli", ili'in was ;n ihr lir|Timiiii!', ol ih'' < ampai|',n ; thry worr 
 
 Ju II I'li'lil y lhii r. ( )ii ihc I'll n (il ^i(■pt^ml>(■r iIk y ainoimtrd 
 
 itcd 
 
 ,v ,\<* \i \\ 
 
 V to pWl 11111 
 
 tl> 01"''.Ml 
 
 , Is ; ai\J I 
 
 \\\ ol lli^ «V 
 
 I'no v.'iii|v 
 
 p.lV IlKill 0! 
 
 1. 
 
 Q:' 
 
 It) ahniil lix Imndutl mid «i;',hty, vvhii h was the gr(;a 
 llimilu r they cvi r amoimiid !<». 
 
 holiaili^l ^-^ ^^1''" ''" v'tii mean hy I'rovincials ? 
 
 A. I iiiidri ll.md lilt III to III' inhal'itaiif'i f>f that country, 
 llliiiiMid nihil 1 nlhi (IS wliii were to have hail tiilli icnt com- 
 illi 111'!, provuhd they had tivrr amounted to tcitain nuiii- 
 
 120, 
 
 IS \i( nation, ^P^'i'<> 
 ■I ? 
 
 (}. Do yon iiu Indc C^madian"^ under the name of Pro-izi. 
 
 |i l.lls r> 
 
 A. I Inlicvf, ill ilu Imhii''! p,iii ol' niy cvid'-ii' e, tlic Ca- 
 
 liiilinis wiio 
 
 Hal 
 
 I. ll |l> l'( Mil' 
 
 hull h'jd and forty-cinhr. airtt 
 
 u" » 
 
 M' 11 o im I, 
 
 lillinsMiilhcd Iroin tl 
 (^ W'ai ( ii ii<'ial I'liP'oyiir's lnonlordcr of thn twelfth 122, 
 |iilv, it'latin;', lo thr l>a};i>,a!',f', P i(fl'y roinp!u'd with ^ 
 A. I loiuiivc it was the duty ol the t oMMitrindiiij/ offitcrs 
 ^t iei;iinents to i:iiit;u.c an obleivan'C and obedience to ilie 
 "lui.il orders, 
 
 Q. Was il ai'^lualjy cnloiccd in fiu h a manner lo the dc- 123, 
 fee you thoiii'Iit il IJioiiM h.ivc hi-eii. 
 
 A. 1 am \\o\ tpiiic poliiivc vvliethci' there was not ano- 
 Jir order illucd allcrwardj 
 
 L^'c/?' 
 
 on 
 

 I 
 
 <' ^ .;:' 
 
 I: 'i 
 
 126. 
 
 127 
 
 atdl 
 
 114 E V I D E N C E. [L. C. Kingaon. 
 
 124. \_^ueJlion rep' V.] 
 
 A. I never had any report m: j mc by a commandinJ 
 officer of any corps, of that order not being complied with. 
 125' Qi What was your own ocular obfcrvation of the quan 
 tity of baggage carried with the army ; and did it appear to 
 you that that order could have been fairly complied with ' 
 
 A. I own I don't recoUcft, not hearing any complaint not 
 attending to it. The quartermafter general of the army 
 inuft naturally know more of the baggage than the adjutant 
 general. 
 
 Q. Do you know what allowance of waggons was made tol 
 a regiment ? 
 
 A. T don't rccolleft any waggons that we had to allow. 
 Q. Was none of the baggage brought down in whcclejl 
 carriages ? 
 i A. Several officers, I believe, bought waggons and cartil 
 
 of the country people for their own ulc ; but 1 do not remcniJ 
 ber any of the King's carts or waggons being appropri 
 to the carriage of ofliccrs' baggage. It might be, but 
 don't recolleft it. 
 128. Q. Can you fay, in a general way, how many horfu 
 might be employed in carrying the baggage of the army, in. 
 eluding ofliccrs' horfes ? 
 
 A. I never had any information upon that fubjeft; it did 
 
 not belong to my department, and I had much bufinefs oJ 
 
 my hands. 
 
 ^29. Q. How was the regimental baggage carried ? 
 
 A. I believe chiefly in bateaux. 
 *3°* Qi How was it carried when there was no water-cap 
 riagc ? 
 
 A. I can't fpeak to tliat point, having had no informatical 
 on that fubjeft ; and when I fpeak of bateaux, I fpeak gcneJ 
 rally, having had no information on the fubje£l. 
 131. Q. Can you fay, in a general way, how many women at-j 
 tended the army ? 
 
 A. I had really fo much to do that I had not much lelfun 
 to pay much attention to the ladies ; and I know very littlij 
 of their beauty or their numbers. 
 '32» Q; Would not the feeding of two thoufand women bei 
 confiderable objeft with refpcft to the provilions of tlifj 
 army ? 
 
 A. I fhould have been very forry to have had two thouranii| 
 women to have experienced that. 
 
 Q,Hoii 
 
 
 ''!':,; 
 
-■■■•I, 
 
 3 water-carJ 
 
 [ingfton.] EVIDENCE. 
 
 low many women were there, if not two tlioufind ? 
 
 "S 
 
 \< 
 
 ^33' 
 
 Jwoultl wifli to give the houfc every information in 
 |er, when I can Ipcak witli any degree of accuracy or 
 igucfs. 1 liavc fccn the commiirary of provifions re- 
 [ think the number of women returned, as viftual- 
 
 thc {lores, was very, very few. 
 
 vou think that a corps of dragoons'mountcd would 134, 
 tn of great ufc to the army ? 
 
 Dwn, I very much wifhed thofe few dragoons we had 
 ivc been mounted, btcaulc, though in that part of 
 , that 1 law they might not have been necefl'ary or ufc- 
 ive made a charge, I think thofc light dragoons might 
 Is applied to very ufeful ferviccs, 
 Jow many had you of thofe dragoons ? i^i, 
 
 bey arc included in the ftrcngth of the Germans, 
 
 ally do not remember their particular number. 
 
 [none or lefsof the park of artillery had been brought jog, 
 
 would there not have been horfes to hare mounted 
 
 goons ? 
 
 Ibelicve there might have been horfes enough taken 
 artillery, or from the provifion train, to have 
 
 thole dragoons, if it had been thought more expe- 
 Ihave employed the horfes in that manner ; but they 
 pd or contradled for, for the fpecial purpofcs of car- 
 
 jvilions, and bri' ging on the artillery, and never 
 
 iheperfons who iurnillied the contract for the dra- 
 
 ^ice. 
 
 la fmaller quantity of baggage had been carried, 137, 
 ithe officers have fpared fome of their baggage horfes 
 kting the dragoons ? 
 
 [ever met with an officer v/ho had horfes to fpare. I 
 Francis Clarke and myfelf wifhed to buy horfes to 
 
 [own fervants ; cared very little what expence wc 
 
 and yet I could not obtain any. 
 
 you know of any corps or party finding their way log, 
 Canada } 
 
 ever heard of any corps finding its way there; and 
 
 pod from the guides who were with us, previous to 
 
 cntion's taking place, that if that was attempted, 
 
 ^reak into fmall parties, and go by what is called In- 
 
 s* 
 
 ppofing there was a fmall party that found its way to 139. 
 
 " Indian paths, do you think it would have been 
 
 »r an army to have done the fame ? 
 
 I 2 A. My 
 
 
 i 
 
 ',..-;4.-»,!t.:Wy'(, 
 
 ;■" • ••' i'.'. ■ 
 
 
I I 
 
 'V* 
 
 
 1 16 V. V 1 1) r: N c K. [L. c.k| 
 
 A. Mv uloa of that imill l)C 1"o\mu1ciI \i|Htn tl\ci 
 thole i^aitks who hail lc'ivi\l \is vny laithliilly as KoJ 
 loniKM (KHalions, and \\\\o inlomtcil im* thatwc nmj 
 into vovy linall panics, to have any ihaiui ol iMakiii't 
 thi(Hi};'i» 'l\o wooils to l.\ii\a»h\ ; and 1 ununihrrili 
 (uMU'ial Phillips ollViivl lo aUinipi lo tin*! his wayinj 
 clcroj;a, il was talLcd v)l ai\il Ku)kril on lo l>c as ilci| 
 rallant. 
 
 140. Q. It any pav'.y diil make its way to C'anaJa, tloyou^ 
 [)o\^' it nuiii l.v that party ol" Provincials th.ii lan.iwJ 
 ihcy well* employed to repair loails, and thai \\,| 
 lieaid ol" alteiwaids > 
 
 A. I icmemluM' lo-ne were rep<Mted to have riii| 
 who wcie inakini^ u>ads, .uul it is likely to havcl 
 l»aity. 
 
 141. (^ When yon mci^tioiud the hirjicll nninhi-v ofj 
 eials, ilul you mean that tluy weii- all aimed ? 
 
 A. I know thai they were not all armcii. W\ 
 ail' • I or them. 
 14.2. Q^ Ol" thole tba'- were armed, fomc verpetlaMel 
 cxeepieil, weie tluy miieh to he tlependeil upon } 
 
 A. A vevv i;icat pan ol them were tueh as I (lioj 
 
 placed very liille ilcpeiulcnee upon. 
 
 143. Ci; Ik-Ioic iiu- army left Canada, was there notaj 
 
 der, that nv>i more than three women a company fJ 
 
 luireved to embaik ? 
 
 A. I ilo know ihrve was fueh an order iil'ued, anil 
 heard any complaint of its havini; \)cen broke tlirJ 
 dvin't recoiled the date ot" that order, or 1 woukl hiJ 
 to UAV book, and Hated to the lioule, upon the lirll[ 
 I dative to the number ot' women that were employs 
 expedition. 
 
 144* Q_. Is it not tlie eufiom in all armies vi(f>u:illfJi 
 
 kinsi's OiMcs, to prohibit the delivery ot" provilioiil 
 
 women over aiid above the number allowed bv oi\Icl 
 
 A. it was cuUomary in all places wdierc I fcm 
 
 k\{l war, and very i\rong and peremptory orders wa 
 
 on that lubiert lo the commiilaries in our array. 
 
 14c. Q; Do you not then believe, that all women whol 
 
 . . your army were ted from the ration of the men tlitl 
 
 cd, or tound their provilion in the country ? 
 
 A. 1 remember, upon aiking the commiiVavicsl 
 came to be lo ksv women in the provincial rctursj 
 
 o 
 
[ingf^on.J F. V I 1) E N C E. tv 
 
 [was the ciirtoiu for tlirin to be ("npplli'd out of the 
 
 IIIOIIS. 
 
 i'lic the woiiKii ronvcycil vn hA[]g'\l\c taiti or horlcs, ».|0, 
 
 jcv w.ilk a-lboi ? 
 
 Jncvn lirani ol the womcti's liciii^ conveyed on liatj,- 
 
 jlts ov tlie k'\\)}\\ lioilis. 
 
 If the women neitlui eniploycil the kinj^'s hoifes, nor i.jy. 
 
 t(l Ins jirovilions, do you ihink they were more ol' 
 
 lent, or ol toniloit to the Kin}','s troops ? 
 never vuuKrllooil from niy lonverCiiion with tlin 
 llclin;; olluers, or others, that the wonuii were any 
 
 jtiii. 
 
 alii r tlie I ikin^^ (»f 'I'icondcroj'^^ there was any 148. 
 |n i!k" ;nniy in wliiih yon lerveil, of ihcir being 
 
 rr.ii li ,\llK\ny ? 
 
 ilon'i n ineniber to have heard any donht't exprell'cd 
 |ri liil>iedl, me.inin}; loon ;ifter the t.ikin-; Titondc- 
 
 ('.ir. it generally vrndcrflooil in the arfny, that it was kjq, 
 bpliti! with .dl the nee ellaries, a|>i)oinlments for wu", 
 [ck's prc^per for forwardini^ tlie expedition to Albany ? 
 jfllways undi rftood that the army hail bitn very well 
 
 with every thing. 
 ^0 you belli, ve, if the ieeretary of flate had ordered 150. 
 
 uiulcr (i; mral I lowc to eo-operate with the army 
 ftiicral lUugoyne for the North River, with a view 
 [fiMined tlie jiniilion of the two armies, that the dif- 
 Jidi hcfcl Cieneral Jiurgoync's arniy couKI have hap- 
 
 ajini£\ion could have been formeil, T fhonUl apprc- 
 ^t Mr. (lates's army might have been dillodgcd, and 
 [misfortune at Saratoga would not have luij)pened. 
 itinly matter of opinion. 
 
 ^0 you apprehend, that if the army vmdcr Sir Wil- j^j 
 pvc had operated on the North River, with a view to 
 
 junction, that fuch a jundtiun would have taken 
 
 lad an opinion while In America, that if the expc- 
 hiih came up the Hudlon's River imder General 
 p, couUl have been there aliout the time of our ;ic- 
 ilic lyth of September, tliat Mr. (latcs woulil have 
 (lifticult to have k'.pt his army together, if he had 
 led over the Hudfon's River towards New England, 
 Vis mere matter of private opinion. 
 
 1 3 Q, If 
 
 k'- 
 
 6 
 
 ■il 
 
 
 
 : ■*.?■• 
 
 » 
 
 ■ f • 
 
 ^i 
 
 ■ W: 
 
 V,: 'A 
 
IIS 
 
 >52 
 
 EVIDENCE. [L.C.Ki, 
 
 Q. ]( you air oC opinion, thnt the troopn uiidrriJ 
 Vavi;;l\an uoviUI Invc liad lii pinvrifiil nn rMctn, rvri,| 
 as Scptcinlv'.i, \\\\:\\ <(\\'(\ do yon think Sir WMhaitil 
 anuv, artinotl Uy aW the tlrrt ami n.itt, woviM liavji 
 ravly as ihr lioginninc: of )n!y^ irnnirdijncly .iCicr 
 prrftitMi whnh tot^k plinc among the tnuny alter M 
 at luondoiog.^ ? 
 
 A. I ilhl not kncnv whnt four thnr wk \i 
 
 -nlJ 
 
 »54 
 
 »55 
 
 inand ol licnnal Viuigh.in, nor do I rvcn now kiuiwj 
 fltoiilvl think \r\o([ certainly, that a giTit avinv J 
 Hu<hon's River nc.ir Albany, would have it)nliilnii»i 
 nuuh to (>\ir making our way to Albany. 
 IS V ^' ^'•'^^" V'^" ^vcr confidrrrd what vvtrc thr raofnl 
 failinr of the expedition inulcr C»eneral rkny,oyMr,r 
 what i.\o you impute it ? 
 
 A. I looked up»m cnir fone n(»t to be npial IoiIkJ 
 our wav to Albany without loinc e*)-operation. 
 
 Q, "UMieie then did yon evnri') that eo-operatimi'l 
 
 A. 1 had no whrre to cxptd i» fiom, but up tlirHl 
 River from New* Ymk ; .ind the fiieecls of Colonel 1 
 ger's expedition wo\ild l»ave bten of \](r ecriaiiilv, 
 
 Q. If Cicneral VVn(lun!;ton's aimy hatl not brfiuij 
 would it not have impeded, or (lopped the progrriil 
 army up tiie llvidfon's River i' 
 
 A. I don't know the flr(n.;th of General Will 
 army, nor the nature of il^c country between ,\li>i 
 New York ; and therefore I cannot form any iuild 
 what w ould have iiappencil. 
 156. C^ Are yiMi not of (^pinion that there are vai\ 
 patVcs or ports on that river ? 
 
 A. 1 lovu\d them very ftrong between TieomicrJ 
 Albany, and from reports of military men of hiftil 
 tion in th? (t'l vice, 1 have underftood there were iv^ 
 ftrong pc^rts between New Voik and Albany. 
 *57' Q. From whence is the .ucount ®f the rtreiig',! 
 Gates's arr,>y taken ? 
 
 A. Fro'U a return voluntarily given by GcnrraU 
 me for ii>v own fati<f'.i«!lion when .At Albany, and tnJ 
 was iigned by (uMieral (lates. 
 J 5S. Q. Have you that return ? 
 
 A. I j;.ive It to General I^urgoync ; I faw it to-^ 
 has it. 
 
 Q^ Was it by confent of General Gates that thJ 
 after the convention retained their cartouch-boxcsM 
 
WIS \in '■^r tin 
 '11 ncnv knnwj 
 r;it anny i 
 ivf n»nliilnit»l 
 
 ..CKiiiRaon.] K V I n E N C E. 
 
 A. Tlicy retained their belts, ami I really (lon*t rccollfft 
 rhclher their rartoiich lioxcu were in general retained or not : 
 talking with Mr. (Jates when the kind's trwopH marched 
 with the accoutrements on, Mr. Ciatcs ofkcd i.ic (wc had 
 ten olil act|uaintancc formcily) whether it was not cuflo- 
 jary on field-days for arms and accoutrements to go to- 
 ctlicr? T told him, there was nothing ("aid in the convention 
 ^at I had agreed to with him relating to accoutrements, and 
 lat he could have no right to any thing but what was ftipu- 
 |tcd in that treaty, lie replied, '* Y^tju arc pcrfcflly right;'* 
 
 (1 turned to (bmc of the officers in their Icrvicc by, and 
 lid, *• if we meant to have had thcui, wc ought to have in- 
 
 fcrlcd ihcin in the convention." {IVilbdrcwm 
 
 "9 
 
 '; . 
 
 m any iii>!p 
 ere are vrtTi 
 'n TicondcrJ 
 
 
 
 I4 
 
 REMARKS 
 
 
 ll^''ft 
 
 5^ 
 
 it'i 
 
c 
 
 120 
 
 ] 
 
 «^v; 
 
 
 h • 
 
 ...i 
 
 ( '■ 
 
 ■%: 
 
 REVIEW of the EVIDENCE ; 
 
 Its feveral Parts compared with the prefatory 
 Speech and Narrutive ; and additional ReJ 
 marks and Explanations. 
 
 THE noble Lord who is at ifllie with me iipojl 
 this occafion has, in a great mtafurc, deprivej 
 me of the bcntfit of a reply, properly fo called, bJ 
 The con- caufc he has produced no defence. His Lorddiip ccrJ 
 GGcrmti'n t^i'^i)' i^^s bcCH Eccufed by me in manv initanccs of j| 
 duiiig the very ferious nature. If he is really willing that his po-l 
 «nq""-y- lineal, and my military conduft fhould be tried by faftl 
 alone, I certainly have not flicwn lefs inclination thai 
 his Lordfhip for that tefl •, but, taxed as 1 avow he hJ 
 been by me, with proceedings derogatory to the oblil 
 gations which ought to fubfift between man and marl 
 I really expefted, as I believe did the Houfe of ComJ 
 mons and the public, to have heard from him io^ 
 juftification in thofe refpeds. Inftead of that, the no 
 ble Lord, in opening the fubjcfls to which he propofd 
 to call evidence, touched fo flightly upon the branch i 
 the enquiry in which we are parties, that a ftrangd 
 would hardly have thought there fubfiftcd a difpua 
 between us. His Lordfhip contradided nothing tha 
 I have alledged refpecfting his conduft or my own ; 
 Hated no circumftance of blame againft me, except 1 
 meant as fuch the cnterprize of Bennington, which 
 (qualified with the epithet " fatal," and pronounced I 
 be the caufe of all the fubftquent misfortunes. Hj 
 pafied entirely over the tranfa(5^ions at Saratoga, 
 forty cfficers or more, belonging to the Conventio 
 
 troop 
 
M:^ 
 
 A-jt: , 
 
 REVIEW QF THE EVIDENCE. 121 
 
 Loops, then in England, one only was propofcd to be 
 ille'^ 1 his Lordlhip's part, viz. Lieutenant Colonel 
 luherland, of the 47th regiment, v.pon parole from 
 K Congrefs, and stl'ing with a corps of the Fcnciblc 
 len in North Britain •, but, upon further refledlion, 
 
 [is Lordihip thought proper to difpenfe with the at- 
 
 tndancc of this officer j and the only witnefs under 
 
 Irdcr of the Houfe was Mr. Skene. No man was 
 
 "tter qualified to give an account of the proceedings 
 
 Bennington j and I heartily lament that the public is 
 
 jeprived of his tcftimony. 
 Eut although I am thus left in pofleffion of the evi- 
 
 |cnce, uncontroverted by the noble Lord, I avail my- . 
 
 :!f of my right of doling the caufe, for the following chim of 
 iirpoles : firiL to colled from the minutes (which, in *^'"- ^'"" 
 
 ' • -I- -iiiTj g'^vne to 
 
 n enquiry ot this nature, arc unavoidably prolix andcioie the 
 iiarranged) the fcattered parts, and apply them to'*"'^'* 
 
 ts, under diftindt and feparate heads. Next, to t. - Mode of 
 
 ine whether the fads (which, from tlie filence of the'"^°''" '"** 
 loble Lord, I am to affumc as admitted by him) are in 
 7 refped invalidated by thecrofs exan.inaiion of the 
 itnc-0es by other gentlemen. And lallly, to explain 
 ch circun)flances, and anfwcr fuch new and collateral 
 )jedions, as have been pointed at in the fame crofs 
 amination, and were omitted, or only flightly noticed 
 
 my opening, bccaufe they did not exift, or were not 
 emed polTible objeds of blame or cavil. In purfu- 
 g thele purpofcs, i (hall confidcr the proofs precifely 
 
 the order of the fads to which they are produced. 
 
 Though the fii ft circumftancc I took notice of in my inrmuation 
 tiling, viz. my condud rcfpet^ing Sir Guy Carleton, "J havirg 
 as rather an inlinuation than an allegation againtl me, kiirivby'sir 
 thoLi^^ht it liohr that it fnould be the firft overthrown ^'•^'; "'"" 
 
 • '^ P , ,, . ... ^overthrown 
 
 evidence i tor while it remamed m any degree of by hicmn 
 rce, it gave a general tinge, as» it was meant to do, '""^"^n". 
 
 my whole caufe. I could not but txped even the 
 rtuous prejudices of the human heart to be againft 
 e, whilft it was poifible to be conceived that in ab- 
 
 cc of tte commander in chief, to whom I had adcd 
 
 fecond ; 
 
 iv ■,:■: 
 
 AV . . -; 
 
 'at >*^ " 
 
 :;^'",i-::«': 
 
 ■■*??':" 11' 
 
 ■■'?-K-y, 
 
 ■i^::.'- n 
 
 m^ 
 
 ^■>- A 
 
 • 'i' ; 
 
 ' 1 
 
 • 1: , 
 
 1 
 
 ■tr ' ■■ 
 
 . ... 
 
 L^r!:- 
 
 ' "-., ' 
 
 ■4i' ' 
 
 
 ^"-■... 
 
 ■ ' ' J ' , , . 
 
 ■'/■ 
 
 4 ■ ' ■' 
 
 < ■ 
 
 V ■ ■ , 
 
 .' . 
 
 !■ „ ■ . K- 
 
 _j.;V-' ' 
 
 vo ;•«-'" " 
 
 ■';'■-■''■ 
 
 ■■:;.vn«^ 
 
 • >'■' 
 
 -:;t:; '■ 
 
 ,£:•*• 
 
 
 ,'•<-•'* 
 
 
 
 i« > ' ' 
 
 '»! ■ 
 
 ■:':^?'''a 
 
 
 if a* 
 
 Mi 
 
 %i,' 
 

 
 Carleton's 
 evidence, 
 ^u. I, ;, 3 
 
 I 
 
 122 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 fccond; whofe attention I had conftantly experienced I 
 and with whole confidence I was then honoured ; I hail 
 pradiifed unmanly and adulatory iatriguc to fuperledtl 
 him in a favourite objc(5l of command. — There ar:l 
 few worfe modes of betraying a fuperior officer to btl 
 found upon the records of diflionour ; and whoevel 
 refledls upon the degree of odium with which the moiJ 
 palliated adls of that fpccies have been received bl 
 mankind, will not wonder ar, or condemn my impJ 
 tience, in applying my firft qucftions to Sir Guy CarlJ 
 ton to that particular objedt. Clear as my juftificatioj 
 ftood by the letter formerly referred to [No. II.] I fliaiil 
 ^ be forgiven for obtaining, though with fome redundarJ 
 cy, a full and fatisfaftory confirmation of my inno-| 
 cencc, from the verbal teftimony of the party whom 
 was fuppofed to have injured. 
 
 It may be proper here to obferve, that the abovemenJ 
 tioned afpcrfion, to which I have fo often adverted, ani 
 at which I have drove in vain for due terms to expreJ 
 my indignation, was not the only one caft upon mc k\ 
 fpeding Sir Guy Carleton. When impartial and can] 
 did men revolted at the infinuation of my treachenJ 
 my prcfumption and infolence (a leflfer but (till a caj 
 luiunious charge) was pointed out in that part of tli!| 
 paper [No. IILj that treats of the force to be left inCaJ 
 nada, and the difpofition of it. I am pleafed with [h 
 queltions in the crofs examination of Sir Guy CarkJ 
 ton, marking the prefcribed diftribution of the troopsj 
 6fi. (38, 59, 40, 41, 42, 43.) becaufe that enquiry afj 
 fords mc an opportunity of juftifying myfelf in a poirj 
 refuted, which I havc not taken notice of before. The poll 
 and the troops vhich I imagined would be neceffaryj 
 occupy them, were fpecified irerely to fhew thattlf 
 number of 3000 was indifpenfibly requifite for the dfj 
 fence of the province. 1 he whole of that detail coif 
 curred with Gtreral Carleton's requifitions for reinforcti 
 ment, and with my realoning upon thofe requifitionsj 
 and when I aflftrt, as I now do, that I never prefumcf 
 to fugged the neceffity or propriety of forming a deti] 
 
 Afperfion 
 from the 
 j)3;ier. No, 
 111. 
 

 l.t 
 
 REVIEW Oi^ THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 123 
 
 of pofts (thus given for information) into precife or- 
 ders for the general upon the fpot, I am furc the fecre- 
 tary of ftate will no more contradid that alTertion than 
 he has done any other I have made. 
 
 When in the fame paper I confidentially communi- No. in. 
 cated my reafons for preterring certain corj)s to others, 
 I was ac^tuated by the fame principle of offering every 
 opinion that could conduce to make the intended fer- 
 vice efteflual. I thought it a juft claim in an arduous Apology 
 undertaking, to have my own choice of the troops ; and 1°/^ coTpi?" 
 I am perfuaded Sir Guy Carleton never took ill of mc, 
 cither that claim, or a fubfequent one in the fame pa- 
 per, of being held free from any imputation of delay, 
 till I (hould be clear of the province of Quebec. WitK 
 an unfeigned confidence in Sir Guy Carleton, I thought 
 it a precaution fully jullifiablc, to fccure myfelf againft 
 others, in the numerous and complicated departments 
 under him, who might be found lefs equitable than 
 he is. 
 
 I know I have before complained of the produflion 
 of thefe fecret communications ; but after fo many 
 precedents as the laft SelTion furniflied, of withholding 
 parts of correfpondences from Parliament, upon the 
 plea that they might afFedl individuals, the noble Lord's 
 lilence upon tliofe complaints, gives me a right Hill to 
 comment upon the finifter purpofes that are to be 
 sicribed to the production of that paper at length, ra- 
 ther than by extradl. Thofe purpofes were various ; 
 but it muft be conftflcd one, and only one, good efTeft 
 may refult from a review of them, viz. It may fcrve 
 as a lalucary caution to any officer, who fnall for the 
 future be admitted into confultation with the fame mi- 
 nifter, how he commits hiniklf by an opinion of men 
 and things. 
 
 The next point that I entered upon previouQy to my 
 narrative, was the tenor of my orders, and I L iicve it 
 was generally expeftcd that the noble Lord would liave 
 taken fome notice of the faft I alledged, that every 
 4ifcretmary latitude which J had propofed was erafed, 
 
 while 
 
 1 «' 
 
 
 
 'tH: 
 
 
 
 4 - ■• ■(■ 
 
 
 
 
 f- 
 
 
pr 
 
 124 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 
 
 thf army 
 v^n tiirc- 
 ing a w.iy 
 to AL'Mny. 
 
 "i ^^ 
 
 Rrmsrki- %i;hile the plan zvas in his haud. As his Lore ifhip* had 
 ft.»ncc re- lo much commentcci upon the nature of" peremptory or- 
 '"''^''''['s'^'-' dcrs, as a^^//<rrrt/ queftion, in my ablencc, ic would 
 ti.Hi I ) he have been tair in him to have rcaronecl upon them after 
 J^du"*"' that important and decilivc clicumltance was laid 
 
 open. 
 Thfgenfrai Thc gcncral idea of fore hi^ a way ti Albany^ which 
 opinion of jj^g army at its outiet conceived, by realbning upon the 
 apparent principles of the campaign, without partici- 
 pation of the letter of the orders is clear, from the ge- 
 neral tenor of tlie evidence. I wiflied, it is true, to 
 have heard more copioufly the fentiments of Sir Guy 
 Carleton, bccaule he had full participation -of the or- 
 ders. Fro 11 the temper and judgment that always di- 
 rc(5t his condui'?>, he declined giving an opinion at the 
 bar upon what might become a quellion in the Houlc. 
 But 1 have fince (upon requcit) received his permillion 
 to publifh a letter from him to me, dated loon after the 
 Convention of Saratoga, which is in the Appendix No. 
 X. and with this reference I clofe my review of the 
 prefatory matter which 1 laid before the Committee. 
 
 Revinv of the frfl Period. 
 
 Mofl of the circumflances dated in my Narrative re- 
 fpccling the Hrit period of the campaign, were, from 
 their nature, to be eftablifhed by written teftimony ; 
 and the papers No. VII. and VIII. in the Appendix, 
 \vcre added to thofe before produced for that purpofe ; 
 strtngth of but the retums of the troops, No. XI. are moreover 
 thearmy. authenticated by the proper official authority, the adju- 
 tant general, and the detail of the artillery, by the major 
 of brigade in that department. 
 Proportton Fi;)m tlic cvidencc of the latter, is alfo confirmed 
 ota.tiiiery. aji that I idvanccd rcfpcdling the opinion and recom- 
 c!' Ri "m- mendation of Major General Phillips, for the propor- 
 fi Id »roin tion of anillery employed ; for the moderate quantity 
 v^ 4 "9- ^ j^^ comparatively with the principles andpradice of 
 
 other 
 
12/> 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 other fervices, and for the ^rcat ex})cdecl ufc of artille- 
 ry in the country where we were to a^t. . 
 
 Had thcle opinions been merely J'peculativc, the in- 
 telligence of the peri'wns from whom they came would 
 have given tiiem lu^iicicnt authority. But fortunately 
 they are verified by fudb j for it appears from a multi- 
 tude of evidence, that the enemy made the true ufe of 
 local advantages : they fortified every pals or proper 
 poft : the nature of the country, and the necellity of 
 keeping the banks of rivers, made it impolfible to turn 
 thole ports : had I wanted tlierefore artillery, 1 could 
 not have proceeded any given ten miles, but at a heavy 
 expence of my bcfl: troops. When it was lound that 
 I was provided with that forcible arm, the enemy inva- 
 riably (quitted their entrenchments, eitiier to retreat, or 
 fight upon ground where they fuppnfed artillery could 
 be leart cffedlually employed. I am to thank the ho- 
 nourable member, whatever his intentions might have 
 been, who by his crols ex imination placed the expedi- 
 ency of carrying the train I did, in fo clear a view. 
 
 The only remaining fad of the firll ])cri()d to which 
 verbal evidence is a[iplicable, viz. Tlie impollibility of 
 following the enemy further than they were followed 
 in their precipitate retreat from Ticondcroga, is elU- 
 blidied by Lord Bakarras and by Lord tlarrington. 
 
 Review of thefccond Period. 
 
 In entering upon the evidence whii:h rcfpefts the firil March from 
 tranfaction of the fecond period, viz. the march from ^'^en-^ioo. 
 Skenefborough to Fort Edward, I cannot helj) obferv- pon Ed- 
 ing how much of the blame imputed to me has been ^*'"** 
 occafioncd by mifreprefentaiion from perfons whofe bu- 
 finefs it was to decry my anions -, and hy uncommon 
 miilakes in the geography of the country by thoJe toMift«ke«ii» 
 whom my anions were milreprelcnted. IJy the crofs {.^^B^^caV. 
 examination of Lord Balcarras k mull be fuppofed, ras, .^u.go. 
 that the perfons v/ho fufpectcd I erred in not taking 
 the route by South Bay after thcfuccefs at Ticondcroga, 
 
 did 
 
 The lifts of 
 it. Ci.tain 
 niomfirlJ, 
 from (jueft. 
 lo to. 1 7* 
 
 Evidence of 
 l-d. Bilcar- 
 ra«, fiom 
 4. 1410 19. 
 
 Ld. Ralcar- 
 
 t.is's ciofs 
 examina- 
 tion, (juef* 
 
 93, 'H- 
 
 Ld. Wi\c»T- 
 ras, qucf. iS. 
 Lord Har- 
 ringtnn, 
 qucf. 4. 
 
 
 
 
 
 '■♦ 
 
 
 i; Vi- 
 
 ^iv:rnk 
 
 ■ ■ * 
 
 
 pi 
 
 Hr" ' *'■''' 
 
 ■V-'- '■-{'' -'r'. 
 
 
 
 r.f : 
 
 sVi ,;:.: ■„■■■■'' 
 
 '...'■'4. -.-•'-,>, * 
 
 .^•.■. ■■.•".»j»: 
 
 
126 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 
 I 
 
 f ' ;.. 
 
 
 C( 
 
 cc 
 
 t( 
 
 did not know where South Bay was. They fcem 
 Queft. 91. equally ignorant of the fituation of Pitch-ping Plains^ 
 by the queftion immediately following the former one j 
 and it muft have been a furprifc to the enquirers to find 
 that the route which they were inclined to approve, 
 was prccifcly that which the main body of the army 
 took under me in perfon, and with fuch cfFedl, as to 
 come up with the rear of the enemy, and drive them 
 from their fortified port at Skenefborough, with the 
 lofs on their part of five armed vcflcls and all the reft 
 of their water-craft. 
 
 But it may be faid, this part of the crofs-examina- 
 tion, though incomprehcnfible in point of geography, 
 ftill applied to the queftion taken notice of in my nar- 
 rative, viz. " Whether it would not have been more 
 expedient to return to Ticonderoga, and take the 
 route by Lake George, than to proceed, as I did, 
 by the Pitch Pine Plains to Fort Eidward ?" 
 I fliall not recapitulate the various motives I have 
 before ftated in fupport of that preference, having pub- 
 lick ly in my favour the opinion of an officer fo en- 
 lightened in military fcience, and 10 well acquainted 
 with the country as Sir Guy Carlcton •,* and never 
 having heard a difilirence of opinion in any other offi- 
 cer of a like defcription, to reft much more upon a 
 fubjed: fo fupportcd by reafoning and by fuccefs, might 
 be conftrued an attempt to divert the attention of my 
 examiners from points lefs defenfible. I therefore (hall 
 only add two fhort remarks •, the one, that the fa6l of 
 gaining confidcrabic time by allotting the whole fer- 
 vice of the water-craft to the tranfport of provifions 
 and ftores over Lake George, inftead of employing 
 great part of it for the tranfport of the troops is incon- 
 teftibly proved by the evidence of Captain Money and 
 Lieutenant Colonel Kingfton : the other, that to have 
 reached Fort Edward with the troops fooner than the 
 29th of July (the day that the firfl embarkation of 
 
 Sir G. Car- 
 lcton, qu. 
 9, 10. 
 
 Confidera- 
 We time 
 fained by 
 the army 
 taking the 
 route to 
 Fort Ed- 
 ward by 
 land. 
 
 Capt. Mo- 
 sey, qneft. 
 4 to II. 
 l.ieut. Col. 
 Kingfton y 
 ^u«ft. 23. 
 
 * See alfo the Map of the Country. 
 
 provifions 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 127 
 
 jvifions arrived at Fort George) would not only have 
 en ufelefs, but alfo highly impolitic •, becaule the 
 jfiftence of the troops at Fort Edward, before the 
 fival of that embarkation, muft have been brought 
 land carriage through much difficult road all the 
 ly from Fort Anne, whi^n, on the contrary, by re- 
 iin'mcT in the neighbourhood of Skcncfborough till 
 paffage of Lake George was elTcflcd, cxclulivcly of 
 confiderations of covering the removal of the hofpi- 
 lof Huberton, and alarming tlic Conncdticut by the 
 [fition of General Reiderd's corps, the army was com- 
 j)dioufly fupplied by water-carriage. 
 |The next circumftance for examination, according 
 the order of the Narrative, is the tranfport of the 
 razines of provifiuns, Sec. from Fort George ; and 
 highly incumbent upon me to fliew the dilHcukies 
 that operation, becaufc, if they were avoidable, it 
 ill be acknowledged one of the principal grounds 
 )n which I vindicate the plan of the expedition to 
 |nnington will fail me. 
 lilt lam pcrfuaded, crery candid examiner will firft 
 lulgc mc in a fliort paule. It will be recolledted, The char- 
 It this is the only part of the campaign upon which J^/^^r'the 
 noble Lord has laid his finger, as judging it pro- Lt. Cene- 
 tive of the fubfequent events. The crois-exami- "J^ 3'°",*;, 
 Jtion had already been prefTed upon the fame ideas, part of the 
 [ch want of knowledge of the nature of tranfport in ""^""p*'^"* 
 \t country has been betrayed ; fo much prepolTefiion 
 |unneceflary delays has apptrared -, fuch emphafis of 
 eftion has attended every circumilance of my con- 
 at this period, that I fhall fland acquitted of pro- 
 Sty if I preface tlie application of the fubfecjuent 
 jdcncebya more comprcheiidve and cotnplcre furvey survrv of 
 Ithe difficulties and anxieties of my fituation than 1 ^^.'^ '''"i'^;»i- 
 eht was neccnary bcrcre. anxieties. 
 
 He combination of arrant;ement for fcedino; the 
 ly might, in fnd, be Pinv.d to iuve extended even p,,^;^^,.^^ 
 Ireland", for fome part of tlic fupply depended upon nr.Dy. "^ 
 tvidualling fictt whiih wa^ [-ivpaicu in ihr.t country, 
 
 accu!'vlifi>'- 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 '■ '1 
 
 • * 
 
 f 
 
 * . 
 
 ». 
 
 i ' 
 
 ' , 
 
 )' 
 
 
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 ■•• 
 
 - V , 
 
 
 §im 
 
 > 1 
 
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 1 
 
 
 
 f 
 
 
 
 
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 •i; 
 
 
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 1 
 
 %^''. 
 
 ."-..■ 
 
 128 REVIEW OF THE IIVIDKNCE. 
 
 according to my rcquifuion bclbrc I left London, a 
 had not rcaclucl (^cbcc when the army took the fid. 
 The teilioiilhi'l's of the navitj;ition from C^cbrcroJ 
 mouth of the Sard need not be again ilefcribcd. tj 
 next embarrafllnent was to manage the conveyance;'; 
 that part of the fupply whieh came from Montreal, jp 
 which was much the greatell, without interfering w 
 the tranfport which with equal necelHty was to be tv 
 dited up the Saint Eawrcnce to Lake Ontario, fort'i 
 fervice of Colonel St. Lrger's expedition, and di? ij 
 menle llores (then neccflarily upon the move alio) 1 
 tlie winter maintenance of the u]>j>er country. I oth 
 might be added a lill ot chances and inconveiiiac: 
 incident to the carryin;^ places between Chambicra; 
 Saint John's-, the uncertainty afterwards of the padji 
 over Eake Champlain and Lake George-, the la' 
 rious and flow operations of drawing the boats overt: 
 Illhmus which divides the two lakes. Thefe toger 
 make a fyllem of embarralVments and difappoinLmc 
 hardly to be conceived by thufc who have not ex 
 ricnced them. 
 
 But although the whole ot* this arrangement (thefij 
 niiliing the upper country excepted) was maiie unJ! 
 my direction, I have been content to date my difficul:. 
 from the lodgement of the I'upplies at Fort Geo 
 and I have touched the oiher parts only to Ihew ni 
 perfpicuoufly the unt-airnefs of judging of an A-ner:ci 
 campaign upon Europ-an ideas. Mow zealoull/ laij 
 a general, in fuch an undertaking as mine, ir 
 fervcd by the chiefs of deparcnunts (and much prJ 
 is due fr jm me upon that icorc) for one hour he c| 
 find to contemplate bo:v he (Ij nil fight his armyy k 
 allot tzveniy to contrive ^'o-jj to feed it. 
 Behaviour The bcliaviour of the Indians is a circumllancei 
 vt" thein- material to be pafled over in a review of the anxieties] 
 **"^* this partof the 'ca;npaign. I had difcerned the caprice, [ 
 fuperdition, the felf-interedednefs of the Indian chanci 
 from my tirft intercourfe, even with thofe nations wlij 
 are fupppfed to have made the greateft progrefs towas 
 
 civilizati 
 
 i;;,.- 
 
RKVIFAV OF THF. KVIDENCE. iic 
 
 lviliz>uion : I nu'an with tliofo callcil the domiciliated 
 jtioiis near Montical. 1 had been taught to look upon 
 ir nnv)tc tr'bfS who joined rnc at Skcnelborou;'Ji us 
 [oro \v.irlikc -, but a very litrle time proved that, with 
 iinl ik-pravity in <:;eiKral jMiiicipi;', their only pre- 
 
 wKWC't coniuted \\\ I'erocity. The hopes I had placed 
 
 their wild iu)iu)ur, and in the controul of their con- 
 jdurs which, as I Itatcd belbre, at firll had been 
 iiiiinL;, were loon at an end •, and tlieir ill humour 
 mutinous difpofiLion were manifeft foon after my Lord Ffar. 
 rival at Fort Kdward. The apparent caufes of their X""^,^^ 
 lan^^e of tem[)cr were the refentmenc 1 had fhewn6toa3. 
 3011 i!ic murder of Mifs Macrea, and the redraints I 
 f\ laid on their difpofition to tommit other enorml- 
 ities; but I never doubted that their evil paflions 
 sre fomented, and their defection completed by the 
 
 )als of the Canadian interpreters. Rapacity, felf-in- 
 tell, and prefumption. arc the charadferiftics of thefe 
 tn, with fome few exceptions. The acquifition of 
 
 Indian lan<^uage has ulually been a certain fortune 
 
 a man with an artful head and a convenient con- 
 lience. 
 
 I To check the old praflices of peculation in thefe 
 tn, Sir Guy Carleton, with great judgment, had given 
 
 fiipcrintendency of the Indian department to Major 
 impbclland Captain Frazer, gentlemen of the higheft 
 feiiiity. Idle Britifli oHicers employed folely in the 
 jlitary conduct of that department, were alfo feledted 
 
 li ecjual propriety. The interpreters had from the 
 regarded with a jealous eye a fyftem which took 
 
 of their hands the dillribution of Indian neceflaries 
 
 prefents ; but when they found the plunder of the 
 intry, as well as that of tiie government, was con- 
 
 ilecl, the profligate policy of many was employed to 
 )mote diflention, revolt, anddefertion. 
 p take this occafion to acquit Monfieur St. Luc ofst. Luc. 
 
 fufpicion of his being concerned in thefe fadtions ; 
 
 I beliere he difcerned them. He certainly knew 
 
 It the Indians pined after a renewal of their accu- 
 
 K ftomed 
 
 .^*? 
 
 % r ..I 
 
 
•1 • V 
 
 
 I 
 
 : . 
 
 i 
 
 130 
 
 I, ml Un- 
 ringloii's 
 ^11. I III. le 
 iciud lo. 
 
 RIsVII'AV OK TIIK EVini:NCE. 
 
 nomcd honors; ;>iul tluit they wen* Ix'comc as impJ 
 ticMl ot Ins coiurovil .IS ol" all (hIkt, tlioiij'Ji llic pry 
 niul iiitiTcll ol auiluuiiy, aiui ihe a(lrctioi\ he U.\x'. 
 his (>1lI allori.itcs, iruliKCil him to cover llu" real cJ 
 \iik1ct various (rivolmis pivtciKcs ol ilikoiiiriit, J 
 which I was ilaily toiiiu ntril, but t() vvhith 1 conlLmj 
 attiiuinl: aiiil ihouj.'ji I ilinii-cd totallv wiij» Saii.t Lj 
 in OjunioM upon tlu- <"(]'icaiy ol ilulc allies, 1 inv.iiulil 
 took his a^Kicf in the niana<»c!nint of them, even: 
 an iiuiiiljH'MCO ol their moll eapneious taiicies, win 
 tiny iliil not involve the ilillionour ol" theKin}','s krv] 
 ;uul the ilil{Maec of huinaiiiiy. 'I'he ciumcil (.( 
 4th ot Augull washiKI at his |>renin«.»; inllanee, aJ 
 in that council, to my }i;reac alloniihiiK-nt (lor he iJ 
 [{wen mc lU) intimation of the ileli'Ui) the tribes ui 
 which he was moll particularly connedal, and ;| 
 whom he interpreted, declauil their intention ot 
 turninii; home, and liemancled my concurieinc 
 allillance. The emharralliiient of this event w,!s 
 ttcme. By aciiuiefcino-, 1 voUintarily rdinquiflid 
 of my force t'lat had been obtained with iiiime^ 
 char<\e to j;overnmcnr, that haii created h\\xh cxjm 
 ration at hoiue and abroad, and that indeed my osj 
 army was by no means in condition to dilpcnlc 
 becaufe, depending- uptMi the fuppoled alUlhuKc 
 this much over- valued race lor itouts and out-poll 
 and all the Idler, bur ncccirary lerviccs, for givij 
 due ••epofc to th.e camp, the Hritiih light-infantrv 
 been trained to higher purpoles : they were cldlisj 
 to lead in the r;eneral and dccilive combats 1 expal 
 in thf wootU, and could not be Iparcd, or riikd, 
 harrallcd, without palpable confequences of the 
 dilai^reeablc kind. 
 
 On the contrary, I was convinced a cordial red 
 ciliation with riic Indians was only to be eliedcd bjl 
 rciuinciation of idl my lornxr prohibitions, and aninfl 
 gcT.cc in blood am' i;ipine, I hA{.\ not a *vierul ini 
 department in \v;u)m I could confide except Mil 
 Campbell, Captain Frazer, and the other Bniiflu 
 
CE. 
 
 )tnc as iiiipi 
 i[',l» I lie pri 
 m lu- Iv.rc 
 
 he real ciw 
 coiitfiii, \m: 
 h 1 i'i)iill,ii',i 
 Mih Saii.t 1,1 
 >, 1 iiw.iiia! 
 Iicm, even 
 hmcics, w 
 ' Kin}','s lav 
 
 inllaiui-', 
 M (ibr he 
 I lie itibfsw 
 d'jci, and 
 
 tKUnCIKC 
 
 t'vcnt w.is 
 
 linquiflu'il 
 
 Willi iiiunCii 
 
 d hi}j;h ap 
 
 ulccd niv 0? 
 
 dllpcnlc wit! 
 
 I airilhiiKC 
 
 and out-poi 
 
 .'s, for givi 
 
 t-infantrv 
 
 were Mh 
 
 ats 1 expeii 
 
 , or liikal, 
 
 of the 
 
 cordial red 
 
 effc-aedbjl 
 
 Is, and an iri 
 
 li > Vic ml in 
 
 excejit Mi 
 
 icr Bniilli' 
 
 RIVIl'AV OI- THI'. ICVIDI'.NCF,. 
 
 Irs: ilnir i.^iiorancr of the laiij-uai^cs, and {\\c very 
 Lbiiv ot tlicir ( liaraclicrs, rciuUiiil iIkiii oI' no wcij^lit 
 
 »T 
 
 Imli.iii (ounei 
 
 Is. A 
 
 n aiilwer, ncviiilu'icls, vva^ to 
 
 D.ulc upon the moment •, and tlic |).iri I tool: was 
 
 Iglvr a hmi rdulal to their propoliiioii, and to ad- 
 
 to (he controids 1 had beloie clLdjlillxd •, but, 
 
 |th a i<'in|KTate repreliMitaiion ol llie ties ol' laith, of 
 
 ic'idliiv, and honour, to join eviry other arfruniefit 
 
 llilliiic wi»h tiiole piinvipies whii I) I could devife, 
 
 jpcikiadc: and eneoiir.i;',e tlu.rn to continue ihcir ler- 
 
 s. 
 
 his rpeeeli apjK-ared to have the defircd cflecl. 
 
 ^ic tribes nearelL home aflecled to le[)aratc from the 
 
 ''^ '''i^Jtrs, and only prefled for permifljon to return iri 
 
 tics to ji;ather in their harvell, jiropofinj', to relieve 
 
 odicr i wjjicli was {>;ranre(l. Some or tiie remote 
 
 i-s alio Teemed to rctra('^l; tJK-ir propofitions, and 
 
 \{vi\l\\ a /.eal for tlie f rvice ; but the defertion took 
 
 cc the next day by Icore.s, loaded with fueji plun- 
 
 as they had coUeelied •, aiul it continued from day 
 
 .ly, till fearce a man that had joined at Skencl- 
 
 )\m\ remaine( 
 
 This whole tranladi(jn, I aver, i,.,r.i ir4r- 
 
 riri|;lr>iri 
 <^U. bfl re- 
 
 before the plan of Bennington was formed. It 
 
 d 
 
 the crof« 
 
 ars io from the cvKlence prouucccl upon tlic croi.s icrcdio. 
 
 lination by ilie ij^enilemen to whom I am obi i<7ed *'*•''"• ^'' 
 io many occalions, for eiudieatiri<r diflerc^t fub- 
 
 ; and the precile date could have been lUrthcr 
 sorted by a memorandum of Sir Francis Clarke ; 
 
 I thou<^ht tliac reference I'uperiluous in a matter io 
 
 kious. 
 
 'hat Monfieur St. Luc, anxious for the credit of his 
 
 iritc troops, and invited by the propcnfity be 
 jd in the minifter to liften to any whifpered intel- 
 ^cc, in contradi6lion to that he receivec' from the 
 
 Krai himkdfi that, under thele temptations, ihac 
 partlzan fhould mifplace dates, and confound 
 
 fs, neither furprifes nor offends me. With this 
 
 ^"'on of fadi, I leave him in full poirefTion of 
 
 stulancy rcfpeding my military talents j and am 
 
 K 2 concerned 
 
 
 
 ■■ . \ 
 
 • ■, r 
 
 
 I 
 
 ■i. 
 
 J 'if 
 
If-- 
 
 (2^ 
 
 German 
 
 troops. 
 
 Gharacler 
 of M. G. 
 Kcidcrd. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 concerned at no effcfts of his comments or co i)n;yj 
 cations, in tlie miniiU-r's clolct or in the news-papJ 
 except as they may have tentltd to iupport the gcna 
 fyftem of deception which has fo lonp; and lb ta!jl 
 influenced his Majeily's advilers. I lie Indian p| 
 ciple of war is at once odious and unavailing; ■, ancj 
 encouraged, I will venture to pronounce, its co:j 
 cjuences will be feverely repented by the prelent 
 •and univerfally abhorred by poderity. 
 
 But to proceed to the furvey of odier difiici]ltio| 
 the time. Great attention was due to the manaOT 
 of the German troops. 
 
 The mode of war in which they were engaged [ 
 entirely new to them ; temj)tations to delert werJ 
 thcmfelves great, and had been enhanced and ciif 
 lated among them by emiflaries of the enemy 
 much art and induftry. Jealoufy of prediicdio:! 
 the allotment of polls and feparate commands 
 fubfills among troops of different dates ; and a 
 preference of judgment in the commander in 
 often appears a narrow national partiality. 
 
 I confefs I was much aflifted in maintaining i 
 diality in an army thus compofed, by the frank, ipj 
 ed, and honourable character I had to deal wii 
 Major General lleidefel •, — a character which wasi 
 early im[)rtfied upon my mind, and which no tiiil 
 intricacy, danger, and dillrcfs, has fmce edacdd 
 addreii was fiill requifitc to fecond his zeal, m 
 diffiile it through the German ranks ; and I Itudid 
 throw iheiii into fituations that might give them 
 
 * One cf thofe comments Lord George Germain thougliJ 
 per to fl Ate, in a fptecli in the Houfe ot Commons. HiiiT 
 ihij) gave me a character in the words ufed by Mr. St. Luc, 
 converfatit-n bemecn them. — " II eft brave, inais lourd con 
 •' Allenand." 
 
 The letter alluded to was addrcfled to me from Canada, 
 Mr. St. Luc*s voyage from England. I do not know to wb 
 duplicate was addrdFed, but he certainly was a perfun of dilij 
 for it appeared in the news*papers the fame day I Kcm 
 onj;inal. 
 
 i" ■■.■ 
 
v'4- ' 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 133 
 
 •nee in thcmfclves, credit with their prince, and 
 Icritv in the purfuit oF an cnterprife, whicli, when 
 [difficulties were confidercd, in faft required enthu- 
 
 )ther parts of the alliance, though not liable to 
 
 licion of treachery, like the Indian.s, nor of con- 
 lliience to be lb much attended to as the Gernians, 
 i^erthclcfs had tiieir perplexities. The Canadians, 
 ;hc pre lent j^ftc officered by rrentlemen of p-rcat condition in their 7''=^""»- 
 
 intry, but were not to be tlependcd upon. Inltead 
 [the cnterprifinp; and daring fpirit which dillinguiflicd 
 
 characlcr of that people under the French govern- 
 [nt, was lubllitutcd a longinp; after home, the died of 
 
 ik of arms and long habits of domellic enjoy- 
 
 US-, and this difeafe (nial de payz) is carried in 
 
 im to a greater proverbial extreme tlian in any other 
 
 Iplc to whom the term is more commonly applied. 
 
 It was neither eafy to keep thefc people together, 
 
 to fupport tiie itieas of relpedt which the enemy 
 
 »rtained of ihem from the remembrance of the for- 
 war. Tiic only manner of effeding the latter 
 [•pofe was to Ihew them oecafionally at a diftance, 
 rarely to commit them upon parties where they 
 likely to fall in with the bed clafTes of the Ran- 
 oppoled to us : perhaps there are few better in 
 
 world than the corps of Virginia Riflemen, which 
 ijci under Colonel Morgan. 
 
 'he Provincial Corps, of which I had two in em- Provinda) 
 
 ), and feveral detached parties, were yet a heavier '°'p^* 
 
 upon time and jiaiience. I'hey were compofed of 
 felled Loyalifts, many of whom had taken refuge 
 
 'anada the preceding winter, and others had joined 
 \\t advanced. The various intercils which influ- 
 
 cd their adions rendered all arrangement of them 
 )radicable. One man's views went to the profit 
 Ich he was to enjoy when his corps (hould be com- 
 ic; another's, to the protedion of the diitrid in 
 jch he refided ; a third was wholly intent upon re- 
 
 »e againft his pcrfonal enemies i and all of them 
 
 K 3 were 
 
 
 
 : ( 
 
 
 
 
 
 •a' 
 
 W''' '.:'■ 
 
 #.': i>'[ 
 
 
 
 
 
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 " . f * 
 
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rn 
 
 >54 
 
 I 
 
 Oilv 
 
 «i 
 
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 fUlllMCIll' 
 
 too. 
 
 ui:vn:w di iiir. i.vidi.ncI'. 
 
 wnv rrinion.nu i-vcn to :ui i.lr;i ol" rnlnMilim 
 
 ;i 
 
 I Ici'.M" tlu' liUll'IIUPt \vl\i> ll\(Mll(| ;u'l ns H |Miv,ll 
 
 I'' II'IM 
 
 fliul \vlu> .IS mi odii . r, or in wlioU- \ory, r'ulin llMiij^Hd, 
 Ih\ \v,is liKloin l.\ir l.ii I'M ilv in.nK mimom.' t!»rinhlv(^| 
 nn«l .is l\ii\lv iis ii l.nKvl, InMcc'cl :i irl.irn. > titj 
 t\MUtii.liul( r ii\C'hivl, wIuihiouM not he pin 
 t1(>lrj>.i(r.l In ;nu)tlur li.nul, wiilunn ihO'in >l,n'l 
 
 Inn. 
 
 vires ;is i!uv wi-ir umIIv iil lo|-, iv. Ir.iii I 
 
 Mini 
 
 M Oil 
 
 tl 
 
 r(>;\vls, ntul <\uivliii!r ^It'tih hiniMls or loIuMur. \\y 
 
 nr 
 
 •!, 
 
 oiuii woir till' oiuiMi r.illinrnts (^1 nu- tunul, ;i 
 t>> \\u' ni.iin iicrriruv .ivoiiUions ol (nmin.nul pnrii 
 niilu.uv. Ii will likrwilc hv vrni<'inlv i('.| \\\.\\ I 
 
 ton.iMi C\>!oi 
 
 '( 
 
 I 
 
 M- w.is, ;ii tliis (imi-, h 
 
 V\>\l SiaiUM\ : cv IV hour w.i"; |M(-j»^i\;int with ri 
 vvcnts. Vhc cuuli^l ;uv,l innMrjiKliiotl, vrllct'lini; i;[\J 
 iiuh A (iui,U;on, will i lu'v k tho rcwliiu Is ol tluii 
 Ivirc: f;u- he it \\o\\\ i\w lmoukmiiI i!>,\i 1 iliil i\tM * 
 nur ni.mv ntxM^ : 1 (i;iK hope to Iiivo ptincil, I'l 
 t!iry ;ii\^ nn tholo w'r. I\ hoc' vcr li'-in IjHvili 
 JVMiUoJ .\r, ;i;vl \v'\ Mv \v r M uov" m,iv bo impiii, 
 
 o,ij 
 
 mo m oSiUM' i;iil.in»r', nu \\\c cv.innnns inc ivn |i 
 iiunlcil io tiaiMirh 011 .n-o ol tlu ir vliK (ucrics. 
 
 '^xprfliti.^n 
 
 i\r.i' g 
 
 u! Hvnv IvM' UK- vApOvluion M lk'nmni;ton as 1 
 
 it 111 
 
 nPvMI C\ UIvIK 
 
 y\ 
 
 \c 
 
 tl 
 
 t|\u~uioas vipoii thv' oim!s rv.nwnUion .110 l^' :tWy 
 
 ]>l.\n.itoiv of the hints \\!iicli iVll Ironi tho nohK- I 
 at"tcr\vai\ls» ii\at o\w wouKl ahuoll itiiairinc the h 
 
 t «-(niKI \io\ h 
 
 \n 
 
 iliMilooil t<> itilVr, tli;il iiour of ibr Fl 
 
 vinciaU vvith n\c wur liiucrc in tliclr lo\.ih\ . i>('li;»p$ in.inv 
 l'.>. Atcvvu.rcol linhiiviuiiluvi binciy, .imonk; wlnrh 
 be u.vin'i tvn 10 lUitA-ul.uiy.c Mr. KuUi, who toil at IV 
 
 
 ir.rci 
 
 flivi V. apt. Mi.uwwd. uhi> was lov«;»nl m rvcrv tcivuc i>t 
 tvi tho c:nl ot tho c.inip.tu;n. 1 onlv iu..int;un ili.it tlic 
 an»1 the p.iHions ot the tovoltoil .Xiikoi'.uis nMu'ciUor in tlic >J^ 
 of the (.\'»ny;rcts : snd ihoi'c o( the Iv^vuUtU biCitk aiul UiKli 
 iiuo vaiiiHis puihuis, wiih which ihc i:avUc ot the K.iiig I1-* 
 tic or nothing to tio. 
 
&rfe 
 
 MCI'. 
 
 Iiihi'iilmu'i 
 
 \ pi l\ .11. n.,.| 
 
 "^ rillin IlimiJ 
 
 In* pMi l>v,l 
 ti J.u'lmn, ■[ 
 ■^ o| Im h i(V| 
 li'Mii^ I'M ni 
 Mtli ■;, I 1, !■• 
 
 • mind, ;i\' 
 nni.nul pnn^ 
 cl .!ru I 
 
 I with cii',', 
 vnci'lini; up 
 S 111 lluii <c\ 
 
 pltUCil, I'll 
 
 I'll l|Huli(',i![ 
 
 iinpui,il'\- 
 
 arc not luillj 
 
 (Ml as 11 (l.n 
 
 i<M1 JIV l>i>i 
 u' noMo I «^i 
 lu- ihc 
 
 otic of tbr N 
 \\ Im'h u «" 
 
 ;U Ui'lUliac. 
 
 :■! \ ivC of »ii .^ 
 
 i.it tin- i:'to( 
 
 \U-r ill tlu- I'l^ 
 
 ilv iinvi I'viKl:^ 
 
 ni'ViFAV or III!'. f:viniN(F. 
 
 '3'J 
 
 jrr orii'jiMlIv ililip.iuil to I'lricdo. I' will l)C rrpti- 
 (oi mc, tluuloic, l(» (oiilidci liuin in that inaniirr, 
 III Ikmh il»i wlioU' I am In ((»ll(<'l, tliat flic faults r-.i-. rup. 
 »;int t'» !'<•• cllaMillird ai'\ ili.it I cini'lMycd ( irrmans '""'* 
 (dim I tlic dil|>"liMMii ol a ( oniiiiy m wlii' li no (irr- 
 j)s KJidid: ili.it ili<" moiiiuiii}/, dra|nKnis was im- 
 irlliUV : til It 'lie i,m(M- piv n in ilu' cxpfdilioii was 
 nrcat : liiif '• ^'-as ii'it oiIjMIi illy ddi^iicd l(jr licM- 
 jiiion : ill II tin' JiiKc w.is ii. idctjuatc. 
 In iCj'.aid t'l ilir III II ol ili' It ( li.ii|ns, icl.itivr to tlie 
 ^nloymciil ol (t( rmaiis, it wixild l>i- vvallc ol ti'ii t . '■'"''' "' 
 1(1 to tin- lull aiilwcr nvn by I-okI ll,iiriii(',f'>(i. Co- (;,.,, „,,„[^ 
 id Kiiiidloii lias aiilvMrctl iliv (picllioii nhMwIin;' ilic'-'"' ""- 
 3Uiilin|r, tlu' tliairnoni ; jiiid iiiotrovn it will lir lo ,,,'(! J,,. 
 tnilHTcd, tliat tlir (olld'hiijr liorli'S wa ; hy no means '" '.'""'' 
 
 •II I <..I.Kin(>. 
 
 lined to that lirvic. I hey weir rvfpiiliic lot ( any- fi.m, -icHt. 
 tlu' lia|>;i',a*K'/' <'^ •'"' ainiy, as rxpi'licd in the m- '"''^ '" '^'* 
 iidions to Colonel ll.mme, 'o the amount of 150'). 
 IIS I 111 ninll -MH e may liave lliiifk lomi! ^rcntlemen, as 
 mliriMiiiji the idea lli.it the Imt,!'/!^^'" .itfendin^i; the 
 iiy was ol eiioinioin ludk. I icpi'll a Inlpen' c of 
 joineiit ii|) Ml this aiiiele, till I (ome to the proper 
 la' ul explan.ition ; ami I revi'rt to the part of the 
 ij-jjc • hieh le'.'ins oi moll importaiuc, vi/. the ex •'''■'•''"' 'n- 
 It of the match, as dchiilied in the 1 nil rudlioiis, .„',.' /i !"|,5r 
 upaictl with the llreiiuih "!' tlu- detachmeiir, &(\ p'p-r-te 
 It tail har'.lly cli .«pi' oblci valioii, what llrcnf.'^rh to \\'„u,'!'^f,t„n 
 dclcnee upon this point may 1)C ilenved fVom arl- '^"- ^"' 
 atcs who wen- not expecleil to a])p'Mr in my behalf, 
 r I lake llipport from the nobh I .orti himlclF, <incl 
 who have believed in his hiie allution., dv adhered 
 his favourite doctrines, by jiKadinfr th.it I undertook 
 expedition to Benninp^lou upon rep 'rr, Ihcnfnhened 
 the lu^fgellioii of perpms of lons^ cxi'rricure aud re.- 
 •ucc III Jii.criiii \ vjho lad lu:cii prcjcnt nil the (pot 
 ^en the rebellion broke out \ and wholi- iiiiorin.iiion had 
 II inv'ch relpeeU'd by the ailminili ration in I'ni.dand; 
 / the friciiih to the Hr'uifu (u.Je ivcrc a: five to oric^ 
 ' that they wanted only tic appear muc of u proicMing 
 
 K 4 force 
 
 
 ^ i. 
 
 V' 
 
 x * 
 
 J.- 
 
 't 
 
 
 r 
 
 ^' 
 
 
 
 /: 
 
I' 
 
 li 
 
 i ' 
 
 136 
 
 RF.viF.w 01" HIE r.vinr.NCE. 
 
 I<y ihr 
 Gcinuiii. 
 
 I 
 
 force to pjcw tbcmfchcu Some criticiiVis upon 
 aJc(jv.i;icy ot' tiio toiii- I ctnployi\l, may dtkii \\ 
 ^.j,^ ^^j,„^^caulc oF the noble Lord; but will lie maintain, tJ 
 oi iii<; un- a recruit ol torcc trom the ciu'iiiy's couiurv waij 
 nJ''',,',''f',,' wild c\pa'"tition, whi-ii thi* recruiu'i-.s, |)i()viiui,il 
 f.ii'po.uvi lonels, governors, land proprietors, aiul popular lr,i,l( 
 of the party who glorv in the v!e!!:^naii«)n of '[^ 
 were upon the Ipot, and perlonaliy iniereileil m J 
 levies ? lie mud luuly iland forth my alvorare in t^l 
 v>inr, or entirely lorget the reaionin^; he held lo J 
 Villiu.n Howe, when without the advantains ot lu| 
 recruiters-, aaiiiill: the belie!" ot the (ieneral himMi 
 \inprc[)ared to repair the diiappoiniment, it dilapio^ 
 mcnt cnfued, in a mealure ot lo miu ii more nia^iiiiiiji 
 and lb much lefs real encouragement, //(f referred tot^j 
 expedient of recruitinj); from the enemy, what he 
 not dren^ith to liipj^ly tVom the mitional troops.* 
 
 This I nmll inh;l' is an inianlwerable detence, \\\ 
 rcfped to the noble l/)rd, and ih^le wiv) think \v!J 
 him ; to'' it is iinCi: and jx)!itivc eoineitlenee wiilitu 
 opinions, palt and prclent — and it' 1 laid it will \A 
 with thole to come, nn'' prophecy would be aurhoii2!l 
 by the conviction and triumpii whicii Mr. (ial\vai| 
 evidence, refpeding the loyalty oF the Amcriu 
 feemcd to produce in the parties to whom I alhulc. 
 But in due relpe*!:}. to other judges, it is incimiLx; 
 upon me to (late a more lerious detence. 
 
 As Lieutenant Colonel Ivingllon cannot prove i; 
 dically that the rough draft of tlic delign whicli ciuj 
 
 ] 
 
 * In a letter from Lonl George Germain to Sir Willi.mi IN 
 dated May :8, 1777, atur acl<iio\vlcili;inj; titat the lurcc foi thod 
 paign would be il.ort ol" ilic General's rcijuilitions, is the to Io«i 
 paragr.iph : 
 
 *' It wc may credit the accoimts wliich arrive from all qiri! 
 ** relative to the good incliiutions ot the inhabitants, thcrej 
 *♦ every reafon to exped that your iuecefs in Pent} Iv.iniai 
 •' enable yon to raiie trum among them fiieh a Ioilc as mavj 
 ** futHcient for the inttrior dclcn^t of the previticc, and leave! 
 " army at liberty to proceed to efienlive operations." 
 
 The whole ot the letter, from which the above is an cMrJJ 
 U curious,]and may be Iccn in the Parliamentary Regiftcr, No.i 
 
I 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. ij; 
 
 the alT.iir of Bennington was the fame wliich was ib- 
 
 [ivc'icd by General Kciclcfcl, antl I am unwillintT upon 
 
 icmory to incur a poflihiliry of millake, even in an 
 
 Iminatui.ii eircumUanee fli.it refpefts an al'fent friend, 
 
 am copteiit it flioultl be confulerc;! as an uncertainty, 
 
 1 I drop all ulc that conlcl be drawn from the original 
 
 npofuion. It u i.'l fully aniwcr my purpole to Uilherc 
 
 the hare allertion which I am lure will never be con- 
 
 [radit'Uil, tint Major (tencral Reidelel originally con- 
 
 :iveil an expedition for the purpole of mounting jiis 
 
 Ir.igoon*;, and lupplvini'; the troops in general with 
 
 Wj'paL'e-iiorles ; that I thought his idea mif^lu he ex- 
 
 ^m!ed to much greater ule, and that the plan was con- 
 
 Jtiered, amended, and enlarged, in concert with him. 
 
 riu'refore upon the abllracl ground and re.ifon of the 
 
 le.ijure, I might urge, that it was fupported by naked 
 
 iilitary principle, according to the fentiments of a 
 
 general of great natural talents, and long fervice under 
 
 ic lirlt mailers of the age. Ir is proved, that the 
 
 Bme lentimenrs wore ratilieil by the full approbation of 
 
 lujor Cniicral Phillips, an oificer of fmiilar ^^'trferip- , 1^.^!^^^^^ 
 
 kion, to Wiidin the plan was communicated ; and if a Kinpfion's 
 
 inglc i>art of the lame jdan, mentioned to be at firit ''"^"' 
 
 iilapproved by Brigadier Ciencral Frafcr, continued to 
 
 )c lb after explanation, that dilapjMobation did not 
 
 Ippcar. Inileed the utmolt that can be drawn from 
 
 Ithe evidence of Lieutenant Colonel Kingflon, or any 
 
 Jther witnels, atnouurs to no more than an implied 
 
 i'ifli in the Brigadier to have conduded the expedition 
 
 It the head ol his diilindt corps. It was the fa6l". 
 
 \'voted to glory, antl prodigal of life ; earned far 
 
 Jhe general luccds of the campaign, and particularly 
 
 mxiuus for every j)lan adopted by the man he loved, 
 
 ie grudged a danger or care in other hands than his 
 
 )wn. Ic was not envy or dilparagement of the Ger- 
 
 lan troops, but zeal and impatient for employ iTient, 
 
 [hat influenced his prediledion for the Britilh. 1 
 
 lonourcd the principle, while 1 reihained it; and I 
 
 Jlervcd his ardour and judgment for a fccond movc- 
 
 ment^ 
 
 !i- i 
 
 'I*'.', 
 
 11, < *"r 
 
 1 :> 'f' 
 
 
 'iii 
 
 ■ ^i 
 
 M^'M 
 
 
 n. K 
 
 
 I. . / ,1 !,/ ,: 
 
 
 V 
 
 l^^-: 
 
Hi 
 
 138 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 inent, whicli ra|uirfd thole (iiialitics much more tlml 
 the cxpciiition to Hfniiin^'.ton did, according; to any mj 
 tclligcnccor appearance ol" tilings at tlic time. It \^i 
 be oblerveil from the evidence, that the whole ot' HrJ 
 «_^ather Frafcr's corps was thrown over the river, :\\k\ ac.l 
 tually polled at the opcninj^ of the plain near Sar.itmJ 
 when Colonel Baumc marched •, and the defign was, uJ 
 on tlie iirll news ot' l^aiiinc's lliccels, to have puilicdl 
 that cor]>s to take poHeirion of the iicights near StiJ 
 vatcr, and to have intrenchetl there, till the army anJ 
 the provifion could have joined, by which means m 
 whole country on the welt tide the river, to the bankj| 
 of the Mohawk, would iiave been our own. 
 
 But moreover it is to be oblerved, that Major GeneJ 
 ral Reidefel was far from beino: iunorant, as has b«3| 
 luggellcd, of the nature of the country, or tiie j)roki.| 
 lions of the inhabitants. He was jull returned iroiii| 
 commanding a detached corps at a conliderabk- di 
 ila nee from the main army, in the very heart of tlKl 
 country from wifich the enemy's force at BcnniiigMl 
 was afterwartis fupplied. He Ipoke the Englifli l.in.f 
 guage well •, lie was allided by many natives of tht;bdt| 
 information. 
 
 It is evident, that the brave but deceived officer wiiol 
 commanded tlK* detachiiK'nt, was induced to dcvutJ 
 from the cautions prcfcribed in the inllrudions. .\\ 
 plan, dr.r.vn by an engineer upon the Ipot, is aducJtol 
 the evidence produced to the committee, to fliew i,,ortl 
 clearly where that deviation happened. It appears aiiol 
 in pr0v)f, that the mcafures taken to relieve Color.elf 
 Baume, upon the news of his dilHcuky, were the molil 
 Lora H.ir- fpcedy that could be ufetl, and would Juve been tiii-dvj 
 ringcon, r, ^^d not Coloncl Brieman's march been more tardy thai;! 
 "* ' could have been fuppofed poflible. I take the fad ail 
 Hated in his own accoimr, without impeaching his crcj 
 die with regard to tlie oblhiclcs he defcribes. ButriSJl 
 farther vindication of the intelligence and princiil 
 upon which the original ftrength of the detaclinuntf 
 was framed, and the mere accident which made cxi 
 
 errol 
 
^■' 
 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 rror pofTible, I rcqueft admilTiDn for the proof of a 
 tw iid whici) I (lid not know it was in my power to 
 lin?, till after Captain Money had left the bar of the 
 ■Ionic of Commons •, and as 1 was precluded from 
 aliin<z luin a fecond time, by the abrupt clofe of the 
 roca'vliii ";s, I had no other way of laying it before the 
 iiolic, than by Hating the (^iicltion in writing, and rc- 
 uiiiiig liis authority to publifli the anfwcr, which I ob- 
 
 iK\l, and they are as follows : 
 
 (^ \)o vou know any circumftance refpc«5ling an nn- 
 
 pcctcd reinforcement received by the rebels at Ben- 
 in 'ton ncarrhc time of the adion ? 
 
 A. "" A lew days atter I was prifoner in the rebel 
 
 * c.unp, lonie of their officers told me, that it was a 
 providential circumftance, that General StarUs was 
 
 * coniins.!: throu.eli FK!-.ni.ir;ton with 1200 militia of the 
 New-l tamp(hir»; Grants, to join their main army 
 near Alba;i/, for the guard on the provifion at Bcn- 
 
 * ningtondid not amount to more than 400 men; and 
 that on his hearing of a ilctacliment of our army being 
 onlv four or five miles from him, he with the guard, 
 and what militia couUl be collcctevl in the neighbour- 
 hood, aitiicked and dei'cated the detatchment, as 
 well as the reinforcenent that were on their march 
 to join them. The rebel officers alfo informed me, 
 and I have feen accounts that agree witii what I then 
 licard, that during the aftion General Starks was 
 * luckily' joined by Colonel Warner with a confi- 
 derablc body of men. I have fre{iuently heard our 
 officers Hiy that were in this adion, that had Colonel 
 Baume retreated four miles, and recroflcd the river 
 he palfed the day before, and taken poll there, when 
 he found by information he could not proceed, and 
 had wrote for a reinforcement, he would have met 
 Colonel Brieman coming to his afliftance, and would 
 not have rifqued the lofs of his corps, which by his 
 inftruftions were fo llrongly recommended, as not 
 even to rifque a confiderable lofs. This, Sir, is as 
 nearly as polfible the anfwer 1 ihould have given had 
 
 « the 
 
 139 
 
 
 } ' 
 
 \ ' ■ 
 
 ■ 1 , 
 . .» 
 
 ■ I 
 
 '','♦■ 
 
 :'■.!■ 
 ■ *i 
 
 < I 
 
 tv . 
 
 
 
 % :■■ "' 
 
 1^.. 
 
 - trjr-''- 
 
 \:»>,'. 
 
HO 
 
 KEVIEVV OF Till', EVIDENCl!:. 
 
 C( 
 
 
 : .1 
 
 the qucftion ba-n alkcil inc in the 1 loulc of Coni.| 
 •• inons. — I. Moncv." 
 
 This picci'oFeviilfiice will fcrvetofhcw that it wnsprii 
 the lucci-ls ot the rebels at Dcnniiigton that animated t!,(| 
 militia to aflcinble, and march in the rauli.* of tlu* ('on. 
 prels i and he imill be ot* Heady faith indeed in Amr 
 rican loyahy who can fuppole nnieh of it re.dly exiiiLMl 
 in the coiintrv of the Hamplbire Cirants (IiowIocviti:! 
 had been alVerteil ami profellcd) when he redec'ts, n 
 only tl:;it (icneral St.iiks and Colonel Wainer wercnotl 
 oppoleii in eolleclini'; their men, thoufdi my army, ihcJ 
 in a tiilc of luccxis, were near at iiand j but alio that 
 not a loynlid was found earnelb enough to convey n:cl 
 intelli«;ence. 
 
 It will likewifc appear, from this piece of cvidrnc:", 
 when compared with the map of the country and tliel 
 difpofition of the troops, that had not the aceidcnta! 
 paflar,e ot the detachments unJt-r Starks and V^^lrncr| 
 ixrcn exceedinj^ly critical, it couKl not have availal.-] 
 Forty-eight hours I'ooner, they would have joined (!.■• 
 ncial Gates j and he would hardb' have detacheil iluni,, 
 or any other part <>f his force, back to I5enninp;t(iii, 
 even though he had heard of a movt ment to my kft;| 
 becauie he mull have known that the whole < f FriJai 
 corps lay ready to march rapidly upon him tro;n nr; 
 rig!)t. — Forty-eight hours later, th'j blow would h:>\A 
 becnllruck-, and the ilorcs, coniiiling of live cutie. 
 and (lower, with abundant carriages to convey it, \soi:L 
 have been out of re;ich. 
 
 Another retletlion will be apt to arife in fpeculativjl 
 minds upon tiiis iiibje(5l, viz. on what nice chances de- 
 pends the reputation of an ofHcer v/ho acHs under Kltilrj 
 and ungenerous employers ! Such men not only \vii!>| 
 hold the fair proteifiion that would nrife from an expl 
 nation of his motives, but are the tirlt to join the cr\j 
 of the uninformed multitude, who always judge byl 
 events. Thus every plan receives a colouring in thel 
 extreme -, and is denominated (often with equal inji:'| 
 fticc) a fatal error or a brilliant cntcrprize. 
 
,s». 
 
 REVIEW OF TIIK EVIDENCE. 141 
 
 Kur it dill niay be f.iitl, the expedition was not ori-Crofi cu. 
 Uiiially ilini^iit'ti ajrainit Ccnnington. I really clo not 3';;;,"' 
 \icc t>)VN'lut it could ttnti ;5p,ainll nic, it that liippolition'ins'on, q. 
 v'tMC ill a {.v't-at dtp.a'C admitted. That li:)mc part ot ' 
 thctbrcf was defif^ncd to adt thtie, will not be dil'putcd 
 by anv who read Ccloiicl P.uimc's iiilbik'lions, and con- 
 sult the m.:p. 'Ihc blame or iiicrii ol* the defi^n alto- 
 gether, mull reft upon the motives of ex[)cclienty ; and 
 litisoMittlc coniapienee whether the tirft and princi- 
 .paUiirtdicn was againll Bennington, or Arlington, or 
 |aru other dillric^^, as my intelligence might have varied 
 relpec^ing the d'polits of corn and cattle of the enemy. 
 At the lame time I muft oblervc it is bjgging the (jue- 
 ilion, u) argue that Bennington v/as not the real, origi- 
 nal obji-Ct, becaulc Bennington was not mentioned in the 
 lirak ot inllructions. A man mull indeetl be void of 
 mi'itary and political addrefs, to jnit upon a paper a 
 critical ilelign, where lurprii'.e was in qutltion, and eve- 
 ry thing depended upon iecrecy. 'i'hough it were true, * 
 ih.it I meant only Bennington, and thought of nothing 
 dels than the progrels of liu* expedition, in the extent 
 of the order, 1 certainly would not now affirm if, be- 
 •car.le I could not prove it ; and becaufe it would feem, 
 that! le.H'ched for remote and obfcure julliiication, not 
 relying upon that wii cli was manifell ; but lurcly there 
 is nothii g new or impioljable i:i tlie idea, that a gerjeral 
 Ihould ddguile iiis real intentions at the outlet of an ex- 
 pedition, even iron^ the oflictr whom he appointed to 
 execute them, provided a communication with that of- 
 ficer was certain and not remote. 
 
 This review of the atf;.ir of Bennington, tho* long. 
 
 **^ , Of 
 
 I truil will not be deemed mifplaced ; and from the dif- 
 ferent parts of it, I think, will clearly beellablifhed the 
 I- few following aliertions : 
 
 ill. That the defign upon Bennington was juftified 
 by the circumftances of the time. 
 
 2d. That there was no rcafon to fuppofe the force of 
 the enemy there greater than what the detachment was 
 ^adequate to defeat. 
 
 3d. That 
 
 
 V )- ' 
 
 
 < I 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■'i-/i^' m 
 
T, 
 
 »4» 
 
 ,' -f 
 
 Difficulty 
 of forming 
 a magazine 
 after the 
 difjppuint- 
 ment at 
 Bennington 
 Lieut. Cul. 
 Kingften, 
 %, 24:031. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 3d. That when the force was difcovcred to be grenr-l 
 the ill confequenccs would have been avoided had r,oi| 
 Colonel Baumc deviated from his inllrin^iions, by coivl 
 mitting his regular force in the woods iiiilead of foniJ 
 fylng a pofl in the open country, and exploring tJ 
 woods only with the Indians, Canadians, and PnivincJ 
 als, fuj>porccd by Captain Fralu's corps^ wiio \vcrf| 
 complete mailers of fuch bufincfs. 
 
 4th. That after Colonel Baumc had committed t.'uJ 
 error, it would have been retrieved had Colonel l!r;;.l 
 man's reinforcement accompliflu I their marcii in [\f\ 
 time they ought to have done. 
 
 5th. That the llrength of the enemy was merely acJ 
 cidental. 
 
 And, as a final obfervation, I will add, that wlicn J 
 minilter ftates a common accident of war, indcpenucntl 
 of any general aiftion, unattended with any Ids tb:l 
 could af}e6l the main ftrength of the army, and littlJ 
 more llian the mifcarriage of a foraging party, to havel 
 been fatal to a whole campaign, of which he had diJ 
 reeled the progrefs and apportioned the force, he makol 
 but an ill compliment to his own judgment. 
 
 I'he next clafs of proofs in regular progreflion, ap.| 
 plies to the difficulty of bringing forward a magazinel 
 of provilion, after the difappointment of obtaining livcl 
 ftock and flower at Bennington. It has been lliew.J 
 by the evidence of Captain Money, Lieutenant Colond| 
 Kina;(ton, and the authentic memorandums of Sir Fran- 
 cis Clarke, thatearly in the month of Augufl: it wasnol 
 caly tafl<: to fupply the daily confumption of the army] 
 Our powers were afterwards, in ibme degree, encreafedl 
 by the arrival of more contrad: horfes, acquifuions oil 
 more ox-teams from the country, and the great vigi-" 
 lance exerted in the departments of the quartcr-mafter- 
 general and infpedlor, whofe afliltants had been aug-l 
 men ted. 
 
 A minute inveftigaticn of this operation, I am it'nfibleJ 
 ^vill be thought dry, and perhaps unneceflary, by gcnej 
 ral readers — they will pais it over — but there are ihoiel 
 
 w'hol 
 

 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 143 
 
 Iho linvc laid much (Irefs upon a wafte of lime, and 
 (ho take delight in tracing the I'mall parts of a fub- 
 U with fcriipulous exa(^lncls. With fuch it is my du- 
 r as a ncrlon on my defence, to enter into detail, and 
 [will lav my ground in ihc quellion put to Captain Mo- 
 fv in his ( roU-examination and his anfwer. 
 n '* Why did the army remain from the j 6th of 
 Auf'urt to the 1 3th of September before they crofled 
 the Hiidlbn's-Kivcr to engage the rebels at Still- 
 water ? " 
 
 A. " To bring forward a fufficient quantity of pro- 
 vifions and artillery, to enable the General to give up 
 his communication." 
 
 With all the powers of conveyance poTible to bccapt.Mo. 
 Liillcred, Captain Money computes (and his computa- "'y>«i- -^J 
 )n tallies nearly with the table rormed by the commil- general a.-. 
 lrv-"cncral) that five days provifion, viz. four forS"""^^"*^ 
 Wii.ing the magazine, and one tor daily conlumption, „fe!f«the 
 las the moll that could be conveyed at once. f""^ "'; 
 
 To bring this to an average I will alTume only twoiztuzs. 
 lys for accidents of weather, roads, fatigue of cattle, 
 rcaking of carriages, and other common dira])point- 
 :nts: this is much Icls time than accc" iing to the 
 ncicnce might be allowed, and upon This computation 
 : would take ten days to convey the magaz'ne to Port 
 iward only. The (tage from thi^nce to the encamp- 
 :nt and intended depolitary muil •loc be computtrd by 
 illance but by impediments. TJic rapids of the river 
 ]d the difierent cafryii\r';-placcs have been defcribed by 
 Je witncflcs, and it rclults that this ilane was much 
 inger in point of time than the former one. It was 
 )t polhble to keep the tranlports going at both llages 
 tjgcther for the ttn days n.entioned, bccauie tlicre were 
 )t boats in the river lufficicnt tor more than the daily 
 bply i nor coultl they l)nve been conveyed there in 
 W lime by any pollible means, for t'lefe reaf /ns •, the 
 )ac carriages, which were of aconrtr.iction fimilar to 
 iber carriages ufcd in England, wee only twelve in 
 mibcr, and each carriage employed fu horfcs or four 
 
 ^ oxen 
 
 %' 
 
 i. . J «• -■I 
 

 
 i 
 
 »44 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 oxen to draw it ; and could any other means of d^ 
 for boats over land have been contrived, or catrlc \2 
 been fupplied from the artillery, or any other dcjj 
 ment, all would have been iifclcfs •, bccaufc t!r bcj 
 themfelves, to a greater amount than thoi'e above |j 
 cified, were wanting till after the whole of the |>rov!!; 
 traniport between 'I'iconderoga and Fort Gcorgt-, up 
 which they were employed, was finiflied, and it^ 
 barely kept pace (o as to fupply the land tra' i]jort; 
 tween Fort George and Fort Edward. 
 
 I defire only an allowance of fifteen days for 
 carriage over the fecond (tagc, and it will thus t.ike,: 
 the whole, twenty-five da}S to form the magaza 
 alone. 
 
 I claim no additional allowance of time for d 
 veying one hundred boats, at Icall, through tIjediS 
 cultics of land and water, in the two Itages, but coq 
 prife that labour among the reft of the hUt Hfta-n dan 
 It muft be neverthelefs obfcrvcd, that even this nuil 
 ber Was fhort of what was wanting, and, to favetin 
 all the artificers were employed in buikiin<r 
 (fourteen of which were finirtied during the tranljoij 
 to make water craft, in the whole fulFicit-nt to cani 
 the magazine forward, after the communication HioJ 
 be at an end. The new caulking the boats, thoi;| 
 indifpenfibly nejclfary to great part of them, afccrpil 
 fing the lakes loaded, and airerwards bemg ihatiij 
 and damaged by land carriage, is another work wli 
 I throw into the Lift fifteen days of the traniport,! 
 irao the fubfequent four days, which muft ■it ihck 
 be allotted for loading the magazines, and arrang^ij 
 the order of its proceeding both in refpedt to navis 
 lion and defence. This was committed to very cxp 
 ° naval officers, and was matter ot no trivial concern, i 
 
 tafy txecution. 
 
 The whole bufinefs, according to the above repij 
 ofentation and calculation, both which are found 
 upon evidence, would have taken twenty-nine darj 
 iw^nty-fevcn only were employed, viz. from Aug 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 145 
 
 i6tii to September the 13th. The exertions in faft 
 [went the calculation •, and I challenge the moft mi- 
 le I'^fculatifts to try the time and the powers we 
 Wed, by every polTiblc diitribution of carriages 
 cattle, different from that which was praflilcd, 
 I will venture to fay none will be found Icfs 
 
 .tory. 
 
 [t appears clearly in proof, that no impediment to 
 k tr;inl"pnrt was occafioned by the interference of the 
 lllery ; but it has been implied by fome queftions in 
 
 croVs examinations, that if the artillery did not in- 
 |fcrc with the tranfport, the tranfport ought to haAC 
 trfercd with the artillery, and that by appropriating 
 Er horfes to the provifion train, much time might 
 >e been fav'.rn. 
 
 It might be a fufficient anfvver, that the artillery, 
 [the reafons I have before afligned, was not to in 
 killed with, and confequently the horfes weie to be 
 fcrved ; but I befides have fliewn, that they could 
 
 have been of ule to the tranfport of the boats j and 
 [faiisfy every fcruple, and to Ihew how miftaken 
 are who fuppofe an advantage was to be obtained 
 [ihe employment of artillery-horfcs to convey pro- 
 
 )ns, I now offer to their reficdtion the additional 
 that they could have been of no avail, becaufc 
 
 lad neither carts nor pack-faddles, more than were 
 ife already. 
 
 ,hat the baggage of the army was an impediment to Kingfton* ' 
 [tranfport, is another acculation clearly confuted bys- 5'i»* 
 [united evidence of Lieu tenant Colonel Kingfton and ',"na "from 
 
 ^lain Money **. ititaij*. 
 
 Having 
 
 ^Injuflice to the officers who are fuppofed to have difoheyed 
 "rs, in relpe^t to the bulk of it, it may be nccelTary to take fome 
 tt (and this is the proper place) of the error of mak'.r.;; ;hat fup- 
 ■on upon the direflions given to Col. Baume forproouring 1300 
 
 1 tor that fpecific ufe. 
 
 elieve the loweft allowaoce of bat horfti tf er madft to ao trMy 
 folUws : 
 
 o 
 
 If? I 
 
 • « 
 
 I" 
 
 1* 
 
 
 : - V 
 
 
 , V ^ 
 
 .5 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 ■ '■> ii 
 
 h; 
 
 
 > 
 
 ^' 1 
 
 k 
 
 1 
 
 f-^^ 1: 
 
 O o 
 
 O 
 
 ■^'r; 
 
 '■AM 
 
H 
 
 146 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EV1DEN€E. 
 
 1^ 
 
 Having thus (hewn that the tranfport of provifi 
 and oiiicr Itores, for about thirty days, was effcftedk^ is 
 ,, .. tlic Ihorteft time noffiblc, it now becomes neceffarvl 
 
 vi:,|'flion ' . I'll ■ '1 
 
 mA .. ^vht cxaimne the qucltion, which has been very mucin 
 ivv'n',! 'iit' ^"'^^^^'^^ '" print, and by the crofs examination app 
 ...(i.Ave to have made imprcflion upon fome gcntlcn^en j w| 
 Aibinv''*''' *^^''* ^^^^ preparation might not have been difpea 
 with, and ti.e army have reached Albany by a 
 march, tiie foldiers carrying upon their backs a fii^^tb 
 (.icncy of provifion to fupport them during the time] 
 
 " ithoiit 
 
 ftoiT!! • 
 
 o 
 
 To a field officer 
 A captain 
 
 A fubaltcrn - t 
 
 A fiirgeon and mate 
 A chaplain 
 A quartermarter 
 For carrying the co ipanv's tents, 2 horfes 
 to each company - do. 
 
 3 per battalion I 
 2 do. 
 
 1 do. 
 
 2 do. 
 I dm 
 I do. 
 
 Total per battalion 
 N. B. This calculation wns made upon eight compan'eij 
 lt.itt:ilion, in whicli two field oHiccrs companies are incluccd. 
 Thr horfVs for the live Rrttilli battalions of the line, upon 
 
 calcul:!liun, amount to - 
 
 General KriJler's corps, reckoned to be equal to four bat. 
 
 talions - - - 
 
 Five German hiittalion!i, at 70 horfes per battalion, that 
 
 being the difleraice in proportion to their flrength 
 Brcy man's corps 
 
 Total for the regiments of the regulan 
 
 STAFF. 
 
 Two major generals 
 
 Four brigadiers 
 
 ]3riiiih(|uartcrman;er general, and his aflttlants 
 
 Oerman ditto 
 
 The holpital 
 
 ^ I'otal of fluff 
 
 o 
 
 IRREGULARS. 
 
 Canadians, Indians, and Provincials 
 
 ^^riificell 
 
 Total of irregulall "^ 
 
 M 
 III 
 
 III 
 
 $1 
 
 |l^capitu)|ti(^of the whole diHributiipn 
 
 o 
 o 
 
 Ho 
 
 lire 
 
 o 
 
^wm 
 
 ifjf 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 147 
 
 lin 
 
 Is very natural for men of z\\ defcriptions, toideaofara. 
 the idea of a rapid march to a diflance of fifty p"* "*•"*»• 
 for it is not more meafuring in a ftreight line 
 Fort Edward to Albany, and it will be proper to 
 ler the principle and prafticability of fuch march, 
 refpcj^ to two diftindt periods, the one before, 
 her after the attempt upon Bennington. 
 th rcfpcdl: to the firft, it will be remembered, 
 the itate the roads then were, and with the re- 
 s then to be employed, no provifion before-hand 
 ttainable. Therefore, to have brought the plan 
 id advance within the compafs of a pofllbility, 
 eration muft have begun by marching the whole 
 y backward, in order to load the men with their 
 of provifions. How the troops, zealous as 
 ere, would have reliflied a ftep fo uncommon 
 nature, and productive of fo much unexpected 
 particularly how the Germans would have 
 perfuaded of the neceffity as to have under- 
 it with good will, cannot be afcertained. 
 thefe doubts apart, it remains to be confidered, 
 he troops were to pafs two very large rivers, 
 udfon and the Mohawk, without previous pro- 
 for a bridge, or water-craft for conveying large 
 at once. Every conceflion a fanguine projector o 
 
 fire Ihall be made upon this point alfo ; the con- 
 eof rafts, bound together by twigs and (trips of 
 as in fa(ft was praftifed at this very period for the 
 of Frafer's corps over Hudfon*s River, (hall 
 itted equally practicable for the whole army ; , 
 argument be it tru(ted to chance to pafs the 
 k in the fame way ; or (hould it fail, let re- ° 
 be had to the ford, which is known to be prac- 
 excep: after keavy rains, near ScheneCtady, 
 ftecn miles from the mouth of the river. 
 conce(Hons granted, we will fuppofethearn^y 
 ank of the Hudfon's River, where they after- ° 
 aflcd it. 
 
 h <D 
 
 ^TJ 
 
 
 
 tk^' 
 
 o 
 
 © 
 
 I 
 
 
 o 
 
 ;m 
 
!■ 
 
 i"^ 
 
 Q 
 
 148 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 The idea of a rapid march will of coiirfv' De exi 
 from all thou^i;ht of pcrl'oiial incumbrances (pnv 
 cxeiiipteii) and the foldier will Itand leprcfcntcd 1 
 Imaginarion, trim and nimble as he is fecn at an 
 cifc in an Eni;lifli encampmeiu — Indccii it is neo 
 he fhould be confidcred in that form ; for nothingi 
 be more repugnant to a projeifV of rapidity, tiiaij 
 foldier 's load, were he to curry all the articles belor^ 
 to him in a campaign.* 
 
 But it may be faid, and with truth, that tioopil 
 ufually relieved from a confidcrable part of this bin 
 and many examples of this relief may be brought 
 the general cuftom of fcrvice, and from manv 
 ments of General Howe's army in particular 
 more, It was a frequent practice of the very an 
 queftion, to march free from knapfacks and camp 
 page. The Wigwam, or hut conllrudted of k 
 may be made a very wholfome fubllitute fori 
 and when vicfliial can be cooked before hand, evi 
 camp kettle for an expeditious march may be laid 
 All thefe examples are admitted: but thcyailij 
 conveniencics tor the fcvcral articles to follow] 
 to be L. ought up in due time. In our cafe tbev 
 have been loH irrecoverably. 
 
 Will it be argued, that fome medium rr!ig!it| 
 been deviled ? And althoiio;h it were imjjoffiblf, 
 fiftently with the idea of rapidity, to carry }( 
 more provilion than for bare fultenance ditrii 
 march, yet carts mighL have been found fui 
 carry the men's knapfacks, and camp kettli 
 other indifpeniible articles ? This fuppofition 
 betray a great ignorance of the country. Froi 
 
 o * They confift of a knapfack, containing his bodily w 
 i blanket, a havcrfack with provifions, a carteen, a haicij 
 X fifth Ihare of the j/eneral camp equipage bclone;ing 'of 
 Thefe articles (reckofting the provifion to be for fourdai 
 to his accoutrements, arms, and fi\ty rounds of ammuniiij 
 a bulk totally incompatible flrith combat, andaweigbt^ 
 fiitty pounds. 
 
 o 
 
 o 
 
mi 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 to Albany there is only one road pra*fticablc for 
 carriage. Tiicre arc many places where by de- 
 fiiiiT the briilges over deep ^i, allies which difcharge 
 ifclvcs into the main river, a pafliige would be 
 :rcd irapair.iblc, not only for a wheel carriage, but 
 lie. There are iuhers u here the road is bounded- 
 ic river on one fdc, and by almoll perpendicular 
 us covered with wood on the other. Here the 
 
 fhort work of felling a few trc^s wouUl (lop all 
 ^ge. The cxpcnce of ti'me to remo-e thefc ob- 
 ftions, or to make new roads, v^ould have brought 
 inc. All notion, therefore, of conveying any 
 ^les more than could be carried upon men's flioulders 
 
 ceafc. The notion of artillery, even the fmallelt 
 
 cs, nuift aifo ceafc of courfe, not even a little 
 
 lunition-tumbril could have found its way. — An 
 
 facrifice to the theorills, who have maintained 
 
 Inutility of artillcrj : but any officer who has fcen 
 
 rroiind of this fup-pofcd march, would point out a 
 
 ^n paflcs, not to fpeak of the paflhge of the Mo- 
 
 :, where, Orengthencd with abattis and fuch other 
 
 :s as the rebels are cx[)ert in making in a few hours, 
 
 ^huncired militia would Hop for a time, ten times 
 
 niiiTiber of the belt troops in the world who had 
 "•lillery to aflift them, 
 laving flatcd thcfe objedtions to the principle of a 
 
 march, let us novv, from the knowledge that 
 )cen fince obtained of circumilances, coniider what 
 have been the certain confequcnces of the at- 
 )t. 
 fhofe who are acquainted with the capricious workr 
 
 of the tempers of men, will not wonder at the 
 Culty of prevailing upon a common iblder in any 
 ;ncy tohufband his provifions. In a fettled camp, 
 pung foldier has very fhort fare on the fourth day 
 
 delivery : but upon a march in bail weather and 
 roads, when the weary foot flips back at every ilto, 
 
 general curfe is provoked at the weight that cauliss 
 retardment, he muft be a patient veteran, and of 
 
 L 3 much 
 
 149 
 
 % 
 
 I 
 
 .1 
 
 T 
 
w- 
 
 'rt'- 
 
 150 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 much experience in fcarcity, who is not temped tul 
 throw the whole contents of the haverfack into m 
 mire. He feels the prefcnt incumbrance grievousJ 
 Want is a day remote. — " Let the General find a fuJ 
 ply : it is the King's caufe and the General's interetl 
 —he will never let the foldicr be ftarved." 
 
 This is common reafoning in the ranks. I (latt 
 
 it for thole who have not feen fatiguing fcrvice, ao^j 
 
 miy have a judgment to form upon it. It need no 
 
 be applied to che prefent confideration ; for had tb 
 
 march taken p'ace at the time it ought to have donJ 
 
 upon the principle of the defenders of that fcliemj 
 
 the time rh:*.^ Frafei's corps firft pall the river upon tbej 
 
 bridge ot rafts, wafte would only have confpiredi 
 
 accomphlh in three days a ruin that with the beft M\ 
 
 bandry would have been inevitable injix : for the fan 
 
 fall of rain which it has been fliewn in evidence zi 
 
 ally carried away the bridge a very few days after i 
 
 was conftrucled, necefiiirily made the ford of tiiei 
 
 Mohawk for an advance, and every ford of the Hud 
 
 fon's River for a return, impaffable. It hardly ne 
 
 be noticed, that a flood muft have made anyufei 
 
 rafts, could they have been timely obtained, equallj 
 
 impracticable. The army, therefore would have bt] 
 
 come viftims to famine, without a blow, or a fiiigkf 
 
 effort of the enemy. Saratoga mull have been tb 
 
 anticipated fccne of furrcnder, without other condU 
 
 tions than the mercy of lullenance ; the whole fora 
 
 of Mr. Gates would have been loofe toco- operate witl 
 
 Mr. Wafhington, with the fincfl feafon of the can 
 
 paign b'rfore them ; and the General of the northen 
 
 army, without a (hadow of profellional defence, an 
 
 precluded from the plea ufually fo perfuaiive, thatl 
 
 fought hard before he failed, muft have met the ce 
 
 fure of his Sovereign and a juftly offended countrj 
 
 with none to fupport him but the prefent advocates! 
 
 a rapid march. Coirld his dependence have been fuij 
 
 «\en upon them ? Would they not rather have adhcr 
 
 to their oppofite and original iyfiem (for ftrange asj 
 
 4 2 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 is, the fame men have fupported both) and have aflerred, 
 Jthat it was extreme raihnefs to crofs the Hudfon's 
 [River at all ? 
 
 If what I have faid in objeftion to the principle and 
 
 [practicability of a rapid march to Albany, previous ro 
 
 the attempt upon Bennington, has weight, very little 
 
 Ineed be added on the fubjcft afterwards, bccaufc every 
 
 |obje(5^ion will multiply upon the mind of the molt 
 
 Icurfory obferver. I fliall only call the attention to a 
 
 [very few eflential circumftanccs. The enemy was in 
 
 Iforce ; a proof of his being lb is, that Mr. Gates 
 
 [quitted his pofitign behind the Mohawk, which was 
 
 lis ftrongeft, and advanced to Stillwater. The force 
 
 found at Bennington upon the march from the Hamp- 
 
 lire Grants to the main army, proved the vigour and 
 alacrity of the enemy in that country. The circum- 
 bnces of the adlion at Bennington eftablifhed a yet 
 
 lore melancholy convidtion of the fallacy of any dc- 
 3endence upon fuppofed friends. The noble Lord has 
 f-iid, that *' I never defpaired of t4ic campaign before 
 the affair of Bennington ; that I had no doubt of gain- 
 
 ig Albany in as (hort a time as the army (in duccon- 
 iition of fupply) could accomplilh the march." -I 
 acknowledge the truth of the aff.rtion.s in their fullefl: 
 extent ; all my letters at the time (hew it. I will go 
 further, and in one fenie apply with the noble Lord 
 the epithet " fatal" to the affair of Bennington, The 
 mowledge I acquired of the profeliurs of loyalty was 
 
 fata!," and put an end to every cxpedtation from cn- 
 
 rprize unfuftaincd by dint of force. It would .have 
 jeeii excels of frenzy to have truileJ for fullenaiice to 
 the plentiful region of Albany. Hul the march tiiirhcir 
 3een pra(5iicable in all refpeds, and even unoppofed, 
 [which nobody will think wov.lci have been tho c.ik) 
 ihe enemy finding the Britifli araiy unrup^'.licd, wouUl 
 )n!y have had to compel the Tories to diive the cattle 
 bd deftroy the corn or the corn mills, and the conven- 
 \m of Albany inftead of Saratoga muft have followed. 
 
 ^ouid the Tories have rifen ? Why did they not rjic 
 
 L 4 round 
 
 151 
 
 ■ 
 
 i 
 
 1 
 
 yyy:-:- 
 
 u; 
 

 
 •^rt 
 
 152 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 round Albany and below it, at the t'lnc they found 
 Mr. Gates's army increafing by lepararc and dilVir.ct 
 parties from remote diftances ? They were better qua- 
 lified by their lituation to catch the favoiiral)le momcn: 
 than I was to advife it. Why did thfv not rife in that 
 populous and as fuppofcc". well affefled dillric^t, iht 
 German Flats, at the time St, Lcgcr was before Fort 
 Stanwix ? A critical infurredtion from any one point of 
 the compafs within diftance to create divcrfion, would 
 probably have feciired the fuccefs of the campaign. 
 Col St. Le- But to revert to the increafe of rcafons againll a rapid 
 No. XIII. * march after the affair of Bennington. It was then alia 
 known, that by the falfe intelligence refpedting the I 
 ftrength of Fort Stanwix, the infamous behaviour of 
 the Indians, and the want of the promifed co-operation 
 of the loyal inhabitants, Lieut. Col. Sr. Lcgcr had 
 been obliged to retreat. The firfl plaufible motive in 
 favour of hazardous hade, the f;icilitatin9; his dcfcent 
 of the Mohawk, was thus at an end. The prolped 
 of finding the enemy difpcrfed, it has before bcen| 
 ilicwn, was over. 
 
 The impoffibility of preferving a communication! 
 was alfo evident. Was the army to have proceeded tol 
 aftion without hofj^ital flores, as well as withoutl 
 vi6\ual } The general who carries troops into fire v,-\M 
 out precautions to alleviate the certain confequencesJ 
 takes a furc ftep to alienate affedlions, and deftroythcj 
 ardour of the foldier— he exacfts more than humaol 
 fpirit can furnifh. Men need not be habituated to| 
 fields of battle to be convinced of this truth, 
 the mind reft for a moment on the objefts which will 
 rife within it after the mention of adtion, and theil 
 refleft, there is not a mattrafs for broken bones, noJ 
 a cordial for agony and faintnefs. They who talk of 
 thefe rapid marches, fuppofe no oppofition, or no lufj 
 fering in confequence of oppofition. The hundreds! 
 wounded men to be cruelly abandoned (if the refl 
 could be prevailed upon to abandon thofe whole cafi 
 might the next day be their own) make no part of m 
 
 1 ' corJ 
 
 ft. 
 Mr. 
 
» ' •> 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 confideration of thefe gentlemen of precipitate imagi« 
 nations. But officers who are refponfible to God and 
 their country for the armies they conduct, cannot eafily 
 overlook fuch objects j and muft be patient at lead till 
 a few hundred beds, and a proper proportion of me- 
 dicine and chirurgical materials, can be brought up 
 for troops that arc to fight as well as to march. 
 
 The ciinfideration ot rapid movement has run into 
 much length : the ftrefs laid upon it in the crofs-exami- 
 nation, was the cnufc. I beg leave very fhortly to re- 
 capitulate the principal points, and fliall then dilmifs 
 it to the public judgment, without great apprehenfion 
 of having it renewed even in fpeculation. 
 
 Had a proper {lore of live cattle been obtained by 
 the expedition to Bennington, (and by the bye it will 
 be remembered, that had the loyalifts of the country 
 been really of the number and defcription reprefented, 
 thai, acquifirion might have been madt without an 
 adtion) all the carriages might have been appropriated 
 folely to ihc conveyance of flour, hofpital accommoda- 
 tions, entrenching tools, and other abfolute necellaries ; 
 and a rapid march to Albany might have been hazarded. 
 
 After the expedition to Bennington had failed of 
 that great purpofe, had a garrifon for Ticondcroga 
 been attainable from Canada, and the force then at 
 Ticonderoga been brought forward, to eftablifh a poft 
 of communication, and fecure a paflTage of the river 
 by a fortified bridge, and redoubts upon the heights 
 which every where command the river, on one fhore 
 or the other, a forced march might ftill have been 
 juftifiable, becaufe a retreat was fecure : but, diverted 
 of both thefe refources, a rapid movement muft ine- 
 vitably have led to rapid ruin. 
 
 Having gone through ail the material points previ- 
 ous to the 13th of September, and ihewn, I truft, by 
 di{lin<fl evidence, as well as rcafonin^j^, the expediency 
 of the march from Skenefboroiigh to Fo:r Edward ; 
 the principle of the expedition to B. nningtfMi •, he 
 caufe of its failure ,; the efforts uleU to brin;^ lor.vard 
 
 the 
 
 «53 
 
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 fin^ the 
 
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 154 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 Review of ^^e pfovifion and ncccflTary ftores, ami the impradtlca- 
 lnhe"pa''f^'' bility ot proceeding without thofc ftores •, the attctuidti 
 of the reader will now be carried to a review of the 
 cneafure of paflin^< the Hudfon's River on that day. 
 
 .1 entered pretty fully, in my Narrative, into the 
 principles which then adluated me ; and I Ihall not 
 enlarge upon them. I have only to reciueft every m.ii. 
 who has been led to doubt whether I was required liy 
 duty, fituation, the voice of the army, and the voice 
 of reafon, to advance and fight, to follow the conli- 
 dcration of thofc principles, with a revifid of the ap- 
 plicable part of the verbal evidence, and I will then 
 J"'!f,*,Jj8*| venture further to appeal to their judgment, whether, 
 :?oto3i. inftead of being required, I was not compelled, by 
 Julg'ton",' the ftate of things, to adt as I did ; even independently 
 ?i to 37. of the peremptory tenor of my orders, which, confi- 
 „ey,'*56,6'„dent in the ftrength of my cafe, I have purpofely omit- 
 and 65 to fgd^ upon this occafion, to reconfidcr. 
 
 In regard to the point lb much agitated in this coun- 
 try, though with no foundation whatever from any 
 thing that happened in America, Brigadier Frafer's 
 Brigadier fentimcnts upon this meafure of paflinp; the Hudfon's 
 lentiraents.Kiver, It would be trifling with the patience or the 
 leader to recapitulate and point the evidence to a matter 
 which I do not believe there is a man fo prejudiced as 
 now to difpute, viz. that that officer joined in opinion 
 -and impatience with tl>e reft of the army. But though 
 the falfehoods fu groJsly and i'o long impofed upon the 
 public, refpecting this matter, are no more, it may 
 not be unworthy curiofity to explore their origin and 
 trace their progrefs. 
 
 It is not diflicult to difcern that the fufpicion of aif- 
 ference of opinion in the army, ujion the meafure of 
 paffing the Hudfon's River, arofe from the paragraph 
 in my public letter from Albany to the Secretary of 
 State, wherein I fay that I had called no council upon 
 that fubjedt, but had adied upon my own judgment of 
 the peremptory tenor of my orders. 
 
 . ; ... . That 
 
 Prep re r* of 
 the falfe- 
 hoods pro- 
 pAnated, 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 That a man, chief in authority, fhoulil rakcintircly 
 upon himfelf a meafure of doul tful confcfjuencc, and 
 upon mere principle preclude himfelf from any fiiture 
 means of ihifting or dividing the blame that might 
 enfue, appeared incredible at Whitehall ; the greater 
 part of that political fchool concluded the profcffion 
 of fuch candour mud be a fincllo, and that, in fadt, 
 the General had not communicated with his offic«r8, 
 becaufe he knew opinions would have been againft 
 him. 
 
 When little minds think they have got a clue of 
 littlenefs, it is wonderful with what zeal and dexterity 
 they purfue and improve it. Corrcfpondence and in- 
 telligence were not wanting; dirapjx)inted jobbers, 
 difcarded fervants, didatisficd fugitives of every fort, 
 fpies, tale-bearers, and fycophants, whom it is to the 
 honour of a General to have his enemies, and a difgrace 
 to office to encourage, abounded in town ; and the 
 primary idea once given, it was carried forward by 
 very ready affiftance, and even lop.ical deduction.— 
 As thus : 
 
 The General declares in his difpatch, he called wi 
 man into council upon the meafure of pafTmg the Hud- 
 fon's River : Thfrefo^-ey his officers diilcrcd in opinion 
 upon the expediency of advancing. 
 
 To differ in opinion upon that expediency, they 
 muft conftrue his orders not to be peremptory : There- 
 forey he {lands fingle in the interpretation he put upon 
 his orders. 
 
 If his officers faw that he was unadvifedly and (Sci- 
 perately leading his army to death, they would cer- 
 tainly remonftrate : Therefore, they remonftrated. 
 
 The remonftrance would naturally be made to him 
 by fuperior officers: Therefore^ the concKifion follows; 
 Major General Phillips and Brigadier General Frator 
 adually made a remonftrance againft palling the Hud- 
 fon's River. 
 
 General Reldefel, who was next in rank to Genera! 
 Phijlips, fecms to have been forgotten. He was pro- 
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 156 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 bably overlooked in the eagernefs to get at General 
 Frafer, on whofe name the important ftrefs was laid, 
 and for two palpable rcafons ; the one, that his name 
 flood high in the public eftimation, and greatly as it 
 deferved fo to ftand, perhaps it acquired, upon this 
 ^ intended ufe, more juftice from fome quarters than it 
 would otherwife have received. 
 
 The fecond and more prevalent reafon wzs, that 
 Brigadier General Frafer was dead. 
 
 Thus then flood the aflertion when I arrived in 
 England : ** Major General Phillips and Brigadier Gene- 
 ral Frafer remonftrated again ft pajing the Hudfon's River ^ 
 which movement was the caufe of all the fuhfequent misfor- 
 tunes.** And having traced this falfehood to its matu- 
 rity, it now may be equally curious to follow its 
 decline. 
 
 After my arrival in England, the friendfliip, and 
 general conformity of feniiment between General Phil- 
 lips and me became more known. He was alive, and 
 might poflibly foon return. His name was therefore 
 withdrawn from the remonftrance, and rcferved, in 
 cafe he did not return, to give colour to a fecond falfe- 
 hood,* then kept back, but (ince produced as one of 
 the laft efforts of malignity in the courfe of the late 
 enquiry. 
 
 The firft public occafion that offered was feized by 
 me to pledge my honour upon the whole ftory of dif- 
 agreement of opinion being falfe ; and I dared any 
 man to produce a letter or a fentence, from Brigadier 
 Frafer or any other officer, to authorife a fufpicion of 
 its being true. Lieutenant General Frafer, upon the 
 fame occafion in the Houfe of Commons, voluntarily 
 and generoufly entered into my juftification, upon the 
 authority of his correfpondence with his late relation, 
 and the knowledge of his general fentiments, 
 
 * That Gencrnl Phillips offered to conduft a part of the army 
 from Saratoga to Ticondcroga. See this falfehood refuted, ia the 
 evidence of Lord Balcurras, Col. Kinedon, &c. 
 
 The 
 
 % 
 
 
I 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 '57 
 
 The 
 
 The falfehood was immediately (o far weakened, 
 that the word Remonjirance was changed into Opinion, 
 « Brigadier Frajer^s opinion was againjl pajfmg the Hud' 
 Jon's River ;" and thus it remained, now and then 
 aflifted and cherilhed, when it was very languid, uy 
 a whiCper, " thai there were Jiill letters to be produced,*' 
 till the late enquiry took place ; and the evidence of 
 Lord Balcarras, Lord Harrington, Colonel Kingfton, 
 &c. gave the death blow to the lad ftruggling efforts 
 of that calumny'. The rafhnefs of pafling the Hud- 
 fon's River was obliterated ; every comment upon that 
 fatal ftep was fuddenly dropt, as if the river had funk 
 under ground ; the charge, with the full accompani- 
 ment of General Frafer*s difapprobation, remonftrancc, 
 &c. &c. was Ihifted ; the minifter was as nimble as his 
 confederates, and exclaimed upon the fatality of the 
 expedition to Bennington. 
 
 And here I (hall finally reft the fupport I have been 
 fo anxious to derive from that grave which has been 
 ranfackcd by my adverfaries for evidence againft me. 
 As a foldier I avow a pride in having polTefled Briga- 
 dier Frafcr's efteem. As a defendant 1 am fenfible I 
 have dwelt upon it to a fault. The precedent of a 
 Chief in Command fufFering the comments of an in-ment$of*a» 
 ferior to be a teft of his adlions, requires an apology '"^""'"'o*'*- 
 
 C rr T 1- • L • r r • j » cer no pro- 
 
 to my protemon. It lies m thecmmenceor myrriend Sperteitof 
 charadtcr. His approbation gave a grace to my de- ^ ^"P*!!'*''* 
 fence, and I was impatient to confute the calumny that 
 would have lobbed me of it ; but to admit that it was 
 necefTary for my acquittal would be to countenance 
 and forward the moft pernicious and prepofterous doc- 
 trine that ever was pradiifed to miHead the public, and 
 to betray the fervice. 
 
 When a minifter or his confederates lean upon private 
 report, table talk, and half fentences, to depreciate 
 an officer they dare not themfelves accufe, it is a fee- 
 blenefs of vengeance thit, in its firft alpeft, is con- 
 temptible in the extreme ; but it calls for our indig- 
 nation when we extend our view to its principle and 
 
 effects. 
 
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 158 
 
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 Compara 
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 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 effedts. They operate to the very inverfion of due pa- 
 tronage, and the abfoliite extindtion of every idea 
 upon which command ought to be beftowed, or can 
 emcacioufly be excrcifed ; they tend to encourage of- 
 ficers to be fpics and informers ; to render camps and 
 fleets, properly the refidence of harmony and honour, 
 the feats of fufpicion, difcord, faction, treachery, and 
 mutiny. 
 
 The diverfity and importance of the matter brought 
 to review in the period of the campaign I am now do- 
 ling, has led to greater length than I was aware of; 
 but I cannot difmil's it without one reference, addref- 
 fed to fuch of the examiners of my conduft as have 
 infified upon the tardinefs of the northern army. 
 
 The reference I would plead is to a campaign in the 
 "'^fame country, memorable for having been conduced 
 by an officer whofe example muft be acknowledged, at 
 this juncture, to be of fplendid and peculiar authority j 
 I mean the campaign of Lord Amherft, in the year 
 
 »759- 
 The great points of the war in America that year 
 
 were to divide the enemy's force, and at the fame time 
 
 to dired the feveral operations with fuch concurrence, 
 
 that, though feparate and remote, they ihould affifi 
 
 each other. The firft objed^s of the army to which I 
 
 allude were to reduce Ticonderoga and Crown Point, 
 
 and the ultimate and mofl important one was to effedt 
 
 a junflion with Mr. Wolfe before Qiiebec. 
 
 Thus far there is great limilarity between the plans 
 of the two campaigns, except that the points from 
 which the armies marched, and to which they were 
 dertinea, were cxaftly reverfed. 
 
 In the Spring, 1759, the army, then aflembled at 
 Albany, took the field as early as the feafon would ad- 
 mit ; but fuch were the natural impediments of the 
 country, that though fupported by the unanimous zeal 
 of the inhabitants, and furnifhed with abundant fup- 
 plies of draft cattle, carriages, water-craft, and every 
 othei' necelFary ; the feveral departments well d'redted, 
 
 and 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 and no enemy to oppofe the narch, the General 
 (Lord Am herd) was not able to commence the attack 
 of Ticonderoga till the 7th of July, when the enemy 
 abandoned that poll, and retreated to Crown Point. 
 
 The diftance from Albany to Fort George is be- 
 tween fixty and feventy miles, the paffage over Lake 
 George to Ticonderoga about forty miles. 
 
 The General had reafon to believe that Crown Point 
 would be given up at his approach as precipitately as 
 Ticonderoga had been. He did not, however, reach 
 ir, a diftance of thirteen miles, and water-carriage at 
 will, till .he 14th of Auguft. 
 
 Was it at that time allced by the miniiler or his ad- 
 herents, what was the army doing not to purfue a flying 
 
 lenemy ? Not to purfue when the whole country 
 
 behind was their own, and magazines, baggage, hof- 
 pitals, and every other necelfary, might follow at lei- 
 furc, and in fecurity ! When it was forefeen an en- 
 creafe of fleet was to be conftrufted at Crown Point, 
 to obtain the fuperiority over the enemy upon Lake 
 Champlain, and confequently that every day's delay, 
 ia beconiing mailer of that poft, riflced the cam- 
 paign ! 
 
 Although thefe enquiries were not then fuggefled 
 to the public, an anfwer to them has been given, 
 greatly to the honour of the General, in a very im- 
 partial hiftory of that time. ** The army was em- 
 " ployed in repairing the fortifications at Ticondero- 
 " ga i and the General look his meafures with the 
 " fame care as if be had exped:ed an obftinate defence, 
 " and attempt to furprife him on his march." 
 
 The enemy adually did abandon Crown Point on 
 the approach of the General, the 14th of Auguft; 
 and, as foon as in pofleflion of that poft, he fet about 
 fortifying it as he had done Ticonderoga. The time 
 confumed in that operation, and in building new vef- 
 felsj brought it to the middle of Od:ober before the 
 General could embark upon the Lake. A fufpence, 
 undoubtedly, of great anxiety; for the great end of 
 
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 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
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 the campaign, the jiini^ion of the two armies, upon 
 which the redndtion of all Canada \v.;s thought to dc. 
 pend, was unattained. 
 
 But did the minifter or his adherents then cavil at the 
 tardincis of that army ? — Enterprifing, fanguine, and 
 impetuous, as was the character of that minillcr's 
 councils, there was not lefs energy in his protection. 
 The nation, not a p."»rty, were bis adherents ; and hi.s 
 word was a Jiat of fame. He beftowed empha Ic 
 praifes on his general ; and a failing campaign becar.ie 
 part of that bafis, from which he has afcended to the 
 high honours he now defervedly poflefles. 
 
 It would be great prefumption, and it is far from 
 being intended, to draw any parallels or inferences 
 from the campaigns of 1759 and 1777, except fuchas 
 merely apply to confumption of time under fimilar 
 circumftunces. In other points the pretenfions of the 
 refpedive Generals may be as different as their for- 
 tunes ; or, to make a much clearer diftindtion, and a yet 
 ftronger contraff, as wide afunder as the aufpices under 
 which they ferved, thofe of Mr. Pitt and of Lord 
 George Germain. 
 
 Ohfervatmis^ ^c. refpeEling the third Period. 
 
 " A feries of hard toil, incefiant effort, Itubbom 
 action, till difabled in the collateral branches of the 
 army, by the total defection of the Indians, and the 
 defertion or t-'midity of theCanadians and Provincials, 
 fome individuals excepted ; difappointed in the lart 
 hope of any timely co-operation from other armic ; 
 *' the regular troops reduced, by loffes from the bell 
 parts, to 3500 fighting men, not 2000 of which 
 were Britifli ; only three days provifions, upon Ihort 
 allowance, in ftore ; inverted by an army of i6,coo 
 •' men, and no apparent means of retreat remaining, 
 ** I called into council all the generals, field officers, 
 •' and captains commanding corps, and by their una- 
 *' nimous concurrence and advice, I was induced to 
 •* open a treaty with Major Gener4l Gates, &c." 
 
 Such 
 
 4( 
 « 
 
 
 ^Ik- ; « 
 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. i6i 
 
 Such was the fummary of affairs given in my let- Appendix 
 tcr from Albany to the fecretary of ftate. At the time ^^•^^^* 
 it was vrritten, I little expefted to have occafion for 
 any other teflimony of my a^S^ions ; and it has there- 
 fore been fuppofcd, that I gave them a colouring more 
 fpecioiis than exad^. This is the ftage of my defence 
 in \\'hk\ I am defirous to bring that matter to judg- 
 ment ; and I have quoted the above palFage, exprefsly 
 to lead the attention of every examiner to the whole 
 of that letter. Let it now be confidered, unitedly 
 with my late Narrative, and both be compared in de- 
 tail with the evidence — I am bold to ftake my caufe 
 jupon the iflue — And refting upon thefe references, my 
 [comments upon this period, though it is the moft im- 
 iportant, will be fliorter than upon either of the for- 
 mer: the proofs alfo are more coUeftedj and the 
 matters controverted or flarted in crofs-examination 
 I are fewer. 
 
 The firft remark I have to make is, that while the 
 I managers of the minifter's caufe have never admitted 
 a doubt of the reality of thofe movements in the 
 campaign, with the propriety of which their ingenu- 
 ity promifed them even a colourable caufe of cavil, 
 they have had the addrefs, when any little fkill and 
 |condu(5l were generally acknowledged, to call the ex- 
 liilencc of fuch movements into queftion. I cannot 
 jmake this remark more pertinently than at prefent, 
 [when the march of the army, preceding the adtion of | 
 
 jthe iQlh of September, is in its due place the objedt of 
 iBotice — •* A pretty combination of columns and de- 
 [' ployments compofed at Albany, and very fit for u 
 f Gazette." This fort of language I believe moflp.T- 
 fons have heard, who have converfed with the de- 
 endents or runners of ofEce, and it will be my ex- 
 bfe for fubmitting to the judgment of my profeflion 
 iplan of the movement. It will ihew in feme degree 
 lie difficulties that the nature of the country oppofed 
 
 a combined march of columns ; and at the fame the enemr 
 M the difadvantage (I might fay, the certain defeat) "Jg^'/s^'' 
 
 M thatJi,a*Jv, 
 
 5 
 
 i 
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 • 
 
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 1 
 
l62 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 carra^, q. 
 n. 34. 
 
 that mufl: have been fuflained, had the army been only 
 in one column upon the ground where it was attacked 
 or had the combination of the other columns, thofe 
 of General f>afer in particular, been lefs exaft to the 
 point of time in which it was expedient they Ihould 
 arrive and form. 
 
 To prove that this march was not compojed at Alba- 
 ny, I refer to 'icveral witnefles, but particularly to the 
 Karl of Harrington. His fituation, as my aid-de- 
 camp, gave him a general knowledge of a movement, 
 A/iaj. For- ^\^.^[ gp (ilicer cmploycd in the execution of a fingle 
 7riord^ part of it could not have acquired. It will be confi- 
 tori"'"^"s dercd by all who know the qualities of my noble 
 to 42 inchi- friend, as very honourable to the difpofitions of that 
 ''"• dav, that they arc fo circumftantially retained in fo 
 
 d'ftingulfhing a mind ; and for my own part, I cannot 
 commit them to military judgment under a better truft 
 than the accuracy of nis defcription. 
 
 I fhall not therefore detain the reader an inftant 
 longer from a fubjedt fo worthy his attention, as the 
 evidence refpe(fting the behaviour of the troops in the 
 efnfuing events of that day. 
 
 Few actions have been characterized by more obfti- 
 nacy in attack or defence. The Britifh bayonet was I 
 repeatedly tried ineffeftually. Eleven hundred Britifh 
 foldiers, foiled in thefe trials, bore inceflant fire from 
 a fucceflion of frefti troops in fuperior numbers, for 
 above four hours ; and after a iofs of above a third 
 of their numbers, (and in one of the regiments above 
 two thirds) forced the enemy at laft. Of a detach- 
 43rto4./ ment of a captain and forty-eight artillery men, thel 
 lJ,.jb^i:„. captain and thirty-fix were killed or wounded. Thefel 
 ras, 3 5.oj9.faits are marked by a concurrence of evidence that! 
 ney!a6ui no man vvill difpute. The tribute of praife due toj 
 30- fuch troops will not be wanting in this generous na-j 
 
 Mai. For« . 1 -^ mi ^ • 1 1 • j -A 
 
 b«, s(oio. t»on ; and It Will as certamly be accompanied witli 
 Lieut. Col. jiift portion of fhame to thofe who have dared to de- 
 ^7 u 67.' prcciate or fully vaiour fo confpicuous— who have theii^ 
 ears open only to the prejudice of American cowardice';! 
 ^ . _ earf 
 
 Aftion of 
 
 Lord Hiir 
 ringCon'i q 
 
 "it. V 
 
een only 
 ttacked, 
 IS, thofe 
 51 to the 
 y Ihould 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 i6j 
 
 at Alba- 
 •ly to the 
 J aid-de- 
 Dvement, 
 
 a fingle 
 be confi- 
 ny noble 
 )s of that 
 icd in fo 
 
 I cannot 
 itter truft 
 
 m inftant 
 in, as the 
 
 jind having been always loud upon that courtly topic, 
 iflc the glory of their countrymen to maintain a bafe 
 Bnfiftency. 
 
 It will be obfervable from the accounts of the kil- 
 J and wounded, that the lofs of officers in all the 
 ;]ions of the campaign was proportionably much 
 eater than that of the private men : and as thi? ob- 
 ivation applies particularly to the adion we are con- 
 ering, it may not be improper to account for it in 
 lis place. 
 
 The enemy had with their army great numbers of Reafon of 
 arkfmen, armed with rifle-barrel pieces: thefe, dur- *''*..'*'''"'?• 
 
 1 1 i/ii»/- portion of 
 
 igan engagement, hovered upon the nanks m fmalUiUedand 
 achmencs, and were very expert in fecuring them- **"'"'*'**• 
 ves, and in fhifting their ground. In this ad^ion, 
 ny placed themfelves in high trees in the rear of 
 if own line, and there was feldom a minute's in- 
 val of fmoke, in any part of our line without ofn- 
 being taken off by fingle Ihot.* 
 ops in the Hit will naturally be fuppofed, that the Indians would 
 of great ufe againft this mode of fighting. The ex- 
 lore obfti- Bple of thofe that remained after the great defertion 
 oner was Bived the conr rary, for not a man of them was to 
 cd BritifhB brought within the found of a rifle Ihot. The Ca- 
 fire fromfcns were formerly very expert in fervice of this 
 bers, forBure; but befides the change in their military cha- 
 ;er, which I noticed before, their beft officer was 
 led early in the adlion, which event cafl: a general 
 p upon the corps. A few of the Provincials 
 eferviceable : but the beft men I had to oppofe as 
 ThefeHkfmen were the German chaflTeurs, though their 
 
 ence thatL 
 
 Captain Green, aid-de-camp to Major General Phillips, was 
 [through the arm by one of thefe markfiiien as he was deliver- 
 leameffage. I learned, after the convention, from the com- 
 liug officer of the riflemen, that the fliot was meant for me j 
 the captain was feen to fall from his horfe, it was for fome 
 believed in the enemy's army that I was killed. My efcape 
 wing to the captain happening to have a laced furuiturt: to bis 
 \ which made him niiftaken for the geneial. 
 
 M 2 number 
 
 • 
 
 te a thifd 
 jnts above] 
 a detach- 
 men, the| 
 
 ife due tol 
 herous na-j 
 ;d with 
 ired to de- 
 have theii^ 
 )waruice;j 
 earl 
 
 tV' 
 
 '♦-■ 
 
 f . 
 
 f» . ■■.■ , ■ ■ 
 
 >S,.; 
 
 
164 
 
 Proceed- 
 ings of the 
 army »fter 
 the aAion. 
 
 Crofi-exa- 
 mi nation of 
 Lord Bal- 
 carrii, qu. 
 98 to 100. 
 Uitto of 
 Lor^ Har- 
 rington, 50 
 and 106. 
 Lieut. Cot. 
 Kingfton, 
 68. 
 
 Maj. For- 
 bes, 19. 
 Capt. Mo* 
 ney, 32. 
 Lieut. Cnl. 
 Kingrton, 
 69 to 76. 
 Lord Har- 
 rington, 56. 
 Lord Bal- 
 carras, qu> 
 100. 
 
 w 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 number was ib fmall, as nor to be one to twenty oiy it on 
 the enemy. ' M ^r i 
 
 The crofs-examination upon the procecding.s of tliM" j ^vaj, 
 army after this action will (hew the folly there woulMf . i fo 
 be in bringing a military caufe to a parliamentary enM? fpy.f.r. 
 quiry, u;^on the prcfumption that any parts of it wouli - 
 be left unexamined. The very want of pradlical know, 
 ledge in the enquierries renders them more inquifitivi 
 and much more tenacious of doubts and furmifes, thai 
 they would othervvife be : for inftance ; I do not 
 lieve that with an army exhaufted by a long and fcvei 
 adlion, and deprived of an uncommon portion of o 
 cers, the quellion of attacking the enemy next mori 
 ing would have occurred to any man of profefliom 
 judgment : that enemy too in a pofition of which 
 further knowledge could be obtained than that it wi 
 covered by an intrenchment and abattis, and the a 
 proach to be made through a thick wood, without ai 
 avenue cut, or a fingle poft fortified to fecurc a retre; 
 or to eover the magazine, which afforded the only pol 
 ble means ot fubfiftence. 
 
 Equally remote would be the thoughts of militai 
 men from attacking a few days after, when it appeari 
 I had received a letter from Sir Henry Clinton, infori 
 ing me of a diverfion fo powerful as an attack up 
 Fort iVIontgomery to be undertaken as at that vi 
 time. 
 
 The queflions relating to the enemy having t 
 baggage packed, if that circumftance was meant as 
 indication that they meant to retreat, is another p 
 how little the queftioncrs knew of fervice. It di 
 not appear in evidence how the fadl was : but no oiAt ^jtj, p 
 will difpute, that if the enemy had not only packKtwhat fi 
 their baggage, but actually conveyed it to the oAjaj jj j 
 fide the river, they would have adled conformablylncy of 
 the general praftice of fervice when 2.6tion is expcftfijntQn 
 and to no circumftance of fervice njorc than to m^ ^j^g ^ 
 ^vhen it is refolved to difpute a poil to the Id % ^, . 
 
 * * ■ 1 he one 
 
 trcmity. iced withoj 
 
 vnt it might 
 
 fiibmit 
 re of t 
 explaii 
 view ol 
 at bcfic 
 k cncm 
 (Is anc 
 withoi 
 ion. 
 
 As for . 
 
 lined bj 
 
 ways in- 
 
 ic prifon 
 
 rvice wh 
 
 mong p 
 
 Ives, an( 
 
 'Durable ( 
 
 pon, by 
 
 c purpo] 
 
 In rega 
 
 me necef 
 
 her worJ^ 
 
 it at tl 
 
 othing 
 
 as a great 
 
 d not ki 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 i6i 
 
 Upon the whole of my fituation at that time, I am 
 
 lib confident that it was the part of an officer to fortify 
 
 |,nd wait events, that I am only further intent to prove 
 
 hat I fortified properly, the nature of the ground and 
 
 nyfevcral purpofes confidered. Upon this principle 
 
 fiibmit the plan annexed. It will alfo fhew the na-PhnWs.v. 
 
 lire of the ground between the two armies, and ferve 
 
 icxplain the difficulties the witncfles exprels of taking 
 
 I view of the enemy's left : but it will be confidered, 
 
 [hat befides thele apparent obftaclcs to a near approach, 
 
 [he enemy abounded in militia, which fupplied out- 
 
 [)(ts and fcouts, that could by no means be driven 
 
 without making the army liable to a general 
 
 tion. 
 
 As for any other intelligence than what could be ob- 
 ained by eye-fight it was generally contradidlory, 
 llways imperfcd:; the defcrters were often fufpicious, 
 lie prifoners very few. I never faw any initance of 
 irvice where it was fo difficult to obtain information. 
 imong people fpeaking the fame language with our- 
 felves, and many of them profefling the mofl: fa- 
 [ourable difpofitions, fcarcely any could be prevailed 
 kpon, by rewards or principle, to rifle his perfon for 
 he purpofe of intelligence. 
 
 In regard to the crofs-examination, refpe<n;ing the 
 [me neceflary for the confl:ru(5lion of the redoubts and 
 |ther works, I neither thought it v/orth while to con- 
 it at the time, nor fliall I conteft it now, though 
 oching would be more eafy than to fliew that there 
 bs a great deal of neceflfary labour which the quefl:ions 
 Id not lead to, and confequently the witneflTes could 
 Dt with propriety enter into the explanation of them, 
 ntwhat makes the confumption of time to me imma- 
 irial is, that I place my juftification upon the expe- 
 [ency of waiting the co-operstion from Sir Henry 
 ilinton. It is in proof, that I received a letter from 
 Im the day after the action of the 19th,* informing 
 
 I* The original letter is in my pofleflion, but couU not be pro- 
 kc(d without difcovering a fecret mode of conveying intelligence 
 It it might be improper to make public, 
 
 M J me 
 
 r^i'^ 
 
 
 iJ.. 
 
i66 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 !*'..,-■. 
 
 me that he meditated an attack upon Fort Montgo- 
 mcry as at that very time. And as I have already fair] I 
 that I fliould have thought it the part of madnefs tol 
 h.ive rilkcd an attack upon the enemy, in the wcakf 
 ftate of my army, for fomc time after the late aftioij 
 and unoer the expectation of fo powerful a diverfion' 
 lo fhould I have deferred it longer, even after bcinu 
 recruited from the hofpital, on account of tlie famq 
 expedation, and the further chance of the reinforce.! 
 ment of Colonel St. Leger's corps, and perhaps a conj 
 voy of provifions from I'iconderoga : fo far am 
 from conceiving the paft delay blanieable, thut I acJ 
 knowledge the meafure of the 7th of Oftober waJ 
 precipitated by fome days, by the forage being becom^ 
 fo fcarce, that a fupply could only be obtained by 
 movement of the army. 
 
 If any perfons have fuppofed, that what has beer 
 called the inadtive ftate of the army at this period vva^ 
 a ftate of reft, they are as much miftaken as theJ 
 would be if they fuppofed it in any other circumftancd 
 Alert fitua- "omfortabie. From the 20th of September to theytll 
 Vrmy^from ^f Odtobcr, the armies were fo near, that not a nighj 
 2oih Sept. paflcd without firing, and fometimes concerted attackj 
 *" '' ' upon our advanced piccjucts ; no foraging party coul(| 
 be made without great detachments to cover it 
 it was the plan of the enemy to harrafs the armyb 
 conftant alarms, and their fuperiority of numbers en 
 abled them to attempt it without fatigue to them 
 felves. 
 
 By being habituated to fire, our foldiers became in 
 different to it, and were capable of eating or llcepirj 
 when it was very near them : but I do not believ 
 either ofiiccr or foidier ever ilcpt during that intern 
 without his cloaths, or that any general officer, 
 commander of a regiment, pafled a fingle night with 
 out being upon his legs occafionally at different hours 
 and conftantly an hour before day-light. 
 Lord B»i. 'pj^e circumftances in general of the adion of th 
 
 *T!"''*' 7th of Odober fta .d in that arrangement in th 
 
 evidencr 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 .67 
 
 fvidcncc of the Earl of Balcarras, Earl of Harrineron, i-o'J ''«- 
 I.ieur. Col. Kingfton, ami Captain Money, and nave '^'^''^'^j' 
 been fo little controverted by crofs-cxamination, that l.'*'"- ^'"i' 
 any length of comment upon them is unneccfl'ary. 1 77, 'c"."* 
 will only obferve, that the movement of the enemy *-"*p'- '^'»- 
 under Genera! Arnold, mentioned in my Narrative Js''' ^^ 
 is a)nfirmcd as lar as circumlhintial teftimony can !'":'-' ^''!'' 
 
 • lilrt V. 
 
 conlirm it, by Captain Money. And if there can be 
 any pcrfons, who, after coiifidering that circurnQaace, 
 and the poficive proof of the (ubrc(iuent obllina^.y, in 
 tlie attack upon the port of Lord Balcarras, and vari- 
 ous other actions of that day, continue to doubt, that 
 the Americans poflefs the quality and faculty of fight- 
 ing (call it by whatever term they pleafe) they are 
 of a prejudice that it would be very abfuid longer to 
 contend with. 
 
 But though comments upon this part of the evi- 
 dence may be fparcd, the remembrance of what I 
 perfonally underwent cannot fo eafily be fupprcHed ; 
 and lam fure I fhall not outgo the indulgence of the 
 candid, if in delineating fituations fo afi'ediing, I add 
 feelings to juftification. The defence of military con- 
 [dudl is an interefting point of profeffional honour; 
 but to vindicate the heart, is a duty to God and to 
 [fociety at large. 
 
 Few conjunctures in the campaign I have been de- 
 Ifcribing, few, perhaps, upon military record can be 
 found fo dirtinguifhed by exigencies, or productive of 
 ifuch critical and anxious calls upon public charac- 
 iter, and private afFcdion, as that which now took 
 I place. 
 
 In the firft place, the pofition of the army was un- loh BjI- 
 I tenable, and yet an immediate retreat was impoflible ;"""» 5»« 
 not only from the fatigue of the troops, but from .■ • . 
 the neceirity of delivering frefh .ammunition and pro- • 
 Iviiions. 
 
 The loffes in the adtion were uncommonly feverc. 
 I Sir Francis Clarke, my pid-dc^-camp, had originally 
 |recommended himfelf to my attention by hi? talents 
 
 M 4 and 
 
 ^.k V 
 
 J 
 
x68 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 K'^ 
 
 i 
 
 ■ '^ ' - 
 
 
 
 
 
 1 . 
 
 
 i]:', . ■- 
 
 • 
 
 
 l\ < 
 
 
 and diligence : as fervice and intimacy opened his 
 character more, he became endeared to me by every 
 quality that can create efteem. I loft in him an iifeful 
 affiftant, an amiable companion, an attached friend : 
 the {late was deprived by his death, of one of the 
 faireft promifes of an able general. 
 
 The fate of Colonel Ackland, taken prifoner, and 
 then fuppofed to be mortally wounded, was a fecond 
 fource of anxiety — General Frafer was expirinjr. 
 
 In the courfe of the aftioo, a ihot had pafled 
 through my hat, and another had torn my wailkoat. 
 I ihould be forry to be thought at any time infenfible 
 to the protefting hand ot Piovidence; but I ever 
 more particularly conlidered (and I hope not fuper- 
 ftitioufly) a foldier's hair-breadth efcapcs as incentives 
 to duty, a marked renewal of the trujl of Beings for 
 the due purpofes of a public ftation ; and under that 
 refle(Slion to lofe our fortitude, by giving way to our 
 affedions ; to be diverted] by any poffible felf-emotion 
 from meeting a prefent exigency with ourbeft faculties, 
 were at once difhonour and impiety. 
 Lon! Bai. Having therefore put aiide for a time my private 
 cams, 53. fenfations, it has been Ihewn that I efFefted an entire 
 rin'gton.Te. changc in the pofition of the army before day-lighr. 
 Plan, No. The plan will fhew the new ground taken up. Early 
 State of in the morning of the 8th, General Frafer breathed his 
 laft — and with the kindeft exprefllons of his affeftion, 
 his laft requeft was brought me, that he might be 
 carried without parade by the foldiers of his corps to 
 the great redoubt, and buried there. The whole day 
 of the 8th of Oftobcr was correfpondent to this in- 
 aufpicious beginning. The hours were meafured by 
 a fucceflion of immediate cares, encreafing doubts, 
 and melancholy objedls. The enemy were formed in 
 Lord Har- x.\vq lincs. Evcry part of their difpofition, as well as 
 the repealed attacks upon Lord Balcarras*s corps, and 
 the cannonade from the plain, kept the troops in mo- 
 mentary expeftation of a general aftion. During this 
 fufpencc, wounded officers, fome upon crutches, and. 
 
 others 
 
 thingi on 
 the 8th. 
 
 Tingtoiij 67, 
 
••lK:fi 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 169 
 
 others even carried upon hand-barrows by their fer- 
 vants, were occafionally afcending the hill from 
 the hofpital tents, to take their iTiare in the i.^ion, 
 or follow the march of the army. The gecnarls 
 were employed in exhorting the troops. 
 
 About fun-fet the corpfe of General Frafer wasoen. Fn- 
 brought up the hill, attended only by the officers who^;;[* ^"""^^ 
 bad lived in his family. To arrive at the redoubt, it 
 palTcd within view of the greateft part of both armies. 
 General Phillips, General Rcidefel, and myfelf, who 
 were Handing together, were llruck with the humility 
 of the proceffion : They who were ignorant that pri- 
 vacy had been requefted, might conftruc it negled. 
 We could neither endure that reflection, nor indeed 
 rcftrain our natural propenfity to pay our lall attention 
 to his remains. Tiie circumftances that enfued cannot 
 be better defcribed than they have been by different 
 witnefles. * The inceflant cannonade during the fo- 
 lemnityj the fteady attitude and unaltered voice with 
 which the chaplain officiated, though frequently co- 
 vered with dull, which the Ihot threw upon all fides 
 of himj the mute but expreffive mixture of fenfibility 
 and indignation upon every countenance: thefc objedls 
 will remain to the laft of life upon the minds of every 
 man who was prefent. The growing dufKinefs added 
 to the fcenery, and the whole marked a chanidler of 
 that jundlure that would make one of the fineft fubjeifbs 
 for the pencil of a mafter that the field ever exhibited— 
 To the canvas and to the faithful page of a more im- 
 portant hiftorian, gallant friend ! I confign thy me- 
 mory. There may thy talents, thy manly virtues, their 
 progrefs and their period, find due diftin{5tion ; and 
 
 long may they furvive •, long after the frail record 
 
 of my pen fhall be forgotten. 
 
 The reflections arifing from thefe fcencs gave place ^j,,, 
 to the perplexities of the night. A defeated army wasm*rchof 
 to retreat from an enemy fiuflied with fuccefs, much^*** ^^^' 
 fuperior in front, and occupying ftrong pofts in the 
 country behind. We were equally liable upon that 
 
 march 
 
 * Particularly Lleutt Col. Kingdon, 85* 
 
 
 I. 
 
 
 > '. 
 
 
 ■ It 
 
 1 ■; 
 
 
 ■X 
 
 
 ^■'li 
 
 i 
 
 •;; '' ■ 
 
 ■•-'^ 
 
 \ 
 ■t 
 
 i': 
 
 
 1 
 
 u 
 
 i> 
 
 .r 
 
 
 fr 
 
 ■t.- 
 
 
 
 iJl, 
 

 :;«. . 
 
 
 iyo 
 
 «••■ 
 
 III- 
 
 Lord Har 
 
 rington 70 
 and fromf 
 iiz to ij8 
 
 
 Continu- 
 ance of th« 
 inarch on 
 the 9th. 
 
 
 
 
 f: 
 
 
 ■■♦,■ 
 t 
 
 1, 
 
 
 -J 
 
 1^^^" 
 
 
 
 
 
 ■■ tl> 
 
 ; •. 
 
 
 -1 
 
 J., 
 
 
 ■,.:j 
 
 %^ 
 
 > 
 
 • 
 
 >i;, 
 
 ..Ilk, 
 
 » . "i 
 
 i 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 march to be attacked in front, in flank, or rear. The 
 difpofidon of a march had been concerted as much as 
 circumltances would admit j and it was executed by 
 the officers and the troops in general with a precifion 
 that experience in critical fituations can only teach. 
 The baggage, which could only move in one column, 
 and in a narrow road, fell into the confufion which it is 
 impoffib'e for caution to guard againft in the dark, 
 becaufc a Angle accident of an overturn or a broken 
 wheel, or even the ftupidity or drunkenncfs of a 
 driver, may ftop, and often confufe the motion of the 
 whole line. Care was taken that no fuch accident 
 ' fhould break the order of the troops : and orders were 
 fent to Major General Phillips, who commanded the 
 rear guard, in cafe he was attacked, to pay attention 
 only to the main objed of covering the troops ; or, if 
 occafion were, of taking a pofition to give them time 
 to form. 
 
 At day-break the next morning the army had reach- 
 cd very advantageous ground, and took a pofition in 
 which it would have been very defirable to receive 
 the enemy. A halt was neceffary to refrefli the troops, 
 and tfi give time to the bateaux, loaded with provi- 
 fions, which had not been able to keep pace with the 
 troops, to come a-breaft". A portion of provifioris 
 was delivered alfo from the bateaux, not without ap- 
 prehenfion that that delivery might be the laft : for 
 there were parts of the river in which the boats might 
 be attacked from the other fide to great advantage, 
 notwithftanding the correfpondent movtin^'iit of the 
 army. 
 
 The above purpofes being effefted, the army pro- 
 ceeded in very fevere weather, and through exceeding 
 bad roads. 
 
 Bcfides the continuation of difficulties and general 
 fatigue, this day was remarkable for a circumftance 
 of private dillrefs too peculiar and afl^eding to be 
 omitted. The circumftance to which 1 allude is 
 Lady Harriet Ackland's paflagc through the enemy's 
 
 , army, 
 
f-H-:lt|:H 
 
 f 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 171 
 
 afmy, to attend her wounded huA)and, then their 
 prifoner. 
 
 The progrefs of this lady with the army could Extnordi- 
 hardlT/ be thought abruptly or fuperfluoufly intro- "^^J/o""'* 
 duced, were it only (o for the purpole of authentica- P"vatc di- 
 cing a wonderful ftory. — It would exhibit, if well de-'*"^'' 
 lincatcd, an interefting pi<fture of the fpirit, the enter- 
 prize, and the diftrefs of romance, realized and 
 regulated upon the chafle and fober principles of ra- 
 tional love and connubial duty. 
 
 But I beg leave to obferve befides, that it has 
 diredt reference to my fubje^, to fhew what the lux- 
 uries were with which (as the world has been taught 
 to believe) the army was encumbered ; what were the 
 accommodations prepared for the fwp tfiou/and wcwtf»Kfngfto^! 
 that are gravely fuppofed, in the crofs examination, ffom 131' 
 to have followed with the baggage. An idea fo pre- *^^* 
 poflerous, as well as falfe, would have been a fitter 
 fubjeft for dcrifion than refutation, but that it was 
 malicioufly intended i not, I am confident, by the 
 member who alked the queftions, but by the perions 
 who impofed upon him, to effedt by prejudice what 
 they defpaired of effeding by fafl. — Not content with 
 cavilling at our pretenfions of having fought hard, 
 they would not allow the army even the claim upon 
 the good^nature of the nation, of having fared hard 
 for its fervice^ 
 
 I ihall however confider part of this ftory as fo far 
 unconnected with the immediate bufinefs I was upon 
 (purfuing the line of evidence upon the retreat to 
 Saratoga) as to give it in the margin. It may well 
 Hand by itfelf ; and I venture to think that this one 
 example of patience, fufFering, and fortitude, will be 
 permitted to pafs without cenfure or obloquy *. 
 
 When the army was upon the point of moving after 
 
 * Lady Harriet Ackland had accompanied her hulband to Ca- 
 nada in the beginning of the year 1776. In the courfe of that 
 cam{)aigQ flie had traverfed a vail fpacc of country, in different 
 
 tho 
 
 ^ 
 
 "' J' M 
 
 
 'M 
 
 fl-'^' 
 
 \il 
 
 •V r-^\ 
 
 
 :v..:;,).^T'^: 
 
 .1-::- 
 
 u.^ 
 
I 
 
 V; . 
 
 . I; 
 V, 
 
 il'^ 
 
 171 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 the halt dcfcribed, I received a mefTage from Lady 
 Harriet, fubniitting to my dccifion a propofal (and 
 cxprefling an earncfl: Iblicitude to execute it, if not 
 interfering with my defigns) of palTing to the camp of 
 the enemy, and requefting General Gates's permiliion 
 to attend her hufband. 
 
 Though I was ready to believe (for I had expcri- 
 enced) tnat patience and fortitude, in a fuprcme de- 
 gree 
 
 
 
 ft 
 
 extremities 01* feafon, and with difficulties that an European 
 traveller will not ealily conceive, to attend, in a poor hut at 
 ChambU'e, upon his fick bed. 
 
 In the opening of the campaign of 1777 flie was reftraincd 
 from offering herielf to a fliare of the fatigue and hazard ex- 
 pe(Sted before Ticondcroga, by the polxiive injunftions of her 
 Aufband. The day after the conqueft of that place, he was 
 badly wounded, and flie croflbd the Lake Champlain to join 
 him. 
 
 As foon as he re* overed, Lady Harriet proceeded to follow 
 his fortunes through the campaign, and at Fort Edward, or 
 at the next camp, me acquired a two-wheel tumbril, which had 
 been conftru<fted by the artificers of the artillery, fomething fimi- 
 lar to the carriage ufed for the mail upon the great roads of 
 England. Major Ackland commanded the B-iti(h grenadiers, 
 which were attached to General Frafer's corps ; and confequently 
 were always the mod advanced pofl: of the army. Their fituationj 
 were often fo alert, that no perfon flcpt out of their cloaths. 
 In one of thefe fituations a tent, in which the major and Lady 
 Harriet were afleep, fuddenly took fire. An orderly ferjeant of 
 grenadiers, with great hazard of fufFocation, dragged out the 
 nrft perfoa he caught hold of. It proved to be the major. It 
 happened, that in the fame inftant flie had, unknowing what 
 fhe did, and perhaps not perfeftly awake, providentially made 
 her efcape, by creeping under the walls of the back part of 
 the tent. The firft obje£k (lie faw, upon the recovery of her 
 fenfes, was the major on the other fide, and in the fame inftan . 
 again in the fire, in fearch of her. The ferjeant again faved 
 him, but not without the major being very fevercly burned in hii 
 face and different parts of the body. Every thing they had with 
 them in the tent was conlumed. 
 
 This accident happened a little time before the army pafTed the 
 Hudfon's River. It neither altered the refolution nor the chear- 
 fiilnefs of Lady Harriet ; and flie continued her progrefs, a 
 partaker of the fatigues of the advanced corps. The next «ali 
 upon he ' fortitude was of a different nature, and more diitrefs* 
 ful, as of longer fufpcnfc. On the inarch of the 19, the 
 t grenadier* 
 
 *;„ 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 grcc, were to be found, as well as every other virtue, 
 under the molt tender forms, I was aftonifhed at this 
 propofal. After fo long an agitation of thefpirits, ex- 
 haufted not only for v^nt of rcH", but abfolutely want 
 offood, drenched in rains for twelve hours together, 
 that a woman fhould te capable of fuch an under- 
 taking as delivering hcrfelf to the enemy, probably in 
 the night, and uncertain of what hands (he might firft 
 fall into, appeared an effort above human nature. The 
 afliftance 1 was enabled to give was fmall indeed j I 
 had not even a cup of wine to offer her i but I was 
 told fhe had found, from fome kind and fortu- 
 nate hand, a little rum and dirty water. All 1 could 
 furnifh to her was an open boat and a few lines, written 
 
 grenadiers bcipg liable to aftion at every ftep, fhe had been di- 
 refted by the major to follow the route of the artillery and bag- 
 gage, which was not expofed. At the time the adtion began 
 ^e found herfelf near a fmall uninhabited hut, where flie alighted. 
 When it was found the a6Vion was becoming general and bloody, 
 the furgeons of the hofpital took poflellion of the fame place, as 
 the moH convenient for the firft care of the wounded. Thus 
 was this lady in hearing of one continued fire of cannon and 
 mufketry, for four hours together, with the prefumption, from 
 the pofl of her hufband at the head of the grenadiers, that he 
 was in the mod expofed part of the adtion. She had three 
 female companions, the Baronefs of Reideiel and the wives of 
 two Britifli officers, Major Harnage and Lieutenant Reynell ; 
 but in the event their prefence ferved but little for comfort. 
 Major Harnage was foon brought to the furgeons, very badly 
 wounded; and a little time after came intelligence that Lieute- 
 nant Keynell was fliot dead. Imagination will want no helps to 
 figure the flate of the whole groupe. 
 
 from the date of that aaion to the 7th of October, Lady 
 Harriet, with her ufual ferenity, flood prepared for new trials i 
 and it was her lot that their feverity cncreafed with their num- 
 bers. She was again expofed to the hearing of the whole adion, 
 and at laft received the fnock of her individual misfortune, mixed 
 with the intelligence of the general calamity, the troops were 
 defeated, and Major Ackland, defperately wounded, was a pri- 
 foner. 
 
 The day of the 8 th was paiTed by Lady Harriet and her com- 
 panions in common anxiety, not a tent, nor a fhed being (land- 
 ing, except what belonged to the Hofpital, their refuge was 
 among the wouaded and the dying* 
 
 upon 
 
 >73 
 
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 4 
 
 ''y 
 
 
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 If 
 
 
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 M: 
 
 
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 ■m 
 
 
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 ■.I : ■ 
 * i ■ .■ 
 
 1.'.. 
 
 174 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 upon dirty wet paper, to General Gates, recoramend- 
 in.; her to his proteition. 
 
 Mr. Bruciencll, the chaplain to the artillery (the fame 
 gentlcMiian who had ofHciated ib fignally at General Fra- 
 ler's funeral) readily undertook to accompany her, and 
 with one female fcrvant, and the major's valct-de-cham- 
 bre(who hnd a ball which he had received in the late 
 a(flion then in his llioulder) flie rowed down the river 
 to meet the enemy. But her diftreffes were not yet to 
 end. The niji,ht was advanced before the boat reached 
 the enemy's out -polls, and the ccntinel would not let it 
 pafs, nor even come on lliore. In vain Mr. Brudeneil 
 offered the flag of truce, and reprefented the Rate of 
 the extraordinary paflcnger. The r^uard, apprehenfive 
 of treachery, and punftilious to their orders, threatened 
 to fire into the boat if it ftirred before day-light. Her 
 anxiety and fuffering were thus protratfted through feven 
 or eight dark and cold hours-, and her rcflciftions upon 
 that lirft reception could not give her very encouraging 
 ideas of the treatment fiie was afterwards to exped. 
 ' •' But it is due to jullice at the clofe of this adventure to 
 
 fay, that flie was received and accommodated by Ge- 
 neral Gates with all the humanity and refped that her 
 rank, hjr merits and her fortunes deferved. 
 ;"' Let fuch as are affedcd by thele circumftances of 
 
 alarm, hardfliip and danger, recoiled, that the fubjecT: 
 of them was a woman ; of the molt tender and delicate 
 , [ frame ; of the gentlell manners •, habituated to all the 
 
 foft elegancies, and reiined enjoyments, that attend high 
 birth and fortune j and far advanced in a ftate in which 
 the tender cares, always due to the fex, become indif- 
 jKrniibly nccelTary. Her mind alone was formed for 
 fuch trials. 
 ArrWai of I now retum to the armv, which arrived in the night 
 *j5"^'^y ^Jat Saratogi, in fuch ftate of fatigue, that the men for 
 Lord H*r. * the moil part had not ftrength or inclination to cut wood 
 and make fires, but rather fought deep in their wet 
 cloaths upon the .\vet ground under the continuing rain, 
 and it was not till after day-light th;jt the artillery and 
 Ld. Baic4^-jjjjj-j^|^Qf the troops paft the Kifli-Kill, and took a pofi- 
 ' ^ ' * tion 
 
 riiigt'in. 
 
 

 and 
 
 ces of 
 bject 
 licate 
 1 the 
 high 
 which 
 indif- 
 d for 
 
 nisht 
 ;nfor 
 wood 
 wet 
 rain, 
 ' and 
 pofi- 
 tioa 
 
 er myfelf as peculiarly accountable to my coun- ^"f'°8*. 
 
 iino iiflninf 
 
 .nd if all the circumflances mentioned by me, in the conven- 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 175 
 
 ,jpon the heights and in the redoubts formerly r.onftni(fled. 
 
 The interval between taking that poiition, and the Jnfe^ai be- 
 conclufion of the treaty, is the folemn crifis in which arrival at 
 I confide 
 
 try. A . . . 
 
 my own vindication, in my Letters, or my Narrative,^'""* 
 are not ettablilhed, and many of them ftrcngthened by 
 pofitive proof ; if every furmife of a furrender on my 
 I part, while there was a poflibility of avoiding it by 
 fight, by manoeuvre, or by retreat, is not done away ; 
 lit even in the laft extremity, it does not appear I was " ' 
 
 ready and forward to prefer death to difhonour; if 
 the evidence I have adduced is not clear, diftindl, and 
 dlreft to thefe points, the public odium, piercingly as 
 itaffcdts a feniible bread, would be far iliort of the 
 Ipiinifiiment I dcferve. 
 
 1 cannot but confider it as one encouragement under 
 
 [this appeal, and it is no fmall one, that though very 
 
 [few parts of my preceding conducl i'-ave efcaped the 
 
 fcrutiny of crofs-examination, not a material tranfadlion 
 
 Oithiscriiis has been controverted or e'anced at, I bee 
 
 |!eave to recapitulate the tranra<^ionsu])()n which 1 rely. 
 
 It is proved by the evidence of the Earl of Har- Lord Hir. 
 Irington and Colonel Kingfton, that the enemy was II,"^^''."' ■* 
 IpolTed on the eaft fide the river to guard the ford. Lieut. Coi. 
 
 It is further proved by the evidence of Lieut. Col. 86."s«"he 
 IKingfton, that in concert with the general officers, it pi»n- Lieut. 
 
 I J • 1 -1 1 1 /I ?' 1 Col. K.in?- 
 
 rvas determined to try a night march on the eaft lide &oa, 
 Ithe river, abandoning the baggage ; and that the at- 
 lempt was prevented by the impoffibility attending the 
 IdeHvery of neceflary provifion. The fame witnefs 
 goes on to Ihew, that the next day it was evident, . 
 pt had the delivery been poflible, the attempt would 
 liill have failed, for we then receiv-'d intelligence of 
 [he enemy being prcvioufiy in poiieliion, in force, of Lieut, di 
 [he couniry on both fides the river betwee 1 us and „,'"^l!'"',. 
 fort Edward.* 
 
 5- 
 91.92. 
 
 93> 94i9j 
 
 * It was alfo in contemplation ro force a way back to Albany, Via<i 
 iv enemy in 'the dAiibution df their pofh weakened their right, to 
 ituh^ive made the ^It'ort -poliible. See Lord Hariington'^ evidence. 
 
 While 
 
 ■■.V 
 
 m 
 
 u 
 
ij6 
 
 
 
 •fc- 
 
 4r 
 
 Llrut. Col. 
 
 88, 89, <)o. 
 
 See the 
 plan. No. 
 VII. 
 
 Lord Har- 
 rington, 84, 
 8y 86. 
 Lord B.il. 
 carriis, t'l om 
 6c to the 
 md. Maj. 
 Forbes, za 
 to 19. Lord 
 Balc«rra», 
 *4. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 While the army was lying day and night upon their 
 arms, " in anxious hope of fuccour from our friends 
 " or as the next dcfirablc expectation, an attack from 
 ** the enemy,"* I cannot omit o'jlerving from ihc 
 fiuue evidence (that of Colonel Kingfton) how near 
 the liill: expedition was being accompliilied. It would 
 be improper to pronounce pofitively what wouUl bave 
 been the ifllie: but I rcquefl: the attention of my mili- 
 tary readers to the plan of the ground, as an argument 
 of the probability of fuccels. The difpofition of the 
 enemy being to pafs the Fifh-Kill in different columns, 
 and to make their greac effort upon the plain, they mull I 
 have formed under the fire of all our park artillery, 
 within reach of grape ihot, a crofs fire from the artil-| 
 lery and mufketry of the entrenched corps uponthr, { 
 hill, and the mufketry of the 20th regiment, which 
 was at eafy dillance to be fupported by the Germans,! 
 it! front; added to this would have been the ad- 
 vantage, which though always wilhed for we neverl 
 had attained, of a charge upon an open plain. lam 
 pcrfuaded the general judgement will go with me when 
 I lament the accident that prevented the enemy's defign 
 (when fo far advanced in it, as adually to have paifed 
 the river with one column) as one of the mod adverfe| 
 Ibokcs of fortune in the whole campaign. 
 
 The (late of things after this difappointment is given| 
 by the F,arl of Harrington : ** It was as bad as polTi- 
 blc ; the numbers of the army were few, their pro- 
 viiions fhorr, their pofition not a good one, owing] 
 to the nature of the country." This flate is corrobo- 
 rated by the evidence of the Ead of Balcarras andl 
 Major Forbes, with the additional clrcumltance, that! 
 there was not a fpot to be found in the whole pofuion[ 
 which was not expofcd to cannon or rifle Ihot. 
 
 The minutes of the firft council of war prove thtl 
 unanimity of opinion for opening the treaty ; and itj 
 is proved by the evidence of Colonel Kingfton, thatl 
 the force of the enemy was actually greater, and theic| 
 
 * Letter from Albany t« the Secretary of State* 
 
 pofition 
 
 (( 
 
 it 
 
 C( 
 
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 ^17 
 
 pofjtion ftrongcr, than the intelligence I had received 
 and laid before the council of war reprefented them. 
 
 K is proved by the fullcft evidence, that the terms M»j.Forbei, 
 firft propofcd by the enemy were inftantly and unani-£'.'^jj^,J;^,, 
 DioDfly rejected by the council ot* war as difhonourable. K,ti\QTy 
 
 The fame unanimity in approving the terms I pro- 
 pofcd and obtained, is equally inconieftibly eftabiflied. 
 
 And laftly, two papers are produced, and authen- 
 ticated beyond a pofilbility of cavil, the one General Append!», 
 Gates's return figned by himfelf, fliewing the effective JJ'^,.^^'* 
 
 ion their 
 friends, 
 cic from 
 rom vhc 
 )0\v near 
 It would 
 uUl kave 
 my mill- 
 irgument 
 )n of the 
 columns, 
 they mud ' 
 . artillery, 
 .the anil- 1 
 upon thf. 
 It, which 
 Germans, | 
 n the ad. I 
 • we never! 
 ^in. lam' 
 me when I 
 iy*s tlefignj 
 avepalfedW' tion of the treaty ccafed, and of a greater part for 
 
 ftrcngth prcfcnt of the rebel army •, the other, the mi- No. xvii. 
 nutcs of the laft council of war, fhewing, that even fup- 
 porttd as I was by the unanimity of the former councils, 
 in opening and condu6ting the treaty, 1 was repugnant s« »»'<> 
 to the figning of it, upon a flight hope entertained of aea°r,.i, I'j'o, 
 remote relief — (a hope arifing from fome intelligence '3«.>3»« 
 received in the night of Sir Henry Clinton's moving up 
 the North River) and gave my voice againft a majority 
 accordingly j that I at laft thought myfelf compelled to 
 yield to the majority upon " the uncertainty of the in- 
 " telligence, and the improbability of General Clinton's 
 " motions being elfcftual if true ; upon the doubts en- 
 tertained of fome part of the troops, if the ncgoiia- 
 
 )ft adverfeH"' want of bodily (trength, if defperate enterprizes were 
 
 to be afterwards undertaken ; and laftly, upon the 
 
 I' reflexion that a mifcarriagc of fuch enterprizes mufl: 
 
 r be fatal to the whole army, and that even a viftory 
 
 * could not fave it." 
 
 To this mafs of evidence, appofite and direft to every 
 ^ftcffential to iny juftification, I beg leave to add the 
 [union of the army, that the terms obtained were bet- Lord BaU 
 than the fituation of things gave us a right to exped. ^ord kar- 
 " a proof that fuch was their opinion, 1 refer to the nngton. 
 mony of Lord Balcarras. 
 
 fair judgment upon recent events is hardly to bcRefleaiont 
 
 'led, cfpecially while many prejudices are alJve.^^"^^^'^^^ 
 
 \ be allowed me to aftume, what no one has ever 
 
 red to deny, that there may be a combination of 
 
 ate* I i^^^^nces under which an army may be juftitied in 
 
 pofitiof N treating 
 
 V^v- 
 
Tf. 
 
 , i. ^ 
 
 ■k 
 
 if 
 
 
 
 
 » 
 
 •',.■■ 
 
 
 .as/ -. < . ■ 
 
 
 J 7? REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE. 
 
 treating with an enemy. That the army under my com- 
 mand was under fuch circumf^ances at Saratoga is aifo 
 gene:aiiy acknowledged : but what is not denied t^^ me 
 from my own fituation, is attempted to be withheld, by 
 fome, on account of the quality of the enemy. They 
 fugged that there Ihould be no treaty with rebels. It is 
 unneceflary in anfwcr to have rccourfe to hiftory. I 
 will not take defence from treaties between Spain, the 
 haughtied power of the world, and the arch-rebel the 
 great Prince of Orange *, nor between Charles the Firft 
 and the arch- rebels the Englilh Parliament (for fuch in 
 both inftances they were called) 1 need only refer to the 
 examples eyiding at that time in America, and fince 
 much improved on at home. My fuperior officer in 
 America, with the approbation of government, had 
 treated upon different occalions with General Wafhing.j 
 ton. The Britifh government in its higheft colledive 
 authority, the King in Parliament, h^s fince commif- 
 fioned five members of that Parliament, theoneapctrj 
 the others of eminent ftation in military and civil capaJ 
 cities, to treat with rebels, I had almoft faid to fue tgl 
 rebels for peace, by the furrender of almoft every prinJ 
 ciple for the maintenance of which they had proiccuteJ 
 the war. I 
 
 Thus highly juftified in treating with rebels, I amaJ 
 a lois to difcovcr by what poflible mode of defence 1 
 could have acquitted my fclf to God or my country, wheJ 
 the brave and intelligentofficersof my army unanimouOJ 
 rcloived, upon military principle, precedent and rcalonl 
 that the treaty was expedient, and the terms honou| 
 able, it' 1 had delivered them up to certain dcftrudtio 
 or even to be prifoners at difcretion. 
 
 If the informed and difpaWonate part, of mankii 
 lliould agree in fcntiment with the qnanimous voice 
 the army, upon the convention of Saratoga, furei^ 
 impute to it the final lofs of the army is too palpabl 
 injullice long to remain upon the minds of the molt 
 judiccd- The convention exprcfely prefervcd the 2 
 tor the icrvicc of the ftatie. According to that cor 
 
 Ull 
 
I. 
 
 REVIEW OF THE E ^IDENCE. 
 
 tion a truce was made during the war, between that 
 army and the enemy, in America, and it now might 
 have been afting againft the Houfe of Bourbon in any 
 other part of the world. The army was loft by the non- 
 compliance with the treaty on the part of the Congrefs ; 
 and that violation of faith no man will ever be found to 
 jurtify. 
 
 I will not decide how far it was encouraged in Ame- 
 rica, by the perfuafion that the miniflry of Britain had 
 neither power nor fpirit to redrefs the wrong ; and that 
 they had funk the nation fo low, in point of refpedl:, 
 that the world would overlook, where (lie was concern- 
 •d, an aftion that would have excited, in any other 
 cafe, iiniverfal cenfurc and indignation. But whatever 
 motives the Congrefs may have h'ld, the tamenefs and 
 filence with which the Eritilh minift'L'rs have bo/ne this 
 outrage, is aftonifliing. That men fo conftaiit and fo 
 prodigal in their anger againft the Congrefs, as never 
 before to have failed in exprefllng it, even in cafes where 
 it bordered upon being ridiculous, fhould on a fudden 
 become cold and mute, and dead to feeling, in a cafe 
 were refentment was juftly founded, can hardly be ac- 
 counted for, except upon rhe principle that it was better 
 tofupprefs thcjufteft cenfure upon a power they deteft- 
 ed, than that even a particle of unmerited odium fhould 
 be wanting to load the man whom they were refolved to 
 deprcls. 
 
 >79 
 
 N 2 
 
 CON- 
 

 .1 • 
 * 
 
 4 
 
 \ 
 
 ( i8o ) 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 ¥■■: 
 It- 
 
 I AM not nware that in the preceding Review of 
 EviJcncft I have n<?gle6led any part efTcntial to my 
 defence. I do not reckon as fuch, that part which 
 applifs to the management of the public purfe. The 
 c;iUimny dcfigncd to v/ound me upon that head was too 
 grofs to kiccei'd : it periflied in its birth, and fcorn is 
 the only k^uiment excited by the remembrance of its mo. 
 menrary exillence. In le^'iard to the more plaufible 
 objfdtions pointed againll my conduft, I have not only 
 endc.ivoured to meet them in the crofs-examination, 
 but hive tearched for them in every place where I 
 could llippofe them to originate or be entertained. If 
 fom? have cfc;;pcd, I fliall (land excufed, when it is re- 
 collected how they have grown and changed from one 
 fh:?pe to another, and that it has never been my for- 
 tune to be confronted with an avowed and regular 
 flccufer — 1 defpair of ever being To: but 1 defire it 
 to be un krflcod, that akhou^h I am earncft in this 
 n^ode of defence, I am lb far from declining another, 
 that I (hall think it one very happy circumftance of 
 the paft enquiry, if any thing contained in it fhould 
 have ellett ficreafter to produce an enquiry by court- 
 jivartial. 
 
 it would rot be an ungrateful tafl< to follow the defence 
 of the camDaign with a detail of the occurrences which 
 happened between the time of figning the convention 
 and my leavirig America. Many of them would be 
 fv>und C'.iriour ; and the cares and perplexities in which 
 I bore a principal and moft painful part, would create a 
 new inrcrvft in the minds of my friends: but I do not 
 think n;\ ftlf at liberty, upon the plan I laid down at 
 
 my 
 
' 1 1 
 
 ew of 
 
 to my 
 which 
 The 
 A/ as too 
 corn is 
 its mo- 
 ilaafible 
 »ot only 
 lination, 
 where I 
 ned. If 
 it is re- 
 om one 
 my for- 
 reguUr 
 efire it 
 in this 
 another, 
 ancc of 
 It fhould 
 y court- 
 defence 
 ;s which 
 Invention 
 ^culd be 
 in which 
 create a 
 I do not 
 down at 
 my 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 my oiufet, to enter into matter where no blame is Im- 
 puted or implied. U'my proceedings during that inter- 
 \al dcfcrve any credit, I am content with that tcllitiiony 
 of it, which 1 may afiume from the filencc of my 
 enemies. 
 
 I have not the fame reifons for pafTing over the 
 tranfadlions in whicli I have been engaged fince my 
 return to England, becaufe blame, and of a very atro- 
 cious nature, has been Imputed to me. But as the 
 principal of thefe iranfadions are already before the 
 public, I fliall mention them very briefly j and merely 
 to introduce connc6ledly fuch further tlioughts upon 
 them as could not with propriety be ftated upon any ior- 
 mer occafion. 
 
 Immediately after my arrival, a board of general 
 officers was appointed to enquire into the caules of the 
 failure of the expedition from Canada. This enquiry 
 was made the foundation of an order againfl: my appear- 
 ing at court. 
 
 The board reported, that they coulJ not take cogni- 
 zance of me being under j^arole — the prohibition from 
 the King's prcfence ntverthclefs dill remained in force. 
 
 1 had recourfe to parliament for enquiry j and open- 
 ly, and repeatedly, and ftrenuoufly called upon the mi- 
 niflers to join ilTue with me before that tribunal. Ob- 
 jedion was taken againft immediate enquiry, becaufe 
 Generals Sir Guy Carlcton and Sir William Howe who 
 might be parties were abfent \ but it was evidently the 
 iil'njfition of the houfe, that an enquiry Ihould be infti- 
 utfd the enfuing fefllon. 
 
 I pledged mylelf zealoufly to profecute that meafurc ; 
 I accufed minifters of injurious treatment towards my- 
 fdf; and it became ray duty, upon occafions with 
 which my own affairs had no conne6tion, to cxprefs 
 deeper relentments of their conduct towards the public. 
 
 In this ftate of things parliament v^as prorogued on 
 thr 3^ of June. On rhe c^th of June ^ 1 rrceived ihe fir(l 
 order to repair to Bof^on as foon as I had tried the Bath 
 waters. 1 he order and my anfwcr, rtprdenting the 
 
 N 5 hard- 
 
 i8i 
 
 :■ [ 
 
 •>A S 
 
m. 
 
 ■1 ' ' 
 
 
 
 
 m 
 
 Iff., 
 
 f -; 
 
 182 CONCLUSION. 
 
 hardfhip of being fent back unheard, and the fccond 
 conditional order, with entire flight of my reprefentii- 
 tions, are too well known to require repetition : but 
 there are two circumltances attending the dates of ihefe 
 orders with which I was not acquainted tid long after^ 
 and which have never yet been jaken notice of. 
 
 The one is, that at the very time I was told that my 
 prefence was material^ and (as the fecond letter from 
 the fccretary at war exprefl'^d) Qf /« much importance to 
 the troops detained ptifoner sin New Englandi that it mult 
 not be difpenfed with — at that very time, it was deter- 
 mined to ratify the convention, according to the requi- 
 fition of the Congrefs j and to tranfmit the ratification 
 through other hands, and without any participation with 
 me, or employment of me, in carrying it to a con- 
 clufion. It was very po.flible, the troops might havp 
 been failed for England before I had reached America, 
 had I even complied as early as the condition of either 
 order could poffibly be confl:ruti'd to prefcribe. But at 
 all events, thecircumftance could not but ferve to mark 
 to me the true intent and meaning of the order beyond a 
 pofTibility of miftake — that it was an order of vindiBixt 
 ^unijhment •, and my prefence with the troops, it I 
 rcaciicd Aa-n;rica in time, was material ^v^^ important \.o 
 mark to them the degree of difgrace to which I was re- 
 duced. 'I he terms are a mockery, and, an infult upon 
 common fenle, if applied, in the fituation in which i 
 was placed, to the lervice of the King, or the confola- 
 tion of the troops. Such a difplay ot vengeance might 
 indeed be intended to apply to their prudence, and to 
 adl as a CaUiion and warning how at their return they 
 fiiould fupport a General under the extremity of the 
 King's dilpicafure *. 
 
 The I 
 
 * In times when the maintenance of the conllitution in iti purity 
 is the ruling principle cf an adminiltration, the King's namt i* in- 
 produced by ( Hice only to denote an a'5t oi the executive part ot the 
 ftate. In tinits when an adjniniilration mean to rule by the intlufncel 
 pt' inuniirciiy^ th'j langui.ge uf office is to connedt the royal pciioDi 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 The otiicr circumftance attending thcfe da^es is hot 
 lefs remarkable, viz. 
 
 The determination of changing the nature of the war^ 
 as afterwards declared by the commiffioners in America^ 
 mull havi beeh taken ar. this time. 
 
 I am very much difinclined to believe, that the con- 
 fideratioh of my perfon as a proper vidim upon that 
 occafion Mras ever regularly and formally debated in the 
 cabinet ( but I cannot think it uncharitable to the indi- 
 vidual adviier of the Crown, whoever he was, who 
 could project fuch an order, to fuppofe, that if upon 
 the firft exercife of the extremes of war on the one fide^ 
 and in the ardour cf retaliation on the other, it had fo 
 happened, that an obje(5t fo well to be fpared as ^n ob- 
 noxious and difgraced Lieutenant General, hdd oppor- 
 tunely prefented itfclf to the enemy's rigour, and had 
 been detained in their prifons, the order for the voyage 
 #ould not have been thought^ by that individual, quite 
 thrown away. Detention, with or without the troops, 
 of a troublclbme and bold complainant, could not be 
 immaterial or unimportant to fuch a perfdn, and the 
 ©rdef was of an import 
 
 " — To make afllirance double fure— 
 And take a bond of fate — 
 That he might tell pale-hearted Fear it lied. 
 
 The living prcfence of an injured man is, perhaps, 
 more offenfive and infupportable to the fight of a mean 
 injurer, than the fpcdtre of him would be after death. 
 
 But to return to the fafts I was recapitulating. 
 
 1 remained under the conditional order in England. 
 
 The enfuing feflion, the parliamentary enquiry now 
 laid before the public took place. It ended, as has been 
 ftated, in July, 1779. 
 
 with the aft, and to give him attributes of pafTion and difpleafure, 
 from which in his political charader he is held exempt. 1 dilclairn 
 language and ideas fo unconiHtutional and didept'diul, and never 
 mean to allude to my Sovereign perfonally, but in adb of julllce and 
 mercy. 
 
 Mi 
 
 it 
 <( 
 
 
 i \ 
 
 
 
 ft ■- J» , >**% 
 
 . -i' ■ 
 
 1 
 
 
 1 
 
 y:: 
 
 N 
 
 In 
 
 .Mi5!i? 
 
if.- 
 
 .'. <■'" 
 
 'M-^-: 
 
 . ■'■1, 
 
 •^:' 
 
 
 !1 
 
 V' i 
 
 i 
 
 f,i.; 
 
 ',:'■■■ 
 
 
 
 • ■ 1- 
 
 ■ ;■ '■ 
 
 , •«, 
 
 h: ' 
 
 
 ;\i ^ 
 
 
 ;i'.l.'. 
 
 * 
 
 «!?■' . 
 
 ' ' 'I 
 
 1:^:;- 
 
 
 CONCLUSIO N. 
 
 In September, I received a fevere reprimand, a Jenial 
 of a court martial, and a prohibition of I'erving my coun-^ 
 try in its exigence, thougli other officers precifely in my 
 fituation were employed — I refigned. 
 
 The blame laid upon me for the part I rook in thefe 
 tranfadlions is, that intemperately and fa6 ioully I en- 
 gaged in oppofition •, that I was guilty of difobedience 
 to the King's orders ; and it has been added in a late 
 publication, that even my defence of my conduft is a 
 libel upon the King's government. 
 
 I think J have petceived, that the firft part of thefe 
 charges, a raP^ engagement in oppofition, is not com- 
 bated by fome who wi(h me well fo ftrenuoufly as other 
 imputations have been. It may pofllbly have appeared 
 to friendly and prudential obfervers, as a palliating plea 
 for a reftitution to favour upon fome future occafion, 
 to have to fay, that I had acted upon the fudden im- 
 pulfe of pafTion ♦, and the.fequel might be, that I had 
 repented, and would offend no more. 
 
 Without doubting the kindnefs which fuggefts thefe 
 cxcufes, 1 have been impelled by principles too forcible, 
 and have taken my part too decidedly, to look for a 
 refource in thofe or any other fubterfuges. It would be 
 inconfift^fnt and diflionourable in me to withhold a pub- 
 lic declaration upon this occafion, in addition to thofe 
 I have made upon others, that I engaged in refiftance 
 to the meafures of the court upon mature rcflcdion j 
 that after coliedling in my mind all the lights upon men 
 and things which my experience and oblervation could 
 furnifh, I believed that the conftiturion of England was 
 betrayed : and neither blaming or fufpeding any men 
 who conceived different opinions, and atted upon them, 
 1 thought it a point of time in which a man believing as 
 I did was called upon to facrifice to his country. The 
 tcft of this motive, it is true, mull reft between God 
 and my confciencc i but let it not be fuppofisd that I 
 a(^tcd blindly — the path of intercll, a broad and beaten 
 track, lay clearly before me from the time i arrived in 
 England. Supple joints, and an atteniivc eye, always 
 
 giving 
 
'm 
 
 CONCLUSION. 
 
 giving way to power, on one fide, and fomctimespufli- 
 ing my friends into the dirt on the other, would have 
 carried me fafely through. I even believe, that the ad- 
 vifer of the letters 1 lately alluded to would rather have 
 feen me in that track, than in the other which he pre- 
 fcribed for me acrofs the Atlantic. 
 
 As little would I be fuppofcd to want difcernment of 
 the path I took : for the barefaced preferences, rewards 
 and punilbments held forth for parliamentary conduft, 
 were among the moft glaring parts of the fyftem I had 
 contemplated. And it was impoflible to doubt, that as 
 a delinquent tbere^ I (hould be prefled both bv art and 
 vengeance to the end the enemies I had provoked fore- 
 fa w-«^the lofs of my profefTion and the impoverifhmenc 
 of my fortune. I truft it will be an innocent revenge 
 on my part, to (hew them I can bear my condition firm- 
 ly •, and that I am incapable of redeeming what I have loft, 
 were rt ever in my option, by the difavowal of a fingle 
 principle 1 have profeflTcd. f 
 
 i;I come now to the fecond charge, difobed«ncc of 
 orders} and in a point that fo nearly touches the verjf 
 eflcnce of military oharad.T, I truft I (hall not trefpafs 
 upon the patience of the reader, if I treat it a little ntiortf 
 8t large than I have done in my correfpondence with the 
 fecretary at war. -:• ■ 
 
 • i admit that fubordination slnd implicit obedience*) as 
 applied to the operation of arms, are primary principles 
 in the military fyftem. An army is a mere name with- 
 out them. • The officer who hefitatcs to meet certain 
 death upon command, deferves to receive it from the 
 hand of the executioner. 
 
 Bur there are poffible exceptions to thefe general prin- 
 cipl s, efpecially out of the field, in the moft abfolute 
 fervices ; and in the Britifli fervice they are known and 
 marked, and co-exiftent with the military eftablifliment 
 itfeif, in the mutiny att, which confines obedience to 
 legal commands. An army muft again be garbled like 
 the army of Cromwell (which God avert!} before an 
 
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 J^S6i CONCLUSION.. 
 
 order could be executed, like that of Cromwell, for 
 garbling the parliament. 
 
 A high fpirit will contfadt. the litnits of obedience 
 ftill morej v^ith illegal, he will reje^l; diflionourabic 
 comrnands -, and he iwill, follow the reafoning I have al- 
 r?ady premifcd, and .ftate it as a maxim thus ; he who 
 theys at the expence $f fortune ^ comfcfrt, health and life^ is 
 a foldiery he who obeys At the ejipeme of honour is a 
 
 But"Imay be afked by -fonie difciplinarians, who is 
 to be ihe judge in thcfe nice definitions of obedience? 
 It is uncommon . military do<ftrine . I may be told, to 
 rcafQn: upon the :Kitig*s OJ:ders^ — I confefs it is fo. Since 
 the. reign of Jame/3. the Second, in the Britilh fervice it 
 nc*^er iias be^n necisflaryi We have been ufed in this 
 age, tO'fee the King's name give wings and infpiration 
 to duty. Pifcipline, in this c6untry, has been raifed 
 upon perfortal lK)rtQur-r!a firpier bafi3 than fear or for-* 
 vility ever furnilhed : and the.minitterwho firft (hakes 
 that hdfipy confidence ; who turns military command to 
 p^ijtical craft,} who dares to ufe his, gracious Sovereign's 
 nstniie as an en^^irfe of Hate, to glut iiis own anger^ or 
 to>;reB)ovle hijs own'fcara, he is amongft the word encw 
 mie^ to thait Sovereign. But Ihould his purpofes go 
 further (a confideration of far greater magnitude to the 
 public) and ihould it be feen that tht royal name was 
 Iwought iorth for the difcipline of parliament, the miniftcr 
 l(E>«ifing it would be not only an enemy t» his Sovereign, 
 but a traitor to the conllitutiou of the ftate. . 
 
 I will clofc the defence of my principles refpwSlina 
 xnilitary fubordination by reference to an anecdote well 
 authenticated and not very remote. 
 
 An officer in a neighbouring nation, for fome error 
 he had committed in a day of battle, received a blow 
 from his prince who commanded in perfon. The offi. 
 ecr drew a pjftol, and his firft movement was to point 
 it at hiis matter; but the next (and it was inllanta- 
 neous) \yas to turn the muzzle, and difchirge the ball 
 intp his own heart. Though my calc differs both in the 
 
 provo- 
 
C Q N C L U S I O N. 
 
 pravcuratioti and thp confequence, in many circumftancqj 
 iny conduft may jullly be fupported upon the fame 
 principle. I receive an affront that a liberal fpirit can- 
 pot epdure i And in a name, againd which no perfonal 
 rcfcntment can be purfued, nor indeed entertained : but 
 afuicide of my profeffional exiftence(if I may be allowcU 
 the phrafe) is preferable to the ftate in which the af- 
 front placed me. In one inftanceonly I renounce the 
 parallpl. — God forbid I ihoud be thought, even in fk 
 burft of paflion, to have pointed at my Sovereign! Ic 
 was not from his band I received the blow. 
 
 I fliall folicit the reader's attention very little further: 
 but I feel the n^ceffity of repeating my application to 
 the candour of thf public, both -as a writer and an ap- 
 pellant. Defence, and imputation of blame to others, 
 Jire naturally interwoven in my caufe : it required a 
 mcrti diftin^ conception, and an abler hand than mine, 
 to keep them always apart, and open to feparatc view. 
 In feme parts my defence may be weakened by this de- 
 ficiency of (kill J but I have no right to offer the fame 
 cxcufe for Ibffering any blame to reft upon others be- 
 yond what I thought myfelf juftified to fupport. 
 
 Upon this principle, I think it juft, at taking leave 
 of the fecrptary of ftate for the American department, 
 briefly to enumerate the only fa6ls and propofitions re- 
 fpei'ling the plan of the expedition from Canada, that I 
 think clearly maintainable againll him. 
 
 Firft faft. It is clear that the plan of ajunftion of 
 tltc greater part of the forces in^Canada with the army of 
 Sir William Howe, was formed in the yc .r 1776, when 
 'Sir William Howe was In full fuccffs-, when his whole 
 force was in the neighbourhood of New York, or in the 
 Jerfies, and Mr. Waftiington was beaten, and at the 
 weakcft. 
 
 Second fact. This plan of a jundion was continued 
 (and upon jufl reafbning) in the dole of the year 17,6, 
 wi en Sir William Howe's firft propcifal of cperations for 
 the cnfuing campaign arrived. Thofe propoials were 
 ipade upon the datum of a nun.ber of troops, futnci- 
 
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 188 CONCLUSION. 
 
 ent to furnifh, befid«:;s the main army, an offenftve army 
 of io,ooo men, rank and file, to aft on the fide of 
 Rhode Ifland, by taking poflcflion of Providence, and 
 penetrating from thence into the country towards Bof. 
 ton ; and another offenftve army, not lefs than io,ooo, 
 •to move up thr North Kiver to Albany, exclufiveof 
 roDO for the defence of New York. 
 
 In either of the above cafes, the plan of jundion 
 could hardly have failed of fuccefs. 
 
 Third fadl. On the 23d of February, Sir "William 
 Howe's alteration of the firft plan was received, and 
 he then projoof^id to ad with the greater part of his 
 force on the fide of Philadelphia, at the opening of the 
 carripaign, and ro enable him fo to do, to defer the of- 
 fenftve plan from Rhode TJland till the reinforcements fljcuU 
 arrive^ and to dtrftine only 3000 men to adt defenfii'tl^ 
 upon the lovver part of the Hudfon's River. 
 
 Fourth fa(ft. On the 3d of March, the fecretary of 
 ftate fignified his MajeHy's entire approbation of this 
 deviation from the plan firft fuggefted. 
 
 From thefe fads arifcs my firft propofition, that at 
 the time the change of plan for Sir Willi'-im Howe's 
 operations was adopted, by which no ofFcnfive force 
 wavto lemain up'>n the Hudfon*s River, nor a diverfion 
 probably to take place from Rhode Ifland, the plan of 
 my operations, the fuccefs of which would propably 
 depend in a great degree upon co-operation and di- 
 vrrfion, ought to have been changed likewife : inftead 
 of that, K was enforced and made pofitive by the re- 
 fufal of theiatitude I had propofed of ading upon 
 the Conni'iflicur, or, in cafe ot exigency, embarking the 
 foops and cffefling the jundion by fea. 
 
 f'lfth fail. On the 19th of March, a letter from Sir 
 ^Villiam Howe, by the fecretary of ftate, acquainting 
 him, thit a brigade of Britifti and fome companies of 
 grcnadi'^rs and light infantry had been withdrawn from 
 Rhode IQand, which made the force left there merely 
 defcnfive. The fame letter mentions the profpefts the 
 enemy had of bringing 50,000 men into the field. 
 
 Sixth 
 
 ■• - '. 1 • ' ■' 
 
 'A' 
 
 % 
 
CONCLUSION; 
 
 Sixth fa6l. I did not leave England till the begin- 
 ning of April, by which time the fecretary of ftate mufl: 
 liavc known, or ought to have known, that no de- 
 pendance could be placed upon reinforcements from 
 England arriving at New York in time for Sir William 
 Howe to refume the intention he had defrrred, vi55. a 
 diverfion from Rhode Ifland, or of making the force 
 upon Hudfon's River adequate to otTenlive opfr.ition. 
 
 Hence ariles my fecond propofition, that the latitude 
 1 had propofed, or other xpedients of precaution, ought 
 then at leaft to have been adopted : inftead of which, I 
 was fuffered to fail, ignorant of Sir Williom Howe's 
 plans, and ignorant of the defalcation or the delays in 
 the reinforcements dellined for him. The confequence 
 was, that neither his letter to Sir Guy Carhton, put 
 into my hands after my arrival in Canada, nor his let- 
 ter to me of the 17th of June, informing me of his def- 
 tination for Pennfylvania, removed my expedation of 
 co-operation, becaufe I was to fuppofe, that fubfequent 
 lothe dates of either of thofe letters, he would receive 
 orders from the fecretary of ftate refpeCling the junc- 
 tion, and alfo a timely reinforcement. 
 
 Seventh fa6t. The iecretary of ftate makes no men- 
 tion of the northern expedition in any of his difpuches 
 toSir William Howe at the end of March, when my 
 orders were fixed, nor in the month of April. And it 
 is a further fad, that ! am pcrfuaded will not he con- 
 tcfted, that he did not mention any orders or rec m- 
 mcndations relative to co-operation verbally to Sir Wil- 
 liam Howe's aid-de camp, or any other confidential 
 perlbn who failed about that time. 
 
 The firft mention made of the neceflity of co-opera- 
 tion was in the fecretary. of ftate's letter of the iStb of 
 May, wherein his Lordftiip " Tru/s tk^it whatever' he 
 fiVr William Howe] may meditate, it will be excafted in 
 time to cO'Operate itHth the army ordered to proceed frcTriV 
 Canada." , il'?'--?; 
 
 The propofition 'clearly juftified by theL- fads is, that 
 if the fecfvitary of ftate had thought proper to fignify 
 
 the 
 
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 ii;o C O N C L U S I O N. 
 
 ihe King's cxpcdlation of a co-opcrarion to l)c made In 
 my favour in the month of March or beginning oi" 
 April, as in confiftency he ought to have done, it would 
 have arrived before Sir William Mowe embarked his 
 army, and in time for him to have made a new difj^). 
 fition : but inftead of that, this very material injunction 
 was not difpatched till it was almod phyfically impof, 
 fiblc it fliould have any cfFcd. And To indeed it hap. 
 pencd, for Sir William Howe received it on the lUh 
 of Aiigull, at a didance from Hudlbn's River too great! 
 ibrany detachment from his own army to be made in 
 time, could it even have been fpared j and the reinforce- 1 
 mcnt from England, upon which Sir William Howe I 
 depended to Itrengthen Sir Henry Clinton, was much 
 later flill — too late (as it has been fhewn) to enable that 
 general with all his acclivity and zeal to give any effec- 
 tual fupport. 
 
 Indeed the conduft of the fccretary of ftate, in in- 
 ferting this paragraph, in his letter of the i8th of May, I 
 when it could not avail, after omitting it when certainly 
 it would have been timely. Teems lo prepoftcrous, that 
 it can only be explained by one fatt. It tranfpired about | 
 that time, that Sir William Howe's army was dellineil 
 for Pennfylvania, and people who had conlidered tiicl 
 force of the enemy to be colledled from the northern 
 provinces b?gan to be alarmed for my army. It is well 
 known (thrugh I cannot afcertain the date) that m 
 ofHccr of very great ability, and a perfedl knowledge in 
 the country through which I was to pals, as foon as lie 
 heard that no difpofition was made for a fupport from 
 New York, foretold to the fecretary of ftate, or his near 
 friends, the fall of my army. Under this apprehenfionl 
 it might appear to the iecretary of ftate a proper cau- 
 tion, that an expe^ation of co-cperation ihould exiill 
 
 . i*ider his hand. 
 
 •f If plans fo inconfiftently formed, and managed by thcl 
 fccretary of rtate with fo much feeming confidence, asl 
 to iniQead his generals, and fo much real reftrve as tol 
 dellroy them, Ihould be defended by that infatuated bcj 
 
 lieff 
 
CONCLUSION. 
 
 lief then entertained of the inability of the enemy to re- 
 fill, I fliould beg leave to ftate, as one propofition 
 more, that after thfe experience of their adions ac 
 Trenton, and many other places, and the intelligence of 
 their new levies received from Sir William Howe, fuch 
 confidence was an additional fault, and perhaps a more 
 pernicious one than any I have (tated. 
 
 Thus much for the noble Lord in his public capacity. 
 What (hare of the perfccution I have fuftained (more 
 than I have diredlly expreffed in different parts of my 
 defence) are imputable to his private councils, is not 
 within my knowledge : but if in fpeaking of my perfe- 
 cutors in general, I may be thought fonietimes to have 
 ufed ftrong terms, I have only to lay, that having ad- 
 vanced no faft which I am not able and relolved to 
 maintain, I have not felt mylelf called upon, in apply- 
 ing thofe fa£ts for any further attention, than to prcfervc 
 the language of a gentleman, which is an attention due 
 to myfelf as well as to the public. It is open and manly 
 enmity alone that unites refped with refentment. 
 
 I wifh I could as eafily apologife for all the other 
 faults with which this undertaking abounds as a com- 
 pofition. At a time when fo many pens are employed, 
 1 mull not expefl to be fpared. 1 fliall treat with fiknt 
 relpedt any comments that are fairly founded and de- 
 livered with liberality; and with contempt, equally 
 fiient, the common invedives of the political prels. 
 This appeal is not to reft upon literary criticifm, or 
 party difputation, but upon the broad equity of my 
 country. 1 know that prejudice and malice will vanifh 
 before the man who dares to fubmit his adUons to 
 that teft — If acquitted there, I feel I am not degrad- 
 ed ; and I have not a fenfation within my breaft 
 which does not at the fame time ailure me, I cannot 
 be unhappy. 
 
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 APPENDIX. 
 
 Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to No, I. 
 Lord George Germain, </^/^^. Hertford-Street, iji 
 January, 1777. 
 
 K • 
 
 M 
 
 My Loud, 
 
 Y phyfician has prefled me to go to Bath for a 
 Ihort time» and I find it requifite to my health and 
 fpiriis to follow his advice ; but I think it a previous 
 duty to afllire your Lordfliip, that, fliould my atten- 
 dance in town become neceflary, relatively to informa* 
 tion upon the affairs of Canada, I (hall be. ready to o- 
 bey your fummons upon one day's notice. 
 
 Your Lordfliip being out of town, I fubmitted the 
 above intentions, a few days ago, perfonally co his 
 Majefly in his clofet 5 and I added, *' That, as the 
 arrangements for the next campaign might poffibly 
 come under his royal contemplation before my return* 
 I humbly laid myfelf at his Majefty's feet for fuch ac- 
 tive employment as he might think me worthy of." 
 
 This was the fubflance of my audience on my part. 
 I undertook it, and I now report it to your Lordlhip, 
 in the hope of your patronage in this purfuitj a hope, 
 my Lord, fonnded not only upon a jult fenfe of the 
 honour your Lordfhip's friendfhip muilreflefl upon me, 
 but alfo upon a feeling that I deferve it, in as much as 
 a folid refped and fincere perfonal attachment can con- 
 llitute fuch a claim. 
 
 1 leave in the hands of Mr. D'Oyley fuch of the 
 memorandums confided to me by General Carleton as 
 require difpatch, fliould your Lordfhip think proper 
 to carry them into execution. 
 
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 ii APPENDIX. 
 
 I alfo leave in that gentleman's hands the copy of an 
 application relative to boats for the artillery, and which 
 1 take the liberty to fubmic to your Lordlhip as well 
 worthy of confideration^ upon the fuppofition that the 
 enemy (hould arm upon Lake George, and that any 
 operation fhould be advifeable by that route. 
 
 I likewife leave the difpofition of winter quarters, 
 which I received by the laft Ihip from Canada. I find 
 no difpatch is come to your Lordfliip by that occafion, 
 and I conceived thofe papers might be of ufe. " 
 
 I have the honour to be. 
 My Lord, &c. 
 
 J. BURGOYNE. 
 
 No II ^^^^^^ of ^ ^fffff^ fi'Off* ^orJ George Germain to Sir 
 Guy Carleton, dated Whitehall, zid Auguft, 1776. 
 
 THE rapid fuccefs of his Majedy's arms, in drN 
 ving the rebels out of Canada, does great honour to 
 your conduct ; and I hope foon to hear that you have 
 been able to purfue them acrofs the lakes, and to pof* 
 fefs thofe pofts upon the frontiers which may effedtualiy 
 iecure your province from any future infult. 
 
 His Majefly, in appointing you commander in chief 
 of his forces in Canada, was pleafed to extend your 
 »^ ->mmiffion to the frontiers of his provinces bordering 
 thereupon, wifely forefeeing that it might be neceiTary 
 for the completing your plan of operations that you 
 fhould march your army beyond the limits of your 
 own government. I truft, before this letter reaches 
 you, that you will, by your fpirit and aftivity, have 
 cleared the frontiers of Canada of all the rebel forces, 
 and will have taken the proper meafures for keeping 
 pofleffion of the lakes. That fervicc being performed, 
 his Majefty commands me to acquaint you, that there 
 ilill remains another part of your duty to be under- 
 taken, 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 M, which will require all your abilities and the 
 Utft application, the reftoring peace and the elta- 
 liirg good order and legal government in Canada. 
 |gan obje«Slof the greatcit importance to this coun- 
 the difficulties attending it are immenfe *, but his 
 ^jrfty depends upon your zeal, and upon your expe- 
 tcc, for carrying it into execution. His Majefty, 
 anxious for the happineis of his fubje6ls, com- 
 ds me to inform you, that no time fliould be k It 
 liicgiiining fo important a work, and that you do 
 [ctofc return to Quebec, detaching Lieutenant- 
 Ual Burgoyne, or fuch other officer as you Ihall 
 kmoft proper, with that part of your forces which 
 belpared from the immediate defence of your pro- 
 |:e, to carry on fuch operations as (hall be mod 
 ducive to the fuccefs or the army afting on the 
 |ot New- York ; and that you diredt the officer fo 
 jched to communicate with, and put himfrlf as 
 laspolTibie under the command of. General Howe: 
 iwill order fuch artillery as you fhall judge necef- 
 |to proceed with this detachment; and, as a great 
 ntity of heavy cannon and military (lores were fent, 
 ithefuppotition that Quebec might have been in 
 |hands of the rebels, you will, upon requifition from 
 eral Howe, fupply him with fuch cannon and 
 as may not be wanted for the proteAion of 
 lada. 
 
 ••• 
 111 
 
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 fty« 
 
 have 
 
 kl forces, 
 keeping 
 irformed, 
 that there 
 under- 
 taken, 
 
 ihtsfor conducing the War from the Side of Canada. No. III. 
 By Limtenant'Qeneral Burgoyne, 
 
 ^HEN the laft (hips came from Quebec, a re- . 
 iprevailed in Canada, faid to have been founded 
 pofitive evidence, that the rebels had laid the 
 • of feveral large veflels at Skenefborough and Ti- 
 troga, and had refolved to exert their utmod 
 
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 W APPENDIX? 
 
 powers to conftrud a new and formidable fleet durini 
 the winter. 
 
 I will not, however, give credit to their exertiort 
 in fuch a degree as to itni?gine the King's troops wi| 
 be prevented paffing Lake Champlain early in th 
 fummer, but will luppole rhe operations of the am 
 to begin from Crown-Point. 
 
 But as the prcfent means to form effectual plans 
 to lay down every poflible d'fficulry, I will luppo 
 the enemy in great force at Ticonderoga : the di| 
 ferenr works there are capable ot admitting tweli 
 thoufand men. 
 
 I will fuppofe him al fo to occupy Lake George wij 
 a confiderable naval ftrength, in order to fecuic hisi 
 treat, and afterwards to retard the campaign ; andl 
 is natural to expert that he will take mcalures to bio 
 up the roads from Ticonderoga to Albany by thewj 
 of Skenefborough, by fortifying the ftrong ground] 
 different places, and thereby obliging the King's arn 
 to carry a weight of artillery with it ; and, by fellii 
 trees, breaking bridges, and other obvious imf 
 iTsents, to delay, though he IV ^uld not have power] 
 fpirit finally to refift, its progrtfs. 
 
 The enemy thusdifpofed upon the fide of Canadaj 
 is to be confidered what troops will be neceflary, 
 what dilpofithjn of them will be moft proper 10 p^ 
 fecute the campaign with vigour and eflfeft. 
 
 I humbly conceive the operating army (I meani 
 clufively ot the troops left for the fecurity of CanaJ 
 ought not to confift of lefs than eight thoufand reg| 
 lars, rank and file. The artillery required in the 1 
 morandums of General Carlcton, a corps of watertnj 
 two- thoufand Canadians, including hacch^-men 
 other workmen, and one thoufand or more favages. 
 It is to be hoped that the reinforcement and I 
 viflualling-fhips may all be rea^y to fail from 
 Channel and from Corke on the lad day of Marl 
 
 1 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 am pci fuaded, that to fail with a fleet of tranfports 
 karikr, is to lubjcd government to lofs and difap- 
 intmtrnt. It may reafonably be expedted that they 
 II reach Quebtc before the 20th of May j a period 
 tuil lime tor opening the campaign. The ro?.ds, 
 (i the rivers and lakes, by the melting and running 
 If of the fnows, are in common years impradicable 
 oner. 
 
 But as the weather, long before that time, will 
 [robably have admiired of labour in the docks, I will 
 kefor granted that the fleet of lalt year, as well ba- 
 Lx as aimed vtflt-ls, will be found repaired, aug- 
 U ed, and fit for immediate fervice. The maga- 
 tnes that remain of provifion (I believe them not to be 
 undaiit) will probably be formed at Montreal, Sorel, 
 Chamblee. 
 
 I conceive the firfl: bufinefs for thofe entrufted with 
 lie chief powers, Ihould be to ine6t and poll the 
 inops deftined to remain in Canada ; to throw up the 
 ilitary icores and provifion with all poffible uifpatch, 
 iwhich fervice the above-mentioned troops, if pro- 
 Itrly polled, will greatly aflllt ■, and to draw the army, 
 eftined for operation, to cantonments, within as lew 
 m march of St. John's as conveniently may be. I 
 lould prefer cantonments at that feaion of the year to 
 Bcampment, as the ground is very damp, and tonfe- 
 liently very pernicious to the men, and more elp^ci- 
 |y as they w. 11 have betn for many months before 
 led to lodgings, heated with ftoves, or between decks 
 ilhips: all thele operations may be put in motion 
 Igtther, but they leverally require fome obfervation. 
 11 (hould wifli that the troops left in Canada, fuppo- 
 hgthe number mentioned in my former mcmoran- 
 m to be approved, might be made as follows : 
 
 ^3 
 
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 4.1 
 
 "I, 
 
 448 
 
 vi APPENDIX. 
 
 The 31ft regiment, Britilh, exclufive of their 
 light company of grenadiers, — — — 
 Maclean's corps, ——. — — —. — 
 The 29th regiment, — — — — ^ 
 Tbe ten additional companies from Grear- 
 
 Brunfwic and Hffle Hanau to be taken by de- 
 tachments or complete corps, as Major- 
 General Reidefel (hall recommend, leaving 
 the grenadiers, liy,ht-infantry, and dragoons. 
 
 Detachments from the other Britifh brigades, 
 leaving the grenadiers and light inlaniry 
 complete, and Iquaring the battalions e* 
 
 Rink 
 
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 3oo5| 
 
 My reafon for fele<5llng the 31ft regiment for ti 
 duty is, that when I faw it laft it was not equallyl 
 order with the other regiments for fervices of adivij 
 
 I propofe the 29; h regiment, <is it is not at prefd 
 brigaued. 
 
 I propofe Maclean's corps, becaqfe 1 very murh 1 
 prehend defertion from fuch parts of ir as are compoj 
 pt Americans, fhould they come near the enemy. 
 
 In Canada, whatfoever may be their dirpofition,! 
 is not io eafy to cffld: it. 
 
 And I propofe making up the refidue by deta 
 mcnt, becaule, by felccting the men leaft calculattdl 
 fatigue or lei^fl accultomed to i:, which may be| 
 qualiy good foidiers in more ci nfined movements 
 better-provided ficuations, the cfFe<^ive rtrength 
 operation is much greater and the detenfjve Itieng 
 pot impaired. 
 
 I mud beg leave to (late the expeditious conveyaij 
 pf provifion and (lores from Quebec and the fevfl 
 
 1? 
 
 ^^ 
 
;1fl 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 other depofitaries, in order to form ample magazines 
 at Crown -Point, as one of the moft important opera- 
 tions of the campaign, becaufe it is upon that which 
 moft of the reft will depend. If failing-vcflels up the 
 St. Lawrence are alone to be employed, the accident 
 of contrary winds may delay them two months before 
 they pafs the Rapids of Richelieu, and afterwards St, 
 Feter's-Lake -, delays to that flxtent are not uncom- 
 mon, and they are only to be obviated by having a 
 quantity of fmall craft in readinefs to work with oars. 
 From the mouth of the Sorel to Chamblee, rowing and 
 tacking is a fure conveyance if fufHcicnt hands are 
 found. From Chamblee to St. Thcrc^ (which is juft 
 above the Rapids) land -carriage muft be uied, and 
 great authority will be requifue to fuppiy the quantity 
 neceflary. 
 
 A bufinefs thus complicated in arrangement, in fomc 
 parts unufual in praftice, and in others perhaps diffi- 
 cult, can only be carried to the defired efFeft by the 
 peremptory powers, warm zeal, and confonant opinion, 
 of the governor ; and, though the former are not to be 
 doubted, a failure, in the latter, vindicated, or fecm- 
 ing to be vindicated, by the plaufible obftrudlions that 
 will not fail to be fuggefted by others, will be luffici- 
 ent to crulh fuch exertions as an officer of a fanguine 
 ;emper, entrufted with the future conduft of the cam- 
 paign, and whofe perfonal intereft and fame theretore 
 confequentially depend upon a timely out-fet, would 
 be led to make. 
 
 The affembly of the favages and the Canadians will 
 alfo entirely depend upon the governor. 
 
 Under thefe confiderations, it is prefumed, that the 
 general officer, employed to proceed with the army, 
 will be holden to be out of the reach of any poflible 
 blame till he is clear of the province of Canada, and 
 furnilhed with the propofed fupplies. 
 
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 APPENDIX. 
 
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 The navigation of LakeCiiamplain, Tccured by the 
 fuperiority ot our naval force, and the arrangements 
 for forming proper magazines fo eltablilhed as to make 
 the execution certain, I would not lofe a day to take 
 pofTefTion of Crown-Point with Brigadier Frafer's corps, 
 a large body of favages, a body of Canadians, both 
 for fcouts and works, and the bed of our engineers 
 and artificers vvell fupplied wivh intrenching tools. 
 
 The brigade would be fufficient to prevent infult 
 during the time neceffii-y for colledling the ftores, 
 forming magazines, and tortifying the pofts ; all which 
 fhould be done, to a certain degree, previous to pro- 
 ceeding in force to Ticonderoga j to fuch a degree I 
 mean as may be fuppofed to be effected in time of 
 tranfporting artillery, preparing fafcines, and other 
 n'tceflaries for artillery operations ; and, by keeping 
 the reft of the army back during that period, the 
 tranfport of provifions will be leflened, and the foldi- 
 ers made of ufe in forwarding the convoys. 
 
 But though there would be only one brigade at 
 Crown- Point at that time, it does not follow that the 
 enemy ihould remain in a ftate of tranquillity. Corps 
 of favages, fupported by detatchments of light regu- 
 lars, Ihould be continually on foot to keep them in 
 alarm j and within their works, to cover the recon-- 
 noitering of general ofHcers and engineers ; and to obi- 
 tain the bell intelligence of their ftrengthj pofition, and 
 tlefign. 
 
 If due exertion is made in the preparations ftated 
 above, it may be hoped that Ticonderoga will be re- 
 duced early in the ilimmer, and it v;ill then become a 
 more proper place for arms than Crown-Point. 
 
 The next nieafure mull depend upon thofe taken by 
 the enemy, and upon the general plan of the campaign 
 ^s concerted at home. It it be determined that Gene- 
 jal Howe's whole forces fhould a6l upon Hudfon's- 
 liiv'tr, and to ihc fouth\yard of ir, and that the only 
 
 obje(^l 
 
■ .'• .^ 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Ljeft of the Canada army be to efFed a jundlion with 
 liiiac force, the immediate pofleflion of Lake George 
 Loiild be of great confequence, as the moft expeditious 
 [and mofl commodious route to Albany j and, fhouid 
 he enemy be in force upon that lake, which is very 
 Iprobable, every effort fhouid be tried, by throwing 
 Ifivages and light troops round it, to oblige them to 
 Lit it without waiting for naval preparations. Should 
 Mofe efforts fail, the route by South-Bay and Skenef- 
 l|)orough might be attempted ; but confiderahle diffi- 
 lulties may be expedled, as the narrow pares of the 
 |iiw may be eafily choked up and rendered impafll- 
 Ible; and, at bell:, there will be necfflity tor a great 
 Jcfal of land-carriage for the artillery, provifion, &c. 
 Iwliich can only be fuppiied from Canada. In cafe of 
 (kcds a' lb by that route, and the ei-eniy not removed 
 llrom Lake George, it will be neceflary to leave a chain 
 lo'^pofts, as the army pioceeds, for the fecunties of 
 Ijfour communication, which may too much weaken fo 
 (imall an army. 
 
 Left all thefe attempts (hould unavoidably fail, and 
 litbecome indifpenfably neceflary to attack the enemy 
 |i)y water upon Lake George, the army, at the out-fet, 
 liliould be provided with carriages* implements, and 
 jardficers, tor conveying arme ", vciTels from Ticonde* 
 |roga to the lake. 
 
 Thefe ideas are formed upon the fuppofition that it 
 Ibethe fole purpofe of the Canada army toefFeA ajur^:- 
 Ition with General Howe ; or, after co-operating lb far 
 las to get poffcfTion of Albany and open the communi- 
 Ication to New- York, to remain upon the Hudfon*s- 
 IRiver, and thereby enable that general to a<5t with his 
 jwliole force to the fouthward. 
 
 But, Ihould the ftrength of the main American ar- 
 Imy be fuch as to admit of the corps of troops now at 
 Rhode-Ifland remaining there during the winter, and 
 H^^ingfeparately in the fpring, it may be highly wor- 
 thy 
 
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 APPENDIX. 
 
 thy confideration, whether the moft important purj 
 pofe to which the Canada army could be employtd] 
 fuppofinf' it in pofleffion of Ticonderoga, would no] 
 be to gain the Connc(^icut River. 
 
 The extent of country from Ticonderoga to the m 
 
 habited country upon that river, oppofite to Charles] 
 
 Town, is about fixty miles -, and, though to conveJ 
 
 artillery and provifion fo far by land would be attendfi 
 
 with difficulties, perhaps more than thofe ahovc^ lugJ 
 
 gefted upon a progrcfs to Skenefborough, fliould tha 
 
 objeft appear worthy, it is to be hopted rciources miglJ 
 
 be found ; in that cafe, it would be advifeable to toN 
 
 tify, with one or two Itrong ledoubts, the heights npj 
 
 pofice to Charles-Town, and eftablifh pofts ot lavageJ 
 
 upon the pafluge from Ticonderoga to thole heights] 
 
 to preferve the communication, and at the fame tima 
 
 prevent any attempt from the country above CharlesJ 
 
 Town, which is very populous, from molefting thd 
 
 rear or interrupting the convoys of fupply, while the 
 
 army proceeded down the Connedicut. Should th^ 
 
 jundion between the Canada and Rhode-Ifland armiei 
 
 be effeded upon the Connedticut, it is not too fanguinel 
 
 an expeftation that all the New-England provinces willl 
 
 be reduced by their operations. 
 
 To avoid breaking in upon other matter, I omittedl 
 in the beginning of thefe papers (oilate the idea of ani 
 expedition at the out-fet of the campaign, by the Lake! 
 Ontario and Ofwego, to the Mohawk- River-, which,! 
 as a diverfion to facilitate every propofed operation,! 
 would be highly defirable, provided the army Ihould| 
 be reinforced fufficiently to afford it. 
 
 It may at firll appear, from a view of the prefentl 
 ftrength of the army, that it may bear the fort of ds 
 tachment propofed by myfelf laft year for this purpoleJ 
 but it is to be confidered that at that time the utmoft] 
 object of the campaign, from the advanced feafonand! 
 unavoidable delay of preparation for the lakes, being! 
 
 the 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 the redu6lion of Crown-Point and Ticonderoga, un- 
 Icfs the fuccefs of my expedition had opened the road 
 to Albany, no greater numbers were ncceflary than 
 for thofe firlV operations. The cafe in the prefent year 
 differs ; becaule the feafon of the year affords a prof- 
 pe(5l of very extenfive operation, and conlcquently the 
 eftabi:fliment of many polls, patroks, &c will become 
 necf ffary. The army ought to be in a ftate of num- 
 bers to bear thofe drams, and (till remain fufficient to 
 attack any thing that probably can be oppofed to it. 
 
 Nor, to arge from probability, is fo much force, 
 neciffary for this diverfioii this year as was required for 
 the laft i becaufe we then knew that General Schuyler, 
 with a thoufand men, was fortified upon the Mohawk. 
 When the diffefent fituations of thrngs are confidered, 
 viz. the progrel's of General Howe, the early invafion 
 from Canada, the threatening of the Connefticut trom 
 Rhode'ldand, &c. it is nut Co be imagined that any 
 detachment of luch force as that of Schuyler can be 
 fupplied by the enemy for the Mohawk. I would not 
 therefore propofe it of more (and I have great diffi- 
 dence whether fo much can be prudently afforded) 
 than Sir John Johnfon's corps, a hundred Britidi 
 from the fecond brigade, and a hundred more from 
 the 6th regiment, with four pieces of the lightefl ar- 
 tillery, and a body of favages •, Sir John Johnfon to 
 be with a detachment in perfon, and an able field-of- 
 ficer to command it. 1 fhould wifh Lieutenant-Colonel 
 St. Leger for that employment. 
 
 I particularife the fecond brigade, becaufe the firft 
 is propofed to be diminifhed by the 3ifl regiment re- 
 maining in Canada, and the reft of rhe regiment, drafted 
 for the expedition, beirg made alfoparc of the Canada 
 force, the two brigades will be exadtly fquared. 
 
 Should it appear, upon examination of the really ef- 
 feflivc numbers of the Canada army, that the force is 
 not fuffipient for proceeding upon the above ideas with 
 
 a 
 
 XI 
 
 
 
 i 
 
 f^:-- 
 

 Xll 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 
 4 
 
 6 
 
 a fair profpedt of fuccefs, the alternative remains of 
 embarking tlie army at Quebec, in order tocfFcdla 
 jundtion with General Howe by iea, or to be employed 
 leparately to co-operate with the main & figns, by luch 
 means as Ihould be within their ftrength upon other 
 parts of the continent. And though the army, u^)on 
 examination of the numbers from the re) urns here, and 
 the reinforcements defigned, fhould appear aciequate, 
 it is humbly fubmitted, as a iecurity a^{ain(l the pof- 
 fil ility of its remaining inaftive, whether it might not 
 be expedient to entrult the latitu^I? of embarlcmg the 
 army by fea to the commander in chief, provided any 
 accidents during the winter, and unknown here, (hould 
 have diminifhcd the numbers confidcrably •, or that the 
 enemy, from any winter fuccels to the fouihward, 
 fhould have been able to draw fuch forces towards the 
 frontiers of Canada, and take up their ground with 
 fuch precaution, as to render the intended meafureim- 
 pradicable or too hazardous. But, in that cafe, it 
 muft be confidf red that more force would be required 
 to be lelt behind, for the fecurity of Canada, than is 
 fuppofed to be neceflary when an army is beyond the 
 lakes ; and I do not conceive any expedition ^rom the 
 fea can b^' lo formidable to the enemy, or fo effedual 
 to dole the war, as an invafion from Canada by Ti- 
 conderoga. This lafl: meafure ought iiotto be thought 
 of, but upon pofuive conviction of us necefTity. 
 
 Hett fora-Street, J, BuRGOYNE. 
 
 Feb, aoih, 1777. * 
 
 ',«■ 
 
 ^ r 
 
 No, IV. Extras of a Letter from Lord George Germain to Ge- 
 neral Carleton, dated Whitehall, 26th March, 1777. 
 
 MY letter of the 22d Auguft, 1776, was intruded 
 to the care of Captain Le Maitre, one of your aid-de- 
 camps ; after having been three times in the Gulph of 
 St. Lawrence he had the mortification to find it im- 
 
 poITible 
 
 'if 
 
appendix: 
 
 pofllble to make his paflage to Quebec, and therefore 
 returned to fclngland with my dilpatch ; which, though 
 it was prevented by that accident from reaching your 
 hands in due time, I neverthelefs think proper to tranf- 
 mit to you by this earlieft opportunity. 
 
 You will be informed, by the contents thereof, that, 
 as foon as you fhould have driven the rebel forces from 
 the frontiers of Canada, it was his Majefty's plcalure 
 you fhould return to Quebec, and take with you fuch 
 part of your army as in your judgement and difcriction 
 appeared fufficient for the defence of the province 5 
 that you ihould detach Lieutenant-Gencral Burgoyne, 
 or fuch other officer as you (hould think moft proper, 
 with the remainder of the troops, and dired: the officer 
 fo detached to proceed with all poffible expedition to 
 join General Howe, and to put himlelf under his com- 
 mand. 
 
 V/ith a view of quelling the rebellion as foon as pof- 
 fible, it is become highly neceflkiy that the moft fpeedy 
 jundlion of the two armies fhor<ld be effefted ; and, 
 therefore, as the fecurity and f,ood government of C-i- 
 nada abfolutely require your prefence there, it is the 
 King's determination to leave about 3000 men under 
 your command, for the defence and duties of that 
 province, and to employ the remainder of your army 
 upon two expeditions, the one under the command of 
 Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, who is to force his way 
 to Albany ;* and the other under the command of Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel St. Leger, wiio is to make a diverfion 
 on the Mohawk-River. 
 
 As this plan cannot be advantageouHy executed 
 without the affiftance of Canadians and Indians, his 
 Majelty ftrongly recommends it to your care, to fur- 
 nifh both expeditions with good and fufficient bodies 
 of thofe men ; and I am happy in knowmg that your 
 influence among them is fo great, that there can be no 
 
 room 
 
 ••• 
 xiu 
 
 • '* 
 
 
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 «/, 
 
xiv 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 
 
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 room to apprehend you will find it difficult to fulfil 
 hisMajefty's expeflations. 
 
 In order that no time may be loft in entering upon 
 thefe important undertakings, General Burgoyne has 
 received orders to fail forthwith for Quebec *, and that 
 the intended operations may be maturely confidc'red, 
 and afterwards carried on in (uch a manner as is moil 
 likely to be followed by (uccefs, he is directed to con* 
 fult with you upon the fubjed, and to form and adjuft 
 the plan as you both (hall chink molt conducive to his 
 Majefty's fervice. 
 
 I am aifo to acquaint you, that, as foon as you fliall 
 have fully regulated every thing relative to thefe expe- 
 ditions* (and the King relies upon your zeal, that you 
 will be as expeditious as the nature of the bufinels will 
 admit,) it is his Majefty's pleafure that you detain, for 
 the Canada fervice, 
 
 The 8th regiment, deducting loo for the expe- 
 dition to the Mohawk, — — — — 
 
 Battalion companies of the 29th and 31ft regi- 
 ments, — — — — — — — 
 
 Battalion companies of the 34th, dedu(5ting j 00 
 for the expedition to the Mohawk, — — 
 Eleven additional companies from Great-Britain, 
 Detachments from the two brigades, — « — 
 Detachments from the German troops, — — 
 Royal Highland emigrants, — — — . — 
 
 460 
 
 896 
 
 348 
 6^6 
 300 
 650 
 
 500 
 
 3770 
 
 You Will naturally conclude that this allotmenr for 
 Canada has not been made without properly weighing 
 the fcveral duties which are likely to be required. His 
 Majefty has not only confidered the feveral garrifons 
 and pofts which probably it may be necefTary tor you 
 to take ; viz, Quebec, Chaudiere, the dilaffed^ed pa- 
 riihe&of Point Levi, Montreal, and pofts between that 
 
 town 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 xr 
 
 Din and Ofwegatche, Trois Rivieres, Sc. John's, Sele 
 
 iixNoix, La Prairie, Vergere, and fome other towns 
 
 Ln the fouth (horc of St. Lawrence, oppofiTe the 
 
 Lof Montreal, with pods of communication to St. 
 
 Li's, but he hath alfo refledled that the feveral ope- 
 
 dons, which will be carrying on in different parts of 
 
 Imerica, muft neceflarily confine the attention of the 
 
 els to the refpt-ftive fcenesof aflion, and fecure Ca- 
 
 ii from external attacks •, and that the internal quiec 
 
 at prefent prevails is not likely to be inter- 
 
 mted, or, if interrupted, will foon be reftored by 
 
 jour influence over the inhabitants •, he therefore trufts 
 
 k 3000 men will be quite fufficient to anfwcr every 
 
 pfiible demand. 
 
 It is likewife hisMajefty's pleafure that you put under 
 [Command of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne, 
 
 tie grenadiers and light infantry of the army 
 I (except of the 8ch regiment and the 24th re- 
 giment) as the advanced corps, under the 
 command of Brigadier-General Frafer, — 
 m brigade, battalion companies of the 9th, 
 21(1, and 47th, regiments, dedudling a de- 
 tachment of 50 from each corps, to remain 
 |in Canada, — . — — — — .^ .. 
 tond brigade, battalion companies of the 
 1 20th, 53d, and 62d, regiments, deducing 
 I ;o from each corps, to remain as above, — 
 I the German troops, except the Hanau chaf- 
 [feurs, and a detachment of 650, — -»- 
 If artillery, except fuch parts as (liall be ne- 
 IceiTary for the defence ot Canada. 
 
 1568 
 
 1 194 
 
 1194 
 3217 
 
 7173 
 
 logether with as many Canadians and Indians as may 
 1 thought neceffary for this lervice i and, after having 
 {rnilhed him in the fulleft and completed manner 
 
 with 
 
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 xvi APPENDIX. 
 
 with artillery, floras, provifions, and every other nu 
 tide neceflfary for his expedition, and I'ccured to hjr 
 every afllitance which it is in your power to afibrtl anc, 
 procure, you are to give him orders to pafs Laka 
 Champiain ; and from thence, by the moll: vigoroJ 
 exertion ot the torce under his command, to proceed 
 with all expedition to Albany, and put himfclt unde] 
 the command ot Sir William Howe. 
 
 From the King's knowledge of the great prepara 
 tions made by you la(l year to fecure the command q 
 the lakes, and your attention to this part of the Q 
 vice during the winter, his Majelly is led to cxptfi 
 that every thing will be ready for General Burgoyne' 
 pafTing the lakes by the time you and he (hall haveaij 
 julted the plan of the expedition. 
 
 It is the King's farther picafure that you put unda 
 the command of Lieutenant-Colonel St. Ler,cr, 
 
 Detachment from the 8th regiment, — — — 
 Detachment from the 34th regiment, — — 
 Sir John Johnfon's regiment of New- York, — 
 Haiiau chaffeurs, —. — .— —.—-. 
 
 Together with a fufRcient number of Canadians ai| 
 Indians •, and, after having furniflied him with prop 
 artillery, flores, provifions, and every other necefiaj 
 article for his expedition, and fecured to him every 
 fiftance in your power to afford and procure, you; 
 to give him orders to proceed forthwith to and do^ 
 the Mohawk- River to Albany, and put himfclfun(| 
 the command of Sir William Howe. 
 
 I ftiall write to Sir William Howe, from hence, 
 the firft packet ; but you will, neverthelefs, endeavo 
 to give him the earlieft intelligence of this meafurj 
 and alio dired Lieutenant-General Burgoyne and Lid 
 tenant-Colonel St. Leger to negled no opportunity 
 
. I, 
 
 ^ other ar^ 
 I red to hir 
 » aHoril and 
 
 pafs LAi 
 ill vigoroui 
 
 to proceed 
 imfc'U" undej 
 
 eat prepara 
 command 
 : of the fer 
 :d to cxpe{ 
 l\ Burgoyi 
 hall haveai 
 
 3U put und( 
 Ler,er, 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Iduir.?; the fame, that they may receive inflrucllons 
 lirom Sir Wilh"am Howe. You will, at the Hime time, 
 lintorm them, that, until they ftiaU have received or- 
 Idtrs from Sir William JIovvc, it is his Muj. fly's 
 Ipltaliirc that tliey aCt as exigences may require, and 
 linfucK manner a«! they fliall judge mofl proper for 
 Iniikii'g an imprelTion on the rt-Fiels, and bringing them 
 oobcdience J but that, in fo doing, they mud never 
 Uofe view of their intended junctions w:th Sir William 
 :lowc as their principal objefts. 
 In cafe Lieutenant-General Burgoyneor Lieutenant- 
 Lolont^l St. I.eger fhould happen to die, or be ren- 
 bred, through illnefs, incapable of executing thofe 
 li ic trufts, you are to nominate, to their refpe^live 
 lonimands, fuch officer or officers as you Ihail think 
 IcH qualified to fupply the place of thofe whom his 
 ' dly has, in his wifdom, at prefent appointed to 
 |oadu6t thefe expeditions. 
 
 xvii 
 
 'I 
 
 ■ \ 
 
 » 
 
 rk, - 
 
 )ther 
 
 ify cfa Letter from L'teutemnt-General Burgoyne to No. \. 
 lord George Germain, dated Qiiebec, May 14, 
 
 1777. 
 
 A/r T [ Private.] 
 
 My Lord, •■ ■• 
 
 anadiansaiBl TAKE the opportunity of a vefTel, difpatched 
 
 .1 ""Sir Guy Carleton to England, to inform your 
 
 irdlhip of my arrival here the 6th inftant. And 
 )ugh my prefent fituation, as ading under u fuperior 
 n the fpot, may make an official correfpondence 
 leceffary, I cannot pcrfnade myfelf I fhall not ap- 
 ir guilty of impropriety in affuming the honour of 
 irivate and confidential one, relative to the objects 
 [m/dedination. 
 
 rom my prefent information, I have reafon to ex- 
 the preparations for opening the campaign to be 
 
 forward on our part. Due exertions were ufed 
 
 pporwnityBiecourie of the winter, and the uncommon mild- 
 '^"" B nefs 
 
 ■ii » 
 
 

 
 r -i 
 
 .4 
 
 . , 4 ' 
 
 XVlll 
 
 
 
 
 M 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 nefs of the weather greatly favoured them, to conveyl 
 provifions to Chamblee and St. John's. One iarJ 
 vidlualler arrived afier I l..ft the St. Lavrence laftNo/ 
 vember *, all refidues ot other victuallers have been 
 coliedled j I am in hopes of finding a fufficiency oj 
 provifion to enable me to crofs the Lake Champlaiii 
 at leaft, without the arrival of the Corke fleet. I hep 
 alfo to find artillery-ftores enough to feel the pulfei 
 the ent-my at I'iconderoga. Should their ficuatioj 
 and relolution be fuch as to make great artillery pre[ 
 parations requifite, I fhall certainly be under thena 
 ■ cefiity of waiting, at Crown-Point, the arrival oftli 
 ordnance (hips from' England. A good body of tlj 
 Indians, 1 am afilired, are ready to move upon tlj 
 firft call, and meafures are taking for bringing the^ 
 forthv^ith to proper rendezvous. 
 
 I cannot fpeak with fo much confidence of the ml 
 tary afliftance I am to look for from the Canadians. Til 
 only corps yet inftituted, or that I am informed can! 
 prefent be inftituted, are three independent companj 
 .aof 100 men each, officered by Seigneurs of the con 
 try, who are well chofen ; but they have not bd 
 able to engage many volunteers. The men are chiJ 
 drafted trom the militia, according to a late regulati 
 of the legiflative council. Thofe I have yet leenj 
 ford no promife of ufe of arms ; — aukward, ignora 
 difinclined to the fervice, and fpiritlefs. Various 
 fons are afllgned for this change in the natives fincel 
 time of the French government. It may partlyl 
 owing JO a difufe of arms, but I believe principallj 
 the unpopularity of their Seigneurs, and to the po] 
 which the emiffaries of the rebels have thrown 
 their minds. Shoiild I find the new companies ipl 
 country better compofed, or that the well-affedcdf 
 ties can be prevailed upon to turn out voluntj 
 though but fur a ihort occafion, as they did lalt 
 
*:^- 
 
 ^' '■ ( 
 
 APPENDIX,' 
 
 1 fha'l move Sir Guy Carletoii to exert farther mea" 
 fures to augment my numbers. 
 
 The anr.y will fall fhort of the ftrength computed 
 in England ; the want of camp-cqu;p.ige, clorhing, 
 and many other neceflary articles, will raule invonve- 
 nience ; I have ncvertheleis determined to put the troops, 
 deftined for my command, immediately in motion j 
 and, afTifted by the fpirit and health in which they 
 abound, I am confident in the profpefl of overcoming 
 difficulties and difappointments. 
 
 Having fettled all meafures with Sir Guy Carleton, 
 both tor this purpofe and for the expeditious tranrporc 
 of the ftores as they may arrive ; and having already 
 difpatched inftrudlions to Captain Lutwidge, who com- 
 mands the fleet upon Lake Champlain, to fecure the 
 navigation, in which I clearly fee he will find no 
 trouble, I (hall proceed in perlon this afternoon for 
 Montreal ; and from thence make my final arrange- 
 ments for purfuing the King's orders. 
 
 I fhould think myfelf deficient in juftice and in ho- 
 nour, were I to clofe my letter without mentioning the 
 fenfe I entertain of General Carleton*s condudl •, that 
 he was anxioufly defirous of leading the military ope- 
 rations out of the province, is eafily to be difcerned ; 
 but his deference to his Majefty's dccifion, and his 
 zeal to give effedl to his meafures in my hands, are 
 equally manifeft, exemplary, and falisfadory. I fliall 
 take every poflible means to tranfmit to your Lordfhip 
 an account of my proceedings from time to time. And 
 have the honour to be, with perfedt refped. 
 
 Your Lordlliip's moft obedient 
 
 And moft humble Servant, 
 
 J. B u R G o y N E. 
 
 P. S. I have mentioned nothinoiof intcllii^cnce con- 
 cerning the enemy, coiicluding that Sir Guy Carleton 
 
 XIX 
 
 
 
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 t 
 
 I 
 
 * 4 
 
 B 2 
 
 will 
 
 i 
 
 *;i^» » 
 
 ^!H.' 
 
^x 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 will tranfmit the material part of it, and in a manner 
 more full than in my power to do. I underftand they 
 have laboured hard to ftrengthen Ticonderoga, and 
 threaten a vigorous refiftance there j and that they have 
 built fome velTels on Lake George, as your Lordlhip 
 may remember I had forefeen. 
 
 
 1 •' . 
 
 ■III 
 
 
 _ ^ 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 ■I 
 
 1 , 
 
 'V 
 
 
 Second ^^py ^f ^ Letter from Lieutenant -General Burgoyne to 
 Wo. V. Lord George Germain, dated Montreal, May 15, 
 
 Mv Lord, 
 
 I HAD the honour to write to your LordHiip the 
 day I left Quebec ; having reafon to imagine this letter 
 may reach that place in time to be djfpatchcd with my 
 former one, I cannot omit the occafion to inform your 
 LordHiip, that the hopes I expreiTed of being able to 
 put the troops in motion, without waiting the arrival 
 of the fleets from England and Ireland, are confirmed. 
 
 The only delay is occafioned by the impradlicability 
 of the roads, owing to late extraordinary heavy rains; 
 and this difficulty will be fpeedily removed, by exer- 
 ting the fervices of the parilhes as foon as the weather 
 clears. In the mean time, I am employing every 
 means, that water-carriage will admit of, tor drawing 
 the troops and (lores towards their point. 1 truft I 
 ihall have veflels fufficient to move the army and ftores 
 together ; and, in that cafe, will take poll at once, 
 within fight of Ticonderoga, and only make ufe of 
 Crown-Point for my hofpitai and magazine. 
 
 A continuation of intelligence, from different fpies 
 and deferters, confirms the defign of the enemy to dif- 
 pute Ticonderoga vigorouQy. They are alfo building 
 bow-gallics at Fort George, for the defence of that 
 Lake, &c. fortifying on the road to Skenefborough. 
 
 It is configned to the New-England colonies to 
 furnifli fupplics of men and provifion ^o oppofe the 
 
 progrcfs 
 
 f," . 
 
*l . 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 progrefs of my army ; and they have undertaken the 
 tafk, upon condirion of being exempt from fupplying 
 Mr. Walhington's main army, 
 
 Ic is my defign, while advancing to Ticonderoga, 
 and during the fiege of that poft, (tor a fiege I appre- 
 hend it mud be,) to give all poffible jealoufy on the fide 
 of Connedlicuc. It I can, by manoeuvre, lead the 
 enemy to fufpeft, that, after the redudtion of Ticonde- 
 roga, my views are pointed that way, the Connecticut 
 forces will be very cautious of leaving their own fron- 
 tier, and I may gain a ftart that may much expedite 
 and facilitate my progrefs to Albany. 
 
 Your Lordlhip may reft affured, that, whatever de- 
 monftration I may endeavour to impofe on the ene- 
 my, 1 fhall really make no movement that can pro- 
 craftinate the great objeft of my orders. 
 
 I have the honour to be, &:c. 
 
 J. BURGOYNE. 
 
 XXI 
 
 J ; ' s 
 
 i. !'■■■ 
 
 5i- ' 
 
 kbftance of the Speech of Lieutenant-General Burgoyne No. VI, 
 to the Indians, in Congrefs^ at the Cavp upon the lii-> 
 ver Bouquet, June 21, 1777 ; and their /infwci'f 
 tranjlated. 
 
 [In Lieutem'fU'General B\.]rgoynt*s, June2 2» 1777.] 
 
 Chiefs and Warriors, 
 
 THE great King, our common father, and the 
 
 patron of ail who leek and deferve his protedlion, has 
 
 confidered, with fatisfadlion, the general conduj^ of 
 
 the Indian tribes from the beginning of the troubles in 
 
 America. Too fagacious and too faithful to be delu- 
 
 Ided or corrupted, they have obferved the violated rigli s 
 
 lof the parental power they love, and burned to vindi- 
 
 Icate them. A few individuals alone, the refuie of ;i 
 
 Ismail tribe, at the firfl. were led aftray j and the mif- 
 
 B 3 reprcfentaiionjj, 
 
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 '^Xll 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 rcprefentations, the fpeciovis allurements, the inlulioiis 
 promifcs, and diverfified plots, in which the rebels are 
 excrciled, and all ot which they employed for that eitect, 
 have lerved only in the end to enhance the honour of 
 the tribes in general, by demonflrating to the world 
 how few and hew contemptible are the apoftates. It 
 is a truth known to you all, that, thtfe pitit'ui examples 
 excepted, (and they probably have beiore this day hid 
 their faces in fhame,) the coiledive voices and hands of 
 the Indian tribes, over this vail cc.itinenr, are on the 
 fide of juftice, of law, and of the King. 
 
 I'he refirainc you have put upon your refenrmentin 
 wailing the King your far.iiei*s call to arms, the hard- 
 efl: proof, I am perluaded, to which your aiTedlion 
 could have been put, is anoth'^r manifelt and affecting 
 mark of your adherence to that principle of conntdion, 
 to which you were always fond to allude, and whicii 
 it is mutually the joy and the duty of the parent to 
 cherilh. 
 
 The clemency of your father has been abufed, the 
 offers of his mercy have been defpifed, and his fjr- 
 tber patience would, in his (yes, be C( me cu'pahle, 
 in-as-r uch as it would wirhhold redreJs from rhe moil 
 grievous opprenicns in tic provinces that ever dil- 
 graced the hif^ory cf mankind. It fhtrt-fore rrmalr.s 
 forme, i he General of one of his Majtiiy's ainiies, 
 and in this cocncil liis reprefcntarive, to relenle you 
 from ihok- boncis which your obedience impoled, — j 
 Warriors, you are iree ; — go lonh in niigl.t of yoi.r 
 valour and your caufe ; — flrike at the cotFimon ene- 
 mies of Great'Ciicain and America -, — difturbers of 
 public ordci, peace, and happincfs j deflroyers oi com- 
 nicrce ; p.uricidcs of the ftate. 
 
 The circle round you, the chiefs of his Majefly'sl 
 European forces, and of the Princes, his allies, elltem 
 you as blethers in the war : emulous in glory and in 
 friend ihip, we will endeavour reciprocally to give and 
 
 tol 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 to receive examples-, we know how to value, and we 
 will drive to imitate, your perfeverance in enterprife, 
 and your conftancy to refill hunger, wearinefs, and 
 pain. Be it our tafk, from the didlates of our religi- 
 on, the laws of our warfare, and the principles and 
 intereft of our policy, to regulate your palTions 
 when they overbear, to point out where it is nobler to 
 fparethan to revenge, to difcriminate degrees of guik, 
 to fufpend the up-lilted Ilroke, to chaftile and not to 
 deftroy. 
 
 This war to you, my friends, is new, upon all for- 
 mer occafions, in taking the field, you held yourfelves 
 authorifed to deftroy wherever you came, bccaufc every 
 where you found an enemy. The cafe'is now very dif- 
 ferent. 
 
 The King has many faithful fuhjeds difperfed in the 
 provinces, conR^q.icndy you have many brothers there ; 
 and ihefe people are the more to be pitied, that they 
 are perfecured or imprifoned wherever they are difco- 
 vered or lufpe<5l:ed ; and to diflemble is, to a generous 
 mind, a yet more grievous punilhment. 
 
 Periuaded that your magnanimicyof character, joined 
 to your principles of affediion to the Kmg, wiil give 
 me fuller controul over your minds than ihe mliiary 
 rank with which I am inverted, I enjoin your moil fe- 
 rious attention to the rules whi' h 1 hereby proclaim 
 for your invariable obrervarioii during the campaign. 
 
 I pofitively forbid bioodllied, when )ou are nut op- 
 pofed in arms. 
 
 A;^'ed men, women, children, and prifoners, niufb 
 be held facred from the knife or hatchet, even in the 
 time of adual conflid. 
 
 You fhail receive compenfatlon for the prifoners you 
 take, but you fhall be called to account tor fcajps. 
 
 In conformity and indulgence of your cuftoms, which 
 have affixed an idea of honour to fuch badges of vidorv, 
 you fliall be allowed to take the fcalps of the dead, wh'^ii 
 
 B 4 kilkd 
 
 XX]I1 
 
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 ■ k 
 
 
 vi 
 
 
 xxlv APPENDIX. 
 
 killed by your fire and in fair oppofition ; but, on no 
 account, or pretence, or lubtlety, or pi'^'varicarion, 
 are they to be taken from the wounded, or even dying j 
 and Hill IcTs pardonable, if polFible, will it be held, 
 to kill men in that condition on purpole, and upon a 
 inppoficion that this protcd^ion to the wounded would 
 be thereby evaded. 
 
 Bale lurking nffifllns, incendiaries, ravaf^ers and 
 plunderers of the country, to whatever army rhcy miy 
 belong, fliall be treated with lels referve ; but the l.i- 
 titude mull be given you by order, and I muil be the 
 judge of ti.e occafion. 
 
 Shouki the enemy, on their parr, dare to counte- 
 nance ads of barbarity towaris thofe who may iili in- 
 to their hands, it fliall be yours alfo to retaliate-, bur, 
 till leverity be thus compelled, bear immoveable in 
 your hearts this folid maxim, (it cannot be too deeply 
 imprefled,) that the great tlJential lewa d, worthy ler- 
 vice of your alliance, the finccrity of yeur zeal to the 
 King, your father and never- failmg p otcdor, will 
 be examined ano judged upon the tefl only of your 
 fteady and uniform adherence to the orders and C(;un- 
 fels of thofe, to whom his MajeHy has enirulltd die 
 direftion and the honour of his arms. 
 
 
 1^. 
 
 lit 
 
 jinfwer from an old Chief of the Iroquois. 
 
 I STAND up in the name of all the nations prefent, 
 to afhire our father that we have attentively lillened 
 to his dilcourle. We receive you as our father ; be- 
 caufe, when you Ipeak, we hear the voice ^f our great 
 father beyond the great lake. 
 
 We rejoice in the approbation you have expreficd qf 
 our behaviour. 
 
 We have been tried and tempted by the Boflonians ; 
 but we ha*, e loved our father, and our hatchets have 
 jDecn (harpened upon our aife(5lionst 
 
 la 
 
'VI 
 
 t, on no 
 
 rication, 
 n dying-, 
 lie held, 
 1 upon a 
 :d Vv'ould 
 
 l^r(>rs 
 
 ancl 
 
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 ht^y 
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 miiy 
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 ay 1 ill in- 
 ate i bur, 
 veihle- in 
 :oc) deeply 
 worthy ler- 
 A-al to the 
 5li>r, will 
 of your 
 \nd C(>un- 
 ul'ied the 
 
 IS. 
 
 s prefent, 
 / lillened 
 her ; be- 
 our great 
 
 )refic:d qf 
 
 [onians •, 
 :ts have 
 
 U 
 
 APPENDIX; xxr 
 
 In proof of the fincerity of our profefTions, our 
 whole villages, able to go to war, are come forth. 
 The old and infirm, our infants and wives, alone re- 
 main at home. 
 
 With one common aflent we promifc a conftant obe* 
 dience to all you have ordered, and all you (hall order j 
 and may the Father of Days give you many and fuccefs. 
 
 Copy of a Letter from Lieut emnt -General Burgoyne to No. VII. 
 Lord George Germain, dated Skenefborough, July 
 nth, 1777. 
 
 I H AVli the honour to inform your Lordfhip, that 
 the enemy were diflodged from Ticonderago and 
 Mount Independence on the 6t!» ioftant, and were dri- 
 ven, on the lame day, beyond Skenefborough on the 
 light, and to Humerton on the left, with the lofs 
 of 128 pieces of cannon, all their armed veflels and 
 bateaux, the greateft part of their baggage and ammu- 
 nition, pi ovilion, and military (lores, to a very large 
 amount. 
 
 This fuccefs has been followed by events equally for- 
 tunate and rapid. I fubjoin fuch a detail of circum- 
 fidiices as the time will permit ; and, for His Majefty's 
 t^irther information, I beg leave to refer your Lordfhip 
 [to Captain Gardner, my aid-de-camp, whom I thought 
 li: necelTary to difpatch with news lo important to the 
 Ring's iervice, and fo honourable to the troops under 
 [my command. 
 
 Journal of the late principal Proceedings of the Army. 
 
 Having remained at Crown-Point three days, to 
 bring up the rear of the army, and to eftablilh the 
 [magazines and the hofpital, and to obtain intelligence 
 pf the enemy, on the 30th June 
 
 I ordered the advanced corps, confifting of the 
 Britini light-infantry and grenadiers, the 24th regi- 
 ment. 
 
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 XXVI 
 
 APPENDIX; 
 
 ment, fonr; Canadians and Savages, and ten pipces 
 of light artillery, under the a mmajid of Brigadier- 
 General Fraler, to move from Putnam-Creek, wh^^re 
 they had been encamped lonie days, up the weO: (hore 
 of the lake to roiir-Mile-Poiiir, fo called from bei:,g 
 within that diilance off the fort of Ticondcroga. ThJ 
 German referve, confifling of thv'^ Brunfwic chafTnir.':, 
 light-inf^intry, and grenadiers, under Lieutenant-Coio. 
 nel Breyman, were moved at the fame time to Richard- 
 fon*s farm, on the call fhorc, oppofue to Putnam-| 
 Creek, 
 ill July. The whole army made a movement forward. Bri.l 
 gadier Fral'er's corps occupied the urong poft, callcdl 
 Three-Mile- Point, on the weft: fliore ; the German re-l 
 ferve, the eaft: fiiore oppofite : the army encamped inl 
 two lines; the ri^ht wing at the Four- Mile Point, tlie| 
 left wing nearly iippofue, on the tall fhore. 
 
 The Royal-Ge rge and Inflexible trigates, with tli^ 
 gun-boats, were anchored at this time juft without m 
 reach of the enemy's batteries, and covered the lakJ 
 from the weft to the call fliores. The reft: of the flcej 
 had been fome time without guns, in order to aftill iij 
 carrying provifions over Lake Champlain. 
 
 The enemy appeared to be pofttd as follows, 
 brigade occupitd the old French lines on the heighti 
 to the north of the fort of Ticonderoga. Thefe linel 
 were in good repair, and had feveral intrench mcnD 
 behind tl'.em, chiefly calculated to guard the nonli 
 weft: flank, and were farther fuilained by a block-houfij 
 They had, tarther to their left, a port at the law- mil 
 which are at the foot of the carrying-place to Laiq 
 George, and a biock-houfe upon an emirence abov 
 the mills, and a block-houle aiid hoipital at the cij 
 trance of the lake. 
 
 Upon tiie right of tlie lines, and between them an 
 the old fort, there were two new block- houfes, and| 
 confiderable battery clofe to the water edge. 
 
 •■f 
 
 ■. ! 
 
^ v' H| 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 XXVll 
 
 It feemed that the enemy had employed their chief 
 
 Ibduftry, and were in the greateft force, upon Mount 
 
 ladependcnce, which is high and circular ; and upon 
 
 [he lummic, which is Table Land, was a liar fort. 
 
 Lade of pickets, and well fupplied with artillery, and 
 
 |i large fquare of barracks within it. The foot of the 
 
 1, on the fide which projefts into the lake, was in- 
 Itrenched, and had a (Irong abattis clofe to the water. 
 This intrenchment was lined v/ith heavy artillery, poin- 
 ted do /vn the lake, n.;nkin^ the warer-battery, above 
 iacuDed, and fuftained by another battery about half- 
 Lay up the hill. * On the wt-ll fide of the hill runs the 
 main river, and in its palTage is joined by the water 
 which comes down from Lak", George. The enemy 
 md here a bridge of communication, which could noc 
 atihistime be reconnoitred. On the eafl fide of the 
 liill the water forms afmall bay, into which falls a ri- 
 \nkty after having encircled in its courfe part of the 
 
 11 to the fouth eaft. The CiC<e to the fouth could not 
 Ibefi^en, but was defcribed as inacceflible. 
 
 About nine in the morning a fmoke was obferved July 2, 
 I towards Lake George, and the Savages brought in a 
 
 )'■ 
 
 Kl 
 
 11 
 
 •■ lie 
 
 report, that the enemy had fet fire to the tarcher block- 
 houle, and had abindoned the faw-mills, and that a 
 confiderable body was advancing, from the lines, to- 
 waids a bridge upon the road which led from the faw- 
 mills, towards the right of the Britifh camp. A de- 
 tachment of the advanced corps was immediately put 
 in march, under the command of Brigadier Frafer, 
 lupported by the fecond brigade and feme light artil- 
 lery, under the command ot Major-General Phillips, 
 with orders to proceed to Mount f[ope, which is to the 
 north of the lines, to reconnoitre the enemy's pofition, 
 and to take advantage of any port ihey might abandon 
 or be driven from. The Indians, under Captain ^ra- 
 kr, fupported by his company of markfmen, were di- 
 redled to make a circuit to the left of Brigadier Fraier's 
 
 line 
 
 4 I 
 
 J 
 
 ■■tr^>4: 
 
 i^. 
 
SXVIll 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 f«*v 
 
 <di. 
 
 m 
 
 4i 
 
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 3 
 
 i. 
 
 \ii 
 
 
 
 'ti.* ■■■ 
 
 line of march, and endeavoured tocutofFthe retreat of I 
 the enemy to their lines -, but this dcfign mifcarried 
 through the impeiuofity of the Indians, who attacked 
 too foon, and in front j and the enemy v/as thereby able 
 to retire with the lofs of one officer and a few men kil- 
 Jed, and one officer wounded. Major-Generul Phillips 
 took pofTeffion of the very advantageous poll of Mount 
 Hope this night, and the enemy was thereby entirely 
 cut off from all communication wiih Lake George. 
 
 Jul/ y Mount Hope was occupied in force by General Fra- 
 fer*s whole corps j the firll Britifh brimaue and two en. 
 tire brigades ot artillery. The fecond brigade, B; itilh, 
 encamped upon the left of the firft, and the brigade of 
 Gall, having been drawn from theeaft fhore, to occu- 
 py the ground where Fraler*s corps had oiiginally been, 
 the line became comple:e, extending from Th. et-Mile- 
 Point to the weftcrnmoil part of Mount Hope : on the 
 fame day, Major-General Reidefel encamped on the 
 eaft fhore, in a para'.!el line with Three-Mile-l^int, 
 having pufhed the relerve forward, near the rivulet 
 which encircles Mount Independence. The enemy ca- 
 nonaded the camps of Mount Hope and of the German 
 referve during moll part of this day, but without ef- 
 feft. 
 
 July 4. The army worked hard at their communications, 
 and got up the artillery, tents, baggage, and provifi. 
 ons: the enemy, at intervals, continued the cannonade 
 upon the camps, which was not in any indance retur- 
 ned. 
 
 The Thunderer radeau, carrying the battering 
 train and (tores, having been warped up from Crown- 
 Point, arrived this day, and immediately began to land 
 the artillery. 
 
 July 5. Lieutenant Twifs, the commanding engineer, was 
 ordered to reconnoitre Sugar-Hill, on the louth fide of 
 the communication from Lake George into Lake Cham- 
 plain, which had been poffefled in the night by a par- 
 ty 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 tfofligHt infantry. It appeared at firft to be a very 
 ii'antageous poll, and it is now known that the ene- 
 my had a council, feme time ago, upon the expediency 
 tfpoflcning it-, but the idea was rtjcdted, upon the 
 liinpofuion that it was impofTible for a corps to be efla- 
 iiilhcd there in force. Lieutenant Twifs reported this 
 lijlto have the entire command of the works ard buil- 
 bgs both of Ticonderoga and Mount Independence, 
 lithe dilUncc of about 1400 yards from the former, 
 indisoo from the latter-, that the ground might be 
 kllcd, lb as to receive cannon, and that the road to 
 convey them, though difficult, might be made prafli- 
 []b!e, in twenty-four houis. This hill alfo comman- 
 Icfd, in rrverfe, the bridge of communication, faw the 
 (n(^ fit. ation of their vtfltls, nor could the enemy, 
 L ing the day, make any material movement or pre- 
 Iprat on, without being difcovered, and even having 
 ieir numbers counted. 
 
 It was determined that a battery fliould be raifed on 
 ISygar-Hill for light twenty-four pounders, medium 
 elves, and eight-inch howitzers. This very ardu- 
 os work was carried on fo rapidly, that the battery 
 ould have been ready the next day. 
 It is a duty in this place to do fomejudice to the zeal 
 ,ida«51-ivity of Major-General Phillips, who had the di- 
 cction of the operation i and, having mentioned that 
 oft valuable officer, I truft it cannot be thought a 
 ligreffion to add, that it is to his judicious arrange- 
 ents and indefatigable pains, during the general lu- 
 erintendency of preparation, which Sir Guy Carleton 
 kntrufted to him in the winter and fpring, that the fer- 
 pis indebted for its prefent forwardnels. The pre- 
 valence of contrary winds and other accidents having 
 [endered it impoffible for any neceflaries, prepared in 
 Tngland for the opening of the campaign, yet to reach 
 \k camp. 
 
 Soon 
 
 XXiX 
 
 

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 XXX APPENDIX. 
 
 July 6. Soon after day-light, an officer arrived cxprefs nj 
 board the Royal George, where in the night I tool< J 
 my quarters as the moft centrical fituation, with in) 
 formation from Brigadier Frafer, that tlie enemy uj 
 retiring, and that he was advancing with his picqiati 
 leaving orders for the brigade to follow, as foon as thci 
 could accoutre, with intention to purfue by land. Tli| 
 movement was vtry difccrnible, as were the Britinictj 
 lours, which the Brigadier had fixed upon the lore 
 Ticonderoga. Knowing how lafely I could trull 
 tliat officer's condudt, 1 turned my chief alteration t| 
 the purluit by wnter, by which route I undcrftuod on 
 column was retiring, in two hundred and twenty bj 
 teaux, covered by five armed galleys. 
 
 The great bridge of communication, throupli whid 
 away was tobeop«'ned, wasfupported by twenty. t\^ 
 funken piers of large timber, at nearly equal did: 
 CQS; the fpace between was made of ffparate flu::] 
 each about iilty feet long, and twelve feet wide, (Iron 
 ly faftened togfther by chains aiid rivets, and allot 
 tencd to the iunken piers. Before this bridge wasi 
 boom, made of very large pieces of timber, faftcr.i 
 together by riveted bolts and double chains, madel 
 iron an inch and ahalffquare. 
 
 The gun-bo.us were inilantly moved forward, r.T 
 the boom and one of the intermediate floats were cj 
 with great dexterity and difpatch, and Commodoj 
 Lutwidge, with the officers and feamen in his depat] 
 ment, partaking the general animation, a palTitgew^ 
 formed in half an hour for the frigates alfo, throni 
 impediments wliich the enemy had been labouring] 
 conilrudl lince laft autumn. 
 
 During this operation. Major General Reidefel li| 
 palled to Mount Independence, with the corps, Br^ 
 man, and part of tlie left wing. He was dircCled| 
 proceed by land, to fullain Brigadier Frafer, or toJ 
 luoie to the left if he law it expedient lb to do. 
 
i 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 TIic 62c1 regiirpnt, Briiifli, and the Brunfwic re- 
 giment of l*rince Frederick, were Rationed at Ticon- 
 (ierogaand Mount Independence, in the place of the 
 parties ot Frafer's brigade which had been left in pof- 
 IcfTion of the artillery and flores ; and the reft of the 
 army was ordered to follow up the river as they could 
 be colledled, without regard to the place in the line. 
 
 About three in the afternoon I arrived, with the 
 Royal George and Inflexible, and the belt fiiling 
 gun-boats, at South Bay, within three miles of Skencf- 
 borough, at which latter place the enemy were pofl:ed 
 in a Itockaded fort, and their armed gallics in the 
 falls below. 
 
 The foremoft regiments, viz. the 9th, 20th, and 
 21ft, were immediately difembarked, and afcended 
 the mountains with the intention of getting behind 
 the fore and cutting off the retreat of the enemy ; but 
 their precipitate flight rendered this manoeuvre inef- 
 fcdlual. The gun-boats and frigates continued their 
 courfe to Skene fborough Falls, where the armed vef- 
 fels were polled. Captain Carter, with part of his 
 brigade of gun-boats, immediately attacked, and 
 with lb much fpirlt, that two of the vefTels very foon 
 llruck ; the other three were blown up; and the e- 
 nemy, having previoufly prepared combullible mate- 
 rials, fct fire to the fort, mills, ftorehoufes, bateaux, 
 &c. and retired with rhe detachment left for that pur- 
 pofc, the main body having gone off when the troops 
 were alcending the mountain. A great quantity of 
 provifions and fome arms were here coniumed, and 
 moft of their ofBcers' baggage was burnt, funk, or ta- 
 ken. Their lols is not known ; about 30 prifoners 
 were made, amon^ which were two wounded ofH- 
 ccrs. 
 
 During thefe operations upon the right. Brigadier 
 General Frafcr continued his purfuit 10 Laflletown till 
 one o'clock, having marched, in a very hot day, 
 
 from 
 
 XXXI 
 
 I 
 
 "■.< li 
 
 
 ix. 
 

 V. 
 
 ml). 
 '•;m : 
 
 it: 
 
 
 %XXU 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I- 
 
 '"^'r 
 
 ^1 
 
 1 
 
 
 from four o'clock in the morning till that time. Some 
 ftragglers of the enemy were picked up, from whom 
 ^ the Brigadier learned, that their rear guard was com- 
 pofed of chofen men, and commanded by Colonel 
 Francis, one of their beft officers. During the time 
 that the men were refrefhing, Major Genera! Reidekl 
 came up, and, arrangements for continuing the pur. 
 fuit having been concerted. Brigadier Fralcr moved 
 ° forward again, and during the night lay upon his 
 arms, in^an advantageous fituation, three miles nearer 
 the enemy. 
 7iTi July. At three in the morning he renewed his march, and 
 about tive his advanced fcouts difcovered the enemy's 
 centries, who fired their pieces and joined the main 
 body. • The Brigadier, obferving a commanding 
 ground to the left of his light infantry, immediately 
 ordered it to be pofieffed by that corps ; and, a con- 
 fiderable body of theocnemy attempting the fame, they 
 met. The enemy were driven back to their original 
 poft i the advanced guard, under Major Grant, was 
 by this time engaged, and the grenadiers were ad- 
 vanced tOofullain them and to prevent the right flank 
 from being turned. The Brigadier remained on the 
 left, where the enemy long defended themlelves by 
 tfie aid of logs and trees; and, after being repulfed, and 
 prevented^ getting to the Caftletown road, by the grena- 
 diers, they raliicdoand renewed theadtion ; and, upon 
 a fecond repulfe, attempted their retreat by Pitsford 
 Mountain. The grenadiers fcrambled up s part of 
 that afcent, appearing almod inacceflible, and gained 
 the fummit before them, which threw them into con* 
 fufion. They were ftill greatly fuperior in numbers, 
 and confcquently in extent; and the Brigadier, in 
 momentary expcdation of the Brunfwickers, had la- 
 o terally drawn irom his left to fupport his right. At 
 this critiral momenfi General Keidefel, who had 
 preflcd oPj upon hearing the firing9 arrived with the 
 
 forcmofl: 
 
appendix: 
 
 forcmoft of his columns, viz. the chafleurs company 
 and eighty grenadiers and light infantry. His jud^ie- 
 Dient immediately pointed to him the courfe to takej 
 lie extended upon Brigadier Frafer*s left flank. The 
 chafTcurs got into adlion with great gallantry under 
 Major Earner. They fled on all fides, leaving dead 
 upon the field Colonel Francis and many other offi- 
 cers, with upwards of 200 men •, above 600 were 
 wounded, mod of whom perjflied in the woods at- 
 tKmpting to get oflT; and one colonel, fevcn cap- 
 tains, ten fubalterns, and 210 men, were made pri- 
 foners i above 20oftands of arms were alfo taken. 
 
 The number of the enemy before the engagement: 
 amounted to 2000 men. The Britifli detachment 
 under Brigadier General Fraier (the parties left the 
 day before at Ticonderoga not having been able to 
 join) confifted only of 850 fighting men. 
 
 The bare relation of fo fignal an aftion is fufficient 
 for its praife. Should the attack againd fuch inequa- 
 lity of numbers, before the German brigade came 
 up, feem to require explanation, it is to be confidcr- 
 ed, that the enemy might have efcaped by delay j 
 that the advanced guard on a fudden found them- 
 lelves too near the enemy to avoid adtion without re- 
 treating ; and that Brigadier Frafer had fuppofed the 
 German troops to be very near. The difference of time 
 in their arrival was merely accidental. The Germans 
 puflied for a ftiare in the glory, and they arrived in 
 lime to obtain it. I have only to add, that the exer- 
 tions of Brigadier Fraier on this day were but a conti- 
 nuance of that uniform intelligence, activity, and 
 bravery, which dillinguifh his chara(5ter upon all oc- 
 cafions, and entitle him to be recommended in the 
 Hioft particular manner to his Majefty's favour. 
 
 The officers and loldiers of this brigade have pre- 
 vented any uiuindions of individuals by a {general and 
 qual difplay of fpirii. 
 
 C The 
 
 XXXUl 
 
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 XXX17 
 
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 8th July, 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 The country people about Skcnefborough having 
 reported that part of the enemy were ftill retreating, 
 the 9th regiment was detached, with orders to take 
 poll near Fort Anne and obferve the enemy's mo. 
 tions. This was efFecfled, but with great difficulty, 
 as the roads were almoft impradicablc and the brid- 
 ges broken. The other troops were employed all that 
 day and night in dragging fifty bateaux over the car. 
 rying-place at Wood Creek, to facilitate the move- 
 ment of the reft of the firft brigade to Fort Anne to 
 diflodge the enemy. 
 
 A report was received from Lieutenant Colonel i 
 Hill (9th regiment) that the enemy had been rein- 
 forced in the night by a confiderable body offrc(h| 
 men ; that he could not retire with his regiment be* 
 Tore them, but he would maintain his ground. The] 
 two remaining regiments of the firft brigade were or. 
 dered to quicken their march, and upon fecond in* 
 telligence of the enemy, and firing being heard, thcl 
 20th regiment was ordered forward with two picccjl 
 of artillery, and Major General Phillips was fenctoj 
 take the command. A violent ftorm of rain, which| 
 lafted the whole day, prevented the troops from get- 
 ting to Fort Anne fo foon as was intended ; but the| 
 delay gave the 9th regiment an opportunity of dillin- 
 guilhing thcmfelves, by ftanding and repulfing an at- 
 tack of fix times their number. The enemy, finding! 
 the pofition not to be forced in front, endeavoured tol 
 turn it i and, from the fuperiority of their numbers,! 
 that inconvenience was to be apprehended ; and Lieu*! 
 tenant Colonel Hill found it neceffary to change his! 
 pofition in the height of adion. So critical an orderl 
 was executed by the regimen; with the utmoft ftcadi- 
 nefs and bravery. The enemy, after an attack of 
 three hours, were totally repulled, and fled towarc 
 Fort Edward, letting fire to Fort Anne, but leaving 
 
 a fawH 
 
 
Wj 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 xxxr 
 
 'h havi 
 
 fiw-mlll and a block-houfe in good repair, which 
 ere afterwards polTcffed by the king's troops. 
 The 9th regiment acquired, during their expedi- 
 jon, about thirty prifoners, fome ftores and baggage, 
 dthe colours of the 2d Plamplhire regiment. 
 One unlucky accident happened, to counterba- 
 ce in fome degree this fuccefs. Captain Montgo- 
 ry, an officer of great merit, was wounded early 
 the aftion, and was in the a(5t of being drefled by 
 lefurgeon when the regiment changed ground ; be- 
 ;g unable to help himlclf, he and the furgeon were 
 en prifoners. I fince hear he has been well treated, 
 lis in a fair way of recovery at Albany. 
 The army, very much fatigued, (many parts of it 9^^ ^^"'1 
 iving wanted their provifions for two days, almoil *o*'^J"^y« 
 whole their tents and baggage,) affembied iti their 
 fent pofition. The right wing occupies the heights 
 Sicenclborough in two lines ; the right flank to tlie 
 untains, covered by the regiment of Rcidefers 
 ffoons, en pounce ; the left to the Wood Creek. 
 The Brunlwick troops under Major General Reide- 
 upon Caftletown River, with Breyman*s corps up- 
 ihe communication cf roads leading to Putney and 
 tland, the regiment of Hefle Hanau, are polled 
 the head of Eaft Creek, to preferve the communi- 
 ion with the camp at Caftletown river and fccure 
 bateaux, 
 favoured tojBrigadier Frafcr's corps is in the center, and ready 
 ir numbers,Bmovc on cither wing ot the army. 
 ; and LieU'Bfhe Scattered remains of the enemy are at Fort 
 change hisB-ward, on the Hudfon*s River, where they have 
 al an ordcAn joined, as I am informed, by General Putnam 
 oft ftcadi Jth a confiderable corps offrelh troops. 
 
 Roads arc opening for the army to march to them 
 
 Fort Anne, and the Wood Creek is clearing of 
 
 trees, funken ftones, and other obftaclcs, to 
 
 pafiage 10 bateaux for carrying ariillery, (lores, 
 
 C 2 provifions, 
 
 D »ng 
 
 etreating, 
 
 rs to take 
 my's mo. 
 difficulty, 
 I the brid- 
 ged all that 
 er the car- 
 the move- 
 rt Anne to 
 
 mt Colonel 
 been rein- 
 dy offrelh 
 giment be- 
 und. The 
 de were or- 
 fecond in. 
 r heard, the 
 tv;o pieces 
 } was lenttol 
 rain, which! 
 )S from get 
 rd } but thc| 
 ityof dillin- 
 ilfing an at 
 y, finding 
 
 \n attack ot 
 
 led lowarc 
 
 [but leaving 
 
 
 
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 licn 
 
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 iS'ifr** •^^*'"f 
 
 xxxvi APPENDIX. 
 
 provifions, and camp equipage. Thefe are laboriou 
 works, but the fpirit and zeal of the troops are luf 
 cient to furmoiint them. Some little time muft all 
 be allowed for the lupplies of provifions to ovcrtali 
 us. In the mean time all poflible diliocncc is ufingi 
 Ticonderoga to get the gun-boats, provifion-veffcl 
 and a proper quantity of bateaux, into Lake Gcorc 
 A corps of the army will be ordered to penetrate 
 that route, which will afterwards be the route fortj 
 magazines ; and a jundlion of the whole is intendj 
 at Fort Edward. 
 
 I tranfmit to your Lordfliip herewith, returns oft 
 killed and wounded, and lifts of fuch parts of proj 
 fions and ilores, taken from the enemy, as could 
 colkded in fo fhort a time. 
 
 I have the honour to be, with the greateft refpci! 
 ^ Your Lordlhip's, &c. 
 
 ; . ,. - , .*.••■ ■'. \ 
 
 ': .•■'■■■ ■ •':; \t 
 
 f!''l: 
 
 m 
 
 No.YllLCcpy cf a Letter from Lieutenant G^»^r^/ BurgcynJ 
 Lord George Gcrmaine, dated Skenclborough, Jj 
 
 [Private.] 
 Mv Lord, 
 
 HAVING given your Lordfhip a detail, im 
 public letter of this date, of the late tranfadlion^ 
 now do myfelf the honour to (late to your Lordfl 
 fuch circumftances as appear to me more proper fij 
 private communication. 
 
 Mr. Peters and Mr. Jefllip, who came over to 
 nada lail autumn, and propofed to raife battalid 
 one from the neighbourhood of Albany, the oj 
 from Charlotte county, are confident of fuccel] 
 the arnw advances. Their battalions are now in^ 
 bryo, but very promifing ; they have fought, 
 with r^iiic. Sir Guy Carlcton has given me bj 
 
 commir 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 Icommiffions for the officers to fill up occafionally ; 
 
 jind the agreement with them is, that the com- 
 
 LfTions are not to be foefFedive till two thirds of the 
 
 hattalions arc raifeu'. Some hundreds of men, a third 
 
 Ipirtof them with arms, have joined me fince I ptne- 
 
 liratfd this place, prcfcfTing themfelves loyalifts, and 
 
 lifting to ferve, Ibme to the end of the war, fome 
 
 lor the campaign. Thoup,h I am without inflruc- 
 
 tons upon this fubjed, I have not hefitated to re- 
 
 ktjve them, and, as fall: as companies can be formed, 
 
 llhali polt the officers till a decifion can be made up- 
 
 iDthe mealbre by my fuperiors. I mean to employ 
 
 km particularly upon detachments for keeping the 
 
 lountry in awe and procuring cattle. Their real 
 
 [fe I expect will be great in the prefervation of the 
 
 ■ational troops; but the imprcfTion which will be 
 
 aufed upon public opinion, fhouid provincials be 
 
 pafling vif:;orouny in the caule of the King, will 
 
 yet more advantageous, and 1 truit fully jullif/ 
 
 Hieexpence. 
 
 The manifeflo, of which I enclofed your I.ordfhip 
 icopy in my laft dilpatchcs, and hercwitii fend a du- 
 klicaie, has great elfett where the country is not in 
 Ic power of the rebt- is j where it is, the coir.miitees 
 iirnall their efforts to counteract ic. Thiy watch or 
 uprilun all lufpedlcd pcrlbns, compel tlie people in 
 antral to take arms, and to drive the caLtle, and to 
 [urn the corn, under penalty cf immediate dcatfi. 
 breat numbers have been hano-ed. Should thcle 
 pretches fucceed to make a deferc of the ccunfy by 
 jreand maffacre, it will at Icall be a pleafing rei'^ec- 
 n, that, while advanta(^es ast* reaped Iroiii the c!e- 
 pt part of the manitelco, thry, and not the King's 
 [oops, are the executioners ot its threats. 
 Your Lorofhip will have obTrTved I have made no 
 ptntion of the Indians in the pu/luit from Ticonde- 
 hi> It is not poliible to draw them in many ref- 
 
 C 3 peels 
 
 xxxvii 
 
 i. 
 
 t. 1- si 
 
 u 
 
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 xxxviii A P P E i; D 1 X. 
 
 pe(5ls from the plunder of that place, and I confidcn 
 tiaily acknowledge this is not the only inlbnce i 
 whuh I have found little more than a name. If, n^. 
 der the management of their condii6lors, they areia 
 dulged, for interefted reafons, in all the caprices an 
 humours of fpoiled children, like them they gro 
 more unrc^afonable and importunate upon every new f< 
 vour. Were they left to themfelves, enormities to 
 horrid to think of would enfue : guilty and innucenrl 
 ■women and infants, would be a common prey. 
 
 This is the character of the lower Canadian I 
 dians, who alone have been with the army hitheri 
 I an informed the Outawas, and other remote n 
 ticns, who are within two days march of joining m 
 are more brave and more trad-^ble ; that they prole 
 war, not pillage. They are under the diredionsot* 
 M.St. Luc, a Canadian gentleman of honour ani 
 parts, and one of the beft partizans the French hai 
 laft war, and of one Langlade, the very man wl 
 projeded and executed, with thefe very nations, t 
 defeat of General Braddock. My firlt intention w 
 to turn li^is whole corps to the Connedlicut imm 
 diately, to force a fupply of provifions, to interce 
 reinforcements and to confirm the jealoufy 1 have 
 many ways endeavourt-d to excite in the New-Engia 
 provinces : but, finding that the enemy are labou 
 ing to remove their ma^^azines from Forts George a 
 Edward, and evciy where deftroying the roads, a 
 preparing to drive and burn the country towards A 
 bar.y, I have determined to employ them, to pr( 
 vent, if pefilble, by their terror, the continuance 
 thoic operatioruS. And, after arriving at Alban 
 tlicy may be employed to renew the alarm towjr 
 Connedlicui and 1! jllon. 
 
 Your Lordiiiip will pardon me if I a little lanfien 
 that my orders do not give me the latitude I venti 
 jcd to propole, in my ciiginal prcjei^l for il.e cai 
 
 p:il2 
 
^ ' t f 
 
 r 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 paign, to make a real effort inftead of a feint upon 
 New England. As things have turned out, were I 
 at liberty to march in force immediately by my left, 
 indead of my right, I (hould have little doubt of fub- 
 duing, before winter, the provinces where the rebel- 
 lion originated. 
 
 If my late letters reach Mr. Howe, I dill hope this 
 plan may be adopted from Albany; in the mean 
 while my utmolt exertions (hall continue, according 
 to my inflrudions, to force a junction. 
 
 I have fcnt fome Indians through the woods, in the 
 hope of their reaching St. Leger with the account of 
 my progrefs : now is the critical time for his pufli up- 
 on the Mohawk. I have certain intelligence that all 
 the country round Fort Stanwix is in alarm ; but I 
 imagine it proceeds from the appearance of fome la- 
 vages detached by Colonel Butler, not apprehending 
 5t. Leger can be got quite fo forward. 
 
 xxxix 
 
 l-^'l; 
 
 
 ^<4j I 
 
 Camp near Saratoga, Atigufl 20, 1777. Jf^ yrjr 
 
 To Lord George Germaine. 
 
 Mv Lord, ^ 
 
 IN my laft difpatch (a duplicate of which will be 
 Inclofed herewith) I had the honour to inform your 
 Lordfliip of the proceedings of the army under my 
 command to the 30th of July. 
 
 From that period to the 15th of Augufl: every poffi- 
 blemeafure was employed to bring forward bateaux, 
 provifions, and ammunition, from Fort George to 
 thefirft navigable part of Hudfon's River, a diltance 
 ofeighteen miles, the roads in lome parts deep, and 
 in others wanting great repair. Of the horfes, ftir- 
 nilhed by contract in Canada, not more than a third 
 part was yet arrived. The delay was not imputable 
 to ncgled, but to the natural accidents attending lo 
 
 long 
 
 I 
 
 H 
 '? ^ s 
 
 t^ 
 
 ix 
 
W ■ :. ! 
 
 it;. 
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 xl APPENDIX. 
 
 long and intricate a combination of land and wr.ter 
 carriage. Fifty team of oxen, which had bttn collcc. 
 ted in the country through which 1 had march'd, 
 were added to afiill the tranfport ; but thefe relour- 
 ces together were found far inadequate to the purpo. 
 ffs of iccding the army and forming a magazine at 
 the fame lime. Exceeding heavy rains augmented 
 the impediments : it was often neceffary to employ 
 tenortutlve oxen upon a fingle bateau j and, alter 
 the Litmoll exertions for the fifteen days above ihitd, 
 there were not above four days provilion before hand, 
 nor above ten bateaux in the river. 
 
 Intelligence had reached me, that Lieutenant Co- 
 lonel St. Lcger was before Fort Stanwix, which was 
 defended. I'he main army of the enemy oppofcd to 
 nie was at Stillwater, a place between Saratoga and 
 the mouth of the Mohawk. 
 
 A rapid movement forward appeared to be of the 
 utmoft conlcquence at this period. The enemy couIJ 
 not have proceeded up the Mohawk without putting 
 themltlvcs between two fires, in cafe Colonel St. Le- 
 ger fliould have iucceeded, and at bell being cut off 
 by my army from Albany. They muft either, there- 
 fore, have Hood an adlion, haye fallen back towards 
 Albany, or have paffed the Hudlbn's River, in ordfr 
 to lecure a retreat to New England, higher up. 
 "Whichever of thefe meafures they had taken, lb that 
 the King's army had been enabled to advance, Cobnel 
 St. Leger's operations would have been affiueJ, a 
 jundiun with him probably fecurcd, and the whole 
 couiHiy of the Moliawk opened. 1o maintain the 
 coriiiiiUJiication with Fort George during luch a move- 
 nicnt, lo as to be luj, plied by daily decrees at a dif- 
 t^r.cc continually inticafing, was an obvious impofii- 
 bility. The army was much too weak to have afford- 
 ed a chain of polls. Elcorts for every feparate tranl- 
 j uft would hiive been a Hill greater diain \ nor could 
 
 anv 
 
 U"^: > 
 
iH-r 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 iny have been made fo (Irong as to force their way 
 through fuch pofitions as the enemy might take in 
 one night's march from the White Creek, where they 
 had a numerous militia. Had the enemy remained 
 lupine, through fear, or want of comprehending fo 
 palpable an advantage, the phyfical impoflibility of 
 being fupplicd by dt- wrt* es from Fort George was dill 
 in force, bfcaule a new necefTuy of land carriage for 
 nine miles ariles at Stiliwater -, and, in thr: proportion 
 that carriages had been brought forward to that place, 
 the tranlport mull have cealed behind. 
 
 The alternative, therefore, was (hort : cither to 
 relinquifh the favourable opportunity of advancing 
 upon the enemy, or to attempt other refources of 
 fupply. 
 
 It is Tvell known that the enemy's fupplies in live cat- 
 tle, trom a lartje trad of country, paffed" by the route of 
 Manchefter, Arlington, and other parts of the Hamp- 
 Ihire Grants, to Bemngton, in order to be occafionally 
 conveyed thence to the main army, A large depofit of 
 corn and of wljeel carriages was alfo formed at the 
 fame place, and the ufual guard was militia, though 
 ir varied in numbers from day to day. A fcheme was 
 formed tofurprifeiienington. The pofleflion of the cat- 
 tle and carriages would certainly have enabled the ar- 
 my to leave their dillant magazi.-.es, and to have a6ted 
 with energy and difpatch j luccefs would alio have 
 anUvercd many fecondary purpoles. 
 
 Lieut. Col. Baume, an officer well qualified for the 
 unclertalving, was fixed upon to command. He had 
 under him 200 difmountcd dragoons of the regiment of 
 Reidel'el, Captain Frafer's markfmen, which were the 
 only Britifli, all the Canadian volunteers, a party of 
 the Provincials who peifcd:iy knew the country, 100 
 Indians, and two light pieces of cannon; the whole 
 detachment amounted to about 500 men. The in- 
 ftrudtions were pofitive, to keep the regular corps pof- 
 
 ted, 
 
 xU 
 
 ,i>;. 
 
 
 
 
 a 
 
 '' .*• 
 
1, , 
 
 
 
 'U 
 
 %l 
 
 ''i. 
 
 :&■ : 
 
 
 
 4 . 
 
 xlii APPENDIX. 
 
 tfd, while the light troops felt their way, and not to 
 incur ilie ilangcr of being furroundcd, or having a rc- 
 tn.'acciu off. 
 
 Ill order to facilitate this operation, and to be ready 
 to take advantage of its fuccefs, the army moved up 
 the call fliore of HirJlbii's River. On the 14th, a 
 bridge WIS formed of rafts, over which the advanced 
 co: p3 p.ifl' cl and encamped at Saratoga. Lieutenant. 
 Colonel Brtryman's corps were polted near Batten. 
 Kill J and, upon intelligence, from Colonel Baume, 
 ihar the enemy were flronf^er at Bennington than ex- 
 pected, and v/ere aware of his attack, that corps, con. 
 lifting or the Brunfwic grenadiers, light-infantry, and 
 chafiairs, were fjnt forward to fullain him. 
 
 It lince appears, that Lieutenant-Colonel Baume, 
 not having bctn able to complete his march undilco- 
 vered, was joined at a place called Sancoix-Mills, about 
 four miles lliort of Bennington, by many people pro- 
 fefling theml'elves to be Loyalifls. A provincial gentle- 
 man of confidence, who had been fent with the de- 
 tachment, as knowing the country and the charadfer 
 of the inhabitants, was fo incautious as to leave at li- 
 berty fuch as took the oath of allegiance. 
 
 His credulity and their profligacy caufed the firft 
 misfortune. Colonel Baume was induced to proceed 
 without futficient knowledge of tlie ground. His de- 
 fign was betrayed j the men who had taken the oaths 
 were the firft to fire upon him: he was attacked on all 
 fides ; he fhewed great perlbnal courage, but was over- 
 powered by numbers. 
 
 During this time Lieutenant-Colonel Breyman was 
 upon the march through a heavy rain ; and luch were 
 the other impediments flated in that officer's report, of 
 bad roads, tired horfes, difficulties in paffing artillery, 
 carriages, &c. that he was from eight in the morning 
 of the 15th to four in the afternoon of the following 
 day making about twenty-four miles. 
 
 Ik 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 He engaacci, fought gallantly, and drove the enemy 
 from three fcveral heighrs i but was too latetofuccour 
 Colonel Baume, who was made prKoncr, and a confi- 
 derable part of his dragoons were killed or taken. The 
 failure of ammunition, from the accidental breaking to 
 piecesof a tumbril, unfortunately obliged Lieutenant- 
 Colonel Breyman to retire conquering troops, and to 
 leave behind two pieces of cannon, befiJes two which 
 had been loft by Lieurenant-Colonel Baume. The In- 
 dians made good their retreat from the firft affair, as 
 did Captain Fraler, with part of his company, and ma- 
 ny of the Provincials and Canadians. 
 
 The lofs, as at prefent appears, amounts to about 
 400 men, killed and taken in both adlions, and twen- 
 ty-fix officers, molUy prifoners; but men who were 
 difperfed in the woods drop in daily. A correct re- 
 turn Ihall be tranfmitted to your Lordlhip the ftrft op- 
 portunity. 
 
 This, my Lord, is a true ftate of the event. I have 
 not dwelt upon errors, becaufe, in many inftances, 
 they were counterbalanced by fpirit. The enemy will 
 of courfe find matter of parade in the acquifition of four 
 pieces of cannon ; but, thac apart, they have fmall 
 caufe of exultation, their lofs, in killed and wounded, 
 being more than double to ours, by the confeffion of 
 their prifoners and deferters, and of many inhabitants 
 who were witnefles to the burial of their dead. 
 
 The chief fubjed of regret on our fide, after that 
 which any lofs of gallant men naturally occafions, is 
 the difappointmcnt of not obtaining live cattle, and the 
 lofs of time in bringing forward the magazines. 
 
 This heavy work is now nearly completed, and a 
 new bridge of boats is ihrovvn over the Hudfon's Ri- 
 ver, oppofite to Saratoga, the former one of rafts ha- 
 ving been carried away by the fwell of water after the 
 late continual rain«. When enabled to move, nothing 
 H'ichin nw fcale of talent ihall be left unattempted to 
 
 fulfil 
 
 m 
 
 3(1111 
 
 : I 
 
 vi 
 
 
 
 
i4' 
 
 
 • r ' .' 
 
 
 ; \' ■ 
 
 » 
 
 I'i^. . 
 
 
 -Vv 
 
 
 lA' ■ 
 
 
 
 
 /i • 
 
 xWv APPENDIX; 
 
 fulfil his Majcfly*s orders ; and T liope circumfl.inccs 
 will be fuch, that my endeavours may be, in lomc de- 
 gree, aflilled by the cooperation of the army under 
 Sir William Howe. 
 
 I have the honour to be, with great rcfped. 
 
 Your Lordfhip's moll obedient 
 And mofl: humble fervanr, 
 (Signed.) J. Bur gov ne.* 
 
 ;■ I, 
 
 1= 
 
 f' 
 
 ,>:v 
 
 
 No. IX. Copy of a Letter from Lieutenant-General Burgoyne to 
 Zc^^ George Gcrmaine, dated Camp^ w^r^jr Saratoga, 
 Augullzo, 1777. 
 My Lord. [Private.] 
 
 I NEED not enlarge upon the concern I have in 
 communicating any finifter events. I am perfuaJed 
 your Lordfiiip will give me credit for partaking every 
 ientiment that your Lordlhip, or any other man war- 
 med with principle and zeal in this conteft, can feel. 
 
 In regard to the affair of Saintcoick, I have only to 
 add to the public account, that, if ever there was a fi- 
 tuation to juftify enterprize and exertion, out of the 
 beaten track of military fervice, it was that in which I 
 found myfelf. Had I i'ucceeded, I Oiould have effected 
 a jundlion with St. Leger, and been now before Alba- 
 ny. And I flatter myfelf, I need only mention thofe 
 views, to fhew, that, in hazarding this expedition, I 
 had tlie foundef^ principles of military reafoningon my 
 fide, viz. that the advantages to be expc(5lcd from fuc- 
 eels were, in a preat (^egree, fupcrior to the evils that 
 could attend mifcarriage. The fecondary purpofes, 
 to which I alluded in the public letter, were to try the 
 afFedions of the country, to complete the Provincial 
 
 corps, 
 
 * The letter tliat follows, No. IX. is alfo materially referable 
 to No. Vlli. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 corps, many recruits for which were unable to cfcape 
 from tlieir villag<'s without a force to encourage and 
 protecil them, and to dillradb the councils of the enemy, 
 by continuing their jealoufy towards New-England. 
 
 Major-Gencral Reidelel has prcfTcd upon me repea- 
 tedly the mounting his dragoons; the men were animated 
 with the famedefire, and I conceived it a mod favou- 
 rable occafion to give into tlieir ideas and folicitations, 
 becauie, in exerting their zeal to fulfil their favourite 
 purpole, they necelTary would effedl the greater purpoie 
 of my own. The red of the troops were fele<^ed from 
 fuch as would leall weaken the folid ftrength of the ar- 
 my, in cafe of ill fuccefs-, and I thought it expedient to 
 make a little trial of the Provincials and Canadians, 
 before I might have occafiyn for them in more impor- 
 tant adtions. 
 
 The original detachment could not have been made 
 larger without opening roads, and other preparations 
 of time, nor fliould I have thought it juHifiable to ex- 
 pofc the bed troops 1:0 lofs upon a collateral ai^lion. Had 
 my inflrudtions been followed, or could Mr. Breyman 
 have marched at the rate of two miles an hour, any given 
 twelve hours out of :he two and thirty, fuccefs would 
 probably have enfiied i misfortune would cert£>inly 
 have been avoided. I did not think it prudent, in the 
 prelent crifis, to ma;k thefe circumdances to the public 
 fo dronglyas I do in confidence to your Lordfliip*, but 
 I rely, and I will venture to fay I expe(it, becaufe I 
 think judice will warrant the expedlation, that while, 
 for the fake of public harmony, that necefiary princi- 
 ple for conducting nice and laborious fervice, 1 colour 
 the faults of the execution, your LordHiip will, in 
 your goodnefs, be my advocate to the King and to the 
 world, in vindication of the plan. 
 
 The confequences of this affair, my Lord, have lit- 
 tle efFet]: upon the drength or fpirits of the army; buc 
 the profpedit of the campaign, in other rcfpedb, is far 
 
 xlv 
 
 •i: 
 
 \ 
 
 I 
 
 ,' J I 
 
 
(«.■■;■,; 
 
 •rti. 
 
 f^pimpip 
 
 'I-.', f 
 
 t . 
 
 ■*_ ' 
 
 ■i ■• . :• 
 
 
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 ■ »: * 
 
 • 
 
 i^i 
 
 '■i> 
 
 ■SKi:- 
 
 
 xlv! APPENDIX; 
 
 lefs profperous than whe*^ I wrote laft. In fpite of St. 
 Leger*s vidory. Fort Stanwix holds out obltinateiy, 
 1 am afraid the ^(pedations of Sir J. Johnfon greatly 
 fail ill the riring^<)f the country. On this fide I find 
 daily reafon^o doubt the finceriry of the refolution of 
 
 o the proftfling loyalifts. I have sibout 400, but not 
 half of them armed who may be deptnded upon ; the 
 reft arc trimmers merely aduated by intercft. The 
 great bulk of the country is undoubtedly with the Con- 
 grefs, in principle and zeal; and their meal'ures are ex- 
 ecuted with a fecrecy and dtfpatch that arc not to be 
 equalled. Wherever the King's forces point, militia, 
 to the amount of three or four thoufand, aflemble in 
 twenty-four hours; they bring with them iheir fubfif- 
 tence, &c. and, the alarm over, they return to their 
 farms. The ITamplliire Grants, in particular, a 
 country unpeopled, and almoft unknown the laft war, 
 now abounds in the moft adlivat and moft rebellious 
 race of the continent, and hangs like a gathering ftorm 
 upon my left, oin aii parts, the induftry and manage- 
 ment, in ^rivin^ cattle and removing corn, are indefa- 
 tigable and certain ; and it becomes imprafticable to 
 movfrwi^hout portable magazines. Another nl<>ft em- 
 barraflTing circumftaRce is the want of communication 
 with Sir William Howe; of the meflengt-rs I have 
 lent, I know of two being hanged, and am ignorant 
 ' 'whtther any of the reft arrived. The fame fate has 
 
 o probably attended thofe difpatclied by Sir William 
 Howe; for only one letter is come to hand, informing 
 met hat his attention is for Pennfylvariia; that Wifhing- 
 ton has detached Sullivan, with 2500 men, to Alba- 
 ny; that Putnam is in the Highlands with 4000 men. 
 That, «lter my arrjtvial at Albany, the movements of 
 the enemy muft guide mine; but that he willied the 
 enemy might be driven our of the province, before any 
 operation took place againft the Connedicut; that Sir 
 Henry Clinton remained in the command in the neigh- 
 bourhood 
 
 o 
 
i n b 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 xlvit 
 
 bourhood of New- York, and would acEl as occurrences 
 might dircft. 
 
 No operation, my Lord, has yet been undertaken 
 in my favour-, the Highlands have not even been 
 ihreatened. The confequence is, that Putnam iias de- 
 tiched two brigades to Mr. Gates, who is now flrongly 
 patted near the mouth of the Mohawk-River, with an 
 army fuperior to mine in troops of the Congrels, and 
 s many militia ss he pleafes. He. is likewife far from 
 being deficient in artillery, having received all the pie- 
 r's that were landed from the French fliips which got 
 into Bofton. 
 
 Had I a latitude in my orders, I (hould think it my 
 duty to wait in this pofition, or perhaps as tar back as 
 fort Edward, where my communic ,tion with Lake 
 George would be perfcdly fccure, till fomc event hap- 
 pened toaflift; my movement forvard ; but my orders 
 being pofitive, to " force a jundion 'vith Sir William 
 Howe,** I apprehend I am not at liberty to remain in- • 
 iftive longer than fliall be necejffary to colledl twenty- 
 five days provifion, and to receive the reinforcement of 
 the additional companies, the German drafts and re- 
 cruits, now (and unfortunately only row) on Lake 
 Chaniplain, I'he waiting the arrival of this reinforce- 
 ment is of indilpenfible neccfliiy ; bccaufe, from the 
 fcour I pafs the Hudfon*s river and proceed towards Al- 
 bany, allfafety of communication ceales. I muft ex- Q 
 pedl a l^rge body of tlie enemy, from my kft, will 
 take poft behind me. I have put out of the qucflicxi 
 bewailing longer than the time neceHaiy for tl>e fore- 
 going purpOles, btrcaul'e the attempt, thtn critical, de- 
 ptTd^g on adventure and the fortune that often ac- 
 companies it, and hardly ji!lliii:\ble but by ortiers from 
 t'lcliate, would afterwards be conrummatcJy delperate. 
 I mean, my Lord, that, by moving foon, though I 
 fiioiild meet with infurmotintable difhcultit- s to my pro- 
 gfd's, I Ihall at Icafl have the chance of fi|^!ning my 
 
 way 
 
 o 
 
 
 
 
 1- 1.- ti 
 
 ■1»?- 
 
 ■ ' i 
 
 Mi \ 
 
 •V 4, •; 
 

 I- 
 
 m 
 
 U-n ■ 
 
 If;'' 
 
 '.'i: 
 
 r"^'- 
 
 'f :' ■ : 
 
 ■ Jf V - > 
 
 W. ■ 
 
 "il 
 
 ^rl 
 
 'lij; 
 
 . 1 
 
 ■i . 
 
 
 i./S 
 
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 "■>, 
 
 ' •■*]■'' 'I 
 
 
 xlviii APPENDIX. 
 
 way back to Ticonderoga; but the feafon a little far- 
 thcr advanced, the diftance encreafed, and the march 
 unavoidably tardy, becaufe furrounded by enemies, a 
 retreat might be Ihut by impenetrable bars, or the ele- 
 ments, and, at the fame time, no polTibk means of 
 cxiftcnce remain in the country. 
 
 When I wrote more confidently, I little forefaw that 
 I was to be left to purfue my way through fuch a tract 
 of country, and holls of foes, without any co-operation 
 from New- York j nor did I then think the garrifon of Ti- 
 conderoga would fall to my fhare alone; a dangerous ex- 
 periment would it be to leave that port: in weaknelsJ 
 and too heavy a drain it is upon ihc iife-blood of my 
 force to giv . it due ftrength. 
 
 I yet do not defpond. — Should I fucceed in forcing I 
 my way ^o Albany, and find chat country in a Itate tol 
 fubfift my army, I fliall think no more of a retreat,! 
 but at the worfl: fortify there, and await Sir \V.| 
 Howe*s operations. 
 
 "Whatever m-iy be my fate, my Lord, I fubmit my 
 a(!!tIons to the bread of the King, and to the candii 
 judgement of my profeFion, when ail the motives beJ 
 come public; and I red in the confidence, that, what-j 
 ever decifion may be paffed upon my condudt, my good 
 intent will not be queftioned. 
 
 I cannot clofe fo ferious a letter, without expreffins 
 my fulled fatisfaftion in the behaviour and countenanc^ 
 of the troops, and my complete confidence, that, ii| 
 all trials, they will do whatever can be expected fron 
 men devoted to their King and country. 
 
 I have the honour to be, &c. 
 
 J. BURGCVNI 
 
 P. S. Upon re-pprufing this letter, I am apprehen 
 five that the manner in which I have expreffed myfel: 
 lefpeiiting the reinforcement being only upon Lali 
 
 Champliiin 
 
little far- 
 lie maich 
 inemies, a 
 or the ele« 
 means of 
 
 )refaw that 
 Lich a tract 
 D.operat'um 
 -rifonofTi- 
 ngerous ex- 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Champlaiii, may feem ambiguous. — I do not mean to 
 impute the delay to any thing but accidents, nor do 
 I mean to conteft Sir Guy Carleton's reafoning, upon 
 not complying ^ith my requifitions to garrifon Ticon- 
 [deroga; loniy lament it. 
 
 'opy of a Letter from Sir William Howe to Lieutenaut- 
 General Burgoyne, dated New- York, July the iph^ 
 
 mi' 
 
 xllx 
 
 f. 
 
 weaknels, 
 ood ot my 
 
 Dear Sir, 
 
 I HAVE received yours of the fecond inftant on 
 
 the i5thi have fince heard from thr rebel army of your 
 
 being in pofleffion of Ticonderoga, which is a great 
 
 mt, carried without lofs, I have received your two 
 
 Sir wB'"^*^^' '^^^' from Plymouth and Quebec, yourlaftof 
 
 ttic 14th May, and fhall obferve the contents. There 
 
 is a report of a meflcnger of yours to me having been 
 
 taken, and the letter difcovered in a double wooden 
 
 nicen : you will know if it was of any confequence ; 
 
 ing of it has tranfpired to us. I will obferve the 
 
 [«r«/« in writing to you as you propofe in your 
 
 tters to me, "Wafhington is waiting our motionfi 
 
 ere, and has detached Sullivan, with about 2500 
 
 len, as I learn, to Albany. My intention is for Penn- 
 
 Ivania, where I expert to meet Wafhington 5 but, if 
 
 egoes to the northward, contrary to my expectations, 
 
 ndyou can keep him at bay, be aiTured I Ihall foon 
 
 af:er him to relieve you. 
 
 After your arrival at Albany, the movements of 
 
 k enemy will guide yours ; but my wiflies are, that 
 
 e enemy be driven out of this province before any 
 
 ation takes place in Connedlicut. Sir Henry 
 
 efled' 'mytelff"^ton remains in the command here, and will a6t as 
 
 upon Lakfr^^rrences may dircft. Putnam is in the highlands, 
 
 Champli^iiW'^^^ about 4000 men. Succefs be ever with you. 
 
 . . Yours, &c. William Howe. 
 D Sir 
 
 A in forcing 
 in a itate to 
 f a retreat, 
 
 I fubmit m) 
 the candid 
 
 motives be-l 
 that, whaw 
 6t, my good 
 
 It exprefling 
 
 countenancfl 
 
 |nce, that, iij 
 
 [peded fror 
 
 &c. 
 
 BURGCVNI 
 
 m 
 
 apprehen 
 
 No. X. 
 
 '•' i I 
 
•S'i 
 
 ■ t ■, 
 
 .1 ■ ;■ 
 
 ■,'V . 
 
 it':' .' 
 
 
 
 'ft- 
 
 t:. 
 
 Second 
 Mo.X. 
 
 .> 
 
 No. XI. 
 
 APPENDIX* 
 Sir Guy Carlcton*s Letter.* 
 
 SIR, i^ekc, November iiy 1777. 
 
 I received your letter of the 20th of Odober, withl 
 your public difpatches, by Captain Craig, the 5th 
 inftant, and heartily condole with you upon the very 
 difagreeable accounts they contain •, all which I fm- 
 cerely lamented, both on the public account and youi 
 own. 
 
 This unfortunate event, it is to be hoped, will ii 
 Future prevent minifters from pretending to direc] 
 operations of war, in a country at three thoufani 
 miles diftance, of which they have fo little knowled| 
 as not to be able to diftinguifh between good, bad, 
 interefted, advices, or to give pofitive orders in mat] 
 ters, which, from their nature, are ever upon th( 
 change ; fo that the expedience or propriety of 
 meafure, at one moment, may be totally inexpediei 
 or improper in the next. 
 
 Having given over all hopes of being relieved th| 
 iall, I determined upon fending home Captain Fo] 
 to furniih his majefty's confidential fervants, and 
 fucceflbr, with the beft information, in my power, 
 the flate of affairs in this province, that they m: 
 form the better judgement of what they have to do. 
 
 I cm, &;c. 
 
 Artny from Canada under Lieutmant-General Burgoyn 
 ^otal Rank and File, ift o/July, 1777, [Sick inckki 
 
 Biltifii. 
 
 9th regiment •«»»•—. j^j 
 
 aofh —•- — — -- ^28 
 
 21(1 —— — — — 538 
 
 24th — — — — — jig 
 
 47th — — — — — 58^ 
 
 Carried over 2660 
 
 BritiA; Brought over i\ 
 
 Grenadiers and lighNinfantry com- 
 panies from the 29th, 3ifl, and 
 34.th, regiments — — — 
 
 Carried over 1 
 
 * This letter, which was never printed before, only regS 
 the vicA- of the evidence, towards the beginninj;. 
 
 3ve, u 
 
 ocuredj 
 
 Ihorfes 
 
 Id the n 
 
 at count 
 
 fime be 
 
 py deh 
 
 rauflioi 
 
 jExcelie 
 
 [immiini 
 
 r procu 
 
! j 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 U 
 
 Brought over 4067 
 LCinada out of the above 343 
 
 Britifh. Total 3724 
 
 [Cwada 7 1 1 
 
 [jr.miaign, German* 3016 
 
 Rejular troops. Total 6740 
 (left out of the above 
 
 - ropa- 
 Inikand file 462 
 ifiiilcand file 44S 
 
 — — 510 
 
 ■tjpafTagc to Albany 5830 
 
 iBfitifh artillery — — ■ 2^7 
 
 Gtrtnan artillery — 100 
 i,f([vants, Sec. in the above. 
 
 Ii under Lieutenant Nutt i;4 
 
 us — — — — ,48 
 L never mote than 500 
 
 Before Si-ptemb. fell of to 90 
 Provincials at moll — 682 
 ift 0&, no mote than 456 
 
 In Septembfrtheadditionalcom- 
 paniesjojned near Fort Miller, 
 in all — — ^ — — 3o» 
 
 Regulars killed, wounded, and prifoners, 
 in the campaign, 1777. 
 
 Tot. 
 
 
 Kill 
 
 Wo. 
 
 Prif. 
 
 firiti/Ii. 
 
 Officers 
 
 
 
 
 26 
 
 47 
 
 '9 
 
 Seijeants 
 
 ir 
 
 33 
 
 14 
 
 Drummers 
 
 3 
 
 S 
 
 6 
 
 R. & Fill; 
 
 207 
 
 549 
 
 449 
 
 Germans. 
 
 Officers 
 
 10 
 
 16 
 
 29 
 
 Serjeants 
 
 12 
 
 28 
 
 59 
 
 Drummers 
 
 I 
 
 8 
 
 lii 
 
 R. & File 
 
 141 
 
 225 
 
 575 
 
 12S5 
 
 941 
 
 \Afplication from Major-General Phillips, relative No. XII, 
 Horfes, D^/^^ Montreal, June 4, i777» 
 
 |SIR, 
 
 fAKE the liberty of informing your Excellency,' 
 Ithere has yet been no arrangement made for 
 hing the field-artillery by landt fhould the corps 
 oops upon an expedition under your command, 
 :courfe of the campaign, quit the lakes Cham- 
 jand George, and the rivers. 
 pe, upon the ftriftefl information which could 
 ocured, reafon to believe, that neither carriages 
 [horfes will be to be had nearer than Albany, 
 jd the route of your army be that way •, and, even 
 M country, it will necefTarily require a confidera- 
 |ime before any can be gotj all v;hich muft'ne- 
 fily delay the operations of the campaign, after 
 ledudioii of Ticoncieroga. I therefore lubmit to 
 |Exceliency*s ccnfideration, whether horfes, and 
 |ammiinition' carriages as may be wanted, fhould 
 procured for the fervice of the campaign, for 
 
 D 2 the 
 
 IK 
 
 w, 
 
■I 
 
 . I 
 
 In APPENDIX. 
 
 the field-artillery attached to the corps of trocpJ 
 Excellency is to command this campaign ? 
 
 I have tne honour to be. Sir, 
 
 "With the greateft refpeift, 
 
 Your Excellency's mofl obedient 
 
 And mod humble fervantj 
 
 M. Phillips, Major-GenerJ 
 commanding the royj 
 
 His Excellency 
 Lieutenanc-General Burgoyne. 
 
 tiilery in Cai^ 
 
 :v^ 
 
 
 . i- 
 
 
 Copy of a Letter to Major-General Phillips, refpi 
 Hor/es, Dated Montcea.\, June 4, i;;;. 
 
 SIR, 
 
 1 HAVE the honour of your letter of thisi 
 date, informing me that no arrangement has yet 
 made for moving the field-artillery by land ; and 
 upon the bed information you can obtain, ne 
 carriages nor horlcs can be procured on theciliti| 
 Lake Champlain nearer than Albany. 
 
 In confequence of this reprefenration, I havetj 
 queft y('U, to give in your opinion upon the mo 
 procuring horles and carriages from this roul 
 combining the confiderations of di (patch, fuffi 
 CEfonomy towards government *, and I wifh to 
 the opinion as foon as pofilble. 
 
 I am, with trueft regard, Sir, 
 
 Your obedient humble fervant, 
 
 J. BuRGOVNE, Lieutenant-Gea 
 
 Major-Gencrai l-'hillips. 
 
 £»'J 
 
 
 ^^M 
 
t:^ 
 
 '. V t 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ps of troops W'^"''''^^ of Lelien from Major-General FhWVipi, 6?r. 
 
 iign P ■ 
 
 i3 cf a Letter from Major-General Phillips to 
 
 Lieutenant-Gemral Burgoyne. 
 
 Montreal, June 5, 1777. 
 
 J HAVE the honour of your Excellency's letter to 
 
 |o[yc(ter''ay, in anfwer to one I wrote on the fub- 
 
 J the fieid-artillery being fapplied w\th horfcs, 
 
 l&c. 
 
 [o'jare pleafcd. Sir, to order me to give an opi« 
 
 jupan the moJe of procuring horfes and rar- 
 
 M'rom this country i combin/ng the confideration 
 
 lilpAtch, fiifiiciency, and (Economy towards go- 
 
 Ini-rnt. 
 
 jiere are but two modes of procuring horfes for 
 
 fervice, luppofing ihc country is not to furnilh 
 
 liiponco vers •, lie one is by purchafing ot hor- 
 
 )jii ilie account of government, the other by 
 
 ■a. 
 
 lie fir ft of thefe mo.les has always appeared, to 
 
 diffi.ulr, uncertain, and full oi opiruings for 
 
 fp-'f.iL's of impoficion, and the exp. nee uncer- 
 G)vernment mull trull various pfople to buy 
 
 S; and, in this toiiiitry, it will not be pofllble to 
 
 leaiiy perfons who will not iiumedia ely |)ur- 
 |e views of gaining money to thtrrilclves, with a 
 Jcration for the King's le'vicf. Add to this, 
 
 will become futh a chargt*, that many coinniif- 
 [muft be appointed, and various other cffijcrs of 
 
 art, &c. which being a mixture of inlpfClors 
 [he purchales of horles, and necffTir-ly alfo ac 
 jthe being purcnafers, it will be difficult evtr to 
 
 ain the price, and feldom that the ^oodnels of 
 
 icaa be depended on. 
 
 ive Ict-n, in my fervice, this mode attempted ; 
 
 liaS, to mv knowledge, tailed. I mull all.w, 
 iS ^ ' that. 
 
 UK 
 
 H-A 
 
 U 
 
 
 .^. "-^ I I 
 
 ! 
 
f: i 
 
 ••I. 
 
 ■I 
 
 I « 
 
 \W APPENDIX. 
 
 that, could it be carried into execution roipplete 
 would be the cheapefl; for government : bit, tali 
 into confideration the various impofitions which 
 atife, and that the fetting out on a plan of thisi 
 ture will require a very large fum of money, perl 
 from 20,oool. to 30,000!. to be intruded into ( 
 ous hands, I freely give it as my opinion that it \\ 
 a perfcdt plan. The contracting for a certain 
 ber of horfes, at a fixed price for the hire by day] 
 duces the whole to a very fimple, and therefore j 
 rally a certain, plan. It depends on the fet 
 by making as cheap, as fair, and juft, a baij 
 on the part of government, as can be: And, beij 
 made, that the military and civil officers do theif 
 ty, by attending to the receiving of horfes only 1^ 
 are fitting for fervice. The contrador has his in 
 fo diredlly connected with ". 'filling his conirac 
 upon failure it ceafes,) that he will exert all me^ 
 do it, and the care of government will be, that] 
 done honeftly and completely. 
 
 I have thus obeyed your Excellency's ordersj 
 given an opinion which I fubmit entirely to you 
 nderation* 
 
 1 5-' 
 
 Mxtra^ cfa Letter to Nathaniel Day, Efq. Ccm 
 General, t^c. Dated Montreal, June 4tb, i] 
 
 I BEG the favour of you to calculate what| 
 ber of horfes and carriages (fuppofmg them 
 are in common ufe in Canada) will be fuffiq 
 conveying, by land, thirty days provifion for 
 men, together with about 1000 gallons of m 
 you will pleafe to ipake me your report as 
 jpoITibk, 
 
 bat 
 M; 
 k'S 
 tiu 
 
 :j:r 
 
 5« 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 ExtrnSl of a Letter to Sir Guy Carleton. 
 
 Montreal Juney, 17^7* 
 HAVING had the honour to reprelVnt to your Ex- 
 cellency the necefficy of being provided with a certain 
 number of horlifs and carriages for the artillery, vic- 
 tuals, and other indifpen fable purpofcs of the army, 
 when it Hiall be obliged to quit the borders of the lakes 
 and rivers j and having underflood from your Excel- 
 lency that fuch provifion could not be made by the 
 ordinary methods ot corvee ; and that, if propofed 
 without compuifion upon the country, the clfedt would 
 be precarious, dilatory, and expenfive ; I have the 
 honour now to lay before your Excellency propofals 
 for contradls for an expeditious fupply of horfes for 
 the artillci-y, and 500 carts, with two h(;rfes each, 
 for the other purpofes. 
 
 I am too ignorant of the prices of the country to 
 offer any judgement upon the realbnablenefs of thefc 
 propofals •, nor have I any long acquaintance with 
 Mr. Jordan, or other motive for wifhing him the 
 preference, if other perfons can be found equally ca- 
 pable, refponfible, and expeditious. I have only 
 thus far interfered, upon a conviction, (after confider- 
 ing the route the Kinf>'s orders dirc6l, and taking all 
 poflible methods of information upon the lupply to be 
 expected as we proceed,) that to depend upon the 
 country altogether would be to hazard the expediiion. 
 
 Your Ex^iellency will oblerve, that, in order to 
 fave the public expence as much as poflible, I have 
 reduced this requifuion much below what would be 
 adequate for the fervice, and I mean to trull to the 
 refources of the expedition for die rcll : 500 cures will 
 barely carry fourteen days provifions at a time, and 
 Major-General Phillips means to demand as f>-\v hor- 
 it's as poinblc, fubjedt to whatever future augmencd- 
 tions future fervices may require : the prelcnt number 
 
 X> 4 waiued 
 
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 Ivi APPENDIX. 
 
 wanted will be about 400 ; there will then remain un- 
 provided ior (tor expeditious movement) the tranl- 
 port of bateaux from Lake George to Hudfon*s Uiver, 
 and the carriage of the tents of the army, ai\d many 
 other contingencies that I need not trouble your Ex- 
 cellency to point out to you. 
 
 Extras of a Letter to General Harvey. 
 
 Montr eaU May 19, 1777. 
 YOU have permitted me, as iormcrly, to write to 
 you confidemially. I take the firft conveyance to re- 
 new a correfpondence fo pleafirig and honourable to 
 myfelf, and that may, in fome cafes, become benefi- 
 cial to the public lervice. Ic fliall never be employed 
 but to convey truths, to do juflice to fafls andperfons, 
 and to ftcure myfelf in the continuance of an elleem fo 
 valuable to me as yours, againfi: appearances and mif- 
 reprtfrntations. 
 
 I have reafon to be exceedingly fatislied with all that 
 has been done, and with moft things that are doing : 
 exertions have been made during the winter, which 
 was remarkably favourable, in all the departments, and 
 preparations are very forward ; thofe that have been 
 committed to the directions of General Phillips have 
 btren executed with a diligence, precifion, and fore* 
 fjght, that entitle him to the fuUelt praife. The troops 
 are in a (late of health almoll unprecedented, and their 
 fpirits and general improvement are equally objedls of 
 great pleafure and promife. To this agreeable repre- 
 fentation I have the happinefs to add, that Sir Guy 
 Carlecon has received mt', and the orders I broughr, in 
 a manner that, in my opinion, does infinite honour to 
 Jiis public and private chara;;tcr. 
 
 1 hat he fliould have wifiitJ for the lead in adive 
 and important military operations is very natural. 
 )'t)ut; ^c tliinks he \\^ f<^mc caufc of rercntmcnt for the 
 
 general 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ivli 
 
 in un- 
 tranl- 
 
 Uiver, 
 many 
 
 ur Ex- 
 
 >i777- 
 write to 
 
 e to re- 
 able to 
 benefi- 
 nployed 
 perfons, 
 tleem fo 
 ind mif- 
 
 i all that 
 doing : 
 , which 
 nts, and 
 ave been 
 ps have 
 d fore* 
 e troops 
 nd their 
 Ibjedts of 
 |le repre- 
 ir Guy 
 ughr, in 
 nour IQ 
 
 in aflive 
 natural. 
 
 It for the 
 gcncnl 
 
 gfncral tenor of treatment he has received from fome 
 ot the minifters is difcernible J but neither his difap- 
 pointmeni nor his perfonal feelings operate againft his 
 duty •, and I am convinced he means to forward the 
 King's meafures, entruftcd to my hands, with all 
 the zeal he could have employed had they relied in his 
 own. 
 
 My intention is, during my advance to Ticonde- 
 roga, and fiege of that poll, (for a fiege I apprehend it 
 mull be,) to give all pofiible jealoufy on the fide of Con- 
 nedicut. It I can, by manoeuvre, make them fufped: 
 that, after the redudion of Ticonderoga, my views are 
 pointed that way, it may make the Connecticut forces 
 very cautious of leaving their own frontiers, and much 
 facilitate my progrels to Albany. I mention this in- 
 tention only to Lord George and yourfelf, and I do it 
 lelt, from any intelligence of my motions that 
 may reach England indiredly, it (hould be fuppofed i 
 [''ive fufFcrcd myfelf to be diverted from the main ob- 
 lect of my orders. The King and his M.ijefty's minif- 
 Iters may rcil afllired, that, whatever dcmonftrations I 
 may endeavour to impofe upon the enemy, I (hall re- 
 ally make no movement that can procraftinate my pro- 
 jgrefs to Albany. 
 
 One thing more occurs. I had the furprife and mor- 
 jtification to find a paper handed about at Montreal, 
 jpublifhing the whole defign of the campaign, almofl: 
 h accurately as if it had been copied from the Secre- 
 Itary of State's letter. My own caution has been fuch, 
 pat not a man in my own family has been let into the 
 Iftcret. Sir Guy Carlecon's, I am confident, has been 
 jfqual ; I am therefore led to doubt whether mip.udence 
 mi not been committed from private letters irom Eng« 
 land, and willi you would aflc my friend D'Oyley, 
 jtowhom my very afFedlionate compliments, whether 
 
 be is any perfon within the line of minifterial com- 
 
 ''inication thathc canful^cdl co be fo unguarded? 
 
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 APPENDIX. 
 
 It Is not of great confequence here, except as fir as re- 
 gards St. Leger's expedition ; but fuch a trick may be 
 of moil prejudicial confequence in otlier cafes, and 
 ihould be guarded againft. 
 
 Mr 
 
 Exira^ of a Letter to General Harvey, 
 
 Camp on the River Bouquet, mar 
 Lake Champ lain, June 22, 1777, 
 
 I HAVE had to contend againft wet weather that 
 rendered the roads alrnoft impradicabie at the carry- 
 ing places, and confequently the paffage of the ba- 
 teaux, &c. exceedingly dilatory ; bcfides a great deal 
 of contrary wind. Indeed, the combination ot land 
 and water movement, bad roads, inadlivity, and fome. 
 times difobedience in the country, and a thoufand other 
 difficulties and accidents, unknown in other fervices, 
 difconcert all arrangements. I do not mention this 
 upon my own account, as I do not hold myfelf relpon- 
 fible for delays within the province of Canada ; but I 
 mention it to do juftice to others, who, I really think, 
 have infinite merit in overcoming the obftrudtions we 
 have met with, and who ought to be juftified againft I 
 fome acquaintances of yours and mine, who travel a- 
 crofs a map very faft, and are very free in their com-i 
 ments, when others, who have ten times their knowledge 
 and relburces, do not anfwer their predidlions and ex-i 
 pedtations. 
 
 I have been exceedingly dlftrefTdd in regard to thel 
 brigadiers of this army. Sir Guy Carleton, the day I| 
 took leave of him, put into my hands an extrad ol 
 letter from the Secretary of War, approving the ap 
 
 tnaq 
 
 pointment of thofe gentlemen, but obferving, 
 whenever any of them fhould lead their brio^ades guKJ. 
 the province of Canada, in order to join the troops link 
 General Howe, there would be a nectfTity for their comj 
 
 mand ceafina as brigadiers, &c. 
 
 ^Verl 
 
 '^ 
 
A P P E N p I X.. 
 
 "Were this to be put in execution, according to the 
 letter of the order anr* the geographical limits of Canada, 
 and fuppofing Major-General Phillips at the fame time 
 to be employed folely in the artillery, I fhould find 
 myfelf at the head of an army to undertake a Tiege, 
 and afterwards purfue objeds of importance, and 
 poflibiy of time, without a fingle intermediate Britifh 
 ofHcer between the lieutenant-general, commanding 
 'pro tempore in chief, and a lieutenant-colonel. Ic 
 would be prepofterous and impertinent in me to fay 
 one word more to you, as an officer, upon the impof- 
 fibility of methodifing or conducting fuch an army with 
 fuch a total deficiency of ftaff. Had Lord Barrington 
 condefcended to have communicated his intentions to 
 me in London, I think I could have convinced him of 
 the impropriety . As it is, I muft conclude that the 
 fpirit of the order goes only to prevent thofe gentle- 
 men bearing a higher rank and pay than fenior lieute- 
 nant-colonels ferving in the fame army *, and that there- 
 fore there can be no fault in keeping it dormant till the 
 junction takes place. In other words, I look upon 
 mine to be the Canada army till fuch time as I am in 
 communication with General Howe, fo as to make 
 part of his force, and confequently, without meafuring 
 degrees north and foudi, that the arrangements made 
 in Canada, and approved of by the King, remain in 
 force till that time. 
 
 I am pcrfuaded, my dear General, you will fupport 
 me in this liberty, if fuch it is to be called, not only as 
 the abfoiutc order and method of the fervice depends 
 upon it, but alfo to avoid to thefe gentlemen, who 
 have really great merit, the vexation and the ridicule 
 of being deprived of their rank and pay in the hour 
 of that very fervice, with a view to which their ap- 
 pointment was originally made. I think I can anfwer, 
 that, thejun^^ion made, and ihcreafons for reverting 
 
 t(i 
 
 ■i' 
 
 
■^^ 
 
 k, ' 
 
 A P P E N D I X; 
 
 to their forrmer ranks become obvious, they will Tub' 
 mir. to his Majcfty*s plcaiure without a murmur. 
 
 ■vi 
 
 
 Extract of a Lelier from Lieutenant -General Burgoync 
 
 to General Harvey. 
 
 Head-Quarters, Skenejborcugh, July 1 1, 1777. 
 
 THE mere compliment of ft-rvice I have given to 
 the foops in orders, and in tlie rt^'arion defigncd for 
 the Gazette, is not doing iheni fufficient juftice. It 
 3s a duty in me farther, through you, and I know I 
 ihall impose a pleafing rafk on you, to afTjre the Kir.g 
 that their behaviour is as uniformly good in the camp 
 as in aftion. 
 
 After what I have publicly mentioned of Frafer, I 
 am fure I nt^ed rot preis you in h:s f.;vour. I cannot 
 but feel confident in the hope th? t hs Majefty's grace 
 will find its way through all obftacles to prevent fo 
 difcouragif'.g a circumftdnce as the return of this gallant 
 oflicer to the mere duty of lieutennnt-colonel, at the 
 head ot one battalion, after having given acendancy to 
 the King's troops, and done honour to his profefTun, 
 by the molt fpirited aflions in critical periods of two 
 fuccefTive campaigns. 
 
 You will obferve. Sir, both in the puSlIc letter and 
 in the order of baitle, which caprain Gardner will put 
 into your hands, that Mijor General Philips is occafi- 
 onally employed feparately from ihe ftrift line of his 
 departmenr. This does not proceed from inattention 
 to the explanation of his M-jefly's pleafure two years 
 ago, but from abl^>lute neccflity. The ftaff beingcom- 
 pokd without any Britifh major-general. Brigadier Fra- 
 fer being polled where he is of infinite ufe, at the head 
 of the advanced corp<;, the fer vice would fuller in the 
 mofl" material degree if the talents of General Phillips 
 were not fuffcred to extend beyond the limits of the ar- 
 tillery, 
 
 ';.. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 b 
 
 i 
 
 tillery» and I hold myfelf fully juftified in continuing 
 the great ule of his afUftanct under this extenfion, by 
 what I underftand lo be the fignificaiicn of the King's 
 ple?^ure to Sir Guy Ciifieton, viz. That this meajure 
 muji not lemade afrecedent^ but not foi bidding it du- 
 ring the preltnc t-xi^cncy. 
 
 1 flatter myit If the King will be fatisfied with the di- 
 li.'cnce uled in taking the fie d, as well as with the 
 fublequent operati; ns ; if not, my difa^^poinrmcnt can 
 only proceed ftom my own deficiency m dating the 
 embarrafllnents I found, notwithftanding previous 
 preparations and cordial affiltances. Remote fitu- 
 ations of the troop*, currents, winds, roads, want of 
 materials for caulking the vcflcls, inadtivity and dcfer- 
 tion of the Canadian corvees, were all againft me. A 
 grejt difficuhy lay in providing horles and carriages for 
 the bare ttanlport ot provifions and tents, when we 
 ihould arrive at Fort George, or any other place where 
 the ai my (liould have no refource of water-carriage. I 
 found an adtive, and I think a reafonable, contraftor, 
 who lupplied this ncceffity at a much cheaper rate than 
 could have been done any other way. I inclofe a copy 
 of the contrad: to the treafury, to which I refer you. 
 You will oblerve that I have limited the number to the 
 mere indilpenfible purpofes of provifions and tents, 
 trufting to the country for the farther afiiftance of offi- 
 cers baggage and the other attirail of an army. Ex- 
 perience already fhews me that I judged right in not 
 trufting to the country for more •, for, had this pre- 
 caution been omitted, I fliould be bound faft to the 
 fpot where I am, or obliged to return by water to Ti- 
 conderoga. 
 
 1 avow alfo to you my advice to General Carleton to 
 grant commiflions to two provincial battalions, tc be 
 ra ftd from Albany and Charlotte County, by a Mr. 
 Jcfliup and a Mr. Peters, upon condition that thecom- 
 niifi;ons fhould not take place till two-thirds of the 
 
 corps 
 
 
 .V. ■ 
 
i ■ 
 
 -v' 
 
 M^ 
 
 ^y^ 
 
 -; ;:i 
 
 ■ ■■•?• 
 
 ..■■■■;■'•;•«•■ 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 corps fhould be effedlive ; provincial corps, a6llng zea- 
 loufly in the King's caufe, muft have great impreflion 
 upon public opinion, and will, befides, in fad, be of 
 fingular ufe to the safe and prefervation of the regular 
 troops. 
 
 Upon this principle, therefore, I have not hefitated 
 farther to receive and to pay fuch loyalifts as have corr.s 
 in with their armsfmce the fuccefs of Ticonderoga, and 
 wifh to be employed. Though I have not power to 
 grant commiflions, I poft the officers, and form them 
 into companies till the meaiure can be decided by thofe 
 who have more authority. 
 
 I hope all thefe articles of expence will meet with 
 the fupport of your opinion *, and have only to add, 
 that as no job fliall be done by myfelf, fo will I ufe all 
 efforts to prevent fuch being done by others. 
 
 I am indifpenfably obliged to wait fome time on this 
 pofition, to clear roads and make bridges, which is 
 great labour in this country, and to bring up a ftock 
 ofprovifion, and alfo to give time to the gun -boats, 
 bateaux, and provifion-velfcis, to be put into Lake 
 George, to fcour that lake and fecure the future route 
 of the magazines. I propofe to pcfTefs Fort Edward 
 at the fame time that the force is ready to move, down 
 the lake ; by which means, if the enemy do not eva- 
 cuate Fort George, the garrifon muft inevitably be 
 caught. In the mean while I have ordered Reidefcl to 
 make roads, reconnoitre the country, and make all 
 other poiTible feints of a march to the Connedlicut, and, 
 by fome other meafures, 1 hope to give alarms that 
 ■way, , . , 
 
 p 
 
 t /I* >■ 
 
 r -a; 
 
 Instruc- 
 
 
(r 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixlii 
 
 Amendments made by Gene* 
 Is-STRUCTIONS for LIcutc- "' ^"'■Soync. 
 
 nant-Colonel Baume, on a 
 fccret expedition to the CoK" 
 }ieciicut River, 
 
 [The erafures were made h'f Gs" 
 neral Burgoyne,*'] 
 
 THE obje6l of your expe- 
 dition is to try the affedions 
 of the country, to difconcert 
 the councils of the enemy, to 
 mount the Reidefel's dra- 
 goons, to complete Peters's 
 corps, and to obtain Jarge 
 I fupplies of cattle, horfes, and 
 carriages. 
 
 The feveral corps, of whicli 
 the inclofed is a Jift, are to be 
 ! under your command. 
 
 The troops muft take no 
 tents, and what little baggage 
 is carried by officers muft be 
 on their own bat horfes. 
 I You are to proceed by the 
 route from Batten Kill to Ar- 
 lington, and take poft there, 
 jo as to fecure the pafs from 
 I Manchejier. You are to remain 
 at Arlington till the detach- 
 ment of the Provincials, un- 
 der the command of Captain 
 
 Sherwood, fhall join you from , 
 
 the fouthward. 
 
 You are then to proceed to 
 Manchefter, where you will 
 take poft fo as to fecure the 
 pafs of the mountains on the 
 road from Manchefter to 
 
 Rockingham; 
 
 «i 
 
 ■ f > 
 
 -\ : 'it 
 
 
 'I' I " '' 
 
 « / 
 
Ixlv 
 
 APPENDIX- 
 
 '•. 
 
 ^^ • 
 
 
 •i 
 
 
 ' '■ '$ 
 
 -;:;,■ 
 
 '':i 
 
 
 ■ |i^ 
 
 v„ 
 
 •• -M 
 
 ;.:•; 
 
 11 
 
 ■^^ 
 
 jjk'i .■ ' 
 
 Rockingham j hence you will 
 detach the Indians and light 
 troops to the northward, to- 
 ward Otter Creek. On their 
 return, and alfo receiving in- 
 telligence that no enemy is in 
 force in the neighbourhood of 
 Rockingham y{i') you will pro- 
 ceed by the road over the 
 mountains to Rockingham, 
 where vou will take poft. 
 This will be the moftdiftaut 
 part on the expedition. (2) 
 
 You are to remain there as 
 long asneceffary to fulfil the in- 
 tention of the expedition from 
 thence^ (3) and you are after- 
 wards to defcend by the Coti" 
 neSiicut River to Brattlebury, 
 and from that place, by the 
 quickeft march, you are to 
 return by the great road to 
 Albany. 
 
 During your whole pro- 
 grefs, your detachments are 
 to have orders to bring in to 
 you all horfesfit to mount the 
 dragoons under your com- 
 mand, or to ferve as bat hor- 
 fes to the troops, they are like' 
 wife to bring in (4) faddles and 
 bridles as can be found. (5) 
 
 Your parties are likewife to 
 brin?5 in waggons and other 
 convenient carriages, with as 
 many draft oxen as will be 
 necefTary to draw them, and 
 all cattle fit for flaughter, 
 (milch cows excepted,) which 
 are to be left for the ufe of 
 the inhabitants. Regular re- 
 
 Amendments made by Ccr?. 
 ral Bur-T;oyne. 
 
 ( I ) upon the Conne^icut Ri. 
 very 
 
 (2) And mujl he proceeded 
 upon with caution y as you will 
 have the defile of the mountains 
 behind yoUf which might ?nake a 
 retreat difficult ; you mu/l there- 
 fore endeavour to be zvell inform- 
 
 id of the free of the ene?nys mi' 
 litia in the neighbouring country. 
 Should you find it may v/iib 
 prudence be ejfeifed. 
 
 (3) while the Indians anil 
 light troops are detached up the 
 river* 
 
 (4) together with as many 
 
 (5) '^he number ofhorfesre- 
 quiftte^ befides thofe neceffaryfor 
 mounting the regiment of dra- 
 goons^ ought to be J 300. lf\ 
 you can bring more for the ufe of 
 the armyy it ivill oefo much tkt 
 better* 
 
 ceipts, 
 
m^. '^-^ 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 jcflpts, in the form hereto fub- 
 jioined, are to be given, in all 
 llaces where any of the above- 
 jmciitioncd articles are taken, 
 lofuch perfons as have re- 
 luained in their habitations, 
 M otherwife complied with 
 Ije terms of General Bur- 
 Ijoyne's manifcftoj butnorc- 
 Jtjp's to be given to fuch 33 
 Ire known to be at^ling in the 
 l.'vice of the rebels. ^6) 
 
 Amendments made by Gene- 
 ral Burgoyne. 
 
 ) 
 
 '1 VW> 
 
 (6) Js you will ha-je %uhh 
 you perfons perfectly acquainted 
 %mth the abilities of the country^ 
 It may perhaps be advifeablc to 
 tax thefeveral dijlri^s with the 
 portions of the feveral articles, 
 and limit the hours for their de- 
 . livery ; and^ Jhould you find it 
 neccfjary to move before fuch de- 
 livery can he made^ hojlagcs of 
 the mofl refpeiiablt people Jhould 
 he taken^ to fecure their follow 
 hig you the enfning day. M 
 poffibk means a) e to be ufed ta 
 prevent plundering. 
 
 j9s it is probable that Captain 
 Sherwood^ ivho is already de~ 
 tachedto the fouihward and will 
 join you at Arlington, will drive 
 in a conftderahle quantity of cattle 
 andhorfestoyou^ you will there'^ 
 fore fend in this cattle to ihear- 
 »iy, with a proper detachment 
 from Peters' s corps to cover them, 
 in order to difencumber yourfelf i 
 butyoumuji always keep the re- 
 giments of dragoons compaSl, 
 
 The dragoons themfehes rhitjl 
 ridc^ and take care of the horfes 
 of the regiment, Thofe horfes 
 
 which 
 
 (, 
 
 \\i 
 
 ! 
 
 ^ 1 
 
 « 5 
 
 i: ■*•?'■ $ 
 
 i'^;'!; 
 
IxvJ 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ,} 
 
 ■'.A 
 
 You will ufe all poflible 
 mrans to make the country 
 believe that the troops under 
 
 Amendments made hyGenf-l 
 ral Burgoyne. 
 
 tuhich are dejiined for the uft , 
 tht army mufl he tied togtthir t, 
 Jirings often eaeh^ in order thai 
 one man may lead ten horfti. Y^l 
 will give the unarmed mm 2 
 Peters's corps to conduSl thtmi 
 end inhabit anti whom you {«k 
 truJI* You mujl always taki 
 your camps in good pofition ; bu 
 atthejame time where there il 
 pajlure \ and you muji have \ 
 chain ofcentineh round your (uN 
 tie andhorfes whtn grazing. 
 
 Colonel Skeene will be uv'fij 
 
 ycu as much as pofjiblcy in ordt\ 
 
 to aj/i/i you with his advice, ti 
 
 help you to dijlinguifl) the go. 
 
 f'lbjeclsfrom t'j body to proturX 
 
 you the bejl intelligence of m 
 
 enemy ^ and to choofe thofe fe'.m 
 
 who are to bring me the account 
 
 efyour progrefs andfuccefs, I 
 
 When you find it necejfary i\ 
 
 halt for a day or two, youmul 
 
 always entrench the camp ofdi 
 
 regiment of dragoons^ tn ordt\ 
 
 never to rifk an attack or affnn 
 
 from the enemy. 
 
 As you will return withth 
 regiment of dragoons mountii 
 you mufl always have a deiocb 
 ment of Captain Fiafer's or Pt\ 
 ters's corps in front of the columii 
 and the fame in the rear, in wX 
 der to prevent your falling inl 
 an ambufcade when you mm 
 through the woods. 
 
 yoa 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 IxvU 
 
 vour command are the advan- 
 ced corps of the army, and 
 that it is intended to pafs the 
 Connedticut on the road to 
 Bofton. You will likewife 
 yve it inftnuatedj (7) that the 
 Lain army from Albany is to 
 tie joined at Springfield by a 
 corps of troops from Rhode- 
 lllland. 
 
 You will fend ojj* occafionally 
 
 \<.iV.U or tarriagesy to prevent 
 
 king too much incumbered ) and 
 
 viillgive me as frequent intelli- 
 
 me of your fituation as pojfible. 
 
 It is highly probable that 
 I the corps under Mr. Warner, 
 now fuppofed to be at Man- 
 chefter, will retreat before 
 you i but, (hould they, con> 
 trary to expedation, be able 
 tocolledl in great force, and 
 poft themfelves advantageouf- 
 y, it is left to your difcreticn 
 I to attack them or not ; always 
 bearing in mind, that your 
 corps is too valuable to let 
 any confiderable lofs be ha- 
 Izarded on this occafion. 
 
 Should any corps be moved 
 [from Mr. Arnold's main ar- 
 |my, in order to intercept 
 your retreat, you are to take 
 as ftrong a poft as the country 
 will afford, and fend the 
 quickeft intelligence tome; 
 and you may depend on my 
 rnalcing fuch a movement as 
 Ihail put the enemy between 
 two fires, or o):herwife effec- 
 tually fuftain you. 
 
 It is imagined the progrefs 
 of the whole of this expcdi' 
 
 Amendments made by Gene- 
 ral BurgoynCf 
 
 (7) InftnuetSt 
 
 r 
 f 
 
 > ? 
 
 E% 
 
 tioa 
 
 
 ix: 
 
Ixviil 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 tion may be cfFctSied in about 
 a fortnight} but every move- 
 ment of it inuft depend upon 
 your fucccfs in obtaining (ucK 
 fupply of provifions as will 
 enable you to fubfiU till your 
 return to the army, in cafe 
 you can get no more. (8) 
 
 All perfons adiing in com- 
 mittees, or any officers acting 
 under the dire«S\ions of Con- 
 grefs, either civil or military, 
 are to be made prifoncrs. 
 
 Amendments made by Gene- 
 ral Burgoyne* 
 
 ( 8 ) And, fl:ould not the arii.j 
 b4 abli to reach Albany lejorc 
 your expedition Jhoidd be comph- 
 tedt J wilt find meam to fout y/i 
 notice of itf and give your rente 
 another dire^lion. 
 
 Sir, Bcitten-KilU iitb /In^i^JI, ly-jj. 
 
 I HAD the honour of acquainting your Excellency, 
 by a man lent yefterday evenii^g by Colonel Skecne to 
 head-quarters, of the feveral corps under my command 
 being encamped at Saratoga, as well as of my inten- 
 tion to proceed the next morning at five o'clock •, the 
 corps moved at that time, and marched a mile, when 
 I received a letter from Briga lier General Frafcr, figni- 
 fying your Excellency's order to polt the corps advan- 
 tageoufly on Batten-Kill, till I fhould receive frelh in- 
 ftrudlions from your Excellency : the corps is now en- 
 camped at that place, and wait your Excellency's or- 
 ders. I will not trouble you, Sir, with the various re- 
 ports which Ipread, as they fecm rather to be founded 
 on the difterent intereils and feelings of the people who 
 occafion them. 
 
 I have the honour to be, mofl refpcflfully. 
 Your Excellency's moft obedient 
 And humble fervant, 
 
 F. Baume. 
 The reinforcement of fifty chafieurs, 
 which your Excellency was pleafcd 
 to order, joined me lad night ac 
 eleven o'clock. 
 
 General Bur gey ne. ^' " *•' 
 
I 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixix 
 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Camhrid^e^ i^th ^ngtijl^ 1777. 
 
 IN confequrncp of your Excellency's orders I mov<'d 
 this morning, at tour o'cloc!^, with the corps uncu-r 
 my command •, an.l, afr^r a march <»t lixteen iniles, 
 arrived at Cambridge ar four m the cven'nti, O'l tne 
 road I rcci'iv?d intelliij;cnce oi forty or fifty of the re- 
 btls being left to guard lomc cattle. 1 immediately 
 ordered thirty of the provincials and fifty favage« to 
 quicken their march, in hopes to furprile them. Tncy 
 took five piifoners in arms, who declared fhenifelves 
 t) be in the fervice ot the Congrels •, yet the ene.iiy re- 
 leiveii advice of our approach, and abandoned tiie 
 hole they were polled in. The provincials and fava- 
 ges continued their march about a mile, when th'v.y 
 iell in with a party of fifteen men, who fired upon our 
 people, and immediately took to the woods with the 
 greaielt precipitarion. The fire was quick on our lide, 
 b^it I cannot learn if the enemy fuftained any lof's. A 
 private of Captain Sherwo:):i's company wis tiie only 
 oae who was (lightly wounded in the thigh. From t!»e 
 many people who came rr.-m ii.nim tn, they 'i(i,r.'e 
 that the numbcir of the enemy amounted to 1 3oo. I 
 will be particularly careful, on my approach at t!i ic 
 place, to be fully informed of their ftrength and ficu- 
 ation, and take rhe precautions nccellary to tuLil bjch 
 the orders and inllrudlions of your fcLxc:e!!ency. 
 
 I cannot alcertain the number of ca'-tle, cai ^s, and 
 waggons, taken here, as they have not bren as yt^c 
 colledted. A few horfes have been alfo brought ia, 
 but am forry to acquaint your Ex^encrncy that the fi- 
 vages either dellroy or drive away "vhac is not pai I tor 
 with ready money. If your fc^xcellency woiild dlow 
 me to purchafc the horfes from the favages, ftipu!aring 
 the price, 1 think they might be procured cheap, other- 
 wile they ruin all ti.ey meet with, their officers a/>d 
 interpreters not having it in their power to conf kI 
 
 E 3 thcii. 
 
 
 
 
 ' -«»// 
 
■r 
 
 '■1. 
 
 f. 
 
 • ^ 
 
 Ixx APPENDIX. 
 
 them. Your Excellency may depend on hearing how 
 I proceed at Bennington, and of my fuccels there : 
 praying my refpe^ful compliments to General Rd- 
 defd, 
 
 I am, moft refpedfully, Sir, 
 
 Your moft obedient and humble fervant, 
 
 F. Baume. 
 
 P. S. The names of the men taken in arms are as 
 follow: 
 
 George Duncan, John Bell, 
 David Slarrow, Matt. Bell. 
 
 Samuel Bell, 
 Hugh More, a noted rebel, furrcndered himfelf yef- 1 
 terdaj' evening. 
 
 The exprefs left Cambridge at four o'clock, on thc| 
 morning of the 14th ot Auguft. 
 
 Sir, 
 
 Sancoick, i^tb Auguft ^ 1777, goXMA 
 
 I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency, 
 thai I arrived here at eight in the morning, having had 
 intelligence of a party of the enemy being in poffcffion 
 of a mill, which they abandoned at our approach \ bur, 
 in their ufual way, fired from the bulhes, and took 
 their road to Bennington ; a favagc was (lightly wound- 
 ed i they broke down '.lie bridge, which has retarded 
 our march above an hour ; they left in the mill abouc] 
 78 barrels of very fine flour, 1000 bufhels of wheaj 
 20 barrels of fait, and about loool. worth of pearl andl 
 pot a(h. I liave ordered thirty provincials and an ofl 
 ficer to guard the provifion and the pafs of the bridge.! 
 By five prifuners taken here, they agree that 1500 tol 
 1 Soo men are at Bennington *, but are fuppofed to leave 
 it on our approach. I will proceed fo far to-day as ta 
 fall on the enemy to-n>orrow early, and make fuch difj 
 
 pofitioir 
 
 ■ '»■■,'■ 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixxi 
 
 pofitlon as I think necrflary from the inretligencf ( may 
 receive. People are flunking in hourly, but want to 
 be armed : the favages cannot be controuied, they 
 ruin and take every thing they pleaie. 
 
 I am your Excellency's 
 
 Moft obedient humble fervant. 
 
 Beg your Excellency to pardon the 
 hurry ot this letter, ir is written on 
 the head of a barrel. 
 
 General Bur^oyne, 
 
 F. Baume. 
 
 f. 
 
 I 
 
 InJiruHions to CQlonei Skeene, upon the ettpedition to Ben" 
 
 mngton* 
 
 Sir, 
 
 I REQUEST the favour of you to proqced with 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Baume, upon an expedition of 
 which he has the command, and which will march 
 this evening or to morrow morning. 
 
 The objeds of his orders are to try the affedlions of 
 the country j to dil'concert the councils of the enemy 5 
 to mount the regiment of Rt^idefel's d agoons*, to com- 
 plete Lieutenant- Colonel Feters's corps 1 and to pro- 
 cure a large fupply of horfes for the ule of the troops, 
 together with cattle and carriages. 
 
 The route marked for this expedition is to Arling* 
 ton and Manchefter ; and, in cale it fhould be found 
 that the enemy is not in too great force upon the Con* 
 ne6ticut-river, it is intended to pals the mountains to 
 Rockingham, and defcend the river from thence to 
 Brattlebury. Some hours before the corps marches for 
 Arlington, Colonel Peters, with all his men, are to 
 fet forward for Bennington, and afterwatds are to join 
 at Arlington. 
 
 
 % \ 
 
 
 
 ■j. J 
 
 E 4 
 
 Receipts 
 
Ixxii 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 
 ■- I 
 
 . • .,1 
 
 ''1 ••'■.# 
 
 I 
 
 
 ■■■i 
 
 ■^. 
 
 Receipts are ordered to be given for all horfes and 
 cattle taken from the country. 
 
 Lieutenant-Coionel Baumc is direfted to conmunl-i 
 cate to you the reft of his inftrudlions, and loconfuic 
 with you upon all majtcrs of intelligence, negotiation 
 with the inhabitants, roada, and other means depend. 
 ing upon a knowledge of the country, for carrying hisl 
 inftrudlons into execution. 
 
 I rely upon your zeal and a6livii^ for the fulled af.| 
 fiftancc, particularly in having it iinderdood in all the 
 country through which you pafs, that the corps of I 
 Lieutenant-Colonel Baume is the firft detachment of the| 
 advanced guard, and that the whole army is pro. 
 ceeding to Bofton, expefting to be joined upon the| 
 route by the army from Rhodc-Ifland. 
 
 I need not reccommend to you to continue there-| 
 
 quifitesof the fervice with every principle of laimaritj 
 
 in the mode of obtaining them •, and it may be proper 
 
 . to inform the country, that the means to prevent their 
 
 : horfes being taken for the future, will be to refill the 
 
 . enemy when they fhall prefume to force them, anrij 
 
 drive them voluntarily to my camp. 
 
 r ...'.>., J j^^yg jj^^ honour to be, &c. &c. &c. 
 
 -■•:.; r ;••-•;,... .. •■'{■'■ -.^ ■ U , J. BuRGOYNeJ 
 
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Ixxiv 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 '1 
 
 ■.4'. 
 
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 .,y. ■; '■ "■'.'■Mr 
 
 
 -'#: 
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 :: -i*': 
 
 Extras^ of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoync 
 to Sir Guy Carlcion, dated Head-Barters^ ^t 
 Skencjborough Houfe^ iitbjuly, ^777' 
 
 I REQUEST your Excellency to take intoconfi- 
 dcration the expediency of fupplying, from Canada, 
 a garrilbn ,for Ticondcroga. 
 
 My communication will widen fo much as ! pro- 
 ceed, the drain upQn the army for poils will be fo 
 confiderabie, not to fpeak of detacbraents and fafe- 
 guards to proced and to awe the country, that, if that 
 firft diminution be not replaced, my effective ftrength 
 may become inadequate to the ferviccs intended. 
 My prefent intelligence is, that Putnam is colledling 
 an army to oppofe roe at Saratoga. Fort Edward is 
 alfo talked of to fuftain a fiegc. 
 
 Your Excellency will, I am fure, agree with me, 
 that Ticonderpga, or fome other fortified poll on the 
 fouth part ofH^ake Champlain, ought to be con^der- 
 ed on the frontiers of the province of Canada. I am 
 aware of the difficulties that arife from the manner in 
 which the Secretary o{ State's orders are penned : but 
 I fubmit to your Excellency, whether, under the 
 principle laid down in the beginning of the order, 
 and afterwards repeated, that 3000 men were held: fnf- 
 Jicient for the deface of th^t province, you would not 
 be juftified in fparing, for the purpofe of this garri- 
 fun, the overplus of the 3000 that may remain ^f(;er 
 completing my army. 
 
 And, notwichilanding the corps for the Canada (ts- 
 vice arc precifely named by the Secretary of State, I 
 would farther fubmit whether, upon my prefling re- 
 quifition, the garrifon might not juftifiably be fur- 
 nifhed by detachment, even though there were no 
 overplus, under the following words of the order : 
 after having fecured to him (Lieuienanc General Bur- 
 
 goyne) 
 
 ■-> 
 
 
 1I -■. 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 goyne) every afftftance which it is in your power to afford 
 ana procure. Your Fxccllency's zeal for the fervice 
 and favour towards me will be betcer interpreters for 
 the latitude I propole than any thing 1 can fartnep 
 fuggcft. My prefent purpofc. Sir, is to get a fuffi- 
 cient number of gun-boats upon the Lake George to 
 fcour that lake as expeditioufly as pofllble, to fupport 
 them with a proper force to attack Fort George on 
 that fide, while, with the main of the army, as foon 
 as refrefhed and fupplied, I attack Fort Edward from 
 hence, and thereby cut off the communication from 
 Albany to Fort George, and consequently prevent the 
 fuccour or retreat of that garrilbn. 
 
 Extra^ of a Letter from Lieutenant General Burgoyne to 
 Sir Guy Carleton. Head- Quarters, near Fort Anne^ 
 Julyi^tb^ 1777. 
 
 THEconftrudlion your Excellency putsupon the or- 
 ders of the Secretary of State is too full and decifive for 
 me to prefume to trouble you farther upon the fubjecl 
 of agarrifon for Ticonderoga from Canada. I mult do 
 as well as I ^an ; but I am fure your Excellency, as a 
 foldier, will think my fituation a little difficult. A 
 breach into my communication mud either ruin my 
 army entirely, or oblige me to return in force to re- 
 ftore, which might be the lofs of the campaign. To 
 prevent a breach, Ticonderoga and F'ort George 
 mud be in very refpeclable (trength, and I muft be- 
 fides have pofts at Fort Edward and other carrying- 
 places. Thefe drain', added to common accidents 
 and lofles of fervice, will neceflarily render me very 
 inferior in point of numbers co the enemy, whom I 
 muft expe6l always to find ftrongly polled. I afk 
 pardon for dwelling <b much upon this fubjed, and 
 have only to add niy recjucft to your Excellency, to 
 
 forward 
 
 Ixxv 
 
 t! 
 
 
 
 \ J 
 
 LI 
 
Ixxvi 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 forward the additional companies as expeditioufly as 
 may be. 
 
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 Co/Jy of Lietitmant General 'BurgoYnt*s Letter to Colonel 
 «..•'. Baume* 'i-*^^* j.; .. 
 
 Near Saratoga, Jugujl 14., 1777. Seven at nigkt, 
 
 SIR, 
 THE accounts you have fent me arc very fatisfac- 
 tory, and I have no doubt of every part of yaut pro- 
 ceeding continuing to be the fame. • 
 
 I beg the favour of you to report, whether the road 
 you have pafied is pradicable ; and, if fo, if it is con- 
 venient for a confidcrable corps with cannon. 
 
 / Should you find the enemy too ftrongly poftcd at 
 Bennington, and maintaining fuch a countenance as may 
 make an attack imprudent, I wifti you to take a poll 
 where you can maintain yourfelf till you receive an 
 anfwer from me •, and I will cither fupport you in 
 
 • force or withdraw you. 
 
 : - You will pleafe to fend off to my camp, as foon as 
 
 I you can, waggons and draft cattle, and likewil'e fuch 
 other cattle as arc not necelTiry { jr your fubfiftence. 
 
 . Let the waggons and carts brmg off all the Oour 
 and wheat they can, that you do not retain for the 
 fame purpofe. This tranlporc mult be under the 
 charge of a commiff on officer, 'w :r.\f.- 
 
 I will write you at full tomorrow in regard to get- 
 ting the horfcs out of the hands of the favages. 
 
 In the mean time, any you ran colledt from them, 
 fit to mount the regiments, at a low price, fhall be 
 allowed. 
 
 I am, with great efteem. Sir, 
 
 Your mod obedient humble fervant, 
 
 J. BURGOYNE. 
 
 /.'■ ". Colonel 
 
 iV .■ '^ 
 
A P P E N D I X. 
 
 Ixxvii 
 
 Colonel St. Leger*j Account of Occurrences at Fort Stan- No.XIIl. 
 
 wix. 
 
 A MINUTE detail of every operation fince my 
 leaving La Chine, wich the detachment cntrufted to 
 my care, your Excellency will permit me to referve to 
 a time of lefs huTy and mortification than the prefent, 
 while I enter into the intercfting fccne before Fort 
 Stanwix, which I inverted the 3dofAuguft, having 
 previoufly puflied forward Lieutenant Bird, of the 
 King's regiment, with thirty of the King's troops, and 
 two hundred Indians, under the direftioii of Captains 
 Hare and Wilfon and the chiefs Jofeph and Bull, to 
 ieize faft hold of the lower landing-place, and thereby 
 cut off the enemy's communication with the lower 
 country. — This was done with great addrefs by the 
 lieutenant, though not attended with the cffed I had 
 promifed myfeU, occafioned by the flacknefs of the 
 the Meflafagoes: the brigade of provifion and ammu- 
 nition boats 1 had intelligence of being arrived and dif- 
 embarked before this party had taken port:. 
 
 The fourth and fifth were employed in making ar- 
 rangements for opening Wood Creek, (which the ene- 
 my, with the indefatigable labour of one hundred and 
 fifty men for fourteen days, had moft effcdlually 
 choked up,) ?nd the making a temporary road from 
 Pine Ridges upon Filh Creek, fixteen miles from the 
 fort, for a prefent fupply of provifions and the tranf- 
 port of our artillery. The firft was effe(^cd by the 
 diligence and zeal of Captain Bouvillc, alTifted by 
 Captain Herkimer of the Indian department, with one 
 hundred and ten men, in nine days; while Lieute- 
 nant Lundy, atfling as affiftant quarter-mafter general, 
 had rendered the road, in the worft of weather, fuffi- 
 cienrly pradicable to pafs the whole artillery and 
 ftores, with leven days provifion, in two days. 
 
 On 
 
 4 ! 
 
 
 
 *■■!' 
 
 % 4. 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 'A 
 
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 'l^ii 
 
 
 4 
 
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 ^1'': 
 
 
 
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 M^iM 
 
 
 On the 5th, in the eveningt intelligence arrived, 
 by my difcovcring-parties on the Mohawk River, that 
 a reinforcement of eight hundred militia, condu6led 
 by General Herkimer, were on their march to relieve 
 the garrifon, and were adtually at that indant at Orif. 
 ka, an Indian fettlement twelve miles from the fort. 
 The garrifon being apprifed of their march by four 
 men, who were feen to enter the fort in the morning 
 through what was thought an impenetrable fwamp, I 
 did not think it prudent to wait for them, and there- 
 by fubjeft myfelf to be attacked by a faily from the 
 garrifon in the rear, while the reinforcement employ- 
 ed me in front. I therefore determined to attack them 
 on the march, either openly or covertly, as circum- 
 ilances fhould offer. At this time I had not two hun- 
 dred and fifty of the King's troops in camp, the va- 
 rious and extenfive operations I was under an abfolute 
 necefTity of entering into having employed the reft, and 
 therefore could not fend above eighty white men, ran- 
 gers and troops included, with the whole corps of Indi- 
 ans. Sir John johnfon put himfelf at the head of this 
 party, and began his march that evening at five o'clock, 
 and met the rebel corps at the fame hour the next 
 morning. The impetuofity of the Indians is not to be 
 defcribed on the fight of the enemy (forgetting the 
 judicious difpofition formed by Sir John, and agreed 
 to by themfelves, which was, to fuffer the attack to 
 begin with the troops in front, while they fhould be 
 on both flanks and rear) : they rulhcd in, hatchet in 
 hand, and thereby gave the enemy's rear an opportu- 
 nity to efcape. In relation to the vidory, it was 
 equally complete as if the whole had fallen j nay more 
 fo, as the two hundred who efcaped only ferved to 
 fpread the panic wider. But it was not fo with the 
 Indians : their lofs was great (I mufl be underftood 
 Indian computation •, being only about thirty killed, 
 and the like number wounded, and in that number 
 
 fome 
 
: arrived, 
 iver, that 
 :ondu6led 
 to relieve 
 It atOrif. 
 n the fort, 
 h by four 
 I morning 
 fwamp, I 
 md there- 
 from the 
 t employ- 
 crack them 
 
 an abfolute 
 he reft, and 
 : men, ran- 
 |rps of Indi- 
 iead of this 
 ve o'clock, 
 r the next 
 s not to be 
 [getting the 
 |and agreed 
 e attack to 
 (hould be 
 hatchet in 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 fome of their favourite chiefs and confidential warriors 
 were flain). On the cnemy'y fide, almoft all their 
 principal leaders were flain. General He. kimer has 
 fincc died of his wounds. Ic is proper to mention, 
 that the four men, detached with intelligence of the 
 march of the reinforcement, fct out the evening be- 
 fore the adlion, and confequentiy the enemy could 
 have no account of thfe defeat, and were in poffelfion 
 only of the time appointed for their arrival ; at which, 
 as I fufpedted, they made a fally, with two hundred 
 and fifty men, towards Lieutenant Bird's pofV, to fa- 
 cilitate the entrance of the relievii ,; corps, or bring on 
 a general engagement with every advantage they 
 could wi(h. 
 
 Captain Hoyes was immediately detached to cut in 
 upon their rear, while they engaged the lieutenant. 
 Immediately upon the departure of Captain Hoyes, 
 having learned that Lieutenant Bird, milled by the in- 
 formation of a cowardly Indian that Sir John was 
 preffcd, had quitted his poll to march to his afliftance, 
 1 marched the detachment of the King's regiment in 
 fupport of Captain Hoyes, by a road in fight of the 
 I garrifon, which, wirh executive fire from his party, 
 immediately drove the enemy into the fort, without any 
 farther advantage than frightening fome fquaws, and 
 pilfering the packs of the warriors which rhey left be- 
 hind them. After this affair was over, orders were 
 immediately given to complete a two-gun battery, 
 and mortar- beds, with three llrong redoubts in the 
 rear, to enable me, in cafe of another attempt to re- 
 lieve the garrifon by their regimented troops, to 
 march out a larger body of the King's troops. 
 
 Captain Lernoult was fent with i lo men to the low- 
 er landing place, where he cfVablilbed himfelf with 
 greatjudgemcntand ftrength, having an enclofcd bat- 
 tery of a three-pounder oppofed to any fally from the 
 fort, and another to the fide of the country where a 
 
 relief 
 
 Ixxix 
 
 !i, 
 
 H. 
 
 n 
 
 Jli^ 'i 
 
 !■»•• 
 
 4-h 
 
ixxx 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 . I-.' 
 
 if 
 
 'J 
 
 relief mud approach j and the body of his camp deep- 
 ly intrenched and abbatifed. 
 
 When, by the unabating kbour of olHcers and 
 men, (the i'mallnefs of our niimhers never admitting 
 of a relief, or above three hours ccflTation for fleep or 
 cooking,) the batteries and redoubts were finimed, 
 and new cheeks and axle- trees made for the fix- 
 pounders, thofe that were feni being reported rotten 
 and unferviceable. 
 
 It was found that our cannon had not the leaft ef- 
 itCt upon the fod-work of the fort, and that our roy- 
 als had only the power of teazing, as a fix-inch plank 
 was a fufiicient fecurity for their powder-magazine, as 
 we learnt from the deferters. At this time. Lieute- 
 nant Glcnie of the artillery, whom I had appointed to 
 afl as afTiftant-enginecr, propofed a converfion of the 
 loyals (if I may ufe the expreffion) into howitzers. 
 The ingenuity and feafibility of this meafure ftriking 
 me very ftrongly, the bufinefs was fet about immedi- 
 ately, and foon executed ; when it was found that no- 
 thing prevented their operating with the defined efFeft 
 bu: the diftance, their chambers being too fma!! to 
 hold a fufficiency of powder. There was nothing 
 now to be done but to approach the town by fap, to 
 fuch a diftance that the rampart might be brought 
 within their pcrtice, at the fame time all materials 
 were preparing to run a mine under their moft form!- 
 dzblt baftion. 
 
 In the midft: of thefe operatior s, intelligence was 
 brought in, by our Icouts, of a fecond corps of looo 
 men being on their maich. The fame zeal no longer 
 animated the Indians ; they complained of our thin- 
 nefs of troops, and their former lofles. I immediately 
 called a council of the chiefs •, encouraged them as 
 much as I could ; promifcd to lead them on myfelf, 
 and br ng into the field 300 of the bed troops. They 
 liltened to this> and promifed to follow me, and a- 
 
 grecd 
 
 ij&i.. 
 
 •> 
 
 > . ; ■ ' ■■•'.■ 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixxxi 
 
 orc.:d t'lJt I fnould reconnoitre the grounv-i propcrefl 
 tor the liclJ of battle, the next morninj.^, accuinpa- 
 iiicd by ibmc of thtir chict warriors, to fettle the pl.m 
 of operations. When upon the ground appointed tor 
 the Held ot battle, I'couts came in with the account of 
 the firll number, Iwelled 102000; immediately after, 
 a third, that General Burgoyne*s army was cut to 
 pieces, and that Arnold w^s advancing, by rapid and 
 forced marches, with 3000 men. It was at this mo- 
 ment I began to iufpeifl cowardice in fome, and trea- 
 fon in others : however, I returned to camp, not 
 without ho;.es, with the afiiilance of my gallant co- 
 ad)Utor, Sir John Johnlon, ar.d the influence of the 
 fiiperintcnding colonels, Claus and Butler, of indu- 
 dng them to meet the enemy. A council, according 
 to their cuilom, was called, to know their refolu- 
 tions i before the breaking up of which I learned than 
 2C0 were already ckcamped. In about an hour they 
 infilled that I Ihould retreat, or they would be obliged 
 to abandon me. I had no other party to take •, (and a 
 hard party it was, to troops who could do nothing 
 without them, to yield to their refolvea i) and there- 
 fore propoied to retire at night, fending on before 
 my fick, wounded, artillery, &c. down the Wood- 
 Creek, covering them by our line of march. 
 
 This did not fall in with their views ; which were 
 no lefs than treacherouQy committing ravage upon 
 their ti lends, as they had lod the opportunity of doing 
 it upon their enemies. To efFeft this, they artfully 
 cauled mefiengers to come in, one after the other, 
 with accounts of the nearer approaches of the rebels ; 
 one and the laft affirmed, that they were within two 
 miles of Captain Lernoult's pod. Not giving entire 
 Credit to this, and keeping to my refoluiion of reti- 
 ring by night, tht-y «.';rew furious and abandoned ; 
 lei/: el upon the officers liquor and clothes, in Ipite of 
 I thu erfuris oi their Icivants-, and became more iormi- 
 
 F dable 
 
 •i 
 
 » 
 f 
 
 f 
 
 ^ I 
 
irxxli 
 
 A r P L N D 1 X. 
 
 :^' 
 
 ^4 
 
 
 dablc tli;^.n tlic enrmy we h:id to cxprdl. I now 
 tluHif;ht it time to call in Captain LtrntulL's poir, 
 rctirin^i; with the troops in catnp to th" mined torr, 
 ciilku William, in the front of the garnlun, not oi.Iy 
 to wait the enemy if they tliought proper to lally, but 
 to proted ihe boais from the fury of the lavages, li- 
 ving fcnt forward Captain lloyes, with his detach- 
 ment, with one piece of cannon, to the |<lace wlicre 
 JBuU-i'ort Hood, to receive the froo[)s who waited the 
 arrival of Captain Lcrnoiilt. MulL of tlie boats were 
 elcortcd that niglit beyond Canada-Creelv, where no 
 danger was to be apprehended from the enemy. The 
 creel; at this place, bending from the road, has a 
 deep cedar Ivvamp octween. livery attention was riow 
 turned to the mouih of the creels*, which the eriemy 
 might have polkllcd tlicmfllves ol by a ra;)id march 
 by ihe Oneyda-Caflle. At this place ihewh le of the 
 little army anivcci by twelve o'clock ai night, and 
 took poll" in luch a manner as to have no tVars of any 
 thing the enemy could do. Here we remained till 
 thrc^e o'clock ntxt morning •, when the boats v^hich 
 could come up the creek arriveii, or rather that the 
 ralcally part of all nations of the Indians would fufFcr 
 to come up j and proceeded acrofs I,ake Oneyda to 
 the ruined fort of Brereton, where I learned that fume 
 boats were Hill labouring down the creek, after bt-ing 
 lif.duened of the beft part of their freight by the Mel- 
 fafagoes. Captain Lernoult propofed, with a boat 
 full ot armed men, to repals the lake that night, to 
 relieve them from their labour, and fupply them with 
 provifion. This tranfacftion does as much honour to 
 the humanity, as to the gallantry, of this valuable 
 officer. 
 
 On my arrival at the Onondago-Falls, I received an 
 anfwtr to my letter from your Excellency j which 
 fliewed, in the cleared light, the fcenes of treachery 
 that had been pra(5llled upon me. The mcfll-nger had 
 
 heard, 
 
 
It 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 xxxm 
 
 I now 
 
 .ill's Y.oi\, 
 
 imed torr, 
 
 , not 01, ly 
 
 ia'.ly, but 
 
 M^C'S, h.i- 
 
 is dct.uh- 
 
 [ace where 
 
 waited the 
 
 boats were 
 
 ^ where r,o 
 
 ;my. The 
 
 road, has a 
 
 :)n was liOw 
 
 I the enemy 
 
 •a lid march 
 
 vh le ot the 
 
 night, and 
 
 tVars of any 
 
 ■cmained till 
 
 iboats which 
 
 cr that d^e 
 
 .vould luffer 
 
 Oneyda to 
 
 d that tome 
 
 after being 
 
 |by the MeU 
 
 ith a boat 
 
 lat nioht, to 
 
 them with 
 
 honour to 
 
 is valuable 
 
 received an 
 
 •, which 
 
 )f treachery 
 
 pfljnger had 
 
 beard, 
 
 i\ 
 
 \ 
 
 .irfl, irKUrt., on 
 
 his way, tliat they were collc-ft'.ifj 
 li.o lame k nd of rah'dw* ;vi before •, but ih \t there was 
 njt a;i enemy within forty milesof Fort-Sc in^vix. 
 
 S )on alter my arrival here, I was joined by Captain 
 Lcrnoii't, with the men and boats he had been in 
 Icatch of. 1 mean immediately to fend off, for the 
 if:; of the upper <;arrif()n, all the overplus provifun I 
 Ihill have, atter i<eepiny a fuHkiency to carry my dc- 
 [uchmjat down •, which I mean to do, with every ex- 
 ipi'Jition in my power, the moment this bufinels is ef- 
 Ie:l:ed ; for which purpoie I have ordered here the 
 
 ;o\v. The (loop is already gone ir.jm this, witli her 
 Ifyll ladlnff. 
 
 OfTicers from each corps are fent to Montreal to pro- 
 Icure neceOaries for the men, who are in a mod de- 
 lorable fituation from the plunder of the fava^i^es, 
 lilt no time may be lofl to join your army. 
 
 I have the honour to be, with the greatcft refpeifl. 
 Sir, your Excellency's mofl: obedient 
 
 And mofl: faithful fervant, 
 
 Ofwego, Aug. 27, Barry St. Leger.' 
 
 ^777- 
 lis Excellency General Burgoyne. 
 
 |E.v/;-tf^7 cf a Letter from Licufenant-GeJteral Burgoyne to No. XIV. 
 Lord George Geimaine, dated at Albany, lotb 
 October, lyyy. 
 
 My Lord, 
 NO pofTibility of communication with your Eord- '^ 
 fip having exKtcd fince the beginning of September, 
 1;: which tune my lad difpatch was fer.t away,) I have 
 prcpjrt to your Lordfliip the proceedings ot tlie ar- • 
 nyiiiuler my command from that period j a feries of 
 (jrd toil, incefiant eiT>rr, ttubborn a(fl:iun j till dif- 
 
 /■' 2 abled 
 
 s 
 

 •^ 
 
 
 4^^ 
 
 \ 
 
 
 V 
 
 
 k'. 
 
 t 
 
 5;! • . 
 
 ^' 
 
 
 ,. . ,l^s 
 
 
 
 '■*' , ' 
 
 • A 
 
 J*-. 
 
 
 
 isxxiv APPENDIX, 
 
 O 
 
 ablet! in tlie collateral branches of the army by the 
 total (lefcdlion of the Indians ; the defertion or titr.i- 
 dity of the Canadians and Provincials, forne indivi- 
 duals excepted ; dilappointed in the lail hope of any j 
 o timely co-operation from other armies •, the regular i 
 troops reduced by lofl'es from the bell part to 3500 
 JBghting-mcn, not 2000 of which were Britifli ; oii!yj 
 three days provifions upon fhorc allowance in ftorcji 
 „ inverted by an army of 16,000 men, and no apparent 
 nutans of retreat remaining j I called into council all 
 the {generals, field- oflicers, and captains commanding | 
 corps, and by their unanimous concurrence and ad- 
 viic I was induced to open a treaty with Major- 
 General Gates. 
 
 Your Lordfliip will fee, by the papers tranfmittedj 
 
 ° herewith, the dilar^teeable profped which a;tended 
 
 the fii (I overtures ; and, when the terms concludedl 
 
 are compared, < truft that the fpirit of the councils ll 
 
 have mentioned, which under fuch circumQances dic-l 
 
 „ rated inftead of fubmitting, will not be refufed a| 
 
 flinre of credit. 
 
 Before I enter upon the detail of thefe events, 
 think it a duty of juilice, my Lord, to take upon 
 myfelf the meafure of having paffed the Hudfon'^ 
 River, in order to force a paflage to Albany. I did 
 not think myfelf authorifed to call any men intc 
 council, when the peremptory tenor of my order^ 
 and the feafon of the year admitted no alternative. 
 • Frovifions for about thirty days having been brough<| 
 forward, the other neceflary ilores prepared, and the 
 bridge of boats completed, the army palled theHudj 
 fon's River on the 13th and 14th of September, ari 
 encamped on the heights and in the plain of SaraJ 
 toga, the enemy being then in the neighbourhood on 
 Stillwitfr. 
 ijih. The whole army made a movement forward, and 
 tncampcd in d good pofuion in a place called DovacoteJ 
 
 t>-' 
 
APPENDIX, 
 
 Ixxxv 
 
 rrence and ac!-! 
 
 It being found that there were feveral bridges to i6th. 
 repair, that worl< was begun under cover of Itrong 
 detachments, and the fame opportunity was taken to 
 reconnoitre the country. 
 
 The army renewed their march, repaired other 17th. 
 bridges, and encamped upon advantageous ground 
 about four miles from the enemy. 
 
 The enemy appeared in confiderable force, to ob- iSth. 
 (tru6t the farther repair of bridg':'s, and vvicii a view, 
 as it was conceived, to draw on an aflioii where artil- 
 lery could not be employed. A fm.iil iofs was fuf- 
 tained in fl^irmifliing j but the work of the bridges 
 was efFcded. 
 
 The paffages of a great ravine, and other roads to- ^"P^- '9* 
 wards the enemy, having been reconnoitred, the ar- 
 my advanced in the following order. 
 
 Brigadier-General Frafer's corps, fudained by Lieu- 
 tenant-Colonel Breyman's corps, made a circuit, in 
 order to pafs the ravine commodioufly, without quir- 
 ting the heights, and afterwards to cover the march 
 of the line to the right. Thefe corps moved in three 
 columns, and had the Iiidians, Canadians, and Pro- 
 vincials, upon their fronts and danks. The BritiiTi 
 line, led by me in perfon, pafHd th*^ ravine in a direct 
 line fouth, and formed in order of battle as fad as 
 they gained the fummir, where they waited to give 
 time to Frafer's corps to make the circuit, and to en- 
 able the left wing and artillery (which, under the 
 commands of Major-General Philijps and hUy^r- 
 General Reidefel, kept the great road and meadows 
 near the river in two columns, and had bridges to 
 repair) to be equally ready to proceed. Thcr47ih 
 regiment guarded the bateaux. 
 
 The lignal-ouns, which h.id bfcn previoufly fcfJed 
 to give notice of all the culun^ns being ready to ad- 
 vance, having been fi-cd between one ai^l two o'clock, 
 the march continued. The fcouts> and Hankers of the 
 
 /'' S coIlLiiii 
 
 
 
 
 i1^ 
 
 w 
 
 

 Ixxxvi 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 ,> 
 
 ';-;• 
 
 
 1 
 
 f. 
 
 -if.. 
 
 *fc 
 
 
 IB ! .• ^ 
 
 1 
 
 
 it 
 
 M.* 
 
 <i 
 
 column of the BritiHi line were foon fired upon from 
 fmall parties, but with no efFe(5t. After about an 
 hour's march, th^^ picquets, which made the ad- 
 vanced guard of that cokirnti, were attacked in force, 
 and obliged to ^:ive ground j but they foon ralUed and 
 were fuftained. 
 
 On the firft opening of the wood I formed the 
 troops. A few cannon-fhot oiflodged the enemy, at 
 a houfc from whence the picquets had been attacked; 
 and Eiigadier-General Frafer's corps had -arrived with 
 fuch preciiion, in point ol time, as to be found upon 
 a very advantageous huiglu on the ri;?,ht of the Bi itilh. 
 
 In the mean time, the enemy, not acquainted wich 
 the com'oination of the march, had moved in great 
 force ouf of their inrrenchments, with a view of turn- 
 ing tiie line upon the right; and, being checked by 
 tlie difpofition of Biigddier-General Frafer, counter- 
 marched, in order to direcl their great effort to the 
 left of the Britifii. 
 
 From the natureof the country, movements of this 
 fort, however near, may be cffcded without a poffi* 
 bility of their being difcovered. 
 
 About three o'clock the adion began by a very vi- 
 gorous attack on the Britilh line, and continued with 
 great obUinacy till after funfec. The enemy being 
 rontinually fupplicd with frelh troops, the Itrels lay 
 upon the 20th, 2 111, and 621!, regiments, moil pans 
 of which were engaged near four hours without inter- 
 million J the 9th had been ordered early in the day to 
 form in referve. 
 
 The grenadiers and 24th regiment were fome part 
 of the iinjc brought into acti.\-i, as were part of the 
 light infantry ; and all thefe corps charged with their 
 ufual fj)iric. 
 
 The riflemen, and .other parts of Breyman's corps, 
 weri alio cf fervice ; but it was not thought advife. 
 able to evacuate thehcis^hts, where Brii^adier-GeiK*ra! 
 
 i-raUT 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixxxvli 
 
 Frafer was pofled, otherwlfe than partially and occa- 
 fionally. 
 
 Major^Cvpneral Phillips, upon firft hearing th.* fi- 
 ring, four. d his way through a difficult part of the 
 wood to the fceneot' adtion, and brought up with him 
 Major Williams and four pieces of artillery ; and 
 from that moment I Itood indebted to that tj;allunt and 
 judicious fecond for incefTant and molt n^iterial fer- 
 vices ; particularly for reftcring the aclion in a point 
 which was critically prelT'ed by a great fuperioricy of 
 fire, and to which lie led up the 20Lh regiment at the 
 utmoft peribnal hazard. 
 
 Major-General Riedefel exerted himfclf to bring up 
 a part of the left wing, and arrived in time to clidrge 
 the enemy with regularity and bravery. 
 
 Juft as the light «.h)feci, the enemy gave ground on 
 all (ides, and left u? completely malhrs of the field of 
 battle, with the lols of abuut five handed men on 
 their fide, and, as fuppofcd, thrice that nUiiiber woun- 
 ded. 
 
 The darknefs preventing a purfuir, the prifoners 
 were few. 
 
 The behaviour of the oiTicers and men in general was 
 exemplary. Brigadier-General Fr,ifer took his pofirion 
 in the beginning of the clay, with greu judgement, and 
 fuftained the aflion with cop.llant prcfence of mi. d and 
 vigour. Brigadier-General Hamilton was the whole 
 time engagtxl, and acquitted himlelf with great ho- 
 nour, adivity, and good conduit. 
 
 The artillery in general was dillinguifhed, and the 
 brigade under Captain Jones, who was killed in the 
 a6tion, was confpicuoufly fo. 
 
 The army lay upon iheir arms the night of the 79th, 
 and the next day took a pofinon nearly .vithin c..nm)n- 
 fhoc of the enemy, fortifying rheir right, and ex:' n- 
 ding their left to the brow o|- the heights, io as to Cv)- 
 vcr the meadows througli which the great river runs, 
 
 F 4 and 
 
 \^\ 
 
 * 1 
 
 I 
 
 * H 
 
 ■•■■: I i 
 
 ■■■'' I ? 
 
 H- 1 1 
 
 i* . 
 
,{S,: ^ " 
 
 ST 
 
 
 : •* 
 
 ■ ft 
 
 ... .te 
 
 111 If «* " 
 
 
 
 ■■:>' 
 
 Jxxxviii APPENDIX. 
 
 find where their bateaux and hofpitals were placed. 
 The 47th regiment, the regiment of H'.lli Hanau, 
 aiid a corps of provincials, encamped in the meadows 
 as a farther lecuritv. 
 
 It was ibou found that no fruits, honour excepted, 
 were attained by the prccedirg vidory, th':! enemy 
 working with redouble^; ardour to flrengihen taeir 
 left : i/.eir liaht was already unattackabie. 
 
 On oL r fide it became expedient to erecSt ftrong re- 
 doubts for the proieition of the m:3gazines and hofpi- 
 tal, not only againft a fudden attack, but alio tor 
 tlitir ftcurity in cal'e of a march, to turn the enemy's 
 fl:.nk. 
 Sept. 21. A mciTengpr arrived from Sir Flarry Clinton with a 
 letrer in cipher, informing mc of his intention to at- 
 tack Fort Montgomery in about ten days from the 
 date of his letter, which was the 12th inftant. This 
 was the only mefTenger of many that I apprehend were 
 difpatched by Sir William Howe, and he that had 
 reached my camp fince the beginning of Augurt. He 
 was fent back the fame night to inform Sir Harry of 
 my fituation, and of the necelTity of a diver/ion to 
 oblige General Gates to detach from his army, and my 
 intention to wait favourable events in that pofition, if 
 pofiible, to the 12th of October. 
 
 In the courfe of the two following days, two officers 
 in difguife, and other confidential perlons^ were dif- 
 patched, by different routes, with verbal mcfFages to 
 the fame effefl ; and I continued fortifying my camp 
 and watching the enemy, whofe numbers increafed 
 iSvery day. 
 
 I thought it advifeable on the 3d of October to di- 
 n)ini(h the foldiers* ration, in order to lengthen out 
 the provifionsi to which meafure the arn.y fubmitted 
 with the utmoll cheerfulnefs. The difficuliies of a 
 retreat to Canada v/ere clearly foreleen \ as was the 
 jjiigmma, Qiouid the retreat be cfFeited^ of leaving at 
 
 liberty 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 Ixxxix 
 
 )ber to di- 
 
 liberty fuch an army as General Gates's to operate 
 againft Sir William Howe. 
 
 This confiderarion operated forcibly to determine 
 me to abide eveni;s as long as pofTible, and 1 reafoned 
 ,thus. The expedition 1 commanded was evidently 
 meant at firft to be hazarded. Circumftances misht 
 require it ihou Id be ^^X'fl/^*:/. A critical jundion of 
 Mr. Gates's force with Mr. Waftiingron might pofTi- 
 bly decide the fate of the war ; the failure of my junc- 
 tion 'vith Sir Harry Clinton, or the lofs of my retreat 
 I to Canada, could only be a partial misfortune. 
 
 In this fituation things continued till the 7th, when 
 no intelligrnce having been received of the expeded 
 I co-operation, and four or five days for our limited ftay 
 in the camp only remained, it was judged advifeablc 
 to make a movement to the enemy's lefr, not only to 
 difcover wliether there were any poflible means of 
 forcing a paflage, fhould it be neccfTiry to advance, or 
 I of diflodging him for the convenience of a retreat, 
 but ajfo to cover a forage of the army, which was in 
 the grenrefl diftrefs on account of the fcarcicy. 
 
 A detachment of fifteen hundred regular troops, 
 I wi'h two twelve pounders, two howitzers, and fix fix- 
 I pounders, were ordered to move, and were com- 
 manded by myfelf, having with me Major-General 
 Phillips, Major-GeneraJ Reidefel, and Brigadier-Ge- 
 neral Frafer. 
 
 The guard of the camp upon the heights was left 
 to Brigadier-General Hamilton and Specht ; the re- 
 doubts and the plain to Brigadier-General Gali ; and, 
 as the force of the enemy immediately in their front 
 confiftcd of more than double their numbers, it was 
 not poiTible to augment the corps that marched be- 
 yond the numbers above ftated. 
 
 I formed the troops within three-quarters of a mile 
 of the enemy's left j and Captain Fraier's rangers, wit'i 
 [adians Jind Provincials, had orders to go by fecrec 
 
 paths 
 
 •h 
 
 
 i 
 
 ^1 
 
 f. 
 
 B'S 
 
 ■ai I 
 

 '«*.,; 
 
 :i 
 
 
 ■M'r' •'/ 
 
 it;-.:^.^ .f'Ai 
 
 
 (<.(*;' 
 ■^f'! 
 
 :?!i^; 
 
 
 jr.: 
 
 % ^ 
 
 iJ:i". 
 
 ■'■' '.';. 
 
 i£ 
 
 £iii^& 
 
 xc A P P E N D I X. 
 
 paths in the woods to gain the enemy's rear, and by 
 fliewing themfelves ih^-re to keep them in a check. 
 
 T he farther operations intended were prevented by 
 a very fudden and rapid attack of the enemy on our 
 left, where the Britifh grenadiers were polled to fup- 
 port the left wing of the line. Major Acland, at die 
 head of thenr, fullained the attack with great refoiu. 
 tion ; but the enemy's great numbers enabling them 
 in a few minutes to extend the attack along the front 
 of the Germans, which were immediately on the right j 
 of the grenadiers, no part of that body could be re- 
 moved to make a fecond line to the flank, where the! 
 llrefs of the fire lay. The rijj,ht was at this time en- 
 gaged, but it was foon obfervtd that the enemy were! 
 marching a large corps round their flank, to cndea. 
 vour cutting off shtir retreat. The light infantry andl 
 part of the 24th regiment, which wcie at that pod, 
 were therefore ordered to form a fecond line, and to] 
 fecure the return of the troops into camp. While this! 
 movement was proceeding, the enemy puflied a frefhl 
 a. id rtrong reinforcement to renew the adion upon the! 
 left; which, overpowered by a great fuperiority, gavel 
 way, and the light infantry and 24th regiment werel 
 obliged to make a quick movement to fave that pointBtheir 
 from being entirely carried ; in doing which, Brigadier-H In 
 General Frafer was mortally wounded. Bmarc 
 
 The danger to which the lines were expofed, be^vent 
 coming at this moment of the mod lerious narure,Barmy 
 orders were given to iViajor-General Phillips and Rei-BGene 
 dcfel to cover the retreat, while fuch troops as wcreBMajo 
 moil" ready for the purpofe returned for the defence ofl Tfi 
 them. The troops retreated, hard prefied, buc in goodlenem' 
 order ; they were obliged to leave fix pieces of can-Barmy, 
 non, all the horl'es having been killed -, and moft ofBand tl 
 the artillery-men, who had behaved as ufual with thilcontai 
 iitmoll: bravery uncier the command of iViajor VVii-iprevcf 
 liams, being either killed or wounded, mk ^r 
 
 ThJilie Fi 
 
APPENDIX; 
 
 ltd 
 
 •ear, and by 
 a check. 
 )reven*ed by 
 emy on our 
 )lted to iup- 
 :land, at rhe 
 great refolu- 
 labling them 
 ing the front' 
 r on the right 
 
 could be re- 
 c, where thei 
 this time en- 
 ; enemy were! 
 k, to endea- 
 t infantry and I 
 at that poll, I 
 
 line, and to 
 , While this 
 uHied a frefhl 
 Lion upon the! 
 eriority, gavel 
 regiment werej 
 ave that poiiitl 
 
 th, Brigadier- 
 
 cxpofed, he* 
 
 erious nature,] 
 
 ;ps and Rei- 
 
 )ops as wen 
 
 the defence otj 
 
 I, but in good| 
 
 lieces of can' 
 
 and moil ot] 
 
 ifuai with th; 
 
 Major Vvii- 
 
 The troops had fcarcely entered the camp when it 
 was ftornncd with great fury, the enemy rufhing to 
 the lines under a fevere fire of grape-lhot and fmall 
 arms. The poft of the light infantry, under Lord 
 Balcarras, adilled by fome of the line, which threw 
 them.felves, by order, into the imrenchments, was de- 
 fended with great fpirit •, and the enemy, led on by T e- 
 neral Arnold, was finally rcpuifed, and the General 
 wounded; but unhappily the iiitrenchments of the Ger- 
 man relerve, commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel Brey- 
 man, who was killed, were carried ; and, although or- 
 dered to be ret overed, they never were fo; and the ene- 
 my, by that misfortune, gained an opening on our 
 nght and rear. The night put an end to theadlion. 
 
 Under the difadvantages, thus apparent in our fitu- 
 aiion, the army was ordered to quit the prefcnt por- 
 tion during the ni'^ht, and take poll upon the heights 
 abc\ e the holpital. 
 
 Thus, by an entire change of front, to reduce the 
 enemy to form a new difpofition, this movement was 
 leffeded in great order and without lofs, though all 
 the artillery and camp were removed at the fame time. 
 The army continued offering battle to the enemy, in 
 [their new pofition, the whole day of the 8th. 
 
 Intelligence was now received that the enemy were 
 Imarching to turn the right; and no means could pre- 
 vent that meafure but retiring, towards Sarat02;a. The 
 army began to move at nine o'clock at night. Major- 
 General Reidefel commanding the van-guard, and 
 |Major-General Phillips the rear. 
 
 This retreat, though within mufquet-fhot of the 
 lenemy, and encumbered with all the baggage of the 
 army, was made without lols ; but a very heavy rain, 
 and the dillkulties of guarding the bateaux, which 
 jcoRcained ail the provifions, occafioned delays which 
 Iprevented the army reaching Saratoga till the niyht a^ 
 [the 9th, and the arriilery could not pals the fords of 
 
 .1 T ^1 
 
 i ' 
 
 ThJllie Fifh-Kiii till the mornio" of the iOth. 
 
 Ac 
 
 i:l i 
 
 %- 
 
 h' 
 
5CCU 
 
 APPENDIX; 
 
 1 ■ 
 
 i 
 
 
 
 
 oa. II. 
 
 ".'■it 
 
 
 '■;v , 
 
 il 
 
 ■■ ■■■>.■ ^ 
 
 
 > 
 
 It 
 
 
 At our arriv.ll near Saratoga, a corps cf the ene- 
 my, between five and fix hundred, were diicovcred 
 throwing up inirenchments on the heights, but re- 
 tired over a ford of the Huaion's River at our ap- 
 proach, and joined a body polled to oppolc our paf- 
 fage there. 
 
 It was judged proper to fend a detachment of ar- 
 tificers, under a (Irong elcorc, to repair the briuges 
 and open a road to Fort-Edward on the well lide of 
 the river. The 47th re[;iment, Captain Fralcr's maikf- 
 men, and M:ick"y's Provincials, were oruercd for 
 that fervice ; but, the enemy appearing on the heights 
 of the Fifli-Kill in great force, and makii.g a dilpo- 
 fition to pals and give i:s battle, the 47th regiment 
 and Frafcr's markfmen were recalltd : the Provincials, 
 left to cover the workmen at the fir It bridge, ran 
 away upon a very flight attack of a Imall party of the 
 enemy, and left the artificers to efcape as they could, 
 without a poffibility of their performing any work. 
 
 During thele different movements the bateaux with 
 provifions were frequently fired upon from the oppo- 
 lite fide of the river, and fome of them were loll, and 
 feveral men were killed and wounded in thofe which 
 remained. 
 
 The attacks upon the bateaux were continued 5 fe- 
 veral were taken and re-taken, but their ficuation be- 
 ing much nearer to the main force of the enemy than 
 to ours, it was found impoflible to fecure the provi- 
 fions any otherwile than by landing them and carry- 
 ing them upon the hill. This was eficcled under 
 fire, and with great difficulty. 
 
 The pofiible means of farther retreat were now 
 confidered in councils of war, compoled of the gene- 
 ral oflicers ; minutes of which will be tranfmitted to 
 your Lordlhip. 
 
 The only one that feemed at all practicable was, by 
 a night-march to gain Fort-Edwaid, with the troops 
 
 carrying 
 
r^r 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 carryinor their provifion upon their backs : the Impof- 
 fibility of repairing bridges putting a conveyance of 
 artillery and carriages out of the quellion, it was pro- 
 pofed to force the ford at Fort Edward, or the ford 
 above it, Bctore this attempt could be made, fcouts 
 returned, with inreliigence that the enemy were in- 
 trenched oppofite thele fords, and poflclied a camp 
 in force on the hiy,h ground, between Fort-Edward 
 and Fort-George, with cannon. They had alio par- 
 ties, down the whole fhore, to watch our motions, 
 and pods fo near to us, upon our own Cidc of the wa- 
 ter, as muft prevent the army moving a fhigle mile 
 undifcovered. 
 
 The bulk of the enemy's army was hourly joined 
 by new corps of militia and volunteers, and tlicir 
 numbers together amounted to upwards of 16,000 
 men. Their pofition, which extended thrt-e parts in 
 four of a circle round us, was, from the nature of 
 the ground, unattackable in all parts. 
 
 In this fituation, the army took the beft pofition 
 poflible, and fortified, waiting till the 13th at night, 
 in the anxious hope of fuccours from our friends, or 
 the next defirable expcdtatioh, an attack from our 
 enemy. 
 
 During this time, the men lay continually upon 
 their arms, and were cannonaded in every part : even 
 riflc-fiiot and grape-fliot came into all parts of the 
 line, though without any confiderable efi^tdt. 
 
 At this period, an exadt account of the provifions 
 v?as taken, and the circumftances ftated in the open- 
 ing of this letter became complete. 
 
 rhe council of war was extended to all the field- 
 officers and captains commanding corps of the army, 
 and the event enfued which I am fure was inevitable, 
 and which, I truft, in that fituation was honourable, 
 biit which it would be fuperfluous and melancholy to 
 repeat. 
 
 After 
 
 xcni 
 
 
 ^^1 
 
 ii 
 
mm 
 
 xcl7 APPENDIX. 
 
 After tlie execution cf the treaty, General Gates 
 drew together the force that had lliirouncied ir.y no. 
 fition, and I liad the conlbhuion to have as many wit- 
 nefles, as I have men imdcr my command, of its 
 amounting to the numbers mentioned above. 
 
 During the events fhued above, an attempt v.as 
 made againfl: Ticonderoga by an army afTembled un- 
 der Major-General Lincoln, who found means to 
 march with a confiderable corps from lluberton un- 
 difcovered, while another column of his force paflld 
 the mountains between Skenefborough and I.ake- 
 George J and, on the morning of the i8th of Sep- 
 tember, a fudden and |.cnc'ral attack was made upon 
 the carrying-place at Lake-George, Sugar-Hill, Ti- 
 conderoga, and Mount Independence. Ihe fea- 
 officers commanding the armed Hoop llationed to de- 
 fend the carryin3-i)lace, as alfo lome of the officers 
 commanding at the polls of Sugar-Hill and at the 
 Portage, were furprifed, and a confiderable part of 
 four companies of the 53d regiment were made pri- 
 loners : a block-houfe, commanded by Lieutenant 
 Lord of the 53d, was the only pod on that fide that 
 had time to make uic of their arms ; and they made 
 a brave defence, till cannon, taken from the furpriied 
 veflel, was brought againli: them. 
 
 After ftating and lamenting fo fatal a want cf vi- 
 gilance, 1 have to inform your Lordfliip of the fatif- 
 laftory events which followed. 
 
 The enemy, having twice fummoned Brigadier- 
 General Powell, and received fuch anfwer as became 
 a gallanc officer entrufted with fo important a poll, 
 and having tried, during the courfe of tour days, fe- 
 veral attacks, and being repulfed in all, retreated, 
 without having done any confiderable damage, 
 
 Brigadier-General Powell, from whofe report to 
 me I extract this relation, gives great commendations 
 to the regiment of Prince Frederick, and the other 
 
 troops 
 
 ^^ 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 xc/ 
 
 hroops flailoncd at Mount- Tndcpentlence. The Bri- 
 ';>dicr alio mentions, witli great applarll*, f'ic beha- 
 viour ot' Captain 'l\iy!or of the 2 lit regiment, who 
 Las accidentally there on his route to the army from 
 :hi hofpital i and Lieutenant Bcecroft of the 24tli 
 re^jiment, who, with the artificers in arms, defended 
 |in important battery. 
 
 On the 24th inltant, the enemy, enabled, by the 
 lopcure of thegun-boais and battaux, which tliey had 
 Inade after the furprifc of the floop, to embaik upon 
 Lake George, attacked Diamond Ifland in two divi- 
 liijns. 
 
 Captain Aubrey, and two companit's of the 47th 
 [•egimenr, had been p ;(led at that ifland from the time 
 bearmy palli^d the Hudloii's River, as a better fitua- 
 lion, for the lecurity of the ftores at the fouth end of 
 Lake George, than Fort George, which is on the 
 Itontinenr, and not tenable againlt artillery and num- 
 p.s. The enemy were repulfed by Captain Aubrey 
 Ijith great lofs, end purfued by the gun-boats under 
 lis command, to the eafl: fhore, where two of their 
 Ipriricipal veflcls were rec.iken, together with all the 
 Itannon. They had jull time to fet fire to the other 
 peaux, and retreated over the mountains. 
 
 I beg leave to refer your Lordfliip for farther par- 
 locLilars to my aid-de-camp, Lord Peterfliam, and I 
 I'wmbly take occafion to recommend to his Majefty's 
 pice that noblemaii, as one endued with qualities to 
 p important lervices to his country in every Itation to 
 [which his birth may lead. In this campaign, in particu- 
 Ihr, his behaviour has been fuch as to cnutle him to the 
 |!iilleft applaufe ; and I am confident his merit will be 
 
 lught a fufficient ground for preferment, though 
 Edfprivcd of the eciai and fort of claim which generally 
 lattends th^ delivery of fortunate difpaiches. 
 
 I have only to add, my Lord, a general report of 
 Itiie killed and wounded. I do not give it correff •, 
 
 tlie 
 
 * 
 
 .V- 
 
 i 
 
 
 ,1 1 
 
 7 
 
 i i 
 
 • 4 
 
 1,1 
 
 ■I , •■'. 
 
xcvi APPENDIX. 
 
 the hurry of the time and the reparation of the corp- 
 liavinij rendered it impoflible to make it lb. 'l\\c\ 
 Britifli officers have bled protulely and moft honour,'. 
 bly i thole who remain unvvoundcd hav! been equally! 
 forward •, and the general officers, from the mode ct 1 
 fighting, have been more txpofed than in other fer- 
 vices. Among the reft of this ftation, I have had myl 
 efcapes. It depends upon the fcntence his Majcrtyl 
 Jliall pafs upon my conduct, u|)on the judgement c; 
 my proft-rnon, and of the impartial and refpcCtablc 
 parts of my country, whether I am to clleem ther 
 blcllings or misfortunes. 
 
 I have the honour to be, &c. 
 (Signed.) 
 
 J. BURCOVNE. 
 
 Second Copy of a Letter from IJcutenaut-Gencral Burgoyne u 
 ^;o.XIV^ 'j^ord George Gtrmaine, dated Albany, lOth Q^q\ 
 ber, 1777. 
 
 [Private y hy Lord Peterfliam. 
 My Lord, 
 
 I HAVE little to add to my public letter refpedlins 
 the courfe of ui.lliccefsful events therein detailed, 
 reft my confidence in the juftire of the King and hi 
 councils, to fupport the General they thought propej 
 to appoint to as arduous an undtitaking, and undcrai 
 pofitive a direction, as pfhaps a cabinet ever fninKdj 
 It will, I am fure, be remembered, my Lord, tha 
 a preference of exertions was the only latitude gived 
 me i 3nd that to force a junction with Sir Williar 
 Howe, or at leaft a paft'age to Albany, was the prin| 
 ciple, the letter, and the Ipirir, of my orders. 
 
 Indeed the appearances at the time I pafled the Hue 
 fon's River, though fubje6t to doubt in forne inllan| 
 CCS, as I then wrote to your Lordlhip, were, upon 
 general view, fuch as I am perfuaded would have rer 
 
 dereJ 
 
A P P E N n 1 X. 
 
 dcrcd inadlion ccnfurnble, had my orders, inflead of 
 being peremptory, been difcretionary. Promilcs of 
 (he profclTing loyalifts were not th( n brought to the 
 lefti the I'pirit of the enemy, «n combat againft regu- 
 lar liritilh troops, had only been tried at Ticondtro- 
 jga, at Hubcrton, at Skencfborough, and Fort Anne, 
 in all which places it had failed *, the total difappoint- 
 mentof eftcdiual co-operation could not be forelecn or 
 luppofed i and, furc I am, had 1 then made fuppofi- 
 tiun that any thing like what has happened might have 
 happened, and remained cautioufly ported, no exer- 
 tion attempted, my condud would have been held in« 
 ilefenfibie by every clal's and diftindion of men, in go- 
 |vcrnment, intheanny, and in the public. 
 
 The expediency of advancing being admitted, the 
 Iconfequences have been honourable misfortunes. 1 he 
 Britifh have perfevered in a ftrenuous and bloody pro- 
 mefs. Had the force been all Britifh, perhaps the 
 perfeverancehad been longer j but, as it was, will it be 
 Ifaid, my Lord, that, in the exhaufted fituation de- 
 Ifcribed, and in the jaws of famine, and invelled by 
 quadruple numbers, a treaty, which faves the army 
 lio the Itate for the next campaign, was not more than 
 Icould have been expecled ? I call it laving the army, 
 Ibecaufe, if fent home, the date is thereby enabled to 
 Ibd forth the troops now deftined for her internal de- 
 Ifence ; if exchanged, they become a force to Sir Wil- 
 liam Howe as effcdlually as if any other junftion had 
 Ibeen made. 
 
 I fliould now hold myfelf unjuftifiable if I did not 
 Iconfide to your Lordlliip my opinion, upon a near in- 
 Ifpedlion, of the rebel troops. The (landing corps 
 Iwhich I have ken are difciplined : I do not hazard the 
 lierm, but apply it to the great fundamental points of 
 Imilitary inlbcution, fobricty, fubordination, regulari- 
 Ity, and courage. The militia are inferior in method 
 land n^ovcment, but not a jot lefs fcrviceablc in woods. 
 
 G My 
 
 XCYII 
 
 ' I 
 
 
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 ''"'^ ■■"■• ■-^'^-■-■- 
 

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 ircviu 
 
 H f P E K D I X. 
 
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 r..4. 
 
 j<o3 
 
 ■A' 
 
 • • 
 
 ^^^ c^jeAur^ wtfi-e Wry different after the affair of 
 ^ Ticondtffoga ; . but I am cdtivinced they were delufive I 
 and it lif a duty to the (late to confefs it. 
 
 The panic of the reber troops is confined, and of 
 Ihort duration 5 the enthufiaifm isextenfive and perma- 
 nent. 
 
 It Is a jtrftice to Major-General Phillips to informl 
 ^our Lordlh'ip, that, when thecrifisof our fituationat 
 Saffttdga arrived, he very handfomely offered to hazard 
 Irii perlbii by making a circuit through the woods, 
 and attempt to throw himfelf into Ticonderoga, to 
 diefend that place, Ihould it be the objedt of the ene.j 
 my fo endeavour the retaking it. 
 
 In regard to myfeif, ! am funk in mind and body;! 
 . Wxtf while 1 hive a faculty of either, it fliall be exer- 
 ikd for the King's fervice. I thall wait, in the neigh- 
 bourhood of Boftooi the orders of Sir William Howe.l 
 
 I have the honour to be, ^c, 
 o o J. BurgovneJ 
 
 N'o. X'V. Minutes tf"^ Cotmil of Wt»r, boldtn on the' Heights tf 
 
 Stratoga'i Oft. 12. 
 
 Present. 
 
 [Ljeul- Gen. fiuRooYNE, Major Gen.^HiLLii^s, 
 
 Major Gen. Reidesel, Brig. Gen. Hamilton^ 
 
 The Lieutenant-General (lates tothe council the pre 
 ?ebt fituaticS of Siffkirs. 
 
 'i'l^e enemy, rh force, according to the befl intelli 
 gefj^e he^ can detain, to the ambUnt of upwards 
 14000 rfien, and a confiderable quantity of artillery 
 iixt on this fide rtie Fifli-Kill, and threaten an attack 
 6fl i\\t ort^ fide tWe Hfudfon's River, between thi 
 army anA F6rt Edward, is anotlier army of the enemy 
 th^ fiuhiBcYs ahknb%n j but one corps, which ther 
 
 ha 
 
 
 '5 • I ^ 
 1 \':- 
 
 ' 'c^ 
 
APPENDIX. ' xdx 
 
 has been an opportunity of obferving, is reported to 
 be about 1500 men. They have likewife cannon on 
 the other fide the Hudfon's River, and they have a 
 bridge below Saratoga church, by which the two ar- 
 mies cm communicate. 
 
 The bateaux of the army have been deftroyed, and 
 no means appear of making a bridge over the Hudfon's 
 River, were it even pradlicable, from the pofition of 
 the enemy. 
 
 The only means of retreat, therefore, are by the 
 ford at Fore Edward, or taking the mountains, in or- 
 der to pafs the river higher up by rafts, or by any 
 other ford which is reported to be pradlicable with dif- 
 ficulty, or by keeping the mountains, to pafs the head 
 of Hudfon's River, and continue to the weftward of 
 Lake George all the way to Ticonderoga : it is true, 
 this laft paflage was never made but by Indians or very 
 fmall bodies of men. 
 
 In order to pafs cannon or any wheel carriages from 
 hence to Fort Edward, fome bridges muft be repaired 
 under fire of the enemy, from the oppofite fide of the 
 river, and the principal bridge will be a work of four- 
 teen or fiftten hours: there is no good pofition for the 
 army to take to fuftain that work, and, if there were, 
 the time dated as necefifary would give the enemy, on 
 the other fide the Hud fon*s River, an opportunity to 
 take poft on the ftrong ground above Fort Edward, or 
 to difpute the ford, while General Gates's army fol- 
 lowed in the rear. 
 
 The intelligence, from the lower part of Hudfon's 
 River, is founded upon the concurrent reports of pri- 
 foners and delercers, who fay it was the news in the 
 enemy*s camp, that Fort Montgomery was taken j 
 and one man, a friend to government, " ho arrived yef- 
 terday, mentions fome particulars of the manner in 
 which it was taken. 
 
 G 2 The 
 
 i) 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 
 *••'', 
 

 /><- 
 
 ■K?r-^'.* 
 
 )■■ '''4 
 
 
 
 APPENDIX; 
 
 The provifions of the army may hold out to the 20th; 
 there is neither rum nor fpruce beer. 
 
 Having committed this ftate of fa6ls to the confi- 
 deration of the council, the General requefts their Icn- 
 timents on the following propofitions : 
 
 id. To wait, in the prefent pofition, an attack 
 from the enemy, or the chance of favourable events. 
 
 2d. To attack the enemy. 
 
 3d, To retreat, repairing the bridges as the army 
 moves for the artillery, in order to force the paflage of 
 the ford. 
 
 4tb. To retreat by night, leaving the artillery and 
 the baggage*, and, fhould it be found impradlicable to 
 force the pafTage with mufquetry, to attempt the up- 
 per fovd, or the paflage round Lake George. 
 
 5th. In cale the enemy, by extending to their left, 
 leave t' eir rear open, to march rapidly for Albany. 
 
 Upon the firfl: propofition, refolved, that the fitua- 
 tion would grow worfe by delay, that the provifion 
 now in (lore is not more than fufficientfor the retreat, 
 fhouid impediments intervene, or a circuit of country 
 become nectflary ; and, as ^he enemy did not attack 
 when the ground was unfortified, it is not probable they 
 will do it now, as they have a better game to play. 
 
 The fecond unadvifeabie and defperace, there being 
 no poflibiiity of reconnoitring the enemy's pofition, 
 ' and h's great fuperiority of numbers known. 
 
 The third impradicable. 
 
 The fifth thought worthy of confideration by the 
 I.ieutenant-General, Major-General Phillips, and 
 Brigaditr-General Hamilton; but the poficion of the 
 eni-my yet gives no opening for it. 
 
 Rclblved, that the fourth propofition is the only re- 
 
 • foiirce; and lhar, to tfi-Vdl it, the utmoft fccrecy and 
 
 fiitnce is to be oblerved ; and the troops are to be put 
 
 in motion from the right, in the Hill part ot the night, 
 
 without any change in the dilpofition. 
 
 N.B. 
 
 m 
 
 
 ti^ 
 
I'Nr 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 N.B. It depended upon the delivery of fix days 
 provifion in due time, and upon the return oF 
 Icouts, who had been fent forward, to examine by 
 what route the army could probably move the firft four 
 miles undifcovered, whether the plan (hould take place 
 on that day or on the morrow. 
 
 The fcouts, on their return, reported, that the ene- 
 my's pofition on the right was fuch, and they had fo 
 many fmall parties out, that it would be impoiTible to 
 move Vv'ithout our march being immediately difcovcred. 
 
 Minutes and Proceedings of a Council of JVar, confifling 
 of all the general Officers and Field Officers^ and Cap- 
 tains commanding Corps, on the Heights of Saratoga, 
 Odlober 13. 
 
 THE Lieutenant-General having explained the fi- 
 tuation of affairs, as in the preceding council, with 
 the additional intell gence, that the enemy was in- 
 trenched at the fords of Fort Edward, and likewife 
 occupied the ftrong pofition on the Pine-plains between 
 Fort George and Fort Edward, exprefled his readinefs 
 to undertake, at their head, any enterprife of difficul- 
 ty or hazard that fliould appear to them within the 
 compafs of their ftrengrh or fpirit. He added, that 
 he had reafon to believe a capitulation had been in the 
 contemplation of fome, perhaps of all, who knew ihe 
 real fituation of things; that, upon a circumltanceof 
 fuch confequence to national and perfonal honour, he 
 thought it a duty to his country and to himfelf, to 
 extend his council beyond the ufual limits; that the af^ 
 fembly prcfent might julliy be efteemed a full repre- 
 fentation of the army, and that he fiiould think him- 
 felf unjuftifiable in taking any ftep in lb feiious a mat- 
 ter, without fuch a concurrence of feiitmients, as 
 ftiould make a treaty the a(5t of the army, as well as 
 that of the general. 
 
 G 3 The 
 
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 I:- 
 
W' 
 
 ■»(■■; 
 
 
 
 
 '-i.!t;:;;,":,t,'. ,■ "i 
 
 
 cli APPENDIX. 
 
 The firft queftion, therefore, he defired them to 
 decide was, Whether an army of 3500 fighting men, 
 and well provided with artillery, were juftifiable, upon 
 the principles of national dignity and military honour, 
 in capitulating in any poffible fituation ? 
 
 Reiblved, nem. con. in the affirmative. 
 
 Qiicftion 2. Is the prefent fituation of that nature ? 
 
 Refolved, nem. con. That the prefent fituation juf- 
 tifies a capitulation upon honourable terms. 
 
 The Lieutenant-vjeneral then drew up the mefifage, 
 marked No. 2, and laid it before the council. It was 
 unanimoufly approved; and, upon that foundation, 
 the treaty opened. 
 
 Odober 14. Major Kingfton, having delivered the 
 meflage, marked No. 2, returned with the propofals, 
 ffiarkedNo.gi and the council of war being aflem- 
 bled again, the Lieutenant-General laid the propofals 
 before them, when it was refolved unanimoufly to re- 
 ject: the 6(h article, and not to admit of it in any ex- 
 tremity whatever. 
 
 The Lieutenant-General then laid before the coun- 
 cil the anfwers to M^jor-General Gates's propofals, as 
 marked in the fame paper, together with his own pre- 
 liminary propofals, which were unanimoufly approved 
 of. 
 
 Oftoberi5. The council being aflembled again, 
 Major-General Gates's anfwers to Lieutenant-General 
 Burgoyne's propofals were laid before them, whereupon 
 it was refolved, that they were fatisfactory, and a fuf < 
 ficient ground for proceeding to a dtfinitivc treaty. 
 
 
 ,;-, . , .- '•■1,*';, Wf^' 
 
 : '• • ---4':* 
 
 No. 2. M^ycr Kingfton delivered the following Mef' 
 fage to Major-General Gamsy 0(^ober 14. 
 
 AFTER having fought you twice, Lieutenant- 
 General Burgoyne has waited fome days, in his prefent 
 
 pofiiion. 
 
 :j- 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 cut 
 
 I 
 
 them to 
 
 ting men, 
 
 able, upon 
 
 7 honour, 
 
 lat nature ? 
 uationjuf. 
 
 e me/Tage, 
 It was 
 oundation, 
 
 ivered il,e 
 propofals, 
 ng a/Tem- 
 propcfals 
 ufly to re- 
 1 anycx- 
 
 the coun- 
 •pofals, as 
 own pre- 
 approved 
 
 'd again, 
 t-General 
 hereupon 
 >nd a fuf- 
 reaty. 
 
 4' 
 
 utenant- 
 s prefenc 
 
 pofition. 
 
 pofition, determined to try a third conflid: againft any 
 iQTce you could bring to attack him. 
 
 He is apprifcd of the fuperiority of your numbers, 
 and the dirpofition of your troops to impede his fup- 
 plies, and render his retreat a fcene of carnage on both 
 fides. In this ficuation he is impelled by humanity, and 
 thinks himlelf jultifiable by eftablifhed principles and 
 precedents of ftate and of war, to fpare the lives of 
 brave men upon honourable terms. Should Major- 
 General Gates be inclined to treat upon that idea. Ge- 
 neral Burgoyne would propofe a cefTation of arms du- 
 ring the time neceflary to communicate the preliminary 
 terms by which, in any extremity, he and his army 
 ipean to abide. 
 
 No. 3 . Major- General G ates*s Propofah -, together with 
 Lieutenant-General Burgoyne's Anfwers, 
 
 I. General Burgoyne's a/my being exceedingly re- 
 duced by repeated defeats, by defertion, ficknefs, &c. 
 their provifions exhaufted ; their military horfes, tents, 
 and baggage, taken or deftroyed ; their retreat cutoff, 
 and their camp invcfted, they can only be allowed to 
 furrender priloners of war. 
 
 Anfwer. Licutenant-General Burgoyne's army, 
 however reduced, will never admit that their retrear 
 is cut off, while they have arms in their hands. 
 
 II. The officers and foldiers may keep the baggage 
 belonging to them. The generals of the United States 
 never permit individuals to be pillaged. 
 
 III. The troops under his Excellency General Bur- 
 goyne will be condu(5ted by the mod convenient route 
 to New England, marching by eafy marches, and fuf* 
 ficiently provided for by the way. 
 
 Anfwer. This article is anlwered by General Bur- 
 goyne's Hrft propofal, which is here annexed. 
 
 IV. The officers will be admitted on parole ; may 
 wear their Hde-arms, and will be treated with the libe- 
 
 G 4 rality 
 
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 rality cuflomary in Europe, fo long as they, by pro- 
 per b.L'haviour, continue to deferve it -, b at thofe who 
 are apprehended, having broken their parole, as feme 
 Britilh officers have done, muft cxpeft tobeclofe con- 
 fined. 
 
 Anfwer. There being no officer in this army un- 
 der, or capable of being under, the defcription of 
 breaking parole, this article needs no anfwer. 
 
 V. All public (lores, artillery, arms, ammunition, 
 carriages, horfes, &c. &c. mufi; be delivered to coni- 
 iBififarics appointed to receive th«m. 
 
 Anfwer. All public ftores niay be delivered, arms 
 excepted. 
 
 VI. Thefe terms being agreed to and figned, the 
 troops under his Exceljenpy Qeneral Burgoyne*s com- 
 mand may be drawn up in their encampments, where 
 they will be ordered to ground their arms, and may 
 thereupon be marched to the river fide, to be pafled 
 over in their way towards Bennington. 
 
 Anfwer. This article inadmiffible in any extremity. 
 Sooner than this army will confent to ground their 
 arms in their encampment, they will rufli on the ene- 
 my, determined to take no quarter. 
 
 VII. A ceflation of arms to continue till fun-fet, to 
 receive General Burgoyne's anfwer. 
 
 (Signed) 
 
 Horatio Gates. 
 Camp, at Saratoga, Od. 14. 
 
 Major Kingflon met the Adjutant-General of Ma- 
 jor-General Gatts^s army, Oftober I4lh, at fun-fet, 
 and delivered the following meffage. 
 
 If General Gates does not mean to recede from the 
 6(h article, the treaty ends at once. 
 
 The army will, to a man, proceed to any adb of 
 dcfpt ration, rather than fubmit to that article. 
 
 T^he ccflation of arms ends this evening. 
 
 No. XVI. A RE-^ 
 
 :;?v;' 
 
 
 "S-; \ .M 
 
 
"![ 
 
 iey» by pro. 
 It thofc who 
 olc, as fome 
 be clofe con- 
 is army un- 
 
 ^cription of 
 er. 
 
 Timunition, 
 ed to coni- 
 
 cfed, arms 
 
 %ned. the 
 
 ynt's com- 
 
 nts» where 
 
 and may 
 
 be pafTed 
 
 extremity, 
 und their 
 n the cne- 
 
 ^n-fet, to 
 
 3 Gates. 
 
 d of Ma- 
 ' fun-fer, 
 
 from the 
 
 y aa of 
 
 A RE- 
 
 J^ETURN of the Army of tl- 
 
 Br'tgadM, 
 
 Brigadier General Nixon's 
 
 Poor's 
 
 Learned's 
 
 Glover's 
 
 Pateifon's 
 
 Warner's 
 
 Stark's 
 
 J 
 
 2, 
 
 3 
 4 
 5 
 
 Bailey's 
 
 
 Whipple's 
 
 Brickett's 
 
 Fell 
 
 ows s 
 
 Woolciit's 
 
 Ten Brock's 
 
 Artillerilts 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 Total 
 
 lii 
 
 1 4 
 I 3 
 
 I 2 
 
 ■I] 
 
 >! ' 
 
 o 4 
 o c 
 
 o c 
 
 ~l~ 
 
 I 2 4..' 
 
 |J. B, Exclufive of the numbers in t 
 '■ • lollowers ut the camp. ' 
 
 Colonel Morgan's corps of rif 
 
 { i 
 
 I 
 
 t f 
 
 : n 
 
 i' '' f' 
 
 i; i 
 
 i 
 
 ■t 
 J 
 
No. XV 
 HETUPtN of the Army of the United States, commandc 
 
 October 1 6, 1) 
 
 
 r 
 Brigadoi, t 
 
 
 
 C 
 
 r- 
 
 om»rjj 
 
 1,1 -''•-, 
 
 loncd. 
 
 
 OJjiccri pre 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 • 
 
 • 
 '-I 
 
 • 
 
 R: 
 
 ft; 
 
 28 
 26 
 
 23 
 
 24 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 22 
 
 23 
 27 
 
 24 
 21 
 27 
 
 S 
 
 7 
 32C 
 
 24 I 4 
 28 I 3' 
 30 1 4 
 
 27 I 3 
 26 3 
 26 4 
 22 3 
 
 24 2 
 
 25 1 4 
 30 2 
 
 28 3 
 25; 2 
 
 1 
 
 50 2 
 
 
 Brigadier 
 
 General Nixon's 
 
 1 
 
 I 2 
 
 4 3 
 
 2 7 
 
 25 
 
 23 
 
 21 
 26 
 22 
 
 27 
 
 
 Poor's 
 
 5 
 
 4. 
 
 4 
 4 
 
 28 
 = 4 
 
 
 Learned's 
 
 I 43 
 
 I 3; S 
 
 
 Glover's 
 
 
 Patetfon's 
 
 I 4 
 I 5 
 I 3 
 
 I 4 
 
 1 
 I 3 
 
 I 2 
 
 "J 
 
 o 4 
 
 
 
 244 
 
 3! 4 
 1' 
 
 ■ 
 
 Warner's 
 
 
 Stark's 
 
 3 4 
 ^1 
 
 27 
 28 
 
 24 
 26 
 
 22 
 
 1 
 
 20 
 
 30 
 26 
 
 27 
 
 23 
 26 
 
 23 
 
 
 Bailey's 
 
 
 Whipple's 
 
 2 
 
 4 
 2 
 
 4 
 3 
 4 
 
 
 Brickett's 
 
 
 Fellows's 
 
 
 Woolcut's 
 
 1 
 2 3 
 
 
 Ten Brock's 
 
 1 ^^ 
 
 22 
 5 
 
 
 
 J}1 
 
 
 I 
 
 : 
 
 545 5'+^ 
 
 
 Artiilerifts 
 
 I 
 1 
 
 45 
 
 1 
 
 I 
 
 
 Cavalry 
 
 3 
 4^ 
 
 8 
 1 344 
 
 
 
 Total I 
 
 K. B, ExcluRve of the numbers in the above Return, there are, the 
 -' • lollowers ot the cnmp. ' ■' ,.. ;.,^Vn'r • 
 
 Colonel Morgan's corps of rifle-men, and the ^^^^^^^^-'^ ' ' 
 
No. XVI. 
 states, commanded by Major General Gaics^ Camp at Saraiog;a, 
 
 October 16, 1777. 
 
 OJjiccrs prrfait, 
 
 1.^ — !! 
 
 
 ^ank and File, 
 
 ^nC(J, 
 
 
 
 
 >r:Ji';»n(J, 
 
 
 
 — , j^ 
 
 
 
 
 ■-1 
 
 • 
 
 :^ 
 
 • "^ 
 
 28 
 26 
 
 -J 
 
 -3 
 
 24 
 22 
 
 24 
 22 
 
 23 
 
 ^ "6 
 
 
 • 
 
 5 .1 
 
 1 
 
 • 
 
 50' 
 
 » 
 
 ■V. 
 
 • 
 ■a. 
 
 • 
 
 '■J 
 
 i2 
 
 5 
 
 
 • 
 
 9 
 
 1 1 
 
 
 25 
 
 24 1 
 
 28 ] 
 
 30 
 
 27 
 
 26 ( 
 
 26 
 
 22 
 
 24 
 
 25 
 30 
 
 28 
 
 25; 
 
 1 
 
 50 
 
 4424 
 
 13343 
 '4332 
 
 I 3 4I 4 4 
 
 D 3 3 2 3 
 D 4! 2 3 2 
 
 3 4J 2 4 
 2 2 'i ; 
 14323 
 2 2 I I 
 
 3 4! 2 3 
 2! 3 I 2 
 
 2\ 4J 2 I 
 
 01 113 
 2', 2 
 
 5424435 37 
 
 3 104 
 
 5! 1 10 
 
 1257 
 
 5S 
 48 
 
 87 
 
 73 
 61 
 
 44 
 86 
 
 53 
 68 
 
 1919 
 
 1 48 
 
 897 
 
 31 
 
 88^ 
 
 \ 35 
 
 5 55 
 
 7 I 
 1.387 
 
 1481 
 
 23 
 
 1132 
 
 64 
 
 SI 
 
 94 
 
 11 
 
 83 
 
 32 
 23 
 
 2 1 
 
 37 
 
 1 
 7 3- 
 
 4 6 
 
 1 
 
 1316^ 
 
 Zl 
 
 4 121 
 
 3 120 
 
 4 108 
 
 54 
 49 
 
 1498 
 
 57 
 69 
 
 61 
 
 8; 
 
 1658J 
 
 26 
 
 1776 
 
 20481 
 1 
 
 22 
 
 1 1255 
 
 12 
 32 
 
 / 
 13 
 
 145S 
 
 27 
 
 3 9'^ 
 
 2 lOI 
 
 3 93 
 2 104 
 
 2 83 
 
 40 
 
 48 
 37 
 49 
 37 
 51 
 47 
 ; 44 
 
 i ^572 
 
 95 
 
 25 
 
 5c 
 
 i: 
 21 
 
 4( 
 2 
 5 
 
 1850 
 
 30 
 
 1 
 
 220 
 
 1303 
 
 26 
 
 S97 
 
 lOI I 
 
 27 
 
 1 12 
 
 1075 
 
 23 
 
 27 
 24 
 
 776 
 
 r I« 
 
 \ 869 
 
 26 
 
 4 113 
 3 ''*^; 
 
 132 
 
 3 IC97 
 
 23 
 
 21 
 27 
 
 S 
 
 7 
 32C 
 
 843 
 
 5 
 3 I 
 
 7 949 
 4 1673 
 
 22 
 
 98; 
 
 S 
 
 
 
 
 545 
 
 2 2 
 
 2 i( 
 
 
 
 43 !i39 
 
 b S 
 
 2 63e 
 
 ili 
 
 1 _ 
 
 S 
 2 
 
 .5jJ 
 
 2 490 
 
 
 
 y- 
 
 ■ 3.6 
 
 33: 
 
 > 15;! 
 
 5 6: 
 
 't 
 2.. 73 
 
 0'; 1S624 
 
 s 
 w 
 o, 
 
 < 
 
 u 
 
 ■s 
 
 o 
 > 
 
 ^J3 
 
 o 
 
 turn, there are, the upper flafFof the army, the bateau men, the artificers, ar.4 
 ^^^^^^^. ^^■^"^'^'t^OK A '1^10- GATES, Ma-or General. 
 
 I 
 
 \ 
 
 ,4' 
 
 * 
 
 * 
 
m 
 
 Wh 
 
 ■H 
 
 '¥'■ 
 
 1 1 • ? ji 
 
 .M. 
 
 fi 
 
 
 m 
 

 APPENDIX. 
 
 c\r 
 
 g\tra5ls from the Minutes of the Injt Council of /Frtr,No.XVIl 
 excepting the Names of the Officer s^ and the Notes they 
 gave, 
 
 ^uflion. 
 
 Genera] Gates having, in anfwer to General Bur- 
 goyne's meflfagr, given a folcmn affirmation, on his 
 honour, th.ir no detachment has been made from his 
 army during the negotiation of the treaty, is the treaty, 
 in its prclent fituation, binding on this army, or is 
 the gentral's honour engaged for the figning it ? 
 
 [Here tolluw the names of the officers as they vo- 
 ted.] ^ • 
 
 The lieurenant-generars opinion being clear, that 
 he is :iot bound by what has paffed, he would not ex- 
 ecute the treaty upon the Ible confideration of the 
 po'Ht of honour, notwithftanding the refpe6lable ma- 
 ionty again It him. 
 
 He is lil<.ewiic far from being convinced that this 
 irmy, by great exertions and by great enduring in 
 point of provifions, might not yet be relieved ; but 
 'r,e is compelled to yield on the following confidera- 
 lions : 
 The treaty was generally thought a mod advanta- 
 geous one before the iiitellio;ence arrived. That in- 
 iciligence is refuted, and ocular demonflration of its 
 iallity pledged as far as relates to General Gates's 
 lorce i the other parts are only founded on hearfay, 
 snd not to be depended upon. 
 Should General Clinton be where reported, yet the 
 ciftance is fuch as to render any relief fiom him im- 
 frobable during the time our provifions could be made 
 to lad. 
 
 .--».-. declares his pofl: untenable; and fays, 
 iithis convention is nor figned, lie apprehends there 
 will be confider^ble defertion. 
 
 . - fays, 
 
 n 
 
 |>MtJw^; 
 

 cvi APPENDIX. 
 
 - - fiiys, he thinks the 47th regiment ii 
 
 not to be depended on. 
 
 -.-..-- is of the lame opinion. 
 
 .,-_-. - thinks the Ozd regiment is difhearten- 
 f d by the fituation of their poll, and not equal to thtir 
 former exertions. 
 
 Several officers think the men in general feem to 
 have got the convention in their heads as defirablc. 
 
 Many of the btft officers are abfent, by fickncfs and 
 wounds, from all the corps. 
 ' Though the other officers, at the head of the Britifli 
 corps, think that they can anfwcr for the fpirit of their 
 men, if attacked on uieir prefent ground, it is evident 
 the moft fanguine do not think any part of the army 
 in that elevation and alacrity of fpirit necelTary for un- 
 dertaking dcfpcrate enterpriles. 
 
 To break off the treaty now renders a future renewal 
 of it hopelefs, as our condition mull every hour grow 
 worfe. 
 
 A. defeat is fatal to the army. A vidlory does not 
 fave it, as they have neither provifions to advance nor 
 retreat againft an enemy, who, by experience, we know 
 are capable of rallying at every advantageous poll. 
 
 And that the life and property of every provincial 
 and dependent of this army depends upon the execu- 
 tion of this treaty. 
 
 POST-* 
 
 A P P E I 
 
 POSTSCRIPT tot 
 
 [Though the following Lettc 
 ' any Part of the Defence, i 
 be deemed fuperfluous. j 
 
 pr^^ 0/ a Letter frcm A^ 
 Lieutenant. General Burgoy, 
 September 29, 1778. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 THE Boflon news-papers h 
 
 Englifh and New-York papers 
 W; your arrival, yourfpeec 
 finety of other matters concei 
 [«ys give credit to news-pa 
 [jublifhers at Boflon will excufi 
 {f news, I do not give them, i 
 kity than I allow the news co 
 I I will not plague you ab( 
 m know it by my afTuhng yc, 
 pu left us i io no more aboi 
 l^ipend upon you, their chief] 
 them, their intereft, their I 
 but you will exert yourfel, 
 pn preferment in common w 
 m i that you will have the 
 3 behalf of their fituation, ri 
 fxpence of living, and ende/ 
 bwance of forage money ; d 
 N ufe all your powers of pel 
 |We troops, which have fer( 
 Nwith honour; andendea\ 
 Nion and promoting their 
 Ftunes which nor fortitude 
 
 
APPENDIX. 
 
 cvU 
 
 ?giment li 
 
 difhearten- 
 lal 10 their 
 
 il fecm to 
 
 lirablc. 
 
 cknefsand 
 
 the BritifTi 
 iritof their 
 It is evident 
 jf the army 
 rary for un- 
 
 ure renewal 
 hour grow 
 
 )ry does not 
 advance nor 
 ce, we know 
 us poft. 
 ■y provincial 
 n the execu- 
 
 POST- 
 
 POSTSCRIPT to the APPENDIX. 
 
 Though the following Letters are not referred to ia 
 any Part of the Defence, it is hoped they will not 
 be deemed fuperfluous. j 
 
 btra^ of a Letter /rem Major-General Phillips to 
 Lieutenant-Gcncral Burgoyne, dated Cambridge, 
 September 29, 1778. 
 
 My dear Sir, 
 THE Bofton news-papers have given extradls from 
 EngUIh and New-York papers, wherein you are menti- 
 m\'t your arrival, yourfpeeches in parliament, and a 
 variety of other matters concerning you. I do not al- 
 iiys give credit to news-papers, nd therefore the 
 lublifliers at Bofton will excufe me, if, in the inftance 
 tfiiews, I do not give them, in my opinion, more ve- 
 pcity than I allow the news compilers at London. 
 I will not plague you about our fituation, as you 
 mil know it by my afTuring you it is almoft exactly as 
 Jau left us i lb no more about it. The troops here 
 lijepend upon you, their chief, in whatever may relate 
 Ipthem, their interell, their honour. It is notdoubt- 
 |t(ibut you will exert yourfelf, that the officers may 
 ;ain preferment in common with other parts of the ar- 
 py i that you will have ihe goodnefs to exert yourfelf 
 p behalf of their fituation, refpe(5ling the very great 
 txpence of living, and endeavour to procure the al- 
 lowance of forage money; and, in Ihorr, that you 
 m ufe all your powers of perfuafion and intereft for 
 ifiefe troops, which have lerved under you with zeal 
 pd with honour-, and endeavour, by ferving their fi- 
 pation and promoting their honour, to alleviate mif- 
 iwtunes which nor fortitude nor valour could prevent, 
 
 and 
 
 . / 
 

 4*' • ■ ' 
 
 :':^i.. 
 
 CVlJl 
 
 '» ; ' 
 
 
 .vJi!'""..' 
 
 ':'»!■<■;.■ 
 
 
 ■ .1 , 
 
 .rf 
 
 i:*'"? 
 
 '0 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 O a 
 
 O ^ 
 
 «nd which ihey fuffer, however, with refignation anj 
 patience. J, am ni©(t) pcrffdiy cdhviriCed df y«ur af- 
 tedlionate, Iwili fay your grateful, regard for us all-, 
 and I leave myfeif and th ttiqops to yourfneadly care, 
 to yoof humanity,'^ to yout honour. 
 
 You canncr expeft a letter of Entertainment -, I have 
 not even a p6wer of making it one of intelligence j it 
 fliall be, however, a letter ot peifecl fincerity j and, in 
 th#^;iliileft fi^fe of it, I profefs to be. 
 
 My dear Sir, ° 
 Your very fjncere fri^r\d and fait^ul fervant, 
 
 o 
 
 (Sign<.!d.Jj' W. Phillips, 
 
 Fi S. et^nclofe you the Copy of a Mi^morial to the Se» 
 cretary at War i I am fure you will aflift it. 
 
 o 
 
 Copy of J Letter front Lieutinant*Q£neral Burgoync to\ 
 Lord Aiftherft, inclc^ng the Memorial referred to inj 
 the above, f^a/>i November 6, 1778. 
 
 o ' 
 
 ° MyoLord, 
 THE heavy misfortune I fuftain, in being preclu- 
 ded th^ Kinj^*s prefence, touches me in no point mora 
 nearjiy than in the pretention of doing juftice to ihf 
 various and extenfive merits of the army 1 had the hoi 
 nour tQ command. 1 hat the conftguences of mj 
 fuppofed or real errors fhould involve pretenfions am 
 int^^refts of fo many gallant officers, is a painful rej 
 fle<5tioi1 i and it c^p only be alleviated by the trucl] 
 fenfe of the trull to be repofed in your Lordfiiip, tpj 
 the general protedion of the fervice. The indole 
 metJK>rial was accompanied with exprelTions ol rel 
 \ ance,° jn the name c^ the vrhole army, upon my el 
 forts to fupport ir. The officers in New-England Hi 
 tie conceive my prefent fituatioi^. I take the firft o{ 
 
 -port 
 
 ur.'t 
 
 ^- 
 
■■HI 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 portunity to tranfmit their caufe to your Lordrhio's 
 napp.cr aufp.ces. wnh this i;>l.mn declaration, fwhkh 
 
 ■H rr ':;• n^r "f "™' ^^"""^ occ.n;„i:t! 
 
 ot a Brit!n ,ffl ''I"";'" ^° "•?''■"■) •'■at there is 
 
 rN.frKf- a '^'^^^ whum I can impure bam-. 
 
 ^.o .y fincer:.',:;- larr.", t,f'^t7irt;: 
 
 1 have the honour to be, &c. &c. &:c. 
 
 J. BURCOVN^E. 
 
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