.^. ^^ > -^^ '^' "°-' or^'^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGE r (/y\T-3) 4~ // /& y. i.O I.I 1.25 140 1.4 — 6" 11^ 1.6 Photosraphic Sciences Corporation 23 WEST nn^iri STRccT WEBSTER, N.y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 iV ,-0-^ :\ \ ^loyed in ny efFortB ' coL'ntry trators of ide \ &nd 'ere colo- ;h-rigbts ; h we de- »n of the s of war, of peace, nation of e pa ration ucai prin- caiidour% At subsequetit periods she has committed other wrongs : and if reparation had been demanded in the same spirit of candour and firmness which were manifested in 1794, that distinguished prece- dent authorizes the opinion, that a like equitable adjustment and reparation might have been obtained. But after a four years nego- tiation, in which volumes of essays and letters have been written, it has, like the seven years negotiation with Spain, been brought (in the language of the president " to an issue of some sort :" that is, every subject of dispute remains as far, probably farther from ad- iustment, than when the negotiations were begun. It is this disastrous issue which now enters mto our deliberations. According to the statements of the administration, we are brought into a situation from which we cannot advance without war, nor re- treat without dishonor. Their negotiations with France have also terminated in mortification and defeat. On the two questions of the impressment of seamen on board our merchant vessels, and a trade with the enemies of Great Britain prohibited m time of peace, the gentleman from Maryland, [Mr. Smith] was pleased to read some parts of a letter written by me last winter to the governor of Massachusetts, to be laid before the legis- lature : and on the latter (neutral trade) he also read the journal of the senate, which exhibited a unanimous vote declaratory of our right to that trade ; and then the names of the senators (mine being one who voted to request the president to demand and msist on re- paration for the injuries done us in violation of that right ; and for thia fiur/iose to enter into amicable arrangements ivttA the British government. . , , , , On these two questions, I should add nothing to the observations made yesterday by the gentleman from Connecticut, but for the ap- parent intention of the gentleman from Maryland, to exhibit an in- consistency between my votes in the senate and the observations of my letter on the same subject. .^ , , It is sufficient for me to remark, that in the passages recited by the eentleman from my letter, my object was to shew, by exhibit- inff in a few words, to the view of my immediate constituents, and through them to the people of Massachusetts, some of the reasons which might have inlluenced Great Britain not to relinquish her ancient usage of impressing her oit>n seamen ; nor to consent that neutral vessels should carry on (as we and other neutrals were car- rvintt on) the whole trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe and their colonies ; to show, I say, that as much was to be said on both sides, those rights, as claimed by the United States, were not to be considered so clear and indisputable as to justify a war Kvith Great Rritain ; into which the proceedings of the execu- tive, in a variety of ways, seemed calculated to plunge us. Before I quit this Bubject, I will make one more observation. It appears to be generally supposed that the rule respecting the colo- Jal trade adopted by Great Britain, and usually called the rule of « 1736, which it seems she has considered as "the ancient and estab- lished principle of maritinf>e law,"* was peculiar to (Ireat Britain : and Mr. Madison says, " it is well known that Great Britain is the only nation that has acted upon, or otherwise given a sanction to it."t fie also mentions this rule as having been introduced, for the first time, in the war of 1756 ; as having been in operation on- ly a few years in that war ; and not afterwards acted upon until 1793. \ Let us examine the subject. In Valin's celebrated work on maritime law (a book in the secre- tary of state's office.' is a regulation of Louis the fourteenth, in 1704, from which I will recite some passages. The title of the regulation is remarkable : it is " concerning prizes made at sea, to necure the navv^ation of neutral statc^ and allies during war ;" implying that this regulation was intended to abate the rigor of maritime law b'^fore that time practise^ towards neutral commerce. Aftor observing that propositions had been made to him by the deputies of the council of commerce, the Frciich king expresses his approbation of them, " seeing he finds in them the means which he has always sought of procuring equally the advantages of the subjects of neutral princes and French cruizers." He adds, " The subjects of neutral princes will thus find the care which his majes- ty has taken to preserve for them t/ie same extent and the same liber- ty of commerce which theij have been accustomed to enjoy dunng peace." I will now read such of the articles of this French regulation as relate to the question under examination. ^''Article I. His majesty forbids French privateers to stop or bring into the ports of his kingdom, vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes, going from the ports of their dominion, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral princes, with merchandise of the growth or manufacture of their own country, to carry the same directly into any other states what- soever, even those with which his majesty is at war ; provided ne- vertheless, that ttiere be not in the said vessels any contraband goods. ''''Article 1. They are in like manner forbidden to stop vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes, going from the ports of any state whatsoever, even of those with which his majesty is at war, and laden on account of the owners or other subjects of the said neutral princes, with merchandise which they shall have received in the same country or state whence they shall have departed, to return directly into the ports of the dominion of their sovereign. '''-Article 3. He also forbids them to stop vessels belonging to the subjects of neutral princes, departing from the ports of one of the * Mr. Madison's letter of March aj. I Same letter. l8o8, to Mr. Erskinc, \ Idem. md estab- t Britain : ain ih the uiction lo luced, for ration on- ipon until :he secre- eenth, in mcerning Uatfs and tended to rl towards m by the expresses ms which cs of the Is, « The lis majes- ame liber- oy dunng ulation as \ stop or 3 subj*ects nion, and d neutral z of their ites what- vided ne- jntraband )p vessels rts of any s at war, the said ! received parted, to reign, ng to the )nc of the states ncuti-al ©r allied to his majesty, to go into another state alike neutral or allied to his majesty ; provided they are not laden with merchandise of the growth or manulacture of his enemies ; in which case the merchandise shall be good prize, and the vessels shall be released. , n , • , • » ^ , ".//rftV/f 4 In like manner his majesty forbids privateers to stop -vessels belonging to subjects of neutral princes departing from a •state allied to his majesty or neutral, to go to a state the enemy of his majesty ; provided there be not on board said vessel any mer- chandise contraband, nor of the growth or manufacture of the ene- mies of his majesty; in which cases the merchandise shall be good prize, and the vessels shall be released. ^^Artide 6. Vessels belonging to subjects of neutral states which shall depart from the ports of a state the enemy of his majesty, and there have taken their lading, in whole or in part, to go to the states of any other prince than their own, whether allied to his ma- iestv, neutral or enemy, may be stopped and brought into his kingdom, and shall be declared good prize with their ladmg, even although laden on account of the subjects of his majesty, or of an allied or neutral state." „ , • ., This regulation of Louis XIV. in 1704 (he beng then at war ■with Eneland and Holland) was re-enacted by Louis XV . in 1744, (France being again at war with Er -land} with some exceptions in regard to those neutral nations with whom h ranee had formed treaty-stipulations incompatible with that regulation. In these five articles we have, if I mistake not, the whole doc- trine of the British rule cf 1756. The cZ/r^cf trade to and from neutral ports and the enemy's ports, being permitted ; but not the ti-adeto and from the ports of one allied or neutral state, to and from the ports of another allied or neutral state ; if ^i lading of the neu- tral vessels consist of merchandise the firoducti^v ^ of he enemy s coun- try ; much less to carry the same from one por» of the enemy, to another port of the enemy. j r., r. u i *• « The PRINCIPLE of the British rule and of the French regulation anoears to be, to prevent new^ra/s coming in to aid the enemy in the commerce of one part of his dominions with any other part thereof, or in procuring a market for the enemy's productions, in any other country than that of the neutral actually transporting the same, and for its own use and conswnfition. It appears moreover, by the preamble to the French regulation, that the restrictions on neutral commerce, which we are now ex- amining, instead of commencing in 1756, were m exercise by the English and Dutch, antecedent to that regulation, and with greater rigor ; the French king professing to ameliorate the condition of neutral commerce, by that regulation.* • But Great Britain has admitted that the vessels of the United States might carry on an inJir.a trade from the European dominions of her enemies to tncr colonies, and from those colonies to their parent wuntrjc m Europe; and « both On the subject of blockade, when vesach of war were not so sta- tioned before the poi t declared to be blockaded, as to constitute what is called an actual blockade, undoubtedly abuses have taken place. To form an actual blockade of a port, ships destined for that ob- ject must l>e " sufliciently near to |)roduce an evident danger in entering." But these words by no means imply a certainty of ca/iture^ by the blockading ships, of the vessel so attempting to enter. What degree of risk from blockading ships will amount to a lawful blockade, may sometimes be a disputable question. Would the chance of capturing three vessels out of four, or seven out of eight, exhibit such un '' evident danger in entering," as would constitute an actual blockade ? that is, when to insure their entering in salety would be worth a premium of from 75 to 90 per cent. This must remam a question of some difficulty to adjust. On these points, sir, and all others in dispute with Great Bri- tain, my opinion remains imchanged, that they are yet proper sub- jects of negotiation, to be undertaken in the real n/iirit of concili' atioJi and adjufitment. That the embargo will not induce her to yield to our demands, we have atnple proof, not only in the answer of the British government to our minister in London, but in th6 certain ability of that nation and her colonies to supply all their own wants. That she j)ossesses the means, I think, has been de» nionstrated by gentlemen who have spoken before me. We have lieard mu( h of the patriotism and patient endurance of our fellow .citizens, under the distresses of the embargo ; and gentlemen cases, the trade has been considered indirect when carried on through the United States : that is, when the cargoes ladtn on board American vessels, n the ports of the enemies of Great Britain, have been first imported into the United States, and carried thenct in the same or other American vessels, to the enemy coun- tries, or colonies respectively But the facts which should constitute an indirect trade, not havinjj been definitively declared ; on the contrary, a they have been several times varied, either by the orders of the British o;ovcrnnnent, or by the decision of htr courts of admiralty — much vexation and injury have thencc-accru- cA to the commerce of the United States. But the treaty negotiated by the president's ministers, (Messrs. Monroe and Pinkncy) and signed by them, with the British commissioners on the ^^ 1st of December 1806, comprehended a definitive provision on this head Such trade, between the parent countries and colonies of the enemies of Great Britain, was to be considered indirect, when the articles of the growth, protluce or manufac- ture of Europe, were first carried to the United States ; and on re-exportation, remained after the drawback, subject to a duty of one per cent, on their valu^. In like maniier, all articles of the growth and produce of the enemy's colonics, being first brought to the United States, and there entered and landed, and on re-exportation remaining subject to a duty of two per cent, on their value, might be re-laden, and freely exported to any country in Europe. The duties in both cases, to be paid into the treasury of the United States This arrangement was calculated to prevent any further dispute between the United States and Great Britain, about the trade between the countries of her enemies in Europe aiid their colonies But the prc$idei)t thought fit to reject thr« ,ti-«utj, withojut laying it before the sCQ»te. lot so sta« constitute mvc taken )!' that ob- langvT in 'tuhuy of npting to 1 amount question. , or seven ring," as sure their to 90 per adjust, ireat Bri- •oper sub- of concili' e her to le answer )ut in th6 all their been de- We have ur fellow entlemen the United n the ports lited States, icmy coun- ; an indirect ' have been , or by the encc-accru- lonroe and he 31st of Such trade, ritain, was r maiiurac- xportatioii, heir valu^. '3 colonics, ed, and on lue, might cs in both ■twcen the ries of her reject thre apealc confidently, that this patience will hold out till Great Tritaiu shall be brought to our feet. At the same time, they calculate on the distresses, which they fondly imagine the eniLai<;o will inflict on the people of (ireat liritain and her colonies, to excite discon- tents and insurrections sulTiciently alarming to induce that govern- ment to abandon usages on which she relies to maintain her mart- time ascendency, and, at this time, her independence as a nation. But why should it be supposed that the people of Great Britain will ije less patient under sutlerings, than the people of the United State? ? Their's would arise from causes beyond their control ; oUr's from some cause or causes operating on our ruLi-ra, but which the /K'o/.'/r can neither see nor understand. Within four months alter the embargo was imposed, the president himself, by procla- mation, announced to us and to the world the existence of one in- surrection, occasioned by the embargo ; and the provisions made- in the supplementary acts, to compel obedience at the point of the bayonet, shew how appiehensive the governn>ent were of discon- tents and resistance. These extraordinary provisions for the ex- ecution of a filuci/lc mraxurt demonstrate, that it was considered as ofifioaed to the gc7u-ral ■'icme of the fieolde ; and, in a free country, such a measure cannot long be carried into execution. The votes of approbation of the embargo by public bodies, and other assem- blies of citizens, so ostentatiously displayed, while they manifest the force of fiariy, are, to say the least, but equivocal indications ot the "general sense of the people, or even of the individuals compos- ing those assemblies. Those votes have always had fewer AfurW XhiiCivo'icra. ■», , , • , , Mr. President, the gentleman from Maryland mentioned the extreme danger to which our commerce would be exposed, while the French decrees and British orders remain unrepealed. It has been often said, and perhaps oftener insinuated, in newspapers and pamphlets, that if our vessels were permitted to go to sea, all would he taken. What escaped the French, would be cap- tured by the English ; and what escaped the latter, would fall a prey to the former. There is a want of truth in all this. The same gentleman quoted a statement made by an eminent mer- chant of Massachusetts, that of eight or ten vessels which sailed about the time the embargo was laid, one only had reached the place of her destination. 1 remember seeing a statement of that sort ; and I think, also, that I saw a detection of its fallacy. If they had not reached their destined ports, it did not follow that they were captured and condemned. The same merchant has expressed his decided opmion, " that, ivotwithstanding the French decrees and British orders in council, if our embargo was off we should haye more trade than would be enjoyed by us, if all the world were at peace, and the respective na- tions should monoDolize as much of their own commerce as usual." Another eminent merchant expressed, at the same time., the same opinion. mm But without resting the question on o/iinionx, Ave muy appeal t» J'acts. I have sought information of the risks whicli liave attended our foreign trade, within the present year, from the two principal districts of Massachusetts. By the statement in my hand, lately received, and which is of un* questionable authority, I find, that at one insurance ofiice in Bos- ton, 43 policies have been written, on vessels engaged in foreign voyages, since the first of January, lb08. Of these 5 were undetermined. 1 vessel (the Neutrality) bound fiom Marseilles to Boston, cap- tured and condemned at (iibraltar, for violating the blockade declared by the British orders in council. 37 arrived safely. In all 4.3. It is stated, that there were three policies on the Neutrality ; and that possibly there might be more than one policy on one vessel among the 37 sale arrivals. At another ollice in Boston, out of 75 risks, principally to the West Indies, 3 vessels were captured by the French, of which the British re- captured 2. 1 captured by the British, supposed to be French property. 16... .about this number are undetermined ; and the rest, about 55, have ended safely. In all 75. At another office in Boston, out of somewhat more than lOi risks, 4 vessels were captured by the British, of which 2 were con- demned for breach of orders in council ; 1 probably enemy's property, and 1 remained under adjudication. 1 captured and condemned by the l''rcnch ; and . 1 seized by them at Alicant, while they had the power there. 25 risks were undetermined ; and the remamder ended safely. Tiie premiums of insurance ha\e bden about eleven percent, to and iVom the West Indies, for the whole voyage. 7 per cent, from the West Indies, with cargo on board. 9 to K' percent, from Europe, if not violating British orders. 4 to 5 per cent, from Europe, against French capture only. By a statement received from Salem, on the correctness of Avhich 1 can rely, I find that in the district of Salem and Beverly, 22 vessels sailed, by the president's permission, between the 5th of April and the 10th of August. Of these vessels, one sailed to Sumatra, one to Senegal, and the rest to the different ports in the West Indies. Of the v.hole number, 1 returned leaky, and remained at home. 12 rLturned in safety ; and 9 reiiuiir.ed undetermined ; but it was not known that any of them had been detained or condemned by any foreign power. In all 22. Tlie iii=ur;mce on the Sumatra voyage, cut and home, w'as 14 per cent. 'appeal t* re littciulftl > principal ;h is of un* ice in Bos- in foreign oston, cap- e blockade •ality ; and one vessel 11 y to the British rc- 5erty. >t, about than 109 ■vvere con- f enemy's Lherc. 1 safely, er cent, to d. orders, inly. jctness of i Beverly, en the 5th e sailed to rts in the at any of gn power. e, was 14 Martinico, *) Huvanna, > Surinam, J The voyage out and home, 9 to 10 per cent. Huvatnia, at and from, 5 \ per cent. The premium of insurance from Calcutta to the United States, the hist summer and autumn, has been 8 per cent. Thus, Mr. President, we see that the risk on our foreign trade has been very little increased since the issuing of the Fr<'ich decree of Berhn, and the British orders in council. i'he gentlc.i.au from Maryland [Mr. Smith] asks— -What would have been the insurance on an American vessel bound to 1- vance . 1 am not informed. Perhaps 75 to 90 per cent, though it is not probable tliat our merchants would hazard their vessels on such a voyage, or that the underwriters would insure them. But what docs this prove ? Why, tliat the risk, under the British orders, is so great, in attempting to enter a port in France, as perhaps to amount to un actual blockade. I now beg leave, sir, to communicate the information I have recently received from the latter of the two merchants before re- ferred to*. Having requested of him the data on which his opinion before mentioned was founded, he has sent me an answer (dated the 23d instant^ from which I will read the material parts. He says, '' respecting the comparative trade of profound peace, .vnd ihe present moment, if the embargo should be removed, and the decrees and orders of council remain, it is a subject about which It is difficult to go into that detail which will show satisfac- torily an exact result : because, if you resort to the exports of a year in time of profound peace, and compare the aggregate with a year in war, the prices being so different, the difference in amount will not give the exact data we want. And to take the (luuntity of each article of export will not be satisfactory ; because in different years we export more of the same article to the same market, and in proportion to the increased quantity raised, or the goodness or badness of the crop. But of the fact I have no doubt, that onr trade would be much greater and more productive, if the embargo were removed, than it can be in time of peace : because when the colonial trade of the European powers is confined as usual, we cannot carry any kind of provisions to the colonies of any of them, without being subject to a heavy duty, nearly equal to a pronibition. And we are not allowed to bring away any thmg but rum and molasses ; and of course we lose the whole of the colonial trade, so far as respects importing any articles with a vie\f of exporting them again ; excepting only from the Isle of France, ancV Bourbon, which has generally been fiee. But we may be shut out there. The trade to the colonies is now free for all exports and imports with small duties. And if the largest and most na- tural European markets for the sale nf cslonial produce are Qcclud. ed, still we have open to us, all that the British have, and we can now carry those articles to Sweden, Spain, Portugal, Coast of Bar- • Mr. Thorndikc. 'I w bary, Turkey, Sidly, Sardinia and Malta j the three last of \vhid« are ports at which the articles sell high, and are bought for the purpose of smugj^ling over to the continent, where they are sent m great quantities. The following statement is then given, of the amount of our exports from the 30th of September, 1806, to September 30, 1807, (taken from the report of the secretary of the treasury) to ooun- tries and places other thar. those in Europe which are under the governmen: or controul, or in alliance with the French emperor ; all which are considered as shut up by the Urirish orders of council. Domestic exports (or of articles of the growth, } produce or manufacture of the United States}, ^ Foreign goods exported, .... To this may be added Spanish dollars, exported to India and China, and which are not noticed in the re- .port of the secretary of the treasury, and may be esti- mated at least at, S 36,109,991 ^4, r 40,495 60,230,480 6,00C,000 "^^ J>oIe amoimt, . . . 8 66,250,486 « This amount may be exported without being subject to the British orders of council : and the extra premiums against French ca/Huresy would not exceed the following rates, vi :. To Sweden, 2 per cent — Swedish and other West Indies, and the Spanish Main, 5 do.—Cape of Good Hope, 4 do— England, Scotland, without the Channel, say Liverpool, Greenock, Ireland, &c Sec. 4 do.— And within the Channel, 6 do.— Guern^jv, Jersey, &c. 5 do.— Gibraltar, 3 do.— Spanish ports in the Bay of Biscay, 6 do.— Spanish ports on the Atlanlic, 3 do— Spanish ports on the Mediterranean, 5 do.— Madeira, the Canaries, Fayal, and other Azores, 3 do— Portugal, 3 do.— Cape de Verd, 3 do.— Sicily, 5 do — Mwlta, 6 do.— China, 4 do Sumatra, 3 do — Spanish and Portuguese America, 3 do— Calcutta, and the Coast oi Coromandel and Malabar, 5 do— Africa, 4 do— Arabia, and Ked Sea, including Mocha, and Muscat, 4 do.— xManilla, 4 do — North West Coast of America, 2 do.— Halifax and Newfound- land, 1 do. " In time of profound peace, our trade might be fairly estimatea thus:— Domestic exfwrts. Foreiifn exfiorta ■ , . , 48,699,392 Nothing. To which may be added spe- ? In time of peace these cie to China and India, J ^>""">0^0 J S 54,699,592 must be so very in- considerable as to be unimportant in this . . statement. ^ This IS supposing the same domestic articles as were exported m 1806, and anowinp- them to be at th comparison stands thus a9t of whidi ight for the ley are sent ount of our er 30, 1 807, y) to coun- e under the 1 emperor ; s of council. , 36,109,991 ^4, 1 40,495 60,250,480 6,00C,00« 66,250,486 bjcct to the linst French Indies, and — England, )ck, Ireland, ^ jy, Jersey, T of IJiscay, li ports on Fayal, and •d, 3 do. — •a, 3 do. — d the Coast \rabia, and lla, 4 do. — Newfound- "f estimated n exfiorta hing. peace these 50 very in- ile us to be tiu in this % 66,250,486 54,699,592 ["e exported 30 that 11 Our exports, if the embargo were removed, would be • • • ' - * , n •*• *u Free from any embarrassment from the British drders in council. , , r- If peace were to take place, and the Lu- vopean nations assume their trade as usual ; and the prices of our domestic n nicies remain as the average prices in 1806, (which they would not) we should export, . . • I-eaving §11,550,894 less export trade in time of peace than we might now enjoy ;, and which amount is to be twice water-borne, once in importing it from the places of growth, and again in carrying it to the con- sumers : and of course would employ shipping appertaining to the carriage of one freight, equal in amount to more than twenty-threc millions, one hundred thousand dollars. '• As an evidence of the correctness of this statement, it wili be seen, by a recurrence to the statement of the secretary of the trea- sury for the year 1803, that the exports had fallen, in that short Peace, from S 93,020,5 13, to S 55,800,033. ^ , . c ^u « It is to be observed, that we might now enjoy a trade to bouth America and the Spanish Main, which might be estimated, at least, at from four to five millions of dollars, a considerable part of which would be again exported to Spain and Portugal, and wh.cn has never made any part of the secretary's report; because the trade to those countries has been prohibited until lately. It may also be remembered, that the export trade does not show the whole ad- vantage of the colonial trade which we might now enjoy ; because all we import for our own consumption ought to be added. FHere Mr. Lloyd slated, that in his opinion the value ot the trade which might now be prosecuted from the United States, consider- ing the present circumstances of the great nations of Lurope, would be as extensive as could be carried on after a general peace, and the adoption, by the European powers, of their restrictive colomal sys- ^^ On\his clear and interesting view of the commerce which the United States might carry on, were the ernbargo out of the way, no comments are necessary. The observations of the writer of the letter are evidences of his being master of the subject. ^ Mr. President, the gentleman from Virginia, [Mr. Giles] nas been pleased to attribute the discontents, in New England, espec- ally in Massachusetts, relative to the embargo, solely to the arts of rfm«§-o^'ues, who wish to get into office. . , . •* The gentleman from Connecticut noticed this reproach : but as it appeared to be levelled chiefly at leading citizens in Massachusetts, I tUl it to be my duty further to remark, that ot all the citizens of the United States, none stand more aloof from, none more detest the chAracter oi aeraugubuc^j wi«" w.o.^ \.^ ^x.^.i. -i— b- m tleman referred. I know tliose men who reprobate the embargo, and who, in convcrsat on, and in newspapers, express their senti- ments about it, or patronize thoKe who do. Thry are not seekir.g for offices ; many of them could not be persuaded to accept the best office in a president's gift ; but to save their country from the effects of measures, in their view, ahke ruinous and dist^raceful. They are men, sir, whose age, whose experience, whose know- ledge, whose wisdom, whose virtue, place them in the first rank of citizens. They are men, sir, ten of whom, had they been in Sodom, would have saved that city from destruction Among them was the immortal Amks, than whom a purer sp rit never left the earth, fie wrote while he had strength to hold a pen He died on the anniversary morning of the nation's birth -day— -and this was among his last prayers : () ! Save my country ! Gentlemen have said much about insurrection and rebellion ; and, in language not very concdiatory, pointe- all their allu- sions to the people of New Kngland. Other rulers pronounced them rebels, more than thirty years ago : while many then unborn now wish to cover themselves with their mantle, and to share the honors of the patriots of seventeen hundred and seventy-six. But why should gentlemen be surprised that great discontmts prevail in that country ; and that the legislatures, with a delibera- tion and solemnity which should command attention, have pro- nounced their opinions of the embargo ? Gentlemen will recollect that there the revolution began, of which Boston was the cradle. And if they will turn to the declaration of independence, they will find one of the reasons for the colonies' separating themselves from Great Britain, and renouncing the government of the king, was. their enacting laws ^' for cutting off our tradk with ALL PARTS OF THK WORLD." Mr. President, in ^ public document on our tables, we are told, that " after a period of twenty five years of peace, hardlv inter- rupted by transient hostilities, and of prosperity unparalleled in the history of nations, the United States are for the first time, since the treaty which terminated the revolutionary war, placed in a si- tuation equally difficult, critical and dangerous." That our country has enjoyed such unexampled prosperity, I readily agree : but the firencm is not the first time that these states have been placed in a dijjicult, critical^ and dangerous situation. '1 he gentleman from Connecticut yesterday noticed the most difficult crises. In l?^3, it ivquired all the firmness and immense popularity of president Washington, to s.em the torrent of popu- lar delusion, that was hurrying the United States into the vortex of the French revolution In 1794, the same steadiness, the same undeviating pprsuit of the public welfare, in spite of popular clamor and formal opposition, were necessary to institute a mission to Great Britain, to negotiate and settle with that government questions of the highest moment to these states, and which, if they remained much longer unsettled, might endanger the peace of the nation. That negotiation, committed 13 ; embargo, heir senti- nt seekiiig accept the y from the isi^racel'ul. ose know- first rank ey been in Among t never left pen He -day — and • rebellion ; their allu- ronounced leii unborn > share the ty-six. discontmts a delibera- have pro- 11 recollect the cradle. , they will hemselves the king, lDK with e are told, dly inter- :Ied in the me, since cd in a si- )sperity, I lese states tuation. the most immense ; of popu- vortex of pprsuit of pposition, ^otiateand It to these ed, might ommitted to the conduct of a statesman, than whom our country has pvo- duccf! not one more firm, more wise, or more upright, was, by his canduL ability and Ueckiiou, tirought to a happy conclusion, in fi wer mi'Ti'/m inau some more modern negotiations have occupied t/cara^ without being brought to any conclusion ; unless tlieir ultery(«7i 15 m1 mor«! list rat ion applica- hey been they not ;s ? VVas 1 because ons, and ioushj in» body po- ir causes, the high- 2 federal e of suc- ch I have that dur- ,vn to the unexam- lis period ts of com' her^ that illigerent ! of 1 794, VI r Jay's [inity was in Octo- od of her d at not Sior have pbliationii mxe. ' pxtended, :ontinued same un- id to the onimerce embargo. :al cause, cau^e has iistify this and then s or just, ht by the the secre- ;ht by her ' should be er of the ugh afteu- wftrds publicly and stoutly denied, they were believed ; and no gen- tleman here will now be inclined to doubt the fact. These reports, and the mystery which surrounded the recommendedenibargo, na- turally excited suspicions and alarms. Of the French papers supposed to be brought by the Revenge, none were communicated to ( ongress, save a letter dried Septem- ber 24, 1807, from General Armstrong to M. Champagny, and his answer of the Tth of October, relative to the Berlin decree, and a letter from Regnier, minister of justice, to Champagny, giving the emperor's interpretation of that decree. These three papers, with a newspaper copy of a proclamation of the king of Great Britain, issued in the same October, were all the papers communicated by the president to congress, as the grounds on which he recommend- ed the embargo. These /lafitrs, he said " shewed the grmi and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen and mer- chandise were "threatened on the high seas and elsewhere, from the belligerent powers of Europe." . . As to the proclamation of the king of Great Britain, requiring the return of his subjects, and particularly the seamen, from foreign countries, it was no more than every government has a nght to issue, and commonly does issue, in time of war. This proclama- tion contained no evidence of increasing danger to " our seamen ;" ' on the contrary, if i mistake not (for I have not the proclamation by me) there was a solemn, public injunction to his naval officers to conduct impressments with increased caution and care. So that impressments would probably rather be dimirished than increased. Let us now examine the three other papers, all of which, as 1 have noticed, and as gentlemen i-emember, related to the decree of No- vember 2 1 , 1 806. This decree was issued at Berlin, by the French emperor, at the moment when, inflated with more than ordinary ar- rogance and pride, he was sitting in that capital of the Prussian monarchy, just then subverted by his arms. The first article declared all the British Isles in a state of block- ade. This, according to its terms, subjected to capture and con- demnation a'; -eutral vessels bound to and from British ports: but it seems to have been held in a state of suspence. But another ar- ticle, declaring " all merchandise belonging to England, or coming from its manufactories and colonics (although belonging to neu- trals) to be lawful prize," was to be carried uito execution. Such was the decision of the emperor as stated by his minister of jus- tice on the 18th of September, 1807, in his letter to Champagny. This decision coming to the knowledge of general Armstrong, he, on the 24th of September, wrote to Mr. Champagny, and asked " whether it was the emperor's intention to infract the obligations of the treaty subsisting between the United States and the French empire." Mr. Champagny in his answer of the 7th of October, inclosing the letter of the minister of justice, with wonderful assur- , v^ 1 « i ^,- *u«* '.f uToe nQcir in rprnnrile the e.x- ance, tens genera: y*ri::suun|^, wi^n. -- ,t,„^ -....■.; — .„_. . ^ ecution of the decree with the observance of treaties I although iiothing was more obvious, (as Mr. Madison on the 8th of February 16 last, wrote to general Armstrong) than that it violated as well the positive stipulations of our treaty with France, as the incontestable principles of public law. Id the European ^jorts, under the emperor's controul, and even in neutral ports, the decree was ric^orously executed. AtkI although it is said there was no formal decision in the French council of prizes, condemninj; American property, under the decree, till the 1 6th of October, 1807 ; yet Mr. Madison states, as early as the 22d of May, 180r, [in his letter of that date to general Armstrong] that " there were proofs that tne French West India privateers had, u/id-r colour of the edict [the Berlin decree.] coinniiited depredations" on our commerce. And moreover, that Spain '^ avowedly pursuing the ex- ample and the views of the French emperor," had issued a similar decree, and even in broader terms, which, " if not speedily recalled or corrected, would doubtless extend the scene of spoliations already begun in that quarter." Such were the French papers in this case. And now let us see the amount of" the great and increasing dangers which threat- ened our vessels, our seamen and iperchandisc." In the letter of February 8, 18*8, from Mr. Madison to general Armstrong, speaking of the Berlin decree, and the emi>eror's de- cision thereon, Mr. Madison says, " The conduct of the French government, in giving this extended operation to its decree, and indeed in issuing one with such an apparent or doubtful import, against the rights of the sea, is the more extraordinary, inasmuch as the inability to enforce it on that element, exhibited the measure in the light of an " empty menace .'" And in his letter of the 25th of March, l$08, toMr. Erskine, Mr. Madison, speaking of the same decree, says, that France was without tht vuana to carry it into effect against the rights and obligations of a yu-utral nation. Thus then we see the president's '' great and increasing dangers with which our vessels, our seamen and merchandise were threat- ened on the high seas and elsewhere, "from the French decree and its extended operation, rested on what he, through his secretary Mr. Madison, has since pronounced " an empty menace," a pro- ject " which France had not the means to carry into effect !" Shall I be told, Mr. president, of the British orders of council? and that they were comprehended in the president's view of the great and increasing dangers to which our commerce was exposed ? If that were the fact, was it not his duty to give such information of them as he possessed, to the nate i He gave none. I know that those orders.were afterwarda pressed into his service to justify the measure : and still later it has been confidently said '» that those, orders stood in front of the real causes of the embargo:" And yet they v/ere invisible to the senaie. What ! the great., the o/icrative cause of the embargo, " before which all other motives sunk into insignificance," not sj^en, not known to the senate ? Nor. glanced at by the president in his message, nor intimated to any of the members who were honored with his confidence, and by them to the senate ? - • ' 1'7 13 well the ontestable and even 1 although I ol prizes, he 1 6th of d of May, lat " there id't' coLjur s" on our ng the ex- 1 a similar y recalled poliations let us see ch threat- to general eror's de- le French :cree, and il import, inasmuch i measure f the 25th ng of the ;o carry it- ion. §• dangers :re threat- ecree and secretary :," a pro- • f council ? e\v of the exposed ? formation I know to justify iid '» that iibargo :'* g-rfo/, the r motives ate ? Not. I to any of \ by them But from reasoning I will recur to written proofs, furnished by the president himself, and now on our tables. In Mr Madison's letter to Mr. Pmkney, the president s mmis- tcr in London, dated December 23, 1807, the next day after the act lavinK an embargo was passed ; and this after it had under- gone three days of earnest opposition in the house of representa- lives during which it behoved the father of the measure, and his friends, to furnish every possible argument to silence opposition, and to satisfy the nation of its expediency and necessity. ...after all this, Mr Madison, in that letter, tells Mr. Pinkney, that « the/.o- /rev and the causes of the measure are explained in the message itself " The contents of the message (comprehendmg the papers it referred to) I have already stated : and the statement demon* strates, that they were not the causes or motives of the embargo : for an " empty menace," a decree vMhont the weans of carrying it into effects could be no cause, no motive for a measure, whose av^v. ed object was « to save our vessels, our seamen, and merchandise from GREAT and INCREASIKG DANGERS." -j ^ , ^ Sir, let all the documents laid on our tables by the president be examined, and you will not find ontj in which he hazards the asser- tion, that the British orders of November 1 1th were known to him at the time he recommended the embargo, or that an expectation o them determined his recommendation. It was not until the 2d ot February, when they had been officially communicated by the Bri- tish minister, that he offered them to congress *; as a farther proof of the increasing dangers to our navigation and conimerce, which led to the provident measure of the act laying an embargo. And Mr. Madison, in his letter to Mr. Pinkney, of February 19, 1808, cautiously avoids ascribing the origin of the embargo to the British ^•ders ; though, he says, the probability ot such decrees was among the considerations which " enforced" the measure ; the language of the British gazettes, with other indications, having (he said) left little doubt that such orders were " meditated. And he adds, that "the appearance of these decrees (meamng the Bri- tish orders) had much efiect in reconciling all descriptions amonr> us to the embargo." . ,r -i» ,• » i„„+ But I must notice the change of languag. m Mr. Madison's last letter In that of December 23d to Mr. Pinkney, he says, ' the policy and the causes of the embargo are explained m the President s message." But in his letter of February 19th, he says, « my last (that of December 23d) inclosed a copy of the act of embargo, and explained the fioUcy of the measure ;" leaving out" causes, and introducing the unknoivn British orders as among the considerations which enforced it. _ . . r The president, loo, in his answer to the Boston petition for sus- pending the embargo, says,«or that the Britisj. o^'^/^Jff^^^X V.exishl the time when the embargo was laid ; but only that /// y . . ^.L_ j_* f »v.a 1.1W ' frnm which thc unwai'V reader might suppose that they were knotm to exist at that date. From all these considerations, it appears to be demonstrated, that thc British orders in council of November llth, 1807, were 3 18 II not known, and that the uewapaper rumors coucernrng them ucvu entered into the views of the president and congress, as a motive ior laying the embargo. And here the well known maxim applies, oc non afi/iarcntibm et non exmendbm cadevi eat lex. Althouj^h the British orders were in existence, yet as they were not knovjti to exiat^ ihey Were, as to the embarj^o, non-entities. Theconclusionft resulting frtim the facts and circumstances which J have collected and compared, are serious and alarming. They demonstrate, that the representation, in the president's message re- '•ommending the embargo, Was delusive, calculated to lead congresi^ mtothe behet that the situation of the United States, in relation to trance und England, was extremely perilous, requiring the instant adoption of the measure recommc-ulcd. And as congress did adopt It, enactmg the law recommended, it must be presumed that they believed an embargo Was necessary to preserve our vessels, our sea- men and merchandise, from great and increasing dangers, with which the message stated that they were threatened. It also follows, as no subsequent disclosure has been made of other dangers knowh at the time the message was .communicated, that the real cause or motive for the embargo has been^ and yet is^ veiled fro >i the eye of Congress and the nation. M. Champagny's letter of October 7, (one of the papers com- municated with the president's message) requifes examination, liut I should hrst remark, that during the years 1806, and 180r» m order to reduce England, by destroying her commerce^ the French oniperor, m execution of, and in the spirit of his Berlin decree, ordered all English merchandise to be seized and confiscated, in every place on the European continent, enemy or neutral, occu- pied or which should be occupied by the Ei-ench armies. For this imrpose, and as one instance among many, his troops took posses- sion ofthecity of Hamburg (a city with which American merchants carried on a large and valuable commerce, and which as neutral was entitled to the same exemption from hostile violence as the ferntory of the United States) and by the emperor's orders, Bour- iienne, his accrecWted minister to that free city, addressed a note to Its senate, in Avhich, having stated that every person who traded on the cdntinent in English merchandise, seconded the views of En- gland, and ought to be considered as her accomplice ; and that a great portion of the inhabitants of Hamburgh were in that predica- ment, and notoriously attached to England ; the emperor caused possession to be taken of their city, and his Berlin decree to be car- ried mto rigorous execution. Accordingly, that minister, in obedi- ence to the emperor's orders, among other outrages, declared, "All English merchandises that may be found in the city, in the harbour, or on the territory of Hamburg, no 7natter to 'mhom they belong, shall be confiscated.'* This was done so early as the 24th of November, ] 806, on^y three days after the Berlin decree was issued. With equal atrocity the emperor caused to be seized and seques- tered the vessels and cargoes of neutrals which were brought into, or voluntarily resorted to the ports of France for purpose^ of lawful trade. And we know from a source which will not be questioned, 11) ig tbcuvucvti is, as a motive laxim appJies, Althoiij^h the inoivn to ejiistf stances which Tiing. They 's message re- Icad congres-s in relation to ng the instant ress did adopt ned that they ssels, our sea- rs, with which een made of iminimicated, '«) and yd is^ papers corn- examination. •6, and 1807, •, the French eriin decree, >nfiscated, in eutral, occu- 28. For this took posses, in mercJiants 2h as neutral )Ience as the irders, Bour- sed a note to ho traded ou iews of En- ; and that a hat predica- >eror caused ee to be car- er, in obedi- clared, "All the harbour, belongs shall November, d. and seques- rought into, ie§ of lawful questione,d, tliMt their liijcration was hopeless ; because they w,.rc ue complete : of England world) con- in language ranks, with imperor had of the same I. fiut the at an open smmerce, at they woulil ihed only by liich I have e Revenge ; Vashington, and oi> the Four days .AN ! go ; tlie re- . The ma- usions gen- be pursued h the repeal te sacrificed nto its pre- he embargo the cause of pledged for