>>. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // ^/ ,erty and civil rights, had virtually abolished the Habeas Corpus and given up the Canadians tp the rule of Lettres de Cachet and arbitrary imprisonment; yet if we barely cast our eyes on the statute we shall be convinced that the Britii^h Parliament when it rjiivoked the Proclamation of the 7t}i of % October, 1763, repealed the English criminal law* for a meie instant of reason, since it enacted that they should continue to be administered, to the exclusion of all others. But if the Habeas Corpus laws were part of the English criminal laws introduced by the Proclamation of the 7th of October, 1763, how can they not be comprised in the same cri* ininal laws which arc to continue to bo administered in virtue of the statute of 1774 ? Are not the criminal laws of the proclamation and the criminal laws of the statute the same ? I say then, that the English Statute 31 Charles I(, chnp. 2, was introduced into this Province by the British Statute of 1774 ; I say that the common law of England, modified and improved by the several statutes relating to the Writ of Habeas Corpus, became the law of Canada by the same act of legislation ; and that our Provincial Le- gislature has recognized the English Habeas Corpus Act as the law of this Province ; and since there has been done nothing to repeal these fundamental laws of civil liberty in this Province, they exist at this Boment in their full vigor, unless their suspension be the legal result of the ordinance passed by the Governor and Special Council on the 8th of November last. The learned Counsel for the Queen produces this ordinance to me as a law, adverse to the claim of Celestin Houde and which I am bound to obey : the learned counsel for the prisoner, on the contrary, assures me that this ordinance has not suspended the Habeas Corpus intro- duced with the Criminal Laws of England by the statute of 1774, and moreover that I cannot obey this ordinance without violating an Act of Parliament, and he reads the statute 1 Victoria, chap. 9, as containing d clause that annuls the ordinance. Thus am I placed between the grave inconvenience of rejecting an ordinance, probably useful, perhaps necessary, of the Provincial authority, &nd the inconvenience at least as great of contravening an Act of the Imperial Parliament. In this perplexity as in ail the intricate questions daily presenting themselves befure the Judges, there are, happily, certain fixed principles which being applieJ give the light and lead to the truth. To ascertain pre- cisely the extent of obedience, we need only find o^t the precise extent of authority, the one being necessarily the measure of the other — an au- thority without limits requires an obedtfince vithout bounds ; but when the power is limited, its boundaries are^^lso the bounds of obedience* ' i-. There are in everj governnR«n We may class amongst the subordinale anthorrties of this emplM those Legislatures which have been establislied in several British <^»> nies and Provinces by divers Acts of Parliamentt with powers defined and limited by those acts. Such subordinate Legiiilatures may de all that which does not exceed the boundaries given to their powers by lh«> supreme authority, but beyond those limits they can do nothing. This applies to every limhed authority. Thus, when a Judge or Tribu- nal has exceeded the bounds of its jurisdiction, thetbing is very corro(!fly said to have been done coram non jndice ; but the application «f this rule is of urgent necessity when the subordinate autliority is at (he satn6 time an exceptional one, extra ordmem^ such as the existing LefislaluM of this Province, grounded upon the temporary euspension of the tight which appertains to every British subject, to obey no otfher laws lliaa such as he has constitutionally consented to. Governed by those principles, a Ju4ge tinds in «A Act ni Partia- ment the reason and the rule of his decision : *tis enough for hfm to understand, and ho obeys it; bat in deciding npon fhe ordinance oTm subordinate Legislature, the Judge has a double duty to performs Ho must peruse the ordinance, to ascertain what hi commands, and lie cannot do otherwise than examine the aot which constttotes ihe in/boTA- nate Legislature and the limils thereby given to k*s powen, for if ft 'hat exceeded those limits, whatever transcends them ^has been ordained without legislative power: but w4ien hall be iccpt in wifo custody wiilioiii bail or mainpii/.e during (lie continliHiice of ihis ordi* nunc(>, and Um( dining the same continnancci no Judge or Justice of tliK Peace shall bail or try any person so committed, without an order from (IiH Governoi with the advice of llie Elxecutive Couucili any laVi ordinance or statute to the contrary notwilhstandingk The suspension of the Provincial Ordinance 24 Qeorge IITt ch. %% seems to admit of no diflTiculiy, and will not occupy us any more ; but the learned counsel for the Petitioner argues, that notwithstanding that suitpension and the terms of the first clause of the ordinance under con- sideration, his client cannot be deprived of the Writ of Habinu Corpu* he prays for ', according to his view, the statute 1 Victoria, chap. 9, has the ('fleet of annulling that clause, which of itself enacts r- thing directly ngainst the Habeas Corpus : and in fact, the same sioii of the Act of the PaiTiaiiMMTt of Gn'ai Briiaiii 14 Grorgn IIL cha|i. 8<3, a snspension that woiil() be imiII accoriiog to ilie tHruK of the constituting statute, 1 Victoria cliap. 9. But it suffices iu the pre- sent state of the case, toadjudi^e that ootwiihstandinu the su«pRiision of the Provincial Oidinance 24 George lit. chap. 1, thero are still cxi^t* ing in this Pruviucc, by force of tho British statute of 1774, laws in virtue of which tlie subjects of the Quee!>, being deprived of their liberty on a criminal accusation, liave a ri^ht to a revisal of ihe catises of their imprisonment, by V/ ni of Habeas Corpus; and this I do adjudge, after mature examination, saving the questions that may follow. For the Ordinance 2 Victoria, chap. 4, has only suspended the Ordi- nance 24 George II [. chop 1. It did not, nor could suspend the Bri- tish statute of 1774, or the criminal laws of tingland which it bus estd« blishfd in this Province. Very loud cries have been uttered about the circumstances of the country, the danger of a collision between the Executive and Legisla- tive authorities, and the Judicial powers has been painted in lively colours. We have been told that in times of rebellion the laws are dead, and the learned Counsel for the Queen has said, tbit ilie weal of the state, that necessity, was the supreme law which every thing* must obey. I grant that the circumstances of the country are difficult, but let the law giver look to circumstances ; the Judge looks to the law : and if rebellion has killed the law in another part of the province, it cannot be charged with the legicide in the District of Three-Rivers, for there has been norebeHion, no sedition, not the smallest popular commotion in this happy and peaceful part of the Province. To anticipate the collision spoken of by the learned Counsel for the Queen would be presuming against law, and I do not consider myself at liberty to enter* tain such a presumption. I assure myself that my judgment if erro' neous, will be corrected by a legal authority superior to mine : and if it be not vacated in a judicial way, I make myself equally sure that il will receive ii*s ejwcution, and will be respected by all the aiUhorities- •f tbe country. n The greatest public ^ood, the most pressing necessity in my opinion is, ihiit we shotilil respect the laws, even when they tliwart our desires and resist uiir viewer for lawo are ihn ronitiiun salV'gurirl of govern* nieiitii hihI of natiuMs, and there can exist no society or government witlioui ilieiii. Tht* learned Counsel for the Queen, who has had ilip modesty of statint; his Hrgumenis in ilu.> shape of doubt", lost iiothiu(> by it, for I on my pail have coiisidend h s doubts as weighty objecMious. Upon una of llieni in particular I aui anxious to satisfy hiui. I uieau that which makes hiiu fear that according to the terms of the Provincial Statute 34 George Hi. chap. 2, I,as judge of Three Rivers, should be disabled to grant a writ of Habeas Corpus in criminal matters. I think the fears of the learned Coimsel wdl vanish if he will take the trouble to cast his eye on the Provincial Statute 10 and 11 George IV. chap. 22, clause 2, by which it is enacted, that the Resident Judge of the District of Three Rivers shall have and possess therein all the jtu-isdiciion, powers, auihoriiy of which the Justices of the Courts of King's B.-nch of the Districts of Quebec and Montreal are Invested in the said DiMricts respecii\el)' by any laws in force in this Province, aiid also all the powers, jurisdiction and auihoiity which were then vested in liie Pro vincial Judges of this District. I am therefore of opinion that there exist in this Province Habeas Corpus Laws in criuiinal matters, which are inaccessible to the powers of the existing Provincial Legi>lature, and [ hold that the Resident Judge has all the jurisdiction required to carry those laws into execu- tion : therefore 1 grant to Cclesiiu Uoude the Writ of Habeas Corpus which he asks of lue. 1 i u St «i It' I IS MONDAT. 7th January 1839. On Petition of Joseph Guillaame Barlhe, for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. Mr. Justice Rolland on giving Judgment, spoke as follows : — ON the Petition of Joseph Gulllaume Bnrtho for a Jluheas Corput : hit imprisonment being on a charge of treasonable practices. Messrs. Vezina and Dunioulin, of Counsel for the Queen, have been heard : they have argued agiinst the application, and grounded themselves on the Ordinance of the Admini>uator of Government and his Special Council, of the 8ih November, chap. 4, which suspeiids the Habeas Corpus. It would seem that this ordinance onght to pMt an end to the dis- cussion, for it is formal, and forbids the Judges from b tiling individuals accused as is the prisoner: but the prisonei's Ciiiinsel coiiiend that notwhhstanding this Ordinance and it's iiijiinciions, the Judge ought to award the Habeas CV^n«, because the existing Logixhiure which is exceptional, has exceeded ii's powers, and thit whiievcr it has done or ordered beyond it's attributions is ipso jure null. That an Ordinance of • subordinate Legislature, to be valid, niiisi be aniliori/.ml by ii*s char- ter, and that the existing Legislature was cioaied merely as a lonipo- rary substitute, with very limited powers, for the Ctmsiitutional Legis- lature. It is therefore stated in opposition, that the Imperial Statute 1 Victoria, chap. 9, contains a proviso concluding in these words :— •• nor shall it be lawful, by any such law or ordinance, to repeal, sus- pend or niter any provision of nny Act of the PnrliMMOt of X2f«nl M 14 ■■'} ** Britain or of the Parliament of the United Kingdom, or of any Act of ** the Legislature of Lower Canada, as now constituted, repciiling or altering any such Actof Pniliiunent," and th;ii the Ordiniince in quKs- tion suspends the RfTectof an Act ofUiL' lin)M>ri>it l*'irli imenl, byiihiT- ing the Criminal Lhws uftlu' cunniry, \vhi<-h can nut br. ReleKMice is made first to the Staliiie 31 Charit's II. rhip. 2, calh'd iIih Habnas. Corpus Act, and next (o iIim 6iatnie 14 Georgu 111. wliicli, it is said, lias ititiuduced the Criiniiiai Laws uf b^iigland into (his Cuiiiitry : tiiusu two arts, it is coi tended, aro nut nor can be re|i«.'Hk>d : thuy aie still in full force : tlify allow the Habeas Corpus prayed (or, which the Judge cannot refuse. And liereaiiscse\'eral important questions: and the first is mooted by the officer of the Crown, who mainiaiuA that thu Jud^e cannot pro- nouiice in opposition to this Ordinance, which is an Act of (he acknow ledged L(>gi>l>tiurc, (he oidy one exis(inj> in the Province ; and that all ii*s Oidinancesare law: that (hey must be obeyed though it were even true that the Legislature had exceeded ii's powers and transcended itV attributions. If (his proposidon is true, all a Judge has to do is to read the Ordinance, to understattd ii*s meaning and conform to it. .It .1) ■J Without entering into a discussion of this question as if it concerned an Act of thu Imperial Parliiuient of the supreme and sovereign Le- gislature, 1 ought to say in this place, that a Judge might, in cerirtiii cases, be called upon to examine wheiher the existing Ijegislatiiro of Lowei Canada, created by Act of Pailiameni, which might be compared to a Commission or Charier us was [traciised in the old binglish Co^ lonit's, ^<4.j authorising (he Governor with a maiori(y of a Council of not le>s (h in five members, to pass certain laws and n) others, has ex- ceeded ii*s poweis. It is not (he first time that English tribunals have adjudged in a similar case. The reason is very plain. There is a de- legation of power from (he sovereign Legislature, all that has been done by the delegate without being authorised, is ipso jure null. And to make (he thing more palpable, and show that there is in this no ano- maly, let us suppose thu case of an Ordinance emanating from our pre- seni Leuislature. In its preamble it rehearses as its authority, the Sta- tute which created it. On referring to it we see that Her Majesty is thereby authorised to constitute, 6y Contfnmio^, a Special Council for the affairs of Lower Canada, with a majority of which U shall be lawful i 1ft for the Governor to mnke laws for the welfare and good government of tliH Province. As the Ordinance refers to the Imperinl Statute, it is as if it were insrrit'd word for word thrrfMU. Now Wft cannot omit the clauses that restrain the poweis which it cuiifti's. Let ks now snopose that this Ordinance should establisli an iiMpost absolniely inohibiied, sliali it be said that when thn legality of this inipixt comes to be tried before a tribunal, the Judges must read no more of the ordinance than what it commands, wiihitut remarking that it refers to the Act of it*ii constitution which, as it pi-ohibits iIik imposing of tax. s, necessarily annuls whatever contravenes this prohibition ? No : the proposition of the Counsel for the Ciowii is i!Ot founded on princi|)le. There may be cases where the Judge could not refrain from declaring null an Or- dinance or part of an Ordinance which evidently was without the power or attributions of the present local Legislature. Hut certis^ to Justiiy the Judge, the case nmst bv of the utmost evidence ; and then to judge thus is agreeable to law. He could not read the Ordinance without finding virtually recited in it, the Statute that created the Council, or without perceiving therein the limits given to thiit power, and beyond which It can do nothing. He could not but see that the Impeiial Act declares null whatever shall be done contrary to its provisions ; and he, the Judge, when he pronounces the nullity of the Ordinance, does no more than declare a nullity previously pronounced by the Imperial Statute, which to him is the supreme law. But let us proceed ; let us see whethet such be the case ; whether the Governor and his Council have fallen into this error ; 1 have sup* posed, whether notwithstanding the prohibition of the Imperial Sia-- tute, by suspending the Habeas Corpus^ they have suspended the effect of an Act of the Imperial Parliament. The question is delicate, and for a Judge in such a case to resolve against acknowledging the injunctions of an Ordinance, however subordinate the Legislature may be, it needs that he be very strong in his reasoning, and that he find in the Ordinance ph infringement of the laws which he is bound to admi- nister. I will therefore examine the question, referring first to the Statute 31 Charles IL chap. 2, and to judge rightly, it will be well to know what was this Statute ; did it introduce un droit nouveau ! Can it be considered as appUcal>le to. the Colonies of Great Bri- tain? ■fj 16 Th« preamble shews that it did not kitTod««e the Haheai Corpm which existed al common law. But it prnvich-s more cffectiially for the exercise ot'lhal right of the Eiigli>h stibjfct which is ess»Miii;il (or ihe proteciiun of his libeiti«'s, d ml for iln; expciiiion of ihf VVrii oi' Habeas Corpus whiMi il h!i> biin issued: it rstabli^JKS riilos for ihe Jinlgos as well MS for all olher persons concernefl, and also penahies in case of in- fringing ii*s pmvisions. This Act was passed in express terms (ot England and Wales* In Canada, previous to the Stnlnte of 1774, the subjoct might be entitled to the Habeas Corpus without ii's bein^ necessary to infer that the Siatnte 31 Charles II. chap. 2, was in force in the country, any more than the regnlaiions and pena'ties which it established fur England* And such is my opinion. (/^.) Let ns now see whether this Statute 31 Charles IT. chap. 2, was introduced into Canada by the Statute of 1774. Th's is the llih clause which has been cited. It will be Well to read it with attention in order to give it ii*s effect* •• And whereas the certainly and leniiy of the criminal law of Eng* *' land, and the benefits and advantages resulting from the use of il " have been sensibly fell by the inhabitants from an experience of more ** than nine years, during which it has been uuifoniily administered, ** Be it therefore enacted that the same shall continue to be adminis- ** tered, and shall be observed as law in the Province of Quebec, as ** well in the description and quality of the offenee as in the method of ** prosecution and trial and the punishment and forfeitures, &c.** Certainty, the Statute 31 Charles IT, chap. 2, is not introdvtced nominatimt but we are told it was virtually so, as being part nf the crioiinal laws of England, when the statute (of 1774) was passed^ The right of Habeas Corpus is not of criminal or of civil law, properly speaking; it is the consequence of that protection which the laws afford an English subject fur his personal liberty, which mny be' assailed by arrest for a crime or without any crioiiual charge what* •▼er. (C,) t Wiih respect to the Statute 31 Charles II, chap.S, I shall say tha^ 'no. fur a supposing of any thing else. (Z>.) s as ■..S^fi Surelv, one mav conceive the introduction of the cl'iminal law in '■ the terms of that clause, without the introduction of \Vhat was qualified - the Habeas Corpus Act, which has regulated for England the manner' of using and enforcing the privilege of An Engli>h subject to be brought^ before tbn Judge in case of arrest for crime, and which in order to its ' becoming law in Canada, ought, it seems to me, to have been especially ni'dnlioned; and it ought even to have been said that it was introduced ''■ as far as it might be applicable.(£) If there be any doubt in the general proposition, the statute seems to resist our considering as introduced into Canada any more of the criminal law than what is formally men- tioned in the clause, t/ui ditit deunOnegatde altera. Moreover, it appears to me that the Legislature intended merely to continue the <^xi$tence of the criminal laws, as they had prevailed in Canada since the Proclamation of 1763. Now the Habeas Corpus Att 31 Charles It, chap. 2, was not in fui^ce, but there was the right or privilege of this writ in virtue of the common law ; this is the utmost that can be > said. But what, if the statute is not susceptible of becoming law in' Canada, if like many other statutes it was passed solely for England, and though it may be considered as forming part of the criminal law there, it cannot receive it's application elsewhere? See the clauses 8, 5, 10, 11 and 12. All those clauses are Only applicable to England. 11 is on this account, no doubt, that it became necessary to pass a law ' in Canada, in imitation of the English statute, but the provisions whereof in regard of localities, are necessarily different, (i^) But it is said : suppose the statute 31 Charles II, chap. 2, is not the statute infringed upon by the ordinance ; has it not transgressed the' ■ C • ' it »!" •i> ri1 • 1 h Statute of 1774 by suspenciing for a time the criminal laws introchced by that statute 'i This question is already answered. Can it be said that the suspending of the Habeas Corpus is ? suspension of the code of Cngh'sh criminal laws confered upon us ? Does it imply any thing repugnant to the English criminal law such as we hate it ? Can th^ right of Habeas Corpus be conceived without there bting joined to it a co-existing right in the Legislature of the country, of suspending it in certain cases, such as thai of open rebellion ? But it is added, whatever affects the criminal law, destroys the Imperial Act of 1774 by which it was introduced as a code into Canada. It may be said in answer that the statute did not introduce the crimina'I laws of England, but said they should continue to be in force. One might as well say that it introduced the civil laws, and that no change can he made therein without an in- fringement of the Imperial statute. I cannot persuade myself thnt in prohibiting the repeal, suspension or alteration the provisionsof acts of the Imperial Parliament, it was intended to prevent all legislation on tHv sifbject either of the civil or of the ciiminal code of the country. (GJL Representations were made in Englafnd against the act of 1774, and whatever may have been the motives of those who made them, and the ' reasons, good or bad, given by them in relation to the Habeas Corpus, it Would appear to have been the general opinion, in Canada as iln England^ that the Habeas Corpus Act was not in force. It is even mentioned that in the debates at the passing of the act of 1774, it was {fropused to insert a clause for introdncing the Habeas Cort^uSf but that it was rejected by the House of Commons, (this fact is of a nature to be substantiated) but I have no need of recurring thus far, and I take the ordinance of 1784. Does not this act of the legislation of the time explain itself on this subject? In a problematical question, I thinft myself much assisted when I have the opinion of the Legislature. This^ ordinance declares that it's object is to introduce the Hai>eas Corpus which existed in England in virtue of the common law ('which it says, H the right of every British subject in that Kingdom) such are it*8 terms. Ii also explains itself in it's preamble. We see that the Legislature is introducing un droit noiiwcatt.aright which up toihat time, England had' been reluctant to allow, as wo find was the case with the other Englis* Cdodies before that time. They had the common law of England, the criminal law of England, and they had not, according to the opinions of the Officers of the Crown, the law of Habeas Corpus or any corres- j 'i iti' 19 Djomding l^w* It W94ild seei|i then, that the one might exist without the other.(/l) To pronounce the contrary, I must put my sense in opposition to the general opinion of that period, and wherefore 1 To find fault wiiii an ordinance of the present time, which' in itself, has nothing but what is useful, and to make which the Governor ought in my opinion to have been empowered, if in truth he has not by the Imperial Statute 1st Victoria. | It is therefore without difficulty that I adopt the opinion that tl^ •fdinauce of 1784 is the Habeas Corpus law of this country. I proceed l&irther, and will sny that we must consider it a^ such, because it was passed with the formal intention of introducing and regulating that right. What need have we to ascend any higher % Is it usual in case of a new code, to refer to any part of the old which is comprised in the new t After the ordinance of 1784, ought we to occupy ourselves with the statute 31 Charles II, chap. 2, or to cite it in any way ) Well, tifis ordinance, the only one whi h in 1838 was the Habeas Corpus \9yf in Canada, has been suspended ; and it might be> How revive an o.l4 statute which, in my opinion, ceased to operate upon the passing of thqi ordinance which was substituted in it^s stead, if it was ever in force x% the country, which is more than doubtful. (/) This manner of looking at the subject is the more satisfactory to me as the legality of this year's ordinance happens not tp be a question. I will add another observation. How can it be conceived that th^ Governor and his Council should have a rio^ht to suspend tho ordinanc9 of 1784, and that by this means there would spring up an old statute as if purposely to defeat the wholesome purposes of the new ordinance ? But this cannot be, for although the ordinance of 1784 be suspended,, it is nevertheless a law, and an existing law, it disables us from cousiderit^ tlie old law, the force of which it has destroyed by incorporating i| within its own legislation. It cannot even be said that this is like the case of the Militia Act, which, by expiring, is said to havo caused the revival of the old ordinances to which it had been substituted. {Ky But I must not forget to mention the statute of 1812. This law recog> nizes the statute of Charles II, as in force in this country, for it directs that all the provisions of the act shall apply to all Writs of Habeas Corpus issued, as well in virtue of the Act 31 Charles II, as under t\ie. Provincial Ordinance of 1784. It is expressly said : one cannot deny it. 1 20 1 1 ' 111. We are then at ihh day to pronounce that ^hfi Provhicial Legisiatuce in 1812 was in error, and certainly it is with pjgmsibility that this decla- ration of the statute is relied upon as a rule for the interpretation of ther statute of 1774. It is added that several Writs of Habeas Corpus have been awarded under the Imperial Act, which is an additional authority. But we have a conflict of legislative authorities. The ordinance of 17S4 gives clearly to understand that it introduces un droit nouveau. The statute of 1812 says that this was an unnecessary trouble, since we the benefit of the Act 3L Charles II, and last, an ordinance passed within these few days, tells us that that statute never was in force in this country. (L) In such a case, a Judge must be free to form and follow his opinion, and I will abide by my first idea, which is that the statute Char'es II, was never a law in this country. It ought also to be observed that the statute of 1812 only mentions it incidentally, as if to give the law it*s eflect in every possible case o( Habeas Corpus. (Ji) My opinion, as is apparent, does not rest in any right in the Executive to silence the laws in time of rebellion. I cannot recognize that principle which has been relied on. It would, at most, apply to the case of the laws being silent of themselves, because they cannot be administered, and martial law is enforced, and this only in the case of necessity as when the tribunals are unable to act. I ought to say th:it I should not have arrived so promptly to the determination of refusing such a writ as the Habeas Corpus^ particularly after the decisions which have been given on tho same question, if I had not since its agitation seriously applied myself to it. The Judges who have given a contrary opinion did it with regret, and it could not but be so. More fortunate, 1 adjudicate in favour of a legislation, that of the suspension of the Habeas Corpus, in case of rebellion, which in many cases becomes absolutely necessary for the salvation of the state. (Mr. Justice Rolland has revised and corrected this Translation of his Speech.) (A.) In most Charters there was a restriction from making a:;y law contrary or repugnant to the laws of England : in that of Canada in 1838 there is a proviso against passing any in opposition to any Act of the Imperial Parliament, see 2d vol. of Chalmer^s opinion, p. 27, 28„ 29, 30, 31. 21 NOTES. The Inhabitants of Canada were entitled to the mbeas Corpus^ anterior to the year 1774, namely, in virtue of the English laws intro- duced by the Proclamation of the 7th of October 1763 : now the same Statute The Statute of 1774» by confirming the inhabitants of Canada ii^ the enjoyment of the Criminal laws of England, has given force of law in this Province not only to the Common Luw of England as it relates to Criminal matters, but alun tq^ |ll {kf $t«tVtes of England which treat of the same matters. Thus the provision in Magna Charta, *' that na free man shall bt '• taktn or imprisoned^ or disseised of his freeholds or of his liberties •* or free customs f or b,i outlawed or exiled or otherwise datruycd: and ** that the King shall not condemn him or cause him to be condemned •* otherwise than by the lawful judgment of his peers and by the law *' of the land." This excellent law, though made expressly and eX' cimivefyfor JSv^laud, is. at this day the law of Lower Canada, not by iVs own furpe, but by the 6riti»h Statute of 1774, made expressly and Pfciusioely fur Canada, and ihe same British Statute has introduced ai }ihesthe CrimiiiRl Laws of England to the exclo* sion of tilt others, as well in the description and quality of the nfftnet ^% in the method of prosecution and ^ritt/und the punishment tindf'**^ feiturct that U to say, in every particular, in eVery thing. No ittgemti^ could point out ai^y part of the Criminal Law not inchided In ^htt 'Aill of 1774. If there could he Imagined any part of the 'Crtmlniil ttati^s irdt (ibilh^ prised in the terms of the Statute, there might be some reason todoubt^ but those terms comprehend every branch^ every detail of the Crimim!! Luw, as well in their substance as in their outward formii, and (he Sta- tute has been uniformly and universally understood to oonfprehend (hb whole body of the Criminal laws of England, as they stood in England in 1774. :l i It is snid the Act of 1774 did no more than contirfue the%XiBfitfilfi!e in Canada of the laws of England, as they had prevailed under the Proclamation of 1763; be it so; aild then we must say that as the Pruclamalion had introduced the laws of England without restriction^ 80 the Statute has continued the Same laWs, in criminal matters, also without restriction, in all their fulness, quidicitde omnibus dicit dt singulis- The Statute Cireumspetth agatis, 13 Edw. I. raientions (he Bishcfp X)f Norwich on\y^ dxit de uno : y^t thk Statute ha« always extended, by an equitable construction, ^to Otfal^r >0i«h tish Statute of 1774. . •>• It was necessary to pass a law in Canada, not for introducing the Habeas Corpus ad Subjiciendum^ the creature of the common law, but for regulating and securing rtie privilege thereof, as a law had been found necessary in England for the same purposes. A law was required in Canada, merely because the 3d, 5ih, lOih, 11th -and 12th Clauses of the English Habeas Corpus Act were inapplicable to the Province ; but the other provisions of that law, it*s general spirit, the common law right of Habeas Corpus, all these things existed in Ca- nada previous to the Ordinance 24 George III. chap. 1. Since the whole body of the English Criminal laws was enacted for this Province by the Act of 1774. The Common law of England is Statute law Iti Lower Canada. A suspension of the Habeas Corpus^ introduced or established by a provision of the Statute of 1774, is in fact a suspension of that provi- sion of the British Statute. It is also a suspension in part of that pro- vision of the same Statute bv which it is enacted that the Criminal laws of England shall be administered in the method of prosecution^ for chap 2. It is therefore undeniable that a competent Legislature has adjudged the English Habem Corpus Act to be the (aw of Lower Canada^