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Colomb, R.M.A. In giving effect to the wish of the Council by reading a paper on this subject, I desire, in the first place, to point out the difficulty which limits the possibility of its full discussion here. Resources — especially of War — must be practically available, capable of actual, if not of immediate application or development. Now, in our great Colonies,^ which offer the wide&t field for present inquiry, the possible develop- ment or the practical availability of such war resources as they possess rests with their own particular legislatures.^ Whether those elements of war power shall or shall not be developed ; whether they shall or shall not be made available ; whether, in short, they are or are not in the true sense of the term " resources " are matters for their decision and not for this Institution to discuss. Therefore, the vital essence of the whole subject must here remain untouched.^ Though it be not legitimate in this place to consider whether those things of which I am about to speak are or are not therefore really and truly our naval and military " resources," we, as officers of constitutional forces must not be blind to constitutional facts. Those who turn wistful eyes towards Greater Britain seeking for signs of naval and military help in that future, no man can foretell, must not overlook the tangle of difficulties we Englishmen — home and Colonial — have made for ourselves in the present. The consolidation, development, or even the bare application of dormant or actual war force stored up in other Englands beyond sea are, from a naval and military point of view, purely theoretical questions based upon a complex variety of political assumptions. The carrying out of practical measures necessary for a common system of defence thi-ough the machinery of multitudinous legislatures differently constituted is another and a wholly different matter. The one belongs to regions of naval and military science — obviously for these reasons more or less speculative, the other is a Canada, Newfoundland, New South Wales, Victoria, Queensland, Tasmania, South Australia, New Zealand, and the Cape. ^ Vide " Constitution of the Britannic Empire," Creasy ; " European Colonies," Payne ; "The English Constitution," Amos ; "The Colonial Office List," Official. ' See speech of the late Premier of South Australia, vol. xxi, No. 91, p. (386, Journal. b 2 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES, stupondous problem, statesmen — of England, Canada, Australasia, and the Cape, &c. — have to face. In. order to bring the subject placed in my hands to such a focus as shall render its brief consideration of the smallest practical value, it is, therefore, necessary to politically assume much. It must be taken for granted that the Colonial, naval, and military resources — whatever they may be — are the common heritage and present common possession of the whole British race. That they are available, can be developed, and may be applied by an homogeneously constituted State. Finally, that these resources are to be regarded practically as factors of one great whole, the value of each factor being relative to its use and adaptability in one common Imperial plan of action in war. From any other stand-point it would be a simple waste of time to investigate the present sources of resisting power — as regards external defence — of any one Colony taken by itself, for none isolated and alone could withstand the organized attack of any first-class Power. Volumes might be, indeed have been, written respecting the direct defence of the Canadian boundary, but the supporting strength of England is vital to the whole question. Any one of the rich, pros- perous, and great Colonies in the South Pacific might — under their present arrangements, and if single-handed — sufier severely from armed strength possessed even by such disorganized countries as Chili or Peru.^ The Cape could not, unaided, stand against the fleet and army of Brazil." Plainly, therefore, the naval and military resources of the Colonies can only be practically and usefully considered as component parts of our great Imperial system. The object to be ' Navy of Chili : 2 ironclads, " Almiraute Cochrane," and " Valpariso." 10 small steamers. Army of Chili : 1,200 cavalry and artillery. 2,000 infantry. 3,200 Navy of Peru : 6 ironclads, one being tho notorious " Huascar." 6 steamers with armaments varying from 2 to 30 guns. Army of Peru : 1,000 artilllery. 1,200 cavalry. 5,600 infantry. 5,400 gendarmerie. 13,200 2 Navy of Brazil : 18 ironclads, small 1 frigate 8 corvettes 23 gunboats 7 transports Having an aggregate of 177 guns 10,000 horse-power. 67 Army of Brazil 3,280 artillery. 2,484 cavalry. 9,864 infantry. 427 Stail and special corps. 16,055 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. 3 i' tained by that system being the security in war of the integrity of the dominions of the Queen, and the preservation of the manifold interests of the two hundred millions of human beings Her Majesty— by various Parliaments, Houses of Assembly, and Councils — rules. I thus introduce the subject because, having been fortunate enough to have elicited discussions in the press of the various Colonies,^ and having closely studied these and the opinions of eminent Colonial authorities, relative to Imperial Defence— I feel bound to express my conviction that no good and much harm may come of discussing this question concerning the Colonies without close regard to their con- stitutional status. It is therefore due to this Institution to ofEer these preliminary remarks, and by doing so I hope to have made what is passing in my mind sufficiently clear without overstepping its laws.^ Introductory. Colonies may be divided into three classes.^ 1. Colonies Proper — Agricultural, Pastoral, and Mining ; such as Canada, Australasia, and the Cape. 2. Plantation Colonies — such as the West Indies, Ceylon, and Mauritius. 3. Military or trading settlements, — such for example as Cyprus and the Fijis, Bermuda and the Straits Settlements, Malta and the Falkland Isles, &c., &c. Of these classes the first demands closest attention, for, as Heenan says, "the Colonists who form them become in process of time a nation properly so called.'"* Naval and military resources may be grouped under two heads, "raw and developed." Men, for example, are "raw materials," but the trained seamen and disciplined soldier are " developed resources." Coal and iron are "raw materials," the ironclad the perfect product of their development. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the raw materials before entering on questions of their present or possible future development. Raw and developed war resources may each be divided into two branches of inquiry — men and material. TLe power of any people ' Those articles published prior to 1877, can be seen in a book entitled " Colonial Defence and Colonial Opinion," which will be found in the Royal United Service Institution, and Royal Colonial Institute Libraries. ^ A perusal of the following will explain more fully what is necessarily left unsaid. The Journals of the "Royal Colonial Institute," 1870-79; Froude's "Short Studies on Great Subjects ;" articles in the "Nineteenth Century," by Sir Julius Vogel, and Sir F. Hincks, and in " Fraser's Magazine," 1878, by Baden Powell, "Imperial Federation" by F. Young. See also the article in the last Christmas number of " Vanity Fair," by the Duke of Manchester, and the conclud- ing chap*^er in Wilson's " Resources of Modern Nations," &c., &c. ^ I borrow this classification from a most valuable paper on " The Colonial and Indian Trade," by Dr. Forbes Watson, vide " Journal Royal Colonial Institute," vol. ix. * Quoted in Creasy's " Constitution of the Britannic Empire." & 2 ^tmrn^i-- 4 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. to preserve by force their own possessions and their own freedom is a question of relative numbei-s and distinctive characteristics of races. The possession of material resources, however great, may in war prove a curse instead of a blessing to any people too numerically weak, or too numerously neglectful to prepare to turn them readily to organized account for purposes of self-preservation. Hencie the second place — under each head — is here given to material resources. Considerations concerning naval and military resources of the Colonies, I therefore take in the foregoing order and venture to remind you it is impossible to do more than hastily point to the most prominent features of so huge a subject. Men. Table I shows the distribution of population in Colonies Proper.^ It will be seen that the aggregate population of the three great groups of Colonies is about eight millions, but the value of the war resources, apparently offered by these figures, must be qualified by reference to the various races swelling the total. The Aborigines of New Zealand are not included, nor have I taken account of the 100,000 Indians in Canada, nor of the 30,000 Chinese computed to have recently settled down at the gold-fields of Queensland. Without therefore taking these into account, it will be seen that from the total aggregate population I have named, some one and a half millions must be deducted. I produce this offset of one and a half millions from the total apparent numerical resources not as a precise statistical state- ment, but as a fair substantial protest against forming hasty con- clusions as to Military Colonial resources from figures only. Besides non- Europeans so deducted, it must also be borne in mind that the German element in the Colonies is considerable, and that a German, until a naturalized British subject, can hardly be counted as a raw material of British war resources. It is obviously im2)ossible to enter further into details, but I would point out that after making reasonable deductions, the aggregate resources offered by British population of the three great groups of Colonies Proper — if estimated by numbers — are more than three times those of Denmark, nearly double those of Portugal, and greater than those of Belgium. Canada in this respect bears fair comparison with the Netherlands, and Australasia with Switzerland. The ratio of increase of population of our Colonies cannot, however, be compared to any country of the Old World ; Canada's population, for example, has increased some sevenfold in fifty years, and about doubled within the last five-and-twenty years. The aggregate population of Colonies in Australasia has more than doubled in the last sixteen years, aud is now about seventeen times what it was when Her Majesty began to reign. ^ The tables in appendices particularly concerning the Colonies must not be accepted as perfectly accurate ; though some trouble to make tliem sufficiently correct has been taken. A careful examination of and rompiirison between the various sources of Jmblished information, hoaie and colonial, will show the difficulties of obtaining per- ect accuracy at present. ___liglll^^^^^ o pq < E-i O 03 P- m o o O ll n o fl Ilk o . 'S CO 08 t- -300 o >A !^ 00 s ^2> to CO OS 00 CQ or w •^ r-l CO (M ^ »(5 ^ o 00 00 Tf* rH pH 5q_ r^^ 000 00 00 sq §- i 00 00 N (M «0 Q US « 2* c CO i-T 00 50 CO CO P rH 05 ■* l« Q i> O t^ O op t» O t- CO ■^ O tH ^ rH O 00 Q O 05 W t^ i> < IM 05 ' N ■ CO I i CO CO >ra 05 1>. rH N O 05 00 IN iH CO r-l O CO t* Q UJ © U5 (M 00 (M ■^ T}i O (N J>» iH r-t CO CO rH co" — v— O »H CO n N Q i> X O O lA O O O CO O C00505>0>HO(M IftCOLO Tf<_ rH^ CO_^ IN N 0_ »0_ "i'^,'* CO ooco'tCco »re"or oTco'otf IMXOlO(MOCO 05 CO 05 O rH CO pH U5 (M Q O OS CO U5 CO C0 1> erf ■* x" 05 00 to 00 I 00 OS o ^ 42 § -^ ^ I , " -S o 03 3 m r^ g-g i.g if gj O pq fq Pm izj b H [2; -J o H 2 § v^ \l I t THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 5 It must not, however, be forgotten that numerical strength of population is — as an element of war resources — directly affected by reference to the territorial area over which distributed. Now there are some 389 persons to every square mile in England and Wales, while in Australasian Colonies, the most densely populated, Victoria, has but 10 to the square mile ; and the least. Western Australia, but one individual to every 38 square miles. In Canada, a population about equal to that of London is dis- tributed over an area half as big again as that of Russia in Europe. In viewing population as a raw material of war resources, it is to be observed that emigration from these islands to a foreign territory represents so much present loss of war power to us, and an incalculable increasing gain of war power in the future to a possible enemy.^ The transfer of population from one part of the Empire to another merely varies the distribution of this element of strength, and such redistribu- tion may — if utilized — be of inestimable military benefit in war. The pale-faced artizan, born, bred, and working in the foetid atmosphere of an overcrowded manufacturing town at home is a very inferior " raw "material" of war resources— to the hardy Englishman labouring by the shores of Winnipeg, the banks of the Murray or the CInfcha, or on his "claim" in Griqualand West. The historian Froude has so eloquently and forcibly written on this subject that further general remark is needless. Some very striking passages from his " Short " Studies on Great Subjects " will be found quoted in Mr. Brassey's paper in the Journal of this Institution^. It is, however, proper here to call attention to the opinion of a military authority. '■ The " Canadians possess," says Lieutenant- General Sir Selby Smyth, in " a marked degree, qualities to make excellent soldiers, being both " hardy and industrious, used to rough life, easily subjected to dis- " cipline, and willing to submit to necessary authority, .... There " are no better soldiers than Canada can produce."^ Turning our eyes towards these islands, it must be acknowledged that manufacturing progress at home is rapidly absorbing rural populations, and shrinking^ the recruiting area which, from natural causes, provides the best -^aw material of military force. It is calculated our home population will amount in 76 years from this to some sixty millions, nearly double what it is now. We may therefore expect the quality of raw material yearly offered by home recruiting fields to diminish rather than to increase with numbers ; while in our Colonies it is both in quantity ' During the 25 years ending Slst December, 1877, up^rards of 4,000,000 persons (of British origin) emigrated from the United Kingdom, of which 2,700,000, — a number greater than the present total population of Switzerland, went to the United States. In 1877 the emigration was as follows : — 45,000 to United States. 30,000 to Australasia. 7,000 to Canada. 11,000 to all other places, These figures are in round numbers for illustration of principles. 2 See " A Colonial Naval Reserve," by T. Brassey, M.P., vol. xxii, No. 96, " Jonrnal of the Royal United Service Institution." s See OfRcial Report on " The State of Militia of Canada," 1877. ■ ■y.^.ma '/' 6 TUE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. and quality increasing every year at a rate difficult to accurately OBtimate. It has, however, been calculr.tcd that in some 21 years' from this date, the aggregate population of Canada, Australasia, and the Capo will be some fifteen millions, nearly half what the total population of the United Kingdom is now — about equal to what it was at the date of Waterloo. Before, therefore, the Naval Cadet of to-day is an Admiral ; before the Sandhurst Cadet of to-day is a General Officer Commanding, Colonial population willformnumerically a very substantial proportion of British war resources, and probably be superior in quality to that likely then to be furnished by the muther-country. The true value and availability, therefore, of this element of national war strength lies — as regards these Colonies — more in the immediate future than in the actual present ; but, forasmuch as it takes at least a whole generation to build up a national, naval, or military organization, it is lull time now to begin to lay the foundation of such a truly national system as shall embrace all the products of these British developments, and have for its object the welding together of the elements of English war strength into " one harmonious whole." It appears to me that a system which now does not do so, must, in a generation, be discarded as effete and obsolete, or remain — to produce gradual but certain disintegration of English war power by excluding from its original sources of naval and military strength the more vigorous portions of our race. Questions concerning the raw materials of war resources, offered by the subiect races in Canada and at the Cape, should properly here be considered. It is, however, too special a subject to introduce inciden- tally. Such resources, whatev^er their true value, must ever be secondary to those furnished by British blood. Those at the Cape can only be fairly estimated when the present war is closed. In Canada the proportion of native races to British is very small, but it may be fitting here to quote from an Address to the Queen from the Chiefs of the Six Nations, " assembled at their council fire," during the Crimean War. " Great Mother," they wrote, " your children of " the Six Nations have always been faithful and active allies of your " Crown, and the ancestors of your Red children never failed to assist •' in the battles of your illustrious ancestors."^ On the general questions relative to the Imperial availability of military resources furnished by native populations, I would venture to remark that the truth — as it generally does — would appear to lie between two extreme opinions. The one which describes a contingent of Her Majesty's Native troops commanded by distinguished British officers as a " horde of savages " is not worthy of scientific consider- ation, but the other extreme of opinion may become a source of real danger. It appears to be briefly this : that " Home defence " is one thing, and " Imperial defence " another ; that so long as British pockets are full, a sufficiency of " billets for bullets " on distant battle- fields can always be readily procured, and may be chiefly furnished by ' See papers presented to Parliament, 25th January, 1855, -^JWi^^y^^^ ^^^^^^^^^^ & t ''^SSS^Si? T5^!3^t^^z?r>Tn7rT!«^^^^^7T^r ^ . o o o § H »:? fl d o B O 1^ S3 •| OS n o I—* o O Ci3 r-l 00 (O in 1 »-» p-l (N < S5 00 IN lA (M lA § 2 3 g N N r-l O •* CC 0) 1-1 »A r-( T? ^■• iH OS «'■*'»" ft) 05 IN O CO CO I IN 00 I 1-^lfl I ■* i>eo 8 05 IN rH oa iH CO 00 (N (N lA kft" 64 O © IN CO OJ Q «D OS UJ t> ■^ CO * >ra rH ^ ^A to a! «i ^— 2 P^ § ^ I Oi (N eo o r-T IN S I H I ca a i 8 I •A .9 'i. .a u o a -"I -■>«in><««m>«MmHBHI \\ > } i¥' 1^ o Hi p a ft B , w • o 5 t> oo b gs ^ I'l^ s ^c s a< 1 f: ch • k » • • H ^ htj W |H Sf (b. Hdp g Q td ^ § ^ ^ s "^ • OQ • ^ "^ — > S 9t^^- m a at o cn-Q. .......... B 3. g CCCQ ^^ CD p r- O CO § g M l« §1^ 00 CO MM 09 CO 1$^ OC M t-'owcn- tS iC •^T 00 ?0 en M M 00 Q"tn bo'^'toto eotocoOH-'qsi-'os oooo- to 00 fe "m to CO — V — to CO CO OS "m ~A B "5° Q £0 P o 3 • *o o o If en > 50 IsB ?0 o w H t teJ !2| !z! o cn ■ Zfl 1— 1 H >-t M Raw Resources, Material. Out of innumerable materials necessary for Naval and Military pur- poses, it may here suffice to select three : Pood, Coal, and Horses. Food. It must be remembered we are now considering Colonial, Naval, and Military resources as component parts of one great whole, of which the United Kingdom is the citadel. It is, therefore, of great naval and military importance to understand how that citadel is pro- visioned, and how far Colonial resourcss are capable of supplying its wants. According to the elaborate calculations of Mr. S. Bourne it appears "that out of thirty-three million inhabitants of the United " Kingdom, eighteen millions may be sustained on food grown at " home, and fifteen millions on that received from abroad"^ He further points out " on an average, each member of the community "now consumes to the value of two and a half times as much foreign " food as he did twenty years back." It is just ten years ago since in two lectures^ here I endeavoured to show the extreme danger of limiting the military scope of National Defence simply to these islands. The aim of those papers was to draw attention to a disagreeable, and then most unpopular truth, viz., that military arrangements for even a passive defence could not be con., fined to the simple question of invasion, because without military aid abroad for our fleets to rest upon, the safety of our water roads was imperilled, and unless these communications were secured absolutely, we could be — starved out. The defence of cur Imperial communications, be it remembered, is not a purely Naval question, but a very complex ' Vide paper read before the Manchester Statistical Society, " On the Increasing Dependence of this Country on Foreign Supphes of Pood." By Mr, S. Bourne, F.S.S. 1877. 2 " Distribution of our \A'ar Forces," Journal, vol. xiii, Ifo. 53, 8 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. problem involving a great variety of Naval and purely Military con- Hiderations.^ The national necessity for no longer delaying to deal with it is increasing with niarvoUous rapidity. At the date, 1869, these papers here n^ferred to were read, the value of the chief articles of food per head of population imported was at the rate of 37 shillings and five pence per annum, while by 1877, it had risen gradually to 57 shillings and seven pence? The food required by fifteen thirty-thirds of our home population at. present comes from vprious countries of the world ; consequently we have tt great variety of divergent supply linet. Our Imperial connecting lines must be defended irrespective of all other consideratious, and if our Colonies possessed food resources requisite to supply home wants, our food lines and our Imperial lines could, in war, become identical. So far, therefore, a? *he actual sustentation of our people at home is concerned, this woUd be equivalent to an increase of war strength ; hence the close connection between Colonial food and Naval and Military resources. Table IV illustrates the imports of food into the United Kingdom in 1877. It sufficiently exhibits the truth that we are not, as regards food, a self-supporting Empire. This is a great naval and military fact, and one on which the whole question of a real national policy of defence turns. It would be impossible here to push inquiry below the figures of that Table, but in order to explain its illustrative impor- tance, brief further remarks may be useful. Taking wheat, for example, we imported during 1877 fifty four and a quarter million odd hiindredweights. Of this, some forty-four and three quarter million hundredweights came from some fifteen different Foreign Countries,^ but nine and a half million hundred weights came from our own possessions. Of this niiic and a half millions, some six millions came from India, and three and a half millions from the Colonies. It is to be observed that of the total wheat required by these two Islands in 1877, only about one-ninth came from India — probably less through the Suez Canal — and only about one-seventeenth of the whole was furnished by the Colonies. We had, during that year, some eighteen difEerent wheat supply lines, made up as follows : fifteen from Foreign Countries, one from xndia, one from Canada, and one from Australasia.* The great bulk, therefore, of the staple article of our food travelled in 1877 along lines by no means identical with the connecting lines of our Empire. The food-producing resources of the Colon'.es are consequently of great naval and military importance. • If the Naval Prize Essay, 1878, Captain P. H. Colomb, R.N., Journal, vol. xxii, No. 94, be read iu conjunction with " Strategic Harbours," General Collinson, R.E., Journal, vol. xviii, No. 77, and Pnaley's " Military Policy and Institution of the British Empire," 1808, the complexity and giuvity of the question will be fully understood. 2 Vide Report of the chief of the Bureau of Statistics, for quarter ending June 30th, 1878. Official : Washington. ' About 21i million cwts. came from the United States, and lOJ million cwt». from Russia — two-thirds of it from Northern porta. * About 6 million cwt. from India. 3 „ „ Canada. \ „ „ Australaaia. 3 8■ h3 (vi ■4-t ^ ,< #* ^ ' - " •s u 1 So?§S t^ rH '2 rH^ i o H CiOOt^'^ us t^, IM rH IfS t^ T)l ;0 50 IM 05 l« --fl tOiH 52 (M •-{ ■* r-l iH -w -• §^ tn n 05 »(S -^ W x^ 1) T) rH 00 Ift CO 00 !>. rH 05^ (>!_ ^ iifOi'^fj^ >(5" 2 o CO 05 1>- 05 S aj CO CO 05 o a, O " 00 00 X 00 Ol M IM l-<. IM CO .i (N 00^ lO '15 T-l t-^ t-^ Co" Q co" H 05 l>. IM •* ■* f^ •* 0' d" (D t-l r-l S>1 rH r-l • t>. 10 CO U5 (U lO 05 1(5 •a !>. 10 -^ t- o 0" n • CO 23" 5>l «0 ' t-l o U5 CO ■* CO O i> 00" 10 ■^ 05 , 00 1^ 10 S3 10 CO ^ • nr^ ' ■* n • Ift • >o M rH IM CO ®«0 (M r-l . . . . . .... • • • • en 1 t o 1/} f^ s I-H o : : :-S 5 qj >., H 03 flou nd p !zi Meat and fish . Grain, meal, and Kice Butter, cheese, ai CO i| ".s r-( ^ "3 00 00 05 CO g M IM l^ CO 515, 608, 050, 056. *>rH t* 00 (N iH r^ ■** Countries specified, < 110,157 4,041 20,546 14,161 CO 00 >o g rH CO rH ^_^05 W rH^ ■^ of I^ r^ a, 'i "2 '*' 2 J:r * lO 00 •< 8 pS co" ■* 00" >0 r-l !?< . rH oogo -) « £:S CO 05^0, § M • ■* ^"rH t) • 05 05 l> cS a oo^,"-;, t) • in 00 £ •* IM CO (M CO i-H i 40,7 59,9 91,0 ,w M 05 rH 00 H s • . • • • • • • .... 'd • • • • N <4H • • • • • • ' • , ^ iN'ir^'iiii jONIES. le sending 1, compact iriation of i^ill be the ppliea and , and per- afford the stem on a oped, and reward of a stupid >ns in its f infinite 3 century 'egate of ggregate now the military V on and its flag, from the Atlantic, d in its military rimarily ominion ito any several >e dealt owever, ial coal San , while Allan " I now lumbia eposits 7. We square olliers t San vill be com- !S the hostile ; still ritory, i with TABLE No. V. CoMfARARATlVK STATEMENT flhowiiig Export of British Coal; dis- tinguishing Home and Colonial ; from 1854 to 1877 inclusive. Pi Year. Now South WaloH ExportH. Canada. Exports. Total Colonial. United Kingdom. Export. Total Kxporfc. Homo and Colonial. 1864 Tons. 50,297 Tons. Tons. Tons.* 4,309,255 Tons. 1855 61,481 4,976,902 1856 84,086 5,879,779 1857 96,565 03 4-> 6,737,718 1858 113,618 1 6,529,483 1859 1860 174,195 233,877 1 7,006,949 7,321,832 1861 207,904 1 7,855,115 1862 308,782 la ■♦-» 8,301,852 1863 298,337 .3 8,275,212 1864 1865 372,601 383,270 •a 8,809,908 9,170,477 1866 541,215 o p 10,137,260 1867 473,666 3 10,565,829 1868 548,187 1 10,967,062 1869 595,795 r*i 10,774,945 1870 578,564 11,702,649 1871 565,782 12,747,989 1872 670,802 322,283 993,085 13,198,494 14,191,579 1873 774,029 404,757 1,178,786 12,617,566 13,796,352 1874 874,143 418,357 1,292,500 13,908,958 15,201,458 1875 928,358 288,176 1,216,534 14,475,036 15,691,570 1876 870,653 284,279 1,154,932 16,255,839 17,410,771 1877 915,727 249,536 1,165,263 14,880,899 16,046,162 ' This Column is taken from a statement in " Coal ; its History and Use." Till-: NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOUROKS OF TIIK COLONIES. 11 moro will it bo iiocoHsary to f?aard tho soarcoH of coal Hupply, and to arm and garrlrtou those British points wlioro coal in stored. Our Colonies, with their mother-country depending on tho agency of coal for nearly all that makes them nrosporous in peace, may fairly share with her — in just proportion —the honour and duty of its protection in war. Neither can hope successfully to secure its safety without pjiinstaking preparation during peace. Tho mother-country cannot justly chide nor children for heedless disregard, natural to youth, of a duty which she in her ago neglects — as testified by unprotected British coal heaps scattered about tho world. Time forbids special reference to other Australasian coal resources, such, for example, as those of Victoria, Tasmania, &c., or those of New Zealand, offering as they do, pledges of that " great maritime future," of which Sir Julius Vogol so eloquently speaks. Passing on our homeward way by tho Mauritius to the Cfape, wo find a vast British territory, the mineral resources of which have not yet been so fully investigated as to warrant practical Naval and Military conclusions. We cannot, there- fore, stop to inquire about tho coal deposits in tho Stromberg Mountains, Capo Colony; tho Highveldt of tho Transvaal, or at Biggarsborg, Natal. It is, however, at tho present time, fitting to remark that onr comrades advancing northward into the heart of Zululand are carrying tho banner of St. George towards tho Zambesi coal discovered by Livingstone. In our plantation colonies, there is no coal of present Naval and Military value.^ Some, however, of these places like Military and Trading Settlements, are of immense Imperial importance as store supply depdts. Some particulars as to the rapid increase of British coal exports will bo soon in Table V. To conclude this rude outline of Colonial coal resources, it may bo observed that their Naval and Military value as regards Canada and Australasia lies in the present, and as regards the Cape, in a possible future. Canada and Australasia furnish the British race with the means of providing for its Naval and Military wants now, — and in the future — in regions most remote from homo supplies. How far we avail ourselves of them for Naval and Military purposes is altogether another question. To what extent we are preparing to make our war fleets, or the links in tho distant chain of our Imperial communications, on which those fleets must rest— depend on these natural sources of supply, are matters upon which I shall not now enter ; but instead will conclude with two slight illustrations. So far back as 1877, Mr. Donald Curi-io in his lecture^ here, fore- warned the country what might happen in a European war, through the absence of a submarine telegraph to the Cape. At this moment a savage, without even a big boat, has given the " greatest maritime " nation in the world " a small taste of the consequence of neglecting mich practical views as wore then put forth by Mr. Currie. Now it is from that lecture 1 extract the following pregnant sentence. " It was ' Labuan ie an exception, but so many questions of detail would [have to be raised concerning Labuan coal, that, in dealing with great principles, it seemed wiser to defer remarks. * Journal, vol. isi, No. 8?, 12 THE NWAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. " only a short time ago that the Admiralty inquired how much coal " we could spare at the Cape, and whether our fleet could be supplied " there, and it was impossible for the Government to loam in less " ^han fifty days their exact position." This, then, is one picture ; in the foreground a Government in a seven weeks' ignorance as to the power of locomotion of the National Fleet ; and in the far distance, that fleet^in waters of Imperial strategic importance,! trusting to a combination of luck and pnvate surplus stores for its coal. To look at the picture in another light, it is necessary to remember what Mr. Robinson, Member of the Natal Legislature, said in this theatre : " there exists in the part of South Africa to which I belong, " as fine a field of steam coal as exists in any part of the world. •' That coal-field is 180 miles from the coast, and we are only too " anxious to got communication by railway, but, unfortunately, our *' poverty and our sniallness bar the way. If the Home Government " would co-operate with us to connect that coal-field with the sea, it " would open out to the British Empire a permanent and good supply '• of steam-coal."^ In speaking from this place two years ago,^ I drew particular notice to the defenceless state of our coal dep6t at Hong Kong. Since that time circumstances drew special attention to that part of the world. England woke up thinking a war was close, and hasty preparations were made. Through the indefatigable exertions of ttvo officers.* defensive works were erected in an incredibly short space of time for the protection of this particular coal dep6t. I am neither aware as to whether these works are sufficiently armed, nor whether the artillery force was sufficient to man them, but it is desirable to point out that Hong Kong is only one of a certain number of strategically placed Imperial coal depdts essential to our naval and military power of defence. In the same paper this sentence occurs : " if war breaks out to-morrow, it would " find our fleets without any system by which their supply of coal " would be assured." I venture to repeat those words again, and do so with the more confidence, because in this very theatre one year after- wards they were fortuitously, yet absolutely corroborated by the dis- tinguished Admiral who, at the time these words were spoken, was commanding the British fleet in the quarter of the world to which they referred. Last year. Admiral Ryder incidentally said : "I have just ** returned from the command on the Japan and China station, and " with an imminent prospect of war, I felt very doubtful whether I " should ever get a pound of coal without taking it forcibly from a " neutral. "6 Now my other illustration is this : During the year an Admiral " in ' TLe total commerce passing round the Cape, estimated by Lord Carnarvon at £160,000,000 per annum. " Vide Journal, vol. xxi, No. 89, p. 241. Note. AtCamdeboo some 50 miles from Port Elizabeth, there is also coal of good quality. * "Russian Development, and our Naval and Military Position in the North Pacific," Journal, vol. xxi, No. 91. * Colonel W. (J. Stuart, R.E., and Assistant Commissary General Moore. * Vide Journal, vol. xxii. No. 97, p. 784. "Discussion on the Prize and other Naval Essays of 1878." i^iiMBittiiiiMa LONIES. much coal bo supplied earn in Iurb picture ; in 3 as to the ar distance, listing to a ) remember laid in this ti I belong, F the world, re only too mately, our jovernment the sea, it food supply jular notice Since that I the world. •reparations 'O oflBcers.'*' time for the i to whether f force was long Kong perial coal e. In the w, it would ly of coal and do so ear after- y the dis- oken, was hich they have just ation, and whether I ly from a Imiral " in ^rnarvon at miles from the North and other / ^ P ^ ri s 1- o a 1 f s H CD o B s ? E • • • • • • • ■ ^ m 05 05 • ; en iJ rl en en • o o en en 2S 8 ■ • 05 OS b8 M en CO OS §s )(>- en OS bS CO t?? ® o -I C9 CO II 00 >, M (0 SJ eo CO K" CO !-• » CO W o o bd H M s 00 ml td THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 13 '« command " of a British fleet, in Chinese waters, " with an imminent " prospect of war," was doubtful as to getting a pound of coal,— the total exporf, of coal from Canada and Australia exceeded a million tons, and at Newcastle, New South Wales, hydraulic appliances for rapidly shipping coal had been established at a cost of some £26,000 to the Colony. Some further information respecting exports of British coal will be found in Table VI, and in conclusion I would commend to your special attention the following brief extract from a work called " Coal. Its History and Uses." By Professor Green. Miall, Thorpe, Riiker, and Marshall.—" This country's fortunes," they say, " are gradually " being merged in those of a greater Britain, which, 'argely through the " aid of the coal, whose prospective loss we are lanenting, has grown " beyond the limits of these islands to overspread the vastest and richest " regions of the earth." Horses. Turning from the agency on which war combinations over sea depend, means of transport for land operations naturally suggests itself for consideration. It is fitting first to remind you that the prize of 6,000 roubles offered by the Czar, for the best " History of Cavalry from the earliest times," was gallantly won by Canada, in the person of Lieutenant-Colonel George T. Dennison, Commanding the Governor-General's Body Guard, author of " A Treatise on Modem Cavalry," and spoken of in Lieu- tenant- General Sir Selby Smyth's Official Report as one " among many excellent Cavalry Officers of the Dominion. The war resources of the Colonies in " Horses " is, I think, a question of immense importance. Armies in Europe are growing almost faster than horses fit for service are bred, and the number of horses required for war purposes increase in direct ratio to force to be placed in the field. A declaration of war is not exactly the time for a nation to be running about seeking horses for its guns, cavalry, and transport. It is all very well for us to rely on free-trade for our profits, and tlie supply of our national wants in peace ; but when rumours of war are in the air, the Continental horse-market becomes, somehow or other, uncommonly "tight." I remember, at one of our " Autumn Manoeuvres," watching a regimental transport man struggling with a certain ugly pair of grey brutes, exhibiting a mai'ked objection to a certain hill. There was no mistaking the nationality of the horses ; nor was there much difficulty in determining that of the man, for between the vigorous strokes of ' The wealth of iron, and other minerals of the colonies is a great naval and military resource. Where iron and coal arc found together in large quantities, as iji New South Wales and the province of Nova Scotia or British Columbia and in other colonies, the raw material resources of war nre enormous. It was impossible, how- ever, in a short paper to treat of these and many otlier interesting fields of inquiry. The inestimable benefit sure to arise from the attraction of population from the one old part of the Empire to many new branches of it, is the development of these material resources here left untouched ? 14 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. his whip^ — this, — free from adjectives, — was his refrain : " Te don't " even speak English, ye brutes, ye don't !" Now Table VII exhibits a fact — wliich naturally recurred to my memory then— that there are, in other Englands beyond sea, some two million horses^ more or less accustomed to English ways, an English tongue, and an English hand. This may appear a theoretical mode of introducing a subject of great gravity, and may seem to infer oblivious* ness to great sea distances, and the effect on horses of long voyages : in short, to lack the possibility of practical application. I hope, how- ever, that, on reflection, it may not so appear. It was impossible here to inquire into the merits and demerits of various Colonial coal ; and, for the same reason, the characteristics of Colonial horses can form no portion of these remarks. It will, however, be of profit to this Institu- tion — and, through it, to the Service — if the discussion elicits informa- tion on these points from gentlemen of practical Colonial experience. The first general consideration as to horse resources of the Colonies is one of numbers ; this, for piirposes of illustration, is met by Table 7. It is lo be borne in mind, however, that the same observation made respecting the extent of area covered by po'pulation applies, though perhaps in a more limited degree, to the " raw material " of war furnished by horses. An example of this truth was indirectly afforded by H.R.H. the Duke of Cambridge with reference to the despatch of horses to the Cape. In the House of Lords, H.R.H. said, " The " reason was obvious. To collect a large number of horses on the " spot would take time, and it was necessary that the men should go " ready to take the field on landing."^ The next general reflection is that as our Colonial Empire contains vast territory in every clime — from the frosty N.W. Province of Canadci, to the tropical districts in Northern Australia, — so are to be found within its limits, horses naturally suited to the purposes of war in any part of the world where British forces may have to operate. I may mention that in Queensland five shillings per head has been some- times paid for shooting wild horses, in order to clear the " Runs" and to prevent interference with the domesticated animals. Now as regards sea distances, which is the point on which the prac- tical question of value and availability turns. No student of modern warfare can observe the increasing facilities of transporting live animals in large numbers over long sea distances — which have been created by the push and shove rivalry of peaceful commercial com- petition — without reflecting how means so afforded can be turned to account in war. To my mind, they furnish to as at once a warning and an encouragement. A warning, because they show that long sea distances do not in themselves present insurmoutable obstacles to foreign attack : an encouragement, because we have only to prepare to avail ourselves of the experiences of peace and to consolidate the Imperial resources we possess — to render our Imperial position at all points practically secure. As a matter of fact the military obstacles ' The number of horses, returned by occupiers of land, in the United Kingdom 1878, was 1,927,066. Vide Agricultural Returns, 1878. ^ See Debate iu the House of Lords, 2l8t February. h-t d CO Sz; (4 O w ? ^ H a 03 3 JX w a ■a o s o w Cm O 6 a o s g .3 -id •c O (O o 'O §^ •s S Ph 2 i> .^ t^ » -2 00 rH g i-H CO 3 » Cl -5 3 DO O rn ■ CO 9 o o <©■* •^ ^-S 1>*^ g> 00 00 3 r^ r-l p f» ;! 05 iH CO 00 00 OS 00 in OS 00 05, o 1> M CO iH IN (N N i> eo 00 « (M sq OS »o i>. lO 0«000i> 05__o cq,oo__?o fff ■^" to"'^co co'eo'os'co" CO COOSOWiNOSCO 00 CO rH rH iH 00 K5 N N OS CS t^ t>» -- - r<^-<^-sf in' O \a I CO iH (N o Pi -s OS O 1^ gj C C3 .S t4 g d OpqmPMOH^ .s 1 ■ ■ ^'^''^KPWiWsS!^'^- 1^" / .ms^* THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 15 apparently presented by long sea distances — in the matter of horses — are theoretical obstacles imagined in peace, which, with good manage- ment and arrangement, vanish under pressure of war. In peace, large numbers of Australian horses, and no inconsiderable number of Cape horses, find their way to India and some time ago, British Columbia frequently imported horses from the Sandwich Isles, a distance of some 2,400 miles. The Mutiny in India compelled our establishment there to draw largely on Australia, for horses, and the bustle of their embarkation at great ports like Melbourne and Sydney told the tale of Military requirements of war capable of fulfilment from points 5,000 miles distant. Recent events in one corner of the world caused a native cavalry force to be moved from India to Malta.. Across 4,000 miles of sea it came, showing Englishmen — Home and Colonial — that steam has bridged not only the channel, but the water distances which separate the various portions of our Empire from the mother- country and from each other ; and reminding all that Empire is not merely something " to be enjoyed " in peace, but that it has to be " maintained " by force in war. Again, cavalry, which, six weeks ago was at Hounslow and at Aldershot, ib now across the Tugela, 6,000 mUes away, thus completing a practical illustration of possible reciprocity of duty and obligation between England and her Colonies. If we can go to them, they can come to us.^ It must be remembered, however, that we are now regarding horses as "raw material" of war power; the "charger" or "battery " horse " is a developed material. The certain change from one to the other is but a matter of time and skill, accomplished by fore- thought and resulting from care, and therefore these short notes under this head, may, I think, be thus summed up. The value of military resources of the Colonies, as regards horses, lies in the present, and their availability depends upon the natiu-e and extent of arrangements made in peace, by which alone, they can, in war, be turned to organized and instant account. While we remember that cavaliy has been rapidly moved from England to the Cape, and swiftly from Bombay to Malta, let us not forget that there are in Canada, for example, nearly a million horses and " many excellent cavalry ofl&cers ; " that Ottawa is nearer Con- stantinople than London is to Pietermaritzburg, and that Bombay is farther from Malta than Malta is from Halifax. It is now time to close this rude survey of those " raw materials " ' In advocating the appointment of a Royal Commission to inquire into the question of Imperial defence, the writer of this paper speaking in 1873 (of the reci- procity of duties and obligations between England and the Colonies, and of the common duty of strengthening and protecting the points which command tlie Imperial roatl) made use of the following a\ ords to convey a meaning more practically exemplified In- tlie presence of Indian troops at Malta five years later : " With the " creation of Imperial fortresses commanding the Im\)erial roads would grow up a " feeling of common security. They would be links in the chain which binds " together the military forces of our Empire ; stepping stones by which those forces " can cross to afford mutual assistance and support." Vide " Colonial Defence," Journal Royal Colonial Institute, 1873. »e mid^iUciicijmiiim^. / iiiililiUMWB 16 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. of colonial naval and military power which appeared to me most wortihy of selection for these short remarks. Whether you agree with me in the general conclusions I have thus far attempted to indicate, or whether you do not, you will not, I hope, at all events, be disposed to differ with the following general conclusions. That from a naval and military point of new, the application to any Imperial purpose of suoh outlying sources of war power as the Colonies possess rests prac- tically on means of transport and the ensured safety of the sea. The Colonial Mercantile Marine may fairly claim its place, therefore, under the head of " developed resources," and, with the armed strength, and naval and military organization of the several Colonies, will form the subjects for consideration in Part II of this paper. Brief, and entirely inadequate though these references to the raw material of Colonial war power — may be, they form a necessary intro- duction to the consideration of such developed naval and military resources as the Colonies possess. They will, I trust, not be without some slight value. Their very insufficiency will, at all events, show that beneath the surface, over which we have so hghtly passed, are yet unfathomed depths of useful study. Great as the natural advan- tages of England have been in the past, great though they still be in the present, they seem but shrivelled and stunted when compared with those of Greater Britain, Wliether the power of self-preservation derivable from such aids will, in days to come, split into fragments, or become united and consolidated, must more or less depend upon the direction of present progress. Either result will more probably be developed from gradual growth, rather than spring from spontaneous or sudden change. If Colonial resources, as they become available, are not grafted into one great defensive system for a common purpose and a common good, then our Imperial power of resistance already con- tains elements of naval and military disintegration, and lacks that unity which is strength. I cannot therefore conclude this portion of my subject without reference to one or two facts which afford some indications of the direction of present progress, and I shall take the heads of this paper in inverse order. As regards Horses. In 1873, a Committee of the House of Lords inquired into the question of Horse Supplies. It was stated to the Committee, that " in case of emergency arising, the Continent would " be virtually closed to us for the purchase of horses." In reply to the 1643 question, Canada was referred to as " another country where we could get horses," but which had not been mentioned. Out of 4075 questions only 33 had reference to Canada ; but one witness — Colonel Jenyns — was examined as to Canadian horses. He stated that " they were wonderfully good horses . . .■ as good troopers as he ever saw," and that " they stand a great amount of hard work and " exposure." He was asked would he bring them over in sailing or steam vessels. There is no mention of Canada or of any Colony in the Report. So far as I am aware, we are not in any way preparing to make ready use of the available horse resources of the C.jlonies on an emergency, though we know full well we shall want horses, and that 30L0NIES. to me most m agree with i to indicate, 1, be disposed from a naval il purpose of IS rests prac- le sea. The refore, under Bd strength, es, will form I to the raw Bssary intro- ind military i be without !vents, show passed, are iural advau- Y still be in npared with ^reservation agments, or ad upon the )robably be ipontaneous mailable, are urpose and ready con- acks that without )ns of the this paper of Lords |.ed to the ent would ply to the where we of 4075 —Colonel lat " they he ever ork and ailing or 'olony in roparing ies on an r of such growth adds to the defensive duties li;ij;+:i«i!*i 3L0NIES. THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP TIIE COLONIES. 21 jre that any lolonios must ,ny effort on rowth of the e burden on ;eamors over •0 tons ; it is -defence" to to look below [ resources of y represents iten that it is ailable value ;he readiness visible force. I the Colonial eve there is t may prove val strength ter than that jrway ; what er, combined tits are such dth effective war broke ned and des- iralia are the irda and for- ive them in d at perhaps in peace as iction for an ore ready to le marine of force, and term the provide the sary to turn vhile we are nsive duties and rfsponsibilities of the Royal Navy, without adding to its ability to meet the increased demand, it will bo advantagoims to defer further remark on this particular portion of the subiect, until some genoial considerations respecting the organization and armed strength of the Colonies have been roughly indicated, and to these we will now pass. Remarks on Ahmed Strength. u Before attempting to outline the salient features of Colonial Naval and Military Organization, &c., it is necessary to define broadly what are the lines of inquiry I propose to adopt. Briefly then, I may say it appears to me more useful to examine them with a view to forming general conclusions of Imperial importance, rather than attempt to inquire into the merits or demerits of purely local systems, which would be not of general interest, and impossible to do fairly in a short space. These organizations can only properly be understood by reference to their common origin ; the soils, so to speak, in which they have been [propagated, and in which some apparently flourish, some languish, end some have withered and died. To trace their common origin to I its true source would necessitate examination of questions neither naval ': nor military, and must not here be attempted ; but in order to approach the subject in an intelligible manner, it is necessary to bear in mind the changes in military distribution and organization which have taken place, and also the development of our Colonies during a period of remarkable progress and prosperity. To those, therefore, it is neces- sary in the first place briefly to refer. I leave out entirely Mediter- ranean stations and gari-isons, and, of course India. When Her Majesty began to reign, the Colonial Empire consisted of 24 Colonies and Settlements, having in the aggregate less than 4 mil- lions of population, a total revenue of less than 2^ millions sterling, and the total aggregate annual value of their exports and imports was some 30 millions sterling only. At that time we maintained in those Colonies a military force of about 27,000, some 10,000 of which were stationed in the West Indies ; some 6,000 in British North America, then consisting of seven separate Colonies ; tlie remainder being quartered at the Cape, in Australasia, Ceylon, Mauritius, and a few other places ; the cost of such forces being given in a Parliamentary paper at some 1^ million sterling. The Crimean War found the fore-, going distribution but little changed in principle, though some variations in detail had taken place. For example, the West Indian garrison had fallen from 10,000 to about 5,000, while the Australian had risen to a total of 4,000. A Parliamentary paper published in 1859 shows the average Imperial Force maintained in these Colonies in each year, from 1853 to 1857 inclusive, to have been nearly 27,000, I again remind you I exclude Mediterranean stations. This force included 6 resident corps,^ boine on the strength of the Royal Army, and pro\ ■ led for in the Army Estimates, all of which have since been ' Newfoundland Companies, Ceylon Rifle Regiment, Cape Mounted Rifles, St, Helena Regiment, Gold Coast Artillery Corps and Falkland Island Comjiany. I 22 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. 11 abolislied. In 1868, just 20 years after the date here taken as the starting-point of comparison, there still was no change in principle of distribution, nor not much variation in the cost of maintenance, but the following remarkable changes had taken place meantime in the position of the Colonies ; the aggregate population had more than doubled, the revenue had more than quadrupled, the annual value of their exports and imports had trebled,* and the number of Colonies had increased by eiglit. The pri iciple of military distribution, however, though it had stood a test of many years and two great national struggles, one in the Crimea, and one in India, was open to one great military objection, viz., that the disposable force being limited and inelastic, the permanent quartering abroad of so large a proportion, left the garrison of the Grand Base, the United Kingdom, dangerously weak. The militia had been neglected, no reserve had been provided, and in spite of the repeated warnings of the most eminent military authorities, no system whatever had been provided for the defence of these Islands, or lOv strengthening and supporting the Army quartered at home, except by calling in the outlying portion. There was one other objection, which on pun ly military grounds had good foundation. All the Colonial positions 03cupied by Imperial troops had not been chosen for Imperial Naval jr Military reasons, nor were the numbers regulated so much wicii regard to military necessities as by trade intarests and political causes. The very best strategic positions we had taken by force, and knew their worth, having learned it by bitter experiences of great naval wars. Since those wars great developments had taken place, the foundations of branch British Nations had been laid, and a new world of civilization and progress opened in the Pacific. The simple fact that we have not yet had to fight for strategic positions in the South Pacific, may in some way account for the circumstance that we never did and do not now maintain any Imperial naval establishment there. The original causes of our having troops in Australasia, were not military, but purely civil, and we find them there in 1858, long years after the civil necessities for the presence of military force had ceased. This, then, was the state of things twenty years ago, and it is quite " plain that the theory of English defence then as handed down to us by naval experience, was based on the assumption of necessity for being prepared for an attack at any part of our position and that the arrangements for the defence of an empire could not be confined to but one portion of it only. In practice it was defective, because, as before remarked, many of the positions were not well chosen and political and trading interests had overruled military caution and thus left the United Kingdom so weak as to be well-nigh defenceless. Up to the time to which I refer, the military forces of the Empire con- sisted of regular troops and militia. The constitutional machinery by which the State could organize and train English manhood into an armed militia for purposes of defence existed. It was rusty and re- ' 1858. Aggregate of Colonial population, 8,148,641 ; revemic, £10,259,292 ; value of exports and imiwrts of the Colonies, £93,030,750, \ lOLONIES. £10,259,292 j THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 23 quired oiling and repairing, but nevertheless the power existed and was ready to hand at home and in the Colonies. Military authorities had for years been endeavouring to have it examined, repaired and im- proved, but snocessive Governments paid no heed to their Avarnings, for the nation looker! upon such matters with coldness and apathy. Then suddenly came the invasion panic, arising from unexpected declaration of war by France against Austria and the rapidity of its consequence. This panic was really due to an acknowledgment of the powerlessness of resisting direct attack upon the Imperial base which military opinion had been for years persistently, bat vainly, pointing out to a nation that would not see. Before any one had time to think, t,n enormous section of ihe English people of Great Britain had rushed to arms and was busy organizing and drilling itself into a volunteer army. Government followed whither the movement led. The militia were for a time forgotten and the theory of Voluntary local or home defence was established as a cardinal principle of our military system and rapidly took such deep root in the English mind at home as to gradually produce a complete revolution of our Colonial military arrangements. It soon became apparent that the Invasion question was not so simple as uneducated popular military enthusiasm imagined. Attention consequently turned to the militia and to the Army. This at once involved serious financial considerations and thus military ex- penditure in the Colonies became a part of the question of the defence of the English Coast line, while the defence of the Colonies ceased to be a national military question and came to be regarded as something not of Imperial concern but of local and individual interest to each Colony only. Having sprung from a common origin it is not therefore surprising to find that all Colonial defensive systems have leading characteristics in common, distinctly traceable to the mode and circum- stances under which the creation of such systems became, more or less suddenly, necessary. It is, however, right to say that the particular history and circumstances of each Colony largely influenced the rature and degree of the individual efforts madp. For example Canada at once started with a militia system of a business-like character to which I shall presently refer, while other Colonies mainly relied upon the voluntary efforts of patriotic individuals to whom permission was given to organize defences subject to certain conditions. On the one hand Government assumed the responsibility of compelling citizens to defend their country : on the other. Government, in many instances avoided the responsibility by leaving it to the citizens to do so or not as they liked. But however different at starting may have been the mode of proceeding by which military safety was intended to be attained, there was one fundamental principle lying at the root of all. It was this — that the defence of each Colony concerns itself only and should therefore be of a purely local character : in a word, that the " open sesame" of Colonial safety lies in the two words — Home Defence. That term is now popular throughout our Empire, but the general adoption of the military principle involved is I think worthy of serious critical examination, I have often asked, what are the territorial limits as defined by tbe word " IJome " in conjunction with the word 24 THE NAVAL AND MILIT.iRY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. " Defence " ? I have never seen a reply. But it may be useful to point out that in Great Britain the obligation of Home Defence is deemed to end — for the greater portion of our military forces — at the water's edge : while in Australian Colonies it has been assumed to terminate at a land line marked on tie map as separating two English Colonies : and I could name a Colony elsewhere which by a carefully and elaborately-drawn law declared it to end at the precise distance of 4 miles from the capital ! no officer or man was to be compelled even to march beyond that magic line, and could not even be called out within it until the enemy practically was in sight. So far was this principle of local obligation carried at the Cape that up to last year the military organization for the defence of the- Colony was by territorial divisions, the inhabitants b'^ing " organized for the internal defence," not of the Colony but merely of " their respective divisions." When trouble came its chief sting lay in the fact that military combinations had been legally paralyzed by Act of Parliament. In New Zealand, at this moment, " no militia officer or militiaman in any regiment can "be " carried or ordered to go ijeyond the boundaries of the districts for " which such regiment or independent company is raised, except only " such as .shall volunteer for service out of the same." No one will dispute there are greater facilities for safe and rapid intercommunication between all parts of the British Empire now, than there were between all parts of England in the 13th century. It is an interesting fact that in 1285 the English freeman armed for defence was not protected by law from leaving his county or shire *' upon the coming of strange enemies into the realm." The truth is the British Empire in its military constitution now is not so far advanced as England 600 years ago.^ Now it may be said we have regular troops enough to move to every part of the Empire when wanted and therefore it is not in a naval and military sense objectionable for each part of the Empire to tie up its forces with parliamentary strings. But when the Empire is acting on its defence, its small regular army, being its only English arm of attack, must not be absorbed by even Imperial positions of passive defence abroad ; and if all the rest of the military forces are immoveable, our Imperial position cannot be made strong at the points it should be strongest. When we recollect thp o in order to send a handful of troops to Zululand we have had almost to break up several regiments, we should not be too sure that our only moveable force is prepared to stand an Im- perial strain. But it may be said these local military forces, home and colonial, are merely supplementary. If so, let it be clearly understood to what they are supplementary. At home no doubt they are supple- mentary to the regular army, their dutie.^ and positions being clearly defined ; but what do Colonial forces si'pplement ? Not a general plan of Imperial defence, for no such plan or scheme exists. The principle on which we rely for ensuring a maximum amount of Imperial safety, with a minimum of force and expenditure, is in itself vague. It is shortly expressed in the concluding paragraph of the report of the i Wide "New Zealand Militia Act, 1870," "Military Forces of the Crown," Clode. THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 25 Select Committee of the House of Commons in 1861. " Your Com- " mittee submit that the tendency of modem warfare is to strike blows " at the heart of a hostile Power ; and that it is therefore desirable to " concentrate the troops required for the defence li the United King- " dom as" much as possible, and to trust mainly to naval supremacy for " securing against foreign aggression the distant dependencies of the *' Empire." From this it would appear that Colonial military forces are supplementary to Naval supremacy, or rather that it is reasonable to regard them as supplementary to our fleets. Now the power of a fleet is in proportion to its absolute freedom from duties of territorial defence. The two leading principles of Naval distribution may be said to be — Ist, Off the enemy's coast ; 2nd, Covering the commanding points of communications on the high sea. To secure our Naval bases and to furnish sufficient means for their local defence is an Imperial duty which I humbly submit we ought not longer to shirlf, and in its discharge should seek to enlist the hearty co-operation of our brother Englishmen in the Colonies. It is to be observed that if military forces created, as supplementary to Naval power, are constituted on the principle of immobility, the operations of the fleet become dependent on the regulations of military forced rather than on the necessities of the naval work to be done. The naval bases must be then selected, not because they are most suitably situated, but because military forces have established themselves regardless of naval necessities. There is no alternative between that and a sacrifice of Naval power by using sea-going force to protect fixed points. But there is one more danger arising from the adoption of the principle of immobility of military force to which I desire to draw attention. If fragmentary local pro- tection be a sound military principle of Imperial defence, but a short step leads to localizing Naval defence, either by Acts of Parliament, or still more surely, by war vessels incapable of keeping the sea. Already there are distinct proofs of Naval Colonial defence — to say nothing of Home — theories developing local proclivities. I observe so eminent an authority as Sir W. Jervois recommending for example, South Australia to expend some £150,000 of her capital and £13,000 a-year of her revenue on a three-masted ironclad for purposes of local defence. She is not to be a regular sea-going ship, but is to be fit to go a certain distance, equivalent to that between Lisbon and the Azores. Sir W. Jervois thus officially speaks of the duties of the Royal Navy in Australian waters. " The Imperial squadron, small, and composed of '• wooden vessels, being charged with visiting the islands of the South " Sea, with the defence of Fiji Islands, New Zealand, and all " Australian Colonies ; the chance is but small of its being available " for the special defence of any one Colony or any particular portion " of the coast."! We have here a clear illustration of the Imperial programme for maintaining economically our Naval supremacy. We annex Fiji being a position of great strategic importance ; a neces- sary point at which to store coal and naval supplies, and as soon as we have got it, it simply becomes a burden to our fleet, because we do not choose to prepare to locally protect it, and because the military ^ Vide " Sessional Papers, South Australia," 1877. JOB mmmm 26 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RFPOURCES OF THE COLONIES. i :l forces supplementary to our fleets are immoveable, and none can be detached to so important a position. We took the point as a means of strengthening our naval position, and oar arrrangments are such thai we must weaken our naval position to defend the point. I have thus dwelt at some length on the one principle, common to all our Colonial defence systems, because it appears to me to deserve very serious con- sideration. I venture to think it may lead us by a perilous path to an Imperial slough of naval and military weakness. As regards the influence of local circumstances on the nature and growth of Colonial systems springii)g from a common original cause, I submit but one brief general observation. It would be unreasonable to expect all Colonies to have acted alike, when no sealed pattern, as it were, was left as a guide, and no" steips taken to assist in securing uniformity. Canada had, and has still, exceptional advan- tages, not only enabling her, but prompting her, to strike out a military policy more or less distinct. She has, what other great Colonies have not, a great and glorious military history of her own. Before she was called upon to organize her military system, she had organized a considerable militia force ; and further, large bodies of the regular army, of all branches, had for generations been quartered in her cities and towns. Besides all this, she is an old-settled country, and having passed the feverish time of petty provincial jealousies, seeks as a united Dominion, a system worthy of consolidated power and enlarged responsibility. It is but right to make this observation, for much misapprehension prevails at home as to the varied circumstances and conditions of other Colonies as regards military capability and power, and some Colonies are often ignorantly blamed for what they cannot help. I will now briefly indicate outlines of military organization in the Colonies. Armed Force. Canada. — The militia consists of all male inhabitants between the ages of 18 and 60. It is divided into four classes. ] st Class. Men from 18 to 30 years, who are unmarried or widowers without children. 2nd Class. Men from 30 to 45, who are married or widowers with children. 3rd Class. Men from 45 to 60. The above is the order in which the male population is called upon to serve. The Militia is divided into Active and Reserve. Active Militia consists of the Volunteer Militia, the Regular Militia, and the Marine Militia. The Volunteer Militia being composed of corps raised by voluntary enlistment ; the Regular Militia of men who have voluntarily enlisted to serve in the same, or who have been balloted to serve ; the Marine Militia composed of seamen, and persons whose usual occupation is upon any steam or sai^-ng craft; the Reserve Militia consists of the whole of the men who are not serving in the Active Militia for the time being. The period of service, in time of s^M$m ^^a^£i^'iii3*W^ h-i 12* ^ O t-« it' ti K. 3 'Jn n >.| o 8 w -I "b m r?" o -J «0 1— • if. 8 4- X '^ r« CA- ^ M ; W -.< ►3 « -2- • O B C H h- ' -** M t^ +« w tt- o ki- CO M CI CO » 'X •-0 w ~ li W M 4- w' I"-* i< w a: sT^ rk'' H-" 1— ' '" oi 7" H-* ^ h-* »- ' Si£. -1 'tl i o c ^TS 2 ' c o o r\ o ~i ps H — ' •tJ w o r^ f-t- '^ r^ E K-' o c C O o' ;:> 1 1 r/. 9T- v. 7 V. 3 =-i- o 1 o o " C Q 1 Hb l-l» u> ^ 1— » h-i 3 -^ t— 1 9 of -J. M H M 2 H o rj >■ 73 *^ M HI 1^ 50 M O S S o (/J H » I— ( •ii THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. 31 •' Brigade, governed by special Regulations under the Volunteer Act, " and intended for service afloat. 3, A Volunteer Force, enrolled on " the principle of granting Land Orders for efficient service, a system " which has been found not to give the desired result ; consequently, " without altering the Act, a revision of the Regulations for the '* Government of the Force has been proposed by Colonel Richardson, " the Commandant, in accordance with Sir W. Jervois' recommenda- " tion. Under these Regulations continuous training for a few days " during each year, besides a certain number of drills in daylight, are " rendered compulsory in return for a money payment. This reform " will constitute a valuable experiment from which the other Colonies " should profit. " In Queensland there is only a Volunteer Force, and the main* " tenance of a permanent nucleus has not yet been decided on. A " Bill is now before the Legislature of the Colony, which embodies " the suggestions made by Sir W Jervois. " The Tasmanian and South Australian Permanent Forces are " about to be raised, and Volunteer Forces are being enrolled, but the " question of organization is under consideration. In South Australia, " the money payment system is likely to be adopted. " In Victoria the Local Forces comprise — 1, A Permanent Force. " 2, A Naval Reserve, governed by special Regulations, but enrolled "under the same Discipline Act as the Permanent Artillery. 3, A " Volunteer Force upon the purely Voluntary principle. The Land "Order system was also tried in Victoria without any good result, " and it has been abandoned." It is to be observed that no allusion is made by Colonel Scratchly to West Australia or New Zealand. The latter Colony declined to have the advice of Sir W. Jervois and Colonel Scratchly on the ground that it had no money to spend on precautions for external defences and West Australia is too poor to provide any such means singlehanded. New Zealand has Militia and Volunteer laws in force. Every man between the age of 17 and 55 being compulsorly enrolled in the Militia, but actual service is limited by the bounds of Militia districts and I believe I am correct in stating that the Militia of New Zealand only exists on paper. In West Australia there is a Volunteer Force. The total armed strength of all these Colonies is shown in Table IX. I regret that space forbids my entering into an examination of the cost of these local isolated efforts of each colony, without a nucleus of regular interchangeable forces. My calculations lead me to conclude that they arc most expensive and that the United Kingdom and each, of the Colonies are wasting money for want of common sense business-like co-operation. Let me, however, give you one instance in order to impress you at all events with the feeling that there is good ground for serioiis inquiry. Tasmania is in a general sense a position of very great importance to the Empire in Australian waters. Between 1860 and 1871 inclusive that Colony spent over £18,000 on works, arms and ammunition, and £27,000 on maintenance of Volunteers. That force " meltsd in air, thin air," and from 1872 to 1875 no military expenditure consequently i^iMjsm m /^ig MWMIW H ! WiJ I<« H»ll msf»m li i 32 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY UESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. was incurred. Parliament inquiry in 1875 broaf;fht out the fact that the Volunteer force consisted of but 28 all told and that it had not been drilled nor inspected since 187.1. The £27,000 might just as well have been thrown into the sea. Now respectingHhe £18,000 spent in addition on works, arms and ammunition I simply give you an extract from an official telegram pent from the Governor, 21 May 1877, to the Minister for the Colonies in London. After naming guns and ammunition required, the telegram concludes thus : " I earnestly beg help for poor Colony : str'-.t^igically important : making efforts, what ou cannot give agents pay." I have watched the military history of Tasciiania in common with other Colonies, and for fear of being misuriderstood, I wish to say I do not mean to imply that that waste of money T^as any one's fault in parti- cular, but is the natural result of a vicious system, or rather of the absence of any Imperial system at all. During the " war scares " of 1877-78, while Englishmen at home were talking of going to Con- stantinople, Englishmen abroad were thinking of their lives and properties, and of their sea trade lines ; and these cannot be injured without the Empire being seriously hurt. Besides being bound together by nationality, loyalty, and natural sentiment, wo are closely knit by self-interest and trade connection, but in matters of defence, we seem to prefer to trust to fickle fortune rather than to business-like co-operation and common-sense precautions. The Gape. — This Colony at present furnishes ample fuel for a burning question, and well it may ; but the subject under consideration does lot admit of our turning aside to give it special or exceptional exa- \ination. I would, however, remark that it is the only Colony I'oper in which are quartered regular troops for internal defence, and that the hour is close at hand when the whole question of Colonial and Imperial responsibility as regards internal order and defence will be raised for the last time perhaps in the history of the Empire. The opening of this question will probably afford the very last favourable opportunity of calmly and deliberately considering the reciprocal, naval, and military duties of England and the Colonies in matters of common defence. It is most earnestly to be hoped that this fact will not be forgotten and that in seeking in peace finality as regards internal Colonial defence we shall not leave the far wider question of Imperial defence to settle itself, or to be settled for us, in the accidents and chances of great war. The history of the organization of local forces at the Cape, is so simple and instructive, that it may be useful to give its brief outlines down to last year. To carry inquiry or remark further would answer no useful purpose, as exceptional causes have, too late, produced exceptional military results. " In 1855, it was deemed ' expedient to make provision ' for en- " rolling and organizing the able-bodied inhabitants of the Colony for " the protection of life and property," not, however, within the Colony, but '■'■ ivithin their respective districts." This is roughly the preamble of the Act of that year, the salient features of which are as follows : — n r THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 33 1. Tho onrolmont by districts of all male residents therein, between the ages of 20 and 50, save and except certain ofJiciais. 2. When necessary for the defence of any divisions of the Colony, tho Governor was empowered to call out this burgher force for service within the said divisions and not elsewhere, except with the burghers' own consent. 3. The officers to be elected by the Force so enrolled, No provision was made to render the Force efficient as a military body ; some idea of the discipline may be gathered from the fact that, absence when called out, wilful disobedience of orders, were punishable by fine not exceeding £3, which was the highest penalty, and was only recoverable by civil process. One year later another Act was passed, by which the inhabitants were authorized to form themselves into Volunteer Corps for the defence of their respective divisions ; while it exempted such volunteers from serving in the burgher force, it naade no other provision for drill, training, or discipline. With such a system tho Cape drifted for over 20 years to a natural destiny of trouble. Then came war, to meet which it was created, and in which it at once utterly broke down. This is a picture in miniature of tho mode and the manner in which the British Empire is now acting. I only ask those who are annoyed with their brother Englishmen in South Africa for neglecting to provide efficiently for their defence, tq remember that they only did on a very small scale what their owa Empire is doing all over the world. Last year the Acts to which I refer were repealed and the following Acts were passed. 1. The Cape Mounted Yeomanry Act. — This provided for a paid corps, not exceeding 3,000, to be raised by voluntary enlistment, for general military service within the Colony or beyond tho border thereof, wherever the interest of the Colony may require. Officers to be appointed by the Governor. 2. The Burgher Force and Levies Act which provided for the enrol- ment of every male between 18 and 60 ; it perpetuates the system of electing officers ; it empowers the Governor to call out the Force for inspection and rifle practice, as he may direct ; and also for actual service. The extreme penalty for absence or for refusing to obey orders when called out, is £2, or in default 14 days' imprisonment. 3. The Volunteer Act empowers the Governor to accept services of naval and military volunteer corps and to make regulations for constitution, pay and discipline. All Forces created under these Acts are liable to service " within the Colony or beyond the " borders thereof " — No anm.al system of training is provided, nor would any of the corps be underthe Mutiny Act, even when on actual service. Now all these Acts have been passed subse- quent to the publication of a memorandum by Sir Bartle Frere containing the following extract : — " I feel assured a Militia on " the English plan would be found more efficient and less expensive than any other force of the kind which has been d r t 34 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOUKOES OF THE COLONIES. " recommended by writers or speakers on the subject."' I draw your attention to the fact that Sir Bartle Frere's opinion is not the basis on which the defensive system o£ the Cape is framed. Natal, — It may be useful to treat Natal in the same manner as I have done the Cape. In 1854 a Volunteer ordinance was framed which made it lawful for persons, with the sanction of the Governor, to form themselves into Volunteer Corps, to elect their own officers and to make their own rules. — Such Volunteers to be exempt from being compelled to serve in any Militia or military force which might be raised, and no corps could be compelled to serve at a greater distance than 30 miles from its own head-quarters. This ordinance was repealed next year — and another Act was passed, in its general principle perpetuating the same system. I will pursue inquiry no further with regard to the Cape and Natal for fear of confusing between the details of defence in one Colony and general principles applicable to all. — The tota!" Volunteer strength of the Cape on the Slst December 1877 was 3,343, of Natal 644, all ranks. At the Cape the force was armed with four different pattern rifles. I am obliged to leave out all reference under this head to Plantation Colonies and Trading Settlements. — I do so with regret, for the history of spasmodic local efforts and their results would bring to notice some very extraordinary facts, of great importance in the general question. Before concluding this review of purely military Colonial organiza- tion there is one most important aspect of the principle on which we are now acting, which must not and cannot be overlooked. No matter what may be the true value of the Colonial developed, resources as regards numerical military strength, when weighed in the scale of Imperial necessity for united action and a common plan, such strength is absolutely useless unless properly armed and supplied, with ammuni- tion and military materials. When we adopted fragmentary systems of Home Defence and Local Self Reliance as the cardinal principles by which our Empire was to be defended, we made no regulations whatever and no provisions what- ever for providing for the supply of arms and munitions of war to the Colonies. We left the question to drift and it is drifting still. The question cannot be shirked nor avoided by saying the Colonies must be self- reliant and buy them, for it really covers a very wide field. It not only concerns the distant positions of our Empire, but enters the very core of our supply system at Home. The Colonies pay for what they want and they expect to get at once and at all times what they require, the question is, are we prepared to supply them when these demands are largest and most urgent, which will also be the hour of our sorest need 1 If any such calamity happened as a rupture yith America — which I say, God forbid, — could the Arsenal at Woolwich with the strain then thrown upon it meet in addition the requisitions of the Canadian army number- * See Memoraaduui 26th December, 1877, " Capo Parliament ropers," \ THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 35 ing 600,000, and also the demands of Australasian and Plantation Colonies and Military and Trading Settlements, til pouring in at one and the same time ? This is an extreme case, but during the scare of 1877-8, from numerous Colonies came constant telegraphic demands for various descriptions of stores, and if they come thick at such a time they will come by hundreds when war is declared. We have done nothing whatever to prepare for meeting promptly, the enormous extra de- mands on Home supplies caused by the fluctuations and the growth of military forces in the Colonies. Now the principle of individual self- reliance on the part of each fragment of the Empire involves not only choice as to what defensive organization each adopts, but also the exercise of a free and independent judgment in the selections of weapons and stores. Hence it is that it places Home arsenals in the position of not knowing from hour to hour what is the precise nature of the stores Colonial Governments may demand through the diverse channels of departmental communication. Want of uniformity, pro- duced by absence of a common or Imperial system of defence, renders it utterly impossible to regulate supply efficiently and economically. I cannot extend my remarks further on this head, but when they are con- sidered in a business-like practical manner in conjunction with the broad fact that British fleets and military forces all over the world are, by our present system compelled to rely mainly on Home arsenals, I think my humble opinion will not be found far short of the truth. It is briefly this — that the Imperial supply system will utterly break down under the strain of war. Before turning to naval colonial organization, let me shortly .jtate the exact point at which the most progressive Colonies have now arrived, Canada is finding out that a permanent nucleus of military force is a necessity. For further information I refer you to the latest official report on the state of the Militia of the Dominion. Victoria and New South Wales have for some years each had a permanent local military artillery force. Now we abolished local military forces of the Uoyal Army because experience had proved the principle to be full of defects, Canada seems to be aware of this, for the plan proposed for considera- tion is to make the small nucleus of three battalions interchangeable with battalions of line in England. It is neither necessary, nor is it now possible, for any Colony of Australia to adopt this system on such a scale, because the permanent military forces, required to be maintained, are small. But if the local forces in Australia are supplementary to naval defence, each nucleus should be adapted to the requirements both of Australian Governments and also to naval power. The practical difficulty of Imperial interchangeabiuty vanishes if the Marine Artillery and Marine Infantry cease to be overlooked. Their organization makes it a matter of indifference whether they have to send a Corporal's guard to Botany Bay or thousands to Gallipoli. The Australian Governments must have a guarantee that such nucleus must not be withdrawn in war, and while they bear the cost of their nucleus we must bear the cost of maintaining a corresponding number of their forces at home, treating them in all respects as part and parcel d 2 tit: Ml \ 36 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. of the Royal Forces, with equal claims as to rank, rewards, and emoluments. The system of the Marine Artillery makes it a matter of indifference whether its members are called on to instruct naval reserves in gun drill or military forces in all branches, — except cavalry and engineering, — of military art, and I think inquiry would show this plan, suggested many years ago, would be more economical to Australian Colonies and not more costly to England than the system now pursued, and would pave the way for that welding together of English war power of defence into " one harmonious whole," for which we should all earnestly strive. I conclude this portion of my subject by stating that the aggregate annual revenue of the Colonies is now nearly 27 millions, the aggregate annual value of their exports and imports about 200 millions. The revenue has therefore increased thirteen-fold, while the annual value of exports and imports is six times what it was when Her Majesty began to reign. "Naval Armed SteengtC and Oeqanization." Under this head I have, as regards Canada, nothing to bring to your notice, except the absence practically of any naval system at all : I desire, however^ to draw attention to the fact that, so apathetic are Englishmen now about naval affairs, it has remained for a military officer. Sir Selby Smyth, to urge upon the Canadian Government the adoption of a system of co-operatiou with the Royal Navy. According to the last Canadian census there are some 16,000 persons whose calling is the mercantile marine ; and by Mr. Keefer's excellent hand- book it appears there are nearly 53,000 men employed in the Fisheries. Victoria possesses the " Cerberus," a harbour-defence ship, and the "Nelson," a sea-going wooden vessel. Considerable alterations have been made in this latter vessel within the last year, and, to the credit of the Colony be it said, without calling in external aid. The Victorian Act of 1870, provides "that armed vessels maintained by " the Colony, shall be for the purpose of defending the Coast of " Victoria and co-operating, in time of war, with the ships of the " Royal Navy, in such manner as the Governor, with the advice of the " Executive Council, shall appi'ove." So far back as 1855, New South Wales passed an Act for main- taining " armed vessels for the service of the Colony for the protection " thereof and for other purposes." Now, with full knowledge of the loyalty and patriotism of Englishmen in the Colonies and their liberality as regards expenditure on defence, I cannot think that in the hour of danger, which will also be a time of popular excitement. Executive Councils will be allowed to permit their armed vessels to extend operations beyond the maritime league. Herein lies a source of danger. The Admiralty at home is tolerably certair to regard each Colonial armed vessel as a source of British Naval strength in Australian seas, and to take credit for it in the estimate of required power, while the Commodore, in those waters, mui^fc make his dis- THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. 37 position of naval force, which he nominally commands, not in accord- ance with the necessities forced upon him by the mode of impending attack, but by the views and wishes of different Executive Councils, controlling portions of his fleet. The annual value of exports and imports of Australasian Colonies approaches now 100 millions ; of this, ov(^r 40 millions passes and repasses to the United Kingdom, and it is difiBcult to conceive a more dangerous naval principle than that which we are now fostering and nourishing in the bosom of Australian seas. The principle of localizing the action of naval force, whether it be by Acts of Colonial Parliaments, by ships that cannot keep the sea, or by immobility of military forces intended to act in the support of our fleets, to my mind contains the germs of creeping naval paralysis, which, if not checked, will prostrate and finally destroy our supremacy of the sea. The naval force of Victoria consists of permanent " Cadres" numbering 119, maintained on board their two ships, and a naval reserve of 229, which receives a retaining fee to hold itself in readiness to complete the complement of the " Cerberus " and the "Nelson." These vessels' complements would be under the Naval Discipline Act when called out for actual service. In New South Wales there is a Naval Volunteer Brigade, numbering some 286, and in New Zealand there are five Naval Volunteer Corps, with an aggregate strength of 431. The developed naval resources therefore of the mercantile marine of the Colonial Empire- — which is by half greater than that of France — consists of one harbour defence vessel, one wooden vessel, and a handful of Volunteers, some of which are wholly uninstructed and others certainly undisciplined. According to the census returns there are more than 10,000 persons in Austra- lasia whose calling is on the sea; the number at the Cape is in- finitesimal. Captain Marshal Smith, Master of the Australian Barque " T. T. " Hall," writing to the " Nautical Magazine," from the other side of the world, says : " it has often surprised the writer at in all the " recommendations for defence, a Colonial Naval Reserve has never been proposed " until Mr. Brassey's proposition." He calculated " that 2,000 " Australian seamen naight be trained and organized as a reserve for " the Royal Navy." Englishmen, however, seem blind to this Colonial resource and deaf to the utterances of a General in Canada and to the pleadings of a Colonial Merchant Captain at the Antipodes. Conclusion. Time compels me to refrain from summing up these two papers in a manner worthy of the subject. I cannot conclude, however, without once more entreating the men who have the power, to obtain inquiry into the workings of our present policy of Imperial defence, which has now been in force for a period approaching ten years. I incline to the belief that it is breeding a series of naval and military con- fusions ; but I sincerely hope I r^ay be wrong. Such an inquiry, I m >M- 38 THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES. venture to ttink, mtist take the form of an Imperial Commission or. ■which should sit representatives of the great Colonies, selected by them for the pnrpose. This Commission should have an advising Council of naval and military authorities, to inquire into and to fix the principles on which the Empire must act, in order to secure the maximum amount of safety at a minimum cost. It is a past hope that the great Colonies will ever now join in a general scheme, in the construction of which they have had no voice, and in the carrying out of which, reciprocal duties and obligations of defence are not clearly defined. " Spreading as the Empire is, over every part of the habitable " globe it is " — says Mr. Frederick Young,! " of the utmost importance " to inquire by what means its permanent union may be most effectually " secured." Now I take it that all Englishmen are agreed on that point, and its naval and military bearing is this :— >" Ji{ is of the utmost " importance to scientifically ' inquire ' by what means Imperial safety in " war ' may be most effectually ' and economically ' gtmra/nteed,^ " This we have not yet done. Having launched our Empire on military and naval planks of self- reliance without any union or any bond, we hope it may drift into a haven of safety ; and we or those who come after us may find it stranded amidst the breakers of " mutual mistrust." It is said that the question of Imperial Defence is too big to inquire into as a whole. Well, the Empire is getting bigger and bigger every day, and if we fear to face the problem now, what have we to hope for in procrastination and delay ? We stave off the duty of calm deliberate inquiry by vague phrases respecting our " supremacy of the sea." We surely ought to inquire and clearly define by what method and on what broad principles that supremacy is to be maintained. This we have never yet done. Since the introduction of steam revolutionized naval warfare, we have had no National Inquiry to seek out and define the grand princi- ples of naval policy which can be implicitly trusted to rule supreme over every branch and part of our national naval system. Groping amidst the debris of microscopic manipulations and elaborate naval details, the nation has vainly hoped to stumble across Imperial naval principles, and it now finds itself hopelessly confused as to what are great naval principles, and what are — however big — mere details. This has produced national weariness and apathy in naval affairs, and it may end in the decadence of national naval spirit. Even the English mind cannot be interested in what it cannot comprehend, and once national interest in naval affairs passes into a certain stage of deadly dull disregard, we may well look at our Imperial future with dismay. It was a national naval spirit won our Empire in the past, and must be its hope and confidence in days to come. There are signs now that military longings are — in the popular mind — supplanting naval enthusiasm, and therefore I think the time has come for such a full and searching inquiry as shall cause the English race to pause and reflect upon the practical, real necessities of their Imperial position. *•" Imperial Federation," by Frederick Young. ■M / \ E COLONIES THE NAVAL AND MILITAllY RESOURCES OP THE COLONIES. 39 If -we drift much longer, we know not whither, we shall end, we know not where. Between fatal centralization on the one hand, and false localization on the other, stands the " supremacy of the sea in the chill cold shade " of national negligence :" we may well look at it in hesitating doubt, as without close examination it is hard to say if it be a teality. It may be no more than a dream of the past; without inquiry we cannot say. We know it was with ns in 1805, we know for certain but little else. For aught we know, the flag lowered to half-mast in the Bay of Trafalgar may have meant more than the death of a hero and apostle. It may have symbolized the decline of the cause for which he fought and the doctrine for which he died. For all we really know of the future conditions of naval war, " our supremacy of the sea " may be " pigeon-holed " with the papers of the Treaty of Paris or buried for ever in the crypt of St. Paul's. ■ / \ !. • ■ • |> - •1 •.,n . R fii ( \ ** LONDON : HAHBrnON AND SONS, PRINTF.BS IN OKPINAtlT T() llEB MAJESTY, ST. martin's lake. iX « i ■4