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Un des symboles suivonts epperettre sur la dernlAre image de cheque microffiche, selon ie cas: ie symbols -»> signiffie "A SUIVRE ", le symbols V signiffie "FIN ". Les cartas, planchss, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre ffilmis A des taux de reduction difffArents. Lorsqus le document est trop grend pour Atre reproduit en un seul clich*. il sst ffilm* A partir de I'engle supArieur gauche, de geuche A droite. et de haut en bas, en prenant ie nombre d'images nAcesseire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent le mAthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 S 6 THE BRITISH COLUMBIAN DISPUTE. [Pall Mall Gazette, Sept. 22.] The Ibsugs of the controveray between the Dominion of Canada and British Columbia have been made sufficiently plain to the public; nor is there any reason to doubt that their gravity has been fully appreciated by the Colonial Office. At the same time it is evident that the Imperial Government can only proceed with great caution in urging the Canadi- ans to carry out their pledge to the Pacific Settlements. The Act of Union of 1867 placed the Dominion in something like the position of an independent Power, and Canadian politicians are not slow to assert their right to shape a policy of their own. Only a few months ago Mr. Mac- kenzie, the Premier of the Dominion, in addressing his constituents at Sarnia, went out of his way to assert with great clearness and emphasis the advancement of Canadian pretentions. He said: — " One of our early struggles in this country was to get Canadian affairs managed by Can- adian.^, and not to have a Colonial Office or a Colonial Secretary under- taking to dictate through an irresponsible Council in Canada what laws should be enacted or what policy should be adopted. That has all been gained, and so far as the management of our own internal affairs is con- cerned there is nothing left in dispute." And he went on to claim for the Ottawa Government a similar independence in the practical if not the formal conduct of negotiations with the United States, should any difficulties arise between the Dominion and its neighbors. This part of policy Mr. Mackenzie asserts, *' does not concern any other portion of the British public;" and he hints that interference on the part of the mother country would be sharply resented. If w^e apply the principle > and the sentiments on which Mr. Mackenzie rests his cri^e to the British Cohimbia controversy, it is yasy to perceive the obstacles to direct Im- perial action for securing the rights of the Pacific colonists are very formidable. The Act of Union speaks of "Terms and conditions " of Confederation, but does not provide any machinery for enforcing the performance of those terms and conditions against the will of the Ex- ecutive Government of the Dominion and of the majority in the Ottawa Parliament. Moreover, those agreements generally havj reference to expenditure of money; and appropriations to meet this expenditure must be granted in the usual way by the House of Commons. Even in this country, where the Government is in direct relations with the Legislature the latter might refuse to provide the means for carrying out a public contract, and the former could only appeal to the honor of the nation at large to wipe awrn/ the stain of such a lireach (\f faith. But the Imperial Qovernment dealing with a colonial Parliament, has no possibility of (2) finding such a remedy. When the Canadian Parliament declines to give effect to the bargain inrith British Columbia, and the refusal is acquiesced in by the Dominion Ministry, the mother countay cannot even cause the question to be remitted to the constituencies. The jealousy of Imperial interference to which Mr. Mackenzie /g^ves such energetic expression -would be aroused, beyond all question, were the Oovemor-Qeneral to be directed by the Colonial Office to dissolve the House of Commons at Ottawa against the advice of his "responsible Ministers." Were even such an expedient — for which there is no recent precedent — ^possible^ it would fail of attaining its object. It is to be feared that the Canadian Conservatives are as little prepared as Mr. Mackenzie's followers to do plain justice to the people of British Columbia, so that a dissolution and a change of Administration would probably effect no more than an al- teration in the methods of evasion. Unfortunately, too, the Senate at Ottawa, which is the bodv directly responsible for the rejection of the "Carnarvon Compromise, consists of members nominated for life, and so long as the majority in this branch of the Legislature remains op- posed to the execution of the contract the dead-lock will continue.. It is not, therefore, to the direct compulsion of the Imperial Qovem- ment that British Columbia can look for the removal of tne grievances of which she justly complains, and the text of the address of tiie Pacific colonists to Lord Dufferin shows that no such illusion is cherished. The address summarizes the controversy with Canada; pointing out that the "many and urgent representations" of British Columbia with respect to "the unfulfilled terms of Confederation, resulting in certain recom- mendations by the Eaxl of Carnarvon, which were accepted by the Dominion Government ns a solution of the difficulty, and that these recommendations were favorable to the Dominion Qovemment, as they would, if carried out, have relieved it from those conditions of the ori- ginal terms of Confederation which were considered by the Dominion Government impossible of fulfilment." But tne address proceeds, "instead of the Dominion of Canada attempting to fulfil these modified obligations in a bona fide manner, she utterly neglected to do so, and in lieu thereof offered a pecuniary compensation to this Province in an ambiguously worded document. This offer was declined by the Pro- vincial Government, and its action was endorsed in the strongest manner by the people." The danger that a sense of wrong originating in this repeated breach of faith may lead to serious political consequences is temperatelv set forth by the Pacific colonists. It is asserted that "the action of the Dominion Gk>vernment in ignoring the Carnarvon settle- ment has produced a widespread feeling of dissatisfaction towards Con- federation, which has been intensified by the utterances of prominent public men of the Dominion, who apparently look upon this Province as a source of expense and trouble to the Dominion, and as a Province whose withdrawal would not be regretted." This is perfectly true. Mr. Mackenzie himself has spoken as if the connection with British Colum- bia were an embarrassing and unprofitable one. Mr. Blake, the present Minister of Justice, has openly declared that if the Pacific Province will not be content with what Canada chooses to g^ve her, she had better go out of the Union; and Sir Alexander Ghdt, as promin.nt on the Conser- vative side as Mr. Blake is among the Liberals, has explicitly endorsed this policy. What wonder if the result has follcwed which Uie address (8) notes aa a wanimg? If, it is said, the Canadian Government "fail to take practical steps to carry into effect the terms solemnly accepted by them, we most respectfully inform your Excellency that, in the opinion of a largo number of people of this Province, Uie withdrawal of this Province from the Gonfederaiion ^irill be the inevitable result; and in such case compensation from the Dominion would be demanded for the unfulfiled obligations which she undertook. This growing desire for separation is not held out as a threat, but is simply the expression of a feeling which is gaining strength every day. (The knowledge that Canada relies on the paucity of our numbers, and her own power to fulfil or repudiate the terms of the Union as she pleases, creates a feel- ing of irritation which is being continually augmented." The Canadians unluckily, do not scruple to say that these small communities must vield SiB anti-Unionists of Nova Scotia were forced to yield to the will of the more powerful provinces. They know that secession from the Union would leave the Pacific settlers, as the address describes them, in a peril- ous and painful situation: — *' Bounded as this Province is, on the north and Boutn by United States territories, and without railway connection with the Dominion of Canada, British Columbia will ever be an isolated, unprogressive Province. The railway and other facilities of the Ameri- can people are sapping our trade and directing commerce and population to their shores." Tet in justice to the loyalty of the British Columbians it must be said they do not even glance at the possibility of annexation, though they call Lord Dufferin's attention to the amazing progress made in the Far West of the Union by the development of the railway system. Still, although annexation remains a word unspoken, it is not less cer- tainly in men's thoughts, and as a possibility it must enter into the reckonings of Imperial statesmanship. It is impossible to admit the pretention of the Dominion Government that this is merely a Canadian question, and that it must be settled as between the Parliament of Ot- tawa and a few thousand settlers in British Columbia. The Pacific Province is equal in area to the German Empire; its ports are upon the most direct line between Europe and the Far East, Victoria, the chief town of Vancouver's Island, is no more than twenty-one days' sail from Hong Kong, and it has been calculated that, were the Trans-Continental Railway opened, the communication between Southampton and the Chinese ports might be shortened by fifteen or twenty days. At anv rate, tlie time must come when the trade of these Pacific colonies with Japan and China will become a most important element in the world's commerce; and the childish narrow-minded trickery of the Canadians is unconsciously diverting this future stream of wealth and power from the British Empire to the American Republic. Isolated and hopeless, British Columbia would be likely to look to annexation for a new career, and the Americans who hem in our colony between Oregon and Alaska may be tempted to accept the invitation of those adventurous spirits who recognize no established allegiance, and whose flag is planted for them bv commercial interest. If the Canadians can afford to disregard these obvious considerations. Imperial statesmanship cannot; and though, as we have said, the mother country cannot enforce the performance of the contract bv constitutional methods, the power of public opinion, ex- pressed with moderation, but also with firmness, by the Colonial Office, . (4) may bring the Ministers of the Dominion to a sense of their wider and higher duties. It is not too much to say that if Canada refuses to be- have with common honesty in carrying out a clear contract, she will be guilty of disloyalty to the Empire, as well as of the more vulgar offence. THE LONDON "STANDARD" ON BRITISH COLUMBIA AFFAIRS. Mr. Mackenzie's Government, says the Standard^ must be by this time convinced that the public opinion of the Mother Country, expressed with a decision and a unanimity most uncommon upon colonial questions is opposed to the vacillating and tortuous policy which has been pur- sued towards Britdsh Columbia. It is now more than two years since we first called attention to the course which the so-called "Liberal" or "Grit" Ministry were pursuing in regard to the project of the Canadian Pacific Railway — to the shuffling and time-serving devices which were being resorted to in order to evade the fulfilment of a bargain to which the honor of England was pledged, and to delay the execution of a work absolutely necessary in order to secure the integrity and the independence of the Dominion. We charged the Mackenzie Ministry with studyinnr rather their own political convenience in the manner they make use of Canadian capitcd and Canadian credit than the wel- fare of the Coafederation and the Imperial interests. We spoke of their policy as "a challenge to secession," as calculated to "loosen the newly-formed bonds of Canadian unity, and to injure the Domin- ion in its relations to the Empire." In return we received a great deal of bad language, and were told that we were actuated by "Tory prejudices" against the best of Ministries. We were informed that the Pacific Railway was being pushed forward as fast as was consist- ent with political purity in the Dominion, and that if the bargain with British Columbia could not be literally fulfilled it was because of its "physical impracticability." Since then the terms of that bar- gain have been greatly modified. A compromise was agreed to in 1874, at the instance of Lord Carnarvon, by which British Columbia agreed to waive its demand for a strict performance of the contract of 1871 — the contract on the strength of which ^e was induced to enter the Dominion — in consideration of a certain new undertaking on the part of Gaocda. The terms of this new compact, as arranged by Lord Camanron and accepted by Canada, were five. The first (5) was that a railway between Esquimalt harbor and Nanaimo, Van- couver Ishmd, shoukl be commenced as soon as poaaible, and com- pleted with all practicable de.spat(;h; the 2nd that the surveys for the mainland line should be vigorously prosecuted; the 3rd that a wag- gon-road and telegraph line should be constructed immediately along the route of the proposed railway; the 4th that at least two millions of dollars should be spent every year within the Province of British Columbia from the date when the surveys should be suffoiently ad- vanced to admit of that expenditure on the construction cf the rail- way; and the last that on or before the 31st of December, 1890, the whohi line from the Pacific to the present furthest western point of the Canadian railway system should be completed and open for traf- fic. Considering that according to the original contract the Pacific Riilway was to have been completed in 1881, it will be generally al- lowed that these terms involve a vf ry great relaxation of the bond on the faith of which British Columbia was tempted to enter the North American Confederation. To a certain extent, however, the pleas advanced by Canada for the non-fulfilment of her bargain were ad- mitted to be reasonable. If it was "jjuysically impracticable," as Mr. Mackenzie urged, to construct the railway within the stipulated t<3rm, there was nothing more to be said. No one in this country, nor, as we believe, in British Columbia, had any idea of keeping Canmla to the strict letter of her bond if the doing so involved the crippling of her own finances. It may be that the o -iginal contract was some- what rashly entered into, and that Canada, as young countries are wont to do, promised more than she had any reasonable prospect of performing. The construction of a railway from sea to sea upon British teri'itory, however important as a means of welding the Do- minion together, was not the only object to be considered. If in the process of cementing the union we ruined its most important member, the result could hardly be satisfactory from an Imperial point of view. Justice and good policy alike demanded that the terms of the contract of 1871 should be liberally interpreted — that Canada should not be asked to bear a burden disi^roportionate to her strength — that British Columbia should not be forced into a premature development at the expense of her neighbors. All these (;onsiderations we cannot doubt were well weighed by Lord Carnarvon when he proposed the compromise of 1874. What we have to complain of now is, that not only have the terms even of that modified contract not been complied with, but that no attempt whatever appears to have been made to comply with them. While we find the Mackenzie Government ener- getic enough in pushing forward public works within those Provinces where it is most essential that its political interest is to be maintained, and prepared to enter into new engagements with the United States, involving the expenditure of a large sum of money, we do not see any sign whatever of a desire to comply with the terms of the Carnarvon compromise. The pretence that the Dominion Upper House rejected that compromise Mr. Mackenzie's own followers can scarcely regard as serious. In the majority of two by which the bill was defeated there were several of Mr. Mackenzie's o^/n pai'ty, including one gen- tleman -^ho had been only made a Senptor a few weeks before upon hU nomination. It io difficult to believe that if the Ministry had been in (6) CKmeai they oonld not have carried the measure through both Hotiaes of the Canadian Parliament. Their recent offer of $750,000 to British Columbia in lien of the Camanron compromise most convince ns, if there were no other evidence, of the fact that they never meant to carry out that bargain— that they have been onlv paltering with their engagements to the Imperial €k>vemmentand to uie Province. It is ab- surd to suppose that British Columbia can accept such a sum as pay- ment in full of all her claims. We cannot wonder that there is a very great discontent throughout the Province — a discontent which it has been beyond even Lord Dufferin's powers of diplomacy to allav. We must still hope that the Canadian Government will be indnced to re- view its conduct in regard to this transaction, and we cannot doubt that what influence the Imperial Government possesses will be brought to bear in order that justice may be done between the Dominion and the Province of British Columbia. CANADA AND BRITISH COLUMBIA. {From the London Saiwrdcof Review.) If Lord Dufferin fails in his efforts to adjust the dispute between Canada and British Columbia, the difficulty may be regarded as in- soluble. With the authority and dignity of high office he combines as fully as^any living statesman diplomatic and official experience, tact, temper, and sound practical judgment. He will offend no pre- judices, he will make allowance for personal and local susceptibilities, and if he cannot overcome unavoidable obstacles, he will not create artificial impediments to the success of his voluntary mission. Nevertheless it is but too probable that he will find compromise or settlement impracticable. It is a gT&\e disadvantage to a negotiator to know that his principals are in the wrong, and 21? arbitoator is embarrassed by inability to rely on the performance by either party of the conditions of an award. The representative of the Crown wiU command a certain respect, but the uncertain and elastic state of colonial sentiment rendera every interference on behalf of the Imperial Government difficult and possioly ineffective. The loyalty of Canada is accompanied by an unvarying resolution on the part of we colonists to have their own way, as often as any difference occurs. The present case is further complicated by the provincial relation of British Columbia to Canada. The quarrel affects the validity of tiie union which was but recently with much difficulty aooompliiuied. The re- (7) mote settlement onthePaciflo coast long hesitated to join the Domin- ion; and its assent was only granted on definite terms. Sir John Bfacdonald and his colleagnes undertook, on behalf of the Giuiadian Government, to complete within a limited time a railway to connect the Eastern and Western Provinces. The enterprise was suggested by the example d the United States in constructing the Pacific Bailway which now extends from the Atlantic coast to San Francisco. The Cfmadian Oovemment perhaps scarcely gave sufficient considGi- ation to the inferiority of colonial resources, to the thinness of popu- lation on the proposed route, and to the severe climate of the North. Even the American Pacific Bailway has hitiierto failed as a speculation, though it is both politically and commercially advantageous to the Union. The construction of the railway was attended by numerous Keuniar^ scandals; and the line might figuratively be said to be bal- ited with broken reputations. In this respect, if in no other, it was easv for Ganada to imitate a bad example. The English Government, feeling a strong and legitimate desire for the Union of all the North American Provinces, undertook to guaran- tee a loan for a portion of the necessary ex]^nt^Umre. One of the principal capitalists of Canada was employed m financial negotiations in London; and, unfortunately, the Canad'an Prime Minister and some of his colleagues became personally coiiLu^romised in the transac- tions of th<^5r agent. It was found impossible to ridse the large sum which would have been I'equired for the constvucLion of the railway; and Lbe disclosure of some irregular bargains with the contractor led to the retirement of Sir John B^usdonald and his Minirtry from office. His successor, Mr. Mackenzie, had opposed the project of the railway; the incoming Government soon announced its intention of abandoning the enterprise. A distinct breach of contract with British Columbia could onl^ be excused by the impossibility of completing the bargain. The Province was naturally slow to admit the necessity of incurring serious disappointment; but, after long negotiation, Lord Carnarvon in- duced British Columbia to acquiesce in an alternative and less advan- tageous plan. The Canadian Government, in consideration of a release from the obligation of making the railroad, agreed to make a waggon road for a part of the distance, and to construct a considerable extent of railroad within tiie Province. The second arrangement has now shared the fate of the fijrst, altiiough the Canadian House of Commons voted the necessary supplies. The bill was, apparently with the con- nivance of the Ministers, lost in the Council; and now a third offer is made of a lump sum of a quarter of a million in satisfaction of all the claims of the Province. There is no security that the damages tendered will be paid; and, although a money compromise would perhaps not be expedient, the Legislature and Government of British Columoia re- gard the Canadian offer as whoUy inadequate. They alle^:e that the railway which the Government of the Dominion undertook to con- struct would have cost several millions; and that the expenditiure of large sums on labor would have been immediately advantageous to the district. In default of a more liberal ammfrement, British Columbia claims to be released from the federal connection to which it had as- sented. The conditions of the original bargain have evidently been violated, and the contention that the contract is void is therefore plaus* ible, if not convincing. (8) According to the analogy of English law, a court would probably hold that the union was irrevocable, and that the Canadian Government was bound either to comply with the t-orms of tlie contract or to make full compensation for failure ; but Eiiglish colonies are almost equally in- dependent with sovereign States of coercive jurisdiction. Lord Duffer- in's task is rather diplomatic than judicial, inasmuch as it is necessary that both parties should concur in any valid settlement. British Col- umbia cannot compel Canada to do justice; and, on the other hand, the Government of the Dominion has no means of enforcing the mainten- ance of the federal relation. It is alleged, perhaps on insufficient grounds that the settlers of Upper Canada are not anxious to facilitate by the construction of roads or railways the passage of European immigrants to the rich lands of the Pacific coast; but their experience of the compe- tition of the Western States ought to have shown the impossibility of stopping immigrants on their way to a chosen place of settlement. The French of Lower Canada are supposed to dislike an increase of the English and Protestant population; but as long as the Eastern Pro- vinces are only sprinkled with settlers, it seems unreasonable to culti- vate a jealousy of the remote districts on the Pacific. It must be obvious to intelligent colonists that in proportion to its economical advantages, British Columbia will increase in prosperity and population with the aid either of Canada or the United States. Patriotism would suggest the expediency of cultivating the connexion which is one of the conditions of the future national greatness of Canada; but it is not sufficiently active to prevail over potty motives and calculations. It is for the English Cabinet to determine, if the case unfortunately arises, whether the consent of the Crown shall be given to the with- drawal of British Columbia from the union with Canada; but the decision of a difficult and dangerous question ought, if possible, to be evaded. Even if tLa Canadians were previously indifferent to the main- tenance of the present connection, they would find a grievance in the infringement of the integrity of the Dominion. On the other hand, neither England or Canada nor both together could prevent the eeires- sion of British Columbia, either from the Dominion or from the Empire. According to the well established policy of England, the colonies are only retained as long as the connection is voluntt ry. It would be absurd, if it were not impossible, to employ for the mu ten- ance of the unity of the Canadian Dominion means wliich have been by anticipation renounced as inapplicable to the assertion of the integrity of the Empire. The independence of British Columbia would be fol- lowed after no long interved by annexation to the American Union; ncr would there be any ground for resenting an arrangement between two foreign communities. If Lord Dufferin fails to satisfy the inhabitants of the Province, he may probably be able to secure a reasonable delay be- fore the adoption of any irrevocable measure. On his return to Ottawa he will have to conduct a negotiation with his own advisors, who still command the Parliamentary majority by which they have» been kept in power three years. It may be a question whether their popularity would not be endangered hy any display of indifference to the risk of mutilating the Dominion. Sir /ohn Maodonald was supported by the Parliament of his day when he engaged to pay a high price for the ad- heaiou of Bntish Columbia to the Union. The same reasons which (9) then recommended his policy may still influence colonial opinion. Since the establishment of the novel system of responsible government, the duties of a Colonial Governor have changed their character. While an Indian Viceroy ;^r a Governor of a Crown Colony is charged mainly with administrative functions, a Governor-General of Canada, or the holder of a similar office in Australia, is something between a constitu- tional King and a resident Ambassador. Lord Dimerin has at all times to keep his own Parliament and his Ministers in good humor; and on on occasions like the present he ilndis it necessary to patch up their blun- ders. His prospects of success in the pendmg negotiation are not encouraging. THE ENGLISH PRESS ON LORD DUFFERIN'S SPEECH. {From the London Standard, October 11th, 1876) The Eatl of Dufferin is a very able man and an eloquent speaker, who in his important office as Governor-General of Canada, has more than once done good service to the Empire. If his recent visit to the Province of British Columbia has been less successful than some of his former expeditions to distant parts of the Dominion, it must be admitted that the task which Lord Dufferin had under- taken was one of peculiar difficulty. He had to appear before the people of British Columbia as the representative not only of the Im- perial but of the Dominion Government, and in attempting to sus- tain the double character of an agent of the Crown and the head of an independent constitutional system — functions never easily recon- ciled, but rarely so irreconcilable as at the moment of his visit, it is no wonder thct even so adroit and experienced a diplomatist should have/ailed. In spite of the flatteries so judiciously administered to the self-love of ine Province — a form of attention to which young communities are particularlv susceptible — the Governor-General does not appear to have accomplished that which we may presume to have been tae object cf his miision — namely, to obtain the consent of the British Columbians to the latest of Mr. Mackenzie's many proposals to evade the Canadian bargain with British Columbia. In vain did Lord Dufferin tax all his powers of pleasing; in vain did he compli- ment the colony on its great resources and its amadng loyalty — upon the idyllic beauty of its scenery, upon its admirable water ways and (10) liailioi-H, ui)on its stalwart men and comoly maidens, ui)on its wealth of t^ohl and silvc^r, and its timbcu' so suitable for the largest sized si)arH. In vain did he wind up his glowing pictures of the treasui-es of Britisli Columbia by declaring it "a glonoiis Province- — a Pro- vince which Canada should b<^ proud to possess, and whose association with the Dominion she ought to regard as the crowning triumph of Federation." Up to this point Lord Dufferin's hearers were probably perfectly well able to agree with him. They never doubted that they are something which Canada shonld be proud to possess. They have been accustomed to regard their union with the Dominion as the crown of the Federal edifice. If they have complained of any- thing it is that Canada is not so proud as she should be of this l)ossession — that she has not exiiibited that sense of the stability of the Federal fabric which might have been desirable in the interests of its crown. Although he took special pains to disavow being the bearer of any message, either from the Imperial or the Dominion Government, Lord Dufferin did, in fact, devote the jirineipal portion of his speech to an elaborate exculpation of the IMackenzie Government from the charge of having failed in its duty to British Columbia. That was a sufficiently delicate mission for a Governor-General of Canada to be engaged in, for it was impossible that he could refer to the subject without investing himself with more or loss of a diploma- tic character. Such a character Lord Duftarin assumed before the citizens of Victoria, nor does he or they seem to have been aware that such an assumption was at all alien to his office or derogatory from his position. Declaring that he had come charged with a mission to testify by his presence that "the entire people of Canada, without dis- tinction of party, are most sincerely desirous of cultivating with the people of British Columbia those friendly, and affectionate relations upon the existence of which must depend the future harmony of the Dominion," Lord Dufferin went into a minute history of the trans- actions connected with the Pacific Railway to prove that the present Canalun>bia scheme. In this predicament he has been compelled once more to offer a compensation to the creditors of the Dominion, proposing to pay down a sum of $7S0j00 in Ueu of the Nanaimo and Esquimalt Bailway. Lord Dufferin considers this to be "^e most natural solution of the problem," and the best compensation to the British Golumbians for the "misadventure" which has led to the second break down in the contract. That is a matter which chiefly concerns the people of British Ck>lumbia. If they are willing once more to condone tne violation of a bargain made under the sanction of tiie Imperial Government, and in consideration of tiie new terms offered, no one will have a right to quarrel with them. But we cannot take leave of the subject without saying that Lord Dufferin has scarcely done justice either to himself or to his office by appearing before tne people of British Columbia as a broker on behalf of the Mackenzie Government. His duty to the Crown must be regarded as superior to aiy which he owes to nis own Ministry; and whatever he might feel im]»elled to do or to say, with the object of retaming tiie people of British Columbia in their loyalty, or of recommending to them any measure emanating from the Imperial Government, certainly it was no part of his business to negotiate a bargain between the Do- minion Government and one of its constitutent provinces, still less to appear as the advocate and apologist of his own Ministry. m -( I g 9. y B- is >n }f in ie j" a >y er le at in « lie as ie be to ly •0- to