'T CANADIAN RECIPROCITY. *>■»< ■ . f.,» *,^4 WHY SOME CANADIANS WANT RECIPROCITY. WHY ENGLISHMEN WANT IT. WHY ,. WE DON'T WANT IT. I' .fi Published by The American Iron ami Steel Association, at No. 2G5 South Fourth Street, Philadelphia, at which place copies of this trad may be had on appli- cation by letter, i, ... ; . ' , r RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA— A REVIEW. To the Editor of The Boston Commercial Bulletin: >' r ; A zollverein between Canada, as a Britisli colony, and the United States, which would be an arrangement for the same custom-liouse duties in both countries, the proceeds to be pooled and divided by the rule of population, or some other agreed rule, will come when the millennium comes, and not one day sooner. It is totally incon- sistent with the present relations of Canada with Great Britain, and is scouted as impossible by all English and Dominion authori- ties. It will become possible when Canada becomes independent, and even in that event, although possible, it is far less probable than annexation, and, at any rate, it would inevitably lead to annexation. The treaty of 1854 was, in substance, an arrangement for the introduction into this country of the raw products of Canadian forests, mines, and agriculture, free of duty. In form, it provided for a reciprocal freedom of duty, that is to say, for an equally unimpeded introduction into Canada of the similar raw products of the United States. But, in fact, by an established and inevitable course of trade, the movement of these products was substantially all one way, from Canada and into the United States. The reci- procity was a diplomatic flourish of words. No treaty was necessary V ' 3 RECirROCITY WITH CANADA — A KEVIKW. at all. The whole thing might have been as well accouiplished by au act of Cougress exeiuj)ting these Canadian products from duty. The treaty of 1854 contained certain (so-called) equivalents for us, in fishery privileges and in the free navigation of the St. Law- rence canals and river, both of them shams, and the last-named so palpable a sham that the pertinacity with which it has been talked and written about is truly amazing. Nothing is clearer or more certain than that the St. Lawrence canals will be closed to us in time of war, and that the Canadians will be only too happy to keep them open for us in time of peace, so long as we will pay the same tolls which their own people pay. It is for tolls and business that canals are built, and Canada would even be willing to pay a round sum every year if the entire carriage of the products of our interior States to the Atlantic Ocean could be diverted to the St. Lawrence route. But, whether shams or realities, these privileges of fishing and navigation on the St. Lawrence canals and river are disposed of in the treaties negotiated by the Joint High Commission, and can no longer be made to perform any duty, useful or ornamental, as make- weights in reciprocity arrangements with Canada. It was commonly said, after the treaty of 1854 was abrogated, that, although that was objectionable and indefensible, a treaty might be negotiated, giving us equivalents in the introduction into Canada duty-free of various articles of manufacture, and thus con- verting a ofle-sided arrangement into one of real reciprocity. It was the reiteration of these ideas which led finally to the last reciprocity treaty, whic' the Senate of the United States refused to ratify, and which, ilie resulting discussions and developments here, in Great Britain, and Canada, show conclusively never can be ratified by any of the parties concerned. The fii-st result of the publication of that treaty was the call upon the British ministry of deputations of English manufacturers and English merchants, calling attention to the fact that the treaty made in terms no provision for the free introduction into Canada of the same manufactured articles from Great Britain, proposed to be admitted free from the United States. The reply of the British ministry was that that was a matter between England and Canada, not necessary or even fit to be incorporated into a treaty with the United States, and that the introduction of P^nglish manufactures into Canada on as good terms as might be allowed to any other country resulted from the nature of the political connection between KJiClPROCITY WITH CANADA — A RKVIEW. England and Canada, and (sould never be a matter of question. And this view was immediately admitted by the Canadian authori- ties to be correct. The delusion that C'anada, a non-manufacturing country, might become a groat market for our manufactures, was thus ruthlessly exploded at the very start. We could go there, to be sure, but only in unrestricted competition with English manufac- turers, and with the advantage in their favor of long-established mercantile relations. Nor was this the whole of it or the worst of it. The treaty only provided for the free introduction into the United States of articles of Canadian manufacture, a competition which our manufacturers did not much dread. But how to distinguish articles of British manufacture from articles of Canadian manufacture was seen to be a problem of no small difficulty, on a land frontier line of three thousand miles, and it was seen also that compound articles might be of Canadian manufacture within the true meaning of the treaty, although parts of these might be of British manufacture. It was seen, in short, that to admit articles of Canadian manufacture free of duty was an unpleasant approximation to a repeal of our tariff on the same articles of British manufacture. If these discoverias were distasteful to the Senate of the United States, they were, in other respects, equally so to the Canadians. Instead of competition with the United States only, they saw that their ports were to be opened to English goods, to the ruin of their revenue and the destruction of their infant and struggling manu- facturing industries. They had no opportunity to act on the treaty, as they were forestalled in that by its summary repudiation by the Senate of the United States, but it is to-day certain that no treaty containing any such application to American manufactures as is found in the fancy sketches of Gen. Ward, of New York, can be negotiated or ratified with them. It is as purely a thing of the imagination as his zollverein between Canada and the United States. The country may be deluded into expressions favorable to re- ciprocity by hopes of opening Canada to American manufactures, but such hopes can never be realized so long as Canada retains its British connection, or, if realized, only at the peril of destroying our tariff on English manufactures, and multiplying the frauds and costs of the long line of custom-houses on our northern and eastern land frontier. George M. Weston. Boston, May 30, 1876. DO WK WANT UECiritOClTY WITH CANADA 'i DO WE WANT RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA? Frmn The lionton CommercuU Bulletin. The reciprocity discussion is continued below in another commu- nication from our original correspondent, Mr. Weston. This time, it will be seen, he examines the question from a new standpoint. Leaving out of account the difficulty of negotiating an ecjuitable treaty, owing to the political relations between Great Britain, Can- ada, and the Unitetl Ktates, he argues that the purchasing of raw products in Canada would not lead to an increase in trade, but would simply be a diversion of trade from the West — from customers who in return buy most of their wares from us, to customers who may not buy anything from us in return. To the Editor of The Commercial Bulletin : No increase of trade results from buying raw products in Canada rather than at home. To do that is to buy so much more in one place, and just so much less in another. If we, of Massachusetts, conclude to purchase a million bushels of potatoes from New Bruns- wick, which we now purchase from Maine and Vermont, we may or may not obtain them for less money or get a better quality of pota- toes. But, at all events, there is no increase of trade. As the power to purchase, which nations or individuals possess, depends upon the amount they have to sell, it is certainly true that New Brunswick, with a new market for a million bushels of potatoes, would have so much more money wherewith to buy of us or of somebody else. But it is just as certainly true that Maine and Vermont, after losing an equal market, would have so much less money wherewith to buy. It is undoubtedly possible, by legislation judiciously adapted to that end, to transfer to the Dominion of Canada, in a large dtnjree, the supplying of this country not only with potatoes, but with hay, butter, cheese, timber, and perhaps beef. To do that would be to increase the population and wealth of Canada, and, from its aug- mented capacity to buy, we might or might not reap the sole advan- tage. But, at the best, there would be for us no increase of trade, as our own farmers and lumbermen, having this market cut off in an exactly corresponding degree, would be by so much disabled from buying. It is much more certain that our own farmers and lumbermen would buy of us, to the extent of their sales and ability to buy, than that Canada would do so. In dealing with our own DO WK WANT UKOirKOCITY WITH CANADA? people we have the advantage of tariffs, proximity, settled habits, and connnc'tlonH of trade. The old idea of conuncrce was barter, or exehange of commodities. In modern times commerce is carried on with money, and people buy, not where they sell, or of those to whom they sell, but where they really can, or think they can, buy to the best advantage. No matter how much timber or hay the Canadians may sell us, they will buy where they are accustomed to buy, or can buy chca{)est, when it comes to spejuding their money for cotton cloth or iron ware. It is sometimes said that we could sell more to the countries south of us, if we would buy more from them. That would have no tendency to effect the object. What we need is to produce cheaply enough the articles they want, but most of all, and what we shall have in due time, a class of merchants with the enterprise and capital to pu.sh trading ventures with all parts of the world. Our own commerce is full of illustrations of the truth that na- tions do not buy where they sell. We purchase raw products on an enormous scale of Cuba and Brazil, and sell comparatively little to either, and Brazil does not buy of us one dollar the more be- cause we have exempted coffee from duty. The merchants in Rio Janeiro and Havana who sell coffee and sugar sell for cash or ex- change on Loudon, and know nothing and care nothing about the operations' of other merchants in the same cities, who buy broad- cloths, machinery, or piano-fortes. In our trade with Great Britain we sell more than we buy. The English pui'chase our wheat and cotton because they need those articles, and would purchase just the same if we did not buy a penny's worth in turn from them. They pay cash for cotton and wheat, and obtain that wherewith to pay as they can, and by disposing of their own wares wherever they can find a market. By buying of Canadians, rather than of our own people, timber and agricultural produce, we diminish by so much the wealth and population of this country, and by so much a trade we now have with the home producers of those articles. We may or may not gain something by getting the same articles for less money. What we lose in trade with home producers we may gain by enlarged trade with Canadian producers, but there is not the slightest proba- bility of it. And, until it can be shown that there is, the Canadian reciprocity scheme has nothing to stand upon. It will not be suffi- cient to demonstrate what is already plain enough, that the more Canada sells the more Canada can buy. It must be demonstrated 6 RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA A DELUSION. also that, out of a nullion dollars more to spend by reason of soiling us that additional (juantity of hay and potatoes, Canada will expend in our nii rkets a sufficient proportion to indemnify us for the loss of a trade of a million dollars .vith our own farmers. And this must be demonstrated, taking into account the fact, of which there is no question, that Canada can admit no article from the United States without duty, or with only a low duty, without giving exactly the same privilege of admission to the same article from Great Britain. Boston, June 14, 1876. Georgia M. Wehton. RECIPROCITY WITH CANADA A DELUSION. From The Boston Cornmercinl Bulletin, July 39th. The vigorous communication below, designed to prove the fallacy of the assumption that Canadian reciprocity would be of advantage to our industrial interests, we commend to the careful consideration of those manufacturers who have recently been coquetting with this reciprocity idea. Undoubtedly nearly all our New England in- terests, at least, would be considerably benefited at first by the adoption of free trade with the Dominion, but, as our correspondent points out, the ultimate injury to us would vastly more than out- weigh this temporary gain. It begins to be more and more aj)parent that, however great the temptation may be in special cases, no protectionist can, with con- sistency, support reciprocity with any country, any more than he can consistently call for free trade in his raw material at the same time that he advocates the imposition of duties upon his manufac- tures. To the Editor of The Commercial Bulletin : It is assumed as certain that we should gain by a reciprocal free trade with Canada in manufactures, and that this would be a fair compensation for what Canada might gain by a reciprocal free trade in raw materials. This is doubtless true in the present condition of things, the United States being much the more advanced in manu- factures, but how long would it continue to be so, with reciprocity fixed by treaty for a considerable term of years? Canada has great advantages as a manufacturing country — an invigorating climate, cheap labor, low taxes, and ample water-power. It lacks capital and trained skill, but they both abound and superabound in England, and they are both of them mobile in their nature. What is to pre- vent their prompt transfer and upon a great scale from England to RKfll'ItOCITY WITH CANADA A DKLU8ION. Cann(la, if t:„•■'' ..■'■,;.,.•,.■;■ ; " The crop of wheat iu the United States is officially estimated at two hundred and forty millions of bushels. We, as a Dominion, imported more wheat and flour than we exported in 1872, as per our government official returns. It is, therefore, very evident that we could not influence in the least degree the market price of wheat in the United States, and that if we send our wheat there we lote the duty. The proportion of our surplus of horses, cattle, sheep, and wool to the amount they consume is so very small that it is equally plain that we can not influence the price in their market, and that ive lose the duty. The Americans consumed last year nearly forty million bushels of barley, of which we gave about one-tenth. If one- tenth can control the market pric