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 1 
 
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 6 
 

 JL 
 
 AN APPEAL 
 
 TO 
 
 THE CANADIAN INSTITL'TE 
 
 ON THE 
 
 IRectification of IPailiaiiient 
 
 BY 
 
 SANDFORD FLHMING. C.M.G.. LL.D. [rT,, 
 
 '•.'.■.KIHKR Wn„ THE CONDITIONS (,N WHICH THK COLNCM. or THK .NSrr.UT, 
 
 OFFERS TO AWAKI) 
 
 ONE THOUSAND 1)()|.|,\ks FOR PRIZK ESSAYS. 
 
 / 
 
 TOKONTO: 
 THE COPP, CI.ARK COMPANY, Limited. 
 1S92. 
 
jLir 
 
 178736 
 
MEMORANDUM BY THE COUNCIL. 
 
 Early in the present year a letter was received from a member of the 
 Society, Dr. Sandford Fleming, bringing to the attention of the Institute 
 the importance of an enquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral 
 and parliamentary system, with the view of averting many evils now 
 attending it. He appealed to the Institute as a body which, while 
 non-political in its corporate character, is representative throuf^h its mem- 
 bers of all shades of opinion. The object expressed was to awaken an 
 interest in a difficult problem, which vitally concerns the whole com- 
 munity, in the hope that some practical and beneficial solution may be 
 obtained. 
 
 The Council has had the matter under serious consideration for some 
 time ; meanwhile an old friend of the Institute, deeply impressed with 
 its importance, and the great public need of a satisfactory solution, has 
 placed at the disposal of the Council the sum of one thousand dollars to 
 assist, as far as possible, in the attainment of the desired end. 
 
 The matter was formally brought before the Institute, at a largely 
 attended meeting, on the 2oth February last, when after the reading of 
 Dr. Fleming's communication and the discussion on the "Note" 
 attached, the following resolution passed with substantial unanimitj' : — 
 
 " That the generous offer of a friend (who does not wish his name to 
 be known) to contribute the sum of $ 1,000 to aid in obtaining a satis- 
 factory solution of the problem referred to in Dr. Sandford Fleming's 
 paper, be accepted with the best thanks of the Institute, and that the 
 Council be empowered to take the necessary steps to obtain essays or 
 treatises, and award the premium to the best workable measure, which, if 
 
4 MEMORANDUM 
 
 made law, would j,mvi; the whole Ciinadiau people equal reprcscntalioii in 
 Parliament, and each elector due \veii,dit in the i^overnnient through 
 I'arliamcnt." 
 
 The Council thereupon appointed a special committee to carefully 
 wei^h the wliole subject, and consider how best to deal with the matter 
 and carr)' into effect the wishus of the meeting and the authority and 
 trust conferred on it by the Institute. 
 
 After many meetings and conferences, the Council has adopted the 
 recommendations of the special committee, and now appeals to every 
 member of tlie Institute and to all thou^jhtful persons within the 
 Dominion, for their assistance in obtaining a complete solution of the 
 ])roblcin. 
 
 While the Institute addresses Canadians as being speciall>" interested 
 in the good government of their own land, the prize competition is 
 extended to all persons of whatever countr> , on equal terms, as set 
 forth in the conditions issued herewith. 
 
 Arihuk Hakvkv, 
 
 Pn'su/t'flL 
 
 Al.-\n M.k i'OL(;.\i.L, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
 Canadian Institute, 
 
 Toronto, April 4th, 1892. 
 
CONDITIONS 
 
 Oil wliicli Tho CiiiDuliuii IiiHtitnto oHers to iiwiird prizoH for eHwiys on "elkitokal 
 
 KKI'HKMKNTATION AMI TIIK UKCTinCATION OF TAllLIAMKNT." 
 
 Tlio sum of onu thouMind (lolliii-H (Je<l,0(N)) Iihh houn placed nt tho (li8|iotuil of tliu 
 ('((iiiu'il of tlio rHnadiim limtituto to lio awiirdi'd in wholo ur in |)art liy tho Institute 
 for t lie best workable measure (liill or Act of I'ailiaiiient) which, if niadc law, would 
 Ijive the whole Canadian people eipial representjition in rarliainent and each elector 
 duo weight in the Govenunent, through Parlinnient. 
 
 The Council of the Iimtitiite accordingly invites essays on Elect/>ral Representation 
 and the Hictification of Parliaim'nt, acconnMHiied l>y a draft liill applicable to countries 
 witlia Pailiaiiient-ary Systeiii siniilar in general features t(» that of Canada. 
 
 Tho essays will be received iiy tho Council before the tirst day of ,luly, 181)3. As 
 the Transactions of tho Institute are printed in Knglish, it is desirable the ossjiys 
 sliould bo in that language. They are tu ho signed with a motto, and tho name and 
 address of tho writer are to ho enclosed in a sealed eiiveloiie, endorsed with that niottn ; 
 tile whole under one cover, to be addressed 
 
 ELECTORAL REPRE8ENTATI0^ 
 
 Secretary, 
 
 
 TO 
 
 Thh 
 
 
 
 
 Canadian 
 
 Institute, 
 
 
 
 
 
 Toronto, 
 
 Canada. 
 
 Tho sealed envelopes to remain unopened until final adjudication by the Council of the 
 Institute. 
 
 Tho Council will, immediately after tho Ist July, 1893, examine all the EssayH 
 received. 
 
 All treatises of merit, to which an ajijjarently " workable measure '" is appended 
 (in which considerable latitude iimst necessarily be allowetl), will then be referred to 
 an independent tribunal for a report. It will bo tho aim of the Council to have this 
 tribunal composofl of men of the highest standing in their several spheres, comprising 
 persons learned in political science, law and practical politics. 
 
 The Council proposes that' one award be given of not le.ss than live hundred 
 dollars (.S5(X)), and otiiers, proportioii.ite to the merits of the works submitted. 
 
 If the ossfiys and draft V)ills shall not bo thought by the above tribiinal of sutticient 
 merit to entitle thorn to receive the principal or any premium, or if the Council on 
 receiving the report shall bo of that ripinion, the Council reserves to itself tho right 
 not to award any premium. 
 
 Tho Canadian Institute re.serves to itself the right to publish the succo.ssful eswiya 
 anil draft bills to which premiums may bo awarded. 
 
 CaNAIHAN IXSTITITE, 
 
 Toronto, April 4th, 1892. 
 
 ALAN MACDorCALL, 
 
 Secretary. 
 
Pi 
 
 w 
 it 
 r( 
 
 C( 
 
 
Ottawa, January ist. i}''92. 
 A /an MacdoH^nll, lisq., 
 
 Corr*tponitini< Secretary Catuuiiaii Institute, '/'oiviito. 
 
 Sir. — I aril desirous of brinjijiii<j to the attention of the Canatlian 
 Institute a subject of more than ordinary importance, and to my 
 mind, especially so at this period in our history. I beg leave to 
 refer to the accompanying^ " Note " by which it may be seen that the 
 ilcsign in view is the removal of certain evils which unfortunate!)' beset 
 us as a people. 
 
 1 cannot resist the impression that the examination of the facts presents 
 a scientific problein, in no way unworthy the consideration of the 
 Institute ; and if a solution of the difficulties presented be possible, it can 
 best be obtained by bringing the subject to the attention of properly 
 tjualified minds. It is the duty of us all to seek the best means of 
 servinf^ our country, and on this groun*.' I appeal to the Institute to 
 extend its consideration to the matter which I respectfully ask per- 
 mission to lay before its members. The Institute, from its recognized 
 character as a scientific and literary body, holds a peculiarly favourable 
 j)osition to entertain the consideration of the subject. It may be briefly 
 described as an inquiry into the possibility of rectifying our electoral and 
 parliamentary system, with the view of averting inany evils now attend- 
 ing it, and of promoting the common happiness by terminating party 
 conflict, and assuring political peace and freedom, by the removal of the 
 painful and depressing influences from which we suffer. 
 
 I feel therefore warranted in api)ealing to the Institute, as a body non- 
 jiolitical in its corporate character, but which, nevertheless, is representa- 
 tive through its members of all shades of opinion, to give the weight of 
 its name in directing public attention to the subject. 
 
 I trust I am not too sanguine in expressing the hope, that by the 
 weight and influence of the Institute, so great and so general an interest 
 in the subject miy be awakened, as to lead to important and beneficial 
 results. Should a practical solution to the problem be obtained, it will 
 be attended with the happiest consequences, and the Institute will have 
 conferred a lasting benefit on the Dominion. 
 
 Along with the accompanying " Note " I enclose a list of writings 
 bearing on the subject of this communication, some of which are of 
 <lccp interest. 
 
 I have the honor to be, Sir, 
 
 Your obedient .servant, 
 (Signed) SANUFOkU FLliMlNti. 
 
f 
 
 1 1 
 
NOTK ON HLKCTORAL KKl'RIvSKNTATION AND 11 IK 
 K ICC TIKI CAT ION OK I'AKLIAMKNT. 
 
 There .lie in Canada few men past middle aj^c, who have not long felt 
 the unsatisfactory coiuliiion of much whicli appertains to pubiir life in 
 the iJoniiniDn. There are not a few wiio li;i • from year to year hoped 
 that the unfortunate ieatures in that which <fc call "politics" would in 
 soniL w.'.y disappear. Recent revelations have, however, rudely dispelled 
 such hope, anil have confirmed the fears of those who foresaw that as 
 the tendency of the evils was progressive, we could not reasonably look 
 for an improvement. 
 
 Thoughtful persons, having the welfare of the country at heart, are thus 
 impelled to give serious attention to the subject, with a view ol consider- 
 ing the possibility of securing some beneficial change. The examination 
 naturally takes the direction of an enipiiry into the origin of the evils 
 with which we are confronted, and the causes which persistently keep 
 them associated with government, which, therefore tends to become 
 Jiiis-government. 
 
 The objects of government may be thus defined : To maintain peace 
 and security, to increase prosperity and wealth, to advance moral «..a 
 intellectual devehjpmcnt, and generally to promote the good and the 
 good-will of the people. 
 
 With us the universal belief is, that the representative sy.stem h best 
 calculated to attain these ends. In other countries the representative 
 system has long been a constitutional reality, and from time to time 
 modifications have been made in the system to render it more workable 
 anil more beneficial ; but, notwithstanding the various changes which 
 have been made, it cannot be held that its full and complete development 
 has yet been attained. In Canada we are familiar with many of the 
 defects of popular government. In the neighboring republic the <lefects 
 in its adaptation are still more marked, and the political condition 
 is consequently far from satisfactory. In Great Britain, the cradle of 
 modern representative government, where the system should have 
 attained the highest perfection, similar evils have been developed. 
 
 That the polit":aI evils which everywhere attract attention are attribut 
 able to imperfect methods of carrying out the representative system ma 
 justly be inferred. The fundamental principle of representative o 
 
1 
 
 il 
 
 10 
 
 NOTK ON KLKCTOKAL KKPKKSKNTATION. 
 
 r 
 
 II 
 
 popular government is, that the sovereign power of a State rests in and 
 proceeds from the people, and thrxt it is exercised by the representatives 
 of the people assembled in Parliament. We have accepted this the 
 democratic theory as our principle of government ; but an examination 
 will show that the methods adopted in carrying it into practice, have 
 failed in their object. VVc, in fact, follow a course which, in its results, 
 operates in a manner diametrically opposed to the true theory of our 
 political constitution The theory is that the mass of the electors shall 
 be present in the persons and heard in the voices of those who constitute 
 the national assembly or Parliament. Such undoubtedly is the princiiile 
 of government whicli we aim to carry into effect, but it has never in practice 
 been even approximately attained ; moreover, it is impossible of attain- 
 ment so long as members of Parliament continue to be chosen according 
 to the present method of election. The obstacles to obtaining a true repre- 
 sentation of the people in Parliament arc due to thL- combined inP:i;ence 
 of two causes. The/;n/ is the expedient universally adopted in choosing 
 members of the legislature by a majority of votes in each constituency. 
 The second I's the division of the people and the representatives into two 
 great parties. The second, indeed, follows in a great measure from the 
 first ; undoubtedly the primary radical error is in assuming that the 
 aggregate numerical majorities in the several constituencies arc represen- 
 tative of the whole community. On this assumption, all those who do 
 not vote with the majorities are unrepresented in Parliament. The 
 aggregate majorities represent only a portion, in place of the whole 
 people ; the electors who voted for the defeated candidates, together with 
 those who had no vote, or did not vote, remain unrepresented. Under 
 these circumstances, even if the whole elected body gives its unanimous 
 support to the administration, we do not obtain a true and perfect model 
 of popular government, that is to say, a people self governed. We have but 
 the government of a part over a part ; possibly, but not necessarily, the 
 maj Drover the minor part. It is proper, however, in considering the ques- 
 tion, that we should deduct the members in opposition, and then we still 
 less have the government we are told we possess ; that is the government 
 of the people. We then have practically government by the minor over 
 the major part. It can be conclusively shown that the minor and 
 governing part is but a fraction of the whole, and that we are, as a 
 matter of fact, usually governed by this fractional part. There cannot 
 be a doubt that from this circumstance spring the unhappy forces which 
 so much disturb the harmony of our political machinery. 
 
 It has elsewhere beer made clear by actual statistics, that the electoral 
 methods which we f.illow prevent a large portion of the community from 
 being represented in Parliament, and exclude a still larger portion, gener- 
 
 t 
 
NOTE ON ELFX'TOHAL REPRESENTATION'. 
 
 11 
 
 ally the great majority of the people, from any share or participation, 
 directly or indirectly, in the government. It has been likewise established 
 that in place of the supreme power being exercised by the people's 
 representatives, the whole power of the State is absolutely possessed by 
 a minority, and practically by an exceedingly small minority. Thus we 
 utterly fail in attaining what is understood ti) be representative govern- 
 ment ; in its place we have acquired a totally different and perverted 
 system — a system of the character of an oligarchy, and, it is hardly too 
 MUich to say, exhibiting some of its worst features. We have acccpteil 
 the (allac>- that a part is equal to the whole. We give supreme 
 authority to a part, numerically in the minority, and we allow it to 
 assume the power which should be exercised by the whole ; at the 
 same time we exclude a large part, generally the majority of the people 
 from the rights and privileges which by theory they possess. 
 
 Is it surprising that this system should result in the constant recur- 
 rence of difficulty ? Would it not rather be a matter of surprise if those 
 excluded from participation in government, or from representation in 
 Parliament, should quietly acquiesce in the injustice ? It is only natural 
 that they should resent the deprivation, and strive to regain their lost 
 rights and privilege waging political warfare against the men who 
 
 'once it is that they employ every means, good 
 from power. The dominant party for the time 
 .nuously defend the position they hold, and leave 
 svart the efforts of their adversaries to displace 
 them. On the one side, there is a persistent and relentless attack upon 
 the party controlling the government ; on the other a life and death 
 struggle for political existence. Thus we have the political peace of the 
 community continualUy disturbed, and we witness, in and out of Par- 
 liament, a never-ending conflict with all its concomitant evil'.. Such 
 to-day is the chronic condition of public life in Canada, whatever party 
 be in power, and it seems to be much the same in all countries similarly 
 circumstanced. In the work of Sir Henry Maine on popular government 
 the condition of party government, is mildly described as "a system of 
 government consisting in half the cleverest men in the country taking 
 the utmost pains to prevent Uie other half from governing." 
 
 It is easy to be seen that the source to which we may trace our political 
 difficulties is an incomplete, if not absolutely false, electoral system. The 
 method of election which we follow, in its effect disfranchises half the 
 population entitled to representation in Parliament, and, without any 
 doubt whatever, it is this grave defect in our political system, which throws 
 all our constitutional machinery out of gear. It is this defect wliicli 
 
 for the moment ' : 
 and evil, to drive the 
 being, on their part 
 notliing undone to 
 
12 
 
 NOTE ON ELECTOUAL HEl'KESENTATION. 
 
 r 
 
 britiffs the organized parties of the present day into being, and which 
 animates and intensifies party feehng. It is this defect which leads to 
 part}' abuses and vices, and while this defect remains, improvement is 
 not probable, indeed, unless humanity changes its nature, it may be 
 affirmed that any marked improvement is not possible. 
 
 Glancing over the pages of history, it cannot be denied that a part)' had 
 its good side as well as its bad in the early days of representative govern- 
 ment. There were special objects to be attained, and questions of great 
 importance to be settled. But great questions do not last forever, in 
 some way they are disposed of, and one by one disappear from the 
 political surface. If parties had depended on great questions to keep 
 them alive, they would have long since perished, and would not to-da> 
 be known as permanent organizations. With truth it may be said that 
 we stand upon the graves of great questions, and it is impossible to con- 
 ceive that the ghosts of dead issues are of themselves sufficient to main- 
 tain the vitality of parties for any length of time. Hut every effect is 
 associated with a cause, and the parties which flourish to-day have other 
 and adequate cause for their continued activit)-. Until this cause be 
 removed, parties will survive as living antagonistic forces to disturb 
 the peace and political harmony of the nation. Until the day comes 
 when Parliament shall be properly constituted, and we have represen- 
 tative government, in fact, we cannot look for a truce in political war- 
 fare ; until the whole electorate be fairly rcjiresentcd in the national 
 assembly — a cessation of hostilities is, in the nature of things, impossible. 
 
 In order clearly to understand a guiding principle of party govern- 
 nipnt and gain an insight into the ideas of leading party men, let us 
 endeavor to ascertain their aims and aspirations. Suppose we ask those 
 in opposition to the ruling power what their views are with respect 
 to the future. Will they not declare their determination to gain office, 
 ami that their hope and desire is to hold the reins of government 
 permanently ? If we make the same enquiry of the ruling party, will 
 they not tell us that they have no intention of throwing up the power 
 they hold, and that the}" will, if they can, retain power always. 
 
 Is not the cardinal idea of each part}', that it shall exclusively rule ? 
 That is to say, the ideal government of each for itself is a class govern- 
 ment, the class to consist of the men of the party. T' his be the logical 
 inference it seems to be indisputable, that party goveri....ent is utterl}' at 
 variance with free institutions. 
 
 All history goes to prove, and it is indeed a necessary result of our 
 human nature that the end of government is primarily and essentially 
 
NOTE ON ELKCTOKAL KEPHE8ENTAT10N. 
 
 la 
 
 our 
 
 tially 
 
 the welfare of the rulinjr class. It an oligarchy governs, the first and 
 great aim is the benefit of the oligarchy. Similarly with respect to a 
 party, and the consequences are the same whatever party inay govern. 
 This rule has alwaj's obtained, and we may re.st satisfied that it will be 
 the rule to the end of time. If, therefore, our object be the welfare and 
 well being of the whole people, it is perfectly clear that the whole and 
 not a part must govern. It becomes a fundamental necessity, therefore, 
 that some wav must be devised bv which we shall obtain government 
 by the whole people, or by representatives or deputies of the whole 
 people, if we are to make any advance in the art of government. 
 
 It is quite true that in Canada we follow much the same methods as in 
 Great Britain, where representative institutions took their origin, where 
 the greatest experience has been obtained, and where we Uiok for the 
 highest perfection. It is undeniable that elections determined by the 
 numerical majority of votes, and the division of the electors themselves 
 into two great parties, arc methods which have been practised in the 
 mother country more or less since the latter end of the reign of 
 Charles II. It must nevertheless be admitted that the numerical 
 majority .sj'.stem is but a rough and ready means of choosing representa- 
 tives, and tliat party government is found in the United Kingdom as 
 elsewhere to be productive of serious political evils. Moreover, even if 
 thc^c traditional methods be held to be tlie only available means of 
 carrying on government in a country which has emerged from feudalism, 
 the circumstances of their ap|)lication on this side of the Atlantic are not 
 tlie same. Here the whole people are on equal footing. There is no 
 privileged class, all are equal in the eye of the law, possessing identical 
 rights and privileges. It is our pride to be in close alliance with Great 
 Britain, and our boast to be an integral portion of the British I'jnpire, 
 but in local government we possess the fullest measure of indepentlence, 
 retaining control of our own affairs, untrammelled by the hereditary 
 rit^hts and practice which spring from past social and political con- 
 ditions. In the mother country there are ways and usaj^es which are 
 historically intelligible, and among them may be classed the political 
 methods we have named ; the circumstances on this side of the Atlantic 
 are however different, and there will be less difficulty in discarding 
 such ways and usages, if they are found seriously to impede progress or 
 interfere with the essential principles of representative government, " the 
 government of the whole by the whole." 
 
 In Canada we have been accorded full liberty to manage our own 
 affairs substantially in our own way. There is no cast iron rule which 
 we are bound to follow ; there are no theoretical impediments to consti- 
 
r 
 
 i!li 
 
 
 U 
 
 NOTE ON ELECTOBAF. REPRESENTATION. 
 
 tutional chanj^es which we may generally desire ; no reason can be 
 adduced why we should rigidly adhere to usages of the pasi if we have 
 been made to feel that they arc productive of evil. 
 
 Feeling clear on these points, two courses are open. First, we ma>- 
 adopt the laisscr-aller policy, and allow matters to go on as now, with 
 the prospect, nay, the certainty, that the evils we experience will become 
 greater, and even more confirmed. Second, we may make an honest 
 attempt to rectify Parliament, and obtain a government based on the true 
 principles of popular representation. 
 
 If we are satisfied that some change in our political methods will be 
 advantageous to us, we are not only free to make the amendment, but 
 it is a duty which we owe to ourselves and to our posterity, to endeavour 
 as much as we are able, to perfect the organization of representative 
 government, so that in this Dominion it may attain the fullest develop- 
 ment and most symmetrical form. 
 
 Following the second course, the problem which challenges our 
 attention is : to devise a scheme of electoral representation, by which the 
 whole electorate may be equally recognized in one deliberative body, and 
 every elector may have an equitable share through Parliament in the 
 general administration of public affairs. It is, in short, to perfect our 
 constitutional system so that every interest within the Dominion shall 
 be fairly represented in its government. 
 
 This problem may be difficult of solution, but considering its vast 
 importance it ought not, in this inventive and constructive age, to be 
 jns(^lublc. What is a party but a portion of the people organized for 
 political purposes? If it be practicable to organize two political parties 
 in the community, it should be quite possible to form one organization, the 
 outcome of that one organization to be the Parliament we are in search 
 of. We are led to think that political organizations are costly affairs. 
 In the one case, each of the two parties obtains funds from private 
 sources or secretly and improperly from public sources. In the other 
 case the expenditure on a single organization would be purely in the 
 public interests, it could be made openly under the highest authority 
 and be a proper direct charge on the public exchequer. 
 
 The writer has el.sewhcre given expression to his views on this subject, 
 and has submitted certain principles by moans of which Parliament might 
 be constituted so as to represent truly the whole electorate. While he 
 does not attempt to furnish a scheme, complete in all its details, the 
 maturing of which would indeed require much time, much consultation 
 
NOTE OS ELKCTOKAL RKPKKSENTATIOS. 
 
 16 
 
 bjcct, 
 night 
 le he 
 Is, the 
 lation 
 
 and much consideration, he ventures to think that such a scheme as the 
 circumstances den, and, could, without great difficulty, be arranged and 
 made perfectly workable ; that while conserving all that is good in our 
 present constitution, and without involving any radical or revolu- 
 tionary change, we could have presented to us a plan by which we would 
 realize in our parliamentary system the true idea of representative 
 government. 
 
 In forming a hew scheme of electoral representation, the central idea 
 should be to constitute Parliament so that in reality it will be "the nation 
 in essence." With this central idea constantly in view, it would be found 
 that no good purpose could be secured by giving exaggerated import- 
 ance, as is often done at present, to abstract political questions during 
 the period of a general election. It would be in the interest of the whole 
 community to choose men to sit in Parliament who are best qualified by 
 common repute to represent the electoral mind, and to leave the settle- 
 ment cf all public questions to the assembled le;^islature. Representa- 
 tives ought not to be considered mere delegates to echo conclusions, dic- 
 tated perhaps by whim or passion, or formed on insufficient evidence 
 and immature judgment. It is well known that often during general 
 elections one question brought into prominence wil! decide which 
 party shall rule ; while in Parliament many questions arise, some of 
 which mil)- involve far more important considerations than the one which 
 receives special attention at the moment of the election. It is not suffi- 
 cient that members should represent their constituents on the one question, 
 or on several questions. The electorate should be well and thoroughly 
 represented on all questions which may arise throughout the duration 
 of Parliament. What is needed in a member is a man of rectitude, good 
 ability and good sense, in direct touch with, and in full sympathy with 
 those whom he is called upon to represent. The duty of the electors is to 
 select the men who have the proper qualifications, and leave the final 
 settlement of every public question to Parliament. When Parliament 
 assembles, each representative should teel himself unpledged, and free to 
 speak and vote on his own clear convictions, unbiassed by preconceived 
 opinions, formed possibly upon incomplete information. In Parliament a 
 member following a debate has the meaiis of acquiring a more perfect 
 knowledge of the subject under discussion than he previously had, or 
 which the generality of those, who have selected him to represent them, 
 could possibly have. The position of a member provides the best 
 opportunity of obtaining familiarity with all sides of a public question. 
 He will hear the most eminent men in public life, he will have access to 
 the best evidence which can be obtained. I"or all these reasons, repre- 
 
nil 
 
 16 
 
 NOTE ON ELKCTOUAIi KEPUKSKNTATION. 
 
 r 
 
 i[ 
 
 'I 
 
 sentativcs of the people in Parliament should be left free to act accord- 
 ing to the dictates of their own jud^nnent, ai'tcr full examination, and full 
 consideration of every subject. It is not possible for an electorate to 
 determine in advance, the varied demands for Icf^islation or the conclu- 
 sions which should be reacheil on the many questions which will arise.* 
 The fjreater is the necessity, therefore, that they should select men of the 
 proper calibre to represent them, men who.se ability and reputation is 
 well established. The representative on his part will owe his constitu- 
 ents the exercise of his best judijjment and the inaintenance of perfect 
 rectitude in all matters. 
 
 This point has an important bearing,' on any new scheme of representa- 
 tion. While the electorate has the rij^ht, and should whenever necessary, 
 exercise the ri^nt to discuss public questions, it is obviously infinitely 
 more important for the constituencies to obtain as members, intelligent 
 independent men, k-nown to be j^enerally .sound on vital questions, in 
 prelerence to those who are willin;.^, in order to obtain a scat, to pledj^c 
 their opinion on an)- Ljivcii question. 
 
 Legislation is not so simple that it may be undertaken by any one. It 
 is not a matter of indifference who undertakes it, or what character of 
 legislation is obtained. We should have as legislators the wisest, the 
 most clear-headed, the best informed, the most just and honest members 
 of the community. The average elector may or may not be well 
 grounded in matters of legislation, or in forming correct opinions on 
 all subjects ; but he can, without any doi bt or difficulty, exercise his 
 judgment as to who he can tru.'-t, and it becoines him to choo.sc some 
 trustworthy man as his proxy to represent him and deliberate with 
 other trustworthy men ; and having done so, he can leave the decision 
 on all legislative questions with confidence to the Parliament which they 
 would constitute. 
 
 A Parliament so constituted would be a miniature copy of the aggregate 
 
 * It would be absuiii to throw on the jieople at largo the actual work of Icf^islation, — since 
 the i)eo|ile only form general aims and wishes, for which it is tlie business of the legislative 
 expert to supply approjniate jiarticular rules fit to be enacted, — but that these general aims and 
 wishes should be regarded as paramount by a representative legislature. And certainly it woidd 
 be (lilTicult for the citizens at large to perform cHoctively the complicated discussion that is 
 often required to mould a legislative scheme into the most acceptable form. Nor would it be 
 practicable for liie constituents to direct the action of the representative in every detail during 
 such discussions ; since it would sometimes happen that compromises and modifications were 
 suggested at the last moment, rendering any previously expressed wishes of the constituents 
 irrelevant to the issue finally put to the vote; while to give time for a reference to the con- 
 stituencies in all ises would ii. ilve intoleiable delay. — Sii/t^zuick, Elements of Politics London, 
 p. 529. 
 
NOTE OV ELECTOKAr, REPItESKNTATinN. 
 
 17 
 
 : accord- 
 ant! full 
 orate to 
 : conclu- 
 ill arise * 
 :n of the 
 tation is 
 constitu- 
 ( perfect 
 
 presciita- 
 ccessary, 
 infinitely 
 itclli'jent 
 stions, in 
 
 to pled 
 
 y' one. It 
 
 iractcr of 
 
 isest, the 
 
 members 
 
 be well 
 
 nions on 
 
 rcise his 
 
 so some 
 
 [■ate with 
 
 decision 
 
 ich they 
 
 Iggrcgate 
 
 lion, — since 
 lei^islative 
 kl aims and 
 lly it would 
 lion that is 
 Ivould it be 
 Itail durini; 
 Itions were 
 onstituents 
 the con- 
 Is London, 
 
 electoral mind — a microcosnnis of the world it would represent. The 
 letjislature of the country would become a focal center, where all the 
 currents of national life would minj^le unembittered by party feeling, 
 where all aspirations and impulses would come into friendly contact, 
 where the different rays of public opinion would meet under the most 
 favorable conditions, to niodif}' each other into a unity of expression. 
 
 Amon^ the important consecpiences to which a rectification of i'arlia- 
 ment as proposed, would lead, there would necessarily be a modification 
 in the formation of the executive, and in the relation of the ministry to 
 Parliament and the people. 
 
 In order to maintain the harmonious operation of every branch of 
 government, the chief executive and administrative body ought to be in 
 full unison with Parliament ; that is to 3a_v', Ministers of the Crown 
 .'^hould have the entire confidence of the representatives of the people. 
 As in Great Britain, we retain in the Dominion the form of Monarchy in 
 connection with democratic principles. In all forms of government there 
 must be a central authority, from which the national power for the 
 time emanates ; the same holds true in this respect in a Republic as in a 
 constitutional monarchy; it is from this source appointments to office 
 are made, including those constituting the supreme executive. Follow- 
 ing this principle, ministers .should continue to be appointed by the 
 representative of the Sovereign ; public policy, however, would e.\act 
 that the chief advisers of the Crown should be chosen from and sup- 
 ported by, if not actually nominated by. Parliament. We would thus 
 secure harmonious action and obtain the needed guarantees that " the 
 wishes and interests of the people would on all occasions be faithfully 
 represented and guarded." 
 
 The intimate relations between the Executive, Parliament and the 
 people, between the government and the governed, would give to the chief 
 administrative body, the greatest possible stability. It would stand as a 
 central unit to command universal respect. The government so formed 
 would not be greater than Parliament, it would be the executive of 
 Prrliament to exercise all the power deputed to Parliament by the people. 
 The executive would be supported by and be amenable to Parliament, and 
 for the reason that Parliament would represent the whole people, the gov- 
 ernment would rest on the broad basis of the entire nation. Thus we 
 would establish our constitutional strut:ture in a manner and with material 
 so good that it could not be easily shaken. Its foundation would consist 
 of a great electoral body comprising the best of the mass of the community. 
 Its superstructure, a representative body of the best of the whole body 
 
18 
 
 NOTB ON KLKCTOHAl, IIKI'KK.SENTATION. 
 
 r 
 
 I 
 
 111! 
 
 of electors. Its summit, a ministerial body the choice of the represent- 
 ative boily. and from the apex o** this noble political pyramid would be 
 reflected the lustre of the Imperial Crown itself. What constitutional 
 fabric could be imagined which would give greater unity, greater solidity, 
 and greater dignity? 
 
 Many will agree with the writer that it is our duty to face the problem of 
 our political difficulties, and make representative government in practice, 
 what it professes to be in theory — Government of the whole by the 
 whole. He has elsewhere submitted his views and offered suggestions 
 as to the means of overcoming the evils of our present system. He 
 disclaims any pretence to regard the alternative he has submitted as the 
 only or the best solution. In locognizing the gravity of the situation, 
 which indeec' is apparent to each of us, he feels that we must, in all 
 earnestness, try to supplement the shortcomings, and eradicate the 
 vices, of politics ; with that view he has ventured to offer to the 
 public the opinions he has formed, simply as a humble contribution to the 
 consideration of a vital question in which we are all concerned. One 
 feature of the proposal may require a word of explanation. An electoral 
 system was suggested by which small groups of electors having identical 
 opinions would select deputies by whom and from whom the ultimate 
 representatives would be chosen, the design being to give every elector an 
 equal interest in the election, and through the members elected, an equal 
 voice in Parliament and an equal indirect share in the government. In 
 order peacefully to overcome every obstacle and remove all possibility of 
 friction in special cases the writer suggested falling back on the Apos- 
 tolic method of settlement by Lot. It is not a new principle of settle- 
 ment in matters where disputes might otherwise arise ; it was favoured 
 by the old Greek philosophers; it is sanctioned by the Old and New 
 Testament ; it is employed to-day under the Danish electoral law of 
 1867 ; and it has been employed for centuries by the Moravians, in select- 
 ing fit men for the ministerial office. If employed at all in any electoral 
 system, its use should be restricted to those cases in which no decisive 
 judgment could otherwise be formed, and invariably its use should be ex- 
 ercised with due solemnity, if held expedient, before a court of justice. 
 
 The writer has ventured to suggest, as a corollary to the proposed 
 rectification of Parliament, that the executive council should be nomin- 
 ated by the assembled representatives of the people. There are reasons 
 for limiting the term of office of ministers, while at the same ilme there 
 are important advantages to accrue from a continuity of administration. 
 Both objects might be attained by an arrangement which would necessi- 
 tate the retirement of a certain proportion of ministers by rotation each 
 
NOTE ON KLKCTOKAL KKPRK8KNTATION. 
 
 10 
 
 c rcprcscnt- 
 cl would be 
 institutional 
 .ter solidity, 
 
 : problem of 
 in practice, 
 lole by the 
 sugy;estioiis 
 ('Stem. He 
 itted as the 
 e situation, 
 must, in all 
 idicate the 
 Tcr to the 
 ution to the 
 rned. One 
 Vn electoral 
 ig identical 
 lie ultimate 
 y elector an 
 •d, an equal 
 nment. In 
 jssibility of 
 the Apos- 
 of settle- 
 favoured 
 and New 
 )ral law of 
 , in select- 
 y electoral 
 ) decisive 
 uld be ex- 
 justice. 
 
 proposed 
 DC nomin- 
 re reasons 
 lime there 
 nistration. 
 necessi- 
 .tion each 
 
 year. They might, however, be eligible for rc-appointment. The prin- 
 ciple of retirement by rotation may indeed be applied with advantage 
 to Parliam nt itself. If one-fourth or one-fifth of the representatives 
 retired annually for re-election or to be replaced by others, Parliament 
 would be regularly renewed from year to year, and by this means the 
 Government and Parliament would continually be brought into direct 
 touch with the people, and thus enabled faithfully to interpret the 
 national mind. 
 
 Bearing on the proposal to rcctif}' Parliament, it may be confidently 
 affirmed that the present method of electing members docs not furnish a 
 correct reflex of the national mind. If the two parties into which the 
 country is politically divided be evenly balanced, and if at a general 
 election one o^ the parties, by skilful tactics or other means, succeeds in 
 many of the constituencies in gaining the upper hand, however slightly 
 in each case, the opposite party may be almost excluded from repre- 
 sentation in the assembly. How misleading, therefore, it is to assume 
 that the majority in Parliament represents the aggregate public opinion 
 of the nation ! and yet many a: e apt to do so until undeceived at the 
 next general election by the movement of the political pendulum to the 
 other side. The consequence of these administrative revolutions is often 
 "xtrcmcly unfortunate for the country, as each party on accession to 
 power endeavours generally to reverse as much as it can the policy of 
 its predecessor. This condition of unstable equilibrium, inseparable from 
 party government, would, t is believed, be obviated, while continuity of 
 policy, subject only to desirable modifications from time to time, would 
 be secured by the plan suggested. 
 
 Election by majorities, it is obvious, is the immediate cause of this 
 instability. Experience everywhere goes to show that elections are 
 often carried by exceedingly narrow majorities, so that a compara- 
 tive handful of electors, distributed ever the constituencies, could, 
 by reversing their votes, transfer the majority in Parliament from 
 one party to the other, and entirely change the character of the 
 administration. * 
 
 This phase of election by majorities has been examined by Mr. H. R. 
 Droop, in a paper read before the Statistical Society in 1881, in connec- 
 tion with the general elections of the United Kingdom of 1868, 1874, 
 and 1880. Mr. Droop points out that in 1868 it would have been possible 
 by the change of only 1,447 votes to have transferred 66 seats to 
 opposite sides. li 1874, if but 1,269 voters had reversed their votes, 64 
 seats might havo been changed ; and in 1880 if 1,929 electors had reversed 
 
iiiir 
 
 20 NOTE ON ELKt'TOKAl- UKl'HKHENTATION. 
 
 their votes 91 scats would have been chanj^cd from opposite party sides.* 
 Similar illustrations of the j^real uiiccrtaiiU)-, and the contlition of un- 
 stable political e(iiiilibrium which results from the system of election by 
 majorities are common among ourselves, establishing how disturbing and 
 unsatisfactory the sj-stem proves. We should aim to substitute for these 
 constantly recurring violent changes a means of securing ccjiitinuity of 
 government by a more natural process. I^y the annual change of a 
 proportion of the members as proposed, we would obtain a settled 
 government, which would mould itself to the varying needs of the 
 people ; we would, in fact, substitute government by regular evolution 
 for government by party revolution. 
 
 One of the strong arguments .'idvanced by tiie advocates of party 
 government is that by means of the party organizations an interest is 
 stimulated among the electors in public affairs, and without this stimulant 
 it would be difficult to get voters to go to the polls. If this argument be 
 well founded, the difficulty might be easily overcome through the instru- 
 mentality of properly devised machinery which would carry the polls to 
 the electors. Such a device need not be widely different from the 
 
 • While tliese jiajjes are passiiij; through the press, a general election has heen held in the 
 Province of Quebec, which affords a pootl illustration of the instability, inseparable from the 
 system of election liy m.ijorities. The party until lecently in power, under the le.idcrsiiii) of 
 Mr, Mercier, had a large majority in the assembly. The general election of March 8th, 1892, 
 resulted as follows : — 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville 54 
 
 Supporters of Mercier 17 
 
 Independents 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 An examination of all the majorities shows that it would have been possible for 804 electors dis- 
 tiibuted over twenty constituencies, by reversing their votes, to have made the returns as 
 folljws : — 
 
 .Supporters of Mercier 37 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville 34 
 
 Independents . 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 If in 32 constituencies 2,006 electors had changed their votes, the returns would have stood as 
 follows : — 
 
 Sujiporters of Mercier 49 
 
 Supporters of De Boucherville 22 
 
 Independents 2 
 
 Total 73 
 
 On such slight contingencies as the change of a few votes under this system the complexion of the 
 government of a Province has been completely revolutionized. Kespice, aspice, prospice. 
 
 \ 
 
NOTE ON KLECTORAL RKIMIKHKNTATION. 
 
 St 
 
 )arty sides.* 
 tion of iin- 
 clcctioii by 
 turbiiij^f and 
 tc for tlicsc 
 jiUinuity of 
 liaiiyc of a 
 I a settled 
 :cds of the 
 r evolution 
 
 .'s of party 
 interest is 
 IS stimulant 
 r^nuncnt be 
 the instru- 
 hc polls to 
 ; from the 
 
 ;en held in the 
 able from the 
 'i leadcrsliip of 
 rch 8th, 1892, 
 
 1. electors dis- 
 lie returns as 
 
 lave stood as 
 
 cxion of the 
 
 means employed for effecting assessment purposes, or for takinjj the 
 census. 
 
 Since the views of the writer on this subject have been made public, 
 he has had the advantajje of examining; other schemes which at differ- 
 ent times have been proposed for improving; the electoral system. It 
 is recognized by many that the present unsatisfactory system cannot 
 be viewed as permanent, and that it must in the end give place to 
 some better method. 
 
 Among the various proposals the electoral scheme of Mr. Thomas 
 Marc, propounded in ICngland in 1.S57 for the representation of minorities, 
 appears to have met witi the greatest favor. The late Right Honorable 
 Henry Fawcctt thus speaks of it: "It can hardly be denied that the 
 advantages of this scheme preponderate immensely over its disadvan- 
 tages, and these last appear insignificant compared with the disadvantages 
 of the present system." In the writings of Mr. F'awcctt published in 
 1873, we find a short explanation of Mr. Hare's scheme of representation. 
 The explanation is a clear and concise exposition of the plan, reduced to 
 its simplest elements, and is referred to in connection with Mr. Hare's 
 treatise, by John Stuart Mill, in the following terms : "The more these 
 works are studied, the stronger, I venture to predict, will be the impres- 
 sion of the perfect feasibility of the scheme, and its transcendent advan- 
 tages. Such, and so numerous arc these, that in my conviction they 
 place Mr. Hare's plan among the very greatest improvements yet made 
 in the dicory and practice of government." 
 
 It is not a little remarkable that a Danish statesman, Mr. Andrac, 
 should have arrived at the same conclusions as Mr. Hare, by a different 
 proces.« and from an entirely different standpoint. That the scliemc is 
 capable of practical application, must be admitted froin the fact that its 
 main features were embraced in the electoral law of Denmark passed in 
 1855, for the election of representatives to the Rigsraad. Mr. Anilrae's 
 method was likewise applied in 1867 to the law for constituting thr 
 Landsthing, and -it is still in successful operation.* It will be seen then, 
 that the scheme of minority representation, for which we arc indebted to 
 Messrs. Hare and Andrae independently of each other, has had the 
 advantage of an experience of over thirty years. Thus establishing be- 
 yond all question, that there is no inherent obstacle in the subject itself, 
 to the securing of an improved system of electoral representation. Mr. 
 H. o's scheme is .so important, that a short explanation of it together 
 with other papers on the subject, is appended. This reference to the 
 
 * His Excellency Count de Sponneck, Danish minister at Washington, writes March 26th, 1892, 
 " the operation of the election law is generally thought to have been very successful." 
 
92 
 
 NOTE ON ELKCTOHAL, IlKPKESEXrATIOX. 
 
 
 scheme may be concliideil in the author's words : " If by the means pro- 
 posed, or by any which are better and wiser, an electoral system can be 
 establisheil whicii in tlie work of forming a representative body, shall 
 succeed in calling' into action all the thought antl intellect of the nation, 
 the effect would be to create a new object of entpiiry anil study, cxteiulinj^ 
 over a field of which we know not the bounds. All attempts to enga^jc 
 society in political conflicts for abstract principles would be henceforth 
 vain, and statesmen would seek to buikl their fame on something more 
 solid and durable than party triumphs." 
 
 The great aim and desire of Messrs. Ilarc, Andrae, I'awcctt, Mill, and 
 writers who share their opinions, have been to secure the representation of 
 minorities. Will it beheld as a political heresy to say that there should 
 be no minorities to represent ? lUit such is the view of the writer who 
 inclines to the opinion that, outside the walls of Parliament, minorities 
 and majorities should practically be unknown ; and moreover that 
 unless the whole electorate, as a body, finds its representation in the 
 national assembly, we do not obtain a true rci)reseiitative I'arli iincnt. 
 It is natural that there should be differences of o[)iiiion. Such diver- 
 gences of view are to be expected on ever)- cjuestion brought forward for 
 decision, when considered on its merits; moreover to act with ordinary 
 prudence and wi.sdom there should be deliberation in public affairs ; but 
 deliberation to be of any use must precede decision. It may be asked is 
 the public mind in the heat of a general election in the best state to 
 deliberate on all important legislative cjuestions, or on any question? 
 and can there be any effective delibc'-ation without the electors coming 
 together? Both these (pieries can only be answered in the negative. 
 It is physically impossible for all the electors to meet in order to 
 deliberate, and in consequence, deliberation can only be effected by 
 deputies or substitutes who assembling in a recognized form will satis- 
 factorily represent the electors, and by their deliberation and decisions 
 will effect substantially the same results as the electors themselves would 
 effect if they had deliberated and voted in one body. Thus it is that 
 Parliament properly constituted becomes the deliberative a.sscmbly of 
 the nation, and it is quite obvious, th;.t deliberation and decision on all 
 questions ought to be the function of Parliament alone. This principle 
 being recognised, in Parliament majorities and minorities vould be as 
 diversified as the questions discussed. Members in all cases would give 
 their votes according to their own clear, independent convictions, un- 
 fettered by pledges or party ties A stereotyped majority and minority 
 are not possible in a true deliberative body ; there would, therefore, be 
 none in the free Parliament we have portrayed. If such a parliament 
 
NOTK ON ELECTOHAL UKI'KKSENTATIO.V. 
 
 23 
 
 c means pro- 
 ystc'in can be 
 L* body, shall 
 >f tlio nation. 
 1>', cxtciuliii}^ 
 'ts to t-n^ja^jc 
 )e henceforth 
 ictliing more 
 
 ;tt, Mill, and 
 escntation of 
 here should 
 ; writer who 
 It, minorities 
 )reover that 
 ;ition in the 
 Parli-imcnt. 
 Such uiver- 
 forwaril for 
 th ordinarj' 
 affairs ; but 
 be asked is 
 :st state to 
 question ? 
 ors coming 
 le ne<,Mtive. 
 I order to 
 ffected by 
 will satis- 
 decisions 
 i\'es would 
 it is that 
 seiTibly of 
 sion on all 
 s principle 
 uld be as 
 'ould jrive 
 tions, un- 
 minority 
 refore, be 
 arliament 
 
 can be constituted, if it be possible to elect members on some better 
 plan than that now followed, and on sounder principles than that 
 of a numerical majority, the foundation of standing parties wouUi dis- 
 appear. Neither inside nor outside of Parliament would there be the 
 same causes to develop the ^'rowth of the dualism which now exists. 
 There would be an absence of purpose in anj' effort to inllame the 
 passions or stimulate antagonism in the community. In place of 
 these evils there would be scope and encoura<,'ement for the awaken- 
 ing,' of a calm patriotism, and the nobler instincts of all classes, and 
 under such conditions, it is believed that men of capacity and wisdom, 
 and of (^ood conscience, with mirids evenly balanced, would be pre- 
 ferred and ^'cneralh' would be chosen as representatives. A Parliament 
 thus constituted would, as much as it could be possible, be free from a 
 contentious spirit. Its members would be in a fit state to exercise their 
 hi.L,dicst reason in the positions they had been selected to fill. 
 
 If the means be put in practice of constituting a Parliament of the 
 whole people, by whatever plan ma)- ultimately be found best, the great 
 and permanent cause of political conflict would be removed, inasmuch as 
 no interest would be excluded from the legislative body, and no indi- 
 viilual elcctcjr would be deprived of his fair share in the general govern- 
 ment through Parliament, in which he would be represented. Thus it 
 would result that party organ nations would lose support, their lines of 
 cleavage would be obliterated, and the party divisions which now form a 
 dualism in the State would disappear and practically become blended 
 into one. No doubt occasions would from time to time arise, when mem- 
 bers in Parliament would differ in opinion on im[)c:)rtant questions, and 
 those of the same way of thinking would co-operate in order to carry 
 their views to a successful issue. Under such circumstances it might, 
 with truth, be said that the combinations formed would be of the nature 
 of parties, but the)' would be merely special and temporary associations, 
 to cease in each case as the questions would be d'sposcd of. There would 
 no longer be the same cause to induce the organization of permanent 
 parties ..ith their members arraj'ed as foemen one side against the other 
 — voting or. all questions identicall)'. There would be no raison d'etre 
 for two such antagonistic forces, as now exist, with fixed antijA..nies, dis- 
 puting under party banners every inch of ground, and mutually wasting 
 their energies in ceasless conflict. 
 
 It vvill be generally admitted among thoughtful men that one of the 
 
 most pressing needs of the Canadian people at this moment is the satis- 
 
 actory solution of the problem set forth ; and the purpose of these brief 
 
24 
 
 NOTE ON ELECTORAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 r 
 
 remarks will have been attained if it be shown that a way may be opened 
 by which the flames of political discord may be extinguished, and the 
 vims of evil which taints our body politic be neutralized. 
 
 A Parliament, fairly representing the whole people, would realize the 
 idea of a true deliberative and legislative unit. Devotion to country 
 would be substituted for devotion to party, and the tendency would 
 be, not to exhaust and neutralize the mental forces of the people's 
 representatives in fruitless agination and barren debates, but to bring the 
 united energies of the wisest and ablest statesmen on both sides to 
 act with purposes in common. They would no longer appear as political 
 enemies to lead on the rank and file in successive faction fights, and in- 
 terminable struggles ; if ever contentions arose it would be in generous 
 efforts to determine who could accomplish the greatest public good. 
 
 As already pointed out, we have happily in this new land no social 
 complications or traditional impediments to encumber our political 
 constitution, or clog the working of any improvement in our system 
 of government. In Canada we are in a state of general and continuous 
 development. Year by year we advance forward as our fathers did before 
 us. If the methods of our fathers do not serve the purposes of the 
 present generation, we must, as they would have done, abandon the 
 methods of our fathers. When we find defects in our political condition, 
 it is our duty to di.scovcr their origin and remove causes of friction by a 
 re-adjustment of the legislative machinery. Now that the foundations 
 of the Dominion are laid broad and deep, we should, by every means in 
 our power, endeavour to prevent and obliterate divisions which tend to 
 cleave us in two. We should have one aim, one aspiration in our 
 political partnership. We should seek to remove the causes which have 
 led to divergence in the past and be animated with one desire, the 
 welfare of Canada as a whole : one determination, to promote her 
 prosperity and maintain her honour. 
 
 If imbued ,vith these sentiments, the sons of Canada a: ti'oach the 
 consideration of the subject which the writer has humbly endeavored to 
 pre.'cent — who can doubt that we shall witness the dawning of a new da\' 
 in public life in this fair land of ours ? Let us with confidence entertain 
 the conviction, that before long there will be a new departure in politics ; 
 that for divisions and weakness and instability, with a long train of 
 evils, there will be the unity, and strength, and security, which proceed 
 from wisdom, and peace, and concord. 
 
• be opened 
 :d, and the 
 
 realize the 
 to country 
 :ncy would 
 le people's 
 3 brinj^ the 
 h sides to 
 as political 
 Its, and in- 
 II generous 
 good. 
 
 J no social 
 
 r political 
 
 )ur system 
 
 continuous 
 
 did before 
 
 ies of the 
 
 andon the 
 
 condition, 
 
 ction by a 
 
 luiidations 
 
 means in 
 
 h tend to 
 
 n in our 
 
 hich have 
 
 csire, the 
 
 note her 
 
 loach the 
 |.vored to 
 new da)- 
 mtertain 
 politics ; 
 Itrain of 
 proceed 
 
 SUPPLEMENTARY NOTE. 
 
 The writer feels himself called upon to express his great satisfaction 
 that the Canadian Institute has been pleased to entertain the appeal 
 to public opinion, contained in his letter of the ist of January last, and 
 that the Council has been enabled to bring forward the subject in a form 
 to invite the serious consideration of all interested in the well-being of 
 our common country. 
 
 The appendix contains several pages of extracts, expressing the deliber- 
 ate opinion of well known public writers, which are worthy of careful 
 perusal. They indicate the tone of thought in minds differently con- 
 stituted in our own country, in Great Britain, in the United States and 
 in other countries. In order to make the information as complete as 
 possible, the writer begs leave to add the following excerpts : 
 
 1. A new Plan of Minority Representation by Professor J. R. Commons 
 from the Review of Reviews, November 1891. 
 
 2. Proportional Representation — the Gove System — with Bill before 
 the commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1892. 
 
 3. Rcsnvid of Hare's work on the Representation of Minorities — 
 specially prepared for the present publication. 
 
 4. Translation and abridgement of the constitution and electoral 
 law of Denmark — also specially prepared. 
 
 It is stated in the prececding "Note" that the scheme of Messrs. 
 Andrae and Hare in its main features was in 1855 included in the 
 electoral law of Denmark constituting the Rigsraad or supreme Council* 
 and that in 1867 it was extended to the Landsthing or upper house of 
 the kingdom. As the new principles of election were first introduced 
 into Denmark and have been in operation in that country for a number 
 of years, it is a matter of the highest interest to ascertain full particulars 
 concerning their application and working; a point of great importance 
 as there is always room for objection against any untried system. The 
 writer accordingly addressed the Danish Minister at Washington on the 
 subject; the latter was pleased to' respond by forwarding the constitution 
 and electoral laws of Denmark ; and to add, that the original law of 1867 
 continues- to be in force, and that it is generally thought to have been 
 very successful in its operation. 
 
 * The Rigsraad belongs to tlie liistory of the past ; it was the Parliament of the Realm before 
 1867. The Danish Parliament is now known as the "Rigsilag" and is composed of the Lands- 
 thing and the Folkething. 
 
r 
 
 J JX "*• 
 
 «0 SUPPLEMENTAUV NOTK. 
 
 In the " Note" which the undersigned has submitted to the Institute, 
 he has dwelt upon the expediency of tracing to the source whence the)' 
 spring the poHtical evils which prevail, and ujjon the necessity of con- 
 tending with the first cause to which the difficulty may be attributed. 
 The writer has continually kept before himself this view, and he has 
 established to his own conviction, that the evils with which we are beset 
 are traceable mainly to defects in the electoral system which prevail, and 
 especially to the method followed in selecting members of Parliament 
 by majorities of votes. This opinion is not confmed to the writer. 
 
 Mr. Seaman in his work "The American System of Government" 
 thus expresses himself on the subject: "The system of popular elections 
 which gives all representation and power to majorities, however small, 
 and none to minorities, however large, tends to stimulate both personal 
 and partisan ambition too highly ; to excite rivalship and strife, partisan 
 passions and prejudices ; to divide a people into parties, cliques, and 
 factions ; and to increase and intensify the violence of party spirit. 
 It offers too great temptations to resort to improper means to insure 
 success, for poor, weak, and selfish human nature to resist ; and hence 
 it tends to stimulate secretivcness and duplicity, petty scheming and 
 trickery, falsehood and fraud, — and to encourage social drinking and 
 prodigality, as a means of popularity and of getting votes. It tends to 
 stimulate and sharpen the intellect ; but to paralize the conscience and 
 the moral feelings ; to foster demagogism and a despicable scramble for 
 office, and to demoralize politicians, and great numbers of people." 
 
 Sir Thomas Erskine May, in his Constitutional History of England, 
 points out that party has exercised the greatest influence for good or evil 
 upon the political destinies of the country. " It has guided and control- 
 led, and often dominated over the more ostensible authorities of the 
 state ; it has supported the crown and aristocracy against the people, it 
 has dethroned and coerced kings, overthrown ministers and Parliament, 
 humbled c.ie nobles, and established popular rights." He takes the most 
 favourable view of party, passes lightly over the meaner and more 
 repellent features, which are attributable to it, — and gratefully acknow- 
 ledges all that we owe to its influence. "The Annals of Party em- 
 brace a large portion of the history of England ; — we owe to party most 
 of our rights and liberties : — we recognise in the fierce contentions of our 
 ancestors, the conflict of great principles, and the final triumph of 
 freedom." While thus forcibly admitting all that can be said in its 
 favour he is constrained to add : "In the history of parties, therj is 
 much to deplore and condemn, — we observe the evil passions of our natures 
 aroused, — 'envy, hatred, malice, and all uncharitableness.' We sec 
 
SUPPLEMKNTARY NOTE. 
 
 2.' 
 
 the foremost of our followcountrymcn contending with the bitterness ol 
 foreign enemies — reviling each other with cruel words, — misjudging the 
 conduct of eminent statemcn, and pursuing them with vindictive 
 animosity. We see the whole nation stirred with sentiments of anger and 
 hostility. VVc find factious violence overcoming patriotism ; and ambition 
 and self-interest prevailing over the highest obligations of the state. We 
 reflect that party rule excludes one half of our statesmen from the service 
 of their country; and condemns them, — however wise and capable — to 
 comparative obscurity and neglect. We grieve that the first minds of 
 every age should have been occupied in collision and angry conflict, 
 instead of labouring together for the common weal." 
 
 Men of both parties, and those who hold themselves apart from all 
 party must assent to the truth as it is expressed in these forcible sentences : 
 Those who so think may not all agree in attributing to the same cause 
 the evils described, but they will acknowledge that our electoral system 
 requires amendment, and that the constitution of parliament calls for 
 rectification, before we can claim that we arc in the enjoyment of that 
 national representative body which our political condition demands. 
 The great niiss of the people should have perfect confidence in the 
 character and constitution of the Parliament by which our laws are made; 
 and on the part of its members, there should be an earnest and deep 
 .sympathy with the people. Neither this confidence, nor this sympathy, 
 is attainable so long as one half of the electors remains unrepresented. 
 This necessary relationshi[) was understood by William Pitt whose words 
 spoken in England a century ago may fittingly be repeated in Canada 
 to-day. " How truly important is it to the people of this country that 
 the House of Commons should sympathize with themselves and that 
 their interests should be indissoluble ! It is most material that people 
 should have confidence in the legislature. The force of the constitution 
 as well as its beauty depends on that confidence, and on the union and 
 sympathy which exist between the constituent and the representative. 
 The source of our glory and the muscles of our strength are the pure 
 character of freedom which our constitution bears. * * * yhc purity 
 of the represent;. tive is the only true and permanent source of such 
 confidence. * * * Prudence must dictate that the certain way of 
 securing their properties and freedom is to purify the source of represent- 
 ation and to establish that strict relation between themselves and the 
 House of Commons which it is the original idea of the constitution to 
 create." 
 
 The question before us to-day is not one of franchise. It is not a 
 question involving any convulsion in our constitution. It is simply to 
 
I! 
 
 ilPiil 
 
 ^ii 
 
 28 
 
 SUPPLKMENTARY NOTK. 
 
 determine a practicable plan by which the whole body of electors, can 
 form a standi; !^ committee chosen from among themselves, to manage 
 and direct the national affairs. The present system places these affairs 
 in the hands of a committee of a party — not a committee of the nation ; 
 and it is to this condition that we may trace the chronic political 
 difficulties from which we are suffering, and which we would greatly 
 lessen, if not entirely remove, by transferring the power of executive 
 government to p committee, really and truly chosen, from a body of 
 electors representing the whole people. 
 
 It must be only too plain to all, that hovvever desirable a rectification 
 of system may be, it will not be easily attained, for those interested in its 
 non-attainment arc many and powerful, holding under control almost 
 the entire press of the country. Nevertheless we .should not be deterred 
 from effort by the thought of the obstacles, real, or unreal, before us, nor 
 yield to apathetic indifference as if the remedy were hopelessly unattain- 
 able. Our ancestors succeeded in overthrowing many theories which 
 were destructive of the liberty of the subject and the well-being of the 
 nation. We will be unworthy of our ancestry, if on our part we 
 hesitate to grappk with the theory of party supremacy and injustice, 
 however strongly entrenched by prejudice and interest. No one, whose 
 opinion has weight, will contend that some clumsy machine of primitive 
 times, which .served its day and generation, is for ever to be regarded with 
 superstitious reverence. Equally, no one can insist that a rude political 
 contrivance introduced before the reign of Queen Anne is the best that 
 can be conceived for the needs of this Dominion in the second half 
 century of the reign of Victoria. 
 
 Edmund Hurke, the orator and philosophic statesman of the last cen- 
 tury, has frequently been alluded to as an advocate of Party government, 
 and his well known definition of Party has been reproduced by nearl\- 
 every writer on the subject. It must be borne in mind that Burke spoke 
 and wrote in defence of Party, at a period in history when political 
 convulsions were impending, and the attention of the British Parliament 
 was directed to questions of a kind to incite strong feelings ; at a 
 time, when, if ever. Party was justifiable and useful. The circum- 
 stances of Canada and America to-day are entirely diP'erent from the 
 circumstances of England and liuropc in Burke's time ; moreover, we 
 must allow that there is such a thing as progression in the views of 
 thinking men. Burke himself did not remain stationary. In a very few 
 years he considerably altered his opinions on several great questions. 
 Before he passed from the political field he deliberately separated himself 
 from his old political friends and completely dis-associated himself from 
 
 t 
 
SUPPLKMENTAKY NOTE. 
 
 29 
 
 lectors, can 
 to manage 
 fiese affairs 
 :he nation ; 
 c political 
 Lild greatly 
 executive 
 a body of 
 
 ectification 
 ested in its 
 rol almost 
 je deterred 
 "ore us, nor 
 y unattain- 
 3rics which 
 iing of the 
 r part \vc 
 d injustice, 
 3ne, whose 
 f primitive 
 ardcd with 
 e political 
 best that 
 cond half 
 
 |c last cen- 
 vernment, 
 by nearl}- 
 rl^'c spoke 
 political 
 [arliamcnt 
 |gs; at a 
 circum- 
 from the 
 |eover, we 
 views of 
 ver}' few 
 uestions. 
 himself 
 lelf from 
 
 the party in which h : had long been piominent. Kvery rational human 
 being, with freedom of opinion, makes progress, and who will affirm that 
 the intelligence of Hurke, would have refused to admit the possibility of 
 some advance in political science, 120 years after his defence of I'arty 
 government ? 
 
 Iknke defined Party to be "a body of men united for promoting by 
 their joint endeavours the national interests upon some particular 
 principle in which they are all agreed." While he approved of this basis 
 of joint action, he did not at any time advocate the party spirit which in 
 modern times lias been developed. Burke held in respect the observance 
 of morality in politics, and he could recognize no virtue in the indiscrim- 
 inate support of Ministers, at all times and under all circumstances. He 
 commended the member who acted according to his own judgment, who 
 voted according to the merits of the several measures as they were 
 presented, who felt himself bound to follow the dictates of his conscience, 
 not that of others. He pointed out that the principle of "an indiscrimi- 
 nate support to Ministers is totally corrupt," that it " destroys the very 
 end of Parliament as a controul, and is a general previous sanction to 
 misgovernment." Again he says, " The virtue, spirit and essence of an 
 House of Commons consists in its being the express image of the 
 feelings of the nation." . . "It was not instituted to be a contr^^ul 
 upon the people, as of late it has been taught by a doctrine of the ..lost 
 pernicious tendency. It was designed as a controul fof the people."* 
 
 In his "History of the English Government and Constitution," Lord 
 John Russell sustains Burke's view of Party, and this authority has like- 
 wise been often quoted. He admits that Party has bad effects, but he 
 disclaims as evils the animosities and violent contentions which proceed 
 from Party feeling. " It is," he says, " from the heat and hammering 
 of the stithy that freedom receives its shape, its temper and its strength." 
 Fallacies often hide under metaphors, and this is a case in point. Every 
 one admits that heat and hammering are good for iron, but no one would 
 say that divisions and animosities are good for men, especially if the men 
 are engaged in a common cause. But accepting the metaphor, we may 
 ask, has not political freedom long been with us an accomplished fact ? 
 Is there any need for the empty clangour of the anvil long after the 
 work has received the last effective blow .-' Is it not time to re-fit the 
 national workshop with new tools, and introduce modern machinery, to 
 be employed in the process of elaborating productions of quite another 
 character, to meet the requirements of quite another age ? 
 
 • Burke's Thoughts on the Present Discontents, 1770. 
 
so 
 
 HUPIM.KMENTAHY NOTE. 
 
 It has been urged thit the Hare scheme of representation has been 
 before the British people since 1857, without being accepted, and there- 
 fore it is inferred, that a departure from the old system of electing 
 members is not required. This is no conclusi.j argument against a 
 change. Englishmen are especially conservative 'y\ their habits of 
 thought, and dislike change even when change is dosirable. As an 
 illustration of the national obstinate resistance to -iiaiige, the reform of 
 the calendar may be instanced. The Gregorian calendar was adopted 
 by the advanced nations of Europe in 1582. It came into force iji 
 Scotland in the year 1600, but it was resisted in England for a centur)- 
 and a half longer. Finally after great difficulty an act of parliament 
 was passed and the "new style" of computing time took effect in 1752. 
 
 The advocates of the Party system are in the habit of spoaking of 
 t lose holding more advanced views in the matter of representation, as 
 weak and amiable persons, as dreamers and visionaries. The papers 
 appended establish the increasing tendency on the part of many able 
 men who have seriously considered the subject, to regard improvement in 
 the election system as being both necessary and possible. A societj- 
 has been organized under the presidency of Sir John Lubbock to pro- 
 mote electoral reform, and nearly 200 members of the British House of 
 Commons have enrolled themselves in its support. This fact is in itself 
 sufficient to set aside the idea that those who aim at a beneficial change 
 are to be regarded as dreamers and visionaries. 
 
 The question is of the utmost concern to this young and aspiring 
 community. However great the obstacles to be overcome it is not for 
 a moment to be said that they are insuperable ; we cannot doubt that 
 they will be eventually set aside if the work be undertaken in a resolute 
 spirit, temperately, wisely, and free from all passionate desire for mere 
 innovation. 
 
 It has been already stated that we do not aim at any radical change 
 in the constitution. There is no thought of any appeal to violence or 
 revolution ; the object is rather to avert any extreme convulsion and 
 even to escape from those administrative revolutions which result on every 
 occasion when the power passes from one party to the other. Instead of 
 the periodical disturbing changes with the violent transitions of authority 
 and the reversals of policy which follow, it is held possible to obtain 
 continuity of government while at the same time carrying into full effect 
 the political constitution we now possess. It must be obvious even to 
 those who have given little reflection to the subject, that until we succeed 
 in so doing, we shall remain in a condition of political immaturity, and 
 
 &. 
 
SUPPLEMKNTAKY NOTE. 
 
 31 
 
 Dti has been 
 1, and there- 
 of electinjj 
 it against a 
 r habits of 
 le. As an 
 le reform of 
 ,vas adopted 
 J to force in 
 Dr a century 
 ' parh"ament 
 feet in 1752. 
 
 speaking of 
 mentation, as 
 The papers 
 many able 
 rovement in 
 A society 
 30ck to pro- 
 sh House of 
 t is in itself 
 icial change 
 
 id aspiring 
 
 is not for 
 
 doubt that 
 
 a resolute 
 
 ■e for mere 
 
 cal change 
 iolcnce or 
 ulsion and 
 t on every 
 Instead of 
 authority 
 to obtain 
 full effect 
 )us even to 
 ve succeed 
 turity, and 
 
 be subject to the evils which are a necessary consequence of our present 
 imperfectly developed representative system. 
 
 Whatever difficulties may stand in the way of electoral improvement, 
 it is impossible to believe that, in this age of increased enlightenment 
 and progression, we can leave unperformed the task which is imposed on 
 us. The problem which the Canadian Institute submits to the world 
 appeals with peculiar significance to the younger men of this Dominion 
 who, in a few years, will be called upon to exercise their political duties 
 and bear the responsibilities of legislation and government. The appeal 
 is directly made to the sagacity of every true Canadian and British 
 subject, to effect the removal of the hindrances which impede the 
 establishment of the representative system, in accordance with its cardinal 
 principle. The main object in view is to make Parliament an efficient 
 scientific engine of order and progress, so tiiat it may perform its im- 
 portant national work without the bitterness and the waste of power, 
 talent, and time, which result from party warfare. 
 
 The appeal does not affect the Dominion alone. It takes a wider 
 range and possesses a higher import than may at first be discerned. All 
 free communities are closely inter-related in the practical application of 
 sound principles of government. If in Canada we succeed, in attaining 
 an effective development of parliamentary representation, and in 
 eliminating the evil consequences of party strife, we shall achieve results 
 which in their beneficial infiucnces will be felt wherever constitutional 
 government is known. The chief obstacle to be encountered is the 
 spirit of war, — a survival of primitive times, which has come to us 
 through centuries of conflict. The representative principle is based on 
 the more excellent spirit of peace. It was entirely unknown in ancient 
 political life ; indeed its application to government is comparatively 
 modern. It is pacific in its conception, and but for its still being 
 associated with contestation and turmoil, through the Party system, its 
 pacific tendencies would permeate society, wherever true representative 
 governments are established. 
 
 It is natural to expect that Party leaders will be the strongest 
 opponents of any scheme of government which would displace their 
 prestige and influence. Such men would probably find it difficult to 
 descend to the less prominent positions of '/caceful co-workers in state 
 affairs. But in pointing out this difficulty, a well known writer remarks : 
 "If it be objected that we cannot get eminent men to take office together, 
 without party compact, the answer is simply — let us try. If party 
 leaders will not work together, it seems to me that their services can be 
 dispensed with in fiivour of others less influenced by individual likings, 
 and more by public zeal." 
 
L 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 
 1 
 
 1 1 
 
 1 
 
 ! 
 
 I 
 ( 
 
 1 
 
 
 , 
 
 32 
 
 SUIM'LKMKNTAHY NOTB. 
 
 The utility of party in its earlier history depended on political condi- 
 tions which have lon^ since passetl away. No one will contend that 
 these conditions will a^ain return. This at least ij indisputable, that the 
 system which we follow is inconsistent with complete representative gov- 
 ernment, and is productive of mnny and j^rave evils. The question arises : 
 How long shall it be necessary to endure those evils? 
 
 A hopeful answer is suggested by a modern writer, Mr. Homersham 
 Cox, in his work, "The British Commonwealth,' and, in words which may 
 fitly conclude these reinarks : " If I understand aright anything of the 
 teachings of modern history, the>' arc gratlually inculcating the lesson 
 that Party is a rude and barbarous instrument of legislation, only less 
 bad than that legislation by despotic power which it supplanted. VVc 
 may fain hope that the era is coming — is at hand — when Party having 
 done that great task will itself be at an end." 
 
 Ottawa, April 7th, 1892. 
 
 SANDFORD FLEMING. 
 
 I!! 
 
 ^|)iiil 
 
)olitical condi- 
 contcnd tluit 
 table, that the 
 scntativc ^ov- 
 jcstion arises : 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 . Homersham 
 ds which ma)- 
 ything of the 
 ifj the lesson 
 ion, only less 
 planted. VVc 
 Party having 
 
 LEMING. 
 
 /'/• 
 
 THK CAUSE AND EPFKCT Ol- I'AUTV. 
 A l>iMi/i(iKitii)ii on Goi'i'nniii'iil," />// Joliii V. Calluiun, IS49. 
 
 "Tlie first anil leading error which naturally arises from overlooking the distinction referred 
 to, is, to confound the n\iinerical niajoriiy with the jieople ; and this so completely as to 
 re^jard them as identical. This is a conse(|uence that necessarily results from considering the 
 mmierical as the only majority. All ndniit that a i)opuIargoverninunl, or democracy, is the govern- 
 ment of the people, for the terms iini)ly this ; a jierfect government of the kind would i)e one 
 which W(juld embrace the consent of every citizen or member of the community ; but as this is im- 
 jiracticable, in the opinion of those who regard the numerical as the only majority, and who can 
 perceive no other way by which the sense of the people can be taken, — they are compelled to 
 adopt this as the only true basis of pojiular government, in contradistinction to governments of the 
 aristocralical or monarchical form. IJeing thus constrained, they are, in the ne.xt place, forced 
 to regard the numerical majority as, in effect, the entire peo]ile ; that is, the greater part as the 
 whole ; and the government of the greater part as the government of the whole. . . This 
 radical erior, the conserpience of confounding the two, and of regarding the numerical as the only 
 majority, has contributed more than any other cause, to prevent the formation of popular con- 
 stitutional governments, — and to destroy them even when they have been formed." 
 
 "The conflict between the parties, . . . tends necessarily to settle down into a 
 struggle for the honors and emoluments of the Government ; and each, in order to obtain an 
 object so ardently desired, will, in the process of the struggle, resort to whatever measure may 
 seem best calculated to effect this puriiO'-e. The adoption, by the one, of any measure, however 
 oiijectionable, which might give it an advantage, would compel the other to follow its example. 
 In such case, it would be indispensable to success to avoid division and keep united ; — and hence, 
 from a necessity inherent in the nature of such governments, each ]iarty must be alternately 
 forced, in order to insure victory, to resort to measures to concentrate the control over its move- 
 ments in fewer and fewer hands, as the struggle became more and more violent. This, in jiro- 
 cess of time, must lead to party org.anization, and party caucuses and discipline ; and these, to 
 the conversion of the honors and emoluments of the government into means of rewarding partisan 
 .services, in order to secure the fidelity and increase the zeal of the members of the ])arty. The 
 effect of the whole cijmbined, even in the earlier stages of the pnjcess, when they exert the least 
 pernicious influence, would be to jilace the control of the two parties in the ham's of their respec- 
 tive majorities ; and the government itself, virtually, under the control of the majority of the 
 dominant party, for the time, instead of the majority of the whole community ; — where the 
 theory of this form of government vests, it. Thus in the very tirst stages of the process, the 
 government becomes the government of a minority instead of a majority ; — a minority, usually, 
 and under the most favourable circumstances, <- ' not much more than one-fourth of the whole 
 community. 
 
 " l)Ut the process, as regards the concentration of the ]iower, would not stop at this stage. 
 The government would gradually pass from the hands of the m.ajority of the party into those of 
 its leaders ; as the struggle became more intense, and the honors and emoluments of the govern- 
 ment the all-absorbing objects. At this stage, principles and policy would lose all influence in 
 
84 
 
 AIM'KNDIX. 
 
 r 
 
 the clcctii)n.s ; ami euiiiiiny, fnlsehooil, ilcccplion, slaiulcr, fiaiiil, .iii'l j;mss appeals to the 
 Appetites ()( the lowest ami most worthless portion of the community, woulil take tlie place of 
 souiiil reason ami wise ilei)ate. After these have thoroii^jhly delniseil and corrupt"il the cdiii- 
 munity, and ail tlie arts and devices of |)arty have heen exhausted, the jjoverninent W(juld 
 vibrate hetween the two factions (for such will parlies have become) at each succeHsive 
 election." 
 
 " Neither would be able to retain power beyond some fixed term ; for those seeking; otiico 
 and jiatronaKe would become too numerous to be rewarded by the offices and i)atronat;o at the 
 disposal of the tjoverninent ; and these being the sole objects of pursuit, the disajipointed would, 
 at tlie next succeedin;; election, throw their weight into the ojiposite scale, in the liope of belter 
 success at the next luni of the wheel," 
 
 "That the numerical majority will diviile the community, let it be ever so homogeneous, 
 into two great parlies, which will be engaged in perpetual struggles to obtain the control of the 
 government, has already been established. The great im|)orlance of the ol)ject at stake, nuisi 
 necessarily form 8tr,)ng paity attachments and jiarty antipathies ; attachments on ihe part of the 
 members of each to iheir respective parties, through whose efforts they hope to accomplish an 
 object dear lo all : and antipathies to the op|)osite party, as presenting the only obstacle lo 
 success. 
 
 " In order to have a just conception of their force, it must be taken into consideration, tii.\t 
 the object to be won or lost ajjpeals to the strongest passions of the huniau heart, — avarice, ambi- 
 tion, and ri\alry. It is not then wonderful, that a form of government, which periodically slakes 
 all its honors and emoluments, as prizes lo be conleiided for, should divide the community iiiio 
 two great hostile parties ; or that party attachment, in the progress of the strife, should become 
 so suong among the members of each respectively, as to al)sorl) .ilmost every feeling of our 
 nature, l)oth social and individual ; or that their nuilual anlip allies should be carried to such an 
 excess as to destroy, almost entirely, all sympathy between them, and to substitute in its place 
 the strongesl aversion. Nor is it surprising that under their joint intlueiice, the coniinuiiiiy 
 should cease to be the common center of aitacliineiit, or that each parly should find that ceiuer 
 only in itself. It is thus, that, in such governments, devotion to parly becomes stronger than 
 devotion lo country : — the promoiioii of the interests of party more important than the pioinolimi 
 of the coininon good of the whole, and ils triumph and ascendency, objects of far greater 
 soliciuule, than the safely and [irospenty ol the coininuniiy." 
 
 "Ils effects wonld be as great in a moral, as, I have attempted to shew, tlr.'v would he 
 in a political jioint of view. Imleed. publio and ]irivaie morals are so nearly allied, that ii 
 would be dil'ticull for it lo be otherwise. That which corrupts and debases the communil)-, 
 politically, must also corrupt and debase it morally. The same cause, \' hich, in govermneiil.> of 
 the numerical majority, gives lo jiarty altachinents and antipathies such force, as to pl.ice party 
 triumiih and ascendancy above the salely and prosperity of the community, will just as certainly 
 give ihcm Nullicenl force lo overpower all rej,ard for uu ill, justice, sincerity, and moral obligations 
 of every ilescripiion. It is accordingly, found I hat, in the violent strifes bet ween parlies for 
 the high and glittering prize of governmental honors and emolumenls, — falsehood, injustice, fraud, 
 artifice, slander, and breach of faith, are freely resorted to, as legitimate weapons: — followed by 
 all their corrupting and debasing influences, . . . Neither religion nor education can 
 counteract the strong tendency of the numerical majority to corrupt and debase the people." 
 
PARTY ClOVEKSMENT AUVEK8E TO OOOU OOVEHNMENT. 
 
 80 
 
 ss appeals to tlie 
 1 tnkc the pKieo of 
 orrupt'vl tin: com- 
 (^ovciniiii'in woiilil 
 It cacli successive 
 
 hose seckiiif; ollico 
 111 ])alronatL' at the 
 ,isa|>puiiUe(l wouM, 
 I the liope of bc'tlei" 
 
 r so homogeneous, 
 n the control of the 
 hject at stake, nui-it 
 i on the part of tlie 
 i to acconiplisji an 
 le only obstacle to 
 
 consideration, that 
 wt, — avarice, anibi- 
 1 iicriodically stakes 
 the community into 
 rife, sliould become 
 very feeiini,' of our 
 e carried to such an 
 bstitute in its place 
 ICC, the community 
 lid find that center 
 lomes stronger than 
 than the promotion 
 ects of far yreali-r 
 
 e\v, th'jy would lie 
 
 larly allied, tlial ii 
 
 |es the community, 
 
 in governmenti of 
 
 ;, as to place jiarty 
 
 ill just as certainly 
 
 moral obligations 
 
 ;t\vecn parties for 
 
 k1, injustice, fraud, 
 
 )ns : — followed l>y 
 
 lor education can 
 
 the people." 
 
 I'AliTY (i(»Vi:i!NMi;\T ADVKKSH 'l'(» (iODl) (l()Vi:i;NM KNI'. 
 From FritMir . Moijn-.iiw, Vul. XL IX. IS.'i^. 
 
 'Die very nature of party tactics is fuiidanieiitiilly adverse to good government ; for party 
 tactics are essentially unpatriotic. Their object is Himply to gain or hold possession of the 
 Treasury bench And therefore tin; measures selected for attack on the one hand will 
 ahvays be the weakest, that is, the most unpopular, not the worst ; and on the other haii<i, 
 the measures brought forward will bu the nu)st iM>pular rather than the beat. That popularity 
 and unpopularity often coincide with goodness and bailnt's.s i.s most true ; that tin y by no 
 means invariably eoinciile is a.^siimed by us, when we delegate the functions of legislation 
 instead of exercising them ourselves. 
 
 (•n the other hand, it may be said party gives us emulation and criticism. The 
 emulation is undoubtedly worth much ; it is even ditlieult to see how its [)lace can bo sup[ilied. 
 It wouM be inestimable, if the pri/.e projiosed was not as it is, the popularity of the hour, but 
 the calm approval of distant years. The eriticism is defective in this, that it i3, and muat 
 be, iniliscriminate and unjust. Many important acts ami measures of government have been 
 seen to be good by most people at the time ; and by all people a few years after. Hut very 
 few important measures of government have ever recoive<l the approbation of the oi)po8ite 
 benches. Any |)resuniably fair tribunal — such, for exami)le, as an assenddy i)rofessodly 
 neutral and impartial — would be really a higher moral restraint upon elevated natures 
 (such as we ho\Hi our governors may be) than the censures of an opposition which does not 
 profess to be eanilid ; and which, therefore, it is always allowable to bailie, evade, or in the 
 last resort, crush, with a voti extorted un<ler a threat of resignation. Ami we mu.st 
 remember the necessity of keeping followers together in this 'generous einnlation' and 
 the price which that necessity entails. 
 
 "Again, |)arty government has made politics a perfect religion of hate^iate which 
 reaches its height in those who, if they are to eomnuind our resi)ect, ought to be more free 
 than ourselves from vulgar passions. It is the tluty of every Whig or Tory, in proportion as 
 he is active in politics, to see the character and actions of every member of the oi)))osite faction 
 in tln^ worst possible light. If accident ha))|ien to throw a man into a (litlerent p(ditical 
 combination fiom that which he has been in before, though his measures and sentiments may 
 remain essentially the same, his whole conduct and every feature of his mind undergo a 
 complete metamorphosis in the eyes of his nuomlam friends. Kvery blunder of the opfiosite 
 side is detected with delight, and exposed with exultation ; even blunders which imiieril the 
 country in a struggle with a foreign foe. The Tories cripple Marlborough, and throw away 
 the fruits of his victories ; the Whigs ' pine at the triumphs of Wellington ; ' the Peelites 
 embarrass I'alnierston ; the Derbyites cndtarrass Aberdeen. Knglish intmliness and gener- 
 osity come in to supply correctives which have not lieen supplied in other countries where 
 the party system has been tried. But the system is distinctly one of organized enmity, very 
 fatal to patriotism, and utterly destructive to loyalty. And yet after all, considering how 
 little p(ditical wisdom is ever likely to reach the mass of the jieople, loyalty towards the 
 rulers of men's choice is a principle in politics with which we can scarcely aft'or<l to 
 dispense. 
 
 To this state of enmity is of course to be attril)uted the immense waste of time and 
 energy in condiative oratory, and the moat undue value set on that accomplishment. What 
 will a sane posterity think of debates in which nobody aims or pretends to aim at enlightening 
 or convincing his neighbour, but only at inllaming the passions and conlirining the jn-ejudices 
 of his own faction? Wliat will it think of Parlianvrntary reputations won, and high places 
 in the state obtained by mere dexterity in wounding the feelings of a rival, without the 
 utterance of a single wise thing, or the performance of a single noble act ? 
 
30 
 
 PPKN'DIX. 
 
 Agftin, party gDveriuiient, as it lends to ft coimtftnt change of pernonH nnil iirinciplcH 
 ill tliu mlniiniHtratioii, is almulutdy fntnl to anything like foruoiwt or ii fur aightiil policy, 
 etc, etc. 
 
 Wo return however to the iMiint from which we Htiirteil. We hiive hitherto j^oiie, 
 ])racticnlly, on tin; theory f)f party governnu nt. Hut party principle fails us. Ah noine 
 think, it fnilx, o\vin>; to H|iccial acciileiitH, fur n time ; hut aH we tiiink, it will soon fail uh, if 
 it \h not alreadj failinj; ub, vitally ami for over. We coninieml the (|m'Mtion to political 
 philoHnpht'i-H aH one which strongly atTccta the morality of pul>lic life at thiM inoincnt, ami 
 which i.s big with the mont monieiitoUD issuea for the future. 
 
 11 
 
 ililii 
 
 i'i 
 
 chk(;ks and balancks. 
 
 liif Eiirl Rtixtell, J,S'>4. 
 
 " Now it appears to us that many ailvantages would attend the enahling the minority 
 to have a part in those returns. In the lirst place, there is apt to he a feeling of great 
 HoreiicsH Avlieii a very considerable number of electors, such as I have mentioned, are com- 
 jiletely shut out from a share in the representation of one place. . . . l!ut, in the next 
 place, 1 think that the more you have your representation conliiied to largo poiiulation, the 
 more ought you to take care that tlnre should be some kind of balance, and that the large 
 places sending members to the House should send those who represent the community at 
 large. Hut when tliere is a very large body excluded, it cannot be said that the community 
 at large is fairly represented. 
 
 " HARE ON REPRESKNT.\TIVES," 1857. 
 
 A Rimimi by John Francis Waters, M.A., 1892, 
 
 The three words heading this article form the short title of an excellent work, namely, 
 " A Treatise on the Election of Representatives, Parliamentary and Municipal," by Thomas 
 Hare, Kscj., Barrister-J.t-Law, published in 1859, in Loudon, by Longmans, Hrown, (!reen, 
 Longmans & Roberts. 
 
 This work has been reviewed i)y many persona of distinction, and an excellent synopsis 
 of Mr. Hare's scheme of representation has ])een given by Millicent Garrett Fawcett, wife of 
 Henry Fawcett, M.F., so well known as Professor of Political Economy in the University of 
 Cambridge. Mr. Hare has for his great object to remove the anomalies, absurdities, and 
 tyrannies of the present method of electing members of Parliament and municipal representa- 
 tives by giving to each elector a direct, equal and j)er8onal representation in Parliament. Of 
 course this does not mean th.at every elector is to represent himself in Parliament, for then 
 Parliament would be but another name for the adult male population of the realm ; but it 
 means that every elector should feel th.at his vote has done a real substantial good by placing 
 in Parliament some man who shall be the honest exponent of the elector's honest views. In 
 following in the footsteps of the distinguished persons who have written more or less 
 exhaustively about Mr. Hare's scheme, and given compressed reports upon it, it is to be 
 premised that in the limits at my disposal no more can be done than to give an outline of 
 the main shape and symmetry of the plan. The writer cannot therefore enter as fully nn 
 
 ALcyu- 
 
ilARB ON KKI'KK.SKNTATIVKH. 
 
 87 
 
 sons an<l prineiplos 
 fur sinhtt'd policy, 
 
 have liitliLM-to j^ono, 
 f.iiU us. Ah some 
 t will Moon fail us, if 
 lUcHtiou to jwlitictt! 
 t this iiioinunt, niul 
 
 laliliiig the minority 
 e ft fuclinj^ of gnut 
 nuiitionuil, arc com- 
 . Jiiit, in the next 
 argu population, the 
 1, and that the large 
 t the eomniuiiity at 
 that the coinimuiity 
 
 lent work, namely, 
 iiml," by Thomas 
 , Brown, (iroen, 
 
 excellent synopsis 
 tt Fawcett, wife of 
 the University of 
 s, absurdities, and 
 nicipal representa- 
 11 i'arlianient. Of 
 irliainent, for then 
 tlie realm ; but it 
 :d good by placing 
 honest views. In 
 ten more or less 
 ipon it, it is to be 
 give au outline of 
 enter as fully ,is 
 
 III' would wish into the analysis of the admirable statement by which Mr. Hare justities the 
 aMHumption that our present methods of p.irliameiitary and municipal elections ar« faulty, 
 unju.Ht, and even ridiculous. It m,\y be asked here, " Is not the direct, ci|Uiil and personal 
 representation of every elector giutranteed by the present systeii t " The best reply to thin 
 is to state very briefly the substance of Mr. Ham's wonls on this jMiint : — 
 
 He shows what must lie apparent to any one who gives the matter live minutes' con- 
 sideration, that a system like ours which permits the nation to be practically governed by .i 
 handful, to the total ostracism of the wishes and representation of practically half the com- 
 munity, cannot be othei than radically w rong. Thus, to make matters plainer by an illus- 
 tration at home, let us look at the result in Canada of our system of parliamentary elections. 
 .Successive contests have shewn that the Liberals in Canada form not far from half the popu- 
 lation. Hut wliat share have they in the government of the country as long as the Conserva- 
 tives, by a slight plurality, have entire control of the Treasury Benches? 'i'herefore, every 
 elector who cast a vote for a Liberal canditl.ite practically wasted it, and really has no repre- 
 sentation in Parliament, since the Liberals in l'ail':imcnt, with things as they are, have no 
 voice etlective in moulding the destinies of the nation. Again, there are thousands of persons 
 interested iu special sulijects of legislation apart from the more or less well-detincd issues 
 sipaiating (Irit and Tory ; but those persons are perfectly well aware that, as things are, 
 .1 vote given for any other than the regular party candidate is utterly wasted, since nobody 
 refusing to ally himself with om^ or the other great political party has any chance of gaining 
 fi scat in the lloii.se of (.'oinmons. The votes, then, uf a cci'lain number of Liberal electors 
 are not wasted in one sense since, according to the majority system which nrevails, they do 
 succeed in returning a certain number of inend.ers to serve in the Common: ; but their votes 
 arc re illy wasted in this sense, that these mcndicrs, being in the minority in the Coinnions, 
 have no power whatever to give efleet to the wishes of tluir constituents One of the 
 absurdities of the prese.'t system is perhaps best illustrated by an example. Let us suppose 
 that ten candidates seek t,.,, sutl'rages of a eoiistitiiency or pocket borough which has lifty 
 voters ; every candidate except one would receive live votes, let us su[ipose, but one would 
 receive six votes ; he would, therefore, be elected to represent the borough, that is to say, ho 
 represents really six voters, while forty-four aio left out in the cold wholly unre]iresente<l. 
 This, of course, is an extreme ca e, but it sho^tS as well as any other the state of aflairs exist- 
 ing uiiiler our present system in which there is hardly any provision for the rejiresentation of 
 minorities. Even the feeble attempt made by Mr. .Mowat for minority representation in 
 Toronto has been the subject of unending ridicule and unjust accusation. But really the 
 I'lemier of Ontario, by preventing voters from marking a l)allot for more than two of the 
 three candidates for the Local Legislature has done no more than secure representation for 
 tlic large Reform minority in the City of Toronto, which otherwise would be left without 
 a voice in the conduct of public all'airs. Mr. Hare's scheme is emphatic iu jiroviding that 
 every elector shall have no more votes than one, liccause Parliament could not become what 
 he wishes it to become, " the mirror of the nation," unless the voting power of every elector 
 Were et|Ual. Cnder the present ri'(jimi- a man may vote in every constituency in which he 
 has a property (pialilication. A radical ditFercnce between Mr. Hare's plan of v<iting ami 
 that in vogue is that, by an elaborate system which he claims, however, to be cpiite workable, 
 a voter should have permission, if the candidates in his own constituency did not suit him, 
 to vote for c:andidates according to his choice in another constituency Candidates, there- 
 fore, of a kind to poll votes from constituencies iu difFei-ent parts of the .calm, and who could 
 not be correctly described as candiilates for any |iarticular constituency, nn'ght be cl.assed as 
 "ail Kngland " candidates. It is well-known that under our present system a candidate 
 often receives an enormous plurality over an opponent less distinguished. Mr. Hare's idfa 
 is that a quota of votes necessary to secure the election of a mendier should be established, 
 and that no candidate should receive more than the required number. It would be objected at 
 once to this that the voter, not having the omniscience of Providence, cannot know whether 
 the candidate of his choice will or will not receive the quota, but Mr. Hare meets this objection 
 
38 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 by iiroviding a form of conditional ballot l)y wbieli the voter records tirst his preference for 
 his candidate and then directs tiiat "-n the event of such candiilate l)eing already elected, or 
 not obtaining the ((uota," the vote should go to a seconil or third or fourth candidate of 
 his choice in tliat constituency or in "all i'lnghmd," as the case maybe. It is obvious, 
 then, that if the p-oposed system were worked out to its logical conclusion every member of 
 larliament would represent an e([ual nnnilier of voters, and that no votes would have been 
 thrown away, since, in the case of candidates either elected f>r who h .ve failed to receive the 
 re(|uired (juota, the elector's ballot would be placed to the credit of another eligil)le candi- 
 date It is claimed l)y those who favour this plan of representation that the Mouse of Coin- 
 mons would tlivn really be a representative a8send)ly and an assenddy of /xira in the sense 
 thai every constituent member would represent an cf/iiat voting; power. Of course, the 
 eiunnies of Mr. Hare's idea claim that the House of ('ominous, by the adoption of this system 
 of electing its me!nl)ers, would become little better than an assend)ly of men for ventilating 
 eccentric and crotchety iu>tions, an objection met, in a sort of way, by the counter-statement 
 that the ])eople who have no crotchety notions have it in their power to secure repre.senta- 
 tion as well as the eccentric voters have. It is clr,' neil by the advocates of the system that 
 mole jiublic interest would be felt in the constituencies if it were possible to elect parlia- 
 mentarj' and municipal re])re8entatives on the basis proposed ; that voters would study by 
 de^'rees (piestions of political economy and statecraft ; that they would eagerly scan the list 
 of candidates ; ami that l)riberyand corruption would gradually, but withal speedily, beconie 
 unknown, becauce the temptation to bribe and to be bribed would be removed, it is pro- 
 vided that with the exception of a registration fee all exi)enses of election should be boriU! In' 
 the .*>tate, ami since no candidate couid receive more than tile (piota of votes, bribers 
 would not be anxious to spend money iu getting ballots marked in all likelihood for 
 men other luan the one in whose supposed interest the bribery was perpetrated. 
 Mr. Hare's plan provides for territorial designations as at present, if that be ])referred, 
 so that an "all England" candidate receiving votes from every part of the kingdom 
 would be designated as a mend)er for that place in which he wouhl have received a majority 
 of his votes ; this would obviate the difficulty of tilling vacancies caused by death or resigna- 
 tion, and would seem to render tlie retaining of territorial designations necessary ; for other- 
 ^ wist, if mend)ers were elected to the House of Commons without territorial ilesignation, how 
 would it l>e possible to issue a writ for an unnamed constituency ! One writer says naively 
 enough, " jjcrliaps rather an Irish way of getting over the ditliculty connected with tilling up 
 those accidental vacancies which occur between general elections, is not to till them up at 
 all , and in order to avoid constituencies remainiug long unrepresented, to have triennial, or 
 even annual Parliaments." A further ol)jection to .Mr. Hare's scheme is that the "all 
 England " character of the rei)reseuiation would tend to destroy local representation and 
 would prevent members of Parliament from taking that interest in forwarding and expediting 
 the process of private bills dealing with local works, which now members of the diflferent 
 constituencies so zealously evince. The cimnterstatement is that these services could just 
 as well be performed by members under Mr. Hare's scheme as at present, and that the great 
 centres of shipping and commercial .activity would for their own interests combine to send a 
 Kufticieut nund)er of local members to conserve local interests. Other objectors find great 
 fault with Mr. Hare's plan on the ground that the working of it would be incompatible with 
 voting by ballot. The objection is not well founded. But it should be said here that Mr. 
 Hare himself did not favour voting by ballot, which in one part of his book he speaks of as 
 " a degradation." Further, he maintains that it is a fruitful source of bribery. People will 
 say, " How can the ballot encourage bribery when the person to be bribed votes in secret, 
 so that the briber cannot know whether or not the bribed voter stuck to his bargain ? " One 
 answer is not far to seek, namely, that payment of bribes could be, .and often has been, con- 
 dition.al upon the success of the cau<lidate in whose interest the bribery is committed. The 
 bribed voter would then have a guilty interest iu sticking to his bargain, since he would not 
 get the bribe unless his candidate were elected ; and, on the other hand, the briber, if he 
 Ml re not elected, would at le.ast have the s.atisfaction of saving his money. 
 
HAKE ON ItEl'KKSENTATIVES. 
 
 39 
 
 lis preference for 
 ready eleutfil, or 
 irth candidate of 
 It is oljvious, 
 every member of 
 would liavu been 
 ed to receive the 
 ur eligil)le candi- 
 L' Mouse of Com- 
 if-rcs in the sense 
 Of course, the 
 )ii of this system 
 n for ventilating 
 )unter-statenient 
 euro represi'nta- 
 the system that 
 e to elect parlia- 
 would study by 
 ;'rly scan the list 
 speedily, become 
 oved. It is pro- 
 mid be borne by 
 f votes, bribers 
 likelihood for 
 as perpetrate<l. 
 it be jjreferred, 
 of the kingdom 
 uived a majority 
 leath or rcsigna- 
 sary ; for other- 
 esignation, how 
 ber says naively 
 with tilling up 
 11 them up at 
 •e triennial, or 
 that the "all 
 reseutatiou and 
 and expediting 
 f the different 
 ices could just 
 that the great 
 ine to send a 
 tors find great 
 nmpatiblo with 
 icre that Mr. 
 he speaks of as 
 I'sople will 
 otes in secret, 
 irgaiii ? " One 
 has been, con- 
 imitted. The 
 he would not 
 briber, if he 
 
 I cannot now do better than quote Mrs. Faweett's words regarding what she calls "the 
 only really formidable obstacle to the practical application of Mr. Hare's scheme " : — 
 
 " No completely satisfactory solution," says Mrs. I'awcett, " of this dilHculty has as yet 
 appeared ; it is, therefore, desirable that the advocates of the scheme should not disguise the 
 existence of a serious obstacle in the way of its application. Making the ditliculty known, 
 and provoking thought and discussion on the subject, arc the .surest means of arriving at the 
 wished-for solution. It has already been stated that no candidate shall be allowed to record 
 more votes than are sullicient for his return, and that when a candidate has ol)tained his 
 quota of votes, the voting or l>alloting pa[)er on which his name is the first mentioned shall 
 be reckoned to the score of the second mitned candidate. The ditliculty we have alluded to 
 is this : suppose the necessary (juota of votes to be a thousand, and that two thousand voting 
 papers are sent in with Mr. (iladstone's name lirst, the second name on one thousand of 
 these voting pap(;rs being that of Mr. .Jacob Hright, and second name 0:1 the other thousanil 
 being that of Sir SVilfreil Lawson. In this case Mr. Hr.ght and Sir Wilfred Lawson would 
 occupy exactly similar positions : each is the secmd choice of a thousand electors, and yet it 
 is piwsible that the one may obtain his fidl (piota of a thousand votes and be conse([uently 
 returned, while the other is not able tr) record a single vote. For if all the voting papers 
 with Mr. Bright's name second are used for Mr. (iL'ulstone's return, the renuvining thousand 
 will lie reckoned to Sir Wilfred Lawson. It is of course highly improbable that sncli a result 
 would ever actually take place, as all the papers would be deposited in a balloting urn, to be 
 opened by a responsible authority, and the votes W(uihl be recorded in the order in which 
 they were drawn out of the urn. 'I'lie aiipearance of all the papers would be exactly similar, 
 and there would conse(piently be no opportunity for the display of any unjust partiality in 
 the opening cf the papers. Still, the suspicion of the possibility of an election resulting in 
 a manner approximating to the imaginary case just deseril)ed, would do much to destroy the 
 moral ert'ect which !>iight be pioduced by the adoption of Mr. Hare's scheme 
 
 1 shall be glad indeed if giving this ipiotation in this place will result in some suggestions 
 being otfered with a view to overcome this difficulty. 
 
 A good deal of space is devoted in Mr. Hare's work on Representatives to " Represent- 
 ative ( Government in Municipalities," but the subject is too large to be entered on within my 
 limits : sullice it to say that his general principles remain unaltered. He is emphatic on the 
 question of safeguarding the suffrage, and he very properly considers that in a Christian 
 Kingdom voting day should l)e hallowed by prayer and sui)plicatiou of the Almighty, as is 
 the case on the day of the greatest function under the English Constitutional systt^m, 
 namely, the coronation of the monarch. 
 
 ( tur author has strong objections to making the line of demarcation too strongly defined 
 between the electors of boroughs and of counties. While he is strongly imbued with i'leas 
 of class distinction, be is quite democratic in insisting that working men should have their 
 own representatives in the House of Commons, jiointing out that while wise and good men 
 belonging to other spheres in life may devote their time and means to the amelioration of 
 the condition of the labouring classes, they cannot know the true state of affairs as well as 
 men who have experienced the dill'erent hardships, trials, and discomforts of the iioor man's 
 lot. Mr. Hare indignantly puts aside a theory advanced by certain vulgar and insolent 
 political economists, to the effect that labouring men would be apt to send to the House 
 representatives so uncouth and l)oorish that the refined members of the House would shrink 
 from contact with them, ami he states what is true enough, that real gentlemen would never 
 think of countenancing so base a doctrine. 
 
 .A very interesting part of this book is that which treats of the geographical, local, and 
 corporate divisions of electors ; but no a})ridgTnent, be it ever so carefully condensed, can 
 do justice to this and other portions of the Treatise, as the author goes very much into 
 dt'iil, apparently forgetting nothing. His book contains all the forms, schedules, lists, etc., 
 
r.. 
 
 40 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 necfssary to make it a complete hand-book of the subject. One thing very ijleasing in the 
 whole work is its Christian tone, and this in a manly, unatl'ected, downright sort of way, 
 wholly removed from sanctimonious hyjiocrisy and cant, and broad enough to be accepted by 
 Christians of every creed. In this he does no more than follow the illustrious publicist and 
 statesman l''<hnund Burke, whom he frcMjuently (luotes, and with whom hu entirely agrees in 
 laying down the fundamental principle that all authority is of (iod, and that princes and 
 peojiles exercise it only as His vicegerents. In fact there has been no great statesman— no 
 man of tlie highest ortler of merit in anything — without religion. This was true even before 
 the Christian dispensation, and Cicero and Plato were no less emphatic in recognizing the 
 authority of Heaven according to their lights, than are Mr. (Uadstone and the greatest 
 moderns in Church and State in bowing submissively to the authority of the true CiOD. 
 The inlidel, the atheist, and the agnostic cannot, because of the fatal defect in them, be men 
 of the highest power ; and when they occasionally evince greatness it is because they are 
 not able, with all their malice, to escape from the (.'hristian influences which surrounded 
 their earlier and better years. Therefore, we must most heartily endor.se Mr. Hare's 
 pioposition as to individual responsibility in the State ; " a soul," says he, " is not a 
 corporate thing. There is no corporate conscience." 
 
 In common with the best minds in the fnited Kingdom and on the continent our author 
 is oj)posed to the American sjstem of paying legislators, claiming that this is to degrade 
 politics and, what is still worse, patriotism, to the level of a mere hunt after dollars. Thi.s 
 subject, or rather this part of the subject, is one on which there is room for much argument 
 jrro iind con. Naturally in such a system a.s Mr. Hare's there would be great need of delining 
 the duties and powers of returning orticers, and he has not failed to attend to this with a 
 patience and fullness of detail that must connnend his work to the admiration of every 
 student and lover of order and system, even though ho may not be able to see "eye to eye ' 
 with our author ou many points brought up and dealt with. T'lie same remark applies ti> 
 the very technical portion of the book dealing with the duties of registrars, which, from 
 Mr. Hare's point of view, leaves nothing to be desired as regards fullness and boldness oi 
 statement ; for one of our author's most admirable traits is that he does not needlessly beat 
 about the bush, but goes straight to the mark with simple directness and conscious strength. 
 Another notable feature in the work is the excellent power of discrimination shewn by the 
 author in making (piotatioii from the works of men of light and leading, such as (iuizot, 
 Edmund Burke, Calhoun, I'assow, and others. It may not be amiss in this connection tu 
 say a word or two about the excellence of his own diction ; — he has a style well suited to 
 the exigencies of historical and political essay writing, a style remarkably clear and fiee, 
 never heavy or ponderous, but also never light or frivolous. It is grave without l)eing 
 severe, and dignified without being bombastic: always interesting— a matter' ditHcult of 
 attainment when treating of a subject regarded by most people as dry and uninviting — he 
 has a happy faculty of blending information with philosophical reflection and of clothing his 
 facts with language not unworthy of the diction of historical romance. Perhaps one cannot 
 take a better specimen of his style than his description of London :— 
 
 "Of whr.t, " he jisks, "does the Metropolis consist? It contains the abode of the 
 sovereign, and of the regal house and household, and of all who compose the court and 
 council of the Queen. It contains the mansions of an ancient and powerful nobility, and 
 their numerous connexions and dependents. In it arc all the chief military and civil depart- 
 ments of the armj', the navy, the ordnance, and the control of their vast equipments ; tlie 
 public treasury, the mint, and the immense otiices which are concerned with the receipt of 
 the revenues of tlie kingdom from foreign and inland trade, and all the subjects of taxation, 
 and for the appmiiriation and li([uidation of the principal and interest of a public debt 
 equal in amount to the value of the fee simple of the dominions of some not insigniticaut 
 mouarchs,— and with the collection and audit of the public accounts of the enqjire. In the 
 metropolis are the chief stewardships of the great estates of the Crown and itj palatinates . 
 
 I 
 
DANISH ELECTORAL LAW. 
 
 41 
 
 very jileasing in tlie 
 rtiiriglit sort of way, 
 gh to lie accepted by 
 strious publicist ami 
 he entirely .igrees in 
 nd that princes and 
 great statesman— no 
 was true even before 
 ic in recognizing the 
 rie and the greatest 
 y of the true fiOl). 
 feet in them, be men 
 18 because tliey are 
 es wliich surrounded 
 endorse Mr. Hare's 
 says he, " is not a 
 
 30utinent our author 
 
 it this is to degrade 
 
 ; after dollars. This 
 
 1 for much argument 
 
 ;reat need of deliniiig 
 
 ittend to this with ii 
 
 admiration of every 
 
 to see " eye to eye ' 
 
 le remark applies to 
 
 istrars, which, from 
 
 less and boMiiess ot 
 
 I not needlessly beat 
 
 conscious strength. 
 
 itioii shewn by the 
 
 g, such as (iuizot, 
 
 this connection to 
 
 style well suited to 
 
 )ly clear and free, 
 
 ive without lieiiig 
 
 matter' dillieult of 
 
 111(1 uninviting — he 
 
 and of clothing iii.s 
 
 Perhaps one cannot 
 
 the abode of the 
 lose the court and 
 
 ;rful nobility, and 
 ■y and civil depart- 
 it equipments ; tlie 
 with the receipt of 
 ibjeets ot taxation, 
 of a public debt 
 e not insiguiticant 
 lO empire. In the 
 md itj palatinates . 
 
 i 
 
 In it reside all the functionaries connected with the Imperial Parliament, — the secretaries, 
 councils, and otlicers, engaged in coimnunication between the (Jovernment and its depen- 
 dencies, — the Canadas, Australasia, Africa, and the Indies, — and with foreign uatioiu. In it 
 are the immense estaiilishmeiits of the (Jeiieral Post OlKce, the great triumph of civilization, 
 —.sowing daily and hourly, with its t'.iousaiid hands, the seeds of public and private intelli- 
 L;eiiee gathered from every part of the habitable ghdie. In the Metropolis are the seats of 
 the Courts of K([uity and Law, and to it are brought all aiipeals in the last resort, from every 
 territory and colony. Here resiile the Bar, and the other profesriors of legal science con- 
 teiiied in the supreme administration of justice, and in tlie settlement and transfer of most 
 of the great properties in the kingdom. In tliis detail is comprehended but a few of the 
 multitude of conditions and occupations engaged in the all'airs of the Empire. There are 
 cla.sses almost beyond the possibility of recapitulation, — merchauts, sliipowners, broUers, 
 manufacturers of an inlinite variety of fabrics, — traders, capitalists composed of companies 
 and individuals, having ramilications of business with every port, inland town, market, and 
 village. Here are associations, academies, and llln.seunl^;, for the promotion of learning and 
 science in all their developments. Ireland sends its brilliant imagination and its romantic 
 bravery ; Scotland its keen intellect and its untiring perseverance. The metropolis attracts 
 to it.self much that the kingdom jiroduees of high talent or superior energy, it gathers 
 together the diversities of gifts with which nature endows her most favoured sons. Here 
 the learning of Johnson, tlie erudition and wisdom of Burke, the genius of Reynolds, ot 
 Lawrence, of Flixmaii, ami Chantrey, found their home. Here the eloiiuence of Erskiue, 
 of C'ojjley, and of Brougham, had their appropriate t'vatre. . . . From the metropolis 
 Hows that comprehensive literature, the seemingly ever-increasing and inexhaustible stores 
 of which are daily poured forth in article and volume, to feed and guide the realm ot thought. 
 
 Foreigners should behold in the rtpresentatioii of this mighty- community a condensed 
 picture of the greatness of our country, and be comiielled to recognize in it a triumphant 
 display of the dignity and virtue ot its institutions.'' 
 
 These words ot Mr. Hare, and not least his closing allusion to metropolitan representation, 
 should stimulate us all in carrying on tlie great work of improving our system of electing 
 parliamentary and municipal representatives, looking upon it as a veritable "labour of love," 
 because a labour of ])atriotisin. For jiatriotism is liased on love ; for which we have the 
 authority of the great Passow, who, speaking of it, says,: — " It must rcist like every other 
 kind of love on soinething unutterable and incomprehensible." 
 
 THE DANISH ELECTOHAL LAW OF 185.-). 
 By the. late Lord Li/lton, then Mr. Lytton, Secrelarij of Leijution. 1S63. 
 
 CoPH.NU.VGF.N, July 1, 18()3. 
 
 With the details of Mr. Hare's electoral theory the ))urpose of this report is not 
 immediately concerned. That purpose is merely to make intellitjible the main fe;itures of 
 the Electoral Law established in Denmark in the year 18.55 for the election of Representa- 
 tives to the Rigsraad. 
 
 To do this, however, the speediest and simplest means will lie to take Mr. Hare's 
 scheme as a point ot comparison and reference. It M'ill, therefore, be necessary to state 
 what is the substance ot this scheme. I will endeavour to do so as briefly as I can. 
 
r 
 
 42 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 It will then be possible to contrast this sclieme, in its chief character.stics, with that 
 which is now law in Denmark, and wliich I propose to tlesurihe, ])ointing ont to what extent 
 tile two systems eointiilo and in what renpeet tliey ditf'er, Uightly to appreciate either the 
 one or the otlier, it is necessary to liear in niiml the ends which, in both cjuses, it has l)een 
 soitglit to attain, and tlie reasons for uiiicli these! ends h.. e, in ea<'h case, a])peared desirable. 
 I must, tiierefore, ask permission to refer in passing to this ini|)oitant part of tiie subject. 
 I .'<liall do so as rapidly as is compatil)le with the claim of sucli a subject to be seriously 
 considered. It will also be necessary, in referiing to the Kleotoral Law of IS.")."), to j)oint out 
 the peculiar circumstances which, unfortunately, liy limiting tiie aiiplication of that law> 
 diminish its value as a jiiactical example. Finally, I shall endeavor to record what, so far as 
 I can y(rt judge, from such conversations as I have been able to hold with persons of 
 intelligence an<l impartiality, interested in the subject; is the general impression in this 
 country, after eight years' experience, of the ])ractical effects of tlie electoral system devised 
 by .\lr. Anilrae, and how far the result of it m.ay be considered as liaviug satislied the 
 intentions of the author. 
 
 I. Notwithstanding the length of time during which Ue[iresentative (iovernment has 
 existed un<ler various forms, it is no*' surprising that the ni.ajority of ijuestions concerning 
 govermnent by representation slioidd still be oiien to debate ; for tlie conckision to be formed 
 upon any question of this kind must always be in relation to circuinstaiicea peculiar to the 
 country in respect of which the (|iiestioii lias to be solved. Hut in reganl to the fundamental 
 princi|ile upon which all government by representation is based, and to the complete reali- 
 zation of which every form of Hepresentative Government must approximate, in a greater or 
 less degree .according as the development of it is favoui'ed or impeded by local circumstances, 
 there would seem to be no reasonable ground for ditl'erence of opinion. It has been adniitteil 
 on all sides that the conipletest form of Representative (iovernment must be tli.at in which 
 the greatest number of interests and opinions are completely represented ; th.at form of 
 government, in sliort, which most nearly approximates to the government of the whole by 
 the whole. But by those who have arrived at the conclusions which have dictated, in the 
 one case .Mr. Hare's electoral scheme, in the other Mr. .Andrae's electoral law, it is argued 
 that such a result is incoinpatilile with any system of representation which tends to assume 
 the jiart as tantamount to the whole ; in other words, to confound the majority with the 
 people. 
 
 If, it is argued, the represent.ativcs of the majority be sutl'ered by a political lictiou to 
 represent more than the m.ajority, not only an arithmetical misstatement, but also a great 
 political injustice, takes place. For the minority is then not merely unrepresented, but it is 
 actually niisreiireseiite<l. It is compulsorily incorporated into the majority ; and this forced 
 fellowship is, to use the words of .Mr. Burke, "conquest and not compact." If it were 
 possible to suppo.Mj (what is never the case) that the whole of a country were, indeed, diviiled 
 into only two sections of opinion, of which one was more numerous than the otlier in the 
 proportion of three to two, the minority in that case, adequately represented, would stand 
 in the representation at a proportion of two to three ; but if it shouhl occur, iis it naturally 
 would occur without some provision to the contrary, that the majority in each constituency 
 were to dispose of the entire representation of that constituency to a member of the more 
 numerous class, instead of there being in the Legislature two of the less numerous to every 
 three of the more numerous sect, the minority woultl, in fact, have no means of meeting 
 their adversaries in the Legislative Body at all. " They are," says Mr. Hare, "previously 
 cut off in detail ;" and in qualifying such a result, he cites the authority of M. (iuizot, "Si 
 la niinorite est d'avance hors de comliat il y a oppression." 
 
 But the evil, it is further argued, does not stop here. For all customary majorities 
 are, indeed, only an agglomeration of minorities, each of which, rather than remain altogether 
 unrepresented, has preferred to secure a sort of partial and collateral representation as part 
 of an aggregate, which coheres only, perhaps, upon a single and often secondary point. The 
 
DANISH IXKCTORAL LAW. 
 
 4a 
 
 racter.stics, with tliat 
 ig out to what extent 
 appreciate either the 
 otii eases, it lias been 
 e, ajtpeari'il ilesiral)le. 
 
 part of the suliject. 
 ,il)ject to lie seriously 
 
 of I.S.M, to point out 
 lication of that Liwi 
 •eeord what, so far as 
 mill with persons of 
 .1 impression in this 
 3toral systoni deviseil 
 
 having satislied the 
 
 ;ive (iovernnicnt has 
 ijuestions concerning 
 iclusion to be formed 
 ancea [luculiar to the 
 il to the fundamental 
 a the complete reali- 
 mate, in a greater or 
 ■ local circumstances, 
 it has been admitted 
 ist be that ill which 
 ;nted ; that form of 
 ent of the whole by 
 lavc dictated, in the 
 1 law, it is argued 
 h tends to assume 
 majority with the 
 
 political tiction to 
 
 it, but also a great 
 
 ■presented, but it is 
 
 ty ; and this forced 
 
 )aet." If it were 
 
 re, indeed, divided 
 
 an the other in the 
 
 ented, would stand 
 
 ;ur, as it naturally 
 
 each constituency 
 
 iend)er of the more 
 
 numerous to every 
 
 means of meeting 
 
 Hare, " previously 
 
 of M. Guizot, "Si 
 
 toinary majorities 
 
 remain altogether 
 
 •esentation as part 
 
 idary point. The 
 
 majority is thus only a majority of a majority, "who may \h\" says Mr. Mill, "and often 
 aie, a minority of the whcde." "Any Minority," he adds, " left out, ei'bnr purposely or by 
 the ]ilay of the machinery, gives the power, not to a majority, \n,. fi iniuority in some 
 other part of the scale." 
 
 And, although this ine<|uality is, no doubt balanced to a great extent, in a system of 
 ri pre.stntation sikIi as that which obtains in iOnghuKl, by the fact that opinions, predomin- 
 ating in dillereiit jilaces, find rough ecpiivalents for the minority with wliicli they are swept 
 away in one place by the majority they secure in another ; yet, if tiie suffrage were to be 
 extended much furtlier (and it cannot be considered as final at a point which leaves out of 
 direct representation the most numerous class in tiie country), the danger which, under the 
 present system, must then arise of i^overnnient by a single (and that, on the whole, the least 
 educated) class has loni,' been apparent to statesmen of all parties. At the same time it 
 woidd be i)ali)ably unjust an<l humiliating to advocate tlie [)irinanout exclusion of this 
 numerous and iini)ortant class from all direct rejireseutation, on no better grounds tiian 
 those which involve the admission that the whole representative macliinery of the country 
 is ennstructed upon a principh," so erroneous that the motive power cannot be augmented 
 without throwing the entire machine out of gear. 
 
 To these considerations is added that of the deterioration of political character to which 
 Voters may be e\j)osed by any sort of compulsion, to select as their representatives, not 
 those men whom they regard as the most enlightone<l and most honest exponents of their 
 opinions or interests, but tliose who seem most likely to conciliate the local, and often ignoble, 
 aniiiiiisitifs l)y whicii majorities themselves are diviiled. 
 
 11. The ■ bove summary, Mltliough very imperfect, is sufficient to indicate the principal 
 motives which, botii in this country and in Hngland, have suggested to eminent statesmen 
 tlie necessity of devising, if possible, some modification of the Hleotoral system, calculated to 
 Secure a more adeijuate representation to the interests of minorities. 
 
 I will now enumerate, within the narrowest possible limits, the most prominent of those 
 jirovisious by whicii Mr. Hare i)roiioses to ol)viate a ileticit, the existence of which is 
 hardly disputed, and by which, in the Electoral Law of 1S55, for the nomination of Repre- 
 sentatives to the Supreme Council of Denmark, Mr. Andrae has sought to secure the same 
 usult, viz., the protection of minorities. 
 
 The essential character of the scheme proposed bj' Mr. Hare may be thus summed up : — 
 1. The number of votes to be divided by the number of mendiers composing the 
 
 legislative body. The quotient to form the electoral basis, that is to say, every candi<late 
 
 ol)taiiung the quota of votes shall be returned. 
 
 '2. No more than the quota strictly necessary for his return is to be counted in favour of 
 any candidate. Tiie surplusage of tlie votes given to any elected candidate is to be dis- 
 tributed in favour of other candi<lates, in conformity with the principle embodied in the 
 following provisions : — 
 
 ((/) The votes to be given locally ; but every elector to be entitled to vote for any candi- 
 date who may oflTer himself in any part of the country. 
 
 (/') Kaeh elector to deliver a voting paper containing other names in addition to that 
 which stands foremost in the order of his ohoice. His vote is to be counted for only one 
 cindidate. But if the canilidate whose name stands first upon his list shall either fail to 
 make u^) the quota, or shall have made it up without the assistance of his vote, the vote in 
 <juestion may then descend in the order of preference given to it by the elector to some other 
 landidate who may stand more in need of it, and in whose favour it shall then count towards 
 completing the necessary (]Uota. 
 
 (c) The question whicli of the votes ol)tained by each candidate shall count for his own 
 return, and whicli of them shall be released in favour of other candidates, shall be decided in 
 
 Ik 
 
44 
 
 APPKNniX. 
 
 such way as to secure the representation by the candidate in (|Ucgtioii of all those who 
 would not othurwiso be rejirescnted at all. The remaining votes, not needed for his return, 
 to be dis^josed of by lot or otherwise. 
 
 ((/) The voting papuiH to be conveyed to some central otfice and there counted ; first 
 votes Iming preferred to si'con<l votes, suconil to third and so on. The voting papers, after 
 being verilied, shall remain in public repositories accessible to all. 
 
 This is a very meagre exposition of Mr. Hare's scheme, which is as minute in its details 
 as it is large in its scojie. 
 
 It is, however, enough to serve the only purpoose with wliich it is here alluileil to. Foi 
 the scheme of Mr. Hare is devised with a view to its adaptation to existing eiieumstauces in 
 England ; and this report being oidy directly concerned with existing circumstances in 
 Denmark, 1 may at once pass to the consideration of the law of 18.').'), merely noting by the 
 way that, if the aims and aspirations of Mr. Hare and Mr. MUl bt^ worth realizing, then tin- 
 extent to which they have been realized by tiie law, and the general results of such ex- 
 perience of the working of the law as must have l)een aciiuired ' Denm.-vrk during the course 
 of eight years, are subjects well worthy of attention. 
 
 III. 'J'lie constitutional history of Denmark, although comparatively short, is far from 
 deficient in interesting phenomena. Nurseries of self-government were planted in this country 
 in 1H:U l)y Frederick VI., wlio then established Consultative States throughout tlie kingdom ; 
 so that when, after the revolutionary movement which convulsed Europe in 1S4S, it Wiis 
 deemed advisable to expand the basis of government in this country, the population was not 
 wholly unj)repared for increased participation in the management of pul)lic atl'airs. Thosf. 
 indeed, who at that period were engaged in the work of political reconstruction appeared to 
 have been disposed to give to the representative element a larger scope than was eventually 
 accorded to it, and they justilied their hesitation on the ground that the constituencies were, 
 as yet, too inexperienced. An abl writer, who has warmlj' engaged in the defence of Mr. 
 Andrae's electoral system, has riu.ciiled tlis notion by pomting out that the greater thr 
 electioneering experience of the constituency (that is to say, the more >•««''.< the electors) the 
 more certainly nuist the majority (unless some [jrovision exist to the contrarj") succeed in 
 crushing the minority, and monopolizing power. For if, as would have l)een the case under 
 the system then contemplated, G.") members were to be chosen by ti.'5,(l(M) electors, no ono 
 elector being entitled to increase the value of his vote by voting for less than the full nunibt r 
 of candidates, it is clear that the majority, consisting of .S'2,.")()l electors, would only have to 
 hoM lirmly together, in tirder to carry the whole number of the (55 seats in accordance witli 
 their choice. And, in that case, no matter how prudently or sagaciously the minority, con- 
 sisting of ■H2,4il!) electors, might exercise tlieir franchise, those .S'2,4!t!) electors wouhl rema'u 
 without any representative at all. Hom', then, should the real opinions of the electors br 
 ascertained, in order that they may be represented in their just pro])ortion ? .Suppose tlut 
 of these 05,000 electors, a compact majority of ;i2,.501 is opjmsed to various dispersed minoii- 
 ties, amounting altogether to .S'J,41li>. If the elections are distributed over ()5 districts, it is 
 possible that 3'2,0G4 of the majority might be found united in (>4 districts against 31,9.S6 of the 
 minority. .So that it W'ould lie only in the G5th district that the minority could make its 
 voice heard. Nevertheless, the majority could only with strict justice claim Xi seats, and 
 the remaining 3'2 should, in that case, it is clear, fall to the representation of various 
 opinions, provided those oi)ini(ms be aot so dispersed as to be unable to come together in any 
 place. 
 
 To attain this result, to secure the adeipiate representation of every tangible opinion and 
 corporate interest, in such way, that, while the majority of the electors shall be able to name 
 the majority of the Kepreseiitatives, the minority of the electors shall be insured an equiva- 
 lent minority in the representati(m, this is the great problem Mhich, in 1855, Mr. Andrac 
 undertook to solve. 
 
DANISH KLECTORAL LAW. 
 
 45 
 
 iioii of all those who 
 needeil for his return, 
 
 1 there counted ; (irst 
 le voting papers, after 
 
 18 minute in its details 
 
 here iilhiiled to. Fm 
 sting circunistaiici'S in 
 tini; circuinstaiK'fS in 
 
 merely noting hy tlit- 
 I'th realizing, then thf 
 al results of sueh ex- 
 lark during the course 
 
 rely short, is far froin 
 
 ilanted in this eountrv 
 
 DUghout the kingdom : 
 
 irope in 1848, it wn-- 
 
 he jiiijiulation was nut 
 
 lulilic atl'airs. 'I'hiisii'. 
 
 istruction appeared to 
 
 ■ than was eventually 
 
 e ennstitueneiea were, 
 
 in the defence of Mr. 
 
 that the greater the 
 
 ^f the electors) the 
 
 contrary) succeeil in 
 
 heen the case under 
 
 MM) electors, no one 
 
 than the full uundiir 
 
 Would only have to 
 
 in accordance with 
 
 the minority, con- 
 
 ctors would renui'H 
 
 f the electors hr 
 
 ion ? Suppose tli. t 
 
 )us dispersed minori- 
 
 er ()5 ilistricts, it is 
 
 j;ainst .S1,!).S6 of the 
 
 ity could nuvke its 
 
 claim '.i'.i seats, and 
 
 ntation of various 
 
 onie together in any 
 
 angihle opinion and 
 lall he able to uan)e 
 insured an eijuiva- 
 1855, Mr. Andrae 
 
 I 
 
 t 
 
 Of all men iu this country ilia Kxcelleucy was, in many respects, the most litteil by 
 antecedent experience and natui'al (lualitications to succeed in the difficult task which he 
 thus spontaneously attempted. 
 
 .Mr. Andrae is a man of original and speculative intellect, a keen investigator, ti hold 
 thinker, admitted hy all his countrymen to he the first mathematician iu I)enmark, and, 
 from his position as Minister of Finance, experienced in the art of bringing the fundamental 
 principles of abstract calculation practically to bear upon complicated facts. 
 
 The scope of his exporinient, however, was painfully limited by condition.s over wliicli 
 lie had no control ; and tix; law of which he is the sole author forms only the incidental part 
 of an institution shaped rather by the force of uncongenial circumstances than by the 
 deliberate option of the ostensible founders of it. 
 
 According to the Census of 1800 the entire population of the Kingilom and Duchies 
 unouiited to '2,(504,0'_'4, so that it was oidy for the direct election of .SO mend)ers out of a 
 I'opuiatiim of upwards of '2,000,000 to an Assend)ly of SO mendiers, that the electoral system 
 iif Mr. Andrae was empowered to pi'ovide.' Ilolstein and Laucnburgh have always refused 
 to send mendicrs to the Uigsraad. For these Duchies the ("onatitution of 1855 is 
 suspen<led ; and, therefore, "20 nicnd)ers must be deilucted from the total of 80 nominally 
 composing the Jtigsraad, and 8 members from the 30 originally contemplated as the ijuota of 
 liiiect I'epresentatiou in the Higsra.ad ; conseijuently, it is oidy the choice of 45 out of (5(1 
 n\endjers that is practically ailectcd by the electoral system of Mr. .Andrae. 
 
 This, no doubt, diminishes the value to be attached to the success or failure of the 
 sj'stem as an example. It is somewhat like au experiment in a pond upon principles of 
 navigation which, if good for anything, must be good for the ocean. Nevertheless, it is an 
 example ; and, in (juestions of iiiis sort, an example of any kind is mosc valuable. I'^^ight 
 years' practical experience of the working of an electoral system devised for the realization 
 of an important principle applicable to all representative institutions is, no matter how 
 " cabined, cribbeil, confined " be the sphere of that experience, a great and notewoithy 
 addition to the knowledge of manlcind. 
 
 V. Within the comparatively narrow limits to which this report must be confined, it does 
 not appear advisable to add any extracts to those already given from the Danish Electoral 
 Law of 1855. Those extracts, indeed, comprise the essence of the law. The subject under 
 consideration is so suj,'gestive and demands for its thorough comprehension an examination 
 so various and minute, that I cannot possibly hope to do more on the present occasion than 
 indicate ground for further aud fuller inquiry. No extensive comment, however, is needed 
 to distinguish the aim and character of the clause above cited. 
 
 I shall now endeavour to state precisely what these clauses are designed to prevent, and 
 what they are designed to secure. It appears to me that the marrow of the whole matter is 
 concentrated in Sections '2'2 ami 23. 
 
 There are two ways in which local majorities may, if unrestrained by law, exercise their 
 power in questions of representation, to the detriment no less of minorities than of themselves. 
 They may do so both in the selection and in the election of candidates. They may virtually 
 dictate the vote of the elector by indirectly circumscribing the freedom of his choice. By 
 this means, indeed, apparent unanimitj' may be obtained ; but the greater the unanimity 
 the greater the mischief, if it be only a unanimous subndssion to " Hobson's choice — this 
 or none : " and when this is the case, it may be truly said of the majorities themselves, 
 
 ' The hidireot election of iiieinhers to the Ri({sraa(l by the local legislative bodies is, however, conducted 
 upon the principle, and in oonforniity with the stipulations, of Sir. .\ndrae's Electoral law. This should be 
 l)onie in mind. 
 
■16 
 
 Al'l'KNDlX. 
 
 " iluminiitioni^ in nltox xi-rriliinn sHitm mfrrcdciii i/diit," — " tlicy are content to pay so great a 
 price as their own servitude to pureliaHe the doniinatiou over others." ' For in order to secure 
 unanimity in the choice of the nuijority, it is previously ncuoHsary for the majority itself 
 to alidieate individual action on tlie part of its own niendiors, Men are more likely to ndniit 
 unanimity in tiieir pasHions and prejudices than in tiieir Hoher judgments : and tin/ candidate 
 thus selected may perhaps re))resent only a saltish compromise between narrow interesta and 
 petty animosities. When this liap[)ens majorities, indeed, may hIiow their power Ity con- 
 verting a l)ad candidate into a wor.se representative, l)iit in iloing so they will have also 
 shown that their power is incompatible with their treedom ; and that may be said of them 
 which Socrates is supposed to say to I'olus in the (Jorgias, wlicn speaking of other tyrannies, 
 "They do not do what they wisli, although they do what they please." 
 
 Hut, on the otiier hand, it is undoubtedly true that all political action nece-isitates a 
 comiiromise between opinions in matters of minor import. The absence of this compromise 
 is anarchy It is only when the compromise is compulsory, instead of s»p()ntaneou8, that it cau 
 be called tyranny. For the fcumdation of all society is conlidencc in otliers. All human creeds 
 must originate in faith of some sort, and men can do nothing without taking something on 
 trust In the public business of life, intlividual action will always i)e guided ami controlled 
 by collective opinion ; and, practically, the opinion <if the many is controlled and guided 
 by the wisdcmi of the few. Every man has a right to think and choose for himself ; 
 V)ut all men are not equally able to think and clioose well, or ei[ually disposed to think and 
 choose at all ; so that, as long as there exists in the world that discreet deference to the judg- 
 ment and that wlndesome ctmfidencc in the character of others without which political com- 
 bination is impossil)le, no conceivalde electoi'al system will prevent the i;hoice of constitu- 
 encies from being greatly inlluenced by the bias of those local notables who, by personal 
 capacity or social position, are litted to guide the conduct of their neighbours. The object of 
 Mr. Andrae's Electoral Law is, not to annihilate this controlling power, but, on the contrary, 
 to give the amplest scope to its natural operati(»n, by relieving it from the crippling circum- 
 8crii)tion of arbitrary conditions. Thus, the constituent who denuirs to " Hobson's choice," 
 is ensured every reascmable facility for bringing forward the candidate he prefers withou- 
 pecuniary saerilice and without incurring that social martyrdom which, in such cases, some- 
 times seems to justify an assertion of Machiavelli's (whose experience of uncontrolled and 
 triunii)hant majorities was certainly as gi-eat as it was bitter) that, "he who deviates from 
 the common course and endeavors to act iis duty dictates, insures his own destruction." 
 
 lly enlarging the scope of the voter's choice, moreover, you elevate the quality of his 
 judgment. When he is free to choose whom he will, not constrained to choose merely whom 
 he must, it is probable that if he gives the preference to a i)erson from his own immediate 
 neighborhood, the person thus preferred will be, not sinq)ly the slavish nominee of a perhajis 
 insigiuticant but petulant party, but a man whom the voter regartls with affectionate 
 eonlidence and respect. Surely it would be unwise to extinguish (even were it possible! 
 those kindly intluences which infuse into the public life ami si)irit of a nation the euthu.si:ism 
 of local atfections, whether they be embodie.l in a respect for noble names and illustriou.s 
 bouses, or in the grateful recognition of tliose good deeds which not sehlom associate a 
 particular family with a particular neiLbbourhood. But is it not rather the local demagogues 
 than the real local nriftoi who would have anything to fear from the most extended com- 
 petition with intelligence and virtue ? lu any case, if the voter, bj' oonlining his vote to a 
 siu'de candidate, be exposed to the risk of diminishing its value without thereby beneliting 
 the object of his special preference, it is to be presumed that he will extend the scope of his 
 judgment and his sympathies, and provide for those contemplated contingencies in which his 
 countrymen elsewhere may benefit by the exercise of his franchise. In doing so he will have 
 to look further and think more carefully. It is probable that he will select the other objects 
 
 I Cowley, "Essay on Liberty." 
 
DANISH ELECTOHAL LAW. 
 
 47 
 
 of \m choice from iiii'ii of eminence ami tllHtiiiction ; bcenuse those who are neither eminent 
 ii'ir (listinguishoil cannot then 1)0 iirl)itr:iiily tlsriiHt upon his notice. The voter wlio ilcicn 
 this will elevate his own character anil class ; aii<l if the whole class of voters do this, tlio 
 whole class of candidates will be improved. 
 
 In the next place, it is no doubt intended by the clauses above mentioned to withdraw 
 from the voter every reasonable excuse for disrct^.irdini,' and neglecting the duty of exercising 
 his franchise, as well as to provide for him every reasonable inducement to perform tliat duty 
 with the most S(!rious retlectiou, and to the fullest possible extent. 
 
 A further consideration lu're sugnests itself in regard to the relations to bo maintained 
 between constituencies and Kepresentatives. Representation has so strong a tendency to 
 dwin<lle into delegation, that it can only be restrained from doing so, either by great moihira- 
 tion on the i)art of the masses, or else by great elevation of character on the jiart of the 
 Uejirescntative class. These two restraining forces react, aiul depend upon each other. In 
 proportion as the character of the liepresentativo class is high-minded and scrui)ulous, it is 
 presumed that the conliilence reposcul in it by the constituencies will bo great ; but, in jiro- 
 portion as the freedom of the Representative is cramped and his responsibility impoverished 
 by the exaction, on the part of his constituents, of exorbitant and vexations pledges, the gene- 
 ral character of the Representative class will be low and subservient, and the conlidence it 
 can command will be consecjuently small. In short, in this, as in all other nuvtters of 
 exchange, the (juality and amount of the demand will regulate the quality and amount of the 
 sui)ply. When i)ledge8 are recklessly exacted, ailventurers will always be found recklessly 
 rea<ly to accept them ; when the character of the comi)act is mistrustful, the cliaracter of 
 those that undertake it will be untrustworthy. In America, the House of Representatives 
 has long been, virtually, a Hcmse of Dcleg.T,tes, wherein the fate of almost every measure is 
 decided before the opening of the Session, an<l the majority of speeches made are addressed 
 not to the conviction of the House, but to the passions and prejudices of the cimstituencies 
 who have sent its members to sit in jmlitical fetters. The solemn responsibility of lei;islation 
 is thus remitted by those on whose part it is a public duty to those on whose part it is only a 
 mischievous assumption. For the natiim can impeach its representatives by the voice of its 
 constituencies ; but to whom are the constituencies jiractically accountable '! The danger of 
 thin is in the fact that the intellect and conscience of the nation are not adeipiately represented 
 in the national public life ; and the verdict of this intellect and conscionje, which must ulti- 
 mately be heard, not having been provided with any constitutional ex|)ression, can oidy lind 
 utterance in revolution. The JiOng I'arlianunt could not have been swept away by a gesture 
 of (Jromwell's if the liead and heart of the nation had been in that body. The temiile which 
 enshrines a constitution cannot long escape from destruction whoi it begins to be muttered 
 about outside the walls of it, that "the gods are departing." In Kngland the high moral and 
 intellectual standard of the representative class is powerfully promoted and sustained by the 
 u'lrcmunerated character of its service ; but under those continental systems of represent- 
 ation in which the representative b^ dy is paid by the State, the danger alluded to is not 
 insigniliuant. Not oidy, however, is it the object, but 1 am satistied that it is also the 
 result of Mr. Andrae's electoral system (so far as that system has l>eeu applied) to facilitate 
 the introduction into the National Legislature of the greatest amount of intelligence and 
 high character, and to hinder the entrance of a great amount of ignorance and passion. I 
 am dis|)osed to think that, on the whole, this system in its practical result attait)s many of 
 the objects of an educational franchise, "vithout invalidating the salutary inlluence of 
 j)roperty. 
 
 Two other results are involved in the arrangements of this law as concerning the 
 (juestion of personal canvass. It is undoubtedly to be desired that every facility should exist 
 for free personal intercourse and interchange of opinion between candidates and voters, and 
 it is not to be desired that the candidate should be to the voter not a man, but merely a 
 name, an abstraction. Whether, however, it be not possible to provide for this reasonable 
 
 : i 
 
 ■ 4 
 
48 
 
 APl'KNDIX. 
 
 and neceSBftry iiitcrcoiirso witliout uxposinj; it t" the ]MisHil)lc ilegnulation of (Ifgciiorntiiig 
 into one of barter and lH'j{K'*>'y, in a (juustion wortliy of coimidunitioii. 
 
 A writer, who was not the U-ast diHtinKuisiiedof Milton's contemporaries, has oxclaimcd, 
 " To what pitiful haHcncHS did tlio nol)K'st KoniauH Hiitiinit thcniHolvi's for the o)itaiiiiiif{ of a 
 I'rautorHliip, or tlio Consular dignity ! 'I'hoy put on the hahit of nui)plicantn and ran aliont 
 on foot, and in dirt, through all the tribes to beg voices ; they flattered the jxtorest artizans, 
 anil carried a noniiMiclator with thi'in to whisper in thtur ear every man's name, leit they 
 should inintaUc! it in tlieir s.ilutntioii ; they shook tin! Iiaiul ami kissed the cheek of every 
 popular tradesman ; they stood all day at every market in the public places to show and 
 ingratiate themselves to the rout ; they employed all their friends to soliint for them ; they 
 kept open tallies in every street ; they distriliuted wine, and bread, and money even to the 
 vilest of the people. " Eu Homanos reruin doininos ! — itehold the masters of the world 
 begging from door to door ! " 
 
 Might not these words receive with justice a more modern application '! 
 
 Whether, however, the personal canvass be a good thing or a bad thing, acconling to 
 this Electoral I^aw of Mr. Andrae it is (piito out of the (piestion. 
 
 And with the persoiuil canvass also disappears a vi'ry inlluential personage intimately 
 connected therewith, viz., tiie electioneering agent. Mow far the complete cH'acement from 
 the electoral (Irntini/in /ii-rxoiioi- of tliis important but costly character is a result to b(^ admired 
 or condemned, involves a question which will be best answered by those who have had 
 personal experience of the part he jilays, both in connection with t)'c pockets of candidates 
 and the morals of vcttcrs. 
 
 Finally, it appears to be the intention of this law to increase the sense of individual 
 resj)onsibilily in matters of public trust ; to place the conscience of each voter in his own 
 keeiiinpaiul to take it out of tiie hands of those careless investors of other men's mtiral capi- 
 tal who tlourish in all large communities and who appear to consider themselves a sort of 
 joint-stock company for conscience, with limited liability. Moreover, it may be said that this 
 law is, in its tendency, a civilizing law — for civilization is the parent tif variety in opinions ; 
 and it is the intention of this law to j)rovide, not oidy the amplest expression for all varieties 
 of opinion, but also to utilize to the utmost all manner of ways and moans provided by the 
 kindly providence of civilization for the formation of these wholesome varieties. 
 
 That these intentions are wise and good will hardly be denied. The only practical ques- 
 tions that remain are, lirst, whether these intentions are fully realized by the mechanical 
 operation of the law. 
 
 Other and perhaps yet more important considerations, however, aie involved in the 
 questions of what are its political results in this country, and how far it may be applicable to 
 other Euro))ean communities. 
 
 These considerations are hardly within the province to which the present remarks must 
 be conlined ; for they raise an infinite number of collateral and secondary incjuiries, which can- 
 not be followed out without bringing the incpiirer into a dis()uisition upon the nccc^ssity and 
 Vivlue of government by party, as well as upon the nature of the various answeis which may 
 be returned to the paramount jmactical question of, " How is the Queen's Government to be 
 carried on ?" 
 
 I may mention, however, that on lately referring to some of these topics in conversation 
 with a Danish gentleman well acquainted with the political life of this country, 1 was assured 
 that, in the discussion and settlement of great ])ublic questions Ijy the Supreme Council of 
 the realm, no disinclination is found to exist upon the part of representative minorities to 
 combine and concur in the formation of a judicial majority for the decision of what is exijedi- 
 «nt. 
 
 ;? SI' 
 
MISRKI'llKSKNTATION. 
 
 49 
 
 I mny also mention that I have l>t!on asHurud by Mr. Amlrau that, in his opiniou, the 
 gi'iicral Htaiiilard of r(-|irc8entativo character HU|iiilit.'il l)y tliin hivv Ih the hcHt an<l hi^'hoHt in 
 tht! country ; and tliat, although hu does not consider that a Butliciont time han t'lapscd 
 wht-rchy to tost the etl'ccts of the law iiiion the conntitueiicie« tiieiiiMelves, ho lit nevertheless 
 of diiinion that, under its oiieration, the cliaracter of the voter as a class has improved and is 
 iniproving. 1 liavi! every reason to helieve, moreover, that bribery is ahnost unknown to the 
 constituencies for the Higsraad. It a]i])ear8 to nie, however, that the permission contained 
 in clause 18 ol Mr. Andrae's Law, and which e(|ually appears in Mr. Hare's scheme — to (ill 
 up the voting i)aper in private — might, under very conceivable circumstances, facilitate 
 intimitlatiou. 
 
 A full and comjdete investigation into the character and operation of this law is a task 
 which I should rejoice to see assumed l>y some person of known impartiality, capacity and 
 experience. For, whatever may be the character or the conse(iuence of the law, 1 venture to 
 think that its existence is one of the most remarkable events iu the history of representative 
 institutions. 
 
 M 
 
 FAIR REPRESENTATION. 
 
 From a Spi-cch, hi/ Lord Shcrhrooke 1SG7. 
 
 . , . There was nothing more worthy of the attention of statesmen in the new state 
 of affairs than anything which would have the tendency to prevent that violent oscillation 
 which they now witnessed. What happened in the United .States? The minority of 
 thousands might as well not exist at all. It is absolutely ignored. Was tlioir country 
 (England) iu like manner to be formed into two hostile camps, debarred from each other in 
 two solid and compact bodies? Or were they to have that shading-oflf of opinion, that 
 modulation of extrenjes, and mellowing and ripening of right principles, whicli are among 
 the surest characteristics of a free country, the true secrets of political dynamics, and the 
 true preservatives of a great nation? He said, then, that what he proposed to the House 
 was in itself just, equal, and fair, founded on no undue and unfair attempt to give a minority 
 an advantage they were not entitled to exercise, and that it was peculiarly applicable to the 
 state of things on which they were entering. 
 
 M 
 
 MISREPRESENTATION. 
 
 From the Fortnightly Review, Vol. VII /., iSjO. 
 
 " It is evident that it is at least as important that a constituency be not misrepresented as 
 tliat it be represented. A voter's tio, therefore, is as important an element in determining his 
 preference as his yes. Hitherto we have entirely ignored this negative element ; and no doubt 
 our habitual indifTerence to principles will prompt us still to ignore it, and to be content with 
 our old one-sided system, unless it be shown that serious evils must inevitably result from such a 
 course. I propose to show that one 'of the most excellent reforms about to be made in our 
 electoral procedure — that of keeping the progress of a coutest secret during the polling— will lead 
 to the introduction of one of the worst features of American politics, unless special means of pre- 
 vention be adopted. 
 
50 
 
 AIM'ENDIX. 
 
 " It is obvious that in nil omnlrics in whicli political (cciinn runs liit;h, and difTcrcnt panic* 
 divide the suHrai^e-. of electors, there will always lie a demand for orjjanisation within eacli party 
 for the purpose of advancinn its inl rests. To a certain extent such or^jani^ations are necessary 
 and henelicia' ; hut there is a point at which their activity Iteconies little else than a mi>ehievou-. 
 nuisance. The action of a connuittee is often necessary to promote unity, and to secure the 
 victory even of the slron^,'est jiarly, and the election of the Iwst or most favourite can(li<l.iie. 
 Hut when such functions become the s|)oit ol mere " .^ ire-jiullers " and "caucuses," and tlie 
 sufTnij^es of ])arties are demanded for inferior candidates, nominated for venal motives hy ven.d 
 men, and eifcliirs have nt) choice hut I<j vote for such candidates or to see their parly he.ilen 
 aitot;etiier, then the or^.misaiion sinks from its orit;inal design and use, and becomes an intoler- 
 able evil. To such a heij;ht has this evil attaine<l in the United States that "there is now 
 absolutely no choice of represeiilatives, strictly s|)eakiT)}j, by the people. Nominations are either 
 bought or olilained by personal or parly inlluence. The whippcrs-in have full control, and 
 intelligent ptiblic opinion has little to do with the result." 
 
 ih 
 
 roLiTicAL rAirriivs and politicians. 
 
 F)-u)n " Thi' Aiiiirican SijHtun of (tuvernment," Inj Ezra C, Seaman, 1S7(>. 
 
 It is idle to talk about principles, without proper men, auil men of principle, to carry 
 them into elluot. It is very unwise iintl dangerous, to elect sellish and uorrnpt men, to carry 
 into etfuet good principles, and wise iiolicies. The conclusion i.s obvious — that there is no 
 good reason for maiatiiining pernianciit party organizations in our country, or in any country ; 
 and that there is no propriety in doing so. All ])olitieal parties should be temixirary and 
 changeable— baaed upon the (juestions and issues of the day, and upon the opinions of 
 Voters of the relative merits of the candidates for President of the Uniteil States, for (jover- 
 nors of States, and other liigh offices. 
 
 So far as political parties and the lines of division between them are produced by differ- 
 ences of opinion in relation to the principles, policies, and measures of government, they will 
 be as permanent as the causes and issues upon which they are based ; and they should be no 
 more so, and should pass away with the causes which producetl them. Parties should not 
 be based upon mere abstract principles, which have no direct practical bearing ; nor upon 
 dead issues which have passed by, and are of no practical importance ; uor should they be 
 sustained and made permanent by organization, party machinery, and party creeds, to pro- 
 mote the election and aggrandizement of party leaders, — regardless of the public good. 
 
 The mode of representation and the system of elections in the United States, are both 
 very imperfect and defective. The former is defective, in giving the entire representation 
 and (lower to m.ijorities, and practically disfranchising minorities, — by allowing them no 
 representation, ami no voice in the govermnent : and the latter is defective in omitting to 
 provide any mode of selecting candidates for oflice, to be voted for by the electors at popular 
 elections. 
 
 In theory, we have a popular government, in which the masses of the people select 
 their own rulers ; but owing to the defects of its organization, system of representation and 
 mode of electing officers, the practice is very different from the theory. 
 
 Officers to be elected by the people are not selected by any considerable number of 
 the voters, but by the dominant faction or clifjue of the dominant party — by whom and 
 their associates in nominating conventions, they are presented to the people, to be by them 
 confirmed by formal vote — the masses of the voters having no choice, except between two 
 
V. . 
 
 POLITICAL I'ARTIKS AND POLITICIANS. 
 
 fit 
 
 py (lifTci'- 
 
 hcy will 
 I be III) 
 
 iiulcl not 
 ir upon 
 tUcy lie 
 
 L to jiro- 
 
 ll. 
 
 iiru both 
 
 Icutation 
 
 theui no 
 
 ftting to 
 
 popiil.ir 
 
 Bo select 
 Ition ami 
 
 luiber of 
 kom an<l 
 fcjy them 
 Veen two 
 
 Huts ot' iioniinei'ii, jii'i'sented for thoir HuH'rajji-H, by imrtisan conventions. In nine i out 
 
 of ten, a mere choice of evils is presented to a large portion of the voters, — the caniliuates of 
 neither party being Hiich an tliey would have preferred. 
 
 'Ihoiigh I iniinally a popiilnr j^uverninent, eontrollcd l)y the voice of the people, ]>raetie- 
 ally our ^oveninieiit liaH de;.;eiierated into an oligarciiy of tlie leaders of the doiniiiant ciipie 
 or e<iterie, of the dominant party of t\u: day; and the people act n very subordinatu part, 
 even in the election of their own reprcMuntatives — a majority of tlieni merely ratifying and 
 confirming tlie noniinatioiis made, and HUpportin;^ the meaaiireH and policies prep.wed by tiie 
 party oligarchy — while the minority look on and have no substantial voice or participation 
 in the government. Party organi/r.^jons and the party character of our government, have 
 been in the jiiocess of development grailually, during a period of nearly lifty year^ — ever 
 since the inauguration of the State and national, as well tis local nominating conventions, the 
 ado|)lion of party creeds and platf irms, and the eh ction of Presidential electors by the 
 people — by general ticket. 
 
 The theory of the government is, that it is a representative government— in which all the 
 adult male citizens, (with few exceptions) are eipially and fairly reprcfcnted, by men of their 
 own choice, and through their representatives have a voice in legislation, an<l in the govern- 
 ment of iho country — making it in some measure a self-government ; a government of the 
 wh de peo|ilc, by the ])cople tlii^inselves. l!ut in pra';tiee, urulcr our defective electoral 
 system, the nnijority of the voters in each electoral district elect all tlic representatives, and 
 the minority none— whereby the minority are unrepresented, and practically dijfranehised, 
 have no voice in the government, and no one to represent, advocate or defend, their special 
 iuterests and rights. 
 
 It is the chttraeteristie of zealous political partisans, to look at every measure presented, 
 and at every political or uatioutil question, from the standpoint of their party ; ami to see it 
 aud examuu! it on one side only. With the eyes of the understanding nearly closed, they 
 listen to the argunicnts of their opponents— not for the purjiose of learning what truth they 
 may contain, and what weight should be given to them ; but for the purpose of finding, 
 defects in them, or what they may distort ami make ai)pear erroneous — in order to destroy 
 their intluence. Heing accustomed to hear the merits of their own party extolled, and its 
 princiides, policies, and measures held up to view as tending to promote the best interests of 
 the country, and the general welfare of the peo{)le ; ami accustonu'd to hear the opposite 
 party and its principles and policies reviled — as temling to evil, and to evil only, political 
 partisans usually take one-sideil and parti.al views of all ([uestions and nicasiirea of a ])olitical 
 or puldie nature. They sehlom view a ipiestion in all its asi)ect8 and bearings ; and hence 
 they get only partial and im[)erfeet views, and in their reasoning upon them, they necessarily 
 arrive at conclusions more or less erroneous. They often l)ecome imbued with enthusiasm in 
 relation to the merits of their own party and party creed, and inclined to attribute all the 
 prosperitj' of the country to its principles, policies, and measures. They can see no good in 
 the other party — either in it8j)rineiples or its policies,— its leaders c its measures. 
 
 The lirst object of many partisan legislators, is to ju'omote the success and secure the 
 ascendency of their party. To promote the general good and welfare of the country, and of 
 the whole people, is with them a secondary consi<leratit)n — being regarded by them mther as 
 a means of promoting the success of their party, than as the proposed end ami object of their 
 legislative action, 
 
 The tendency of party spirit is to tolerate no man as a leader, who is not blind to the 
 faults of his own partj-, and to the merits of his opponents. Men of sound understandings, 
 who look at both sides of political questions and judge fairly and impartially of their merits 
 soon lose the conridenee of violent partisans, are distruste<l l)y them, aud no longer recog- 
 nized as leaders. A fair-minded man, who looks at both sides of ])olitic.al questions, aud 
 considers them carefully, with a view to judge of their merits, is uulitted for a party leader 
 
 'm': 
 
! i^ 
 
 52 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 iiiul must stiinil in the hack-ground. Partisan cnthiisi.tuts, and men who have one blind aide, 
 and are .auuuHtomed to see and appreciate the merits of one side only, must occupy the trout 
 .tiats. 
 
 The violent party .sjiirit and party organizations of the present day, tend to make sharp, 
 <ino-sided, and uarrow-miiidud men, and cunning politicians — hut not statesmen. They tend 
 til discourage freedom of in([uiry. freedom of tliouglit, and freedom of speech npon political 
 questions ; to destroy freedom of action ; and to unlit men to hecome statesmen, however 
 lung they may he in puhlic life, i'arty spirit is, in fact, so wedded to temporary partisan 
 expedients, that it can hardly tolerate sound statesmanshij). 
 
 The power of party organizations and the intensity and violence of party spirit, have 
 greatly increased during the last lifty years. 
 
 Party organizations, such as we have in this country, exist in no other, and are not 
 necessary in a well-organized government. They were invented long since the organization 
 of our government, partly to supply the defects of our system of elections, and partly to 
 [iromote the success of party, and party leaders (as is shown in the first chapter of this work) ; 
 and they can he dispensed with when tliose defects are supplied hy law. The pi'incipal evils 
 of our syste u of government, grow out of these organizations, nominating conventions, and 
 otlier party machinery, devised to stimulate party spirit, to secure success at elections — 
 t'ither l)y fair or foul means, and to control the destinies of the country. 
 
 By the caucus and convention system, everything is arranged in secret hy a few leaders, 
 without any puhlic discussion in convention, of the resolutions presented, or of the merits or 
 relative merits of the candidates named ; and when they come to vote, the silent vote is 
 cast, without any reasons heing assigned. Conventions come together simi>ly to record the 
 decisions of the leaders, when tliey are united ; and to determine by vote, which faction or 
 section is the strongest, when they are divided. 
 
 Political partisans often justify themselves, and quiet their consciences, in practi&ing 
 decejjtion and falsehood, and other corru])t means, to jjromote the success of their jiarty, hy 
 alluding to the fact, that their opponents do likewise ; tliat to do so is sanctioned by cust'jni, 
 and necessary to success. Criminals of all grailes reason in a very similar manner, to apolo- 
 gise to themselves, for their crimes. 
 
 The bad practices of each party tend to corrupt the otlier ; and unless some remedy can 
 be devised, to correct the corrupt practices and evils which have grown up under our system 
 of party organizations, nominating conventions and caucuses, and electing jmblic officers, 
 there is great ger of such widespread corruption and distrust of all puhlic officers, and 
 of legislation and the administration of law, that we shall sink into anarchy, and a chronic 
 state of revolution and civil war — as Mexico has done. 
 
 Party organizations tend to foster party spirit, a spirit of exclusiveness and intolerance. 
 By means of party creeds and platforms, adopted without debate or nnieh consideration, to 
 fan the ilames of ch>.ss interests, and the prejudices of race and partj', and to catcli votes, 
 they tend to create .\nd perpetuate artificial distinctions between i)arties, for mere party 
 purposes. They furnish rules and tests of party faith, by which to determine the lidelity of 
 the members, and to discipline or denounce as unfaithful, those that presume to think for 
 themselves, contrary to the party creed. 
 
 Party organizations and machinery have become so complete, party spirit so intolerant, 
 and party discipline so rigid and etticient, that if a party man, having any position or intlu- 
 ence, presumes to express opinions differing from the creed or the policy of his party, the 
 party leaders combine against him, charge him with deserting his friends and the prineii)les 
 of his party, and denounce him as a political heretic. Very few men have popularity and 
 strength sufficient to withstand such attacks, and maintain their position. The result is, that 
 
POLITICAL I'ARTIEd AND POLITICIANS. 
 
 53 
 
 most of the public officers of our country are the mere slaves of party anil party leaders — 
 without much freetlcn of action, or freedom of speech —being accustomed and reijiiired, to 
 speak and act, in accordance with tlie creed and policy, and the supposed exigencies of their 
 party ; and if they fail to do so, they are usually denounced as traitors. 
 
 What is the moral of all this, but th' u American politics to-day, there is no place for 
 middle men ? He who would achieve political success must ally himself with a party, abide 
 by its fortunes, and endorse its policy, whether or not it commends itae'' to him. There can 
 be no hope for promotion in any other line of action. The day for ni-adle-men is past ; the 
 Held for those in this country or in England, who would win power without the sacrilice of 
 independence, is closed. Henceforth, the successful men in our politics are to be the parti- 
 sans who will stick at nothing which is avowed by the party to which they belong. 
 
 Party organizations and creeils, aud party spirit, tend to magnify the importance of 
 many questiims of but little real consequence, and to encourage the formation of immaterial 
 issues, in order to multiply the differences between parties, — to enable them to maintain 
 party lines as distinctly as possible. They lead men to study the success of their party, and 
 their own success connected witli it, r.ither than the interests of the country ; to consider 
 every question from a party standpoint ; and to regard principally, its hearing upon the 
 future success of the party. In legislative bodies, they induce party leaders to op[)ose, as a 
 matter of policy, the measures of their opponents, — even if good ; rather than lend their 
 eBbrts to improve and perfect them — for fear they may inure the future success of tlieir 
 opponents. 
 
 Party organizations have become so strong, and their machinery so extensive, far-reach- 
 iug and powerful, that they dictate interpretations of the constitution, the creeds ami 
 political faith of the people, and the leading measures and policies of the government ; and 
 in a great measure control the action of the government. They have checked aud restraineil 
 freedom of inquiry and freedom of thought, freedom of speech, andfieedomof the press ; 
 increased the intensity and violence of party spirit ; engendered political intolerance and 
 tyranny ; and nearly destroyed all freedom and independence of official action. 
 
 The machinery and infiuonce of party organizations, tend to form and mould the opinions 
 of the people, in accordance with party creeds ; to form narrow-minded politicians ; and to 
 prevent the development of enlarged views, and a high order of statesmanship— which can 
 sjiring only from freedom of action, freedom of thought, and very mature deliberation. 
 They are inconsistent with the formation of great statesmen, and nol)le-minded, self-sacrific- 
 ing patriots. The great civil war, through which our country has passed, developed and 
 formed some great commanders ; but very few statesmen have been produced in our country, 
 during the last forty years. Under our advanced system of party organizations, and party 
 discipline and intolerance, statesmanship is dying uut. 
 
 By electing to office, through the agency of party organizations, and subjecting to the 
 domination of such organizations, .and to the tempt.itions to bril)ery aud corrui)tton, great 
 numbers of politicians of pliable consciences and easy virtue, and many of bail or doubtful 
 character, the legislation of the country, all the departments of the national, State, and city 
 governments, and nearly all branches of the public service, have been mere or less corrupteil- 
 Even the judiciary have not alw.ays escaped the taint of party intluences, and partisan 
 prejudices and p.artialities ; nor even the suspicion of bribery, in some instances. The 
 whole tendency of such a system is, to corrupt politicians and office-holders, .and to demoralize 
 the people. If the evil be not arrested, it will undermine and destroy the stability of our 
 government. <■ 
 
 It is very desirable, that our system of elections should be so amended and reconstructed, 
 that party committee and nominating conventions, party machinery and political leagues 
 and societies, may all ue rendered unnecessary, and dispensed with — as not consistent with a 
 
 m 
 
 mi 
 
 
'J 
 
 54 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 frtt and vnhiasaed exercise of the elective fraiichiae ; nor witli tlie right of the people to 
 choose their own rulers ; nor with a fair and upright administration of the government. 
 The peoj)lo have more reason to repose contidenoe in responsilile public olficers, either elected 
 or duly appointed, and acting publicly, under the sanction of an oath, than in irresponsible 
 l)arty committees and political societies, whose operations are carried on in secret, for party 
 purposes. 
 
 POLITICAL CORRUPTION. 
 
 From the Canadian Monthly., Vol. II., 1872. 
 
 "Corruption grows by what it feeds upon. It will increase, and increase in an ever accelerating 
 ratio, while the mor.il resistance will become continually weaker, till amont; us, as in other countries, 
 bribery becomes a jest, and corruptionist a name hardly more odious than that of politician. 
 The progress of electoral demoralization is as certain as the increasing volume and rajiidity of tlie 
 descending avalanche. We shall sink to the level of the States, and perhaps below it. For cor- 
 ruption is deeper, more complete, and more hopeless in a small nation than in a great one . . 
 Who doubts the unsatisfiictory character of the present state of things ? Who believes that the 
 deli Iterations of a party cabinet have, for their paramount object, the welfare of the country, and 
 not the retention of office ? The Opposition orators and journals thunder indignantly against the 
 questionable acts of the Government. . . Without entering into details, at once needless and 
 disagreeable, we do not doubt the general fact to which these various accusations point. We do 
 not doubt that the present Government of the Dominion subsists, like other governments of the 
 same desciiinion, by means which are more or less corrupt. We do not doubt that, even in 
 dealing with the greatest interests of the nation, even in dealing with such momentous undertak- 
 ings as the Pacific Railway, it is influenced by a motive which renders its decisions more or less 
 untrustworthy, and its action more or less injurious to national morality, as well as to the material 
 prosperity of the nation . 
 
 " ' Then,' cry the opposition, ' the remedy is obvious. Vote for us. Turn out the Govern- 
 ment ; put us in power. Corruption will vanish, and a reign of purity will commence.' But is 
 it so? The general system, and the mode la which the cabinet is formed — out of a special group 
 of office-seekers — remaining the same, will a mere change of Ministers make much difference in 
 the morality of the Government, or in its method of maintaining itself in place ? . . When 
 Parliament meets, or rather long before Parliament meets, will commence a political auction, at 
 which the articles biti for will be the votes of the unattached members for the smaller provinces, 
 and the bidders will be a ' corrupt ' Government on one side, and a virtuous Opposition on the 
 other. . . The bidding will be high, parties being so evenly balanced, and the stake, under 
 the present circumstances, being so large ; and the expenses, whatever they may I e, will be 
 defrayed by the public. 
 
 " We have ^reat faith in the honourable intentions of the leaders o( the Oppositii n ; and we 
 are at the same time perfectly convinced that, as soon as they became the heads of a party Gov- 
 ernment, struggling for its life against a hungry and vindictive enemy, nearly a match for it in 
 force, their intentions would give way to the exigencies of their position, and that they would 
 do first things for which they would be sorry, and then things of which they would be ashamed. 
 At last shame itself would cease. 
 
 " Electoral corruption has its source in Parliamentary corruption, which affords inducements 
 to candidates and Ministers to purchase seats ; anil the source of parliamentary corruption is the 
 system of making the offices of State, with the patronage annexed to them, the prize of a per- 
 petual conflict between two organized factions, euph mistically styled party government. 
 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION. 
 
 66 
 
 " This question has been more than once presented to our readers within the last half-year ; 
 but we wish to keep it before their minds for a time, on account of its transcendent importance 
 to the country, and i)ecause it is more likely to command attention while the memory of the 
 elections, and the evil influences revealed by them, is fresh. Moreover, as we have said before, 
 this is the accepted season ; soon the malady may be beyond control, and the last chance may be 
 lost of saving the country from tlie gulf into which it is too manifestly sinking. 
 
 "Already the sinister forms of American corrujition have made their appearance among us. 
 Already some of the most unjirincipled members of the community have taken to politics as their 
 congenial trade. The Wire-puller is here. The Log-roller is here. The Ward Politician is 
 here. The Working Man's Friend is here. And at Ottawn, since the recent development of 
 public works, we have seen plainly enough the sinister face of a Canadian Lobby. 
 
 " Party government, in England, dates as a regular institution from the reign of William 
 III., who, after vainly attemjiting to form a cabinet without distinction of party, was compelled, 
 by the factiousness and selfishness of the men about him, and his position as the occupant of a 
 (.Hsputed throne, to form a cabinet on the party principle. And with party government .at once 
 came organized corruption. ' From the day,' says Macaulay, 'on which Caermarthen was called a 
 second lime to the chief direction of affairs, Parliamentary corruption continued to be practised, 
 with scarcely any intermission, by a long succession of statesmen, till the close of the American 
 
 war It at length became as notorious that there was a market for votes at the 
 
 Treasury as that there was a market for cattle in Smithfield. Numerous demagogues out of 
 ])ower declaimed against this vile traffic ; but every one of these demagogues, as soon as he was 
 in power, found himself driven by a kind of fatality to engage in that traffic, or at least to connive 
 at it. Now and then, perhaps, a man who had romantic notions of public virtue refused to be 
 himself the paymaster of the corrupt crew, and averted his eyes while his less scrupulous 
 colle.agues did that which he knew to be indispensable and yet felt to be degrading, liut the 
 instances of this prudery ware rare indeed. The doctrine generally received, even among upright 
 and honourable politicians was, that it was shameful to receive bribes, but that it was necessary 
 to distribute them. It is a remarkable fact that the evil reached the greatest height during the 
 administration of Henry Pelhani, a statesman of good intentions, of spotless morals in private 
 life, and of exemplary disinterestedness. It is not difficult to guess by what arguments he, and 
 other well-meaning men, who like him followed the fashion of their age, quieted their con- 
 sciences. No casuist, however severe, has denied that it may be a duty to give what it is a crime 
 to take. . . . And might not the same plea be urged in defence of a Minister who, when no 
 other expedient would avail, paid greedy and low minded men not to ruin their country.' 
 
 "The only intermission of corruption, during the period mentioned by Macaulay, was when 
 Chatham for a few years put party under his feet, and ruled as the Minister of the nation. 
 
 " But the mutual hatred, the mutual slander, and the reckless sacrifice of patriotism to 
 factious passions, which party ;.';overninent brought with it, were worse if possible, than the cor- 
 ruption. Chatham himself conspired from merely factious motives — motives which were afterwards 
 admitted to have been merely factious by the conspirators themselves — to drive Walpole into the 
 iniquitous and disastrous war with .Spain, which, as its natural consequence, brought on the 
 attempt of the Pretender, and a renewal of civil war in England. In the recent controversy 
 respecting the Treaty of Washington, Lord Cairns, a man who had held one of the highest offices 
 in the State, supported with the utmost violence and with all the resources of legal casuistry at his 
 command, the most outrageous pretensions of the American Government, simply for the purpose 
 of embarrassing the Government of his own country. The same man had done his utmost, at 
 the time of the American war, to impede the efforts of Lord Palmerston's Ministry to prevent the 
 escape of cruisers and preserve the neuli-ality which was so essential to us as a commercial nation. 
 Can it be doubted that Lord Cairns had been taught by the party system to hate Englishmen of 
 the opposite party more than he loved England ? Did not Lord Derby, when he took his 
 tremendous 'leap in the dark,' by carrying an extension of the suffrage, which, whether 
 
li .1 
 
 56 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 expedient or not in itself, was contrary to ail the avowed principles of his party, and which he 
 must have believed to be fraught witli the utmost peril to his country, find comfort in the 
 reflection that he had 'dished the Whigs?' And would not the Whigs have sacrificed the public 
 good with equal facility for the satisfaction of dishing Lord Derby ? 
 
 "In France party government was introduced with constitutional monarchy, on the 
 restoration of the Bourbons, and reintroduced with the constitutional dynasty of Louis Philippe. 
 There again it bred corruption, (the Government multiplying offices for corrupt purposes, till, 
 under Louis Fhilipi)e, the number of officers actually exceetled the number of electors,) and not 
 only corruption, but, as the fury of the fictions increased, civil war and political ruin. Trans- 
 ported with hatrad of his rival Guizot, Thiers, himsolf an adherent of constitutional monarchy, 
 headed the movement which overthrew the constitutional throne, 
 
 " It is needless to show how corruption has attended party government in the United States. 
 But it is equally certain that the spirit engendered by the struggle of the two factions fur place 
 contributed in no small degree to prepare the way for the civil war : and if any one feels assured 
 that the possibilities of such calamities in the United States are exhausted, he reads the situation 
 with different eyes from ours. . . . 
 
 "As we have said before, in England party has at least an intelligible basis, and one 
 which may determine the allegiance of a reasonable man and a lover of his country, inasmuch as 
 the great conflict between aristocratic and democratic principles of government, carried on fur so 
 many years and with so many vicissitudes, is not yet closed. But in Canada, since the establish- 
 ment of Responsible Government and religious equality, party has had no intelligible basis ; it 
 has been faction and nothint; else. In all the speeches and manifestoes of the party leaders 
 during the late contest, it was impossible to discover any principle which could form a per- 
 manent line of demarcation. There were reminiscences of a political past, before the concession 
 of responsible government, when piinciples were really at stake ; but as regards the present, 
 there were only administrative questions, such as that of the Pacific Railway, which, however 
 important at the time, cannot furnish permanent articles of party faith. Skiving such questions, 
 we had nothing but vague though vehement assertions of the necessity of party government, and 
 of the impracticable and visionary character of all who looked beyond it. British institutions, 
 we were told, could not be carried on without party. If by British institutions is meant party 
 government, the proposttion is indisputable, though not profound ; but if it is meant that we 
 cannot possibly have representative assemblies, self-taxation and trial by jury, without putting up 
 the government peiiodically as the prize of a faction fight, the proposition agrees neither with 
 re.ison nor with facts. Again, it was laid down that party was necessary because God had so 
 constituted us as to think differently on most subjects. We imagined that God had so con- 
 stituted us as to think alike on all subjects, truth being one, and our laculties being the same ; 
 and that difference of opinion arose from error on one side, or both, wliicli further investigation 
 and discussion would in the end remove. Such has been the case in science and in all rational 
 inquiry. But it seems that in politics Providence has made half the community incapable of 
 ever arriving at truth, in order that there may always be a Parliamentary Opposition. A 
 Ministerial orator avowed his theoretical belief in party, and in the necessity of having a body of 
 ' astute and able men ' as an Opposition, to criticize and control the Government ; but afterwards, 
 coming to parties in Canada, he laid it down that there ought to be only two — one, that of 
 patriots like himself, at once in the best sense Conservative and Reforming, carrying on the 
 government in the highest interest of the whole nation; the other that of 'Independents,' 
 'Annexationists,' and other infamous and disloyal persons, making it their business to 'paralyse ' 
 the government and prevent it from promoting the union and prosperity of the country. So that 
 half, or nearly half, of the community are to be always disloyal, enemies of the nation, and 
 devoted to the malignant work of paralysing the efforts of a Government which is labouring 
 successfully for the public good. This is to be the basis of our political system for ever ! 
 
 "On no subject but politics are such absurdities now current. But in former days the 
 scientific world was divided into factions which throttled each other as the political factions do 
 
POLITICAL t'OHKUPriON, 
 
 now. Perliai s, if lucrative ottices liad l)eeii the prize of the conflict, we should still have the 
 parties of Nominalists and Realists wrestling over a psychological question which has long since 
 been settled by mental science, and consigned to the grave of the Middle Ages. . . . 
 
 " In the old country, which we affectionately but somewhat unreflectingly imitate in spite of 
 the great difference of our circumstances, party government, we repeat, has nt 'oast a rational and 
 moral basis. It has also, to temper its evils, antidotes which are wanting here. In England 
 there is a -trong and settled public opinion which restrains the excesses of the party chiefs ; there 
 is a great body of independent wealth and intelligence which, though it may to a certain extent 
 belong to the parties, belongs more to the country ; there is a corp. of public men whose tenure 
 of their places in Parliament is practically assured to them for life, and who are deeply imbued 
 with traditions of government, which amidst all their rivalries, they continue to respect ; there 
 are the grave experiences and heavy burdens of an old country, which impose, even on the most 
 unscrupulous, a prudence unknown to political adventurers gambling with the virgin resources of 
 a young nation ; there is a great Civil Service, which fortunate accident has combined with 
 wisdom to place outside party, and which carries on the ordinary administration of the country 
 almost independently of the party chiefs who form the Cabinet ; there is a press in which, though 
 there are plenty of organists and Bohemians ; there are also a great many independent writers on 
 ])olitics of the best kind, furnished in many instances by the numerous fellow-ships of the great 
 universities, which thus exercise, in their way, a critical and corrective power. And yet, even 
 in the old country, how superior to all more party governments was the government of Sir 
 Robert Peel during that brief hour for which faction permitted him to rule, in some measure, as 
 the Minister of the nation ! How mournfully did the hearts of the people follow the retirement, 
 how anxiously did they expect the return, of the one statesman who aspired to rule, not for a 
 faction, but for the country ! 
 
 " A party government is essentially a weak government. It cannot venture to offend or 
 estrange any one who commands votes. It is unable to grapple with the selfishness of local 
 interests, sections, rings — the perpetual enemies of the common weal. It cannot even give ii-^ 
 attention steadily to its proper work. The greater part of its energies is devoted to the main- 
 tenance of its own existence against the attacks of V e Opposition — the smaller part to the public 
 service. It can contain only half the leading statesmen of the country, while the faculties of 
 the other half are devoteil to obstructing and paralyzing the conduct of affairs. Probably it will 
 not contain the greatest administrators of all ; since the temper of the great administrator is 
 peculiarly alien to the narrowness of faction. . . . 
 
 " Hut the system of government by organized factions is a process by which the most 
 unprincipled members of the community are almost infallibly selected as the holders of power, 
 and as cynosures for the ;■. . ation of the community at large. It may s.ifely be said, that no 
 rational being wouKl have i..oUght of instituting such a system if he had not been misled by false 
 examples aiu' blind adherence to tradition. 
 
 " It wjuid probably be a further improvement if the election of members for the Dominion 
 Parliament were vested in the Provincial Parliaments, as that of the American .Sen' .e is in the 
 State Legislatures. This would at once settle the relations between the local and central 
 Assemblies, and bind them together in a united whole. It would spare the country one set of 
 popular elections without derogating from the electoral supremacy of the people. It would, 
 probably, act in some measure as an antidote to localism in the choice of representatives, the preval- 
 ence of which has ruinetl the character of the representation in the United States, and to which 
 there is a marked tendency here. ■ The standard of English statesmanship has been hitherto 
 maintained by keeping the representation national, and freely electing eminent men to seats for 
 constituencies with which they have no local connection, as in the case of the present Premier, 
 and in those of Lord Palmerston and Canning before him. Of late the House of Commons has 
 been invaded to a formidable extent by ' locals,' and the consequence has been such a falling off 
 in ability that, when the present leaders go, it is difficult to say who will take their places. It 
 
ii M 
 
 58 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ■5i 
 
 might fairly lie hoped that in elections to the Dominion Parliament, conducted in the manner 
 here suggested, by the members of the Provincial Parliaments, exercising their electoral power 
 as a trust in presence of the people of the province, while mere wealth would generally 
 prevail, room might sometimes be found for capacity, and that a sufficient succession of statesmen 
 might be provitled for the government of the nation. It may perhaps be thought by some that 
 statesmanship ha.s become unnecessary, and that we can get along very well with a Parliament of 
 opulent geiulemen, who subscribe liberally to local objects, and give picnics to their constituents. 
 Those wiio liave studied with attention the critical changes which are now going on in the whole 
 tissue of society, religious, moral, social and industrial, will probably be o( a different opinion, 
 
 " There is nothing cloudy or chimerical in the proposal to substitute legal elections for 
 faction, as the mode of selecting the Executive Council out of the Legislature. It is a definite 
 remedy for a specific disease, a remedy for which is urgently needed, and being perfectly feasible 
 in itself, it is a tit subject for practical consideration. That which is cloudy is the theory that 
 Nature or Providence has divided the community into two sections, which aie destined to be for 
 ever waging political war against each other without a possibility of agreement. That which is 
 chimerical is the notion that faction, when recognized as the instrument of government, and 
 called by a soft n-.me, will cease to be faction, and, at the height of a furious struggle for power 
 and pelf, curb its own frenzy, and keep its selfish ends in subordination to the paramount claims 
 of the public good." 
 
 iSlii 
 
 i 'ill 
 I 
 
 
 PARTY POLITICS. 
 
 J^rom the Canadian Monthly, Vol. II., 1872, 
 
 " A friend of ours was once a good deal puzzled in attempting to explain to a young lady of an 
 enquiring turn of mind the nature of a Parliamentary Opposition. Government she understood 
 and Parliament, as a deliberative and legislative assembly, she understood ; but the idea of a ]iarty 
 of men, whose sole function was to (^/-pose what others /w-posed, seemed to be beyond her grasp. 
 If it could have been explained to her that the so-calletl Opposition was a mere temporary organiz- 
 ation for a temporary purpose —the government of the country having fallen into l)ad hands and it 
 being very desirable to harass them into an abandonment of their position — the thing would have 
 been more easily intelligible ; but no, the truth had to be told, that this ' Opposition ' was as per- 
 manent an institution as Oovernment itself, and that the eagerness and bitterness with which it 
 pursued its ends, bore no assignable relation to the merits or demerits of the holders of authority. 
 However faultless an Administration might be, there must still be an Opposition, or the British 
 Constitution would fall to pieces. ' Why don't they content themselves with opposing what is 
 wrong? ' was aslced, with simvilicity. ' Well, of course, that is what they professs to do,' was 
 the answer. ' Then there is no particular reason for calling them Opposition, for everybody pro- 
 fesses the same thing. I am Opposition, and you are Opposition — we are all Opposition 
 together, if that is what it means. ' 
 
 "The difficulty in wliich our young friend was involvetl was one which, in some shape or 
 other, presents itself to everybody. Even grown n\en, tolerably familiar both with the theory 
 and the working of the Constitution, find themselves wondering how the thoroughly artificial 
 distinctions which prevail in the political arena, came to acquire such force and persistence ; 
 wondering, too, whether no new page of political history will ever be turned, and the monot- 
 onous see-saw of party strife — Oppositions becoming Governments, and Governments becoming 
 Oppositions, and each with every change of fortune, displaying most, if not all of the faults of 
 those whose places thf^y take — be succeeded by something more in accordance with reason, and 
 more favourable to true progress. The subject is one which a little honest thought will do a great 
 
PAKTY POLITICS. 
 
 59 
 
 deal to clear up ; for, to tell the truth, the difficulties that seem to sunouml it are mainly the 
 creation of those who think they have an interest in the perpetuity of the present state of things. 
 It is commonly assumed, for example, hy the defenders of jiarty, that those who are dispose<l to 
 retjard it as out of place In this advanced stage of human culture and reason, are bounil to devise 
 a complete new set of institutions for the jjovernmenl of nations • 1 havinjj devised them, to 
 demonstrate their practicability. This assumption we entirely rt,. Hate, for reasons which will 
 sulliciently appear in the course of our argument. What we have to do, is to try and render a true 
 account of party to ourselves, to ascertain what it is and what the conditions are that call it into 
 existence. As we inirsue the investigation, we sliall see that the contlitions which give it its 
 greatest vitality have passed away, and are little likely to return ; and that party, if limited to its 
 natural and legitimate development in these days, would be a very dilTerent thing indeed Irom 
 wliat we now witness. 
 
 " We cannot do better than take our departure from Murke's well-known definition. 
 M'arty,' says the great philosophic statesman, ' is a body of men united for promoting, by their 
 joint endeavours, the national interest, upon some principle n whicli they are all agreed.' 
 Party, in this sense of the word, is something every one can understand : it calls for no justifica- 
 tion, any more than any olher form of association for a worthy object. It will be observed, 
 however, that according to Hurke's definition, parly is but a means towards an end, and a means 
 which is only available in certain defined circumstances. Tlie end is the national interest, and 
 the condition necessary to give vitality to party, is the .agreement of all its members in ' some 
 particular principle' which they wish to see applied in the government of the country, and to 
 which of course, another [larty in the State is opposed. Burke vs not a word to justify the 
 opinion that i)arties are essential to the well-being of the State, ui. r all circumstances : for that 
 would be simply tantamount to saying ihat no country could be prosperous in which there were 
 not those radical differences of opinion upon political subjects, which alone afford a rational basis 
 for party organization. Nearly all the talk we hear in the present day on the subject of parties, 
 really involves the absuril proposition that, iinlt'ss a country is divided against itself, it cannot 
 stand. Because parties were once a necessity of the times — the natural expression in Parliament 
 of real and lamentable antagonisms that existed throughout the country, therefore parties nmst 
 exist for ever ; and if we have not real antagonisms to support them, we must get up sham ones ! 
 The Chinaman, in Charles Lamb's charming apologue, set his house on fire, in order to have, 
 indirectly, some roast jjork. Our roast pork is the party system ; and, in order that we may taste 
 the savour again and again, we set the State on fire with r kinds of false and factitious issues. 
 
 " In Burke's tiine, and almost down to the present n. in England, there have never been 
 wanting more or less serious causes of division among parties ; moreover, in a country like 
 England — the continuity of whose political history has never been broken by revolution, and 
 where, consequently, many institutions exist, simply because they have existed, and not because 
 they are peculiarly adapted to the present time — there will always be a certain opposition 
 between those who wish to preserve what time has handed down, and those who, imbued with 
 the spirit of the present, aim at bringing everything as much into harmony with that spirit as 
 iwssible. Even in England, however, there are unmistakable signs that the palmy days of the 
 party system have passed away for ever. It is in politics, in these days, very much as it is in war : 
 men see the inevitable much sooner than they used to do ; and, when they see the inevitable, they 
 yield to it. This arises simply from the greater sway that reason has over the minds of men, 
 and, particularly, over the minds of those fitted by nature to lead. 
 
 "The political circumstances of Canada are very different from those of the Mother Country. 
 There, where so much exists w' !ch it interests one class to maintain, and which it seems to 
 interest a much larger class to destroy, there will, for a long time to come, probably, be some 
 real significance in the terms ' Conservative ' and ' Liberal,' or ' Tory ' and ' Radical ; ' though 
 there is every reason to hope that the political struggles of the future will be mitigated by the 
 influences to which we have just referred. In Canada, however, when the same terms are 
 employed, nothing can exceed the sense of mockery they bring to the mind. In oklen times, 
 
 ) ■ 
 
■' '' 
 
 w 
 
 GO 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 when a knot of infatuated men, thought they could govern ilie country for their own private 
 interest, the political designations that had been borrowed from the parent State, were not so 
 entirely out of place. But in the present day, you who call yourselves Conservatives, <lo tell us, 
 for heaven's sake, what it is you wish to conserve that an>body else wishes to destroy? And you 
 also, who call yourselves Liberals, where are we to find proofs of your liberalism or liberality, or 
 whatever it is you pride yourselves upon? Or, if yoii prefer to call yourselves Reformers, what 
 18 it that you wish to reform ? Your political creed, if wc credit your own professions, is one of 
 the intensest conservatism, regarding all the established jjrinciples of the constitution. You find 
 fault with nothing, so yoi s.iy, in the political frame-work of the Stale, and only complain of a 
 few abuses of executive authority on the part of a set of men whom you hope soon to consign 
 to perpetual oblivion ; and yet you dub yourselves lU' formers, just as if there waft work to be 
 done for a generation or a century, in the redressing of abuses, the removal of anomalies, and the 
 general reconstitution of a disordered commonwealth. When you have acceded to power ami 
 have wrought such improvements as you are able oi disposed to do in the management of public 
 aftairs, what will there be to hinder you from adopting the title of 'Conservatives,' now a|)pro- 
 priated by and to your opponents? Nothing in this wide world. And what will there be t<> 
 hinder them, after you have committed a few blunders, as you are sure to do with.n a short time, 
 from seizing, if they choose to do it, for political elTect, upon your special name of ' Reformers,' 
 on the plea that they are going to put to rights all the things that you have put wrong ? Surely 
 you are both to be congratulated on the peculiar felicity of party designations so chosen that you 
 might make an impromptu ' swap,' and look neither wiser nor more foolish in your new colour^ 
 than you do at present. . . 
 
 " It is not the bitterness of political discussion that seems to us the worst result of the party 
 system ; it is its amazing hoUowness. A reasonable man is simply lost in wonder .as he reads day 
 after day, in ably-edited j>,ainals, whole columns of writing in which there is hardly the faintest 
 gleam of sincere conviction to be discerned. Day after day the same miserable evasions, the 
 same varnishing up of unsightly facts, the same reiteration of unproved charges against opponents, 
 the same taking for granted of things re(|uiring proof, anil proving things that nobo-iy questioned ; 
 the same hypocritical appeals to the good sense of the electors whom every effort is being used to 
 misinform and confuse ; the same dreary, unmeaning jil.ilitudes : in a word the same utter abuse 
 of man's reasoning powers, and of the privileges and functions of a free i)ress. Of course so long 
 as both sides indulge in this kind of thing, each can make out at least a partial case against the 
 other ; and so a constant cross-fire is kept up in the exposure of misrepresentations, and the 
 rectification of all that has been set down in malice on one side or the other. To-day a gooil 
 point perhaps is made by the Opposition ; to-morrow it will be returned to them, if possible, 
 with interest. Such is the party system of political warfare — a system which ought to have won 
 the admiration of Archdeacon Paley, since it possesses the attribute that was wanting to that 
 celebi;ated watch of his — the power, namely, of perpetually reproducing itself. Looking simply 
 at the wordy strife lietween two such organs say as the Globe and the Mail, what is ever to bring 
 it to an end? There is no termination to their arguments, any more than to a repeating decimal, 
 which, truth to tell, they very much resemble. 
 
 " ' Like everything good,' says the former of the two journals we h.ave just mentioned, 
 ' party may be abused.' We should like very much to know where the proper use of party ends 
 and its abuse begins. The abuse, we suppose, is when men do things in the interest of their 
 party that are not for the interest of the state ; when, for example, the supporters of a Govern- 
 ment convicted of some reprehensible act rally around it to save it from just condemnation ; or 
 when an Opposition, knowing that the Government is dealing with a very difficult and dan- 
 gerous question, walking, to use Horace's metai)hor, on hot cinders lightly covered over with 
 ashes, seek to hamper and distress it by every means in their power, even at the risk of fanning 
 the smouldering fires into open conflagration. Hut if this is abuse, it is of the very essence of 
 party politics. Lither the interest of the country or the fortunes of their party are to dominate 
 in men's thoughts : if the former, then all party tactics are at an end ; if the latter, then it is- 
 
PAKTY POLITICS. 
 
 61 
 
 simply absurd to talk oi party being 'abused.' It is all abuse from first to last. \'ou mij^ht as 
 well talk of selfishness beinjj abused, or dishonesty being abused, or of hypocrisy bcinjj abused. 
 
 " Let us, however, hear a little more about party from that thorough believer in it whom we 
 have just <iuote(l : — ' All the essential characteristics of parly,' he proceeds to say, ' enter into the 
 very idea of free popular government, and when they are eliminalci.1, sucii a government is not 
 only impossible but inconceivable. Who is to say what is really for the good of the nation ? All 
 may lie equally iiatrioti". all e(|uall. anxious to lay aside self-seeking and everything iniati and 
 unworthy, but they ma) :ave dilTerenl ideas how this greatest national good is to i)e secured ; 
 nay they will have if they think freely and intelligently. And with what result ? Why, with 
 the formation of more or less distinctly ojiposing parties, with more or less keenness in liieir 
 discussions, and more or less divergence in their eventual courses of action. The whole history 
 of the |)ast tells of this : while the ' national principle ' would at best but give us something like 
 the slumberous stillness of a sultry summer noon — quiet and peaceful, but at the same time 
 stagnant and the fruitful parent of injurious miasmata.' 
 
 " Here let us draw lireath. Who wouK' have imagined, had we not let out the secret, 
 whence this charming picture of party politics was taken ? There is a touch of idyllic tender- 
 ness and sweetness about it which the great Sicilian poet himself could scarcely have surpassed. 
 ' More or less keenness in their discussions ' — of course ; but then each side is so ' anxious to lay 
 aside everything mean and unworthy ' — among other things, all mean and unworthy suspicions 
 of their opponents — that really their divergences of opinion serve only to procure for those who 
 lake part in politics a reasonable and healthful amount of intellectual exercise. Under the 
 'national' system we should all stagnate and be choked by noxious miasmata ; while under t le 
 party system we are braced and vivified by the pure powers of free discussion. What a hajipy, 
 golden dream, one cannot but exclaim, for the writer to have who was penning an article for the 
 same columns that contained ' Wha wants me ? ' Not more fancy-free was Colonel Lovelace in 
 his prison than is this editor in his sanctum. lie cannot for a inument assume the patriotism of 
 his particular political opponents — tluy are tricksters, corruptionists, deceivers — everything in 
 lact that is morally execrable ; but when he wants to draw a picture of the party system at work, 
 why, all at once the political atmosphere becomes pure if not altogether calm ; there is equal 
 patriotism on both sides, and men are only divided by theoretic differences which do not in the 
 least impair the profound respect they entertain for one another. 
 
 " Now the truth of the matter is that what this enthusiastic advocate of party has been 
 here describing is not party at .ill ; but that very ' n.itional ' system, the application of which to 
 popular mstitutions he pronounces to be sheerly ' inconceivable ' (though not too inconceivable to 
 allow its miasmatic results to be clearly foreseen). No one pretends that if men could be 
 induced to give up the conscious imposture and rant and gibberish that are now dignified with the 
 name of party controversy, they would forthwith all be of one mind. The great difference would 
 be that men would endeavour to make their opinions triumph by legitimate means ; and 
 further, the expression of all opinions would be very much freer than at present. As things 
 are now a man is not at liberty at all times to utter the thought that is in him : he lias to consider 
 how his party will be affected by what he may say. In this way truths that would be eminently 
 seasonable, so far as the country's interests are concerned, are suppressed ?s being unseasonable 
 from a party point of view. The credit that a man would, personally, feel inclined to give his 
 opponents for something he knows them to have done well, he withholds out of consideration for 
 his party who would be seriously compromised by any admission in favour of those whom they 
 are steadily trying to undermine in popular favour. It is the rarest thing in the world at present 
 to see .1 man get up in Parliament and seem to utter his real and innermost conviction on any 
 important question. Vou note his place in the chamber, and before he speaks you know almost 
 all he has to say. Such is the party system. Instead of stimulating thought and teaching intel- 
 lectual honesty, it does just the reverse — puts a ban on the free exercise of a man's mind, and 
 leads people to conceal or misrepresent their real opinions. . . . 
 
 > 
 
 II 
 
 I;. \ 
 
m 
 
 I 
 
 6-J 
 
 AI'PKNDIX. 
 
 " Tliu jjrcat clilTiculty in arj^uiiij; the thesis liiat llic [niijlic interest is niH i)romolc(l i>y an 
 arliitrnry division of tiie leijislature and of all those who taice an interest in politics, into two 
 <)|)|)o.iiij; c;ini|)-i, i>, to avoid sayin;; ihiiii;-; tiiai are self-evidoiit. It is perfectly clear that a party 
 would not i)e a l>^riy, as the word is commonly undorsiood, if it were actuated only by a desire 
 for the public jjood, and if it followed out a strictly honourable line of action towards its adver- 
 saries. Such a body would not and could not display what is called party spirit ; and as to [larty 
 discipline, it wouM be I0-.I in the hii;licr and nobler discipline of duty. The a^^reeinent that 
 existed amongst its members at any moment, however perfect it might be, c luld not be held to 
 g\iaraiilee their agreement on any new i^sue ; for ('.i' /ij'/>o//u:h every man, .is often as a new 
 (|ueNtii)n came up, would sliape his course upon it, not with a view to improving the poHition of 
 his parly, but to promoting the advantage of the State. It is understood now that those who act 
 together to-day will act together lo-morrow and next day. Why? Simply because //uy ntcuii 
 to do so ; that is all about it : they have dciermined that their opinions ^.hall not ditfer. l''or liuw 
 could they ever hope to gain party triumphs without party organization ami party orthodoxy ? 
 If the couniry does not thrive under such a system ; if the vices of government are not cured ; 
 if the pco|)le are not educated to disinterestedness and high-mnidedness : in other word-i, if 
 patriotism and public spirit are not encouraged — so much the worse for all the interests, moral 
 and material, involved. The Hritish Constitution of which party government (we arc told) is 
 the noblest tradition, cannot be allowed to fall through nu-rely because a niiion threatens to go 
 to ruin. 
 
 " When we are told that jiarty is absolutely essential to free, popular government, we cannot 
 help thinking what a vast amount of government is done, and what vast interests are successfullv 
 managed, without any help from the pirty principle. Look at our municipalities ; look at o u 
 Imnks, our railways and other public enter|>rises ; look at our churches, Would it really be well 
 to see our city corporations, and our county and township councils divided between two 
 parties, each trying to hamper the other to the utmost of its ability? Who would care 
 to hold slock in a bank or railway, whose alTairs were made the sport of party struggles ? 
 Whenever party spirit h.as shown itself in connection with the latter class of corporations, it has 
 been the product of, as it has in turn ministered to, the very grossest and most shameless forms of 
 corruption an J robbery. We see party here assume its final an 1 perfect development as ihe rim; 
 — an association of robbers who have agreed to aid in fdling one another's pockets. When how- 
 ever, (as fortunately is most often the case) this horrible disease h is not fastened upon a great public 
 company, its administration is a fiir type of what the a.lministratiou of a country's al'fiirs might 
 be, if the organized selfishness of party were to pass away. Every shareholder knows thai the 
 value of his jiroperty depends on the successful a Iministration of the company's affairs, and the 
 maintenance of its credit before the world. His great anxiety, therefore, is lo have the right kind 
 of men as directors, and, when the right men have been found, it generally rests with them lo say 
 how long they wdl remain in the responsible positions assigned to them. Men get thanks for 
 conducting the affairs of a company or association prmlently and successfully ; they get none for 
 doing their duly by the State: they get interested and formal praise from their supi)oiters, an I 
 unvarying depreciation and abuse from their opponents. The praise affords them no satisfaction, 
 and the abuse, in the long run, hardens them and takes the edge off all finer feelings. The greai 
 dilfereuce between a memlier of a joint-stock company and a member of Parliament is, th.Tt while 
 the former would lose more then he would gain by pursuing an obstructive course, or in any 
 way trifling with the interests of the society, the latter may pursue a similar line of con.luct, and 
 profit by it. His interest as a private citizen in sound legislation, and elTective administration may 
 easily be overcome by those special inducements which party leaders can offer. That is precisely 
 the position, and hence it is that party is possible in the Legislature and hardly any where else. 
 Party may therefore be defined with absolute correctness as a body of men whose interest in 
 supporting one another is greater than the interest they have in giving a right direction at all 
 times to [mblic policy. We should scarcely call this, however, a good thing per se. 
 
 " What becomes then of Hurke's definition of party as ' a body of men unite I for promoting 
 
hare's schkmk of ukpukhentation. 
 
 63 
 
 by their joint endeavours (lie nnlionni interest upon some principle in which they are nil rtj,'reeil ? • 
 Is ii of no np|)lic,ilioa at all in our day? Certainly ; as often as a body of men honestly a^jrce in 
 a particular principle, let them unite their elforts to make that principle triumph, an<l if they 
 choose to call themselves a party, why let them do so. No harm will result from that. Harm 
 results wlien men luke a license to them-iclves to do, a-, a parly, ihiujjs that are not for the national 
 interest at all, and tiiat, in their own consciences, they know are not for the national 
 interest. It is certainly a strange tiling that, because n number of men have got hold of one 
 sound jirincipie throuj,di which they hope to triumph, ihcy should feel themselves excuscil in 
 j;ivint; their sanction, if not their active support, to a nunilier of evil ones. \'et this is precisely 
 wliat our parties do ; they have one end in view which perhajis they simeiely think a ^'ood one 
 and this end they allow to justify ot siinclify the most scandalous means. Such is tlie party 
 system ; and if any one hints that a system, which not only permits hut erects into a code the 
 loosest moral piactice, may not be worth perpeliialini;, he is pronounced rU once an cnlliiisia'^t, a 
 dreamer, a doctrinaire, a person whom all sensible, jiractical men may comi)lacentIy lauj,di at, 
 without troubling themselves in the least to eni[uire into the value of his ideas. 
 
 " We hold that a i,'reat portion of the evils from which we suffer are due to a defective 
 political system, and to that conhision of mind on political subjects which the current lauf^naj^e 
 in retjard to party is so well calculated to ]n'o(luce. The heart of the people is not ho unsound 
 as some woulil have us believe; and if -the people make up their minds to it, they can have 
 honest men to serve them— men who will ])refer honour to office, and the sense of duty performed 
 to personal triumphs however flatterinji. To preach the cessation of party strife is no do ibt, at 
 jjresent, like crying in the wilderness, but our hope is that, like other preachi ^ that has befjun 
 in the wilderness, it will end by convenin.f the multitude. Stripped of all verbiage and o( all 
 subtleties, tile cpiestion is simply one between good and evil ; and the good must either gain on 
 the evil, or the evil on the good." 
 
 EXPL.VNATION OF HARE'S SCHEME OF KKI'KESKN TATIOX. 
 By M. C. Fa wait, iSj2. 
 
 The end and object of Mr. Hare's scheme is the direct, equal anil jieraonal representation in 
 Parliament of every elector. If this end were accomplished, I'arliamer.t would become the 
 mirror of the nation, and, in proportion to the extension of the suffrage, all opinions would have 
 in Parliament a strength corresponding to their strength in the country To attain this end it 
 would be necessary that each voter should have an e(jual amount of electoral power. At present 
 there is nothing to prevent an elector from having a score of votes in different constituencies. 
 Non-residence not being a disqualification for the county franchise, a man may have a vote for 
 every county in the kingdom, if he can possess him>:elf ol the reepiisite property (jualifications. 
 To remedy this inequality Mr. Hare's plan jirovides that each elector shall have but one vote ; 
 and in order to enable the elector to obtain real representation, he would be permitted to give 
 this vote to any candidate, irrespective of the restrictions of local representation. For instance, 
 a voter living in Hampshire could vote, if he chose, for a candidate standing in Yorkshire, or in 
 any other part of the kingdom. Under this system, those who are willing to serve in I'arlianient 
 might be described as " All England " Candidates, because they could poll votes in every con- 
 stituency in the kingdom. If this p.lan of choosing members of Parliament were adopted, those 
 candidates would of course be elected who obtained the largest number of votes : but in order to 
 prevent inequality of electoral power through one candidate receiving an immensely large number 
 of votes, Mr. Hare's scheme provides that no candidate shall receive more voles than are sufficient 
 to secure his return. F'or this purpose the following arrangement is proposed. It is obvious that 
 
64 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 if all electors were allowed to vote for any candidate, well known and popular men, such as Mr. 
 Ciladstone and Mr. Hrinlii, would receive a lar^e proportion of llie entire nunilier o( votes polled. 
 Kijuality of electoral power, wliicli is one of ill'.- main t)l)jects of the scheme, would l)e (lestroyed 
 if Mr. (Jlad>tone received six times as nriny votes as any other candidate ; for his constituents 
 would then not lie suftieiently rejireseMted in proportion to their numbers. It has therefore been 
 proposed to fmd, by dividing,' the total number of votes polled by the numlK-r of v.it ncies to be 
 fdled, the (piota o( votes necessary for the return of each member. If 658 menibci arc to be 
 elected, and the total number of votes recorded is 2,632,000, four thousand votes would be the 
 ipiota necessary for ilie return of a member. Kach elector would vote by a votini; paper, which 
 would be drawn up in the following' form : — 
 
 Nttinc (ot voter) 
 
 Addri'tia 
 
 Vote, No 
 
 Parish of 
 
 lioroiiuh of 
 
 Tliu !il)Ove-naiiic(l elcetor horeliy recorils his vote for the eandidate nnmeil 
 first in the siilijoiticd list ; or, in tlie went of such eniidiilate liein*,' already 
 eleeti'd, or not oliliiiiiinK the i|Uo(n, IIk,' ttiK>ve-naiiiL'd elector votes for the 
 sccoiid'imined eniididate, and so on, In their lunnerieal order, viz.: 
 
 1. (Name ot eandidate). 
 
 2. (Ditto of another) 
 
 3. (Ditto of anothu.-) 
 
 ■1. (I)iltoof another) 
 
 (and so on, adilini; as many as the elector chooses). 
 
 ¥,■ 
 
 The fore},'oin{; form, fdled up with the names proposeil by tlie voter, expresses in substance 
 this :— I <lesire to be represented by the candidate whose name I have placed No. I. If he 
 should obtain his ciuoia of votes before mine comes to be counted, or if he should fail to obtain a 
 suftlcient ninnber. and therefore caimot be elected, I direct tliat my vote be transferred to the 
 Candidate I have ])laced sa \o. 2, and under the same conditions, to candidate No. 3, and so on.* 
 
 The above comprises the whole of the so-called complexity of Mr. Hare's system of repre- 
 sentation. The main principles of the scheme mifjht be tabulated as follows:^ 
 
 1. All voters to be represented in Parliament. 
 
 2. Each Member of Parliament to represent an equal immber of voters, 
 
 3. Each elector to have one vote. 
 
 4. Electors to be allowed to vole for any candidate, 
 
 5. Electors to be allowed to transfer their votes from one candidate to another, so thai no 
 votes are thrown awoy for canilidates already elected, or for those who have no chance qf obtain- 
 ing the quota. 
 
 The most striking efiects of such a deviation from the traditional methoil of conducting 
 elections would first be seen in Parliament itself. The House of Commons woukl then no longer 
 be filled with local magnates, whose names are unknown outside their own boroughs, and whose 
 only recommendation to serve in Parliament consists in their employing a large number of work- 
 men, and being able consequently to command a considerable number of votes. On the contrary, 
 the House of Commons -vould be filled by really representative men, who would be sent to 
 Parliament not solely on account of their wealth and local influence, but on account of their 
 
 
 * Pamphlet on Representation Reform, issued by a Committee appointed by the Reform League, p. 9. 
 
hare's .SCHEME OF REPRKHENTATION. 
 
 G5 
 
 no 
 
 [ill- 
 
 o|>inii)ns. A comtnnn clirirt;i; l)rinij;lit aj;ainst this plan of ]iroportioiml representation is tliat it 
 would Ijring into tlie House of Coninioiis noiiody liut tlie representatives of crotcliets, In reply 
 to this it may be stnteil that it will lie their own fault if people without crotchets are unrepre- 
 M-'nted ; if, indeed, they are so few as not to heahle to secure a ipiota of voles for their candi- 
 d.vles, ihen the House of Commons will justly lie composed of crotchety members ; it would nut 
 he representative if it were not. 
 
 Tile effect of Mr. Hare's scheme upon constituencies would he more gradual, hut not less 
 lieneficial, tlian its effect on the House of Commons, '['he present system of selectinj,' candidates 
 leaves little or no choice to the mass of the electors ; they mu>t either support the candidate 
 startetl by the wire-pullers of their own party or not vote at all. Hence the franchise is too often 
 exercised merely mechanically ; little study is^jiven to political (|Uestions. Men vote with their 
 party as a matter of course, and the minimum of political intelligence is evoked. If, on the 
 other hand, electors were free to vote for whom they ple.ased, they would probably be induced to 
 examine into the respective merits of a considerable number of candidates. Instead rf 
 votinji blindly, and for no assignable reason, for the local candidate, they would be obli^jed to 
 make n selection between many dilTerent candidates, and would feel that they were actin^j fool- 
 ishly if they could not justify their choice. An elector is now seldom asked, " Why did you 
 vote for Mr. A ? " If such a question were asked, the reply would probably be, " Mr. A wa^ 
 brought out by the party ; we didn t like him i)articularly, but we voted for him, because, if we 
 had split, the other side would have got in their man." If electors were free to vote for any 
 candidate, the ipiestion, " Why did you vote for Mr. A ? " would receive a very ilil'ferent answer. 
 It would probably be something like this, " I read through his address, and his views on the 
 political questions of the day are those that I liold ; and, as far as one can judge of his character, 
 I believe him to be an honest and indejiendent man." In this way the selection of a candidate 
 would produce an educational and moral iiilluence on each elector, especially as he would be 
 required to name a succession of candidates, and to place them in the order in which he esteemed 
 their merit. The educational effect produced by inducing electors carefully to weigh the respec- 
 tive claims of a large number of candidates would be very considerable, and would ])robably 
 stimulate a great increase of the mental activity brought to bear on political (juestions. The 
 moral effect produced by giving a free and independent choice of a representative to each elector 
 would be invaluable. At present a candidate, no matter how bad his personal character may be, 
 is thrust upon a constituency by half-a-dozen active wire-pullers, and the electors frccpicntly have 
 no choice between not voting at all, voting for a man of notoriously bad character, or voting 
 against their political convictions. Kew electors would deliberately declare that their free and 
 unfettered choice as a representative, the man whom they desired al>ove all others to see in 
 Parliament, was a well-known roid, a fraudulent director of companies, or one who had been 
 convicted of personal bribery 
 
 The great advantage which Mr. Hare's plan possesses over all other schemes of proportional 
 rejiresentation is, that it would give to each elector one vote, and would allow him to give this 
 vote to any candidate he pleased. The choice of an elector would not be restricted to the candi- 
 dates who might happen to present themselves for election in any jiarticular constituency. By 
 this means a minority, however locally insignificant, could join its votes with those of other 
 electors in other localities, and thus secure the return of a representative. If, for instance, 600 
 members had to be returned at a general election, and the voters in all the constituencies 
 amounted to 600,000, any thousand electors, no matter where they resided — they might be 
 scattered in twos or threes all over the country — could secure the return of a representative. 
 The present restricted choice of constituencies seems to act as a process of natural selection to 
 weed out from Parliament, and from political activity in constituencies, men whose opinions are 
 characterized by special loftiness or originality. Even ordinary uprightness and intelligence 
 sometimes deter electors from joining actively in political life. An honest, intelligent and cultivat- 
 ed man is apt to turn in disgust from taking any part in an election, when he finds that he has to 
 choose between voting for a promoter of false and fraudulent companies, a religious bigot, or a 
 
 lii 
 
 i 
 
66 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 man wlio has never read a book or had an idea in his life. If such an elector could feel that he 
 was not compelled to submit to the farce of being represented by such candidates, but could 
 choose from amon},' all public men, who were willing to undertake the duties and responsi- 
 bilities of a member of Parliament, he would no longer feel himself shut out from real repreM.-n- 
 tation, and a stimulus of the very i)est kind would thus be given to political activity. In all 
 contests there is enough and to spare of the worst kind of activity and enthusiasm, spring- 
 ing from the mear st and most contemptible of passions ; if ]iolitical life is to be improved, 
 it is not by crushing out activity and enthusiasm, but by changing the source from which they 
 too often spring, A strong influence would be brought to bear in this direction by affording the 
 means of real representation to all voters, instead of leaving them to the tender mercies of local 
 candidates. 
 
 THE DECLINE OF PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 By Gohhuin Smith. Extrait from Macmillaii's Alagaziite, Vol. XXX V/., iS-jf. 
 
 It is curious with what implicit faith we have all reposed upon party, as the normal, permanent 
 and only possible mode of carryin<> on a free constitution, disregarding not only the objections 
 which reason oliviously suggests to the system and the general evidences of its bad effects on 
 politics and political character, but the facts which showed plainly enough that its foundations 
 were giving way, and that if this was the only basis of government, government was likely to be 
 soon left without a basis. 
 
 In normal times the occupations of legislatures and governments will be matters 
 of current administration, not one of which is likely to form an issue of sufficient importance to 
 swallow up all the rest and form a rational ground for the division of the nation into two 
 organized parties struggling each to place its leaders in exclusive possession of the powers of the 
 state. 
 
 In the second place, questions of expediency, however important, do not last for ever ; in 
 one way or other they are settled and disappear from the political scene. Slavery dies and is 
 buried. Parliamentary Reform is carried out with all its corollaries, and becomes a thing of the 
 past. Whcit is to follow? Another question of sufficient importance to warrant a division of 
 the nation into parties must be found. But suppose no such question exists, are we to manu- 
 facture one? That is the work to which the wire-pullers devote themselves in democracies 
 governed by party, 
 
 . , In Canada, for example, while New World society was struggling to repel the 
 intrusive elements of the old rigime forced upon it by the Imperial country, and to extort self- 
 government, the parties, though not altogether edifying in their behaviour or salutary in their 
 intluence upon popular character, were at least formed upon real lines. But the struggle ended 
 with the abolition of the State Church and the secularization of the Clergy Reserves. .Since 
 that time there has been no real dividing line between the parties ; they have ceased to be truly 
 directed to public objects of any kind ; their very names have become unintelligible. Politics 
 under such a party system must inevitably sink at last into an " interested contest for place and 
 emolument " carried on by "impostors who delude *he ignorant with professions incompatible 
 with human practice, and afterwards incense them by practices below the level of vulgar recti- 
 tude." It is needless to say what effects an incessant war of intrigue, calumny and corruption 
 carried on by such party leaders, with the aid of the sort of journalists who are willing to take 
 their pay, must produce on the political character of a community, however naturally good, and 
 well adapted for self-government. Nobody is to blame. The blame rests entirely on the system. 
 
 il 
 
RKPRfcSENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 67 
 
 It is needless to dilate upon the relations of party, its machinery, its strategy, the press 
 which serves it and expresses its passions, to public morality and the general interests of the 
 state ; the facts are always before our eyes. But experience of a colony or of some new country 
 is needed to make one thoroughly sensible of the effects of this warfare upon the political 
 character of the people, and of the extent to which it threatens to sap the very foundations of 
 patriotism and of respect for lawful authority in their minds. 
 
 Party is no doubt indispensable to selfish interests, which by taking advantage of the balance 
 of factions are enabled, to an almost indefmite extent to compass their special objects at the 
 expense of the community. It is indispensable to political sharpers who, without legislative 
 powers or any sort of ability or inclination to serve the public in any honorable way, find 
 subsistence in an element of passion and intrigue. To whom or to what else it is indispensable, 
 no one has been able definitely to say. 
 
 The tendency inherent in party government to supersede the national legislature by the party 
 caucus has long been comjjletely developed in the United States, where it may be said that in 
 ordinary times the only real debates are those held in caucus, congressional legislation being 
 simply a registration of the caucus deci,>ion, for which all members of the party, whether they 
 agreed or dissented in the caucus, feel bound by party allegiance to record their votes in the 
 House ; just as the only real election is the nomination by the caucus of the party which has the 
 majority, and which then collectively imposes its will on the constituency ; so that measures and 
 elections may be and often are carried by a majority but little exceeding one-fourth of the house 
 or the constituency, as the case may be. The same tendency is rapidly developing itself in 
 England ; and it is evidently fatal to the genuine existence of Parliamentary institutions. 
 
 So far as England is concerned, the institution of an executive regularly elected by the 
 legislature at large in place of a cabinet formed of the leaders of a party majority would be sub- 
 stantially a return to the old form of government — the Privy Council. Parliament is now the 
 sovereign power, and election by it would be equivalent to the ancient nomination by the crown. 
 The mode of electing and confirming a .Speaker shows how the forms of monarchy may be 
 reconciled with the action of an elective institution. 
 
 THE REPRESENTATION OF MINORITIES. 
 
 the 
 rt self- 
 their 
 I ended 
 Since 
 truly 
 I'olitics 
 Ice and 
 Datible 
 recti- 
 Kipiion 
 Ito take 
 Ll, and 
 lysteni. 
 
 By Leonard Courtney. Extracts from Nineteenth Century, Vol. VI. iS'jg, 
 
 . . The idea of the representation of minorities is this : that if you have got one 
 thousand electors to elect ten representatives, any hundred of the thousand might combine 
 together to vote for one of the ten, and if they combined you inight get \\\<^ whole thousand 
 electors represented in your ten, each hundred getting a representative. S j throughout the 
 whole kingdom the forces might be so distributed that each group vill be collected together, 
 and vote for a particular man, sending him to represent them. If that could be realized, you 
 would secure the first object of the representative principle : you would get the representation of 
 the whole. The elected body would have the flexibility and the life of the electing body. It 
 would be the electing body itself in miniature. As the people in the country wo combine, 
 so the elected representatives would combine, representing every determination of tlie original 
 body. You have, therefore, under this principle of the representation of minorities, an assured 
 result — namely, the security that in the body elected there will be an acruraie reflection of the 
 persons who elected them. 
 
 This is only the first reason, though it is one of great importance, why this system should 
 be preferred. What is the effect of the present system on the character of the representatives 
 
i 
 
 
 
 If 
 
 ii 
 
 68 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 chosen? And aijaiu what is the effect on the electors themselves? How are the men chosen 
 under the present majority system ? It is a very great difficulty to j;et a canditlate ; you have 
 some experience of that here. How shall you get hold of a proper candidate ? Under the old 
 plan, now becoming discredited, there was usually some select committee, who had interviews 
 with certain peoiile, tested them, .and then came to a conclusion to run for tiie constituency. 
 Under the new plan you have election-committees of hundreds by which you intend to make a 
 selection. We don't know what will be the principle of action of these committees. Under the 
 old plan the primary object w.is generally this : ' We must have a man to keep the party to- 
 gether. We want a man who will not lose the support of any secti(m of the party.' This last 
 was the great point held in view. You must keep the party togetiier ; therefore your candidate 
 must have in him nothing that will drive away any members of the party from adhering to the 
 choice of the few. In order to do that you must have a man who will offend nobody — who will 
 be free from all tendency to kick over the traces: whether in thought or in action, he must keep 
 well within the party lines. If he will vote ste.adily and pledge himself to support the leader 
 for the time being, he has the best chance of success. That is the way in which the mass of 
 members have been chosen, and candidates have always been obliged to beir this in mind. The 
 first duty of a candidate is to be prudent — not to offend anybody — to subdue his mind as far as 
 possible to the lowest level compatible with any life at all, and to be careful not to disturb the 
 prejudices of any section at all. That is the necessity of getting a majority of any constituency. 
 The result is to produce a candidate with the gift of mediocrity. You would not find a majority of 
 your constituency to go together for a man who is pronounced in his opinions, or in his character, 
 or in the force of his thought ; and the result is, that the strongest man has to be put aside in order 
 that the moderate man may be run, because the moderate man has the best chance of winning. 
 If this is anything like an accurate representation of the fixcts, the result must be a degradation 
 of the character of your candidates, and of your electoral body. If you get indifferent materials 
 to worl; with, you cannot do good work ; and if you send into the Legislature such men as I 
 have described, you will not make a brilliant assembly out of them. 
 
 But the evil goes furthe. than that. Having brought down in this way the temper and 
 mind of candidates, you produce a feeling throughout the country that the thing to be regarded 
 is the movement of the m.ass of the people. You will find that from the candidates the sense of 
 dependence upon the cohesion of unknown masses passes on until the leaders themselves are 
 affected with the s.ame dependence upon the words and thoughts of the mass of the people. 
 Instead of having leaders inspiring and instructing their followers, you will have leaders waitmg 
 on the swaying hither and thither of the people, waiting for the movement of the masses. 
 
 Now as to one other merit of this system. If you could get it into operation, you would at 
 once get all the persons in the electorate represented in the elected body, because there would 
 be none outside who would not have a representative inside. Under the present system many of 
 those outside, have no representative inside, having no living connection with the governing body 
 of their country. If a person outside has a living connection with those inside — if he can always 
 say, ' I voted for that man ' — he will keep his eye on what is going on inside ; he feels he has an 
 interest in what is going on. Every one can understand what an astonishing effect it has on the 
 interest we take in the House of Commons if. we have a relation insiile. If this interest was 
 extended to all — if, as I have said, every man could feel that he h.ad some one there for whom he 
 voted, who was his man — then, to use expressive words, every one would feel he was ' built in ' 
 to the .State. The House of Commons would be vivified, and the nation with it, and all would 
 make up one living existence of which the House of Commons was simply the consummation. 
 Instead of hav--„ .^ half-dead-alive country, you would have a living, growing country — you 
 would have fresh and vigorous life bursting forth on all sides throughout the country. Bear in 
 mind also that a Chamber thus representative would be a Chamber of larger information, of 
 broader sympathies, and f wider range of aim than any we can now possess ; that being truly 
 representative, all classes would find their representation in it. 
 
 One great result that would arise from the reform I advocate would be disintegration of 
 
 is 
 m: 
 
 kii 
 
 SOI 
 po 
 
 an 
 iii; 
 be,' 
 
 th< 
 
PARTY RULE IN THK UNITED STATES. 
 
 69 
 
 party. Parties would not cling together so closely as Conservatives and Liberals do now. 
 Amongst Conservatives you would find differences of opinion as also amongst Liberals, and you 
 would more freely detach men, one by one, from any majority. At present scarcely any member 
 of a party ever dares desert it ; but if a man had not to depend for his seat on mere party 
 cohesion within a limited area — if he knew that his independence would bring support from a 
 wider range— you would have more freedom of thought, and there would be more room for 
 conversion than you now have. Not that men are not converted now. Many are converted in 
 their minds, but they do not change theii votes. 
 
 m of 
 
 PARTY RULE IN THE UNITED STATES 
 
 From "A True Republic." By Albert Stickney. 
 
 Id the minds of the men of 1787 who framed the Constitution of the United States, one 
 idea stood out more strongly than any other. 
 
 The intention was that this Government should be, as the phrase is, a government by 
 the people, that — 
 
 1 . The people should choose their own rulers. 
 
 2. The people's offices should be used only in the people's service. 
 The result has been a government by party. 
 
 1. Party has chosen the people's rulers. 
 
 2. The people's offices have been used in the service of party. 
 
 As it seems to me, few men are in the habit of thinking how far these two statements 
 are true, how thoroughly the interests of the people have been sacriticed by our public 
 servants to the needs of the party. It is a point worthy our careful consideration. 
 
 Party did not at once get its full growth. Nor did the system of party rule at once 
 bring its full fruits. Able men wished to servo the people under the Government ; and the 
 people wished and had their services. It took many years for party polities to drive our 
 best men from public life, where they wished to be. 
 
 But the system began its work early. The abuses began as soon as parties got their 
 existence. In the earliest days of party history, party men acted on true party principles. 
 They used the people's offices to pay for party services. They used officirvl power for party 
 ends. 
 
 In theory and in law, the people elect their rulers. In fact, these rulers are not elected 
 by the people, but are appointed by the party leaders. The real working of the Government 
 is controlled, not by the officials whom the people nominally elect, but by the party 
 managers who really appoint those officials. These party managers hold, as such, no position 
 known to the law ; they have no duties or responsibilities under the law. Usually they hold 
 some official position for the purpose of drawing a salary from the people. But the real 
 power they have, not from their official position, but because they control the party policy, 
 and, above all, the party nominations. And they hold tliuir real power in the State, not for 
 any short term of years, but without any limit whatever as to time, simply until tyranny 
 becomes unl'earable, and we have a peaceful revolution at the polls. 
 
 When our Constitution of 1787 was formed, the American people intended to use wisely 
 the lessons they had from English history, and from all history. They had learned that 
 
 ll 
 
i i '■. 
 
 70 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Mi 
 
 m 
 
 I 
 
 irresponsible power in a hereditary monarch certainly made a tyranny. They said, there- 
 fore, we will have no hereditary king, and no tyrannj' l>y any man or set of men. Tiiey 
 established, as they thought, a true republic — a govcruineiit, of tlie pcoi)le, by the people, 
 for the people. They established, as a matter of fact, a powerful oligarchy, a tyranny, of the 
 people, l)y party, for party. They kept, as they thought, the real control of the ftovernmeut. 
 They kept, as a matter of fact, notiiing l)\it a rigiit of peaceful revolution. Elsewhere 
 tyriinny and revolution both violate the law; with us they liotli follow it. Often, before 
 our time, revolution has resulted only in a change of tyrants ; with us it is still the same. We 
 rebel against the tyranny of one party ; we simply place ourselves under the rule of the other 
 party ; and then again go through the same cycle of tyranny and revolt. 
 
 The LVmstitution of the Uuite<l States hail been formed "to secure the blessings of 
 liberty " to the petjple of the United .States in the year 1787, and their posterity after them. 
 . . We have had the election of our rulers taken from us by party oligarchies. We 
 have had the money of the people stolen and their lives wasted by the olhcers who should 
 have guarded us from harm. We have had our courts of justice used, not to protect the 
 life, liberty, and property, but to rob honest men, and open prison doors for convicted 
 thieves. 
 
 But, it is sometimes said, the real cause of the present condition of our public affairs is 
 the fact that we no longer have the same class of men in public life as in years gone by. 
 Where are the Websters, the Calhouns, the Clays, in our national Government of to-day, it 
 may be asked? It is said we sufTer from our own apathy ; we have in our hands the remedy 
 against these wrongs — we must choose a better class of men for our public olhcers. 
 
 But why is it that we no longer have the same class of men as of old in public place ? 
 How does it happen that our public men are no longer as able or upright as they were in 
 former years ? For, without imagining all the glory to have passed from the earth, it will 
 be generally admitted that there has been a falling off in the character of the men in our 
 l)ublic service. 
 
 This is only another effect of party rule. 
 
 No man can now hold ottice under our (Jovernment for any long time unless he will 
 sacrifice the interests of the people to the interests of party. The party leaders wish pliant 
 men who will serve party, and not honest men who will sei've only the people. 'I'hey will 
 not have in official position men whom they cannot control and use. The men they cannot 
 control and use they drive f"om public life. 
 
 The men who stay in public life are compelled to yield and submit to party. They can- 
 not resist the immense party pressure which surrounds them. We have notably three 
 Presidents — Mr. Lincoln, General Grant, and Mr. Hayes — each of whom, as most men will 
 agree, took office with the purpose of always serving the people without regard to the 
 interests of party. They all at last gave themselves more or less completely to the control 
 of the party men. So long as they tried to do their simple duty to the people, they found 
 themselves in the midst of enemies, without friends. They had to surrender. To resist 
 would take strength more than human. 
 
 But is there any way out of this party tyranny ? May it not be that this party tyranny 
 is a necessary incident of republican institutions in any form, that it is an evil which we must 
 submit to, and bear as well as we can ? May it not be, even that party has itj good points, 
 its advantages ? 
 
 To answer these questions, we must consider what are the causes which bring party into 
 existence, the nature of party, and its uses. 
 
 All men will admit that party rule, as we have had it in this country, has been attended 
 with great evils and abuses. But most men think that tliese evils are merely accidents o { 
 
 im> 
 

 PARTY RULE IN TIIK LNITKU STATES. 
 
 71 
 
 the time, that in some way party government eau be kept and these evils can he removed, that 
 these evils are far outweighed hy the good results which party brings, and that party, with 
 all its evils, is a machinery without which free government cannot exist. 
 
 I believe this to be a mistake ; that these evils which we have had are not mere acci- 
 dents, but that they are ot the very essence of party ; that we cannot rid ourselves of these 
 evils uidcss we rid ourselves of jjarty ; that what men call the good results of party we 
 should still get if we had no parties ; that party, instead of being a iiaehinery necessary to 
 the existence of free government, is its most dangerous foe ; and that in order to get anything 
 M'liieh really deserves the niimo of republican government, we must destroy i)art}' altogether. 
 
 Uur public servants, who depended for keeping their offices on carrying elections, in the 
 same way gave their l)est etl'orts to carrying elections. Whetlier they wished it or not, our 
 iniblic servants were driven t)y tliis i)oint in our system of government to make this work 
 of carrying elections their regular profession. In that profession they gained great skill, 
 hi that work they were sure to have more skill than the ordinary citizens, who gave their 
 time and thougiit to other things. The professional must always beat the amateur. These 
 party organizations became vast and powerful. The leaders of tliese parties controlled party 
 action. It came to be the fact (almost without exception), that no man could be chosen to 
 an ortico without a party nomination, and no man could have a party nomination against the 
 will of the party leaders. And the party leaders would g >e party nominations to no man 
 who did not do party service. The natural and certain result was, that party leaders, for 
 party purposes, controlled the elections of public servants, and the action of public servants 
 after they were elected. 
 
 So it has always been in English Parliamentary history. Each party has been, at one 
 time or another, on both sides of every important question of government policy. Principles 
 and measures have had little to do with the action of parties in England, except there, as 
 here, the party leaders have used the great questions of the day as battle-cries in the struggle 
 for place. Many great men and honest men in England have been party men. They have, 
 too, done groat service to the English people. But they have done that good service always 
 in spite of party and party iiilluences. 
 
 We have in this country developed not only parties, but euormoug party machinery for 
 the mere purpose of carrying elections — a machinery that is intricate, . ostly, powerful, and 
 tyrannii'al. The man in public place in these days in this country must be, not a statesman, 
 but a man of skill and capacity in manipulating this election machinery. 
 
 It is said that parties are combinations of citizens for the purpose of carrying measures. 
 I maintain, on the contrary, that these condonations, which we call parties, never can be 
 anything but combinations of otHce-holders, or office-seekers, to carry elections. 
 
 And with the men who manage these parties, however upright may be their intentions, 
 the end which is iirst, in point of time, is to get office for themselves ; to this end they must 
 have the support of other party men ; to this end they must give their support to other part}' 
 men. The ]>arty organization naturally and certainly becomes an organization of men who 
 combine and work together to secure their own election to the different places under govern- 
 ment. It becomes, try to disguise it as we may, a system of trading in office. 
 
 In the afifairs, too, of great nations, or even of a single city, there are, not one or two, 
 but very many, weighty (juestions of public policy. As a matter of fact, the men composing 
 these large parties cannot all agree on more than one or two of those main questions. Nor 
 do they profess to. And as to those one or two main questions, they agree, not on actual 
 measures to be carried, but only on what they are pleased to term general principles. 
 
 There is, however, one point on which the party leaders can agree — their candidates for 
 office. And here they do agree. On all other points they must differ, and they do dififer. 
 
 .'if 
 
 
n 
 
 72 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 They do iiuleeil, before each election, say soinothiiig about "principles;" they make a 
 " platform," as they term it — a collection of " sounding and glittering generalities," so vague 
 as tn mean nothing, by which they think they can catch votes. This word "platform" truly 
 describes the tiling for which it is the name. It is something to be put under foot. 
 
 Whatever may be the theory of political parties as they shouM be, wherever there are 
 many oltices and many elections, the natural and cc-tain result is that these party organiza- 
 tions, as a fact, are used for the purpose of carrying elections and not measures. Parties tlo 
 not elect men to put into action certain principles ; they u.se principles as battle-cries to elect 
 certain men. 
 
 That is not only the working of party rule, it is the theory of parly rule as it actually 
 exists. Any other statement is only the theory of party rule as men wish it might be. 
 
 We have seen so much of parties and party contests that we have almost come to look 
 on them as an end in themselves. But what is always the real end to be reached in pul)lic 
 afl'airs ? .a we should all agree, it is action of some kind. In order to have that action wise, 
 we need calm thought and discussion before we decide what that action shall be, and united 
 effort after our action is decided. We need at every stage, not strife between two factions, 
 but harmony of all men. We must have the workimj together, of all men's minds, to get the 
 wisest thought, of all men's wills, to get the strongest action. 
 
 And how does this machinery of party tend to help or hinder us in getting these results, 
 wise thought and strong action, from both the people and their public servants ? 
 
 Parties and party contests make it iin impossible thing to gei. from the people their calm 
 wise thought and action. One party seizes one side of the ques'^ion, the other party takes 
 the other side, or, oftener, each party takes different aides in different sections of the country. 
 What the party men labor for is not to tind out the best thing to be done ))y the men of all 
 parties, but to catch votes for their own party. And their whole effort is to make nitii 
 follow i)arty and work for party success, instead of using their minds and their judgments. 
 In party contests men do not tiiink over measures ; they light for candidates. We have 
 alwf ys strife, not deliberation. 
 
 So it ia as to the action and thought of the people themselves. But how is it as to the 
 action of our public servants ? It is our right to have our Senators and Representatives sit 
 down together and give us the best possible results of their combined wisdom. When once 
 they enter our legislative halls they have no right to know that there is such a thing as 
 party in existence. They arc bound to think oidy what are the best measures for tlie 
 people's interest, and to give us those measures. That is not what they do. Every measure 
 is made a " party (jucstion." If the administration party, as it is called, brings forward a 
 wise measure, the opposition party, if it dare, opposes it, for fear their enemies may gain 
 votes through having done the people good service. These party men may be able men ; 
 they may be men of honest intentions. They are driven l)y the pressure of this vast party 
 machinery to serve party and not the people, whether they wish it or not ; for on party they 
 depend for their future. 
 
 So much as to whether party and party machinery Helps or hinders us in getting from the 
 people and their servants wise action. But when measures are once decided and taken, 
 surely no one can claim that party strife as to those measures should go on unceasingly. But 
 it never ends. Ho question ia ever at rest. 
 
 In private affairs, when men have once made a decision, they act. The decision may or 
 may not be wise. Of that they cannot be certain. But when the decision is once made, 
 they do something — they put their decision to a trial ; aud if, ujjon trial, they lind they have 
 made a mistake, then they try something else. In j)ublic affairs we should do the same. 
 When a course of action is once determined on, then all men should agree, in putting it to 
 
 i 
 
 m% 
 
^ 
 
 
 PAHTY RULE IN THK irNITKD STATES. 
 
 7S 
 
 the test of experience ]f the course of action is not wise, time will so prove ; and then we 
 can try other measures. And so we whould do, were it not for party. 
 
 Hut it is in time of war, when a people hIiouM he united, when th?y must show an un- 
 •)roken front to tlieir enemies, that the greatest evils from |)arty have ever come. In eveiy 
 time of danger tliat the ])eople of the United .States have yet had, party has nearly ruined 
 us. Party men, whatever may have heen their intentions, have in practice not heeded the 
 needs of the people, have looked at party ends, have brought war <m us when it suited their 
 purposes, and, when war has come, have done much to brinj? on us defeat and destruction. 
 
 In the only two important wars we have had, the war of ISl'J and the war of the rebel- 
 lion, when all men should have united ng.vinst the common enemy, we have been nearly 
 ruined by party strife. 
 
 The calm opinion of to-day is that the war of 1812 was entirely needless, that it was 
 begun on no suttlcieut reason, that it was carried on with disgraceful inefficiency, and that it 
 brought no substantial results. That the war ever came, or that it was carried on as it was, 
 was due to the violence of party contest. One party dragged us into war for party reasons. 
 The other party, after war had come, did its utmost to cripple the administration and make 
 the war a ruinous failure, for party reasons. 
 
 The war of the rebellion came. As to whether it would have come had it not .» for 
 |iarty strife, many men differ. But after the war once came, as to the disastrous et .cts of 
 party strife men cannot differ. 
 
 Again, as in the war of 1812, when the nation was in the greatest danger, whti. wo 
 needed, of all things, that all loyal men should sink their differences of opinion on other 
 matters, and tight togetlier for mere existence, we had nearly half the men at the North 
 arrayed in opposition to the Government, doing all tiiey could, whatever may have been their 
 purpose, to aid the public enemy and destroy the nation. 
 
 In short, at all times, in war and peace, the need of the people is agreement — on some- 
 thing to be done. Then 'h1 of parties and party men is always strife over what they call 
 " principles." 
 
 We have in this country every four years a convulsion of the whole nation. The entire 
 business of the community stands still at an iran ise money loss. If the men of a new 
 party come into power, they may aihtpt a totally new system of levying revenue ; they may 
 liring in a new taritf ; they may overthrow the existing currency, or issue a (juantity of irre- 
 deemable paper money. The commercial and banking operations of the whole country 
 may be thrown into utter confusion. Prosperity may be changed to ruin, for large number 
 of our citizens, according to the particular measures that demagogues think will carry them 
 into olKce. The mere machinery and labor of a Presidential elee" on cost immense sums of 
 money. Tliis money is paid, in one shape or another, Ijy the people, and out of the people's 
 purse. Why should the people pay this imuiense tax every foui" years, have their public 
 servants at all times doing duty to the party instead of the Statu, and be subjecteil to tliin 
 immense business loss and this enormous upheaval of the whole social fabric? We miy, 
 indeed, live through it. The people's liberties may not be permanently destroyed by it. 
 We may be prosperous in spite of it. But why should we have it ? 
 
 The JInglish system of government and our own system are both bad. We have a 
 revolution once in four years. They have one whenever the ministry are beaten in the 
 House of Commons. I do not yet feel certain wliich system is the worse. 
 
 We come, then, to the next point. Is it a necessary thing to have this party strife, in 
 order to keep alive the interest of the people in public affairs ? 
 
 One of most frequent complaints of the day is that our people, and especially the edu- 
 cated men, do not take an interest in public affairs. And the complaint is in a measure well 
 
 
t 
 
 i 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Ill 
 
 lii; 
 
 iii 
 
 '■hi 
 
 : F * 
 
 it ii 
 
 2ii!i 
 
 foundod. Mc!n di) not take a liealthy iiitorost iu tho iifTaii's of our (iovonimeut. And why 
 is it HO ? Simply this : the ordinary citizen knows tiiat lio has no powor, that the party men 
 can and will nianago our govornmeut affairs very nearly as tiiey ehoose. Fiut before party 
 machinery and party power l)eoanie so fully developed, men did take the deepest interest in 
 all the atl'airs of the nation. 
 
 All int'n in the country, hut the educated men more than any others, think and read 
 and talk of pul>lie allairs more now than ever before. As a class, the educated men are more 
 eager thin any others to go into public life. Xothing else has for them such fascinations. 
 Mut thi^y cannot get there. They are ke])t out by the party loaders. 'I'hey try again and 
 again, and they fail. What has at times seemed the indifference of elegant leisure is in fact 
 the despair of repeated defeat. 
 
 Is it a [tossible thing that men of any class should lose tlieir interest in the public affairs 
 of their own country, of their own time ? This government and these laws, we live under 
 them. They make or mar men's fortunes and the fortunes of tlieir children. Men who 
 read and think at all, read and think of the atl'iii's of every people and of every age. Wher- 
 ever we go, in a railway train or in the farm-houses, we hear all men discussing matters of 
 European politics. Are we suddenly to lose all interest in the affairs only of our own 
 country, and in the making of our own laws? On the contrary, remove these narty oligar- 
 chies, and the best men in the country wcmhl again come into public life. Keraove these 
 party contests, and we should have instead of this feverish upheaval once in four years over 
 a mere struggle for office, a steady, healthy interest in ((uestions of public policy. When 
 men found that thoj' really had some power in the atl'airs of State, they would try to use it. 
 Men in any country have never, under any circumstances, been able to lose their interest in 
 the affairs of their own (iovenimeut. We are not now to have such a miracle for the first 
 timi! in the world's history. 
 
 To say that we must have these party contests in order to keep up the interest of the 
 ])eople in public affairs, is to say that a man must have a fever once iu four years to keep 
 warm. 
 
 Are these party combinations, then, necessary to [)reserve free government ? 
 
 All the republics in history have been destroyed by party — t)y these organizations of 
 men who have made a profession of carrying elections. The tyraiiny of kings has been often 
 overthrown by one people or another in the history of nations. The tyranny of party is the 
 most dangerous enemy freedom can have. No people has ever yet concpiered it. These 
 single royal tyrants, with only one life, are puny things ; but this immense monster party, 
 which is immortal, has the people's own strength. 
 
 Hut if these were the only evils resulting from pirty combinations we might be com- 
 paratively at ease. We have not yet the worst point. It is this necessity of carrying elections, 
 under which we put all our public servants, which is the root of all the corruption of our 
 pul Mien. We bind them hand and foot, in the chains of party slavery. And we do 
 more ; we compel them to serve the powerful interests in the land which control votes. Our 
 public servants, on ipiestions of revenue, on all matters of legislation, where we have a right 
 to their honest judgment and honest action, do not give us their honest judgment and lioiiest 
 action. They are driven to look at the next election They say they work for their p.arty. 
 They give it too good a name. They shape their official action in such a way as to gain the 
 support at the next election of the rich and powerful men and corporations. Disguise 
 it as we may, they sell their otticiid action for votes ; and the next step downward, the sell- 
 ing of official action for money, is one that is easily and often taken. But that is not often 
 the first step. 
 
 Some men have been in the hfd)it of thinking that the corruption which we have had 
 among members of Congress and of State Legislatures was some special fruit of some special 
 
 IHi 
 
 
RF.PUKSENTATIVK OOVKHNMICNT IN KNGLAND. 
 
 7r) 
 
 '■■■ii 
 
 feature of rei)ul)li(:aii institutiitus. This is a iniHtake. Wheiiovor, uiuliir any syHtuin of 
 f,'iivcniinoiit, it is ncui'ssary for ]ml)lii: ollicors to evtcli votes for oluotioiis, tlu^y will catch the 
 Votes. The votes will lie bought and paid for in money, or olliue, or oiKuial action, as the 
 ease may bo, whether it bo under a monarchy or a reimblic. 
 
 This thing that we call party is the poison which makes a healthy national life an im- 
 possible thing These great party combinations, instead of being eoniliinations of citizens to 
 carry wise measures in the interest of the [leojile, are inily combinations of politicians to 
 carry elections in their own interest. Parties, so far from being necessary to carry measures, 
 to keep alive the interest of tht! pcoplt' in imblic affairs, and thus to jireserve free govern- 
 ment, are the most ])owerful hindrances to etiicieiit action, kei^i alivi' endless and nee<lkss 
 strife, are hot-beds of corruption, ami are tlie most dangerous encMuies that free government 
 can have. 
 
 This party oligarchy under which we now sutler is not the creration of any one set of men. 
 The ))resent ])arty leaders are not responsilile for its existence ; they are not to be blamed 
 for it. It is the natural legitimate fruit of our govi^rnmeut system, it is not from clioice 
 that our public men sacritiee the interests of the people for those of party. They form these 
 immense and powerful combinations only because our system of government drives them to 
 it. They nuist carry these elections, or they will lose their places. 
 
 The people of the United States have a new and great problem to solve. That they 
 will solve it I make no doubt. 
 
 Tile immense growth of party which we have had in this country is something new in 
 history. 1 do not think its evi.s have been duly weighed ; nor do 1 think its causes have 
 been carefully studied. » 
 
 Party and party rule, as they now exist with us, are, as I believe, great evils — evils 
 which naturally and certainly result from certain features in our ]iolitical system. 
 
 In private life we find in every profession and employment many men who do their 
 woik as well as they know how. We have at times such men in public life ; but, as a rule, 
 our public nusn <lo tlieir work, not as well as they know how, but only as well as the interests 
 of party will allow them. Many of those men have gooil intentions, but they are bouud in 
 the chains of party. Party controls the selection of our public servants ; it controls tlieir 
 actions. 
 
 I believe all this can be changed. There is somewhere a remedy for this state of things. 
 That remedy can be found. And if the remedy can be found it will be used, I have un- 
 bounded faith in the honesty and sound sense of the i)eople. 
 
 I 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT IN ENGL.VND. 
 
 Bj' David Syme, iSSi. 
 
 In carrying out such a system as this it is evident that the good of the country is likely to 
 be sacrificed lor the benefit of party. If the government be carried on purely in the interests 
 ol party, it is very certain this cannot be to the advantage of the country. The motives and aims 
 in the one case arc distinct from if not incompatible with, the motives and aims in the other, 
 unless we are to assume that the interests of party and of tlie country arc identical, which would 
 be as correct as to assert that an imlividual in following his own selfish interests was acting 
 disinterestedly or that a pickpocket was a useful and patriotic member of society. 
 
 
 M 
 
m 
 
 i;; 
 
 ■I! f 
 
 l.lw 
 
 I 
 
 ■,■■;■ liv 
 
 ' 1 f 
 
 70 
 
 AIM'KNIUX. 
 
 . . Once the jiolicy of a party has been carried there is no longer a reason for the 
 existence of the party, wliich should therefore be dissolved. There is a wide distinction between 
 a party which exists solely as the advocate of certain principles, and a party which subordinates 
 nil principles to office. Unfortunately the two great y»>\'a\ A parties in the ICnjjlish I'urliament 
 belong to the latter category. Neither of them has ever been distinguisheil f'jr honesty of 
 purpose, or for strict adherence to any principles. Hoth of them, on the contrary, have made 
 themselves notorious by their fickleness, by their greed of office, and by their unscrupulous use of 
 means to attain it. They have been trimmers and time-servers ; they have been everylliiiig by 
 turns and nothing long. If they have supported a good cause it has generally been from a bad 
 motive. They are ready to advocate one set of principles to-day antl another to-morrow, if by 
 so doing they may hope to trip up their opponents. . . . The conduct of neither o( the two 
 great parties in the .State appears to have been regulated by any principle whatever. Their 
 politics changed with the hour and the opportunity. What one |)arty approved of the other 
 opjiosed ; whatever action one jiarty took the other condemnetl. If the Whigs were in otiice 
 and brought in a measure, the Tories would oppose it as a matter of course ; if the Tories 
 succeeded to office and brought in a similar measure on the same subject, the Whigs would 
 pronounce it to be utterly worthless. And their successors follow precisely the same course. 
 With Liberals and Conservatives alike everything is fair in party warfare. Truth, honour, and 
 fair ilealing are alike sacrificed to the exigencies of party. The enil justifies the means, according 
 to the ethics of either party, and the supreme end of both parties is to secure or maintain 
 possession of the treasury benches. Government by I'arty is of a com[)aralively recent date. 
 It was the outcome of a long series of corrupt Parliaments tlating b.ick from the Restoration. 
 There is no trace of its existence till after the Revolution, and it was not till long after that 
 event that it was organized as it now is. Macaulay tells us that [lolitical parties had their origin 
 in the Long Parliament. It is true that there were two political parties in the Long Parliament, 
 and that is all that can be said n .i-" i:\:tcr. They were not parlies in the sense understood by 
 the term at the present day. They were not org.inizitions for the mere purpose of securing or 
 holding office. The parties of that day had not become mere place-hunters. Previous to the 
 Revolution the sovereigns of England chose their ministers on personal grounds alone, and often 
 in defiance of Parliament. The king's ministers were the king's friends. William III. was the 
 first sovereign who formed a ministry on a purely political basis, and his example was generally 
 followed during the subsequent reigns. But this was not always the case, and it was not till the 
 present reign that ministers were regularly chosen from the majority in Parliament. The last 
 memorable instance of a sovereign dismissing a minislry which ha<l a majority in Parliament was 
 during the short reign of William IV. Taking advantage of the accession of the premier, Lonl 
 Allhorp, to the peerage, the king suddenly dismissed his Whig ministers, and entrusted the 
 Duke of Wellington with the formation of a government from the Tory i'arty, who were in a 
 minority in the House of Commons. The defeat of the ministry at the general election w!-ii''>. 
 followed showed that they were in a minority in the country as well .as in Parliament, and from 
 that time forth the premier, on whom now devolved the task of forming a cabinet, has invariably 
 been chosen from the party wliich for the time being had a majority in Parliament. 
 
 Government by Party is usually spoken of as if it were the same thing as government by 
 the majority. This is a great mistake. It is true, as I have said, that the government of the 
 day is now chosen from the majority in I'arliament, but it by no means follows from this that the 
 government is carried on by a parliamentary majority ; on the contrary, we know that Govern- 
 ment by Party is not government by the m.ajority, but government by the majority of the 
 majority ; that is to say, the majority of the party which has a majority in the House. And 
 this majority of a majority may be, and often is, really a minority of Parliament. Let me 
 explain what I mean by an illustration. Supfiose a jjarty in the House brings about a ministerial 
 crisis which results in the leader of the party forming a cabinet, .Suppose also the new cabinet 
 has a large majority in the House, and that in attempting to carry out the policy of their parly, 
 they introduce a measure which is based on that ])olicy. But the measure may not be acceptable 
 to all the members of the party ; indeed, it would be strange if it were, for there is almost 
 
 I't i 
 
 II 
 
mil 
 
 HEl'KESENTATIVK OOVKKNMKNT IN BNQLAND. 
 
 77 
 
 invarialily a clissenticiit minority in every jiarty on some question or otiicr. Party organization 
 however, we MJiali suppose, triumphs over the (lissenti';.its, who vote, if they do not l)elieve, wiili 
 tlie majority on liieir own side of tlie House, and tlic hill is carried. Now what I wisli to point 
 out is that it is ijuite possii)le that tlie niiimrity anion^; tlie f,'overnment supporters who were 
 secretly opposed to the l)iil together witii the whole of the o|)p<jsition niijjht make a majority of 
 the House, In such a case the majority of the majority would i)e a minority of Parliament. 
 Talce another case. The {government introduce a hill, some of the details of which are not 
 acccptahle to more than a hare majority of their sui)i)orters, The ministerial ininorily wish to 
 amend it, and the amendments which they desire would also he acccptahle to the whole of the 
 opposition. IJut ministers refuse to give way, and the hill is eventually carried, the whole of the 
 ministerial following voting for it rather than hreak up the ministry. In this case the majority 
 of the majority would he a very small minority of whole House. 
 
 Government hy Party and government hy the majority are thereft)re two very dilfereiit things. 
 
 . . . If Government hy Party is not government hy majority, on what grouml can it rest 
 its claims ? It cannot iie that party government is necessary to the progress of legislation, as we 
 have seen six Reform Hills rejecteil in succession hecause they were made party ([uestions, and 
 the seventh only ciirried hecause hotli sides of the House agreed to withdraw it I'rom the sphere 
 of party politics, Nor can it be that | arty government is necessary for the support of the 
 government of the day, for it is in orilur to get at the government of the day that ministerial 
 measures are rejecteil, the opjiosition preferring to sacrifice even good measures rather than 
 allow ministers to remain in office. Nor can it be said that party government is an essential jiart 
 of the representative system, because it is evident that representative institutions would work far 
 better without it. Representative institutions Mourislicil in England for centuries before party 
 government was ever heard of. Indeed, party government is a positive hindrance to the effective 
 working of the representative system. The fundamental idea of the representative system is 
 responsibility to the constituent body ; the leading princi])le of party government is loyalty to 
 party organization. The representative owes allegiance to his constituents and to them only ; llie 
 party man sinks the representative in the jiartisan and votes and acts as his leader directs him. 
 
 The .advocates of party government do not intleed deny that their system is at variance with 
 the ]iriiiciple of representation. Nay more, they frankly admit the fact, though, strangely 
 enough, they nevertheless cling tenaciously to their theory, " F'arliamentary government," says 
 Earl Grey, " is essentially a government by means of party, , , . The House of Commons 
 owes its success as an active part of the supreme authority, and its peculiar excellencies, to what 
 are rega.uled as defects and departures from the principle in our reiu'esetitative system . . . and 
 it is chiefly through these defects that the ministers of the Crown have been enabled to obtain the 
 authority they have exercised in the House of Commons." Parliamentary Government and 
 l>arty government are represented as synonymous, a mistake wh.icli runs throughout I'^arl Grey's 
 book on the subject. But what we have here more particularly to note is, first, the admission 
 that party government owes its success to " ilefects and departures" from the iirinciple of 
 representation ; and, secoiully, the statement that it is owing to these very detects and departures 
 that " the ministers of the Crown have been enabled to obtain the authority they have exercised 
 in the House of Commons." According to Earl Grey, therefore, party government has had the 
 hapjiy effect of enabling ministers to obtain ".authority" in the House, and it is carried on for 
 the benefit of ministers, and in order to enable them to coerce Parliament. And no doubt, in 
 this respect, the system has succeeded admirably. Pany Government has placed Parliament at 
 the feet of the ministry of the day. We have alre.ady seen how a ministry, hy means of a part) 
 vote, may coerce a majority ; we may also see how a ministry may exercise authority and openly 
 set the House at defiance. 
 
 . . . As a rule, ministers profess great consideration for the opinions of Parliament. It 
 is only the opposition minority that they treat with contempt. Where an important vote is 
 pending they first try to make sure 'leir majority. If there are any signs of disaffection in 
 
 
 
 i| ■ 
 
78 
 
 AJM'KNUIX. 
 
 1 1' 
 
 !:! 
 
 ■ I ,• 
 
 ■ it ,• 
 
 tlic ininixtcrial rank and file, they rally their party, an appeal is made to party feeling, the 
 (.lii.iffccteit have tu stand uut, all the inlluenue at the eoninund uf ministers is empluyed to 
 cunciliate them, and when all else fails, a threat of resignation or of a dissolution of I'.irliament 
 will generally biiiig them to terms. The ministerial ranks are then elosed, aivl the re-iniiled 
 majority behind the treasury lienehcs are used to cru>li the opposition minority. To the outside 
 public all scents fair and square, but none the less effectively have ministers exercisuil their 
 inlluence and Authority tu silence the voice of the majority. 
 
 I'ut it is really desirable that ministers of the Crown should exercise authority over I'ar- 
 liament? Is it not desirable rather that I'arli.iment slioultl exercise authority over miiiisters? Is 
 it not an essential principle of parliamentary government that ministers should be helil responsible 
 to Parliament, instead of Parliament being held responsible to ministers? 
 
 But, say the advocates of Party government, the business of the country cannot be carried 
 on without a strong ministry. It is necessary, we are assured, that a government should have .i 
 large and pliant majority behind them to enable them to retain their position and to carry their 
 measures through Parliament. We are left in no manner of doubt as to how this majority was 
 got together in the pre-reform era. "The adherents of the ministry," >ays Todd, "were 
 obtainable from the first by means of various small boroughs wliieh were under tlie ilirect control 
 of the Treasury, and of other boroughs which were subject to the inlluL-nce of certain great 
 families or wealthy proprietors, who were willing to dis|)ose of the same in support of an existing 
 administration." And this majority was, accoiding to the canditl admission of another friend 
 and advocate of party government, retained in a still more (.bjectional)le manner. " Parlia- 
 mentary t;overnment," says Earl Cirey, "derives its whole force and power horn the exercise 
 of an inlluence akin to corruption." 
 
 . . When there is no great question agitating the country, par'.ies in the House are, as 
 a rule, evenly balanced, and ministers are contimially changing. A succession of weak 
 atlministralions is ilie incvitalile result of such a state of things, A notable illustration of this we 
 have in the condition of political parties in the Italian Parliament for some time past. The 
 Parliament of Italy is modelled on the Hnglish system of Government by Party, and there have 
 been no less than twenty-five new administrations in that country in eighteen years, or an average 
 of one every eight or nine months. In New Zealand, also, where the worst features of the 
 parliamentary system of the mother country have been adopted, there were in 1872 no less than 
 nine changes of government within seven months. A general election, and a good cry to go to 
 the country with, would have put an end to this state of things. Party government in Knglaiid 
 has only been saved from merited contempt by the party leaders on either side adroitly seizing on 
 every question of public interest, and turning it to account for party purposes. , . . 
 
 Like the dogma of the divine rights of kings and passive obedience, party government came 
 to the front during the stormy period of the Revolution. The system is indeed so monstrous, 
 that it could only have found a:ceptance at a time when national animosities ran high, and the 
 people were in an abnormal state of excitement. Under no ortlinary circumstances is it con- 
 ceivable that the English people would have tolerateil a political system so entirely different from 
 that to which they hail been so long accustomed, and so opposed to their practice in the affairs 
 of everyday life. To the mass of the people it was, and always will b'j, a matter of utter 
 indilTerence as to who were in office or who out of it, so long as the country is well governeil. 
 ". hey had been accustomed to send their representatives to Parliament to confer togethe rand 
 co-operate for the common good of the whole community. It must therefore have shocketl their 
 moral sensibilities when they discovered that their representatives, inste.id of attending to the 
 business of the country for which they hail been elected, were devoting themselves to far other 
 purposes ; that no sooner did they come together th.an they immetliately ranged themselves on 
 opposite sides of the House; that they openly avowed hostile intentions towards one another ; 
 that they at once proceeded to open acts of hostility ; that they spent their time and energies in 
 vilifying one another, in misrepresenting one another's motives, opinions and actions, and in 
 
KLECTISd KKI'RESKNTATIVES 
 
 71) 
 
 attoinpting to ruin one another'n reputations, to ilufeat one another's plans, and to delay and 
 mutilate, when they could not reject, one another's measures. And that men eminent for their 
 talents, their elixiucnce and even tlioir upri(,'htness in other relations of life, should do all this 
 without any sense (jf its impropriety and its injustice, was a si(^ht not calculated to raise jiarlia. 
 Micntary institutions in the estimation of rij;ht thinkiuj,' men. Had it heen the design of its 
 authors to demoralize the puhlic min<l, to imjicdc the puhlic husiness, to create natural animosities 
 and f^eneial anarchy, ihey could not have hettcr accumplishcil their end than hy the introduction 
 of such a system as this. N'othing can be more rdivious lo common sense than that the 
 representatives of a great nation could he hound together hy the same intcresls, aims and 
 aspirations as the people themselves, and that thuy should co-operate with them for the common 
 good of the whole country ; and nothing can he more alisurd than to su[)p()se that the common 
 good could he achieved hy a system that tends to create ami perpetuate party strife an<l national 
 animosities. We might as well create discord in order to produce harmony, or provoke (piarrels 
 fill' the purpose of ])roinoting frien<Klii|> and cordiality. The most extraordinary part of the 
 matter is that there are still men to he foui;d who helieve such a vicious system is essential to 
 parliamentary government. 
 
 This species of party warfare, too, is peculiar to parliamentary life, I had almost said in 
 Knglish parliamentary life, for it has not fairly established itself in any noii-Knglish speaking 
 r.accs, and even in England itself it has foun<l no i)lace in any other deparlments of public or 
 private service. It is unknown in the Church. Ecclesiastical assemblies, whether established 
 or dissident, have not .a<lo[ited it, and I am not aware that these assemblies are more disonlerly, 
 or that their business is worse conducted on that account. It is also unknown in municipal life, 
 where the representative system is in full vigour. The local representatives do not range them- 
 selves in hostile camps and sjiend their time and energies in faction fights. On the contrarv-, 
 they meet, discuss and vote on civic matters, and absolutely ignore parliamentary precedent in 
 their mode of conducting business. Party organization is e(iually unknown in commercial life, 
 where the representative system also exists. The board of directors is a minature parliament 
 elected by the sharehouKlers to manage their business for them, liut no one ever heard of party 
 organizations in the board-room of a joint stock company, A commercial undertaking 
 conducted on the improve<l parliamentary model would be doomed to certain ruin. Had 
 (Government hy Party not come into existence under exceptional circumstances ; had it not been 
 the slow growth of generations ; h.ad it not been as-ociaied with the names of our most endnent 
 men and with some of the proudest events of our history and had almost become a part o( our 
 natural life, it would find few defenders amongst us at the present day. The system is tolerated 
 because of old associations, and because we have come to think that it is in some way an essential 
 part of our time-honoured Constitution ; but if it were now, for the first time, proposed for our 
 acceptance, I venture to say that it would not recominend itself either to the intelligence or to the 
 moral sense of the community. 
 
 
 [' 
 
 ELKCTING REPRESENTATIVES. 
 
 By H. R. Drooi). From the Journal of the Stalistical Societi/, June ISSl. 
 
 The election of representatives has become, in modern times, a most important part of 
 all political and social machinery. Whenever a nundier of persons cannot conveniently 
 meet together to determine how their common atl'airs should be managed ; whether because 
 they are too numerous, or for want of leisure, or for any other reason, they elect repre- 
 sentatives to act for them. Thus, not only national assemblies like the House of Commons, 
 and municipal bodies, such as town councils, school boards, and boards of guardians, but 
 
 
^» 
 
 V ■ 
 
 80 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 ill 
 
 lif 
 
 lifi- 
 
 also boards of directors for joint stock companies, and committees of voluntary societies, 
 consist either altogether or to a great extent of elected representatives. It is assumed that 
 the electors have it in their power to elect such representatives as will be satisfactory 
 substitutes for themselves, and will, by their delii)erati(ins and votes, yield substautially 
 the same results as if all the electors met and deliberated and voted as a single body. Hut 
 whether and how far this assumi)tion may be realised, will depend to a great extent upon 
 the mode in which these representatives are electe;!. Until within the last few years it 
 was almost universally taken for granted that there was only one possible mode of electing 
 representatives, viz., that now known as majority voting, according to which each elector 
 may vote for as many candidates as there are repn.'sentatives to be elected, but may only 
 give tme of his votes to the same candidate. It is called "majority voting" because 
 whenever a sutlicient number of electors to constitute a majority of the constituency agree 
 to vote for the same set of candidates, they can secure the election of their whole set of 
 candidates. 
 
 Of late years, several other methods of electing representatives have been devised as 
 substitutes for majority voting, and some of them have been not merely discussed theoreti- 
 cally, l>ut brought into ]iractical operation. Of these metliods, those best known in 
 England are, (1) the limited vote, applied by the Reform Act of 1807 to three-cornered 
 constituencies and the city of London, and since introduced on a much more extensive scale 
 in Brazil, (2) cumulative voting, applied in 1870 to school board elections, and also in use in 
 the Cape Colony (since 1853), and in Illinois and Pennsylvania ; and, ('A) the preferential 
 vote of Mr. Hare's s:cheme, and of M, Andraj's Danish constitution. . . . 
 
 Obviously these different metliods of electing representatives are all practical applica- 
 tions of the science of statistics. 'I'hey all consist in collecting certain statistical data as to 
 whom the electors wish to have as i-epresentatives, and putting together these data so as to 
 construct these into a representative assembly. 
 
 Majority Votimj. 
 
 The method of majority voting cannot claim to have originated in any scientific con- 
 sideration of the problem how a representative assembly might best be formcl. It has 
 manifestly been developed gradually out of the mode in which an assembly decides upon ;iy 
 proposal that may be submitted to it. Until the abolition of the show of hands by the 
 Ballot Act of 1872, the lirst stage in an English parliamentary election consisted in asking 
 the electors, as to each candidate separately, whether he should be their representative. 
 In the second stage, at the poll, when the votes of the electors were recorded systematically 
 it was convenient to receive the votes for all the candidates at once, and then the 
 majority vote rule was adopted, being no doubt recommended by the consideration that it 
 would lead to the same practic ' result as if the electors had voted separately for or against 
 V 'h candidate. Accoiding to .. .er ]>rocess a majority of one more than half the voters in 
 favour of any candidate or candidates secures his or their election. .... 
 
 At the present day, at any rate in electing representatives for parliamentary or municiiial 
 assemblies, electors do not seek exclusively or mainly to select the most honest, intelli- 
 gent, and competent of the candidates. On the contrary, with but fev exceptions, the 
 electors pay very little attention to the personal (jualilications of the cam. 'ates, and 
 look only at the views they hold and the measures, they promise to support. What they aim 
 at securing is that their views and their measures should prevail in and be carried out by 
 the assembly. 
 
 Majority Voting may compk'tely Exclude Miiwriti/. 
 
 It may happen *hat the same party has the upper hand in every constituency, and that 
 the other p<arty has no represent, 'ive whatever in the assembly. Thus in Geneva, according 
 to a report presented to the Grand Council in 1870, by three of its members, Messrs. Roget, 
 
ELECTING REPKESENTA'riVT.S. 
 
 81 
 
 Aloi'in, and Bellamy, "the opposition has always numhered more than one-third of the 
 electors, and we hav seen it successively repri'sented liy 0, 7 deputies, and 1 dejiutj'.'' 
 This refers to the grand council, which consisted of 102 dej)uties, for the eleetioi> of which 
 the canton was divided into three constituencies. The same happened in Marj'land in 18G8, 
 according to Mr. Simon Sterne's "Personal Representation " (Lippincott, IMuladelphia, 
 1870), p. 71. In this election 02,.S5(i votes were cast for democratic candidates, and 30,442 
 for repuldican, and yet this republican minority of nearly one-third of the whole Ijody of 
 voters, did not obtain a single representative in either the senate or the house of represent- 
 atives. 
 
 Mnjor'dy Voting may give Minority Control of Assembly, 
 
 But as a rule the representatives are divided more or less unecjually between the two 
 parties, the proportions depending however not upon the comparative strength of the two 
 parties in the constituencies., but on the nundjer of constituencies in which each party 
 happens to have the majority, and the number of representatives returned by these 
 constituencies. This will usually exaggerate the difference between the two parties, and 
 give the stronger party a much larger majority in the assembly than it has in the constitu- 
 encies ; but sometimes on the contrary it assigns the majority in the assembly to the paity 
 which is really in a minority in the constituencies. To make my meaning clearer, I will 
 assume that each constituency has a number of representatives in exact proportion to the 
 iiumber of electors it comjjrises, an assumption which will be very nearly correct in 
 countries where representation is in jiroportiou to population, e. g., in the United States 
 and in France, and which is being moi-e nearly realized in the United Kingdom by every 
 successive Reform Bill. I will further assume that there are 1,990,000 electors who have to 
 elect 199 representatives, or one representative for each 10,000 electors. SuppooC now that 
 100 of these representatives are elected by the A party by narrow majorities of 5,100 to 
 4,900 in constituencies I'cturniug only one member, of 10,200 to 9,800 in constituencies 
 returning two members and of numbers in the same proportion of 51 to 49 for constituencies 
 returning three or more members, while the other 99 members are elected by the B party, by 
 unanimous constituencies of in all 990,000. Then the A party which has elected 100 
 representatives, and therefore has a majority in tlie assembly, will have only received th" 
 
 - of 510,000 electors, while the B party, which has only 99 representatives, will have 
 received the votes of 490,000+990,000=1,480,000 electors, or more than 74 per cent. i. c, 
 very nearly' three-fourths of the 1,990,000 electors. 
 
 This is, of course, an extreme and improbable case, imagined to illustrate what majority 
 voting may possibly do in the way of jjutting the minority in the place of the majority, but 
 many very much more probalde distributions of votes might be siiggested, which would 
 produce substantially the same result, i. e., that the majority of represent.ativcs would 
 correspond to the minority among the electors. Moreover, such cases are known tt) have 
 repeatedly occurred in practice. In tl. United States the President is not elected by a 
 direct vote of all citizens entitled by the franchise, but by a body of electors in a rejjre- 
 sentative assembly, of whom a certain number, from 35 in New York to 1 iu Nevada, are 
 elected by each State, all the citizens of a State voting as a single constituency. At three 
 of the four presidential elections next preceding the civil war of 1871, the successful 
 candidate only received a minority of the popular vote. Thus (ieneral Taylor had only 
 1,362,242 votes, when Cass and Van Burou had between them 1,515,173 votes. Mr. 
 Buchanan, again, had only 1,838,229 votes, while Fremont and Fillmore had between them 
 2,215,789 votes. So Lincoln had only 1,860,452 votes, while Douglas, Bell, ind Brecken- 
 ridge, who were all opposed to him on the slavery question, obtained between them 
 2,813,741 votes, or nearly a million more. 
 
 The following additional instances are taken from an article, by Mr. Dudley Field, in 
 "Putnam's Magazine" for June, 1870, p. 712: "In New York, in the Assenddy, 76 
 
 6 
 

 U2 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 11 
 
 republican members were elected in 1808 by ,"'J7,S99 votes, while only 52 ileniocratic 
 members were elected by 4.Sl,r)10 votes." Proportionally there ought to have t)een 1)7 
 democrats, and IJl republicans. In the same year, " In California the republicans elected 
 23 members by ol,5'J2 votes, while tlie democrats elected 97 members by a less number, 
 that is by 54,078." 
 
 In Helt,'iuni, according to M. Leon I'ety de Thozee, " Reforme Electoralc," p. ■', 
 Bruxelles. 1874, " In the elections of 14th Juno, 1870, 18,737 electors voted for the liberals, 
 and only 14,090 for the catholics, and yet only 31 liberal members were elected, against 30 
 catholics, and if a very small number of votes had been changed at Cliarlei-oi, there would 
 have been only 29 liberal numbers to represent 57 per cent, of the electors, and 32 catholics 
 to represent the minority of 43 per cent. 
 
 These instances show that majority voting is not always able to ensure that the 
 majority of representatives is on the same side with the majority among the electors. 
 
 m. 
 
 Instahility under Major iti/ Votiiuj. 
 
 Moreover, when an assendjly is elected by majority voting the relative strength of the 
 different parties is much more unstable and lluctuating than it wouhl be under such a 
 system of proportional representation as I have just referred to. Then tlie rtuetuations 
 would oidy be in proporticm to the changes of opinion which time and circumstances might 
 produce auu)ng the electors. (/nder majority voting it often happens (indeed much mure 
 frequently than would be anticipated d priori) that elections arc decided by very nairow 
 majorities, so that if only a very few votes changed siiles the representation would l)e 
 transferred to the other jiarty. 
 
 Narrow Majorillrn uudi'r Majoritij Votimj. 
 
 To illustrate this, I have prepared tables showing for the last three general elections for 
 the United Kingdom, those of 1868, 1874, and 1880, (1) how many seats were won Ity 
 majorities not exceeding 100, and (2) how many seats were won Ity majorities not exceeding 
 10 per cent, of the votes polled for the .successful candidate. 
 
 From Tables I and II it appears tliat in 1808 34 conservatives and 33 liberals owed their 
 success to majorities of less than 100, while 48 conservatives and 48 liberals gained their 
 seats by majorities less in each case than 10 per cent, of the votes polled for the successful 
 candidate. I have further calculated how many voters must change sides in order to 
 transfer these seats to the other party. I find from Table I (of majorities under 100) that 
 the 34 conservative seats would be transferred to tlie liberals if 790 voters changed sides, 
 and that the 32 liberal seats would be transferred to the conservatives if 057 voters changed 
 sides. 
 
 Instability EesuUimj from Narrow Majorities. 
 
 It is easy to understand how a slight change in political opinion among the electors 
 may produce a very considerable change in the bjilance of paities among their representa- 
 tives. The political f item is in fact always in a state of unstable equilibrium, liable to be 
 turned upside down „ anything that may make the one party popular or the other 
 unpopular at the time of a general election. This makes the leaders of parties extremely 
 sensitive to fluctuations of public opinion, and unwilling to risk even a slight amount of 
 temporary unpopularity ; while on the other hand it makes popular agitators much more 
 inrtuential than they would be if thj elections <lid not so often depend upon small majorities, 
 and thus come to be decided by that class among the electors whose votes are most readily 
 affected by temporary fluctuations of opinion. 
 
ELECTING KEl'RESENTATIVES. 
 
 83 
 
 
 ■e 
 
 Corruption Due to Narrotu Majorities. 
 
 'I'he t;il)les of narrow iiiajoritius (Nos. 1 to VI) will also explain why eluctors under 
 majority voting are so liable to he inHueneeil by r)ril)ery, treating, intimidation, and other 
 undue influences. The bulk of the electors in a constituency may be too honest to be bribed 
 or corrupte<l, and too indui)i'n(k'ut to l)c intimidated, but there will always be some few who 
 are accessible to such intiucni.cs, and whenever the honest and independent electors are 
 divided into two nearly ecjual parties, supporting two rival candidates, or sets of candidates, 
 the election is really left in the hands of the corrupt or dependent residue. . 
 
 It occasionally happens, as election investigations have shown, that not only a small 
 residue, but a considerable fraction, jicrhaps a majority, of a constituency has become corrupt. 
 Hut ill these cases it will usually be found that tlic corruption has gradually increased from 
 small beginnings. A few voters having been bribed to turn an election, gradually more 
 and more insist on being paid. If the election managers had not been tempted at tirst to 
 bribe a few, the constituency would have remained pure. 
 
 Majority voting is also responsible for a great part of the expenditure incurred by 
 candidates in rctaiuing election agjiits, haviii;^ cominitCce rooms, advertising, and bringing 
 voters to the poll. ^^'ithin certain limits, expenditure for these purposes is legitimate, as 
 contributing to make the views and claims of the candidates known to the electors : but, 
 uiKjucstionably, a very large portion of this expcndituio is only incurred because elections 
 depend upon narrow majorities, and it is, therefore, worth while to incur a very considerable 
 expenditure for the chance of securing a few additional votes. 
 
 Oerrymanderinfj. 
 
 'J'here is another mode in which tlie circumstance that under majority voting elections 
 frecpicntly depend upon a small balance of votes, may be used to transfer seats from one 
 party to the other. This is by altering the constituency, and either adding or taking away 
 some class of electors which is supposed to be much more favourable to the party than to the 
 other. This may be done either by altering the boundaries of the electoral districts or by 
 enfranchising or disfranchisitiy a particular set of electors. The alteration of boundaries for 
 this purpose is extensively practised in the United States, under the name of gerrymandering. 
 
 Division into Two Parties. 
 
 Thus far I have reasoned on the assumption that the division into two, and only two 
 parties, which is found almost everywhere under majority voting, will not be affected by the 
 change to another mode of voting. Hut in fact, as I belies c, this limitation of electoral 
 contests to only two parties is due mainly to majority voting, and would be more or less 
 broken in upon if any method of voting were substituted which enabled smaller sections of 
 the electors to obtain separately their respective shares of the representation without being 
 compelled to combine together to form a majority party. That majority voting by thus 
 compelling smaller sections to combine together, on pain of being left unrepresented, tends 
 to limit to only two the number of parties competing at an election, I have shown in a 
 previous part of this paper. It may be thought, however, that this, though an adet^uate 
 cause, may not be the only possible cause. It is a prevailing opiniim among those who 
 confine their attention to English party divisions, that though the creeds of the liberal and 
 conservative parties may vary from time to time in their iletails, they correspond substanti- 
 ally to two opposite tendencies of thought, which produce naturally two opposite sets of 
 opinions and two opposing parties. Hut even without going outside English politics, 
 anyone who examines carefully the opinions from time to time advocated by these two 
 parties on those ([ucstions of domestic and foreign pohcy which from time to time promin- 
 ently occupy public attention, will, I think, come to the conclusion that not unfrequently 
 the members of each party are kept in agreement with eaoh other far more by reluctance 
 
 ite' 
 

 1 
 
 
 If' 
 
 
 •t 
 
 1 
 
 
 84 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 to separate from their common organization (which under majority voting is the condition 
 of their exercisinj,' any political inrtuunce) than by any of the principles which they liold in 
 common. And when we look beyond the United Kingdom to other countries where 
 representative government with majoritv voting has been for a long time m operation, to 
 the United States, to Switzerland, or to Belgium, we shall lind everywhere the same 
 <livision into two and only two parties, but the cliaracter of the party division varying in 
 different countries. In the United States tho distinguishing characteristics of the rival 
 ]iarties have nothing whatever in common with those of our Liberals and Conservatives, 
 ajid this is also true of the Independents and Radicals of (Jeneva. ^Ve lind, moreover, that 
 the same party divisions usually run through all elections, whether federal, State, or 
 municipal, or, as the case may be, national or municipal, though there is no connection 
 between the ipiestions to be dealt with by the different sets of re])rcscntatives. These 
 phenomena I cannot explain by any theory of a natural division between opposing tendencies 
 of thought, and the only explanation which seems to me to account for them is that the two 
 opposing parties into which we lind politicians divided in each of these countries have been 
 formed and are kept together by majority voting. 
 
 i: 
 
 ■f 'i 
 
 I'AIITIZAN GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By W?rt. D. LeSucur. From the North American Beview ; Vol. CXXXIL (ISSl). 
 
 In an article already referred to as written some years ago, we expressed ourselves as 
 follows, on the subject of party journalism: ''It is not the bitterness of political discussion 
 that seems to us the worse result of the party system ; it is its amazing hoUowness. A 
 reasonable man is simply lost in amazement as he reads, <lay after day, in ably edited 
 journals, whole columns of writing in which there is hardly the faintest gleam of sincere 
 conviction to be discerned. Day after day the same miserable evasions, the same v.irnishing 
 over of unsightly facts, the same reiterations of unproved charges against opponents, the 
 same taking for granted of things retpiiring proof, the same proving of things that nobody 
 questions, the same h.y])oeritical appeals to the good sense of electors whom every effort is 
 being used to misinform and confuse, the same dreary, unmeaning platitudes, — in a word, 
 the same utttr abuse of the reasoning faculty and of the functions and privileges of a free 
 press. Of course, so long as both sides indulge in this kind of thing, each can make out at 
 least a partial ease against the other ; and so a constant crosslire is kept up in the exposure 
 of misrepresentations and the rectification of all that has been set down in malice or 
 unduly extenuated on one side or the other. To-day, a good point is made by the oppo- 
 sition ; to-morrow, it will be returned to them, if possible, with interest. Such is the 
 party system of political warfare — a system which ought to have won the admiration 
 of Archdeacon Paley, since it possesses the crowning attribute which was lacking to that 
 celebrated watch of his, the power, namely, of perpetuall/ reproducing itself." 
 
 Now, in so far as this language is applicable to the political controversies of to-day, — 
 and few will deny it a certain applicability, — it becomes tiie duty of all who have it in their 
 power to inriuence public opinion independently of party, tc oall attentior in season and 
 out of season to the utter insincerity of the whole performance. If people answer that 
 they do not look for sincerity in political journals, and that for their own part all they want 
 is to hear all possible good of their own side and all possible evil of the other, nothing 
 more can be said ; they must die, if they are determined to do so, in their sins. Some, it 
 must be allowed, though they are not likely to make such an avowal, might do so with 
 truth ; for there are misguided individuals in the community who outdo in party bigotry 
 
PROPORTIONATE UKPRKSLNTATION. 
 
 85 
 
 the most violent of tliuir luailers, jiict iis lliere are lay devotees who far outdo tlieir liriests 
 in superstition. On the other han I, there are many who have a tincture of fair-mindedness, 
 and some respect for their own understandings, and who would lie inclined to resent any 
 deliberfite attempts to befog and befool them. 'J'o these an appeal on behalf of rational and 
 decent methods in political discussion may hopefully be made ; not in the expectation, as 
 we have before said, of doing away with parties and caucuses, with managers and wire- 
 pullers, but of leading tliese to recognize some limit to their powers. 
 
 That party controversy, is in general the merest parody of anything like legitimate and 
 serious political argument, is easily shown to any one who is not himself a hopeless thrall 
 to party ; and not less demonstrable is it that the systemtatic depreciation and abuse of 
 public men tends to poison the whole political iitmosphero and to educate the rising 
 generation in a sickly cynicism by robbing them of all opportunity of recognizing and 
 admiring public virtue in their own land and time. Let genuine, unmistakable corruption 
 be exposed and lashed ; and, if possible, let the operation be performed by some one who 
 hates corruption in a friend even more than in a foe ; but let not errors of judgment 
 receive the denunciation due only to deliberate misdoing. Where public services have been 
 rendered, let them he cheerfully and unstintedly acknowledged ; and where a man has won a 
 general character for uprightness, let his character be reckoned the property of the nation, 
 and not a foot-ball for faction. Is not our country's richest inheritance, to-day, the 
 e/i((r«c/cr of the men who laid the foundations of her national greatness? And shall it be 
 said that the United States have ceased in the beginning of the second century of their 
 independence to lay up this particular form of wealth ? It is Seid to think to what a trade 
 cahinniy has been reduced, and that instead of a growing faith in those who are called to 
 the service of the republic, there should be an estabhshed conventional tone of mockery and 
 distrust. Yet who is there, practically conversant with public atVairs, who does not know, 
 that, many as are the evils that fasten themselves on government, the general state of 
 things is not as bad, or nearly as bad, as is conventionally represented, that public men in 
 general are far more honest than they get the credit of being, and that we are really, to a 
 large extent, walking in a vain show of political wickedness, proiluced wholly and solely by 
 the persistent falsilications of unscrupulous party journals ? A vain show in one sense, for 
 wickedness in the measure alleged does not exist ; but a most serious reality in another, 
 for this constant talk about evil hegets evil by Iteijettiiuj despair of good. 
 
 I' 
 \l 
 
 P 
 
 I 
 
 PROPORTIONATE REl'RE.SENTATION. 
 
 /?)' Fredtrich Scebohm. The Contemporary Keview, Vol. XLJV., iSSj. 
 
 In the first place, it must be recognized that a Parliament is only a device for conveniently 
 arriving at the will of the nation after proper discussion. 
 
 If a nation were one vast constituency, and could declare its will like a vestry, by a majority 
 of direct votes on every question submitted to it, no system of representation would be needed. 
 The process might be clumsy, and the proper discussion of each question imperfect, but the 
 result would be sim[)le, and in theory it would be a true government by the majority. 
 
 But in practice such a mode of government by pldlnscitc would he full of evils. A nation 
 cannot deliberate and act e» masse, and hence arises the necessity for a system of representation. 
 
 Now it is obvious that if instead of deciding each question by the direct vote of the whole 
 nation, a certain number of memliers of Parliament were chosen by the majority of votes of the 
 
H 
 
 86 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ;i 
 
 whole nation acting as one great constituency, Parliament would consist of members representing 
 only the niajurity — i.e.., the larger half of the people— whilst the smaller half of the peojile wouKl 
 be umepresented. Tiie discussion in Parliament might be thus all on one side, and it W(juld be 
 possible that the conclusion arrived at by a majority of votes in such a Parliament might express 
 the opinion of little more than n fouriJi of the people. 
 
 This, in a country pretty evenly divided in its political interests, would be reco;.^nized by 
 every one as an altogether jiernicious result — a complete failure of fair popular representation. 
 For supposing, for instance, that there happened to be a contention of interests between trade 
 and land, and that voters rejiresenling land had for the time the majority over those interested 
 in trade. Parliament might find itself comjiosed solely of landowners of various shades ; 
 ojiinion. The majority of these landowncis might be the more bigoted half of their class ; and 
 thus a Parliament of bigots as regards land, representing little more than a fourth of the nation, 
 might adopt a policy of Protection and cripple trade in the supposed interests of land, even 
 against the will of the better though smaller half of their own class. 
 
 This is an extreme case, no doubt, but it is useful to put it, so that it may be seen clearly 
 thafgovernment by the majority of a majority is no true popular representation. And further 
 because it brings out ,the fact that the division of the nation into a multitude of separate 
 constituencies is, after all, a device for securing that fair representation, which dealing with the 
 nation as one great constituency would fail to secure. In old time-;, when only certain privileged 
 classes had votes, it was the only device thought needful to obtain true representation. And it 
 remained so till the introduction of the rough attempt, containcii in the last Reform Bill, to 
 provide for the representation of minorities in three-cornered constituencies. 
 
 •i , 
 
 mi 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 Bi/ RohfiH B. Haywood. From The Nineteenth Centurij, Vol. XV. (1SS4). 
 
 Mr. Cowen, in his fresh and vigorous .speech at Newcastle, has seized this aspect of the 
 question of reform, and well expressed it in the following words ; — 
 
 " What is it we want ? Is it not government of the peo])le by the people for the people ? 
 Parliament should mirror tl e spirit, wisdom, and interest not of a section only, but of the 
 entire nation. The elected sL )uld be an e|)itoine of the electors. The majority must govern, 
 but the minority should be heai d. That is scarcely the case now, and every year it gets less 
 so." 
 
 This then m real representation — that Parliament should be an epitome of the nation in 
 all its variety. And does not this in:iply, wheii expressed in more fm-mal, though less 
 pieturescjue, language, that every group of electors who have common interests and common 
 pcilitieal sympathies and sentiments, should be represented in Parliament in due proportion 
 to its nunieri<;al strength iu the country ? 
 
 This is what is intended by the phrase " Proportional Representation." Strictly speak- 
 ing the word proportional is superfluous, for representation, so far as it is real and fair, must 
 be proportional, and if it deviates very widely frMui proportionality, it ceases to be in any 
 true sense representation at all. Rut this word having been extended, or rather appropriateil 
 to the existing system, which I shall take the liberty of distinguishing in this paper as 
 majority representation, and the phrase minoritij representation having been inisunderstood or 
 misrepresented, by those who are the slaves of phrases and catchwords, as implying that the 
 minority should rule and not merely that it should be heard, the phrase " proportional repre- 
 sentation " may be accepted as expressing the ideal representation which has been above 
 described. 
 
 Ui 
 
TlIK PUOPOUTIONAL HEI'RESKNTATION SOCIETY. 
 
 87 
 
 THE PIUV ORTIONAL UEPRESEN'TATIOX S(JCIETY. 
 
 By Sir Juhn Lnhhork. From The Nineteenth Ceiituri/, \'ul. XV. (1SS4). 
 
 Is there any way Ijy wliicli Wf can reconcile these views, — by which we can secure for 
 the majority the jiower wliieh is their right, aiiil at the same time preserve for the iriiiiority 
 that fair iiearing to which tiiey are justly entitled ? 
 
 The present system, then, renders the result >)f a general election uncertain, and to a 
 large extent a matter of chance ; it leads to violent fluctuations in the balance of political 
 power, and eonsecpiently in the policy of the country. In fact the present system may be 
 good or may be Ijad, but it is not representation ; and the question is whether we wish for 
 representation in fact or in name only. 
 
 Tlie adoption of proportional representation moreover would raise ;ind purify the whole 
 tone of |)olitical coiitesti. What do we see now when there is a contest in any of our great 
 northern cities ? The majority of the Irish electors, instructed by the lionourable mend)er for 
 Cork, withiiold their votes. They do not consider the prosperity of the Kminre as a whole, 
 l)ut what they regard as the advantage of Ireland. I do not blame them. They do not seem 
 to me wise : yet I can sympathise witii their devotion, mistaken though I think it is, to 
 their own island. Then some deputy in the conlidence of the Home Rule party has more or 
 less elanilestine and secret interviews with the candidates or their lea<ling supporters. We 
 hear tlie most ojjposite .accounts of what lias occurred. K.ich side accuses the other of 
 truckling to the Home Rule Party, and sellishly imperilling the integrity of the Empire. It 
 nnist be very unsatisfactory to all concerned ; and it would l)e far better if Liverpool had 
 eight votes, and the Home Rulers tliere are sufficiently strong to return a Home Rule mem- 
 ber, than that they should extract doubtful pledges from reluctant candidates. 
 
 Moreover, the gef)graphical difl'erentiation of political views tends to become more and 
 more accentuated, and might, 1 think, constitute a real danger. At present Scotland is 
 overpoweringly Liberal, while the south-eastern counties of lOngland, with scarcely an 
 exception, are represented ])y honourable members sitting on the opposite side of the House. 
 It is Init a small consolation to the unrepresented Lil)eral of Kent to be told that the Con- 
 servatives of Scotland share the same grievances, Jind are as badly otF as they are. 
 
 But further than this, it will be a great misfortune to the country if one part becomes 
 and continues overwhelmingly Liber.al and another Conserv.ative — if their distinctive diflfer- 
 ences become (juestions of geography and localitj- rather tlian of opinion. The different por- 
 tions of our Em])ire are not yet so closely fused that we can afford to despise this danger. In 
 my own county we look upon the shires as ilistinctly lower and less civilised than we are. 
 
 America might have been spared a terrible civil war if the principle of proportional 
 representation had been recognized in the composition of the House of Representatives. 
 This was forcibly pointed out in the report unanimously adopted by the Coniniittee of the 
 United States Senate appointed in 1809 to consiiler the question of representative reform. 
 
 "The absence (they say) of .any provision for the representation of minorities in the 
 States o' t.i"-^ ^'^•. -.'a when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were t.aken to break 
 the . ai Unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together, 
 
 an. c have given them a voice in the elector.al colleges and in Congress. But they were 
 fearfully overborne by the plurality rule of elections, and were swept forward by the course 
 of events into impotency or open hostility to our cause. By this rule they were shut out of 
 the electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorganized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, 
 they could oppose no effectual resistance to secession and to civil war." 
 
 We shall ourselves make the same mistake and run the s.ame risk of civil war if we 
 neglect all warning, and allow the loyal minority in Ireland to be .altogether silenced .and 
 
 ft -r—r 
 
T^ 
 
 88 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 B 
 
 I 
 i • 
 
 ■1 ■ 
 
 I 1 '^ ■ 
 1 ' 
 
 ^ •: 
 
 excluiletl. This in iu my hmnblo judgment i)erhapH the greatest langer with wliich Englaml 
 is now threatened. 
 
 The Proportional Representation Society lias indeed hitherto contiued itself to the adop- 
 tion as the liasis of its constitution of the following resolution : " That without prejudging 
 how far the principle may he suh8e{[uently carried out, it is indisiiensihle, aa a tirst step 
 towards securing the true representation of the electors, that whenever a constituency 
 returns more than two members some form of proportional represei.tation should he adopted." 
 
 I regret that this (juestion has heen so often argued as if the great or even the main 
 reason for it was to admit representatives of small minorities. Indeed, it is often said that 
 any such system would merely admit members who are in favour of crotchets. It is no 
 doubt diflicult to say what is really a crotchet. When Mr. (Jrote brought up the (juestion of 
 the Ballot was that a crotchet? When Mr. Villiers brought forward Kree Trade was that a 
 crotchet ? Many and many of the opinions now generally entertained were regarded as 
 crotchets when things first made their appearance. Kverything must have a beginning, an<l 
 almost everything, even proportional representation itself, has been regai'ded as a fa<l and a 
 crotchet. 
 
 But in my humble judgment the representation of small sections is a very small part of 
 the tjuebtinu. \\'hether small minorities represent the temporary delusion of the moment, 
 or a great, although as yet unrecognized truth, the House of Commons is scarcely the pro])er 
 sphere for their exertions. What I am much more anxious about is that the great parties iu 
 the State should be adequately represented iu tho ditl'erent districts of the Empire. 
 
 Those who object to the fair representation of minorities do not seem to realize the 
 diffei-ence between an executive government ivnd a representative assembly. A government 
 of course must be as far as possible homogeneous and of one mind, but a representative 
 assembly should be a mirror of the nation, The exclusion of the minority, which is a 
 necessity iu the one Ccase, would be tyranny and injustice in the other. We are told by those 
 who have not studied the (juestion that we wish to give the minorities the power which 
 rightly belongs to the majoritic. The very reverse is the case. An untrammelled system 
 of proportional representation is, as Mr. Mill has truly said, "not only the most complete 
 applic'ation of the democratic principle that has yet been uuwle, but its greatest safeguard." 
 I trust that under the new Bill we may secure for the new voters, as well as those already 
 on the register, tb'? right not merely of recording their vote, but of doing so in such a manner 
 as may give to it wl just and reasonable cH'ect. If this l)e done, the Parliament of 1880 will 
 have given cfTect to a great principle, and we shall have for the Hrst time a really represen- 
 tative assembly. I venture to recommend the system of proportional representation to the 
 House of Commons and to the country because it would give its just political weight to the 
 vote of every elector ; it would eleviite and purify the whole tone of elector.al contests ; 
 would obtain for the minority a fair hearing ; and last, not least, because it is the only mode 
 of securing for the majority that preponderance to which of course they are justly entitled. 
 
 The following Members of Parliament have already joined the Proportional Representa- 
 tion Society : — 
 
 Rowland P, Blennerhassett 
 
 Thomas William Boord 
 
 Charles Bradlaugh 
 
 Henry A. Brassey 
 
 J. Brinton 
 
 Hon, St, .John Brodrick 
 
 Alexander Brogden 
 
 M, Brooks 
 
 Sir H. Harvey Bruce 
 
 James R. Bulwer 
 
 C. T. Dyke Acland 
 
 Henry G. Allen 
 
 R. L. Allmau 
 
 Ellis Ashmead-Bartlett 
 
 John E. F. Aylmer 
 
 Arthur James Balfour 
 
 Thomas C. Baring 
 
 Col. Barne 
 
 The Earl of Bective 
 
 Michael Biddulph 
 
 Francis Wm. Buxton 
 
 James A. Campbell 
 
 William C. Cartwright 
 
 Lord E. Cecil 
 
 Sir Thomas Chambers, M.P. 
 
 \V. L. Christie 
 
 Edward Clarke 
 
 Arthur Cohen 
 
 Sir E. Colebroke 
 
 Eugene Collins 
 
THE I'ROFORTIONAI- KKI'KKSUNTATION SOCIETY. 
 
 89 
 
 Thomas Collins 
 Colonel Colliurst 
 Jiiini's I'ortor Corry 
 Alcleriinvu Cotton 
 Cieoigu Courtiiuld 
 [.eoiianl Henry Courtney 
 Joseph Cowcn 
 Hon. H. F. Cowper 
 Hiilph (.'reykc 
 Viscount Crichton 
 James Cropper 
 
 C. Dalrymple 
 David Davis 
 James Dickson 
 Thomas A. Dickson 
 
 Hon. John Charles Dumlas 
 
 V^iscount Ebrington 
 
 Henry Edwards 
 
 Lord Elcho 
 
 Hon. A. D. Elliott 
 
 tieorge Erringtou 
 
 T. 'V. Evans 
 
 Wm. Ewart 
 
 Archibald Orr Ewing 
 
 Rt. Hon. Henry Fawcett 
 
 William Findlater 
 
 Sir \V. H. H. Ffolkes 
 
 Viscount Folkestone 
 
 R. N. Fowler (Lord Mayor) 
 
 D. F. (iabbett 
 
 Rt. Hon. Edward Gibson 
 
 Sir A. Cordon 
 
 Daniel Grant 
 
 William Grantham 
 
 T. Greer 
 
 G. B. Gregory 
 
 Albert H. G Grey 
 
 Montagin 'Im Guest 
 
 Robert Thornliagh ( Jurdon 
 
 Lord ( Jeorge Hamilton 
 
 Mitchell Henry 
 
 The Hon Sydney Herbert 
 
 J. M. Maxwell Heron 
 
 Lord A. Hill 
 
 Sir H. T. Holland 
 
 Lt.-Col. D. Milne Home 
 
 William H. Houldsworth 
 
 E. Stafford Howard 
 William I^awies Jackson 
 
 iSir J. J. Jenkins 
 
 Hubert E. H. .furuingham 
 
 Coleri<lge J. Kennard 
 
 Colonel Kennard 
 
 Sir John Kennaway 
 
 Edwiinl II. King-Harman 
 
 Colonel Kingscote 
 
 Dr. Kinnear 
 
 ¥. Winn Knight 
 
 Sir Uiiinald Knightley 
 
 Samuel Laing 
 
 Hon. F. W. L,ambton 
 
 Sir J. Clarke Lawrence 
 
 Thomas l^a 
 
 Sir E. A. H. Lechmere 
 
 Hon. G. Leigh 
 
 Sir Baldwin Leighton 
 
 Stanley Leighton 
 
 Lord H. Lennox 
 
 Lord Lewisham 
 
 Sir Robert Lloyd Lindsay 
 
 Morgan Lloyd 
 
 Robert Loder 
 
 Rt. Hon. J. Lowther 
 
 Hon. W. Lowther 
 
 J. W. Lowther 
 
 Sir John Lubbock 
 
 Sir Andrew T.,u8k 
 
 Sir W. McArtluir 
 
 Sir rhomas McClure 
 
 James Carlile M'Coan 
 
 Sir J. McGarel-Hogg 
 
 David Maclver 
 
 Colonel Makins 
 
 R. B. Martin 
 
 T. W. Master 
 
 Chiirles Henry Meldon 
 
 Sir Charles Henry Mills 
 
 Sir. F. G. Milner. 
 
 F. Monckton 
 
 Samuel Morlcy, M.P. 
 
 Arthur Moore 
 
 J. Mulholland 
 
 P. H. MuKtz 
 
 E. Noel 
 
 J. S. North 
 
 Charles Morgan NorM'Oi)d 
 
 Colonel O'Beirne 
 
 R. H. Paget 
 
 PiobtTt William ('. Patrick 
 
 Arthur Pease 
 
 Sir Henry Peek 
 
 K. L. Pemberton 
 
 John Pender 
 
 Frederick Pennington 
 
 Enrl I'ercy 
 
 Lord Algernon Percy 
 
 lit. Hon. Sir I^yon Playfair 
 
 Rt. Hon. David U. Plunket 
 
 Hon. W. Henry B. Portman 
 
 G. E. Price 
 
 John Henry Puleston 
 
 Pandeli Halli 
 
 Sir John Ramsdeu 
 
 James Itankin 
 
 William Rathbone 
 
 Sir !•;. J. Keed 
 
 Sir Matthew W. Ridley 
 
 Chas. Campbell Ross 
 
 J, Round 
 
 Lord Arthur Russell 
 
 Thomas .Salt 
 
 Bcrnhard Samuelson 
 
 Chas. Seelcy 
 
 William Shaw 
 
 Henry B. Sheridan 
 
 Sir J. G. T. Sinclair 
 
 Rt. Hon. Wm. H. Smith 
 
 P. J. Smyth 
 
 Mar([uis of Stafford 
 
 C. H. Strutt 
 
 Henry Villiers Stuart 
 
 Charles Beilby Stuart- Wortley 
 
 Christopher Sykes 
 
 John (lilbert Talbot 
 
 John Pennington Thomasson 
 
 W. K. Murray Tomlinson 
 
 W. T. M. 'J'orrens 
 
 Colonel Tottenham 
 
 Sir Richard Wallace 
 
 Sir S. H. ^^'aterlow 
 
 Sir E. Watkin 
 
 Benjamin Whitworth 
 
 E. ^V. liryilges Willyams 
 
 Chas. H. Wilson 
 
 Henry de Worms 
 
 J. R. Yorke 
 
 IIIHiv 
 
 
 1 1- 
 
!i 
 
 lit 
 
 lijiif 
 
 90 APPENDIX. 
 
 REI'RESHNTATION AN'I) MISHKI'RKSKNTATION. 
 
 Wv»tm'n\ster Rvvifw, Val. LXV., ISS4. 
 
 A Souitity ha8 recently been established under the presilency of Sir John Lubbock, with 
 offices nt I'tdace Oliiuntwrs, Westminster, for the purpose -if securing, as far as possilyle, the 
 recounitiiin of tiio prin(M]ih! of propurtion.'il roprcsciitiition in rarliauientary elections, and 
 other representative iutititiitionH of tile country, and has already received the support of 
 nearly 200 nujinbers of I'arlianieiit. The (Society as yet has expressed no opinion as to the 
 Itest form of j)rop()rtional re])resentation, since this may depiMKl upon the particular circuin. 
 stances of each case, nor does it insist that the system shoidd lie applied in the tirst instance 
 to all the constituencies. The main object is to secure that in all constituencies retuining 
 more than two niend)ers, which after a redistribution of seats are likely to become more 
 numerous, some system of proportional representation shall be retained. 
 
 The programme of this .Society so forcibly expresses the need of a change in our [iresent 
 system that it is worth (pioting at length: "The extension of the Kranehise which is 
 proposed in the IJill which Her Majesty's (rovernment have introduced renders the con- 
 sideration of the system under which members of I'.irliament are elected a matter of urgent 
 importance, it being obvious tiiat the present system of voting will under a unifi,""i franciiise 
 tend to diminish that variety in the representation which has hitherto been considered 
 essential to the constitution of the House of (^ominous. 
 
 " This system is also open to grave objections because, while it does not in all cases 
 ol)tain for majorities their due predominance in the Legislature, it fails to secure for 
 minorities that proportion of reiiresentation to which their numl)ers fairly entitle them. 
 The present system of voting, no matter how the constituencies are arranged, may bring 
 about eitlu^r, on the one hanil, the rule of the minority or, on the other, the political 
 extinction of the minority. 
 
 "It renders therefore the result of a general election uncertain and to a largo extent a 
 matter of chance ; it leads to violent fluctuations in the balance of political power and 
 consequently in the policy of the country. 
 
 " These objections will be greatly aggravated if large constituencies are to return a 
 number of mend)er3 at all in proportion to their magnitude, uidess some plan of pro])ortional 
 representation be .ndoptod. 'J'lius, if Liverpool were to return eight members as an undivided 
 constituency it would be obviously unjust that 81,000 electors belonging to either of the 
 great parties in the State should return eight members while .10,000 belonging to the other 
 should be altogether shut out from representation. 
 
 " It would also be most objectionable that it should be in the power of a few voters by 
 changing sides to tr.ansfer eight seats from one party to the other, making a difTcrence of 
 sixteen votes on a division. 
 
 "Unless some method of proportional representation be adopted, it is probable that 
 Ireland will be greatly misrepresented, and that those who hold moderate and loyal 
 opinions, although numljering more than one-third of the whole electorate, may be every- 
 where out-voted and reduced to silence. 
 
 " On the other hand the Irish electors in England have been hitherto almost entirely 
 excluded from direct representation. It would be far better that the Irish electors in otir 
 great cities should return mendwrs of their own than that their votes should be the subject 
 of more or less secret negotiation with the leaders of the different parties. 
 
 "The Proportional Hepresentation Society, in preparing or supporting any measure 
 
 
i- 
 
 |{ !•; I' H KS KN r AT ION A N I) M I s i l.; 1' |l KS KNl' A I' ION. 
 
 n 
 
 im\ 
 
 (Iculinj^ M'itli tlie actual ilutails of voting aud the machinery (»f oluctiong, will keep in view 
 tiiu t'ullowiug practical rtMiuiHiteH : 
 
 fa) That the majority of tlio ropresontation bo sucuroil to the majority ot tiie 
 
 electors. 
 (h) That the iiiinoi'ity lie Hfuureil a fair hearing, 
 
 (r) That the nimli; of voting he one ea>*y to 1)h untli'rstooil and put in practice liy tiie 
 average elector. 
 
 fil) That every vote ahouhl have its duo weiglit in clctermining the result of tlie 
 election. 
 
 " Wiiilst nniinly directing its ctl'orts to the iniproveiui'nt of parliamentary representa- 
 tion, tile Society «ill use its best endeavours to maintain tlie same princijiles in the election 
 of other repre.sent.itive bodies, micIi ;is tiic muiii('i[ialiti(s and Si'iioid iSoarda of the kingdom, 
 and to support any amendment which may render our representative system still more just 
 and efHcient. 
 
 *' Under any true tiieory of representation, the electeil body should i)e, as far as is 
 practii'able, an accurate reflection of tiie state of o|)iuion in the country. Without tlierefore 
 prejudging how far the principle may be subsequently earrieil out, this Society deems it 
 indispensable, as a tirst step towards securing the true representatiou ot the electors, that 
 whenever a constituency returns more than two members some form of proportion''l 
 representation slmuld be adopted. 
 
 "The Proportional Keprescntatiou Society is based u|ion, the acceptance of the foregoing 
 principles, ami has been formed for tlu' purjiose of promoting, by all means in its power, the 
 adoption by Parliament of such measure of reform in the representation of the people as will 
 secure that, wiiile the majority bhould govern, every con»ideral)le section of the electors 
 should bo sure of a hearing in Parliament." 
 
 Local associations in connection with the parent Society are already lieginning to be 
 formed, and it is hoped l)efore long to organize in th'.s way tlie friends of jtroportional 
 representation thnnighout the country. 
 
 In conclusion, it may be well to point out how this system of representation might be 
 introduced into the country without any violent change, an<l so as to include in itself some 
 of the advantages of equal electoral districts. Let the new Heforin Hill provide, in the case 
 of all boroughs returning more than two members, that they be divided into electoral wards 
 equal ill number to the members to be elected ; and to such boroughs let the system of 
 .alternative voting be ap[)lied ; the members, after they have been elected by the voters of 
 the whole borough, choosing for which ward they will sit ; in case of a by-election the voters 
 belonging to the ward of the deceased or retiring member being alone allowed to vote. It 
 would not be necessary that the wards should be the same size, since their ouly oViject would 
 be to replace a member who died or retired, and they would have no ed'ect on the answer 
 given by the country to any question submitted at a general election. If this system 
 worked smoothly it might in a few years be extended to all single-member constituencies 
 throughout the country, Lastlj^ when public opinion had become ripe for it, and the 
 county government s\ stem had become lirmly established, a Bill might be passed enabling 
 each voter to vote for any candidate standing for any of the seats in the county, whether 
 boroughs or divisions of the county ; the elected members choosing which of tlie constitu- 
 encies in the county, if more than one, for which they had been piuposed they would 
 represent. In order not to lose the advantages of municipal life, all boroughs large enough 
 to return three or more members should be excluded from the county and made counties 
 of themselves. 
 
 To summarize the result at which we have arrived : We have shown that our present 
 system is deticient, since it does not secure either that the majority should govern, or that 
 
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 APPENDIX. 
 
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 the minority should be heard, while it prevents a large part of the electors expressing their 
 views on social and other questions which are not matters of party politics, and places the 
 choice of candidates almost entirely in the hands of party organizations. We have pointe<l 
 out that these difficulties are likely to be increased by the Franchise Bill. We have 
 examined the proposal to form equal electoral districts and have shown that it will not 
 accomplish its objects while it will introduce fresh ovils. We have examined the schemes 
 for proportional representation and have shown that they would all secure that the majority 
 would govern on party questions ; that all considerable sections of the nation would be 
 heard ; and that two of these schemes have been proved by experience to present no practical 
 difficulty in working. We have stated the objections which have been alleged against the 
 third plan — that of alternative or transferable voting — and shown that they can all be 
 avoided, and that this scheme is free from any objection that is found in the present system 
 or in the systems of limited and cumulative voting. We have pointed out the few simple 
 rules which^would make its working certain and rapid ; and lastly, we have shown that it 
 could be introduced gradually without any sudden changes, and also without the loss of the 
 political life and political history which are to be found in many of our present constit- 
 uencies. 
 
 This is no party question ; it is in the truest sense conservative, securing that no one 
 class shall overwhelm the other by its numbers, and preventing any extreme party 
 obtaining from a wave of popular feeling a control over the legislature ; but it is equally a 
 Liberal measure, providing for the growth and improvement of our institutions, giving to all 
 parties and classes their share in the government of the country, and enabling the majority 
 of the people always to rule. 
 
 Societies for the promotion of these views are now to be found in most of the nations of 
 Europe, and the support they have received seems to point to the near approach of the time 
 when they will be everywhere recognized as necessary to secure a good representative 
 system. England, which has taught the principles of freedom to all other nations, will not, 
 it may be hoped, be the last in recognizing the importance of these improvements in securing 
 that the House of Commons shall be the true exponent of the people. 
 
 
 :'T 
 
 PARTY STRUGGLES. 
 
 F)-om " EiKjland a?irf Canada," 188 4. 
 
 By Samlford Fleming. 
 
 The difficulty with our present system lies in the fact that the interests of party must 
 be consulted, whatever the cost, whatever the sacrifice. Party takes precedence of ever/ 
 other consideration. Party seems to cloud the judgments of men who, in many instances, 
 are irreproachable in private life. Public men seem to act on the principle that there is one 
 creed and language for the hustings, the press and parliament, and another for social inter- 
 course. 
 
 The Canadian Pacific Railway has been considered a political question during three 
 administrations, and has ])l.ayed an important part in party warfare. Every year, since 
 1871, motion after motion has been made in Parliament relating to engineering operations 
 and the mode of conducting the work. Seldom have there been such acrimonious discussions. 
 Frequently the whole debate was dictated by the party results supposed to be obtainable. 
 Committee followed Committee, year after year, in tiie Senate and House of Commons, 
 nominally to investigate matters, in reality to create party capital. Who now can point out 
 
 * 
 
THE DESPOTISM OF PARTY. 
 
 93 
 
 the slightest result from all these efiforts ? Two Royal Commissions of special enquiry were 
 appointed. The first made no report ; the second prolonged its sittings for two years, at a 
 cost of some $40,(KX) to the country. What remains of the labours of those Commissions 
 beyond the items of their cost in the public accounts ? The report of the second (Commis- 
 sion was contained in two bulky volumes. The record of an attempt for party ends to blast 
 the reputation of men who had given the best years of their lives to the performance of 
 public <luty. When this report was con3id(;red it was held to be so valueless that it has 
 never been circulated. 
 
 In Canada we enjoy a liberal constitution, and it may be affirmed that it 11 the only 
 principle of authority which, as a people, we would tolerate. It cannot, however, be said 
 that in its present form our system of government is an unmixed blessing. 
 
 We may ask if representative government is ever to be inseparable from the defects 
 which form the most striking feature in its application and administration, especially on this 
 continent. Must a country constitutionally governed be inevitably ranged into two hostile 
 camps ? One side denouncing their opponents and defaming the leading public men of the 
 other, not hesitating even to decry and misrepresent the very resources of the community 
 and to throw obstacles in the way of its advancement. Never was partyism more abject or 
 remorseless. Its exigencies are unblushingly proclaimed to admit the most unscrupulous 
 tactics and the most reprehensible proceedings. Is there no escape from influences so degrad- 
 ing to public life and so hurtful to national honor ? 
 
 It ia evident that the evils which we endure are, day by day, extending a despotism 
 totally at variance with the theory and principles of good government. Possibly Canada 
 may be passing through a phfise in the earlier stage of her political freedom. Can we cheer 
 ourselves by the hope that institutions inherently good will clear themselves from the slough 
 into which they unfortunately may be immersed ? May not the evils of partyism at last 
 become so intensiUed that their climax will produce a remedy? As by natural laws a 
 liquid in the process of fermentation purities itself by throwing oflf the scum and casting the 
 dregs to the bottom, so may we be encouraged to believe that we are approaching the turn- 
 ing period in the political system we have fallen into, and that year by year Parliament will 
 become less and less a convention of contending party men and be elevated to its true 
 position in the machinery of representative government. Public life will then become more 
 ennobling ; it will, indeed, be an object of ambition for men of honour and character to till 
 places_in the Councils of the Nation, when rectitude of purpose and patriotism and truth wilj 
 be demanded in all and by all who aspire to positions of national trust and dignity. 
 
 THE DESPOTISM OF PARTY. 
 
 Bij Herbert Tttltle. From Atlantic Monthly, Vol. LIV., ISS4. 
 
 The party becomes a species of inipermni in imperio. Its form-', its agents, its organs 
 are closely patterned after those of the state ; it exercises the great functions of government ; 
 it has its hierarchy of ofhcials, acting within the circumscriptions, and ranjjing through all the 
 grades which obtain in our political system. These officials feel the responsibility of their 
 positions, which they compare to places of trust in civil administration. The struggles for 
 place within the party are scarcely less keen than the struggles for political life ; the same 
 arts of intrigue and persuasion are used ; the same acquiescence in the result of a contest is 
 always expected, and rarely withheld. Thus the force of imagination alone, excited by the 
 constant spectacle of this vast machine, completely equipped and manned and always in 
 movement, leads people to regard it as a permanent institution, having a corporate existence 
 
 It 
 
I 
 
 \ 
 
 \ 
 
 
 i 
 
 94 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 in the state, anil therefore entitled to be treated as an end in itself, and not as a means to the 
 attainment of an end. 
 
 It ia not, however, by the imagination alone that this illusion is maintained. This of 
 itself would make the error dangerous ; but it has, besides that, led to the announcement of 
 certain audacious propositions, and even to measures of actual leyislatiou, which grossly 
 confuse the distinction between a political party and a political commonwealtii, and disclose 
 a fatal tendency toward the very evil against which Mr. Webster so solemnly warned his 
 countrymen 
 
 Let us inquire for a moment to what, if pushed to its logical cnnseiiuences, the politi- 
 cians' view of party would lead. It is known that they abhor independents, and often 
 express the patriotic opinion that every citizen should join a party. The majority in each 
 party should again control its action, and the minority should frankly obey. A careful 
 organization, with executive agents and representative assemblies wouM furnish the 
 machinery for making the system ellective. This seems to be a fair statement of the 
 politicians' ideal. Now what would be the result if this ideal were realized ? The result 
 would be to collect the voters of the country into two or three gre:it parties, held together 
 by intlexible rules of discipline and fealty, and each forbidden in eiiect to allow desertion or 
 to receive desertera. As no changes of allegiance couhl take place, the relative strength of 
 parties would be changed from year to year only by the death of existing members, and the 
 enrollment of new ones from young men just reaching their majority, and from newly 
 naturalized imiiiigrants. But even this element of uncertainty can be somewhat reduced. 
 The annual death-rate would probably bear the same ratio to the total membership in all the 
 parties. Again, young men generally follow in the political footsteps of their fathers ; and as 
 the birth-rate in the various parties would be fdso ai)proximately eijual, the balance of power 
 would be little atfected from this cause. We are conlined, therefore, to the immigrants ; 
 they would hold the key to the situation. If now it be .assumed that the Irish would in 
 general go to one party, and tho Germans to the other, the iasue ■would really lie between 
 these two classes, which compose the great body of our foreign population. The problem of 
 immiijration would assume a new and startling interest. (>ne party would tiiid a potent ally 
 in Irish famines, which encourage emigration from the Emerald Isle. The other would have 
 a keen sympathy with the high taxes and the military system of fJermany, which drive so 
 many excellent men from the fath-irland. The battles of American politics would be fought 
 out by immigrati(m agents and runners for the rival steamship lines, all liberally supplied 
 with money from the campaign funds of the parties, anil perhaps also with platforms, to be 
 posted in the leading seaports and distributed by colporteurs in the interior. 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By John Stuart Mill, ISS4. 
 
 Two very different ideas are usually confounded under the name democracy. The pure 
 idea of democracy, according to its delinition, is the government of the whole people by the 
 whole people, equally represented. Democracy as commonly conceived and hitherto prac- 
 tised, is the government of the whole people by a mere majority of the people, exclusively 
 represented. The former is synonymous with the eipic'^lity of all citizens ; the latter, 
 strangely confounded with it, is a government of privilege, in favour of the numerical majority, 
 who alone possess practically any voice in the .State. This is the inevitable consequence of 
 the manner in which the votes are now taken, to the complete disfrfinchisement of minorities. 
 
 The confusion of ideas here is great, but it is so easily cleared up, that one would suppose 
 
 ^ I 
 
1 
 
 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 95 
 
 the slightest imlicatiou wuuUl be sulHcieat to place the matter in its true light before any 
 mind of average intelligence. It wduld be so, but for the power of habit ; owing to whijh 
 the simplest idea, if unfamiliar, has as great difliculty in making its way to the mind as a far 
 more complicated one. That the minority must yield to the majority, the smaller number to 
 the greater, is a familiar idea ; and accordingly men think there is no necessity for using 
 their minds any further, and it does not occur to them that there is any medium between 
 allowing the smaller number to be equally powerful with the greater, and blotting out the 
 smaller number altogether. In a representative body actually delil)erating, the minority 
 must of course be overruled ; and in an ecjual democracy (since the opinions of the con- 
 stituents, when they insist on them, determine those of the representative body) the majority 
 of the people, through their representatives, will outvote and prevail over the minority and 
 their representatives. But does it follow that the minority should have no representatives 
 at all ? Because the majority ought to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all 
 the votes, the minority none? Is it necessary that the minority shouhl not even be iicard ? 
 Nothing but habit and old association can reconcile any reasonable being to the needless 
 injustice. In a really equal democracy, every or any section would be represented, not dis- 
 proportionately, but proportionately. A majority of the electors would always have a 
 majority of the representatives ; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority 
 of tie representatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. 
 Uidess they arc, there is not e(iual government, but a government of inequality and 
 privilege : one part of the people rule over tlie rest : there is a part whose fair and ecpial share 
 of influence in the representation is withheld from them ; contrary to all just government, but 
 above all, contrary to the principle of democracy, which professes equality as its very root 
 and found.ation. 
 
 The injustice and violation of principle are not less flagrant because those who suiFer by 
 them are a minority ; for there is not e(iual suffrage where every single individual does not 
 count for ns much as any other single individual in the community. But it is not only a 
 minority wlio suU'cr. Democracy, thus constituted, does not even attain its ostensible ol)ject, 
 that of giving the powers of i,'()vcrninent in all cases to tiie numerical majority. It does some- 
 thing very diiferent : it gives them to a majority of the majority ; who may be, and often 
 arc, but a minority of the whole. All principles are most effectually tested by extreme cases. 
 Suppose then, that, in a country governed by e(jual and xmiversal suffrage, there is a con- 
 tested election in every constituency, and every election is carried by a small majority. The 
 Parliament thus brought together represents little more than a bare mnjority of the people. 
 Ihis Parliament proceeds to legislate, and adopts important measures by a bare majority of 
 itself. What guarantee is there that these measures accord with the wishes of a m.ijority of 
 the people ? Nearly half the electors, having been outvoted at the hustings, have had no 
 influence at all in the decision ; and the whole of these may be, a m.ajority of them probably 
 are, hostile to the measures, having voted against those i)y whom they have been carried. 
 Of the remaining electors, nearly half have chosen representatives who, by supposition, have 
 voted against the measures. It is possible, therefore, and not at all improbable, that the 
 opinion which has prevailed was agreeable only to a minority of the nation, though a majority 
 of that portion of it, whom the institutions of the country have erected into the ruling class. 
 If democracy means the certain ascendancy of the majority, there are no means of insuring 
 that, but by allowing every individual figure to tell equally in the summing up. Any 
 minority left out, either purposely or by the play of the machinery, gives the power not to 
 the majority, but to a minority in some other part of the scale. 
 
 . . . Is it not a great grievance, that in every Parliament a very numerous portion of 
 the electors willing and anxi(nis to be represented, have no member in the House for 
 whom they have voted ? Is it just that every elector of Maryleboue is obliged to be 
 represented by two nominees of the vestries, every elector of Finsbury or Lambeth by those 
 (as is generally believed) of the publicans ? The coustif uencies to which most of the highly 
 
 
*! .*■ 
 
 ! 
 
 .?' 
 
 
 96 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 educated and pulilic spirited peraons in the country l)elong, those of the large towns, are now, 
 in great part, either unre|)reseute<l or uusrepreseutud. The electors who are on a different side 
 in party ijolitics from tlie local majority, are unrepresented. Of those who are on the same side, 
 a large proportion arc misrepresented ; having Ijeen o))liged to accept the man who had the 
 greatest number of supporters in their political party, thotigli his opinions may differ from theirs 
 on every other jraint. The state of things is, in some respects, even worse than if the minority 
 were not allowed to vote at all ; for then, at least the majority might have a member who 
 would represent their own best mind ; while now, the necessity of not dividing the party, 
 ior fear of letting in its opponents, induces all to vote either for the first person who presents 
 himself wearing their colours, or for the one brought forward by their local leaders ; and 
 these, if we pay them tlie compliment, which they very seldom deserve, of supposing their 
 choice to bo unbiassed Ity their personal interests, are compelled, that they may be sure of 
 mustering their whole strengh, to bring forward a candidate whom none of the party will 
 strongly object to— tliat is, a man without any distinctive peculiarity, any known ojjinions 
 except the shibboleth of the party. This is strikingly exemplified in the United States ; 
 where at the election of President, the strongest party never dares put forward any of its 
 strongest men, because every one of these, from the mere fact tliat he has been long in the 
 public eye, has made himself objectionable to some |)ortion or other of the party, and is there- 
 fore not so sure a card for rallying all their votes, as a person who has never been heard of 
 by the public at all until he is produced as the candidate. Thus, the man who is chosen, 
 even by the strongest party, represents perhaps the real wishes only of the narrow margin by 
 which that party outnumbers blie other. Any section whose support is necessary to success, 
 possesses a veto on the candidate. .4ny section which holds out more obstinately than the 
 rest, can compel all the others to adopt its nominee ; ami this superior pertinacity is un- 
 happily more likely to be found among those who are holding out for their own interest, than 
 for that of the public, The choice of the majority is therefore very likely to be determined 
 by that portion of the body who ai'e the most timid, the most narrow-minded and prejudiced, 
 or who cling most tenaciously to tlie exclusive class-interest ; in which case the electoral 
 rights of the minority, while useless for the purposes for which votes are given, serve only 
 for compelling the majority to accept the candidate of the weakest or worst portion of 
 themselves. 
 
 That while recognising these evils, many should consider them as the necessary price paid 
 for a free government, is in no way surprising : it was the opinion of all the friends of freedom, 
 up to a recent period. But the habit of passing them over as irremediable has become so 
 inveterate, that many persons seem to have lost the capacity of looking at them as things 
 which they would be glad to remedy if they could. From despairing of a cure, there is too 
 often but one step to denying the disease ; and from this follows dislike to having a remedy 
 proposed, as if the proposer was creating a mischief instead of offering relief from one. 
 People are so inured to tlie evils, that they feel as if it were unreasonable, if noc wrong, to 
 complain of them. Yet, avoidable or not, he must be a purblind lover of liberty on whose 
 mind they do not weigh ; who would not rejoice at the discovery that they could be dis- 
 pensed with. Now, nothing is more certain, than that the virtual blotting out of the minority 
 is no necessary or natural consequence of freedom ; that far from having any connexion with 
 democracy, it is d-ametrically opposed to the first principle of democracy, representation in 
 proportion to numbers. It is an essential part of democracy that minorities should be 
 adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is 
 possible without it. 
 
 Those who have seen and felt, in some degree, the force of these considerations, have 
 proposed various expedients by which the evil may be, in a greater or less degree, mitigated. 
 Lord John Russell, in one of his Reform Bills, introduced a provision, that certain constitu- 
 encies should return three members, and that in these each elector should be allowed to vote 
 only for two ; and Mr. Disraeli, in the recent debates, revived the memory of the fact by 
 
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT. 
 
 97 
 
 reproftching him for it ; heinj; of opinion, ripparently, that it Ijelits a Conservative statesman 
 to regard only means, and to disown B(;oniful).y all fellow-feeling with any one who is 
 betrayed, even once, into thinking ends. Others havct proposed that each elector should be 
 alldwud to vote only for one. By either of thciie i)laii8, a minority eipmlling or exceeding a 
 tliird of the local constituency, would l)e able, if it attempted no more, to return one of the 
 three members. The same result might be attained in a still better way, if, as proposed in 
 an able pamphlet by Mr. .James (jlartli Marshall, tlie elector retained his three votes, but 
 was at liljerty to bestow them all upon the same candidate. These schemes, though infmitely 
 better than none at all, are yet but makeshifts, and attain tlie end in a very imperfect 
 manner ; since all local minorities of less than a third, and all minorities, however numerous, 
 which are made up from several constituencies, would remain unrepresented. It is much to 
 be lamented, however, that none of these plans have been carried into effect, as any of them 
 would have recognized the right principle, and prepared the way for its more complete appli- 
 cation. But real e(iuality of representation is not obtained, unless any set of electors 
 amounting to the average number of a constituency, wherever in the country they happen to 
 reside, have the power of combining with one another to return a representative. This 
 degree of perfection in representation appeared impracticable, until a man of great capacity, 
 fitted alike for large general views and for the contrivance of practical details— Mr. Tliomas 
 Hare — had proved its possibility by drawing up a scheme for its accomplishment, embodied 
 in a Draft of an Act of Parliament : a scheme which has the almost unparalleled merit, of 
 carrying out a great principle of government in a manner approaching to ideal ))erfection as 
 regards the special object in view, while it attains incidentally several other ends, of scarcely 
 inferior importance. 
 
 According to this plan, the unit of representation, the quota of electors who would be 
 entitled to have a member to themselves, would be ascertained by tiie ordinary process of 
 taking averages, the number of voters being divided by the number of seats in the House : 
 and every candidate who obtained that quota would be returned, from however great a 
 uund)er of local constituencies it might be gathered. The votes would, as at present, be 
 given locally ; but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate, in whatever 
 part of the country he might offer himself. Those electors, therefore, who did not wish to 
 be represented by any of the local candidates, might aid by their vote in the return of the 
 person they liked best among all those throughout the country, who had expressed a willing- 
 ness to be chosen. This would, so far, give reality to the electoral rights of the otherwise 
 virtually disfranchised minoj'ity. But it is important that not those alone who refuse to vote 
 for any of the local candidates, but those also who vote for one of them and are defeated, 
 should be enabled to find elsewhere the representation which they have not succeedel in 
 obtaining in their own district. It is therefore provided that an elector may deliver a voting 
 paper containing other names in addition to the one which stanils foremost in hii preference. 
 His vote would only be counted for one candidate ; but if the object of his first choice failed 
 to be returned, from not having obtained the quota, his second perhaps might be more 
 fortunate. He may extend his list to a greater nundjer, in the order of his preference, so 
 that if the names which stand near the top of the list either cannot make up the (piota, or 
 are able to make it up without his vote, the vote may still be used for some one whom it may 
 assist in returning. To obtain the full nund)er of mendjers reijuireil to complete the House, 
 as well as to prevent very popular candiilatcs from engrossing nearly all the suffrages, it is 
 necessary, however many votes a candidate may obtain, that no more of them than the quota 
 should be counted for his return : the remainder of those who voted for him would have their 
 votes counted for tiie next person on their respective lists who needed them, and could by 
 their aid complete the quota. To determine which of a candidate's votes should be used for 
 his return, and which set free for others, several methods are proposed, into which we shall 
 not here enter. He would of course retain tlie votes of all those who would not otherwise be 
 represented ; and for the remainder, <lrawing lots, in default of better, would be an unobjec- 
 tionable expedient. The voting papers would be conveyed to a central office, where the 
 
98 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 3 
 
 votes would be counted, the number of tirat, second, third, and other votes given for each 
 candidate ascertained, and the ((uota wouUl be allotted to every one who conld make it up, 
 until the nunilierof the House was complete ; Hrst votes being preferred to second, second to 
 third, and so forth. The voting papers, and .all the elements of the calculation, wouhl bo 
 placed in i)ublic repositories, accessible to all whom they concerned ; and if any one wiio hail 
 obtained the quota was not duly returned, it would be in his power easily to prove it. These 
 are tlie main provisions of the scheuie. 
 
 In the tirst place, it secures a representation, in proportion to numbers, of every division 
 of the electoral body : not two great parties alone, with perhaps a few large sectional 
 minorities in particular places, but every minority in the whole nation, consistinj; of a 
 sufficiently large number to be, on principles of e([ual justice, entitled to a representative. 
 Secondly, no elector wouhl, as at present, be nominally represented by some one whom he 
 had not chosen. Every mendjcr of the House would be the representative of an unanimous 
 constituency. He would represent a thousand electors, or two thousand, or live thousand, or 
 ten thousand, as the quota might be, every one of whom would have not only voted for him, 
 but selected him from the whole country ; not merely from the assortment of two or three 
 perhaps rotten oranges, whicli may be the only choice otl'ered to him in his local market. 
 Under tliis relation the tie between the elector and the representative woul^l be of a 
 strength, and a value, of which at present we have no experience. Every one of the electors 
 would be personally identified with his representative, and the representative with his con- 
 stituents. Every elector wiio voted for him, would have done so either l)ecau8e, among all 
 the candidates for Parliament who are favourably known to a certain number of electors, 
 he is the one who best expresses the voter's opinions, or because he is one of those whose 
 abilities and character tiie voter most respects, and whom he most willingly trusts to think 
 for him. The member would represent persons, not the mere bricks and mortar of the town 
 — the voters themselves, not a few vestrymen or parish not,al)ilities merely. All, however, 
 that is worth preserving in the representation of places would be preserved. Though the 
 Parliament of the nation ouglit to have as little as possible to do with inirely local all'airs, 
 yet, while it has to do with them, there ought to be members specially commissinned to 
 look after the -nterests of every important locality ; and these there would still be. In 
 every locality wjiich could make up the quota within itself, the majority would generally 
 prefer to be represented by one of themselves ; by a person of local knowledge, and residing 
 in the locality, if there is any such person to be found among the civndidates, who is otlur- 
 wise well qualitied to be their representative. It would be the minorities chiefly, who being 
 unable to return the local member, would look out elsewhere for a candidate likely to obtain 
 other votes in addition to their own. 
 
 Of all modes in which a national representation can possibly be constituted, this one 
 affords the best security for the intellectual (jualitications desirable in the representatives. 
 At present, by universal admission, it is becoming more and more diHicult for any one, who 
 has only talents and character, to gain admission into the House of Commons. The only 
 persons who can get elected are those who possess local influence, or make their way by 
 lavish expenditure, or who, on the invitation of three or four tradesmen or attorneys, are 
 sent down by one of the two great parties from their London clubs, as men whose votes the 
 party can depend on under all circumstances. On Mr. Hare's system, those who did not 
 like the local candidates, or who could not succeed in carrying the local candidate they pre- 
 ferred, would have the power to till up their voting papers by a selection from all the persons 
 of national reputation, on the list of candidates, with whose general political principles they 
 were in sympathy. Almost every person, therefore, who had made himself in any way 
 honourably distinguished, though devoid of local influence, and having sworn allegiance to 
 no political party, would have a fair chance of making up the quota ; and with this encour- 
 agement such persons might be expected to offer themselves, in numbers hitherto undreamt 
 of. Hundreds of able men of independent thought, who would have no chance whatever of 
 
UKIMIKSKNTATIVE (iOVKUNMENT. 
 
 99 
 
 being cliosen by the majority of any existing constituoncy, have by tlieir \vritinj;s, or their 
 exertions in some lieUl of public usefuhicHS, made themselves known antl approvetl by a few 
 persons in almost every distiict of the kiiigilom ; and if every vttte that would l)e given for 
 them in every jdiice could be counted for their ejection, they might lie al)le to complete tiie 
 number of tiie cpiota. In no otiier wa> which it seems possible to8Ug^est, would Parliament 
 be so certain of containing tiie very elite of the country. 
 
 And it is not solely through the votes of •ninoriHes that this system ()f election would 
 raise the intellectual standard of the House of (Commons. Majorities would be compelled to 
 look out for mcnd>ers of a much higher calibre. When the individuals composing tiie 
 majority would no longer be reduced to Hobson's choice, of either voting for tiie person 
 brougiit forward l)y tiieir local leaders, or not voting at all ; when the nominee of the leaders 
 would have to encounter the competition not solely of the candidate of the minority, but of 
 all the men of established reputation in tlic country who were willing to serve ; it would be 
 impossible any longer to foist upon the electors the iirst p((rson who presents himself with tiie 
 catchwords of the party in his mouth, and three or four thousand pouiuls in his pocket" 
 The majority would insist on having a caudiilate worthy of their clioice, or they would carry 
 their votes somewhere else, and the minority would prevail. Tho slavery of the majority to 
 tlie least estinial)le jKirtion of their number would be at an end : the very best and most 
 capable of the local notaliilitics would be put forward by preference ; if possiide, such as 
 were known in some advantageous way l)eyond the locality, tliat their local strength might 
 have a chance of being fortilied by stray votes from elsewhere, ('onstituencies would become 
 competitors for tiie tiest candidates, and would vie with one another in selecting from among 
 the men of local knowledge jvud connexions tliose who were most distinguished in every other 
 respect. 
 
 The natural tendency of representative government, as of modern civilization, is towards 
 collective mediocrity : and this tendency is increased by all reductions and extensions of the 
 franchise, llieir eti'ect being to place the principal power in tlie liaiuls of classes more and 
 more l>elow the highest level of instruction in the community. Hut tliough tlie superior 
 intellects and characters will necessarily be outnumbered, it makes a great diti'erence wlietlier 
 or not they are heard. In the false democracy which, instead of giving representation to all, 
 gives it only to the local majorities, the voice of the instructed minority may have no organs 
 at all in the representative liody. It is an a<lmitted fact tliat in the American democracy, 
 which is constructed on this faulty model, the highly cultivated memliers ot tlie community, 
 except such of them as are willing to sacrifice their own opinions and modes of judgment, 
 and become the servile mouth-pieces of their inferiors in knowledge, seldom even oiler them- 
 selves for (Congress or tho .State Legislatures, so little likelihood have they of being returned. 
 Hatl a jilaii like Mr. Hare's by good fortune suggested itself to the enlightened and ])atriotic 
 founders of the American Kepuljlic, the Federal and State Assemblies would have contained 
 many of these distinguished men, and democracy would have been spared its greatest 
 reiiroaeh and one of its most formidable evils. Against this evil the system of jiersonal 
 representation, proposed by Mr. Hare, is almost a sijccilic. The minority of instructed minds 
 scattered through the local constituencies, wouhl unite to return a number, proportioned to 
 their own uumiiers, of tlie very ablest men vnintry contains. They would be under the 
 
 strongest inducement to choose such men, Si-^v, n no other mode could they make their 
 small numerical strength tell for anything considerable. The representatives of the majority, 
 besides that they would themselves i « ii-oved in quality by the operation of the system, 
 would no longer have tl' whole Held vu themselves. They would indeed outnumber the 
 others, as much as the lass of electoitj outnumuera the other in the country : they could 
 
 always outvote them, ')i ^y would speak and vote in their presence, and subject to their 
 criticism. When any ci. )nce arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the in- 
 structed few, by reasons, at least apparently, us cogent ; and since they could not, as those 
 do who are speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right 
 
 <;■■;» J 
 
 ■^1 
 
100 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 it would occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they wore in the wron^. As 
 tliey would in general be well-moaning (for thus nuich may roiiHotiiibly l)e expected from a 
 fairly-chosen national representation), their own minds w<iuld i>e insensibly raised by the 
 miiuls with which they were in contact, or even in conflict. Tiie champions of unpopular 
 iloetrines would not put forth their arguments merely in books and perio Heals, reail only by 
 their own side ; the opposing ranks would meet face to face and hand to hand, and there 
 would be a fair comparison of their intellectual strength, in the presence of the country. 
 It woulil then be found out wlietiier the opinion which prevailed by counting votes, would 
 also prevail if the votes were weighed as well as countetl. The mul'ituile have often a true 
 instinct for distinguishing an able man, when he has the means of dis]>laying his ability in a 
 fair Held before them. If such a man fails to obtain at least some ]iortion of his just weight, 
 it is through institutions or usages which keep him out of sight. In the old democracies 
 there were no means of keeping out of sight any able man ; the bema was open to him ; 
 he needed nobody's eonsent to become a public adviser. It is not so in a representative 
 government ; and the best frien<ls of representative democracy can hardly be without mis- 
 givings, that the Themistocles or Demosthenes whose counsels would have saved the nation, 
 might be unable during his whole life ever to obtain a seat. But if the presence in the 
 representative assembly can be insured of even a few of the lirst minds in the country 
 though the remainder consist only of average minds, the intiueuce of these leading spirits 
 is sure to make itself sensibly felt in the general deliberations, even though they bo known 
 to be, in many respects, opposed to the tone of popular opinion and feeling. I am unable 
 to conceive any mode by which the presence of such minds can be so positively insured, 
 as by that proposed by Mr. Hare. 
 
 PARTY GOVERXMEXT. 
 
 By Mathew Macfie. From The Confempornri/ Review, Vol. XL VI., ISS.}. 
 
 If Parties were associated unswervingly with the same set of principles, even though 
 these should sometimes happen to be erroneous, the spectacle of Party greed and recij)rocal 
 bitterness would, perhaps, be somewhat more endurable. But both LiberaU .id Tories 
 have been notoriously fickle and time-serving. Too often have both supported a good cause 
 from a bad motive, ever ready to a<lvocate a new set of principles if by so doing the one 
 party could deal a blow to the other. 
 
 VVe look in vain for principle regulating the conduct of the two great Parties in the 
 State. Truth, honour, and fair dealing, as a rule, are alike surrendered to party convenience. 
 An example of demoralized ethics is thus daily set by our statesmen, which if carried out in 
 the relations of private life would be unsparingly condemned, and the combined religious 
 teaching of the 90,000 preachers of all denominations in the country utterly fails to neutralize 
 the eflfect of the moral injury thus publicly intiicted. 
 
 If Government by Party were identical with Government by the Majority in the 
 Lower House, the faults of the system might perhajjs be treated with great leniency. But 
 it has not — although it is fallaciously said to have — even this redeeming feature in its 
 favour. While the (Jovernment of the day is chosen from the side showing a majority in 
 Parliament, it is simply a majority of the party which has a m.ajority in the House, and not 
 the majority of the whole House, which governs. Indeed, this majority of a majority, 
 relatively to the totality of members may be, and often is, an actual nriuority. More than 
 one case could be adduced, since the present Ministry was formed, in which a measure has 
 been introduced, not acceptable to all the members on the Liberal side. Party organization. 
 
I'AKTY KKKLING. 
 
 101 
 
 howivcr, for the nioHt part haa trimiiiihtMl over the (lisstntiints. Hut it has uinUmlitoiUy 
 happL'tiot Hoinotiiiit'ti tliat tliu disHeiiticiit minority niiioiig tho (ioverniuent supporters, 
 secretly opposed to a given niensure, when added to tlio whole force of tho Opposition, has 
 represented a distinct majority of the entire House. Clearly, in such a case, therefore, tho 
 majority of the majority hy whose influence the iJill is carried, would constitute a minority 
 of Parliament. The ellect of temporizing Party tactics under such conditions, is that the 
 views of tho majority are really misrepresented. 
 
 Not the least potent olijection to Party (lovernment is that the arrangemt -t is diamet- 
 ncally at variance with the principle of representation. The cardinal idea of tho repre- 
 sentative system is responsihility to the constituent body only. 'I'lie liasis of Party (Joveru- 
 nient is loyalty to jiarty organixation. The Party man merges his representative individuality 
 in the partisan, and votes as an unthinking nuiehine under the din ction of his leader. An 
 amusing illustration of tiiis pliant conformity is given in the experience of one of the rank 
 and tile who once confessed " that he made it an invarialile rule never to he present at a 
 debate or absent on a division, and that he <)nly once, during the course of a long parlia- 
 mentary life, ventured to vote according to hia conscience, and on that occasion he had 
 voted wrong." 
 
 
 PARTY FKELINO. 
 
 From "Popular Oovenniient." By Sir Hmry S. Ma'we, ISi^i. 
 
 The Wire-puller is not intelligible unless we take into account one of the strongest 
 forces acting on human nature — I'arty feeling. Party feeling is probably far more a survival 
 of the primitive combativeuess of mankind than a cousciiuence of conscious intellectual 
 differences between man and man. It is essentially tho same sentiment which in certain 
 states of society leads to civil, intertribal, or international war ; and it is as universal as 
 humanity. It is better studied in its more irrational manifestations than in those to which 
 we are accustomed. It is sai<l that Australian savages will travel over half the Australian 
 continent to take in a tight the side of comb.atants who wear the same Totem as tliemselves. 
 Two Irish factious who broke one another's heads over the whole island are said to have 
 originated in a rjuarrel about the colour of a cow. In Southern India, a series of dangerous 
 riots are constantly arising through the rivalry of parties who know no more of one another 
 than that some of them belong to the party of the right hand and others to that of the left 
 hand. Once a year, large numbers of English ladies and yentlemeu, who have no serious 
 reason for preferring one university to the other, wear dark or light idue colours to signify 
 good wishes for the success of Oxford or Cambridge in a cricket-mateh or boat-race. Party 
 differences, properly so-called, arc supposed to indicate intellectual, or moral, or historical 
 preference ; but these go a very little way down into the population, and by the bulk of 
 partisans they are hardly understood and soon forgotten. " Guelf " and " (ihibelHue " had 
 once a meaning, but men were under perpetual banisliment from their native land for 
 belonging to one or the other of these parties long after nobody knew in what the difference 
 consisted. Some men are Tories or Whigs l^y conviction ; but thousands upon thousands of 
 electors vote simply for yellow, blue, or purple, caught .at most by the appeals of some 
 popular orator. 
 
 It is through this great natural tendency to take sides that the Wire-puller works. 
 Without it he would be powerless. His business is to fan its flame ; to keep it constantly 
 acting upon the man who has once declared himbslf a partisan ; to make escape from it diffi- 
 cult and distasteful. His art is that of a Nonconformist preacher, who gave importance to 
 
102 
 
 AI'PKNDIX. 
 
 f 
 
 n hody of (■i)iiiiii<>ii|)liic(! i-eliKioniHts ))y |i(>rHimiIing tlii'iii to wi'ir n uniroriii (iinl tnko a mili- 
 tary title, or ot' a man who iiiadu tliu hiiccchh of iv 'rcinintraiico Society l>y pruvuiliii^ on itH 
 inuinberH to wear always and openly a l)liiu rihiton. In thu long-run, theitu uontrivanecii 
 cannot l»e coiilined to any one party, and their elfcctH on all pai tien and their leaderH, and on 
 thu whole ruling deinoeraey, inunt lie in tiu! liigheHt degree serious and lasting. The first of 
 these etluctH will liu, I think, to nmku all |iarties very like one another, and indued in tho 
 end almost indistinguiHlia)>le, however leiulers may (juarrel and partisan hati^ partisans. In 
 th(! next plaee, each party will proliulily liecome more and more homogeneous ; an<l the 
 opinions it profeRSOH, nud tho policy which in the outcome of thuHu opinions, will leas and 
 less retleet tlu; individual mind of any leader, but only the ideas which Heem to that mind 
 to be more likely to win favour with the greatest nundier of supporters. 
 
 Historically speaking. Party is probably nothing more than a survival and a conse- 
 quence of the prin)itivu condiativuness of mankind. It is war without the city transmuted 
 into war within thu city, but mitigated in jirocess. The best historical justilication 
 
 which can be ofl'ered for it is that it has oftei; iiabletl portieus of the nation, who would 
 otherwi.se be armed enemies, to be only factions. I'arty strife, like strife in arms, develops 
 nuvny high but inrierfeet and one-sided vn'tues ; it is fruitful of self-denial and self-sacrilice. 
 Ihit wherever it jirevails, a great part of onlinary morality is unquestionably suspended ; a 
 number of maxims are received, which are not those of religion or ethics ; and men do acta 
 which, except as between enemies, and except as between political opponents, W(mlil be very 
 generally classed as either immoralities or sins. 
 
 Party disputes were originally the occupation of aristocracies, which joined in them 
 because they loved the sport for its own sake ; and the rest of the community followed one 
 side or the other as its clients. Now-a-days, Party has become a force acting with vast 
 energy on multitudinous democracies, and a number of nrtilicial contrivances have been 
 invented for facilitating and stimulating its action. Yet, in a democriicy, the fragment of 
 ]iolitical power falling to each man's share is so extremely small, that it would be hardly 
 I)oasible, with all the aid of the ('aucus, the Stump, and the Campaign newspaper, to rouse 
 the interests of thousands or millions of men, if Party were not coupled with another political 
 force. This, to speak plainly, is Corruption. * * 
 
 Whether Hamilton looked forward to an era of purity in his own country, cannot be 
 certainly known. He and his coadjutors undoubtedly were unprepared for the rapid develop- 
 ment of Party which soon set in ; they evidently thought that their country would be poor ; 
 and they probably expected to see all evil influences defeated by the elaborate contrivances 
 of the Federal Constitution . But the Unite<l States became rapidly wealthy and rapidly 
 populous ; and the universal 8u(t''vi;;o of all white men, native-born or immigrant, '-as soon 
 established by the legislation oi the most powerful States. With wealth, popula .., and 
 widely diffused electoral pow»\r, corruption sprang into vigorous life. President Andrew 
 Jackson, proclaiming the principle of "to the victors the spoils," which all parties soon 
 adopted, expelled from office all administrative servants of the United States who did not 
 belong to his faction ; and the crowd of persons tilling these ofHces, which are necessarily 
 very numerous in so vast a territory, together with the groups of wealthy men interested in 
 public lands and in ths countless industries protected by the Customs tarifT, formed an 
 extensive body of contributors from whom great amounts of money were levied by a species 
 of taxation, to be presently expended in wholesale bribery. 
 
 It is obvious, then, that the simple device of dividing the country into small constituencies, 
 the m.ijority in each of which returns members to Parliament, is at best a clumsy and a haphazard 
 way of approaching the fair representation of the people. In the case of the Metropolis a 
 district more than half Tory threw the balance of its influence in Parliament against the Tory 
 Government, the minority being over-rejire.sented and counting as a m.ijority. In the second 
 case the majority had all the members, and the minority was not represented at all. During the 
 
PARTY FKKLIN(}. 
 
 103 
 
 last . ..•ssion, in wliicli llie AKncultural IIoIdiiiKs Act was passed tliroimli tlic House, a nuniher 
 of I.ilieral vidors in five at;iicultiiial counties, jjreater than tlie nuniher of I.ilKTai voters in 
 liirniin^^Iian), liail actually no voice at all, wtiilst the jiarty renrcicntinj,' the landlord's side of the 
 <|uestion was represented by twenty-four votes, ll.ad these five counties heen divided into twi 
 as many sections, it is inipossil)le to say whether the result would have been better ; it cerlaiidj 
 could not Imve been worse^ 
 
 These illustrations are enoufjh, f think, to show that the fair representation of the people 
 would not necessarily be secure<l by the division of the country into e(|ual electoral districts with 
 one or two members to each. I will not here more than simjily allude to the still fjraver, and, 
 a> I think, fatal objections which may be urjjed a^ainsi the proposal to divide our larj^e con- 
 stiluciRcs into wariN ; tlie utterly artificial character of nil arran;^'emcnt which would break up 
 into fraj;ments a (greater political unit like Hirniinj;ham, and make Mr. I5rit;lit the menil)er for 
 Ward No. I or No. 2, and the tendency it would have to inoviiicializc I'arliament and l(j ex- 
 aggerate petty local interests at the expense of far j^reater national ones. 
 
 If the system cannot be relied on to secure even to the majority its jiroper weijjht in 
 Parliament, it is surely self-condemned, apart frcmi the otiier grave reasons which may be urged 
 against it ; and, therefore it is not necessary here to urge them. The nation will hardly be 
 pursuad'.Ml to break up its natural political units, and to sacrifice much of its best political life, for 
 an object which cannot after all be attained by the sacrifice. 
 
 ,'\re we then to fall back upon large constituencies withont any direct attempt to secure 
 proportionate voting? Is a bare majority in a large constituency to return all the members of one 
 colour to I'arliament ? 
 
 This brings us back to the point that a .system by which the minority in each constituency is 
 eliminated and the majority only is represented in Parliament, cannot be made to secure a fair 
 representation of the peojile. The objections to it become still more apparent and morally 
 serious when we look at the character of the representation produced by it in each individual 
 constituency, whether small or large— when we consider how easily it may fail in securing a fair 
 rei>resentation of the majority itself, and also how often it may give undue re])resentation to 
 elements in the nation which certainly ought not to be over-represented. 
 
 It so happens in England, and probably wherever there is government by parties, that in a 
 great number of constituencies the voters are nearly evenly divided between the two parties. In 
 Liverpool and Manchester, for example, two or three thousanil voters — a tenth, perhaps of the 
 whole number — swinging over from one side to the other — can convert a minority into a majority, 
 and have done so over and over again. In many boroughs a still smaller fraction holds the key 
 to the result of the election in iis own hands ; and Professor Kawcett has long ago pointed out 
 with great force and truth that this fraction — this miserably small minority — is thus infinitely 
 over-represented, and has artificially jilaced in its hand a power for good or for evil, altogether 
 disproportioned to its numbers or legitimate influence. 
 
 This oscillating class of voters, swinging like a ferry-boat from side to side of the stream, is 
 not composed of the sober-minded men of solid opinion, .vhether Tory or Liberal. It is too often 
 composed of injured or frightened interests, or of dissatisfied spirits, or of cliques representing 
 special crotchets, and the result of an election at any given time depends far too much upon 
 which way it may cast its votes. It is bad enough that a fickle fraction of the people should 
 have it in th ir power, by fits and starts, to change the lines of the Government of England, 
 when the bulk of the nation has not changed. Hut it becomes still worse when a compact and 
 organized clique is tempted to make a test point of its special crotchet or object, however 
 honestly pursued. It is a mockery of representative Government that such a clique should have 
 the power d liberately to force its views upon political parties l)y putting them in the position of 
 choosing between success and defeat according as they accept or reject its dictates. 
 
 This is, in truth, an interference with fair popular representation. It is an act of intimida- 
 
i';l: 
 
 !< 
 
 SI 
 
 104 
 
 AI'PKNDIX. 
 
 tion annlojjous lo lliat of tin- lii^jhwnymari wlio di'inantls your purse, |Miiiiiin^ a pisiol at your 
 breast. It is undui; inlluciicc of the worst kimi, all tlic more ilcniorali/.iii),' in its results, iicciusii 
 the Htake is so larj;e. And why should wi; allow so corrupt a practice to continue? The faui 
 is lliat the power of this fraction of voters, in the absence of proportionate votint,', is simply and 
 unnaturally m;-,t,'ni(k'(l in a larj^e constituency by the unjust and clumsy ami artilicial arrall^;eMlenl 
 that a bare majority shall shift the whole representation over in a lumji from one side to the 
 other, inslead of the representation correspondint; with the proportionate stren^jih of paities. . . . 
 
 I have |)urp jsely treated ihis (|Uestion from a Liberal p(jint of view, liul it is not a party 
 ipieslion. When the result of '.he imperfect system of representing only majorities is considered 
 from a broad |)oint of view, its dar.j^ers and it.s ovils are founil lo lie by no nieiins counteracted 
 by the mere sidxlivision of constituencies, by truslint; to the laws of chance, or lo the correcliou 
 which is sometimes obtained in an average result. The last two or three elections have already 
 given pn.of enou,^h of the reality of the dan};er of exajjf^eratinj^ the inllueiK.'e of the cl.i^s c,f 
 oscillating,' and dissalis("ie<l voters. Kor six rears the nation was dra),'^'ed by a majority m the 
 House of Commons, which probably did not represent the majority of vo'ers,* into a line of 
 foreign |)olicy whicli the conscience of a majority of the nation condemned, in<l from which ii is 
 now found possible altogetlier lo retire. 
 
 And there is another nati(jnal danj^er from which we m.ay be anxious to protect our country — 
 viz., the tendency of minorities remaining long imrepresenled iiopelessly to retire from political 
 life, leaving the majority without that natural and just and wholesome restraint which the jireseuce 
 of an active minority puts n])on their aciiop.s. Our faith in the democracy of the future, if it rest 
 upon a rational basis, ri'sls chielly upon the (iiir representation of the whole people j u]ion the 
 success with which the mass of s(jnnd political conviction, which we believe to lie at the bottom 
 of our national life, is secured its due weight by means of fair representation in Parliament ; 
 upon keeping the best minds in the nation interested in jiolitics, and upon the growth in the 
 constituencies of a solid and stable public opinion, which will have its due inlluence in steering 
 the vessel of the .State in a steady course. To attain this object, lo save the democracy of the 
 future from the rocks which, in the experience of o'lier nations, have wrecked it in the past, il 
 seems to be essential that true popular representation should be steadily aimed at and as far as 
 possible secured. Nor do I ^ee how lo secure that Parliament shall re)>resent the sober sense of 
 the majority of voters in tlie nation with anything like substantial correctness, wilhoiil pro)iortionate 
 voting in large constituencies. 'I'he (juestion remains how this can best be attained? 
 
 . . . A Parliament representing only local majorities, shifted fiom side lo side by the 
 oscillation of the least stable and the least intelligent class of Ihictualing voters, is no lair 
 represenlaii(jn of the nation — it may, at certain crises in mlional history, become government by 
 the mob. A system which robs the sober mass of the nation of its due weight and power in 
 controlling its own destinies, and which jiuts it in ihe power of a mere tithe of the nation 
 periodically to drag it against its will into lines of action, which, when the mischief is done, it 
 has at the first o|)portunity to repudiate, and the evil results of which even a long repentance 
 cannot wipe out, whatever else it is, is hardly in any true sense democratic. And surely the 
 time when the franchise is extended, and a redistribution of seats becomes necessary, is the right 
 time to consider how the sober and solid mass of the nation can best make its voice heanl, so 
 that the democracy we are creating may ai least be a real one. To refuse to do this because il 
 involves some fresh effort of thought, and some deviation from old-fashioned ways, woukl be, ui 
 my humble opinion, to shrink a responsibility which rightly rests upon the shoulders of tin-. 
 generation of statesmen. 
 
 'There were about 300,000 mori Liberal than 'lory votes polled in 1874 in the contested constituencies. 
 
RKPnESKSTATION 
 
 105 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 ItKI'KKSKNTATIoN. 
 Ihj Sir John Liihlmd; liurl, M.l\, J-'./LS D.C.L., I.L.I).. ( lSSr>). 
 
 Sir (i. {'.. I.i;wia, in Iuh woiii '• On the I'.- i 
 lii.s iii-dfiMiiiil Htiiily of iiiiL-iiMit iii.story, nor .ii« 
 cniiliU'cl liini to iii'i'ive lit it dcciiltHl oiiinion ou tliiii 
 
 '■1 if (nivurninciit," ttllM uh tiiiit luiitiit-r 
 cxpfrionoe in rational iiU'aii'H, Iniil 
 ortiint i|U>'Htion. 
 
 of a lii'litor .md urcilitor iic<:ount ; thu 
 vciglitM in ono Hualu may l)e Iohm iiuavy 
 
 . . 'I lit" 
 
 " Thii controversy," lie Hayti, "in one eonMis, 
 (lillicnity lieM in ^trikin^ the liahmei! fairly. Th 
 
 than the weij,'htH in the other Hcale, liiit they are neverthelesx \veij,'ht8. 
 (lillieiilty w to (leteiinini! wliieh of two Hets of valiil ar^^uinentH iireiioniliMMtes.' 
 
 Thu reniarkalile Haying of the late I'riiiee ('onnort that KepreHentative lustitutionM are 
 on their trial hau lieen ao often i|Uoleil, that I alnioat huaitate to do ho again. 
 
 Yet it might well have seemed that government "of the people, for the ])t!ople, and )»y 
 the [leople," was Ho ohvioualy wise and just, that it nnist almost of necessity work well in 
 any intelligent community. This, however, has certainly not been the general experience. 
 
 Why, then, has Democracy so often failed in tiie past? Why have we seen that in 
 State after State power has oscillated from one extreme to the other- from the Tyrant to the 
 I)ennkgogue, and hack again from the Demagogue to the 'I'yr.'iiit? 'ihe true reason, I helieve, 
 is to he found, not in any fault of the principle, hut hecauae the principle has not been 
 correctly applied — because, in fact, no country has ever yet adopted a true system of He- 
 presentation. 
 
 This has been well pointed out by a distinguished American statesman, Mr. CallKUUi. 
 
 "The effect," ho says, " of the oi'dinaiy .system.s of representation, is to place the control 
 of the parties in the hands of their respective majorities; and the (Jovernment itself, 
 virtually, under the control of the majority of the dominant party, for the time, instead of 
 the majority of the whole connnimity ; -where the theory of this form of government vests 
 it. Thus, iu the very lirst stage of the process, the government becomes the government of 
 n minority instead of a majority -a miiiority, u.sually, and under the most favour.ilih' 
 circumstances, of not nuich more than one-fourth of the whole contmunity," 
 
 John Stuart Mill has stated the ease still nutre forcibly. 
 
 "In a representative body," he says, "actually deliberating, tiu' minority must of 
 c<iurse be overruled : and in an (^pial democracy («ini;e tin: opinions of the constituents, 
 when they insist ou them, determine those of the representative botly) the majority of the 
 people, thr(Uigh their representatives, will outvote and prevail c.er the minority and their 
 representatives. 
 
 " Hut does it follow that the minority should have no ri'presentatives at all ? HecauBo 
 the majority o\ight to prevail over the minority, must the majority have all the votes, the 
 minority none? Is it necessary that the minority should not even be heard ? Nothing but 
 habit and old association can reconcile any reasonablt: being to the needless injustice. 
 
 " In a really equal democracy evi^ry or any .section would be represented, not dispro- 
 portionately, but pi'oitortionately, A majority of the electors would always have a majority 
 of the representatives ; but a minority of the electors would always have a minority of the 
 re[)resentatives. Man for man, they would be as fully represented as the majority. Unless 
 they are, there is not equal governnumt, but a government of inecjuality and privilege : one 
 part of the people rule over the rest ; there is a part whose fair and equal share of influence 
 in the rej)rc8entation is withheld from them contrary to the princi|ile of democracy, which 
 professes equality as its very root and foundation. " 
 
 V 
 
 h 
 
 5 
 
 k 
 
 i1 
 
 :;l i 
 
 n ■' 
 
106 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 And again — 
 
 "The majority," lie says, "would indeed outnumber the others, as much as the one 
 class of electors outniunhera the other in the country. They would always outvote them, 
 but they would speak and vi>te in their presence, and subject to their criticism. When 
 any difference arose, they would have to meet the arguments of the instructed few by 
 reasons at least apparently as cogent ; and since they could not, as those do who are 
 speaking to persons already unanimous, simply assume that they are in the right, it would 
 occasionally happen to them to become convinced that they were in the wrong. 
 
 "Now, nothing is more certain than that the virtual blotting-out of the minority is no 
 necessary or natural conse(}uence of freedom ; that, far from having any connection with 
 democracy, it is diametrically opposed to the lirst principle of democracy — representation in 
 proj'ortion to numbers. It is an essential part of fdemooracy that minorities should be 
 adequately represented. No real democracy, nothing but a false show of democracy, is 
 possible without it ." 
 
 This evil is remedied by the system of Proportional, or, as it is sometimes CJilled, 
 " Minority " representation. The latter name is, however, misleading. 
 
 The supporters of proportional representation have no desire to give the minority a 
 larger share of political power than that to which their numbers justly entitle them. On 
 the contrary, as Lord Sherbrooke said during the debate of 1867 in the House of Commons, 
 he did not " argue for any protection to the minority . . . but that between the 
 members of the constituency there should be absolute equality ; the majority should have 
 nothing given to it because it was a majoritj'. " 
 
 Mr. Fawcett, again, in his last speech to his constituents at Hackney, truly pointed 
 out that 
 
 " Far from those who advocvte proportional representation wishing to give to the 
 minority the power which proi)erly belongs to the majority, I think I shall have no difficulty 
 in showing that one of the chief dangers which the advocates of proportional rcpresentatation 
 desire to guard against, is the minority obtaining a preponderance of representation which 
 ought to belong to the majority." 
 
 Nay, so far from this, a true system of proportional representation is — in the words of 
 Mill — "not fmly tlie most complete application of the demo<.atic prhiciple that has yet 
 been made, but its greatest safeguard." 
 
 In fact, although it may seem a paradox, it is nevertheless true that the system of 
 representation hitherto adopted, not irerely through inequalities of area or restrictions on 
 the right of voting, but as a consequence necessarily ensuing from the system of voting 
 hitherto adopted, has had the effect of placing power in the hands, not of the majority, but 
 of a minority. 
 
 Lord Spencer also has pointed out in the House of Lords that "in America for many 
 years past great complaints have been made that large numbers of persons, men of influence, 
 of intellecr, of wealth and position, refrained from taking any part in political life. Why 
 was that? Because they felt that they were a hopeless minority, whose opinions were 
 crushed by the overwhelming mass of the majority." 
 
 It is hardly necessary to point out how the system of single seats limits the freedom of 
 the elector. The Liberal Committee put forward one candidate, the Conservative another, 
 and all the elector can do is to choose between them . Perhaps the elector does not approve 
 of either. This is no doubt one reason why, in large constituencies, we see so many 
 abstentions. Hut, however little he may be disposed to either candidate, he cannot bring 
 forward a third without dividing his party, and generally ensuring the return of a political 
 opponent. 
 
KEPRESENTATION. 
 
 107 
 
 i 
 
 Professor Ware, of Columbia College, New York, has forcibly pointed out that umler 
 this system, though the elector is "nominally free to vote for whom he pleases, the 
 knowledge that his vote is thrown uway unless it is gis'en for Uie regular candidate binds 
 him hand and foot." 
 
 Again, this system has a tendency to promote bribery. It often happens that in a 
 constituency the two great j)arties are evenly balanced, and a few votes sutliee to turn the 
 scale. There may be, say, 2,5()0 Liberals, 2,500 Conservatives, and '2o0 persons with no 
 political views. In the hands of these last, tlieu, the whole representation rests. If the 
 agent of either party purcliases 100, or dO, nay, even 10 of them, the weight of tiie constituency 
 is tiirown into tlie scale of the party lor which he acts. 
 
 Those who support the single member system appear to be under the impression that if 
 constituencies were ecpialized the present mode of voting would — roughly, indeed, but surely 
 — secure that the majority of electors woulil rule the country. But this is not so. A majority 
 of electors in every constituency is by no means the same thing as a majority of all the 
 electors. Suppose, for instance, a community of 60,000 electors is divided into three 
 divisions, each containing 20,000, and that tliere are 32,000 Liberals and 28,000 Conservatives, 
 the ilivision might be, and very likely would be, as follows: — 
 
 Ist Division. 2ud Division. 3rd Division. 
 Liberals . 15,000 .... 0,000 .... 8,000 
 
 Conservatives .. 5,000 .... 11,000 .... 12,000 
 
 20,000 
 
 2(),(M)() 
 
 20,000 
 
 And thus, though in a minority, the Conservatives would actually return two members out 
 of three. This is no hypothetical case. 
 
 By the constitution of 1841 Geneva was divided into four colleges. The liberal electors 
 were massed in one ward, which they carried by an immense majority ; while the Con- 
 servatives, though in a minority, secured the other three ; and the extreme dissatisfaction 
 thus created greatly contributed to the revolution of 1846. In fact, as already stated, a 
 majority of electors in each constituency is by no means the saiii : hing a.s a majority in all 
 the constituencies. 
 
 . . . The recent history of America has peculiar significance. The committee of the 
 United States Senate, to which I have already referred, were of opinion, that if America had 
 adopted proportional i-epresentation, instead of single seats, their disastrous civil war might 
 have been prevented. 
 
 "The absence of proportional representation," they say, "in the States of the South 
 when rebellion was plotted, and when open steps were taken to break the Union, was 
 unfortunate, for it would have held the Union men of those States together, and would have 
 given them voice in the electoral colleges and in congress. But they were fearfully overborne 
 by the plurality rule of election, and were swept forward by the course of events into 
 impotency or open hostility to our cause. By that rule they were deprived of representation 
 in Congress. By that rule they were shut out of the electoral colleges. Dispersed, unorgan- 
 ized, unrepresented, without due voice and power, they could interpose no effectual resist- 
 ance to secession and civil war. 
 
 "Their leaders were struck down at unjust elections and could not speak for them, or 
 act for them in their own States, or at the capital of the nation. By facts well known to us 
 we are assured that the leaders of revolt, with much difficulty, carried their States with 
 them. I'lveu in Georgia, the empire State of the South, the scale was almost balanced for a 
 time between patriotism and dishonour ; and in most of those States it re(piired all the 
 niachinery and influence of a vicious electoral system to organize the war against us and hold 
 those connnunities compactly as our foes ." 
 
if 1 
 
 108 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 PARTY AND PRINCIPI-E. 
 
 Quarta-hj Rtvkw, Vol. CLXI/I, ISSC, 
 
 A gi'owiiig contempt and impatience of the wliole machinery of Party ; disgust Avith a 
 method which compels us to accept liad rulers instead of good at the hands of a class, which 
 is as yet incompetent to distinguish good from had ; and shame at the Nwastc of time, the 
 interminable wrangling, and the ignoble ambitions which, in spite of certain splendid 
 exceptions, have marked the course of Party government for some years past, are certainly 
 the most conspicuous phenomena of the present day 
 
 Yet what are we to say ? If parties in their old form have died out in the country, it 
 is useless to try to prolong their existence in Parliament by artificial means. If, to repeat 
 what we hare ahx-ady said, the public no longer see suflicient difference between Whig and 
 Tory Conservatives to make them enthusiastic partisans of either, and if parties cannot be 
 redivided into Constitutionalists and Kudicals, into those, that is, who wish to preserve, 
 with all necessary improvements, tho existing constitution of society, and those who are 
 anxious to subvert it, why go on playing at parties in the House of Commons which corres- 
 pond to nothing outside of it? This game of ghosts can hardly be expected to satisfy a 
 living people, inspired by a new order of ideas, and anxious for a new kind of political life 
 which shall allow their convictions free play 
 
 In the eyes of ^the inuependent public, we fear the antagonism of parties has latterly 
 seemed little better than a tight for place, to which everything else is sacrificed. What did 
 even Mr. Cowen say on the subject not two months ago ? "I am indifferent," he said, " to 
 Party organiztation : I think thij objects which lead men to union very paltry. They bring 
 out the worst features of human nature," We may depend upon it the feeling is spreading 
 very widely, Place ! Place ! Place ! Si poKifi.i ncte, ai non ijuociuiqiip. modo. That is the 
 sole meaning which large masses of the nation are beginning to attach to politics 
 
 The division of the country into Liberals and Conservatives has long been an uttei'ly 
 unmeaning one, a mere form out of which the spirit has departed ; and it has been pro- 
 longed, as it has been on former occasions,'by mechanical contrivances to suit the convenience 
 of particular classes and individuals. Artificial differences have been cultivated where no 
 natural ones existed ; and, what has been worse, the Whigs, having no differential policy to 
 mark them off from the Tories, have been obliged from time to time to fall in with the 
 designs of the Radicals, in order to impart to their own position some semblance of reality. 
 After the various reforms which have been accomplished, some by one party and some by 
 another, during the last fifty years, there is little left to quarrel over now but the funda- 
 mental institutions of the country 
 
 The Party system, then, can no longer be conducted on these terms, terms which 
 compel honourable men to stoop to evasions and subterfuges, which in any other walk of 
 life they would despise ; and produce on the public mind the unfortunate conviction, that 
 the game of politics is played only for selfish objects, in which principles have no part. 
 
PARTY AND PATRIOTISM. 
 
 109 
 
 PARIY AND PATRIOTISM. 
 
 By Si/dney E. Will'mim, ISSC. 
 
 It is the simplest of truths that the aim of politics — like the object of good government 
 and the ralson d'Hre. of parties— is the welfare of the nation. Yet obvious as it ia, tlie truth 
 fails to exercise anything like its due influence over men's thoughts and actions. Nor is it 
 less true, nor less disregarded, that the good of the nation depends, not upon this or that 
 particular nostrum, nor this or that parochial programme, but upon the development of the 
 national life by means of measures planned not for partial interests ))ut the general benefit, 
 upon the elevation, the unselfishness, the help of all classes and all interests, and upon the 
 greatness and well-being of the empire with which all alike must stand or fall. And this 
 being so it matters little by what party or by what government we are brought nearer the 
 common goal. No government has a monopoly of wise legislation ; nor has any party a 
 monopoly of sound principles. Each has its aspirations and its errors, and each must be 
 judged by its deeds 
 
 It has been said, with unconscious sarcasm, that our system of government by party 
 does not lay claim to absolute perfection, and that its greatest admirers will bear to be told 
 that it has its drawbacks. But outside the circle of its admirers, which includes few except 
 party politicians, thei'e are many who are beginning to doubt whether its advantages outweigh 
 its disadvantages and whether its use is more conspicuous than its abuse. "Nay, I find 
 England in her own l)ig dumb heart, whenever yon come upon her in a silent, meditative 
 hour, begins to have dreadful misgivings about it." 
 
 Its chief defect — and a sufficiently grave one in any institution — is that it defeats the 
 very object for which it is intended. Its main object, and the only one that can justify its 
 existence, is to promote the national good. But so little does it attain this en ' that its chief 
 tendency is to divert the national energy from national objects. It aims at the general welfare 
 by the conflict of opposing parties, each of which claims that it alone is able to promote it, 
 each of which holds out to us the hope of infinite bliss or the dread of infinite woe. We are 
 in short told by the admirers of party government that the only way to attain a common 
 purpose is to wrangle over the means of effecting it. No wonder that the main object is lost 
 sight of. An institution which attracts so much superstitious reverence naturally becomes 
 an end in itself 
 
 "Party," says Bnrke in a well-known passage, " is a body of men united for promoting 
 by their joint endeavours the national interest upon some principle in which they are all 
 agreed." And to the institution as thus defined little exception can be taken. But it is 
 manifestly of the essence of the definition as well as of the institution that the object should 
 be to promote the national interests, and to promote them upon some principle in which we 
 are all agreed. How little the institution, as at i)resent seen, answers to this definition we 
 all know. ]"]ven Burke, with his exaggerated reverence for the constitution and parliamentary 
 government, might well have had his faith shaken by the present state of affairs. When 
 we see the object of the "joint endeavours" to be the furtherance not of national but of 
 mere party interests, upon principles which are neither sound, stable, or generally believed 
 in, we may well be excused for doubting whether this " excellent mechanism " is "the most 
 satisfactory that the wit of man has yet devised for the management of the affairs of a state." 
 
 . . . Every one is expected nowadays to sacrifice his judgment, and even his conscience, 
 at the shrine of party, even though his party have no policy, and be guided by no intelligent 
 principles. Having once given his adherence he will be expected to support it for all time, 
 however it may change its policy or depart from its principles ; he will be expected to espouse 
 its quarrels, condone its blunders, and credit it with a monopoly of wisdom and right motives. 
 This, it is obvious, is not so much allegiance as mental slavery. Combined action is no doubt 
 
 I 
 
110 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 necessary in order to carry into effect common opinion. IJut the necessity f(n' combined 
 action ceases tlie moment the opinion ceases to be common. Party spirit ought not to be 
 merely enjirit de corps, but iin untenla cordialc. 
 
 The extent to which party dominates politics in the present day is almost unexampled 
 in our history. Party considerations inspire our political proj/rammta, determine the policies 
 of our governments, and decide tiie result of most divisions. Each party trims its sails t" 
 catch the popular breeze, each member gives his vi)te to keep in ollice or rct:\in his seat. 
 Hardly a thought is given to the national interest, but rather is it openly avowed tiiat a 
 particular line is taken in the interests of party, and apart from higher considerations. 
 
 Public spirit is crushed out by party spirit, and with few exceptions our legislators 
 lack the courage to be honest. Tliey seldom, if ever, speak freely the thing they feel, and 
 we wait ir. vain for a frank expression of personal conviction. When oct .sions arise which 
 call for plain speaking, our politicians are dumb ; and we can only conclude that they ilo not 
 know or are too cowardly to say. Nor is this .all. WHiat makes matters worse is tiiat .here 
 is so little attempt to disguise the fact, and so little general feeling among profess ional 
 politicians, that the whole thing is unedifyiug and discreditable. Our High Court of Parlia- 
 ment scarcely attects to be actuated by high motives. Opportunism is the thing thought of, 
 and statesmanship is becoming a byword. What is expedient for the party at the moment, 
 not what is expedient for the country in the long run, is the dominant fai:tor in parliamentary 
 calculations. " Political considerations must prevail,' though other and higher objects have 
 to be sacriliced. To get the better of one's opponents is the highest of political ambitions, 
 and to divest oneself of principles likely to jeopardise electoral prospects is the lirst duty of 
 the modern statesman 
 
 The chief objection to political organisations is, that though they profess to give ex- 
 pression and effect to public opinion, they in fact do much to control and stiHe it. Pul)lic 
 opinion is the growing, Huctuating, ever-varying sentiment of society. It is a highly- 
 sensitive and impressionable entity, swayed at times by a breath or moved deeply by a 
 thought, liable both to gra<lual change and to violent transformation. It it ol)vious that no 
 permanent organisation with fixed aims can ever hope to represent so intangil)le a quantity. 
 Nor can any organisation however perfect do otherwise than destroy its mobility, which is 
 really its life and essence. Least of all can any political association with its party name, its 
 party shibboleths, and party prcjuilice, hope to represent its finer shades, or even, for long, 
 if-a Ji')lder outlines ; and certainly none such can be trusted to form and mould it. 
 
 The natural tendency of all such orgauisa* us, whatevt .heir professed object may be, 
 is to manufacture, not represent, public opinion. They can but imperfectly represent it, and 
 must inevitably tend to mar it. They both force and check the common feeling by driving 
 divergent opinions into one rigid mould. They crystallise a sentiment which ought to remain 
 free, and arrest a current which should continue to flow. They encourage mental indolence 
 by supplying electors with a ready-made political creed, and destroy independent thought by 
 asking them to surrender the right to form an opinion. 
 
 These are evils almost necessarily inherent in any system of organisation, but they are 
 greatly aggravated in the case of party organisations, by joiniu'^ which a man undertakes to 
 blindly follow one side and as blindly oppose the other ; to support everything done or 
 proposed to be done by one party, and denounce everything don-^ or proposed to be done by 
 the other. He shuts himself out from taking a true and impartial view of politics by 
 entering an association which encoui-ages political ignorance by looking at questions from 
 only one point of view and by suppressing unpalatable truths. He, in short, relinquishes all 
 claim to that love of fair play which is supposed to be characteristic of Englishmen. 
 
 Besides the danger of a mechanical working of the vote in obedience to a small knot of 
 wire-pullers, who are rather partisans than politicians, there is the further danger of a 
 
PARTY GOVKUNMI'NT. 
 
 Ill 
 
 mechanical working of Parliament in obedience to the same high authority ; the practical 
 effect of organisation being to enable a small body of voters to dictate on the one hand to 
 electors for whom they shrU vote, and on the other hand to rarliauient forwliat it shall vote. 
 Thus supreme powei is vested in an oligarchy who usurp the right of electors on th< one hand 
 and the functions of Parliament on the other 
 
 A member of Parliament is a reprusent'vtive or nothing. He goes to Parliament to 
 represent a constituency, and can never be wholly independent. On the other hand, he is 
 not a mere delegate, the mere mouthpiece of a caucus. If he were wholly independent the 
 country would be unrepresented, and if a mere delegate Parliament wouhl be a mere voting 
 machine. It is impossible for the electorate to determine the details of government and 
 legislation, and any attempt to usurp this function would inevitably tend to lower the 
 character of Parliament 
 
 Parliament is a deliberative assembly, not a mere voting machine, nor ought its members 
 to be mere lay-figures. They ougiit, to the best of their ability, to form an honest opinion, 
 upon the arguments placed before them, as to what is best for the whole community. An<l 
 how can this be possible, as Burke pertinently asks, " when one set of men deliberate and 
 another decide." 
 
 A member of Parliament, moreover, ought to be able to see, and does generally see, 
 further and more clearly than his constituents. He should be, and generally is, able to 
 interpret the national will more correctly and more courageously thau a caucus 
 
 It is surely time that the world began to realise how false is the sentiment which would 
 have us believe that to stiHe our judgments and our consciences is a high political virtue, and 
 that to possess common courage and honesty is a political stigma. The sentiment is the 
 direct result of party spirit. The party virus has spread over the whole political .system till 
 no part of it is free from the taint. And if we do not crush the evil, it will assuredly crush us. 
 
 Party spirit, with its evil influence, is more or less inseparable from party govern- 
 
 ment. 
 
 . . . The a I vantages of party discipline are almost insignificant beside its evils, 
 beside its moral cowardice and insincerity, its want of priucii)le and indifference to the public 
 interest, .so one can view without some feeling of disgust the cavilling and bickering, the 
 maligning misrepresentation and calumny, wliicli pass for political criticism, and which are 
 the chief artifices of party warfare. The party system is rotten at the core. Yet this is the 
 system by which we test the purity and usefulness of our institutions and the value of 
 our legislation. 
 
 We cannot wonder that high-minded men shoidd shrink from the prospect of 
 becoming mere party hacks and of giving up their self-respect for the sake of being mere 
 puppets on the parliamentary stage. As well might we expect a Salvini to conform to the 
 taste of a transpontine gallery. And it is to the party politician and wirepuller that we owe 
 this deplorable state of things. Between them they are doing their best to make the most 
 independent asseml)ly in the world a mere machine impelled by unworthy motives, and are 
 converting an hououralde pursuit into a trade of sharp practice and trickery. 
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 From Westminster Review, Vol. LXIX, JSS6. 
 
 At first sight, a system of government by party seems unfeignedly ridiculous. But the 
 fact that it exists, and that the enthusiasm of most men is attached to the one side or the 
 other, the absurdity of the arrangement must have been painfully evident long ago. That the 
 
U2 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 work of government should be done for a time by one set of men, while another set do 
 nothing but cavil at them, and that wlieu their criticisms have broiijjht al)out some catas- 
 tro])he the cavillers should do the work of governing the nation, whiU' those who were 
 lately in power become the critics, d(ieg not, at lirat sight, conimentl itself uo one's mind as 
 at all a rational system. It is diflioult to believe that th(i country has, at any one time at 
 its disposal, two sets of men e((ually capable of governing ; .md even if we were convinced 
 of the fact that it was so fortunate, wo should think it a curious waste of the highest moral 
 ;iiul intellectual power which the country civn produce, that while the one set were doing the 
 work, the other set should be doing tiieir Ijest to make it impossible for the lirst to discharge 
 their all-important duties. Such a method has never been tried in the transaction of any 
 other business than that of government. Had it had any inherent excellence, surely wo 
 should have found it in other dei>artments of affairs. Its continued existence in relation to 
 the art of governing is to l)e accounted for, aa we shall sec, not by its efliciency, but by 
 other circumstances which of tiiemselves go far to discredit it, as an institution. But 
 against this view, we have no doul)t the startling fact that party government is not a now 
 thing, and that it seems on the whole to have worked fairly well, or at least without positive 
 disaster to the country. We confess our entire allegiance to facts, and are willing to admit, 
 as a rule, that that which works well is a great leal better than that which can be reasoned 
 well about. But the fact that government by piirty has not been productive of <'i8aster, is 
 oidy to be accounted for by the circumstance that, whenever an emergency hiis arisen which 
 would test the efliciency of the system and find it wanting, the common sense of men in and 
 out of ofHce, came to tlie front, and that which was necessary to be done was done by all 
 concerned without any regard to the system of government by party. Every reader of the 
 daily prints has become familiar with the phrase, "this is not a party question," applied 
 with increasing frequency to matters which would formerly have been regarded, and which 
 in many instances are still reganled, as fair fields for party fights. But tha,t of itself seems 
 to indicate that this system of government is like an unseaworthy ship which may sail well 
 enough on smooth seas, but which will go to pieces under any stress of weather. The 
 wisdom of those on board has been shown in the past by deserting the good ship — Party — 
 whenever the skies threatened 
 
 It is surely too obvious that if party government is the system of ruling, the object of 
 the in,s will be scarcely so much to govern well as to keep office. The objects of the "outs " 
 will be not to see that the inn govern well, but to make it impossible for them to govern at 
 all, and to demonstrate their incapacity to the country, and to secure the power for 
 themselves 
 
 Now the position that the existence of party is essential to healthy parliamentary 
 government does not seem to us to be at all a strong position. And if we can disprove the 
 necessary connection between the existence of popular government and the organization of 
 parties in the State, we shall have disposed of the only reason wliich seems to be urged for 
 an institution which it is admitted or all hands, has little else to recommend it, and has 
 innumerable features, as these writers have shown, which discredit it. 
 
 We have pointed out that at one time, when great dynastic and other questions impor- 
 tant to the very life of the nation were in the arena of politics, there was a reason for parties 
 in politics. No doubt civil war can only be carried on by means of parties, but it does not 
 therefore follow that government can only be carried on by a sort of smothered civil war. 
 In our time, were it not that party is a means of raising the temperature of lukewarm 
 enthusiasm — were it not that the war of parties is a foolish survival of primitive savagery 
 which serves the purpose of the few ambitious men who are able to make themselves the 
 leaders of those fao*^ions, we are convinced that parties would cease to exist. No doubt 
 when civil war w ' question the currents of thought might be well compared to two main 
 streams. They are like rivers which made their own ways through the obstructions of the 
 land. Now, however, party thought is like a watercourse which is made to How in a certain 
 
PARTY GOVKRNMEST. 
 
 113 
 
 ilireotion, liku a cannl, by thb aiUlioial banks and lockH of pnrty diseipliiiu. As it is, an wtt 
 have tried to show, the iuterests of tliu country, the inter ists of the nink-und-lilu of 
 politiuians, are Bacriliced to the auibituu'. of their leaders in much the same way as the 
 common people and the soldiery used to be Siieriticcd to the ])ridti of kings. It is for tills 
 |)ur[io8e, then, that the irrational distinction between the two parties is maintained. We 
 coHMtantly, in this foolish warfare, hear of tactics, o( maii-euvres, of party moves, and one 
 leader is proud of the appellation " old parliamentary liivud ; " and while most of thehe tricks 
 and tactics are turned against the opposite party, the greatest dupes of all ore the ])artits 
 themselves. The ordinary politician toils years in the vain hope of rising to a position in which 
 lie will merit the rewards which it is in the power of party to Icstow, and only a few of 
 them ever have the loaves and the Hshes wliich are the end and aim of what l)y a (ine irony it* 
 called practical politics. The principle which we have stated as being the ethical foundation 
 of parties — namely, that Men may honestly sacrifice minor matters of principle for the sake 
 of i)arty— seems to us t(. . inunoral. We have said that great danger may justify the losing 
 sight of individual opinion. On a b.attletield private judgment nmst be at a miiiimu:n. But 
 why in these times we should still keep up this semblance of war in order to make these 
 sacrifices a necessity it is ditiicult to see. The trick by means of which the juggle of parties 
 is constantly played is that men maginfy the points of dilference between themselves and 
 their fellows, and shut their eyes to the far more important points of agreement — a process 
 which is dishonest to your antagonist and unfair to yourself. But further, on this matter of 
 sacrificing minor matters of principle at the high behests of party interests, is it not difficult 
 to say where such a process, once inaugurated, is to stop '! The advocates of the system say 
 in " small matters," in " minor matters," a man may sacrilice his principles for the sake of 
 the organization. Hut there is an indetiniteness about this rule which gives spacious latitude 
 to ambitious consciences. It is very dangerous to begin paltering, and when a man has 
 given in the mint and the anise and the cummin for the sake of party, and for the hopes 
 that adhesi n to party rear in men's minds, he may easily enough be induced to sacrifice 
 more weighty matters. Where there is room for a conscience in party spirit most candid 
 people have failed to see. But then it is said j'ou cannot work your representative and 
 democratic institutions unless you are willing to put up with these inconveniences. That, 
 as we have seen, is the position which the advocates of party government take up. Well, in 
 the lirst instance, it is not the highest praise which can be bestowed upon popular government 
 that it can only be worked by means of this immoral and foolish machinery 
 
 Surely the fact that so much in English political life depends upon these party organiza- 
 tions and upon these captains of votes, the wire-pullers, is sufficient of itself to condemn the 
 system and to recommend that which we are here uiging as a sulwtitute — the government of 
 the country by the best men, irrespective of party consideration, the permanent tenure of all 
 the great offices during efficiency and good behaviour, and the obedience of the Ministers of 
 the Crown to the expressed wishes of the representatives of the people. Against this sj'steni 
 we do not know any reasons of any cogency which can be urged. That there would be less 
 *' .«^ id and fury " in politics is one of the recommendations of the system — all the " sound 
 an<i .ary " at present signify nothing ; that there would be less enthusiasm brought to bear 
 upon national affairs may be true, but the enthusiasm which arises out of politics in conse- 
 <iueuce of the war of parties, is like that which is produced on religion by persecution. We 
 may buy our enthusiasm too dear. But to say that there would not remain enough of interest 
 in national affairs to induce the best men to take part in them is, we think, untrue and 
 libellous. While there is great work to be done — and the good government of a country like 
 ours is great work — there will not be wanting the great men to do it. But the party strife, 
 with its chicanery and cunning wliich form such a largo part of ))arty warfare, is a means of 
 keeping some of the best men of the country apart from *the work of governing altogether. 
 It is well known that there are many especially able men in America who already keep 
 themselves apart from the din and bustle of politics. The proportion of persons who do not 
 aspire to honour by the roail which leads through St, Stephen's is in this country every year 
 
 8 
 
 ? 
 
114 
 
 API'KNOJX. 
 
 ■ 
 
 ill 
 
 :'! 
 
 becoming grnater. That thcBe men wo\ilil lit- ftttrnctuil to the services of the Statu if they 
 wore no longer the rewftnl of purty tiictiuH, but were the recognition of sjiecial capacity 
 and practical exiKsrience, we think none can (loul>t. Inileed, the objections to the one 
 HVsteni are no many, anil the objections to the other so ftw, thiit it is almost like weaknewH 
 to argue the matter. It is in deference, not to the reasons which can bo urged for govcrn- 
 i.ient by party that we have said so much, but because we are aware of the long roots whicli 
 the system has struck into the national life, and of the firm hold it has over the mimls o( 
 contemporary politicians. 
 
 THE DANOEU OF I'AUTY. 
 
 By Frederk IfarrUon. From the Conteniporarii Review, Vol. XL IX., ISSO. 
 
 There is urgent need to form a public opinion, independent of Parliament and of all 
 electoral machinery whatever. The lierce rivalry of parties, and the way in which i)arty 
 absorbs all political thought amongst us, is a growing danger. It may be agreed that the 
 healthy organizaticm of party is an essential condition of Parliamentary government. As 
 practised with us, the organization of party tends to crush and stiHe the free play of public 
 opinion. Members of Parliament feel it a duty not to embarrass their party leaders by 
 discussing any question which the leaders do not sanction, or by ever criticising anything 
 they do or omit to do. Party men and politicians outside Parliament follow the s.ame cue 
 and encourage the members in silent discipline. The journalists and publicists usually have 
 their party side, and make it a ])oint of honour to stir no awkward topic, but with their 
 whole force to support the party side. Thus, as the whole political energy of our day runs 
 into Parliamentary channels, and is organized with military discipline to secure party 
 victories (and the same thing is even more conspicuous i« the United States), the free 
 formation of public opinion is almost as difficult as under the despotism of a Czar or a 
 Najjolcou. 
 
 In the nani jf Freedom and Progress let some of us at least keep out of the Parlia- 
 mentary race-course, out of the party caucus, out of party journalism. Let us in this place 
 attemjit to do what we can to organize a real Moral Force. I would claim for Positivists 
 this nnich : that they are the only organized body of politicians in the kingdom who 
 sy.stematically strive to build up public opinion on other than party lines, with other than 
 Ministerial victories as tlisir aim. I'ositivism, in its essence, means simply the formation of 
 some moral power as the inspirer of active life, without any coarse stimulus of rivalry oi' 
 ambition. The Churches busy themselves with theological and celestial (juestions only. 
 Here is the failure of merely celestial religion. Let us with such help as Conservative, 
 Whig, or Padical will give, try to form high and right canons of public judgment ; let us 
 insist on making the plain mor.al law dominant in national politics ; let us urge the clear 
 intelligences and the just spirits everywhere to make their voices heard and not slavishly to 
 submit to the linid cries of the many, and the gross verdict of a wooden ballot-box ; let us 
 insist that the Hrst and most crying of public duties is to teach, guide, and lead the people, 
 and as a means to that teaching, to make the people teachable. Let us raise up the spirit of 
 enlightened education in things public and national, strengthening in the people everywhere 
 the idea of being taught and led, convinced and elevated. Politics are not, any more than 
 astronomy or medicine, the province of the mass. They are the province of wise guidance 
 and intelligent eo-operatiou. j 
 
PARTY Oil EM PIKE. 
 
 110 
 
 PA15TY AND PATRIOTISM. 
 
 Bi/ Alfred AiiMtin, From the National lievlew. Vol. VII. ISSii. 
 
 1 sue aymptoins of thi-s iloinoralization of thu |iuhlic ooiiscienuu in every direction, and i 
 triiue it, for the most part, to the corrupting intluenue of I'urty politics, in wiiich un- 
 fortunately, the whole community now take part. ... If one mercilessly thinks it out 
 does it not become painfully apparent, that hy the very operation of I'arty politics, every 
 prominent politician in the House of CoinniODs is being perpetually tempted and tormented 
 by his friends not to bo honest, and perpetually assailed and harrasaed by his foes in order 
 to he made not to appear honest? (Government by Party necessarily entails the continual 
 surrender l>y a man of hiw convictions, in order to keep his party together ; and if he be in 
 the Cabinet, or in the Ministry, ho will be fortunate if he bo not called upon at times to 
 defend in debate what he has opposed in council. This is what he has to thank his friends 
 for. As for his foes, they try to trip him up on every possible occasion, to make him look 
 inconsistent, incapable, and generally contemptil)lo. In a word, and to put the operation of 
 Party politics in as succinct u form as possible, each half of the nation is employed, morning, 
 noon, and night, from year's end to year's end, in proving the other half fools and tricksters. 
 For this end, no shaft of ridicule, no craft of speech, no device of invective is spared. 
 
 And does anyone suppose that you can demoralize a people politically, and leave them 
 moral and manly in matters into which politics do not or should not outer? ... Of 
 cleverness in political life, there is an unfailing supply. But one ounce of character is worth 
 a ton of ability, and, unhappily, it is character that is wanting. Conviction, courage, and a 
 tranquil but immovable will, these are the constituents of character. When are we to look 
 for them in public life ? . . . 
 
 arlia- 
 
 ilace 
 
 tivists 
 
 who 
 
 than 
 
 ion of 
 ry or 
 )nly. 
 
 ative, 
 (^t us 
 clear 
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 lot us 
 
 icople, 
 
 lirit of 
 
 where 
 than 
 
 idauce 
 
 PAUTY Oil KMPIIU:. 
 
 Friiin the National lieview, Auijunt ISSti. 
 
 The days of Party Government in the old constitutional sense, are numbered. The 
 reign of its decrepitude ia to be read alike in the growth and in the colla))Si! of the caucus. 
 . . We are aware that many will scout the bare idea of such a possibility, and they will 
 point to America as a country i • hich the Party system has continued to woik, though the 
 division of parties has long ceast., to carry with it any rational significance. Hut we deny 
 that any conclusion applicable to Kngland can be drawn from the United .Slates, a nation not 
 weighted with the necessity of a foreign policy, not connected in a common system with a 
 number of independent and alien States, a Government m which the Executive is practically 
 indepenilent of the Legislature and in which the jjopular House of llepresentatives plays a 
 comparatively unimportant part. We repeat that in England the days of Party Govern- 
 ment are numbered because neither the mechanical ingenuity of the wire-puller, nor the 
 mendacious phrases of the rhetorician can continue to holtl together associations of U)en no 
 longer dependent on principles corresponding with the realities of things. They are numbered 
 because the old causes of division between the two great historical Parties in the state have 
 been removed, and because the Imperial questions that on all aides are pressing for solution 
 are not of a kind that can be thrown with safety into the arena of party stiife. 
 
 , * m 
 
 ■ 
 
 I 
 
 ■f-f\ 
 
I ^: 
 
 IIG APPKNPIX. 
 
 ■iii()r<;iirs aiiout i-aktv itv i.okd ski.uokm;. 
 
 Extract from Conic lupofiiiy Rn'mv, Vol, LI., iS8i. 
 
 " Mr. Justin M'Cartliy, in his ' History of the Four Geortjes,' predict* that 'the principle 
 of Ciovernment by parly will sonur tinK- or other conm to l>c put !■> the cliallenne in Knylish 
 poHtic'ul life.' 
 
 " Me refers (I think justly) the ori>;in of the nunlern (unn dI tii.it system to the days of 
 I'ulteney and Walpole, There h.ael jieen, of course, earlier parties, exereinin.; a powerful intlu- 
 ence ui)on t;overnnient ; hut they h.id i>een of a dilTerent kind —constitutional, dynastic, or 
 roliyious. 
 
 "'With I'ulteney and his t.ictics,' says Mr. M'Cartliy, 'began the party organization 
 wliicli insi<le the House of Coniiuons ami outside, works unceasingly with tongue and pen, witii 
 o])en antagonism and underhand intrigue, with all the various social as well as political 
 in(luences-the iiamphlet, the Press, the petticoat, even the pulpit— to discredit everything done 
 by the men in oltice, to turn public opinion against tliem, and, if jiossilile, to overthrow them. 
 Inside llie House he made it his business to form a party wliich should assail the 
 Ministry on all points, lie in wait to find occasion for attacking it, attack it rightly or wrongly, 
 attack it even at the risk of exposing national weakness or bringing on national danger, keep 
 attacking it always. . . . I'ulteney and his companions set themselves to appeal es;^»?cially to 
 the prejudices, passions, and ignorance of the vulgar herd. They ni.ade it their busine>.. to create 
 a public opinion of their own. They dealt in the manufacture of public opinion. They set up 
 political shops to retail the ariicie which they li.id thus manufactureil.' 
 
 "This Mr. M'Cartliy <leclares to have been ' uiu|uestionably the policy of all our more 
 modern English parties ; ' though he thinks that an English Opposition would be, in our time^ 
 more scmiiulous than I'ulteney and his sujiporters sometimes were. Some of the outlines and 
 colours of this picture might be taken from life at the p'-esent day : the ' social as well as tiie 
 political intluences ' — (clubs, ' Primrose Leagues,' whatever may l)e tiie name of the imit.ated 
 article upon the other side) — ' the manufacture of public opinion' — and the ' polititai shops set 
 up to retail the manufactured article.' We have learned better manners (I ho|)e, because we 
 have worthier thoughts of, and more generous feelings towards, the less-instnicted multitudes of 
 our countrymen) than to talk of ' the vulgar herd ; " but appeals from ' classes ' to ' masses ' are 
 still not unknown. The art may have been improved since Pulteney's time ; neither party has a 
 monopoly of it ; nor is it, by any means, confined to the jiarty which may be, for the time being, 
 in opposition 
 
 " The Liberal party has also been deemed, by some who have led or who have aspired to 
 lead it, to require a new education, of which the result may iieihaps be to accelerate the time 
 foretold by Mr. M'Carthy, when the principle of government by party may be put upon its trial. 
 
 " I have alluded in the outset of this paper to what is popularly known as the 'Caucus 
 system,' introduced from abroad into this country, not long since, under high Liberal auspices. 
 It is, I think, an important question whether that system, in any of the forms which it has 
 .assumed or may assume, can be permanently reconciled with true Liberality. I cannot myself 
 dissociate political Liberality from Liberty, or Liberty from honest independence of thought and 
 judgment on the part of constituencies, and also of their represenatives. It is not, at all 
 events, the old Liberal idea, which would remove the centre of gravity ol the constitutional 
 system from Parliament to a federation of deleg.ates of political unions ; wiiich would practically 
 limit the choice of Liberal electors, in every constituency, to persons who had first approved 
 themselves to the managers of an inner conclave, holding the local party in leading strings ; 
 which may tend to transform leaders of party and Ministers of State into dictators, by enabling 
 them, through these outside agencies, to ostracise all who, even on subjects vital to the public 
 
A i'l(*)III.KM IN i'OLITiCAL SCIEMOK 
 
 nf 
 
 Welfare, have ilared in the lloiiso df t'oinmons to itpcak and vote as they think. Formerly, n 
 nitinljcr who so ni iiiilcsicd his inilL-|iL'n<lfnce nii^ht liavo ii.ul to justify liiiuscll to his consiitii- 
 onts, and he generally would have succeeded in doinj; so if they thought him an honest man, and 
 if he could give good reasons for the course wIulIi he had taken. Now, it there were iniong 
 I.ilierals no power of patriotism stronger than the liond of party association, !ie would have to 
 justify himself iiefore some * council of three hundreil,' or two hundre<l, or whatever else the 
 iMinilier may he ; that council itself being under the intluence— perhaps in the h ading-strings — 
 (if a larger ' federation,' of which a very few individuals may he (prohahly arc) the wire-pullers 
 and masters. 
 
 " The system of party government will he essentially changed in character, and may soon 
 cease ti) he tolerahle, if it cannot lie emancipated from this slavery 
 
 On all such subjects, the profession of Liberal politics cannot justify a man m making any 
 political leader or wire-puller the keeper of hit conscience, or absolve him from the duty and 
 neiessity (if he is hone>t) of making up Imh mind for himself; he nnist act as he thinks, whai- 
 L-ver others who pass by the same parly name may do. If he approves such n)easures, he will 
 support them, not because he belongs to a j'arty, but because lie thinks them right. If he dis- 
 .\pproves, he is under a mural as well as a political obligation to oppose them. That duty is one 
 v'hich no honest man is at liberty to sacrifice to a party name." 
 
 I 
 
 A i'KOhLLM IN POLITICAL SCIENt.'K. 
 
 Bij fiitadfonl Flciniwi. From Trawt. lioij. Soc Cdiiailii, Vol, VII., tSSD. 
 
 I proi)ose to direct attention to a Moieiitiilc ([uestion within the domain of polities or 
 civil government which appears to nie to be of great interest. It presents a problem 
 which up to the present time remains unsolved. 
 
 The institution of Parliament, as we all know, is of ancient date. In Kngland a general 
 assembly or council of the nation has bi a held immcmorially under various names. Before 
 the C'on(pie8t three designations were at various times assigned to it : — 
 
 1. Mycel Synoth, or great synod. 
 
 '2. Mycel (iemot, or great council. 
 
 ■1. Witeuagemot, or crvaucil of the wise men. 
 
 The name of " Parliament " was not given to the National Council in Knglaud until after 
 the Concpiest, when the French language was exclusively used by the dominant class, anil 
 French became the otticial language of the English nation. 
 
 Parliament has greatly chan^'ed since its earlj- days, It has grown and developed from' 
 century to century, and it may be said to be still in a condition of growth and development. 
 
 Whatever '• '.y have been the character of the meetings of the wise men before the Con- 
 (piest, or of .lie Parliaments which followed, the central idea of Parliament at the present 
 day, -s an assembly of individuals esenting the whole nation. The functions of Parlia- 
 
 mei it are to act on behalf of the n^. ..on as the supreme authority, and — representing the 
 nation — it possesses every power and every right and every attribute which the nation 
 possesses. The fundamental idea and guiding principle of Parliament is, that it embraces all 
 the separate parts which compose the realm, that in fact it is the nation in essence. 
 
 This is the theoretical and proper idea of Parliament, but it cannot be affirmed that the 
 ideal Parliament has ever yet been realized. Indeed it may be held that the means taken 
 
 ^1: 
 
 
 4 
 
 %(t\ 
 
 Bin 
 
 i 
 I 
 
 ^ ] 
 
w 
 
 118 
 
 .APPENDIX. 
 
 I !l 
 
 'if-- 
 
 to constitute Parliament cannot, in tlio ntaturo of tliintjs, result in producing a national 
 assunihly in wliicli every individual elector may l)e fairiy represented and his voice lieai'd. 
 As a matter of fact, under the existing system, it is not practicable to have in the 
 elective house every part of the nation represented : some parts must necessarily remain 
 unrepresented. 
 
 Such V)eing the case, the problem which science may be asked to solve, is simply this : 
 to iliTiMf till- iiicini.'^ o/furmlwj an ckctive asHtmhlij which practical/ 1/ <;« irell an tkiunlicalli/ will 
 lie thi' nation in cuncjice. 
 
 What is commoidy known as the " Government " or the " Administration," and how it 
 may be constituted, form no part of the problem, but are separated (piestions which I do not 
 pr(>|)ose to discuNS. I merely submit as a general priucijile, that the (ioverument may be 
 consitlered in the light of a comi'iittec of I'arliament, or executive council to carry into etl'ect 
 the acts and resolutions of t'arliauient and administer affairs to the approval of Tarliament. 
 
 Nations difl'er in their social and political circumstances, but iu all free countries, at 
 least, it is generally recognised that the ei-^ctive assenddy is of the first importance. The 
 theory of the elective assend)ly, is that the whole people or such of the peojde as are duly 
 qualiticil to vote shall be ecjually represented. It cannot be said that hitherto this object 
 has been even approximately attained. Its attainment may indeed be impracticable, but the 
 question is of so much im))ortance that it cannot be unworthy of grave consideration. May 
 we not ask if it be possible to devise some means, by which the whole people of the realm 
 may be brought to a central point, to a focus so to speak, in a deliberative assembly or 
 Parliament. 
 
 The ([uestion of electing representatives to sit in Parliament has received the attention 
 of many ])olitici),l writers and has likewise been investigiited at length by many celebrated 
 geometers, who have recorded their dissent from the practices followed. Under the present 
 .system, mendiers are elected by a part of the community only, while their election is opposed 
 by another part. It is quite true that the intention is to have the majority of the pco])le 
 represented, but even this is not a necessary result of the existing system ; moreover it uoes 
 not follow that the majority of members returned will hold the views and opinions of the 
 majority of the people on any subject. It may happen and frecpiently does happen, as a 
 direct result of the present system, that legistative power is placed, not in the representatives 
 of a majority, but in those who represent a nnnority. Sir John Lubbock gives an apt illustra- 
 tion of this result. He supposes a country in which there are 1,200,000 electors who vote 
 with p.arty A, and 1,000,000 who vote with party '?. Now if the two parties are evenly dis- 
 tributed over the whole country, it is clear that, unilerthe ordinary system of representi.„ion, 
 the weaker party will be utterly swamped. To use a familiivr illustration (he remarks) 
 whenever you drop a bucket into the sea, you will bring up salt water. In such a case there- 
 fore the 1,0(.^,000 will be practically unrepresented. But we must carry the matter a little 
 further. In the House so elected, let the majority bring forward some bill of an advanced 
 character and carry it by two to one, i.e., by tho votes of members representing 800,000 
 electors and against those representing 400,(100 ; in such a case it is clear thivt the minority 
 in the House would have with them also the 1,000,000 in the country who were left un- 
 represented ; so that iu fact the measure would represent the wishes of only 800,000 electors, 
 and would be opposed by those of 1,400,000. Thus he points out that the result of a system 
 "of Government by majorities, is, ou the contrary, to enable a minority of 800,000 to over- 
 rule a majority of 1,400,000." 
 
 This illustrates only one of the many defects in the present system, but it is quite 
 suHicient to show that the principle of Uepresentative Government, which is inherently ^ood, 
 has not been realised. It is obvious from the very nature of the system practised in electing 
 members, that, every Parliament, not the whole but only a ](art of the electors are repre- 
 sented, and that the represeiit<ative3 of a minority may frequently over-rule a majority of the 
 people. 
 
 u 
 
A PROBLEM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 no 
 
 Tftko tlie ]jresent Parliaineut of our own Dominion, and in iloing so we have a case in 
 whieli all will acknowledge that the Administration at the present moment is supported by 
 a large working majority of nifinliers. At the last Oeneral Election (Feb. 1887) the total 
 luimber of voters (m the lists in all tlie constituencies where contests took place was 94S,5'.'4. 
 < >f this number tlie votes polled for one party were :<7(),.S4'J antl for the other 3,") t,714. That 
 is to say, 3!) per cent, of the whole represents one party, and ;]7 per cent, the other party in 
 Parliament. As the representatives of the 37 per cent, are swamped in Parliament and are in 
 no way recognized in the administration of affairs, it follows that 3!) per cent, of the electors 
 through their representatives have complete contr(>l, and the remaining (il per cent, have 
 practically no voice in the government of the country. Moreover, as the election of members 
 re])riseiiting the 3!) pur cent, of votes was in every instance opposed by the voters who 
 munlier 37 per cent, of the whole, it follows that on all (piestions settled on strict party 
 lines. Parliament si)eaks and acts in its decisions by the mendiers who represent but two per 
 cent, of the whole bodj' of electors. This is not an accidental but a common and, indeed, a 
 necessary result, of the present .system, which must continue so long as we foUow the 
 ordinary method of electing members to sit in Parliament. 
 
 The question presented is this : Is there any means whatever by which a national 
 assembly can be formed ajiproximating more closely to the ideal Parliament ? 
 
 r.et us begin the iiu^uiry by assuming that the electorate consists of only two electors, 
 t'lat they are ecpial in all resiiects, in ability, integrity, in worldly means, in puldic spirit ; 
 that they have each equal claims and e(iual desires to act as representatives, and each is 
 ecjually willing to be represented the one by the other. 
 
 Under such circumstances what course would be followed by the two to settle the 
 question? Would not the natural method be to cast lots? Assuming that the two electors 
 were left to their own resources, removed from all outside iiiHiieuces, would not this be the 
 only rational means by which they could make a choice ? 
 
 There are doubtless some minds who would have an innate feeling against resorting to 
 such practice ; the easting of lots being more or less associated with <li('e-playing, lotteries 
 and games of chance, to which objections are taken on good and sufttcient grounds ; but in 
 the case presented there remains no waj' of reaching a decision except by lot. What other 
 course could be followed? A contest would not mend matters ; a trial of physical strength 
 and eudurance would be at once futile and indefensible. If the object be to turn the two 
 into a single representative unit, unanimity is essential, and while agreeing in nothing else 
 they could agree in casting lots. Is the jii'iuci|)le of settlement by casting lots in itself 
 objectionable? Was it not considered wise and good in ancient tiin.js? And would it not 
 be e(iually good to-day? It is certainly a time-honored usage for determining dilHcult 
 (juestions, and is exemjdilied in many passages in Holy JScriptui'c ; indeed the uniform voice 
 of Scripture goes to show that decisions thus obtained are not only wholly unobjectionable in 
 themselves, but that they were considered to have been overruled and directed by s])ecia 
 providential interposition. 
 
 I shall cite but one example, the selection of an apostle to take the place of Jiulas 
 Iscariot. An account of tins election by casting lots is given in the " Acts of the Apostles," 
 Chap. I, verses 15-26. It is stated that about a hundred and twenty persons were called 
 upon to select one of their number. They proceeded with deliberate wisdom to follow a 
 usage regarded ))y them as a means of obtaining the divine mind. They determined by lot 
 who should be the twelfth apostle, and thus they made a selection to which a cheerful 
 acquiescence was unanimously given. 
 
 I have assumed a case of two electors, and pointed out the course which might be 
 followed — indeed, the only rational course which could be followed. If the principle laid 
 •down be sound, could it not be applied in other cases ? Let us assume that the electorate 
 
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 1 
 
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 ll'O 
 
 APPRNIMX. 
 
 consists of twenty voters, wliat could be done in this case ? If individual voters in the elec- 
 torate were equal in all respects, as in the first case referred to, the (luestion would he a very 
 simple one, as it might he settled hy casting lots for one of the twenty equally eligible per- 
 sons. It may be taken for granted that under the circnnistances no one would object to 
 make the selection in this way, as being the Him[)le8t and best mode of making a choice. It 
 Would remove antagonism and promote unanimity ; and, by the very act of casting lots, eael> 
 one of the twiuity taking part therein would be an assenting party to the choice made. Men 
 as we ordinarily find them are, however, not alike ; they differ nnich in their <iualilications, 
 and their opinions are not the same ; we must therefore consider cases in which equal eligi- 
 bility and uniformity of mind in the whole electorate is not the rule. 
 
 First, let us suppose that among the twenty electors, live votes favor the choice of ^1 , 
 another live 1], another C, and the remainder I). We slundd have /), /}, C, D each e(iually 
 desired and preferred as the representative; of the twenty. 
 
 {A + B+C+ />)-i-4 would therfore be the representative unit of the whole. We eanuot, 
 however, take one quarter oi A, B, C, and D, and combine these quarters so as to form one 
 individual, but we can reduce the four to one by the principle of easting lots. One of the 
 four can be selected by whiit may be termed the " Apostolic " method, and the person so 
 selected would be recognized as chosen by the twenty electors as the common representative 
 of the whole. 
 
 Svcondli), let us suppose a case in which there is less diversity of opinion ; two groups of 
 live electors each favor A, one group of live prefer li, another C. 'J'he .selected men wouM 
 thus stand A, A, li and C, and the representative unit of the whole would be (2^1 ■\-B+ C')-h4. 
 As in the previous case, this complex woulil be reducible to a single individual by casting 
 lots, and it is obvious that the probability of the lots falling upon A would be as two to one. 
 
 Third, suppose three groups of five electors desire to be representetl by A and one group 
 by /}'. In this case we should have (3/1 + /i)-f-4, as the representative unit : in selecting one 
 by lot, there is undoubtedly a possiliility of the lot falling upon B, but the probability of 
 •I'.f being chosen would be three times greater than the probability in H's case. True it may 
 l)e said that there should be no possibility of B'h i>eing chosen in a constituency where three- 
 fourths of the electors desire A. We must, however, bear in mind that the object is not so 
 imich to have particular sections of the country, as to have the whole nation, fairly repre- 
 sented in parliament. If we look a little further, if we take four constituencies precisely 
 similar to the one under consideration, acconling to the mathematical theory of probabilities, 
 there would be returned out of the four, three mendjers in sympathy with A and one 
 mend)er in sympathy with B. Again, if we carry the matter still further if we take into 
 consideration every one of the constituencies into which for convenience the whole nation 
 may be divided, it would be found as a general result that the representatives returned to sit 
 in Parliament would collectively represent the nation and fairly endwdy the reason containe<l 
 in the whole conununity. 
 
 There is one peculiarity of the system suggested which may be noticed ; in every case 
 the election of a representative would be effected deliberately and without conflict. It 
 would be accomplished in fact with unanimous assent. Kacli individual voter would con- 
 tribute toward a common result— a result which would be reached on principles eijually just 
 and fair to all, and thus command general acquiescence. 
 
 These results are attainable only l)y bringing to bear, on matters of <loubt or difliculty, 
 the principle of settlement adopted by the Apostles. That principle cannot be objected to 
 on scientilic grounds, and those who hold the belief that mundane affairs are over-ruled and 
 directed, should have no difficulty in accepting it as a means of promoting harmony and 
 advancing the common good. The belief in a Providence, who takes cognizance of the 
 affairs of men, is the foundation of all religion ; communities therefore, the social fabric "f 
 
elt'c- 
 VI! ry 
 pcr- 
 
 !Ct t(. 
 It 
 
 eacli 
 
 Moil 
 
 ticiiis, 
 
 oligi- 
 
 A PHOBLKM IN I'OLITICAL SCIENCE. 
 
 121 
 
 wliicli is haseil ou f 'liristiiuiity, should have no hesitation in leaving matters of the highest 
 inoniunt to the arbitrament of an infinitely wise I'lovidence rather than to the settlement of 
 men with all their individual interests and selfish views, all their prejudiees, all their 
 passions, and all their errors of judgment. 
 
 I have so far, for the purpose of tlio argument, assumed hypothetical cases ; it remains 
 to he Considered how the principles laid <lown may he a|)plieil practically. Let lis take for 
 example the election of a single representative in a constituency of 2,000 voters. It is desir- 
 al)le in the liist i)lace that each voter, or group of voters of one mind, should have jH'rfcct 
 freedom of choice in the nomination. Suppose, in order to accommodate every shade of 
 opinion, it he arranged that each hundred voters of one way of thinking name the person 
 whom they would wish to represent them. 'I his would separate the constituency into 
 twenty groups of voters, who woulil each uomin.'ite whomsoever th»iy most favored. It does 
 not necessarily follow that there would be twenty persons nominated in the constituency, as 
 two or more groups might nominate the same person : a circumstance wliich would increase 
 the ))robability of his selection exactly in proportion to the number of groujjs making him 
 their nominee. On the twenty nominations l)eing made, the next step would be for the 
 person nominated to proceed on the principles ai)ove set forth, to select one of themselves. 
 
 If unable to make an unanimous choice, they might, as in the case of the twenty. elec- 
 tors choosing a representative, sort themselves into smaller groups and, by the application of 
 the principles set forth, proceed to reduce the numljcr of voting units, and finally, by the 
 apostolic method, determine the election of one person. The person so chosen would be helil 
 to be the common choice of the whole 2,000 to represent the constituency in Parliament. 
 
 In the carrying out of such a system, there would be, as in every system, a number of 
 possible contingencies for which provision would have to be made ; these I have not deemed 
 it necessary at present to enter into. My object h.is been briefly to suggest lea<liiit; principles 
 by which, as it appears to me, the central idea may be realized. If the principles submitted 
 be sound, I venture to think that it is not impracticable to devise pri)[)er machinerj' to elect 
 representatives who, wiien brought into one deliberate gathering, would, so far as such a 
 thing is possible, be a mathematical concentration of the whole electoral body — would in fact 
 constitute an assembly which would closqly approximrte to the ideal Parliament. 
 
 Ueferrin:; to the present system an eminent svritcr asks : " Is government only possible 
 by the conflict of opposing princi|)lcs ? " The familiar expression, "government of the 
 people by the people " cannot be held to mean govei'nment of the whole by a part or by the 
 conflict of liost'le parts. It must be oi)vioiis the united energy and wisdom of a whole nation 
 directed towards on* end can only be fully I'ealized, when the supreme pi.wer is vested in a 
 Parliament chosen by the whole people, and fairly representing the whole people. This is 
 the great problem for solution and it is manifest that if such a Parliament is ever to be 
 constituted, the j)eople, in choosing mend»ors to represent them, must in some way be Ijroiight 
 to act not in contestation and conflict, but in concert and in concord. 
 
 If ,t be one of tile first of political desiderata to have no large minorities left unrepresented 
 ill the national assemlily, it appears to me essential to seek for some means of securing tlie 
 co-operation of the whole body of the electors in the election of members to sit in the High 
 ( 'oiirt of Parliament. To obtain this result it is oliviously ex[)eilient to ailo[)t a system which 
 necessarily does not develoj) animosity or provoke hostility ; the aim should be to promote 
 fiieiidliness and agreement in a matter which concerns all alike. It cannot be denied that 
 the wliole community is concerned in having in Parliament, not men of extreme views, liut 
 moderate-minded men of good common sense and good conscienct', capable of representing 
 the more enlightened electoral mind. Hy electing reiiresentatives (ni the j)rinciple8 laid down, 
 these desirable objects wmild undoubtedly in a large measure be attained ; every step would 
 be ileliberately taken, free from the excited and heated feelings which so freijuently accompany 
 ordinary elections. In every stage of the proceedings there would be a t'udency to return 
 
 4' J 
 
 I 
 I 
 
 111 
 
 
 sUiHi 
 
122 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 i I 
 
 only the best men. At the very first step it is ol)vinus that a candidate must he a person 
 respected and supported hy a liundred electors. It is |)resiunal)le that no hundred electors 
 of any class or race or creeil would (lelil)erately put forward a base or unworthy or even an 
 inferior individual ; it is not to be suj^posed that they would choose one of the least 
 intelligent or least honest or least reputable among then m their representative in the 
 candiilature. As a rule, electors of one mind would arranj;u themselves into grouiis of one 
 hundred, and each group would select some man, who, on his merits as a citizen, would 
 creditably represent them, or who as a statesman would connnend himself to their favour. 
 In their turn, those sclecteil by the hundreds would follow the same course, selecting 
 generally the best, the worthiest and wisest men until the tiiial choice was reached and a 
 member selected to represent tlie C(jnstituency in I'arliiiment. 
 
 It can scarcely be doubted that if such a system could be put in force, the tendency 
 would be Ujjwards from hr.st to last, and that there would be drawn to the legislature 
 accomplished statesmen, men endowed with wisdom and patriotism, practical knowledge and 
 experience. 'I'he inevitable effect would be to fillay the spirit of faction and remove political 
 rancour. lu a higher degree than under the ordinary method of electing members, the 
 system would atti'act within the pale of Parliament men in generous sympathy not with a 
 part only, but with the whole people. Thus might be constituted an august body which as 
 closely as possible would be a true mirror of the enlightened mind of the nation to reflect its 
 opinions, its wisdom, and its virtues. 
 
 lu a Parliament so constituted, perfect unanimity on all ijuestions, perhaps on any 
 <(uestion, is not to be looked for, and each separate (juestion would have to be settled, as it 
 arose, by the voice of a majority. Hence it may be said that as every question would in the 
 end have to be determined by a majority, the Parliament as proposed would be no improve- 
 ment on the present. It will, however, readily be seen that there is a wide difference 
 between a parliament representing the whole people, deciding questions by a majority of its 
 own members, and a Parliament in which a part only of the electors has any voice. The 
 proposed assembly would not consist of men placed in their seats in direct opposition to a 
 large number of the people, but a ParlianK nt formed through the co-operation and assent i' 
 the whole body of the electors, to promote their common welfare ; it would ajjproximately 
 be a microcosm, so to speak, of the nation. In and through this Parliament each and every 
 elector would have an ecpial voice in public affairs. 
 
 The proposal is to sujjstitute in our Parliamentary elections the principle of co-operation 
 for the principle ot antagonism, and by this means to choose representatives, who when 
 brought together in a deliberative assembly would realize the true idea of Parliament — a 
 " Witenagemot or great council of wise men," representing every part of the realm, ami im- 
 bued with the spirit of the whole, to act in the name of the whole, and sjjeak the voice of the 
 united nation. 
 
 If such a Parliament be an object to be desired ; if it be a fundamental principle that 
 all who bear the taxation should share in the representation ; if it be the sacre 'ight of 
 every elector to have a just and proper representation in Parliament ; then it must be 
 recognized as a paramount duty, and an object worthy of the highest efforts of the progressive 
 statesman, to Hnd some means by which such a legislative body may be realized. A complete 
 solution of the problem may be remote, but as has been stated, Parliament is a growth and 
 development, and in all matters into which the principle of growth enters, the element of 
 time must also enter. ' The (juestion vitally concerns all free communities, and any change 
 must in the nature of things be preceded by a deliberate and impartial enquiry. I have 
 ventured to submit a scientific solution ; it may not be the best means of attaining the 
 desired end, and I offer it with all diffidence merely as a contribution to the general dis- 
 cussion, in the hope that it may not be wholly barren of utility. I cannot but think that 
 if the strictly Hcientilic habit of mind be brought to bear on the question, so:ne jiractical 
 
 il 1 
 
 !i t 
 
 I! 
 
w. 
 
 :'; 
 
 TIIK DEOKAIIATION OF OUK I'OLITICia. 
 
 138 
 
 method of solving the problem will slowly and surely l)e evolved. Whatever the solution, I 
 huml)ly think that it must he based on principles wliieh will not Ijeget the contiicts and 
 contestations which result from political activity under the present system. 
 
 It is hehl by the nmst eminent political economists t'lat by co-operating two men will 
 do mere work and do it better than four men, or four times four men acting in opposition. 
 Is not the rule of universal apjilieution ? Can there be eo-operatiou without haruKUiy ? Caa 
 there be antagonism without discord ': And are not discord and liarmony in the state likened 
 unto disease and health in the human bcdy ? This much will l)e conceded; the chronic 
 feuds between ti ilies and races which characterized the liistory of the human family in a less 
 ailvanced stage of civilization no longer exist. War is manifestly not the normal condition of 
 society in our time. Js it not tlierefore fin anachronism to perjietuate hostility in the internal 
 nffiiirs ot a nation V Is it not in tlie highest interest of tlie state that each member of the 
 community, in every matter which concerns liira as a citizen, should have the fullest 
 opportunity of acting up to the injunction, "Live peaceably with all men?" If the age of 
 belligerency has passed away, is it not eminently lit and proper that we should seek the 
 removal of the last vestiges of a belligerent age which still remain in our political system '! 
 
 ■ If, 
 
 TIIK DKORADATIDN' OF OUR PuiJTlCS. 
 
 JJ;/ Dr. t\ A. P. Barmt-d, in " The Forum," ]'ol. JX. IS'JO. 
 
 Under the early presidents, appointments to ofKce we; j made in the true spirit of the 
 Constitution. A certain service was to be performed in the interest of the public, and a man 
 possessing the requisite cajjacity and tried character was looked for to perform it, Api)oint- 
 ment as a reward of partisan service, and removal as a punishment for difference of political 
 opinion, were unknown. In the first division of parties, the strength was with the Federal- 
 ists, and George Washington, their candidate, was elevated to the presidental chair. But 
 Ceorge Washington was iirst of all a patriot, and only in the second place a Federalist ; and 
 his earliest executive act was to appoint to the leading jilace in his cal)inet his most conspic- 
 uous political opponent, since known as the father of American Democracy, Thomas 
 Jefferson ; while Alexander Hamilton, the champion of the party which had just triumphed 
 in his own election, was assigned to a lower seat at the same council board. And in this 
 large and liberal and magnanimous spirit were made all the ajjpointments to office during 
 the administration of that great man. If under his earlier successors the same noble magnan- 
 imity was not the invariable rule, there was at least no large departure from it for more than 
 thirty years. There came a time at length, however, when the chair of slate was tilleil by a 
 man who chose to make himself the chief of a party and not of the country, or, rather, in whose 
 view no co\mtry existed excej)t the party supporting him. Under the iron rule inaugurated 
 l)y this energetic chief, every incumbent of a federal office, no matter how insigniticant, who 
 was presumed not to have been favorable to the revolution whicli brought the new dynasty 
 into power, was unceremoniously ejected from the public set-vice ; anil in Idling the nniltitude 
 of places thus vacated, the qualifications demandeil were no longer honesty, competency, 
 and fidelity to the Constitution, but, instead of these, activity aiul zeal in the service of 
 the party and devotion to the party chief. 
 
 From that time to the present, the character of the civil service of the country has 
 been steadily falling lower and lower. Among the servants of the public, the public interest 
 is the last thing thought of. Rather, on the other hand, the public treasure is regarded by 
 those into whose hands it has fallen not otherwise than as the mercljandise of a rich caravan 
 is regarded by the Bedouins of the desert — a legitimate booty, to be seized with favoring 
 
 w 
 
 4 
 
 H 
 
124 
 
 ArricNDix. 
 
 
 : ^! 
 
 
 I 'k 
 
 opportunity and ilivuleil among the nienibera of the sucoussful baml. N'ot even in the 
 l>eginuing was any attempt made to conceal the mercenary cha* icter of the new system. It 
 was even defended as a just system in the highest legislative council of the nation, )iy a 
 very prominent leader of the party which tlrat profited by it, whose pitiiy enunciation of its 
 ftindainental principle will never pass from the memory of man — "To the victors belong the 
 sjjoils." But it is no longer the system of a particular party. It has become the recognized 
 system of all parties, until the continually-recurring political struggles l)y which tlie country 
 is agitated have ceased to he contests over great (picstions of constitutional law or govern- 
 mental policy, but have degenerated into discreditable scjuabblcs to determine which of two 
 bodies of political cormorants, both ecpuilly unworthy, shall be permitted to prey upon tlie 
 |)ublic. Under its opei'atitm the very ciiaracter of our government has been ch.inged. 
 
 This violation of the spirit of the Constitution in prostituting the power of appointment 
 to be an instrument of reward and punishment, originated as we have seen, in the will oi a 
 single man, strong enough in an abnormal popularity to force his own measures upon the 
 country in spite of a hostile legislature, and to convert the government for a time into a 
 practical despotism. He was accustomed indeed to speak of the government as " my gov- 
 ernment," and of himself as one " born to command" ; and had he been asked to define the 
 state, would, probably, like Louis XIV., have answered, L'itai c'e/it mu'i. Hut his 
 imperial mantle fell upon a successor fashioned in a far inferior mould and iuliuitely less 
 daring in temper, who, though not suited to the bold role of avowed dictator, was possessed of 
 an astuteness which amply compenseited for this defect. It was his boast to tread in the foitt- 
 steps of his illustrious predecessor, and in some respects he certainly improved upon the 
 example his predecessor had set him. To him is believed to have been ilue an important 
 discovery, if not in the science of political economy, at. least in the economy of scientilio 
 politics— that the power of governmental patronage may l)e indelinitely increased by the 
 ingenious expedient of employing middle men in its dispensation. The miiUlle man, who 
 must be a man worth buying, is bought by the privilege of bestowing the benefaction ; the 
 final recipient is bought by the benefaction itself. The men most woith buying by this 
 particii>ation in the power of a)>pointment are naturally to be found, and they were found, 
 among the memliers of the legislative body ; and by Hrmly attaching a sufficient number of 
 these, in interest as well as in sympathy, to the recognized head of the party in power, there 
 was secured to the executive the incalculable advantage of a never-failing and indiscriminate 
 support, in th;it body, of all his measures. The system thus introduced speedily and 
 etlectually took root, and has since become the established system of American polities. No 
 matter what party is in power, it is always practiced. But it has wrought, in the experience 
 of years, a consequence which the inventor certainly never anticipated ; for the privilege 
 which the middle men at first received with thankfulness, they now, in virtue of a long- 
 undisturbed ijossession, boldly demand as a right. The spoils of victory are claimed as the 
 common property of the victorious band ; the riglit of the chief to control its distribution is 
 set at defiance ; and thus the executive, with wliich the system originated, has been shorn 
 by it of the power to name its own subordinates, and the government of the Constitution 
 has practically ceased to exist. 
 
 in its place has grown up something which admits of no classification among systems oi 
 government ancient or modern. Republican in form, as nominally representative, it is vt t 
 not a republic ; for its representatives, though chosen by the peoplt are not the people's 
 choice. Democratic in methods, as seemingly resting on universal sutfrage, it is yet not a 
 democracy ; for the periodical ai)peal to the popular voice is a ceremony as empty and unreal 
 as a ^//tVyMCiVc under the Second Empire. Though the government of a class, it is not an 
 aristocracy ; for it is largely composed of elements least of all deserving of respect. And 
 tliough the government of a few, it is not an oligarchy ilc jiirc, though it is such di; furfo : 
 for it exists by no recognized right, and its existence is not even confessed. The imperfection 
 of language hfis necessitated the invention of a new form of words to describe it ; and this 
 
' 
 
 THE DEGRADATION OF OUK POLITICS. 
 
 1-jn 
 
 has lit't'ii 8Ui)plie(l, by those most familiar with its workings, in the felicitous expression, 
 " machine government. " No phrase could have been better chosen. A machine is a con - 
 tri'-ance in whicli numorous separate elements arc comliined for tlie etfectivc application of 
 force to a determinate object. Such is the political machine. It is composed of a class of 
 men who make politics a profession, and whose ruling aim in life is to make their profession 
 profitable. In order to do this, it is necessary to secure the possession of all places of trust 
 and emolument under the government to men of their own class. And in order to do this 
 again, it is further necessary that the people shall be deprived of the option to choose other 
 men. The efl'tctiveness of the machine is most strikingly illustrated in the thoroughness 
 with which this object is accomplished. So long as forms of popular election are maintained, 
 party divisions among the people are, of course, inevitable. And it is as true of parties as 
 of armies, that without organization, unity of purpose, and concert of action, there can Ijc 
 no success. To control the party organization is therefore the aim of the professed politician, 
 and experience has shown that this is comparatively easy. The process is a curious combina- 
 tion of fraud and farce. 
 
 The first stc)) in it, is what is known as "engineering the primaries." The primaries 
 are in theory assemblies of the sovereign people. Their province is to select delegates to a 
 representative convention, having for its function to set forth publicly tlie principles for 
 which the party ostensibly contends and to name its standard-bearers. The primaries are 
 easily engineered. Their business is carefully prepared for them in advance, even to the 
 designation of their own officers. At the appointed hour, the captains of tens and the cap- 
 tains of titties are prompt in attendance ; a machine i)olitician is called to the chair }>y a vote 
 without a count ; a machine politician proposes the nominees ; the nominations are declared 
 to be adopted ; and the engineering of the primary is complete. The management of the con- 
 vention is almost equally simple. Being made up of machine politicians, it knows very well 
 what it has to do, and it does it. The really important part of its work has been prepared 
 tor it in anticipation of its meeting by a process conducted in secret, known among machine 
 politicians as "making up a slate. " In general, the slate, after the observance of certain 
 decorous formalities, is duly ratified ; but occasionally, as there will now and tlieu Ije 
 factions within factions, the slate may be broken, and a new one produced — a result, liow- 
 ever, of no importance to the country, since it is perfectly understood that '.lie winning party 
 in any case shall have the use of the machine. The portion of the work of the convention 
 wiiich is designed for popular effect, is the declaration of principles, technically called a 
 " platform." This is a beautiful piece of composition, glowing in every line with patriotic 
 an 1 virtuous sentiment, setting forth with earnest emphasis a variety of indisputable propo- 
 sitions, and embellished with a choice selection of those glittering generalities which sound 
 so well and, when we think of it, seem to mean so little. 'I'hese may l)e varied from time to 
 time according to circumstances ; but there are one or two specifications which, as being 
 always in place and particularly well-sounding, are quite indispensable to any properly- 
 constructed i)latform. These are, first, a peremptory demand for the retrenchment of the 
 public expenditure ; and, secondly, a proper denunciation of the ungrateful miscreants who 
 would rob our brave iioldiers and sailors of their well-merited pensions. The platform being 
 duly pronndgated, the work of the convention is ilone. 
 
 In the meantime, the opposing party has been going through with a performance entirely 
 similar ; and the result is that the simple citizen, or the " man outside of politics," has no 
 alternative but to stay outside altogether, or to choose the machine with which he will run. 
 There remains, of course, the expedient of independent action ; but such action is only labor 
 wasted, unless it be so wisely concerted, so thoroughly organized, and so energetically prose- 
 cuted as to become powerful enough to break both machines. It mubC be attempted, if 
 at all, under enormous disadvantages. The advantage of experience is against it ; it 
 must oppose raw volunteers to disciplined and veteran troops. The advantage of position 
 is against it ; one of the parties is already in possession of the government. The 
 
 ',■■" 
 
126 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 
 f.' I 
 III 
 
 ! 
 
 advantage of iiKtniinuiitnlitioa jh against it ; the custum house, the post nffice, tliu internal- 
 revenue liureau, the laiul oIKcu, and all the other raniitications of tlie civil service, 
 are so many engines in tlie hands of the enemy. And, linally, the advantage of access to the 
 puhlio ear is against it ; for the periodical press is largely either subsidized by existing 
 parties or in sympathy with then'. 
 
 It would be an olHce wholly ungracious thus to >et forth the evidences of our moral anil 
 political decadence, were there not a hojic bciiind, that, out of the unpleasing exhiliit, tliere 
 might grow some sujrgestion of good. It is oidy by portraying the evil in its fullest magni- 
 tude that we can be thoroughly impressed with the lesson of its accompanying danger. For 
 there is before us a danger greater and graver than any we have yet encountered. Hitherto 
 the forms of our Constitution have been resjjccted, though the spirit has been perverted. 
 Hitherto our personal rights have been secure, though our political franchises have l)eeu 
 practically lost. We need but travel a little further on the downward road, and even those 
 relics of our liberties will be swei)t away. In the grand oorruption which made for a time 
 the commercial metropolis of our country an illustration of the ills the people suffer 
 when the wicked bear rule, we had almost reached the point at which law itself ceases 
 lo have efficacy, and the most sacred rights of j)er8on and pro[)erty become the sport 
 of the caprice of cany adventurer bold enough and bad enough and strong eno gh to throttle 
 justice iu her own temples. The example of that tyranny was typical of the system which 
 rules the country. It was only a little in advance of the general progress. But nothing is 
 more surely written in the book of destiny than that, unless ett'^ctual remedies be s|)eedily 
 devised to arrest this downward tendency, what was true of New York in 1870 will, long 
 before the close of another century, be true universally ; and more than that, the career of 
 defiant corrui)tion will culminate inevitably in the downfall of all law, and a sea of anarchy 
 and a social chaos will engulf all rights of the citizen, personal or political. 
 
 Are there, then, remedies for these evils ? Undoubtedly there are, but they are remedies 
 which, if applied at all, must be applied by the people themselves, and which can only, or 
 will onl^ , be applied by a people thoroughly aroused to their danger and their duty. 
 
 'i'he wide departure from the principles of the Constitution which is the source of all our 
 woes, has been owing to the abiise of power in the hands of the mcMi who hold it. We neeil, 
 therefore, no change in the Constitution, but a return to the Constitution ; no change in the 
 laws, but a great change in methods of administration ; and to this end we must have men 
 in posver not wedded by habit to existing abuses, or bound to them by interest. How shall 
 this object be scoured ? 
 
 We should teach our youth, therefore, that the first duty of every good citizen is at 
 present to use his moat energetic eflforts for the breaking up of machine government ; for it 
 is through the political machine that the people have been practically divested of their 
 rights, and subjected to the rule of a usuri)ing and unscrupulous oligarchy. 
 
 In order to ttiis, effort must begin at the bottom. If the system of what is called 
 regular nominations is to be continued, the nominations nnist i)e honest nominations of honest 
 men. The primary meetings in which they originate nuist be really meetings of the honest 
 voters, must be organized and controlled by the honest voters, and must express the will of 
 the honest voters ; instead of being what they have so long been heretofore, close caucuses 
 of petty pot-house politicians, employed to give the outward forms of regularity to corrupt 
 arrangements already perfected in secret. And this they will be, as soon as honest voters do 
 their duty, by direct and personal participation in the selection of the men who are in turn 
 to name their rulers. 
 
 Our young men should also be instructed as to the nature and use of parties in political 
 afl'airs, and taught to distinguish the limitations within which the action of such is healthfu', 
 and beyond which it may be destructive of the ends of good government. Upon every great 
 measure of public policy, and upon every great question of constitutional interpretation, 
 
PAHLIAMENTARY VH. I'.UITV OOVEKNMKNT. 
 
 m 
 
 opiiiioiiH will necesBarily \>e divideil ; and on tlicHe diviMions will inevitably arise oppoHing 
 pailit'H, which, in spite of thoir ditl'eiencea, may bu t-qually honest and e(iually patriotic. 
 Hut it ia in the nature of things lunnan that these points of ditference cannot be eternal. 
 Questions of public policy cease with the occasion out of which they grew. Questions of 
 constitutional law must in some form or other be at length adjudicated. But though with 
 the disappearance of the original cause of difference the reason of their being is itself removed, 
 it is rarely the case that parties recognize the fact that their usefulness has cea8e<l, and 
 voluntarily dissolve themselves. For while the questions dividing them were living ques- 
 tions, it was unavoidable that the struggle over these should take the practical form of a 
 struggle for the possession of the government, and these being lost, the possession of the 
 government becomes itself the object of contention, the greed of gain becomes the bond of 
 union, and seltishness takes the place of ])atriotism as the ruling motive. 
 
 t, 
 
 I 
 
 1 
 
 l'.\RLIAMEXTARV IS. I'AKTV GOVERNMENT. 
 
 Address at Queen's University, by Chancellor Fleming, iSgi. 
 
 The matter which I take upon myself to bring to your notice involves the consideration of 
 an evil to which it is impossible to shut our eyes, and in the removal of which every hones 
 minded person is directly interested ; and this fact will I am sure be accepted as my reason for 
 dealing with it specifically. Wherever there is a public evil, there is a public wrong to be 
 righted ; and it becomes a duty, which we owe to the community, to apply our utmost intelli- 
 gence to discover the proper remedy, and act with energy in its application. The theme of 
 my address is Party Government versus Parliamentary Government. 
 
 .At the recent prolonged meeting of parliament at Ottawa, there was brought to light a series 
 of transactions, which have given a shock to the moral sense of many of our people. These 
 revelations will little surprise those who are familiar with public affairs in the United States. 
 
 I believe I am correct in saying, that in Canada we have not reached the length which our 
 neighbours have attained in what passes by the name of "politics." Methods and practices 
 have, however, been introduced into our public life, in some respects the same as theirs, and if 
 our system has not yet reached the same development we may reasonably e.xpect that if we 
 continue on the path which they have followed and which we have entered upon, we shall in 
 course of no long time arrive at the same goal. 
 
 In a work recently issued from the press, " Bryce's American Commonwealth," there are 
 twenty-three chapters devoted exclusively to the subject of government by party, and many of 
 the other chapters have a bearing on the same matter. Within the pages of this valuable and 
 instructive work we find a full and detailed account of the party system which jjrcvails among 
 our neighbours. The author describes at length the business of the politician, the machinery of 
 parties, how it works and what it effects. He reveals the fact that the mr.chinery has many and 
 costly ramifications, and that a great deal of money is required to keep it in motion. Where the 
 money comes from is another question. He points out that "the [loliticians themselves belong 
 to, or emerge from a needy class " and the funds generally must come from other sources than 
 the pockets of the men most actively engaged, but from whatever source money may in the first 
 place be obtained, the startling conclusion is irresistibly reached that "the whole cost in the long 
 run is thrown on the public." 
 
 At the first glance it is not easy to see that this conclusion can apply to the party out of 
 power and in no position to help themselves. The author, however, explains that its members 
 live on hope ; they hope that they will eventually succeed in overthrowing their opponents 
 
 ;:il 
 
m 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 If' ' : 
 
 '1l 
 
 '.'!i 
 
 :-M 
 
 m 
 
 and are buoyed up with the l)elicf that the minority of to-day will 1)0 the majority of to-morrow, 
 lie points out th.it as a fuivl mil-it he raiseil meanwhile to carry on the struggle, tlio vassals of 
 the party are assessed and suliscriptions levied on manufacturers, contractors, otHce seei<ers ami 
 expectants generally. Thus, claims are esta!)iished on the spoils which sooner or later will come 
 under the control of the jiarty. When the victorious day arrives, the expectants do not as a rule 
 allow their claims to he forjjotten. 
 
 One thing clearly broujjht out by the author is that enormous sums are expended by each 
 party contendinj; for the mastery. Those, enfjajjed in the conflict, maintain journals, employ 
 writers, speakers, canvassers and a^'itators ; in fact an army of professional politicians finds 
 employment in this kind of warfare. The necessity of a party fun 1 is aiiparent. If money is 
 the root of all evil, it is likewise the main-sprinf; of party activity ; the greater the activity, the 
 larger the demand on the purses of those who have something to give, or something to expect. 
 
 Party organizations on both sides are on an elaborate scale, and nothing is left undone by 
 each contestant to advance party interest. It is civil war on a gigantic scale. There are hostile 
 camps everywhere. The nation is formed into two divisions, each division contending and 
 struggling for the supremacy. The r.mk and file are drilled by the professional politicians, who 
 manage the nominations, dictate who are to he the candidates, and generally direct the contest so 
 M lO carry the elections. The jiarty managers are, for the most part, men who make politics the 
 sole, or chief business of their lives, and who live and flouriwli by the occupation. The list, not 
 seldom, includes ministers of state, or those who expect to be ministers, members of congress, or 
 those who expect to lie members ; it also comprises those, who make the jvirty to which they are 
 att.iched a stepping stone to power and place ; and who if they do not at once attain their ends, 
 are rewarded meanwhile if in no other way by the excitement which is stimulated by contest. 
 
 The fullest and most painstaking enquiry into the whole system leads the author to describe 
 the general result in the following words : " The tremendous jiower of party organization has 
 been described. It enslaves local officials, it increases the tendency to regard members of con- 
 gress as mere delegates, it keeps men of independent character out of local and nationf\l politics, 
 it puts bad men into place, it jierverts the wishes of the people, it has in some ]ilaces set up a 
 tyranny uniler the form of democracy." 
 
 This conclusion arrived at l>y the latest independent authority is not disputed in any cpiarter. 
 It is supported by every writer of any note. Albert .'^tickney in " IJemocratic Government," 
 1885, says : "The practical result of the present political system in the United States, which at 
 first sight seems in form so thoroughly democratic, has been to develop the most ingenious and 
 remarkable tyranny known in all jiolitical history. . . . The political life of the nation 
 is a never-ending struggle for political ])ower between rival factions — all of them brought into 
 existence liy the same cause, oljeying the same laws, using the same melho Is, compelleii, whether 
 they wish to or not, to prostitute the power of public oftice to ])ersonal ends. The result is a 
 new kind of tyranny — the tyranny of the election machine. Under this system ])olitical 
 freedom for the citizen cannot exist." 
 
 Henry George in "Social Problems,' 1890, writes: "Speaking generally of the whole 
 country from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the lakes to the gulf, our government by the 
 people has in large degree become, is in larger degree becoming, government by the strong and 
 unscrupulous. . . . Money and organization tell more and more in elections. In some 
 sections bril)ery has become chronic, and numbers of voters expect regularly to sell their vote>. 
 In some sections large employers regularly bulldoze their hands into voting as //lejr like. In 
 Municipal, State and Federal politics the power of the ' machine ' is increasing. In many 
 places it has become so strong that the ordinary citizen has no more influence on the 
 government under which he liv>.s than he would have in China. He is, in reality, not 
 one of the governing classes but one of the governed. . . . And he is beginning 
 to accept the situation and leave politics to politicians, as something with which an honest, 
 self-respecting man cannot afTord to meddle. . . The type of the rising party leader. 
 
PAKLIAMENTAUV V8. I'AKTY GOVKHNMENT. 
 
 129 
 
 is not the orator or statesman of an earlier day, Imt the shrewd maiinfjer who knows how 
 to handle the 'workers,' liow to combine pecuniary interests, how to obtain money und how to 
 spend it." The same writer in another place referring to the party organization, says : "III 
 members carry wards in their |)ockets, make U|) the slates for nominatinfj conventions, distribute 
 offices as they barj^ain tofjether, and— though they toil not neither do they spin — wear the l)est 
 of raiment and spend money lavishly. And who are these men? The wise, the tjoo''> 'he 
 learned ; men who have earned the confidence of their fellow-citizens by the purity of their lives, 
 the splendour of their talents, their probity of public trust, their ileej) study of the jiroblems of 
 ({overnment ? No ; they are ^jamblers, saloon keepers, puj;ilists, or worse, who have made a trade 
 of controlling votes and of buying and selling offices." 
 
 An e(|ually well-known writer, Dr. Goldwin Smith, remarks: "A national conflict every 
 four years for the Presidency, and the enormous patronage that is now annexed to it, must bring 
 everything that is bad to the top, and will end in the domination of scoundrels. The moral 
 atniosi)here is darkened with calumny, bribery and corruption and all tlieir fatal effects upon 
 national character. How can the political character of any nation withstand forever the virus of 
 evil passion and corruption which these vast faction fights infuse ?" 
 
 We have thus described to us the character of the machinery which controls political affairs 
 in the republic. Writers gencr.illy alTirm that public life has become so foul that the best men 
 and the finest intellects take no part in the business of the nation ; that these have been driven 
 off the field and politics have now to a large extent become a prey to unprincipled plunderers. 
 
 It is well to know something about the road we are travelling, and I read these extracts so 
 that we may understand whither we are going, and what is before us if we continue as we have 
 commenced. So long as we travel smoothly and pleasantly we do not think of making enquiries 
 concerning the way. IJut when we come to "bad spots," then we ask the next traveller we 
 meet the condition of the road before us. This is exactly our case in political affairs. We have 
 stumbled on a stretch of rough ground ; we enquire the character of the way we have to pass 
 over, and those familiar with it tell us, that it becomes worse and worse, terminating in a quag- 
 mire. With this information, unless we are fatuously blind and criminally indifferent to our fate, 
 we call a halt and consider as to the attempt we should make to find a better route. 
 
 The political path followed in the United States is "partyism," and wo plainly see where it 
 has landed our neighbours. In Canada we have not yet travelled so far, but if anything be 
 wanting to show that we are hurrying on in the same direction, let me read a few sentences from 
 a good authority, the Halifax Heraldy the chief organ of one of the parties in Nova Scotia. 
 Within the last few days (Oct. 12), that newspaper, in a leading article, expressed these opinions: 
 "Those who are acquainted with the political methods of either party might, we presume, furnish 
 the public with an interesting experience of the use and abuse of caini)aign funds. . . Party 
 government is an institution in itself, recognized under the political constitution of the country. 
 The organization of a party, its maintenance, and successful working all necessitate large financial 
 outlay. . . The money must be raised, and those who refuse to contribute their fair share, 
 only increase the temptation ever present to the party workers to obtain funds from those who 
 have a financial interest in the success of one party or the other. It is useless to ignore existing 
 conditions. The struggle between rival parties will continue. Funds for political purposes must 
 be raised. It is, therefore, the duty of all good citizens to contribute according to their means ; 
 and if they fail to do so, the political organizations of rival parties must be thrown more and 
 more into the hands of those who contribute to their support from corrupt or selfish motives." 
 
 I believe I am warranted in saying that in Canada partyism is not yet developed to the 
 extent described in the United States, but recent disclosures show the tendency in public life, and 
 it is perfectly clear that if we act on similar principles and follow the same headlong course, we 
 cannot fail to reap the same or similar evil consequences. 
 
 We know that there are good men on both sides of politics. It is not the want of men, 
 patriotic, public-spirited and able, that we have to deplore, it is the malign influences of the 
 
 9 
 
 
180 
 
 AI'I'KNDIX. 
 
 system by which tlicy are enslaved. Tlie liest men are draj^jjed downwarils l)y the parly mael- 
 strom, and once within its vortex they become powerless to escape (roin its baleful embrace. 
 
 The low tone of public life which we Canadians have already rc.iched, is evidenced iiy the 
 fact, that no ordinary man in his private dealint;s, would do that which by a singular oblii|uity 
 of moral sense is considereil unobjectionable in party ethics. It seems to be well understood on 
 both sides, that dishonesty in almost any form only becomes an offence when detection follows ; 
 and if we judj»e our politicians as described by themselves or by the partisan press, there are few 
 indeed of whose public or [jrivate character it is possible to form an exalted opinion. 
 
 It is not necessary to go far a field for evidence of the demoralizint; tendency of the 
 political system practised in our own land. The i>roceedings of the last lew months clearly 
 indicate that we have already made a most discpiietiny proj^ress in our downward course. C an 
 nothing be done to turn it in a right direction? The universal law is that there must be progress. 
 Nothing remains stationary. If we jiermit the system to remain as it is, the progress will con- 
 tinue downwards ; and ihe experience of our neighbors teaches us that as time rolls on we will 
 make the descent at a greatly accelerated speed. 
 
 We may one and all ask the question what in this emergency are we to do ? We do not 
 want retrogression or degradation. We do not desire to go from bad to worse. Our object 
 should be improvement and advancement. 
 
 If this be our aspiration the are certain things wiich we must not do. We must not fold 
 our hands in despair and leave politics antl political affairs wholly to the politicians. We must 
 not close our eyes to the misdeeds which have been brought to light in our own land, or to the 
 experience derived from the United States. The past history of politics in both countries will be 
 of benefit to us if we only determine to profit by it. We must not listen to that school of politi- 
 cians, who tell us that government by party is the only means of carrying on free institutions ; 
 that it is impossible to attain to good government without opposing parties. We must be pre- 
 pared to dismiss from our minds the 'ogma that ]>artyism is a necessity, however ably or by what- 
 ever number the assertion be made. 
 
 Government by party has been practised in the United States for a hundred year^ ; in 
 England for two centuries ; in Canada it may be traced from the first year of her legislative 
 existence. In all three countries it has been tried and found wanting. I think I cannot be 
 wrong in laying down the axiom, that no system, however deeply rooted by long usage, however 
 strengthened by prejudice, if foundeil on evil or productive of evil, can be considered a finality. 
 
 The parly system divides a nation into two halves ; in itself an evil. It is based on princi- 
 ples which nurture some of the worst passions of our nature. It is productive, as everyone must 
 admit, of intolerable evils ; and on every ground we are warranted in the conclusion, that this 
 system should not be held as sacred, or unassailable and unalterable. 
 
 If that much be conceded to us, we may venture a step further and consider if it be at all 
 possible to make a change for the better, a wise and beneficial change. It must be clear to 
 everyone that we cannot continue in the old way, shutting our eyes to what is going on arouml 
 us. Do not all the facts, all the testimony from every quarter, establish that the old w.-iy leads 
 downwards to a lower and lower plane of political demoralization ? 
 
 It is historically true, that the spirit and force of party organizations have, in past genera- 
 tions, been an essential, possibly in some cases, the chief factor in tlovernment. At thir day, 
 the system is xipheld by men of eminence whose opinions deserve to carry weight. There is 
 indeed a traditional idea of wide prevalence, that the party system alone will suit a free people ; 
 and that the principles upon which it is based are essential to purity of government. Do the 
 facts, may we ask, establish that the party system has resulted at any period of our history in 
 purity of public life, or has it effected the opposite result ? Has it been proven, that the conten- 
 tions and discords and contlicts of partyi-sm are in any way conducive to our national well- 
 being? Is it the case that subjection to traditional party s))irit is indispensable to our freedom? 
 
 Let every thoughtful man, whatever his predilections, consider these questions care- 
 fully and dispassionately, and it will become more and more clear to him, that the party 
 
I'Altl.IAMKNTAUY VS. PAKTY dOVKUNMKST. 
 
 i:u 
 
 lael- 
 
 system of tjoveinmt;ni, which wc have inhuriteil as the acci)mi).>niinent of re|ircsentative institu- 
 tions, is no l()ii|;or a nccfssity ; that its usefulness has conic to an end, thit it lias in il>> latest 
 (levciopnii-nt jjrown to l)o a positive evil ; and that it should now ix; ie|>laco(l i)y another system 
 l)elier adapted to the improved intelli^jence and altered circumstances of the age. 
 
 Within the present century, scientific methods have ma le contpiesis over traditional methods 
 in marly every sphere of life. In a^'riculture, in conuuerce and in mechanical art the traditional 
 spirit has disappeared, and j;iven place to the scientific spirit. We find that ii, spinning, weav- 
 inj;;, printing, li^;litinj;, htatin;,', teleyrajJiin^', travellinjj by land and sea, and in nearly everyr 
 human en};ai>enient we can name, the scientific nieihod has irrevocai)ly sujwrsedi'il traditional 
 methcxls. Is the yreat question wc are now discussing to prove an exception ? Is the an of 
 government to remain outside the pale (jf projjress ? Surely parliamentary iltvelopment has not 
 reachetl its ultimate stage, and inihlic affairs for ever must be administered acconling to the 
 l)rinciples of the jiri/.e ring. Heaven forbid! Can we not discern some little glimmerings ol 
 light, following perha])s the deepest darkness preceding the dawn ? Is it not the case that in 
 modern times the power of tradition has been weakened and that its authority is steadily declin- 
 ing ? May we not, therefore, cherish the lu)i)e that it may bo dethroned in political life ; that 
 we shall not always remain victims of a superstitions belief in the system of government by party ; 
 and that this fair land shall not forever lie the bati.. "'fM of gregarious politicians ? What this 
 young nation wants is not endless political conflict with all its accompanying evils, but settled 
 rest and peace. 
 
 Our people essentially democratic, antl attached to representative institutions, will bear in 
 mind that parliamentary government and party governmen* are not identical, indeed, that they 
 are totally distinct. True they have been so long associated that they have come to be considered 
 inseparable, but reflection will miko it clear to us that the connection, even if it be historical, is 
 accidental, and that it is ar. erroneous popular notion, that a connection between them is a 
 necessary consequence. 
 
 The tendency of events sugi^ests that important changes must eventuajly be made in ihe 
 structure of parliament itself .Such changes are needed in the ilirection of unity, simplicity and 
 strength. Our parliament is supposed to represent the nation ; but as at present constituted it 
 l)r.ictically conipii^es liut the representatives of two jiarlies. The theory of parliament is an 
 assembly of persons chosen by the whole bmly of electors with supreme authority to speak and 
 act for the nation. The ideal p.irliament is the nuion in essence, but the system followed in the 
 election of members utterly fails to attain this 'lesired end. Under the party system it is abso- 
 lutely im|>ractic.ible to attain even an approximation to the ideal parliament. It is true that 
 parliament, formed by means of the existing system, assumes the functions of a perfectly consti- 
 tuted national assembly ; but its memliers represent only a part of the nation, and those who 
 support the administration of the day, and keep it in power, form a still smaller rejiresentative 
 part. Take for example the parliament formed after the general election of 1887. The govern- 
 ment had on this occasion the largest support given to any adminstration since Canada became a 
 Dominion ; and yet, including every vote polled for government candidates who were defeateil at 
 the elections, the supporters of the administration represented only 39 per cent, of the whole 
 body of electors. The opposition members represented 37 per cent, of the whole, counting also 
 the votes jiolled for the defeated candidates on their side. Thus it becomes perfectly obvious, 
 that a large majority of the people, whatever [)arty miy rule, has no part whatever through 
 representatives, in the administration of public affairs. In the case referred to 61 per cent, of 
 the whole body of elec'ors hail no share in the government of the country. The administration 
 was supported by the representatives of 39 \wr cent, and it was opposed by those of 37 per cent. 
 in every measure carried in the house by a party vote ; leaving as a net balance the representa- 
 tives of only two per cent, of the electors to determine legislation, to settle the policy of the 
 government, and to speak and act for the nation with the whole weight and supreme authority of 
 ]>arliament. I have presented no extreme case. If we take the results of the recent general 
 elections (1891), it will be found that the number of votes cast for government candidates was 
 enly ;^^ per cent, ol the electors, and the government net majority in the house represents but 
 
 ii 
 

 II; ; 
 ■fli!: 
 
 I 
 
 ti 
 
 
 132 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 one-and-a-half per cent, of the total number of voters on the list. As a matter of fact, the system 
 of government by party enables a minority, frequently a small minority, to seize antl hold control 
 of tlie affairs of state, and award to its friends office, power and patronage with every one of the 
 prizes of party victory. All outside the lines of the successful party are systematically ignored. 
 Do not the facts prove that pany government is opposed to the true theory of parliamentary 
 government ? Is it surprising that in' working out the party system the stru>;gle becomes so fierce, 
 a ■ that ways nnd means are resorteil to .\ hich shock the sensibility of even party men when 
 they come to be exposed to the light of day ? 
 
 What IS the remedy for the state of things wliich now jjrevails ? It is not far to seek, and 
 it involves no great constitutional change. We have simply to obey the law of perpetual evolu- 
 tion so that our parliament may became freer and better than it ever has been. We have only 
 to free it from the trammels of party and obtain an assembly which will represent the people in 
 fact as well as in name. Hitherto we have had the sh.idow, now let us have the substance. In 
 all previous parliaments a part only of the electors, and not necessarily the best part, has been 
 represented. Why should any portion be excluded ? Should not the supreme national assembly 
 command the confidence and reverence of the whole people ? To obtain their confidence and 
 reverence it is obvious that our parliament should represent the u hole, and consist as far as 
 possible of the wisest and best men the entire natioti has to offer. 
 
 This is the tru; conception of a parliament for a democratic people such as we are, and we 
 must seek to obtain such a parliament if we wish to escape from the evils which at present beset 
 us. Dcnou' cing the politicians for the inevitable consequences of a bad system, as some of our 
 people do, is an easy matter ; but it is folly to suppose that this alone will bring any permanent 
 remedy. Politicians are human as we are, and they become precisely what the people make 
 them, or allow them to make themselves. If the people so will, and take the proper course to 
 effect their purpose, the school of politicians which flourishes to-day will disappear. 
 
 Having the clearest evidence that we have never had and never can have a perfectly consti- 
 tuted parliament under existing political usages ; having the best grounds for the belief that the 
 system which prevails is hastening us to a condition of political subjection, to an oligarchy of the 
 woisi kind, such as we find in 'le United .States ; being satisfied on these points, every good 
 citizen must feel the responsibihiy resting upon him that he should do his utmost to avert such a 
 national calamity. 
 
 The first important step is to take means to have a perfectly constituted parliament. In 
 Canada we have accepted the great fundamental principle that " the people is the source of all 
 law and all power,' we must therefore strive to constitute our parliament so that it will represent 
 not a part, as now, but the whole nation. This step cannot be taken without effecting other 
 changes which would tend to the common welfare ; the chief of which would be that a new com- 
 plexion would be given to the government, We would no longer have a party government ; the 
 executive would proceed from the national assembly and thus would be the veritable focal point 
 of the whole nation. The best and wisest members returned by the people could be chosen by 
 parliament from its own members to sit at the same council board to guard public interests, 
 administer the laws, and speak and act for the nation. 
 
 In a paper published in Volume VII. of the Royal Society proceedings under the heading 
 " A problem in political scierce," I have endeavored to show that by the scientific adjustment of 
 votes and the application of sound principles, the true parliament could be constituted.* I can- 
 
 'The object of my paper "A problem in Tolitical Science," was simply to demonstrate that Parliament 
 could be formed so as to represent truly the whole nation. 
 
 I do not wish it to be thought that I have «iven the only solution to the problem. I merely wish it to be 
 understood, tuat having established the possibility of constituting the national assembly with scientific 
 accuracy, I felt warranted in urging that an effort should be made to abolish government by party and 
 substitute government by the whole people. 
 
 I do not doubt that features open to objection In the solution presented in my Royal Society paper can be 
 eliminated or that better means may be devised, of attaining the desired object. If a " will " become apparent 
 in the public mind, a " way " will not be wanting, S. F. 
 
 i' I 
 
f! 
 
 PAKLIAMENTARY VS. PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 13;{ 
 
 not here enter into ixiiy extendal explanation of the proposition. I must content myself with the 
 statement, that in my judgment it is perfectly practicable by the proposed plan, even if no better 
 can be devised, to extend to every elector full and equal representation, thus removing the anom- 
 alies I have pointed out. 
 
 The details of the machinery cannot here be discussed. Indeed, it would be premature to 
 deal with details in advance of principles ; but the machinery may be of the simplest charmner, 
 and being entirely national the cost would be made a direct charge on the state, as the cost of 
 taking the census or of any otiier public service is borne by the public exche'i'.ior. The practical 
 working of the system would be conducted by public officials, specially appointed and held 
 responsible for the proper performance of their duties in the manner of other public officials. 
 The cost of the proposed system of choosing representatives might be considerable ; but ii 
 would fall far short of the cost of the present system, when the expenditure uniler two ])arty 
 organizations and every accessory charge are taken into account. Moreover, the whole would be 
 o]ien and above suspicion, and there would be no room for improper practices. Whatever the 
 cost, it would render party organization nugatory, and the gain to the public would be incal- 
 culable. Legislation would certainly be greatly simplified. The sessions of parliament would 
 no longer be prolonged through the interminable and profitless discussions which proceed from 
 party strife. There would be great economy of time and money ; but however great this 
 economy, it would be of small moment compared with the more important benefits which 
 would result generally from the overthrow of a pernicious system, entirely out of joint with the 
 march of events. 
 
 Partyism has an historical origin. It was born in trouijlesome times, when the spirit of 
 antagonism between the classes was general, and when the masses of people were in a ruder con- 
 dition than they now are. As the ages succeed each other, the spirit of humanity changes with 
 the advance of civilization. We have long passed out of the age of fierce and cruel persecutions. 
 We have left behind us the sjnrit of conflict and destruction, and have entered the marvellous 
 period of construction and production. Our lives are now more happily passed in the peaceful 
 era of human justice and human reason. If we have left behind the belligerent ages, would it be 
 in advance of our time to abandon political methods in civil life, which keep alive the spirit cf 
 conflict and maintain usages which are opposed to true progress ? In intelligent communities at 
 the present day partyism can be viewed only as an anachronism. 
 
 Consider for a moment the consequence if partyism were introduced into modern commercial 
 life. Take a bank, an insurance comp.any or any large business concern. Introduce the prin- 
 ciple of partyism into the management, what would follow ? We should in each case have a 
 house divided against itself, and how long would it stand ? 
 
 Suppose the directors of a railway company were divided, as parties are ranged in parlia- 
 ment. The persistent endeavour of one portion of the board would be directed to keeping the 
 trains in motion ; while the other portion as persistently would do their utmost to throw 
 obstacles in the way. Would the public reap any advantage from the antagonism? Would the 
 shareholders receive dividends ? 
 
 Take this university. How long would it prosper, how long would it maintain its ground 
 and h useful to the community, if partyism gained a footing so as to cause continual contentions 
 and strife among the trustees, or the senate, or the council ? 
 
 Consider the consequences if partyism were allowed to enter into the proceedings of the 
 great annual assemblies of the several religious denominations. Would it be justifiable on any 
 ground? Would any one of these important bodies perform its functions so speedily and so well? 
 Each one of these great gatherings partakes of the character of parliament, and might with 
 advantage in some respects be imitated. An mormous amount of business is brought before 
 them, and ordinarily they do more in one week than they could in ten weeks if party tactics, 
 such as are displayed at Ottawa, prevailed. 
 
 iU 
 
 
 
ijii 
 
 l?£; 
 11 
 
 13 i 
 
 APPENPIX. 
 
 
 Take a much lumihler well-known illustration. Take an ordinary row boat, allow the crew 
 to fi^ht among themselve>i, or suppose the rowers determine to pull in opposite directions. It is 
 needless to say there would be much agitation of the water, but little or no satisfactory progress. 
 
 These several illustrations will bring out the well est.ablished fact, that to the extent that 
 conflict is provoked, satisfactory results are lessened ; and that under all ordinary circumstances, 
 conflict is a wasteful expenditure of force. This rule must apply to political and national affairs 
 as to everything else ; and viewing the question before us from all points, we are led to the con- 
 clusion that there is no logical justification for partyism in this age. In order to supersede 
 partyism, it is not at all necessary to broach any new doctrine, revolutionary in its character. In 
 reality the opposite is the case. The desire is to maintain the institution of parliament and make 
 it more efficient, more perfect and more stable. The design is to realize the ideal national 
 assembly in which every elector may have an equal voice. The aim is to maintain all that is 
 good in the parliamentary system of government, and take away all that is defective and bad ; 
 to remove the worn out vestures of the past which ai'e ill adapted to the growth of the nine- 
 teenth century. The great primary object is to establish unity and ]iromote amity, and thus 
 remove far from us the desolation which proceeds from, a "kingdom divided against itself. ' 
 
 In my humble judgment the question of parliamentary representation is capable of scientific 
 treatment, and it is safe to say that if so treated, partyism, as it now exists, wiih its banefu' 
 influences and demoralizing effects, would irrevocably be swept aw.iy. There are few questions 
 which more deeply affect society and civilization. In the heat of party warfare it cannot be dis- 
 cussed fruitfully, and it is only in the intervals between conflicts, or under conditions removed 
 from the struggle that calm reflection will avail. This question is the great problem of to-day ; 
 it has the strongest possible claim on the attention of every well-wisher of his country who has 
 the qualifications to consider it carefully and dispassionately. I fear it has small chance of being 
 so considered by those who place party triumph higher than country, or who regard fealty to 
 party more binding than the laws of the decalogue. Such men are wanting in intellectual 
 freedom to approach this subject appreciatively. Even those whose relations with political 
 organizations are not close, so far as they are partisans are they wanting in the qualifications 
 necessary to take a disinterested view of it ? There are many men with whom party advance- 
 ment and success have been the ruling motives; such men will naturally have a settled unwilling- 
 ness to part company with old associations and the party spirit inherent to them. They will 
 cling with tenacity to their deeply rooted habit of thought. They will extol the advantages of 
 party government. They will reiterate that government "by party is the only possible means of 
 carrying on representative institutions. They will declare thai the abolition of party would 
 mean an end of all order and progress, and would prove the beginning of general desolation. 
 Certain it is that governmsnt by party will never be reformed from within, and we may be well 
 assured that every honest attempt to effect a change will be ridiculfi as Utopian or branded as a 
 mischievous innovation. True partisans are not the men to yield without a struggle. They will 
 never pull down their own ramparts and surrender their own citadel. The stronghold of 
 partyism can only be sapped and mined by the slow process of public education, and eventually 
 demolished through the common sense of the nation. 
 
 Whatever the present political condition, we may rest satisfied that the great heart of Canada 
 is sound. We may depend upon it that so soon as the nation comes to understand the true 
 nature of the malady, and that a remedy is possible and applicable, from that moment party 
 government will be doomed. 
 
 There is but one cure for the disease under which we suffer. Laws may be passed to prevent 
 scandals begotten of party exigencies ; but ways will be found to elude them, let them be ever so 
 stringent, so long as partyism exists. There is a rankling sore in the body politic. We may 
 heal an ulcer ou the surface, but the ulcer is but one of the symptoms, and so long as the deep- 
 seated disease remains it will again break out in another spot or apj^ear in another form. The 
 true physician directs his attention to the source of the ailment, and by proper treatment removes 
 the first cause of the evil and thus purifies the whole system. In this national matter in order to 
 
 'I, 
 
Tirn 
 
 PARLIAMENTARY VS. PARTY GOVERXMENT. 
 
 135 
 
 succeed, the same course must be followed ; and whenever the mind of the nation becomes 
 satisfied that it is the only effective means of getting rid of our political evils, then, and not till 
 then, will partyism he dethroned. 
 
 How is the mind of the nation to be reached on this cardinal problem ? The national mind 
 is made up of many indivdual minds, each one of which is a minute fraction of the whole. 
 These fractional jiarts must in the first place be moulded and instructed by men of recti- 
 tude, whose powers have been matured by study and observation, men who are watchful 
 of the highest interests of the people. What class better qualified by the nature of their calling 
 for this noble and patriotic duly, than teachers, both lay and clerical, throughout the land ? 
 Obviously we must look mainly to the school, the college and the pulpit for the agencies to 
 enlighten and elevate the individual mind, and, through the individual, the collective mind of the 
 nation. We must first form private opinion, from which public opinion will slowly and surely 
 form itself. 
 
 It may be objected that ministers of the gospel should not meddle with politics. If politics, 
 degenerating into partyism, have become vicious and impure, so much the more is it the impera- 
 tive duty of clergymen to employ every proper means to promote a sound and healthy moral tone 
 for the benefit of the community. Is not Canada a Christian land ? Does not the census inform 
 us that, with the exception of a few tribes of Pagan Indians and a few hundred Jews, we are 
 from sea to sea all Christians ? On what ground then should a Christian teacher be debarred 
 from assuming all the duties of his office ? Can he indeed throw off the grave responsibility 
 which rests upon him ? Can he neglect the high duty of using every opportunity to restore 
 public life to a healthy and more upright character? Merely party issues in which no moral 
 element is involved should be absolutely excluded from every pulpit discourse ; but a great 
 question, such as this, in which the public morality, the purity, the honour and the lasting 
 welfare of the whole nation is involved, should be fearlessly dealt with by every clergyman in the 
 land. The inlluence of the pulpit has been and always will be great, and no better or more 
 effective means can be found of enlightening the masses and elevating public opinion to a higher 
 level. It was written a century ago ; " the true cure for darkness is the introduction of light." 
 Who better able to introduce light than those who have obtained its possession — the wise and 
 the learned ? Who more fitted to purge politics of its evils than those whose lives have been ' 
 dedicated to morality and uprightness ? , 
 
 In this young country it is only in harmony with nature that everything should be in a con- 
 dition of healthy growth. I know of no reason why our parliamentary system should not 
 partake of the general improvement and advancement. At Ottawa a corner of the curtain has 
 been raised sufficiently high to admit of our seeing evidences of fundamental defects in govern- 
 mental methods, and traces of grave obstacles to our progressive well being. I ask should it not 
 be the earnest aim of every Canadian with the true patriotic spirit to seek to eradicate these 
 tiefects and remove every obstacle which retards our growth and elevation as a people. 
 
 If this be a Christian country surely the entire moral code of Christianity should be binding 
 on all, and on none more than our law-makers. It is of unspeakable importance that we should 
 find effective means to purify the fountain of legislation. It is a matter of public economy, 
 public morality and public honour, and our hopes must rest on the three great educational factors 
 which I have named. In this question, is involved the first and last needs of the Dominion, and 
 we must appeal to our best teachers of all creeds and in all ])laces to set about the task of lifting 
 politics out of partyism into a loftier and healthier atmosphere. True, there are enormous 
 difficulties to be overcome, but the task is as noble as it is necessary and it is rendered nobler 
 even if more difficult by the fact that we shall look in vain for a precedent, no other nation having 
 led the way in any successful attempt to bring parliament up to its true ideal condition. The 
 scientific movement of the nineteenth century has accomplished marvellous success, it has been 
 crowned with peaceful victories far more wonderful and far more glorious than military conquests. 
 If, in the new field, the calm voices of science and of reason can be heard through the din of 
 
 
136 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 party strife, it may be that Canada will do something to accomplish her destiny, by establishing 
 a precedent which all nations possessing tree institutions may follow. 
 
 We remember the familiar phrase " Canada first." These two short words have a strong 
 sterling ring about them. Let Canada be the first in a movement towards a rectification of the 
 national administration, and a recognition of happier political methods. Let the sons of Canada 
 determine to be first in all that is good, to be in the front rank of the great family of Hritisli 
 nations. What loftier ambition can we h.ave than to elevate our country, and present Canada 
 before all the nations of the earth, a bright example of vigorous, upright youth, in every respect 
 worthy of the historic races from which we spring ? 
 
 PLAN FOR MLXORITY REPRE.SENTATION. 
 
 By Prof. J. R. Commons in "Review of Reviews" Vol. IV., tSgi. 
 
 One of the features of the Australian ballot reform is the provision whereby parties or groups 
 of men, whose numbers give them little political significance, can yet secure representation upon 
 the common public ballots. This provision, however, is incidental to the character of the Austra- 
 lian ballot, and was not the main argument for the striking popular approval of that measure. 
 It was the promise of freedom from bribery and corruption that led to this approval. The 
 American people are not yet sufficiently alive to the rights of minorities to make thoughtful efforts 
 to bring about minority or proportional representation for its own sake. Yet if some plan at once 
 simple and efficient were devised, it is probable that the advantages of such representation would 
 be clearly brought to view. If you can show how to do a good thing, it doesn't take long for the 
 people to see why it should be done. The difficulty with all projects of minority representation 
 has been their awkwardness. It requires a professor of mathematics to apply them. They are 
 not suited to the rough needs of our democratic mass-meetings. This is true of the Hare 
 system, the only one that has received anything like wide attention. This system is now 
 employed in the election of alumni trustees for Amherst and Harvard Colleges, where its 
 unwieldiness is not apparent, since these elections are conducted by correspondence. What is 
 wanted is a plan that can be used not only in elections for college trustees, but in turbulent poli- 
 tical meetings, in all kinds of conventions, societies, and corporations, so th.it the plan can 
 become a part of the popular habit, just as the motion for the previous question or the distinction 
 between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government is a part of popular habit 
 or way of thinking. In this way such a plan could gradually grow into favor and finally win its 
 way into the highest political organizations, such as Congress and the legislatures. 
 
 Among the multitude of new things proposed or adopted at the recent state convention of 
 the People's party of Ohio was a plan for minority representation which seems to meet these 
 requirements. This plan was devised by Dr. L. Tuckerman, an alumnus of Amherst College) 
 and a prominent Nationalist and labor reformer of Cleveland, Ohio. Dr. Tuckerman has been 
 experimenting upon this plan and perfecting it for several years. He had a definite project 
 before him ; how to harmonize and unite the different incongruous labor elements of the city of 
 Cleveland, such as Nationalists, Socialists, Knights of Labor, Trades Unionists, etc. Under the 
 current plan of elections, the result of attempts to unite such elements resulted in something as 
 follows : Suppose that at a union meeting of these organizations it was voted to elect a committee 
 of five to draft a series of resolutions. Each clique would put forward its own ticket. But only 
 one ticket could be elected. This might include representatives of the two strongest elements, 
 but those which were in the minority would be left out. Consequently a bolt and hopeless 
 antagonisms would be the result. This evil of unrestricted majority-rule is apparent especially in 
 political conventions. Suppose we have a convention of one hundred delegates, divided into two 
 
PLAN FOR MINORITY REPRESENTATIO.V. 
 
 m 
 
 factions. It is proposed to elect a committee of five for some purpose. If one faction numbers 
 fifty-five delegates and the other forty-five, the first faction will elect the entire committee and the 
 faction numbering almost half, will have no voice in moulding or tempering the action of the 
 convention. Their only recourse is to bolt, and thus risk the defeat of their party altogether, 
 The evil is recognized by our political conventions, and recourse is taken to the Czar-like policy 
 of putting the nominations of co.nmittees in the hands of the chairman. As a result the minority 
 gets representation, but it is in the person of some insignificant figure, who is wholly ignored by 
 the strong characters of the majority. The committees of the American House of Representatives 
 offer an exhibition of this fact. 
 
 The Tuckerman plan provides for wnghing the choice!: of each elector. If there are five 
 offices to be filled the elector writes on his ballot the names of five candidates in the order of his 
 preference. Then the tellers, in counting the ballots, allot to each name on the ballot a weight 
 of choice corresponding to the position held by that name on the ballot. Thus if the candi- 
 dates A, B, C, U, E, are written on a single ballot in the order given, candidate A will have five 
 units credited to him, candidate B will have four units, C three units, D two units, and E one 
 unit. After all the ballots are counted the units opposite the names of the candidates are 
 added up, and the five having the highest number of units are declared elected. Thus only one 
 ballot is required to elect five officers. Continuing the example given, suppose the candidates 
 A, B, C, D, E are voted for in the order named by each of the fifty-five delegates. The 
 weight of choice would be as follows : — 
 
 Choice. 
 
 Units. 
 
 
 Ekctors. 
 
 Total Units. 
 
 A. 
 
 5 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 275 
 
 B. 
 
 4 
 
 X 
 
 •55 
 
 320 
 
 C, 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 165 
 
 D. 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 no 
 
 E. 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 55 
 
 55 
 
 But candidates F, G, H, I, K receive the support of the minority of forty-five electors. 
 The preponderance of choice will run ; — 
 
 Candidates. 
 
 Units. 
 
 
 Electors. 
 
 Total Units 
 
 F. 
 
 5 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 235 
 
 G. 
 
 4 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 i8o 
 
 H. 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 »35 
 
 I. 
 
 3 
 
 X 
 
 ^45 
 
 90 
 
 K. 
 
 I 
 
 X 
 
 45 
 
 45 
 
 Consequently the successful candidates are A, B, C, F, and G. The majority faction has 
 thiee representatives, and the minority has two — their first and second choice. According to 
 the current method they would have been unrepresented : but with this plan they can in no pos- 
 sible way be excluded so long a.s they number one-fifth of the total electors. In such case their 
 first choice would receive one hundred units, bringing him in ahead of the fifth choice of the 
 majority. 
 
 In the manifold applications of the plan there would be variations from the examples given, 
 but the principle is eminently simple. Its results are about the same as those of the Ilare 
 system, so far as the representation of the minority is concerned — in fact the plan is merely a 
 simplification of that method. It differs from the Hare plan in the device of employing the 
 units to compare the weight of choice, and thereby does away with recounting the ballots and 
 dropping the names of the lower candidates on the scale. Its best results are found in the elec- 
 tion of boards and committees consisting of more than one member. But where only one officer 
 is to be chosen, as president or chairman, the gain comes in the prevention of a deadlock, and 
 this is no small gain, because, as every one knows, it is in the attempt to break a deadlock that 
 our legi:lature3 in electing senators have been the scenes of bargaining and bribery. 
 
 In municipal, state or national elections for representative assemblies, the operation of the 
 
138 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 -iii 
 
 plan would be the same, ami can be illustrated by taking the typical example of a state house of 
 representatives. Let the .State for the purpose of eleciint; members of the lower house be divided 
 into districts of such a niimber that each district would elect five representatives, this being the 
 most convenient number. Then each elector would vote for five representatives in the order of 
 his choice, with the result above shown in the election of committees. If there were three parties 
 in the field, it is probable that the third party would elect members from different districts, by 
 means of this cumulative voting, and the state legislature would be in fact an exact mirror of 
 jiublic opinion. 
 
 Among the other advantages of the general adoption of this plan might be mentioned the 
 following : — 
 
 It would prevent one-man rule such as that exercised by the Speaker of the House of 
 Representatives. Committees could be elected on a general ticket at a single balloting. Mino- 
 rities would have no excuse for bolting conventions, since they would have their ablest men on 
 the committees. (Committees would be truly representative. This would also prevent many of 
 the opportunities for ring rule in politics. 
 
 Electors of a minority or third party, besides securing their own first choice, could throw 
 some weight in the scale between the candidates of the other pr.rties. 
 
 In the case of private corporations this plan would seem to offer the means of avoiding some 
 of the most flagrant abuses. It furnishes a very simple device for cumulative voting for directors 
 and officers. 
 
 Finally, the freedom from machine rule, and the possibility of selecting the ablest men of 
 the community without recourse to bargains, is one of the first necessities for the reform of our 
 politics. Cumulative voting and minority representatives would bring this about. If this kind of 
 voting can be simplified, as it has been done by Dr. Tuckerman, there seem to be conclusive 
 reasons for adopting it. Perhaps in the election of city councils and boards of aldermen is the 
 place to begin. 
 
 it 
 
 If: 
 
 Km ■ 
 
 PARTV SPIRIT ANf3 ITS VICES. 
 
 Bjf E. de LaveUye, from " Democratic Government" tSgi. 
 
 f. -tt. - -, 
 
 I til}'; 
 
 li*;;.'- 
 
 ■J .'i'' 
 
 THE SPIRIT OF PARTY AND ITS DEFECTS. 
 
 The spirit of party is the necessary motive power of the representative system, and is at the 
 same time its scourge, when institutions in place of combating its excesses aid in its develop- 
 ment by the offer of encouragement and reward. 
 
 The spirit of party resembles the spirit of sect ; it calls into being a special conscience which 
 believes everything permissible for the good cause. The faults of friends are never avowed ; they 
 are never even perceived. The good faith of its adversaries can never be admitted. On their 
 side are only seen fraud, falsehood, injustice, perfidious plots. The desire is to repress them, or 
 without pity to strike them down ; because while they were leading to the abyss of ruin, on the 
 other side the true interests of the country were being defended. With the republican every 
 monarchist is an obscurantist, an abettor of despotism, one full of ambition greedy for favour, an 
 ignoble soul aspiring for servitude. For the monarchist every republican is an apostle of disorder, 
 a disciple of guillotine — the grandson of Marat. Parties engaged in this contest, under the form 
 adapted to the political manners of our days, are nothing else than those hordes of antiquity who 
 in the heart of the forest disputed for their prey, or the factions which fought with arms in their 
 hands in the Italian republics of the middle age. 
 
PARTY SPIRIT AND ITS VICES, 
 
 139 
 
 The spirit of party is so intoleratit, and the credo so ri^id, that wliocver fxils to defend it as 
 a whole is a traitor. All independence of thought disappears ; every one becomes the slave of 
 the official programme. The statesman with originality of mind becomes a peril ; he is " a horse 
 which kicks out in the ranks " — he must be reduced to the yoke or expelled. 
 
 The government of i)P.rty appoints to the vacant offices its partizans only, without regard to 
 merit or the claim to consideration. On their sitle those thus appointed to office only act to 
 increase the influence ot their friends antl to maintain them in power without thought of the 
 general good. 
 
 To win numbers with a democracy, what is needed is a simple and striking watch-word, a 
 general idea, which resumes and makes manifey* the whole facts by their most salient siile. 
 Those who place lliemseives without scruple and without reserve in obedience to this watch-word 
 and who know skillfully in the matter to appeal to the passions and prejudices of the crowd, arc 
 the destined ringleaders of parties. 
 
 Those eminent minds which consider affairs under all their phases, which desire that 
 circumstances should be considered, which, knowing the past foresee the future, are held in 
 distrust. 
 
 Parties in the struggle must organise themselves, as hostile armies. Their partizans are 
 brigade<l into the iissociation ; committees which direct the campaign are placed at their head ; 
 blind obedience must be given to these chiefs ; the strictest discipline is imi)used uniler ])enalty 
 of ruin. Two or three large masses advance to the vote in serried columns under the same flag. 
 The most numerous carry the day, and govern in the name of national sovereignty. 
 
 The sovereign then is not reason, but numbe 
 
 • As the representative system is the condition of a free government, and party spirit is the 
 indispensable motive power, there can be no question as to its suppression ; but it is essential 
 that the attempt should be made to prevent its attendant abuses. Experience indicates the 
 means of attaining this result. They are the following : Representation of minorities ; system 
 of voting by which the secret of the vote and its sincerity is assured ; to take from the govern- 
 ment in the most effective manner the disposal of offices to bestow on its political friends. 
 
 UNJUST INFLUENCES IN ELECTIONS. 
 
 When the interference of government is present by threats or promises, it lowers or corrupts 
 the national character. In England in the eighteenth century, the votes of deputies were 
 purchased by favours, or by even ready money. To-day the proceeding is different ; it is the 
 body of electors which is purch.ased, by the promise of public works, a post, a wharf, a road, 
 a riilway, subsidies for the corporations. 
 
 Every candidate for parliament promises that government will dispense millions for their 
 district. When the budget for the public works is presented it is an interminable narrative of 
 such requirements. 
 
 The minister replies to all, concedes all or part, promises what is desired, in order to obtain 
 the votes of members and, above all, that of the electors. Everyone desires to dip into the 
 public chest, as if it were replenished by its own force. It is not understood that each province 
 pays its part in the local outlay. The State gives. But who pays ? Always the taxpayers. 
 There is an illusion that it is a gratuitous gift as it comes from the public chest. Often to accord 
 to each province an equal part of the cake, works entirely useless are voted and hastily 
 determined. 
 
 'j- 
 
 I 
 
 
140 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ■ii 
 
 THE POLITICIANS OF TO-DAY. 
 
 
 i^'.\ 
 
 From " T/te American Commonwealth" by James Bryce, iSqi. 
 
 The greatest parties .ire tlie Republic.ins and the Democrats. Wliat .are their principles, 
 their distinctive tenets, their tendencies ? Which of them is for free trade, for civil service reform, 
 for a spirited foreij^n policy, for the re{,'ulation of telejjraphs by Iej;isl.ition, for a national bankrupt 
 law, for changes in the currency, for any other of the twenty issues which one hears discussed in 
 the country as seriously involving its welfare ? 
 
 This is what a European is always asking of intelligent Republicans and intelligent Democrats. 
 He is always asking because he never gets an answer. The replies leave him in deejier perplexity. 
 After some months the truth begins to dawn upon him. Neither party has anything definite to 
 say on these issues ; neither party has any principles, any distinctive tenets. Hoth have tra- 
 ditions. Both claim to have tendencies. Both have certainly war cries, organizations, interests 
 enlisted in their support. But those interests are in the main the interests of getting or keeping 
 the patronage of the gover...-'ent. Tenets and politics, points of political doctrine ami points of 
 political practice, have all but vanished. They have not been thrown away but have been 
 stripped away by Time and the progress of events, fulfilling some policies, blotting out others. 
 All has been lost, except office or the hope of it 
 
 The chief practical issues which once divided them have been settled. Some others have 
 not been settled, but as regards these, one or other party has so departed from its former attitude 
 that we cannot now speak of any conflict of principles. 
 
 When life leaves an organic body it becomes useless, fetid, pestiferous : it is fit to be cast 
 out or buried from sight. What life is to an organism, principles are to a party. When they 
 which are its soul have vanished, its body ought to dissolve, and the elements that formed it be 
 regrouped in some new organism : 
 
 " The times have been 
 That when the brainu were out the man would die." 
 
 But a party does not always thus die. It may hold together long after its moral life is 
 extinct. Guelfs and Ghibelines warred in Italy for nearly two centuries after the Emperor had 
 ceased to threaten the Pope, or the Pope to befriend the cities of Lombardy. Parties go on 
 contending because their members have formed habits of joint action, and have contracted 
 1 I reds and prejudices, and also because the leaders find their advant.age in using these habits 
 and playing on these prejudices. Tiie American parties now continue to exist, because they 
 have existed. The mill has been constructed, and its machinery goes on turning, even when 
 there is no grist to grind, . . . 
 
 In America we discover a palpable inducement to undertake the dull and tiresome work of 
 election polu'cs. It is the inducement of places in the public service. To make them attractive 
 they must fe jaid. They are paid, nearly all of them, memberships of Congress !ind other 
 Federal pi.^'^js. State places (including memberships of State legislatures), city and county pLaces. 
 Here then is the inducement, the remuneration for political work performed in the way of 
 organizing and electioneering. Now add that besides the paid administrative and legislative 
 places which a democracy bestows by election, judicial places are also in most of the States 
 elective, and held for terms of years only ; and add further, that the holders of nearly ail those 
 administrative places. Federal, State, and municipal, which are not held for a fixed term, are 
 liable to be dismissed, and have been hitherto in practice dismissed, whenever ])ower changes 
 from one party to another, so that those who belong to the party out of office have a direct 
 chance of ofiice when their party comes in. The inducement to undertake political work we 
 have been searching for is at once seen to be adequate, and only too adequate. The men for the 
 work are certain to appear because remuneration is provided. Politics has now become a gainful 
 profession, like advocacy, stockholding, the dry goods trade, or the getting up of companies. 
 
 IHI 
 
THE POLITICIANS OF TO-DAY. 
 
 m 
 
 People go into it to live by it, primarily for the sake of the salaries attached to the places they 
 count on yettini;, secondarily in view of the opportunities it afTonls of makint; incidenlal and 
 sometimes illegitimate gains. Kvery jierson in a high administrative post, whether Federal, 
 State, or municipal, and, above all, every member of Congress has opportunities of remlering 
 services to wealthy individuals and companies for which they are willing to pay secretly in money 
 or in money's worth. The better otiicials and legislators — they are the ijreat majority, except in 
 large cities — resist the temptation. The worst succumb to it, and the prospect of these illicit 
 profits renders a political career distinctly more attractive to an unscrupulous man. 
 
 We find therefore that in America all the conditions exist for producing a class of men 
 specially devoted to political work and making a livcliliood by it. It is work much of which 
 cannot be done in combination with any other kind of regidar work, whether professional or 
 comnii rcial. Even if the man who unites wealth and leisure to high intellectual attainments 
 were a frequent figure in America, he would not take to this work ; he would rather be a philan- 
 thropist or cultivate arts and letters. It is work which, steadily pursued by an active man, offers 
 an income. Hence a large number of persons are drawn into it, and make it the business of 
 their life ; and the fact that they are there as professionals has tended to keep amateurs 
 out of it 
 
 Having thus seen what are the causes which produce professional politicians, we may return 
 to inquire how large this class is, compared with the corresponding class in the free countries of 
 Europe, whom we have called the Inner Circle. 
 
 In America the Inner Circle, that is to say, the persons who make political work the chief 
 lusiness of their lives, includes : — 
 
 Firstly, AH members of both Houses of Congress. 
 
 Secondly. All Federal office-hjolders except the judges, who are irremovable, and who have 
 sometimes taken no prominent jiart in politics. 
 
 Thirdly. A large part of the members of State legislatures 
 
 Fourthly. Nearly all State office-holders, excluding all judges in a few States, and many of 
 the judges in the rest. 
 
 Fifthly. Nearly all holders of paid offices in the greater and in many of the smaller cities, 
 and many holders of paid offices in the counties 
 
 Sixthly. A large number of people who hold no office but want to get one. This category 
 includes, of course, many of the "workers" of the party which does not command the majority 
 for the time being, in State and municipal affairs, and which has not, through the President, the 
 patronage of Federal posts. It also includes many expectants belonging to the party for the 
 time being dominant, who are earning their future places by serving the party in the meantime. 
 
 All the above may fairly be called professional or Inner Circle politicians, but of their 
 number I can form no estimate, save that it must be counted by hundreds of thousands, inasmuch 
 as it practically includes nearly all office-holders and most expectants of public office. 
 
 It must be remembered that the ' ' work " of politics means in America the business of 
 winning elections, and that this work is incomparably heavier and more complex than in Eng- 
 land, because: — 
 
 (l) The voters are a larger proportion of the population ; (2) Tl j government is more 
 complex (Federal, State, and local) and the places filled by election are therefore far more 
 numerous ; (3) Elections come at shorter intervals ; (4) The machinery of nominating candi- 
 dates is .'ar more complete and intricate ; (5) The methods of fighting elections are far more 
 highly developed, i.e., they are matters requiring more technical knowledge and skill ; 
 <6) Ordinary private citizens do less election work, because they are busier than in England, and 
 the professionals exist to do it for them. 
 
 Mi 
 
142 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ri 
 
 m '"1 
 
 ''\jf 
 
 I have observed thai tliore are also plenty of men engaged in some trade or |irofcssion who 
 interest themselves in jiolitics and work for their jiarty without any definite hope of office or 
 other pecuniary aim. They correspond to what we have called the Outer Circle politicians of 
 Europe. It is hard to drr 'V a line between the two classes, because they shade off into one 
 another, there being many farmers or lawyers or saloon-keepers, for instance, who, while pursiiintj 
 their regular calling, bear a hand in politics, and look to be some time or other rewarded for 
 doing so. When this expectation becomes a considerable part of the motive for exertion, such 
 an one may fairly be called a jirofessional, at least for the time being, for although lie has 
 other means of livelihood, he is apt to be impregnated with the habits and sentiments of 
 the professional class 
 
 I shall presently return to the Outer Circle men. Meantime let us examine the professionals 
 somewhat more closely ; and begin with those of the humbler type, whose eye is fixed on a 
 municipal or other local office, and seldom ranges so high as a seat in Congress. 
 
 This species, like thn weeds wliich follow human ilwcliings, thrives best in cities, and even 
 in the most crowded parts of cities. It is known to the Americans as the " ward politician," 
 because the city ward is the chief sphere of its activity, and the ward meeting the first scene of 
 its triumphs. A statesman of this type usually begins as a saloon or bar-keeper, an occupation 
 which enables him to form a large circle of acquaintances, esiiecially among the " loafer " class 
 who have votes but no reason for using them one way more than another, and whose interest in 
 political issues is therefore as limited as their stock of political knowledge. But hj may have 
 started as a lawyer of the lowest kind, or lodging-house keeper, or have taken to politics after 
 failure in storekeeping. The education of this class is only that of the elementary schools : if 
 they have come after boyhood from Europe, it is not even that. They have of course no com- 
 prehension of political questions or zeal for political principles ; politics mean to them merely a 
 scramble for places. Thev are usually vulgar, sometimes brutal, more rarely criminal, ov .at 
 least the associates of criminals. They it is who move about tlie populous quarters of the great 
 cities, form groups through whom they can reach and control the ignorant voter, pack meetings 
 with their creatures 
 
 These two classes do the local work and dirty work of politics. They are the rank and file. 
 Above them stand the officers in the political aimy, the party managers, including the members 
 of Congress and chief men in the State legislatures, and the editors of influential newspapers. 
 Some of them have pushed their way up from the humbler ranks. Others are men of superior 
 ability and education, often college graduates, lawyers who have had practice, less frequently 
 merchants or manufacturers who have slipped into politics from business. There are all sorts 
 among them, creatures olean and unclean, as in the sheet of St. I'cter's vision, but that one may 
 say of politicians in all countries. What characterizes them as compared with the corresponding 
 class ii. Europe is that their whole time is more frequently given to political work, that most of 
 them draw an income from politics and the rest ho]ie to do so, that they coine more largely from 
 the poorer and less cultivated than from the higher ranks of society, and that they include but 
 few men who have pursued any of those economical, social, or constitutional studies which form 
 the basis of politics and legislation, although many are proficients in the arts of popular oratory, 
 of electioneering, and of party management 
 
 In this general description I am simply repeating what non-political Americans themselves 
 say. It is possible that with their half-humorous tendency to exaggerate they dwell too much on 
 the darker side of their public life. My own belief is that things are healthier than the news- 
 papers and common talk lead a tnaveller to believe, and that the blackness of the worst men in 
 the large cities has been allowed to darken the whole class of politicians as the smoke from a few 
 factories will darken the sky over a whole town. However, the sentiment I have described is no 
 doubt the general sentiment. "Politician" is a term of reproach, not merely among the 
 " superfine philosophers " of New England colleges, but among the better sort of citizens over 
 the whole Union. " How did such a job come to be perpetrated ? " I remember once asking a 
 casual acquaintance who had been pointing out some scandalous waste of public money. " Why, 
 what can you expect from the politicians ? " was the surprised answer. 
 
PHOHOHTIONAL RbPKESKNTATION — THB ClOVU SYSTEM. 
 
 118 
 
 ;'lf 
 
 PROI'OIITIONAL UKI'Ki:SKN'IATlON-THE GOVE SYSTEM. 
 
 ExlractH from NoUh on Electing Jieprem'ntalh'eH In/ John M, Birry, WorcenU-r, Mann., 1892, 
 
 . . In the guncral choruH uf nntional pride, is there nnt n constuut un<lertone of 
 (liBBatisfactinn bewailing pnlitiual decudencc ? Is it nut evident tu all that we are tuu much 
 exposed to mei'ccnnry influenees ? , . . . 
 
 It may almost be said that political corruption is getting to be deemed the rule rather than 
 the exception ; we expect even more than wc lament it. The ntl'aira of state are prostituted 
 to serve the ends of those in jiower. UHico is not the freo*gift and choice of an intelligent 
 constituency. It is secured by barter between those who would profit i)y it. Candidates 
 climb to leadership by the promise of spoils. Hril)ery has become so common in legislative 
 bodies that it no longer surprises any one. Political rings and lobbyists direct and control 
 the legislature for [jcrsonul gain and aggrandizement. Scarcely a matter that comes up is 
 fairly and honestly considered upon its merits without prejudice or influence. High minded 
 and honorable men in the legislature find themselves sadly at variance with their surroundings, 
 and sometimes feel that the censure of the legislative body is no disgrace, but that its 
 fellowship and good will may i)e. Hut yesterday, as it were, we saw a member of tho 
 legislature of one of our oldest aiul proudest states, a state second to none for legislative 
 virtue and honor, resign his seat, disgusted at the unworthy and trifling manner in which 
 his associates were accustomed to deal with important public matters. If the ordinary 
 construction of language can be applied to the reported utterances of Senator Ingalls, in a 
 recent speech*, he boldly avows that politics is a battle in which any means are justified 
 which enable the party using them to win. When such an open confession is made to tho 
 world by the president pro tempore of the senate without protest from his fellow members of 
 congress, it is unnecessary to seek further for proof of political degeneracy and the need of 
 radical reforn). 
 
 The place where this reform is most needed is in our system of representation, condemned 
 by such vile products. Had we sunk so low as a people as we must if the legislative bodies 
 just spoken of fairly represented us, sjvd, indeed, would be our condition, and hard the task 
 to discover a remedy. But it is not so. Our legislators are the real choice of but a few. 
 The fault is in our defective system of election. It is an essential feature of our government 
 that it professes to be representative. In that essential point it has failed, and reform is 
 bitterly needed. The right to vote, indeed, is carefully guarded by the constitution. But 
 voting does not necessarily secure representation. It should do so; that is its proper object; 
 but the means are so poorly ailaptcd to the end that it almost completely fails. Of wliat 
 avail is the dropping of a ballot if it does not count to elect a representative ? 
 
 At the last general election (1888) over five million citizens voted for representatives in 
 congress, yet failed te secure representation ; and in some states these formed a majority of 
 those who voted. In round numbers eleven million votes were cast for representatives in 
 congress in all the states ; three million of these elected the Republican majority and 
 therefore control legislation, while more than five million who voted did not elect a 
 representative. It is estimated that five million more of voting age and sex omitted to vote 
 at all, largely influenced we may fairly infer by the feeling, warranted by the above facts, 
 that such action would be futile, a result sure to occur if they belonged to a hopeless 
 
 *"The purification of politics is an iridescent dream. Oovernmeiit is force. Politics is a battle for 
 Bupremacy. Parties are the armies. The decalotfiie and the i^'olden rule have no place in a political caniiiaign. 
 The object is success. To defeat the anta(,'oiiist and expel the party in power is the |)urpose. In war it is law- 
 ul to deceive the adversary, to hire Hessians, to purchase mercenaries, to mutilate, to kill, to destroy. The 
 commander who lost a battle through the activity of his moral nature would be the derision and jest of history. 
 This modern cant about the corruption of politics is fatiguing in the extreme. It proceeds from the tea-custard 
 and syllabub dilettanteisra, the frivolous and desultory sentiraentalism of epicenes. ' 
 
144 
 
 AIM'ENUIX. 
 
 V 
 
 ''I 
 
 I. ' I. 
 
 
 w 
 
 m-f- 
 
 minority in tliuir rcHpective iliatricts. Over onn-soveiitli of the Nortiuiiu rcprusenUtivcH 
 were tjlcctoil by uii actual minority (although a conipartttivoly largo one) of voturs in thuir 
 districtH. 
 
 Political i»artit'H are ho ofjually divided that the Hum of the voters r)n tiio losing side in 
 the virioUH districtH comprises nearly one-half of those who vote, an<l none of these have a 
 representative, or rather they ari, i usrcitresentod by one whoso views are opposed to theirs, 
 In reply to this consideration it is n.istakeidy urgeil, by some who do not justly appreciate 
 true representation, tiiat the defeat of a given party in one district is bahinced ami com- 
 pensated by its success in another, so that the i)artie8 are fairly represented after all. Were 
 this 80, the individual voter still loses his right to a voico in the selection 
 
 To the unrepresented inend)er8 of the defeated one of the two great parties in each 
 district are to bo added the mendiers of still snuvller i)arties. If these vote, they do it with 
 almost the certainty of failing to secure representation, and in the present congress none of 
 these minor parties has even a single representative. Taking both of these elements together 
 the wholly unrepr'isented often form a nuvjority of all who vote at any election. Yet these 
 unrepresented citizens contribute their share toward the expenses of government. Thus we 
 have taxation without representation, the very thing which M'as thought by our forefathers 
 just cause for war. If under a king this was just cause for a bloody revolution, it is not a 
 greater wrong under a free representative government where the people are supposed to be 
 guaranteed cijual rights, ond is it not time to seek if possible, means for a peaceful revolution 
 in this res[)ect ? The whole population of the colonies was less than two million, yet here at 
 the present time are over live million of unrepresented tax payers who voted, and if we add 
 to their nund)er those who did not vote, it swells our unrepresented population to nearly 
 two-thirds of the inhabitants having the right of suli'rage. 
 
 It may be said that it is the privilege of the citizen to vote only and that many nmst 
 necessarily be outvoted, yet that they have no ground for complaint, as the majority must 
 rule. This is no answer to the complaint of loss of votes cast for a representative. If the 
 votes were directly upon a proposed law or measure, as in voting upon a proposed amendment 
 to a state constitution, the principle woul^l be as stated ; but in voting for representatives, 
 the people are not voting directly, but are choosing delegates to vote for them upon measures. 
 Consequently if one's vote does not count to elect a representative, he is not merely outvoted ; 
 he loses his vote altogether upon the questions brought l)efore the legislature ; he has no voice 
 directly or indirectly in the making of the laws. Our legishitive system is not a government 
 by majority. It is government of a majority of pluralities in separate districts. Consequently 
 we have actually minority rule. It is customary to call the plans proposed for remedying 
 the evil, plans to s ">-e minority representation. The term is a misleading one. The plans 
 do aim to give a hose now left in the minority in the various districts, but the final 
 
 result aimed ■■ .^e of the majority through the ecjual representation of all, 
 
 . . . .ual to attribute such results to gerrymandering. That the evil is 
 
 occasiom .avated by this cause is unfortunately true, but the main reason fo- it lies 
 
 far deeper, i^et districts be arranged as justly as possible, a minority usually largo in each, 
 must necessarily be defeated and left without representation, the sum of these minorities 
 being usually sufficient to elect several representatives. Moreover, the party in the minority 
 in the state will usually obtain much less than its fair proportion of representatives, while 
 it is always possible that it may obtain far more than the fair proportion. The evil is 
 inherent in the system itself, which is radically defective. 
 
 The result of the last election shows the district system to be unjust and delusive. 
 Unjust, because less than half who voted at the North, secured 202 of the 211 representatives 
 from that portion of the country. * 
 
 * The Southern States are purposely omitted to avoid any complication on account of the alleged sup- 
 pression of the negro vote. If the whole country were included the showing would undoubtedly be far worse. 
 
rROI'ORTIONAL RKPIlKSKNTATtON— THE" OOVE 8YBTRM. 
 
 14ft 
 
 Deliisivo, beoaiiau thu popular belief is that a majority of those who vote control thrcugli 
 the reprcaentativcH they elvut. 
 
 Yet in tliu election of the present congreaa in the Northern atates, new Htate.'t inchuled, — 
 
 H, 17-,y99 citizi'iiM cli'otud 1(57 represontativos, a majority of tlio '.i'i'2 in congrcHS from nil the 
 HtntcH l)otli North jvnd South, while— 
 
 3,.S0t,(U)2 who vuteil in 1U7 Northern iliHtricta, failed to elect any 
 
 One half the Northern Reprcseutativos were elected by less than n ((unrtur of the 
 Northurn votors, and more than twice ns many who voted in the same Htates did not elect 
 even one. To 8(!curc anything like justice or c(iu(dity tiie rcHult should be far ditlereut. 
 One ([uartor of the voters should elect one (juarter of the representatives, and twice as many 
 voters should elect twice as numy representatives. 
 
 It may be that men like Senator Ingalls, disregarding all broad considerations of justice 
 aiul ]>ublic welfare, may see in these tigures only a satisfactory partisan advantage. Hut the 
 majority i)arty itself can by no means afford to look with eiiuaniinity upon this unjust 
 method, although for tiie moment gaining an unfair advantage from it. Its position is too 
 precarious. No very great change of vote, whether from change of opinion or from corruption 
 of voters, instead of making a proportionate change in the representation, might completely 
 reverse the relative ))osition of the parties. IjCss than throe per cent, of the Northern 
 vote coultl have bee i so changed as to tip the scale and give an entirely different majority 
 in congress for all the s'^a^es. The power of so few voters to change entirely the complexion 
 of congress is too strong a temptation to bo lefi open to unscrupulous politicians, and hangs 
 a Damocles sword over the heail of the winner 
 
 Some object to the representation of all, on the ground that the ignorant so far out- 
 number the wise that they would rule, but this objection cannot be sustained. The ignorant 
 are found in all parties, and so far from making common cause against the educated, would 
 almost without exception vote for the ablest man of their own party if they knew who he 
 was. Hut even if the objection was well founded, the remedy would bo an educational 
 (jualitication, or some change in the law instead of <levice8 to cheat a voter by givir. ; him 
 the appearance of political power without the reality. In any case intelligence will rule. 
 At present we are ruled by intclligont demagogues, and if the same amount of brain power 
 now applied to personal and party ends was applied to lofty unselfish statesmanship we 
 should be ruled by intelligent patriots. 
 
 Aristotle argued that the wisdom of the whole people included and exceeded the wisdom 
 of the few who were wise. Therefore let us utilize the wisdom of the mass by granting to all 
 their right of representation. All the great beneficial movements among mankind have been 
 the work of determined minorities. Therefore let the wiser minority also be represented. 
 
 Various attempts have been made to secure a more just system of representation and 
 much thought has been expended upon it. It is only necessary for us to become once 
 thoroughly alive to its importance and a way can readily be devised to apply an effective 
 remedy. We have seen how the present system fails. Let us in conclusion take a glance 
 at some of the propositions made to introduce a better one. 
 
 In 1 8C9 the United States Senate appointed a committee on representative reform. 
 
 . , The committee were of opinion that had there been equal representation, our 
 disastrous civil war might have been prevented 
 
 In 1870 Mr. Marshall proposed a measure to give equal representation and was supp.^rted 
 by Mr. S. S. Cox, Mr. Garfield and others, and almost carried the House with him. . . . 
 
 There has been in Denmark for thirty-five years representation by the single transferable 
 vote. An estimate is made of the number required to elect, by dividing the votes cast, by 
 lo 
 
 I! 
 
146 
 
 APPKNDIX. 
 
 •M 
 
 t: ,; 
 
 M 
 
 
 Pi ; 
 
 t)io number of repreBcntativeB. Any canditlate receiving tliis number iu deelivred elected, 
 and any surpluH or inedcctive votcH are trauHferred to aHHiHt in electing othcrH of the 
 same principIcH. TIiIh HyHtem, (Mr. Andni''H, liewt known m Mr. Hare's) iu endorwcil by 
 Mr. John Stuart Mill, Sir John Lubltock and otlierH, and HeeniH the niont jiiHt of any yet 
 put to practical teut. Harvard College and Home other iuHtitutiouM and corporatioiiH have 
 elected oflicerii by thin method. Hy thiii plan tlierc is the leaHt poHHible 1o»h and waHte of 
 votes, and the greatest poBHi))le number of individual voters reprcBcnted. 
 
 itctainiug all thcHe excellenciofl and including some new and desirable features, is a 
 system oifered and recommended to the Mashachusetts Legislature in 1M88. 
 
 The New York Evening I'ost in commenting on it, says : 
 
 " It presents a scheme which seems to us the most complete and practical that we have 
 seen. It is worked out in lil with great care and elaboration so as, we should think, to 
 leave no loophole for blunder or fraud. The fundamental principle is that of Mr. Hare's 
 plan, the transference of suri)luM votes to other candidates, by which every representative 
 ^08 an e<)ual constituency, and every voter has a representative for whom he voted. But 
 while Mr. Hare distributca the suridus votes by a complicated and perplexing method, the 
 plan before us recjuires each candidate hrforn thf cli'dion to say to whom his unnecessary 
 votes shall be transferred. Each voter, therefore votes for a. single name, but with the 
 knowledge that his vote for A, may count for H, (J or I), and the transference of the surplus 
 votes is made by a simple rapid process, always to a candidate or candidates in general 
 agreement with the one voted for." 
 
 So general is the conviction among the best thinkers that some reform in representation 
 is demanded, tliut the time is not far distant when it must come. Remedies have lieen 
 sought in other countries as well as our own, a system of voting by which no votes shall bo 
 lost, or at least no considerable nund)er, and every vote shall count for the election uf a 
 person who is the choice of the voter. 
 
 Appeal has been made to congress, l)ut a system that elects legislators, too often blinds 
 tliei to its injustice. Only the opposition of men conscious of their unlitness for the places 
 they occupy, and conscious thiit in a fair and just representation of all voters other and 
 better men would supersede them, has so long delayed reform. When that comes, and 
 every citizen exerts an inliuenco, true statesmen will hold the sufTrage of the people and 
 legislation will be for their benefit and the best good of the country, and not to conciliate 
 parties <jr sections witii a view to re-election. Thjii tlie purest anil best nsen will stand at 
 the helm, their aspirations satisfied in a true statesmanship, free from dei)asing intrigues 
 which now excludes many of them from ."'1 participatiim in matters of government. , . . 
 
 A majority of representatives in the present congress (r)2nd 1892) were elected by less 
 than 21 per cent, of the votes, while over twice as many cast at the same election did not 
 elect any. 
 
 In the Northern States at that election, using round numbers, .'l.S hundred thousaml 
 Democratic votes elected 121 representatives, while ,'14 hundred thousaml Kepublican votes 
 cast in the North electeil only 83 representatives. 
 
 / In the Northern states — 
 
 2,70.3,970 votes elected 1(57 representatives a majority of congress from both North and 
 
 South, while 
 .'{,420,240 in the North voting at the same time could not elect even one. 
 
 Other countries suffer from the same evil. h\ Great Hritain there are — 
 <J, 007, 133 registered voters. 
 
 The House of Commons has 070 members. In the present House 449 seats 
 were contested, 221 were uncontested. 
 3,100,755 votes were cast for the 449 contested seats. 
 
I'KUI'ORTIONAI. IIKI'UKSENTATION TIIK (iOVK HVSTKM. 
 
 147 
 
 1,302,081 vot(!« are n^ircHuiited, having clcctod .'Jt»5 niuinbtirti (19 more than a majority of the 
 wholi! House) while a larger muiilier- 
 
 l,.'10.'J,8r2 votcf. oast at the Hanie eluctioUH are unropreHented being waHted ou defeated 
 caiididateH 
 
 THE OOVE HILL. — LEOI3LATIVI0 KKI'HKSKNTATION. 
 
 Commonwealth ok MAHHA(!iii)SKiTs, 1 
 
 In the V'ear One Thoimand Eight Hundred [ 
 
 and Ninety-one. ) 
 
 KKSULVE. 
 
 To amend the Constitution relative to the Elootiou of Senators and Uepresontatives. 
 
 Ht'MolDi'tl, Hy both liouHeH, that it is expedient to alter the conHtitution of tliiw Common- 
 wealth uy the adoption of the subjoined article of amendment ; and that the said article, 
 being agreed to by a majority of the senators and two-thirds of the members of the house of 
 representatives present »>!id voting thereon, be entered on the journals of both houses, with 
 the yeas and nays taken thereon, and referred to the gen".ral court next to be chosen ; and 
 that the said article be jmblished, to the end that if agreed to in the manner provided by 
 the etmstitution by the general court next to be choHcn, it may be submitted to the people 
 for their approval and ratilicatiun, in order that it may become a part of the constitution of 
 the Connnonwealth. 
 
 AltTICLE OK AmKNDMKNT. 
 
 Section 1. In order to provide for a representation of the citi/.ens of this (Commonwealth, 
 founded upon the principle of e()uality ; any rcHident of this Commonwealth, eligible under 
 the constitution to the ollice of senator, may be nominated as a candidate for said ollice by 
 any person. 
 
 No such nomination sliall bo valid unless the following conditions arc complied with : — 
 
 (1.) 'I'lie nomination shiil' Ih? in writing, Higne<l i)y the person making it, and shall 
 contain the name and place ol .'csidcnce of the candidate. 
 
 (2.) An acceptance of the nomination signed by the candidate shall be endorsed thereon. 
 
 {X) It shall be deposited in the ollice of the secretary of the Connnonwealth not more 
 than three months nor less than live weeks Ixifore the day of election. 
 
 (<t.) There shall be deposited with the nomination the sum of lifty <lolIarH, or such 
 other sum not exceeiliiig one humlrcd dollars, as tht; legislature may liereafter by law direct. 
 
 S'rc. 'J. Not less than four weeks before the day of election, the secretary of the (>)mmon- 
 wcalth shall furnish to each candidate and to every voter who shall recjuest it, a jirinted list 
 containing the names of all tlnr (;aii<li(latcs in alphalietical order with the place of residence 
 of each, and the name of the person by whom each was nominated. 
 
 Sect. S. At any time after his nomination and not less than three weeks before the day 
 of election, any of said cantlidatcs may furnish to the secretary of tin; Commonwealth a 
 statement in writing, signed by himself and a(;knowl(!dg(Ml before any magistrate authorized 
 to take acknowlcilgnient of .deeds, which slatement sliall contain the names of one or more 
 others of said candidates with whom he believes himself to bo in accord upon the most 
 important public (jucstions, and to one or more of whom be wishes to transfer any ineffective 
 votes cast for himself. 
 
 Sect. Jf. The secretary shall prepare a new list of candidates similar to that named in 
 si.'ction two of this article, but containing also against the name of each camlidate the names 
 in alphabetical order of all camlidates named in the list, it' any, furnished by that candidate, 
 as provided in section three ; and he shall, not less than two weeks before the day of 
 
 1 
 
148 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 '- 
 
 P 
 
 It 
 If 
 
 i*' 
 J 1 
 
 III 
 
 i'f , 
 
 'If: 
 
 
 it! 
 
 '^■'J! 
 
 election, furnish to the clerk of every city or town a sufficient number of copies of said new 
 list. Every such clerk shall, immediately upon the receipt thereof, post conspicuously, and 
 open to the inspection of the public, one copy of said list at each and every pla3e in his city 
 or town where votes are to be received at said election, and shall also immediately furnish 
 one copy to every legal voter resident in said city or town who shall demand the same. 
 
 Sect. 5. Every lei,'al voter wherever resident, shall be entitled to cast his vote for senator 
 in favour of any person whose name appears in the aforesaid list of candidates ; but no person 
 shall vote for more than one candidate, nor for any person whose name does not appear ujion 
 the aforesaid list of candidates. 
 
 But whenever a candidate duly nominated 'is omitted from the list published by the 
 secretary of the Commonwealth, votes may be cast for him with the same eflfect as if his name 
 appeared on said list. 
 
 If the secretary shall make such omission intentionally or through wilful neglect of duty, 
 he shall, upon conviction thereof, be ever after incapable of holding any office of trust or 
 profit under the Commonwealth. 
 
 Sect. G. The returns of votes having been transmitted to the secretary of the Common- 
 wealth as provided by the constitution, the secretary shall make a list of all candidates 
 voted for, with the vote received by each candidate in each precinct or voting place, and his 
 total vote, and said list shall be transmitted, published and distributed in the same manner 
 provided in section four, concerning he list therein named ; and after the secretary shall 
 have ascertained who are the persons who appear to be elected, he shall make a list of the 
 successful candidates with the computation by which their election has been ascei'taiued, 
 and shall forthwith furnish a copy of the same to each candidate and also to every voter who 
 shall request it. 
 
 Sect. 7. Ineffective votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate 
 for whom they were originally cast, to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate 
 as provided by section three. 
 
 The forty candidates then having the highest number of votes shall be declared elected 
 and the secretary shall issue certificates of election to them. 
 
 In case two or more candidates have the same number of votes, the candidates residing 
 at the greatest distance from the state house shall be deemed, for the purpose of election, to 
 have the highest number. 
 
 Sect. 8. The following shall be deemed ineffective votes, and shall be transferred in 
 the order named : — 
 
 (1.) Any votes cast for a candidate in excess of one-fortieth of the entire vote cast, 
 beginning with the candidate receiving the largest vote, and proceeding to the one next 
 highest and so on. 
 
 In the ca.se of two or more receiving the same vote, the transfer shall be from each 
 alternately, in alphabetical order. 
 
 (2. ) Votes cast by candidates who have since their nomination died or become ineligible 
 in the same order. 
 
 (.S. ) Original votes cast for candidates who fail of election, beginning with the candidate 
 receiving the smallest total vote, and proceeding to the next lowest, and so on ; in case of 
 two or more receiving the same vote the transfer to be made from each alternately in 
 alphabetical order. 
 
 No votes shall be transferred from any candidate who has not furnished the statement 
 named in section three. 
 
 Sect. 9. Every ineffective vote of a candidate shall be transferred to the candidate 
 

 PARTIES AND PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 U9 
 
 uatned in his said list, living and eligible at the time of counting the vote, for whom the 
 largest number of votes were originally cast and whose vote by transfer or otherwise docs 
 not equal one-fortieth of the whole vote cast, until all arc transferred as far as possible. 
 
 If the same number of votes were originally cast for two or more candidates named in 
 said list, the candidate residing nearest the one from whom the votes are to be trausfei-red 
 shall be preferred. 
 
 Sect. 10. The secretary shall at once transmit to the treasurer and receiver-general all 
 sums of money received as provided in section one. 
 
 Immediately after declaring the names of the persons elected senators, he shall draw on 
 the treasurer and receiver-general a warrant for the payment of tlie sum received with one 
 nomination, and issue the same to the person nominating each candidate who shall appear by 
 the returns to have received one thousand or mote original votes, and all such warrants shall 
 be paid by the treasurer and receiver-general on presentation. The remainder of the sums 
 paid under section one shall be and remain the property of the Commonwealth. 
 
 Sect. 11. In case a vacancy shall occur in the senate after the declaration of election 
 provided in section seven, the votes cast for the member whose seat shall have become vacant 
 together with any ineffective votes assigned to him, shall be re-distributed in the same 
 manner as if he had died or become ineligible before the canvassing of the votes, and the 
 candidate not before elected, who, after returning to him any votes originally cast for him, 
 shall then appear to have largest number of votes shall be declared elected. 
 
 Sect. 12. The supreme judicial court, upon the petiticm of twenty-live legal voters, shall 
 have jurisdiction to enforce by mandamus the ct)rrection of any ermneous or improper issue 
 of such certificate of election, when such error can be made to aj>pear from the face of the 
 returns issued by the secretary as provided in section six, ujjon cauvasing said returns in the 
 manner provided in section seven, eight and nine. 
 
 But the senate shall continue to be the final judge of the election of its members. 
 
 Sect. 13. The legislature may at any time provide by law that representatives be 
 elected in substantially the same manner as is herein provided for senators, and by such law 
 may, if it so decides, divide the Commonwealth into not exceeding six electoral districts, 
 from each of which the candidates voted for in that district must be taken, and by voters 
 within which such candidates must be nominated. The number of voters in each of these 
 districts to be as nearly equal as possible. 
 
 PARTIES AND PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 By Henry Sitfgu'ui: From " T/ie Elements of Politics" iSgr. 
 
 The dual system seems to have a dangerous tendency to degrade the profession cf politics : 
 partly from the inevitable insincerity of the relation of a party leader to the members of his own 
 party, partly from the insincerity of his relation to the party opposed to him. To keep up the 
 vigour and zeal of his own side, he has to maintain the fiction that under the heterogeneous 
 medley of opinions and sectional interests represented by the " ins" or the "outs" at any par- 
 ticular time there is a fundamental underlying agreement in sound political prmciples ; and he 
 has to attribute to the other side a similar agreement in unsound doctrines. Thus the best politi- 
 cal talent and energy of the country acquires a fatal bias in the direction of insincere advocacy ; 
 indeed the old objection against forensic advocacy as a means of obtaining right judiciid conclu- 
 sions — that one section of the experts employed are professionally required to make the worse 
 
 il 
 
 Iff 
 
150 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ', 'i ■ 
 
 
 if':. 
 
 i'it\ - . 
 
 
 phi 
 1'^ 
 
 
 1^- 
 
 seem the better renson — applies with much more real force here than in the case of tue law- 
 courts. For in the case o( the forensic advocate this attitude is frankly avowed and recognized 
 by all concerned : every plain man knows that a lawyer in court is exempt from the ordinary 
 rule that hinds an honest man only to use arguments which he believes to be sound ; and that it 
 is the duty of every member of a jury to consider only the value of an advocate's arguments, and 
 disregard, as far as possible, the air of conviction with which they are uttered. The political 
 advocate or ]iarty leader tends to acquire a similar professional habit of using bad argimients with 
 an air of conviction where he cannot get good ones, or when bad ones are more likely to be 
 popularly effective ; but, unlike the forensic advocate, he is understood, in so doing, to imply his 
 personal belief in the validity of his arguments and the truth of the conclusions to which he 
 desires to lead up. And the case is made worse by the fact that political advocacy is not con- 
 trolled by expert and responsible judges, whose business it i- to sift out and scatter to the winds 
 whatever chaff the pleader may mingle witli such grains of sound argument as his brief affords ; 
 the position of the political advocate is like what that of a forensic advocate would be, if it was 
 his business to address a jury not presided over by a judge, and largely composed of persons 
 who only heard the pleadings on the other side in an imperfect and partial way. 
 
 What has just been said applies primarily to the leading members of a party who undertake 
 the task of advocacy. Hut the artificiality of combination which, the dual system involves has to 
 some extent a demoralising effect on other members of the legislature ; they accpiire a habit either 
 of voting frankly without conviction at the summons of the "whip," or of feigning convictions 
 which they do not really hold in order to justify their votes. 
 
 And the same cause impairs the security for good legislation, apparently furnished by the 
 fact that a measure can only bo passed if it has the approval of a majority of the 'egislators ; 
 since it increases the danger that measures may be passed which are only desired and really 
 approved by a minority — it m.ay even be a small minority if sufficiently fanatical or selfish; — such 
 measures being acquiesced in by the rest, under the guidance of their leader.', in order to maintain 
 the party majority. 
 
 Of the gravity of these disadvantages it is difficult to form a general estimate, as it depends 
 largely on the condition of political morality, which is influenced by many causes more or less 
 independent of the form of government : but we may reasonably regard the disadvantages as 
 sufficiently grave to justify a serious consideration of the means of removing or mitigating them. 
 The availalile remedies are partly political, partly moral : the former will naturally vary much 
 according to the precise form of government adopted. If the .Supreme Executive is practically 
 dismissible at any time by a Parliamentary majority — even with the possibility of appealing to the 
 country — the danger of transient and shifting Parliamentary majorities is so great and obvious, 
 that a nation in which the two-party system is firnly established is hardly likely to abandon it. 
 Hut the case is different with other forms of Representative Government. For instance, where 
 there is a supreme executive appointed for a fixed period, without the power of dissolving Parlia- 
 ment, there is less manifest need of this system than where the executive holds office on the 
 English tenure, and less tendency, ceteris paribus, to promote its development : since, in the 
 former case, the party struggle in parliament is not kept always active — as it is in the latter case — 
 by the consciousness that the Cabinet or the Parliament may come to an end at any moment. 
 It is true that the example of the United .States might be quoted on the other side, since there 
 the fixed tenure of the Presidency has not interfered with the fullest development of dual party 
 government that the modern world has seen. Here, however, I conceive that the election of the 
 President by the people at large, and the "spoils" system, have operated powerfully to foster 
 this development : if there were a .Supreme Executive elected by the legislature, with subordinate 
 officials holding office independently of party ties, I think it probable that the tendency to a dual 
 division of parlies — and generally the influence of party on government — would be materially 
 reduced. 
 
 Assuming that a Parliamentary Executive is retained, the bad effects of two-party govern- 
 ment might still be mitigated in various ways. Substantial portions of legislative and administra- 
 
BURKES DEFENCE OF PARTY. 
 
 151 
 
 tive work mijjlit be withilrawn from tlie control of the party syj^tem, under the influence of public 
 opinion, aided by minor chanjjes in parliamentary rules and in the customary tenure of executive 
 offices. Firstly, as I have before suggested, on certain imjiortant questions, not closely connected 
 with the business of the executive dejiartments, the jireparation of lej^islation might be entrusted 
 to ])arliamcntary committees other than the executive cabinet : and the natural tendency to 
 different lines of divisions on different subjects might thus be allowed fair play. 
 
 Secondly, certain headships of departments, in which a peculiar need of knowledge, tramed 
 skill, and special experience was generally recognized, might be filled l)y persons not expected 
 normally to retire with their colleagues, when the parliamentary majority sujiporting the govern- 
 ment of which they were members was turned into a minority ; but only expected to retire when 
 the f|uestions on which issue was joined between the parties related to the administration of their 
 special departments. 
 
 Again, it would seem jiossible, by certain changes in the customary relation between the 
 Cabinet and Parliament, to reduce the danger of excessive instability of government consequent 
 on allowing free play to the natural tendency to a multiplicity of parties. Thus, it might be the 
 established custom for ministers not to resign office because the legislative measures proposed by 
 them were defeated, — unless the need of these measures was regarded by them as so urgent that 
 they could not conscientiimsly carry on the administration of public affairs without them — but 
 only to resign when a formal vote of v.-: ' of confidence was carried against them in the House 
 of Representatives. This charge wc i ■ at once promote, and be facilitated by, an increased 
 separation of the work of legislation from that ot administration. 
 
 Again, the introdic.ion of the " Referendum " — even to the limited extent suggested in 
 chapter xxvii. — would at any rate reduce the danger that a minority, concentrating its energies 
 on narrow political aims, may force through legislation not really approved by a majority of the 
 assembly that adopts it. 
 
 Finally, the operation of the party-system might be checked and controlled — more effectually 
 than it now is in Fnglaiid and the United States by a change in current morality, which does not 
 seem to be beyond the limits of possibility. It might be regarded as the duty of educate<l persons 
 generally to aim at a judicial frame of mind on questions of current politics, whether they are 
 inside parlies or outside. If it is the business of the professional politician to prove his own side 
 always in the right, it should be the point of honour of the "arm-chair " politician, if he belongs 
 to a party, to make plain when and why he thinks his party in the wrong. And probably the 
 country would gain from an increase in the number of persons taking a serious interest in politics 
 who keep out of party ties altogether. 
 
 BURKE'S DEFENCE OF PARTY. 
 
 By Dr. Goldwin Smith. From " The North American J^evieiv,'" Vol. CLIV., i8()3. 
 
 The great sponsor for the morality and the necessity of party is Burke, whose words in 
 " Thoughts on the Present Discontents " have been cited a thousand times. Burke is a magnifi- 
 cent writer, but unless read with reference to time and circumstance he is very apt to mislead. 
 He is the Prince of Pamphleteers, but he is a pamphleteer, and, like all pamphleteers, to some 
 extent makes his philosophy for the occasion. " Thoughts on the Present Discontents " is the 
 manifesto of the Rockingham connection of Whigs against the cabal of "King's Friends," who 
 were striving to put an end to constitutional government, and instal the personal government of 
 George III. in its place by backstairs intrigue, jobbery and corruption. To vindicate any 
 
162 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 a' 
 
 1i 
 
 l 
 
 3' 
 
 u 
 
 \i\ 
 
 
 connection of constitutional sti.tesmen ngainst backstairs intrigue, jobbery, corruption, and the 
 personal government of George III. was not difficult. But as a general vindication of the party 
 system, if it was so intended, this renowned passage will not bear examination. " Party," says 
 Burke, "is a body of men united for promoting by their joint endeavors the national interest 
 upon some particular principle in which they are all agreed." The particular principle appar- 
 ently can be nothing but their joint opinion on the great question or questions of the day. But 
 the great question or questions of the day will in time be seltlel. When they shall have been 
 settled, what will there be to render the bond of party moral or rational ; what will there be left 
 to hold the connection together but the common desire of political power and pelf? The party 
 will then become a machine, and its Cohesion will be maintained either by mere personal associa- 
 tion or by motives and influences more or less corrupt. By the philosophy which is always forth- 
 coming in defence of existing arrangements, particularly those arrangements in which many 
 persons have an active interest, it has been alleged that men are naturally and almost providen- 
 tially divided from their birth into conservatives and liberals. But this bi-section of humanity is 
 a politician's dream. Temperaments vary through an infinite series of gradations, and the same 
 man is conservative on one subject and liberal on another. Youth as a rule, perhaps, is prone to 
 innovation, while .ige is reactionary. Yet nobotly is so violently reactionary as a young aristocrat. 
 Is the community then to be artificially divided into two sections, at perpetual war with each 
 other, for the purpose of carrying on the system ? How is the apportionment to be made, and 
 why, if the existence of the two parties is necessary, should each of them be always traducing 
 and striving to annihilate the other ? Burke's glowing language about a generous contention for 
 power on manly and honorable maxims, and without proscription of opponents, sounds like a 
 satire on party politics as they are. The reality is that which he would exclude by contrast, — 
 "delusion of the ignorant, by professions incompatible with human practice and followed by 
 practices below the level of vulgar rectitude." If he could only have seen the machine and the 
 bosses ! If he could only have looked into the office of Mr. Schnadhorst ! If he could only 
 have been present at a nominating convention for the Presidency or witnessed a general election 
 in the England of these days ! A convention of Whig magnates gathered round the dinner 
 table of the Marquis of Rockingham to settle the policy of the connection, and distribute the 
 pocket-boroughs at its command, was the only sort of convention that he had ever seen. Party, 
 unless there is some great question, such as parlianT'ntary reform or slavery, to justify its exist- 
 ence, can be nothing but a fine name for faction, of which the ties are passion and corruption, and 
 which always must be in the end, as it always has been, the ruin of the commonwealth. 
 
 Yet how under the representative and elective system are we to dispense with the party 
 machine ? There is the problem. How are the individual votes to be combined and directed so 
 as to elect the representatives and form the basis for the government ? 
 
 
 m 
 
 By Charles Richardson. 
 
 PARTY GOVERNMENT. 
 
 From Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social 
 Science, January, 1892. 
 
 Among the most important functions of these organizations are the selection of candi- 
 dates and the adoption of a platform or declaration of principles. These responsible duties 
 are intrusted to conventions, composed of delegates chosen for the purpose at the party 
 elections, known as the primaries. 
 
 Those who have so far conformed to the rules of a party as to be entitled to vote at its 
 primal ies may be dividid into two classes, as follows: 1. Citizens who have no special 
 advantages to gain, and whose only motive for participation is their desire for good govern- 
 ment. 
 
PAKTV GOVERNMENT. 
 
 IfiS 
 
 : It 
 
 2. Those who are actuated by personal ambition or hopes of seeming office, contracts or 
 pecuniary l)euefit8. 
 
 lu order to carry the primaries a considerable amount of time and labor must neces- 
 sarily be expended. The voters must communicate with each other ; views must be 
 compared and harmonized ; candidates suggested, interviewed and agreed upon ; tickets 
 prepared and supplied, and concert of action secured. 
 
 This labor is undertaken with eagerness and enthusiasm by the mt , iio are working 
 for the offices or other person.il benefits, and are .actu.ated by purely sellish motives. But 
 the majority of citizens, engrossed as they are with private business and family cares, have 
 neither time nor inclin.ation for such tasks. And when theic reluctance is overcome, as it 
 occasionally is by their sense of public duty, they are likely to lind th.at tlieir opponents 
 have no hesitation in resorting to mi.srepresentation, trickery or fraud, in order to control 
 the result. Under these circumstances a small, but well-disciplined, energetic and un- 
 scrupulous minority can generally defeat the honorable and patriotic majority. It is 
 therefore not surprising that honest and industrious citizens are apt to concUule that it is 
 useless for them to take part in such contests. 
 
 The growth of this feeling is particularly noticeable in our lai cities. Ettbrts to arrest 
 it are only successful in rare instances, and it seems inevitabi hat the primaries must 
 continue to be gradually abandoned more and more to the control of the class generally 
 designated as politicians. 
 
 These gentlemen may have great abilities and many good qualities, but for the reasons 
 just stated, their positions cannot, except in rare cases, ho either won or retained unless 
 their dominant motives are personal and partisati advantage ; moral principles and the 
 interests of the public being secondary considerations. Public offices, contracts and patron- 
 .age are what they work for and what they must have, by fair me.ins if possible, but if not, 
 then by whate\'er ujeans may be necessary. For this purpose they are obliged to combine 
 among themselves and submit to such leaders as may seein best able to direct their eflforts, 
 and to secure and apportion among them the i)rizes they covet. Having once acquired 
 complete control of a nominating convention, their natural desire, is of course, to nominate 
 such candidates as will best serve their own personal interests, and in the absence of 
 factional fights among themselves, the oniy real check upon this desire is their fear of losing 
 enougli of the more independent voters to turn the scale in the general elections. 
 
 This conilict l)etween what they would like to do and what they dare to do, usually 
 results in their nominating such men as have no more honesty and independence than may 
 seem to be .absolutely necessary for ultim.ate success. And if they can secure candidates 
 who are generally believed to be able and honorable, but who will really obey .and assist the 
 spoilsmen, the temptation to nominate them, and thus deceive and outwit the people, can 
 hardly be resisted. 
 
 In the construction of a party platform the leaders are naturally governed by similar 
 motives, and, instead of publishing a fr.ank stiitement of their re.al objects .and intentions, 
 they are disposed to adopt whatever m.ay seem most likely to attract the voters. In their 
 efifort to do this they seek to treat almost every subject of public interest, but there are 
 necessarily some points in regiird to which even the members of their own party are divided, 
 and it is one of the defects of party government that while many voters find sentiments 
 which they disapprove in each platform, they can see no alternative but to cast their ballots 
 for one or the other, and thus seem to endorse and support ideas to which they are really 
 opposed. 
 
 It would appear, therefore, that our system of political parties must necessarily tend to 
 place the selection of our candidates and the declaration of our principles in the hands of a 
 small minority of able but comparatively selfish and unscrupulous men. If this tendency 
 
154 
 
 APPENDIX, 
 
 
 I' 
 
 was confined to either pnrty, it might be poasihle to hold it in check hy voting for the 
 nomineea of the other ; but the ])resent system practically confines the choice of the people 
 to the candidates of the two principal parties, all of them having been selecteil and nomin- 
 ated by niniilar methods, and therefore characterized by a similar lack of unsellish patriotism 
 and moral principle. However dissatisfied the voters may be with the candidates of their 
 own party, they are naturally disposed to believe that the candidates of the other party, 
 having been chosen in the same way, are at least as bad. Tliey have therefore no means of 
 expressing their preference for better men, and their votes nmst be determined by the 
 attractions of a more or less unsatisfactory and untrustworthy political jdatform, rather 
 than by any considerations of personal honor or fitness. 
 
 Under such a system, if a candidate belongs to a party which happens to be on the most 
 popular siile of some leading question, like the tarifl' or silver coinage, his lack of integrity 
 or personal ability nnist be very glaring to prevent his election. And when he takes his 
 seat in a legislative body, and it becomes his duty to make a careful study of some imimrtant 
 question, to sift the evidence and reach a wise and just conclusion, he, who should l>e like 
 an impartial judge or an unprejudiced juryman, may find that he is only the bond servant of 
 the leaders of hi.s party, a mere automaton for the registering of their decrees. It is in this 
 way that our legislative assemblies are slowly losing their character as deliberative bodies, 
 and yielding more and more to the dictation of irresponsible partisan chiefs, or the decrees of 
 a secret caucus. 
 
 ^Vhile it is true that there are many exceptional instances, and occasional popular 
 uprisings, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that our general submission to the rule of 
 political parties tends to lower our moral standards, corrupt our people, and subject our 
 National, State, and Municipal governments to a class of men who care far more for personal 
 and partisan success than for either the honor or material interests of those they profess to 
 serve. 
 
 
 
 }A 
 
 PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION. 
 
 By Professor J. R. Commons. From Annals of the American Academy of Political 
 
 and Social Science, March 1892. 
 
 An earnest efifort to abolish the " gerrymander " will probably lead to the conclusion 
 that the district system must be abandoned. To do this in Congressional elections, it will 
 not be necessary to return to the system of a general state ticket elected by the majority 
 party of each state, which was the custom in the first quarter of the century, and which is 
 still employed in the case of the presidential electors. A modification of that discarded 
 system could be adopted by introducing some simple device of proportional representation. 
 
 Proportional representation is not a new thing in politics, although it has heretofore 
 received but limited application. Twenty years ago there was abundant discussion of plans 
 for minority and proportional representation, and out of the discussion in our own country a 
 crude plan of cumulative voting was adopted by some of the municipalities of Pennsylvania, 
 and for the election of members of the lower house of the Illinois legislature. This plan is 
 still in force. It has been recently applied to all private corporations by the new constitu- 
 tions of Kentucky, North and South Dakota and Montana. The Illinois system for the 
 election of state representatives was submitted to the people b" the Constitutional Conven- 
 tion of South Dakota, but was defeated at the polls. In Denmark, another plan of minority 
 representation has been in force since 1856. But the most important application of pro- 
 portional representation has been made by the Canton of Neuchatel, in Switzerland, and 
 
PUOPOHTIONAI. HKPKI'.SENTATION. 
 
 155 
 
 more recently by the Canton of Ticiiio, Something like the Swiss plan coulil be profitably 
 adopted in tliu election of all our representative assemblies and boards. 
 
 For Congressional elections, let each state elect its entire quota of representatives on a 
 general ticket. Let each party iu the state convention nominate the entire list, or as many 
 candidates as it could probably elect, adding a few names for favorable contingencies. 
 Then, in canvassing the returns, let the representatives be assigned to each party in propor- 
 tion to the popular vote of the party, giving preference to the candidates according to their 
 standing on tlie vote. 
 
 For exami)le, Ohio, in the elections of 1890, cast 713, 1">2 votes for Congressmen. The 
 number of Congressmen to be elected was twenty-one. This gives a quota of .S.S, !).")!• votes 
 to each Congressmiin. The Republicans cast 3()'2,0"24 votes, which gives them ten represent- 
 atives and a remainder of 2.'{,0,S4 votes. The Democrats cast 350,523 votes, giving them 
 ten representatives and a remaimler of 10,928' votes. The Prohibition vote was 21,891, 
 anil the Union Labor vote 3,223. There being twenty-one representatives to elect, and 
 the Republicans having a remainder above their ten quotas larger than the Democratic 
 remainder, anil larger than the total Prohibition or Union Labor vote, they get the 
 additional representative. Thus, the Ohio delegation would stand eleven Republicans 
 and ten Democrats. At present, under the gerrymander of 1890, it is seven Republicans 
 and fourteen iJenidcrats. 
 
 In the election of state legislatures, the state could be divided into districts, each 
 electing live, seven, or some odd number of representatives, and the electors of each district 
 "would vote for the entire list of names on their party ticket, the quotas and proportions 
 being obtained as aljove. For example, the county of Cuyahoga (including the city of 
 Cleveland) sends repeatedly a solid delegation of six Republicans to the Ohio State Legisla- 
 ture, elected on a general county ticket, and not one Democrat. By the proportional 
 system, there would be three Democrats and three Republicans. The county of Hamilton 
 (including the city of Cincinnati) sends to the Sixty-ninth General Assembly a solid delega- 
 tion of nine Democrats. The Republicans of that county are unrepresented. With, propor- 
 tional voting, the delegation would stand five Democrats, four Republicans. Other counties 
 in the state send one representative each. They could be grouped into districts of five, and 
 could then vote on the proportional plan. 
 
 In cities, election districts for councils and boards of aldermen could be constructed on 
 a similar basis. Where there are two branches of the city legislature, the smaller branch 
 could be chosen on a general ticket for the city at large by the proportional system, and the 
 more numerous branch by districts of five. 
 
 In all elections upon this plan, the different party tickets could be printed on a single 
 ballot, according to the form of the Australian ballot. The order of names on each ticket 
 would be determined by the state convention of each party, and this would indicate the 
 order of preference of the party. Voters v/ould not vote for individuals, but for the ticket. 
 If individual voters took the liberty of changing the order of names, they would lose their 
 vote altogether. This provision is necessary in order to simplify the counting of the ballots. 
 But " bolters " could nominate a new ticket, and at the same time assist in electing the party 
 ticket, simply by placing their first choice at the head of their ticket and following it by 
 names taken from the regular ticket. If they were sufficiently numerous to comply with 
 the law, the privilege could be obtained of having this new ticket printed separately on the 
 Australian ballot. If, now, the voters of this ticket could command a quota of the entire 
 vote, they would elect their first choice, and any remainder above the quota would go to the 
 next name, thus helping to elect one of the regular party nominees. The new system would 
 thus involve no waste of votes. 
 
 The plan here outlined is a modification of one devised by Dr. L. B. Tuckerman, of 
 Cleveland, Ohio, who has developed it with special reference to the election of committees 
 
 iff 
 
ue 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 
 ■ 
 
 
 »: 
 I.. 
 
 r 
 
 pi 
 
 30^ '.' 
 1 1' ' 
 
 r 
 
 by conventions or mass-meetings. In such assemblies the one-man power of the chairman is 
 clone away with, and each party can be fairly represented on committees by its own lirst 
 choice. 
 
 To set forth all the advantages of proportional representation would require an extended 
 study of politics and parties, and a careful weighing of remote causes. For the present, it is 
 possible to point out only a few of the patent bciielits it would v,.nfer. In the lirst place, the 
 gerrymander would be absolutely abolished. No other feasible plan can be thought of that 
 will do tiiis. The gerrymander inheres in the district system. So long as it is possible to 
 redistiiet a state, it is hopeless to exiect that a party in power will refrain from doing so to 
 its own advantage. The changes in iiopul.ition necessitate redistrictiiig at least once in tun 
 years. If legislatures be prohibited from passing such an act within a period less than ten 
 yearn, the party which happens to be in control of the legislature at the legal time will fasten 
 its own gerrymander on the people for a decade, with no possible chance for redress. It is 
 better to let the two parties play against each other. 
 
 Public oiMnion cannot stop the gerrymander, because public opinion rejoices in this kind 
 of tit-for-tat. The fact that one party has infamously cut up the state is good reason for tlie 
 other party to retrieve itself when it gets the power. If Congrcs.^ sliould take the matter 
 out of the hands of the State Legislature, it would be simply to do its own gerrymandering, 
 while state and municipal gerrymandering would still go on as before. Constitutional 
 restrictions, requiring equal population anil contiguous territory, are easily evaded. Xot- 
 M'itlistanding such restrictions, the populations of Congressional districts in New York vary 
 from 107,844 to SI 2,404. In no state is the Constitution on this point observed. And as foi- 
 contiguity, a glance .at the diagram of the English district of North Carolina or the First ami 
 Third districts of South Carolina will show on what a slender thread this liction may be 
 niatlo to hang. 
 
 It seems plain that with proportional representation abler men would be attracted into 
 legislative careers. The area of choice would be enlarged, and the leaders of a party could 
 not be driven from legi.«lative h.alls where their ability is needed, as was done at the last 
 Congressional election. 1"he feeling of responsibility to the whole people wouhl be increased 
 in the leaders of parties, because they could stand on their record before the state at large, 
 and not be compelled to dicker with petty local magnates. A man is at present elected to 
 Congress, not on account of public service, but according to his ability in turning spoils anil 
 appropriations into his district. He does not represent before the country any great policy 
 on which to stand or fall. He must depend on local wire-pulling and tne exchange of favors. 
 If he has done some distinguished service for his party, or has reache<l eminence in politics, 
 the whole strength of the National party of the opposition is thrown into his district, and if 
 possible, he is gerrymandered out of office. 
 
 Right here, however, will arise the principal popular objection to this plan, namely, 
 that districts would not be represented. But a slight thought will show that this objec* 
 tion has no force. The ge: ryroander has taken nearly all the virtue out of a district that it 
 may ever have possessed. There are few Congressional districts that have a unity of any 
 kind, either economical, political, topographical, geographical or historical. The county of 
 Huron, in Ohio, has been in five different combinations durint; the past twelve years, and 
 now it is in the western part of a district one hundred and twenty miles long and twenty 
 wide ; its Congressional representative lives sixty miles away, and had, previous to the last 
 gerrymander, very little knowledge of or interest in the county. In this, and hundreds of 
 other cases, the candidates in some districts at the other end of the state are better known 
 to the voters of the district than are the candidates in their own district. On the other 
 hand, the state is a historical and political unit. Its great men belong to no one district. 
 At present only two of them can go to the United States Senate, and others are shelved a.'^ 
 governors, or are compelled to seek some Presidential appointment. Under proportional 
 
PROPORTIONAL HEPRESENTATION. 
 
 IW 
 
 n'prfsentation those who are unavailable for Senators would lead their party delegations in 
 t\w House. 
 
 Arguments for proportional representation have usually been advanced in behalf of 
 minorities. Hut tliey are eciually valid as a defenoe of the majority. Under the system of 
 di.stricts and primaries less than ten per cent, of the voters of a party often dictate the policy 
 of the i)arty. Machines and ward bosses are the party rulers, and the majority does not 
 dare to " bolt " at the polls, because the opposite party would then come into power. Pro- 
 portional representation would permit independent movements within t)ie party without 
 ri.-diing the defeat of the entire ticket, sim|)ly by allowing the nomination of a new ticket 
 com[iosed partly of independents and partly of the regular ticket. If the independent 'an- 
 didates are elected and there is a surplus of voters ai)ove the quota, the surplus goes to the 
 regular ticket. The majority of the party would be benefited as often as the minority. The 
 ])re8ent system on the face of it means the rule of the minority. The gerrymander over- 
 throws majority I'ule. 
 
 The fact that voters could not vote for individuals, but must east their ballots for the 
 straight ticket, may seem at first sight a serious objection. But the objection is not valid as 
 ayainst the present system, because even now the voter has uo choice except between party 
 tickets, while under the proposed plan independent movements are made possible without 
 risking the complete defeat of the party. 
 
 Other objections might be noted. A small third party would be likely often to hold the 
 balance of ])ow'er. The probability is, however, that there would be no occasion for third 
 jiarties, because reforms inside the old parties would promptly gain a hearing, and com- 
 promises wouM head off radical " bolts." 
 
 The strongest objections are those which come from inertia and the dread of change. 
 Constitutional ainendments will be necessary in some cases, though Congress has coinijlete 
 power in the matter of National representatives. Nevertheless, representative government 
 is not something absolute and ll.xed in the nature of things. It is the result of circumstances 
 and experiments without any great amount of political analysis or design. It grew out of 
 the primitive mass-meeting, or folk-moot, simply because distant electors could not con- 
 veniently come up to the annual meetings. In the folk-moot the minority was, of course, 
 fully represented. How they should be represented in the delegate assembly was at first a 
 problem, but its solution was abandoned. The history of Colonel Maryland shows, in an 
 interesting way, how this came about. The original deliberative and legislative body was a 
 primal y assembly, where any freeman might speak and vote. In the second assembly — 1038 
 — voting by proxy was allowed to those freemen who could not be present in person. 
 Abuses of this device led to the issuing of writs to the local divisions, instructing them to 
 teturn representatives. But realizing that those who did not vote for the successful caiuli- 
 dates -would be unrepresented, individuals who were in the minority were allowed to appear 
 in their own right. The third assembly was therefore an anomalous body, comprising the 
 governor and his nominees, the duly elected representatives of localities, those individuals 
 who had not consented* to the election of representatives, and the proxies of other unrepre- 
 sented individuals. Such a heterogenous mass was neither representative nor primary, and 
 was so threatening to the representative element that the hope of minority representation 
 was given up in despair and the assembly delined its owus constitution by limiting popular 
 representation to the elected deputies, and ruling out proxies. Doubtless other colonies 
 went through similar experiences. 
 
 The system finally adopted is rigid in the extreme. It has endured because there has 
 been no special strain. But the growing intensity of class divisions and the immensity of 
 the interests involved call for a more elastic system. Proportional representation seems to 
 meet this requirement in every essential particular. 
 
 Ii: ' ' 
 
 
 M-it 
 
1A8 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 ■ I 
 
 V' 
 
 si- 
 
 ii 
 
 iSi- 
 
 THE CONSTITUTION AND KLRCTORAI. LAW OF THE KINODOM 
 
 OF DENMARK. 
 
 Abstract and Analysis made and translated by R. J. Wickuleed, LL.D., D.C.L., etc. Barrister. 
 
 THE (!()N8TITUTION. 
 
 (Adoptvd 184->, rvviaed and promulijatf'd i^Sth July, ISOG.) 
 
 Section 1. The form of government is a limited monarchy. 
 
 2. The legislative power is exereiseil concurrently by the King and the Rigsdag. The 
 executive power belongs to the King, Judicial jjower ia exercised by the tribunals. 
 
 13. The King ajipoints and disnuBscB his ministers. 
 
 15. The Assembly of the ministers forms the Council of State. The King presides. 
 
 19. The King each year convokes the Rigsdag, for its ordinary session. 
 
 20. He may summon the Rigsdag for an extraordinary session. 
 
 22, The King may dissolve one or both of the chambers of the Rigsdag. 
 
 24. The consent of the King is necessary to give the force of law to a resolution of the 
 Rigsdag. The King orders its promulgation, and superintends its execution, , 
 
 29. The Rigsdag is composed of two Chambers, the Folkething and the Landsthing. 
 
 30. Every person is an elector to the Folkething who possesses an unblemished 
 reputation, who is a citizen, and of the full age of 30 years, provided always he is not in the 
 service of a private person and has no household of his own ; that he has not received or is not 
 in receipt of public assistance, which he has not been forgiven or which he has not paid 
 back ; that he can dispose of his own property ; that he has had a domicile for one year 
 previous to the election, in the electoral district or town wherein he resides, 
 
 31. Any person is eligible to be returned as a member of the Folkething, with the 
 exceptions one, two and three mentioned in the last preceding section, who possesses a 
 blameless character, is a citizen, and is of the full ago of 25 years. 
 
 32. The number of the members of the Folkething bears the proportion to that of the 
 inhabitants of 1 to 16000. The elections are carried out iu electoral districts. Each 
 district elects a representative. 
 
 They receive a daily 
 
 33. The members of the Folkething are elected for 3 years, 
 indemnity. 
 
 34. The number of the members of the Landsthing is 6G, — of whom 12 are appointed by 
 the King, — 7 by Copenhagen, — and 45 by the electoral districts, 1 by liornholm and 1 by 
 Faroe. 
 
 35. No person can take part directly or indirectly in the elections of the Landsthing, 
 unless he has fultilled the conditions required of the electors of the Folkething. 
 
 36. In Copenhagen the united electors appoint electors of the second degree, in the 
 proportion of 1 to 120. An equal number of electors of the second degree are appointed by 
 the electors who the preceding year were in receipt of a taxable income of, at least, 2000 
 rixdoUars. These two classes of electors of the second degree proceed together with the 
 election of the Landsthing for Copenhagen. 
 
ELECTOUAIi LAW OP DKNMARK. 
 
 15J) 
 
 37. In tlio country parta tho united electors appoint one elector of the seoond degree 
 in each rural commune, 
 
 ProvisioiiH «« to certnin towns. 
 
 38. All are eligible for election to the IjAndathing who arc eligible to the Folkethiug. 
 
 30, The roynl mombera are a]ipointed for life ; but nmat be chosen from among those 
 wJio have been or who are elected members of the representative C'hambcrs of tho Kingdom. 
 The other members of tho Laiulsthing are electeil for 8 years, --the moiety of the members 
 is renewed every four years. The members uf the Landsthing receive the same indemnity 
 as those of the Folkething. ^ 
 
 40. Tho elections for the fiandsthing are conducted according to tho proportional 
 system. The electoral law fixes the other provi8ir)n8 respecting the elections. 
 
 THK KLECTOIIAL LAW. 
 
 The law of eleetiona put in force on July 12th, JS07, in tlie reign of Christian ttte Ninth, 
 at Copenhagen, * 
 
 1. FOLKKTHING. 
 Electorai. Kights and Privileges. 
 
 Section 1. All persons of unblemished reputation, possessing the right of citizenship, 
 and of the full age of 30 years, are electors to the Folkething. 
 
 2. No one is considered as enjoying a spotless reputation who has been found guilty, by 
 a court, of an act dishonorable to the man, in the eyes of the public. 
 
 .3. No one in the service of a private person can enjoy electoral rights, unless he has a 
 household of his own. 
 
 4. No one who has received assistance from the Government, which has not been repaid 
 or forgiven, can exercise electoral rights. 
 
 5. No person in pupillage or bankruptcy can be an elector. 
 
 C. Ono year's domicile within the city or electoral circle where he resides at tho time of 
 the election, is required, Those who arc domiciled in various places may themselves elect 
 the place where they will vote. 
 
 7. Every person is eligible for election to the Folkething who enjoys an unblemished 
 reputation, has tlie right of citizenship and is of the full age of 25 years, — unless he conies 
 within the provisions of sections 3, 4, and 5. 
 
 Electoral Lists. 
 
 Section 8, The governing bodies in tho Communes are obliged to prepare the lists of the 
 electors domiciled within each commune, 
 
 9. The names of the electors are in alphabetical order on the electoral lists ; which 
 ought also to include their name, age, business and domicile. 
 
 10. The electoral lists are prepared every year. A special list is prepared of those who 
 have not fully accomplished the required conditions, 
 
 11. The electoral lists must be completed within the last fortnight of February. 
 Doubtful points are decided by the communal government, 
 
 12. From the 1st to the 8th of March, inclusive, the electoral lists are exposed in a 
 convenient place to the public view. 
 
 Mill 
 
160 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 f 
 
 1 1 '■..,. 
 
 \-. 
 
 M'. 
 
 ' I' 
 
 m 
 
 II' 
 
 •it 
 
 ill 
 
 m- 
 
 13. Co»nplaint8 respecting errors are made, within three clays of the exposure of the 
 lists, to the communal autliorities. 
 
 14. The claims and protests are examined by the communal authorities at a session 
 within the following fortnight ; to which are summoned tlie complainants and the jiarties 
 complained of. 
 
 15. The president of the commune which does not contain the place for holding the 
 election, sends certified coiiies of his election lists to the president of the commune where 
 the election is held. 
 
 16. The president of the commune where the election is held is bound, within the three 
 days following the Ist of April, to inform a qualified bailiff what lists are wanting. 
 
 17. The bailiflf, by imposing suitable penalties, procures the missing lists. 
 
 18. If the lists are not revised in the manner authorised bylaw, a bailiff compels the 
 communal authority, by means of a penalty, to conform to the provisions of the law, the 
 legal delays being shortened. 
 
 ] 9. Examinations of protests in Copenhagen. 
 
 "0. If the communal authority refuses the right of voting to any person, the latter may 
 appeal to the courts. 
 
 21. The electoral lists are available for elections from the 1st of April to the 31st of 
 March in the following year. 
 
 Electoral Circles and Committees. 
 
 22. Each electoral circle returns a member to the Folkething. 
 
 23. In each circle is formed an electoral committee, composed of delegates from all the 
 communes belonging to the circle. Each commune elects one member of the committee 
 whatever its population. The communes of 3,000 souls appoint two, and one more for each 
 1,500 of population. The members of the committees are elected by the communal 
 authorities, so soon as the circle is called together for an election. 
 
 24. The member or members of the committee elected by the commune where the election 
 is to take place make all the preparations, receive the notifications of the candidates, &c. 
 
 25. The original electoral lists are brought by the members of each commune represent- 
 ing it, to the electoral committee. 
 
 20. If the original list is wanting recourse is had to a true copy. 
 
 27. The electoral commit ee in each of the electoral circles of Copenhagen. 
 
 28. The electoral committee where the election is had, keeps a minute book of pro- 
 ceedings, correspondence, &c. This is kept by the communal authorities where the election 
 takes place. Eight days after an election, the president of the electoral committee forwards 
 to the proper minister a certified copy of these minutes, who in turn presents this copy to 
 the Folkething. 
 
 Electoral Candidates. 
 
 29. No person can be elected to the Folkething unless presenting himself as a candidate ; 
 ITe must also be recommended by one of the electors of the circle, who is not a member of 
 the electoral committee. 
 
 30. The candidate must present a written notification of his intention to be a candidate. 
 He must also present himself, on the pain of nullification, on the day of the election . 
 
 31. The candidate need not justify before the electoral comm tee. 
 
 32. No person can offer himself as candidate in more than one electoral circle. 
 
ELECTORAL LAW OP DENMARK. 
 
 161 
 
 Election Meetings. 
 
 33. Elections for the Folkething are made for each circle in electoral meetings which 
 are open to the public. 
 
 34. The day, hour, and place of meetings are announced, 8 days in advance, in the 
 official Journal of the locality, or, in rural communes, in the churches, for two Sundays 
 preceding the election. 
 
 35. At the meetings, the president presents the candidates and their sureties to the 
 meeting. The candidates and their sureties address the meeting in alphabetical order. 
 They also answer questions. No member of the committee is allowed to speak. 
 
 Voting by Uplifted Hands. 
 
 36. Voting for the candid.xtes then takes place. The electors voting in alphabetical 
 order. The one obtaining the majority of votes is elected member of the circle for the 
 Folkething. ' 
 
 37. If there is only one candidate he must obtain more than one-half the votes in order 
 to be elected. 
 
 Voting by Names. 
 
 38. A defeated candidate, or his sureties, may demand a vote by names. When only 
 one candidate, fifty electors present may demand a vote by names. This demand must be 
 made within one quarter of an hour after the proclamation of the result. 
 
 39. In voting by names the electors decide between the candidate elected by t show 
 of hands and the opposing candidates. 
 
 40. The various electoral lists are distributed among the members of the committee, 
 who collect the votes, 
 
 41. The electors give verbally their votes in the order in which they come forward. 
 The member of the committee in charge of the list inscribes on it opposite the name of the 
 elector, the name of the candidate for whom he votes. Before the elector retires the name 
 of the candidate for whom he has voted is read over to him. 
 
 42. When all present have voted, the chairman declare.:, the election closed. The 
 members of the committee sign the lists and give +.hem < > the chairman. 
 
 43. The committee, when met, again proceed to examine the lists and add them up. 
 The result of the vote is recoi-ded in the electoral register and announced to the meeting. 
 The electoral lists and the lists of votes are returned to the respective communes, — signed 
 by the members of the committee. 
 
 45. Elections in the Bailiwick of Holbaek. 
 
 46. Elections in the Faroe Llands. 
 
 2. LANDSTHING. 
 
 ■'•If 
 
 Electoral Rights and Qualificatioss. 
 
 47. Electors to have the same qualifications as those to the Folkething. 
 
 48. Members of the Landsthing to possess the same qualifications as :ho8e of the 
 
 Folkething. 
 
 Circles of the Landsthing. 
 
 49. Besides the 12 members appointed by the King, the Landsthing is made up of 54 
 members elected by circles. 
 II 
 
162 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Hi' ■ 
 
 V/.: 
 
 I H'-^ 
 
 ft '■..'■■ 
 
 
 
 50. The elected members of the Landsthing are elected for 8 years, — one half being 
 renewed every four years. 
 
 Election Committees. .,• . 
 
 51. The landsthing elections are directed by special committees for each circle. 
 
 52. The committees are composed of a chairman, appointed by the King, and of two 
 members for each of the bailiwick councils comprised within the electoral circle, and of one 
 member of the communal authority of the largest town of each of the bailiwicks of the 
 circle. Special provisions as to Copenhagen and divided Bailiwicks. 
 
 Electoral Lists. 
 
 53. As the basis of the electoral lists, the proper minister publishes yearly, before the 
 15th January, the number of rural communes throughout the country, and within each 
 circle of the Landsthing. 
 
 54. In the elections of electors of the second degree, the electoral lists in use for the 
 Folkething are employed, with supplementary ones respecting the electors of the first degree. 
 
 55. These supplementary lists are prepared in the same manner as those of the 
 Folkething. 
 
 56. Preparation of the lists of the electors of the first degree in Copenhagen. Exposure, 
 protests, &c., same as in the case of lists for the Folkething. 
 
 57. Lists of electors of the second degre prepared in other towns, by the communal 
 authority. Exposures, claims, and protests as in Folkething. 
 
 58. Any person whom the electoral committee refuses to put on the lists mentioned in 
 sections 56 and 57, may a^peul to the courts as in section 20. 
 
 69. The lists of those electors in the country parts who are most highly taxed p.ud who 
 take part directly in the Landsth'ng elections are prepared by the committees of their 
 respective circles (see sections 51 and 52). 
 
 60. In the preparation of these lists the revenue officers must, before the 15th January 
 m each year, forward to the electoral committees a statement of the rate-payers who have 
 paid to the state and to the commune of the bailiwick the highest taxes, — giving three times 
 the number of such ratepayers as there are rural communes in the district served by the 
 inland revenue office. This statement contains the amount of the taxes paid, and the rural 
 commune where the ratepayer has his domicile. 
 
 61. The electoral committees have, before the 1st February, with the assistance of the 
 statements before mentioned, to prepare a list of the ratepayers, who, in the proportion of 
 two for each of the rural communes in the corresponding circle of the Landsthing, arc 
 allowed to take pan, directly in the elections of the Landsthing, ranking them according to 
 the value of their taxes. Printed copies of this list are sent to each communal council of the 
 circle as soon as possible to be exposed for the same time and at the same place as are those 
 for the Folkething. Protests are invited to be fyled within 3 days following the conclusion 
 of the exposure. The committee pronounces upon the protests at a meeting in the end of 
 March ; summoning the interested parties to it, three days in advance. 
 
 62. Any person who is refused enrolment on the list may appeal to the courts, 
 
 63. Immediately after the sitting mentioned in section 61 at least before the end of March, 
 the committee prepares the final list of electors who pay the highest taxes, which contai.ir a 
 number equal to that of the rural communes of the circle. To provide for vacancies, a 
 supplementa-y list is prepared, on which are placed the names equal to half the number of 
 the rural communes of the circle, of those next in order of highest taxation. 
 
 
« 
 
 ELECTORAL LAW OF DENMARK. 
 
 urn 
 
 64. Notice is given to the direct electors of their being such, and of the time and place 
 of election. The list of the direct electors must be prepared at least 8 days before the 
 election of the electors of the second degree. The electors are bound to present themselves, 
 on pain of penalty. 
 
 65. The calculation of taxes. All the taxes that a person pays to the state, no matter 
 where the properties are situate, are reputM as being paid in the locality in which he i» 
 entered as an elector to the Folkethinj?. 
 
 Election of Electors of the Second Degree. 
 
 66. These elections, in Copenhagen, are carried out as in the elections to the Folkething. 
 Outside they are carried out by each commune separately, under the direction of their 
 respective communal authorities. The same lists are used as in the Folkething elections. 
 The domiciled electors in the commune or the circles can alone be electors of the second 
 degree. ^- The electors of the second degree may be chosen by the highest ratepayers from 
 out of the general body of the electors. 
 
 67. The elections of the electors of the second degree are iixed by the electoral colleges 
 at Copenhagen, and by the highest ratepayers in the other towns. The day and place ara 
 announced as in section 34. 
 
 68. At Copenhagen all the electors on the Folkething lists appoint the electors of ther 
 second degree in the proportion of one to 120. An equal number of electors of the second 
 degree are appointed by the ratepayers who had, the previous year, a taxable revenue of at 
 least 2000 Rixdollars, — they are divided among the dififerent circles of the Folkething, as 
 mucli as possible proportionately to the number of the highest ratepayers in each circle.. 
 A list of those elected in the rirst manner is sent to the circles to prevent dual elections. 
 
 69. In the country places all the electors appoint one elector of the second degree iiv 
 each rural coniniunc. The committee of each circle sends to all the communal authorities 
 within the circle a list of all the highest ratepayers who take a direct part in the Laudsthing 
 elections, and who therefore cannot be elected as electors in the second degree. 
 
 70. Elections in towns. 
 
 71. The voting takes place Jopenly in a convenient place. The circles may be divided 
 into several voting divisions. The electors each vote for as many electors of the second, 
 degree as have to be elected within the circle. 
 
 72. Three hours after the opening, if no one offers to vote, the election is declared, 
 closed. The majority decides. In case of a tie the decision is by lot. 
 
 73. The names of those elected are inscribed on a register authorised by the communal 
 authority. 
 
 74. Every person appointed an elector of the second degree is bound to accept the trust 
 unless he can plead a legal objection. 
 
 75. Every elector of the second degree who makes default or abstains from voting i» 
 subject to a penalty of 20 rixdollars, — which penalty is absorbed by the poor box of the 
 commune ; or the municipal treasury. 
 
 76. The duties of the electors of the second degree terminate with elections of the 
 Landsthing — unless a re-election is ordered. 
 
 77. The electors of the second degree are not bound by the instructions of their con- 
 stituents nor by any engagements they may have made with them respecting the elections. 
 
 78. The electors of the second degree receive an indemnity of 48 skillings per mile, from 
 their domicile to the place of voting for the Landsthing. 
 
 
i 
 
 I'. I 
 
 !-;■'• 
 
 r 
 
 If., 
 
 
 1A4 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Elections of the Members of the Lamlsthiug. 
 
 79. The place of election of certain circles is fixed by the King. The day, hour, and 
 place is announced by the electoral committee, as in section 34. 
 
 80. The electors of the second degree and the direct electors must be present at the 
 place, and hour of election. 
 
 81. The election meeting is public. All the eleotors are present, and, after identification, 
 receive a ballot paper containing as many divisions as there are members to elect. 
 
 82. The elections for the Landsthing are conducted according to, what is known as, the 
 proportional system. The electors proceed to vote by filling up their ballots. The 
 number of ballot papers handed in to the chairman divided by the number of members 
 of the Landsthing to be elected, forms a quotient which is taken as the basis of 
 election. After the ballots have been lodged and cast into an urn, the chairman draws 
 them out one by one and reads out in a loud voice the name which stands at the head 
 of each ballot. So soon as a name obtains the number of votes equal to the quotient above 
 mentioned the reading is stopped, the ballots verified, and the candidate proclaimed elected. 
 The reading of the remaining ballots is continued, taking care to consider the name of the 
 candidate already elected, and which may be found at the head of the list, as efifaced, and to 
 consider the next name at the head of the list. A second candidate is obtained, as before, 
 when his name reaches the quotient ; — and so on until the ballots are all drawn out. 
 
 83. If there still remain members to be elected, the names of those who have obtained 
 the greatest numl)er of ballots are selected to rill the remaining places, provided always that 
 the person to be elected must obtain at least one-half of the quotient in the number of votes 
 cast for him. In case of ties the lot must decide. 
 
 84. If there still remain elections to be completed, the ballots are read over again, and 
 out of the candidates placed at the head of the ballots, who have not already been elected, a 
 Bufhnient number is taken to fill the number of members required. 
 
 85. Special provisions as to Bomholm and Faroe. 
 
 86. The committee cannot reject votes because they have been given to men whose 
 qualifications are doubted. The Landsthing determines questions of this kind, when they 
 present themselves before it. 
 
 87. All that passes at the election meeting is enterecl in the Register, and examined by 
 the chairman. This Register must contain exact and particular information, — the number 
 of ballots cast, the number of those who were elected, and the number of votes given to each, 
 the ballots rejected and the reasons therefor. The ballots are then sealed up and preserved. 
 The chairman then notifies the elected members of their election. If they do not refuse to 
 act within 8 days they are taken to consent. 
 
 Eight days, thereafter, the Chairman sends a copy of the Register to the Minister in 
 charge. He, in turn, lays it before the Landsthing when they meet. 
 
 General Provmons. 
 
 88. General elections, every three years for the Folkething, and every four years for the 
 moiety of elective members of the Landsthing. 
 
 89. A member of the Rigsdag elected to replace another serves for the time that the 
 member whom he replaces would have served. 
 
 90. The king fixes the day of the general elections. The elections for the Folkething 
 coming first. For bye-elections the date is fixed by the proper minister. 
 
 91. Every person elected to the Rigsdag receives a letter, signed by the electoral 
 committee to that effect. 
 
[! 
 
 VOTING BY COMMAND. 
 
 160 
 
 92. Any person, neglecting the duties imposed by the present law, is subject to a fine of 
 from 10 to 200 rixdollars ; unless a severer penalty has been imposed. 
 
 93. The costs of the elections to the Folkething are, broadly speaking, paid by the 
 treasurer of the commune. 
 
 94. Travelling allowances of 48 skillings per mile are allowed to the members of the 
 electoral committees for verifying lists, &c. The electors voting directly are not allowed any 
 kind of indemnity. This refers to the Landsthing. 
 
 95. All the costs of the Landsthing elections are paid by the chairman of the electoral 
 committee. He prepares a statement which is veriried > by the council of the Bailiwick, 
 where the election occurs. 
 
 1)6. After this statement is verified, the chairman divides the costs of the election among 
 the communes of the circle, according to the number of electors of the second degree each 
 commune has to appoint. One month after the receipt of notice the communal authorities 
 are obliged to reimburse the chairman the proportion to be paid by them, under a penalty. 
 
 97. The chairman of the committee of each of the Landsthing circles (except Copenhagen 
 and Faroe) is authorised to secure an advance from the treasury of the Bailiwick where the 
 election occurs of tlie necessary sum, on condition of repayment within 3 months following 
 the election, 
 
 98. Costs of elections how paid in Copenhagen and Faroe. 
 
 99. P^very member of the Rigsdag receives an indemnity of three rixdollars per diem 
 while the session lasts. Travelling expenses are also allowed. 
 
 100. Repeal of laws. 
 
 VOTING BY COMMAND. 
 
 By Dr. Wkksteed. From " The Week" May 13th, 1S92. 
 
 In order that the Canadians may fully appreciate the importance of the question of 
 compulsory voting, I desire to place before them the following statements submitted to the 
 members of the Select Committee of the House of Commons of Canada, to whose consider- 
 ation has been referred the Bill of the present session entitled, " An act to make voting 
 compulsory": — 
 
 Relying upon the desire which actuates the members of this committee, the desire to 
 calmly and thoroughly investigate and pass upon the principles involved in the liill Ijefore 
 them, I venture to put forward, in writing, a few extracts from the works of others, bearing 
 upon the subject of compulsory voting in elections for the House of Commons. 
 
 The question whether an elector in Canada should be compelled to vote may be discussed 
 from four standpoints, viz. : the moral, the ethical-political, the ideal-political and the 
 practical-political. 
 
 Extract "A," in the appendix hereto, from the pen of Dr. R. W. Dale, a Congregational 
 minster of Birmingham, England, is a good example of the argument on religious grounds. 
 
 In extract " B," we have the views of the late Dr. Francis Lieber, as expressed in his 
 " Manual of Political Ethics." The " Encycloptedia Britannica" includes this work when 
 stating: "The political writings of Francis Lieber are held in great estimation by all 
 publicists. " 
 

 
 I'R 
 
 :li 
 
 PK 
 
 
 mM !i 
 
 lee 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 Nearly one-third of the olectora of Canada refrained from voting in the elections of 1891, 
 as is shown in quotation " C." 
 
 All scriptures, both sacred and the honest profane, are written for our learning ; and he is a 
 foolish statesman who acta without informing himself beforehand, from the history of nations 
 and the writings of their best men, wiiat had been advocated under similar circumstances by 
 rulers and philosophers, and how their teachings were borne out and resulted when put to 
 actual test. 
 
 Extract " D," taken from that dialogue of Plato called "Laws" is given as showing 
 the compulsory manner of voting enjoined by this pliilosoplier in his ideal commonwealth for 
 the Athenians, written about 350 years before Christ. This is the philosopher of whom it 
 has been said that "he hivs anticipated nearly all the questions that have swelled into 
 importance in the meta- physical and ethical speculations of these later ages ." 
 
 The only modern instance, we can discover, of the compulsory voting being made use of 
 in state elections is that of the kingdom of Denmark. In 18C6, a new electoral law was 
 passed, in which the principles of compulsory voting and proportional representation were 
 embodied. According to the Danish ambassailor at Washington, this law has worked 
 well; and according to the " Encyclopjedia Britannica " "notwithstanding lier dismember- 
 ment (in 1864) Denmark has prosjiered to an astonishing degree, and her material fortunes 
 have been constantly in the ascendant. " 
 
 Let us return to Canada. Under the Dominion Elections Act it is provided that all 
 persons possessing certain qualifications "on the day of the polling :;t any electioi; for any 
 electoral district, shall be entitled to vote at any such election for such electoral distiict, 
 and no other persons shall be entitled to vote thereat." How does this Act work in practice '! 
 In 1891, as shownby ai)pendix " C," out of 1,132,201 electors on the lists, only 730,457 
 voted. This fact might not be so much deplored but for the prophecy of the wise Licber : 
 "they whose voting is the least desirable are the surest to be at the poll." In Canada the 
 surest to be at the poll are the venal, the bribed, the boodler, the place-hunter, the weak, 
 the worthless, while the brains, the sinew, the substance of the State keep away from the 
 poll. The latter do not answer to the question. What are the duties of your station ? as does 
 the elector in Bolingbroke's political catechism : "to endeavour, so far as I am able, to 
 preserve the public tranquility, and, as I am an elector, to give my vote to the candidate 
 whom I judge most worthy to serve his country." 
 
 The law of the land governs all : it declares that (for good reasons) certain persons (the 
 majority) shall not vote ; and declares that certain others — the privileged, the representative 
 minority, the trustees of the Dominion people at large — are entitled to vote. What we want 
 from the Bill is to substitute the words "must vote" for the words "shall be entitled to 
 vote." The reason why they were not substituted at first was the argument that, although all 
 electors could vote, yet some of them abstained ; still the machinery of the law would not be 
 affected, inasmuch as sufficient votes woidd be cast to carry out the intentions and the 
 provisions of the Act. The bare provisions, as expressed in words, perhaps, but surely not 
 the intentions of our law-makers. But we lind that the machinery, for want of or from 
 improper feeding, although it works, turns out bad work or inferior work. The worl .irned 
 ■out by the electoral machine is not representative of the truest a: id best manli()od of Canada 
 — which it would be in time if the one-.iiird laggards were whipped to the polling booth, and 
 some of the now voters were whipped at it. If the army machine of England were not fed 
 witli sufficient recruits of good (juality — what would happen ? why, at once, a compulsory 
 recruiting or conscription Act would be passed. 
 
 We have seen that on religious, moral, ethical, political, historical and practical grounds 
 all electors should vote or be punished. We therefore call upon the members of the House 
 of Commons to pass the Bill making voting compulsory. We ask those members who are 
 
VOTING BY COMMAND. 
 
 167 
 
 ready to punish one of their number, who, having heard the question in the House, declines 
 to vote ; we ask them to punish electors in their electoral districts, w ho, having heard the 
 pronouncements and appeals of the various candidates, decline to vote. In what do these 
 two bodies differ? — they are both representatives, they are both trustees — the electors of the 
 nation, the Commoners of the electors. 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 A uthorities, Citations, Opinions and Extracts in favour of. 
 
 A. — "The great outlines of national legislation and policy are laid down, not in 
 Parliament, not in the Cabinet, but at the polling booths. It is the electors who make war 
 or maintain peace, who repeal old laws and pass new one who interfere, justly or unjustly, 
 between landlords and tenants, masters and servants, [..lenta and children. Those who 
 abstain from voting, determine the national policy as truly as those who vote. The 
 
 responsibility of the Parliamentary franchise cannot be evaded According 
 
 to the Divine order civil autliority is necessary to the existence of civil society. Civil rulers 
 are ' ministers of God.' But they are not designated t'l their office by a voice from heaven. 
 In this country the sovereign and the peers inherit their position by birth ; the rest have to 
 l)e selected, directly or indirectly, by those who possess the franchise. It is surely a part of 
 (jod's service to determine who shall be ' God's ministers,' ami for the manner in which we 
 discharge tliis service we are responsible to God. Not to vote is to act the part of the 
 unfaithful servant who hid his talent in the earth and made no use of it. To vote corruptly 
 is felony ; it is to appropriate to our own pur))08es what we have received as trustees for the 
 town or the nation." — From the Laws of Christ for Common life, Inj Dr. R. W. Dale. 
 
 B. — " The question has been made, whether a citizen, possessing the right to vote, ought 
 not to be legiilly bound to vote for general elections, as the citizen is obliged to serve on juries 
 Wh}', it is asked, should those for instance, who possess most property and receive the full 
 benelit of tlie law, from indolence, superciliousness or cowardice be allowed to refuse to join 
 in that manner of expressing public opinion or of appointing law-makers which the law of 
 the land establishes ? It cannot bo lenied that affixing a penalty for unexcused omission of 
 voting would have this advantage a*, least, tliat the public opinion resjjecting the obligation 
 of every citizen lawfully to aid in the politics of his country, and the discountenance given 
 
 to politicial indifferentism, would be lixedly pronounced by law We have 
 
 treated already of the bs,d motives and mischievous tendency of political apathy or 
 superciliousness. A man who from indolence or blamable disdain does not go to the l)allot- 
 box knows little of the importance of the whole institution of the State, or must be 
 animated by very little public spirit ; or he deserves the mantle of lead which Dante 
 apportions to cowards in the lower regions. There seem to me to be two rules of perfect 
 soundness and elementary importance in politics : — 
 
 1. There is no safer means of preventing factious movements of any kind, and the State 
 from falling a gradual prey to calamitous di orders, wherever the franchise is enjoyed ou an 
 extensive sca'e, than the habitual steady voting of all who have the votive right at all 
 primary elections. , ■ ■ . 
 
 2. The moral obligation of depositing without fail one's vote increases in the same 
 ratio as the right of suffrage extends, which right will necessarily more and more extend 
 with modern civilization, so that with increasing civilization this obligation of voting 
 increases. . < . ■ . 
 
 . . . There is no great principle which has ever actuated mankind that has not had 
 
168 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 likewise its inconvenience for tlie individual ; so has the main moving principle of our times ; 
 but we are not on that account absolved from conscientiously acting upon it and acting it 
 out. Therefore, if we have a mind honestly to join in the great duties of our period, ',/e 
 must act as conscientious citizens, and, if we mean to do this, we must go to the poll. It is, 
 I repeat it to my readers, of primary importance, and the more they read history the more 
 they will feel convinced of it. The more extended the franchise is, the more it must likewise 
 extend to tliose persons to whom time is of little value, to people who make a feast-day, 
 perhaps a riotous day, of the election time, They whose voting is tlie least desirable are the 
 surest to be at the poll ; but the industrious mechanic, the laborious farmer, the man of 
 study, the merchant and professional man — in short, all those who form the sinew and 
 substance of the State, feel it a sacrifice of time to go to the place of voting, where they are 
 not unfrequeutly delayed for a long time, by the other class, from depositing their vote, 
 especially in populous places. They are, therefore, the more imperatively called upon to 
 keep constantly before their minds how imi)ortant it is that they should vote, and not leave 
 the election to be decided by those who have the smallest stake in the society. Let no man 
 be prevented from voting by the consideration of the loss of a day's labour, or the incon- 
 venience to which he may expose himself in going to the poll. — ^roHi Manual of Political 
 Ethics, by Dr. Francis Liebcr. 
 
 C. — The total votes on the lists on which the elections of 1891 were run numbered in all 
 Canada 1,132,201, of which 730,457 voted. In 1887 the voters numbered 9i);<,914, of which 
 725,05(5 voted. 
 
 D. — "The Council shall consist of 360 members — this will be a convenient number for 
 sub-division, ^f we divide the whole number into four parts of ninety each, we get ninety 
 counsellors foi u,oh class. (Note. The Athenians were divided into four classes, according 
 to their rated jiroperty. ) First, all the citizens shall vote for members of the council taken 
 from the first class ; they shall be compelled to vote, and, if they do not, shall be duly lined. 
 When the candidates have been elected, some one shall mark them down ; this shall he the 
 business of the first day. And on the following day the election shall be made from the 
 second class in the same manner and under the same conditions as on the previous day ; and 
 on the third day an election shall be made from the third class, at which every one may, if 
 he likes, vote, and the three first classes shall be co.upulled to vote ; but the fourth and 
 lowest class shall he under no compulsi^on, and any member of this class who does not vote 
 shall not be punish sd. On the fourth day members of the council shall be elected from the 
 fourth and smallest class ; they shall be elected by all, but he who is of the fourtfi class shall 
 suffer no penalty, nor he of the third, if he be not willing to vote ; but he who is of the first 
 or second class, if he does not vote, shall be punished ; he who is of the second class shall 
 pay a line triple the fine which was exacted at first, and he who is of the first class quadruple 
 On the fifth day the rulers shall bring out the names noted down, in the presence of all the 
 citizens, and every man shall choose out of them, under pain, if he do not, of suSTeriiig the 
 first penalty ; and, when they have chosen 180 out of each of the classes, they shall choose 
 one-half of them by lot, who shall undergo a scrutiny ; these are to form the council for the 
 year." — From the Dialoijues of Plato. "Laws," Book 6. 
 
 E. — Provisions of the election law of Denmark, of 1867 : Section 64. Notice is given to 
 the direct electors of the Landsthing of their being such, and of the time and place of 
 election The electors are bound to present themselves on pain of penalty. 
 
 Section 74. Every person appointed an elector of the second degree is bound to accept 
 the trust, unless he can plead a legal objection. 
 
 Section 75. Every elector of the second degree who makes default or abstains from 
 voting is subject to a penalty of 20 rix-doUars — which penalty is absorbed by the poor-box 
 of the commune or the municipal treasury. 
 
 I, 
 
 \ 
 
COMPULSORY VOTING. 
 
 itt» 
 
 Section 78. The electors of the second degree receive an indemnity of 48 skillings per 
 mile, from their domicile to the place of voting for the Landsthing. 
 
 Section 80. The electors of the second degree and the direct electors must be present 
 at the place and at the hour of election. 
 
 Section 92. Any person neglecting the duties imposed by the present law is subject to 
 a line of from 10 to 200 rix-doUars : unltss a severer penalty has been imposed. 
 
 i 
 
 COMPULSORY VOTING. 
 
 \ 
 
 Bi/ Si/diu'!/ Fisher, in the Montreal Herald, Mai/ 24th, lSO:i, 
 
 I cannot agree with the view that this compulsory voting, will be an effectual or even 
 partial cure. Such an expedient may force some few to an unwilling and unintelligent 
 compliance vvith the law, but it will not in any way remove the cause of the evil, therefore 
 cannot be effective. At the same time compulsory voting may easily cause hardship and 
 may lower the morale of numbers of the electorate. It must be remembered in discussing 
 the plan of forcing every man to vote that under our present laws a voter can only vote for 
 one of certain duly nominated individuals and in consequence of the consent of the candidate 
 being required and a large money deposit being exacted to nominate a man, it is not easy to 
 secure the nomination of more than two or three candidates. Thus the average elector would 
 be obliged to vote for a candidate in whose uomin.'.tion he has had no part, unless indeed 
 as one of the rank ami tile of a great political party, and of whom very probably he does not 
 approve. Suppose for instance an honest voter who believes in protection finds two 
 candidates nominated in his constituency, one a free trader and the other a boodler or a 
 drunkard, consequently men neither of whom he can honestly support, nor does he consider 
 either worthy to represent his views on public questions. Why, under such circumstances, 
 should the voter be ioreed to cast his vote or lose his franchise or pay a fine ? Suppose again 
 a voter is a prohibitionist and finds no candidate who will agree to vote for Prohibition, why 
 should he be forced to vote for a man who is opposed to what he considers the most important 
 public question ? It would be a hardship to make him lose his right to vote when other 
 candidates are in the Held. I see it is proposed by some that religious scruples shall relieve 
 a voter from being forced to vote. I fear that in election times there would be great, if 
 insincere, accession of religious fervour and I doubt the moral improvement of many of those 
 who thus would shirk the vote. Anotiier point which would largely nullify any benefit 
 that might be obtained by compulsory voting is the secrecy of the ballot. It is something 
 like the old adage, " One may bring the horse to water, but a hundred cannot make him 
 drink." You may make the man go 'uto the polling booth and go through all the motions 
 of voting, but you cannot tell whether he votes or not. • 
 
 I believe a better remedy would be to adopt an expedient by which the elector would 
 have to appreciate his privilege in the franchise, and the only way I can think of to accomplish 
 this, is to throw the responsibility of securing his right to vote on the citizen himself. Let 
 only those vote who value the privilege sufficiently to make an effort, only a slight one but 
 still an active step, to secure the privilege. This may at first sight appear reactionary as it 
 is radical, but the mode I suggest of carrying the plan out is not reactionary at all. I would 
 place the right to vote within the reach of every male British subject of twenty-one years 
 of age who lives in Canada, but I would exact of him the active step of appearing personally 
 before the proper official and entering his name on the list. If any resident of Canada be not 
 willing to take so much trouble as this once a year to secure the right to have his say in the 
 
170 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 }'. 
 
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 I' 
 
 
 Jmnagement of our public affairs, either he is so ignorant of tlie duties and privileges of citizen- 
 ship that he is not competent to vote intelligently or he does not take suthoient interest in 
 the affairs of the community to study them enough to vote properly. If a man has thus 
 taken the trouble to obtain the right to vote, he is pretty sure to make use of it if he 
 conscientiously can. 
 
 There are but few difficulties in the way of this reform, while nearly all the objectionable 
 features of our present urrangemomts would disappear. The scheme I would suggest, after 
 considerable thought given to it during several years of active participation in election work 
 is this : That in a certain month of the year, say May or September, the secretary-treasurer 
 of the municipality, or in large cities an ofRner appointed for the purpose, should during 
 certain hours of the day keep open a reg''^ v-i ^r>.' .oters. Any man who would appear before 
 him and make oath (the official being empowered ex-officio to adminster oaths) that he was 
 a British subject, twenty-one years of age, a resident in the municipality at that time, and 
 that he had not registered anywhere else that year, should have his name entered as a voter. 
 In case of continemfuit to the house by sickness during the whole of the month, a doctor's 
 certificate under oath would entitle the applicant to registration without personal appearance, 
 and absence from Canada during the whole month, properly established by oatli would do 
 the same. This list should come in force at the end of the given month and be valid for one 
 year. The same process for a new list being gone through each year. 
 
 This list would cost hardly anything, there being no labor on the part of the officer to 
 hunt up names, no enquiry into qualification, no revision. The man making oath would be 
 liable to prosecution for perjury, if swearing falsely, which would be sufficient check on 
 improper registration. 
 
 Tlyis plan involves the principle of one man one vote, which is the only true principle of 
 a demdcratic franchise. No doubt at first the number of voters would be lessened, l)ut it 
 woidd be the indifferent or ignorant who would be left off, just the men who now either do 
 not vote or put up their vote for sale. 
 
 ATOrther enactment ought to go with this scheme ; namely, that paying a man for his 
 time apid trouble in registering or inducing him to register, would, in the first place deprive 
 him of the right to vote, and also be punishable by a fine or imprisonment for either party 
 to the bargain. I do not suppose that this or any other exi)edient will do away with bribery 
 in elections until the voters themselves become honest, but I do believe that it would greatly 
 lessen the evil of corrupt elections. The time of registration would not usually be in the 
 heat of a contest and men would not be so easily induced to j)ledge themselves to an unknown 
 candidate or to a future contest as they now are willing to sell themselves for cash down 
 within a few days or a few hours of voting. A politician or a party even would not be so 
 willing to pay out money to men for an uncertain return, and consequently bribery would be 
 made more risky. This scheme is put forward as a reform, which I am confident would do 
 more than any other so far suggested to improve our election work, while at the same time 
 it would remove nearly all the expense and labor, and waste of time involved in the making 
 up of our voters lists and so render corruption more difficult. 
 
 Certainly some reform in these matters is absolutely necessary if Canad». is to be governed 
 by her people in their own interests, and the most just aud most effective mode is to shut 
 out the ignorant, indifferent and corrupt from the power to control the election of the 
 representatives. ■• ,. • i •■ , . . , , • • 
 
 1 f 
 
POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 t 
 * 
 
 The foregoing excerpts present in a condensed form the views of 
 many public men who have given much attention to the subject sub- 
 mitted for consideration. It is believed they will not be unacceptable 
 to some of those readers who do not live within reach of public libraries, 
 where they could have access to the original works. 
 
 While they were passing through the press, two articles have appeared 
 which the writer deems it expedient to add to the list. The first in the 
 " Week" of May 13th, by Dr. Wicksteed. of Ottawa, under the heading 
 " Voting by Command ; " the second in the " Montreal Herald " of May 
 24th, by Mr. Sydney Fisher, for many years member of the Dominion 
 House of Commons, under the heading " Compulsory Voting." The first 
 expresses the convictions of that section of the community which in 
 order to obtain the voice of the people advocates the introduction of a 
 law by which electors would be compelled to vote or be punished. The 
 second takes a different view and with the design of shutting out the 
 ignorant, indifferent and corrupt, from the power of controlling elections, 
 submits a plan which he thinks would have that effect ; he is of opinion 
 too that it would tend to raise the franchise so as to embrace diiefly, 
 those who are sufficiently inttelligetit to value their political privileges 
 and are patriotic enough to exercise them properly. These articles 
 together with the introduction of a Bill in the Canadian Parliament to 
 enact the principle of compulsory voting and the appointment of a special 
 committee to consider the expediency of adopting the principle, are at 
 least hopeful indications that among members of the House of Commons 
 of Canada the feeling is arising t'" ♦: some amendment of our electoral 
 system is imperatively called for. The Proportional Representation 
 Society has already been alluded to (page 30) : a list of members of 
 the British House of Commons who had joined this organization will 
 be found at page 88, and in this list will be noticed the names of no less 
 than twelve members who are, or were, ministers of the Crown, and of 
 these, four ranked as " cabinet " ministers in Lord Salisbury's adminis- 
 tration. Such facts attest that the public conscience in both countries 
 is being awakened to the necessity of some radical change in electoral 
 methods. . , 
 
 The writer is unable himself to recognize that any extraordinary 
 results of a beneficial character would be achieved by the enforcement of 
 
172 
 
 I'OSTSCIUPT. 
 
 if 
 
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 L 
 
 a system of compulsory voting. Taken by itself as explained in Dr. 
 Wickstced's paper, it would give no freedom of choice to the elector. 
 Compulsory voting would not touch the real difficulty, which leads to 
 party organization, and its outcome, the caucus system by which the 
 choice is determined. The candidates would be selected as at present, 
 and as a rule by coteries of party politicians. The ordinary independent 
 voter would not have the remotest voice in the selection, and many will 
 consider it a monstrous proposal that an elector should be forced by le^Ms- 
 lative enactment, under threat of fine, to vote for one of the two party can- 
 didates, in neither of whom he could place confidence. For this is 
 practically what he would be reduced to, if he were dragged in his 
 despite to the polls, and compelled to choose between two evils. His 
 alternative would be to pay the penalty, or go through an empty form 
 which would render his vote of no effect whatever. Would not high 
 minded men, rich and poor alike, feel themselves humiliated and degraded 
 in being thus coerced ? If compulsory voting could be effectively 
 enforced, its tendency would be to drive all .composing the voting com- 
 munity, whether they will or not, to take sides with one party or the 
 other. It would by no means remove the evils of party government. Its 
 direct consequence would be to separate the community more completely 
 than even at present, into two great political divisions. In what 
 way then would it effect good ? Would it not tend to intensify 
 party bitterness ? Would it not consolidate and perpetuate the dualism 
 which we deplore ? Would it not always leave unrepresented in parlia- 
 ment that great mass of the electors who had supported the defeated 
 candidates ? 
 
 High authorities have expressed the opinion that representative 
 government is on its trial. We may ask the question ; has true repre- 
 sentative government ever yet been tried.'' The writer is profoundly 
 convinced that our present duty is to make every effort to obtain this 
 ideal government, and seek for nobler ideas of public life than now 
 prevail, that is to say if we are to be freed from the political ills from 
 which we suffer. The issue, with greater accuracy, may be set forth 
 that it is government by party which is on its trial. Can we doubt what 
 the verdict will be, when we have something better to take its place ? 
 
 The foregoing pages indicate the views which begin to dominate on 
 both sides of the Atlantic on this subject ; the lesson is inculcated that we 
 have reached the stage when we should aim to lay aside the spirit of 
 antagonism and zvrong which we have acquired by transmission from the 
 distant past, and substitute the spirit of amity and right, in national, as 
 we do in almost all other human affairs. We recognize that we are in an 
 
POSTSCRIPT. 
 
 178 
 
 age of evolution : the arts and sciences are expanding civilization In 
 •every sphere of activity, and it appears inconsistent with the law of 
 progress that the domain of government should remain non-progressive 
 OK become retrogressive. 
 
 Thr vidence before us leac\^ to the conviction that to enter on the path 
 of prCt,ress, popular government must stand on a broader and sounder 
 basis than that of party. We must hope for a political evolution which 
 will enable every man In the land to feel that the acts of the government 
 arc his acts, that the laws made by parliament are made by those who 
 represent him. We must look for a political development based on the 
 fundamental principles of our constitution ; one which will bind every 
 individual life, in the common life of the state ; a development which 
 removing the causes of chronic Internal dissensions, will benefit society, 
 will give strength and stability to the commonwealth, and enable It the 
 better to stand the test of time. 
 
 To determine the best means of effectively promoting this high 
 public purpose is the end and object of the appeal which the Canadian 
 Institute submits to the world of thought and constructive statesmanship. 
 It cannot be doubted that this object will find earnest sympathy with 
 every well wisher of his country. 
 
 
 Ottawa, May 26th, 1892. 
 
 S. F. 
 
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 CONTENTS. 
 
 pRgfe. 
 
 Memorandum by the Council, of the Canadian Institute, April 4th, 1892 3 
 
 "inditioiis on which prizes will be awarded r 
 
 Letter to the Canadian Institute, from Sandford Fleming y 
 
 "Note " Accompanying Mr. Fleming's letter g 
 
 Supplementary Note by Mr. Sandford Fleming 25 
 
 .. PAPERS AND EXTRACTS. 
 
 Cause and Effect of Party, from a Disquisition on Government, by J. C. Calhoun, 1849. ^3 
 
 Party Government Adverse to Good Government, Eraser's Magazine, Vol. 49, 1854. 35 
 
 Checks and Balances, by Earl Russell, 1854 ^g 
 
 Hare on Representatives, 1857, A Remmd by John Francis Waters, M. A 36 
 
 The Danish Electoral Law of 1855, by the late Lord Lytton, 1863 41 
 
 Fair Representation, from a speech by Lord Sherbrooke, 1867 40 
 
 Mis-representation, from the Fortnightly Review, Vol. 8, 1870 49 
 
 Political Parties and Politicians, from "The American System of Government," by 
 
 E. C. Seaman 1870 -_ 
 
 Political Corruption, from the Canadian Monthly, Vol. 2, 1872 tA 
 
 Party Politics, from the Canadian Monthly, Vol. 2, 1872 eg 
 
 Explanation of Hare's Scheme of Representation, by M. G. Fawcett, 1872 63 
 
 Decline of Party Government, by Goldwin Smith Macmillan's Mag., Vol. 36, 1877. 66 
 
 Representation of Minorities, by Leon'd Courtney. Nineteenth Century, Vol. 6, 1879. 67 
 
 Party Rule in the United States, from " a True Republic," by Albert Stickney, 1S79.. 69 
 
 Representative Government in England, by David Syme, 1881 75 
 
 Electing Representatives, by H. R. Droop, from Journal of Statistical Society, 1881 . . 79 
 
 Partizan Government, by \Vm. D. Le Sueur. North American Review, 1 88 1 84 
 
 Proportionate Representation by F. Seebohm, Contemporary Review, Vol. 44, 1883. 85 
 
 Proportional Representation, from The Nineteenth Century, Vol, 15, 1884 86 
 
 Proportional Representation Society, from " " Vol. 15, 1884. . 87 
 
 Representation and Misrepresentation, from The Westminster Review, Vol. 65, 1884. 90 
 
 Party Struggles, from England and Canada, by Sandford Fleming, 1884 92 
 
 The Despotism of Party, by Herbert Tuttle, the Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 54, 1884 93 
 
 Representative Government, by John Stuart Mill, 1884 94 
 
 Party Gov. -rnment, by Mathew Macfie, The Contemporary Review, Vol. 46, 1884.., 100 
 
 Party Feeling, from " Popular Government," by Sir Henry S. Maine, 1884 loi 
 
 Representation, by Sir John Lubbock, 1885 jqc 
 
 Party and Principle, from the Quarterly Review, Vol. 163, 1886 108 
 
 Party and Patriotism, by Sydney E. Williams, 1886 109 
 
 Party Government, frosn the Westminster Review, Vol. 69, 1886 n 
 
 The Danger of Party, by Frederic Harrison, Contemporary Review, Vol. 49, 1886.. 114 
 
 Party and Patriotism, from The National Review, Vol. 7, i886 j 15 
 
 Party or Empire " " " jj^ 
 
 Thoughts abfv ' Party, by Lord Selborne, The Contemporary Review, Vol. 51, 1887. . 116 
 
 A Political Problem, by Sandford Fleming. Trans. Roy. Soc. Canada, Vol. 7, 1889. . 117 
 
 The Degradation of Politics, by Dr. F. A. P. Barnard, in The Forum, Vol. 9, 1890.. 123 
 Parliamentary '<s. Party Government, address by Sandford Fleming at Queen's Univer- 
 
 sity, 189- 127 
 
176 
 
 CONTENTS. 
 
 
 m 
 
 Paare. 
 
 38 Plan for Minority Representation, by Prof. J. R. Commons, in Review of Reviews 
 
 Vol. 4, 1891 ,36 
 
 39 Party Spirit and its Vices, from "Democratic Governmep*," by E. de Laveleye, 1891 . . 138 
 
 40 The Politicians of To-day, by James Bryce. The American Commonwealth, 1891 . . 140 
 
 41 Proportional Representation— The Gove System, 1892 143 
 
 42 Parties and Party Government, from " Elements of Politics" by Henry Sidgwick, 1892 149 
 
 43 Burke's defence of Party, by Dr. Goldwin Smith, North American Review, No. 426, 
 
 1892 151 
 
 44 Party Government, by Charles Richardson, Annals Am. Academy, Jan., 1892 152 
 
 45 Proportional Representation, by Prof. J. R. Commons, Annals Am. Acad., Mar., 1892 154 
 
 46 The Electoral Law of Denmark. Translated and Analysed by Dr. Wicksteed, 1892. . 158 
 
 47 Voting by Command, by Dr. Wicksteed, from " the Week " May 13th, 1892 165 
 
 48 Compulsory Voting, by Sydney Fisher 169 
 
 Postscript by Sandford Fleming, May 26th, 1892 171 
 
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