r%k ^. «^V„'^"<^' % <^ y >^i ^^>' ^' IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I lit L<> 12.0 1.25 ^1^ Photographic Sciences Corporation // ^/ ^J' ^^ fe. 3 I; i t,: iii ;y rS t !:} v» '^f MAIN sraiET WU»?TH,N.Y. 145M 11 i CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICIVIH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Instituta for Historical IMicroraproductions / Institut Canadian da microraproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. □ Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur n n D n n Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagde Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurde et/ou pelliculde □ Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque I I Coloured maps/ Cartes gdographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) □ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur □ Bound with other material/ Reli6 avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La re Mure serrde peut causer de !'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge intirieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouties lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela Atait possible, ces pages n'ont pas 6td filmies. Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplAmentaires: L'Institut a microfHm6 le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a 6t6 possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la methods normale de filmage sont indiquis ci-dessous. I I Coloured pages/ • >/ D D Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommag6es Pages restored and/oi Pages restauries et/ou pellicul^es r~l Pages damaged/ I I Pages restored and/or laminated/ Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages ddcolor^es, tacheties ou piqudes □ Pages detached/ Pages ditachies Showthrough/ Transparence I I Quality of print varies/ Quality inigale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du materiel suppl^mentaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partieilement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 4t6 filmies it nouveau de fapon d obtenir la meilleure image possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmdi au taux de reduction indiqu* ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X y 26X 30X 12X 16X aox 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: Library of the Public Archives of Canada L'exemplaire fiimi fut reproduit grflce d la ginirositift de: La bibliothdque des Archives pubiiques du Canada The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility o^ the original copy and in keeping wfth the filming contract specifications. Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettetA de I'exempiaire filmd, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last pijge with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated Impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. Les eKemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprimte sont fiimds en commenpant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la derni6re page qui comporte une empreinta d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le ssv^ond plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont film6s en commen^ant par la premiAre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou dlllustration et en terminant par la dernidre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol —^-(meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol ▼ (meaning "END"(, whichever applies. Un des symboles suivants apparattra sur la dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE", le symbols V signifie "FIN". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hend corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les csrtes, planches, tableaux, etc.. peuvent dtre filmte A des taux de reduction diff6rents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche. 11 est film6 d partir de Tangle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en has, en prenant le nombre d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mithode. % 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 nm urn ^^^^^^ff^^ ■4 THE EXPEDITION AGAINST ROCHE FO kr Fully Stated and Considered. I N A • -I, .» LETTER To the Right Honourable the AUTHOR O F T H E CANDID REFLEXIONS ,- ? ; ■ ,,"'■' O N T H E REPORT - O F T H E GENERAL OFFICERS, ^c. ^"j a Country Gentleman. ^Je^ we mt decreed Ten Colonels, Ten Generals, Ten ,V Aids de Camp, and Two Commanders of Horfe? 't Yet what^ do they perform ? YoU form Colonels and Aids de Camp for the Forum, not for the War, ;^ Francis De.viosthenes. r*"** The Second Edition, with Additions. LONDON. Printed and Sold by J. Towers in Piaadilly. 1758, ( Price IS. 6d. ) t wimmmmmm «'>»*.« - •I ^ .= i 3 ) A LETTER, &c. ■ { S I R. S)G(-)9("^ O U may, perhaps, be a little fur- Y ^ prifed at receiving a Letter from w'^j "^^* P^r^o^s of my Defcription are SMLkmji j^Qj eafily found in the Circle of your Acquaintance, and you will be puzzled to guefs my Name ; but no Matter what is my Name, or what my Acquaintance with you : I might as well alk who that Friend in the Country was to whom you have thought fit to addrefs your Letter. I have lived a good many Years among thofe who are called Country Gentlemen, and never found that you had a fingle Friend among them ; they knew you too well : Let us ceafe therefore to enquire who was your Correfpondent, either when you A 2 wrote ( 4 ) wrote your own, or when you receive this Letter. We both have our Reafon for the manner of Addrefs. You will wonder, perhaps, by what Means I have traced this Performance Home to you. Whatever I am, I claim no Title, I form no Pretentions to fuperior Sagacity, or to a more extenfive Intelligence, than others who bear the fame Charadler, which I, perhaps, affumej but the Tree is known by its Fruits, and the Piece often betrays the Workman. Whether the Performance is of the Hand of the Great Mafttr himfclf, or whether it has only been fkctchcd out by him, and Vvork'd up by fome inferiour Artift, I am not Con noifltnir enough to determine, but I know the School. The World was enriched laft Winter with fo many T'cjis^ and fo many other curious Pieces in the lame Tafte, that it is impoflible not to find out the Hand : To you therefore I addrefs myfelf, as to the great Fountain and Source, without confidering whether you have con- veyed your Poifon through your own mafterly Pen, or transfuied it into the Qiiill of fome lefs noble, tho' ilil! perhaps truly noble, Dif- ciple. Your Appearance on thisOccafionjuftifies the Advice you give to your Friend in the 43d Pago ( 5 ) Page of your great Work. Imagine fpeeiJicaUy •what is moft agreeable to common Senfe^ and then do not befurprifed at finding the Event diame- trically oppojite to it. In the Name ot that Common Senfe, what have you, or any of your Fadtion, to do, in being the Paitizans of thofe Perfons who are the Objedts of that Report, whofe Unpopularity might, for a Time perhaps, have ecHpfed even yours, unlefs you was originally a Party in their Cffence, and from thence are become bound to be a Party in their Juftification. Thofe who think you have a Right to the Attribute of Com- mon Senfe, muft be perfuaded that you arc involved in this unfortunate Defcription. Mankind, indeed, had heard of the extraordi- nary AfTiduity with which you attended the General in C f, from the Moment of his Return, to that of his Trial ; and that you was employed in the arduous Bufinefs of draw- ing up his Defence: Yet they were difpofed to hope, that this proceed only from the Warmth of Friendlhip, and if yourDifcretion fultVred in the Opinions of the over prudent, you was recompenfed by the Honour which was refleded on your Humanity. Why then would you not fufter it to red on a Foundation To advantageous to you ? Why would you conHrm the Imputations which mnny had, with too much Appearance of Plaufibility, thrown ( 6 .) thrown out upon you, that you zndyourswcre the real Authors of that dii'graceful Difap- pointment which the Nation fo deeply feels and refents, and that the Generals who have hitherto born the Infamy, were but th« Puppets which you and y'ours have actu- ated. You fay. Page the 29th. " The Unpro- " mifingncfs of this Expedition was not " judged ot only by the i^ivcnt, but Numbers *' here, on knov/ing its Dcftination for the " Coaft of France, and the Conftitution of " Things in thofc Parts, made even no Merit •* of pronouncing boldly^ ih^at nothing would^ or " could be done by that grand Armada." Once more in the Name of Common Senle, why do you, of all Men living, bring this Cir- cumftance back to Peopic'ii Memory. It was well obfcrvcd at the Time, and did not pafs without the natural Comment, that a certain Sett ot Men, not famous for their extenfivc Knowledge, did, even long before the Squa- dron failed, declare publickly, and otfcr my \N dig^v, i\\i\t rchercfocvcr was its Dcftination, nothing zvould be done by it. Mankind wereallo- nifhcd at the Boldnefs with which this was pro- nounced. They proceeded i'o iar as to draw from this Boldnefs a very ill Omen of theSuccefs. They wciU fl:ill farther; for to diis were entirely owiu I I ( 7 ) ing thofe Sufpicions, or as you fay Page 9tFi. *' thofe treafonable Infinuations, that a Ten- ** dernefs for H — n — r might occafion an •« Armament to be fent out with Intimations^ ** properly given, that nothing being done *• would not be the moft difpleafing Thing •* imaginable." They obferved, that the Per- fons who thus pronounced with fo much Boldnefs^ were the fame, who, by their private In- trigues and Cabals, had a tew Months before thrown the Affairs of the King and Kingdom into fo much Confufion-, and it feemed no great Refinement in Politicks to fuppofe, that the fame Influence which enabled them then to put a Stop to all Publick Biifmefs, might ftill fubfift to fuch a Degree, as would blaft the Expedition ; for they knew very well, as you fay. Page 7th, " The Envy of ** fome, who oppofe the prefent Minifter*s ** Rife to Power, would be carried to fucK ** treafonable Lengths, as fecretly to thwart •' and countermine his Operations." Has the Event proved thac they were miftaken in this Apprehtnfions ? Or will this Book of yours prove it ? You tell us, Page the 2ifl:, •* That his Royal HifUnells the Duke greatly defired an ^ prelTed this Meafurc, in Hopes of its •' iiiak ing a powerful Diverfion j" and you refer cc cc V. If ( 8 ) refer us as for a Voucher to the Enq. Page 20." I have read that Page in the Enquiery again and again, and I iind nothing to war- rant iuch an Aflertion ; I fee, indeed, in that Page, that Sir J. Ligonier informs the Com- mander in chief of the Land Forces, what was one Point in the King's View in this Meafure, *' that it was to create a Diverfion in Favour " of his R. H. and the K. of Prujfia, and *' that the K. of Prujfia dcfired and prefled ** this '•jery Meafure :'* But I find no Intima- tion that it was the Duke*s Defire. I find no Reafon to fuppofe that the Plan had been communicated to him, or approved by him, much lefs recommended or prefled by him for Execution. I moft heartily wilh it had; for though it is poflible you and I might differ in our Rcafons, wc fhall both agree in one Conclufion. That a Plan approved and re- commended by his R. H. would not have fo fhamefully failed widiout any Attempt to execute it. You tell us, Page 7, that on the Return of the Fleet, " Some merely guided by private •* Attachments^ or Prejudices in Favour of *' the jProjedors, or at lead the principal *' Promoter of the Attempt, extolled it to ♦' the Skies, and that on the other Hand, ♦' Others perhaps^ influenced by Conlidera- tions it <( C( i( f the State of the Troops of France, which were {aid to amount to 300,000. The Memorial delivered in by Authority makes them fomething lefs than 200,000. You fay you don't difpute the Truth of this Ac- count, but you infinuate the general Opinion to be, that they are above 300,000 Regu- lars„ if ( 17 ) lars. But the military h'lUs of Frame, you fay^ are open, and it would be unpardonable not to have a thorough Knowledge of that Point. But pray, Sir, how is one to attain that thorough Knowledge ? Do you expeft a Cer- tificate trom the Mufter-Mafter-General of France, (if there be fuch an Officer j or what other Information do you demand ? The beft that can be obtained, unlefs from immediate Authority of the King of France, ( and per- haps the beft, even without that Exception) is what the Cabinet Council had before them. Look into the Memorial. Can you have a more exaft Account, than the very Corps of which the Army confifts •, their Numbers in Time of Peace ; their different Augmentati- ons fince the War commenced, and their prc- fent Deftination ? How does it appear that the Memorial is not taken from thofe very military Lifts to which you appeal ? But the Point was too ftrong againft you to be fuffered to remain in full Force, and therefore you en- deavour to contradift particular Accounts, delivered by Authority, by vague Reports, which you are pleafed to fay were current in other Countries. How fuch Reports came to your Ears I cannot imagine ! I believe you are the firft Man of Bufinefs who ever attempted to pafs fuch a Report on the World. But that vou may make as free with my Intelligence as C I i^ lit ( 18 ) I have done with yours, I will tell you a Re- port which 1 have heard, and I tancy from ra- ther better Authority than your Dutch RejX)rt. That fo far were the Prepch from having the Troops on the Coaft which you infinuate, and which I think, if all coUedtd together, as in your different Accounts, would amount to about 100,000 Regulars, befides 100,000 Militia, there were ac \ally but 4000 tegu- iar Troops at the Time our Fleet came upon the Coaft, for the Detence of all the Garrilbns and Outworks in and near Port I'Ohent, la Ro- €belle^ and Rochefort, and that the fmaller Di- vifion of thefe was at Roehefort^ I will now communicate another Report ; You, as well as the Generals, feem to ftand in great Awe of a Name fo dignified as that of a Marlhal of France You fpeak, in different Places, of the Alertnefs ot the Enemy on this Occafion, and the proportionable Rttfiftancc whuih our Troops muft undoubtedly have met with, it they attempted to land. Yet what was the real Cafe: The old Marfhal, worn out with In- firmities, ne faifoit que pleurer. Such were the Accounts the French themfelvcs gave ot him. He confidered all as loft, the Moment the At- tack was pointed at Rochefort^ and tar from making Difpofitions to dilpute the landing, he pafled the Hours in Tears, and in writing ExpreiTes to his Cuurc. Page !■: ( '9 ) Page 17. You pretend not fully to under- firand the Meaning of the Term Coup de Main, You attempt Definitions of it -, from its vague and uncertain Import you would infinuate that it was hardly underltood by our Generals what they were to do, but you argue as if by at Coup de Main, was meant, only a Surprife, and that it the Opportunity of a Surprife was loft", the whole Profped: of Succefs was over. I fhall enter into no Scholaftick Difpute about the Definitions of Terms, I will only fay, that it is very apparent, that the Term Coup de Main was not ufed to exprefs the taking Rochefort by Surprife only, but that it was to be attacked in every other Way, except the opening Trenches, and ereding Batteries. In the Advice delivered by Sir John UgOr- nier, whofe Experience in the Art of War, Sir y. Mordaunt fays, will vindicate any Of- ficer guided by his Authority, I find this Paragraph, Enq. p. 22. "As for a Coup " de Main, it may perhaps fucceed befi at " your coming up, as the Enemy may be *' in a great Hurry, Surprize, and Conftcr- *' nation, at luch an unexpected Vifit, and *' not have Time to make his Difpofitions. " But if that is not thought proper, it may " fucceed as well after the Place has been tho* " roughly reconnoitred, and you have fixed the *^ Spots where you defign to make the greatel^ C :? '* Efforts, I r 4 I '\ K C( cc (C i( C( (C ct cc C( ( 10 ) Efforts, and if the Enemy fee any Prepa* ^* ration for a regular Attack, they will lefs exped: a Coup de Main. Bergen- op- Zoom was taken by a Coup d( Main, after a long Siege. St. Philips was taken by Scaling- Ladders, and a Coup (le Main, tho* the Garrifon wa? ^^ooQ ftroiig, after a Siege of 56 Days : The Neceflity of dividing a fmail Garrifon in a Place of fuch Circumference as Roche- fort may facilitate the Succcfs of a bold Attempt." If Sir 'John Mcrdaunt really thought Sir J. Ligonicr to be a Man of that Experience in the Art of War which he de- fcribes him to be ; if he really meant to guide himfelr by the whole of his Advice in the Execution of the Plan, and not to excufe himfejf, only by fcleding certain Parts of it irom others which were explanatory, and with which they were conne<5led, how come he fo totally to have forgot this Part of it, which, if any Doubt had fubfifted, would have ex- plained what was intended by a Coup de Main^ and to have remembered only the Recommen- dation to fecure a Communication for a Re- treat ? nay of what Sort was that Communi- cation to be ? See the fame Paper, Enq^. p. 21. '* Suppofing the Troops landed, it muft be left ** to the Confideration of the Generals whe- ther they (hould not march with proper Precautions dirctlly to Rocheforty to pre- vent C( C( t( -, . ( 21 ) M vent any Succours being thrown into the «' Place, at the fame Time that the Marines '* fliould be employed for making a good I n- *' trenchment for the Security of the Stores ** to be landed from Time to Time, as well " as of a Retreat in Cafe of Neceflity." Here then vanilhes at once all that Part of your Argument, and of the General's Defence, which IS founded upon the Plan of Attack, being intended to take the Place only by Sur- prize. Here vanilhes all the Weight which was to be derived from the Advice of Sir J, Ligonicr, with regard to the Necefllty of Fort Fouras being taken before the Troops were landed^ in order to fecure a Retreat. Sir J, Ligonier fuppofes the Troops firft to land, and then to chrow up an Intrench ment, in order to lecure a Retreat, and to receive and preferve the Stores as they were landed. •' (.' I' Another Argument, which you endeavour jto force into your Service, is the Countenance given by the Concurrence of the Sea-Officers, to the Opinion of that Council of War which determined to do nothing againft Rochefort, Let us feo. what Sir Edward hawke fays on the Subjefl : In his Letter to Mr. Secretary P///, Enq. p. 1 01, are thefe Words : " We " (meaning the Seamen) aflfented to the Rea- •* fons for not attempting to take Rochefort by 1 C( C( t< (( ( " ) ^* by Efcalade, in Confidence of /;&i7> ','meani- ing the Land OfEccrs) Judgment and Know Jedgc in iheir own Profeflion ; but I anj every one elfe agreed in Ojfimon, I bat the Land- ing could be ejfetled.''' What therefore is the Inference to be d/avn from hence, but this : I'he Seamen were pcrl'uaded tlicy could cfFedt the whole of their Duty -, they could land the Troops ; As to what the Troops could do when landed, it was not their Pro- vince to judge: It was the Bufinei's of the Generals to determine i and they figned their Names to the Council of War, not in Tefti- mony of their own Opinion, but in Deference to the Opinion of thole whole Proviiice it was to judge and determine. That is, they aded confiltently with the King's Inftrudlions, to live in Harmony with the Land OfHcers, and not to give Occafion of Di Icon tent, by intermeddling, protefting, and remonHrating in what was not their Province j but fg weary does Sir Edward Ilawke appear to have beep of thele Councils of War, that when Sir y. Mordamit applied to him, to call one, to con- fider whether die Attack which they had agreed to make on Fort Four as was of Conlequencc enouii,h to dday the Return of the Fleet, Sir Edward refulcd, aliedging that the Seamen had nothing to do with it j it was a Land Ope- ration only. £»y. p. 35. You ( 23 ) You are pleafed to objefl to the Teftimony and Opinion of Colonel Clerk as defer ving lefs Weight, becaufe it was upon his Reprefenta- tion that the Attempt on Rocbefort was firft thought of; and he, you thinks is bound in Honour Co fupport the Pradticability, that is, the Honour of his own Plan : But you think, at the fame Time, that the higheft Credit is to be given to the very Names of the Officers of which the Council of War was compofed, forgetting that they were the very Parties to be tried, and that their Teftimony is brought forth for their own Coudcmnation or Ac- quittal. I have thus endeavoured to demolifh that Outwork of Prejudice within which you have endeavoured to intrench yourfelf: So far goes the Coup de Main ; and now, if you pleafe, wc will begin the Attack in Form. The Report of the Board of General Offi- cers, which was the Ground-work of your Letter, muft likewife be fo of mine. You have concUided, and I will begin with it j for the Plan of that Report wiil give a Regula- rity to our Arguments ; and as that has con- fidered every Part of the Conduct of the Gene- rals, it will bring on all that can be urged for or M: I'i- ' ■' ' 1 <( 1 'h k H « * ( 24 ) or againft them from the Evidence hithei't6' made public in a regular Method. The firft Article of the Report is, ** Ii! appears that one Caufe of the Fxpedi- tion having failed, is the not auacking Fort Fouras by Sea, at the fame Time that it would have been attacked by Land, agreeable to the firll Defign, which cer- tainly mut have been of the greateft Uti- lity towards carrying your Maje(ly*s In- ftrudlions into Execution ; It was at firft relolvtd by Sir Ed-ward Hawke {I'hierry^ the Pilot of the Magnanime^ having undertaken the fafe Condu6t of a Ship to Fort Fouras for that Purpofe) but aftei wards iaid c.fide upon the Reprejentation of Vice - Admiral Knowles, that the Barfleur^ the Ship de- figned for that Service, was on Ground at the Diftance of between Four or Five Miles from the Shore, but as neither Sir Edward Hawke, nor the Pilot c )uld aticnd to give any Information upon that Head., we cannot prefume to offer a certain Opi- nion thereupon." This is the Firft Article of the Report, which, after having told us, p. '^y, that it is a moft admirable Piece, calculated, as if by Compromife, neither to acquit or condemn, you I you tell b9, p. 38. (hews that at leaft fo Far the Commanders are in no Fault. If they are in no Fault are they not acquited ? I am ready to allow, that fo far as this Article goes, the Commanders of the Land Fotces are acquitted j b It if you will argue farther, that ail the Commanders who were to conduft the Expe- dition were in no Fault, ei'pecially if you infill as you do, p. 38. ** that it appears plain, that Fouras vras inaccefiible to Shipping, notwith- ftanding the Pilot Tbierrfs Promife, which it Ihould feem he could not make good, I totally deny your Conclufion.'* A Child in Argument mull fee the Fallacy of it. If the Fad was clear that Fouras was inaccefiible to Shipping, how comes it to pal's that the not attacking it is given as a Caiife of the Fail- ure of the Expedition. No pofitive Opinion was given you fay upon it. Why was it not, and where was the Necfcfiity of leaving this Point 6\)tn for farther Enquiry after the Re- turn of Sir Edward Hawke and the Pilot, if it already appeared to be a Meafure impracSti- cable ? But Impra^icdble is the Word, arid every Thing is to be, from Beginning to End, pror!ouriced unpradicable. I fay that it ap- pears to be far from certain, that Fori Fouras was inaccefiible to Shipping, and yet the Board of Officers did right to give no Opinion, bccaufe Sir Ed%^ctrd Hawkt and ^hierryy Par- D ties m; I." viimin^t^f^wwr' . i : ■-■(■ If ( 26 ) tics principally concerned, had not Been heard. I will enter farther into the Confideration of this Matter, for fome Conclufion may be drawn from it ; it is a Thing fo aftonifhing, that (as you fay) a Sift of Gentlemen, of un- fainted CharaSier'^ and trujled with' the Anns of their Country might add, that tho^ the Vice- Admiral could not conduft a Ship to the Fort, there were Captains in the Fleet who it feems offered it : Capt. Colby offered to carry the Princefs Amelia, Enq, p. 30. How then can we unriddle this Myftery, for a Myftery there certainly is ? Perhaps it is eaAer to guels the Solution than to ex- plain iu Fronri all thefe Circumftances, I fay it is clear that Fouras muft be, and was acceffible by Sea j That the Board of Officers are there- fore juftified in the Report, that the not at- tacking it by Sea appeared to be one of the Caufes of tlie Failure of the Expedition. I have faid this merely to juftify the Report of the Board ; for the Condudl of the Generals feems to me fo little affefted by this Article, and indeed, fo totally independant of it, that from this Moment, if you chufe it, I will fuppofe i\\^x. Fouras was built only to guard a Sand- ijanky ( p ) Bank, and 'that it was inacceflible to eVery ihing but a Long-Boat. 4( « 4« C< mt, ct C( «c «c C( 4C CC C( C€ «< (C CC c< ti (C t< CC The next Article in the Report is, *« That another Caufe of the Failure of the Expe- dition was, that inftead of attempting to land when the Report was received on the 24th of September from Rear- Admiral Bro- deritky and the Captains who had been fent out to found and reconnoitre, a Council of War was fummoned, and held on the 25th, in which it was unanimoufly re- folved not to land, as the Attempt upon Rocbfort was neither advifeable or pradlica- able. But it does not appear to us that there were then, or at any Time afterwaixls, either a Body of Troops, or Batteries on Shore, fufficient to have prevented the at- tempting a Defcent, in Purfuance of the Inftrudions figned by Your Majefly. Neither does it appear to us, that there were any fufEcient Reafons to induce the Council of War to believe, that Rochfort was fo far changed in refped to its Strength, or Pof- ture of Defence fince the Expedition was refolved on in Englandy\ as to prevent all Attempts of an Attack upon the Place, in crder to burn and deftroy the Docks, Magazines, Arfenals, and Shipping, in Obedience to Your Majefty's Command." I M I I' fit t i it 1 ■'■ t :■; ■'('• f 3« > Is this. Sir, the Part of the Report, which you fay is io far from carrying Cenlure, that the Commandeils (I mean the Land Com* manders) .night eren glory in avowing and fiibfcribxng to it ? Is this the Part whkbyou fay dies Honour to thtsr Stnfo and Obedience ? Let us ftate it in fewer Words: A Cat»fe of Failure in this Expedition was, that the Generals^ in- ftead of landing on the 244:h of September^ when the Report of thoie fent to reconnoitre was made, called a Council of War on the a5th, and rcfolyed not to land. Yec there -was no Reafon which prevented their having landed as they were ordered. Nor do we think the Cotmcil of War had any Rea- son to imagine, that the Situation of Roche^ fort appeared now io diflerent from what it was reprefented to be when the Expedition was firft iet on Foot, as eo make it impoITible to execute their Orders. If thia is Obedience, if this is Matter of Glory to a Soldier, in the Name of Common Senfe, what m Diibbedience ^ and whaC can he do to de<' rvc Shame and Dishonour ? Can it be aflcrted in ftrongpcr Terms that the Ex- pedition lailcii, bccaule the Council of War, vjit^hour .any Reafon t9 judify fueh Refslution^ o > Jiid been aflembled in thofe two Places, ic would have been impoflible to have fpared fuch a Number as could have marched to the Coaft to give a ferious Oppofition to the Landing As to the pofitive Intelligence of Troops aflembled, let us fee what it amounts to. Admiral Broderick faw an Army in the Fields Enq. p. 45, amounting to 400 or 500 Foot and 150 Horfe. General C^«'k-'^j fays, Enq. p. ^6^ that one Prifoner had faid there were eleven Battalions, and another feven, but not in the Field but at Rochelk ; and tho' he paid little Regard to them fingly, yet on the whole, he thought there was no room to doubt but there wtrefime Troops -y Enq. p. ^>i. .Captain Skinner, of the Piper Sloop, told Colonel Howard that on Sunday or Monday he ^-w a confiderable Number of Troops, and that he reckoned eight or nine Pair of Co- lours *. But whether they were regular Troops, or Troops of the Country, he could not tell. Enq. p. 32. And I think Sir 7. Mordaunt fays, that the Prifoners declared there were Troops, and even named Rc- gimmts, Enq. p. 17. What ^ * There are three Standards to each Batta- lion, and a /rr»f^ Battalion is generally com- puted at 500 Men, !,1 :( ( 41 ) What is there in this Sum Total of Evi- dence on this Point, to vary the Intelligence given to the Generals before they failed. They were told there were fome Troops, Regiments j and even Battalions ; but what credible Evi- dence was there to induce them to fuppofe they were too numerous for the Troops on board the Fleet to cope with ? But how could our Troops have been landed ? In the firft Place Amiral Knowles^ in Concurrence with the Admiral and Cap- tains who went to reconnoitre, " had njfured them there were two Landing- Places out of the Reach of any Battery ; That the Beach was dry, fandy, and firm, and the Soldier need not have wetted his Shoes in getting out of the Boat ; that the Men of War, [which drew from 2q to 30 Foot Water] might have come within two Miles j and tho' the Cannon from them could not an- noy the Troops, if there were any behind the ;jand-Hills, yet the Bomb-Ketches mi V i> which throw a Bomb two Miles and tw ; Lirds •, and which, as they drew but eie>t: lect Water, might have come (pro- bably) is near as the Tranfports.'* So that the Men might have landed under Cover of the Bombs, which, as the Sand-Hills were but Forty Yards from the Water Edge, muft ^ have II I . Ill l- fr.Si HI i ( 42 ) have cleared the Ground for confiderably more than a Mile beyond the Sand-Hills. ijAs to the Number of Troops that could ave land ed ar a Time, it ft cms altoni filing that this fhould never have I.een confidtTcd by the Generals I may fay, till they wanted an Excule to come home again. For Col. fVoIfd depol'ts, Efiq. p. 21. I'liat he belie\es there never was an exaft Calculation made how many could have embarked at a Time in the Boats; What a not . '^orefight in the Ge- nerals ! He thinks, h(; er, that thirty- Hx Companies of 60 Men, with their Officers, might have embarked at 3 '^rine •, in all above Two Thoufand and Two Hundred. And how long would it have been before thele could have been fupported by fuch another Body ? Would it have been two Hours ? that, cer- tainly, is the very utmoft. But perhaps Eot Half an Hour. Hitherto, indeed, the Generals, and their Advocates, have been pleafed to calculate the intermediate neceflary Time between landing the Detachments, from v/hat would have happened on the turbulent and tempeftous Night of the 28th, when the Tranl ports lay at ?i great Diflvince from the Shore, and when the Sea run fo peculiarly high, that the ableft Seamen differed whether they could reach the Land or not: Even then it would have n ( 43 ) Iiavc been done in five or fix Hours, or not at all. It is moft evident, therefore, that in the Courie of a Night, betWeen dark and light, the whole Body of Troops on board the Fleet might have been afiembled on a dry, fandy, firm Beech, under the Prote6lion of Bomb-Ketches, which would have cleared the Ground for a Mile beyond them : Why then was not this done in the Nights either of the 24th, 25th, 26th, or 27th, during which I'ime there is no Appearance that the Surf of the Sea would have given any Obllru(5tion. T may be miftaken in Terms •, I am neither Soldier nor Sailor -, I pretend only to fuch Knowledge as flows from common Senfe and common Realbn. As to the great Difficulties arifing from the PoJJibility of a Wind ietting in from the Bay, which for fix Weeks together might prevent A Communication with the Ships, I mull be cxcufed if I lay little Strefs upon it; becaufe, tho' this is fet forth with all due Magnificence, when it is to juftiry tlie Generals in the Non- Obedience of their Orders, and when they did not chufe to land -, yet neither this, nor the Terror of Armies behind the Sand-Hills, had the leaft Influence, when they found themfelves difpofed to leave the Coaft: with the Glory of having taken Fort FouraSy tho* tbe DiiHculties were then greater thro* the tempcftuous i 1 I n •' n I 141 ( 44 ) tenipcftiious Weather. You do well to fay, that in this the Generals did too much, and it was an Imprudence. They did indeed. They did infinitely too little for their Country, but they did infinitely too much for their own Juftifi- fication. When their Duty, the Execution of their Orders, the Honour and Interefl: of their Country, call upon them to adl. Diffi- culties are raifed as high as Mountains, but they fink inftantly to Mole-Hills-, or, what is as ridiculous, to Sand-Hills, the Moment it becomes a Confideration, whether it would not be fater for the Generals to do fomething which might allay the national Clamour pgainfl: them. I i Let us now confider how far they are jufti- fied, by what they found, in determining, in Contradidion to what they were ordered, that an Attack upon Rochefori was not to be at- tempted. In the firft Place, I fliall take Teavc to ftriji them of that Part of their Defence, which arilcs totally from their own Mifcon- dud, the Want of having a Place of Re- treat. When we are to judge from Events of the Pia6licability of a Meafure, we are to argue from die Cafe, as it would have Itood, }f all had been done which could have been done. Fotiras might have been had for a Place of ( 45 ) of Retreat-, and it is but an unfortunate Slip in the General, who owns, Enq. p. 28. That had Fort Fouras been taken, there would have peen great Eafe in the reft of the Enterprife -, I fliall take the Liberty, therefore, to confider the Army as landed, and the Stores, ^c. fe- cured within the stalls of that Fore, 1 t > f c .f I {hall likewife take Leave to ftrip them of tha art ot their Defence, which arifes from ( I thi.ik, a Sort of Prevarication, but certain- ly) a Mifreprefentation of the Words of their Inftrudions. They are eternally telling us of the great Change between the State of Affairs in which they were to afb, and the State in which they were fent out, arifing from Delays of various Kinds, by which an Alarm was fpread, and the Poflibility of a Surprife was prevented, and they were to aft only by Way of Surprife. Who told them fo ? Their Initrudions, I am fure, held no fuch Language. ^0 attack^ and by a vigorous Jmpreffion, Force, Enq. p. 78. Thefe were the Inftrudlions. If I order a Man to force into a Place, does it imply, that if he can't Ileal into it, he need not attempt it ? He may try that Method firft, if he pleafes. It is fafer for himfelf -, but if he can't do that, is he to decline every other Attempt ? Where, then is the Force which he is to ufe ? If le: »» II ( 46 ) If the Infl:ru6li ^ therefore, convey no fiich Ideas as cc fi' the Operations of the Troops to a Surpii'v:;only, is there any Thing in the Hints ol Advice given by Sir Jcbn Ligomet', whofe Opinion, founded on Tuch confummate Experience, the General in Chief thought would be a Juftification to any Of- ficer. Read the Paper as it Itands together, £?iq. p. ;ioth, 2 ill, 2 2d. He fays, indeed, that it would perhaps be kjl, if the Er-emyt could he ilirprifed ; but a boldAttack^ after hav- ing fecurcd a Place of Retreat^ fecured Guides on the Spot, and thoroughly reconnoitred, andfxed Upon the filiefi Places, is what is recommend- ed and enlarged upon. But the GeneraLs, it feems, did not li cure the Place of Retreat becaule tht-y would not attack j and they did not attack, becauie they had not fecured a Place of Retreat. As to the other Meafures adviftd, the getting Guides on the Spot, re- connoitring, and trying to find out fit Places to attack, all thele they omitted, for they never were on the Spot. Of all the Hints, therefore, given by that confiimmatc Gene- ral, Sir John Ligonier, not one was carried into Execution, As to the State of the French Troops which were at Rochefort, I have already con- fidered that Point, and therefore need add little !',ll ( 47 ) little to it now. The utmoft which the Ge- nerals pretend to have imagined, amounts to no more than this : Sir 'John Mordaunt fup- pofes, p. 27, that there miift have been a good Garrifon, befides, Workmen in the Docks, and the Crews of the Ships in the River. General C(?«ze;jv, p. ^c), from general Reafoningy and from Intelligence, ivas per- fttaded there mull be a ccnfiderable Number of Men m Rochejort : And General Corn- 'wallis does not fo much as mention any Dif- ficulty to be feared from the Enemies Troops, but puts the whole on that of Landing, and the having no Retreat or Communication with the Ships fecured. Thus, then, the Terrors, which you in your Performance en- deavoured to magnify, of the great Oppofition to be expeded from the Enemies Troops not only vanifh, but it appears, that the Generals themfelves never adopted thofe Terrors, for they had no credible Intelligence contradict- ing the Accounts received at home : and one fuppoles only a good Garrifon^ and the other a (onftderaMe Number of Men in Rochefori* Being Mafters then of Fouras^ and no Bo- dy of Troops in the field to oppofe them, they could at lead have marched to re- connoitre,, and inlpedt, with their own EyeSy the Nature of the Fortifications about Roche- fort. it' i 11 I Ui ill iFii; ( 48 > fori. And this they might have done with- out Danger to their Troops, and without the Lofs of a fingle Soldier. Had they founds by their own Obfervation, and by incontro- vertible Teftimony, that the Fortifications of the Place fo far and fo totally varied, from the Accounts given of them, as to make the Suc- cefs, by Aflault, impoflible, or, in a very high Degree, improbable ; then, and not till then, would they have been juftificd in return- ing to their Ships ; for then they would have performed their Orders ; They would have ai- tempted as far as was found ■pra5licable. But Po- fterity will hardly believe that three Englijh Ge- nerals, of noble Blood, high in their Mafter's Favour, and high in Reputation, who were fent with a powerful Armada, and a Body of near 10,000 Britijh Troops under their Command, upon an Enterprize of the great- eft Importance to their Country, and upon which the Eyes, not only of their Country- men, but all £«r£)/)^, were turned witheagerEx- pedlation, could confent to come back again, even without an Attempt to reconnoitre^ leaving behind them, if not their own Honour, yet certainly the Honour of their Country ; be- caufe, in a Council of War held aboard their Ships, their appeared a Contrariety of Evi- dence, whether the Ditch about the 1 own of Rocheforty which was fuppofed at their firft fettipo; ■ ( 40 ) letting out to be dry, wa<;, in R-eality, a dry or ii wet Ditch : Yet, Party and Prejudice a- part, is not this a true State of the Cafe? Suppofing the Troops in PoircfTion oi Fcuras^ wiuch they might io eafily have been, what other Dih'^culty do the Generals pretend to Juggell, bcfides the wet Ditch. I have fcarce Patience enough to argue with them upon the ProbabiHty of this Point, f)ne way or the other ; yet, as I have under- taken an irkfome Taflc, I will go through with it. S\r John Aicrdaunt^ in his Narrative delivered into the Board, is very fliort, and not very particular in the Account of what he liad heard was the State of the Fortifications. I'he firH: Part relates to the open Part of the Town, where there was no Rampart for 60 Tards in Length ; this Si^JohnfuppofcsmuJl have been fortified "^'wh an Entrenchment, as by Thierry's Account, there was a Palifade, and a Trench might be thrown up in 24 Hour's Time, to which the Ships in the River would be better Flankers than a Baftion. But did Sir John go to Rochefort, in order to hear this Evidence trom Thierry, and to examine his Plans ? Sure- ly he might have done that at home. Yet he docs not fugged one Syllable of new Intelli- gence gained on this Head fince his Arrival 0/1 the Coaft j but fpeaks only of his own G ^ttp' "I Vi II. i' '1 II ■!; ( 50 ) StiPprJiliou.^, in which, however, lie was mif- taken. I'hc reft of the Circiinirerencc of the rowii was generally proved, he fays, (but it does not appear by whom) to be ftrong and high ; but I flKUild have been glad to iiavc leen the Depofitiona of tliole Witnefies wliq proved this; bccnuil', when they I'pokc of the geficnil Parts being iViong and liigh, it is natural to i'up[.)ol'e they were nflved fome few .Qiieftions as to thoie particular Parts which were not flrongand high •, yet I am not iure they were afls.cd luch Q^icitions ; and tliefore I can- poc but again lament the total SupprcfPion of the Evidence given to the Council of War. t I. It ! !t> , As to the State of the Ditch, two Wit- nefics declared they had feen it full of Water, by Means of Sluices in the Town. When S;r Jcl^ii is interrogated on thefc Points, by tjjc Hoard, he lays, that there was a Contra- diction in the K\ idence given to the Counci I of War i and that fome of the Prifoners con- tradicted, and fome confirmed Col. Clcrke\ Account. As to the fjill Part of the Fortification, (I mean the open Parts near the River) it ap- pears, from thence, how much the Generals were out in their Reafoning ; that the Jong Alarm upon the Coaltj the particular Hx- pedation •:i ! ( 51 ) peftation of a Vifit in thole Parts -, the Pre- ience of a Marefchall of France, and the great Alertnefs, Wifdom, and Sagacity of the People, had put every I'hing into fuch a Polbiirc of Defence as might defy an Attack. It appears how much better that Officer rea- foned, who faid, WeJJjould never take it for granted that all is done which ought to he done^ even in France. Bonneau, the t'iiherman, re- commended to Col. Gierke, as a knowing, fenfible Fellow, by Capt. Hamilton, General Conwafs Aid de Camp, allured him, in the Prefence of Col. IVolfe, and Icvcral other Perfons, that upon the 2 lit of that very Month, when our Fleet was or* the Cbail, that very Spot remained as open, and as unlorti- led, as it was when Col. Clcrke firll law it in tne Year 1754. Knq. ip. 52. But this, tho' reported to the General, he would not believe ; he would not believe a Fiflierman in the Af- fair of a Fortification, becaufe he was not an F^ngineer •, and yet he would not believe the En_,ineer of the Fort of Aix, who faid the Ditch was dry, and the Town open, becaufe he was an Engineer. It feems to me to be one of the mod un- happy Omens for this Country , that the French have gained fuch an Alcendency over the Minds of our military People, as to be confidered by them in the Light of fuperior G 2 Beings, I m M- I) ! ( 52 ) Beings, to which our lefler Gcniufcs dare not prerume to look up. " After the ft^veral In- " telligences we had received, fays the Ge- *' neral, Enq. p. 14, that the French cxped:vd *' an Invafion on this Part of the Coall, and were n • alari'n. 1, // ".vns impojftbl^ to imagine tb.at a i-'lacc lik^ Roclcjortt the fecond certainly in Importance on the whole Coaft, fhoukl, after fucK Warnings be totally negk^ded.'* And yet it was fo totally negleded. that an Intrenchment , which might have been thrown up with Eafe, and planted with Bat- teries, to defend an open Entrance into the Town^ fixty Yards wide, was not thrown up, even after our Ships had been on that very Coaft. But how aftoniflied will our Generals he when they are told that cnis is not the firft Time that there has been this Negled at Rochefort. (C There has been no Akeration in the For- tifications ot that Place thefe 70 Ycars^ and the French confidered it as an 0{)en Town, lo faid the Engineer of Jix to Colonel Clarke. And yet the Expedition againd Port P 0- ricnt, might have alarmed tiie French for Rochefort fo far, at leaft, as to throw an F.n- trenchment round it, \\ that wouki have been i'ufiicient to fecure it agamft an Affault. It may be, and indeed it was alloniihing to think I ( 53 ) think, that a Place fo important as Rochefon fhould have been no better lecured. But for what a Length of Time did the principal Dock- yards of England lay cxpofed not only to be deftroyed by a great Force, but to be burnt by the Crews of two, or three r.iva- teers. But there arc Bkinders and Over- fights in all Governments, for which a pru- dent and adive Adverfary lies in Wait to take his Advantage. For the future the French will rake Care of Rochefort : OurOverfights wc are unhappily taught to correct, by fevere I.ofles, while the French are taught to cor red their Blunders by our fuperior Blunders. ft ■' V As to the Ditch, if the concurrent Evidence of Colonel Clarke^ and the French Engineer, that it was a dry one, had been out of the Qiieilion, the contradictory Evidence given before the Council of War, might have been cleared up Irom the very Situation of the Place: It was a Maxim of one of the greatcll French Generals, and a French Maxim will have Weight with our Englijh Generals, that one Ihould never fuppofe a Ditch to be full of "Water till fome-body, we can d.*pend upon, has dipped in his Finger and tailed it •, yet that French General would fcarce have taken the Trouble of lending to fearch if there was Water in a Ditch whit lay Hill. m V U ( 54 ) Hill. It is impofPiblc without Sluice?, which' mLiil be repeated as often as the Level ot the Ground vnrits, Ccia nc pomrcii eire a caufe de n^iegalitc du ter^'ein, was what might have oc- curred to an Englijh General, as well as to a French Entrincer. Even if there had been Sluices, to demofifli them was not the Work of a Battering Train. A Couple of Field Pieces would blow up a Sluice in Half an Hour, and then where would be the wet Ditch, I have heard too another Thing, and I am well founded in averting it. There was a certain iVIonfieur Bonneville^ a Voluntier, who went under the IVoteclion of one of our Gene- rals in this Expedition. He had been about Eight or Nine Years fince thro' Rochfort, and great Strels was laid in the Cpuncil ot War on the Evidence that he gave, that to the heft of his Recollection^ there was then Water in the Ditch ; This Evidence, tho* from fuch long Memory, and tho' he declared he did not take particular Notice of this Circumftance, was eagerly caught at ; but a very deaf Ear was turned to the Undertaking, with which he accompanied his Evidence, ih^ateven iho' there fhotild be IVater, be would^ by a Me- thod zrbich be explained, make that Ditch frac- ticnhlc in Two or Three different Places in the Space of a few Minutes^ and wide enough for a Battalion to march m I'ront. That the Mate- rials ( BS ) rials for this "juere in their Power ^ and that thfi Thing was no chimerical Proie&^ fince it had been done hy Marjhal l.owcndhal the lafi War in Two federal In fiances, where he himfelfwas pre- fent and in Service. But tiiis ic feemii was too dangerous. Whoever is acquainted with the Chara6ler§ of the Generals, concerned in this Expedition, will acquit them of the Imputation of perfonal Cowardice ; Far be it from me to impute it; I declare I would nor attempt to infinuate it ; ihey have never indeed commanded before, but they have ferved, and lerved with Spirit and Gallantry •, their Condud therefore, on this Occafion, is more myflcrious and aftonifh- ing. Of the whole which was their peculiar Department, have they, or did they attempt to execute a fingle Part ? The Fort of Jix was taken, not by the IVoops, but by Captain Howe-, if the Fleet would have\aken Fou is likcwife they were at full Liberty to do it, and if they could have failed up to Rcchfort, and have taken that too, it do might, in Prudence, pur- n chafe, • iit) ■If i Hi I M ( 5S ) chafe, even with the Lives of fome of ill- Soldiers, and might thereby have l^yed the Lives of many of its Subjects. The lall Article in the Report relates to. the Refolutlon to attack Fort Fottras on the 28th, and in p. 41. of your own Work, you are pleafed to rrprefent this Rcfoiution, as an Excefs of 7a:oI to cam on the Enterprife, ajid a Pa'feverance in a Plan which was found im- pra^icahle : But you have forgot that the Ge- nerals thcmfelves claim nofuch Merit, nor do they even pretend that this was attempted with aViewftill to proceec; :v2;x\w^ Rochefort •, Qiiite the contrary. The Gcnei.d hip.ifelf, Enq. p. 109. repreftnts it as lomtUvng to employ the Troops before they went Hon^e, while the For- tifications of Aix was blov/ing up, but being prevented from landing that iSight, and the Fleet being ready the next IVrorning, they did not think it worth while to (lay another Day. They were fodett:rmined by the contradidory Kvidcnce given at the CouacH of War, and fo fixed in thfirRefoiutiiMi, in no Situation to attack Rochefcrty that it was not worth while to detain the Fleet a Da)\ in order to take a Place, which if the Seamen had taken at firf]-, the General lays the rcll of the Enterprife -woHld have ken eafj^ and from wlience they might 4 ( S^ Tiiiglvt, with Safety, have informed then* owi> Eyes of the exadl Situation of tlie Town. You are plealcd to exprefs an high Con- tempt of the Idea of giving any Blow to Iramc, not only in any Part of the Land Frontiers, but of that immenfc Trad of Coaft which fpreads for ib great an Extent through difFerent Seas, and you flicker your-, felf under one Axiom of Schomherg^ " 1 hat '* attacking France in France^ was takino- a " Bull by the Horns." And another of the Great Vitior Amadi'us of Savcy^ «' That he *' knew a thoulknd Ways into France, but '* none out of it." This is another Inftance of what I have before lamented, as an unhappy Omen to this Country, that even great Statefmen can adopt the Maxim, that the Wifdom and Power of France renders her invulnerable. Yet I did not expedl that you, of all Men living, would have endeavoured to expofe the Abfurdity of taking the Bull by the Horns ; you who have been, who continue to be the grand Advo- cate for liand-Operations, and for fending the Force of this Ifland upon the Continent. I will agree, indeed, that neither in the laft War, nor perhaps in the prefent, was there much Probability that our Troops fliould 4iirer France^ So much the worfe lor us. \\ H 2 But >*•? Ill' I i^ 'ill if ( 60 ) But do you make no Ditlcrence betwcn at' tacking llich a Barrier as France has toward;* FlnncLrs^ or even attacking it from the Side ofZ^7/jv, and the fending a lliperior Fleet to florm at once a Place lituated on the Coaft which tlic Generals were not inltrudled tc( bold r.nd mahitainy but to deftroy, and then go on board their Ships ? The Way back, if the Fleet continued lliperior, was juft as pfy as the Way thither. But tho' I differ from you in that Opinion, v.e agiee exP.cStly in another, which you ad- vance -, I mean the great Importance or Ctf/^ Breton., and the Blow which /tj«^^ would re- ceive in the L.ofs otit j yet if, as you obferve juilly, it would not now be a Folly io he fur- prifed (li any Thin^^ I fliould have been a little ruri)rik\i to hear the Ncgledl of that Object clurgcd as an Imputation on the Minilter, whom you and youn have fo often ridiculed, lis Ai'icrica-iwzfX. Mult I really afk theQue- ilion ? Was that great Objedl forgot ? Has the War in America in general, or a Plan of Attad: on that Place in particular, been n-'glecled by him •, or was it hisScramb'c for l^ower ? Was it his Junto, or his Party Ca- bal that fufpendcd or weakened the Opera- tion ? Look back a few Months. When was the Att^.ck of that Place ^rojeded? And wheq < 6i ) Srvhea was the Armament fitted out and prer pared for the Execution ? Was it not in that very Hour when you and yours were with lb much Decency and Humanity ridiculing a Bed-ridden Minifter, and repreli nting him to be as impotent in his mental Faculties as he was in his bodily State ? Was not tnat Arma- ment prepared by thf' then Board ot Admiralty, with an Expedition that (liewed they were no Strangers to Bufinels, how much foever they might be ridiculed as Novices in Office ? Was it not ready to fail Six Weeks fooner than any Armament could be fent from the Ports of France^ notwithilanding the utmoft Exer- tions of that wife and alert People ? Was it not fufficient for the Service, and infinitely fupcrior to any Thing which at that Time could oppofc it in America? When by a Se- ries of advcrfe Winds, the Departure of that Armament had been delayed fo many Weeks, and till the French Fleets were ready to put to Sea, was there not a Reinforcement of Six Capital Ships deltined by that Admiralty, to be added to thofc originally ordered to that Service, and which were to follow them as foon as pofTible ? I affirm that there was. How that Reinforcement came to be applied to other Purpoff s, you beft can tell, fince it was thro* ypur Scramble for Power, thro* your Junto, tjiro* your Party Cabal, that a Difmiflion was given w i '!, \ ,»t> I II n U ( 62 ) given in that critical Conjundlure to that Board of Admiralty, and the Minilter with whom it was conncAed. The fuccteding ho.ird happened to be of a different Opinion from die preceding one, and the Reinforcement deltined for the Attack of I.oaisl^curg was (I do not fay perverted but) converted to other Purpofes. To Cruife upon the Trade c/ France, was, by th^t Board, thought the bell Method ofdeftroying the Enemy, and inflead of a Chimerical iVttack iipon Loidsbourg or Roche- fort^ the Fleet of England was immediately exerted in what the French call the piratical Kind of War : A Kind of War, which I fup- pofe, is the fitted for the Fleet of England^ becaufe the Ircnch ridicule it the moll ; and fare I am, that our maritime OfHccrs not only applaud it the moll, but Ic-em of late Years tu have turned their I'houghtb to little elfe. As foon as the fix Weck*s Admiralty re- tired, and gave way to the prefcnt Board, and the prefcnt Miiiifter was ordered to relume the Functions of that Office, which not a Man in England ^-xx^^ to fill after him, the Ameri- can Sytleni refumcd its Vigour. Such Shijis as could becolleded, tho' not equal, either in Strength or Numbers, to what had been ori- ginally dcfiined to that Service, were imme- diately It;nt to reinforce thofc at Halifax ; and I ( 63 ) I do again affirm, and am prepared to prove, that, except a very fliort Time, in which the Squadron of Mr. Holbourne was, by the be- foremcntioned Accidents, by a fingle Ship perhaps, inferior to the French^ he had under his Command, during the whole Summer, a Fleet fuperior to any Thing the French had at Louijhourg^ or could, by any Means whatever, bring there, whether you confidcr the Num- ber of Line of Battle Ships, the Number of Men on board, the Number of Guns, or the Weight of their Metal ; and yet almoft the whole Maritime Force of France, fo far as it could be manned, was, by Stratagem, col- leded there. Was it then lb very abfurd and romantic, that when their Maritime Force was drawn away to America, and their Land Forces engaged in Germany, the refcrved Strength of this Country fhould be exerted ifi attempting a Blow fo very decifive, as the taking of Rochefort would have been ? Why it mifcarricd, to this Moment, I can hard! v gucfs •, but fure I am, it was not thro* the Im- praifticability of it. . - ! " I have now. Sir, gone through the Cotv- fideration of your whole Performance, and if you are not tired with reading. I confeis I am heartily tired with writiiig. I have endeavour- ed to tep as dole as polTible to the Subjcd, and Hi 1 i It' il and, tho' often tempted, I liavc indulged f6v7 Sallies of my Pen i If now and then you ihould have found a little Deviation, a little Playfulnefs of Imagination, forgive it. 'lis but a Copy of my Countenance ; 'tis but a forced Smile that covers a bleeding Heart : A Heart broken and bleeding tor the Diilrefs, for the Difgrace of this Country. Where, alas ! can we look, whither can we diredl our Hopes. Under which of thofe dark Clouds that furround,andfeem ready to burll upon us, can we flatter ourfelves there is a Ray of Light that will break forth ? To what Purpofe is it that we boaft our Trade, our Wealth, and our Credit ? We are but ^o many Sheep, whofe Carcafcs tempt the Wolves to devour us. Where is the Glory of the Britijh Name -, where are the Terrors that ufed to accompany our Fleets and Armies ? The Treafurcs of tlic Country are poured forth in vain by an united and willing People. Our Enemies are become invulnerable, and every Blow our Minifters meditate, Impradli- cable. In Germany their Ravages are not flopped for a fingle Hour, for there were not fo many Men in the Gennan as in the French Army,therefore to check their Progrefs is Imt- prafticable. In America^ where our Troops are at lead double to thofe of the Enemy, to check their Progrefs is equally Impradicable. to ( ^5 ) 'To deflroy their Docks at Roche fort, a Town confidi'ied in France as an open Town, with- out Baftions, Without Fortfiications, without a Wail tor its Defence, is Impraftirable % for 'tis mod certain there was a Ditch, and fomebody laid there was Water in it. Such is the Sum total of the pr fent Ac- count of our mihtary Operations, and can we look forward with a better i^rofped ? As to our Fleet, we have indeed been our own Undoers, and have killed tlie pan pv red Child with Kindneis. We have dcftruyed the, Principle which was the Source of our Glory. We have mifguidcd the Ambition of our Seamen -, we have ttmpted them with Wealth inltead oi Reputation -, and we have fubftituted Avarice to Honour. We have at this ; To). '" many who would make brave and cxcdlent Coriairs, and I hope that in the long Lifl- we have tv/o or three good Admirals. As to the Army, the Soldiers are ftiil brave, and, I am per (iiaded, will H tion on the Coaft was greater than could be cxprtlTedv- it beirig underftood that in the Courfeof afi?\MDays, both Rochefort mdRoMle woUld.neceflariJy fall into che Hands of the Eft* ^iijh^ thert being noFoiubilicy to reinforce then> !tili^-the Hoylhold Troops could arrive from VcrfailUs, . .- , . , ,.. • »» lf.»<'.,-if"il • * •♦,»■.■"-»•>. .*'* :. : 11 \:^< •■:) !^. : n« •iZi:o\A i. u .v ..*i7 . '-.'^ ii^ii; «1 f. .> ? D-firfniA \\-x) :^rr::l.' t. •••)•'-;(••? ^ ;")! ! ' /;:ih f «'; :•? ./J :; '♦* J .( i '. t *;, f. : i:,-A ill i:i;-.5.:';« ^ •.!'; ;•> JDi;-' s.:? 10 .f;i.i CU •♦^/•.»i •'.« ♦ ..,..1, *Urf .t../ *: f.-C •. . ! f- * 4 » •i ^ ;s If".;, ■*. 4 I -^ ftm J ^ •l-Vi . . "♦•*■■■■•• 1 f * :/.» ';,'!• *r^il (;; i; kZ ^Si,, .' .< . Vi'.' ;S:^.lv .1 r fir ;.:,.>x;i.' '^.. ^v^;