/2^ THE DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GEEATER BRITAIN. SKETCHES OF ITS NAVAL, MILITARY, AND POLITICAL ASPECTS ; ANNOTATED WITH EXTRACTS FROM THE DISCUSSIONS THEY HAVE CALLED FORTH IN THE PRESS OF GREATER BRITAIN. BY CAPTAIN J. C. R. COLOMB, F.S.S., F.R.G.S., AND FELLOW ROTAL COLONIAL INSTITUTE. mxib IX m^' LONDON: EDWARD STANFORD, 55, CHARING CROSS, S.W. 1880. C12 PREFACE. As a Royal Commission, limited in its nature and local in its constitution, is now sitting to investigate portions of the subject of the follow- ing pages, I am induced to lay them before the general reader. In doing so I venture to offer the facts they con- tain to the earnest attention of those whose broad national sympathies and instincts are superior to the provincial prejudices of political partizanship. J . C R. C. Dkoumquinna, Kenmabe, December 1879. CONTENTS. -•- rAOK ^^Ai' to/ace title Text ok Koyal Commission tiii CHAPTER I. Introductoky anu Political 1 CHAPTER II. TiiK Navy and the Colonies 14 CHAPTER III. Colonial Defknce 35 CHAPTER IV. Impeiual anu Colonial Responsibilities in Wau ,. .. 93 CHAPTER V. Naval and Military Raw Resources of the Colonies ,. 157 CHAPTER VI. Naval and Military Developed Resources 200 APPENDICES. No. I. — Extract from the Naval Prize Essay, by Captain P. H. CoLOMB, R.N 249 „ II.— Extract from Lecture by General Collinson, R.E. 257 „ III. — Extract from Lecture by Lieut.-Col. Strange, li--^ 259 Extract from ' Gazette,' \2th September, 1879. Downing Sthef.t, Septemher dth, 1879. The Queen has been pleased to issue a Commission under Her Majesty's Royal Sign Manual to the effect following : — * ♦ • » » Whereas we have thought it expedient, for divers good causes and considerations, that a Commission should forthwith issue to inquire into the condition and suffi- ciency of the means both naval and military, provided for the defence of the more important sea-ports within our Colonial Possessions and their dependencies, and of the stations established or required within our said posses- sions and dependencies for coaling, refitting, or repairing the ships of our Navy, and for the protection of the commerce of our Colonies with the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, with each other, and with foreign countries : And whereas it is expedient to consider and determine in which of our stations and ports it is desirable, on account of their strategical or commercial importance, to provide an organized system of defence, in addition to such general protection as can be afforded by our Naval forces ; and whether such defence should consist of permanent works manned by garrisons of Imperial or local troops, or both combined, or of any local naval organization or other armaments and appliances : And whereas it is desirable to consider whether, and in what proportions, the cost of such measures of defence should be divided between the Imperial Government and Vlll TEXT OP ROYAL COMMISfllON. the Colonies to which they rohite, or ahouhl bo wholly defrayed by the Im{)erial Govornm(;nt or by the Colonies : Now know ye that we, reposing great trust and con- fidence in your zeal, knowledge, and ability, have autho- rized and appointed, and do by these presents authorize and appoint you, the said Henry Howard Molyneaux, Earl of Carnarvon, Hugh Culling Eardley Childers, Sir Henry Thurstan Holland, Sir Alexander ]\[ilne, Sir John Lintorn Arabin Simmons, Sir Henry Barkly, Thomas Brassey, and Robert George Crookshank Hamilton to be our Commissioners for the purpose of such inquiries as aforesaid, and that you may offer such suggestions as may seem to you meet as to the best means (regard being had to the works completed and in progress, and to the ordinary number of our naval and military forces voted by Par- liament) of providing for the defence and protection of our Colonial Possessions and commerce as aforesaid, special attention being given to the necessity of providing safe coaling, refitting, and repairing stations in such of our Colonial Possessions and their dependencies as you may deem best suited for the requirements of our fleet and mercantile marine in time of war. m DEFENCE ov GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTORY. For the first time in tlie history of our Empire we are about to inquire — How to defend it ? The fact of our taking such a great and unprecedented step has attracted but little notice ; " a suspected murder at Richmond" would command infinitely more. Proof is thus furnished of the necessity for such inquiry, for the comparative silence with which the official announcement was received by the home press and public indicates how little the multitude knows of what concerns it most. It is therefore desirable it should be encouraged to learn, and though a Royal Commission may be little more than a convenient political " limbo " for inconvenient questions, it is nevertheless a great public instructor ; it collects authentic facts, and by their subsequent publication knowledge is in- creased and attention awakened. It is possible the larger portion of " the public " B ,'/ 2 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. do not even know that there is an intimate and indissohible connection between the state of the defences of particular colonial ports (respecting which the Commission is to inquire) and the per- sonal safety of the inhabitants of Great Britain and Ireland. Did the people of the United Kingdom believe this public inquiry concerned their own individual interests so closely, the announce- ment of the Commission would, doubtless, have at once received a warmer welcome. It is, there- fore, uuhappily necessary to explain that, according to the terms of the Commission, its fundamental object may be thus shortly expressed : — 1 . To inquire and leport on the steps necessary to adopt to ensure that in war the people of these islands shall not be starved into submission, and that the communications of Great with Greater Britain shall not be cut. 2. To consider how the burden of cost resulting from taking these necessary steps should be appor- tioned between Great and Greater Britain ? There are thus two apparently distinct problems submitted to the examination of the Commission ; each concern Great and Greater Britain, though widely different in their nature. Having shortly explained the nature of inquiry, in order to draw attention to its extreme import- ance, it is further necessary to offer preliminary remarks on each of the two questions submitted to its consideration. INTRODUCTORY. As regards the first, — This is a strategical problem, the complexity of which only arises from the fact of its necessarily involving both naval and military considerations, and its scope is only limited by the waters of the world. That our Empire should have drifted often peril- ously near whirlpools of war, without any inquiry into so obviously necessary provisions for its safety, is perhaps the most remarkable feature of its naval and military history. The only justification per- haps for such criminal neglect, is the memory of a naval past so brilliant and so dazzling as to render it difficult to see clearly those things on which now depends our naval future; seeing nothing, we have refused to believe that there could be as regards " naval supremacy," any question at all. Our national naval policy thus became simply a policy of blind trust. While the Royal Commission on National Defences in 1859 calmly left " the ex- tended commerce," and consequently the food supply of Great Britain, to the protection of the fleet ; a select Committee of the House of Commons, 1861, declared Greater Britain must, for its defence, " trust mainly to naval supremacy." Without pausing to inquire into the altered conditions and principles requiring fulfilment to enable naval power to perform the twofold task then and in the future, the Empire took a new departure, and with these two reports as its passports set out on a voyage of purely military discovery. The adven- B 2 4 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. turea of a naval Empire in search of a purely mili- tary career, are at once painful and instructive ; and it is interesting to note that the " intelligent Zulu" has shaken more than one belief; for public confidence in Lord Cardwell's schemes for securing British safety by purely military means — regard- less of either naval requirements or colonial ar- rangements — received a severe check at St. Vincent, and finally collapsed in the bush of South Africa. Meantime, while the public has been dreaming of a military future and of proud honour yet to be won by driblets of half-trained English boys con- quering great hosts on imaginary battle-fields somewhere in Asia Minor or Eastern Europe, British commerce has been extending and Greater Britain developing, and the official Gazette calls us back to reflect that after all we are not a military nation but a great naval Empire, and are quite in the dark as to its necessities, even under the known circumstances of modern naval warfare, and have been wilfully blind to those commonplace require- ments which are essential to British safety. It is for these reasons it appears desirable to submit to the consideration of the general public the following chapters. They deal with the sub- ject, now about to be officially and publicly inves- tigated, and are selections from many similar efforts during past years,^ purposely framed with the ex- press object of obtaining this public inquiry, and * Commencing 1866. INTRODUCTORY. in this respect they have the merit of an entirely practical, yet partial, success. Practical, because the inquiry for which they strove has been granted, and the nature of this inquiry officially committed to the Commission is identical with that herein defined as necessary,* and, as will be seen, persistently advocated throughout these writings ; partial, because the composition of the Commission is essentially and most disappointingly different. Greater Britain is left out in the cold, without any representation on the Commission which is to determine questions vital to her various interests. Returning, however, to the "primary question to be investigated by this Commission, and with which the text of the following chapters deals, the reader is warned that the views so put forth rest upon the assumption that we are an Empire, and that it is essential, not only to " British interests," but to the civilization and peace of the world, we should remain so. It may, in the eyes of some, be almost a crime to use the word Empire to describe the British position ; it may even be a matter of opinion whether, in a political sense, the aggregate of colonial interests over which Queen Victoria reigns can be properly described by the word Empire, but it is a matter of fact that, taking the mother country and her colonies together, no other word than Empire describes our geographical position ; nor can it be denied that the people of this geogra- * Vide pp. 32, 87, 97, &c. 6 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. phical Empire have as much right to assert a united claim to a common nationality as the people of Bulgaria, for example, and therefore should be prepared to preserve it. If this be admitted, it follows, as a matter of course, that British duty necessitates the taking of ordinary precautions for the defence of our geographical Empire as a whole ^ and then are we led to the direct conclusion that British defence must be Imperial both in its objects and its nature. Doubtless the question is hugely wide ; but it is hoped the following chapters will sufficiently show that by the practical application of simple first principles, the broader features of its solution are in no way beyond the comprehen- sion of the most ordinary mind. The real value of these papers entirely depends upon whether the first principles are true? and whether they are truthfully applied ? and here the reader must form his own deliberately calm opinion, irrespective of all considerations as to where he may find him- self landed by logical conclusions from which — if the premises are correct — there can be no escape. It is necessary, in all humility, to say this ; because, unless I misread altogether the popular view and ordinary conception of national defence, we have been in the past, and are even now, apparently led more by fancies than by facts. In 1859, we fancied that France furnished a model for British defensive necessities; in ISQ6, we fancied it had become a question whether Prussia did not INTRODUCTORY. 7 furnish a better. Sedan firmly established the fancy that Germany was the best ; but 1879 brings before us the fact that Germany has no Greater Germany, and that we are not prepared to protect our commerce, nor even to guard the food supply of these two little islands in war. When I recall the supiemely placid contempt with which some years ago my reasons for urging this inquiry were treated by the popular mind wrapt in such fancies, and the official brain vainly endeavouring to please it, the announcement of a Royal Commission now to hold this very inquiry is but another proof that a little truth may have a great triumph. Relative to the purely naval, military, and strategical aspects of Imperial Defence, it is not necessary here to say more. Ample materials for serious thought and careful consideration will be found in the text, written as it was in the anxious hope of leading people to think out the question independently for themselves. In passing, how- ever, to a few introductory remarks on the political aspects involved in the problem, which turn mainly on the element of " cost," I must add one remark. The indulgence of " fancies " in social life is universally acknowledged to be expensive, equally so is it a costly item in national expenditure. A nation, or an Empire, must pay heavily for such indulgence, even though in the end there naturally be very little indeed to show for it. 8 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Not till our war forces aie re-organized in a manner perfectly adapted to the necessities of our Empire — exceptionally situated and essentially different from all others in the world — can that great auditor History, "write off" what has been wasted on popular military delusions. Even now, who can accurately estimate what our French, Prussian, and German '•^fancies" have cost us, though all are aware we have uncommonly little, if anything at all, to show for them ? Turning, then, to the next problem submitted to the Commission, — viz. the distribution of the cost of measures necessary, for Imperial safety, between Great and Greater Britain. It may be fairly described as a constitutional " Gordian-knot," which has taken busy British brains, working in all four quarters of the world, more than a centui j to tie. They have done their work so wpII that now only the sword of repre- sentation can ever cut it. Those of my readers who do not accept this assertion are referred to the notes to the following pages, which give in her own words the views of Greater Britain on the all-important matter of cost and its control. These notes are simply extracts from the discus- sions which Chapters III. and IV. raised in the press of Greater Britain.* These expressions of * None arc appended to Chapters V. and VI., as the Institution, before which they were delivered as lectures, excludes politics from its discussions ; to attach, therefore, political criticisms to these chapters would neither be respectful nor proper. — J. C. R. 0. INTRODUCTORY. 9 opinion are the utterances of the only voice Greater Britain at present has in Imperial policy ; on this ground alone these notes should command earnest and rebpectful attention. It is only hy and through the press of Greater Britain, we at home can know what are the hopes and fears of her people in respect of Imperial policy, in the direction of which she is constitutionally dumb, though equally concerned. She sits now voiceless at the feet of that Gamaliel whose abode is at Westminster, whose latest exploit is the discovery that childish obstruction is an Imperial power, and whose chief characteristic is apparently a com- pound of hysterical excitement in the presence of national danger, with a morbid craving for micro- scopic introspection when it has passed away. This lawgiver, on whose wisdom the fate of Greater Britain hangs, may speak words of peace to her comfort, or of war to her peril, she has only in silence and humility to obey. What is it to her that an Indian budget or Colonial bill ever finds the halls deserted where Imperial wisdom dwells? let it be enough for her to know that a question on the "state of Rotten Row" crowds them from floor to roof. But even this Gamaliel cannot stop the progress of the world, and while Greater Britain sits silently pondering outside the doors of the huge vestry of Westminster, the balance of such power as material resources and commercial prosperity 10 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. give is quietly but swiftly passing from us to her. Applying this fact to naval and military con- siderations, it will be seen in Chapters V. and VI. that we have as yr done practically nothing whatever to prepare for this great change. Though the primary sources of Great Britain's naval and military power are even now, in some respects, overshadowed by the aggregate of those found in Greater, Britain our internal Imperial policy has ignored so important a fact. If it be asked why, the answer is, because the whole problem of defence resolves itself in practice into one cost; cost in its turn resolves itself into taxes ; and, as taxes cannot be separated from representation, we are at once brought face to face with the naked fact, that Imperial representa- tion lies at the root of the problem of Imperial defence. If, then, Greater Britain's resources are to be at the disposal of the Empire, she cannot be debarred from taking her place in its councils. The real question at issue, therefore, is this — Is Great Britain, with increasing pauperism and, relatively, decreasing trade, prepared to face the future with its accumulating Imperial responsibilities, but with- out relatively accumulating power at command to meet them ? If she is not, then she must either wriggle out of her responsibilities as best she may, or go INTRODUCTORY. 11 honestly into a real partnership with Greater Britain, and abandon the theory that she alone has the brains and the money necessary to carry on an Imperial business both in peace and war. Delay in coming to terms will not diminish the responsibilities of Great Britain, but will increase the resources and the power of Greater Britain, and therefore procrastination only tends to make it more to the advantage of Great Britain, and less to the benefit of Greater Britain, to form such partnership. In any case. Greater Britain will have many words to say on the subject, indeed has much to say now, even on that one aspect of the question — defence. It was, therefore, of extreme importance to let Greater Britain, by means of these notes, speak in the words of its own press direct to the reader of the text. Their distinct utterances will sufficiently warn him that Imperial Defence cannot be settled on any lasting basis simply by naval and military science, and they forbid the vain hope that the Royal Com- mission — in the composition of which the principle of Colonial representation is excluded — can do more thUn suggest to Greater Britain what she has a clear right not to accept, and what Great Britain would, were the positions reversed, cer- tainly reject, viz. to pay bills for war purposes without any control over the Items, nor any voice in the question which rules the total — peace or war? 12 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. A French paper * reviewing Chapter IV., thus tersely expressed the present position of the pro- blem of British Imjjcrial Defence : " Ces impossi- bilites actuelles sont des impossibilite's de legisla- tion;" but it added, "en cas d'urgence il est probable qu'elles seraient promptement repolues." As we, however, cannot look forward with com- placency to internal revolution being added to external war, nor for a case of emergency such as would over-ride constitutional government, we should calmly survey our real position now, and hope the force of public opinion may resolve the diflSculties of our own creation, which stand in the way of the solution of the problem of Imperial Defence. It is to be hoped that the Eoyal Commission now sitting is but a preliminary investigation, a preparation for such measures as shall draw together Great and Greater Britain by a closer and more enduring tie. The Gazette announcement of 12th September, 1879, may perhaps mark a point of new departure in our naval, military, and political history. It is, at all events, an official intimation that the time has come for a great question to descend from the spaceless region of speculative thought, and present itself to the business-like examination of "any three or more commissioners" — just like any ordinary Gas or Sewer Bill ! It may vanish back • La Liberie CoUmiale, June 17, 1877. INTRODUCTORY. 13 whence it came ; or, it may take its place in the arena of practical politics to bo torn to pieces m the conflict of local parties, or, perhaps, prove stronger than both by producing new political combinations. 14 OKFKNCK OF ORKAT AND GREATKR KRITAIN. CHAPTER II. THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES.* TnERE is but too much reason to fear that neither the Navy nor the Colonies command at present suffi- cient popular attention. Nine Englishmen out of ten are but too apt to accept the assertions that the Navy is the " right arm of England," and that the colonies are the " glory of the mother country," without any strict examination into the reasons supporting them. Lord Palmerston's declaration that " steam has bridged the channel," is as often repeated as the fact that it has done something infinitely greater is forgotten : it has bridged the water distances which separate the colonies from tlie mother country and from each other. Those who perpetually dwell upon purely military arrangements necessary to resist invasion take the bridging of the channel by steam for their text; and its truth is undeniable. In 1859, public opinion awoke to the unpalatable conviction that — in the words of the Royal Commission — "The nation cannot be considered as secured against invasion if depending for its defence on the fleet alone." This " Royal Commission on the National * This chapter originally appeared in the British Trade Journal, 1 Jan., 1872. THE NAVY AND THE COLONIEB. 16 Defence of the United Kingdom," in 1850, broke down some of our most cheriHlied and time- honoured popular l)elief8 and prejudices. Those amongst us, however, wlio remember the course of events and the circumstances which ultimately led to the assembly of that Commission, have doubtless not forgotten that, for years previously, evidence had been accumulating, and men's minds had been working towards the conclusions which that Commission authoritatively expressed. There are signs now on the surface of public thought indicating a tendency to extend the outlook on our preparations for defence beyond the shores of that small portion of our Empire which absorbed all our attention twenty years ago. It may be useful, therefore, to glance at some facts which may assist us in arriving at practical conclusions. To appreciate their value it is necessary briefly to call to mind the salient features of our defensive arrangements and policy from 1859 to 1879. The first thing of striking importance is the growth of a purely military spirit amongst us, plainly ex- hibited (1) by the spontaneous action of the nation in arming and organising itself into a volunteer force of some 170,000, binding itself to serve for the defence of Great Britain only; (2) the re- suscitation and total re-organization by successive Governments of the Militia and Yeomanry, a force of some 150,000, legally bound to serve only in Great Britain and Ireland; (3) the complete re- 16 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. organization of our regular army — " horse, foot, and artillery " ; (4) the construction of splendid fortifications and military works in the United Kingdom, at Plymouth, Portsmouth, Chatham, &c., which did not exist twenty years ago. Now, the whole of these great, extraordinary, and rapid movements in a purely military direction spring originally from a feeling of national insecurity, created by the fall of the national confidence in the power of " the wooden walls of old England " to protect these islands from invasion, and the substi- tution of no amount of thickness of armour for wood can win back that blind and implicit bygone trust so rudely shaken by a practical appreciation of the change produced by steam. But, besides all these solid proofs of the quick growth of a purely military spirit, there are others more subtle, but nevertheless as sure. Most Englishmen would now be ashamed to acknowledge ignorance of the broad features of the military history of recent wars, or the leading principles of military opera- tions. The press and the current literature teem with articles of a purely military nature, and the whole question of national defence is in the vast majority of instances, treated from a purely military standpoint. On the other hand, the Navy, as a sort of abstract quantity of national necessity, absorbs no such popular attention, though th service is, as it deserves to be, most popular. It would be very hard to find an Englishman, uncon- THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 17 nected with the service, who is ashamed to say he knows nothing at all of recent naval history, and still less of the broad principles of naval operations and arrangements. The nation gets angry and excited when an ironclad goes to the bottom, and, from ignorance of naval matters, generally blames the wrong man; but, in the intervals between mishaps which must occasionally happen, the popu- lar mind is somewhat lethargic, if not wholly apathetic, in its regard of much that appertains to "England's right arm." It insists it shall be always most powerful, and must, at a moment's notice, be ready to " sweep the sea " ; but what really constitutes naval power, or how fleets are to *' sweep " the sea in days of steam, it does not care to inquire. There is, further, a remarkable differ- ence in the general method of approaching naval, as compared with military, questions, even in the House of Commons. As a general rule, military questions are dealt with on broad principles. The amount and nature of force required to defend G-reat Britain, or India, or anywhere else; the proportion of artillery to infantry &c it is pos- sible to discuss with a full House, because the sub- ject is well understood ; but all naval discussions generally empty the House, and turn usually on the stability of a particular ship, the thickness of a particular plate, the efficiency of a certain torpedo, or the cost of some shipbuilding material. Naval debates show but too often and too clearly that we 18 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. are more or less really " at sea " as regards general naval principles. We are but too apt to excuse ourselves by attributing all our naval difficulties to the " advance of science," but we have never applied ourselves to ascertain whether these diffi- culties are real or imaginary, or whether they are not aggravated, if not originated, in the decline of national interest in naval affairs, resulting in a neglect to seek out and define general principles of naval policy. To sum up the results of our national defensive efforts of the past twenty years, it may be said, as regards the army, we have sought out, defined, and carried out the general principles to govern our military arrangements, we have taken every advantage of "advancing science" to improve and perfect the details ; but with respect to the Navy we have only used "advancing science " for the improvement of some details, such as ships, without even the faintest national effort to seek out the great general principles which must guide our naval arrangements. This is doubly remarkable when it is remembered that it was the change produced on naval operations by steam that has led us so far afoot towards a purely military goal, and caused us, so to speak, to turn our back on those new naval principles which are the very essence of the problem submitted by steam for England's solution. It would be impossible in the space at command even to glance at more than one of these great n THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 19 principles which mubt guide our naval arrange- ments in these days of steam, but which, neverthe- less, we neglect. Take, for example, the primary- element on which all steam fleets must rely — coal. Button-hole the first intelligent-looking gentleman casually met, and ask him to explain what the national arrangements are for the supply of coal to British fleets all over the world in war. No satisfactory reply will be given. Ask any number of Knights of the Shire, and you are tolerably certain to get no explanation. Ask naval officers, and from them you certainly will get information which will hardly be satisfactory. Not many months ago, for example, the Admiral who com- manded our China fleet in 1877, Admiral Ryder, stated as follows : — " I have just returned from the command on the Japan and China Station, and with an imminent prospect of war, I felt very doubtful whether I should ever get a pound of coal without taking it forcibly from a neutral." In 1854 a magnificent British fleet steamed away to the Baltic. Her Majesty bade it adieu, and with it went the great heart of England. The Admiral's signal of " Sharpen your cutlasses " is I remembered by many, but the fact that the fleet H went to one rendezvous while its coal went to another is forgotten by all. Before we blame "advancing science" for the absence of well- defined national naval principles, we should at least take a business-like view of our naval arrange- c 2 20 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. ments. The nation is not free from well-deserved reproach if it neglects now to inquire what these arrangements are. In the navy estimates for 1878-79, at page 201, will be seen, among other items, 73,500/. charged to Deptford Yard for coals for the fleet abroad ; that is all the information given on the subject. Who can picture what momentous issues may hang in war on what is unwritten on page 201 of our naval estimates, but on which even now some light is thrown by the above-quoted statement of the Admiral, whose station was bounded on the north by Russian waters, and whoso naval base, Hong Kong, is but eight days' steam from the Russian naval base, Vladivostok ? It is apparently Japan, or perhaps China, to which the Admiral probably refers under the term " neutral." Taking " coal forcibly " from Japan means conflict with a power possessing a respectable ironclad squadron, or, in the case of China, possessing dockyards, one of which, 117 acres in extent, has all modern appliances, and in ten years has turned out fifteen war steamers, with an aggregate tonnage of 15,000 tons; whose navy is further supplemented with such formidable wasps as the * Alpha,' &c., built in England. As the annual value of our trade with China and Japan approaches 15,000,000/., the arrangements for supplying and securing to our fleet in war ample supplies of coal is surely a question of very considerable national importance ; yet it does not THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 21 command popular sympathy. But the question of coal supply does not simply concern the power of the British war fleets to keep the sea ; on it rests the whole complex operations of our steam trade. Steam companies take care to provide ample fuel for their wants, and store it at the most convenient points along the great highroads of the [sea. Though, as a general rule, these vessels have far superior coal-carrying capacity to any of our war- ships, they are nevertheless dependent on fixed coaling-stations, the great majority of which are on British territory. The main object of hostile cruisers would be to damage our sea trade, and no more effective mode could suggest itself than burn- ing the coals of our steam mercantile fleets. If the defence of these British coal-stores abroad is to be left to sea-going ships, instead of such ships being at their proper places on the high seas, they will be in war snugly lying off" the coal wharves. Here is another principle which " advancing science," at all events, does not obscure, but it is not on the programme of present popular favour. There is yet one more principle of naval arrangements to which, while excluding from consideration several others, it may be as well to refer. Were the Horse Guards to send a cavalry force on any ex- pedition without spare horseshoes, or the means of making them, there would be a general outcry; yet the nation silently acquiesces in the dispatch of whole fleets, composed of ships which are com- 22 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. plicated masses of intricate machinery, to distant parts of the world without providing them with means of repair, floating or fixed, and does not even provide dock accommodation for war-ships at 80 important a place as the Cape, commanding as it does the great pass leading from one hemisphere to the other. Having thus indicated roughly some matters really worthy of national consideration, and in no way above the ordinary conception of the least intelligent among us, let us return to another aspect of the results of the past twenty years. Careful examination will show that while our preparations to resist invasion with purely military forces have enormously increased, the possibility of invasion has not in any like propor- tion increased if measured by the steam transport at command of possible invading powers. If such examination be diverted into another channel, the following curious circumstance is brought to light: — As before remarked, beyond improving the details, such as ships, of our naval arrange- ments, we have done but little in the direction of naval progress, though during that period the number of our steamers employed in the foreign trade has quietly and noiselessly quadrupled. This means that for every steamer requiring protection in war in 1859 there are now four, and that our trading operations are therefore now four times as !!' dependent on coal as in 1859. In 1859 the total tonnage of British vessels which entered and ^ THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 23 cleared at ports in the United Kingdom was 13,000,000 odd; in 1877 it was 53,000,000 odd. "We have therefore now four times as great a national stake on the water as we had in 1859, at which period we commenced giving our exclusive attention to purely military arrangements. It is instructive to think of facts such as these, and it cannot be too often repeated that one-half the people of these islands are now dependent on over-sea transport for food. It is also a matter for serious reflection that other nations are making rapid strides in naval develop- ment, while two new naval powers, Germany and Italy, have risen out of the troubled Europe of the two last decades. We have been so engrossed with secrets of late military successes, that we are seemingly in some danger of becoming blind to what has followed in naval directions. We are hardly justified in complacently reckoning up the number of our ironclads and comparing the total with those of other nations. There is a wide difference between a purely naval attack on a nation absolutely dependent on the sea, and a purely naval attack on a power not so situated. The defence of innumerable and enormously long sea-roads, which girdle the globe, is a totally different problem from that of a simple and single coast-line. The "advance of science" has, by producing torpedoes, made that difference all the greater. Experience has proved them to be of 24 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. great efficacy in securing a coast-line from naval attack, but of small account in the defence of a line of communication on the high sea. An ex- tended position, connected by long lines, requires a much greater force to maintain it than to attack it. An insignificant attacking force can harass and worry it, unless the most careful, painstaking attention be paid to strategical laws, based on accurate knowledge, and all arrangements are made subject to those laws. This is as true of sea as of land positions, and it is as applicable to the great sea-roads of our Empire as to the frontiers and passes of Afghanistan. In the one case, how- ever, the general public is an excited and interested student ; in the other, merely a careless, indolent spectator of what it does not even profess to com- prehend. The extent of our sea commerce is so great that we take Admiralty assertion as to the provision for its adequate protection in war as much on trust as most peojDle do the statements of astronomers respecting the distance of planets from the earth. To most minds it is too fatiguing to attempt to inquire closely into a subject which in area covers all the oceans and seas of the world, and has to deal with millions of tons of shipping carrying cargoes of hundreds of millions of pounds sterling value. Hence it is that our war fleets are scattered, meandering over the globe, and no one apparently knows how in war they are to have supplies of coal, or means of supply and repair, nor 1 THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 25 on what great principles the whole naval machinery of England is to accomplish the work it will then have to do. It is the fashion to blame the Admiralty when anything goes wrong ; but the nation has yet to define for Admiralty guidance what are the car- dinal principles on which naval preparations for war are to be based. It has never insisted upon a public inquiry into the changes in our mari- time position produced by steam and by the de- velopment of our commerce. It is apparently content to go on in days of steam as it did in days of sail power, and hence it is that we have enor- mously costly war-vessels carrying but little coal, and huge mercantile steam fleets, while no national movement whatever has been made for the supply of coal to our war fleets when hostilities occur, nor have we taken precautions for the security of the coal depots of our mercantile fleets when war breaks out. We have water-roads 13,000 miles in length, commanded by points of British territory, but there is not a place of refuge where helpless merchant ships in war can find even temporary safety or security along their whole length. The present Admiralty, in preparing to supplement the war navy with the best of mercantile steamers, deserves the gratitude of the nation, which should in return strengthen the hands of that department by insisting that the coals and supplies for the maintenance of our fleets should be adequately 26 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. and locally protected, so as to leave the fleets free to do their work in guarding the great passes of the ocean. Whether it bo the business of the War Office to see to this or not, is a departmental ques- tion of infinitely small importance. If England makes up its mind to have the work done, it will not tolerate a paper war between two departments respecting whose business it is to do it. It is evident that as the absolute necessity of arming our mercantile marine in war becomes more apparent, so will the value and importance of our fixed points commanding the great water-roads become more clear as a great element of maritime strength. They must not merely be protected coal depots, but naval storehouses, where guns, gun- mountings, and ammunition suitable for the use of the mercantile marine can be safely stored. It would be a fatal mistake to attempt to interfere in any shape or form in peace with the internal arrangements of merchant ships for war purposes, if in any way detrimental to their peaceful avo- cations ; and this Mr. Barnaby, the chief con- structor, has most happily recognized. It would be, also, simply preposterous to attempt to place in peace any restrictions whatever on the freedom of action, or on the operations of the mercantile marine, in order to provide for the contingency of war. There is hardly any great branch of national industry so exceptionally sensitive of State inter- ference as the shipping trade ; none so dangerous THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 27 a subject for experimental legislation. If, therefore, we are to be prepared — as we undoubtedly must be prepared — to arm our mercantile marine on the outbreak of war, we must recognize the fact that we shall not know beforehand exactly in what part of tiie world the particular vessels we have selected for the purpose will, at that moment, bo found. If we have, say, one hundred of these vessels on the Admiralty list, probably not more than sixty may be at home at any one time. Consequently, if provision for arming them is only to be found in England, two things must happen : — 1. Only about one-half of such reserve of ships can bo at once armed. 2. The remainder will have either to run the gauntlet home unarmed, or idly wait wherever they may happen to be for armament dispatched from home; and as warlike stores cannot be risked at such a time, armed vessels will have to take them out. Such vessels will, during the per- formance of that service, be so much deducted from the force available for other duties on the sea. It is very evident, therefore, that if we are to combine efficiency with economy, and freedom of action of the mercantile marine in peace with its readiness of preparation for war, we must be prepared to arm our mercantile steamers at many points away from home ; and the great coaling- stations of our merchant fleet along the lines and at both ends of our sea communications are the most convenient points at which those vessels can ^it^ 28 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. bo SO equipped. Such considorationH as these point first to the great colonies, the natural termini of most of our chief water-communications, and next to the smaller intermediate British territories forming stations along the routes. Before oflfering necessarily brief remarks on the colonial portion of our subject, it may be instruc- tive to summarize some remarkable changes which, from a defensive point of view, the twenty years just closed has brought about in our colonial history. We have since 1859 withdrawn regular troops from all our great colonies having respon- sible governments, except the Cape. In the interval which has elapsed the United Kingdom has gone so far as to sell old military clothing and muskets to Canada, while Canada has developed a military system capable of placing 600,000 men under arms, and, as all are aware, has tendered offers of substantial military assistance to us within the last few months. The colonies of Australasia have organized local military forces, and erected de- fensive works, and the Cape is at this moment engaged in providing military means of internal local defence. The West Indian colonies do not appear to have followed in the same path. The example set by the mother country has not been without its influence on her children, and, there- fore, it is not surprising to find that in naval directions little has been done. Canada has pro- vided herself with a naval force of small armed THE NAVY AND TOR COLONIES. 29 stoamers for lake eorvico. Victoria is distinguished by the possession of the ' Cerberus ' and ' Nelson,* and a naval establishment of some 350 of all ranks. We may look in vain elsewhere for any advance as regardp naval preparations in any of our great colonies at all proportionate either to their military progress or even to their great mercantile development. If we cast our eyes towards India we find the abolition of the Indian navy as the most striking event of our recent Imperial naval history. Passing from this cursory review of colonial and military changes, let us now throw a side-glance at the developm.ant of the trade of the four great groups of our Colonial Empire during nearly the same Tjeriod. In 1859 the total value of exports and imports of Aus- tralasia was 48,000,000/. odd; in 1876 it was 88,000,000/. odd, or nearly double. In 1859 that of British North America was 20,000,000/. odd; in 1876 it was over 39,000,000/., also nearly double. In 1859 that of our West Indian Islands was 8,000,000/. odd, while in 1876 it was nearly 11,000,000/. In 1859 that of the Cape was nearly 5,000,000/., while in 1876 it was over 11,000,000/. It is needless to multiply proofs of the enormously increasing dependence of all parts of the British Empire on the freedom of the sea roads except for the purpose of impressing all Englishmen, home and colonial, with the ever- increasing responsibilities of naval protection. We 30 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. appear to be in some danger of forgetting that the purely military defence of our Empire as a whole must ever be secondary to its naval security. No amount of military force can swirriy and therefore in an Empire such as ours it can only move to defence or attack through the agency of our mer- cantile marine under the shelter of sea war-power and sufficient naval strategical arrangements. Putting aside this very interesting question, how- ever, and treating our navy simply as a force for the protection of British sea commerce, the fol- lowing concluding remarks may serve a useful purpose. The British navy is furnished, paid, and main- tained exclusively by the United Kingdom, but a very large proportion of British sea commerce it will have to protect in war belongs to other parts of our Empire. For example, the number of vessels reristered at ports of the United Kingdom is 25,09'\ iith an aggregate of 6,336,360 tons, while the number of vessels registered at ports of the British possessions is 13,158, with an aggre- gate of 1,797,477 tons. The rest of the Empire, therefore, has on the register of its ports half the total number of ships and about one quarter of the aggregate tonnage of the total British mercantile marine. The gross revenue of British posseasions is about equal to that of the United Kingdom ; and while the revenue of the United Kingdom is annually charged with some 10,000,000^. for the THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 31 naval protection of British mercantile marine, British possessions are not chargeable with any sum whatever for such protection. India, however, contributes about 69,000/. a year on account of the expenses of the fleet on the Indian Station ; but the rest of the Empire bears no share of the naval expenses incurred or to be incurred for the pro- tection of its sea commerce in war. The extraordinary commercial development, pro- gressing by " leaps and bounds," must sooner or later force upon all Englishmen's attention the question of mutual responsibility and mutual effort in the really imperial matter of sea defence. Every year's delay in coming to a common understanding on the subject may possibly render solution more difficult, and there is but too much reason to fear that neglect now may lead the United Kingdom ultimately either to attempt high-handed measures which would surely end in disastrous failure, or towards a blind repudiation of responsibilities which would be the beginning of a lamentable end. It is earnestly to be hoped when this question receives the popular attention it merits that no ill- considered effort will be made to settle it off-hand by any simple " pound, shillings, and pence " arrangement. There are other grave questions behind which forbid such simple mode of dealing with so complex a problem. The strength of the English race does not rest on money-bags ; it lies deep in the hearts of a great and free people, who. I t 32 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. above all things, love fair play. If, therefore, the extraordinary anomaly respecting naval burdens of Empire is ever to be a thing of the past, it can only satisfactorily result from friendly consultation and reasonable compromise. We must not ask our colonies simply for cash, but we must enlist their active sympathy and practical help in a common effort for a common good. If the foundation-stones of any real system of truly British naval defence are ever to be laid, the colonies must be called into consultation on the matter. We on our part must show real desire to join with them in carrying out, not only systematic and well-defined preparations for ensuring in war the safety of those great water- roads common to us all, but we must do more. We must show our determination to secure them in peace their due proportion of the honour and prestige attaching to a great and noble service, as well as those more solid advantages arising from the expenditure ©f capital and labour incidental to its maintenance. Englishmen are great at com- promise, and it is hard to suppose that a truly representative Royal Commission or inquiry into a matter of such vital importance to each and all parts of the Empire would fail to lay down prin- ciples ensuring ultimate co-operation and practical success. It is a hopeful sign when men like Mr. Froude, Sir Julius Yogel, Mr. Brassey, M.P., Mr. Donald Currie, General Collinson, Sir E. W. Watkin, M.P., and others are found giving, from ■%. THE NAVY AND THE COLONIES. 33 various points of view, notes of warning, and it is earnestly to be hoped their voices will not be raised in vain. When the force of public opinion, home and colonial, grapples the question in a business-like practical manner, the germs of possible combination for naval defensive purposes between England anp her colonies will probably be discovered in those small neglected points of British territory which command the water-roads of both. Most of them private enterprise has converted into important coaling-stations, and their eflScient local protection will, in war, be a matter of common concern to every portion of the Empire. That being so, pro- vision for their safety is a matter in which every part of the Empire is vitally interested. It is more than possible that an expenditure of some 4,000,000/. would provide all of them with ample permanent means of necessary local protection. In the case of the great home fortifications, con- structed since 1859, +>>e money required was raised by loan. Is tho whole British Empire in combination, with its gross annual revenue of some 158,000,000/., too poor to raise a loan suflScient to protect the points which, in a strategical sense, command its water-roads, and, from a naval poiut of view, are vital to the power of locomotion both of its war navy and its huge mercantile marine ? Let it be remembered that we cannot in war " go down to the sea in ships, nor occupy our business o 34 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. in great waters," save under the fostering care and shelter of armed ships, now absolutely de- pendent on coal for efficient protective power. In 1859 we realized the fact that "steam has bridged the Channel." Is 1879 to pass without any visible proof, however slight, of a national recognition of the truth that steam has bridged the water distances which separate the colonies from the mother country ? Finally, it is to be observed that when attempts at invasion are, in a naval sense, possible, attempts to cut our sea communications are more than possible ; they are even probable, because in the existing state of our naval arrangements and un- defined naval principles, the operation involves the application of a much smaller naval-attacking force. We have by the creation of purely military forces, and by the erection of great home fortifi- cations, given in the past twenty years the most ample practical proofs of our national belief in one danger, while during the same period our neglect of naval principles is a striking national memorial of our utter disbelief in the other, perhaps the more real of the two. ( 35 ) CHAPTER III. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE.* Though this subject has direct reference to the colonies, it is necessary to observe that " Colonial Defence " cannot be considered as an abstract ques- tion, any more than that " National Defence " can be limited in its meaning to the defence of the United Kingdom. The full force of this assertion is not, however, generally understood. When we get frightened on the subject of what is falsely termed " Our National Safety," but one idea is prevalent in the minds of nine people out of ten, to the exclusion of all other considerations ; it is this : — guarding the soil of the British Islands against invasion. In time of profound peace we like to talk of "our vast Colonial Empire, our extended com- merce, and interests in every part of the globe." It sounds big and grand, and, perhaps, some vainly imagine that big swelling words must frighten away aggression ; but when danger, real or supposed, threatens, and the nation is alarmed, we habitually forget that "England with her colonies is still a giant amongst nations, and that Read before the Royal Colonial Institute, June 28tb, 1873. D 2 36 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. without them she would be a dwarf," * and exhibit practically ou" disbelief in the *' giant " by seeking refuge in the " arras of the dwarf." f Look back a few years, and by past events test the truth of this assertion. Take the panic of 1859 and its results. Wo were in a state of wild alarm. We imagined that France threatened our safety, nay, our existence. We took fright at her successful armies, and her powerful fleets, capable of transporting those armies. We stedfastly shut our eyes to the fact tliat the possibility of the invasion of England J involves, as a natural con- * Vide Sir E. Sullivan on ' Our Economic Catos.' t Australia. — " It is easy enough to defend a dwarf, but then he *8 only a dwarf. When the English horn of plenty overflows with the rich produce of her far-off climes, and peace has rest for the sole of her foot, then the magnitude and value of her possessions is eloquently acknowledged. Shall it, then, be a reproach to her that in the hour of her adversity she forgot all this, and selfishly looked merely to the protection of her own chalk cliffs and hedgerows ? We opine not. We have no reason to believe or even to surmise this. What individual politicians may urge matters little when the will of the people is so easily asserted. The giant will remain a giant in war as in peace."— Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874. X West Indies. — " England has grown up to be the greatest maritime power in the world, through her commerce and colonies, quite as much as by the prowess of her arms." — The West Indian, April 2ud, 1874. Canada. — " Twice within a century she has alone and single-handed faced successfully the whole civilized world in arms, and by her naval strategy brought each contest to a glorious as well as profitable con- clusion, despite the dense imbecility and gross ignorance of her states- men and diplomatists ; and now when at her nod armies and fleets would arise in every quarter of the globe, manned and commanded by her own sons or their descendants, her politicians and strategists are striving with might and main to confine her force to the defences of the bathing-machines at Brighton, or the buoys and light-ships on the Mersey. The forefathers of the Manchester school of politicians were ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 37 sequence, the possibility of investment, tbe cutting of the Imperial lines of communication, and attacks upon " our vast Colonial Empire, our extended commerce, and interests in every quarter of the globe"; we, in short, forgot everything except our personal safety, and instead of taking measures for defending the Empire, we were satisfied with taking measures for defending the hedgerows of England. Again, we owe change in our military system to the last panic. We are told by the Govern- ment of the day that England (the dwarf) is now better prepared to resist an attempted invasion than during any past period of her history. How has this result been attained ? By rendering her colonies and possessions (which swell the dwarf into the giant) less capable of resisting attack. wiser in their day and generation — thoroughly understanding the value of the principle of carrying the war ii o Africa." — Volunteer Review, Ottawa, February 2nd, 1875. South Africa. — " Sooner or later the subject of Imperial defence will compel attention. At present very few persons, and these men of little real weight in councils of the Empire, bestow any thought upon it. True, we hear much about national defence, and are somewhat familiar with the question of colonial defence. As popularly under- stood, these two questions have very contracted meanings : the one signifying the protection of the British Islands, and the other the guarding of some particular colonial border. To our thinking, how- ever, national defence can no more be considered an abstract question than colonial defence can be regarded as connected only with the defence of this or of that British colony or dependency. Imperial defence may be said to embrace the former two, as those terms are generally applied. Now, we regard Imperial defence as an obligation binding upon the nation at large." — Port Elizabeth Telegraph, May 23rd, 1874. 38 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. The military policy has been to disarm the giant in order to arm the dwarf. I must, however, here observe that I do not argue against the pressing necessity which existed for defending the Imperial base of operations by withdrawing the insufficient garrisons formerly maintained in the colonial outposts; on the con- trary, I was one of the first to advocate the with- drawal of the few regular troops quartered in certain colonies and possessions,* as a necessary part of a scheme of Imperial defence ; but that scheme did not propose to leave the question of the defence of our colonies and possessions in the air, as has been done. What appears objection- able in the military policy pursued is, that it has been confined to the narrow limits of the defence of the Imperial base, to the exclusion of all con- siderations for the safety of our Imperial com- munications, the security of our colonies, and the maintenance of our power in distant possessions. I therefore venture to assert that before these troops were withdrawn, before the question of military re-organization was practically dealt with, it was the duty of statesmen to cast their eyes beyond the shores of " Happy England," to look beyond the " streak of silver sea," and to face this truth, viz., that the security of the United Kingdom against invasion is but a part of the * For the purpose of concentrating them at certain strategic and Imperial positions. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 39 great question of " National Defence." It is now nearly five years since, at the Royal United Service Institution,* I endeavoured to draw attention to this fact, in these words: — "The defence of the United Kingdom against invasion is an object of primary importance, but to suppose that this is the one thing needful in the matter of national defence, is a grievous error. We are bound to look to the general welfare of the Empire.f The sources of * ' Lectures on the Distribution of our War Forces,' 1869. t West Indies. — " The future relations of England and her colonies have a bearing on the question of colonial defence of more practical impbrtance than any other consideration. Thoy will be found to afford grounds for more satisfaction and encouragement than is derived from the history of tlie past. England has thriven by her colonies, and may reasonably expect to continue to thrive by them in a greater degree in proportion to the development of their resources. Her colonies are at all times, in peace or war, her best allies." — The West Indian, April 10th, 1874. Australia. — " The withdrawal of the regular troops from outlying and detached portions of the British Colonial Empire does not, we are happy to observe, meet with any denunciation in this paper. The policy of concentration has indeed been accepted with almost unanimous concurrence, and in the case of what was thought to be the most valuable portion of the British Colonial Empire, it has called forth such an encouraging demonstration of military capacity for organiza- tion, that no politician of any established reputation would dream of reverting to the principle of garrisoning the colonies with men drawn from any other source than the colonies themselves. It is now admitted on all hands that they are at least as capable of protecting themselves as the people of the United Kingdom are. But wo take it that it was the purjwrt of Captain Colomb to show that the defence of what is called the British Empire involves world-wide considerations, which cannot bo narrowed to the confines of the islands separated from the continent of Europe by the British Channel and the German Ocean. The maintenance of what he calls the Imperial main lines of communi- cation is essential to the successful defence of the Empire, and in effect he invites the colonies to say how they would propose to assist one another in asserting the maritime supremacy of the British 40 DEFENCE OF GREAT AXD OREATER BRITAIN. our greatness are the possession of India, and our commercial prosperity. Our commercial prosperity is in direct proportion to the freedom with which we can carry on trade with our colonies and other countries. Commerce is in fact the link that binds together the several interests of the scattered territories comprising the Empire. . . . Bearing this in mind, let us suppose that the view which limits national defence to the protection of Great Britain and Ireland against invasion be practically adopted, and that the whole resources of the country have been wholly and exclusively directed to rendering the soil of the British Isles secure, and that this object has been fully attained, what would our position be in time of aggressive war on the part of one or more great powers ? Does it not stand to reason that, as the object of all aggressive war is either to acquire territory, or to weaken, if not destroy, the power of the nation against which war is made, the easiest and the safest mode is adopted to carry out these objects : under the circumstances we have supposed, there- fore, an enemy would naturally confine his efforts to destro^'ing our commerce and our power in Empire, for that is really what it amounts to." — Bnsbane Courier^ June 11th, 1874. South Africa. — " It is cheering, after the narrow and selfish views which have been of late years, not only unblushingly advocated, but almost established as political axioms in England, to hear Englishmen once again extending their sympathies, so long coDtracted within the silver streak ; once more recognizing the fact of a British Empire ; once more awake to the prinoi nnion, as absolutely necessary for defence."— rAe Times of Natal, 24th, 1874. !& ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 41 Imlia, leaving the Britiwh Isles to watch his pro- ceeding with impotent dismay." If the heart and citadel of the Empire is alone protected, will it " surprise us to hear " that, when the Empire is attacked, our enemy prefers cutting our unprotected communications and appropriating our undefended colonies and possessions, to a direct assault upon a " small island bristling with bayonets " ? * • Australia. — " The question of colonial defences is one which has at various times, when there were rumours of wars, occupied a t| good deal of attention in England, but it has never yet been considered V: of sufficient importance, or urgency, to require being dealt with in a systematic manner. When Canada a few years a^o was threatened with invasion, the Government of the day expressed its intention, if need were, to defend that dependency with its last man and its last ship; and no doubt, had the occasion arisen, thousands of British soldiers and millions of British money would have beeu poured across the Atlantic. At about the same period all the small military detach- ments which had previously been stationed in the Australian colonies were withdrawn, and we were, in effect, told that we must ourselves provide for the defence of our ' hearths and homes.' Some of our j neighbours set to work, after a fashion, to prepare to receive an enemy : £ New South Wales did a little in the way of fortification at Sydney, as I did Victoria at Port Phillip Heads, Sandridge, and Williamstown ; and % the latter-named colony went so far as to invest in a turret-ship. As a portion of a well-devised scheme, each and all of these works would probably prove effective ; isolated as they are, at the most they could but protect a very limited area. ITie thing, to be successful, must bo treated in a comprehensive way; and that, unfortunately, has not hitherto been the case. Except in conjunction with the Imperial naval and military forces, acting upon some pre-arranged plan, any puny efforts the colonies might individually make would be compara- tively futile." — Queensland Times, June 4th, 1874. New Zealand.—" This is the forcible point in Captain Colomb's excellent paper, and it is one which comes home very closely to every colonist." — The Cornwall Chronicle, June 22nd, 1874. Malta. — " And if England is to maintain that position among the European nations which she has so deservedly earned, she must be prepared to assert that position much sooner, perhaps, than may be generally exiwctcd. That, when (ho hour ol trial and of danger arrives, 42 DEFENCE OP GiiEAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. In tlio celebrated article in tlio Edinburgh Review it is written : " Steam applied to naviga- tion has done at least as much for a defending as for an invading Power; even the stores of coals needed for marine locomotion ire principally ours; and while by the aid of this powerful agent the ships of both nations may scour the coasts with favourable weather at from twelve to fifteen or sixteen miles an hour, the railways which gird the land, to say nothing of the telegraphs, may in all weathers carry the armies which are to guard it and their materiel from point to point at twenty, thirty, or forty." * Now these are the utterances of a master mind, but it is passing strange that it never seems to have occurred to the writer that we cannot limit the field of operations of an opposing fleet. If our enemy's fleets can scour the coasts of " Happy England" at from twelve to fifteen or sixteen miles an hour, they can scour the coasts of " Unhappy Colonies and Possessions " at the same she may be fouDd strong and invulnerable in all points, is a consumma- tion which all her sons cannot but be most anxious to promote."— Fuhlic Oinnion, Malta, April 1st, 1874. Canada. — " We still require i)olitical consideration, and the in- fusion into the councils of the Empire of an element that will always enlarge the political idea, and teach the English people that its defence means something more than the ' hedgerows ' of the United Kingdom. Speaking for ourselves, we want the recognition of the principle that there is no difference in the Imperial policy between the County of Middlesex in England, and the County of Middlesex in the Dominion of Canada." — 2'he Volunteer Review, Canada, January 27th, 1874. • • Germany, France and England.' By the Right Hon. W. E. Gladstone. Edinburgh Review, 1870. ON COLONIAL DSFENCB. 43 rate, where their operations will not be hampered by the presence of any army at all. Even the stores of coal needed for marine locomotion, •* though principally ours," are conveniently situated at comniaiuling points along the Imperial roads, and, by being for the most part totally neglected and undefended, afford a guarantee that the enemy's fleets shall not bo inconvenienced by want of fuel in a raid upon "our vast Colonial empire, our extended commerce, and interests in any part of the globe." It is said that a certain bird when hard pressed in its flight buries its head in the sand, and finds imaginary security because it ceases to see the near approach of danger ; and the present policy pursued by this country in the matter of defence appears to me to be somewhat analogous. Our Imperial Eagle, whose wings cover the seas, buries her head in the sands of the defended shores of England, and blinding her vision of danger with a few men, guns, volunteer reviews, and autumn manoeuvres, her statesmen bid her believe that she is safe ! This is one side of the picture; let us glance briefly at the other. It is not many years ago since our defensive measures were based upon an exactly opposite principle, and one equally dan- gerous to the safety of our Empire. Our armies and our fleets were scattered indiscriminately over the face of the globe, while the United Kingdom 44 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. (the Imperial base of operations) was left destitute of any power of resistance. All our war force was exhausted on means for the direct defence of our colonies and distant possessions, to the exclusion of all considerations relative to the security of the Imperial base.* The defenceless state of the British Islands at the time of which I speak, can best be pictured by ♦ Australia. — " That there has been a change of policy in respect to the disposition of the British forces, everybody knows, and few ri The scattered armies were of small account after all. Any little hubbub over the determination to concentrate rather than dis- tribute the Imperial forces has disappeared, and many wonder why so much fuss was made about so little. A ' pressing necessity ' did exist for defending ' the Imperial base of operations ' by withdrawing the insufficient garrisons formerly maintained on the colonial outposts; for, with slight exception, they were needless, expensive, and happily got rid of. To the exception we shali recur. Meantime it may be observed that the colonies are quite satisfied with their own little armies. They will be able to do all the work that is required of them. The New South Wales soldiers are men who literally have an interest in defending their homes, for the guerdon of their service and efficiency is a portion of the land they occupy. This material stimulus to patriotism is, however, unnecessary, for in a time of imminent peril our citizen army would bravely take the field," — Sydney Morning Herald, June Sth, 1874. New Zealand. — " This, however, wonld be carrying the self- reliant policy to an absurdity. By that policy we do not understand that England is to leave any portion of her territory to bear the full brunt of an enemy's attack, but only that each district is to provide all the means in its power to resist invasion, and England will do the rest. Surely the most ardent advoeate of self-reliance would not argue that, in the event of the United States concentrating all their strength in an attack uiKin the West Indies, Great Britain should refrain from sending a soldier or sailor to their defence I Supposing England and the United States were at war, and the latter made an attack upon Jamaica with all their military power, it is evident that the other parts of the British Empire would, for the time, be relieved from the danger of attack, and thus the concentrated assault could be met by a con- centrated defonce."— Wanganui Chronicle^ June 5th, 1874. ON COLONIAL DKFENCE. 45 recalling the concluding words of the celebrated letter of the Duke of Wellington, in which he showed the ease with which these islands could be carried by assault : " I am bordering on seventy- seven years passed in honour. I hope that the Almighty may protect me from being a witness of the tragedy, which I cannot persuade my contem- poraries to take measures to avert." We were then as oblivious to the truth that the capture of the citadel involved the downfall of the Empire as we are now blind to the fact that the security of that citadel is no guarantee for the safety of jifty-nine- sixtieths of British territory, or for the protection of the lives and properties of six-sevenths of Her Majesty's subjects. In avoiding Scylla we have encountered Cha- rybdis. Where, then, is the true channel through which the Empire may safely pass, defying attack ? Many may think, with the Government of the day, that this question may be solved by saying to our colonies and possessions — Arm yourselves ; it is every man's duty to defend his hearth and home. Do as we have done in England, raise volunteers, create what military forces you please, do as we have done, and our Empire is safe ! Now, let us consider whether this be a true solution of the problem. In the first place, it is not possible to lay down a general rule of self-reliance and self- defence applic:«ble to all colonies and possessions alike. The power of resistance of each fragment 46 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. of the Empire can only be measured by a com- pariBon between its population, its geographical position, and natural defensive advantages, and those of its possible enemy. It is simply ridiculous to tell any one of our West Indian islands to be self-reliant, and to trust to its citizens to resist the war power of the United States. If this general rule is the basis of our plan of Imperial defence, and is to be applied, it means in plain English that in the .c^happy event of a rupture with America, we offer that nation peaceable and quiet possession of 100,000 square miles of territory, and make over the lives and properties of IJ million of British subjects. I fear it would not be difficult to find what are termed " advanced thinkers " in the country — nay, in Parliament, and seated on Grovernment benches — ^who would not think this a very great national calamity. Possibly such persons might argue that the United States would allow the money value of these territories as a set-off in the final balance- sheet of American claims of indemnity for expenses caused by war. It is therefore necessary to observe that the loss of the West Indies affects the safety of Canada, First, by increasing the resources of the United States ; secondly, by securing to that power the command of the Western Atlantic — thus rendering it impossible for Imperial forces to create a diversion in favour of Canada, in the hour of ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 47 trial, by blockade and attack on the southern and eastern shores of America.* It follows, therefore, that the general and indis- criminate application of the policy of fragmentary self-reliance and self-defence, though possible to Canada as a direct means of frontier defence — besides involving the loss of other possessions — is ♦ West Indies. — " It is well for us there is the prospect of the continuance of peaceful and friendly relations between Great Britain and the other nations of the world for a series of years, during which the colonies will have time to grow to maturity and to strengthen themselves by drawing closer the bonds of union. The West Indies form an important link in the chain of communication between those situated on the shores of the North and South Atlantic, and even between 'the Australian colonies and England, the chief trade being carried on round the capes. It is in the common interest of all that this link of the chain should not be allowed to drop out or to be broken, for the question of colonial defence must be regarded as a whole, and not in parts ; not in respect of any particular colony, or of the defence of England, Scotland, and Ireland, and the command of the Channel only, but of all the colonies, which are integral parts of the Empire, and keeping open the communications between them across the seas. Towards this union and consolidation of interests nothing avails more than the sense of the mutual advantages derived from the alliance by all the parties to it. What these are may be seen in one — in India, where the British name is a tower of strength, a talisman against internal dissension and jealousies, as well as against foreign aggression. The flag of England guarantees the safety of all those who cross the seas, while it secures peace and good government everywhere. The colonies enjoy the benefits of the equal laws and free institutions of the mother country. Each has its own local administration, making its own laws, and raising and appropriating its own revenues, without derogation from the dignity and prerogatives of the British Crown. So long as the sense of these mutual advantages prevails in the colonies, that loyal attachment which they have always shown towards the mother country, and none more so than the West Indies, will continue to exist, and continue to be the strongest assurance of their trust in England, — the ground on which they look for her protection in the hour of danger."— West Indian, April 7th, 1874. 48 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. the most certain method of ensuring she shall be left in her struggle unaided and alone. Similar arguments apply with equal force to other colonies and possessions elsewhere ; but as it is impossible to deal with this great question in a short paper, I think I have said enough to show that this general rule of " self-reliance " fails to solve the problem of Imperial Defence. The question therefore remains — What are the general principles on which the defence of the Empire must be based ? * Before we can give a reply worthy of the name, it is essential that we should understand what is the Empire, and what is vital to its exist- ence. Speaking generally of its geographical position, it consists of ten groups of territory separated by long sea-distances. The British Islands, British North America, the West Indies, * Australia. — " But in times of peace, far removed from the din of battle and the tumult of opinion, it is well to consider dispassionately the position we occupy, and how we would be situated in the event of war. Besides, it is only in such times that we can fully realize the best and the worst of existing policies and systems, and alter or amend them in accordance with the dictates of prudence and the fullest expe- rience. The greatest battles of late years were battles fought on clearly- defined principles and the amplest information. It is well known that the Germans, in anticipation of the bitter revival of the Rhine question, made France a special study, and found good means to draw from her in peaceful years the secret of her overthrow. Nowadays, as ever, to be warned is to be forearmed ; and further, to test and reflect on the policy we espouse is to make us more fit to grapple with any diflBculty that may arise. European complications may ere long attract our notice, without touching us home in the smallest degree ; but, mean- time, it is as well to look in the face aught that might endanger us ihen.^^— Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 49 the West Coast of Africa, the Cape, the Mauritius, Australasia, Hong Kong, the Straits Settlements, and India. This is a rough sketch of the ground to be defended. Now, to quote from a work by Sir C. Pasley, written in 1808,* "The strength of an empire composed of several islands or possessions, divided from each other by the sea, will be further modified by the geographical position of its respec- tive parts. The strength of an empire of any kind, whether insular or continental, will be greater or less, with equal resources, in proportion to the facility with which its several parts can aiford each other mutual assistance when attacked, and to the difficulty which an enemy may find in supplying and supporting his invading force." f This able exposition of a great military truth brings to light two great principles : — 1. That it is of vital importance that the safety of the Imperial communications be secured. 2. That it is essential to the military strength of the Empire that forces created or existing for the defence of one portion be not so constituted as to preclude the possibility of using them in the defence of another. If the Imperial communications are not secured, * * The Military Tolicy and Institutions of the British Empire. t New Zealand — " Although this had no reference to the Aus- tralias, and was written as far back as 1808, no stronger argument could be adduced in the present day in favour of Colonial Federation." — Cornwall Chronicle, June 22iid, 1874. E 50 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. our enemy can make it physically impossible for the several parts to afford " mutual assistance when attacked." On the other hand, although they may be tolerably safe, if the military forces of each part are by law so constituted as to preclude the power of moving them to another, we ourselves render it a moral impossibility for the several parts to afford " mutual assistance when attacked." In the one case the enemy cripples the necessary power of concentration ; in the other we save him the trouble by doing it ourselves. What then becomes of the military value of forces constituted as our militia and volunteers are, at home or in the colonies, when weighed in the Imperial scales ? If the Empire is to be defended at all we must apply, on a large scale, the ordinary and common military principle applicable to the defence of all territory, large or small. The fundamental principle is briefly this. The success of all operations of war, whether defensive or offensive, depends upon the disposition of force in such a manner as will best secure the base of operations, and ensure safety and freedom of com- munication. It is useless to do one without the other, for in the one case neglect of the rule must lead to a " lock-out," in the other the " lock- up" of military force. Our former disposition of our force risked the " lock-out " of military force by rendering the capture of the base possible : our •.t ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 51 present plan endangers, nay courts, the " lock-up" of military force at the base by leaving our com- munications exposed, and outposts undefended.* In the late war we saw first of all an attack upon the advanced positions on the lines of commu- nication ; next the cutting of the lines of com- munication ; and lastly, as an inevitable conse- I quence, Paris fell. The United Kingdom is our Imperial base. The Imperial main lines of communication are : — 1. To British North America across the North Atlantic. 2. To the West Indies. * Australia. — The well-drilled Voluntary force, auxiliary to a properly-recruited and powerful regular Army, encircled, too, by the fiuest and strongest Navy in the world, may dispel any fears we might foolishly entertain regarding the safety of our island home. But it ig not so with the rest of the Empire. The centre, the citadel, is secure, but the outposts are not invulnerable. The scattered immensity of our Empire leaves it peculiarly oix;n and liable to attack, unless measures are concerted and carried out for its due and full protection. The altered policy of the Imperial Government renders this fact doubly significant and urgent. When the violation of solemn treaties, which were bonds written in blood, is permitted or connived at, and our " moral " influence is the only supreme influence we can boast, if indeed it is worth bragging about, it is high time to scan the political horizon and watch for the black clouds that may loom even over the Euxine. At a time, too, when a faithful ally and the control of a highway to some of our richest lands are surrendered voluntarily, we may be chary of trxisting hasty politicians or incautious and over- sympathetic statesmen. It is blazoned on our patriotic shield that the sun never sets on our Empire, and that very truth it is which proclaims to us the dangers our vast possessions, wealth, and commerce entail on us. Everywhere our Hag flies the honour of England is at stake, and a (shock or injury to any member of the Empire is felt at the remotest (extremity." — Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874. E 2 52 DEFENCK OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAlJf. 3. To India, China, and Australasia by the Mediterranean. 4. To India, China, and Australasia round the Cape. 5. From Australasia and the Pacific round Cape Horn. The Imperial base can bo reduced in two ways : — 1. By direct assault : invasion, 2. By indirect means : investment. It is curious — I trust I may be forgiven for saying it — that while the possibility of invasion is not generally disputed, I believe I happen to be the only individual who believes in investment ; at least I know of no other who has for eight years tried to force on public attention the fact that the certainty of investment, partial or complete, fol- lows the possibility of invasion as surely as night follows day. Consider for one moment on what the presump- tion of possible invasion rests. It rests on this — the loss, temporary or permanent, of the command of the waters surrounding the British Islands. But remember that the lines of communication all radiate from these waters ; the loss, therefore, of our command here cuts every one of the Imperial lines ; and what is this, but investment ? The statesman who could, in a magazine, speak complacently of an opposing force " scouring our coasts at twelve, fifteen, or sixteen miles an hour," ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 53 must surely have forgotten that the heart of the Empire thus cut off from its sources of supply must cease to beat* Hardly a mile could be so traversed in triumphant defiance without injury, in a greater or less degree, to some artery or nerve, ])roducing in some far-oif member of the body politic of the Empire results more or less disastrous. It might be but a nervous tremor produced by a temporary disarrangement of the free course of trade, or it might be paralysis caused by a pro- longed interruption of the vital powers of com- munication. The question of results is but a question of time. As regards the safety of communications, it must be borne in mind that the greatest danger to which they can be exposed ie that which threatens the greatest number at one and the same time. Geo- graphically speaking, this can only happen at the point of convergence or radiation, which in our case is the Channel. The Royal Commission of 1859 discarded the Channel Fleet as a first line of defence against invasion, because " Were an imdue proportion of our fleet tied to the Channel " our enemy's " would be proportionably set free, to the great danger of * Australia.—" The question of Colonial Defences is, of course, paramount with us." — Sydney Morning 7/erald, Juno 8th, 1874. Canada — « Naturally Englishmen, in whatever part of the British Empire they may lie placed, feel they are as fully entitled to the pro- tecting agis of the Mothoi Country as if living in their native land. . . . True defence must be Imjicvial and not national." — Lritish Colmitt, Victoria, B.C., February 20th, 1877. 54 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. our colonies and to the injury of a commerce whicli becomes of more vital importance with every step of national progress." But I desire to observe that, though it may not be our first line of defence against invasion, it is our first line of defence against investment, and, further, the front of our first line of colonial defence. Of what avail is it if our colonies, though protected in their own immediate neighbourhood, are " locked-out " from the mother country by a force in the Channel, against which we are unable to contend ? Of what use is it protecting our commerce on distant seas if it is to be destroyed within sight of the shore^ of England ? Surely, in reckoning up our means of de- fence, we should not forget that if our enemy con- fines his operations to an attack on our commimica- tions, and we are unprepared to resist it, the forces we have created for the special purpose of repel- ling invasion will be after all but a harmless host of spectators of a ruin they are powerless to avert. I do not for a moment underrate the immense im- portance and absolute necessity of being prepared to render invasion impossible by purely military forces. If we are not so prepared we st^ke the fate of the Empire on, perhaps, a single naval engagement, A temporary reverse at sea might (by the enemy following up his advantage) be converted into final defeat on land, resulting in a total overthrow of all further power of resistance. It is necessary for the safety of tlie Channel that invasion be efficiently ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 56 guarded against, so that should our homo fleet be temporjirily disabled wo may, under cover of our army, prepare and strengthen it to regain lost ground, and renew the struggle for that wliich is es8(!ntial to our life as a nation, and our existence as an empire — the command of the waters of the United Kingdom. We are all so keenly alive to the necessity of rendering invasion impossible, that this part of the subject may now be dismissed. I may also pass from the front of tlie first line of colonial defence with the remark, that the fleet required to maintain it must not be confused nor mixed up with the cruising force necessary for the safety of the distant lines of communication. To hold our supremacy of the Channel we require a force com- posed of vessels adapted to the combined action of fleets, and of a strength equal to that which may possibly be brought against it. This remark also applies to the protection of the line of communi- cation passing through the Mediterranean. But on more distant seas, for the protection of such lines, a special class of cruisers, capable of keeping at sea for long periods of time, is required ; the strength of this patrolling force on each line being in pro- portion to the value of the line, and to the force against which it may have to contend. The fleets necessary for the safety of the Channel and Medi- terranean are not adapted to the protection of distant lines, nor are the vessels suited to the 66 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. defotice of those lines of any value as a reserve force to be called in to aid in the defence of the Channel and Mediterranean. But the defence of our communications ib not secured by the mere presence of sufficient naval force at home or in the Mediterranean ; for as there are two modes of attack on the United Kingdom, so there are two ways in which our lines of com- munication may be destroyed. Ist. By direct attack on the point of convergence. 2nd. By a variety of attacks on one or more lines at points far removed from the place where they all meet.* Assuming provision for meeting the first to have * Australia. — "Difficulties that seemed insurmountable ha.u been in two recent instances expeditiously and triumiihantly overcome. The story of Hannibal almost i»ale8 before our campaign in Abyssinia ; and the Ashantec war is a fjlorious proof of England's rapid i)ower of enforcing her authority and displaying her ability to trausjwrt troops to far-off countries. But the dangers that would menace us could only arise from wars of a different kind ; yet even then, we repeat, England could readily stretch out her ann to aid her colonial armies. For the reasons stated, we do not agree with Captain Colomb when he ventures to speak lightly of ' the general rule of self-reliance.' Why, that is tho inspiring rule of our colonics, the very genius of a self-made people. And if the general nde of self-reliance ' fails to solve the problem of Imperial defence,' it nevertheless goes far towards its solution. " But the question bears an altered complexion when we come to look at the vulnerability of the Empire along the lines of communica- tion. It is essential to our commercial pros]writy that our ships should sail the ocean unmolested, and that our great southern and eastern marts and cities shoidd be secured from attack. ' Commerce is, in fact, the link that binds 'ogether the several interests of the scattered terri- tories comprising the Empire.' The destruction of her commerce would be the ruin of Britain. She must still rule the wave, and inspire con- fidence in those who trust their argosies to her powerful care. And no fear of attack or investment will ever make us quake so long as we know that England can protect her shijis, for she can then intercept an enemy's fieet."— Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874, ox COLONIAL DEFENCE. 57 l)een made, I will now deal with the moanH to bo adopted to moot this other mode of attack ; and this is tlie most interesting portion of my subject. Communications, whethei* sea or land, whether long or short, can only be secured by a firm grasp of the points which command them. The greater tho extent of the line, the greater is the number of defended points necessary for its safety. In order to cut a line of communication, tho first thing to be done is to seize the point which commands it,* and in defending a line the point which commands it is tho last to surrender. Such points are tho minor bases of operation of forces acting in defence of the line. The relative importance of such points to the line, and to each other, can only bo estimated by the circumstances of their geogra- phical position and their distance from the main base from which the line springs. There is this difference, however, between tho defence of sea as compared with land communi- cations. Naturally in the second, a purely military force only is required, but in the case of sea lines the employment of a purely military as well as a purely naval force is necessary. The navy furnishes the patrolling or skirmishing force, while the army secures to it its bases or arsenals. To leave the naval force responsible for the protection of its * New Zealand. — " . . . Extreme danger would put the whole of the Empire on its metal, nor do we fear that the result would be less favourable to England than similar perilous crises have been." — 58 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. base would be to tie its hands. It would be " using the fleet to maintain its arsenals, instead of the arsenals to maintain the fleet."* Some years ago a governor of an eastern colony proposed to leave such places almost exclusively to naval protection, ; and the late Sir John Burgoyne thus speaks of the value of the proposition : " Under the system pro- posed, a small squadron, with 3000 or 4000 troops, in eastern seas in time of war, would take the Mauritius and Hong Kong, and destroy the naval arsenal and means at Trincomalee, if it did not capture the whole island of Ceylon.'* f The force thus alluded to might be Russian or that of some other power. In any case, how would the loss of Ceylon affect our military position in India ? Is it likely that aggression would stop there ? Might it not gather strength, and might not Ceylon be a convenient base of operation for an attack on Australasia ? If, therefore, we trust the protection of our lines exclusively to a purely naval force, by imposing on our fleets the defence of the points which command them, we risk, nay, we court a general attack, not on England, not on the Channel, but on " our vast Colonial Empire, our extended com- merce, and interest in every quarter of the globe." J * Vide Defence Commission Report, 1859. t See Apjjendix to ' Life of Field-Marshal Sir J. Burgoyne. X Hong Kong. — " That this is not an exaggeration of the da' ger that would be incurred will be readily believed from the fact that when the last great war broke out on the Continent, and it was rumoured that England would be involved in it, the question as to the safety of Hong Kong was discussed here with an:siety, as, small though this colony is, it would be a most important blow to British prestige in the •w ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. fi9 It is now time to ask what are these points? and, in an attempt to reply, I will take each lino separately : — 1. The line to Canada. The only point here is a terminal one — it is Halifax. 2. To the West Indies. Here we have Bermuda, the Jiahamas, Jamaica and Antigua. The stra- tegic value of Bermuda is in some degree under- stood. The military value of the Bahamas was fixed by Sir John Burgoyne.* Jamaica, from its central position and capacious harbour, is of con- siderable importance. I add Antigua for two reasons — (1) because Jamaica is far too leeward to whole of China, and as a necessary consequence also iu India, were it captured even for a short period by a foreign power ; and the evil effecta which would be thus produced might be an object in time of war. In Ilong Kong a regiment is stationed, and there are usually a fair numlwr of men-of-war on the station ; but, if hostilities broke out at home, the naval forces might possibly be reduced even further than they have been by the retrenching ixjlicy of the Government of late years, and the danger above indicated be incurred. This colony jiays a military contribution of 20,000?., which has not unjustly been objected to, because the forces are stationed here s much in the general interest of Great Britain in China as in those of Hong Koug, and the amount is very heavy for so small a colony. Captain Colomb suggests that a general and enlarged scheme for the defence of the sea-communications of the Empire can only be made by the colonies cooperating, and one of the first things that would have to be done would be to adjust the contributions from the different colonics upon a well-considered and equitable basis. At present, these contributions are levied capriciously, and frequentlj' cause much discontent ; but there can be little doubt that the colonies for the most part would willingly contribute towards the general defence of the Empire, if, in return, they luul some voice in the government ; and it would be a good adjunct towards the consum- mation of such a policy as Captain Colomb agitates that some measures for the representation of the colonics in the Imperial Parliament werci taken."— 2%e Daily Press, Hong Kong, May 1, 1874. * See Appendix to ' Life of Field-Marshal Sir J. Burgoyne.' I 60 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. be of value as a coaling station or arsenal for cruisers acting in the defence of communications to the Eastern Islands ; such vessels would burn a great quantity of fuel in steaming up to their station froiT^ Jamaica against the trades; (2) vessels bound for the greater Antilles and Gulf of Mexico generally pass between Antigua and Guade- loupe. 3. To India, the East, and Australasia, by the Mediterranean. The points here are Gibraltar, Malta,* Aden, Bombay, Cape Comorin,f and King George's Sound on the main line, with Trin- * Malta. — " There can bo no doubt that the Imperial Government is fully alive to the great imi)ortanco of Malta as a naval an;l military station : the improvements recently carried out in its armament and the additional works of defence which are even now being constructed, api)ear to have rendered the island absolutely impregnable. On tho other hand, are the warlike stores and the war material on tho sj)ot, sufficient to meet tho emergencies contemplated by Captain Colomb, and which alone can justify the annual expenditure of so much treasure ? And what is of still greater importance, is the number of men iwrmanently stationed here sufficient to man even tho most im- jx)rtant works of defence ? Where could be found a safer or better defended depot for both men and war material to be used, not only in defending the island, but also to be dispatched, at the shortest notice, to India and the other distant dependencies of the Crown ? Is the dock accommodation sufficient to rejKiir and refit such ships as may be disabled in an engagement at so great a distance from England ? And what about the coal dei)6ts? These are all considerations which have no doubt occurred to the able "wal and military commanders on the station ; though they may have remained unheeded by the Central Government, csjiecially under tho rigid economy preached by the late Administration." — Public Opinion, Malta, April 1, 1874. f Although there is not now any harbour of importance at Cape Comorin, those who have read the pai)er on " Indian Harbours " by General Sir A. Cotton, will understand the strategic importance of the position, and the possibility of creating a harbour at " Colachul " in its vicinity. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 61 comalce, Singapore, and Hong Kong on its northern branch. Of all the Imperial roads this is the most diffi- cult to defend, owing to its want of continuity. The most commanding position — the Isthmus of Suez — is not in our possession. Here our line can be most easily cut, and here we have least power to prevent the contingency. So long as the canal is neutral or in the hands of a neutral power, so long is it at the disposal of friend and foe alike. Were it in the hands of our enemies, it is only open to them and not to us. To make this line safe, the occupation by military force of the Isthmus might, under certain conditions, be a necessity. Arc we prepared for that ? Supposing it to be neutral, it must be remem- bered that if purely naval power cannot be entirely relied on for the local protection of our outposts, neither can it be relied on to prevent the entry into the Nile of vessels of our enemy, and once there they would have the whole of our Eastern possessions at their mercy, unless we have a force sufficient to blockade the Red Sea. But as the necessity for the existence of such a force rests on the possibility of our direct communications being cut somewhere between the Red Sea and the Eng- lish Channel, it is important to consider how our fleets in the East could exist, without adequate means of supply and repair, independent of our home resources. 62 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Such considerations as these point to the ah- jolute necessity of having a commanding and strongly-defended great naval arsenal in the Eastern hemisphere. Here we might have ships and stores in reserve; here should be the great base of naval operations in peace and war for all our Eastern fleets. Is it safe to assume that the resources of Portsmouth, Chatham, and Plymouth would be equal to the task of supplying our war fleets throughout the world at such time with ships, stores, and means of repair ? Can we dream of private firms during maritime war taking con- tracts to maintain in a state of efficiency war fleets 6000 and 10,000 miles ofif?* With the development of the resources of India, Australia, New Zealand, and a host of smaller possessions, the necessity for securing their roads increases ; so also increases the power of providing ♦ Australia.-—" These are precisely the considerations which affect the outlying portions of the Empire. Secure and unbroken communi- cation with Britain is essential to the safety of the Empire, and the means requisite to ensure this are decidedly within our reach. The first condition is the existence of a strong army for home defence ; the second, the existence of a sufficient force in each of the most exposed outposts ; the third, the existence of additional forces ready to be moved if required to other distant possessions ; and the fourth, the existence of a fleet to protect the Imperial centre, to guard our commerce, and to transport the necessary troops on emergency. England must ever have an army of occupation in India, and garrisons in her foreign dependen- cies, and • towers along the steep.' Her sentry-boxes along the ocean highway must never be vacant, nor her harbours of refuge neglected. But this is quite a different thing from planting a standing army in thoroughly English colonies. Besides, the troops required to strengthen her valuable posts, and garrison her strategic points, may be spared in time of peace from the regular army, and kept as cheaply on such foreign service." — Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874. f ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 63 and supporting adequate means of defence.* With a Russian sea- board on the one h^nd, and an Ame- rican sea-board on the other, it cannot be said that by their remoteness from us ^hey are removed from danger of attack : nor must it be forgotten that the very fact of their distance from us adds to our difficulties in defending them, unless by a judi- cious combination of .^'nperial resources — to which India should contribute a large proportion — we render the fleets for their defence independent to a large extent of home support. If naval protection without military protection be productive of danger to the Empire, great dis- aster may also be expected to result from attempt- ing to hold distant possessions by military force, if that force might be completely isolated and locked out from its sources of supply and reserves for want of the naval protection of its communi- cation with the Imperial base. If it be asked what we have done to guard against the possible isola- tion of our army in India ? the reply is, we have abolished the Indian navy and substituted nothing in its place ! Though India supports the army necessary for its safety, it contributes nothing f towards a fleet for the protection and security of the communications of the army, without which it cannot exist. * The total value of exports and imports of India, Ceylon, and Australasia is about four-fifths of the total value of exjiorts and imiHjrts of the United States. t The contribution from the Indian Government, on acanint of the cxpt'use of a fleet on Indian stations, is practically nothing. 64 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Two circumstances have lately occurred to threaten our command of this direct route — the opening of the Suez Canal, and the removal of the restrictions placed upon Russian power in the Euxine. We agreed to the latter on moral grounds. But if on moral grounds we have practically shown our sympathy with the desire of Russia to accumu- late physical force in the Black Sea, we should extend our cympathy to India and our Eastern colonies, and be careful that it takes an equally practical form, by the creation of a naval arsenal adapted to the probable requirement of the defence of their communications : thus balancing the power of resistance * with the increased power of aggres- * New Zealand. — " Of course, Canada and the West Indies occupy a very different military position to the Australias, but what strikes colonists in this part of the world is their exposure to sudden raids upon their shipping and seaport towns. It would be a most difficult task for any foreign power to invade Australia or New Zealand, and even if an invading force cfTected a landing, its surrender or rc-embarka- tion would very soon take place. But light armed cruisers might do us enormous damage by picking up colonial merchantmen and levying contributions upon our seaports. There is not a seaport town in New Zealand which is protected against such a visitation. Not a torpedo has been sunk in one of our harbours, or a heavy gun planted to command them. Yet there are plenty of trained artillerymen in New Zealand, and sums of money have been spent upon ' Defence Purposes ' which would have furnished every town of the colony with two or three guns of the heaviest calibre, whose presence would bo quite enough to deter any vessel of the ' Alabama ' class from dropping in at Auckland or Wellington some fine morning and asking for a donation of 100,000^., with the certainty of getting it. The subject has been discussed by secret committees of tlie General Assembly, and been reported upon to the Government by an experienced engineer officer ; but nothing has been done. The danger is not visible, and procrastination is so easy. The Australian colonies are little better in this respect, although Victoria has done something for the protection of Melbourne. But ON OOLONVAL DEFENCE. 65 sion which our " moral sympathy " has so gene- rously provided. To attempt to determine the exact site for such a reserve naval arsenal for the Eastern portion of the Empire would be beyond the scope of this* paper, but considerations respecting climate, and its effects on stores, &c., point to some port of Australia,* as best adapted for the purpose. The tliero is one iraiwrtant part of the military defence of tliese coloniea whicli hivs been entirely neglected, and that is the i)rotectiou of our coal dejiOts. To the necessity of protecting the coaling stations of the Kmiiire, Captain Colomb draws special attention, and the force of his r(!as(jning is obvious now that sailing war-vessels are obsolete. The grand coaling station in the Southern hemisphere is Newcastle N.S.W., and that town ought unquestionably to be fortified. At jyresent, wc Ixjlicvc it is just as defenceless as the cit} of Wellington." — Wanganui Chronicle, June Sth, 1874. * Australia. — " The suggestion is feasible and practicable, and, next to the strategic stationing of our ships, demands earnest and serious attention. Indeed, the one thing deixinds on the other. A large, scattered, defensive steam fleet requires repairing, and ammunition as well as coal ; and the erection of dejiots is not more essential than the construction of an arsenal. The outlay would doubtless be great, but oven in times of peace the docks might be profitably used for the Government advantage. Wherever such an arsenal might be situated, whether in Bombay or in Australia, it would, we venture to believe, be a great and invaluable support to our defence." — Sydney Morning Herald, June 8th, 1874. *' Among other things, Captain Colomb has suggested an arsenal. Ho is in doubt whether this necessity ought to be Australian or Indian; but, if anytliing, his inclination leans towards us, and leaning thus, suggests Sydney. Bombay may easily be defended — so far as Bombay requires to be made secure, and as an Indian outjwrt it will ever com- mand serious and anxious attention. But to talk of it as the centre of repairing, fitting-up, and coaling in this hemisphere, to speak of it as the Woolwich- Portsmouth away from England, is rank absurdity. The circumstances and conditions are averse to the jxisition. Bombay is ours through force, and is but a portion of our wealthiest dependency. As we said in a previous article, no works of such vital imi)ortance should be constructed save among oiu: own people. Fortify, strengthen F 66 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. strategic importance of Bombay,* however, cannot be overlooked. It must be borne in mind that the appliances, such as docks and machinery for repairs, &c., would be available for our commercial fleets in peace ; and hence that Imperial resources expended to provide for the contingency of war, could not be regarded as money thrown away in peace. 4th line : To India and the East, and Austral- asia, round the Cape. Here the points are Sierra Leone, Ascension, St. Helena, Simon's Bay, the Mauritius, and King George's Sound. 5th line : From Australasia and Vancouver's Island, round Cape Horn. Here we have Sierra Leone, Ascension, the Falkland Islands, and Sydney. These points are, however, valueless for the defence of the line between Vancouver's Island Bombay, if they choose ; still the British Government know that it is theirs only so long as their prudent strength is asserted. It is far other- wise with Australia. Here is a loyal people, having the welfare and supremacy of the Empire as much at heart as those who see Her Majesty in London, or welcome lier victorious troops from the ends of the earth." —Ihid., June 15th, 1874. * India. — " The question as to the military force for the protection of our colonies is far beyond our limits. But if they are to be self- reliant, we should provide them with guns for the armament of their batteries, as also other warlike supplies. We should give the colonics the best arms we can supply them with. \Vc might go further, and give them drill-instructors. We believe we are right in stating that the two monitors stationed at Bombay for the protection of the harbour are too weak in men to be able to work their guns with the proper reserve necessary for a naval action, it is therefore self-evident that the question of colonial defence is not deemed worthy of that con- sideration which the question merits." — The Englishman, Calcutta, April 24th, 1874. ox COLONIAL DEFENCE. G7 and Australia, but a commanding position for this part of the line has been offered to the Govern- ment — the Fiji Islands. It remains to be seen whether the Government accepts the offer. It is a position of great importance from an Imperial strategic point of view. The Ilydrographer of the Admiralty tlius speaks of it: "The Fijis lie nearly in tlie direct track from Panama to Sydney^ and if a steamer touched at one of them for coal she would only lengthen her voyage about 320 miles, or one day's run, in a distance of 8000 miles. In like manner, in the voyage from Vancouver's Island to Sydney, the touching at Fiji would lengthen the distance 420 miles in a voyage of 7000. An intermediate station between Panama and Sydney will be most desirable — indeed, if the proposed mail route be carried out it is indispen- sable. In the above statement I have confined myself to answering questions referred to me by the Colonial Office ; but, on looking into the sub- ject, I have been much struck by the entire want of Great Britain of any advanced position in the Pacific Ocean. We have valuable possessions on either side, as at Vancouver's Island and Sydney, but not an islet or a rock in the 7000 miles that separate them. We have no island on which to place a coaling station, and where we could ensure fresh supplies." A comparison between the value of our property passing and repassing in the vicinity of these F 2 68 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND ORKATKR IIRITAIN. islands with that of other nations, will kIiow that we have a vastly greater interest in maintaining freeck. • New Zealand. — " Two of his recommendations forcibly im])rcss a New Zealand colonist. One is, that a naval arsenal siiould be estab- lished for tho Eastern portion of the Empire. An Australian jxjrt ho deems would be best adapted for tlie purpose ; at tho same time, tho strategic imiwrtance of Uomliay cannot bo overlooked. The other recommendation is, that the Imperial Government should take posses- sion of the Fijis in order to command the line between Australia and Vancouver's ittlaud. The military imi>ortance of tho Fijis has been urged again and again by the Australian and New Zealand journals ; and it may safely be asserted that unless tho Imi)erial Government assumes their sovereignty in timo of jxiace, the first thing tho Australian Colonies will have to do for self-protection, ui)on war breaking out, will be to seize the group, lest it should become the refuge of a host of privateers." — Wanganui Chronicle, June 5th, 1874. 70 DKFENCE OF GUKAT ANI> GUKATKR IIIUTAIN. if not the only, coaling station of the district they command. Too much attention cannot be paid to the selec- tion of the coaling stations of the FJmpire. They should be under our control. Take, for example, the West Indies. The great coaling station in that di«trict — St. Thomas — is not in our possession. The consequence is, that were we engaged in hostilities in that quarter, a large portion of our force would be necessarily employed in the blockade — so far as our enemy is concerned — of this i)oint, and would be so much deducted from the force available and required for other purposes. It is possible at first sight Sierra Leone and Ascension* may not appear to be of Imperial * St. Helena. — " At St. Helena wc have had some lessons which, if Captain Colomb's views gain acceptance, may be of value. In the Uussian War of 1854-5, and in the American Civil War of 1862-4, we had here at St. Helena illustrations of the value of the island as a ]H)int of protection to our trade. Hail the Uutwian frigates in 1854 made a dash at this island and carrieil it, they could without doubt have held the place for six months at least, and what interruption and damage to our shipping would have ensued may be imagined. The famous cruise of the * Alabama ' in the American War will show what might Iw done by one single cruiser between the Cape and St. Helena, if there were no force at hand to protect our commerce. . . . Two small islands in the South Atlantic Ocean are both jiossibly of importance in some con- tingency — St. Helena and Ascension. In the ordinary course of things it would be imagined these two little Islands shotild be united under one Government. But no, that is not at all the case. Ascension lx>long8 to the Admiralty. It is not a colony, but a ship ; while V.t. Helena is admitted to the full honours of a British colony and is governed by the Secretary of State. The consequences may not be apparent to the uninitiated, but they are important. At Ascension, whatever money is wanted to bo spent is procuretl by the commanding ON COLONIAL DKFENCE. 71 value, or to fulfil the8e coiiditions. It is therefore necessary to draw attention to the fiict that the Imperial roads round the Cape and round Cape Horn cross each other at a point on the Equator ahout 25° W. If a comparatively small circle with that centre be described on a mercantile chart, it will bo found to inchulo the path of nearly all vessels passing along those roads. It therefore follows that the defence of the sea area so included is of the greatest importance to Australasia and Eastern and Pacific possessions, and that it would bo useless to distribute force for the protection elsewhere of the commerce of those places unless we can command that small area. But we cannot maintain a patrol .at these Imperial navdl officer, auking the Admiral to Hanction it in the nam© of the guanlHliip HtatioiH'd there — say the old ' Flora' ; and whether tlie Hum he 201. or 20,000/., is practically the same ; the expenses of Asconsiou are never brought before Parliament, and the only thing a ciirioua inquirer can find out is that a guardship at Ascension is always tho most «xi)en8ive vessel in the Navy. Now St. Helena, being placed under the Colonial Office, has to provide for its local expenditure by U»cal taxation, and should anything iwyond this bu required, it must be introtluced into some imrlianjcntary vote and bo subjected to parliamentary questioning. Yet there is as good reason for the one island being supjMjrted by Im|)erial funds as the other, and many distinguished officers, huth naval and military, have advocated this view. In his latest Governor's rejwrt, Vice-Admiral I'atey, who is a good authority on professional subjects, says that ' the situation of St. Helena in mid-ocean renders it a most imjwrtant jn^sition for Imperial pur|)oses as a coaling station and dejntt for vessels of war.' Moreover, if we were engaged in hostilities, the sinking of a ship in the Suez Canal might close that pas-sage, and then St. Helena would be hardly less valuable than Malta or Gibraltar. ' Two or three steamers stationed here,' says Admiral Patey, • would intercept the whole returning trade from the Eabt.' "SI. Ikkmi Omrdian, May 7th, 1871. 72 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GRKATEU 15111TAIX. cross roads without bases of operation from which that force can draw supplies ; we have no choice, therefore, but to adapt Sierra Leoi:o and Ascension to the purpose of fulfilling this Imperial require- ment. It is further essentially necessary for the safety of Australia, and the East, that these points should not fall into other hands, * and if we do not adopt measures for their defence, there is nothing to prevent such a contingency. Now, though the Imj^erial strategic points I have named are numerous, I think it will be found difficult, even on close inspection, to reduce the number without risk to the safety of the Imperial lines. It must e remembered that a point near a line of communication, if not secured to our own use by means of defence, is placed more or less at the disposal of our enemy. The position we abandon, because we have others in its neighbour- hood, may be of vast strategic importance t\j the power having none. The immense and Imperial importance of the great majority of strategic poim^^ named cannot, I think, be much doubted, and therefore for purposes of illustrating general prin- ciples requires no further remark. We have seen * South A&ica. — " A colony is not now removed from danger of attack by roinoteness, and the vessels which England in case of war should furnish to defend her colonies, must plainly be, during war time, indeiiendent to a largo decree of home support." — The Natal Mercury, May 23itl, 1874. " The defence of the Empire may possibly become a popular cry when it is too late to save many of its most valuable outlying \wx- tions."— Por< Elizabeth Telegraph, May 23rd, 1874. ON COLONIAL DKFKNCE. 73 that military garrisons are required to prevf^ *■ tlieir capture by assault. * Where are they . come from? What provision has the Empire made for the safety of positions which command her roads ? It is our boast that we are at last secured from invasion, because we have 100,000 regular troops at home, lint when we are threatened with invasion, we are in imminent peril of investment. As the regular army is the only military force we can move, it clearly follows that, if 100,000 or * West Indies. — " India is (juite able toholil her own o<;ainst any foreign attack ; she has nothing to fear \vl\ilst she remains firm in her allegiance to the sovereignty of England. With regard to the Anstra- lian colonie? and Southern Africa, they are strong by natural position and their remoteness, and every day their strength is growing, and with it their cai>ability of self-defence. Coining to the Western Con- tinent, what has Canada to fear, except from an invasion by the United States, a bordering country, whose inhabitants sfMnik the .same language, enjoy the same free government, belong to tho same race, and aro cower would venture to disturb them, or ihink it worth their while to fit out an exiwdition for their conquest." — The West Indian, April 7th, 1874. Australia. — "The geographical jwsition, conditions, and resources of Canada and other colonies referral to by Captain Colomb are so dissimilar to those or Australasia that we need not descant on tiunu here. Neit-lier do we think it necessary to follow him in his surmises and prognostics regarding the possible victory of the Americans in tho West Indies, and how far such a conquest would affect the safety of our North American dominions. These problematical difticulties but retard tho projx'r study and drift of the question. They lend no weight to the argument they are made to sustain, and the argument itself is a weak one." — Sydney Morniny Herald, June 8th, 1874. 74 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. any large proportion of that number of regular troops are necessary to guard against invasion, no force is available for garrisons of places on which the safety of our communications depends. We should have to choose, at such a time, between risking invasion or courting investment, partial or complete. When this argument is used it is generally met by the assertion tliat we have, or shall have, a powerful fleet, and therefore shall command the sea. Now the "command of the sea " is a vague term, conveying no precise mean- ing to the mind. It is, from its vagueness, most valuable to mystify constituencies, or to confuse the conception of our true military requirements, both in times of ** panic " and intervening periods of " parsimony." By war ministers it is used alternately to lull the awakened consciousness of military weakness, or as an argument for the reduction of military force. To most people it means something purely naval. To some it con- veys the idea of covering the seas with numerous fleets; to others, the possession of a few ships more powerful than those of our neighbours. Few realzie that the command of the sea can only be maintained by a scientific combination of three things — strategy, purely military force, «nd purely naval po\\^er. The command of the sea is nothing more nor less than the command of the Imperial roads, the securing of the first lines of colonial defences. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 75 It is important to bear in mind that the more war fleets rely on machinery and artificial motive power, the more necessary are fixed bases of operation to tlieir action, and the greater must bo the resources of those bases. Hence it is that, as the science of naval warfare advances, the necessity for developing these resources at the great strategic points, and for efficiently protecting them, will probably increase.* But " an ounce of fact is worth a pound of theory " ; and while others dwell on the political results of the exploits of the 'Sumter' and ' Alabama,' it is desirable not to lose sight of the lesson in Imperial Defence the cruise of these vessels teaches. Captain Semraes, writing on board the ' Sumter,' in the West Indies, remarks : "The enemy has done us the honour to send in pursuit of us the ' Powhattan,' the ' Niagara,' the * Iroquois,' the ' Keystone,' and the * San Jacinto.' " * Australia. — " This is indisputably and 8u (JIMIAIKU HIUTAIX. Times of Deceml)er 9tli, ISd.'l, wo read: "From our Rhippinj^ list it will be Been that there r.re no fewer tiian seventeen American merchantmen at present in our liarbourH. Their groHS tonna/j^e may be rouglily t;et down at 12,000 touR. Some of them have been lying here now upwardH of three jnontlis ; and all this at a time when there iH no dulness in the frciglit market, but, on the con- trary, an active demand for tonnage to all parts of the world. It is indeed to ns a home picture — the only one we trust to have for many years to come — of the wide-spread evils of war in modern days. But it is a picture quite unique in its nature, for the nation to which these seventeen fine ships belong has a navy perhaps second only to Great Britain, and tlie enemy with which she has to coj)o is but a schism from herself, possessed of no port that is not blockaded, and owning not more than five or six vessels on the high seas. The tactics with which the Federals have to combat are without precedent, and the means to enable them successfully to do so have not yet been devised." It is as well to remark, that at the time this was written the naval force of the Federals consisted of about 700 ships and some 40,000 men! Yet it was not equal to preventing the interruption of American commerce in distant seas, although it maintained a strict blockade of the enemy's ports. Now Singapore was n neutral port, and therefore ON COLON! A I, nfePENCE. 81 afforded protection to the Federal vessels; l)ut where are the available ports likely to be neutral, along our lines, to afford protection to our com- mercial fleets under similar circumstances? The natural rendezvous of commercial fleets are in our possession, and could only afford protection in pro- portion to their means of defence.* By securing bases of operation for our war fleets, we also provide safe refuge for our traders at places where it is most required. If ever we are in real danger of invasion, wo shall bo actually engaged in a naval war; we sliall not have the excuse that the tactics we have then to combat " are without precedent " ; but wo may bitterly regret that the means " to enable us successfully to do so have not been devised," not from lack of power, but from w.int of will. Wiiile it is essential to guard the strategic • Hong Kong. — " What wo say is, that every place of such com- mercial imiKjrtanco as IIc)ii<^ Konj; slionlil be proixirly fortified, and so fortified that, in tlie absence of a defending fleet, the enemy wouhl find it no easy job to obtain a good position in front of the city for y)lacing liis guns. "What wo have said as regards Ilong Kong, would probably apply in a greater or less degree to all imrts of call betwcjcn hero and Suez ; and although wo can hardly l)o expected to take as much interest in the iirolection of other places as in this, yet wo doubt not tlieir inhabi- tants would gladly join with ours in making such a represenLition to Piirliament as will convince them of the facts that wo aro in no way luotccted, and that for the interests of tho llritiKh Isles it is necessary that we hhculd be. As to the question of cost, wo must deter that to another time, when wo hope to be able to jwint out tho way in which it should lie divided amongst the colonists and those living at home." — Overland China Mini, May 9th, 1874. Note. — No article relative to the distribution of cost, hero referral to, luxs reached mo. — .J. C. R. C. G 82 DEFENCE OF GREAT ANT) GREATER BRITAIN. points from capture by military force, it iH equally necessary to M3cure tlieir resources from destruction by bombardment from the sea; and in many instances military force would bo — from natural circumstances and situation — powerless to prevent Buch a contingei.'^y. The destruction of certain coal depots mij^ht be accomplished in a few hours by a single ship with very few guns ; and heavy requisitions, on pain of instant bombardment, might be hastily levied on a fleet of merchantmen in liarbour by " an intelligent maritime Uhlan " in the shape of an insignificant crusier, even in the presence of military force. This danger can in several instances only be met by port defence vessels, and torpedoes. A very small local force, if trained and provided with these weapons, would meet the requirement. But where are the weapons ? Where is the force ? It will be too late to await the outbreak of war to provide tlie weapons and to train the force, for an atttick on our coal dep6t8 at the strategic j>oints will not be the last, but the first act in the drama of future war. The means for their destruction are always at the disposal of any maritime power, but the measures for their adequate defence take much time to develop. A single cruiser bringing her guns to bear on one of our coal depots, would in a few hours paralyze the action of our fleet for months. It is not possible here to enter more fully into details respecting the defence of the Imperial 1 ON COIX)NIAL DEPENCK. 83 roaflfi, which ih the first, and can 1x5 mado the Btroiigest lino, of colonial defences. In no way can our colonieH and possessions Ix) so efficiently protected as l)y a firm command of their communi- cations, for, with the exception of Canada and India, they would thus be exempted from the possibility of attack, and unless Canada and India are to bo cut oflF from succour and support, their communications must be held, come what may. The linos of colonial defences may be thus summarized : — 1. The defence of their communications, whicl involves fortifying the Imperial strategic points, and the existence of a purely naval and a purely military force ; the one equal to the task of keep- ing open the roads between the points, the other sufficient to secure those points from capture in the necessary absence of the fleet.* * India. — We have only to look to the case of the * Alabama,' sunk in Enjjlish waters, bccauHc she had no place to rofit, no dock to which she might proceed ' to be overhauled, and have her Iwilurs reimired.' Ko, without sufficient ammunition, and in her imiK^fcct state, site wiui sunk in seventy minutes. Have wo a large naval arsenal in tlio Eastern seas? Have we port defence vessels? Are all our harlxnirs protected by tor|K;doc8 ? And, if they were, have we a body of men instructed in their use? It would apjxjar as if we laboured under the opinion, in case of war, that our enemies would never think of bom- barding our ports, of interfering with our commerce, of destroying our supplies of coals, or of attacking any of our ix)S8essions. Wo have withdrawn our troops from the colonies, and wo have said to them, * Protect yourselves,' and we have given them no arms and no guns, so that they might follow the advice given. We have five millions of surplus at home, a largo i)ortion of which is derived from our customers ; and we are oblivious of the fact that, if they ceased to exist our revenue might possibly decrease." — The Englithman, Calcutta, April 24th, 1874. Q 2 84 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. 2. The interior line of sea-defence, which must provide against the destruction, by bombardment from the sea, of naval resources at the strategic points in cases where that object cannot be secured by land batteries and military force. It also includes similar provision for the protection of colonial mercantile ports to prevent their com- mercial reduction by enormous requisitions. 3. The defence of the soil of all colonies and places not necessary to the Empire as military and strategic positions. Having thus briefly viewed the nature of our requirements, it is desirable to draw some practical conclusions as to how they can best be met. The communications of the Empire being the common property of all its component parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence, and should cont ' )ute to that object.* * Australia. — " The Royal Colonial Institute is no doubt a little in advance of the times, but perhaps there is no harm in that, for speculative opinions expressed within the bosom of such an association are sure to be wholesomely modified by the intense repugnance which the practical British-Colonial mind has to the consideration of questions involving the fortification of strategic points, and other matters of high Imperial consideration. Great as is the support which we now receive from our intimate and attached relationship to the mother country, it would bo vain to deny tbat in the event of war, the interests of British commerce and of international comity might bo subserved in a higher and more Imperial sense by the absolute independence of the federated Canadian or Australian colonies than they could be by the fortification of strategic points as recommended by Captain Colomb. We have said ' in the event of war,' but a war between Great Britain and a combina- tion of great maritime powers is not a contingency which wo can at present contemplate. Meanwhile, let us avoid that, and taking counsel ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 85 The forces intended for the defence of the com- mnnications must be Imperial, and not colonial. They must be prepared to act at any point on the Imperial lines where they may happen to be required. Naval colonial volunteer forces which may be created under the Naval Defence Act of 18G5 are only of value, and that to a very limited extent, to meet the necessities of the second or interior line of colonial defence. The forces necessary for the defence of the Imperial communications should be under the control of one directing head. As military force is necessary to the support of naval power, and as in our case military force is in its turn dependent upon naval power, the distribution of the one must have reference to that of the other. If, therefore, the military force is under the control of one department, and the naval force under that of another, the defence of our communications is, to use a homely phrase, "between two stools." from tho source of all good counsel, let us keep our powder dry, and work on towards union and strength among ourselves." — Brisbane Courier, Juno llth, 1874. South Africa. — "We need not say that tho plan suggested is based on tho presumption that the colonies, being interested in keeping open the Imperial roads, would contribute towards tho cost ; that it contemplates a system of mutual co-operation between Great Britain and her colonies ; that it presupposes federation, or the consolidation of provinces or small colonies into territories or dominions ; or that it leads almost inevitably to that great confederacy of the whole Empire which some may deem chimerical, but which we firmly believe to bo the only real solution of the anomalous relations now existing between the colonics and the mother country." — The Times of Natal,3\mG 24th, 1874. 86 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. In vain might our " Admiralty " despatch fleets to distant seas, if the bases of their operation are not secured by the " War Office " ; equally valueless would be the distribution of military force for the protection of those places by the War Office, if the Admiralty do not keep the communications between them open. Unless there be a war minister re- sponsible for, and controlling the general principles which should govern the action of each department, nothing but confusion can result when the Imperial communications are in danger. If the colonies are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence, it is time they should combine to force on the attention of the Imperial Parliament the neglected state of the Imperial roads, and the necessity for devising adequate means for their security. They must, however, be prepared to bear their fail" share of the burden.* If the mind of the mother conn try is morbid, and, from dwelling continually on the terrors of invasion, has lost the power of comprehending the * New Zealand. — ."Imperial and local interests manifestly run concurrent here, as they do in reality throughout. But the difficulty is to impress that fact upon the colonists. Theoretically they might agree with Captain Colomb upon the importance of maintaining the Imperial lines of communication; but if he asked them to accept the logical conclusion, and help to pay for the defence of those lines, they would draw back. They have become so accustomed to shirk their national duties, that it will take a long while to get them out of the selfish groove which they find so pleasant, but which is rapidly denuding them of patriotism, and making them a set of mere money- hunters. A great calamity might possibly awaken in them a nobler spirit." — Wanganui Chronicle^ June 5tb, 1874. ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 87 consequences of investment, it is time her young and vigorous offspring should awaken her to a true sense of her position. A Royal Commission to inquire into the defence of the Imperial communications, if properly con- stituted on an Imperial basis, would lead to most important results. It may be taken as a certainty that such a Commission would recommend the permanent strengthening of the great strategic points, which it would be in a position accurately to define. It might possibly determine the just limits of Imperial and colonial responsibilities in the question of defence.* * Canada. — " We quite agree with the gallant lecturer, that a fede- ration of the Empire is a necessity — that a federal fleet and a federal army are requirements of the day, and tliat the defence of Great Britain, as well as of its most insignificant dependency, is incomplete without it. We arc also certain that the colonies are prepared to pay their share of the cost, as well as to bear their share of the burthens ; as far as Canada is concerned, no difficulty would be found in applying any portion of her army to Imiwrial purposes if necessity required, nor would she be wholly defenceless as far as naval jwwer is concerned ; one of her people (Sir Hugh Allan) controls the largest and finest line of ocean steamships possessed by any company in the world — vessels that would realize the gallant captain's idea of efficient ocean cruisers in the amplest sense of the term." — Volunteerlieview, Canada, January 27th, 1874. Natal. — " Let us hasten, then, to claim a part in this great work ; first throwing aside the leading strings which cramp our action ; then multiplying our strength by a close union with the southern continent, of which we form a part ; lastly, by urging in the Council of a great federation such a ^wlicy as the paper before us indicates. The cry will soon be raised by other colonies ; will, ere long, swell into a universal chorus ; let us, though one of the smallest and weakest, not be the last of the great British family to claim our share in this noble and patriotic scheme."— TAe Times of Natal, June 24tb, 1874. West Indies. — "England must follow the example of ancient Rome, 88 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. With the creation of Imperial fortresses com- manding the Imperial roads would grow up a feeling of common security. They would be links in the chain which binds together the military forces of our Empire; stepping-stones by which those forces can cross to afford mutual assistance and support. Such a Commission, and such measures, might and give to all her colonies and foreign possessions the right of citizenship and the name of British subjects, and of being considered integral parts of the British Empire. It is due to her greatness and to the maintenance of her position amongst the foremost nations of the world. If she is concent to limit her dominions to the British Islands, and desires to cast off her colonies and to leave them to work out their own destinies, she must withdraw from the first rank and give place to the United States, Russia, France, and Germany, and see herself, at no long distance of time, reduced to a level with her own colonics in Canada and Australia. But we cannot believe that this is the view taken by British statesmen, Liberal or Conservative, of the question, or which would be sanctioned by the British Parliament." — The West Indian, April 7th, 1874. Malta. — " Captain Colomb's paper appears to us to contain sugges- tions of the highest importance ; and a Royal Commission, as proposed by him, would tend to enlighten both the Government and the public concerning the defence of the Imperial communications to be established on an Imperial basis. Inquiries of such magnitude and importance can only be made in times of profound peace like the present, which are also most suitable for the taking of such defensive measures as shall efficiently protect from a combined attack all the parts of the Empire to which England owes so large a share of her wealth and commercial prosperity." — Public Opinion, Malta, April 1st, 1874. The Cape. — " Captain Colomb recommends the issue of a Royal Commission to inquire into the defence of the Imperial communications, and we cordially endorse his recommendation. This seaport, for in- stance, is at present defenceless, £i,nd yet, by a small expenditure, in the event of a war between England and another naval power, it might be protected from the deprelations of some new * Alabama.' A few Arm- strong guns, with the needful ammunition and a few torpedoes from the Imperial stores, with the Naval Brigade resuscitated, would impart a sense of security to the community it has not felt since the commencc- meucemeut of the Crimean War. A federation of the war forces of the ON COLONIAL DEFENCE. 89 prepare the way for a federation of the war forces of the Empire, which is essential to its safety. It would be easier in a given time to collect forces from all parts of the Empire at a given point now, than it was to concentrate the military forces in the United Kingdom on any particular place on the coast line sixty years ago. It is sin- gular that when science has done, and is doing, so Empire is indeed essential to its safety." — Port Elizabeth Telegraph, May 23rd, 1874. Australia. — " Captain Colomb urges the colonies, if they are really in earnest in matters relating to their defence, to combine to force upon the attention of the Imperial Parliament the neglected state of the Irai^erial roads, and the necessity for devising adequate means for their (security ; but he warns us that we must be prepared to bear our fair share of the burden. And this is where a great difficulty would arise, for in time of peace — when alone such a scheme could bo carried out — it is to be feared many a colonial legislature would fail to see the necessity for voting the requisite money, and the Imperial Grovernment woidd bo powerless to enforce payment." — Queensland Times, June 4th, 1874. " A Royal Commission for such a purpose might, no doubt, attract attention to the subject, and prepare the way for a consideration of that much larger subject, which includes the confederation of the British Empire. The Duke of Manchester tells us that in this matter wo of the colonies should claim this as our right. That is to say, he tells us we have a right to be an integral part of an Empire of which at present we are only dependencies. We should assert a right not only to con- tribute to the maintenance of these strategic points, but to guide and control the policy which maintains them. But, as his Grace says, ' the House of Commons is so apathetic '; and we fear we may add the colonies are also. They are growing, it is true, in wealth and strength, but as yet they are scarcely educated into a perception of the full benefits of these Imperial privileges, and of the Imperial responsibilities which await them. In the meantime, we here in Australia have scarcely yet entered on the threshold of the inquiry. We have not yet taken the still more needful and preliminary step of providing, after the example of Canada, for a Federal Government, com^jetent to deal with questions involving such serious international questions." — The Brisbane Courier, June 11th, 1874. 90 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. much to increase our power of concentration, Imperial policy should be undoing her work by persisting in the creation of local forces which it is impossible to move, and all this at a time when concentration is the great principle of attack, and the power of concentration is the great principle of defence. Though by nature and by science we possess all the physical means necessary for the concentration of military forces, we have neg- lected to turn them to account, and further, by limiting the action of militrry forces to the par- ticular portions of the Empire where they are raised, we wilfully destroy the necessary power of resisting concentrated attack by a combination of Imperial resources, which is in these days the true source of strength. It is only in maintaining the second line of colonial defences that local forces are of real value, but it is the duty of the Empire to see that they are provided with the means and weapons to enable them to act. For the first and third lines they are of no avail, so long as the necessary power of concentration at the weakest point is absent. It is military necessity, and not consti- tutional law, which determines where the greatest power of resistance is to be applied. While we acknowledge and applaud the prin- ciple, that it is every man's duty to defend his home, it is to be regretted that our ideas of its practical application are lamentably indistinct. ox COLONIAL DEFENCE. 91 The mother country has put her own construction on the word " home," in applying the principle of calling into existence military forces which can only be used to put up her shop shutters and to bar her doors. She calls on her children to adopt her definition of its meaning and to follow her example, and some have done so. But who among the armies thus organized, for what she is pleased to call " home defence," can determine the exact distance from a man's home at which the obligation ends ? Who can draw the magic circle which is to include the territorial area of his duty to die for his country ? Home is something more than an abstract idea having reference only to locality; its foundations are laid in common in- terests, sympathy, and affection. A " silver streak of sea " cannot divide these interests, nor can miles of ocean sever the strong ties of affection and of sympathy. Hence it is that, from whatever quarter of the Empire a cry for help comes — wherever the British flag waves over Englishmen struggling on their own ground for all they hold dear — it is there our home is in danger, there is the rallying-point of forces created for its defence. While we boast of armed hosts here and in the colonies, whose proud motto is " home defence," they must " survey the Empire " to " behold our home." ^^ * Canada. — " Our immediate interest ia all this arises from the posi- tion we occupy to Great Britain — politically and strategically — a point that has been lost sight of by the statesmen of the Manchester School ; 92 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. but ono which affects the interests of the Empire in no ordinary degree, ncvortholess, and deeply concerns ourselves. " In the event of a great Euroi)ean war, it will bo absolutely neces- sary for Great Britain to act her house in order. There can be no now trials. Our position geographically and strategically is such that wo can to a very great extent compel our neighbours to look to their own concerns, and to make it their direct interest to take the part of Great Britain in the quarrel ; thus keeping open a vital source of supply — • food — for her people. " If this is to bo done effectually, British statesmen must bo up and about their business. An adjustment of the naval and military rela- tions of the Empire must precede a federation of its dopcndcmcies, and the defensive movements must no longer bo confined to the hedge- rows of England. With her own power consolidated, and the United States as an ally. Great Britain may bid defiance to the world in arms." — The Volunteer Review, Ottawa, February 2nd, 1875. ^ ( 93 ) CHAPTER IV. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN WAR.* In 1873 I had the honour to address this Institute on the subject of "Colonial Defence." As the remarks I am about to offer as a basis for dis- cussion here and in the colonies are but a con- tinuation of that paper, I must briefly refer to general views and principles it formulated.f It is necessary to do so for the reason that they were honoured by great consideration at the hands of the colonial Press. One of the chief objects of this Institute is to bring to a focus colonial opinions, so that national shortsightedness at home may have the assistance of Imperial spectacles ; { and * Read before the Royal Colonial Institute, May 1877. t Australia. — " It may seem ungracious to become impatient with people whose only fault is an over-anxiety for our own safety ; and yet the patronage of such fussy busybodies is very irksome. Captain Colomb believes that he has a mission to awaken the homo Government and tho colonial moiety of the Empire to a sense of the dangers which threaten them from the inadequacy of the means of defence in the Pacific." Melbourne Leader, Victoria, July 28th, 1877. X Australia. — " Considerations of this kind all tend to show that colonial federation is indispensable to our future security, as anytliing like common action is almost impossible without it. We are aware that there is, in Victoria, a political party wliich is in favour of neutralizing that colony. But what naval power at war with England would consent to such a neutrality ? A successful raid upon Melbourne would bo worth 94 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. therefore as one of its Fellows, I shall best fulfil my duty by submitting to special notice such views and arguments as are adverse to those put forth in that paper, omitting for the present all reference to still more numerous expressions of cordial approval. In a matter of such vital importance as Imperial Defence,* the main question at issue is this : How to secure with economy, yet truly and efficiently Imperial safety ? When any solution of that great problem is suggested — and I grieve to say no one besides myself has ever yet considered the question as one great whole — more attention should bo paid to arguments calmly and deliberately urged against its adoption, than to any outburst of senti- ment, however general, which advocates its off- hand acceptance. War sweeps away all " castles in the air," all false sentiment, and leaves nothing standing but bare, naked facts. It crumbles to dust false ideas and false hopes, and consolidates the power of one Empire by scattering to the winds the fanciful delusions of another. Therefore in considering questions relating to defence, it is most important not to trust sentiment too far, but to weigh calmly and carefully practical arguments. from 5,000,000Z. to 10,000,0002. to the war-chest of the nation making it ; and Victoria, in order to neutralize, must first denationalize her- self. " — Queenslander, August 4th, 1877. * New Zealand. — *' The chief peril of war to England is, not so much the conquest of its colonies, as driving them to the conviction that their safety lies in secession, that is, in becoming neutrals."— TAc Colonist, Nelson, August 21st, 1877. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR REaPONSiniLITIEfl. 95 The paper to whicli I refer was a sketch of our Imperial position, tlio dangers to which it is ex- posed, and the strategical operations necessary for its safety. It may thus be briefly epitomized : — (1) It brought to view the fallacy that colonial defence can be considered as an abstract question, or that national defence can be limited in its meaning to the defence of the United Kingdom. (2) It pointed out that the principle of " home " or " local," or " domestic defence," if indiscrimi- nately applied, as it has been by the wholesale creation of forces which cannot be moved from the soils on which they are raised, must produce Imperial weakness, not Imperial strength. (3) That the United Kingdom is merely the *' grand base " of the Empire, that for this reason it must be rendered secure, not only from capture but also from having its communications cut near home. Were the .latter contingency to happen it would be helpless as regards itself, while it would cease to be of any value to the rest of the Empire with which it could not then communicate. (4) That even supposing the United Kingdom securod both against invasion, and the interruption of its water roads near home, there yet remained to be effectually guarded against as pressing and as serious a contingency, viz. partial investment by an enemy operating against one or more of its communications, with the other portions of that Empire of which it is but the heart and citadeL 96 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. For example : an opposing naval force operating with St. Helena as a base, at the crossings of the South Atlantic, would cut the whole of the Im- perial communications round both Capes ; and were the Suez Canal to be blocked at the same time, the whole Empire, except Canada and the West Indies, would be locked out from its grand base, and the United Kingdom would be partially invested. (5) That we can only secure the Imperial water roads, first, by a firm, strong grasp at all times of the ^joints which command them ; second, by fleets adequate to the requirements of keeping free and open the lines between the points. (6) That those fleets would be paralyzed in their action if the points between which they are to operate are not held by military forces suflScient to render the protection of the sea-going fleets un- necessary ; or, if there are not in addition at these points, stores of coal and means of repair adequate to the requirements of the fleets of which they are the base. The reasons for these conclusions will be found stated shortly in that paper, and at greater length in other papers and works I have put forward during the last eleven years. They have never been disputed, and though they were most un- popular eleven years ago, because we could think of nothing at home but our own personal safety, they are now happily attracting attention. The IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 97 "genie" of the British Empire* is rising out of the " pot" of the United Kingdom in which it was too long confined. May this " spirit " never be " asked to go back to show where it came from," and let us hope the time is approaching when Englishmen will cease to talk of their " country," and at all times and under all circumstances act as citizens of a Great United Empire. On the conclusions referred to were rested the following propositions : — 1. That as the Imperial strategic points had been and are utterly neglected, the colonies should combine to force on the attention of Parliament and Governments the necessity of providing means for their security and of increasing their naval resources. 2. That a commission properly constituted on an Imperial basis, should be appointed to inquire into this matter, and that such a commission might determine the just limits between Imperial and colonial responsibilities in the question of defence ; * Australia. — " The unity of the British Empire is now more than ever a prominent theme of discussion in England. Nor can we be sur- prised at this. How best to encourage and promote the closest rela- tionship between the mother-country and the colonies may verily be considered one of the questions which most vitally concern the welfare of Britain, as well as the immediate future of her outlying possessions. The doctrinaires who glibly prated about the advantages of a policy of separation, and whose whims and speculations were for a season coun- tenanced by a section of the British Parliament, have been silenced, so that we hear nothing that is worth heeding about the advantages of retiring from India, abandoning Gibraltar, or leaving Canada and Australia to go their own ways." — South Australian Advertiser, August 14th, 1877. H 98 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. and that thus might be prepared the way for a federation of the war forces of the Empire for purposes of defence. 3. That an absolute and pressing necessity exists for the erection of a great Imperial dockyard at the other side of the world, which would relieve the pressure on home dockyards and fulfil duties they cannot in war perform, and in peace offer commercial advantages of construction and repairs to ships of the mercantile marine. 4. That some change appears necessary in the administration of our war forces, because as the protection of the Imperial roads is partly naval and partly military, there is no one controlling power over both ; the Admiralty may scatter fleets in one direction, the War OflBce tie up military forces in another, but there is no power to com- bine the two, and without such combination each branch of our war power of defence would be helpless. 6. That as the communications of the Empire are the common property of all its compound parts, each portion, according to the use it makes of them, has a direct interest in their defence and should contribute to that object.* * West Indies. — "Imperial and colonial interests are identical and it is the duty of both the mother-country and her colonies to take a fair proportion — according to wealth, population, and the nature of the duty required — of the labour and sacrifice which the preservation of the common heritage demands. It may be difBcult to prescribe or define the area of duty which should be allotted to each component of the Imperial aggregate, but we are convinced that the true loyal policy IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 99 Lastly. That forces created for the defence of "home" must "survey the Empire," in order to behold that which they are to defend. Now an exceedingly able writer in the Sydney Morning Herald,* took great exception to some of these views. He says : " We want — we lequire no standing army here. If England does her duty^ this colony at least will do hers. Increased and stronger harbours and coast defences, and a gradual filling up of the ranks will go far to protect all we hold dear. Besides, in these days of rapid com- munication, additional troops can be landed on any shore : there is always sufficient warning of im- pending danger to enable the Imperial Crovernment to send assistance to the places most likely to need it .... It is argued that fragmentary self-reliant forces are of no use, for to be of any value they must be fitted to move from one attacked point to another. Now this strikes at the root of what may be called our system of domestic defence. New South Wales, for instance, should not, cannot indeed, be asked to pour her defenders into Ceylon, or the West Indies, nor would she expect to be similarly assisted. The only movable troops are those of the Imperial army. They ought to be shifted from one threatened or assailed place to another, as the occasion demands. The self-reliant is to consider tlie interests of one as the interest of all." — Jamaica Colonial Standard, July 16th, 1877. * 6th and 15th June, 1874. H 2 100 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. isolated armies of the * fragments ' of the Empire will do yeoman's service on their own ground, and that is all that may be expected of them. That is the reason of their being, and that is the object of the movement which has met with such laudable success. . . But we need not follow Captain Colomb further, unless it be to record another disagreement between us. He believes that any expense incurred in repairing * the state of the Imperial roads,' ought to be shared by the colonies. We think not. We impose no burdens on the mother-country for the maintenance of our safety ashore ; and so long as we are integral portions of the Empire, we believe it is her duty to keep the roads in repair. Hi^/ honour and supio jaacy are dear to us all ; but they concern herself first and principally. Our share of the obligations we willingly do, and to the statesmen of G-reat Britain we look for the rest. .... Self-defence and self-reliance must be watch- words, and each colony will do its duty if it provides a force sufficient to protect its own territory." * I submit these passages to special notice, as they are directly opposed not only to the views stated at length in my former paper, but will not be found in accord with my further remarks to-night. They form a candid, fair, and straightforward expression ♦ Australia. — "As our readers know, that is practically tbe system which Sir William Jervis has been carrying out. He is visiting each colony and arranging for each its own entirely separate system of defence." — Sydney Morning Herald, August 3rd, 1877. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 101 of that colonial opinion which is adverse to the adoption of any Imperial scheme of defence, as will be presently seen. Those few brief but weighty words, extracted from two very lengthy and very able articles, very favourable in other respects, are deserving of most serious attention. They cover the whole ground of possible objections to acknow- ledging that my Imperial responsibility rests on any fragment of the Empire outside its own boundary^ save and except that portion called the United Kingdom. The truth is, that while every portion of the Empire now happily recognizes fully and absolutely the necessity for defending it as one great whole, opinion as to responsibility, if not much divided, is at all events left utterly undefined. Before, however, proceeding further I will give two passages from that remarkable paper, " Fallacies of Federation," which must be taken in conjunction with what I have already quoted. " It must be borne in mind," says Mr. Forster, " that so long as any colonies are British colonies the British Grovernment is bound to protect them, and would protect them in case of war .... and Great Britain is also bound to bear, and could not avoid bearing, the chief cost of such war." Taking this last passage in connection with the general state- ments of the address from which it is extracted,* I conclude the chief cost means the whole cost, less only the expense of such local and purely defensive * Vtde ' Journal Royal Colouial Institute,' vol. viii., 1876-77. 102 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. works and forces colonies choose to create or main- tain. Any colony may or may not provide means of defence. The British Government cannot, in an Imperial sense, compel it to do so, nor exercise control over the constitution or distribution of such local forces or means of defence, — if created, — beyond colonial limits. The fact of a colony not adopting of its own free discretion means of defence adequate to its requirements, or to the best of its ability, simply increases the responsibility of the British Government. The responsibility, therefore, of the Government at home in the matter of de- fence becomes greater in exact proportion as a sense of responsibility on the part of the colony diminishes. The less a colony does, the more must the United Kingdom do. Now this is not a matter merely between an apathetic colony and the mother-country, but it affects every portion of the Empire, because the extra war power necessary to put forward for the safety of that colony is just so much deducted from the force available for the protection of other Imperial fragments. There can be no doubt that " so long as colonies are British colonies, the British Government is bound to protect them" to the very best of its ability ; and there can be no doubt also that " self- defence and self-reliance must be our watchwords." The point is, however, are these watchwords to be used in an Imperial sense, binding all Englishmen under an Imperial standard which they combine to IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 103 defend, or is each Englishman to have a little flag of his own, and hoist it where he sees fit, and try to defend it or not, as he feels inclined ?* The question to ue first settled is this : What is protection ? What is defence ? It is really only chasing shadows to devise schemes for the protec- tion of our colonies ; it is only a dreamer's fancy to arm for defence and to emblazon flags with " Self-reliance," if we are not clear what it is we have to protect, what it is we have to defend. Are we going to protect the unity of the Empire, or merely to prepare to save what we can out of a possible wreck ? Are the strong to defend themselves, and let the weak perish ? Are Englishmen behind "increased and stronger harbours and coast de- fences" at Sydney to regard with complacency the capture of Fiji ; to hear without dismay the seizure of King George's Sound; or that the foe had established a base of operations at New Gruinea, or in still more suitable positions on some of the neighbouring islands? I feel certain the able writer of the article would in the presence of such contingencies be inclined to think that the honour, wealth, and supremacy of magnificent Sydney was concerned "first and principally," and that so long * Hong Kong. — " The colonies have duties to the mother-country as well as claims upon her, and it is only by recognizing them properly that a spirit of unity will be kept up between them. It is a good sign that Englishmen are gradually growing proud of the British Empire rather than of the British Isles, and to feel that it means something far mightier than the seat of government in Europe." — The Daily Press, Hong Kong, July 23rd, 1877. 104 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. as Sydney could spare a single man or had a single shilling available to help to prevent such a cata- strophe she would not have done her duty did she not spend that shilling and dispatch that man. I rather fancy that tl e writer now so strongly in favour of rooting all military power of defence to the par- ticular soil o^ which it is raised, would then fling away his pen and carry a sword across the sea for the safety and honour of that Sydney he so dearly loves. I do not ask for "standing armies in the colonies." I only submitted that the several parts of the Empire should come to a common understanding as to the defence of the Imperial strategic points, such, for example, as Fiji and King George's Sound, and in proportion to the extent to which their honour and wealth is concerned in the security and efficiency of these positions, so should they con- tribute in common with the mother-country to their maintenance and safety as Imperial strong- holds.* If the colonies think it is wholly and solely the duty of the people resident in the United Kingdom to provide for the safe keeping of these Imperial * Australia. — "Yet imagine the hue-and-cry which would be raised by the demagogues in the Victorian Assembly if any treasurer should have the temerity to propose placing a sum of money to assist . . I in placing either or all of those points in a state of defence ! * What ! ' j I * they would exclaim, ' send money out of the colony for the benefit I of our neighbours? Spend our taxes in providing employment for ' '* foreigners," whom it is the object of cjr fiscal system to injure and impoverish ? Never, never, never.' " — Queendander, August 4th, 1878. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBIUTIES. 105 keys, they should insist that they do it; they should not allow measures vital to their own safety to be so completely neglected. There is no use concealing the fact that the British Government, labouring under the pressure of home constituencies possessing all the power, cannot be reasonably ex- pected to move far in such a matter except supported by counter-pressure from without. It is idle to forget that if cavalry and field artillery be deducted from the strength of the regular army — our only movable force — the number remaining would not provide the strategic points of the Empire with garrisons, much less furnish expeditionary forces, which the colonies imagine we can at any moment *' throw on any shore." The Imperial roads cannot be kept open unless such places are secured inde- pendently of the protection of sea-going fleets, and therefore if the mother-country and her colonies do not come to some common and really Imperial understanding as to how these places are to be provided with sufficient garrisons, adequate de- fences, and naval resources, a great war will find our fleets helplessly watching their bases, while home and colonial merchant ships are being chased over the ocean like hares by Alabama greyhounds. The injury to commerce, the paralysis of trade thus caused will be the " chief cost " of such a war. It will fall on the mother-country and her colonies, not regulated by our own theory of re- sponsibilities in matters of defence or warlike 106 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. preparation, but practically pro rata on each por- tion of the Empire, according to its commerce and trade, the strategical advantages its territory offers for seizure or requisition, and its relative goo- graphical position to the quarter from which the opposing war power is launched. Whatever therefore may be a true or false theory of responsibility in matters of our defence, war against us will not be waged on any theory what- ever ; it will visibly press upon, and be most felt by the interests most exposed to attack, and leave us to settle our " Alabama claims " and our damages and accounts as best we can among our- selves. It is hard to say therefore, beforehand, on what portion of the Empire the " chief cost " will in the end fall. If Fiji or King George's Sound were captured, Australasia would feel it most ; were Singapore or Hong Kong taken, each part of the Empire would suffer in proportion to its India and China trade; and so on. If our squadrons are tied to these places because they are not defended nor have adequate garrisons in war, the water districts of which they are the centres would be left witliout efficient protection, and similar results follow.* * New Zealand. — " Let us hope that, in duo time, theie will be an Australian and New Zealand militia, trained in the aits of modern warfare, and not unmindful of the solidity of the whole Empire. In this ho^ie, we think there can be no doubt that the colonists of Australia and New Zealand will heartily join." — Uawke's Bay Herald, July 31st, 1877. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 107 " If," says the writer, " England does her duty, this colony (New Houtli Wales) at least will do hers .... There is always sufficient warning to enable the Imperial Government to send assistance to the places most likely to need it." Clearly, then, he considers it the duty of the people living in the United Kingdom to send military force to every place " likely to need it." If this be a correct view, it is as well the whole Empire should know England has not prepared to do so. While she now, as of yore, expects "every man to do his duty," Englishmen in the colonies rightly expect she will do hers. But the very essence of the whole question lies not in the sentimental expres- sion of a readiness either on the part of England or the colonies to do their duty, but to distinctly comprehend practically what are the duties to be done. When Mr. Forster says, " the mother- country is bound to protect her colonies," let it be asked in what w^ay ? Is her responsibility unlimited ? And are the colonies not bound to help ? Does it extend not only to guarding all the trade lines of each particular colony, no matter in what direction they lie, but also all English homes and interests scattered over territories in the aggregate sixty times her size ? Are colonies neither to furnish men nor money according to their means to help the people of the United Kingdom to do so ? In that case the signal of Trafalgar must be reversed so far as the colonies 108 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN, are concerned. It mnRt stand thus : England does not expect every man to do his duty, but every man expects England to do hers ! I am sure Mr. Forster differently construes the word " protect," and is very far indeed from thinking that the colonies have no duties and no responsibilities in this matter of defence, or that Englishmen whose lot is cast in the colonies instead of at home may absolve themselves from all obligations lying beyond their own shores, while, on the other hand, those who live in Eng- land cannot by any means do so. In the latter case, an Englishman can vary his responsibility by simply changing liis residence from one part of the Empire to another.* At home he can be taxed to protect water communications, the safety of which is a common necessity to all ; but in the colonies he can escape the obligation. This is surely a very * The political aspects of the question must be left to others to dis- cuss. It would be out of place to consider difficulties preseuted by internal Imperial policy in a i>aper which deals with the external pres- sure of war. If that policy weakens our power of resistance, w j must take the consequences ; we cannot make the war operations of our enemy subservient to our particular ideas of government. The reader who wishes to follow up the subject in its jwlitical aspects, will find ample matter for close study and grave thought in the ' Proceedings' of the Institute, and in 'Imperial Federation of Great Britain and her Colonies,' by F. Young. It is also but right to draw special attention here to a passage in Mr. Forster's paper previously referred to: "The British Government and Parliament have no right to inflict this revolution [Federation] upon any colony or group of colonies, unless with the full consent of the colonists concerned, or unless it can be shown that such a course is absolutely necessary for Imperial interests, for the interests of the Empire generally, in short, for the interests of us alV [The italics are mine. — J. C. R. C] IMPEUIAL AND COLONIAL VVAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 109 strong argument in favour of a general exodus from England to the colonies on the eve of war. There is too much reason to fear that rather than grapple with a great difficulty which deeply con- cerns us all, we Englishmen at home and abroad try to hide it from our sight. We are but too apt to believe there is a wide difference between Impe- rial and Colonial responsibility in war : we entirely forget that no home or Colonial Legislature, no power and no man, has ever yet even attempted to draw that line which is supposed to divide dis- tinctly the one from the other.* I would submit that there is no such line ; that there can be none. The problem of Imperial security cannot be solved by disintegrating that which is common to all ; it is a burden resting proportionably on every frag- ment of the Empire, and distinctions are not those of responsibility, but simply of practical ability.! • Bermuda. — " "When the question of federating the provinces of British North America, as they now exist, under the Dominion of Canada, was being discussed, the Hon. Joseph Howe, of Nova Scotia, proposed the broad question, which underlies Captain Colomb's entire thesis, of the federation of the Empire. And the day is fast approach- ing when a practical consideration of the matter will be forced on us by the sequence of events, as regards the commercial relations between England and her colonies." — Bermuda Royal Gazette, June 3rd, 1879. West Indies. — " It is the common duty of England and her numerous colonies to share the cost and labour of defence, but the great question that wants solution is how to distribute this responsibility and duty." — Jamaica Colonial Standard, July 18th, 1877. f Australia. — "But while we have no control over any diplomacyy no word to say about the Eastern question^ or any other question^ no power to determine 110 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. The weak must bear the burden according to their strength. The problem is one, not of division, but of adjustment. The misfortune is, that Impe- rial policy has been directed, not towards adjusting the burden, but has really thrown it down, leaving the United Kingdom and the colonies to cut off bits here and there according to selfish, mistaken instincts of self-preservation, and the result is that much of it remains repudiated by both. No one can say to whom the heavy remainder belongs, whether to the mother-country or to the colonies. We will not pick it up, because we have taken all the "home defence" out of it we require; the colonies will not touch it, because they have cut off as much " domestic defence " as they think they want. To understand what that remainder is, it is necessary to examine closely our existing arrange- ments for the defence of our Empire. " Each colony," says the article, " will do its duty if it provides a force sufficient to protect its own territory .... our share of responsibility we willingly do, and to the statesmen of Great whether we shall go to war or remain at peace, there is no political reason for asking us to defray tJie cost of a war in which we have no voice, and perhaps no interest. There is nothing in this view of the case thai is selfish ; it is simply a corollary from the admitted doctrine uuit taxation and representation go together." — ' Sydney Morning Herald,' August 3rd, 1877. \ IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. Ill Britain we leave the rest." This quotation fur- nishes a very brief but most distinct idea of the prevailing notion existing in men's minds of the allocation of responsibilities in war. Let us examine its practical value, and take New South Wales as an example. It has a population of some 600,000 souls, scattered over an area of some 323,000 square miles, and an enormous assailable coast line, offering numerous safe places for landing troops. No very large proportion of rural popu- lation so scattered can be made really effective for military service. In that splendid essay * by Mr. Reid it is stated that 27 per cent, of the whole population of the Colony is to be found in the metropolitan district of Sydney. These two facts taken together show that on that district rests the main responsibility of protecting the whole colony. The forces for the protection of its territory con- sisted in 1875 of a naval brigade mustering 329, and military forces 4646, all told, about one-third of which is made up by cadet corps furnished by colleges and public schools; 3000 therefore about represents the available military force. Our ablest , Engineer oflBcers are already considering on the spot works of defence. Doubtless they will point out a pregnant expression used by the greatest engineer England ever produced : t " My fear would be of establishing works at very considerable * ' An Essay on New South Wales.' By G. H. Reid, t The late Field-Marshal Sir John Burgoyne, R.E. I / 112 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN, expense, and afterwards being forced to abandon them for want of troops." If New South Wales is to be left when attacked entirely to its own military resources, any extensive works might have to be abandoned. The fortifications of Paris did not save France, nor can forts at Sydney save New South Wales in the absence of suflScient garrisons. Without such forts at Sydney and Newcastle the action of a movable army and a movable fleet would be completely crippled; but the forts without this army and this fleet, and without sufficient military force to defend them, / would be monuments of extravagant shortsighted- ness. A power in possession of Sydney or New- castle, and also King George's Sound, could hold in an iron grasp the whole continent of Australia. In the safe custody of those positions is the whole continent " first and principally concerned." Each colony in that continent has an equal and direct interest in the safety of such places. If, therefore, colonies are not responsible beyond their own boundaries, if they are under no obligation to share the military expenditure necessary to secure places because they are beyond their political limits, and if these forces cannot be moved out of the colony in which they are raised, it all comes to this — the population of Sydney must be respon- sible for the safety of one-half the continent, and whatever Englishmen happen to reside in the vicinity of King George's Sound must be held J\ IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 113 responsible for the other.* But their responsibility does not end here, for if these points are lost the trade and commerce for a huge area around them are lost also. *' Trade follows the flag," and the flag that waves triumphant over Sydney and King George's Sound will determine the nationality of the trade on the great districts of ocean of which they are the " strategic points." This is not a thing merely affecting the interests of those Eng- lishmen who happen to reside at those particular places. It " first and chiefly " concerns Austra- lasia, and is of vital importance to the whole British Empire. Thus does this principle of " home or local defence," indiscriminately applied, place an Imperial burden on a few individuals, not because they are most capable of bearing it, not because they are alone interested, but simply because they have the misfortune to live at places of Imperial strategic importance. Such points are most liable to attack because they offer enormous advantages as naval and military positions. When attack is resolved upon it will be delivered with such imperial or national impetus as may be deemed sufficient to offer reasonable prospects of success. The means of attack will be furnished by the available resources of a groat nation ; the nature and amount of force employed for the pur- * Australia. — " We know that our volunteers are not worth much, but such as they are, we should decidedly object to their being taken away to garrison King George's Sound." — Melbourne Leader, July 28th, 1877. I 114 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. pose will be determined by the necessities of the particular operation — by nothing else. These necessities will be estimated by our means and method of resistance. Concentrated energy of Imperial or national power may be brought to bear on the point selected for attack. Now, suppose either Vancouver's, King George's Sound, Fiji, Newcastle, Sydney, or any other point, be so selected. If our power of military resistance at such places be regulated not with reference to the Imperial importance of the position, nor to the nature and extent of defensive work to be done, nor yet by the possible force of attack, but simply by a rule-of-thumb system of arming and drilling whatever Englishmen happen to live there, the result of contact is not a matter for speculation or for hope — it is a miserable certainty. The simple truth is that power of attack means power of concen- tration ; and if in defence power of concentration be absent, weakness is opposed to strength, and a very natural result follows " the survival of the strongest." Again : there can be no doubt whatever that if a colony has no commerce, no trade, and no in- terests beyond its own boundaries, it will have done its duty if it provides forces sufficient to protect its own territory.* But the glory of New * New Zealand. — " In the literal sense, it cannot be said that any colony answers this description, though, if the underlying principle is considered, it may very well be contended that ift includes most of the Australasian settlements. Their trade is almost entirely confined to IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 115 South Wales is her external trade. " According to population her external trade average," Mr. Reid tells us, " is more than double that of the United Kingdom." Those who maintain that there is a distinction between Imperial and colonial responsibility in war, and that the responsibility of a colony ends on its shores, must answer this question : Why should the people of the United Kingdom pay and find the force necessary, and be responsible for the protection of the " external trade " of New South Wales, wlien the proportion of individual interest is as one to two ? Again : but one-third of the total exports and imports of New South Wales comes to and goes from the United Kingdom. Why should the English- men at home be responsible for the protection of the other two-thirds which neither comes to nor goes from them, while those " first and chiefly concerned " look on from behind the " stronger harbour defences " of Sydney with all their resources and war-power carefully locked up? These are questions which cannot be shirked by believers in *' home defence indiscriminately ap- plied," nor passed over by those who differ from the purchase of articles not grown or manufactuied within them, and the sale of gold, wool, or other raw material, that would find a market just as readily on the Continent of Europe or in the United States as in England. There are really no ties of interest to one country rather than the other, and this narrows the question of defence to their own territory." — The Colonist, August 2 1st, 1877. I 2 116 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. my humble opinion that there is no such thing as a distinction between Imperial and colonial responsibility, and that in war all must share, according to their several ability, the Imperial burden of defence. But, putting aside all this, surely it is a fallacy to assume that any colony can " protect its own territory." Is each fragment — nay, is any fragment of our Empire, single- handed and alone, a match for any power which can possibly attack it? Could each particular colony in Australia defy the power of the United States ? Is it at all certain that New South Wales, the greatest of them, is a match for Russian power on the Pacific? Mare Island, the United States naval arsenal, is but 6460 miles, and Vladivostock, the Russian base, but 5000 miles, from Sydney. The Russians moved without steam power military forces, stores, and guns backwards and forwards in 1854, over a sea-line nearly 900 miles long, in the North Pacific, in complete defiance of the combined naval forces of France and England. It is not wise to rely entirely on the power of fleets to prevent the despatch of expeditionary forces from either Vladivostock or Mare Island. There is no physical impossibility to prevent either power working from these bases to transport a complete corps of 5000, without any great eflbrt, to the shores of Australia. In war the only matter to be considered by them is the reasonable prospect of success. This prospect of success can only be esti- IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 117 mated by our preparations for defence * In inverse proportion to our preparations for resistance will be the arguments in favour of attack. The less we liave the power of concentration, the more possible is success to those against us. King George's Sound and Sydney command the Aus- tralian Continent; but under existing arrange- ments either power, in contemplating operations which would, if successful, carry the whole Conti- nent, has not to consider the force of resistance furnished by the whole Continent, but simply to calculate the military strength of Western Australia as regards King George's Sound, and of New South Wales as regards Sydney or Newcastle. Is it to be supposed that either of the two colonies named could protect their own particular terri- tories from the assault of 5000 disciplined, pro- bably picked men, ably commanded, furnished with accurate maps, possessing full and detailed information, and backed by the resources of a great nation ? It would not be the inhabitants of Mare Island ; it would not be the residents of Vladivo- stock appearing at Sydney, Melbourne, Newcastle, Perth, Adelaide, Hobart Town, or King George's Sound, to measure swords with the populations of each place. It would be the concentrated pressure of a great nation scientifically brought to bear on * Australia. — " The theatre of a future war would not, as before, be the Mediterranean and the Black Sea alone ; the Pacific would offer a more promising field to an enemy." — Perth Inquirer, Aug. 11th, 1877. 118 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. the lungs of Australia, in order to leave lier pros- trate or to mar her life. The advantage to be gained by such an operation is an Imperial or national advantage, while under our " home de- fence " arrangements the military resistance to be overcome would be but fragmentary, or, in other words, colonial. The principle of local defence, which prevents the concentration and combination of the whole war power of Australia, is one of the strongest possible inducements for attacking favourable positions there, in order to reduce each colony in succession. Are we to assume that because Australian colonies, each separately, are physically unable to furnish local forces sufficient to protect their own particular territories, they are each to be considered as having failed in their duty ? * If we are alone responsible for their safety, have we no right to insist upon a com- bination or federation of the war power of the great Continent ? Are they at liberty to increase our responsibility, and our difficulty in defending them by objecting to combine their forces ?f. Is * Australia. — King George's Sound is in this position : an enemy's fleet can occupy it to intercept the steamers carrying the mails and carrying the gold, and can also sally forth to capture the ships arriving from England. Although there are no coal mines in the neighbourhood, there is always sufficient coal in hand to replenish the bunkers of a hostile fleet. Western Australia must be treated as a Crown colony, and the defence of its principal harbour (King George's Sound), if it is thought worth defending, must rest with the Imperial authorities, until the colony grows strong enough first to share the burden and then to take it all. — Sydney Morning Herald, August 4th, 1877. f " No doubt, if Australia were federated for general intercolonial IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 119 the burden of" Imperial responsibility to be shuffled off by the mother-country and the colonies by a hap-hazard apportioning of our respective duties, without regard to our respective resources, and without reference to any consideration, but a pitiable desire to be rid of it '^ These are all questions which must be answered by all those who see distinctions between Imperial and colonial responsibilities, and who therefore argue against the federation of war forces for purposes of defence. Again, all colonies are not practically taking the same view of preparations for defence. Some are doing much towards providing military means to resist attack, others are doing little or nothing. In a general war, are the people of the United Kingdom to " help those who helped themselves," or are their efforts to be chiefly directed to pro- tecting those who by their own neglect have rendered themselves more tempting objects of purposes, or even simply for defence purposes, the care of all the necessary strategic points would fall on the common fund. But sepa- rated as we are at present in our governments, we could not, if we would, combine for the defence of King George's Sound, even if we feel strongly that we had a common interest in doing so: for we have no official machinery through which we could act, and our intercolonial jealousies would prevent that decisive action which is essential to success in all military operations. There is no alternative, therefore, but to leave a post of that kind to be dealt with at the discretion of the Imperial Government, and the only possible way in which the colonies could help at present would be by a pro rata contribution towards the cost of the Imperial defence of the place ; just on the same principle as we make a contribution at present to the civil establishment at Cajx: York." —lUd. 120 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. attack? Without some binding federal arrange- ment as to tlie distribution, organization, and maintenance of war power, the colony that buried its talent in peace may in war reap the solid ad- vantages of assistance from us at the expense of others who meanwhile have made ten. But, more than this, are the residents in the United Kingdom to \)Q left to give or to withhold assistance at will, and be free from any binding federal obligations ? Or are they to be expected to have real Imperial strength without the power to draw from the whole Empire, in proportion to the resources of its several parts, real Imperial power ? If there be distinctions of responsibility in war, these ques- tions must be answered. They must not be left to be settled when war comes, to chance and " English spirit." Sentiment without system means in these days defeat and disaster. To take a practical illus- tration. Canada, with a population of some three and a half millions, furnishes an example to the English race. Her commercial progress in peace does not blind her to the necessity of being pre- pared for war. She takes a calm view of her position, and arranges to meet possible events. She taxes her financial resources, and calls on all her sons to do their duty, and willingly do they respond. Possibly some day or other, the eyes of the world may be fixed on North America, watching a life and death struggle for the honour of the English name. In such a case are other IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR UKSPONaiHILITIKS. 121 fragments of the Empire to deapatcli correspondents to give interesting accounts of tlio proceedings and — nothing else. Tlie naval power of the United States, drawn from 10,000 miles of Atlantic coast, would, if we do not prevent it, be concen- trated on the St. Lawrence. Considering that an Englishman in Canada bears a far heavier military burden than an Englishman in the United King- dom, surely, in common justice, we would be bound to sacrifice our whole naval power rather than permit her being invested by blockade. This involves our sending, besides a naval force su- perior to hers, a strong war garrison to Halifax, and a movable and purely military force for strategical coast distribution, and for counter attack. But let us turn to the South ; are we then to leave Bermuda without force, and abandon to their fate the English West Indies ? Our only movable military force, which is also the reserve for India, is but 100,000. This force would be at once absorbed by requirements in the West Atlantic. We may be in no danger of invasion at home, and sorely pressed for troops abroad, but meantime we shall have a military force of 300,000 men in the United Kingdom, which the principle of " home defence " has made it impossible for us to move.* It is illegal to send them where they * Australia. — " It may be maintained that if a defensive force is | "TT „ f I It liable to be removed, it ceases to be a defensive force. This is precisely i^ the ix)int (Ml which the colonics and the Home Government disagreed at ' ^^^^vvc '^Wv,*^ 122 PKFKNCK OF (JURAT AND (IRKATKn ItUITAIN. are roquiretl; tliorotbre tlicy nmst remain whoro thoy aro not wanted, and look on at Enjj^UHlinicn being slaufi^htcred, with tho calm conHciousness tliat, tliouKandH of niiloH away from tho fight, thoy aro striking examples <3f tho principle of self- reliance, and fulfilling Imperial responsibilities in war. But supposing this estimate of probable require- ments to be exaggerated, and that somo force, naval and military, could be spared for service in other parts of tho globe, is it quite certain that, in tho absence of binding federal obligations, tho people of the United Kingdom who really have control would readily part with force? The Colonial Office would be pulling one way, the Admiralty in another, and the War Office in a third, while public attention at home would be fixed upon the fact that its trade and commerce is brought to a focus in and about the Channel. The principle of "self-defence and self-reliance " is as applicable to naval power as to military force, and if we are true to our principle, colonies need not be surprised at its results. Our greatest trade centres are near home, and where our greatest danger appears to be, there, in obe- dience to the dictates of this principle, have we tho right to concentrate more power than may be the time when the Imperial troops were withdrawn. The colonics were willing enough to pay for the maintenance of these troops in times of peace, provided they were not withdrawn when war broke out." — Melbourne Leader, July 28th, 1877. • •i' IMPJ;ilIAL AND COLONIAL WAR UKSrONSIIULITIES. 123 roiilly vviiiitcd if we soo fit. Public opinion at lioiiic, with tlio Governmont in its liandH, free and unfettered by any binding federal obligation, might in a panic poHwibly insist upon keeping the roHiduum of our movable forces at homo. Tliero would 1)0 some justice in the asserUion that as the United Kingdom alone pays and finds the only movable forces, otliof parts of the Empire have no real ground of complaint if these forces are distri- buted without regard to their special requirements. Many arguments might at such a time be produced in favour of retaining forces at homo. It would then be remembered how in 1778 Paul Jones in the lianijer defied our fleets, harassed our homo trade, landed at Whitehaven, seized the forts, spiked the guns, set fire to the shipping, and even carried off Lord Selkirk's plate from his scat on St. Mary's Isle. Economists would point out that in the war between 1775 and 1783 eighty-two men-of-war were taken from us, besides 118 of our war vessels being destroyed or lost, and that this was the expensive result of England's fighting all over the world. In tlie popular excitement produced by a threatened commerce, in the chaos of our war administrative systems, and in the absence of bind- ing federal obligations as regards defence, it is not impossible the necessity of upholding the in- tegrity of the Empire at any cost and at any risk might disappear before constitutional clamour for the adoption of a policy of '* self-reliant isolation." 124 DEPEXCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Point might be given to such views by reference to the fact that long ago the colonies had been told to arm themselves and to be self-reliant, and that as they were satisfied with it in peace they must take the consequences of its results now that war had come.* They might be told " we could not swop horses when crossing the stream." Such pictures may bQ considered too highly coloured, but let it not be forgotten that without any such sharp incentive as actual danger for centralizing and tying up our only movable forces, that is the practical policy we are steadily and noiselessly pursuing now. We have a national (?) mobiliza- tion scheme which has taken years to elaborate, and in that scheme there is not even an indirect allusion to any place lying beyond the chalk cliffs of Dover. More exclusive attention year by year is being directed to the construction of such types of vessels as are useless for service on distant seas; while millions have been and are being spent on extending home dockyards which are but little use cr the eflScient maintenance of fleets at the other side of the world. Let us now glance at the possible condition of the Pacific Ocean. Even granting wo blocked the * West Indies. — •' The interests of the mother country and her colonies are so bound up together and so thoroughly identical, that whenever this grei»t fact is ignored, and negligence or selfishness is allowed to obscure and impede the operation of a trae patriotic policy, the injury is felt not only by the ofifendtd member but by the central heart and, to a greater or less exter.i, throughout the whole organiza- tion." — Jamaica Jolonial Stavdard, July IGth, 1878. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 125 A-tlantic ports of the United States, the safety of Australia, New Zealand, Fiji, and Hong Kong will then be in proportion to the force and vigour of Canada's resistance or power of counter attack. If it be sufficient to absorb the purely military power of the States any concentrated effort on any of the points named would be hardly possible ; but if not, several thousand men migl;t be poured into, say Fiji, before a single detachment of troops from England or India could reach it. For Pacific terri- tories to assume " there is always sufficient warning of impending danger to enable the Imperial Govern- ment to send assistance to the places likely to need it " is to forget geography. Yladivostock is 8000 miles, and Mare Island some 7000 miles nearer Sydney than Plymouth. The great Pacific railway across the States effectually settles the question of time; it has shortened by months the possible concentration of American military force on any point in the Pacific. On the other hand, within the last twenty-three years, complete water com- munication for 2200 miles from the interior to the Pacific has been acquired by Russia, and within the last four years her naval base on her Pacific coast has come down some 800 miles nearer Hong Kong and Australia. Before the Crimean war her military forces were barred out from the sea by some 200,000 square miles of intervening terri- tory then belonging to China. That war rendered it necessary for her to burst the barriers. While ■\ / 126 DEPRNCE OP GREAT AND OREATER BRITAIN". we pressed her in on the Baltic and Black Sea, she bulged out on the Pacific. Her military forces are now spread over seaboards and territories formerly Chinese, and their headquarters is now 3000 miles nearer Australia than in the year 1854. She has one advanced military post within fifteen days' steam of Vancouver, and another within eight days' steam of Hong Kong. The Russian naval I force in the Pacific is practically independent of European arsenals, and that of America entirely independent of Atlantic dockyards, while our Pacific fleets have to rely for support on Ports- / mouth and Plymouth, and can only receive stores and reinforcements round the Cape or through the Suez Canal, and our military force is caged at the other side of the world. , In view of such developments in the North Pacific, Australia is vitally concerned in the honour and supremacy of British naval power in that region. It is necessary to her security that it should be well guarded. Our fleets must keep that sea ; they cannot do so without coal. Nature has provided it, and British instinct of a former age, ignorant of the value or even of the existence of this all- powerful element, secured to us the place of its abode — British Columbia. Our power of keeping the sea in the North Pacific rests entirely and exclusively on our ability to secure British Colum- bia against all attack, and in guarding this North Pacific gem, set as it is with black diamonds, we IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 127 shall be establishing a post naturally capable of Imperial strength, about as near Australia as Mare Island. It would be an outwork against that steady advance of Russia which sooner or later will shift the real Eastern question from the Mediterranean to the Pacific. It would also " hold a pistol to the head " of San Francisco. Being 1000 miles nearer Sydney than Panama, Australia could regard the cutting of the Isthmus of Panama without any very great apprehension of its strategical consequences. I may remark that the cutting of that canal will considerably modify the view of the able writer already quoted, and a time may come when a certain island in the West Indies may be in reality an Australian Gibraltar. But how has this huge Empire, with all its wealth and intelligence, acted with regard to British Columbia ? It has left it shutout from succour, it has left it to sink or swim, because to connect it by railway with the Atlantic would cost some 10,000,000/. and might not pay for some time. Canada must be self-reliant and make it if she wants it, and leave it alone if she does not want it. i jw, the United Kingdom has within the last five years thought it worth while to pay 7,000,000/. on account of water communications ; 4,000,000/. has gone into the Suez Canal, through which but one twenty-eighth of our total commerce passes; and 3,000,000/. has gone, no one knows where, as a fee for Captain Semraes' lessons in sea strategy, 128 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. by which we have not profited. But for a work of immense value in peace and in war, vital to our Imperial life in half the world, we cannot afford to pay 10,000,000^. Thus the Empire is ready to cast down its North Pacific pearl to be trodden down by "swineherds," whose name is — shoddy. We shall only have ourselves to blame if it is picked up and placed in the Imperial crown of Russia, or added as one more star in the flag of the United States. As we have seen, a day may come when Australia will watch with anxiety the operations of the Canadian army, so her fate may hang on a naval action fought at or near Van- couver's Island. The hauling down of the Union Jack in British Columbia would be the ominous warning to all our Pacific territories that the hour had come when the ferocious national war strength of our enemy could " strike at the roots " of our innocent little systems of " domestic defence." Not only is Australia deeply concerned in the Canadian Pacific Railway, but it is a matter of vast import- ance to us at home. As I have for years per- sistently pointed out on every possible occasion,* * " It may be perhaps excusable to repeat the concluding passage of lectures ou * The Distribution of our War Forces,' delivered at a time when the ghost of invasion frightened the word Empire out of England : 'As regards the United Kingdom — the citadel of the Empire — let it never be forgotten that we have two dangers to guard against — direct assault and investment, partial or complete. Though these islands may bristle with, bayonets, though, at the very name of invasion, millions of riflemen may be ready to line the hedgerows, let us not shut our eyes to the fact that our BUpplies might be cut off,' that we could IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 129 these Islands must not only be guarded against invasion, they must be also secured against invest- ment. As our population increases, so can the successful chances of invasion be made to diminish, but so also do the dangers resulting from invest- ment become more possible and more serious. Increase of population in the United Kingdom means more mouths to feed, more numerous claimants for national out-door relief. We are a great people, but we must have food. We at pre- sent buy in the cheapest open market, but it never seems to have struck us that there can be such a thing as an Imperial co-operative store, and that the site of the butcher's and baker's department lies between the Red River and the Rocky Moun- tains, and that all we want is a road to it. We forget, also, that in making this road we should also be making a short cut to the infinite supply departments of Australia, Tasmania, and New Zealand. But we have up to this been so busy preparing for invasion that we have not had time to think of these things. In the event of war with America the mouth of the Mississippi will be closed, the American " Golden Grate " of the Pacific will be shut, and the other lines of our food supply will be objective points of attack by swarms of cruisers. be, in short, starved out. Therefore must our war forces be distributed in such a manner as will best secure the Imperial base of operations, and ensure safety and freedom of our Imperial communications." — Journal Boyal United Service Institution, 1869. E 130 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. No hostile squadrons may hover close round our shores, yet we might be in imminent danger of investment, and might possibly feel the stress of hunger.* We keep Bermuda and Halifax as Imperial fortresses to provide for the contingencies of war with the States, and yet take no thought how, in that event, we are to feed our people at home. If such a war takes place before the British Pacific Railway is made, we may bitterly regret we spurned Nature's gifts profusely spread at the foot of the Rocky Mountains. With empty stomachs we shall have no "spirit left in us" to retaliate for the loss of British Columbia, and Australia may then call in vain for help. With that railway and consequent cultivation and de- velopment of this " fertile region," the forces neces- sary to keep open Canada's communications would at the same time guard our food supply, and also protect the Atlantic side of the short cut to Australia. By thus making it possible for one force to perform a triple duty, we should free two- thirds of our available naval strength, and thus all other parts of the Empire not so directly con- cerned in this line of defence would proportionably benefit. Surely, then, as a defensive work this railway is an Imperial question, and not simply a ♦ New Zealand. — " Neither Danube nor Rliine would be of equal interest with the scanty meals of thousands of families. England might fight for the Balance of Power without much sympathy from those doomed in consequence to suffer hunger." — The Cdonist, August 2l8t, 1877. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 131 colonial concern. This is a part of that heavy remainder of the Imperial burden of defence we pass by. Telegraphic communication is another. While Russia has connected her naval bases in the Pacific with a continuous wire from St. Petersburg some 6000 miles long, we cannot afford to lay 2000 miles of wire to connect our great coaling port of the North Pacific with London. Russia can put her Pacific armies and fleets in motion three minutes after the order is given from St. Petersburg. We can only send messages through United States' ofiicials, who are not responsible to us if they never reach their destination. This is our application of the principle of " self-reliance " ! It is but the logical result of the system of " frag- mentary self-defence." British Columbia can have neither armies nor fleets to move, and therefore telegraphic communication would be perhaps superfluous. We have some ships scattered over the whole ocean. There are no works of defence raised by Imperial hands at British Columbia, no forts for the protection of our coal, nothing but prestige, sixty-nine militia,* and a few constabulary guards it from attack,! while a powerful Russian fleet is already concentrated in this quarter of the * Sec Official Report of No. 11 Military District of Canada, 1876, f Canada.- -"Anything more tlioroughly defenceless than our position it would be difficult to imagine ; it would almost seem from its help- lessness that it was thus placed to invite attack and afford an enemy the opportunity of being easily supplied with naval stores." — The British Colonist, 1877. K 2 132 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Pacific waiting events, and its officers openly talk of taking Vancouver's Island. If that point is left to be protected by our fleet, our naval force must be concentrated there. The Eussian squadron has then a clear road to Australia. Supposing we try to blockade that squadron now at San Francisco, we may get into difiSculties as to neutrality bounds with the States ; it may, besides, slip through our fingers, as it did in 1855 in Castries Bay. In the latter case our fleet may go in hot haste to Van- couver's, to find the coals burned and the mining works destroyed, and to learn the enemy with full bunkers has left for Australia, whither our fleet cannot follow because it cannot get coal. Thus it is that the principle of "self-defence indiscrimi- nately applied " to British Columbia vitally con- cerns Australia, and leaves it open to attack. For some reasons or other it is assumed that in the matter of the defence of the Empire, the pro- tection of the sea and the defence of the land are two separate and distinct questions : that colonial responsibility is bounded by sea, and what is called Imperial responsibility is bounded by land ; that colonies have none beyond their shores, and that with some few exceptions, Imperial duties of defence are strictly and entirely confined to the sea. It is on this assumption we have based our preparations for defence ; it is this theory which has produced huge military forces, "fixed as the monument on Fish Street Hill," and which cannot IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 133 move across the sea or pass from one colony to another, even though nothing separated them but a political boundary. We have at home 400,000 troops. Three-fourths cannot be moved across the sea, and nearly one-half (the volunteers) cannot even be moved to Ireland. " The self-reliant armies of the fragments of the Empire will do yeomen's service on their owh ground, and that is all that may be expected of them." It is, there- fore, very evident that both the United Kingdom and the colonies at present seem to believe there is neither reciprocity nor commonality of responsi- bility so far as land defence is concerned. The result is that when we are threatened with invasion at home we can look for no military help from abroad, and when the colonies are threatened abroad they can get no military aid from home.* We may be in no danger of invasion, and with a military force, at the very least, of 300,000 at home, we are to let British Columbia, or the West Indies, or all our colonies go rather than give military help. The Cape may let St. Helena, the Falkland Islands, and the Mauritius go rather than move a man. Queensland must not mind Fiji • Aiistralia. — " And in the meantime the British Empire, vulner- able at so many points, is, for defensive purposes, a heterogeneous mass of incoherent atoms." — Queenslander, August 4th, 1877. " We wish we could impugn the accuracy of these statements, but we fear it is impossible ; and we cannot do better than submit them to careful consideration as constituting arguments which appear to us to be perfectly unanswerable, in favour of Australian federation, as one great step towards Imperial federation and Imperial safety." — Ibid. 134 DEPENCK OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. being captured, nor New Zealand Tasmania being taken ; nor must New South Wales mind Victoria being overrun, nor Victoria stir a military finger though the enemy be encamped at Adelaide ; and South Australia must look on while a hostile force occupies King George's Sound. We impose no burden (say the colonies) on the mother-country for the maintenance of our safety ashore, therefore they must defend themselves. We impose no burden on them, therefore we must defend our- selves; and so the system of territorial defence may thus be shortly summed up — every place for itself and the Empire for none ! But weak colonies, having neither population nor resources sufficient to make even a faint show of military preparation, sometimes get a little doubtful as to the efficacy of this newfangled doctrine of military disintegration. Mr. Forster comforts them with the assurance that the British Government at home " is bound to protect them in war." But faith in the logic of these words is somewhat disturbed by the logic of these facts — that the British Government at home ties up its military forces and omits mentioning such places altogether in its great mobilization scheme. This creates alarm, and then we quiet them by pointing to our fleet. We give all our colonies to under- stand that the fleet will, without any army, make up for every deficiency in the matter of land defence here, there, and everywhere, all over the IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 135 world, and thoy believe it. But they muRt re- member wc ourselves do not believe it. We have created a military immovable force 300,000 strong because our Channel fleet cannot be relied on to protect an assailable coast line from the Humber to Penzance, only 750 miles in length. How, then, are ships scattered over a world of water to be relied on single-handed to protect territories with thousands of miles of undefended shores?* Further, our fleets cannot keep the sea without the support of an army distributed strategically over the face of the globe to secure their bases. Our existing arrangements lock up our military forces, and provide no garrisons for the Imperial strategic points. Our fleets cannot move far away, therefore, from those places when ex- peditionary forces are on the sea. They caimot leave their coals to be taken or burned, nor risk the capture of thqir stores and means of repair. The truth is, the principle which ties up our military forces in immovable detachments also will bind, with strong chains of necessity, our fleets to * Australia.—" In the case of South Australia the direct advantage of having British men-of-war in those waters is trifling indeed. One of Her Majesty's ships engaged in cruising in the Pacific, enters our jHirts occasionally : but the visits, like those of celestial beings, are short and far between. Beyond this, what reliance can we place upon these vessels, and what security have we that in the hour of danger they will be at hand to assist us ? Simply none at all. Adelaide might bo sacked and burned while H.M.S. ' Nymphe ' was at Fiji, and the latter might be occupied by an enemy while the 'Nymphe' was in Australia." — Adelaide Observer, 1877. 136 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. their own depdts. In adopting this principle of ^rap^mentary defence, which deprives us of the power of concentrating^ naval power or mihtary force, wo are forgetting our past history, and doing our iKJst to deprive all liritish territory and all British sea lines of 'ntercommunication of efficient naval protection in war. Our military weakness is not so much a want of force as a self-imposed inability to apply it where it is wanted. This system was not devised by the British Government, though it sprung from its neglect. Englishmen at home armed themselves because the Governments had not provided for the defence of the United Kingdom; Englishmen abroad followed their ex- ample because the same Governments left them " naked to their enemies." Those abroad " will do yeomen's service on their own ground ; " those at home will only resist invasion. Between them lie our Imperial water roads, which our fleets cannot protect unless the " strategic points " which command them are efficiently garrisoned in war. The armed Englishmen abroad think it is no affair of theirs, those at home think it is no part of their duty to garrison and defend the keys of the Empire. Colonial Legislatures regard it as an "Imperial responsibility," the British Parliament seems to regard it as a "colonial burden." Meantime, places like Vancouver's, Fiji, King George's Sound, St. Helena, and others are to be left to take care of themselves. Thus, in chasing a IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RKSPONSIHILTTIKS. 137 " will-o'-tho-wiHp," composed of imap^inary and fan- tastical distinctions tetwoon " colonial burdens " and " Imperial responsibilities," we are walking into a dangerous quagmire, to find, perhaps too late, that there are no such " distinctions " and no separate " burdens," and that with a federal army and a federal fleet we might have defied attack, and thus prevented war. Our fleets, however, will want other things besides military garrisons at their bases. In these days they will need dockyards near at hand, pro- viding sufficient means of repair; and they will require a sure, steady, and certain supply of coal and telegraphic communication. To protect the trade lines in the Pacific Ocean, with its 70,000,000 square miles of water, we shall in war require an enormous fleet. That fleet should be entirely independent of Atlantic dock- yards, and a great Imperial dockyard at the other side of the world is a most apparent necessity.* ♦ Australia. — '« The only proposition of real value .... is that 1 1 England should have a dockyard somewhere in the Pacific." — Melbourne Leader, July 28th, 1877. " The suggestion that the Imperial Government should have a dock- yard at Sydney is, of course, one that will meet with no opposition here ; and a Bill is now i)assing through the Imperial Parliament which provides that fortifications in a colony may be vested in the Governor of a colony on behalf of Her Majesty, so that thero would be perfect Imperial control over the Imperial property. What the colonists are doing in the way of defence is for their own sakes, and is of course limited by their means and by their necessities. But if any particular port is thought to be of such transcendent importance for the purposes of Imperial strategy that it is not safe to leave it to a limited colonial defence, but that as a matter of Imperial policy it ought to be made 138 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Though Austraha and New Zealand are first and chiefly concerned, it is not merely a colonial want. Every portion of our Empire has an interest in that ocean, and therefore such a dockyard is a great Imperial requirement. If it be said our Empire cannot afford to create such a dockyard, then let us quietly haul down the Union Ji>ck in the Pacific before we are ignominiously compelled to strike it. But before doing so, it may be worth considering whether it would not be a better alter- native to abolish one of our home dockyards, and re- move the officials, plant, and sufficient reserve ships to Sydney, the natural Portsmouth of the Pacific. The loss at home would be more apparent than real. Though there would be one Royal dockyard less at home, the pressure both in peace and war of the maintenance of fleets for half the world absolutely impregnable, then there is nothing to prevent an Imperial protection being superadded to the colonial works." — The Sydney Morning Herald, August 4th, 1877. " A naval arsenal to be complete in itself involves fortifications and a permanent garrison. These also would have to be treated as Imperial." — The Adelaide Observer, August 4th, 1877. " A dual naval base in England and Australia would be of the utmost importance, the establishment of an Imperial dockyard at Sydney being csj,)ecially desirable. But in considering these questions of strategic necessity and of the distribution of the cost of defence, it must be bonio in mind that it cannot be settled off-hand. If, however, Colonel Cross- man's calculation is not very far below the mark, tliat the actual defences of the Empire would not exceed 2,000,000^., which could bo equitably charged on the Imjjcrial and Colonial Exchequer, then we can at present foresee no great obstacle to the initiation of a practical scheme which would remove the reproach of defencelessness all along our Imes of communication." — The South Australian Advertiser, August 14th, 1878. T>>:- IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 139 would be removed. The resources of private yards at home are so enormous that not only can they meet the demands of the mercantile marine in its busy time of peace, but they can turn out war vessels, for our possible enemies, by scores. They would be idle in war, and available for the construc- tion and repair of war ships. There are no such private naval resources away from English shores, and therefore at present for aid, for reinforcements, and for maintenance, the enormous Pacific fleet responsible for the safety of half the world must in war rely on private and public yards crowded together in a sm.all island in the north-east corner of the Atlantic ocean ! To use a homely phrase? " all our naval eggs are in one basket," and though we may lay them on one side of the globe, the communications on the other may be exposed or shut out from us while they are being hatched.* There are, however, economical as well as strategical aspects of the question of an Imperial dockyard at Sydney. 1. A ship fitted out in England for the Pacific would be at least two months later on the scene of action than if fitted out at Sydney. The expense of her maintenance during that passage would be * New Zealand.—" Now that the neutral flag is recognized as a protection to cargo, it would not need many losses, nor any long period of paying war premiums, to convince colonial merchants and the people sufl'cring from the larger prices of everything they had to huy and tho less of what they had to sell, tliat this ad\ outage was to bo found iu indciMjndcncc." — The Colonist, August 21st, 1877. 140 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. saved. While passing from England to the Pacific or back the vessel cannot be counted as effective force, either in that ocean or at home, and coal consumed would alone add very con- siderably to her value by the time she reached her destination. 2. The resources of such a dockyard at Sydney would be available in peace for the repair and con- struction of merchant shipping. 3. The extent of the ocean and the nature of the service to be performed points unmistakably to the conclusion that in war the chief demand to be met will be for swarms of small unarmoured or partially armoured cruisers. Those who have read the admirable paper on " Civilization in the Pacific," * by Mr. Coleman Phillips, and studied Mr. Read's essay, do not require to be told that such vessels can be constructed at Sydney cheaper than in any other part of the world. 4. As we must expect great development in that English mercantile marine having its birthplace and its home in the great Pacific Ocean, so must we prepare to protect it in war. The ties of youth are not easily broken, and a little care and attention to a mercantile marine starting in life may be the means of binding together the interests and the sympathies of our peace and war navies on the other side of the world. There is a cloud no bigger than a man's hand * Sco • Journal Royal Colonial Institute,' 1875-6. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 141 hovering near Cape Horn ; it is a warning for the Empire to " gird itself up and run for the entrance of the gates of Sydney." Developments and civilization are steadily advancing to the South, and we have allowed the coal in the Straits of Magellan to slip through our Imperial fingers. Six miles from Sandy Point a coal mine has been opened and connected by rail with the wharf. *' Vegetables of all kinds are grown in abundance, and there is excellent pasture for sheep. The Settlement now to a great extent produces enough to supply itself, and it is to be hoped," says Mr. Rumbold,* " that it will ere long supply the Falk- land Islands." Where we have not the command of coal, we shall not in war have the power of military and naval communication. A damaged or worn-out ship must, under our existing arrange- ments, sail tho whole way from Sydney to Plymouth, 13,000 miles, and take chance of fall- ing an easy prey to any small steamer having coal in her bunkers. The Chinese Empire in the last ten years has converted 117 acres of ground into a dockyard and arsenal, with means and appliances both of construction and repair, quite equal to such as we require for our Pacific fleets. It is rather too much to suppose the English Empire cannot follow in the wake of the Chinese ! When we turn to the Cape, the same arguments * * Report on the Progress and General Condition of Chili,' 1875. 142 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. apply towards the Imperial necessity of providing naval resources, but they are considerably modified by its proximity to England. The same Imperial reasons for providing adequate means of naval repair and protected coal stores apply to this great strategic point of empire. Powers of construction are not required, but localization and self-reliant support of naval force in that district of ocean are equally necessary. The protection of the road round the Cape is a matter which, though it first and chiefly concerns that colony, is nevertheless a matter in which every portion of the Empire has a vital and direct interest. The fleet-centres appear to be England for the North Atlantic, Baltic, and Mediterranean, the Cape for the South Atlantic, Bombay for the Indian Ocean, and Sydney for the Pacific. The smaller links of the chain of responsibility which must bind the whole Empire together by defending its lines of communication must not be neglected, remembering that the whole strength is but equal to that of its weakest part. Means of minor repair, stores and coal must be provided at squadron-centres such as St. Helena, Antigua, Mauritius, Singapore, and several other points to which I have elsewhere referred. It is impossible in a short paper, on so huge a subject, to enter into details. They will all require strong garrisons in time of war ; many of them have but few English residents, and are but comparatively small worth IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 143 to trading enterprise. But places of little commer- cial importance in peace, will be by war suddenly transformed into positions of immense value, to wliicli our helpless merchant shipping will naturally run for shelter, and our exhausted war vessels look for succour and support. If there are no forts and " no garrisons, they may seek and look in vain. There is no law of nature which strategically distributes populations, and if we hope to solve the problem of Imperial defence by the simple process of arming residents, we may suddenly find the whole fate of our Empire depending on a corporal's guard, and reap the consequences of adopting a system which has had no place in history, dating from a time when the "four kings" waged the first war in the world, and even these " were joined together in the vale of Siddim which is the salt sea.'* It w&a naval and military combinations saved our Empire in the past. It was the ready unfettered power of combining naval and military force applied by us at the strategic points which brought down to the dust the power of the Dutch. Let us be warned by the lesson of St. Eustatius in 1781. The Dutch power was great in the Spanish Main, their colonies were of immense importance, and their commerce great. War was going on all round them, but true to their purely commercial instincts, they neglected means of defence — it was regarded as unnecessary because they were neutral. The centre of their trade and commerce was the 144 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. small island of St. Eustatius. They were making money by supplying our enemies, and thus it happened we suddenly declared war on the 21st December, 1780. Instructions were at once sent to our Admiral (Rodney) in those seas " to attack and subdue the possessions of the States General," and saying, " the islands which present themselves as first objects of attacks are St. Eustatius and St. Martin's, neither of which it is supposed are capable of making any considerable resistance." These orders reached the Admiral at Barbadoes 27th January, 1 781. He embarked military forces under General Vaughan, and on the 3rd February dropped anchor at St. Eustatius. He gave the Island one hour to surrender, and to use his own words, " the astonishment and surprise of the garrison and inhabitants was scarce to be described." The place instantly surrendered. Thus in an hour not only had the keys of the Dutch position in the West Indies passed into English hands, but also 130 ships besides a Dutch frigate of thirty-eight guns, which was immediately manned by British officers and seamen, and a few days later was cruising against the Dutch and capturing Dutch ships ! " Had the * Australia. — " But then the question at issue is one of politics as well as one of military science, and it is our function to look at it from a political point of view ; and it appears to us to be inevitable that under the present relations which these colonies maintain with the mother- country, there is no other alternative but that the colonists should defend themselves from aggression and leave the naval charge of the ocean highways to the mother-country." — Sydney Morning Herald, August 3rd, 1877. wrr IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 145 Dutch," says Rodney, " been as attentive to their security as they were to their profits the Island had been impregnable." Thus was St. Eustatius taken, and with it fell the islands of Saba and St. Martin, and seven weeks later the colonies of Demerara and Essequibo. Now, had the forces of General Vaughan been rooted to Barbadoes, Rodney could not have struck this Imperial blow at the centre of national Dutch power. We carefully study Napoleon's preparations for invasion, in order to learn how to resist it; we take no notice of his elaborate arrangements for the capture of our strategic points abroad, par- ticularly St. Helena, then strongly garrisoned and defended. So little do we value it now, that though at the outbreak of war with Russia in 1854 a heavy Russian frigate was known to be in the South Atlantic on passage to the Pacific, no ofiicial notice that the English Empire was at war was sent to the Government of our most important outpost in that sea.* It is important to remember this in connection with what I have previously stated, viz. that the seizure of St. Helena means the partial investment of the United Kingdom, the lock-out of all our colonies whose lines pass round both Capes, the loss of our command in half the world. Though the United Kingdom is first and chiefly concerned in the defence of St. Helena, every portion of the British Empire is vitally interested in its security. • I have this on the best authority. L 146 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. If we do not value such places because they are ours, let us remember what we suifercd when they were in an enemy's hands. Take the Mauritius as an example of this. Napoleon recognized the importance of that strategic position, and amply provided for its requirements. De la Bourdonnais, some sixty years before, had developed its resources as a naval base. As a French post it was a thorn in the side of British India and British trade in the East. The Marquis of Wellesley resolved in 1800 to take it, and a military force, 1800 strong, was collected for the purpose at Trincomalee, com- manded by Colonel Wellesley, afterwards the Duke of Wellington. It could not go without a naval escort, it was helpless without the fleet, and there it had to wait for Admiral Rainer's squadrons. When they arrived the Admiral objected to the proceedings, and the expedition had therefore to be abandoned.* Now those who think a fleet can go anywhere and do anything without a movable army, or that naval bases can be left unprovided with fortifications and garrisons, should carefully study history. I submit one passage from the secret and private despatch of Marquess Wellesley, 5th February, 1801: "A naval war of the most * It is worthy of note that in 1794, at Bastia, the same description of administrative difficulty arose, but with the conditions reversed. General Dundas would not do as the Admiral (Hood) and Nelson wished. In this case, however, the navy did what the General " after mature consideration " considered to be impossible. No one, however, was more astonished at the successful result of the naval siege of Bastia than Nelson himself. IMPERIAL AND COTX)NIAL WAR RESPOXSIBILITIES. 147 destructive nature is now actually waged by the enemy against the commerce of India by the aid of those French Islands, and cannot be terminated without their reduction." It is generally supposed "Trafalgar" efifectually settled our supremacy of the sea all over the world, but that is a mistake. The batteries and garrison of this French strategic position enabled the French fleet to defy our naval forces on Indian seas for five long years after that decisive battle was fought. The damage that fleet inflicted on our commerce was almost past calcula- tion. "In 1807," says Beveridge,* "the port of Calcutta alone in six weeks sustained losses by capture to the amount of 300,000/." In 1809 four frigates under Captain Willoughby, with a detach- ment of the 33rd and 69th regiments, attempted to take Port Louis. We lost all four frigates in the fruitless attempt. They fell a sacrifice to naval and military combination and shore batteries. When the French boarded Captain Willoughby's ship they found nothing but wounded, dead, and dying, and he himself sitting on the capstan, his arm dangling in its socket, his eye hanging on his cheek, singing, "Rule Britannia.*'! Britannia, however, did not rule in this region for another * 'History of British India.' t New Zealand.—" Granting all the pride of being part of a naighty Empire, it would speedily give way under the pressure of general distress. A fall in wool and a rise in sugar would appeal irresistibly to the most enthusiastic chanter of ' Rule Britannia.'" — The Colonist^ August 2l8t, 1877. L 2 148 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. year, when the place was taken by 10,000 troops and eighteen ships of war. These are useful facts to remember in days of free trade, when the wealth of the English race covers the world " as the waters cover the sea." Let the advocates of the simple system of undefended coal ports, dockless and unfortified naval bases, and self-reliant immovable detachments, remember that at present a fillibuster- ing force even can take most of them, and once taken from us we shall have no movable military force available to recapture them, for the moment they are taken they will at once be put in a state of defence. Let it also not be forgotten that even if England and her colonies combine * to fortify and defend them now before it is too late, hornets' nests may still in war be established round Australia, the Cape, and the West Indies, and we * Australia. — " We do not wish in any way to defend the doctrines of meanness, or to train the colonists in shirking any part of their fair responsibility, or to ask that the tax-payers in England should bear a burden that fairly devolves on the tax-payers in Australia. But when Captain Colomb lays so much stress on defending ocean highways, and the property that travels thereon, we are forced to ask whether that property does not to an enormously preponderating extent belong to England and not to the colonies. It is true that the ships that run between England and Australia are of equal convenience to us and to our brethren at home, but nearly all the ships belong to England, nearly all the outward cargoes are the speculations of English shippers, and even the homeward cargoes are to a very large extent bought on English account, before they leave our shores. The fact is that the commerce of England is so large that it spreads over all the world and rising communities are more or less mortgaged to English capitalists ; and the great English navy exists quite as much for the protection of this commerce as for any other purpose." — Sydney Morning Herald, August 2nd, 1877. MPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONfalBIUTIES. 149 must have movable military forces to root out and to destroy them. It seems to be forgotten that free trade in peace means in war naval armaments of all descriptions and sorts beyond calculation great. We are not and we never can be a great military nation, but if we are to live as an Empire, if we English- men are to live at all, we must hold together on the sea. To do so England and her colonies must combine, and the British Empire "grapple to its soul with hoqijjs of steel " the strategic points of power on the sea. The aggregate annual value of exports and im- ports of British colonies and possessions is some- thing like 300,000,000/. The value of exports and imports of the United Kingdom in 1806 was but some 60,000,000/., while last year it was 655,000,000/., therefore the colonies alone have five times and we have ten times a greater stake in the sea than we had in the year succeeding Trafalgar. The navy estimates for 1805 were 14,493,843/.; in 1814 they were 22,000,000/., or a little over one-fourth of the value of our exports and imports of that year. The value of exports and imports of Australian colonies alone is now equal to that of England and France together in 1802 — the year of the peace of Amiens. Such facts as these suflBciently indicate that the burden of pro- tection of our common commerce in war must be shared and justly distributed according to the ! 160 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. capacity of the several joints in the Imperial back;* they point unmistakably, first, to federal • Australia.—" The need or even the expediency of a cotnprehen- ■ive syHtom of naval defence for the whole Empire has yet to be donion- 8tmted to Imiwrial oti well as to colonial tiix-pavcrB. If conceded, its practicability Iiiih next to be proved, and after luat the comprchonHive plan has tx) be formed. The final stage, and one apiMrently still a long way off, will be the question of cost. It was siguificant that so few colonial statesmen at the meeting entered on the purely |)oIitical aspect of the case." — Adelaide Observer, August 4th, 1877. " This can only bo done by co-oiwratiuu and the adoption of a joint strategic policy whereby troops could bo transferred from one place to another. We are afraid that hero, however, the diiTiculty long foreseen is yet insurmountable, fur the very restraints which make the militia and volunteers immovable at home will probal)ly operate to prevent the local armies of these colonies from being sent to Ceylon or Fiji, although they might act in common and at any asHailed ix>int for the defence of Australia." — 'ITie Oouth Auatralian Adverti$er, August 14th, 1877. Hong Kong. — " There are, of course, few colonies in a position to contribute men like Canada, but in another quarter of a century, probably, Australia, New Zeidand, and the Cape will be able to follow her example. In the meantime, most of them can contribute in money, and thus lighten the burden J the mother country. At present many of the colonies defray military contributions, but these are somowhai unequally levied. Ceylon, the Straits Settlements, and Mauritius, which colonies all require a larger garrison for their defence, rightly pay a good round sum for it. Hong Kong also contributes a large amount, one out of all proportion with that of other colonies similarly situated. Malta, for instance, pin about one-sixth of the amount contributed by this colony. The troops located here are intended as much for the defence of the British communities in China and Japan as for that of the island. Yet the residents in the Treaty ports do not bear any of the cost. The contribution would not be unreasonable if it did not fall upon Hong Kong alone. As it is, the residents at Shangai, Yokohama, &c., enjoy a great and unfair advantage. The Hong Kong military contribution clearly ought to be reduced. But the principle that the colonies should help to bear part of the expense incurred in their protection, is undoubt- edly correct, and we trust the fact will be spoutaneously recognized by t'hem:'~The Daily Press, Hong Kong, July 23rd, 1877. Australia.— "The most rigid economist who fairly looks in the face the reasons for the maintenance of the British fleet, and the reten- tion of British naval ports, will admit that if the Australians were IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 151 naval poHitions, and noxt to a federal fleet and a federal movable army to flupport that fleet. If the Kni[)ire huH deliberately accepted the principle that each portion of it should be inde- pendently rcHponHible for its territorial defence, no matter vvhether the population or internal re- sources of each are sutlicient for the purpose or not, it has accepted a principle which renders it liable in war to subjugation in detail, unless the fallacy be assumed that the fleet of the United Kingdom can everywhere prevent any hostile attack exceeding in power means of isolated local defence. More than this, it risks the command of the sea, without which territorial defence in tlio United Kingdom means starvation, and in the colonies ruin. I venture to think the colonies have never been asked a question in the matter, and have simply accepted this principle of *' domes- tic defence" because they were left no choice but to adopt it. They are loyal, and they are true, and though they must each and all, except Canada, acknowledge military weakness, they trust implictly to one of two things — first, that war may not come till time has made them strong ; second, that if it does come before they are ready, separated to-raorrow, England would not on that account nialutain one ship the less, or dismantle a single fort, or recall a single garrison."— Sydney Morning Herald, August 3rd, 1877. Bermuda. — '• There is a disinclinatiDU in the colonics to incur liabilities for military purposes, the immediate necessity of which is not apparent." — Bermuda Royal Gazette, June 3rd. 152 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. they trust to the statesmen of England to provide for every deficiency, and to cover every defect: they look to them, in short, to do " the rest." Now, it is just these very deficiencies, it is just these very defects ; it is, in short, " the rest " of Imperial defence that the statesmen of England cannot provide for without the spontaneous pres- sure of hearty, willing, and practical co-operation of the colonies. They require watching and urging on, and they would not be human if they did not. It is most important to remember that in 1854 we drifted into a war wholly unprepared. We declared war, and left " the rest " to the War Office and the Admiralty, and land transport, food, and clothing for our Crimean army were lost in the gulf which lies between the two departments. In that year the Secretary of State for War ceased to be also Secretary for the Colonies, and their affairs passed into the hands of a separate officer of State. It is worthy of note that the requirements of a great war which threatened the colonies rendered it necessary to transfer in 1794 their affairs from the Home Office to the War Department, while the necessities of a smaller war which — as Russia was weak in the Pacific — did not threaten them, caused the care of the colonies to be transferred to an office altogether separate. The next great war will find all matters relating to coionial defence IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 153 between three stools instf^ad of two. Now, this may account for a good deal of that fog which envelops Imperial defence. The War Office regards it as chiefly an Admi- r^lty or Colonial Office question : the Admiralty views it as either a War Office or Colonial Office matter; and the Colonial Office, having neither fleets nor armies at its disposal, feels quite certain it only concerns the War Office and Admiralty. The easy way out of the difficulty is to leave each colony to provide for its own defence in any way it thinks fit, and to trust " the rest " to " English pluck" and " English spirit." There is no colonial branch of the Admiralty or War Office, there is no war branch of the Colonial Office, and therefore it is not surprising that every military and naval change has hitherto tended to distort the English vision from taking one wide view of the whole great question ; nor should we wonder that Imperial defence has been spHt up into little bits and strewed about the world. The people of the United Kingdom would, I believe, spend their last shilling, and fight to their last man, to preserve the Empire intact, and would prepare to do so, and to take their full share of Imperial duty in defence, if they only knew how, if they could only grapple with that " rest," which the colonies look to the statesmen of England to do. Englishmen in the colonies are not difi*erent 154 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. from Englishmen at home, and an Imperial * com- mission, such as I ventured to suggest ten years ago, and have huml^ly pleaded for many times since, would let in a flood of Imperial light upon the " parochial " English mind, and let the world know we meant to stick together in defending each other. It is for Home and Colonial Legislatures, it is for England's sons all over the world to make their voices heard on this matter. We of this generation are the pioneers of the next. When • Oape> — " When, however, such nepotiationa have been entored, into it will still be questionable who is to pay for the works. Between the Imperial Government and that of the Cajie, there will be much more haggling on this question than if the Colonial Parliament had at once voted for such measures of frontier defence as would have shown the Im^^erial Government that we are quite prepared to undertake the whole of it without the assistance of any British troops." — Cape Standard and Mail, July 10th, 1877. " If ever it should hapiien to the Imperial Government to take up Captain Colomb's idea of appointing an Imperial Commission to inquire into and reixjrt ujwn the best means of defending the British Empire, we trust the Cape Commissioners will not fail to impress the other Commissioners with the idea that British South Africa is in an excep- tional position, and should, while having certain definite claims to Imperial protection, be allowed, to a much larger extent than the other colonies, to shift for herself in all matters connected with defence." — • Ibid., June 3rd, 1879. Australia. — " The appointment of a Royal Commission to examine and report on the best means of defending the outlying parts of the Empire, and apportioning the cost thereof would, we think, be advi- sable ; for then the burden of the expenditure might be so adjusted th-.. 'Htle, if any, room for complaint would be left. The only doubt we entertain on this head is whether such an expedient is not too late, though certainly the scheme of uidependent defence recommended by Sir William Jervois and Colonel Scratchley will hardly militate against the proposals which an Imperial Commission would make.^^— The South Australian Advertiser, August 14th, 1877. IMPERIAL AND COLONIAL WAR RESPONSIBILITIES. 155 all Europe is an armed camp, and when one single power like Germany, which had but one corvette \ and two small gunboats in 1848, bids fair to be ' soon the third great naval power of the world, we cannot go unarmed. We push to the front home and colonial statesmen to warn us of dangers and difficulties ahead ; they are the scouts of our history yet to be written, and in days of consolidating power they must not be blind.* We can hear behind us the measured tread of a host of advancing English nations, whose common path we are to prepare to make plain, and to render safe. We see before^ us tangled masses of confused systems, which we must do our best to clear away. We are warned of the dangers of our path by the whitened bones of empires which have gone before and perished. But through the sunshine of peace, or through the darkness and gloom of war, our clear duty and our only hope is still to advance " shoulder to shoulder," helping the weak and cheering on the strong until we have prepared for those who coiie after us a safe camping-ground on the shores of a * Australia. — " The Colonial Empire may be in a transition state ; we may be passing on towards a dismemberment of the Empire ; or we j may be working towards an Imi)erial federation. Some think one, some J think the other ; some wish one, some wish the other ; but while we \ are as we are, parts of one Empire, and yet unrepresented in its Parlia- • ment, we do not see how the colonies can be forced to share in an expenditure over which they have no manner of control." — Sydney Morning Uerald, August 3rd, 1877. 156 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. great future. Then, and not till then, can we take the rest of the weary, confident that so far as in us lies, we have done our part to ensure that our Empire shall remain one and indivisible " till wars have ceased in all the world." ( 157 ) CHAPTER V. THE NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF THE COLONIES* In giving effect to the wish of the Council by readin -^ a paper on this subject, I desire, in the first place, to point out the difficulty which limits the possibility of its full discussion here. Re- sources — especially of war — must be practically available, capable of actual, if not of immediate, application or development. Now, in our great colonies, which offer the widest field for present inquiry, the possible development or the practical availability of such war resources as they possess rests with their own particular Legislatures. Whether these elements of war-power shall or shall not be developed; whether they shall or shall not be made available ; whether, in short, they are or are not in the true sense of the term " resources," are matters for their decision and not for this Institution to discuss. Therefore, the vital essence of the whole subject must here remain untouched. Though it be not legitimate in this place to consider whether those things of which I * Delivered before the Royal United Service InstitutioQ, March 28tb, 1879. 158 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. am about to speak are or are not therefore really aud truly our naval and military " resources," wa, as officers of constitutional forces, must not be blind to constitutional facts. Those who turn wistful eyes towards Greater Britain seeking for signs of naval and military help in that future no man can foretell, must not overlook the tangle of difficulties we Englishmen — home and colonial — have made for ourselves in the present. The con- solidation, development, or even the bare appli- cation of dormant or actual war force stored up in other Englands beyond sea are, from a naval and military point of view, purely theoretical questions based upon a complex variety of political assump- tions. The carrying out of practical measures necessary for a common system of defence through the machinery of multitudinous Legislatures dif- ferently constituted is another and wholly differ- ent stupendous problem, statesmen— of England, Canada, Australasia, and the Cape, &c. — have to face. In order to bring the subject placed in my hands to such a focus as shall render its brief con- sideration of the smallest practical value, it is therefore necessary to politically assume much. It must be taken for granted that the colonial naval and military resources — whatever they may be — are the common heritage and present common pos- session of the whole British race ; that they are available, can be developed, and may be applied NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP COLONIES. 159 by a homogeneously constituted State : finally, that these resources are to be regarded practically as factors of one great whole, tlie value of each factor being relative to its use and adaptability in one common Imperial plan of action in war. From any other standpoint it would be a simple waste of time to investigate the present sources of resisting power — as regards external defence — of any one colony taken by itself, for none isolated and alone could withstand the organized attack of any first-class power. Volumes might be, indeed have been, written respecting the direct defence of the Canadian boundary, but the supporting strength of England is vital to the whole question. Any one of the rich, prosperous, and great colonies in the South Pacific might — under their present arrangement, and if single-handed — suffer severely from armed strength possessed even by such dis- organized countries as Chili or Peru. The Cape could not, unaided, stand against the fleet and army of Brazil. Plainly, therefore, the naval and military resources of the colonies can only be prac- tically and usefully considered as component parts of our great Imperial system. The object to be attained by that system being the security in war of the integrity of the dominions of the Queen, and the preservation of the manifold interests of the two hundred millions of human beings Her Majesty — by various Parliaments, Houses of Assembly, and Councils — rules. IGO DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER nRITAIV. I thus introduce the subject because, having been fortunate enough to have elicited discussions in tlie press of the various colonies, and liaving closely studied these and the opinions of eminent colonial authorities, relative to Imperial defence, I feel bound to express my conviction that no good and much harm may come of discussing this question concerning the colonies without close regard to their constitutional status. It is therefore due to this Institution to offer these preliminary remarks, and by doing so I hope to have made what is passing in my mind suffi- ciently clear without overstepping its laws. Introductory. Colonies may be divided into three classes : — 1. Colonies Proper — Agricultural, Pastoral, and Mining; such as Canada, Australasia, and the Cape. 2. Plantation Colonies — such as the West Indies, Ceylon, and Mauritius. 3. Military or trading settlements — such, for example, as Cyprus and the Fijis, Bermuda and the Straits Settlements, Malta and the Falkland Isles, &c., &c. Of these classes the first demands closest atten- tion, for, as Heenan says, " the colonists who form them become in process of time a nation properly so called." Naval and military resources may be grouped NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. IGI under two heads, ** raw and developed." Men, for example, are " raw materials," but the trained seaman and disciplined soldier are " developed resources." Coal and iron are "raw materials," the ironclad the perfect product of their develop- ment. It is therefore necessary to examine the nature of the raw materials before entering on questions of their present or possible future de- velopment. Raw and developed war resources may each be divided into two branches of inquiry — men and material. The power of any people to preserve by force their own possessions and their own freedom is a question of relative numbers and distinctive characteristics of races. The possession of material resources, however great, may in war prove a curse instead of a blessing to any people too numerically weak, or too numerously neg- lectful, to prepare to turn them readily to organized account for purposes of self-preservation. Hence the second place — under each head — is here given to material resources. Considerations concerning naval and military resources of the colonies I therefore take in the foregoing order, and venture to remind you it is impossible to do more than hastily point to the most prominent features of so huge a subject. 162 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Men. Table I. showa the distribution of population in Colonies Proper.* It will be seen that the aggre- gate population of the three great groups of colonies is about eight millions, but the value of the war resources, apparently offered by these figures, must be qualified by reference to the various races swelling the total. The Aborigines of New Zeal.ind are not included, nor have I taken account of the 100,000 Indians in Canada, nor of the 30,000 Chinese computed to have recently settled down at the gold-fields of Queensland. Without, therefore, taking these into account, it will be seen that from the total aggregate popu- lation I have named, some one and a half million must be deducted. I produce this offset of one and a half million from the total apparent numerical resources, not as a precise statistical statement, but as a fair substantial protest against forming hasty conclusions as to military colonial resources from figures only. Besides non-Europeans so deducted, it must also be borne in mind that the German element in the colonies is considerable, and that a German, until a naturalized British subject, can hardly be counted as a raw material of British war resources. * The tables concerning the colonics must not be accepted as per- fectly accurate, though some trouble to make them sufficiently correct has been taken. A careful examination of and comparison between the various sources of published information, home and colonial, will show the difficulties of obtaining perfect accuracy at present. NAVAL AND MIUTART RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 163 il s "I < s ^ 6 I SB CO n CO ^1 I $ I 1 si ■^■^ 9* o gi I- § •o o S •I S « 1^ :0 *« I- "♦• O -< 0> IM •- © IM © o 1 O M © i(^ OS t^ I -ti "H (N © 2 '» ) «©l M M ^ O *0 t>- © If} © ifj 94 00 84 -V ■*! © (N I- rt FH « CO © i-l CO CO CO i ©o hc©iJ5 © wSSo ■^© »t i-li- 168 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. only be fairly estimated when the present war is closed. In Canada the proportion of native races to British is very small, but it may be fitting here to quote from an Address to the Queen from the Chiefs of the Six Nations, "assembled at their council fire," during the Crimean War. " Great Mother," they wrote, ** your children of the Six Nations have always been faithful and active allies of your Crown, and the ancestors of your Red children never failed to assist in the battles of your illustrious ancestors." On the general questions relative to the Im- perial availability of military resources furnished by native populations, I would venture to remark that the truth — as it generally does — would appear to lie between two extreme opinions. The one which describes a contingent of Her Majesty's Native troops commanded by distinguished British officers as a " horde of savages " is not worthy of scientific consideration, but the other extreme of opinion may become a source of real danger. It appears to be briefly this : that " Home defence " is one thing, and " Imperial defence " another ; that so long as British pockets are full, a suffi- ciency of " billets for bullets " on distant battle- fields can always be readily procured, and may be chiefly furnished b^' the bodies of British sub- jects having a darker coloured skin. But if the teachings of history are to be trusted, this peace philosophy, based upon the sandy foundations of NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP COLONIES. 169 money and subject races, will not, in time of trouble, avail us much. The signal at Trafalgar was surely not of momentary import, but for all time the Shibboleth of safety of England and her colonies alike. Table 11. shows approximately the distribution of population in plantation colonies. It will be seen that the war resources offered by white population are of little numerical practical value. Climatic and other influences combine to render it improbable that this element can ever be in this particular respect of much account. Table III. gives similar information concerning military and trading settlements, to which the same remark applies generally with greater force. Raw Resources, Material. Out of innumerable materials necessary for Naval and Military purposes, it may here suflSce to select three : Food, coal, and horses. Food. It must be remembered we are now considering colonial Naval and Military resources as compo- nent parts of one great whole, of which the United Kingdom is the citadel. It is, therefore, of great naval and military importance to understand how that citadel is provisioned, and how far colonial resources are capable of supplying its wants. 170 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. 1^ '^k 4 n £ 1-1 S ieoi-4 040000 ui »i com CO m (N m 00 00 C4 O i-l s 8 ei «0 05 rt <0 5) ( 1-1 •»< t» "^ 1^1 C5 cc "^ MOl W •* t^« 35 a> w 1-1 00 O 04 Q J-184 i-t 05 * C4 s 3 ^ ct © 50 c» »t? « »A 1-1 © «©"«'- • «> i>- 1^ i^ I- C4 6 '13 * •a o 6 o if I I I I I I I I s NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 171 d H 5 g ri o it 1^ i I ijii m I I a 8Q Q o t^r^o^t-o i-i t- •n C4 s CO ^ «0 00 •♦< ^ t^ t^ 00 » 00>0-Hf.-Hlft CO -^ O — Q 0> 03 ?S « « t>- IM 04 -f OT Oi05l-*|lSO«<-l .i-tOOO CM© o — •* 04 ■^ ^ (N 00 •*•* 04 O IM -t< t^ 00 04 «o eo A S 04 8 .1 t* 8 to F«0S00t^lO«OO^ pH OO «♦< M CO ' I-I ^ Ifl 04^ i-T 0> 00 O CO ^ t^ . W 'O O t- CO •<*« l-( 00 o «4 eo 55 s a d| § IS e*?-^ 2-2 5 o c.a a g H .a •3 § •ES ■e •s * a, U f oa 08 g «8 CS 2 172 DBPENOE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. According to the elaborate calculations of Mr. S. Bourne, it appears " that out of thirty-three million inhabitants of the United Kingdom, eighteen millions may be sustained on food grown at home, and fifteen millions on that received from abroad." * He further points out, " on an average, each member of the community now consumes to the value of two and a half times as much foreign food as he did twenty years back." It is just ten years ago since in two lectures f here I endeavoured to show the extreme danger of limiting the military scope of National Defence simply to these islands. The aim of those papers was to draw attention to a disagreeable, and then most unpopular truth, viz., that military arrange- ments for even a passive defence could not be con- fined to the^ simple question of invasion, because without military aid abroad for our fleets to rest upon, the safety of our water-roads was imperilled, and unless these communications were secured absolutely, we could be — starved out. The defence of our Imperial communications, be it remembered, is not a purely Naval question, but a very com- plex problem involving a great variety of Naval and purely Military considerations. J The national necessity for no longer delaying to deal with it is * Vide paper read before the Manchester Statistical Society, " On the Increasing Dependence of this Country on Foreign Supplies of Food.'' By Mr. S. Bourne, F.S.S., 1877. f " Distribution of our War Forces," Journal, vol. xiii., No. 53. X If the Naval Prize Essay, 1878, Captain P. H. Colomb, R.N., Journal, vol. xxii., No. 94, be read in conjunction with " Strategic NAVAIi AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP COLONIES. 173 increasing with marvellous rapidity. At the date, 1860, these papers here referred to were read, the value of the chief articles of food per head of population imported was at the rate of 37 shillings and Jive pence per annum, while by 1877 it had risen gradually to 57 shillings and se^ien pence. The food required by fifteen thirty-thirds of our home population at present comes from various countries of the world ; consequently we have a great variety of divergent supply lines. Our Imperial connecting lines must be defended irre- spective of all other considerations, and if our colonies possessed food resources requisite to supply home wants, our food lines and our Imperial lines could, in war, become identical. So far, therefore, as the actual sustentation of our people at home is concerned, this would be equivalent to an increase of war strength; hence the close connection between colonial food and Naval and Military resources. Table IV. illustrates the imports of food into the United Kingdom in 1877. It sufficiently exhibits the truth that we are not, as regards food, a self-supporting Empire. This is a great Naval and Military fact, and one on which the whole question of a real national policy of defence turns. It would be impossible here to push inquiry below Harbours " General CoUinson, R.E., Journal, vol. xviii., No. 77, and Pasley's * Military Policy and Institution of the British Empire,' 1808, the complexity and gravity of the question will be fully understood. See Appendices 1 and 2. 174 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. »-4 t U CI} hi 1 i ■ i • * f4 1 •s 1 « 1 • g 1 i t ■0 id '^ c t c 3S?8?3 t^ i-^ -s 8,275,212 1864 372,601 8,809,908 1865 383.270 9,170,477 1866 541,215 OQ 10,137,260 1867 473,666 s 10,565,829 1868 1869 548,187 595,795 5 10,967,062 10,774,945 1870 578,564 11,702,649 1871 565,782 12,747,989 1872 670,802 322,283 993,085 13,198,494 14,191,579 187a 774,029 404,757 1,178,786 12,617,566 13,796,352 1874 874,143 418,357 1,292,500 13,908,958 15,201,458 1875 928,358 288,176 1,216,534 14,475,036 15,691,570 1876 870,653 284,279 1,154,932 16,255,839 17,410,771 1877 915,727 249,536 1,165,263 14,880,899 16,046,162 * Thia column Is taken from a statement in ' Coal ; its History and Uses.' sources of supply, are matters upon which I shall not now enter ; but instead will conclude with two slight illustrations. So far back as 1877, Mr. Donald Currie, in his lecture here, forewarned the country what might happen in a European war, through the absence of a submarine telegraph to the Cape. At this moment a savage, without even a big boat, has given the greatest " maritime nation in the world " a small taste of the consequence of neglecting such NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 183 practical views as were tlien put forth by Mr. Currie. Now it is from that lecture I extract the following pregnant sentence : " It was only a short time ago that the Admiralty inquired how much coal we could spare at the Cape, and whether our fleet could be supplied there, and it was im- possible for the Government to learn in less than fifty days their exact position." This, then, is one picture ; in the foreground a Government in a seven weeks' ignorance as to the power of loco- motion of the national fleet; and in the far distance, that fleet — in waters of Imperial strategic im- portance,* trusting to a combination of luck and private surplus stores for its coal. To look at the picture in another light, it is necessary to remember what Mr. Robinson, mem- ber of the Natal Legislature, said in this theatre : *' There exists in the part of South Africa to which I belong, as fine a field of steam coal as exists in any part of the world. That coal-field is 180 miles from the coast, and we are only too anxious to get communication by railway, but, unfortunately, our poverty and our smallness bar the way. If the Home Government would co- operate with us to connect that coal-field with the sea, it would open out to the British Empire a permanent and good supply of steam coal." f * The total commerce passing round the Cape, estimated by Lord Carnarvon at 160,000,000?. per annum. t At Camdcboo, some 50 miles from Port Elizabeth, there is also coal of gooil quality. 184 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. In speaking from this place two years ago,* I drew particular notice to the defenceless state of our coal depot at Ilong Kong. Since that time circumstances drew special attention to that part of the world. England woke up, thinking a war was close, and hasty preparations were made. Through the indefatigable exertions of two officers defensive works were erected in an incredibly short spaco of time for the protection of this par- ticular coal depot. I am neither aware as to whether these works are sufficiently armed, nor whether the artillery force was sufficient to man them, but it is desirable to point out that Hong Kong is only one of a certain number of strategi- cally placed Imperial coal depots essential to our naval and military power of defence. In the same paper this sentence occurs : " If war breaks out to-morrow, it would find our fleets without any system by which their supply of coal would be assured." I venture to repeat those words again, and do so with the more confidence, because in this very theatre one year afterwards they were for- tuitously, yet absolutely, corroborated by the dis- tinguished admiral who, at the time these words were spoken, was commanding the British fleet in the quarter of the world to which they referred. Last year, Admiral Ryder incidentally said : " I have just come from the command on the Japan and China station, and with an imminent prospect ♦ "Russian Development, and our Naval and Military Position in the North Pacific," Journal, vol. xxi.. No. 91. NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 186 of war, I felt very doubtful whether I should ever get a pound of coal without taking it forcibly from a neutral." Now my other illustration is this : During the year an admiral " in command " of a British fleet, in Chinese waters, " with an imminent prospect of war," was doubtful as to getting di, pound of coal, — the total export of coal from Canada and Australia exceeded a million tons, and at Newcastle, New South Wales, hydraulic appliances for rapidly shipping coal had been established at a cost of some 25,000/. to the colony. Some further information respecting exports of British coal will be found in Table VI., and in conclusion I would commend to your special atten- tion the following brief extract from a work called * Coal ; its History and Uses,' by Professors Green, Miall, Th'^rpe, Eiiker, and Marshall. " This country's tortunes," they say, " are gradually being merged in those of a greater Britain, which, largely through the aid of the coal whose pros- pective loss we are lamenting, has grown beyond the limits of these islands to overspread the vastest and richest regions of the earth." * * The wealth of iron and other minerals of the colonies is a great naval and military resource. Where iron and coal are found together in large quantities, as in New South Wales and the province of Nova Scotia or British Columbia, and in other colonies, the raw material resources of war are enormous. It was impossible, however, in a short paper to treat of these and many other interesting fields of inquiry. The inestimable benefit sure to arise from the attraction of population from the one old part of the Enqiire to many new branches of it, is the development of these material resources here left untouched. 18G DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Eh oo o H 14 O on" O 5 o w OQ HI H o Izi O M H ■< SB HH H » o o n CQ « t^ cc ?' S IN M CO I"- Ul 1^ 1 So" 4 lO 00 •ft (n" CO OS . h- (N © ;^ eo co_ © 3 ei ■*" h- CO (N 00 o o £ "oQ © o HH lo lO rr <^' 1ft •^ • CO CO 3 CO CO 6 . . " ' • • • , • • • • 00 'S < M a J % s 1 o H H a •3 CQ 1 1 O & !Z5 U naval and military resources of colonies. 187 Horses. Turning from the agency on which war com- binations over sea depend, means of transport for land operations naturally suggests itself for con- sideration. It is fitting first to remind you that the prize of 5000 roubles offered by the Czar for the best ' History of Cavalry from the Earliest Times,' was gallantly won by Canada, in the person of Lieu- tenant-Colonel George T. Dennison, Commanding the Governor-General's Body Guard, author of * A Treatise on Modern Cavalry,' and spoken of in Lieutenant-General Sir Selby Smyth's Official Report as one " among many excellent cavalry officers of the Dominion." The war resources of the, colonies in "horses" is, I think, a question of immense importance. Armies in Europe are growing almost faster than horses fit for service are bred, and the number of horses required for war purposes increases in direct ratio to force to be placed in the field. A declara- tion of war is not exactly the time for a nation to be running about seeking horses for its guns, cavalry, and transport. It is all very well for us to rely on free trade for our profits, and the supply of our national wants in peace ; but when rumours of war are in the air, the Continental horse-market becomes, somehow or other, uncommonly " tight." I remember, at one of our "Autumn Manoeuvres," 188 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. watching a regimental transport man struggling with a certain ugly pair of grey brutes, exhibiting a marked objection to a certain hill. There was no mistaking the nationality of the horses ; nor was there much difficulty in determining that of the man, for between the vigorous strokes of his whip, this — free from adjectives — was his refrain — "Ye don't even speak English, ye bruten, ye don't ! " Now Table VII. exhibits a fact — which natu- rally recurred to my memory then — that there are, in other Englands beyond sea, some two million horses* more or less accustomed to English ways, an English tongue, and an English hand. This may appear a theoretical mode of introducing a subject of great gravity, and may seem to infer obliviousness to great sea distances, and the effect on horses of long voyages ; in short, to lack the possibility of practical application. I hope, how- ever, that, on reflection, it may not so appear. It was impossible here to inquire into the merits and demerits of various colonial coal ; and, for the same reason, the characteristics of colonial horses can form no portion of these remarks. It will, however, be of profit to this Institution — and, through it, to the service — if the discussion elicits information on these points from gentlemen of practical colonial experience. * The number of horses, returned by occupiers of land, in the United Kingdom, 1878, was 1,927,060. Vide Agricultural Returns, 1878. NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP COLONIES. 189 g O a> 9 QQ H 958.982 i OS 33,357 11,723 ?! . ©1 t- M 00 OT (M (M CS lO «5 J5§5 (N C 1^ o © tD P © (M O (N t^ t» OS »o «o oo ;o 00 IM n O o •m (N ^ to -t< «> eo M 05 eo o a> © CO (N OS M •fS irt —1 PiN0 bblonoikq to Bbitibh Coloniks and PossKSSioNS, 31st Docomber, 1877, and Distribution thuruof. Oroap. Total. CUus. Name. VeweU. Tonnage. VeneU. Tonnage. Colonies Proper. Canada Auatralasia Capo* 7,568 2,311 57 1,211,451 245,464 6,271 9,936 Total Colonies Pronfli" 1 4(i:i ISf! West Indies 1 — •• 1,200 70,662 Plantation Colonies. Ceylon Mauritius .. 248 99 16,470 8,770 1,547 Total Plantation Colonies 95,908 T^.._ fOibraltar ^"""PnMalta.. } 207 26,455 Military and Straits Settlements 409 54,585 Triuliiig Bettlcmouts. Iloiig Kong West Africa .. 66 96 20,934 2,996 Falkland Isles.. 7 423 845 Total Military and Trading Total Colonies and Settlem Settlements ents .. ,. 105,393 12,328 1,664,487 Empire of India 187 69,481 }, and India Total Colonics, Scttlemonti 12,515 1,733,968 Shipping of United Kingdci m 25,73? 0,399,869 Total British Shif ping 38,248 8,133,837 • St. Helena included. Note.— Shipping returns have not been received from Melbourne since 1866, nor from twenty- two dtber jKirls abroad for 187f. The above 'I'ablo, therefore, probably uiiderstutcs the actiuil number of vessels and aggregate tonnage,— vide Annual Statement of Navigation and Shipping of the United Kingdom for the year 1877.— Pailiamontary Paper C-1999, 1878. 202 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. These are intoresting and striking facts, and superficially regarded, they are apt to he construed as indications of immense and immediately avail- ahle maritime power. Let us hriefly examine whether this be a correct conclusion. It will be ebserved that the military and trading settlements, taken together, have only an aggre- gate of 846 vessels, and as these places are scat- tered and far apart, and the average tonnage per vessel is only about 125, the war value of this portion of the colonial mercantile marine is prac- tically nothing — except as affording the Empire a series of small training schools, in which, free of public expense, men of various races receive nautical knowledge. That knov/ledge does not of itself, in these days, make a war seaman, and in the absence of any arrangement by which our navy can strengthen itself in distant parts of the worlds readily and at once, it is, I think, quite possible that, generally speaking, the colonial mercantile marine may — under present circumstances — bo found to offer more temptations to our enemies than resources of strength to ourselves. The plantation colonies only possess one steamer over 800 tons, this belongs to Hong Kong. It appears to me therefore that any resource offered by the mercantile marine of plantation colonies must have reference to men, not ships, and in the absence of any effort on our part to husband and organize such resources, the growth of the planta- NAVAL AND MILITARY REflOURCES OF COI/)NIEfl. 203 tion mercantile marine increaeos proportionally the bunion on the Royal Navy without adding to its power. Turning to the colonics proper, Canada owns steamers over 800 tons : — 3 over 800 ftml under 1000 tons. 4 „ 1200 „ 1500 „ 1 „ 1500 „ 2000 „ 1 „ 2000 „ 3000 „ 9 Australasia has but 3 steamers over 800 but under 1000 tons ; it is therefore useless to preach naval ** self-reliance and self-defence " to those colonies. I trust I have said enough to show how neces- sary it is to look below the surface of figures in the matter of estimating colonial resources of war. 1 grant that the mercantile marine of a country represen^;8 proportionately maritime power, but it is too often forgotten that it is power in a latent and dormant state. Its real, actual, available value as a war resource, entirely and altogether depends upon the readiness with which it can be converted from latent power into visible force. Without Imperial arrangements by which such change in the colonial mercantile marine can be readily made, I verily believe there is serious ground for thinking that in the outbreak of war, it may prove a source of naval weakness rather than a source of naval strength. Take Canada, for instance, with a mercantile marine greater than that pos- 204 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. sessed by any European power, except Sweden and Norway ; what a picture is here presented of immense dormant naval power, combined with actual naval helplessness ! Our Imperial arrange- ments are such that though home ports are always more or less filled with effective reserve ships, none are ever laid up in colonial ports. If war broke out, many of these ships kept at home would be commissioned and dispatched to those water districts of which Canada and Australia are the natural bases ; but we prefer to bring these ships backwards and forwards across the world at great expense, rather than leave them in reserve in colonial ports, where they could be maintained at perhaps a less cost, and where they would, at all events, be invaluable in peace as naval depot- centre training ships and schools of instruction for an Imperial naval reserve; while in war they would be more ready to hand for distant service than if laid up in home ports. If the latent maritime power of the enormous mercantile marine of the colonies is incapable of ready conversion into visible force, and furnishes no practical resource whatever for what we term the Imperial fleet, it is simply because we do not choose to provide the machinery, nor to make the reciprocal arrangements necessary to turn it to account. Meantime the colonies are " growing while we are sleeping," and every year of such growth adds to the defensive duties and responsibilities of the NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 205 Royal Navy, without adding to its ability to meet the increased demand. It will be advantageous to defer further remark on this particular portion of the subject, until some general considerations respecting the organization and armed strength of the colonies have been roughly indicated, and to these we will now pass. Remarks on Armed Strength. Before attempting to outline the salient features of colonial naval and military organization, 1 I 1i a a o o .a&.9 Si V ► I I (2 (2 M *» 3 lO 1-- M eo eo a »f o C5 l^ eo '> 244 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Magazine,' from tljo other Bide of the world, says : "It lias often surprised the writer tliat in all the recommendations for defence, a Colonial Naval Re- serve has never been proposed until Mr. Brassey's proposition." He calculated "that 2000 Australian seamen might be trained and organized as a reserve for the Hoyal Navy." Englishmen, liowever, seem blind to this colonial resource, and deaf to the utterances of a General in Canada and to the pleadings of a Colonial Merchant Captain at tlie Antipodes. Conclusion. Time compels me to refrain from summing up these two papers in a manner worthy of the subject. I cannot conclude, however, without once more entreating the men who have the power, to obtain inquiry into the workings of our present policy of Imperial defence, which has now been in force for a period approaching ten years. I incline to the Kj»elief that it is breeding a series of naval and military confusions ; but I sincerely hope I may be wrong. Such an inquiry, I venture to think, must take the form of an Imperial Commission on which should sit representatives of the great colonies, selected by them for the purpose. This Commission should have an advising Council of Naval and Military authorities, to inquire into and to fix the principles on which the Empire must act, in order to secure the maximum amount of safety at a minimum cost. It is a past hope that the great NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OP OOLONIEfl. 245 colonios will ever now join in a general scheme, in the construction of which they have had no voice, and in the carrying out of wliicli recipro- cal duties and ohligations of defence are not clearly defined. "Spreading as the Empire is, over every part of the habitable globe, it is," says Mr. Frederick Young,* '* of the utmost importance to inquire hy what means its permanent union may be most effectually secured." Now I take it that all English- men are agreed on that point, and its naval and military bearing is this:— "/if is of the utmost importance to scientifically ' inquire * by what means Imperial safety in war 'may be most effectually' and economically 'guaranteed.^ " This we have not yet done. Having launched our Empire on military and naval planks of self-reliance without any union or any bond, we hope it may drift into a haven of safety; and we or those who come after us ii»ay find it stranded amidst the breakers of mutual mistrust. It is said that the question of Imperial Defence is too big to inquire into as a whole. "Well, the Empire is getting bigger and bigger every day, and if we fear to face the problem now, what have we to hope for in procrastination and delay ? We stave off the duty of calm, deliberate inquiry by vague phrases respecting our " supremacy of the sea." We surely ought to inquire and clearly define * " Imperial Federation," by J'rederick Young. 246 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. by what method and on what broad principles that supremacy is to be maintained. This we have never yet done. Since the introduction of steam revohitionized naval warfare, we have had no National Inquiry to seek out and define the grand principles of naval policy which can be implicitly trusted to rule su- preme over every branch and part of our national naval system. Groping amidst the debris of microscopic manipu- lations and elaborate naval details, the nation has vainly hoped to stumble across Imperial naval principles, and it now finds itself hopelessly confused as to what are great naval principles, and what are—however big— mere details. This has pro- duced national weariness and apathy in naval affairs, and it may end in the decadence of national and naval spirit. Even the English mind cannot be interested in what it cannot comprehend ; and once national interest in naval affairs passes into a certain stage of deadly dull disregard, we may well look at our Imperial future with dismay. It was a national naval spirit won our Empire in the past, and must be its hope and confidence in days to come. There are signs now that military longings are— in the popular mind— supplanting naval enthusiasm, and therefore I think the time has come for such a full and searching inquiry as shall cause the English race to pause and reflect upon the practical, real necessities of their Imperial position. NAVAL AND MILITARY RESOURCES OF COLONIES. 247 If we drift inncli longer we know not whither, we shall end we know not where. Between fatal centralization on the one hand, and false localization on the other, stands " the supre- macy of the sea " in the chill cold shade of national neghgence : we may well look at it in hesitating douht, as without close examination it is hard to say if it be a reality. It may be no more than a dream of the past ; without inquiry we cannot say. We know it was with us in 1805, we know for certain but little else. For aught we know, the flag lowered to half-mast in the Bay of Trafal- gar may have meant more than the death of a hero, and apostle. It may have symbolized the decline of the cause for which he fought and the doctrine for which he died. For all we really know of the future conditions of naval war, "our supremacy of the sea" may be " pigeon-holed " with the papers of the treaty of Paris or buried for ever in the crypt of St. Paul's. fApPENDIX I. ( 240 ) APPENDIX I. Extract from the Naval Prize Essay* Royal United Service Institution, 1878. By Captain P. II. Colomh, B.N., on " Great Britain's Maritime Power." " My conviction is, that in considering our naval power and its development as a whole, we too commonly fall into the error which is sometimes apparent in our military designs. We are too apt in toth cases to overlook tire differences which exist in the circumstances of nations, and to regard our own empire as liable to the same dangers and amenable to the same military or naval treat- ment as all others. We thus commit a double mistake ; we suppose that all other nationalities present similar naval and military features — which they do not — and we fancy that we ourselves exhibit a correspondence in cir- cumstances, temper, and character, with that which we have imagined to be common to all our neighbours. Amongst the nations we are like one of our countrymen who happens to own a foreign ancestry, and to carry a foreign air unconsciously. Such a man will often aim at the uniformity which he thinks he perceives around him, unaware of the peculiarities which others see in him, and which being fundamentally natural, can never be shaken oflf. If we look for it we can readily detect, in the spoken and written words of our foreign naval critics, their opinion * Sec 'Journal Royal United Service Institution,' vol. xxii.. No. 94. 250 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. of the singularity of Great Britain's naval position ; and sometimes perhaps we may trace a certain covert surprise on tlieir part, whenever our naval policy appears to follow that of any other country. " History and tradition — our excellent friends if treated with intelligent confidence, but our mortal enemies if allowed an unrecognized sway — are in some decree to blame for this national failing. Many of our famous naval wars have been carried on with nations whose circum- stances were not very dissimilar to our own. When the Hollanders fought with us, we both strove for the same prize, the acknowledged dominion of the Narrow Seas. The south and east coasts of England were matched against the shores of Holland. The conditions were alike ; the field of battle was localized, and close at hand ; so that if the Citizen Navy in its hitter days imitated the dash of Prince Itupert, and carried the war into our rivers, the lloyal Navy of the Second Charles was glad to borrow the lighting formation of the enemy's fleet. Bot)^ nations, in short, fought on an equal footing, were liable to the same dangers, and experienced the same chances of success at sea. It was in the nature of things that their naval views should agree, and should produce identical results in policy. In the French wars prior to those of the Revo- lution and the Empire, the naval circumstances of France and of England did not so greatly differ. Each had a seaboard trade — vast for that epoch — and while each had growing colonial interests in the West and East, neither nation could be starved into submission by a blockade. When the revolutionary war broke out, the relative situa- tions of the two countries had not materially altered. If Canada had passed to England, England had lost the United States, and France still held her magnificent West Indian colony. If French influence in Hindostan was on the wane, Pondicherry was not the unimportant colonial item it has since become ; and a very few years previously, the APPENDIX. 251 French had doemed it politic to maintain a fleet, numeri- cally more powerful than our own, in the Eastern Seas. As the war progressed, the fleets, trade, and colonial pos- sessions of Holland, combining with those of France, restored any balance which might have been overthrown by the progress of our Indian Empire. Lastly, to com- plete the picture ; if at a later period of the war, England trembled under the exc'tement of a threatened blow from the camp at Boulogne, ^jh Vendee, at an earlier time, might easily have become the stepping-stone of England to a new conquest of France. " Thus the dim recollection of the glories of the past, often disinclines us to take that calm and firm survey of the present, which can alone dictate a policy capable of securing 'a powerful and economic imperial Naval Force.' History is often allowed to sway us in one way, when, did we adopt its real teachings, it would show that tiiat way was a treacherous by-path. For in what degree, let us ask, does tiie British Empire of to-day resemble, in its naval aspect, that of any other country ? And how far, with the world against us in arms, could we now adopt the naval policy of the close of last century, or be put to the shifts and expedients of a still earlier naval epoch ? In none of her former naval wars did England begin with any tangible superiority in her favour ; still less could she claim a monopoly of power on her side. When she won her higher place at the close of each war, she did it by the stubborn daring of her naval leaders, and by the superior moral and physical strength of her seamen. Her forces at any menaced point, seldom exceeded the nominal power of those of her enemies, and when she beat them, she did it in spite of the facts. If she now adventures into a naval war- even with the world against her — she does so with one absolute and one practical monopoly in her favour. In the marvellous constellation of naval stations with which she has spangled the ocean, Great 252 DEFENCE OF GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. Britain possesses an absolute monopoly of resource. She starts in a war with a connected series of points d'appui, wliich are of overwhelming value, and which cannot be rivalled by the rest of the world banded together. For- merly, the propulsive force of ships was common to all nations. Now that force is unequally distributed, and England possesses it in larger quantity, and in better quality, not only than any single nation, but than any moderate group of nations. The coal fields of Wales produce a steaming fuel that has no rival, and in her great colony at the Antipodes, England holds alike the control of steam power there. In her iron, her inventive power, and her restless industry, she possesses advantages which may easily be added to swell the list of her superi- orities at starting ; but these she has always possessed, and has always used in achieving her naval supremacy, so I do not add them. But in her coal she has far more than the mere superiority which the quantity and quality of her production supply. Her coal mines combine with her naval stations abroad to give that second * practical ' monopoly of which I have spoken. Coal, before it can become a naval force, must find its way into the bowels of the war ship. England alone possesses the appliances for making this transfer in every quarter of the globe. Her enemies must commonly load with coal in neutral ports in short measure, and in haste and fear. England alone stores her war ships everywhere within the security of her own harbours. Steam, which in popular fears ' bridged the Channel,' in truth and in fact placed in our hands the means of barring every ocean highway to all but British ships. " But if the progress of time has submitted these vast powers to our control, it has not failed to add correspond- ing weakness and dangers to our Empire. The power which closed the naval schemes of Napoleon at Trafalgar, was the self-sustaining, self-contained, and self-reliant, APPENDIX. 253 eighteen millions of people who lived in the British Islands. However truly the last adjective may apply to the thirty-two millions who have succeeded their ances- tors, the two first can no longer do so. In 1813, the British people lived on the produce of their soil. In 1875, that people required side hij side with every pound's worth of raw cotton for manufacture, one pound's worth of raio corn or jlour for their sustenance. In considerations such as the foregoing — which might be multiplied if space per- mitted — we must recognize one of the great changes in the Empire, since the close of the last naval war. That manu- factures and commerce have enormously increased is a well understood fact, but this increase has not so much altered as intensified the conditions which were peculiar to Great Britain in earlier days. The state of the food supply, and the increased population dependent on it, are new elements in the problem, which materially alter the general result. The change is also complete in rela- tion to those outlying colonies of whose enormous value as coaling stations I have spoken. In naval war, under the old conditions, a blow aimed at any of our smaller colonies would have been more dangerous to our prestige than vital to our power at sea. The capture or destruction of a coal depot on British ground might now inflict a wound which would be well-nigh fatal. Deprived of the supply which was absolutely necessary to their value as fighting ships, the British men-of-war in the vicinity must either fly from an inferior force, or yield to it; and the commerce which depended on their protection, must cease to flow. " What then is the British Empire in its maritime aspect? It is a vast, straggling, nervous, arterial, and venous system, having its heart, lungs and brain in the British Islands, its alimentary bases in the great possessions of India, Aus- tralia, and North America, and its ganglia in the Crown colonies. Through this system pulsates the life-blood of the Empire. Main arteries and corresponding veins lead 254 DEFENCE OP GREAT AND GREATER BRITAIN. East throngh tlio Moditcrranoan and tlie Eed Sea to India, Chiiin, and Australia; West to America and the West Indies ; South to Australia, Southern Africa and America, and to tlio Pacific. Capillaries the most minute, at the extremities of civilization, gather up the raw produce of the nations, transmit it to the larger channels, which in their turn convey it to the heart. This tremendous organ having extracted all that is necessnry for its own sustcnta- tion, forces the trauHinitted product; through the great main channels, and finally through millions of hranching liluments to sustain and revivify the nations of th(j earth to their remotest borders. The life of an Empire so highly organized, must hang by a thread. It is no mollusc from whoso inert substance huge masses may be detached at will without much effect upon its vitality. It is a living organism whose parts are all inter-dependent, and highly sensitive in their relations. A stab at the heart may put it to death more suddenly, but perhaps not more surely, than the severing of a remote artery, or the wound of a ' nerve centre.' " Assuming that this picture of the British Empire, its strength, and its weaknesses, is a true one, it is well to put the statement to some closer examination. Do we in fact frame our naval policy in correspondence with the facts of our Imperial position? or, would the course we pursue equally fit Russia, France, Germany, or America? Are we recognizing to its full extent our practical monopoly of coal supply? Are we guarding these 'nerve centres' — our coaling stations — with a clear notion of the effect of a wound there ? Are the conditions I have sketched familiar to the naval mind of England ? Do they form the ordinary argument of public writers and speakers on naval policy ? To all these questions, I think we must give such answers as will confirm my statement. Eiom the complications of a naval policy which is sadly driven and tossed by the wind of the day, we may occasionally extract a fact, a APPEJ^DIX. 255 tlioufi^ht, or a statomont, consonant with a general system ; bnt the ruh) is the other way. " Take for instance the invasion scares which every now and then set our wits 8ta