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1 2 3

4 5 6

QUIEKS OF WPLOIACY.

READ BEFORE THE

4: c^ tj) ^ >$>

JANUARY '22, 1874.

BY LIEUT.-COLONEL COFFIN,

COMMI88IOKEE OF OKDTJfA^JCE AND ADMIRALTY LASD3,
DOMINION OF CANADA.

JOHN LOVELL, 23 AND 26 ST. NICHOLAS STREET.)
1874.

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

Quirks op Diplomacy. — What are Quirks of Diplomacy ?
It is right to answer this query, at once, by explaining the
meaning of the word '• quirk." A quirk, says Worcester, in
his excellent Dictionary, is " a twist or turn from the straight
or right way." Johnston, quoting Burton, defines it to be
"an artful distinction " Now, diplomacy has been held, to
be the science of artful distinctions, and its earlier professors
piqued tlicmselvos, not a little, on their ingenuity in twist-
ing common sense, and turning common language, from the
right or straiglit way. With these men " words were made to
disguise thoughts." They regarded diplomacy and duplicity
as synonj-mous terms. Good Sir Henry Wotton, a name
familiar to all old Etonians, spoke very undiplomatic truth,
when he gave a " pleasant definition of an ambassador " in
these words, '^Legatus est vir bonus, peregr4 missm, admentien-
dum ReipubUcoi causa," which, at a later period, with equal
discretion and wit, he interpreted, thus " an ambassador is
an honest man, sent to lie abroad for the good of his coun-
try." Such was his estimate of his own craft, in the days of
our James the Ist, A.D., 1612.

But the progress of human ideas has shown that, as with
all other sciences, the foundation of the science of diplomacy
is truth and it is a ])roud satisfaction to know that "artful
distinctions " have been long since discarded by the manly
and practical diplomacy of England ; that the publicity due to

^l:

4 QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

a Constitutioiuil and Parliamentary form of Govornment, has
impressed upon it that sterling characteristic of the national
mind-a " love of right, a hate of wrong," and a contempt of
gain boughv by the sacrifice of honesty. And if, in the
course of a long and honorable career, England has coni-
mitted errors ; if, in her own despite, by the force of currents
unknown to mariner«, she has been driven from " the straight
or right way," no ignoble or mercenary motive can bo
charged against her. Her errors point in another direction.
Truthfulness can never bo excessive, but there may be an
excess of frankness, and an excess of generosity, pernicious,
as affecting the interests of others. But, if chargeable
with errors such as these, she has ever shown herself ready
to repair them ; she has never shirked responsibility to foe
01- friend; she has been munificent in reparation, and she
can afford it; she can point to the magnificent structure
Khe has raised, to the wealth and to the power of the Empire,
and, great in all things, acknowledge great errors, redeemed
by still greater sagacity, and reply to the persiflage of a
school of foreign negotiators, which is not altogether extinct,
by a light proverb in their own language,-" II rit Men qui

rit le dernier."

It is the purpose of this Lecture to review, briefly, so
much of the Diplomatic transactions of England as affect
the Dominion of Canada, and to invite the attention of a
Canadian audience to the purport of Treaties which, having
been made between England and other countries, are still in
force, and continue to exercise a potent influence on the pre-
sent prosperity and future destinies of Canada.

The Treaties to which we shall refer may be thus briefly

summarized :

l6t. The Treaty concluded at Paris, 10th February, 1^763,

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

by which the Canada of France devolved to the British

Crown.

2nd. The Treaty of 1783, also a Treaty ratified at Paris
the 3rd September, by which the Independence of the United
States of America was acknowledged, and the boundaries
of their territories defined.

3rd. Jay's Treaty, so generally designated, signed in Lon-
don 19th November, 1794.

4th. The Treaty of Ghent, made in 1814, 24th December,
terminating the war, known to us, as the War of 1812, again
defining, but ambiguously, the territorial boundaries of Great
Britain on this continent, and of the United States. Thi*
Treaty led to other Treaties, which afforded a good deal of
explanation, but were not always satisfactory, to wit, to
5th. The Convention of 1818.

()th. To the Treaty of Washington, 9th August, 1842,better
known as the Ashburton Treaty.

7th. To the Treaty of Washington, 15th June, 1846, known
as the Oregon Treaty, and, finally,

8th. To the last Treaty of Washington, the Treaty of the
8th May, 1871, which has been the subject of so much con-
troversy in Canada.

By the Treaty of Paris, ratified in 17G3, three years after
the capture of Quebec and the capitulation of Montreal,
England acquired all the French possessions on the Continent
of America. By the Treaty of 1783, confirming the Inde-
pendence of the United States, England relinquished, not
only the territory claimed by each State of the Union,
severally, but abandoned to the General Government
immense tracts of territory unsettled and, in fact, unexplored
and unknown. The prevailing ignorance of the time was
innocently shown in the Treaty itself. The North-Westera

QUIRK8 OF DIPLOMACY.

angle of demarcation was fixed at the North- West angle of
the Lake of the Woods, from which point of departure it
was to run due locst, to the sources of the Mi8HiH8ii)pi. It was
Hubsequontly found that the sources of the Mississippi wore
many Jmndrcd miles to the south, that the line prescribed
was, in fact, nn impracticable lino. It was, consequently,
by Jay's Treaty, 1794, and the Convention of 1815, changed
to the line 49 of Northern parallel, more in accordance with
the intent of the Treaty, and still more with the interests of
the United States. England retained simply her loyal
Colonies or Piovincos of New Brunswick and Nova Scotia,
the Island of Newfoundland, the Hudson's Bay Terri-
tory, including Prince Rupert's Land, and her acquisitions
from the French Crown, which have since expanded and
extended across the Continent to the Eocky Mountains and
tlic Pacific Ocean.

But these vast extents of ton*itory were wanting in cohe-
sion. Contiguous and conterminous, they were yet, by force
of physical circumstances — from climate — from remoteness,
long drawn out — by barriers of Lake and Ocean — by icy bar-
riers in winter, and by Treaty barriers all the year round —
left separate and apart, debarred from intercommunication
at the present, and, to all human prescience, in the future.
The Northern Lino of demarcation between the countries,
established in 1783, terminating at the North- West point of
the Lake of the Woods, drove England and Canada into the
Arctic regions, inaccessible except by birch canoe or Indian
dog-sled. A little more of foresight, a little less of precip-
itation, and some knowledge of physical geography, would,
without question, have secured to Canada, in 1783,a roadway,
at the least, to the North-West. But that which, in 1783 was
unobp'^rved and unappreciated, was, at a later period, in 1814,

QUIRKS or DIPLOMACY. f

with open oyoH flung aHido, with ull tho spendthrift generosity
and Bublimc indifference of diplomacy. Men In Cana<la, how-
ever proud, and justly proud, of the eventf» of tho war of 1812,
are not always mindful of tho practical results, won, chiefly
too, by tho gallantry of native Canadians, and quirked away
recklossly by tho Treaty of Ghent. It may bo well to recall
the fact, that in December, 1814, England was in a position
to havo forestalled and foreclosed for ever tho mortifying
humiliation of tho Ashburton Treaty of 1842, and to have
secured to herself, at tho same time, on the largest
scale, and on the shortest line, a right of way to her North-
VVest Territories. In December, 1814, she was, by conquest,
in actual possession of the fortress of Michiliraacinac — called
Macinaw, for shortness— of Lake Michigan, of tho site of the
present City of Chicago, and of a lino of territory terminating
at tho fort of Prairio du Chien, on the Mississippi,— had won
back in fair fight, and held by right of war, the whole of the
Territory conceded in l;S3, and which now constitutes
Michigan, and the more Northern States of Wisconsin and
Minnesota. In tho autumn of 1814 Colonel McKay, an
Indian trader— a man endowed with a natural p;onius for war-
like enterprise, well known afterwards as a citizen of Mont-
real, and father to the present Judge McKay, of the Superior
Court of Montreal— with tho consent of the British military
authorities, and to protect Macinaw from Ame " an aggres-
sion, embodied a force of Indians and Half-breev ), Orkney-
men and voyageurs, among tho latter the well-known French
Canadian, Captain Rolette, and with this heterogeneous
force, ably led, and wonderfully kept in hand, penetrated
into the wilderness, 453 miles, captured a strong palisaded
work, supported by a powerful gan-boat on the Mississippi,
annexing thereby to Canada the whole intermediate territory

QUIRKS OV DIPLOMjiCl.

andholdirig it militarily, until restored to the United States
by the Treaty o.' Ghent.

It may bo well, also, to remind the men of Canada that,
ir\ this samo mo.r.th of December, 1814, England held, not
by force of arms alone, but by the eager adhosicu of the
people of the country, the whole of chat part of Massachu-
setts, now Maine, lying between Ncav Brunswick on the east,
Canada on the north, and the Penobscot on the west. In
the months of July and September, 1814, expeditions organ-
ized by Sir John Coape Sherbrookc, governor of Nova
Scotia, occupied 100 miles of territory, weat of New Bruns-
wick, including the whole of tho " disputed territory " fraught
in later years, with po much of difficulty, and, according to
Lord Palmerston, with the disgrace of the " shameful capitu-
lation" of 1842. In December, 1814, this territory v*^a«i ours,
not only by right of war, but with the consent and content
of the population. Remember too, that this was the epoch of
the Hartford Convention. Ingersoll, an American historian
of the time, writes " without a blow struck, part of Massa-
'' chusetts passed under the British yoke, and so remained
" Avithout the least resistance until restored at the peace."

The restoration was made under the 1st Art. of the Tre'ity
of Grhent, concluded in this same month of December, 1814.
The negotiators lact, and, almost as a preliminary, com-
menced operations by a mutual peace-otfering, fair enou^li
in outward bhow, but in reality, unequal an-' delusive. It
was agreed without hesitation, and apparently without
enquiry, " to restore all 'territories, places and possessions
whatsoever, taken from either party, by the other, during
the war." The British restored Forts Niagara and-Mucinaw
— the fort at Prairie du Chien, and the territory interven-
ing between the mouth of the river Wisconsin and the line

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY. 9

49 ® They gave up their acquisitions in Maine then Massa-
chusetts, accepting, as a consequence, a vexatious contro--
versy and a disputed territory. On the Pacific Ocean
they gave up Astoria, on the southern shore of the mouth
of the River Columbia— then consisting of a fev ruined
huts, which not only never had been captured, but was
actuluy, at the time of surrender, ihe property, in posses-
gion of 'British subjects. With eftervescent good nature,
overstraining xhe meaning of that fatal principle, so appro-
priately draped in a dead language-that of the statu quo
ante, they gave to the Americans a ^^pied a terre," '' which was
aftemaiis tortured," says the Quarterly Review, " into an
abandonment, and an admission of adverse possession," and
created the diplom.-tic leverage, which, in 1846, pried Great
Britain and Canada out oC the Territory of Oregon.

On the other hand the Americans gave up nothing, for

the simple reason that they had nothing togive. They had,

for a short time, occupied a small portion of the western

frontier of Canada, and hud burnt the village of Amherst-

burg, but they had long before withdrawn to Detroit, and

had not even left a sentry on the Canadian shore.

Let us, now, for one moment, consider the attitude and the
temper, the situation and the power of tue two nations, at
this critical moment of time. The recent success at Platts-
burg— the battle of New Orleans took place after the signing
of the Treaty— had no doubt reanimated America, but the
depression among the people was great. The costs and sacri-
fices of the war had been enormous ; the General Govern-
ment was in a state of bankruptcy. The American Marine
had been driven from the ocean; trade and commerce were
prostrate ; a large portion of the population was dissatisfied,
nay, disaffected. The Hartford Convention was actually in

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

session, and the Eastern States threatened to secede. If
wo may judge from the writings of the times, America was
defiant in aspect, but very sick at heart.

On the other hand, England was jubilant, her long con-
gest with Napoleon had been crowned with success. Her cup
was full to the overflowing, and it overflowed with good
nature and good-will. She was eager to be generous and
could afford generosity. We might appreciated the sentiment
better, were we not the victims of it — we should like it more,
if we felt it less.

For, if at this moment, free as she was to act, and with
immense forces at her disposal, had she resolved to retain
her territorial conquests, as a compensation for tho costs of
the war, there can be no doubt, but, that, at the present day,
the Province of New Brunswick would have extended to the
Penobscot, and the Canadian Pacific Kailway would have
been some 1500 miles the shorter.

The improvident concessions of 1814 threw us back upon
the provisions of tho Treaty of 1783, which, so far as they
related to the north-eastern boundary, were, in tho language
of the king of Holland's award, " inexplicable and impracti-
cable." The words of the Treaty, if they meant anything,
meant self-immolation — an act of national " harikari " for
the special delectation of tho American public. This was
clearly impracticable and inexplicable, and a Treaty which
could boar such misconstruction, was no T»'eaty at all . It was
a mutual misunderstanding — and both parties agreed to view
it in this light, so far as related to the boundary between
New Brunswick and Maine — but, the re-opening of the ques-
tion was attended by evil auguries. The popular feeling in
the XTnited States was adverse to retrocession. It was des-
perately resisted in the American Senate. It involved the

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

Btill greater family question of state rights. Maine raved
like a maniac, and was ready for a free-fight with all crea-
tion. She defied England, ran-a-muck at Canada, and shook
her impious fist in the fiice of her own maternal Government.
The two countries were brought to the verge of a war.
The immediate danger was stayed by the personal interven-
tion of the great Peacemaker— a well deserved and honour-
able title— General Winfield Scott. These perilous compli-
cations were cleared up, and closed by the Treaty of 1842, or
the Ashburton Treaty.

It must be owned that, under the critical circumstances of
the time, the Ashburton Treaty did all that could be done.
It gave us a boundary, shorn of the American pretensions,
but by no means equal to our just rights, as proved, subse-
quently, by the production of the celebrated Franklin or
" red line " map, but it gave us peace, and the satisftxction of
knowing that New Brunswick had made great sacrifices for
" the good of the Empire." While upon this subject, it is
but fair to state, in explanation of the course taken by
Daniel Webster, that although, doubtless, the Franklin or
"red line" map, discovered by David Sparks in the
Archioes des affaires Etrangeres, at Paris, was in his hands,
during thsse negotiatiops. this piece of evidence was no: con-
clusive. It afforded strong presumption, but not absolute
proof, of the correctness of our claims, under the Treaty,
which, however, we had abandoned when we abandoned the
Treaty itself and accepted an arbitration. Nor could a public
minister or a private advocate be expected to make out his
adversary's case; but, ono thing is now certain, that, in
secret conclave, the presumptions raised by the " red line "
map were employed by Daniel Webster to moderate the
formidable opposition of the Senate, and to overcome the

QUIRKS OP DIPLOMACY.

intractable violence of Maine, and secured peace between the
two countries, at a moment when it was additionally endan-
gered by the Canadian revolt and its consequences, — by the
cases of the Caroline and the Creole, — by the right of search
question, — and by the hostile attitude of the French pr^ss
and the French people, in these days, periodically afflicted
with Anglo-phobia.

Nor can the famous expression, the " shameful capitu-
lation," of Lord Palmerston, pass altogether unchallenged.
It came ill from the mouth of one who, in 1833, had rejected
a compromise, which, if accepted then, would have foregone
all need for capitulation in 1842. In 1833, May 28, General
Jackson, with that sinf^ero love of peace which actuates all
true and tried soldiers, made a proposition to the British
Government, through his Secretary of State, Mr. Livingston,
and Sir Charles Vaughan, our Minister at Washington,
which, in the reprobatoi'y language of Albert Gallatin, one
of the oldest diplomats and ablest statesman of America, was
denounced '• as a proposal to substitute for the due North
" Line, another Avhich would have given to Great Britain
" the greater part, if not the ivhole, of the disputed territory.
" Why the proposal was made, and why it was not accepted,"
adds Mr. Gallatin, " cannot be otherwise accounted for,
" so far at least as regards the offer, than by a complete
"ignorance of the whole subject." This favourable opening
for an arrangement was rejected by the Government of Lord
Palmerston, but, whether from complete ignorance or
haughty indifference, it was only exceeded in mischief to
Canada, by the "childlike and bland, heathen Chinee"
style, of the concessions of the Treaty of Ghent.

Much had been done thus far, for the "good of the Em-
pire " and the " love of peace," but we had deeper depths to

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

traverse still. By the Ashburton Treaty we gave up one
half of the territory in dispute, but by the next Treaty—
the Oregon Treaty— we gave up the whob. In both cases,
Canada reminds us of a rabbit or a dog in the hands of an
experimental anatomist. Like animals doomed to vivisec-
tion for the benefit of science, she has been operated upon
unsparingly, for the good of the Empire. Diplomatic doctors,
in constantly recurring succession, have given her up, and
given her over. She has been the victim of en endless exhi-
bition of Treaties, applied allopathically, and then, by force
of counter irritants, has been treated nigh unto death. It
might have been presumed that thus far, enough had been
done to satisfy both the " good of the Empire " and the " love
of peace "-that, in short, the « good of the Empire " could
hardly have been bettered, by any further sacrifice, or the
■'^ love of peace " bought, at a higher price.

But no— the peace of this continent was destined to be no
peace. Scarcely was the ink dry on the face of the Treaty
of 1842, when the mercenary jade renewed her exactions
and her outcries. She merely effected a " change of base ' '
from th^ Atlantic to the Pacific sea-board, and demanded,
incontinently, twelve degrees of latitude lying between the
Eocky Mountains and the Pacific Ocean, as the price of con-
tinued favors. Great Britain claimed, and claimed most
justly, the whole territory to be found between the 42 par-
allel of latitude and the Kussian domain of Alaska. The
Americans claimed up to 54S 40'. They " riled," and they
raged, and gave vent to the national wrath. In the foil alliter-
ation of '« fifty-four forty or fight." But, who would fight
for a scrap of coast, not much more in area than Spain and
Portugal with the half of France thrown in? The game of brag
and bluster succeed ed-England compounded for the line

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

499, gave up, onco for all, about six degreog of latitude by
three of longitude, and accepted in retui'n the Southern cape
of Vancouver Island as an excuse — a diplomatic excuse— for
a capitulation far more inglorious, than the alleged cajiitu-
lation of 1842.

I have been greatly assisted in my enquiries into the
'' outsets" of this transaction, by an excellent and exhaustive
essay, written and published, during the pendency of these
negotiations, in 1846, by my friend E. A. Meredith, Esq., the
Vice-President of this Association, and I have to thank him
for much of what follows. At the outset, it was conceded
at once, in a frank and generous spirit, that the whole Ter-
ritory having been held by the British Crown previous to
the Independence of the United States, gave to England and
America an equal right in it. This principle was agreed to
by both nations, and recognized by the Convention of 1818,
which gave to England and America a conjoint right of
occupation for a period of ten years, v/hich was afterwards
extended for a like period. But the greed of the American
people was insatiable. As its value became better known,
they coveted the whole of the vineyard. American diplo-
macy, always with an eye to the Presidency, rode in on the
spread eagle, in a very " quirky" spirit. We will not extend
this, already lengthy lecture, by dwelling on their preten-
sions — whether under the Bull of Pope Alexander VI., or
their Spanish Titles, or their American Titles, or the discov-
eries of Lowis and Clarke, or the previous occupation of
Astovia, — all which, refuted often, proved simply, that
" Even though conquered, they could argue still."

As it was admitted that they had a right to share in the
territory, a proposal was made to divide it. The most nat-
ural line of division was the Eiver Columbia, fi'om the line

QUIltKS OF DIPLOMACY.

49^ to the seu. It gave to both countries the best dcfinod
and safest boundary. It gave to the Americans the larger
and the richer half of the Territory. It gave thorn the dis-
coveries of Lewis and Clarke. It gave them Astoria. But
this was not enough. It gave them no harbor. The mouth
of the Columbia was impracticable. Therefore they demand-
ed harbors on Pugets Sound and Admiralty Inlet, and got
them, and having got them, turned rounu and asked, "Why
make two bites of a cherry ? if we hold the harbors, what is
the good of the remainder of the territory to you ?" and on
this showing, they got that too ; and two years afterwards,
in 1848, by the conquest of California, became possessed of
the finest harbor on the whole Paciflc coast, the harbor
of San Francisco. Little wonder at the alacrity with which
the American Senate ratified the Treaty of 1846, standing at
that moment face to face with the Mexican war, tliough
England scorned to make use of her " opportunity." And
ju8tly,may it be added, in the words of the Quarterly Review ;
" Never was the cause of a nation so strong as ours in this
dispute ; never, owing to unscrupulous assertions on one side,
and to the courteous desire to waive irritating arguments on
the other, was the case of a nation Loss decidedly put forth."
Such was the chief purport of the next Treaty — that of
1846, or, the Oregon Treaty. The line 49°. which by the
Ashburton Treaty had been left indefinitely, in the Eocky
Mountains, was extended from the Eocky Mountains to the
middle of the Channel of the Gulf of Georgia, and, dividing
that channel and the Straits of Fuca, southerly, so reached
the Pacific Ocean. The American government, with rare
magnanimity, waived their claim to the extension of the
line 49 " across Vancouver Island, gave up graciously the
Southern Cape, and allowed Great Britain to remain in

QUIRKS OP DIPLOMACY.

■r

undisturbed possession of tho whole of her own dependency.
In after discussions, tho American Commissioner, Campbell,
a man of shrewd wit and sharp practice, dwelt loftily and
long, on the disinterestedness of America in this matter of
" swapping armor," — the gold of Glaucus against the brass
of Diomed — and about 270,750 square miles of the El Dorado
of the Northern Pacific, compensated — by a touch of Van-
couver cement, laid on with a camel hair paint brush.

This Treaty of 184G, or the Oregon Treaty, has been also-
called the '•' Boundary Treaty" and has assumed, under that
name, a significance, and a portent, not contemplated by its
projectors. It gave rise to the St. Juan question, now so in-
auspiciously closed. This question never should have been
a question at all. Tho British right, under the Treaty, to
one-half of the channel between tho Continent and Vancouver-
Island was unquestionable and, in this view, the Island of
St. Juan was indisputably her's. How came it, then, that a
question of right was allowed to take the shape of a question
of compromise ?

This controversy has become history, and it behoves Can-
adians to mark, learn and digest it. There can be no doubt
but that, from the first, the British authorities insisted,
perversely, that the Eozario channel was the right channel of
the Treaty. The Americans retaliated, and, with equal per-
tinacity, insisted on the Ilaro channel. Both sides Vv-cre
imperfectly informed, and each took its information from
interested parties. It became manifest, from the first, also,
that it was in the interest of tho Americans to ignore tho
real meaning of the Treaty, and to encourage the delusion
of the British, and they succeeded, by the play of their
opponents, notonl}^ in making their game, but in winning it.

Both parties, at remote distances, had, no doubt, recourse

QUIUKS OF DIPLOMACY.

».

to the bent source of information within reach. The British
(Jovernmont turned naturally to the Hudson Bay tIonii)any.
We find the name of Sir John Pelly, governor of the Hudson
Buy Company, prominent in the early stages of these trans-
actions ; they had been the first explorers ; they were the
first occupants of the country ; Thoy knew all that was then
known about it; in their intercourse Avith Vancouver Island
from tho mouth of the Fraser River they had always navi-
gated the Rozario channel ; they know ^ ait it was the best,
and they brought themselves to believe that it was the right
channel, and this belief was strengthened by the knowledge
that its maintenance would secure to them, under their lease
from the Crown, the 400 square miles of island, islet, rock
and water, which make up the Georgian Archipelago ; they
counselled as they believed, judging with the judgment of
shrewd and intelligent traders, but the questions evoked by
the Treaty of 1846 demanded the foresight and the fore-
thought of statesmen.

Viscount Milton has produced a book, printed in 1869,
entitled, " A history of the St. Juan Water Boundary Ques-
tion, as affecting the Division of Territory between Great Bri.
tain and the United States," interesting in details and valu-
able as presenting, in a compendious form, a large amount
of official information, which, even with his opportunities^
was obtained with difficulty. Wo cannot, however, agree
with him in his conclusion.

His Lordship has written mainly to expose the miserable
policy of compromise. He denounces the action of Lord
John Russell, who, in 1859, for the sake of the settlement of
tlie Boundary difficulty, offered to accept the Douglas channel
as a compromise. The Douglas channel would have given
to Great Britain the Island of St. Juan, and to the United

QUIRKS OV DIPLOMACY.

States, all the remainder of the Goorgiftn Arcliipolngo. He
contendis that tlie Ilozarioeliannol, as claimed hy m, was our
unquestionable and indiHjmtablc riglit, and that, to give up
one rock or islet of the 400 Bquare miles which intervene
between the Ilozario and llaro channels, was a fatuous aban-
donment of great national interests. Hero we take leave to
differ with his Lordship. We do not feel that, under the plain
reading of the Treaty of 184G, we ever had the least right to
the Rozario channel, still less under that Treaty, could the
Harocbannel be imposed upon us. Under that Ti-eaty the
true passage or channel, if any, was the Douglas channel,
and the error committed by liOrd John Kussell was not so
much in suggesting the Douglas dmnnel as a compromise,
as, in not having insisted on it as a right.

But the fact is that, in 1850, Lord John Russell was
already ham])ercd by the acts of his predecessors. At an
earlier period England, ill-advised, had asked too much.
She had thereby raised a false issue, and had been shrewdly
and irre])arabl} checkmated. So far back as 1848, under
instructions to Mr. Crampton, she had officially claimed the
Rozario channel, not so much under the Treaty of 1846, as
under the construction she chose to put upon it. She claim-
ed that it was the best, if not the only, navigable channel
then known and used. On the other hand it was shown or
contended that the Haro channel was just as good, and upon
the quarrel, in this shtipe, the contestants joined issue.
Never w^as there a more erroneous issue raised, or a more
pernicious. Neither does the Rozario nor the Haro corres-
pond with tlie meaning of the Treaty ; the Douglas channel
alone conforms to both letter and spirit, and, if insisted upon
from the first, would have, most assuredly, given to England
the great bono of contention, St. Juan Island.

QUIKK8 OF DIPLOMACY.

u He
jiH our
;ivo up
orvcuo
4 aban-
eavo to
10 plain
L-ight to
luUi the
saty tho
•hanuol,
s not HO
iproinise,

tj,ell was
At an
much,
shrewdly
18, under
liinod the
^ 1846, a8
she claim-
channel
shown or
, and upon
nod issue.
3V a more
aro corres-
as channel
isisted upon
,0 England

The fact iH that tho whole fabric of argument origin-
ated in a misconception, which, by force of reiteration, had
assumed the semblance of reality. It is incomprehensiblo
how tho plain language of tho Treaty could have been so
perverted. Now, what are the words of ihe first article of
the Treaty of 1846 ?

ARTICLE I.

"From tho point on tho fi^rty-ninth parallel of north lati,
" tude, where the boundary, laid down in existing treaties
"and conventions between Great Britain and the United
" States, terminates, the lino of boundary between the tcrri-
"torics of Ilor Britannic Majesty and those of the United
" States shall be continued westward along tho said forty-
" ninth parallel of north latitude to the middle of the chan-
" nel which separates the Continent from Vancouver Island,
"and thence, southerly, through the middle of tho said
"channel andof Fuca's Straits to the Pacific Ocean.

" Provided, however, that tho navigation of the whole of
" the said channel and straits, south of the 49th parallel of
" north latitude, remain free and open to both parties."

Nothing can be plainer, more intelligible or more practi-
cal, than the meaning of this first article of the Treaty of
1846. It prescribes that the line of tho water boundary,
starting from a given point on the 49th parallel, in the
oniddle of the channel which separates the continent from
Vancouver Island, should pass thence, southerly, through
tho middle of tho said channel and the Straits of Fuca, to
the Pacific Ocean. Tho channel spoken of is the Grand
channel, the whole space, whether of island, rock or water,
which separates the continent from Vancouver's Island.
No mention is made in the Treaty of interjacent islands or

QUIRKS OP DIPLOMACY.

of intormcdiato cluirmolH, Hiinply„bocauHO tho tiogotiafors,
workiiii; at WaHhin^ton, by the aid of itn]ierl'o(t and uiitnmt-
worthy chartH, knew but little on the Hubjoct. ThoHo /i^entle-
mon, with unwafe knowledge, but perfect honesty of purpono,
did tho best thing, if not, tho only thing, t.hey could do*
They had no time to pauHo; urged by the clamor of tho
hour, and by tho commercial anxieties of two great nations,
they brought tho Treaty rajjidly to a cIoho, determining
that tho water boundary should bo a lino drawn in the mid-
dle of tho channel — the whole space or channel — which sepa-
I'ates the continent fron. Vancouver Island ; and to pre-
clude injustice or inconvenience to either of the contracting
powers, they carefully and emphatically provided, in tho
same article, that the navigation of tho ichole of tho said
channel, including of course all intermediate arid subordi-
nate channels, should be free and open to both parties.

Tliat such was the true intendment of "the Treaty is con-
Hrmod by the language of Siv Richard Pakenham, the
British negotiator, used at a subsequent period, in explana-
tion of the transactions of 1846, and refeiTod to by Lord John
Jiussell in his despatch ofthe2-4th August, 1859. He says:
" It is my belief that neither Lord Aberdeen, nor Mr.
" McLane, nor Mr, Bancroft possessed at that time a suflfi-
" ciently accurate knowledge of the hydrography orthegeo-
" graphy of tho region in question, to enable them to define
" more accurately what was tho intended line of boundary
"that is expressed in tho words of the Treaty," and again,
" all that we kn<3w about it was, that it was to run through
'• the middle of the channel which separates the continent
'^from Vancouver Island, and thence southerly through
" the middlo of the said channel and of Fuca Straits to the
"Pacific Ocean."

QUIRKS or DirLOMACY.

The snmo vioM' too haH boon rocontly niippoi-lod by a vory
grout European authority. The Lonaun Tiwrs of tho llth
Novombor, 1872, contained, an trannlatod fn a an Italian
Journal, a letter from tho Chevalier Nogra, a Hcholar and
statesman, now umbaHsador at tho court ofMcMahon, whoso
name alono commandH attention, strongly contirmat-vo of
the view taken above. Ho says :

"By the Oregon Treaty of 1840, English and Amoricans
" agrood that tho •iHh degree of latitude should form thoir
" boundary from tho Rocky Mountains to tho Gulf of Goor-
" gia, and that, from that gulf to tho Straits of Juan doFuca,
<' the frontier lino should run in the middle of tho channel
" that separates the continent from Vancouver Island * *
"But is not tho entire si)aco, as I think, and as Capt. Pro-
"vost truly said in 1857, a channel like the English Chan-
"ncl? and should not tho boundary lino, therefore, acconl
" ing both to the spirit and the letter of the Oregon Treaty,
" pass through the middle of tho groat channel, of course
" with the curves necessary to give to the English or to tho
"United States, the undivided property of the islands
" through which a straight line would cut, according as the
" greater part of the Island was found upon tho English or
" the American side of tho line ? I can discern no geogra-
" phical reason for dividing back, as the English might like
" to do, the line eastwards to tho Eozario Channel, or, for
" pushing it over to the west to the Haro Channel, as was
" decided at Berlin. Neither in the first nor in tho second
" case, is tho line in the middle of the channel, and the
«' channel comprises all the space between Vancouver Island
" and tho continent, and is everywhere navigable, although
" the navigation be better in the broader waters of tho
<' Rozario and better still in thoso of Haro."

QUIIIKS OF DIPLOMACY.

Had the Treaty been thus read and thus acted on ab initio^.
had this dividing line been insisted upon from the first, we
should possess i w as a right, that which Lord John Eussell
proposed as a compromise.

For, take the Admiralty chart, and with a pair of dividers
trace a line " commencing in the midst of the channel" on
the line 49^ and running southerly down the middle of the
said channel which separates the continenv from Vancouver
Island following the curvature of the same, at all times
equidistantly from the shore of the continent and of Vancou-
ver Island, down to Puca's Straits, regardless of all secondary
channels, and of all rocks and islets by the way, and we pro-
duce a line in accordance with the letter and the spirit of
the Treaty, running as nearly as possible through what is
now known as the Douglas Channel, which would give to
Great Britain the exclusive right to the Island of St. Juan
and to the United States an equal right to Orcas Island and
other fine islands, while tho Ilaro Channel and the Rozario
Channel and the Douglas Channel itself, and all other inter-
mediate channels or passages, would have remained free and
open to the navigation of both nations. It is difficult to con-
ceive how any misconception could have arisen. Wo
remember in our juvenile days, to have seen a quaint, highly
coloretl, caricature of the younger Pitt, whose exhaustive
budgets and marvellous exiguity of form had obtained for
him the sohriquet o£ tliG " bottomless Pitt." The Chancellor
of the Exchequer is addressing the House, with extended
arm and flashing eye, while the excitement of the debate
has disarrayed his garments, and exposed, irrepressibly, the
lank contour of his frame. "Mr. Speaker," exclaims the
orator, " Where there is a fundamental deficiency, why call
for paper ?'' Wo apply the incident in the present case, and

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

ask, whei'o there is a fundamental deficiency, in the absolute
absence of ail ambiguity, why call for complications ?

It has been before observed that the subject was one
demanding the foresight and forethought of statesmen. Now
what did the statesmen do? Acting under insti-uctions from
his Government, we iind that, in 1848, the British Minister
at Wa8hini:;ton blandly suggested to the Americun Goveru
ment, in the most honied accents of diplomacy, that, as the
Rozario Channel was, beyond a doubt, the right channel, the
sooner it was deslared so, the more gratifying it would be^
and 80 on, with the usual reciprocations. The Americans,,
not to be outdone in " bunkum," replied handscneiy, and.
rejoined, " Haro." Here was the first official false step..
This first stiirtling impress on the sand became thenceforth
hard and ineffaceable as granite.

The discussion was thenceforth nursed assiduously, and
kept warm carefully, up to the year 1856, when a joint com-
mission was appointed to settle the water boundary. The
American Commissioner was Alexander Campbell, the Bri-
tish, Captain Prevost, R.N. The Commisbioners met,
reciprocated, and altercated. Prevost moored, fore and aft,
in the Rozario Channel, prepared for action. Campbell was
equal to any emergency in the Haro Channel . At this safe
distance, they exchanged broadsides of minutes and memo-
randa. At length Prevost, weary of feints and dodges, broke
ground, and put in a suggestion of compromise. He pro-
posed the " Douglas" Channel, and advised his opponent to
accept it at once, as ho would never have another chance.
Campbell answered, that he did not want another chance, and
would never accept it, if he had.

Nothing of course remained to be done, but to retunv
home had report piogress. Acting on the diplomatic maxim

!■' :

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

festina le7ite, nothing more was done for three years, when
Lord John Eussell took the matter up, and in his memorable
despatch of the 24th August, 1859j capped the climax, by
formally proposing the Douglas Channol as a compromise.

At this time the splendid surveys of the British Admiralty
were so far advanced, that all the gx'eat hydrographical facts
must have been known in London. If not known, the
despatch should have been delaj^ed until they were. These
facts, interpreted by the Treaty of 1846, would have justified
his Lordship in brushing aside all previous misinterpreta-
tions and complications, in assuming new ground, and in
demanding a centre line, or the Douglas Channel, as a right.
Of course, the position, then taken, was conclusive. Nothing
remained to be done, but to arbitrate between the two chan-
nels, the Haro and the Rozario.

But while Lord John Russell was penning his despatch in
Downing Street, a great deal more had been, abruptly, done
among the distant isles of the Pacific, than the mind of diplo-
macy could conceive, or its temper stand. The people of
Oregon Territory coveted the island of St, Juan, and General
Harney, an oSScer.of the United States Army, on the most
frivolous pretext, withou. warning, invaded the island, drums
beating colors flying, with all the pomp and panoply of war.
Harney was a kleptomaniac of the school of the first Napo-
leon, He occupied first and explained afterwards, and his
explanations aggravated the outrage. This was in Jul}-,
1859. The British Admiral at Esquimalt Harbor, ten miles
distant, pent over ships of war, seamen and marines. For a
time, t)ie aspect of affairs was threatening in the extreme ;
but the tact and judgment of the British Governor, Douglas,
averted a collision. The intelligence of this hostile irrup-
tio»« reached New York on the 7th Septemb'^r, 1859. Lord

iiliiiij f 'I M IWl i

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

2-5

Lyons was then our ambaasador at Washington. His Loi-d-
ship addressed, at once, to the American Cabinet, a note
calm, grave, and resolute. The answer came promptlj-, and
was enforced with energy. General Scott, commanding the
American nrmy,— again the Peacemaker of the time,— v/as
despatched at once to the Oregon Territory, to supercede,
if he could not control, his fantastic subordinate. Harney
was ordered to report himself at Washington, at a safe dis-
tance from the scene of his mischievous exploit. The
Americans ought to have withdrawn from an illr^^al occupa-
tion with becoming acknowledgment, but they did not, for
reasons best known to diplomacy. Scott and Douglas, dis-
creet men both,arranged for the joint occupation of the island,
by British and American troops during the continued pend-
ency of negotiations. On the 20th March, 1860, a detach -
ment of British marines was landed on the island, and this
joint occupation endured harmoniously, without let or hin-
drance, for a period of thirteen years.

This long delay was caused chiefly by the American Civil
War. While the contest raged, the British Ministry, with
gentlemanly delicacy, refrained from embarrassing a govern-
ment, already, sore beset. This was acknowledged, with
ecrimp courtesy indeed, by Mr. Seward in 1867, but the
Hon. Reverdy Johnston was despatched to England with
peaceful protestations and full powers.

During this long interval, the British Government had,
no doubt, become slowly, but widely awake, to the impor-
tant bearing of the questions at issue, and we now find a
strong stand made, for the reopening and reconsideration of
the whole subject, with amended j^lcadings.

The American Plenipotentiary appeals to have been per-
fectly satisfied as to the equity of the British pretensions-

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

and acting on the groat international policy of "honeHty to
all men," agreed with Lord Stanley, 10th Nov., 18(38, to u
protocol, by wluch the meaniiuj of the first article of the
Treaty of 1846 was reierred to the arbitration of the Presi-
dent of the Swiss Confederation.

In pursuance of this protocol, on the 14th Jan., 18(59, the
Hon. Eoverdy Johnston, charged with full power to thi»
effect, and, no doubt, strengthened by the approval of his
own Government, signed a convention with the Ear! of
Clarendon, referring to the Swiss President, the solution of
the question, as to the trne construction to be put on the first
article of the Tref y of 1846, whether it meant the Haro
Channel or the ilozario Chaimel, or the whole channel, or any
intermediate channel.

Although this convention was recommended by the'
Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs for ratification, it was
never brought before the Senate, and the period, withiu
which the ratification should have taken place, expired.
V The fact is, that the Senate of the United States never
could be brought to face the convention of 1869. That body
gibbed and shied, and at last fairly bolted, leaving the
Treaty which, by their nationa,! representative at the (Jourt
of St. Jame.?, had been pledged to win, in a very undignified
position on the floor of the House. The force of contrast
made the matter worse, for the preceding Treaty, that of
1846, had been sanctioned with suggestive alacrity, at that
rate of lightning speed, euphonistically known as " slick " —
three days only having elapsed between the signing, and-
sealing, and the ratification. Many reasons were assigned,
diplomatically, for the collapse, but the best answer is to be
found in the 36th protocol of the Treaty of Washington

QUIRKS OP DIPLOMACY.

(8th May 1871), whereby this vexed question was again dealt
with, and finally, thus :

"At the Conference of the 15th Kxvch, the British Com-
missioners proposed that the question of the water boundary
should be made upon the basis of the Treaty of 1869," or
the Eeverdy Johnston Treaty.

" The American Commissioners replied that, though no
formal note was taken, it was well understood that that
Treaty had not been favorably regarded by the Senate."
And, in this way we are introduced to the last Treaty of all,
the Treaty of the 8th May, 187L or the last Washington
Treaty, in its relation, with this subject.

It was clear, from the stand taken above by the American
negotiators, that no reopening of the question, no modifica.
tion of the channels, could ever be approached, except
weighted with grave liabilities. They offered, indeed, to
abrogate the Treaty of 1846 so far, and to rearrange the
boundary lino as thereby established, or, in other words, to
revive the American claim to Vancouver Island, with " fifty-
four, forty, or fight." Diplomatic humanity revolted at the
proposition. Better to endure all the ills we had, than to
rush in*o unknown danger, on the Russian frontiers. There-
fore, we were thrown baJc upon another reading of the
statu quo principle equally distasteful to the Canadian ear,
the statu quo ante pactum.

Then, at the Conference of the 29th April, the British
Commissioners, bound by the chain of the sins of their pre-
decessors, "proposed the middle channel, known as the
Douglas Channel." " The American Commissioners declined
io entertain the proposal." On their side they proposed the
Haro, which was, of course, declined on the other. " Noth-
ing therefore remained to be done but a reference to arbi-

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

:« \

■i

tration to dotcrmino whether the line should run througli the
Haro Channel or the Eozario Straits. This was agreed to."

But the British Gommissionors persisted still " they then
proposed that the arbitrator should have the right to draw
the boundary line through an intermediate channel. The
American Commissioners declined the proposal, stating that
they desired a decision, not a compromise.''^

Alas! most lame and impotent conclusion. Had the
plain common sense construction of the Treaty of 1846
been apprehended from the first, the intermediate channel
would have been the line of division, the Island of St. Juan,
ours, and no compromises asked from either party.

Again, with forlorn desperation, the British Commis-
sioners j)roposed " that it should be declared to be the pro-
" per construction of the Treaty of 1846, that all the chan-
" nels were to be open to navigation by both parties. The
" American Commissioners stated they did not so construe
" the Treaty of 1846, and therefore could not assent to such
" a declaration."

Oh, conclusion, lamer still, and still more impotent ! for
thus it falls out. Under the plain common sense meaning
of the Treaty of 1846, we were entitled to a line dividing the
whole channel, between the continent and Vancouver Island,
while all intermediate water and minor channels were open
to both nations, but, under the St. Juan award — the Haro
Channel having been declared to be the right and only chan-
nel under the Treaty — we are restricted to the water of that
channel alone, the widest it is true, but beset with rocks and
shoals, exposed to fogs and gales, and to the influence of tides
and currents, which render sailing navigation diflScult, if not
dangerous, and we are debarred from the right of navigating
any of the other, deeper and safer, intermediate channels.

1 i

f«H*»«t<w i(.s**.-#»WKiC3»C<^

QUIRKS OF DT"LOMACY.

Thus, the direct line of intercourse between Few West-
minster on the Fraser River, in British Columbia, and Vic-
toria in Vancouver Island is hampered and crippled to the
very verge of usclessness. The injury done is grievous
beyond measure, still, it is not irreparable. There is little
help for it beyond self help, but this sturdy auxiliary will
not be wanting, and it will be hard if Canada cannot find a
way for herself, yet, through this tangled skein of complex-
ities and complications.

And now, let us hope, that we have seen the last of these
unilateral conventions— that the eagle, filled to repletion, has
folded, for aye, its predatory wing,~and that the British lion
and the Canadian lamb, may ever henceforth slumber
together, side by side, undisturbed by suggestive odors of
mint sauce;- --but, should these aspirations fail, should the
need for other negotiations ever arise, we trust that they may
be transferred to a more hopeful arena. The three last
Treaties have been manipulated at Washington. We dislike
the diplomatic atmosphere of this cis-Atlantic Capua, where
the self-sumcient foreigner, piquing bimself on his savoir
faire —

Who knows whats what, and thats as high

As metaphysic wit can fly.
is bewildered by the most delicate attentions ; where the voice
is the voice of Jacob, but the hand is that of Esau ; where the
women are charming, the men hearty and hospitable, and
the frolic withal, irreproachable, if not paid for at our
expense. We doubt not the honor of our negotiators, but
we distrust their good nature. The very sea voyage disturbs
and demoralizes the British organism. Our people are apt
to vaunt somewhat ostentatiously the trite Horatian axiom
" c^lum non animum mutant;' &c, but, here it should

't\

^30

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

<•»'

road, with an emendation. Our English l)rod-diplon(\atH,
Non coelum stomachnm, mutant, qui traaa mare currunt.

They cross the Atlantic, predestined to give up everything,
and they do so most effectually. Let us, therefore, in the
future, profit by experiences, fraught with the qualms, as well
as with <he quirks of diplomacy.

It has boon before remarked, that Canada, thrown upon
its own resources, will, beyond all peradvcnture, relieve
itself from embarrassments it did not create, let the cost be
what it may; and, in conclusion, wo may bo allowed to
express an entire confidence that this immense cost, caused
by the acts of others will, in due time, receive generous and
just considei'ation. If sacrifices have boon made at the
expense of Canada, for the good of the Empire, the Empire
is bound to redress the balance. If through the carelessness
of subordinates, the Alabama escaped from an English port ;
if England admits that this escape was to her blame, and
that she is bound to pay the penalty of the mishap, it may
fairly bo claimed, that /oro conscientice, she is equally bound
to compensate Canada, if by tho acts of her negotiators in
1814, by the act of Lord Palmorston's government in 1833,
by the act of Lord John Russell's government in 1859, and
bjT^ the St. Juan award of 1872, Canada has been sacrificed
for tho good of tho Empire. Admitting that she may have
shared in the benefit, she ought not to bear more than her
share of the cost. Great Britain has always shown a noble
readiness to repair wrong. Let us point to tho opportunity.
We are about to embark in a groat enterprise, as a national
work, the construction of a railway which is to connect tho
Atlantic with tho Pacific Ocean, and make the Empire, one
and indivisible. Let Great Britain take her fair share in the
«08t of an undertaking of equal value to her and to us, and

QUIRKS OF DIPLOMACY.

thus componsato New Brunswick, and British Columbia, and
our far western territories, for sacrifices made in the past, and
encourage this Dominion, when called upon, to make still
greater sacrifices it) return.
Ottawa, 1st February, 1874.