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BEITISH AND AMERICAN

^- "DIPLOMACY AFFECTING CANADA.

CSttn :

1782-1899.

A CHAPTER OF CANADIAN HISTORY.

THOMAS HODGINS, Q.C.,

FORMERLY SCHOLAR IN CIVIL I'OI.ITY AND HISTORY,
UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO.

WITH MAPS.

'■'■Thou who didst buihi tip this Brittannick Empire to a glorious and enviable
Vieighth, with all her Daughter Lands about her, stay us in tkis/elicitie." — ^JoHN
tMlLTON.

" This will sometime hence be a vast Empire, the seat of power and learning:
\ Nature has refused it nothing ; and the)-e will grow a people out of our little spot,
England, that will fill this vast space." — General Wolfe.

'Toronto :

"The Rowsell-Hutcuison Press."

THE PUBLISHERS' SYNDICATE LIMITED.

1900.

HE
ap
Ind<

the Joii
£Dtema
jltocity,
States.

The
the long
has sugj
tional ii
have, fr(
the pari
and fist
trade fa(
piftictical

The
internati
necessita
material!
nynts; i
to tlie o;
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In mi
lUfchoriti
of the mi
^te Britii

PREFATORY NOTE.

!HE substance of the earlier pages of this little work
appeared as an Article on " Canada's Loss by the Treaty
Independence," with incidental references to some later
reaties, in an English Review in 1898, a few months before
ie Joint High Commission assembled in Quebec to adjust the
itemational differences respecting the Fisheries, Trade-Reci-
rocity, and other matters, between Canada and the United
ites.

The assumed, but it is to be hoped temporary, failure of

long continued negotiations of the Joint High Commission,

suggested that fuller details of the diplomatic and interna-

^nal incidents, and of the legislative and political acts which

|ve, from time to time, indicated certain lines of policy on

part of the United States affecting the many boundary

Id fishery disputes, commercial intercourse, and carrying-

ide facilities, between Canada and that country, would be of

ictical utility at the present time.

;| The compilation and systematic arrangement of thesei

jrnational incidents, and political lines of policy, have

jessitated a more exhaustive investigation of the abundant

jiterials contained in State Papers, and other public docu-

its ; and have therefore involved very extensive additions

jthe original Article, so that the present publication is pr*"?*

illy a new work.

In making selections from State Papers, and other standard

^horities, care has been taken to present accurate statements

the matters discussed, so as to enable readers to realize how

British and American Diplomacy of past years has affected

Canada, and her original territory, and also her international
relations, as one of the nation-communities of Greater Britain,]
with her adjoining neighbour of the United States.

The lessons which that Diplomacy furnishes, in the varied]
international incidents and lines of policy of former years,
if thoroughly studied and appreciated, will be found instructive
to the fair-minded Statesmen and people of the communities
concerned ; and should enable them to realize the far-reaching
responsibilities of future Diplomatic negotiations, involving asj
they do the equitable adjustment of the many pending crucial]
and disquieting questions affecting the healthful and neigh-
bourly international responsibilities and rights of each nation!

The extracts from the Despatches and Letters noted " MS."|
are from the originals in the volume of " Oswald Correspond-
ence " in the Public Record Office in London, which — except]
in a few instances — have never been published in any State|
Papers or Histories.

The accompanying Map shows the territories of the Unifcedj
States and of Canada, prior to the Treaty of Independence.*

This little work is sent forth to assist in the study of thq
past international relations of the United States and Canada
and as a contribution of some materials for a Chapter o^
Canadian History.

T.H.

* The Map is copied, by permission, from Dr. Winsor's Narrative and Critv
Hintory of America, v. 7, p. 148.

CONTENTS.

PllliMMINARY NkOOTIATIONS FOR THK TrEATY OF INDEPENDENCE, 1782.. 9-18

Opening Negotiations for Peace — American Diplomatic Qualities —
"Downfall of a once Respectable Empire" — Fall of Lord North's
Ministry— Dr. Franklin and Lord Shelburne correspond — Lord
Shelburne becomes Secretary of State — Sends Mr. Richard Oswald,
" a pacifical man," to negotiate with Dr. Franklin — American com-
ments on Oswald's unfitness — Not a match for Franklin, Jay and
Adams- Separate policies of American Diplomats — Franklin pro-
poses cession of Canada and Nova Scotia to the United States —Dr.
Franklin's '* Canada Paper " — Oswald submits it to Lord Shelburne
— But it is not communicated to the King and Cabinet — Lord Shel-
burne's notes on it — Oswald favours the cession of Canada— Cabinet
Minute appointing Oswald to negotiate — Oswald's unfavourable
opinion oi the conquest of Canada — Hia disclosure of Ministerial
confidences to Franklin.

|Mk. Richard Oswald's Appointment as Plenipotentiary 18-24

Lord Shelburne becomes Premier — Oswald's Commission as Plenipo-
tentiary drafted by Jay — Canada's territorial extent in 1782 —
Britain's autocratic "parental government" of her Colonies — Her
disregard of the precedents of home revolutions —Value of Canada
to the Empire — Franklin's sketch of Canada's brilliant future (1764)
— Opinion of Congress that Canadian Mississippi-Ohio lands were
better than theirs — Oswald again advises cession of Canada— Benja-
min Vaughan, a maladroit negotiator, joins Oswald.

IPolicy of the European Allies of the United States 24-31

France and Spain hostile to the claims of the United States to the
Canadian Mississippi-Ohio territory, and Fisheries — British caval
successes over France and Spain— Congress instructs its Commis-
sioners to follow French advice — And modifies its original ultima-
tum to (1) Independence and (2) Validity of French Treaties —
Canadian Fisheries not in modified ultimatum — Depressing military
and financial outlook in the United States — Diplomatic and
Military influences favourable to Britain — Absence of British
advisory control over Oswald— Jay senda Vaughan to Lord Shel-
burne to champion American interests — Canada's original bounda-
ries under the Quebec Act, 1774.

i'ROCKEDINGS ON THE DrAFT TrEATY OF INDEPENDENCE 31-44

Jay drafts the Treaty — Agreed to by Oswald, who again pleads for
the cession of Canada — "Back Lands of Canada"— Divided opin-
ions of the Cabinet —Contents of the Draft Treaty— Lord Shelburne
and the Fiench Minister on the Loyalists' claims — Their claims
disregarded by Oswald and Vaughan— Severity of the United
States to-Loyalists — Goldwin-Smith's statement — Impending British

national disaster— Britain loses thirteen Colonies, and gratuitously
cedes 415,000 square miles of Canadian territory for nine additional
States. The King's plaintive letter— Henry Strachey sent to avert
the British disaster — American criticisms on him — Oswald's and
Vaughan's concessions against him — He gains slight changes —
JJritish Commissioners unaware of modified ultimatum of the United
States — Discussions over the Fishery clauses— Misrepresentation of
the then policy of Congress — Jay's admission — Sarcastic letter of
French Minister to Franklin— Strachey's private letters on American
diplomacy — Its characteristics — Reader's judgment thereon.

Tkeatv of 1782 A Humiliation to Canada 44-4';

Loss of Territory and Fisheries, and uncertain boundaries — Lord )
Townsend's opinion — American view — "Bargain struck on the
American basis" — Later "good bargains" of Canadian territory
— Recent disregard of Canadian rights in Alaska — Further Amer-
ican congratulations — England "endowed the Republic with
gigantic boundaries" — " British sacrifice unparalleled in Diplomacy."

International Relations between the United States and Great

Britain since the Revolution 47-53]

Diplomatic correspondence show embittered relations — No considera-
tion for Britain's cruciate difficulties owing to Napoleon's Berlin
decrees— Inconsistent diplomatic policy of the United States —
Mississippi uncertain boundary — Treaty of 1803 settling it rejected
by the Senate — Treaty of 1806 extending neutral coast immunity
unratified — Origin of the War of 1812— British eastern and western
conquests in the United States — Not even a United States sentry in
Canada at the close of the War— Britain, although aware of the
Mississippi and Maine boundary disputes, restores all its conquests
to the United States by the Treaty of Ghent, 1814 — Her reward, a
vexatious controversy and an armed invasion — Fishery and other
rights abrogated by the War.

Subsequent Treaties between the United States and Great Britain. 53-61

Treaty of 1818 concedes certain fishing privileges to the United States
— Renunciation by the United States of certain fisheries — Irritating
charges against Canada respecting the same — Eflforts to settle-
United States TariflF policy the real difficulty — Reciprocity Treaty
of 1854 — United States abrogates it in 1866— Washington Treaty of
1871 — One-sided condition against Canada —United States abrogates
its Fishery clauses in 1885— Fenian claims against United States
rejected, 1871— Curt reply to Canada by the Colonial Secretary —
Legislation of Congress injuriously affects Canada's Treaty rights-
Canadian vessels stopped at water-ways — Free passage of United
States vessels through Canadian Canals— Brown-Thornton Treaty
of 1874, rejected by the Senate — Its contents — Chamberlain-Tupper
Treaty of 1888, also rejected— Its contents.

British Du'Lomatic Policy Generous to the United States 61-65

Treaty of 1818 ceded Canadian territory at Mississippi and Lake of
the Woods to the United States — Adh burton Treaty of 1842 ceded
further Canadian territory— Treaty of 1846 ceded Oregon territory
— Loss of St. Juan Island owing to the restricted terms of reference.

loUNDAKY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATSS AND CANADA DRAWN ON MaPS

IN 1782 63-69-

Oswald's Map— Strachey's Map — "King's Map "—American Plenipo-
tentiaries transmit marked Maps — Adams's and Jay's Evidence
proving boundary lines — All maps with boundary lines in State
Department of the United States disappeared in 1828— Franklin's
marked Map sent to Jefferson in 1790, produced to Senate on Ash-
burton Treaty, has also disappeared— Spar ks's discovery of Frank-
lin's " Red Line Map " and letter in Paris Archives in 1842 — Both
sustained British claim of boundary — Original Franklin Map of
1782, in French Archives, has also disappeared, and another substi-
tuted (note)— Lord Ashburton unacquainted with certain Maps —
Webster's suppression of the Franklin Red Line Map.

3ME CAUSES OF INTERNATIONAL FrICTION BETWEEN GrEAT BRITAIN AND

THE United States 69-7 1

Civil Service of the United States subject to political changes —
Trained qualities of British Civil Service — How Canada's relations
with the United States have suffered — Spurious maps and reports of
surveys in 1839-40 — Falsified translations of Russian documents in
1893— Faithless United States official not punished — Contradictory
affidavits in the Behring Sea Arbitration— Threats to Indians giving
evidence to British agent.

Canada's " Baptisms of Blood " by Raiders from the United States . . 12
Invasions of Canadian Territory in 1775-76, 1812-14, and 1837-38—
Fenian Raids 1866, 1870, 1871 — United States Government aware
of proposed Fenian invasions of Canada — Never interfered until fili-
busters had crossed the boundary, and slain Canadians — Few ring-
leaders arrested and speedily released, and their arms restored.

t>ISCRIMINATION AGAINST CaNADA's TrADE WITH THE UNITED STATES. . . .73-7&

United States Policy of 1806, of 1818, of 1820, of 1887— McKinley
and Dingley Tariffs — Unsuccessful effort against British and Cana-
dian Carrying Trade — Retaliatory policy of 1892 respecting the St.
Mary Canal — No similar retaliatory laws in British or Canadian
legislation — Effect on Canada.

Accountability of the United States to other Nations 78-8S

Political acts tending to degrade another nation — Hostilities of a tact-
less diplomacy — United States school and history books teach hos-
tility to Britain — Politics there largely controlled by lobbies and
•bosses — Canada's estimate of their spasmodic political impulses —
British indifference and chilling advice to Canada in 1873 — Canada's
weapons for supremacy on the farm-battle-fields of nature— Her
responsibility as a nation- community of Greater Britain- Canadian
ideas of friendly relations with the United States— Mr. Secretary
Bayard's views— Britain's intervention in favour of the United
States in the Spanish- American War.

JRiTisH AND Canadian Efforts to Adjust the Alaska Boundary and

other Differences with the United States 83-8^'

Canada's continued conciliatory advances— Opening of Diplomatic
Negotiations in 1898 — Jeopardized by position taken by the United

'^:ti-

•li !

States on the Alaska boundary dispute— Departure from the Veneic-
uelan precedent — Involves cession of Canadian territory — Bayard's
sentiments forgotten — Russian Treaty of 1825 described Alaska coast
line — Measured from the Pacific Ocean — "Ocean," "Coast" and
"Shore" in International Law — Artificial shore-lines across bays
and rivers— Alaska boundary crosses Canadian rivers and inlets —
Lynn Canal the crux of the boundary dispute — Its measurement
{note) — United States' precedents of 1793, sustain Canada's claim to
the Lynn Canal— Arguments of the United States against Canada's
claim are conflicting.

•Charge that Canada has Tacitly Allowed the Claims of the United

States Kespectino the Alaska Boundary 89-1001

Historical facts disprove the charge— United States obtained possession
of Alaska in October, 1867— Canada's urgent and yearly efforts since
March, 1872, before any settlements had been made within the dis-
puted area— Canada's action in 1876 — United States in 1892, agreed
to a Treaty to deliminate the Alaska boundary line " in accordance
with the spirit and intent " of the Russian Treaties of 1825 and 1867
— Another Treaty in 1897, to settle the line from Mount St. Elias
— These Treaties are solemn acknowledgments by the United States
of their doubtful title to the territory abbut the disputed boundary
line — They refute the charge of Canada's tacit acquiescence — And
prove that no rights from settlement had been acquired or claimed
by the United States — United States maps of boundary lines con-
demned by their State Department — British proposal to accept the
Venezuelan conditions a conciliatory departure from the prior
Treaties of 1892-7 — Its non-acceptance justified the British and
Canadian withdrawal from further Negotiations — Further impedi-
ments to arbitration by the United States — Special qualities of
American diplomacy (note) — Conditions required by the United
States involved a forced surrender of Canadian territory, and an
abandonment of British subjects —Modus Viveiidi of October, 1899,
excludes Canada from Lynn Canal (no<e)— American umpire declined
— Negotiations on other Treaty matters suspended -British and
Canadian anticipations disappointed — Sir J. A. Macdonald on
British indifference and United States unneighbourly policy to
Canada— Great Britain's modern Imperialism — British Island
Crown's relation to the British Colonial Crowns— Offer of Colonial
Representation in the Imperial Parliament by King George III. in
1778, (note).

Appendices »<101-H|

No. 1 — Articles of the Treaty of 1825 between Great Britain and
Russia, describing the boundaries of Alaska.

No. 2 — Provisional boundary line between Canada and Alaska,
October, 1899.

No. 3 — Map of Lynn Canal, showing the respective boundary lines
claimed by Canada and the United States.

BRITISH AND AMERICAN DIPLOMACY
AFFECTING CANADA.

1782- 1899.

THE peace negotiations of 1782, which resulted in Peace negoti-
the "Provisional Articles" of that year, and thetweenthe
^'Definitive Treaty" of 1783, acknowledging the Inde- ^^^j^^'J^^**^^'
pendence of the Thirteen American Colonies, marked Britain, 1782.
the commencement of diplomatic intercourse between
the United States and Great Britain. According to
the frank avowal of an American apologist, the under-
taking was " a difficult errand in diplomacy, especially American
under circumstances demanding wariness and adroit- diplomatic
oess, if not even craft and dissimulation;"* — a^"*^***^^*
grotesque grouping of appropriate, with sinister,
diplomatic qualities which were severally illustrated
in the international drama then placed on the stage of
history. The wariness and adroitness, and perhaps
what might be paraphrased as the sinister strategy, of
some of the players, the incapacity and blundering
indiscretion of others, and the mournful epilogue
pronounced by the King over " the downfall of a once " Downfall of
respectable Empire," best explain why only one of Empire."
the nations, then forming the audience, applauded the
Treaty.

* JohnAdaiitH, by John T. Morse, Jr. (American Statesmen Series),
Boston (1890), p. 165.

:ci

Fall of Lord
North's Min-
istry, March,
1782.

■!:■!

Correspond-
ence between
Lord Shel-
bnrne and
Dr. Franklin.

Lord Shel-
burns be-
comes Secre-
tary of State,

He sends Mr.
Oswald to ne-
gotiate with
Dr. Franklin.

Mr. Oawalvi's
qualifications.

The disaster to Lord Cornwallis at York town, in
October, 1781, hastened the downfall of the ministry
of Lord North ; and in March, 1782, the Rockingham
administration came into power, — the chief policy of
which was the stoppage of the war in America, and
the recoirnition of the Independence of the Revolted
Colonies is the United States. Shortly before the
formation of the new Government, Lord Shelburne
had, through a friend. Lord Cholmondely, intimated
to Dr. Franklin, then diplomatic representative of the
Congress of the United States in Paris, that he would
be pleased to hear from him ; whereupon Dr. Franklin
replied congratulating him on the change of public
opinion ^;:' England towards America, and expressing
the hope that it would tend to produce a general peace.
When Dr. Franklin's letter arrived. Lord Shelburne
was Secretary of State, and to him must be justly
conceded the credit of initiating the peace negotiations
which resulted in the Treaty of Independence. But
his negotiations were unfortunately sullied by a
want of candor.* Without the knowledge of his
colleagues he despatched a Mr. Richard Oswald to
Paris with instructions to open informal negotiations
for peace with the representative of the Ai.erican
Congress at the French Court.i*

Mr. Oswald was introduced by Lord Shelburne ta

* This peculiarity in Lord Shelburne's character is referred to inr
Mr. Lecky's History oj England in the 18th Century, v. 4, pp. 210-15.

t Lord Shelburne in a debate on the " Manifesto issued by the
Commissioners for Quieting the Disorders in the American Colonies "■
(1778), had rather rashly stated: "that he never would serve with
any man — be his abilities what they might— who would either main-
tain it was right, or consent, to acknowledge the Independence of
America." Parliamentary History, v. 20, p. 40. j .

n I It

Dr. Franklin as " a pacifical man,* conversant in those " A pacifical
negotiations which are most interesting to mankind," —
a peculiarity which the Doctor confirmed by describing
him as " a plain and sincere old man, who seems now
to have no desire but that of being useful in doing
good." He had been a successful Scotch merchant in
the City of London, was at one time an army con-
tractor, and had acquired, through his wife, large
estates in the West Indies and America; and, on
account of his connection with both countries, iiad
been occasionally consulted by the Government during
the American war. f But a candid, and therefore
instructive, comment en Mr. Oswald's unfitness has
been furnished by a former eminent American diplomat,
that " Of all the remarkable incidents in this remark- American
able transaction, nothing now seems so difficult to ^jr"^"^^|°"g
account for as the mode in which Great Britain pur- unfitness.
sued her objects by negotiation. The individual
pitched upon to deal with the United States was a
respectable and amiable private gentleman, nominated
at the suggestion of Dr. Franklin, with whom he was
to treat, because he thought he would get along easily
with him ; but by no means a match for a combination
of three such men as Franklin, Jay and John Adams." |

I i.

* Lord Edmond Fitzmaurice in his Life of Lord Shelburne, usea
the dxpression "practical man" (v. 3, p, 177); but all other
autLorlties use the expression given above. See Life of Franklin^
Written by Himself, v. 3, p. 69 ; Sparks's Life of Franklin, v. 9,
p. 241 ; Life of John Adam», by J. Q. Adams and C. F. Adams,
V. 2, p. 13 ; Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence of
the United States, v, 5, p. 536.

t Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 175.

t Life of John Adamn, v. 2, p, 32.

American
diplomatic
representa-
tives.

Unfit repre-
sentatives has
been Great
Britain's
misfortune.

United and
-separate
policies of
American
diplomats.

The representatives of the American Congress were
Dr. Franklin, then Minister to France ; John Adams,
Minister at the Hague, formerly Commissioner to
France, and Chief Justice of Massachusetts ; John Jay,
Minister to Spain, ex-President of Congress, and then
Chief Justice of New York ; Henry Laurens, Minister
to Holland, formerly President of Congress, and who
had just been exchanged for Lord Cornwallis.

To be on equal terms with such astute and experi-
enced politicians the same writer has added: "Great
Britain had need of the best capacity and diplomatic
experience within her borders. But it was her fortune,
during all this period, — and indeed almost to the present
day, — to insist upon under-rating the people with whom
she had to deal, because they had been her dependents ;
a mistake which has been productive of more unfortu-
nate consequences to herself than an age of repentarce
can repair."

The American representatives, though differing on
some details of the proposed Treaty of Peace, were
united in policy to secure the independence of the
American Colonies, and to repudiate all national
responsibility for the action of the several States in
confiscating the property of the Loyalist British-
American subjects. Each of them had, in addition,
a special interest to further in the Treaty. Dr.
Franklin's was the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia
to the United States. Mr. Jay's was the '?Tt3nsion of
their boundaries through the Indian and C'»nadian
territories westward over the Alleghany Mountains to
the Mississippi River. Mr. Adams championed the
New Englanders' claim to the Canadian fisheries,
which they pressed with extreme anxiety; and they

relied on him to secure the fisheries for theiii, if it
were a human possibility to do so. *

Mr. Oswald arrived in Paris about the middle of
April, 1782; and, after communicating Lord Shel-
burne's desire for peace to Dr. Franklin, and ascertain-
ing his views, the Doctor gave him a confidential paper
of " Notes for mere conversation matter between Mr.
Oswald and Mr. Franklin," which contained what, by
others, would have been considered a startling propo-
sition — that Great Britain should " voluntarily cede "
the whole of Canada and Nova Scotia to the United
States.f On his return to London, Mr. Oswald reported
to Lord Shelburne the result of his mission, and handed
to him the confidential notes, afterwards known in the
negotiations as the " Canada paper." J

Lord Shelburne appears to have given only a partial
outline of Mr. Oswald's report to his colleagues in the
Cabinet ; and he withheld from them all knowledge of
the " Canada paper." The excuse offered for him was,
that " there was nothing in the contents of the paper, or
in the manner in which it came into his hands, which
rendered it incumbent on him to communicate it to

Mr. Oswald
meets Dr.
Franklin,
who proposes
cession of
Canada and
Nova Scotia.

Lord Sliel-
burne's par-
tial report ta
the Ministry.

the

* Though a claim tc the Newfoundland, as well as the Canadian,
fisheries was made by the American Commissioners, the negotiations
for the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia, did not include the
cession of the Island of Newfoundland.

t Sparks's Life and Writings of Franklin, v. 9, p. 250.

t An American biographer of Dr. Franklin says : ♦* Mr. Oswald,
with most undiplomatic readiness, declared that, in his opinion,
nothing could be clearer, or more satisfactory and convincing, than
the reasoning in that paper. He said he would do his utmost to
bring Lord Shelburne to the same view." Parton's Life of Franklin,
-'. 2, p. 461.

First know-
ledge of the
" Canada
paper. "

Lord Shel-
burne's reti-
•cence indefen-
sible.

Contents of
the " Canada
paper."

his colleagues ; and he thought best not to send any
formal answer to it." *

It was from a casual remark of Mr. Oswald, in
June, that the existence of the " Canada paper " becams
known to Mr. Grenville, then representative of the
Foreign Office at Paris, who at once reported the
matter to Mr. Fox, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs.
In his reply, dated 10th June, Mr. Fox said, " The
paper relative to Canada I never heard of till I
received your letter ; and it may be said that Lord
Shelburne has withheld from our knowledge matters
of importance to the negotiations." -f-

The reticence of Lord Shelburne in not disclosing to
the Crown, or his colleagues, the secret and confidential
proposition for the cession of Canada and Nova Scotia,
cannot be defended. | In the opinion of Lord John
Russell, " it is impossible to justify Lord Shelburne for
his favourable reception of so important a paper as
the one he had received from Franklin about Canada,
without communicating the substance of it at least to
his colleagues." § The " Canada paper " also dealt with
the question of reparation for the towns and villages
which had been burnt by the British and their Indian
allies, and gave several arguments why Canada and
Nova Scotia should be ceded to the United States,
closing with the very tempting inducements that

* Life, of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 183.

t Life of Charles James Fox, by Lord John Russell, v. 1, p. 313.

X Lord Shelburne subsequently declared in the House of Lords
that " The great advantage of Monarchy in the British Constitution
was that it trusted to the Crown the secrets which must necessarily
attend all negotiations with Foreign Powers." Parliamentary His*
tory, V. 23, p. 309.

§ Memorials of Fox, v. 1, p. 384.

Great Britain should " in all times coming have and
enjoy the right of Free Trade thither, unincumbered
with any duties whatever ; and that so much of the
vacant lands there, shall be sold as will raise a sum
sufficient to pay for the houses burnt by the British
troops and their Indian allies, and also to indemnify
tlie Royalists for the confiscation of their estates." *

Lord Shelburne's views respecting the " Canada Lord Snel-
paper " appear in his " Memorandum for Mr. Oswald in qq j^e «« can-
conversation," in which he thus outlined the minibcerial ada paper."
policy respecting Canada :

" The private paper desires Canada for three reasons :

" 1st. By way of reparation. Ansiver : No repara-
tion can be heard of. .

" 2nd. To prevent future wars. Ansiver : It is hoped
that some more friendly method will be found.

" 3rd. Loyalists, as a fund of indemnification to
them. Answer : No independence to be acknowledged
without their being taken care of, Penobscot to be
always kept." f

None of these details of the policy above indicated Policy not
was communicated to the Cabinet, or submitted for the ^^^d to King
sanction of the Crown ; and it is even dor.btful whether ^^ Cabinet,
this memorandum respecting the " Canada paper," was
more than mere notes for conversation, or that the
policy indicated was ever communicated to Mr. Oswald ;
for Sir G. C. Lewis says: "The probability is that
Lord Shelburne made no remark upon it (the Canada
paper) to Oswald, fearing that it might offend Frank-

* Sparks's Fra7iklin,v. 9, p. 252.

t Lewis's Administrations of Great Britain, p. 47; Life of Lord
Shelburne, v. 3, p. 188. Penobscot was subsequently ceded.

Dr. Franklin's
comment on
Mr. Oswald's
report.

Cession of
Canada and
Nova Scotia
possible.

Cabinet min-
ute appoint-
ing Mr.
Oswald to
negotiate a
Treaty.

lin ; and that Oswald construed his silence into appro-
bation." *

This view appears to be sustained by the entry in
Dr. Franklin's diary that, on his return to Paris in
May, " Mr. Oswald reported to me his opinion that the
affair of Canada would be settled to our satisfaction,
and that it was his wish that it might not be men-
tioned till towards the end of the Treaty." -f- Lord
Edmond Fitzmaurice confirms this by saying that wherv
Mr. Oswald returned the Canada paper to Dr. Frank-
lin, " he expressed his own personal conviction that it-
had made an impression ; and that if the matter were
not given undue prominence during the early stages of
the negotiation, a settlement satisfactory to America
might still be ultimately arrived at in regard to the
cession of Canada and Nova Scotia." |

Acting on such partial report of Mr. Oswald'*
mission as Lord Shelburne made to his colleagues, the
Cabinet, on the 23rd April, 1782, agreed to the follow-
ing Minute : " It is humbly submitted to His Majesty
that Mr. Oswald shall return to Paris, with authority
to name Paris as the place, and to settle with Dr^
Franklin the most convenient time for setting on foot
a negotiation for a general peace ; and to represent ta
him that the principal points in contemplation are the
allowance of Independence to America, upon Great-
Britain's being restored to the situation she was placed
in by the Treaty of 1703 ; and that Mr. Fox shall sub-
mit to the oonsideration of the King a proper person
to make a similar communication to M. de Vergennes." §

• Lewis's Administrations of Oreai Britain, p. 48.

+ Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, p. 269.

t Life oj Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 191.

§ Memorials of Fox, v. 1, p. 345.

' Sparks

This reference to the Treaty of 1763, and again in a
hater Minute, dated 18th May, 1782, would lead to the
[inference that Canada was to be retained ; for its
Icession by France to Great Britain, and the delimina-
Ition of its boundaries along the Mississippi, had been
{settled by that Treaty ; * and rendered it all the more
lincumbent upon Lord Shelburne to disclose to his
colleagues Dr. Franklin's secret and confidential propo-
sition for the cession of Canada.

Mr. Oswald was shorn of the Samson locks of his

diplomatic strength when he confided to Dr. Franklin

lis personal opinion that the conquest of Canada by

Great Britain, had an injurious effect on the relations

)f the American Colonies to the Empire, — an opinion

lot shared by Dr. Franklin, as will presently appear.

ind when Dr. Franklin hinted that " England should

lake us a voluntary offer of Canada," he found that

Mr. Oswald much liked the idea, and promised that

le should endeavour to persuade their doing it;"-|'

;hich he fulfilled in the following report to Lord

Jhelburne : " The Doctor touched upon Canada, as he

[enerally does on like occasions, and said there could

le no dependence on peace and good neighbourhood

^hile that country continued under a different gov-

rnment, as it touched their States on sl a stretch

Treaty with'
France, of
1763, de-
scribed
Canada's
boundaries.

Mr. Oswald's
opinion ttiat
the conquest
of Canada was
injurious to
the Empire.

He favou -s
Dr. Franklin's -
idea of the
cession of
Canada.

In the negotiations for this Treaty it was admitted that the
lleghanies (Appalachies) formed the western boundary of the
|t'ii American Co'-^nies; but the French contended that the val-

of the Mississi^ pi belonged to Louisiana, and formed no part
I the territory of Canada, which France had agreed to cede. Great
litain maintained the contrary, and after nearly three years dis-
Itation, the French gave way, and Canada was ultimately ceded to
reat Britain with the Mississippi River as its western boundary.

Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, p. 254.

lllll!

Mr. Oswald
discloses con-
fidential
opinions of
Ministers.

Lord Shel-
burne be-
comes
Premier.

Mr. Fox

resigns.

And Mr.

Oswald's
commission
drafted by
Mr. Jay.

of frontier. I told him I was sensible of that incon-
venience ; but having no orders, the consideration of
that matter might possibly be taken up at some future
time." *

Lord Shelburnps biographer relates how Mr. Oswald
also indiscreetly disclosed co the American plenipoten-
tiary the confidential and personal opinion. > of certain
members of the Cabinet : " Oswald told Franklin that
personally he agreed with him ; and he also mentioned
that he had not concealed his opinion when in England,
but had urged the cession of Canada during an inter-
view with Rockingham, Shelburne and Fox. The two
former, he said, spoke reservedly on the point, but in
his opinion did not seem very averse to it. Fox, how-
ever, seemed startled at the proposition ."-f- This state-
ment is confirmed by an entry in Dr. Franklin's diary.
The death of Lord Rockingham, and the succession
of Lord Shelburne to tlie Premiership, led to the resig-
nation of Mr. Fox, which was followed by the with-
drawal of Mr. Grenville from Faris ; and enabled Lordt?
Shelburne to comply with Dr. Franklin's urgent request'
that Mr, Oswald should be sent to treat. Accordingly,
Lord Shelburne's " pacifical man " became the British
ig plenipotentiary under a Commission, drafted for the
British Ministry by Mr. Jay, "in his own handwrit-
ing,"! authorizing him to treat with the " Commis-

* MS. Despatch, Oswald to the Foreign Secretary, Paris, lltl
August, 1782.

f Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 206 ; Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, if
.316. '

J "It was a singular circumstance that one who had lately beeil
regarded as a rebel-subject of the British Monarch should now pre
pare a Commission from that Monarch by which hi« late Colonial
were to be acknowledged free and independent." Life of John Jay
V. 1, p. 143.

sioners of the United States," for the settlement of the
great political and territorial interests which emi- Diplomatic
nently required an experienced and adroit negotiator*, r"qi/ij.e^|^
skilled in judicious and tactful diplomacy ; and one
who had a local knowledge of the territorial localities
of Colonial America and Canada,, equal to that pos-
I sessed by the American Commissioners.

Canada at that time was one of Great Britain's Canada in
largest and most important territorial possessions; f or Britain'^*
lit included not only her present great domain, but also g''®*t?st
the Great Lakes and the fertile agricultural territory session^
south of Lakes Erie, Huron, Michigan and Superior,
down to the confluence of the Ohio and Mississippi
rivers, about latitude 37° N. — out of which Canadian,
land subsequently ceded, territory, containing about
1280,000 square miles, were formed the modern States
|of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Wisconsin and
Minnesota* — a territory contemptuously described by Mr. Oswald's
VIr. Oswald in his despatches as the " hack lands 0/^°"^^^"^?*^"°"^
'anada" " a country worth nothing, and of no impor- Canada.
unce ; " f but which, if it had been retained by Great

To this must be added the south-eastern or *• Indian territory,"

lying between the Alleghany Mountains, Spanish Florida and the

)hio River, containing about 135,000 square miles, — M'hich had

formed no part of the old Colonies ; — out of which were subsequently

|ormed the States of Kentucky, Tennessee and Alabama.

+ Six years prior to Mr. Oswald's despatch, this portion of Canada
[lad been thus described : " The triangular track of land between
Ihe Mississippi, the Ohio and Lake Erie, is the finest spot of earth
In the globe, swelling with moderate hills, but no mountains ;
ratered by the finest rivers, and of the most delightful climate ;
Bie soil, as appears from the woods with which it is clothed, is of
[lie most abundant fruitfulness and vegetation. It abounds with
oal ; and there are multitudes of salt-springs in all parts of it.
[here are mines of iron, copper and lead. Wild rye grows there

r: I

Original
area of Can-
ada equal to
Russia (ex-
cluding
Siberia).

Great
Britain's
policy as a
Sea Power,

Britain, would have mftcle her combined Canadian
possessions in North America over 4,000,000 square
miles, or larger than the territorial area of Russia in
Europe and Asia (excluding Siberia) ; and would have
constituted British influence the imperial and dominant
power on the American continent. *

Great Britain was then more intent upon humbling |
the European nations which had challenged her
supremacy as a Sea Power, by despoiling them of their
territorial possessions, than in acquiring colonial homes
for her adventurous people, and markets for her man-
ufacturers, which, in our times, constitute her more
beneficent and Imperial policy. A century ago she
Her old fash- governed her Colonies after an autocratic and old-fash-
ta?despotism ^^"^^ " parental - government " despotism, — for she
oyer the colo- recognized, and would then learn, no other. While her
army and navy were ad^Mng to her Colonial Empire, |
her home statesmen, though trustees of the constitu-
tional rights and traditions of all the subjects of!
the Crown, denied those rights and traditions to their
Her disregard Colonial fellow-subjects ; and forgetting the revolu-
precedents^ of ^^^"^^y teachings of former home despotisms, imposed
revolutions, on the American Colonists a despotism which recalledi
the island precedents of revolutionary resistence ; -f and|

spontaneously." JUap of the Middle British Colonies in iVoWi"^
America, by ex-Governor T. Pownall, M.P., published by J. Alnion.
London, 1776.

* The claim of the United States to Canada was gravely assertedi
on the ground that: "By the Treaty of Paris of 1763, Arti
cle VII., Canada was expressly and irrevocably ceded by France t
the King of Great Britain, and that the United States are, in conxei
quence of the Revolution in their government, entitled to the ben^
efits of that cession." Secret J ourncds of Congress, 1780, v. 2, p. .^27 i

+ "The structure of the British Government was made to rest upoi^
the people's right of resistance, as upon its corner stone. *

ultimately caused the loss of an extended and flourishing

Colonial Empire, and a loyal and sympathetic kindred.

The value of Canada to the Empire — won from Value of .

France on Canadian battle-grounds — was well-known *"* *'

to Dr. Franklin, the writer of the " Canada paper," for

he had, the year after its conquest, thus graphically

sketched a brilliant future for it, in the following

letter to Lord Kames :

" No one can more sincerely reioice than I do on the P'"; ^™"^'

' lin 8 brilliant

reduction of Canada ; and this not merel}' as I am a sketch of
Colonist, but as I am a Briton. I have long been of ^^^J*^* "^
the opinion that the foundation of the future grandeur

I and stability of the British Empire lie in America ;

land though, like other foundations, they are low and
little now, they are nevertheless broad and strong

I enough to support the greatest political structure that
human wisdom ever yet erected. I am, therefore, by
no means for restoii ng Canada to France. If we keep
it, all the country from the St. Lawrence to the Missis-
sippi will become vastly more populous by the
immense increase of commerce ; and your naval power,
thence continually increasing, will extend your influ-

|ence round the globe, and awe the world." *

Such was the prophetic picture of British territorial Now coveted

land commercial supremacy on the North American con-

Itinent, drawn by the diplomat who now coveted the

Iwhole of the Canadian domain for his nation, and to

jWe should ever bear in mind how essential to the preservation of

the Constitution this principle of resistance is; an extremity to be

cautiously embraced, but still a remeiy within the peopleV reach ;

|a protection to which they can and will resort, as often as their

lulers make sach a recourse necessary for self-defence." Political

'Philosophy, by Lord Brougham, v. 3, p. 293.

Life oj Franklin, Written by Himself, v. 1, p. 299.

i^!!

i!:'

Mr. Oswald's
advice to cede
Canada to
the U. S.

American
Congress's
opinion of the
value of Cana-
dian lands.

Better lands
than those in
the U. S.

Mr. Vaughan,
another mala-
droit British
negotiator.

whom the British representative had imparted the
encouraging information that, before he left England,
he had advised her Ministers "that in his opinion
Canada should be given up to the United States, as
it would prevent occasions of future differences, and
as the Government of such a country was worth
nothing, an^ of no importance, and that he was not
without hopes it would be agreed to." *

Mr. Oswald's unfavourable opinion of Canada was
evidently not concurred in by Dr. Franklin, nor did
it weaken his efforts to secure its cession. Nor did iti
in any way deter Congress from pressing for its acqui-
sition: "Great Britain already possesses Canada and!
Nova Scotia; should that immense territory, which
lies upon the rear of these States, from the Gulf of St.
Lawrence to the Gulf of Mexico, be acknowledged to
be vested in Great Britain, it will render our situationj
truly hazardous. The lands, as you know, are infin-
itely better than those on the coast ; they have an open|
communication with the sea by the River St. Law-
rence and Mississippi, and with each other by thosel
extensive inland seas with which America abounds.!
They will be settled with the utmost rapidity froml
Europe, but more particularly from these States, fori
the fertility of their soil will invite numbers to leave]
us." t

About this time another, and perhaps more mala-
droit, negotiator, Mr. Benjamin Vaughan, an intimat«j

* Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 5, p. 572!

+ Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 3, pi
273. The Articles of the Confederation of the United States, 1778|
provided that "Canada acceding to this Confederation, and joining
in the measures of the United States, shall be admitted into anc
entitled to all the advantages of this Union."

friend of Dr. Franklin, was despatched by Lord Shel-

burne " to give private assurances to the latter that

the change of Administration brought with it no

change of policy." * Mr. Vaughan appears to have

been a twin neophyte in diplomacy to Mr. Oswald,

for he liidiscreetly admitted to Mr. Adams that many

of " the best men in England were for giving up Canada Also favours

and Nova Scotia."f But his peculiar unfitness for even CanadaTml*^

a minor public ser . may be realized from a perusal Nova Scotia.

of the childish p: -. cured out in a letter to Dr.

Franklin, which mu.T>t have been smilingly read by that

astute diplomatist :

" My Dear Sir: — I am so agitated with the present His pathetic
crisis that I cannot help writing to you, to beseech pj,ankii„_
you, again and again, to meditate upon some mild
expedient about the Refugees, or to give a favourable
ear and helping hand to such as may turn up. If I
can judge of favourable moments, the present is of all
others most favourable. We have liberal American
Commissioners at Paris, a liberal English Commissioner,
and a liberal First Minister in England. All these cir-
curastances may vanish to-morrow, if the Treaty blows
over. T pray, then, my dearest, dearest Sir, that you
would a little take this matter to heart. If the Refu-
gees are not silenced, you must be sensible what con-
stant prompters to evil measures you leave us ; what
perpetual sources of bad information. If the Minister
is able, on the other hand, to hold up his head on this

* Life of Lord Shelbume, v. 3, p. 242.

+ "As to Mr. Vaughan, he seems so willing to be active, and so
void of judgment, that it is fortunate he has no business ; and the
sooner he returns to his family the better." Letter from King George
III. to Lord Shelbume, 22nd December, I7H2.

w^m

France and
Spain hostile
to the exten-
sion of the
U. S. to the
Mississippi.

And to the
U. S. claims to
the Canadian
.fisheries.

one point, you must see how much easier it will be
for you both to carry on the great Avork of the union,
as far as relates to Prince and people. Besides, you
are the most magnanimous nation, and can excuse
things to your people, which ive can less excuse to
ours. To judge w^hich is the hardest task, yours or
England's, put yourself in Lord Shelburne's place. The
only marks of confidence shown him at Paris are such
as he dares not name. Excuse this freedom, my
dearest Sir; it is the result of a very warm heart, that
thinks a little property nothing, to much happiness.
I do not, however, ask you to do a dishonourable
thing, but simply to save England, and to give our
English Ministry the means of saying on the 5th
December that we have done more than the last Min-
istry have done. I hope you will not think this zeal
persecution." *

Prior to the arrival of this "agitated " diplomat in
Paris, the French Government had intimated to the
American Congress thf *• the influence of France and
Spain was hostile to the extension of the United States'
boundaries through Canadian territory to the Missis-
sippi, and to their claims to the Canadian fisheries.
And M. de Vergennes, the French Foreign Minister,
emphasized this in Paris, by arguing with the American
Commissioners in favour of England, and by declaring
that the demands of the Americans were unreasonable,
and that France would not continue the war for
American objects, f Nor were the English Ministers

*Sparks's Franklin, v. 9, p. 4,33. The italics are as in the
original letter.
+ Winsor's Narrative and Critical History of America, v. 7, p. HO

Ignorant of this decision of the Allied powers. Mr.
Fitzherbert, the British PlenipotentI ry to France,
was also informed by the French Minister that It was
the joint policy of France and Spain to shut out the Their joint
United States from the Mississippi, the Gulf of St. municatedto
Lawrence, the Great Lakes, and the fisheries; and he^"**^"*"**"'
was urged to concur with France in a concert of
measures for that purpose, — because it could only be
accomplished by the approval and aid of Great Britain.*
And M. de Rayneval, who had been sent to London on
a confidential mission to the British Ministry, also
expressed to them the '* strong opinion " of the French
Government " against the American claims to the
Fisheries, and to the valley of the Mississippi and the
Ohio," "These opinions," says Lord Shelburne's bio-
grapher, " were carefully noted by Shelburne and
Grantham." i* That this was the known policy of the Their policy
French Court, is confirmed by the American Commis- American
sioners' Report to Congress, after the Ti-eaty was signed, Commis-
that " as the Articles respecting the boundaries, the
refugees, and fisheries, did not correspond with the
policy of this (French) Court, we did not communicate
the preliminaries to the Minister until after they were
signed ; and not, even then, the separate article." |

sioners.

* Ihkl, pp. 120 and 122. Sparks's Franklh), v. 9, p. 386.

t Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 263. M. de Rayneval also wrote
I to the American Commissioners: "It is clearly evident that the
I Court of London, when it was as yet Sovereign of the Thirteen Colo.
hues, did not consider the vast territories situated eastward of the
jMissiasippi, as forming part of these same Colonies. " M. de Rayneval
jto John Jay, 6th September, 1782 ; Wharton's Revolutionary
\Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 6, p. 26.

+ Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of (he Revolution, v. 10, p.
1120.

ipim

British Naval
victories ruin
the sea power
of France and
Spain.

Congress _
instructs its
Commis-
sioners to be
foverned by
'rench ad-
vice.

British diplo
macy aided
by U. S. modi-
fied ultima-
tum.

During these negotiations, the naval victory of Lord
Rodney over the French fleet under DeGrasse, in the
West Indian waters, in April, 1782, and the successes
of Sir George Elliott and Lord Howe, at Gibraltar, in
September, 1782, had ruined the sea power of France
and Spain, and had given the finishing blow to the
then European war against Great Britain. In America,
Congress, in acknowledgment of the material aid oil
France in assisting the United States to a national,
existence, had given imperative instructions to the'
American Commissioners that in their negotiations
with Great Britain they were " to make the most can-
did and confidential communications upon all subjects i
to the Ministers of our generous ally, the King of'
France ; and to undertake nothing in the negotiations
for peace or truce, without their knowledge and concur-
rence ; and ultimately to govern yourselves by their
ad^'ice nnd opinion." * And pending the negotiations,
Cong "s communicated the following resolution to the
Frencn Plenipotentiary : ** That they will hearken to
no propositions which shall not be discussed in confi-
dence, and in concert, with His Most Christian
Majesty." f

The diplomatic position of Lord Shelburne's Govern-
ment was also materially aided by the modified instruc-
tions and ultimatum of the American Congress. In
the earlier sessions. Congress had instructed its Com-
missioners, that in any negotiations with Great Britain, j
they were to insist upon the grant of Independence,
the Mississippi boundaries, and the Fisheries, subse-
quently adding, however, the following modification;!

* Secret Journals of Congress, v. .3, p. 138.

t Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 10, p. 86 1

"Although it is of the utmost importance to the
peace and commerce of the United States, that Canada
and Nova Scotia should be ceded, and more particularly
that the equal common right of the United States to
the fisheries should be guaranteed to them, yet a desire
of terminating the war has induced us not to make
the acquisition of these objects an ultimatum on
the present occasion." * The modified instructions of U. S. de-
June, 1781, informed the Commissioners that Congress j^m^ted' to '
thought it " unsafe at this distance, to tie them up by two essen-

tials

absolute and peremptory directions upon any other

subject than the two essential articles " which were :

(1) To effectually secure the independency and sove-(l) Indepen-

reignty of the United States ; and (2) That the treaties ;|f"^f',.,.,

. . . 1. (2) Validity

with France should be left in their full force and valid- of French

ity ; adding : " You are therefore to use your own Treaties,
judgment and prudence in securing the interest of
the United States in such manner as circumstances
may direct, and as the state of the belligerent, and
disposition of the mediating, powers may require."
" But if a difficulty should arise in the course of the
negotiation for peace, from the backwardness of Britain
to make a formal acknowledgment of our Indepen-
dence, you are at liberty to agree to a truce, or to
make such other concessions as may not affect the
substance of what we contend for, and provided that
Great Britain be not left in possession of any part of
the Thirteen United States." f
The subsequent action of Congress respecting the Action of

Fisheries appeared in the report of a Committee J^ipectingtho^
recommending " that the best security for obtaining a Fisheries.

* Secret Journals of Congress, v. 2, p. 228.

t Wharton's Revolvdionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 4, p. 477.

:.i

|l'i'r:iJI

iilii

II ^

U. S. Com-
missioners
aware of the
modified
ultimatum.

Depressing
outlook in
the United
States.

U. S. Treas-
ury empty.

right to the Fisheries, short of admitting it into the
ultimatum for Peace, will be a representation to His
Most Christian Majesty (of France) through one of
the Ministers for negotiating the Peace, of its great
importance to the United States, and of the grounds
upon which it is claimed and expected."*

The American Commissioners were, therefore, fully
aware, before the negotiations commenced with Mr.
Oswald, that Congress had modified and practically
limited its ultimatum to the independence of the
United States, and the validity of the treaties with
France. But not being as simple-minded as Mr.
Oswald or Mr. Vaughan, they did not reciprocate the
blundering indiscretion of these gentlemen, by dis-
closing to them the secret and confidential action of
Congress respecting the desired treaty with Great
Britain.

At this time the military and financial outlook of
the United States was depressing. General Washing-
ton reported to Congress that it was impossible to
recruit the army by voluntary enlistment. Silas
Deane, in private letters, intimated that it would be
impossible to maintain the army another year. The
Secretary of State wrote to Dr. Franklin about their
mortifying financial disappointments, and the " impor-
tunate demands for money," — adding : " The array
demand with importunity their arrears of pay. The
Treasury is empty, and there are no adequate means of
filling it."f And again: "Never was there a time
when money was more necessary. The total aboli-
tion of paper money, the length of the war, the
arrears of debts, and the slender thread by whiclj

* Secret Journal,^ of Congress, v. 3, p. 151.

+ Lecky's History of England in the 18th Gentw^y, v. 4, pp. 250-61 1

t Ibid,

%Life

HMr.

own."

W barter

public credit hangs, put it totally out of our power to
make any great exertions without the immediate sup-
ply of money." *

Such were the favourable diplomatic and military British
influences assisting the Ministry of Great Britain in and miUtary
these negotiations. But there was then no masterful '"fl"®"*'*^'
or Palmerstonian mind moulding British diplomacy.
The absence of even an advisory control is apparent in
the confession made by Lord Shelburne to Mr. Oswald, Lord
a month before the Treaty was signed: "As you^^^™^'^
desire to be assisted by my advice, I should act with
great insincerity if I did not convey to you that I find
it difficult, if not impossible, to enter into the policy
of all you recommend upon the subject, both of the
fisheries and the boundaries." -f* He had previously
informed him : " We have put the greatest confidence His great
ever placed in man in the American Commissioners." | ^^"^® g"** ^"
No wonder, therefore, that, after these admissions, Commia-
Messrs. Oswald and Vaughan were enabled to give
effect to their unpatriotic policy respecting Canada, The result,
and to concede to the United States more than was be-
lieved possible by that nation, or their European allies.

Mr. Jay, suspecting that M. de Vergennes was Mr.Vaughan's
"plotting with Fitzherbert in order to exclude the "^"^ ™'^"°''
New England fishermen from the Newfoundland
banks, and to keep the valley of the Ohio for Eng-
land," § induced" Mr. Vaughan to return to England IT

* Sparks's Diplomatic Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 3, p. 251.

t Wharton's Digest of International Law, v. 3, p. 906.

X Ibid, p. 905.

§ Life oj Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 254.

H Mr. Lecky aays that "Jay despatched a secret messenger of his
own." (v. 4, p. 285.) Mr. Vaughan was the only one sent: See
Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 1, p. 647.

"'^. ■■

! I

and " tell Lord Shelburne of the American sentiment

and resolution respecting these matters." * To which

Mr. Adams added his advice : " I desired him —

between him and me — to consider whether we could

have any real peace with Canada or Neva Scotia in

the hands of the English."

He cham- Mr. Vaughan accepted the commission o Messrs.

pions Ameri- t jaj i. r. ' k • • i. ^ j

can interests. "^^Y ^°^ Adams, to champion American inte "ests, and

to impress upon Lord Shelburne " the necessity of

taking a decided and manly part respecting America,"

and not " seek to secure the possession of vast tracts

of wilderness." He was disastrously successful ; and

Lord Shelburne and his colleagues thereupon consented

€anada's re- to grant " a confinement of the boundaries of Canada "
1 If* f
te^rritory?^ ° to a narrow strip of territory along the St. Lawrence

and Ottawa rivers. In authorizing Mr. Oswald to so
agree, Mr. Secretary Townshend said : " The third
article must be understood and expressed to be con-
fined to the limits of Canada as before the Act of
1774." t !

The Act referred to, known as " The Quebec Act,"
was passed on the 13th January, 1774, — prior to the
Revolution, — and described the boundaries of Canada
from the Bay of Chaleurs on the Atlantic, to the St
Lawrence, on more southerly lines than the present
Treaty boundary; thence up the St. Lawrence River,
and through Lake Ontario and the Niagara River into
Lake Erie, to the point where the boundary of Penn-
sylvania intersected its shore, thence southward, along
that boundary, to the Ohio River, and down it to its

* Winsor's History of America, v. 7, p. 123.
t MS. Despatch, Whitehall, Ist September, 1782. The limits here
referred to were those described in the Proclamation of October, 1763.,

Quebec Act

described

Canada's

original

'boundaries.

[confluence with the Mississippi, and thence turning
I northward, through the Mississippi River, to the Hud-
I son's Bay Territories.*

Actinjr on the Foreign Secretary's instructions, Mr. Mr. OswaU

I . . 11 1 1 ,1- c j.t agrees to Mr.

Oswald provisionally agreed to the outlines oi the jay's draft

Treaty of Independence drafted by Mr. Jay; and thent'"®**y-
I transmitted them to Mr. Secretary Townshend with
the " Minutes regarding the Treaty with the Commis-
sioners of the Colonies, and what is required of me by
His Majesty's Ministers on that head," in which he
reported " the articles said to be necessary and indis-
pensable," as follows :

"(1) Independence, — supposed to be granted as a He advises
Preliminary. (2) A settlement of the boundaries Canadian
between the Thirteen States and the King's Colonies, lands to U. S.

j(8) A cession to the Thirteen States, or to Congress, of
[that part of Canada, that was added to it by the Act
[of Parliament in the year 1774, — said to be necessary

and indispensable." "If not granted there would be a
[good deal of difficulty in settling the boundaries of the

Thirteen States, especially on their western frontier, as
Itlie said addition sweeps round behind them; and I
jinake no doubt a refusal would occasion a particular Refusal
rudge, as a deprivation of an extent of valuable terri- ^^""^jg^^®* ®

tory the Provinces had counted upon, and only waiting

[to be settled and taken into their respective Govern-

iients.-f- I shall therefore suppose this demand will be

Tlie Supreme Court of the United States has held that, by the
p'reaty of ladependence, the United States succeeded to all the
sovereign rights which the King of France had in the Canadian ter-
ritory between the Ohio and Mississippi, and which he had ceded to
fireat Britain, as Canada, in 1763. United States v. liepentigny,
Wallace's Reports, 211.

tThe Quebec Act, being a Charter of Government to that Pro-
vince with described boundaries, having become law before the

And as "ad
visable arti-
cles:"

granted, upon certain conditions." Mr. Oswald also
reported the Doctor's " advisable articles, and proper
to reconcile the Americans to a cordial and friendly cor-
respondence with Great Britain, and which he thought>
were necessary to erase those impressions of resentment
for past injuries which otherwise must remain on the
minds of the inhabitants of those colonies for ages to
Money indem- come, viz. : (1) £500,000 or £600,000 as indemnifica-
m ca xon. ^.^^ ^^ ^^^ sufferers of the Thirteen States, for burning
and destroying their towns, houses and other property.
Parliament'a (2) Some sort of acknowledgment, in an Act of Parlia-

sympathy for . . , • u p .i • /•

misfortunes Toaent or otherwise, oi our concern tor those mistor-
tunes. (3) Ameiican ships and trade to be on the
same footing in England and Ireland as our ships, and
trade. (4) A surrender to Congress of every part of the
remainder of Canada, after the said reduction to the
Surrender of limits preceding 1774, reserving to Great Britain a
^da^toU^S**^^"^^ freedom of fishing, and of imports and exports in
general, free of all charges of import or other duties." *
Dr. Franklin's Mr. Oswald's ready assent to the cession of Canada
further de- ^^^ Nova Scotia, desired by Dr. Franklin, appears to
have suggested to that astute diplomatist less concil-
iatory demands ; for Mr. Oswald goes on to say : " In
April, when I first came over, Dr. Franklin mentioned
the reservation of the Canada lands, only as a thing
very desirable for the sake of preventing disturbance;*
and quarrels between the inhabitants living under
different governments ; and he proposed, in case the
grant was made, that the lands should be sold, and the

of U. S.

U. S. ships
and trade
equal to
British.

Cession of

Canada

desirable.

Revolution, and while the Thirteen Colonies were subject to Great
Britain, was binding, as to boundaries, on the American Colonies
lying along the boundaries of Canada described in that Act.

* MS. Despatch, Oswald to the Foreign Secretary, Paris, 11th Sep-
tember, 1782.

money applied for the relief of the sufferers on both

sides, as expressly specified in a writing which he put

into my hands with a liberty of perusal when necessaiy.

Since then, and particularly in July last, he proposed

tbat these hack lands of Canada should be given up, "Back lands-

and no allowance made out of that fund for the suffer- g^^Jj^^Qf J'jjg

ers on both sides. But, on the contrary, that a sum of lakes, to be

money (£500,000 to £G00,000) should be granted by^'''*""^'

Great Britain for the sufferers in the American cause.

T am afraid it will not be possible to bring him back to

the proposition made in April, although I shall try it.

Meantime I can plead that by resigning the sovereignty Mr. Oswald

into the hands of Congress, the purpose for which he^j^^^j. ^^ggj^^

wished to have these additi inal lands given up (being to Congress.

that of preventing quarrels amongst the inhabitants),

will not be disappointed, since Congress may setl;e

them in any manner they think proper, whatever v/ay

the value or price of the land is disposed of." *

Such pleading of the American cause by a British Effect on the
plenipotentiary seems to have aroused the indignation ^l^
of some members of Lord Shelburne's Cabinet. " Rich-
mond and Keppel were very bitter against Oswald,
who, they declared, was only an additional American
negotiator, and they proposed to recall him. This
Shelburne and Townshend refused to do, as they
especially desired that Oswald should be at Paris to
I negotiate a commercial treaty." -f*

Diplomatic disaster to British and Canadian interests Diplomatic
[now seemed imminent. Mr. Jay, having obtained Mr. (>,*^*^^^^*"
Oswald's ready assent, drafted the Treaty, which the interests the
[latter forwarded to London as " a t- ^e copy of what has

* MS. Despatch, Ibid.
iLife of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 298.
5

Draft Treaty
provided for
(1) Indepen-
dence.

(2) Cession of
Canadian ter-
ritory, and its
British set-
. tiers.

(3) Right to

Canadian

fisheries.

(4) Naviga-
tion of Miss-
issippi with-
out entrance
or exit.

been agreed on between the American Commissioners
and me to be submitted to His Majesty's consideration."*
It provided for : (1) The Independence of the United
States. (2) The cession of nearly the whole of Canada,
including what are now the best settled parts of Onta-
rio with the thousands of British Loyalists and French 1
Canadians by whom it had been settled, — the boundary
being from the Atlantic on similar lines to those
described in the subsequently signed Treaty, as far as
latitude 45° on the St. Lawrence, at which point it was
proposed to cross the river, and to run from " thence
straight to the south end of Lake Nipissing, and thence
straight to the source of the River Mississippi." "f (3)
The cession of the Canadian fisheries in these words:
" the people of the United States shall continue to
enjoy unmolested the rigJit to take fish of every kind"
in British-Canadian waters, " where the inhabitants of
both countries used at any time heretofore to fish." J
(4) The free navigation of tlie River Mississippi to
Great Britain, — but without any means of entrance
or exit for her sliips. § Compensation for the Loj'ul-

* MSS. Despatches, Oswald to the Foreign Secretary, 7th and 8th
October, 1782.

t See "Oswald's proposed boundary line," as indicated on the Map.

X One of the grounds upon which the United States claimed the ;
Canadian and Newfoundland Fisheries was "from their having:
once formed part of the British Empire, in which state they always ]
enjoyed, as fully as the people of Britain themselves, the right of
fishing," and that "they were tenants-in-common while united |
with her, unless, by their own act, they had relinquished their title."
Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 5, p. 91.

§ In a debate on the Treaty, Lord North said : " There seemsto]
1)0 a peculiar mockery in the Article which granted an eternal and
free navigation of the Mississippi. Such is the freedom that, wh* '
•we had not been locally excluded, we have eflfected our exclusion lif]
Treaty." Parliamentary History, v. 23, p. 452.

ists, reversal of confiscations, and payment of American
debts to British merchants, were refused, and there- Righti
upon abandoned by the British Commissioners.*

Lord Shelburne had particularly instructed Mr. Lord Shel-
Oswald that no independence should be acknowledged FrenchMin-*
without the British Loyalists being indemnified, and ister on Loy-
their confiscated property restored. "f And the French
]\linister had conceded the justice of these claims by
advising the American Commissioners that their views
oil the subject of the Loyalists were unreasonable.!
Political bitterness, however, influenced American
diplomacy ;§ and Messrs. Oswald and Vaughan care-
less of the honour and justice of their nation, approved Unfaithful-
of the demand that not a foot of British land should Messrs.
be left in America where the Loyalists could find a Oswald and

, Vaughan.

refuge from political persecution, or a home for their

families ; and by ultimately ceding a fruitful agricul-
tural territory in the latitude of their homes, which
had, up to the Revolution, formed no part of the terri-
tory of the original Thirteen Colonies. IT

* A copy of this Draft Treaty is printed in Sparka's Diplomatic
Correspondence of the Revolution, v. 10, p. 90.
t Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 189.
t Ibid, p. 300. ~

§ '' From motives of humanity I hope she [Great Britain] will not

I succeed ; unless the same feelings of humanity should prompt me to

I wish all mankind at war with that Nation — for her humiliation —

I which is, at this time, if ever ont. was, hostis humani generis" John

[Adams to the President of Congress, 19th March, 1781. Wharton's

in'olutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 4, p. 315.

H " The British wanted to bring their boundary down to the Ohio,

imd to settle their Loyalists in the Illinois country. We did not

bhoose to have such neighbours." Dr. Franklin to the Secretary of

|tate, 5th December, 1782. The " Illinois country " above referred

|o, is now the State of Illinoia.

U. 8. severity
to Loyalists.

Professor
Ooldwin
Smith's
sketch ,

The Loyalists had been treated with undue severity
by the American revolutionists, for no crime save
fidelity to the lost cause of Great Britain, A graphic
statement of their sufferings has been given by a gifted
writer, whose syn^pathies are known to be favourable
to the United States :

" The first civil war in America was followed, not by
amnesty, but by an outpouring of the vengeance of the
victors on the j'allen. Some Royalists were put to
death. Many others were despoiled of all they hati,
and driven from their country. Massachusetts ban-
ished by name 308 of her people, making death the
penalty for a second return. New Hampshire pre-
scribed 76 ; Pennsylvania attainted nearly 500 ; Dela-
ware confiscated the property of 46 ; North Carolina,
of 65, and of 4 mercantile firms ; Georgia also passed
an Act of confiscation ; that of Maryland was still more
sweeping. South Carolina divided the Loyalists into
four classes, inflicting a different punishment upon
each. Of the 59 persons attainted in New York, 3
were married women, guilty probably of nothing but
adhering to their husbands, members of the Council, or
Law Officers, who were bound in personal honour to be
faithful to the Crown. Upon the evacuation of
Charleston, as a British Officer who was on the spot
stated, the Loyalists were imprisoned, whipped, tarred
and feathered, dragged through horse-ponds, and car-
ried about the town with ' Tory ' on their breasts,
All of them were turned out of their houses and plun-
dered, 24 of them were hanged upon a gallows facing!
the quay, in sight of the British fleet, with the arni}^
and refugees on board."*

* United States, an Outline of Political History, by GolJ'ii
Smith, D.C.L., pp. 110-11.

Judged by their subsequent actions, neither Lord
Slielburne, nor any of his colleagues, appears to have
reiilized, until Mr. Jay's draft treaty was before them,
the impending Decensua Averni Politici, into which
they had, partly with their own consent, and partly
from want of efficient supervision, allowed the colonial
and teiritorial interests of Great Britain in Canada, to
drift, under the unskilful diplomatic pilotage of Messrs.
Oswald and Vaughan.

Thus piloted, and surrounded by the darkness of
home ignorance of the agricultural wealth, and the
undeveloped resources, and apparently indifferent to the
future commercial value of the trade, of the coveted
Canadian territory, Lord Shelburne's Government, to
the astonishment of the European allies of the United
States, surrendered to every demand, abandoned the
Loyalists and, after losing thirteen British Colonies, in a
fit of unintelligible, and — as Great Britain subsequently
realized — unappreciated, benevolence, gratuitously
made the Thirteen United States a gigantic present of
sufficient British and Canadian territory, which Brit-
ish arms had won from France, out of which to create
nine additional States ; — thus endowing the revolted
and lost Colonies with an additional territorial empire
of about 416,000 square miles, about equal to the
present combined area of Germany and France ; and
thereby alienizing the British inhabitants which had
their homes within its boundaries. *

Diplomatic
pilotage of
Messrs.
Oswald and
Vaughan.

Great Britain
loses 13 colo-
nies and then
cedes terri-
tory sufficient
for 9 new
States.

Equal in area
to Germany
and France.

3iS

* The additional territory gratuitously ceded by Great Britain to the
United States, was afterwards, at the dates mentioned, formed into
the following States : Kentucky (1792), Tennessee (1796), Ohio (1803),
Indiana (1816), Illinois (1818), Alabama (1819), Michigan (1837),
Wisconsin (1848), and Minnesota (1858).

The King's

J>laliitive
etter.

Lord Shel-
bnrne's warn
Ing to Mr.
Oswald.

Mr. Strachey
Bent to averc
the impend-
ing disasters.

Mr. 8tra-
ohey's
oourageous
tenacity.

When the extravagant generosity of the Draft Treaty
was realized, and the tie between the American
Colonies and Great Britain was about to be severed,
the King ^/laintively wrote to Lord Shelburne : " I am
too much agitated with a fear of sacrificing the inter-
ests of my country * * that I am unable to add
anything on that subject, but most frequent pra3'ers to
Heaven to guide me so to act, that posterity may not
lay 1/he downfall of this once respectable Empire at my
door ; and that if ruin should attend the measures
that may be r^lopted, I may not long survive them." *

Lord Shelburne, in writing to Mr. Oswald, evidently
felt the peril in which his Government stood, and
warned him that " the nation would rise to do itself
justice, and to recover its wounded honour." Appar-
ently, with the hope of averting, if possible, the im-
pending national disaster, Mr. (afterwards Sir) Henry
Strachey, who had been Secretary to Lord Clive, and
was then Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, was
despatched to Paris with instructions to insist 'mon
compensation to the Loyalists, the retention by Great
Britain of the " Indian Territory," and of the original
boundaries of Canada within the Ohio and Mississippi;
or, if any Canadian territory should be ceded, to charge
it with compensation for the Loyalists; to obtain a
more favourable boundary of Nova Scotia, and to
reject the cession of the Canadian Fisheries, "f*

Mr. Strachey, though coming upon the diplomatic
battle-ground late, and single-handed, appears to have
fought for his imperilled cause with courageous ten-
acity, and to have taken a decided stand against some

• Life of Lord Shelburne, v. 3, p. 297.
+ Ibid, p. 281.

ins

aigum

wer

* "YjI
for a sed
Ministrj

JMor
§ \Vi,J

of Messrs. Oswald and Vaughan's concessions.* As
stated by an American diplomatist, he "had been sent Criticisms on
from England for the purpose of stiffening the easy ^^'■- ^''''**^''*'y*
nature of Mr. Oswald, but he only succeeded in infus-
ing into the Conferences all the asperity which they
ever betrayed." f A late equally Anglo-phobe writer
declares that, " Mr. Strachey appeared in Paris as the
exponent of English arrogance, insolence, and general
offensiveness." i But his contemporaries were more
just : " Mr. Strachey won an acknowledgment from
both sides for his persistent energy and skill. Adams
said of him, ' He presses every point as far as it can
possibly go. He is a most eager, earnest, and pointed
spirit.' And Mr. Oswald, in writing to Mr. Secretary
Townshend, said, 'He enforced our pretensions by every
aigument that reason, justice and humanity, could
suggest.' " §

Mr. Strachey was too late ! Had he sounded the But he was
French Minister, — whose policy respecting the United ^^^ '
States he must have known, — he might, perhaps, have
learned that Congress had withdrawn the claims to
the fisheries, and the Mississippi boundaries, as ulti-
mata ; and that M. de Vergennes w' as ready to use the
supervisory influence which Congress had given
France, for the purpose of making the American pleni-
potufi tiaries more conciliatory. IT Against him, however, Messrs.
wer*- the betrayals of Cabinet secrets to the Ameri-y^yg}^^^",'j^j

disclosed

*"Va!ighau, regretting the interposition of Strachey, undertook ^'^^*"®* ^^°'
for a second time to represent the American views to the British
Ministry." Adams's Worku, v. 3, p. .312.

iLi/e of John Adams, by J. Q. & C. F. Adams, v. 3, p. 39.

{Morse's John Adams, American Statesmen Series (1890), p. 218.

§ Wiusor's America, v. 1, p. 139.

H Ibi

141.

«■!

And approved
. of the cession
of Canada.

He gained a
slight change
in boundaries.

British Com-
missioners
unaware of
U. S. modifi-
cation of
claims to
Canadian
shoio fisher-
ieo.

can Commissioners by Messrs. Oswald and Vaughan ;
their oft-given approval of the cession of Canada and
Nova Scotia; the consent of the British Ministry to a
confinement of the Canadian limits to a small strip of
territory along the St. Lawrence River, and the cession
of the remainder to the United States.* He failed,
therefore, to reverse Mr. Oswald's cession of the fertile
agricultural territory of southern Canada south of the
Great Lakes, and in the valley of the Ohio and Missis-
sippi. He also failed to have the Nova Scotia boun-
dary commence at the Penobscot River, but he recov-
f ced the territory between the St. John and St. Croix
Rivers, making the latter, where it flows into Passa-
maquoddy Bay, the Atlantic starting point. And,
under imperative instructions from the Foreign Office,
he regained the portion of the Caniidian (now southern
Ontario) territory between Mr. Oswald's Lake Nipissing
and Mississippi line and the lakes ; and he accepted the
present river and lake boundary.f

Neither Mr. Oswald, nov Mi*. Strachey, appears to
have been aware of the conditional modification of the
claims respecting the fisheries as an ultimatum; nor
that Congress had directed their Commissioners to
claim the ricjht to take fish " on the banks of New-
foundland and other fisheries in the American seas any-
where, excepting within the distance of three leagues

* MS. Despatch, the Foreign Secretary to Oswald, Whitehall,
let September, 17S2.

+ One of the alternative boundary lines proposed was to continue
on the 45th degree of north latitude from the point where it crossed
the Connecticut River, and thence west to where it would strike
the River Mississippi. MS. Despatch, Strachey to the Foreign Sec
retary, November, 1782. For the Draft Treaty proposing this 4i'
latitude boundary dce Sparks's Diplomatic Comnpondencf: oj tH
JtevohUion, v. 10, p. O.").

off the shores of the territory remaining to Great
Britain at the close of the war, if a nearer distance Conceded
cannot be obtained by negotiation." * But, apparently Canadian
in in^norance of these facts, all Canadian in-shore fishery r?c>procal

o ' "^ right to

riirhts were conceded, without even the suggestion — American
much less the demand — of a reciprocal concession to^j.?g® *
Canadians to take fish in American in-shore waters.

What took place over the fishery clauses of the-^"*®"^*"

' . •' , account of

Tieaty has been dramatically related by Mr. Adams s the discussion

i; ^i„., over the fish-

biographer: ^ ^ ery clauses.

" Mr. Strachey proposed that the word ' right ' in

this connection should be changed to * liberty.' Mr.

Fitzherbert sustained the movement by remarking that

' right' was an obnoxious expression. The suggestion

seems to have fired Mr. Adams, and immediately he

bui'st into an overwhelminfj defence of the term he

had chosen. He rose, and, with the concentrated Suppression

power which he possessed when excited, declared that modified

when first commissioned as a negotiator with Great P°^^°y °^

7 Congresfl.

Britain, his country had ordered him to make no peace
without a clear acknowledgment of the right of the
fishery, and by that direction he would stand. No
preliminaries should have his signature without it.
And here he appealed with some adroitness to Mr.
Laurens, who had been President of the Congress when
the first commission was given. Mr. Laurens readily
responded to the call, and seconded the proposition
with characteristic warmth. And Mr. Jay virtually
threw his weight into the scale." -j-

* Secret Journals of GougreHH, v. 3, p. 231. See also the report of the
Committee of Congress, 8th January, 1782.

tZ/t/e of Adamii, v. 2, p. 44. "The fact seems to be that John
Adams was determined to get the use of these fisheries, regardless of

♦♦ The stroke

proved

deciBive."

Mr. Jay's
dniission.

Sarcastic
letter of the
French
Minister.

i ■ : ': hi

The biographer of Mr. Adams thereupon paraphrases
the sinister maxim " tlie end justifies the means," by
telling us that " the stroke proved decisive ; " but he
apologizes by adding : " The act was the assumption
of another prodigious responsibility."* And so it
was ; for the American Commissioners well knew that
the earlier policy of Congress as set out in their first
commission had been modified, and that the ultimatum
respecting the Canadian fisheries, which they asserted
with such indignant fervour, had been practically
withdrawn. And Mr. Jay confirms this by recording :
" Had I not violated the instructions of Congress, their
dignity would have been in the dust."i*

When the terms of the preliminary Treaty of Inde-
pendence became known, the French Government at
once demanded an explanation from the American
Minister. " T am at a loss," sarcastically wrote M. de
Vergennes to Dr. 1 ranklin, " to explain your conduct,
and that of your colleagues. You have concluded
your preliminary articles without communicating with
us, although Congress prescribed that nothing should
be done without the concurrence of the King. You
are wise and discreet, Sir ! You perfectly understand
what is due to propriety ; you have all your life per-
formed duties. I pray you to consider how you pro-
pose to fulfil those which arc due to the King."| He

his instructions." Snow's Treaties and Topics in American Diplo-
macy, p. 430.

* Life of Adams, v. 2, p. 45.

f Life of Jay, v. 2, p. 105.

X Dr. Franklin apologized, and admitted that the French Minis-
ter's observations were just : " we have been guilty of neglecting*
point of biensSance : we hope it will be excused," and that the greit
work would ' < not be ruined by a single indiscretion of ours. " H'

also instructed the French Minister at Philadelphia to
inform the American Secretary of State that the
American Commissioners had deceived him, and had Charges the
been guilty of a gross breach of faith. And in writing c^misdon-
to M. de Rayneval, he said: "The English have f" with

nrGAOn or

bought a peace, not made one. Their concessions have faith,
exceeded anything we believed possible." And the Surprise at
French representative to the United States reported ^®^^^|^*Jj"^^j[
to M. de Vergennes, that the cession of the western territory.
Canadian territory to the sources of the Mississippi,
had surpassed all expectations, for it gave the Ameri-
cans four forts that they had found it impossible to
capture. *

The closing letters of Mr. Strachey to the Foreign Mr. Stia-
OfRce, give a blunt Englishman's opinion of a specialty letters on
he discovered in American diplomacy. In reporting -f."!®"^'^"

^ *' . diplomacy.

to his chief, he said, "Iho Treaty must be re-written
in London in regular form, which we had not time to
do in Paris, and several expressions, being too loose,
should be tightened. These Americans are the greatest
quibblers I ever knew."-|- Later on he wrote to a
colleague : " The Treaty signed and sealed is now sent.
I shall set off to-morrow, hoping to arrive on Wednes-
day, if I am alive. God forbid if I should ever have
a hand in such another Peace." J

de Vergennes accepted tlie apology. Mr. Secretary Livingston also
expressed his personal disapproval of the acts of the Commission-
ers, adding : " It gives me pain that the character for candor and
fidelity to its engagements, which should characterize a great
people, should have been impeached." 25th March, 1783.

* Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 158, note 5.

+ MS. Letter, Strachey to the Foreign Secretary, Calais, 8th
November, 1782.

t MS. Letter, Strachey to the Foreign Office, Paris, 30th Novera-
I ber, 1782.

Allowable
strategic
policy in
•diplomacy.

Reader's
judgment on
American
diplomacy.

Treaty a
humiliation to
Canada.

Lord Town-
ahend's opin-
ion.

Whatever strategic policy may be allowable in
Treaty-making diplomacy, it should be controlled by
the knowledge that the diplomatist represents the con-
science and good faith of his Sovereign, and the dig-
nity and honour of his Nation. The skilled diplo-
matist who possesses the tact des convenances, may
make legitimate use of argumentative strategy, while
combining adroitness with integrity ; but ever mindful
of the radiant light of his representative station ; —
combinations of qualities which will win for him a
reputation for sagacity, tact and rectitude, and assure to
him a recognized supremacy in diplomatic emergencies.
Judged by such standards, the reader can say whether
this early venture of American diplomacy illustrated
the specialty recorded by the British representative;
the conduct charged by the French Minister ; as well
as the sinister diplomatic qualities frankly avowed by
American apologists. *

The Treaty of 1782 was a humiliation to Canada, in
the loss of her territory, in the cession of her fishery
rights, and in the uncertainty of her boundaries.
Lord Townshend, in the debate on the Treaty, well
said : " Why should not some man from Canada, well
acquainted with the country, have been thought of

* Sir John Macdouald, writing confidentially to a colleague in
1871, respecting the Protocols on the Treaty of Washington said:
" The language put into the mouths of the British Commissioneri
is strictly correct ; but I cannot say as much for that of our American
colleagues. They have inserted statements as having been made by
them, which in fact were never made, in order that they may have
an effect on the Senate. My English colleagues were a good deal
surprised at the proposition ; but as the statements did not preju-
dice England, we left them at liberty." — Life of Sir John A. Mac-
donald, by Joseph Pope, v. 2, p. 134.

I I

tble in
led by
he con-
le dig-

diplo-
s, may )|
, while
iiindful
tion ; —

him a
isure to
fancies,
vhether
istrated
itative;
as well
wed by

lada, in
fishery
ndaries.
well
la, well
ight of

league id

con said:

Ussioneri

Lmerican

[made by

lay have

irood deal

)t preju-

U. Mac-

for the business which Mr. Oswald was sent to nego-
tiate ? Dr. Franklin, Mr. Jay, Mr. Laurens, and Mr.
Adams, had been an overmatch for him ; he either did
not know, or appeared ignorant, how the country lay
which he had been granting away, as the bargain he
had made clearly indicated." * And a Canadian Lieu-
tenant-Governor reported : " When Mr. Oswald made Mr. Oswald'
a peace with the Americans in 1782, he evinced his an^^ of "he
total ignorance of the country and its true interests, country,
in the line he fixed as the boundary between us."

It has been truly said by American writers: *' The Bargain with
bargain with England was struck on the American «« struck on

basis.

Considering the only ultimatum they were. . „

the Aniericatt

ordered to insist upon, the Americans made a wonder-
fully good bargain. The United States could, in all
reason, ask little more of any nation." f And the U. S. has
diplomatic history of the subsequent treaties proves ot^er"^' good
that the United States have asked for, and have gen- bargains " of
erally struck, further "good bargains" with Great territory.
Britain "on the American basis" respecting Canadian
territory. Even now efforts are being made by the Ignores Can-
United States to hold Canadian territory,! and ignore *„ Ykska."*

* Parliamentary History, v. 23, p. .391.

\John Adams (American Statesmen Series) p. 200. *' The great
object upon which all American minds were bent, was Peace ; and
they were agreeably surprised at getting it upon such favourable
terms." Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 158.

X In 1876 the United States directed its Alaska officers to collect
duties from Canadian settlers at places on the Stikeen river, which
were subsequently found to be seven miles within Canada. "It
seems remarkable iliat while that Government has hitherto refused
to detine the boundary, it should now seek to establish it in accord-
ance with its own views, without any reference to the British
authorities, who are equally interested in a just settlement of the
iaternational boundary." Canada Sessional Papers (Ihl^), "So. 12j,
pp. 63, 66 and 144.

ill! II!!'
Bill"'

England en-
dowed the
U. S. with
"gigantic
boundaries on
the south,
west and
north."

And weak-
ened British
empire- power
in America.

Canada's ri<jlit to be heard in thr <a boundary

dispute. *

A candid historian of the Unit. cates reminds the
people of the United States that : " However great the
errors committed by England in the American struggle,
it must always be remembered to her credit that, in
the peace negotiations, Shelburne, declining all tempta-
tions to a contrary course, endowed the Republic with
the gigantic boundaries on the south, west, and north,
which determined its coming power and influence, and
Hs opportunities for good."*f' But this endowment
of "gigantic boundaries" transferred Great Britain's
wealth of empire-territory in Canada to the Republic,
thereby weakening her empire supremacy, and Canada's
sphere of influence, in North America.

* In view of the many efforts of certain newspaper correspond-
ents in the United States to prejudice public opinion against the
Canadian Government's action respecting the Alaska boundary, the
following historical precedent may be cited : In 1S31, when the
Kii)g of the Netherlands made his Award on the Maine boundary,
Mr. Preble, of that State, was American Minister at the Hague, and
f<erved the King with a protest against his Award. He sent his
despatch and papers to the U. S. Secretary of State by a tedious
route, via Paris, Brest, and New Orleans, to Washington; while by
the more expeditious route, via Liverpool and New York, he sent a
pressing recommendation to the Governor of Maine, urging that
the Legislature should protest, in advance, against any Award by a
Foreign Potentate which might in any way affect Maine or deprive
her of any portion of the State territory, for the benefit of England.
The " State Rights " protest, was thereupon formulated, and success-
fully aroused public sympathy for Maine, some weeks before the
official Award reached the U. S. Government. This mauvaia tour
soon became known to the Government, and caused much embar-
rassment ; but American public opinion had been inflamed, and made
hostile to Great Britain in advance ; and the President and his politi-
eal party, being on the eve of a Presidential election, reluctantly
rejected the Award : See Grattan's Civilized America, v. 1, p. 353.

t Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 150.

An equally congratulatory opinion on this endow- Great Britain
iiient of tli: United States has been expressed by a well- and took
known American commentator on International Law -.least.
" It has been frequently said that, of all the Treaties
executed by Great Biitain, this Treaty was the one in
which she gave most and took least. And in view of
the fact that Great Britain at that time held New
York, Charleston, and Penobscot, and had almost
unchecked control of American waters, her surrender —
not merely of the entire territory claimed by the
Colonists, but of the Indians in that territory whom
she had held under her allegiance, of the rifjhts of the
Refugees she had pledged herself to protect, and of the
Fisheries, in which she conceded to the United States
a joint ownership, — presents an instance of apparent British sur-
sacrifice of Territory, of Authority, of Sovereignty, aii"ied in"
and of Political Prestige which is unparalleled in the l>iplomacy.
liistory of Diplomacy." *

The diplomatic correspondence during the early Diplomatic
years of this century furnishes materials for a history deiice^nce
of the embittered international relations between the Revolution,
United States and Great Britain, — born of the Re vol u-iered rela-
tion, matured by the frenzied terrorism of Robespierrian *^°"*'
France, and made passionate by the drastic and retali-
atory policy which Great Britain was forced to adopt
to counteract- the effect of Napoleon's Berlin decrees of
1806, prohibiting neutral commerce with the ports
decreed closed to British trade ; and also in the defence,
single-handed, of her island-shores from a threatened
invasion oy her bitter and war-trained enemies, and in
maintaining her supremacy as a Sea Power. Her
estranged American kindred showed no consideration

* Wharton's History and Digest of Intematio7ial Law, v. 3, p. 907.

No considera-
tion for Great
Britain's
emergent
neceesities
during
Napoleon's
wars.

Difficult to
harmonize
U.S. policy
in construc-
tion of
treaties.

Case of the
Mississippi
boundary
line.

Uncertainty
admitted
in 1794.

for the cruciate and emergent necessities of their then
isolated, but domineering, old Motherland ; whose for-
eign and sea policies they then passionately denounced,
but which they have since admitted were justified by
International Law, as being "necessary measures of self-
defence, to which all private rights must give way." *

There is much also in that correspondence, and also
in the correspondence respecting the subsequent
Treaties suggested, agreed to, and rejected, which
make it difficult to harmonize the policy and the argu-
ments of the United States in their diplomatic discus-
sions, as well as in their one-sided interpretation of
their Treaties, with Great Britain. f

The Treaties of 1782-83 had assumed that the boun-
dary line on a " due west course " from the Lake of the
Woods, would strike the Mississippi (for all the pro-
posed boundary lines converged to that river), and
thence down the middle of that river to latitude 31°.
By Mr. Jay's Treaty of 1794, the uncertainty of the
"due west course" was admitted; and it was there
agreed that the boundary line should be adjusted " in
conformity to the intent of the Treaty of Peace." It
was subsequently admitted that the head waters of

* Moore's History and Digest of International Arbitrations (1898),
V. 1, p. 841. Lord Stowell held that the British orders of blockade
were resorted to as a defence against the injustice and violence
of the French ; and that they were justly reconcilable with those
rules of national justice by which the international actions of inde-
pendent States were usually governed. See his judgments in 1
Dodsou's Reports, 133 ; and Edwards's Reports, 314 and 382.

t In one case the United States contended that Great Britain
intended to abandon the right of visitation because no mention of it
was made in the slave trade clause. But on a claim by Great
Britain to hold a certain boundary they contended that the word*
describing it in the Treaty, must govern. G rattan's Civilizd
America, v. 1, p. 414.

the Mississippi were nob " due west," but almost eighty
miles directly south of the Lake of the Woods. *
Under the doctrine oi falsa dernonstratio non nocet, it Legal
is a well recognized rule of law that, where natural ^^"^["^^j^
and permanent objects are designated or described in
a patent, or deed, as connected by a line on a certain
course, or distance, which is found to be erroneous,
both course and distance must yield to the dominant
control of the natural objects, in order to give full
effect to the act or deed of the parties."!* And the How U.S.
Supreme Court of the United States has formulated construe
another doctrine, that Treaties ceding territory to the treaties.
United States are to be construed most favourably to
the ceding power,:]: — which in this case was Great
Britain.

In 1802 the United States, in a despatch reciting theU. S. agreed'
erroneous description of the "due west" Mississippi line J^J^^fg^
in the Treaty of 1783, proposed the following rectifi-
cation : — " It is now well understood that the highest
source of the Mississippi does not touch any part of
the Lake of the Woods. To remedy this error it may
be agreed that the boundary of the United States, in
that quarter, shall be a line running from that source
of the Mississippi which is nearest to the Lake of the Line from
Woods, and striking it westerly at a tangent, and, from Lake^of^he "
the p:int touched, along the water-mark of the lake to^°°<*8'
its most north-western point, at which it will meet the
line running through the lake." §

* Bancroft's History of the North West Coast, v. 2, p. 320.

+ "The extent of the mischief which would result from unsettling
this priiiciple cannot be conceived." Per Marshall, C. J., in Nevosom
V. Pryor, 7 Wheaton's Reports 7.

X United States v. Arredondo, 6 Peter's Reports 691.

% American Slate Papers, Foreign Affairs, v. 2, p. 585.

Treaty of
1803 settled
the Missisfjip-
pi boundary.

Rejected by
U. S. Senate.

Conciliatory
policy of
Great Britain
on marine
jurisdiction,
1806.

U.S.
proposal
of neutral
coast
immunity.

Under these instructions, a Treaty was si^meJ in
London on tiie 12th May, 1803, in which it was agreed
that, instead of the boundary line in tlie Treaty of
^783, it should be "the shortest line which can be
drawn between the north-west point of the Lake of
the Woods and the nearest source of the Mississippi."*
But, although the initiative for this Treaty had been
taken by the United States, the Senate declined to ratify
it unless the clause settling the boundary line was struck
out, — the reason given being that the United States
had then acquired the French rights in Louisiana, -f-

The conciliatory policy of Great Britain towards the
United States may be further illustrated by the excep-
tionally liberal rule as to marginal jurisdiction on the
High Seas, contained in an unratified Treaty of 1806.
Owing to the capture by British war vessels, on the
coasts of the United States, of the ships of the Euro-
pean nations with which Great Britain was then at
war, the United States proposed that it would not be
unreasonable, considering the extent of the United
States, the shoalness of their coast, and for other rea-
sons, that the neutral immunity from belligerent acts
should extend to at least one league from the shore, or
should correspond with the claims of Great Britain
around her own coasts ; and quoted the Hovering Act
of 1736, 9 Geo. II. ch. 35, extending the jurisdiction
respecting smuggling to four leagues, j The Admiralty
and Law Officers of the Crown advised against conced-

* The Treaty was signed by Rufus King and Lord Hawkesbury.

+ Treaties and Conventions between the United States and Other
Powers, p. 1016.

J Mr. Madison to Messrs. Munroe and Pinckney, 17th May, 1806,
and 3rd February, 1807.

ing more than the usual three marine miles ; but the
British Government, desirous of giving " a strong proof
of a conciliatory disposition in their government
towards the government and people of the United
States,"* yielded to the proposal of the United States Extended by
by extending the neutral coast immunity from three JJom^^a^o's*'"
to five marine miles in the following article: — (12) marine miles.
" And whereas it is expedient to make special provisions
respecting the maritime jurisdiction of the High Con-
tracting Parties on the coast of their respective posses-
sions in North America, on account of peculiar circum-
stanc« ~ applicable to those coasts, it is agreed that in
all cases where one of the said High Contracting Parties
shall be engaged in war, and the other shall be at
peace, the Belligerent Power shall not stop the vessels
of the Neutral Power, or the unarmed vessels of other
nations, within five marine miles from the shore
belonging to the said neutral power on the American Treaty never
seas." The Treaty was never submitted to the Senate u*'|^*^ ^^
*or consideration or approval, f

The war of 1812 originated with the United States Origin of the
mainly because of the retaliatory measures adopted ^^ °^ ^^^^'
by Great Britain to counteract the Berlin decrees of
Napoleon. During the two years it continued, the
United States suffered more severely than Canada.
The British forces and Canadian militia captured and British con-
held possession of a portion of Maine to the Penobscot quests on the
River, including the disputed Maine boundary territory

* Messrs. Munroe and Pinckney to Mr. Madison, 3rd January,
1807.

+ " The Treaty, not including an article relating to impressments,
the British Commissioners should be candidly apprised of che reason
for not expecting a ratification." American State^Papera, Foreign
Sdationa, v. 3, pp. 145 and 154.

MB'

I 'I

(bill

And west to
Mississippi.

U. S. had no
conquest in
Canada.

Great Britain
aware of the
east and west
boundary
disputes.

U. S. change
of ultimatum.

on the east; and, on the west, nearly all of Michigan,,
including the fort of Michilimakanac, and other por-
tions of the former Canadian territory (including
what is now Chicago) to Prairie du Chien, on the River
Mississippi, which had been won back from the United
States in fair fight, and a large extent of which, at the
close of the war, was held by right of conquest.*
At the same time, the United States had not even a
sentry on Canadian territory.

The British Government had long been aware o the
unsettled disputes with the United States respecting
both the north-eastern (or Maine), and the north-west-
ern (or Mississippi), boundaries, and of the undue
bitterness previously imported into the diplomatic
discussions with the United States. In 1814, Great
Britain was then free from the continental wars.
Napoleon had abdicated, and had retired to Elba. The
American Secretary instructed the plenipotentiaries
for the United States that it was " important to the
United States to make peace," and that " the great
and unforeseen change of circumstances, particularly
the prospect of a more durable state of per e between
Great Britain and the Continental Powers of Europe,

* " Without a blow struck, part of Massachusetts (Maine) passed
under the British yoke, and so remained, without the least resist-
ance until restored at the Peace. Two frontier fortresses, Michili-
macinac and Fort Niagara, were surprised, captured, and forcibly
held by the enemy [British] during the war ; and parts of Maryland
and Virginia were overrun." IngersoU's Second War betvieen the
United IStales and Oreat Britain, v. 1, pt. 2, p. 116. "For a time
the County of Washington in Maine (lying between the Penobscot
River and Passamaquoddy Bay) came under British authority. It wa»
a most important surrender. The County of Washington embraced
9«e hundred miles of sea coast, and formed the territory adjoining
New Brunswick." Kingsford's History of Canada, v. 8, p. 528.

i:i

i 1

and of security to our maritime rights, justify the
change of our ultimatum." But notwithstanding this
leverage of international peace, and Great Britain's
war conquests, her historic generosity restored, uncon-
ditionally, all the conquered territories to the United
States, as a peace offering, by the Treaty of Ghent ;
and she was subsequently rewarded with a vexatious
diplomatic controversy about, and an armed invasion of,
the formerly captured, and long-time disputed, territory
between Canada and Maine.*

The war of 1812 abrogated the fishery rights con-
ceded to the United States, as well as the paper rights
of navigation of the Mississippi River (previously
described), conceded to Great Britain, by the Treaties
of 1782 and 1783.t But by the Treaty of 1818, Great
Britain again conceded fishery privileges on certain
coasts of Newfoundland, Labrador and Canada, to the
United States. And although the United States
renounced, forever, the liberty to fish within three
marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks or har-

* Many of the international diflRculties over the Maine boundary
■were caused by the actions of the State authorities, and not by those
of the Federal Government. See North Ainerican Boundary Papers,
(Imp.) B, (1838) Appendix.

+ " Logically war implies the cessation of existing intercourse, and
therefore a right on the part of a State to expel or otherwise treat
as enei.iies, the subjects of an enemy-state found within its terri-
tory." Hall's International Zoic, p. 327. "War puts every indi-
vidual of the respective Governments, as well as the Governments
themselves, in a state of hostility with each other. All Treaties
contracts, and rights of property are suspended. The subjects of
the state are in all respects treated as enemies. They may seize the
persons and property of each other. They have no persona standi
in judicio, no power to sue in the public courts of the enemy
nation." Wharton's Digest of Jnternatioval Law, v. 3, p. 242. See
also British and Foreign State Papers, v. 7, pp. 79-97.

Great
Britain's
peace offer-
ing in 1814.

Her
reward.

Rights abro-
gated by war
of 1812.

Great Britain
in 1818 con-
cedes fishinff
rights to U. Di

Irritating

charges

aeainst

agi
Ca

iinada.

bours, not included in the specified British-Canadian
waters, there have been irritating charges of " prepos-
terous " interpretations of the Treaty, and of " brutal '^
enforcements of Canadian rights respecting such re-
nounced fisheries, which have introduced much political
acerbity into the diplomatic discussions between Great
Britain and the United States.* The Reciprocity Treaty
of 1854; the Washington Treaty of 1871 ; and the unrati-
fied Treaties of 1869, 1874 and 1888, and offers of reci-
procity in Canadian Customs laws, besides other pro-
posals to negotiate, may, however, be cited as showing
Great Britain that Great Britain and Canada have earnestly, and
persistently, oflfered to settle these and other disputes
in a spirit of mutual compromise and fair bargaining.
But though Treaty settlements have been agreed to by
leading American diplomatists, they have not been
approved by the Senate of the United States. It is now
generally conceded that, in this unneighbourly policy
on the part of the United States, the real difficulty in
the way of a settlement of the Canadian Fisheries
controversy on broad lines, is the tariff" system of the
United States ; and that, until that is modified, there
can be little hope of a satisfactory settlement.-f*

In 1854, when the generation of the children of the
actors in the early B evolutionary times had almost
passed away, and a generation imbued with the national

pad Canada's
efforts to
settle with
U.S.

U. S. Tariff
is the real
difficulty.

Canada's
trade
policy, and

* Isiiam's Fishery Que8liu7i (1887), pp. 73-4. The Treaty cau-
tiously provides that the privileges of fishing shall be under such
restrictions as may be necessary to prevent American fishermen
taking, drying, or curing, fish in the Canadian bays or harbours, or
in any other manner abusing the privileges reserved to them.

+ Treaties and Topics in American Diplomacy, by Freeman Snow,
LL.D., p. 468. "It is not at all clear that the Fisheries difficulty
can as well be met by Retaliation on Canada, as by a Revision of
our own Tariff." Isham's Fishery Question, p. 78.

ill

characteristic of bargaining and bartering, held sway, the Reci-
Lord Elgin and Mr. (afterwards Sir) Francis Hincks, on Treaty of
behalf of Canada, initiated better trade relations, and ^^^*'
arranged the Reciprocity, or " give and take," Treaty ;
to continue in force for ten years, and further, until a
year's notice to terminate it should be given by either
party. Under it, the United States obtained the liberty
of fishing in the Canadian in-shore fisheries, and of
navigating the River St. Lawrence ; and Canada
obtained the liberty of fishing in the American in-shore
fisheries noith of latitude 36°, and of navigating Lake
Michigan. Reciprocal free import and free export of Free import

.. 11 ji.- 1 11. 1 blikI export of

certain natural productions were also conceded to each natural pro-
nation. But during the Civil War of 1801-65, the ^^"'^^''o^s.
sympathy of very limited portions of the British and
Canadian communities with the South, was assumed
by the Northern States to be universal; and theU.S. termin-
escape of the Alabama, and other privateers, from^^g^^^. '^
British waters, rekindled, — " in the hour of peril and
adversity, when feelings are most keen," — the almost
forgotten embittered relations of the earlier years of
the century ; and in a spirit of retaliation, the United
States gave the notice which put an end to the Reci-
procity Treaty in 1866.

The Washington Treaty of 1871 admitted Great Washington
Britain's liability for the Alabama claims, and pro- Jj^*gJ°^^^^'
vided for' an Arbitration to settle the damages sub- Fishery rights-
sequently awarded and paid ; adjusted the Canadian
Fishery Question on the basis of compensation for a
ten years' purcliase; conceded to the United States
the free navigation of the St. Lawrence up to latitude
45" for ever ; while the United States conceded to
Canada for only ten years, the free navigation of Lake

Michigan. It also assumed to give to Great Britain a

' Great

rights on right to the free navigation of the Yukon, Porcupine
und^^Rus^'^ n ^^^ Stikene rivers in Alaska, — a right which Great

Treaty of
1825.

Britain then possessed under the Treaty with Russia
of 1825, which provided that " the subjects of His
Britannic Majesty, from whatever quarter they may
arrive, whether from the ocean or from the interior of
the continent, shall forever enjoy the right of navi-
gating freely, and without any hindrance whatever,
all the rivers and streams [in Alaska] which, in their
course towards the Pacific Ocean, may cross the line
of demarcation." * (Art. 6.)

By the same Treaty it was further agreed that

* The above had become part of the International Law of Alaska,
when that territory was ceded to the United States. " Treaties, as
well as statutes, are the law of the land, both the one and the other,
when not inconsistent with the Constitution, standing on the same
level and being of equal force and validity." Opinions of U. S.
AUomeys-General, v. 13, p. 354. The treaty of cession of 1867
recited the Anglo-Russian Treaty of 1825, and the boundaries of
the strip of Russian territory delineated therein, and ceded to the
United States "all the territory and dominion now possessed by His
Majesty on the continent of America." The following observations
respecting British claims when Louisiana was ceded to the United
States also apply : " Therefore with the r. its acquired in 1819, the
United States necessarily succeeded to the limitations by which they
were defined, and the obligations under which they wore to be exer-
cised. From these obligations and limitations, as contracted towards
Great Britain, Great Britain cannot be expected gratuitously to
release those countries merely because the rights of the party origin-
ally bound have been transferred to a third Power." Bancroft's
History of the North- West Coast, v. 2, p. 372. "Or, as Mr. Gallatin
put the British claim, ' the United States cannot claim under their
Treaty with Spain, any greater right than Spain then had," Ibid ,
note 23, "An alliance between two nations cannot absolve either
from the obligations of previous treaties with third Powers."
Wharton's Digest of International Law, v. 1, p. 18.

each nation should, for ten years, have the right ^Reciprocity
of free importation of fish, and fish oil, except fresh fish oil', canals,
water fish; the free navigation of their respective J"^^^*"^"**
eanals, and the privilege of the transit of goods in
bond, or a reciprocal carrying trade ; but with the
one-sided stipulation that the United States should
have the right to suspend the privileges granted to
British subjects " in case the Dominion of Canada
should deprive the citizens of the United States of^°'^:?J?®^

'■ . coiidition

the use of the canals of the Dominion on the terms of against
equality with the inhabitants of the Dominion." ^CJanada.
co-ordinate right to suspend the privileges of the
carrying trade conceded to the United States, in case
one of the States similarly acted, was not allowed to Fishery
Great Britain or Canada. The fishery clauses, andg*j"^^^yu°s.
some other provisions in this Treaty, were abrogated
by the United States in 1885.

When the Treaty was rbout to be negotiated, the Fenian claima
British Government was urged that the claims of against the
Canada against the^ United States, arising out of the P. ^-rejected
Fenian Raids into Canada, should also be adjusted; —
alleging stronger grounds of " negligence and want of
due diligence" against the United States, than those
charged by that Government against Great Britain
in the Alabama case. The Imperial Government
assented ; but owing to the indefinite phraseology of
the British Minister's communication proposing the
negotiations for a Treaty, the High Commissioners for
the United States refused to consider the Canadian
claims, alleging that they did not regard them as
coming within the class of subjects indicated in the U.S. reason
communication of the British Minister; and curtly *^®'"®^*"^'
adding that " the claims did not commend themselves

I' fv

' ' ;' 1,;

Curt reply to
Canada by
Colonial Sec-
retary.

Unfriendly
policy of U. S.
under the
Washington
Treaty.

U. S. imposes
a duty on fish
cans.

Canadian ves-
sels stopped.

U. S. vessels
pass free.

to their favour." To this denial of international justice
to Canada, the British Commissioners submitted, and
stated that "under these circumstances they would
not urge further that the settlement of these claims
should be included in the Treaty." The reply of the
Colonial Secretary to the Canadian protest against the
ruling out of these Fenian claims, was equally curt :
" Canada could not reasonably expect that this country
should, for an indefinite period, incur the constant risk
of serious misunderstanding with the United States."*
The unfriendly treatment of Canada by the United
States may be illustrated by their actions in carrying
out that Treaty. Article 21 provided that fish and
fish oil should be admitted free of duty into either
country. After the Treaty had been four years in
operation, Congress passed a law that " Cans or pack-
ages made of tin, or other material, containing fish of
any kind admitted free of duty under any law or
treaty," should be charged with a specific duty,^* —
though it was well known that the tins, when opened,
could not be used again. The duty practically pro-
hibited the exportation of fish from Canada, and
rendered the above provision of the Treaty nugatory.^
Article 27 conceded to each nation the reciprocal use
of their respective canals. American vessels with
cargoes were permitted to pass through all the
Canadian canals, and the St. Lawrence Kiver. But
Canadian vessels with cargoes were stopped at the

* Despatch, Earl of Kimborley to the Governor-General, 17th
June, 1871. The Fenian Raids had cost Canada over $1,605,000.

+ United States Statutes at Large (1875), v. 18, p. 308.

t Despatch, Sir E. Thornton to the Earl of Derby, 19th April,
1875.

Isi

mmmmm

tes.

junction of the American canals with the water-way,
and had either to return to Canada, or tranship their
cargoes into American vessels.*

In 1874, Canada's further efforts to promote friendly Canada's
and reciprocal trade relations with the United States ^^^^j-'j^^j^P^^-
resulted in a Draft Treaty being settled by the late Sir relations with
E. Thornton and the late Hon. George Brown, on behalf ' '
of Great Britain, and the late Hon. Hamilton Fish, on
behalf of the United States. It provided for (1) The Concedes
concession to the United States of the Canadian in- rights^ and
shore fisheries for twenty-one years, and the aban- abandons
donment of the compensation provisions of the Wash- therefor,
ington Treaty of I87I. (2) The reciprocal admission,
duty free, of certain natural product. (3) The recipro-
cal admission, duty free, of certain manufactured
articles. (4) The enlargement by Canada of the St.
Lawrence and Welland Canals. (5) The construction Other pro-
of the Caughnawaga and Whitehall Canals. (6) The ;:^'j°';^Jfty.
reciprocal right of each nation to the coasting trade of
the St. Lawrence and the Great Lakes. (7) The recip-
rocal right of each nation to the use of the Canadian,
New York and Michigan Canals. (8) The reciprocal
admission of the ships of each nation to registry. (9)
A joint commission to secure eflScient lighthouses
along the inland waters. (10) A joint commission to Brown-
regulate fishing in the inland waters common to both Tr^at"v reiect-
countries. The draft treaty was accepted by Great ed by U. S.
Britain and Canada, but was rejected by the Senate of
the United States.

* Canada Sessional Papers (1876), No. 111. Subsequently the
prohibition was relaxed to the extent of allowing Canadian vessels to
proceed as far as Albany, on the Hudson River.

Canada in
1888 again
offers a
friendly
policy to
the U. S.

Joint Com-
mission to
delimit bays,
etc.

Rules respect
ing three-
mile limit.

Strait of
Causo to be
free to U. S.

Again, in 1888, by another effort to settle the Fishery
and other disputes, a Treaty was signed by the Right
Hon. Joseph Chamberlain, M.P., Sir L. Sackville-West,
and Sir Charles Tupper,on behalf of Great Britain and
Canada, and the Hons. Thomas F. Bayard, William L.
Putnam, and James B. Angell, on behalf of the United
States, which provided : (1) That a joint Commission
should be appointed to delimit the bays, creeks, and
harboui's in which the United States had, in 1818,
renounced the liberty to fish. (2) That the three
marine mile limit, mentioned in that Treaty, should
be measured seaward from low-water mark, and that
at bays, creeks and harbours, not otherwise specially
provided for in this Treaty, such three marine miles
should be measured, seaward, from a straight line
drawn across such bay, etc., in the part nearest the
entrance, where the width did not exceed ten marine
miles.* (3) That in certain specially named bays, etc.,
the three mile limit should be measured from, and to,
specially named points. (4) That the Strait of Canso
should be free to all United States fishing vessels.

(5) That United States fishing vessels should comply
with the usual harbour regulations, but not be bound
to report, etc., nor liable for certain specified charges,
and should be entitled to certain specified privileges.

(6) That certain rules should apply to cases of forfeiture
for violation of the fishery laws ; and that judgments
of forfeiture should be reviewable by the Governor-
General. (7) That when the United States should

*By the Anglo-French Treaty of 1839, and the Anglo-German
Treaty of 1868, bays, inlets and indentations of the coasts of each
nation, of the width of ten nautical miles at their entrance, measured
from headland to headland, were declared to be territorial, or inland,
and closed seas.

remove the duty on Canadian fish oils, and fisli, and When m-
the coverings for the same, the like products should and tish oil to
be admitted free into Canada ; and United States fish- ^® ^^^^'
incf vessels should be free to enter Canadian ports to U. S. fishing
purchase provisions, bait, etc., and to tran-ship catch, j^g^^^.g^'^®®
ship crews, and have other specified privileges. (8) Canadian
That Canadian fishing vessels should have on the
Atlantic coasts of the United States, all the privileges
reserved by the Treaty to United States fishing vessels
in Canadian waters. An interim tnodus Vivendi was u. S. Senate
agreed to, pending the ratification of the Treaty. ^g^^'^J^'^ *'^«
Canada adopted the Treaty ; * but the Senate of the
United States declined to ratify it.

Great Britain's diplomatic policy towards the United CSreat
States has, for many years, been eminently one of con- generosity
ciliation and generosity, with a leaning towards an *° *^® ^- ^•
easy optimism, or laissez nous faire, at the 'expense
of Canada's territory. Notwithstanding Jay's Treaty
of 1794, and the agreement in the unratified Treaty of
1803, previously mentioned, — by the Treaty of 1818,
Great Britain ceded to the United States the Canadian Ceding
territory situated between the head waters of the territory.
Mississippi and latitude 49°.-f By not consulting the
reports of Canadian officers, an isolated north-western
promontory of about 10,000 acres in the Lake of the

* Statutes of Canada (1888), 51 Victoria, c. 30.

+ The Plenipotentiaries of the United States reported to Congress,
on the 14th December, 1782, that Great Britain possessed the coun-
try on the Mississippi Eiver to the Lake of the Woods. Sparks's
Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 10, p. 119. "About four millions of
acres to the west of Lake Superior, being a tract which had always
been claimed by Great Britain, M'ent to satisfy the thrifty appetite
of the Republic." Canada since the Union of I84I, by J. C. Dent,
V. 1, p. 205.

Cessions of
Canadian
territory to
the U. S.

Cession at the Woods, twenty-six miles north of the nearest territory
Woods. of the United States on the international boundary

line of 49°, was cut off from Canadian territory, and
ceded to the United States, by the same Treaty.

By the Ashburton Treaty of 1842, about 4,489,600
acres of Canadian lands were transferred to the United
States, which the concealed " Franklin's Red Line
Revocation Map," of 1782, would have sustained Great Britain's

?n Tr"atre7ofCl*^^ *0- ^^ *^® ^^^^ Treaty the boundary line
1782, 1783 described in the Treaties of 1782, 1783, and 1814, was
abandoned, and a strip of Canadian territory, lying
between the Connecticut and St. Lawrence rivers —
over 150 miles in length, — was alienated from Canada,
and ceded to the United States, by moving the original
treaty line of latitude 45° north, about three-quarters
of a mile, into Canada, increasing to a mile and a half,
and then sloping to the true astronomical latitude of
45° at the St. Lawrence River, — because the United
€e8sion of States desired to retain the town of Rouse's Point, in
J^'^^^^g ^°^°^^ which they had, improvidently, but for hostile pur-
poses, built Fort Chamblee. * Owing to incomplete-
ness in the Joint Commissioners' description of the
boundary line of 1822, " a large island in dispute in
the passage between Lake Huron and Lake Superior,
known as St. George's or Sugar Island, was given to
the United States,"*!' by the same Treaty.

* The treaty line of 1814 was removed into Canada 4,326 feet
north of the true latitude of 45* at Rouse's Point. Winsor's
America, v. 7, p. 180. The Award of the King of the Netherlands had
recommended that the treaty line of 45* should be adhered to, but
that Great Britain should cede to the United States a semicircular
piece of territory, with the fort. North American Boundary Papers
(Imp.), 1838, Appendix, pp. 7-15.

+ Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 180.

In 184G, when the little islanders and anti-colonials panada loaea
had chloroformed the Imperialists, the diplomatic territory,
leverage of the United States pried Great Britain and
Canada out of several millions of acres in the Oregon
territory, together with their British settlers and
traders, and a sea coast of about six degrees of lati-
tude on the Pacific Ocean, with jijood harbours for
naval stations* And by Great Britain agreeing to |jf J^^*^"^ °^
limit, at the instance of the United States, the s*^ ^e of
the reference to the German Emperor in 1871, u ^nly
two of the Vancouver channels, Canada was arbitrated
out of the Island of San Juan.-f

Many diplomatic discussions have taken place about Boundary

liDcs clrftwii

the boundary lines drawn on Maps during the negotia- on Maps
tions for the Treaty of Independence. Mitchell's map ^^ ^'^^'
of North America (1755) is admitted to have been i le
one used by the plenipotentiaries. Both groups of
Commissioners appear to have drawn boundary lines
on the maps sent to their respective Governments.
Mr. Oswald transmitted one on the 8th October, 1782, Oswald's
which is said to be still in the Public Record Office in
London, and has a faint red line drawn on it, between

* Lord Ashburton appears to have imitated Mr. Oswald, in both
<lisparaging and ceding Canadian territory ; for in a conversation
respecting the Maine boundary dispute in 1843, he stated that
" the whole territory we were wrangling about was worth nothing."
Creville's Memoirs, Part 2, v. 1, p. 469. And subsequently, in a
debate, in 1846, on the question of Great Britain's right to the Oregon
territory, he said it was "a question worthless in itself," and that
ib would be madness to go to war for " nothing but a mere question
•of honour." Hansard's Debates, v. 84, p. 1119.

+ An unratified Treaty of 1869 for the settlement of this boundary,
contained no limitations. Moore's History and Digest of Inter-
national Arbitrations, v. 1, pp. 223-31.

Strachey a
Map.

" The King ,1
Map."

Boundary
lines of
American
Plenipoten-
tiaries.

President
Adams's evi-
dence, 1797.

Mr. Jay's
evidence.

Canada and Maine. * Mr. Strachey transmitted another
map-f showing three proposed lines : (1) the Nipissing-
Mississippi line, originally accepted by Mr. Oswald ;
(2) the 45° latitude line, from the Connecticut River
lirect to the Mississippi ; and (3) the present river and
lake line to the Lake of the Woods, and thence to the
Mississippi — which latter was the boundary line
accepted by the Foreign Office. J This line appears
to have been subsequer.i/Iy traced on a map by King
George III., who wrote along the line the words
" Boundary as described by Mr. Oswald." § This map
is now in the British Museum, and is known as the
" King's Map."

In one of Mr. Oswald's despatches to the Foreign
Office, he reported that the American Plenipotentiaries
had obtained from London " a complete set of the best
and largest maps of North America." And it is a
matter of history that the Plenipotentiaries transmitted
maps with marked boundary lines to their Govern-
ment. President John Adams, one of the Plenipo-
tentiaries of 1782, when examined in 1797, before the
Joint Commissioners appointed under Jay's Treaty of
1794, stated : " Lines were marked at that time, as
designating the boundaries of the United States upon
Mitchell's Map." Mr. Jay, another of the Plenipoten-
tiaries, was also examined, and stated that " certain

* This map, known as " Oswald's Map," was subsequently referred
fco by Lord Palmerston as " the red-lined map showing the boundary
as claimed by Great Britain." See also Winsor's America, v. 7^
p. 181.

+ MS. Despatch, Strachey to the Foreign OflSce, November, 1782.

J MS. Despatch, The Foreign Secretary to Messrs. Oswald and
Strachey, Whitehall, 19th November, 1782.

§ Lord Brougham identified the handwriting as that of King
George III.

larked on the copy of Mitchell'

which

lines were

was before them at Pari.«.' * And in the Boston
Monthly Magazine, for 182G, it was stated that copies
of Mitchell's maps " with lines in pencil, hardly obliter-
ated, were then in the Department of State in Washing-
ton." But about 1828, or a year before the " Statement
on the part of the United States," respecting the Maine
boundary was submitted to the King of the Nether-
lands, all of these maps " had mysteriously disappeared
from the American Archives, and were nowhere to be
found ;" — for the maps there now have no marks, f
In Dr. Franklin's published letters there is one to Mr.
Jefferson, dated April, 1790, in which he also stated
that " the map we used in tracing the boundary " was
one of Mitchell's ; and he added : " Having a copy of
that map before me in loose sheets, I send you the sheet
where you will see that part of the boundary traced." J
This map was produced to the Senate during the
debate on the Ashburton Treaty, and was declared by
the Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations
(after comparing it with the Franklin Red Line Map),
to sustain in every feature the map obtained in Paris
by Dr. Sparks; but it also has since disappeared. §

Maps in U. S.
State Depart-
ment, 1826.

Their mys-
terious disap-
pearance in
1828.

Dr. Frank-
lin's Map
sustained
"Red Line
Map."

It also has
disappeared.

* Moore's History and Digest of International Arbxtrationf, v. 1,
pp. 19 and 21.

t The statement of the disappearance of the marked maps of 1782
was made by Mr. J'orsyth, then Secretary of State, to Mr. Grattan,
British Consul at Boston. See Grattan 's Civilized America, v. 1,
pp. 371 and 436. Their disappearance from the U. S. Department of
State, is also confirmed by Winsor'a America, v. 7, p. 181.

t Life and Letters of Franklin, by John Bigelow, v. 3, p. 462.

§" There is no knowledge or recollection in the Department of
State of the map sent by Franklin to Jefferson in April, 1790."
Moore's History and Digest of International Arbitrations (1898), v. 1,
P- 157.

Dr. Sparks's gyj; ^he map which furnished the best evidence in

aigcovery of • • i r^ •

Franklin's suppoi't of the British-Canadian claim respecting the

Map " of "^ Maine boundary, was discovered by Dr. Jared Sparks,

1782. of Harvard University, in the French Archives in 1842.

He first discovered the following letter from Dr.

Franklin to M. de Vergennes, dated Passy, December

6th, 1782 — written six days after the preliminary

■r, Franklin's treaty had been signed : " I have the honour of return-

letter to the *' . "

French ing herewith the map Your Excellency sent me yes-

imster. terday. I have marked with a strong Red Line,
according to j'our desire, the limits of the United
States as settled in the preliminaries between the
British and American Plenipotentiaries." * The map
which accompanied this letter was found among several
thousands in the Archives, with a strongly marked
" red line." Dr. Sparks, who was familiar with the
Maine boundary dispute, sent a copy of the map, and

Map and of Dr. Franklin's letter, to Mr. Webster, then Secretary

Mr ^Webster" ®^ State.f I )rd Ashburton subsequently produced to
Mr. Webster a map disclosing a similar boundary
line; J but ifc was not accepted as evidence by the
United States ; although Mr. Webster then had the

Evidence of Franklin "Red-Line Map" and letter, which could
' have been claimed by Lord Ashburton, had he been

* Wharton's Revolutionary Diplomatic Correspondence, v. 6, p. 120,
t VVinsor's A^nerica, v. 7, p. ISO. Webster's Works, v. 2, p. 143.
t Probably the " Oswald Map," for it is said that Lord Ashburton
was not then awaro of the existence of the " King's Map." There
was said to have been found in the Public Record Office in London,
a Mitchell map of 1755, on which was traced a faint red line which
supported the British claim, and was assumed to be the "Oswald
Map." See Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 181.

aware of their existence, as corroborative evidence of
the British claim. *

Dr. Sparks, in reporting to the Senate Committee Dr. Sparks'a
on Foreign Relations, stated that after discovering the Congress,
letter, he made further searches and *' came upon a
map of North America, by D'Anville, dated 1746, in
size about eighteen inches square, on which was drawn
a strong red line throughout the entire boundary of
the United States, answering precisely Franklin's
description. The line is bold and distinct in every
part, made with red ink, and apparently drawn with a

hair pencil, or a pen with a blunt point." " /w "Red Line

short it is exactly the line now contended for by Great tained British
Britain, — except that it concedes more than is*'^*^'"*
clairaed."i* He subsequently deposited in the Library Copies in
of Harvard University a tracing of the red-line map, Library,
and also a modern printed map of Maine on which he
traced lines dividing the water-shed along the southerly
highlands to the monument on the present western
boundary. To this he added the following certificate : Dr. Sparks's
"The broad black line on the annexed map corres-
ponds with the Red Line drawn by Franklin on the
map deposited in the Archives des Affaires Etrangeres,
nt Paris." J

* " Lord Ashburton told me it was very fortunate that this Map
ami Letter did not turn up in the course of liis negotiation, for if
tliey had there would have been no Treaty at all. Nothing, he said,
would ever have induced the Americans to accept the line, and
admit our claim ; and with the evidence in our favour,' it would
have been impossible for us to concede what we did, or anything
like it." Greville's Memoirs of the Reign of Queen Victoria, Part 2,
V. 1, p. 469.

\ ^QQ Senate Debates, 17th-19th August, 1842.

+ The original Franklin "Rod Line Map," as well as the original
letter of Dr. Franklin enclosing it to M. de Vergennes, have also
mysteriously disappeared from the French Archives at Paris. " It

certificate.

French Map
of 1783 agrees
with the
"Red Line"
Map.

Maps used to
secure assent
of U. S.
Senate.

Lord Ash-
burton not
aware of cer-
tain Maps.

Mr. Web-
ster's caution
to Mr.
Everett.

Another French map, published in Paris in 1784,
entitled "Carte dea Etata Unia de L' Amerique,
auivant le traiU de Paix de 1783" and dedicated to
Dr. Franklin, gives a boundary line corresponding in
every respect with the " red line " on Dr. Franklin's
map. The presumption is irresistible that the boun-
dary line printed on this map, must have been either
furnished to the publisher by Dr. Franklin, or copied
from the map transmitted by Dr. Franklin to M. de
Vergennes. These maps were produced before the
United States Senate, to secure its consent to the
Ashburton Treaty.*

Neither Lord Ashburton, nor the British Foreign
Office, appears to have known of any of these Franklin
maps ; and it is a matter of history that " Mr. Webster
was anxious lest the English Government should obtain
a knowledge of the Franklin map, for he cautioned
Mr. Everett, the American Minister in England, against
searching for maps, in England or elsewhere ; — evi-
dently in iear that Lr. Sparks's traces could be
found. "f Subsequently, in 1843, he defended his

is a strange thing that neither letter nor map are now to be found at
Paris, at least we have hitherto failed in doing so. But we ha''&
found ano/Aer map altogether in favour of the American claim. I
will tell you the particulars of this curious affair when we meet,"
Lord Aberdeen to Mr. J. W. Croker, 25th February, 1843, quoted
in Wharton's Digest of International Law, v. 2, pp. 178 and 179.
Copies of Dr. Sparks's maps were, by the courteous permission of
the late Dr. Winsor, obtained by the author from the Harvard
University Library.

* The assent of Maine and Massachusetts was obtained by the
payment of f ^00,000 for their expenses in sending the State Militia
to hold the i .jputed territory, and in making a survey. Moore's.
History and Digest of Inlemational Arbitrations, v. 1, p. 151.

t Winsor's America, v. 7, p. 180.

784,

action thus : " I must .onfess that I did not think it a
very urgent duty on my part to go to Lord Ashburton

and tell him that I had found a bit of doubtful evidence Mr. Web-
. T). i(.i.ii •!. 1 1 ster's defence,

m raris, out oi which he might perhaps make some-
thing to the prejudice of our claims ; and from which
he could set up higher claims for himself, or throw
further uncertainty on the whole matter." *

Such was the evidence available in support of Great
Britain's title to the disputed territory in Maine, had
due diligence been exercised in procuring it.*f*

Perhaps some of the international friction between Souk- uauees
the United States, Great Britain and Canada, is due to tiona' fric"
the want of disciplined experience, and tact, in subordi- *^o"-
nate officers, especially in those of the outside public
service of the United States. Their Civil Service — U. S. Civil
owing to the frequent political changes, consequent ®'"^'*'®*
upon their maxim, "to the victors belong the spoils," — is
unable to acquire the trained qualities, the diplomatic
and departmental traditions, the permanent character-
istics, and the political independence, of the British Civil British Civil
Service. Had the American Civil Service similar tra-
ditions and characteristics, or were a non-political band
of expert servants of the State, experienced in emergent
foreign and colonial affairs, some unfortunate occasions
of friction, for which the higher types of American
Statesmen cannot be held responsible, would never

* Webster's Worku, v. 2, p. 153. " The nature of the Federal
Constitution gave Mr. Webster no chance of being honest."
<i rattan's Civilized America, v. 1, p. 364.

t " Our successive Governments are much to blame in not having
raiiHacked the Archives at Paris ; for they could certainly liave done
for a public object what Jared Sparks did for a private one, and a
little trouble would have put them in possession of whatever that
repository contained." Greville's Memoirs, part 2, v. 1, p. 469.

V 'III

Canada's have occurred. Our international relations with the

with U. S. United States have suffered accordingly ; and Great

have HuflFered. gj.j^g^jjj and Canada have been angrily and unjustly

blamed on every occasion, when an American official's

over-zealous interferences, and illegitimate incidents,

have caused friction.

In 1839-40, a map and certain reports of surveys of
the " highlands of Maine," said to have been previously
made by United States surveyors, were sought to be
Incident of a used as evidence before the Joint Commission on the
and"urv^8^ Maine boundary. The British Commissioner, after
in 1839. investigation, was satisfied that the map was not gen-

uine, and that the alleged surveys were " spurious
surveys." He thereupon requested that the American
surveyors should be examined on oath before the Joint
Commission, — offering that the British surveyors
should also be examined on oath at the same time.
Both request and offer were declined.*
Falaified During the Behring Sea Arbitration of 1893 some

Behiing°Sea° ^^^'^^^^^^ ^^^ interpolated translations of Russian docu-
Arbitration men ts, the great majority of which "could only be
accounted for by some person having deliberately
falsified the translations in a sense favourable to the
contentions of uic United States," were made by a
faithless official of the Department of State, and fur-
nished to the British Foreign Office. Just as the
Foreign Office was about to notify the American

* The British Commissioners reported to the Foreign Office as fol-
lows: "It has apparently been the policy of the official American
agents to substitute fancy for reality, and to endeavour to boldly
put forward, as fact, a state of things which was for the moat part
hypothetical and conjectural, in order to draw attention from the
real merits of the British claim." North American Boundary
Papers, 1840 (Imp.), pp. 42-45.

in 1893.

«o

authorities, the latter voluntarily withdrew the ftilsi-
fied translations, and furnished corrected ones;* but Faithless
the faithless official was never punished. In the same ° ^/g^g^"
Arbitration, numbers of affidavits were offered by the
United States as evidence against the British claims,
some of which were certified by the officer to have
been sworn before him, on the same day, at Lynn
Canal (Alaska), Victoria (British Columbia), and San
Francisco (United States). Another set of aflBdavits
were certified by another officer to have been sworn Affidavits put
before him, on the same day, at places 1,G80 miles apart, y^"^^^ ^
Another officer who had taken twenty-three affidavits
of certain Indians in Alaska, sent a police officer to
them, who, in the presence of the British agent, used
threatening language, and told them that the United U. S. officer
States officer would send anyone to gaol who talked Indians giv-
with, or gave evidence to, the British agent. The ing evidence
British printed argument further states that "in a agent,
great number of cases deponents, giving evidence for
the United States, have been seen with reference to
their affidavits; and almost invariably it has been
found that the statements made in their original depo-
sition were capable of considerable modification and Contradio-
explanation, not found in the original affidavit. Fresh ments in
affidavits have been obtained from some of these depon- attidavits,
ents. In-many cases the witnesses directly contradict
their former statements, and others even deny that
they made them."-f- The Blue Book gives the extracts
showing the contradictory statements of the witnesses.

* Behring Sea Arbitration, Britkh Counter Cane, U.S. Senate Ex.
Doc, 1893-94, v. 8, pp. 7 and 305-378.

f find. Argument of Ifer Majesty's Oovernmevt, No. 4, 1893
(Imp.), pp. 148-157.

lit ■ •;> i! I .

Invasions of
1776, 1812,
1837.

Canada's From the United States, Canada has received several

Blood ''^^"° "Baptismsof Blood" through filibus' ring raids organ-
U. S. raiders, ized in that country, not from any international friction
or embittered relations between Canada and the Re-
public ; but solely because of the colonial relation and
faithful allegiance of Canada to Great Britain. The
American invasions of 1775-76, 1812-14, 1837-38, as
well as the Fenian Raids of 186G, 1870 and 1871, were
undertaken bv certain citizens of the United States in
the hope of striking an effective blow at the British
Fenian Kaids Empire, in one of its most vulnerable parts. The Fenian
*nd 1871. ' Raids into Canada, — repulsed by the Canadian Militia,
— were ostentatiously undertaken to avenge the alleged
U. S. failure British misgovernment of the Irish people. The
Fenian raids. Government of the United States, though fully cogni-
zant that their Fenian citizens were arming for the
declared invasion of Canada, never interfered until
some of their filibustering hordes had crossed the
boundary, and had slain Canadians who were in no
way responsible for the British government of the
Irish people, and w^hose only crime was that of defend-
U. S. releases iiig their families, v.heir homes and country ; and then,
after arresting a few of the r^^turned Fenian ring-
leaders, who had been caught red-handed, the same
Government, at the request of Congress, and with
undue precipitancy, released and pardoned them, and
restored their arms.*

* " It would be difficult to find more typical instances of national
responsibility assumed by a State for such open and notorious acts
as the Fenian Raids in Canada, and by way of complicity after such
acts. Of course in gross cases, like these, a right of immediate war
accrues to the injured nation." Hall's International Law, p. 180.
The representations made by the Canadian to the Imperial Govern-
ment of the action of the Government of the United States respecting
the Fenian Raids are sot out in Canada Seamnal Papers (1872),
No. 26.

Fenian ring
leaders

A policy of discrimination

aj^ainst

the

trade ofI?"crimina-
tion against
Canada with the United States, arose in 180C, when Canadian

the Canadian merchants presented a memoiial to the *'"**^® *" ^^^^'

British Government, complaining of (1) their exclusion Exclusion

from Louisiana, with which they had traded while a Loyigjana.

colony of Spain, and subsequently a colony of France,

the trade with which had amounted to from $200,000

to $250,000 yearly ; (2) their being made to pay Extra duties

higher duties on goods carried by them into the Oj^fdiana.

United Statfes, than the duties payable by citizens of

the United States on goods imported from other

<;ountrios— charging Canadians 22 per cent, at inland

parts, instead of 1G| per cent., the duty at Atlantic

ports. They also complained that, in violation of

Jay's Treaty of 1794*, they were compelled to pay

$(j for a license to trade with the Indians — not required License

of American citizens; and to dismiss their Canadian Indian

voyageurs at the United States ports, and to employ *''*^*°8-

Americans "at great expense and inconvenience;"

and that the United States revenue officers at Michili- Revenue

OluC61!*S

iiiakanac, had "harrassed and impeded -the trade of impeded
British merchants, on pretences the most frivolous ^*'^**^'*°
and unfounded, and in a manner equally vexatious
and injurious." f The Treaty of 1806 was intended Treaty of
to remedy these complaints ; but it was never I'atified. ratified.

* Thi 8 Treaty (Art. 3) provided that the people on each side of
the boundary line should have free passage by land, or inland navi-
gation, and freely to carry on trade and commerce with each other ;
and that goods and merchandise should be carried into each country,
subject to the proper duties there charged. The Article declared
that its provisions were intended to render the local advantages of
each party common to both, and " thereby to promote a disposition
favour.ible to friendship and good neighbourhood."

t American State Paptrs, Foreign Relationn, v. 3, p. 152.

,■

U. S. Congress
prohibits
trade with
Great Britain.

U. S. retalia-
tory law
against Cana-
dian vessels.

Not to land
U. S. goods
in Canada.

Violation of
Treaty of
1818.

During the same year (180C), Congress prohibited
trade with Great Britain, and lier colonies, in leather,
silk, hemp or flax, tin, brass, woollens, window-glass,
silver, paper, nails and spikes, hats, clothing, millinery,
playing-cards, beer, ale, porter, pictures and prints. *
And in 1809 commercial intercourse with Great Britain
and her dependencies, and also with France, was inter-
dicted, t

In 1818, a retaliatory law closed the ports of the
United States against British vessels coming from a
port in a British colony which, by its ordinary laws of
navigation, had closed its ports against vessels from
the United States ; and declared that such Briti.sh
vessel touching at or clearing from a port in another
Briti.sh colony which was open to ve.ssels of the United
States, should not be held to remove the interdict. It
also required that British ves.sels taking on board
articles of the growth, produce or manufacture, of the
United States, should give bonds not to land them in
such inhibited British colony, on pain of forfeiture;
but in legislative irony it was declared that such inter-
diction should not be construed to violate the Treaty
of Commerce of 1815, | which provided that the
inhabitants of the two countries should have liberty,
freely and securely, to come, with their ships and
cargoes, to all places, ports and rivers in their respec-
tive territories, and to hire and occuj)y houses and
warehouses, and enjoy the most complete protection
and security for the purposes of their commerce.

* United States Stattites at Large, v. 2, p. 379.
fied in 1808.
+ Ihid, V. 2, pp. 529 and 550.
X United States Statutes at Large, v. 3, p. 432.

The law was modi-

In 1820, a further retaliatory law closed the ports of
the United States against British vessels coming from
Lower Canada, New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, New-
foundland, Prince Edward Island, and other named
British Possessions. *

And in 1887, Congress, in a minatory spirit of retalia- U. S. assumes
tion against Canada, and in the assumption of a right Tje"tfJ^by a
to interpret a Treaty, as judge and party, in the absence retaliatory
of the other party to it, -f* passed a law authorizing the
President, in certain eventualities, to deny to Canadian
vessels, their masters and crews, any entrance into
the waters, ports, or places within the United States,
except in cases of distress, etc., and to prohibit the
entry of Canadian fresh or salt fish, or any other
product of, or other goods coming from, the Dominion
of Canada into the United States. |

Of the early policy of discrimination, the McKinley McKinley
and Dingley tariffs may be cited as the more modern Xariffs"^
developments; for they contain many piovisioiis
framed to hamper Canadian trade with the United
States. The latter tariff* puts a high duty on Cana-
dian timber imported into that country, — to which is
tacked an automatic rider, that if Canada§ should Automatic
impose an export duty on saw-logs, or other specified Canada.*^"^
timber product, going from it into the United States,

* Ibid, V. 3, p. 602. The law was modified in 1823, and repealed
in 1830.

1' Aliquis no7i debet esse judex in proprid caiisd, quia non potest esse
judex et pars. Co. Lit. v. 1, p. 15. See Canada Sessional Papers
(1878), p. 63.

t United States Statutes at Large (1887), v. 24, c. 339, p. 475. No
occasion for the enforcement of this law has ever been given by
Canada.

§ The words in the United States Statute are : " any country or
dependency." * -

attempt
jigainat
British and
Canadian car-
rying trade.

Retaliatory
law of 1892
respecting St.
Mary Canal.

Canada
favours ocein
trade.

the prescribed high duty on Canadian timber should
be increased by an additional sum, equal to the amount
of such Canadian export duty.

An attempt to prejudicially affect the British and
Canadian carrying trade with the United States was,
by an amendment, surreptitiously introduced into the
Dingley tariff, by which a discriminating duty of ten
per cent — in addition to the high customs duties therein
imposed — should be levied on all goods carried into the
United States by the Canadian railways or British
ships. Owing to the bungling phraseology used, the
obnoxious amendment failed of the purpose since
avowed by its promoters.*

Again, in 1892, another retaliatory law was added
to the samples of unfriendly legislation against Canada
which are contained in the United Slates Statutes at
Large, by which the President was authorized, when-
ever the passage of United States vessels through the
Canadian Canals was " made difficult or burdensome
by the imposition of tolls or otherwise," to suspend or
prohibit the free passage of Canadian vessels through
the United States canal at Sault Ste. Marie. It
appeared that the Canadian Government had, for some
years, imposed a uniform rate of toll for all vessels
passing through the Canadian Canals ; but in 1892, in
order to encourage the ocean carrying trade, had
allowed a rebate of tolls on freight, limited to farm
products only, going to Montreal for ocean export ; f
but not on freight of similar farm products, or other
merchandise, going to Toronto, Kingston or to any
intervening Canadian port on Lake Ontario, or the St.

* United Slates Statutes at Large, v. 30, p. 151.
tSee Statutes of Canada (1892), Part 1, page c.

lould
ount

Lawrence River, between the Welland Canal and U. S. and
Montreal ; placing all non-ocean exporting ports in ocean ports
Canada and the United States on an equal f ooting. °°^ *^*^'^^®^-
Thereupon the President issued a Proclamation impos-
ing a toll of twenty cents per ton on all hinds of
freight carried by Canjidian vessels passing through
the St. Mary Canal. The following year the Cana-
dian Government, so as to avoid all possible ground of
complaint, readjusted the '^anal toils, and imposed a
uniform rate of ten cents per ton on all freight passing Canada's

through the Canadian Canals. The United States conciliatory

° ... action,

thereupon revoked the Proclamation of 1892 imposing

tolls on Canadian freight. *

These unneighbourly and retaliatory laws of Con- No similar
gress, restricting and prejudicially affecting the trade Britain or
fo Canada with the United States, have, happily, no Canada,
duplication, or counterpart, in the legislation, or in the
Executive acts, of either Great Britain or Canada.

The acts of armed hostility, and international and Efifect of these
commercial unneighbourliness, on the part of some of ^°t"o„ ^
the dominant politicians of the United States, instanced Canadians,
above, and others, have, at the times, naturally roused
a spirit of irritation and resistance, even a threatened
lex talionis, in Canada, which has severely tried the
forbearance and political discretion of the resourceful
and courageous people who, for over a century, have
maintained untarnished the supremacy and honour of
Great Britain over one-half of the North American con-
tinent. With such experiences it would, perhaps, be
wrong to deny that sometimes a stricter policy, or per-
haps a subtile form of retaliation, has been adopted by

United States Statutes at Large, v. 27, pp. 267, 1032, and 1865,

Reasonable
fielf-defence.

Golden rule
offered by
Canada.

Accounta-
bility of the
U, S, to other
nations.

Political acts
tending to
another
nation's
degradation.

Canada — partly as a means of reasonable self-defence,
and partly to suggest a re-consideration of theii" un-
friendly policy towards their northern neighbour.*
But the many suggestions for reciprocal trade, and
attempts at treaty-making, show that the offer of the
golden rule has been more frecjuently made by Canada,
than by the United States.

The moral accountability of the United States to
their own people, as well as to foreign nations, (and
this must be considered as applying to Canada as
w^ell), necessarily involves some restraint on their
political actions, — that, as a nation, they may so deal
with another nation as they would reasonably expect
such other nation should deal with them.-f* Political
actions of a nation tending to degrade another, and the
studied neglect of that courtesy of expression which
Governments are wont to observe in discussing inter-
national questions, mar diplomatic intercourse, and
induce petty international disputations, and mean repri-
sals, where the nation affected is not prepared to submit

* As an illustration the reader may be referred to the Crown Tim-
ber Regulations (1898), authorized by the Ontario Act, 61 Vict.,
c. 9, requiring all pine cut on Crown Lands to be manufactured into
timber in Canada, — lately decided by the High Court of Justice to
be within the legislative authority of the Province of Ontario. Pre-
cedents for such legislation will be found in many of the early Eng-
lish Statutes. An Act, 50 Edward 3, provided that " no woollen
cloths shall be carried into any part out of the realm of England,
before they be fulled " (c. 7). And another Act, 3 Henry 7, c. 11,
reciting the complaint of the poor men of the crafts of shearmen,
fullers, and other artificers, provided that woollen cloths should not
be carried out of the realm before they be barbed, rowed, and shorn.

t"A State is a moral person, capable of obligations as well as
rights. No acts of its own can annihilate its obligations to another
State." Woolsey's InternatioJial Law, p. 52.

to the dejrradation, or discourtesy.* Amonfj such actions Minatory ami

" . . . . retaliatory

may be classed minatory laws authorizing a prospective laws.

retaliatory policy towards another nation, or certain of
its inhabitants ; laws authorizing a threatened increase
of duties on all, or classes of, importations from it ; hiws
impairing its treaty agreements, or claiming to exercise
control within disputed territorial boundaries ; or auto-
matic laws contingent upon possible fiscal eventualities,
or a probable political policy, of such other nation. Hostilities of
An audience of sedate on-looking nations would doubt- jip'iomacy.
less consider such laws as the hostilities of a tactless
diplomacy, — even though the nation so legislating
should boast of its fiscal smartness, and legislative
cunning, and diplomatic strategy.

Much of the former political unfriendliness to Great Hostility to
r, '. • 1 1 i. 1 1 iv 1 • p Great Britaia

Britain was largely nurtured by the slow poison of in u. s. school

political hostility, and which is, even yet, daily imbibed ^ooks.

by the American youth from their school and history

books; and may excuse the declaration made a few

years ago by some Anglophobe newspapers that

" American hatred of England is deep-rooted and un- "American

nitrfifi or

slakable." That hostility was also aggravated by theE„giand."
machine politicians who controlled the "lobbies," andU. S. politjcB
" rings," or " bosses," or " trusts," and other base powers io^|j[gg^^jngg^
so graphically described in Professor Bryce's American ^^°-
Gommomuealth.'f The simulated patriotism of these prior
irresponsible elements has sometimes beguiled a certain ""'"^**®^

percentage of citizons of sympathetic and humane
instincts, who, knowing better, and desiring friendli-
ness and better trading fificilities and diplomatic rela-

patriotism.

• See Lord Clarendon's references in Hansard's Debates, v. 79,
p. 117.
+ V. 2, chapter 63, et seq.

Some U. 8.
citizens
friendly to
Canada.

Canada's
estimate of
the U. S.
political
impulues.

Canada's
weapons.

tions with Great Britain and Canada, when, inflamed
by some alleged British, or Canadian wrongdoing, or
fancied selfishness, have allowed the demagogue power
of political unrighteousness to sway their fair-minded
consciences, and reverse their friendly instincts. A
larger percentage, however, have been influenced, some
by Canadian relationships and intimacies, or commer-
cial advantages; others inspired by a sympathetic
interest intb<? graver duties of their political responsi-
bilities, and a beneficent civilization, have endeavoured,
by the promotion of philanthropic movements, to
improve and elevate the moral character and political
manhood of their own nation, and also to maintain
sympathetic and neighbourly relations in such inter-
ests with the kindred people of Canada.

Canada's neighbourship enables her to appraise at
their true value, the spasmodic political impulses which,
until recently, found vent, — sometimes in pleasant,
though vapourous, platitudes about kinship and lan-
guage and political freedom ; and sometimes in bluster-
ing and eft'ervescent hostility to Great Britain. For
the moment, the American orator's " tail twisting "
performances, or political fireworks, against " our
eternal onemy, Great Britain," that " proud, arrogant
and QfPsping enemy," formerly aroused sympathetic
cheers from a portion of the American community ; but
in Canada they were generally regarded as political
circus exhibitions, or gaudy bathos. The forest-axe,
theplough-shpre, and the .TOwing and reaping-machines,
are Canada's indigenous and cherished weapons ; and
armed with them, and skilled in their use, she challenge*
her neighbour-naiion to a strenuous and scientific war-
fare for supremacy on the farm-battle-fields of nature.

Nor has Canada's Daughter-love been weakened by British
the former indifference of Mother Britain ; or the chil-and chilling
ling advice, given in 1873 by the leading organ of °P^"'°°?'
English public opinion — patriotically rebuked by Lord
lennyson in the " Idylls of the King," — that Cana-
dians, the men of the " true North," should take
up their freedom, seeing that " the days of the'^
apprenticeship were over;" or the oft- published apo-
cryphal prophecy that in the event of a dilemma,
Canada, owing to her far closer commercial relations
with the United States, would not be long in making
up her mind to sacrifice her British association ; * or
the philosophic sneer at the "official mendacity "of the
Canadian Constitution in declaring itself to be " similar
in principle to that of the United Kingdom." -f-

Canadian public men know that the dominating Canada's
policy of the people of Canada has been to patiently and responsibll-
wisely subordinate these unneighbourly and un- i*y *« Great
motherly experiences to the allegiance and political
responsibility they owe as one of the nation-communi-
ties of their great Imperial Empire. And they sincerely
desire that the sentiments of a late distinguished and
fair-minded American Secretary of State, — who had Canadian
so eloquently and tersely expressed the Canadian ideas ^J^*fn°*J''
of a neighbourly and healthful international relation- expressed by
ship, — would influence the Government of the United^
States in its dealings with the Government of Canada :
" The gravity of the present condition of affairs," wrote
the late Mr. Bayard, " between our two countries

* Tliorold Rogers's Political Economy (1876), p. 255. " Every man
of sense, whether in tlie Cabinet or out of it, knows that Canada
must at no distant period be merged in the American Republiv,."
Edinburgh Review (1825), v. 42, p. 2W

t Dicey 's Law of the ConstittUion (1886), p. 153,

demands entire frankness. I feel that we stand 'at
the parting of the ways.' In one direction I can see
well-assured, steady, healthful relationship
petty jealousies, and filled w}^h tfio. ftwit^^sr u pros-
perity arising out of a friendship cemented by mutual
interests, and enduring, because based upon justice.
International On the other, a career of embittered rival rj'- staining
baaed upon ^ur long frontier with the hues of hostility, in which
justice. victory means the destruction of an adjacent pros-

perity, without gain to the prevalent party ; — a mutual
physical and moral deterioration which ought to be
Duty on both abhorrent to patriots on both sides." * * "It
move causes behooves therefore those who are charged with the
of difference, gg^fg conduct of the honour and interests of the respec-
tive countries, by every means in their power, sedu-
lously to remove all causes of difference." *

Not in eloquently phrased sentiments have the
people of the United States recently realized what
the diplomatic friendship of Great Britain has been
worth to them in a trying international emergency.
Their great and powerful Motherland, without any

Friendship
of Great
Britain for
the U. S.

* Hon. T. F. Bayard to Sir C. Tupper, .Slst May, 1887, Canada
Sessional Papers (1888), No. .36. Similar sentiments had been
uttered by a Canadian Statesman, nearly thirty years before in
these words : "Captious objections, fancied violations and insults,
should be discountenanced ; and above all there should bo an
abstinence from attributing to either nation or people, as a national
feoliog, the spirit of aggression. Every friend of humanity would
regret further misunderstanding between Great Britain and the
United States. The march of improvement which is to brirg the
broad regions of North America, between the Atlantic and Pacific
within the pale of civilization, is committed, by Providence, to
tiieir direction. Fearf ^ will be the responsibility of that nation
which mars so noble an itage." Hon. J. H. Gray ( 1858), cited in
Moore's Histort/ and Dii,M of IiUernational Arbitrations, v. 1, p. 473.

suggestion from them, but under the inspiration of a

long existing, and most real, sympathy for her kindred

in the United States, diplomatically intervened on

their behalf, and effectively suppressed a threatened Intervention

intervention of certain European powers against them jg^'l^fjgriJan

in their recent war with Spain ; and she did it quietly, War, 1898.

without flaunting the potentiality of her Sea Power,

or the influence of her diplomacy, and without any

expectation of national gratitude. But her unasked

and imperial beneficence, and diplomatic intervention,

can never be forgotten ; for these potential acts of

regal friendship for her "kin beyond the sea" have

now become part of the war-history of the Kepublic.

The moderating effect of this friendly diplomatic Diplomatic
intervention of Great Britain, and the conciliatory ad- ^j^f °^^**^°""
vances of Canada, seemed to have made propitious the
opening of diplomatic negotiations between the United
States and Canada in 1898. The people of both com-
munities seemed desirous of adjusting on equitable To adjust all
terms, all causes of previous international misunder- ^^ences.
standings, or friction, and of agreeing upon a recipro-
cally advantageous policy respecting the trading rela-
tions, and carrying privileges of each country; — Modification

necessarily involving mutual modifications of some°'^*°*^

systems.

details -in their respective fiscal systems.

But the auspicious anticipations of the people of
Oreat Britain and Canada of an adjustment of interna-
tional differences, have unfortunately been jeopardized
by the inexplicable position taken by the United States inexplicable
Commissioners on the Alaska Boundary question, in po"**^/*^^'
refusing to refer that question to Arbitration on similar question,
terms to those imposed on Great Britain by the United

Varying

Venezuelan

precedent.

Condition of

Arbitration

involves

cession of

Canadian

territory.

Mr. Bayard's
sentiments
forgotten in
U. S. treat-
ment of the
Alaska
question.

States in the Venezuelan reference;* and in seeking
to vary that precedent prejudicially to Canada by "a
marked and important departure from the rules in
that boundary reference," by requiring that the Arbi-
trators should be debarred from considering, or holding,
that the Russian Treaty of 1825 was applicable to the
cases of towns or settlements on tide-water which may
have been settled in recent years under the authority
of the United States ; but that all such towns should be
conceded to be within the territory and jurisdiction of
the United States at the date of the proposed Treaty, —
practically requiring, as a condition of arbitration, their
forced cession to the United States, and that " an effect
should be given to the United States' occupation of
land in British territory which justice, reason, and the
equities of the case do not require."

The position thus taken shows that, neither the
inspiration of Mr. Bayard's sentiments, nor the more
friendly relations with Great Britain, have moderated
the policy of the United States, respecting the Canadian
rights in the Alaska boundary dispute. Both Ameri-
cans and Canadians are given to bargaining. But in
view of the United States appetite for Canadiark
territory, it is a simulated parade of indignation to
charge Canada with "demanding a slice of American
territory." How much of the territory in dispute

* The terms of the Venezuelan Arbitration were : that adverse
holding, — such as political control, as well as actual settlement, —
for fifty years, should make a good title ; and that the Arbitrator*
tthould give effect to claims restirag on other grounds or principles
valid in International Law, which were not in contravention of the
fifty years limitation ; and should also give effect to equities arising
out of the occupation of either nation's territory by the subjects or
citizeuB of the other.

belongs to eitlier nation, depends upon the meaning of

ihe Treaty with Russia of 1825, which defined the Russian

. . . . Treaty of

width of the lislere de cdte, or Russian strip of territory 1925 defines

on tlie coast. The Treaty placed the line of demarca- JV"*|^ ^'■°'"

•^ ' the Ocean.

tion on the summit of the mountains parallel to the
coast, but declared that wherever their summits should
prove to be at a distance of more than ten marine
leagues (thirty miles)/ro»7i the Ocean* the limit should
be formed by a line parallel to the windings of the
coast, and should never exceed {ne •pourra jamais) the
<listance often marine leagues therefrom. Tiie phrase
) which determines how the extreme width of the Russian Controlling
fitrip of coast is to be measured over the inland terri- Treaty,
tory is " the distance of ten marine leagues from the
Ocean; " and the phrase which directs how the boun-
dary line is to be drawn on that inland territory is
^'by aline parallel to the windings of the coast"
along that from which the measurements are to be

made, i.e., the ocean; — subject to the negative and Negative

words
imperative restriction that such line " shall never

exceed the distance of ten marine leagues therefrom." f

* Before the Treaty was signed, each Power suhmitted a draft
Treaty, providing, in negative words, that the strip of coast should
not exceed in width ten marine leagues from the sea, — the British
«xpre8sion being depim la mer, and the Russian du bord de la mer.
But the Treaty reads— "(Ze VOcean," — an improved and more accu-
rate expression, — equivalent to the term "the high seas," — which
are free and open to all nations, " no nation having territorial title to
them ;" — and therefore a term whicli docs not include and is wholly
inapplicable to "littoral" or other " territorial," or " inland," seas,
Buch as rivers, inlets, bays, or harbours of a certain limited width,
defined by Interiiationil Law. The articles describing the Treaty-
boundaries of Alaska are given in Appendix No. 1.

t The negative forms of expression used in the draft treaties were :
British. — " The strip of coast shall not in any case extend in width

■-.1 '.

Meaning of

' shore

Artificial
shore at
mouths of
rivers and
bays.

These references to the provisions of the Treaty would
seem to make it reasonably clear to judicial minds
that the measurements of the liai^re, or strip of Alauka
coast, are not to be made from the head waters of its
rivers or inlets, but from the Ocean.*

By the Award in the Behring Sea, or Fur Seal,
Arbitration between Great Britain and the United
States, made in 1893, it was unanimously decided
that the ocean referred to in the Treaty of 1825
between Great Britain and Russia, meant the Pacific
Ocean, f

The terms "coast" and "shore" in International Law
«' Bh^i^'*"^^ include not only the natural territorial coast or shore
washed by the ocean, but also an artificial coast, or
shore, or sea-front, formed by a straight line drawn
from, headland to headland, across the mouth of each
river, inlet or bay, of a certain width recognized by
International Law, or Treaty. And such river, inlet
or bay, is designated and recognized as a territorial or
littoral sea ; and its national character is reckoned from
such straight line, or artificial sea-front, and seaward to
a distance of a marine league therefrom. J

from the sea towards the interior beyond the distance of ten marine
leagues." Ituissian. — "The strip of coast shall not have in width
upon the continent more than ten marine leagues measured from the
shore of the sea." "Every statute (and the same rule applies to
treaties), limiting anything to be in one form, includes in itself a
negative." Viner's Abridgment, v. 15, p. 540. Negative words in
a statute (or treaty) are to be construed as imperative. Bex v.
Leicester, 7 Barnwell and Cresswell's Reports, 12.

* See General Cameron's Report on the Alaska boundary, (1886),

f Fur Seal Arbitraiimi Papers, U. S., v. 1, p. 78.

X " The littoral sea, or territorial water, is reckoned to begin from

a straight line drawn between the headlands, shoals, or islands, which

form the mouth or entrance of the closed bay or river, and between

It is conceded by both Great Britain and the United
States, that the Treaty-boundary line between Canada
and Alaska, crosses all the rivers which flow from the
interior of Canada through Alaska and into the Pacific
Ocean, — either where the "summit of the mountains,"
nearest the coast, becomes the boundary, or where the
"ten marin? leagues from the ocean," determines it.
And that the opposite shores of the coast territory
along these rivers, as well as the beds of all such
rivers, within the lisiere, or strip of coast, described in
the Treaty, belong to the territorial domain of the
United States in Alaska.* And it will doubtless be
conceded thai, the term " Ocean," as interpreted by the
International Award, does not include, and is therefore
wholly inapplicable to, any such water-channels as are
ordinarily known or designated as rivers or inlets, or
bays, or other channels, of a certain limited width.

The maps of Alaska indicate that along its coast
there are several water-channels coming from Canada,
which are designated, apparently at random, as
rivers, inlets, channels, and canals, — the latter designa-
tion being perhaps rather inapt. The term " canal "
ordinarily means an inland navigation, and includes :
(1) canals proper, i.e., artificially constructed water-
channels; (2) tidal canals, i.e., those affected by the

Alaska

boundary

crosses

Canadian

rivers.

At summit
of mountains
or at ten
marine
leagues from
ocean.

'•Ocean"
does not in-
clude inlets,
etc.

Maps of
Alaska.

"Canal" au
inapt term.

Its ordinary
meaning.

which the breadth is not more than ten sea miles." Netherlavdn
Manual of International Law, by Jan Helenua Ferguson, v. 1, p.
397. The " coast sea," to a distance of a marine league, is territory.
Woolsey'a International Law, p. 80.

* The Congress of Vienna of 1815, in opening the Rhine and other
rivers to and from the sea, declared that " Navigation for the pur-
poses of trade is not to be interdicted to any person on such navigable
waters as traverse the territories of several States ; this being con-
ditioned on their conformity to local police regulations."

Four classes
of canals.

Lynn Canal
is the crux in
the dispute.

U.S. prece-
dents sustain
Canada's
• claims.

-1

rise and fall of tides; (3) rivers rendered navigable by
weirs to inciease their depth of water, and locks for
the ascent and descent of vessels ; (4) to which may
be added the class described as " ocean ship canals," i.e.,
canals connecting oceans or seas, such as the Suez
Canal, between the Mediterranean and Red Seas ; the
Panama Canal, and the Nicaragua Canal, between the
Atlantic and Pacific Oceans, and the Kaiser Wilheim,
or Holtenau, Canal, between the Baltic find North Seas.
But the international dispute between the United
States and Canada is whether the Lynn Canal is an
inlet, or a territorial, or littoral, sea, or tidal river ; high
sea, or ocean. If it is an inlet, or a territorial, or littoral,
sea, or tidal river, then for thirty miles inland from
a straight line drawn across its sea-front or mouth at
its junction with the ocean, it is part of the territo-
rial domain of the United States ; and the precedents
of the United States will sustain the claim of Great
Britain and Canada to the latter's sovereignty over its
upper territorial waters, beyond that distance,* and

* In 1793, the United States declared that Delaware Bay was part
of the territory of the United States, and that the capture of a
British ship within its waters by a French ship-of-war, was unlawful.
See American State Papers, Foreign Relations, v. 1, p. 148; and 1
Kent's Com,, p. .30. Delaware Bay is 10.5 nautical miles wide from
headland to headland at its junction with the Atlantic Ocean, widen-
ing to twenty-five miles inland, and is sixty miles long. Chesapeake
Bay, which is also said to be claimed by the United States as a
territorial, or closed sea, is 12.7 nautical miles wide from headland
to headland at its moutii. Lynn Canal, which is claimed by
Canada as an inland water-channel and as equivalent to " inlet" or
•' tidal river " as defined by International Law, has islands at its junc-
tion with the ocean, and the several water channels at its mouth are
respectively 4f, IJ and 1^ naulioal miles wide from shore or island,
headland to headland, widening to about ten miles inluad, north of
the islands.

i^i

may

apparently International Law will sanction no other
conclusion.

But it is difficult to harmonize the arguments of U. S. con-
the United States respecting the Lynn Canal, with the^J^'^^jj^
recognized rules of International Law, and their own
precedents, — according to which it must be classed as
a tenitorial, or closed, sea, and therefore " territory."

One of these arguments is that the expression " wtnd- As to
ings {sinuosiUs) of the coast," entitles the United ^
States to measure the Alaska coast-strip from the
salt-water shores of Lynn Canal, and not from its
inouth or ocean front. The United States also claim
dominion over the whole length and width of its
water-covered soil-bed, by virtue of its being a closed
sea. But the claim and the argument are mutually
destructive of each other ; for if the Lynn Canal is, as
admitted, a closed sea, then by International Law, its
soil-bed and the waters over it, — like the soil-bed and
waters of a river, — come within the definition of, and
are subject to the same rules as, land and territorial
domain.* The United States, however, claim to be
entitled to the sovereignty over the whole territorial
area and waters of Lynn Canal, and also over thirty
marine miles of additional inland territory.

Since the unpropitious close of the Negotiations, Charge that
it has also been charged that Canada has tacitly g^jj^^^^ u.*s,
allowed the United States to administer the " dis- to govern,
puted territory " as their own, and that their citi-
zens have been permitted to settle there for the last
twenty-five or thirty years ; a charge which cannot,
in view of the actual facts, be sustained. The United

* " That a.rm or branch of the sea which lies within the fauces
terrce, where a man may reasonably discerne between shore, is, or at
least may be, within the body of the county." Lord Hale's De Jure
Maria, Part 1, c. 4.
12

■■>iM

IJii

■if
.1 i:

U. S. pro-
ceedings
1867-68.

Before any
U. 8. settle-
ment Canada
urged a
boundary set
tlement.

U. S. Con-
gress failed
to produce
funds.

Canada's
action in
1876.

U. S. refusal
to appoint
Commission.

Convention of
1892 to settle
boundary.

States obtained possession of Alaska on the 18th Octo-
ber, 1867, %nd the necessary legislation to carry the
Treaty of cession into effect, was passed on the 27th
July, 1868. In July, 1871, Canada acquired the
adjoining territory ; and in March, 1872, before any
settlement had been made by citizens of the United
States in the now disputed territory, efforts were made
by Canada and Great Britain, to induce the United
States to agree to a deiimination of the boundary line
according to the terms of the Treaties of 1825 and 18G7.
But the Secretary of the United States while " per-
fectly satisfied of the expediency of such a measure,
feared that Congress might not be willing to grant the
necessary funds." His fear was realized, for Congress
failed to make any appropriation. Canada, however,
at once bound herself to bear one-half of the British
expenditure for determining and marking out the
boundary.

Further efforts by Great Britain and Canada were
made yearly from that date ; and in 1876, in a lengthy
report by the Prime Minister of Canada, it was stated
that " notwithstanding every effort made by the Cana-
dian Government to obtain a complete, or even a par-
tial, deiimination of the boundary line between Alaska
and British Columbia, that question still remains
undealt with in consequence of the refusal of the Gov-
ernment of the United States to agree to the measures
necessary for appointing a Joint Commission." *

After further yearly " continual wearying " by Can-
ada, a Treaty-Convention between the United Statea
and Great Britain was signed at Washington on the
22nd July, 1892, for the deiimination of the whole
boundary line from the Prince of Wales Island to

* Canada Sessional Papers (1878), No. 125, p. 60.

Mount St. Elias, in which, after a recital acknowledg-
ing the fact of the unsettled boundaries and a diplo-
matic desire for the removal of all differences in regard
to the Treaty-boundary, it was declared that : —

" The High Contracting Parties agree that a coinci- Joint survey
dent or joint survey (as may be found in practice ° «*"*«•
most convenient) shall be made of the territor}' adja-
cent to that part of the boundary line of the United
States of America and the Dominion of Canada divid-
ing the territory of Alaska from the Province of
British Columbia and the North- West Territory of
Canada, from the latitude of 54° 40' north to the point Whole boun-
where the said boundary line encounters the l'*l«tg*JJ^g^^^j^®
degree of longitude westward from the meridian of
Greenwich, by Commissions to be appointed severally
by the High Contracting Parties, with a view to the
ascertainment of the facts and data necessarv to the
permanent delimitation of said boundary line in Boundary to
accordance with the spirit and intent of the existing ^^^^"[^jf

Treaties in regard to it between Great Britain and »*»tent of the

Treaties
Russia, and between the United States and Russia."

After providing for certain details, the Convention And to be

proceeds: "The High Contracting Parties agree that Ste^Commia-
as soon as practicable after the report or reports of thesio*» reports.
Commissions shall have jeen received they will pro-
ceed to consider and establish the boundary line in
question." No conditions, similar to those recently No conditions
sought to be imposed upon Canada, appear to have been *'"Posed.
thought ot, or suggested, when this Treaty-Convention,
and the subsequent one extending it to the 31st
December, 1895, were signed.

A further admission of an unsettled boundary was Treaty of
made in a supplementary Treaty-Convention between ^^''

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WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580

(716) 872-4503

Provision as
to Mouni;
St. Elias,

Treaties
an a(!kuowl-
edgment of
doubtful
title of U. S.

Refute
charges
against
Canada.

the United States and Great Britain, signed on the 30th
January, 1897, for the survey of the 141st meridian
from Mount St. Elias to the Frozen Ocean, reciting the
Treaties of 1825 and 1867, and that the location of the
said meridian involved " no question of the interpreta-
tion of the aforesaid Treaties," it was thereby agreed
to appoint Commissioners and other officers for such
survey. It further provided that : —

" Inasmuch as the summit of Mount St. Elias,
although not ascertained to lie in fact upon said 141 st
meridian, is so nearly coincident therewith that it may
conveniently be taken as a visible landmark whereby
the initial part of said meridian shall be established, it
is agreed that the Commissioners, should they con-
clude that it is advisable to do so, may deflect the most
southerly portion of said line so as to make the same
range with the summit of Mount St. Ellas, such deflec-
tion not to extend more than twenty geographical
miles northwardly from the initial point."

These acknowledgments of an unsettled international
boundary line between the territories of Canada and
Alaska ; and these solemn treaty-agreements to ascer-
tain the facts and data necessary to the " permanent deli-
mination of the said boundary line in accordance with
the spirit and intent of the existing Treaties in regard to
it " were diplomatic and national admissions of a doubt-
ful and una.scertained title in the United States to the
territory adjacent to the actual boundary ; and must
therefore be justly conceded to be a conclusive refuta-
tion of the recent charge of Canada's tacit acquiescence
in any alleged settlements of the United States ; and
must also be taken to be conclusive and binding admis-
sions by the Government of the United States that there

the 80th
leridian
ting the
n of the
erpreta-
agreed
br such

Elias,
id 14 1 St
i it may
v^hereby
ished, it
ey eon-
he most
le same
I deflec-
raphical

lational
%da and
ascer-
mt deli-
ce with
3gard to
', doubt-
s to the
id must
refuta-
escence
)s; and
admis-
it there

were, up to 1897, no rights arising from settlements in
any part of the disputed territory, based upon any
acquiescence of Canada; or, if there were, that any
claims or rights respecting them, were then waived by
the United States ; or were too insecure and too unsub-
stantial to warrant any claim in the preceding diplomatic
discussions or any reservation of them in the Treaties.*

It may be further observed that the action of the
High Commissioners of the United States is also all
the more inexplicable in view of the condemnation of
the boundary line claimed by the official maps issued
by the Government of the United States, pronounced
in the Despatch of a former Secretary of State to the
American Minister to England, and subsequently
presented to Congress, in which he said : —

•' The line traced on the Coast Survey Map of Alaska,
No. 960, of which copies are sent to you herewith, is
as evidently conjectural and theoretical as was the
mountain summit traced by Vancouver. It disregards
the mountain topography of the country, and traces a
line on paper about thirty miles distant from the gen-
eral contour of the coast. The line is a winding one,
with no salient landmarks or points of latitude or

* The settlements about Lynn Canal have been as follows : " In
1884, a log shanty was built at Dyea by a trader. In 1888, another
was built at Skagway. No further settlements were made at either
place until about 1897. The first known grants of land there were
made by the United States in 1898. In the Yukon territory, a sur-
vey made in 1896 placed the Town of Forty-mile, which had been
assumed to be west of the 141st meridian and on United States ter-
ritory "within Canada, and therefore subject to Canadian jurisdic-
tion and the laws of the Dominion of Canada." The survey was
acquiesced in, and no question of prior settlements there under the
authority of the United States, was raised. See Bulletin U. S.
Department of Labour, 1898, p. 355,

No U. S.
rights

claimed prior
to 1895-97.

U. S. claim
of boundary.

Condemned
by U. S.
Secretary of
State.

■I'

U.S. Despatch
urges a line
in accord
with the
Treaty of
1825.

British con-
ciliatory
offer in 1899.

U. S. condi-
tions a repu-
diation of
Treaties
1892.6-7.

Involved a
forced cession
of Canadian
territory.

Treaty boun-
dary were to
j[overn.

longitude to determine its position at any point. It is
in fact such a line as it is next to impossible to survey
through a mountainous region, and its actual location
there by a surveying commission would be nearly as
much a matter of conjecture as tracing it on paper
with a pair of dividers." * His Despatch closed by
urging the expediency of appointing an international
commission, at the earliest practicable day, to fix upon
a conventional boundary line in substantial accord
with the presumed intent of the negotiations of the
Anglo-Russian Convention of 1825.

The proposal of Great Britain and Canada to refer
the dispute to arbitration on the terms of the Venezu-
elan precedent, indicated a conciliatory effort to secure
an equitable and final decision on the boundary dis-
pute ; when, had such a proposal been made by the
United States, it could have been effectively urged
that it was entirely inconsistent with the positions
assumed by each of the High Contracting Parties
in previous diplomatic negotiations, and was also an
unwarranted departure from the precise terms of the
Treaty-Conventions of 1892-95-97. But the non-accept-
ance of the British and Canadian proposal, unless on
dishonorable conditions which involved a surrender of
Canadian rights, and a condonation of a territorial usur-
pation, must have come as a diplomatic surprise ; for it
meant a national repudiation of the unconditional and
unfettered terms under which the United States had,
in those Treaty-Conventions, solemnly pledged their
national faith to Great Britain, to deliminate and estab-
lish •* the boundary line in accordance with the spirit
and intent of the existing Treaties in regard to it

* Mr. Bayard to Mr. Phelps, 20th November, 1886.

p .

fc. It is
survey
location
early as
n paper
osed by
•national
fix upon
1 accord
is of the

I to refer
Venezu-
to secure
dary dis-
e by the
y urged
positions
f Parties
3 also an
as of the
Q-accept-
mless on
render of
'ial usur-
se ; for it
onal and
.tes had,
ed their
id estab-
he spirit
rd to it

between Great Britain and Russia, and between the
United States and Russia." The rejection of such sur-
render-conditions, and the consequent withdrawal of
the British and Canadian Commissioners from the
unfinished Diplomatic negotiations, were eminently ^,"**^^<^^°?®
justifiable, and were the only dignified courses that tions juatifi-
conld have been adopted. *

A further impediment to a mutual reference to arbi- Further
triition, arose on the anomalous proposal of the United by U. S.
States Commissioners to refer the dispute to six jurists,
instead of three, as proposed by the British Commis-
sioners. The British Commissioners were unable to
agree to this counter proposition, because it did " not
provide a tribunal which would necessarily, and in Tribunal not
the possible event of differences of opinion, finally dis- finar**" ^
pose of the question."

Finding, therefore, that neither the precedent of the Head-lock in

■\r 111 I'll- 11 neeotiationB.

Venezuelan boundary arbitration, nor any reasonable

compromise of the Alaska boundary dispute, nor any

equitable concessions within the recognized rules or

principles of International Law, would be admitted or

conceded by the Commissioners for the United States,

* The special qualities of American diplomacy — referred to in other
portions of this work — may be further illustrated by the following
comments by an American writer on Mr. Seward's despatch excusing
the Trent affair in 1861. " He glided lightly over the difficult places,
substituting for thorough argument here a plausible assumption ;
there a crafty implication. He assumed an analogy where there was
none, and then used his false assumption to support his contention.
That his argument was unsound, was a tribute to his marvellous
skill in ' making bricks without straw. ' It was a political master-
piece. But what he accomplished was one of the greatest feats of
the war-period ; and has rightly given him lasting fame and honor
in American history." Li/e of William H. Seward, by Frederick
Bancroft (1900), v. 2, p. 242 et seq.

pill

Surrender of
Canadian
rights and
authority.

Alaska boun-
dary referred
to their
Government.

Responsi-
bility to U.

American
umpire
declined by
Great Britain.

except such as involved a surrender of Canadian ter-
ritory, and a treachery to the British subjects settled
there, and therefore a degradation of British and Cana-
dian sovereignty ; and that a dead-lock had been reached,,
the British Commissioners were of the opinion that no
useful end would be served by further pressing, at
the present time, the Negotiations, and that they must
refer the matter to their government.* The responsi-
bility and reproach therefore of allowing the diplo-
matic difierences and unneighbourly disputes between
the United States and Canada to continue, and per-
haps become more irritating, or festering, sores in their
international relations, must hereafter rest upon the
United States Commissioners, and not upon Canada
nor the British Commissioners, f

After discussing the constitution of the proposed
arbitral tribunal, and the selection of an umpire from
the American continent, — which was declined by the
British Commissioners owing to " the long maintained

Agreement of * An agreement, or modus viveudi, for a Provisional boundary line

1899 excludes about the head of the Lynn Canal, was entered into at Washington

Canada from ^^^ ^.j^^ 20th October, 1899 ; but the line gives Canada no access to the

* ' head waters of Lynn Canal except over territory claimed to belong.

to the United States, and thereby bars the free access of Canadians

to the ocean ; and may possibly, in future negotiations, be claimed to

operate as a waiver of Canada's rights to the shores and territory

above the " ten marine leagues from the ocean ; " or as a condonation

of an adverse occupation and political control by the United States

of Canadian territory. The agreement is given in Appendix No. 2.

t Lord Clarendon in a debate in the House of Lords on the Oregon
question, after referring to the predilection the United States had of
acquiring what did not belong to them, said : " If their government
did consent to negotiate it would seem that it could only be upon
the basis that England was unconditionally to surrender her pre-
tensions to whatever might bo claimed by the United States.'*"
79 Hansard's Debates, p. 117.

and recently asserted policy of the United States
towards the other countries on that continent," and
which would not offer to Great Britain the guarantee
of impartiality, the Protocol records that the Commis-
sioners of the United States then " proposed that the
Joint nigh Commission should proceed to a determi- U. S. desired
nation of the remaining subjects of difference named tho^matters
in the original Protocol. They regarded it as unwise nearly
to further defer the adjustments so nearly concluded
after full consideration. Several subjects were so far
advanced as to assure the probability of a settlement.
If, then, ctll differences, except one, could now be
adjusted, would it not be a most commendable advance
in neighbourly friendship ? Could not our respective
governments be trusted to settle the principal remain-
ing difference by direct negotiations ?

" The United States Commissioners further regretted Regret

,1 . o 1 i • r XI- L' L- suspension of

the suspension tor any long time of the negotiations jj^^^jj^^jQ^g
in view of the progress already made in solving the
differences. They therefore urged that the Joint High
Commission should advance to a conclusion their
negotiations upon the remaining subjects as early as
possible.

"The British Commissioners replied that all such British defer
questions should be deferred until the Boundary ques- X"kr""*'^
tion had been disposed of, either by agreement, or dispute is
reference to arbitration. The manner in which they Arbitration,
would be prepared to adjust some of the other import-
ant matters under consideration, '^ist depend, in their
view, upon whether it is possible to arrive at a settle-
ment of all the questions which might at any time
occasion acute controversy, and even conflict."*

♦Protocol LXIII., Gaiiala Sessional Papers (1899), No. 99.
13

British and
Canadian
hopes
disappointed.

Sir J. Mac-
donald on
U. S. un-
friendly
policy, and
British in-
difference, to
Canada.

Disheartened
at British
response.

Great
Britain's
modern Colo-
nial policy.

And thus, to the great disappointment and regret
of Great Britain and Canada, the United States enticed
to shipwreck the halcyon anticipations of a fair adjust-
ment of international diflferences between the United
States and Canada by the siren lure of an elusive and
wily diplomacy ; and then offer a tabula ex naufragio
of protocol sorrows.

The late Sir John A. Macdonald, who represented
Canada in the negotiations for the Treaty of Wash-
ington, in 1871, realized the historic continuity of the
unneighbourly policy of the United States, as well as
the British indifference to Canadian interests, when he
thus wrote to one of his colleagues : " The American
Commissioners have found our English friends of so
squeezable a nature, that their audacity has grown
beyond all bounds." And he added : " Having made
up my mind that the Americans want everything,
and w^ill give us nothing in exchange, one of my chief
aims now is to convince the British Commissioners of
the unreasonableness of the Yankees." Disheartened
by an unsympathetic response to his efforts, he then
wrote, " I am greatly disappointed at the course taken
by the British Commissioners. They seem to have
only one thing in their minds — that is, to go to Eng-
land with a Treaty in their pockets, — no matter at
what cost to Canada." * This British indifference to
Canadian interests has, in the many instances recorded
in the preceding pages, encouraged the United States
in assuming an aggressive policy against Canada's
international rights and territorial sovereignty.

Since Sir John Macdonald wrote, thanks to the
sturdiness of Canadian statesmen, Great Britain has
given up presenting to Canada a pantomime of diplo-

* Life of Sir John A. Macdonald, by Joseph Pope, v. 2, p. 105.

regret
iticed
(Ijust-
nited
e and
fragio

matic negotiations with the United States, from which
the digiti clamosi of Canada's political interests were
conspicuously absent. And now her earlier policy of P*"!!-^^
indifference to Colonial interests has, happily for the now an
Empire, become an estranged sentiment. And the ^^^"^^Jjse^^^
modern Imperialism which is sowing the seeds of a
Greater United Britain, will, it is hoped, hereafter
bring forth Empire-fruit not to be repented of May
it also produce a beneficent harvest of peaceful and
neighbourly international relations between Great
Britain, Canada and the United States. But that
Canada's share therein shall be assured and real, JtClanada's

share in dip-

should be an essential condition in any Empire-com- lomatic nego-
pact for the more complete consolidation of our Greater yV**"^ *'* ^
United Britain, that in all diplomatic negotiations,
and Treaty-adjustments with the Government of the
United States, Canada, as the only nation-community
of Greater Britain most affected by the international
policy of her neighbour nation, shall have an advisory
and, in matters affecting Canadian interests, a control-
ling diplomatic influence.*

But in the evolution of any compact for the better
consolidation of an Empire federation, the advocates of
this modern Imperialism must not forget that while,
externally, and to foreign nations, the Imperial Crown BritishCrown
represents the sovereignty and unity of the whole ariy^the^sanie
Empire, and is also internally acknowledged to repre- j" British
sent, constitutionally, the supreme regal authority over colonies.

* " During 1889, a resolution was brouglit forward in the Canadian
House of Commons in favor of giving the Dominion the right of
negotiating and concluding Treaties. It was generally felt that the
object sought for was the power to conclude Treaties with the United
States. * * It is a fact that British Diplomacy has cost Canada
dear." Problems of Greater Britain, by Sir C. W. Dilke, M.P., pp.
63-4.

100

Colonial sub-
jects practic-
ally governed
by the Island
subjects of
the Crown.

Fundamental
axioms of
British Con-
stitution.

every portion of that Empire ; yet a constitutionally
illogical usage prevails by which the Crown of the colo-
nial nation-communities is suzerain and subordinate to
the Crown of the island nation-communities ; and that
the colonial subjects of the Crown are thereby practic-
ally subordinated to the island subjects of the Crown.
This present controlling and suzerain authority of
the Crown of the island nation-communities, over the
Crown of the colonial nation-communities, — necessary
in their early development, — is a question which must,
some day, loom persuasively, or imperiously, for mutual
and thoughtful re-consideration on the Imperialistic
horizon ; for equal rights of nationhood, and of citizen-
ship, and equal authority in Parliamentary govern-
ment, for all the subjects of the Crown, wherever on
British soil their homes may be, are fundamental
axioms of the British Constitution. *

* It may be interesting to the modern advocates of "Imperial
Federation " to quote here a clause from the Royal Instructions
under the Sign Manual of King George III., dated the 12th April,
1778, authorizing the Commissioners for Quieting Divers Jealousies
in the North American Colonies, appointed under the Statute 18
George III. c. 13, to propose Colonial Representation in the Imperial
Parliament, and which may be considered as bringing the great
question of " Imperial Federation " for the first time into the
domain of practical politics : — " If it should be desired that our
subjects in America should have any share of Representation in our
House of Commons, such a proposal may be admitted by you, so far
as to refer the same to the consideration of our two Houses of Par-
liament ; and it will be proper that in stating such a proposition,
the mode of Representation, the number of the Representatives,
which ought to be very small, and the considerations offered on
their part, in return for so great a benefit, should be precisely and
distinctly stated." Another clause proposed a Federation of the
American colonies " for the better management of the general con-
cerns and interests of the said colonies, and to preserve and secure
their connection with Great Britain." MS. State Papers, Public
Record Office, tit. America and the West Indies, v. 299.

101

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APPENDIX No. 1.

ARTICLES OF THE TREATY OF 1825, BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN
AND RUSSIA, DESCRIBING THE BOUNDARIES OF ALASKA.

(Pages 85-89.)

Articles III. and I V. were copied into'the Treaty of 1S67, betioeen Russia

and the United States.

Article III.

The line of demarcation between the posaessiong of the High Contracting
Parties upon the coast of the continent and the islands of America to the north-
west, shall be drawn in the manner following :

Commencing from the southermost part of the island called Prince of Wales
Island, which point lies in the parallel of 54° 40' north latitude, and between the
LSlst and the 133rd degree of west longitude (meridian of Greenwich), the said
line shall ascend to the north along the channel called Portland Channel, as
far as the point of the continent where it strikes the 56th degree of north
latitude ; from this last- mentioned point, the line of demarcation shall follow
the summit of the mountains situated parallel to the coast, as far as the point
of intersection of the Hist degree of west longitude (of the same meridian) ;
and, finally, from the said point of intersection, the said meridiau-Une of the
14l8t degree, in its prolongation as far as the Frozen Ocean, shall form the
limit between the Russian and British possessions on the continent of America
to the north-west.

Article IV.

With reference to the line of demarcation laid down in the preceding Article,
it is understood ;

Ist. That the island called Prince of Wales Island sliall belong wholly to
Russia.

2nd. That wherever the summit of the mountains which extend in a direc-
tion parallel to the coast, from the 56th degree of north latitude to the point
of intersection of the 141st degree of west longitude, shall prove to be at a
distance of more than 10 marine leagues from the Ocean, the limit between the
British possessions and the line of coast (la lisiire de c6te) which is to belong
to Russia, as above mentioned, shall be formed by a line parallel to the wind-
ings of the coast, and which shail never exceed the distance of 10 mxtrine
leagues therefrom.

Article VI.

It is understood that the subjects of His Britannic Majesty, from whatever
quarter they may arrive, whether from the Ocean, or from the interior of the
continent, shall for ever enjoy the right of navigating freely, and without any
hindrance whatever, all the Rivers and Streams which, in their course towards
the Pacific Ocean, may cross the line of demarcation upon the line of coast (sur
la lisiire de la c6te) described in Article III. of the present Convention.

102

APPENDIX No. 2.

PROVISIONAL BOUNDARY BETWEP:N CANADA AND ALASKA IN
THE REGION ABOUT THE HEAD OF LYNN CANAL.

Hay-Tower Agreement .signed on the 2Uth October, 1899.

(Page 96.)

"It is hereby agreed between the Governments of the United States and
of Great Britain that the boundary-line between Cmada and the territory of
Alaska in the region about the head of Lynn Canal shall be provisionally fixed
as follows, without prejudice to the claims of either Party in the permanent
adjustment of the international boundary : —

"In the region of the Dalton Trail, a line beginning at the peak west of
Porcupine Creek, marked on the Map No. 10 of the United States' Commis-
sion, December 31, 1895, and on sheet No. 18 of the British Commission,
December 31, 1895, with the number 6500; thence running to the Klehini
(or Klaheela) River, in the direction of the peak north of that river,
marked 5020 on the aforesaid United States' Map, and 5025 on the aforesaid
British Map ; thence following the high or right bank of the said Klehini
River to the junction thereof with the Chilkat River, a mile and a-half, more
or less, north of Klukwan,* — provided that persons proceeding to or from
Porcupine Creek shall be freely permitted to follow the trail between the said
creek and the said junction of the rivers into and across the territory on the
Canadian side of the temporary line wherever the trail crosses to such side,
and, subject to such reasonable Regulations for the protection of the revenue
as the Canadian Government may prescribe, to carry with them over such part
or parts of the trail between the said points as may lie on the Canadian side of
the temporary line, such goods and articles as they desire, without being
required to jjay any customs duties on such goods and articles ; and from said
junction to the summit of the peak east of the Chilkat River, marked on the
aforesaid Map No. 10 of the United States' Commission with the number
5410, and on the Map No. 17 of the aforesaid British Commission with the
number 5490.

" On the Dyea and Skagway Trails, the summits of the Chilkoot and White
Passes.t

" It is understood, as formerly set forth in communications of the Depart-
ment of State of the United States, that the citizens or subjects of either
Power, found by this arrangement within the temporary jurisdiction of the
other, shall suffer no diminution of the rights and privileges which they now
enjoy.

"The Government of the United States will at once appoint an officer or
officers, in conjunction with an officer or officers to be named by the Govern-
ment of Her Britannic Majesty, to mark the temporary line agreed upon by
the erection of posts, stakes, or other appropriate temporary marks.

" It shall be understood that the foregoing Agreement is binding upon the
two Governments from the date of [the] written acceptance of its terms."

*See Provisional Boundary, 1899, marked (1) on Map, Appendix No. 3.
t See Provisional Boundaries, 1899, marked respectively (2) and (3) on the

same Map.

A IN

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fixed

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APPENDIX No. 3.

MAP OF LYNN CANAL, SHOWING THE BOUNDARY LINES
CLAIMED BY CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES.

(Pages 85-89.)

(1), (2) and (3) indicate the localities of the three Provisionil Boundaries "*
described ia the Agreement of the 20th October, 1899, in Appendix No. 2.