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' -::,■ . .iii t • I , • 1 I ■ 1 , 1 1 , < • • y: 5 •> V THE PARALLEL, OR THE Condud and Fate O F GREAT BRITAIN In Regard to our Prefent Conteft with France ; Exemplified from the HISTORIES O F Macedon and Athens. There is nothing new tender the Sun. Solomon. . 9> I LONDON: Printed for J. Scott, at the B/ack Swan in Pattr-no/Ier- ^ow. 1756, i-^xy/}. ? irv* * If* r. *« ^. ■\ 4.<«- u ■.» 4 > V I .. t ♦ * : v: () (' r !^ J THE PARALLEL, O R T H E Conduct and Fate O F GREAT BRITAIN, &c r^^"*lF the Efleem of the Public was to I M ^ be meafured by the Intention of k)«(^l»^ Writers, we fhould find their Praife or Cenfure more judicioufly dif?)enred, and more regarded by the few feledtcd Perfons whofe Judgments fix the Standard of Ta/le, and whofe Opinions are a Guide to our Sen- timents : But when the loofe and idle Ideas of faife Patriotifm are fpread abroad by the Pen of a Scribler, it is flrange, I fay, when the Pubhc applauds thefe declamatory Trifles, B that [ 2 1 that the icfl fliould let their Tlioui^hts re- main in Silence, to avoid being overborn v^ith a Storm of Clatnour and Impertinence. Yet fuch arc too often the political Writings of the prcicnt Age : And all Sciences appear as delpicablc, when they fuflcr lb unworthy a Proftitution. A Miniilcr (whether from Party-Prejudice I will not determine) feldom fails of liiiFering by Abufe, or of being exalt- ed with fmooth Panegyric ; from the Folly, the Violence, or the bad Intentions of his Cotemporaries. Thesk arc the particular Circumflances which have fligmatizcd the Science in gene- ral, and cafl an Odium on the Writers with- out Diftindion. Nor is the Afperfion ill founded j the numerous I'reatifes, EfTays, and voluminous Performances on this Head, ferving rather to entangle than unravel the Knots of political Refledions •. But the Evil is not to be remedied ; and fuch is the boaft- ed Liberty of the Englijh Prefs, that every free-born Briton has a Pviglit of expofmg himfelf with Impunity. Here let me not be accufed of Arrogance or Prefumption, nor endeavour to raife my own Fame on the Pvuins of another's Repu- tation. tiitlon. I profcfs inyfclf a Novice in the Art of Writing j nor do I imagine that mine will live heyond the ufual Date, but will link into Oblivion with the reft of my Fraternity : So that when I profefs I expedt no Continu- ance to my Work, nor Fame from the Pub- lication, I hope my Endavours will be jLifcrib- cd to a Motive not unworthy of an Englijl:- man. Vox if any Patriot fliould be warmed by my Exhortations, to a more vigorous Ex- ertion of his Talents for the good of his Country ; my End is fully anfwered, and I fhall remain contented with that Reward of my Labours. To explain the Word Patriot, I iliall ob- ferve, that he is a Charadler whom the ?3ad reverence, and the Good emulate ; the Pride and Glory of every Nation ; who flrives to iivQ a finkiiig State, by fubduing foreign or (what is more critical) by with! banding do- meftic Enemies : The one effeded by Force of Arms, and the other by oppoling with In- trepidity the Attacks of Corruption. A Politician is one whofe Qualifications give him a large Infight into public AiFairs j his Attention fliould be quick, his Compre- henfion clear, and his Judgment folid and B 2 re- [ + ] refined ; in Ihort, he ought to be a Man every Way formed to execute what the Patriot does by Inclination : The one is a Patriot in The- ory, the other a Politician in Prailice. Having fixed the Ideas of the two Cha- racters, wc find it is no ImpofTibility that they (liould foinetimes be connedlcd, altho' by Moderns efteemed a Paradox. Ik tiiis is allowed, and if bright and refin- ed Talents are joined with Solidity of Rcafon- ing, and guided by true difinterefted Princi- ples i ought not fuch a Man to be honoured and regarded, as the moH: conducive to the Prefervation of a fickly State ? In the prefent Situation of our Afl-'airs, that there is an Occalion for the Exertion of fuch patriot Principles, will be allowed, I fuppofe, without Hcfitation : An immcnfe national Debt, a long and unfuccefsful War, and an inetfedlual Peace, are the apparent Caufes of a latent Difeafe, The vifible Eflfedts are the innumerable Taxes and Burthens on the People, which rather increafe than diminifh under this Ad— n. I would not here be under- ftood as condemning them for new and un- common Syftems. We have feen the Con- duett of tlicir Predeceflbrs produ(5tive of the fame wn fame Inconveiiicncics, and tKe~ prefent Ad n fcem only following their Foot- fteps. Not that I am of Opinion, their Errors ought at any Time to plead Prcfcrip- tion and Example. But is it not more ex- cufable for a blind Man to walk upon a bea- :en Track, through ever fo dirty a Road ; ihan attempt a better Way, which his natu- ral Defedt renders impoflible to find ? Under thefc Circumftances (bad as they are) we are threatened, by a Power whom Policy and Arms have contributed to render formidable. What mud we oppofe to this ? Muft we be amufed with Negotiations, and lofc in the Cabinet what we acquire in the I'leld ? No, let us not any longer depend on fo fallacious a Support. Let Refolution and Conftancy be our Weapons j thefe we can depend upon, thefe maft be effedlual. Such did our Anceftors employ, when France her- felf fubmitted to the Arms of an Edward 'ir\i\ ^Henry, ^Bttt though at this Time our Conftitution is fo widely different, that we fliould find no general Affiftance, by comparing our own with remoter Ages : And though the Con- dudt of Qur Anceftors will not fuit with the pre- ^ • CM prefent Syftcni of Affairs ; yet the Ufe of a comparative Hiftoiy, is, I believe, evident. The grand End of this Branch of Knovv- ]'"dge, is, that we may affifl: ourfelves in a Comparifon ; either by avoiding the Errors, or by taking Advantage of the good Policy of former Times. In this View, there is not only Pleafure but Profit, arifing from an hif- torical Narration. My Intention, therefore, was to chufe a Iliftory adapted to my Purpofe ; and after fearching the different Periods, I found none fo well calculated to anfwer my Defign, as that of the Athcmans in their War with the Mc^cedoniaijs. Let us endeavour to fet their Miflakcs as a Mark by which we may fleer our Condud:, and avoid fplitting on their Example. This howeverj cannot be effed:ually compleated, without flating the Views of the Antagonifls, and obferving how the Means were propor- tioned to the Ends defigned by the feparate Parties. Athens was a Republic which all the Ef- forts of a popular Fadlion could not for many Ages enflave ; but their Government was much altered from the Time when their Anceftors had gained the Vi^flories of Ma- rathon [ 7 1 rathon and Platcea : Pericles was the Man who broke the Balance of Power, and like Henry the Seventh of England^ deflroyed the Influence of the Nobility by a more equal Divifion of Wealth and Preferment. Their Dominions were large enough to have op- pofed Philip, and their Revenues were pro- portionable : Being poiTefTed of a flourifhing Kingdom by Right, and enjoying Euhoea by Conqueft, their Influence muft neceflarily be extenfive ; but their chief Dcpcndance was on their foreign Colonies, which fup- plied them with the Necefl^aries of Life j as England is from the American Plantations, Notwithftanding all thefe Advantages the People were degenerate j they were vain and indolent ; Vices which introduced Cor- ruption by their natural Tendency, and ex- pofed them not only to the open, but the fecret Attacks of every Invader. The public Offices were diftributed by Cabal and In- tereft 3 thefe were the Authors of Party- Zeal and Prejudice ; and thefe again extend- ed the Influence of Corruption. Their for- mer Frofperity had opened the Way to Plea-r fure ; Senfaality was the next Step, and arj indolent Supinenefs was the Confequence, Unwilling to fight, evpn for their ^wn Li- berty, [ 8 ] berty, they employed mercenary Troops in their foreign Wars ; but with fo bad Succefs, that their Reputation was greatly funk in the Opinion of their Allies. The better Part was fenfible of this Defi- ciency, and their Eloquence brought the People by degrees to a Senfe of their Danger ; they found the Defigns of Philip to be fuch as tended to the Subverlion of Liberty ; they iaw the Neceffity of preferving a political Ba- lan :e, not to permit the Arms of one to acquire a Dominion, which would render the whole obnoxious to his Invafion. Such was the Opinion of the wifeft Counfellors of Athens ; a Maxim confirmed by Experience, and applicable as much to the prefent Times as to the ancient Syflem o^ Greece oxMacedon. Let us fuppofe the Cafe our own : Should not we, when France fhall endeavour by Force or Fraud to extend her Limits, and to fettle a Tyranny over the allied States ; fhould not we, I again repeat, exert that Power and Authority, which have more than once re- duced her Dominions to proper Bounds? Let this be granted, and it will follow, that Athens undertook a juft War, when (he endeavoured to efFedl a Diminution of the Strength, and put a flop to the Encroach- ments T I [9] hients of Philip. The Evil became certain, not barely contingent; Nevertheless her ConducEl is blameable in m any Refpeds ; and in none more appa- rently than in the Indolence and SupinenLfs, generated by that oftentatious Self-confidence^ which made her imagine, that the Name of Athens carried Victory to the Side (lie em- braced. But Philip intruded her other\vife, and was found equally capable of fubduing by War as by Policy. This Monarcli, with the moft extenfive Views of univerfal Domi- nion, had a Head as fit to defign as his Heart was willing to execute j his Accomplifh- ments, naturally prodigious, were improved by the moft arduous and intenfe Applicati-* on ; his Courage in War, and his Conftancy in purfuing his Aim, were remarkable ; his unwearied Care, his refined Policy, and his encreafing Power, made him formidable to the moft diftant, and courted by his neigh- bouring Powers. But his Heart was as dark and deceitful, as his Words feemed fair and open ; his private Intereft was preferred to the moft folemn Treaties ; no Oaths, no En- gagements could bind, where an Fvalion of- fered a temporal Advantage. Such is Philip rcprefented by Hiftorians j and in the Courfe C of [ 10 ] of his Affairs, his Actions will tcftify the Truth of thefe Obfervations. Greece was divided into feveral States, the chief Strength of which confifted in their Union ; as the Power of E?iglandi and its Allies, fubfifts by that indiflbluble Connec- tion of Treaty. , - • The King of Macedon was a common Enemy to them all in general, and equal- ly endeavoured to fupplant the whole, by fomenting Divifions or adling Hoflilities a- gainft fome, and laying others afleep with falfe Profeflions of Amity and Alliance. He quickly perceived the Athenians were the only People capable of putting a Stop to his Deiigns ; and upon attempting to crofs Ther- mopylay he found himfelf effedually retarded by a Fleet and Army ready pofted to guard that important Paffage. The Straits of Tbermopylce were the Bar- rier between Thebes and Macedonia, as the FlemiJJj Towns were the Barrier of Holland and France-, and it behoved as much the Athenians to infpcd the Motions of Philip, as it does England to have a watchful Eye Qv&x France and its Adherents. A Ceffation of Arms was concluded on by both Sides, and a Treaty was ratified, which '1,.. . i..: ;. .:-^; . carried -^-^ 11 ["] carried only the Appearance, not the Reality of a lading Peace: for Fhilip\ Condud was enough to convince every one, that his Intentions were no farther pacifick, than fuited with his Convenience. Yet ever fer- tile in Expedients, his Orators perfuaded tlie Athenians that he meant fincerely, while his Actions infringed every Article of the Treaty he had fo lately fworn to. Such is Gallic Faith, and fo far it may be relied on in Mat- ters of Confequence 5 for if we judge of Hi- ftory, by comparing one with another, we may find the Treaties with France (I will not particularize any) violated as foon as formed, and fee another Philip in the Heart of every Frenchman, But to proceed to our Narrative : This lafl: Truce, which may be fliled a barrier Treaty, was broke through as foon as concluded on ; Philip taking Advantage of the Security of Athens broke through the Limits, and ra- vaging the Allies deftroyed their Towns, difmantled their Citadels, all out of Good- w'U to the Athenians^ and the Safety of Greece in general. Let every Englijhman, when he perufes thefe Lines, re-confider the Policy of Philip not as a mere Event which happened above C 2 Two [ 12 ] Two Thoufand Years ago, but as that which niii^'ht, nay which hath been fcea in the late Treaties between Great Britain and France, Was not every Article of the Peace at Ryf- *wick, Utrecht, or Aix la Chapellc circum- V en ted by Policy, or infringed by Violence ? yei while our Arms have laid ftill, how oft have the Soothings of their AmbafTadors re- tarded all our Attempts, or deceived us with fpecious Appearances ? Such were the Re- marks that great Friend to public Liberty Demqfthenes himfelf made at the Ratification of the Peace. ' What, (fays he) has not < Philip done to recommend himfelf to any •• of the Grecian States, rather than to you ? * Are not his Views larger and more extent * five than merely affronting you ? Yes ! But * having univerfal Subjection in his Eye, and * regardlels of Law, Jufticc, or Equity ; he ^ knew well (O my infatuated Countrymen) * thu you were not proper Confederates in * fj h an Enterprize: he faw too plain that ' yju. as Friends to univerfal Liberty, both * ?om the Conftlrution of Government, and * vour free and generous Spirit, would be 1 litde inclined to alTift the Favourers of Sla- ^ very, even when employed againft Enemies. ^ On the contrary, That yoi4 would witli ^ Violence i I [ '3] ' Violence oppofe all Meafurcs, that * might tend to fuch a Confequence.' Such was the Opinion of tlie greateft Orator and Statefman that ever llione in the brightcfl: Age of Learning and Science. I have pre- ferved, 1 hope, his Sentiments, although I have purpofely avoided a literal Tranflation, that the Parallel might be more plainly dif- cerned. But let it be allovi^ed to purfue the Orator ftill farther : * Is not this, he exclaims, * a Proof of the higheft Regard and Tefti- * mony of the Veneration he pays to your * Generofity ? Yes ; Philip himfelf owns, * that no private Intereft can fvvay you, my * Countrymen, to accept an Equivolcnt for * the Slavery of your Allies/ Such were the Words of the Athenian Statefman. Let thefe Confiderations move us ; the Danger of our Neighbourhood with Pi>/A)>, in the Moft Chriftian Majefty of this Age, is I hope plainly feen : but at the fame time let the Supinenefs and the wavering Difpofi- tion of our Allies convince us of our Impor- tance 5 how necefiary it is, at this Jund:ure, to exert our Power to hinder that exorbitant Dominion from increaflng and overwhelm- ing our Laws, our Liberty, which it plainly jlefigns to attempt, Having [ H ] Having laid down thefe Precautions, let us rell: awhile to defcribe the prefent Power of France, that England may not only difccrn the Danger, but at the fame Time guard againfl it with timely Care and Con- dud. We all know that in Extent of Coun- try, France, by her Incroachments on the neighbouring States, ex eds any whofe Do- minions are near enough to give her Um- brage ; here Ihe is evidently the Superior: Add to this, if we reflcd: on her Lands abroad, we find her Settlements flourifhing in We;.i:h and Plenty, remitting the Conve- nlencies of Life to their parent Country ; and well defended from foreign Infults. At home we fee, it is true, the Commons in ex- treme Poverty j but the Public immenfely rich ', we fee the People, amidft their appa- rent Mifery, flill ready to facriiice their Lives and Fortunes for the Glory of their Monarch: We fee diem tamely fubmit to the Oppreflion of a military Force, which makes all Europe tremble -, we fee them chearful, under a Ty- ranny which they can never exchange for Freedom ; and enriched with the Follies of thofe with whom they have DealingG. In Policy are they not allowed to excel ? Are .. . : not [ 15 ] not tlicir Generals {killed in the Art of War, beyond thofe of other Countries ? These are Points I leave to be decided, by thofe whofe Capacicy may enable tJiem to determine with greater Exadnefs : But this I believe is granted, that the King of France is abfolute, with a prodigious military Power, a Country full of People ready to obey hij» Call, and Revenues capable of executing anv Projedt which the mofl unbounded Dcfirc of Glory could fuggeft. Thus I have defcribed, with pretty appa- rent Truth, the State of our Country widi Refped: to its Enemies : But before we pro- ceed farther, let us draw a fliort Parnilel of the feperat*"! Hiflories, to prcfcrve Conncc* tion and prevent Obfcurity, the too general Fault of a political Treatifc. We have pur- fued the Narrative down to the lall Peace, as far as the Comparilon will hold : For the enfuing Part, let us confider their Condud with Regard to what may happen, rather than with an Eye to paft Events. We have feen the King of Macedofr, though feated on a Throne enviroricd with foreign and domc- ftick Enemies ; yet by the Infinuations of Policy, and Force of Arms, repel the Attacks of the fmaller States ; and lay the Sufpicions of [ i6] of Others afleep, by the Arts of Perfuafiorl and falfe ProfeiTions of Peace and Friend- Hiip. We have (ccn the Allies of Athens hairafTed with the Sword of Warj we have feen the confederate Cities fold for Slaves j we have (qqw OlynthnSy Amphipolisy and the reft of the States, perifh by the Hand and Deceit of Pfjilip ; was not Thejfalia fubjeded by his Flattery, more than his Arms when under the Pretence of delivering them from Tyrants, he fomented their internal Divili- ons ? did he not introduce, by degrees, that Slavery he affedcd to extirpate ? Was not this our Cafe, when our Allies were plundered, our Armies beaten, our fo- reign Garrifons fubdued ? Was not Flanders (a Country abounding like ^hejfalia in Wealth and Plenty) reduced to open its Gates to the Conquerors ? Was it not fub- dued more by the Louis d'Ors of France^ than the Arms of Frenchmen F And when the Treaty was concluded on. how was it ratified, and what were the Articles ? I (hall avoid a Recital difagrceable to the Ears of every Fnglijhman, who can feel for the true Good of his Country. But the Peace was made ; and both Sides, tired with the Expence and Trouble of a deftrudiv© War, I 11 *.vJ^-> T [^7] War, which mined the Commerce of hoth Parties, were induced to lign the Treaty: A Treaty which lias proved an Introdu- tians i a Nation of fo heavy a Genius, by Reafon of die GrofTnefs and Humidity of the Air, as to become a proverbial Expref- fion ; their Situation lay convenient for Trade i but low, damp, and liable to In- undations of the Sea. They were a Peo- ple juft in their private, but inflncere with Regard to public Dealings ; their Parts were folid, adapted to their Govern- ment ; Friends to Liberty, but neither fpe- cious nor penetrating: They had produced one Commander, who had preferved their Freedom \ but after his Dcadi they were re- duced to afk Aiiiflance from Athens^ by ^ whofe * The Situation of Boiotia, fcsms not very unlike Xlollund, "' , I >vlioro Aiil flic again floiiriflicd and prcfcrv • cd her Dignity : A Service which (l)c repaid with the higlieil Ingratitude j for on every Occafion flic deceived her Allies, and made it plainly apparent, that \^ Athens was not be- trayed, flic might impute it ratlicr to Imbe- cility or Cowardice, than to the Good-will of the Boeotians, The LaceiLenionhnis were a Nation, \\\i(.\ under the Influence of good Commanders, had extended their Power, and rendered themfelves formidable and rcfpccHed ; Tlicir Interefts were evidently joined with the jltbc- nians to fupprefs the growing Power of Md- cedon^ fince Lacedcemonia could not fland ii' the Liberty of Athens was invaded. Tiie People, though degenerate from their Aiicc- ftors, were grave, folid, and fententious^ juil to one another, but cruel to their jMiemics ^ quick to conceive, How to execute -, they liad not th€ fprightly Imagination of the Atbeni- rns, but excelled them in Strength of reafon- ing and Solidity of Judgment; and had the Force of their iVrms been equal to their Sen- timents, they A\ould have been an over- match for tb.c Axthenuvu or the Mac c do- mans. D 2 Such [ 20] Such \v2iS Lacedcemon at tlieTime of the Peace j for by a Succeffion of weak Kings it was greatly diminifhed in its Authority over the reft of GreecCy and was more celebrated for fpeaking with Judgment than ading with Wifdom ) but ftill it feemed firmly refolved to exert itfelf to expel Pbilipy as the Oppofer of publick Liberty. Tkffhli T, weak in itfelf, and incapable of aflifting others, became Slaves to Thebes or Macedonia^ as either prevailed. The fmalier Grecian States were of but little Confequence 3 too weak to refift, yet unwilling to fubmit, they condemned the Condu(5t of which they were the Pr^di- fers. Such were the Allies oi Athem as:ainft the Power of the moft politic Prince in Europe^ whofe Influence was much more extenfive than his Dominions ! The Phoceansy indeed, were engaged by a ftridt Bond of Alliance to aflift them ; but what could be expeded from a Nation fo opprefTed with the moft dreadful Calami- ties ? The Argrces and Mejfenians hung waver- ing in the Balance of Philip or the allied States m [21] States, in order to throw themfclves into the rifing Scale. In this Light we fee the confederate Forces, not aififting, but g^rowing jealous of the Athenian Power, which it was their Interefl to have cherilhed and pro- teded. But amidflall thefe difcouniglng Circuni- ftances, Athens (lili held up her Head ; flie mourned the Peace flie had concluded, yet was refolved not to be the iirfl to infringe the Treaty: Some peftilent Orators were rafii enough to propofe fuch Violences j but their Advice was over-ruled by the wlfcr Athc- niam^ and particularly Bemojihenes^ who, in an Oration compofcd for that Purpofe, ufed invincible Arguments to prove the Truth of his AfTertion. Thefe Arguments are drawn chiefly from the NecefTities of their Allies, their own timid Condu6l, and their fubmiirive CourtfLip of Fhilip : * But ilill (fays that * excellent Statefman) fhould we fubmit to * farther Difad vantages ? No certainly : The * Truce is made, and we have fworn to ob- * ferve the Articles ; but fhould Phi/ip any * more violate that Peace, he becomes the * Agrefibr, and the Allies can no loiigcr be * rleafed with a Gen er;il 'vhofe Conduct j. * gives r =2 ] * gives thcni fuch Caufc for Sufpiclon : In * this Cafe, they mull join witli you tliro' * Policy, to avoid a general Oppreflion.' SucTT were the Arguments Demojlhcncs made Ule of; and the Macedonian foon fup- plied liim with a plaufible Reafon for com- mencing riolliiities. It has been mentioned that the Athenians drew a great Part of their Weahh from their foreign ColonieSj which not only conftituted the Strength of their Revenues, but were necefTary Checks on the neighbouring States, and a vail: Accefiion of Pov/er to their owii Repubhc : They knew their Importance, and, by powerfully fupporting them with Forces and Soldiers, convinced their Enemies what a Value they placed on their Trade, and how far they imagined their political Intereft was connected with their commercial Advan- tages. Philip was too clear fighted not to difcern the: -Views, and with the fame Ardour rc- folved to gain by Conqucil, what they had determined to defend to the utmoil Extre- mity. Such was their Situation at the Time of the Peace. Hk liad before, taken many Places in Thrace from the Alhcnians^ with an Inten- tion [ 23 ] tloii of lettling his Troops behind their foreign Colonies, and by Degrees incroaching upon all their Lands and Pollcfficns j which mufi: ruin their Commerce, and bring them to whatever Terms of Peace he fhould chufe to impofe. He made a Pretence indeed of lliewing a Kind of Right, but this was fo very frivolous and trifling, that Philip him- felf, though Mailer of the greated Art, and capable of rendering the m^fl tri\i:U Cir- cumftances ufeful, had but little Dcpendar.cc on any Thing but I'orce. To this he applied his Thoughts, and began with ravaging the Lands, and deflroying the I'owns, in tlie upper Country, imagining pcrliaps tliat the Athenians would again be footlicd vrith liis Profeffions of Alliance and Fnendfliii). But hcvdn P/jilij) himfelf vras deceived; for DiopitheSy the Commander of the Aihe^ nian Forces in thofe Parts, Icoking upon this Condud: of the Macedonian in its true Li^ht, and confcious that the Republic would ap- prove of fo Ipirited and at the fame Time fo juft a Reprifal, fuddenly enters Thrace, and makes the Subjedts of Maccdon flifFer the fame Evils they had infliited upon his Friends and Allies, Thilip [24] Philip being employed with all his Forces in a different War, was obliL^ed to have Re- coiirie to Remonftrances by Letter, which he gave the Atheniam with Profufion. That the Letters fliould be fent and received, is no way flrange ; but that they {hould be near taking Effect, is undoubtedly furprizing : Yet fuch was the venal Difpofition of the Orators at that Time, that many were found who would have brought Diopithes to a Trial ; as if his Defence of the Country and Colonies, was a Crime worthy of Death : The only Difficulty in Difpute, was whether he ought to have begun the War without a formal Declaration. Demojlhenes was his Advocate, who, mounting the Tribunal of Harangues, em- ployed the Force of his Rhetoric, not more in defending Diopitl'cs, than in ^cculing Philip of tlie Violation of Treaty : * For if, * fays that accomplifhed Orator, Philip is not * in Motion with his Forces, or if he does ' not invade your Allies ; or if he does not ' privately negotiate to procure you Enemies, * and if he withholds no Places contrary to the * Treaty, let us then obferve the Peace : But ' if it is undeniable that Philip has notc:;- * ouily infringed every Article, even long * before I [ 25 ] * before the Departure of Diopithes ; (who * is now charged with Beginning the War) * if he has excited the reft of Greece to com- * mcnceHoftilitiesagainftyou; who will aflert, * that Peace or War is in our Choice ? Force to * Force is the only Meafure we have left j un- * lefs we content ourfeives with the Suppofi- * tion xh2LtPhilip is not at War ; while theCita- * del o^ Athens remains unmolefted .' And in a- notherPlace: * If we difband our Forces, what * fhall we do when he invades thofe Coun- * tries ? Why, we will accufe Diopithes : 'What then? We will fend Afliftance. But ' what if the Winds fhould prevent their fail- ' ing ? Then we will truft that Philip will * not invade us. — O Athenians ^ would not * Philip himfelf wifh that you might reafon * fo abfurdly.' He concludes with the ftrongeft Exhortations, rather to approve than condemn his Condud:, to enlarge his Command rather than difband his Forces. Whether or not this Advice was ftridly fol- lowed we are uncertain ; but the Truth of his Arguments is too evident to be farther explained. However from what lias been faid, this In- ference may be drawn ; that fometimes it is allowable to begin a War without a fornal Declaration. E Phtljp I'r'^ B r; '";! [26] Philip, after this, turning his Views to- Policy rather than Force, employed all his. Agents in PeloponnefuSy endeavoured to fubvcrt their Councils, and by his winning Bchaviouf almoft perfuaded the States, to believe his Caufe the mofl juft and equitable : nay, if the Rhetoric of Deimjihenes had not removed the ImprelTions his Offers had made on their Hearts, he would have feizcd the Whole, without enduring the Labour of a fingle Campaign. ' But Providence determining otherwife, the Eloquence of one Man overweighed the Power of Philip, although united with the Terror of his Army. Being baffled in this Negotiation, he turn- ed his Thoughts to Eubocay an Ifland which lay conver/iently fituated for didivtGin^ Attica : as he had before attempted the Place with- out Succefs, he failed not at this Time to employ every artificial Machinery of Politicks to win over the People to his Intereft ; bribed Priefts, worked on their Superftition, and by the all-potent Influence of Gold opened every Fortrefs, and gave a ready Inlet to the Ma- eedoniahs to enflave the Country. Yet even then was Athens fo infatuated, as to believe that his Defigns tended not to the Damage of [27 ] of GreecCy or that they endangered j^nica in :particular ; which they ought to have appre- hended, not more from the Troops ot Phi- lips than the Difpolition of the Inhabitants of Euhoea, The Euboearnvf^xt generally in Extremes, cither Patriots or Traitors j of a volatile Tem- per inclined to Profafion and Luxury i changeable, hafly^ yet generous and fincere when attached to a Particular ; being pallio- nate and at every Man ca- pable of commanding : The unhappy Eife<^t of too much Liberty. Demojihcnes, however, could flill with his Eloquence be of Service to the Country : He it was, who infpired the Jhebans with fuch Warmth and Ardour for Liberty, that nei- ther the Artifices of Philif^ EmbalTadors, nor their natural Timidity, could withfland. This was a Condud worthy of Liberty itfelf 3 to aflift the States almoft againft their Will, and to attempt the Deliverance of Greece al- moft unaffifted. With Regard to the Event, the bad Suc- cefb was owing entirely to Fadion and Party- F 2 Spirit; *> [ 36 ] Spirit; f:r had the Generals in Battle, fhewn the lame Condud as the Citizens fhewed Ardour and Courage, Greece would have been delivered, and not enflaved on the decifive Plains of Cheer onca. Yet fuch was her Fate j Philip triumph- ed over Liberty, and the unhappy Condudt of the Confederates became a lafting Ex- ample to fuccecding Ages, to fliew how far Party-Zeal and Prejudice is conducive to the Ruin of a Republic. Thus I have touched upon the principal Periods of the Mucedonian and Athenian! IFIi-* fi-ories, with all poilible Concifeaefs. Some may perhaps imagine, that I have affecfted an Obfcurity of Stile, and would have more underftood than expreffed. But to clear all Doubts thut may arife, if any Sufpicion of that k.nd ihould be objedled; I declare, that I look upon Perij)icuity in writing to be of fo Incftimable a Value, that any one who claims the Name of Author, ought to reje(^ the Charms of Eloquence, or the mere Pomp qI Words J if by that Means he can thro^v any more light on bis Performance. But [ 37 ] But it is now Time to addrefs inylelf to thofe who have not miftaken my true Mean- ing, but imagine that my only intention was to draw a Parallel between the Hldories, that I might the eafier convince thole to whom I dedicate this Treatife, how far the Danger has already proceeded, and warn them by my Exhortations, to retard its Pro- grefs. Here an Objedlion may be flarted, I con- fefs, that as the Government of Athens^ and the Conftitution of Rnglandy are fo widely different, the Comparifon will not hold al- together ; and fo confequently this Hiftoiy cannot with any Juftice be given as a Paral- lel : And if the Circumflances are not agree- able the one with the other, then the Force of the Arguments will fall to the Ground. My Anfwer to this will be : I grant the Difference of their Government ; but deny the Conclulion, becaufe I have only traced ;.bei! Condud:, without defcribing their Mc- i;:;/ d- of governing. I grant alfo that my Deng"' will be effedlually deflroycd, if the Fads fhould not bear a due Corrcfpondence. T^ But let the P'a6ts therefore fpeak for themfelves. Our [ 38 ] Our prefent Government is by the Majo- rity of the Nation, thought fo excellent, and fo harmonioully conneded, that it would be depreciating its Merit, to compare it with any other in prefent or former Ages : Yet even this may be deftroyed by Fadion, Party- Zeal, and inteftine Jars. With thefe alone, fhall I compare it to the Athenian Republic ; and I wifli I could fay with Juftice, that even here it would not bear a Comparifon. We have i^QQw how rival Parties have pre- ferred a Chares :< ^he Command ; how Cor- ruption prevailea the public Council, and how the Orators would have perfuaded the People that the moll: flagrant Ads of Philip's Injuftice, were done out of Kindnefs and Good-will. 1 do not here mean to infinuate that any of our illuftrious Senate are venal j but if there ihjuldbe fome few, there ftill remains a Num- ber impregnable to the Attacks of Philip's Louis d'Ors, and fufficient to over-ballance the corrupted Divifion. Yet this will little avail, while in the rival Parties of our De^ mojihenes and Mfchines^ we fee Prejudice pre- vail over Judgment. A ?! C 39] A Union fhould then be efFeded, fince by thefe mutual Animofities we forward the In- trigues of our Enemies : Would they not at any Price fow Divifions among our Councils, while they infenfibly aggrandized their own Dominion, and left the rival Parties in Eng^ land the fole Satisfadtion that they had been made the Dupes of France F Then we may boaft we have made a Peace, and procured a prefent Repofe, that we may be afterwards Slaves to Perpetuity : This is a melancholy Refledtion ! But for the Truth, let me ap- peal to the Hiflory I have juft recited j let us compare the Fadts, and then judge of the Confequence. When the Peace was proclaimed through- out all the Dominions of the European Powers, each Side feemed to lament their hard Conditions, as if none had been a Gainer : But France was, and fhe alone ; to witnefs her Incroachments, her numerous Invajlions, her frequent Campaigns, in which {he never loft any confiderable Advantage, but gained many : we fhall find her Power extended beyond its former Limits, in a very large Degree ; we (hall find her politic Con- dudl to be fuch that her Acquifitions were cer- [40] certain, and what ihe was to furrender lei"-' fened only the Shadow of her Power, while the Subflunce was left entire and undimi* ni/lied. Nor let it be deemed a Falfity to aflert, that the Power of the French is larger fince the Peace, than it was at the Commence* ment of the late War. No furely, fays an Englijhman, their Influence over us is great- ly leflened by the Demolition of Dunkirk : Dunkirk is demolifhed by the Treaty of Utrecht^ and renewed by the Treaty of Aix^ la-Chapelle : Well, if we fuppofe it is fb, I would fain know what difference a few Baf- tions could make in the politic Syftem of Europe: But let this over fanguine Patriot but pafs over the Water, and fee how this great Demolition has been repaired ; he will there behold every Artifice which Fortifica- tion will fupply, to render a Place impreg- nable : Yet England may reft fecure, be- caufe Diuikirk is demoliflied ! .;.,., But even thefe Politicians, fo fecure of Peace, are at a Lofs how to account for their Condud in the Wejl-Indian Colonies, and by their Silence feem to confefs that it re- quires a particular Explanation. With Re- gard [+1 ] gard to their Importance, I have fo often in this Work, and fo ftrongly exprelTcd myfelf on that Head, as to render a farther Rcpre- fentation needlefs ; and only refer thofe who are defirous to be better inftrudled, to a late publifhed Pamphlet ; entitled, " Reliedlons ** on the Importance of our America?! Plan- " tatlc.is." The French Condudl appears here in its tnit Light J their fecret and deceitful Pradi- fes with the Indian Chiefs, their alienating the Affedions of the Natives by their cun- ning Treatment, their unjuft Encroachments during the Time when the moil folemn Treaty fubfifted ; all prove the firft Infringe- ment of Peace to be on the Side of France^ and not of England, What then could a maritime State at- tempt for her own Defence r Is not a na- val Armament the only proper Bulwark to relift Invaders? And if fo, may not that State, when attacked, make Ufe of thefe Arms ? But England has been attacked j and if that is allowed, the Confequence is too plain to be more particularly expreiled. If then, we may exclaim with Demofihe- nes, they have been deficient in every Article G of [ 42 ] of the Treaty, the Engagement on our Side is dilTolved •„ and we may commence Hoflili- tif vuHoi t Declaration of War, as againfl Pii. .. or Robhers. Bu r as in thefc hafly and fudden Attacks, we often rafhiy undertake without Premedi- tation, and are hurried into a War unprepa- red and undifciplined ; fo in this Place there is a large Field to commend the Care of the Adminiftration, who at fo fliort a Notice could provide a Fleet and an Army, not only capable of spreading Terror into the French Troops and Settlements, but to put an ef- fedual Stop to the Progrefs of their Arms. Yet even here we fuffered by the Mif- fortune of Party-Prejudice, and faw another Chares exalted to Power and Preferment, while the Virtues of a Phocion lay concealed : But Merit will buoy up at the laft : and what Praifes are due to him who could in fo (hort a Space recover the Affedlions of the aliena- ted Nations, and with unequal Forces not only engage but extirpate a vidlorious Army, and drive the Troops of this modern Philip from their Fortrcffcs and Setdements ? If we may judge of the future by the pad, wliat may we not exped from an Hero who i has i [ +3 ] has proved himfelf unfuffering by Pain or Fatigue ; whofe Condudt is equal to his Va- lour, and whofe Fortitude is lliperior to both. Such are thofe who may be eftccmed tlie true Supports of a State : nor arc there want- ing a fufficient Number at this Time in Eng- landy who may juftly be entitled to fuch an Appellation. Flim then we ought with all our Power to affift, and by fupporting him with all neceffary Implements whereby he may work his Delign, convince our Enemies that we are on our Guard in every Place. Lr us not endeavour fo much to extend, as proted: our Colonies; let us trufl to uur- felves, without Dependance on the Forces of the allied States ; and we can never again be deceived with falfe infignificant Qu()tas, and treacherous and evafive Embaffics : We /hall again rife to the fame Dignity, and exert tlie fame Superiority which Britannia maintain- ed when file held the political Balance of the Power of Europe, But if we negledl all proper Cautions, if ourCouncils remain dillinited, if claQiing In- terefts prefer their own to the public Good, what may we not apprehend from the Vi- G 2 % gilance If ' [ 44 ] gilance of Philips and from our Infenfi- biJity. Yet if we believe and truft to the indo- lence of particulars, the Treaty is ftill pre- ferved ; although our Allies around us have feparately been attempted by the grand Cor- rupter, and are fo far difabled that by much the greater part are become almoU only Pro- vinces of France. Boeotia is now fo reduced as to be fcarce able to ftile herfelf independant; and can only now complain of her Weaknefs, wlien fhe might have exerted her Dominion : The/- fall a is too weak, and fubjed:, to be men- tioned in the Clafs of Allies ; and Lacedce^ 777011 is too degenerate to be matched with Athc7is or Macedonia. From whence then mufl: we receive Af- fiflance ? Shall we again be deceived by the Boeotians 3 or rely on the Favour of the La^ cedcemojiiam ? Will the PhoceanSy opprefled and funk with Calamities, be able to help us ? No 5 although with the ftrideft Alliance they have preferved a Faith inviolate, yet their miferable and defponding State, de- mands even more Affillance than Englaiid could fupply. Happy [45] Happy the Monarch whofe Care extends to univerfal Charity, and blcft the People who can view them with fuch difintcrellcd Compaffion. — JLvtry EngliJJman will perceive for what Monarch, and for what People, I defign this Eulogium. Thefe are the chief Alliances oi Great Britain', and on which of them flie ought to rely would be hard to de- termine. Let Negotiations pafs on Negotiations, but let this Maxim be adhered to, That Eng- land depends alone on the power of England. Having inculcated this Maxim, I would not have it underftood that we fhould negledt our Allies, or their Interefts ; but only as to what concerns the Defence of our own Country, fince our Confidence in others has proved always uncertain, and often times more to our Prejudice than Advantage. With Regard to Euhoea (an Ifland fo con- tiguous and connected that it deferves to be particularly confidered) the Practices o^ Phi- lipy and the Artifices of defigningPriefls, arc too palpable to be concealed 5 and tho* as yet no Forces have entered the Place, yet we may diftinguifh the inward Workings of Policy, as attempting to eflablifh a Power which [46] which the Intcrefts of our Country require iliould be Itifled in its Infancy. The fupine and lazy Condudt of Athem had nearly cffeiSled their own Ruin i had not the vigorous Genius of one Commander pre- fervcd them from that imminent deftrudion. I'hofe who are the bed acquainted with this Point of antient Hiflory, will in the clearert: Manner difcern how this Conjundure was the Crilis on which the future Profperity of Athens^ or a final Conclulion of its Liberty, depended. Such is the prefent Period, with Regard to the Interefl of Great Britain ; not that I affert immediate Slavery will be the Confe- quence, but;, unlefs we ardently exert our- felves, that our Influence, even now much leffened, will fufFer a ftill farther Diminu- tion. I have, I think, compared part Fad:s with what has happened tc ourfelves, as far as they will go ; I hope with fome Degree of Propriety : As my Intention is clear, I hope my Performance will not want an Explana- tion. As I am drawing near a Conclufion, I (hall only endeavour to difplav the Schemes of [47 ] of Philip, j\nd offer a few Conjeaures on the Manner we fliould oppofe them. The Ma- cedonian Schemes have been {^q,\\ to hang on the fmall Point of a mere ecclefiaflical Dif- pute ; the ProdiKft of three or four Acres ; which involved Greece in fo diificult a War, that they embraced Slavery to be at Peace. The Defignsof Frj«^^, although fo con- cealed, feem to be turning on an Affair of as little Importance : This is the Eledion of a King of the Romans : For the Empire will be the Confequence ; and when fuch an Ac- quiiition of Dominions iliall come, will Hungary withftand the Torrent ? or the Ila^ lian States rcfufe to fubmit to the Power of France \ already accuftomed to Suojediion, and to the Yoke of the Empire ? If this is gained, will Holland withftand the Shock, even now unable to oppofe its Progrefs ? Spain, by Nature formed to refill the French Power, now gained by Alliance, will be found too weak and pufillanimous to attempt its Redudlion : What then will Bri- tain affume to herfelf, after fo general a De- fedion ; will fhe not be obliged to take up tvith Conceffions, unjufl and dilhonourable ? Cer- ■ [48 ] • Certainly flie will ; it is therefore her grand Aim to hinder this important Event. That this is the Defign of the French^ will, I fuppofe, be confidered as probable, by any one who refledls on the Means they ufe to accomplifli their Ends. Corruption is the Principle which Philip has difFufed fo plen- tifully through the G n States, that he will render them obfequious to his Will 5 by foothing Spain with falfe P-omifes of Advan- tage, and by a conftant arid perpetual Care of their fortified Places. But they feem flill to think that England is too powerful ; and by their late infinuating Meafures, and their prefcnt Violence, feem to leave no Method unattempted which may efFedl a Reduclion of our Influence on the Continent : No one is certain but even E?tg^ land may feel the Weight of an Invaiion -, or, which is more probable, that Irelajid may luffer under the Tyranny of Finance -, or that fome Dupe to their Deligns, may ilir up a Rebellion in Scotland : Any one of thefe would produce the Effeds they defire ; tliat of drawing our Troops from the AfTifla^ice of Allies whon-i it is our Intereft to defend. TheSi: [49] These are fome few of the Methods they may take, and, if not vigoroufly oppofed, will produce the melancholy Effedl I before mentioned, of fubjeding our Allies to the Dominion of our Enemies. The War to which we are provoked by this Gallic Perfidy, is not likely to be foon concluded : The Subjed is .00 important to be haftily decided, by either Englm^d or France : And for this Reafon our Meafures ihould be taken with the utmofl Caution, and exerted with Vigour. Let no Coniideration draw us from fup- porting our naval Armament j let us aug- ment our Forces in Americay but keep a fu^ ficient Number to guard our own Coails ; while our Ships harrafs the Enemy's Trade and Navigation, and cut off their foreign Supplies. By the reverfe Condud, we fuiTercd them in 1710, and the following Years, to be enrich 'd, prolonged the War, and were compell'd to agree to a felonious Peace, thro' that Overfight. The Athenians herein acTted wifely, and obliged Philip to fue for Peace ; but they committed an Error in not ading before, if when [5o] when their general good called upon them to defend their Allies : They were deceived by Artifice: Let us therefore not endeavour to imi- tate their Conduct, but reap Ad\'antagc from their Errors : Let us vigoroufly fupport our Allies ; not with bare Promifes, but with Deeds -, neverthelefs let our Dependance be on ourfelves alone : Let us make Diverfion$ to draw the Enemies Troop.- from our Colo- nies ; but by no Means adl the offenfive Part, fo far that we negled the defenfive. We fliould be found every where in Readinefs ; and, by a Treatment altogether mild and equitable, fecure the Friendlhip of tlie EU' joeam, and our other Neighbours, whofe AfFediions may be wavering, though no ways alienated. This, together with domeflic Troops, will fecure us at home, and convince France that we may again be terrible to theHouie ofBour^ bon. Were this Plan for our Operations fol- lowed, I am apt to imagine that our Allies on the Continent would be confirmed in their Friendfliip ; that the States of Germany^ who adt for France^ through Fear, and not with Affection, would be glad to renounce a League which mull give her univerfai Domi- nion ' [51] riion on the Continent of Europe: That Spain would at leafl be neutral, we are cer- tain ; and that Holland would again aflert her Liberty. This might be efFeded by Force and Policy, but never by Bribery and Corruption : But if, like AthenSy we fupinely reft till this modern Philip has feized the Empire, this meer contemptible Name of King of the Ro- mans, will be a Caufe of Calamities unfpeak- able to the Allies in general, and to England in particular. We ihall find no modern Bceotiam ready tg hazard their Lives for their Country, but rather to fubmit tamely to the Yoke ; our Power mufl: inevitably decreafe ; nor would it then be in our Determination, even to finifli the War like Athens^ by one decilivc Engagement. By the drawing thefe parallel Fadts, I have in fbme Degree, I hope, anfwered my pro- pofed Defign, of exhorting my Country to ufe all poflible Precautions againft the Policy, Perfidy, and Arms of Jr^;/^-^, by fetting the Danger in Profped before them : A Dan- ger which jheir own Pears encreafe ; but which, [ 52 ] whiphj.ir we exert, ourfelves acdboiing to our. nauiral Strength and Interefi, will dimi-^ nifh as we approach nearer. >,,,,/, ^^^^. .; ^ In the Charaders I have drawn, I believe I have not' exceeded the Truth -, and if my Inferences are not deduced like a Statefman, let the Intention juftify the Attempt. But if ever Indolence, Luxury, and Corruption fhould become the fole Ends of the Admini- ftration, in vain fliall our Phocmt defend our American Plantations 3 in vain fhall our great and royal Commander, exert a laudable Dif- cipline amongft his Troops 3, and in vain fhall our Sovereign, for his paternal Indulgence, be ftyled the Father of his People, 7 ■■^\^- • :::./ ;• .; f: \. . 1 -' < i ^^ '- it ' t •••:r ,' -■•■,» .( F I N I S. . » T . . i. ) . . . ... t - -