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Letter from the Hague, O N THE lE.zxXoiCheJierfield'^ Embaffy andASi^r- cefs^ and the Emperor s Death ; Wherein the late Change in our Miniftry^ the prefent Views and Interefts of the Powers of Europe^ and of the Empire particularly; and the Strength and Weak- nefs of France and her Enemies, are con- fidered in a new but natural Light* y ^ ■ ' ■ ■ ■' ' . I ■ Done from the French. L N D N: . Printed for M. C o o p t r , in P ater-Nofier Row, M.DCC.XLV. [Price One Shilling.] *" T I. % ■•s. •.\> ^^-.^ .A .» •■ 'i' *»'.!■ ' A .«■•"■ St, .. "T V* 1 a g h r 3 5 f V THE • 1 _ * * ' Dutch Reafoner^ i Letter from the Hague y Scd -t^ >» I JK^ tlague^ PS, II, 1745* U have fent Us ah Am- ballador Extraordinary, the moft likely to aiifwer the Vi^ws of your Court you could pofTibly pitch uport.^ His Politehels, Affability, ' and other amiable Qualities render him a- greeable to all Ranks of our People ; but his known Integrity and Love of his Coun- ii'y recommend him particularly to our A 2 Statef- i ■ Statefmen, who have look'd with a more favourable Eye than ufual on your Cabinet^, finc^ tbc( late ^hange in your Miniftry. /, Wc l)cKcve, and I hope we are not mif. J taken, that your Syftem of Politics is al- tered, on a Suppofition that the New- comers had ftipulated for a Change of Meafures before they would confent to fliare in the Admmiflration. Nor arc we lefs perfuaded t&at- thme of the Miniilry who are join^ with them, did very wil- lingly^ concur in fuch a Prdi^iiinary, be- lieving It conducive to tlie Glory of tlie Prince, and Intereft of their Country. In a Word, we Hollancters look upon your prefgit Miniflrjj, as a» natural .and well- conneded " Work, which promifes -Solidity- and Duration. Some of its Individuals perhaps may have different Notions as to the Forms of Go- verprrreut ^ndieligious Woiihip ; but from what we . can learn of their political' T't- nets,. and let me; tell you that our Infor-. mations from England feldom are Errone- ouSj they have all the fame Views, with regard to Mcther-'Land^ an Epithet, which, you know, we Dutchmen^ by way of Ex- cellence, chtiie to bellow on our Native' oOll* '..'.. > • f ' •.?•.'■ We have ever look'd upon your Ihte- ' reft and our" own as In fcparable, with re- card tq RelilLion and Equiility of Power in , i 1 r ,urc4>^ te- :e- -I •■■a. ( S ) Europe: And if our Politics have not r always appeared tp ypu to be confiltc^nt with that blended Intereft, be affured tji^t the. Variadon was rather on your Side than, ours. Whenever we found your Cabinet influenc'd by an Intereft npt truly Britijb, we have altered our Meafurcs, and pro- bably not altogether to the Gouft of the Engii/Jj Nation in; General, without con- , fidering that the falfe Condudl pf their own Superiors had occafiond the Varia-; tion they difrelifh'd. ; - ■ . '« r Need I point out to you, who have fo long oppos'd and condemn'd the Meafqres- of your Cabinet, the Rcdlitude of ourT Condudl in not co-operating with its vague and fludluating Schemes fpr many Years; paft ? Whenever we can perceive the true Intereft of England purfued by your Mi- . nillry, we never fail co-operating with • them with all Willingnefs and Cordiality. Therefore, if we feem'd lometimes to be ; leis Pliant and Tradable, it was becaufe we conceiv'd your Politics to have been hi- . afs'd by Ibme foreign Intereft. And, Sir, allow \ me to afTure you that we, on this Side the ; Water, extend our Refledion to the per- : fonal Charader of your Minifters. Thofc/ fumed for Honour, Virtue, and Probity, in private Life, leldom fail of making I good Minifters ; and why ? but becaufe e- • very honcft Man muft love his Country and t • • ; . . , ' ' ■ ■ th^ . "t a IE 111 ( 6 ) the Comrtiunity ; that is, be a good Patriot^ and he who is fo will never approve, much lefs purfue Meafures injurious to what he loves. ^^ . ... Whenever we have feen Men of this a- miable Caft at the Head of your Affairs, we have willingly fufFer'd ourfelves to be guided by your JVJaxims. We have truft- ed to your Wifcfern, and aided you with our Power. In (hort, we rely'd on your Condudt, and countfed upon our Safety while you condudled, on a Suppofition, which all conliderate Dutchmen incline to, that he who is a good Englijhman muft be a Friend to Holland. At laft then, Sir, we fee, or flatter our- felves we do, fuch Men in your prel'ent Admi siftration as are thofe Friends to HoU land, which the true Interefl of their own Country direcfls them to be. ' We hav« fcruliniz'd the particular Charaddrs of the Principals of your Miniftry, and perfuade ourfelves we ice fo great a Fund of good Senfe and Probity among them, as promi- fes that they never can be at a Lofs in di- Ainguifhing the true frotn the falfe Inte- ; red of their C'ountry, or fteadily purfuing it when they have found it. Confidering how plain the Road to right Reafon is j confidering how obvious the true Intcreft of any Country is; confidering, in a Word, how much eafier it is for a Man to adl Honeftly than Villainoully, anvi # "ft •i \l M) f ni- idi- ite- It ^ V ■1 ( 7 ) and how much more Eligible, even in Point of Intercft, is Integrity than Dif- lioncfty, one would wonder how Men of Scnie could turn Sycophants and Par- ricides. But, I know not by what In- fatuation, we fee daily. Men that pafs for Senfible, committing fuch grofs Er- rors in the Government of States, that would aftoniih a Man of moderate Re- fledion. To fee them fwerving con* flantly from the plainefl Maxims in Na- ture, would incline one to believe that the Fault lay rather in the Heart than jHead. And I fear this has been your Cafe in England for many Years. Your late Mintjler particularly was thought to have Talents equal to the Truft repofed in him ; but as for his Honefty^ if I don't care to de- fcribe it minutely, let me fay, at leaft, that his immediate Predecejfor and he were fuppofed to take the fame indircdt Path to arrive at power in the State, and Influ- ence in the Cabinet. There might haye been a Biafs^ nor was it unnatural there (hould, to a Foreign Interefl. But it was'both Imprudent and Unnatural to feed and indulge that Foible, however Natqr^l and Prevailing with the PoiTcffor. An hgneft Man, in fhort, a good EngliJ}jnian, would endeavour to plunt the Edge of fuch an impolitic Biafs ; Wid m^ft prevail \>y thp Strength of Rea- 1^1 ( S > fon, which fo diredly {Joints to Self-inte^ refi in quitting it- Had this been done with Caution and AdJrefs, you Would have fecn long before now a Change of yolir oi^rn Meafures, and of ours aHo, which iilvirays ought, and would have been the fame, if the Intereft of Englan J only had been parfiicd. '-' *Ti9 pofiible foine Meii 6f weak Kxlnds or corrupt Hfearts may have imbib'd the erroneous, vulgar Notion, lately inculcat- ed by fome of your venal Writers, that du'r late Dllatoriiiefs in embarking openly with England again ft trance^ W2ls owing to the Influence of French Cori^uption. But, Sir, however Men lefs enlighten'd or more prejudit'd than yoti, may Judge Unfavourr ably anti^l/nlctjliitably of d^r Faith and Underftandin^, I'aflureii^yfelf you do, add have always entertained other Notions of Dutch Probity and SteadineiS. What In- dications have we giv^n that ever we would barter away Liberty for a'pert!y execrable Bribe?' what is or was there iii the Power of France t6 give, that coufd atone for the Lofs of F/eddotii ? . Sir, i&ttt is not 2. D'ufchrhany of ahy Refledtion liv- ing, that could be bribed ;tb ejtchange li- berty for Chains. • ■ '■ ' ' ^ But need I teH you' this? need I attemjit exculpating the States General to yoii, wb^ liave^ fo oft^n, .fincc the EmpeitJf V ' ^ Charles f :n done ild have of yolir which ; been 'IvJnds b'd the ncultat- that dur \\y with 5 to the Jut, Sir, ' more ifavonf-r th and lo, and tions oif 'hit In- ; would rcrabi^ iii the coufd r,'tlit!tV on livi. igeEi-i ittem^t mperof Charles ( 9 ) Charles the 6th's death, applauded theif Politics and condemn'd your own? Sure I am, you huve not approved of the Conduct of your own Cabinet, and I won't doubt that your Motives of Dif- like v;ere well founded. And, Sir, if you yourfelf and the Majority of your Peo- ple have difapprov*d of the Meafures of yoUr Cabinet, can you wonder we did not approve of them ? Can you, in fhort, wonder we did not embark implicitly with Minifters whofe ^Condudt we difliked, no lefs than we were fufpicidus of their Abi- lities, their Steadinefs, and Integrity ? We faw no Reafon for fuppofing that they had the true Intereft of England at Heart * and, as I hinted before, unlefs they gave Proof of being good EngliJJom?n, we were Very fure they would not be goodiDutchmen, The Principals oi your two lafl Ad-^ miniflrations were feemingly of very dif- ferent Characters, but yet in the Main, they were not fo unlike as the World ima- ^jn*d. They Were both of them Bullied by Nature, but of different Calls. The K72ight was a pacific, negociating Bully, who put on big Looks, and attempted frightening all Europe with Treaties and Alliance?, but funk into mere Cowardice before the Steady and Refoltite. His im- mediate Siiccelibr was a bulUing, fwag- v!;erlT>2; Bm11\^ afTumlns: an Air of Reib* B Uuion, fi i:f ' 1 t ,'. n ■ folution, threatening to l^nook any Man on the Head tjiat fliould fay nay, and tread- ing on the Corns of all who flood in his Way 5 but in the Main, loved Blows and Bloodflied no better than the Treaty- inonger. How did he Vaunt and Bounce as foon as he was invefted with Power ? and yet how fneakingly did he creep along afterwards ? How inglpqoi^s did he mif- «fe the Advantages which Chance gave him over the Enemy ? How did he im- prove the Advantage at Dettingen the reft of that Campaign ? and what Advantage did he take of the Weaknefs of Prance laft Campaign, after the French march'd from FUnders to j^Iface? Or what did your vaft Maritime Superiority avail you i» the Mediterranean ^mcc he held the Reins? The Minifter, like the Bird of Tempeft, inafl: love living in a Storm, or he never yrould difrelifh the pacific Propofals made to him at Hanau. Had he a thou fand Lives, they would be all too few to atone for fb capital a Miftake. Did he confult the Ba- lance of Power, the general Good of Ger- many, the pretended Good, of his own Country, and the Peace and Happinefs of Mankind, he would have clofed with the Propofals of Peace offered at Htviau, And there muft have been fome fecret Motive, as yet unexplored, for his Contempt of the Offers made hirn for putting an End to 1: 4 I ■I 4 t MPanott I tread- 1 in his Dws and Treaty- Bounce Power ? p along le mif- e gave he im- he reft vantage France narch'd lat did you \vk leins? mpeft, never made Lives, for fo leBa- Ger- ovvn lefs of ih the And otive, Df the id to C" ) iSxt War. They talk'd of particular Re^ fentmentSy and Views to certain Seculariza- tions ; but I am perfuaded that the Prolon- gation of the War was more owing to fomC private View of the Minifter's, than any peculiar R6fentment of the Prince's. There fecms, in every Inftance, to have been a premeditated Defign of raifing and extending the Storm. If the Minifter had not intended an Incrcafe of the Publick Confufion, would he have flighted the Mediation of his Fruffian Majefty, a Prince perhaps too eafily Difgufted, and not fo cafily Pacify*d ? Had Tie not defign'd to encreafe the Alliance againft the Queen of Hungary y would he have publifli*d the I oth Article of the Treaty of Worms till the Moment it diould be thought proper to put it inExecutiph? Was it prudent to have exafperatcd a State, which, tho' not Powerful, might be of great Advantage to Spam in her Views on the Milattefef A wife Man would liet^r force a jealous Peo- ple from their Neutrality. Suppofing the king of Sardiriia ihfifted that the Court of Vierma fhoitld niakc him a Ceflion of the Queen's Righit to Fm^/, did it follow, that thd CefTio^cu^t to be publifli'd as fbon as made ? I Kopfe the Face of Affairs in Italy will foon be chang'd to the Difad- vantage of Spain -, but iliouKl it not, I ain B ;•. ftead- f\ i'i' ( 12 ) (Icadfaftly of Opinion that the Gencefe will contribute not a little to the Succefs of that Crown. And who was it that pufh'd.t{iein into the Arms of Spain ^nd France ? ; „ , Some perhaps may wopdcr why a Dutcb^ man would take upon him to ccnfure the Conduct of an Englifi Minifler j but you, Sir, who are confcious that all important Miftakes in the Cabinets of cither .State muft afFejfl the other, wilj, I aflure ray-^ ielf, readily excufe any decent Freedoms I may be oblig'd to take ^ith your Statef- inen. Their capital Errors and ours reci- procally affedl both States, which gives each a tacit Right to animadvert on tjie Condud: of the other. Befides, as I am now acr counting tp you for our Condudl for the two or three laft Years, \ atpi under a Ne- celllty of producing your late jyiiniller. ia his natiye Light, or at leall: in th^t in which \\t appeared to me. For had his C^ondud: been Regular and Uniforra, had his; Views l3een to the general Happinefs of Mu^ope^ or particular Intereft of hi? pwn pountry, I)ad his Meafures bepji conflftenf with found Politics 3 in fine, had his Heart been truly Englijh, v^e would have epibark'd with you openly in the Common Caufc long before 3VIy Lord Chejlerfield came to hx our l^efplves. ', • : ^^i, ^;i ^^ . ., ,. ,^,, 'M ^. i ♦ 1 at ^ h cfe will of that d.tjiein Dutch^ ure the Lit vou, portant r -State re my-' Ipms I Statef- rs reci- pes each 'ondud: DW acr for the a Ne- ller ia which ondud: Views )untry, found truly h you before our Eat i Ik I- « i * But let us draw the Veil of Oblivion pver what is pad, to indulge ourfelves with the Pleafure of the more pleafing Scene in View., Let us forget the Errors of your lateAdn^iniftratidn, to dwell ontheVirtuqs of the prefent. I cannot fay how yourpre^ fent leading Men are reljfli'd among dieir own Countrymen,. but with us here I can afllire you that we hold your Miiiiftry in the higheft Efteem. If we had not Infor- ipation of the perfon^l Merit of mod of them, we ihould be inclined to judge of ^hem by the noble Pattern you lately fent us. We could never fuppbfe that he would aflbciate with Men of different Principles with himfelf. No Temptation could in- duce hini to draw with the Faithlefs and Infinc^re, nor to go into Meafures incon- ijftent with the true Interefl of his Coun- try. We looked upon hiin as a true Eng- liJJjman v/h^nhQ wsiS herelafl; nprhas his Ipng and unwearied Oppolition tp your two kftMinifters alt€c^d our Opinion of him. Gn the contrary, ^his SteacJinef? on thofe Qccafions has heighten'd our Elteem of his Virtue, e rv>r,H tn '■■■■:£■{ 'bdi to ^n-jr ^ T And here, Sk, allow me to congratulatie you and your Country on the late Change pf youf Miniftry. It was a wife, and let me ^dd, aneceflary Step, which has gain'd you fhe Confidence n©t pnly of this State, but of I n f f « ^ i' 1 1- ft ■ ill t*4> moid of the Powers on the Continent, You already fee the good Effects of your Prudence, in the Succefs of your Ambaifa^ dor Extraordinary. Like Cafar^ ht no iboner came, and was fettn, but he fucceeded. You may reckon upon it. Sir, My Lord Chejkrfiild h^s obtakied for you all thai you exped:ed or defired. The States con*- cur in all your Views, and ftgree tb ^1 your Meafur^s. We make otit ^ufe of it, and are promis'd to eo all your Lengths. Wif have agreed to me Proportion of Expcnee which you youtfclvcs thought proper tb ailign us. We have, in motty comply'd with all you required of us, except declare ing War againfl France and Spain. And had your Oibinet receded as cooly on this' lad Point as your Ambaffador, we (hould have been di^ns^d from the Uiieaiineis^ of refuiing our Afleut Xq any Part of yeur Propofiils. ^-^ • ■■^' ^iv;-i. f.- ■ -v^- :^-\ You fhan't only Banre our Wiflies with you in profetcoting the Wair, but our Forc& alfo both by Sea and Land, which wilV naturally ib fer draw upOir us the Refetit^' mcnt of the Houfe of Bourbon^ that I' exped both Branches of it will declare open War againft us bdorfe Midfummer! next. Bui in the mean Time, it can never' prejudice the Common Caufe that we en-- joy an uniaterrupted Commerce. Your^ Am- n. )rce \\\ t\U t I are iver' en-' ■I ( IS) Atnbaf&dor feon pcrcciv'd the Force of this Reafon^ and wifely acqui^c€;d, Ife knew the natural Paffion uf us Dutchman for Trade, and wa3 too diicp-ning and prudent not to iilydulg^ it, where the Indulr gence broke not in upon the General In^* terefl of the Allies. We have engag'd to your Minifter Pleni- potentiary, and you may count upon our Sincerity^ that we will join you and aft tot is viribus againft the Common Enemy* And may we not do fb, tho' we contian^ our Trade to France and Spain f You have a large Empire and a krtile Soil, and may therefore be the leis follicitous concern- ing Trade -, but we that have fcarce any native Produ(5ts, Qiould we negledt it, we are undone. This Coniideraiion will al- ways have Weight in our Deliberations; nor ought our Friends to wifli it otfaer

wife, fincc without Trade we (hould be as inoffenfive and ufelefs as our SHler States of Venice and Genoa. What I have faid about Trade (hould not induce you to think, that it was the Conii- deration of our commercial Intereft which hindered us to adt in Concert with you fiPw. the Death of the lail Mak. of the Houfe of Aiiflria. No, Sir, it was folely the bad Condud: of your Minifters, and our bad Opinion of them, that determined us m I l( ;; m US into Supinenefs and Inadlioh. Trade iS always dear to a Dutchitian^ but Freedoni IS much dearer to him. And we judg'd that this dearer atid more valuable Jewel would be endaiigcr'd more by embarking with the Rajh and Injincerey than by con- tinuing Neuters. / r,, ' You fee how willingly we come into your Meafures when you change yours \ you fee we can rifk our Trade to embark with you, when we cpnceive a good Opi- nion of the Integrity and Capacity of your Minifters. From your prcfeht Statefmeri we exped: a Condudt . founded in Wifdom,' Truth, and Refolution. ' With fuch, a State may fafely co-operate. Arid you may perceive that we think fo, by the prefent Alacrity and Chearfulnefs with which we go all the effential Lengths you yourfelves would have us. - • - \:.;" We expert foon to feel all the Weight of French Refentment for the Step we have taken J but if you continue as firm and fincere as we promife ourfelves your Miniftry will, we (hall be able to take fe- verc Revenge for any Infult offered by France, I can't help thinking that there is Luck in Negociation, and that fome Negociators are more lucky than others, with equal Merit. But be that as it will, 'tis certain that r 'iK ! I K>>, s t ( 17 ) ihat the critical Death of the Emperor wati not inpiifpicious to Lord Chejlerfield*s Ne- gociation, tho' many were of a contrary Opinion, here and very probably there too. I fliall hot altogether adhere to what common Fame reported, of the late Em- peror's Refolution f-^ qiiit the Alliance of France, tho' I rriay not think the Many- tongued Meflenger in the Wrong. But oil a Suppofition of that Prince's nrni Adhe- rence to his Allies, his Death methinks fhoiild quicken the Pace of all who would dppofe the defpotic Views of FrancL Charles VII. was diftemper*d and in thd decline of Age, and confequently if he had not already, he would fooh be tired of the War. Men in his Condition naturally love Eafe, and hoWever ardent their Am-^ bicion, it ncceflarily fublides to make way for Content arid Repofe ; fo that if the late Emperor had lived many Months lon- ger, there is fcarce a doubt that he would have given Peace to his C^uritfy, whether France would or no. But ought we not to cohfider the Son in a quite different Light ? Youth is common- ly, if not always, afpiring and ambitious, a Lover of the Buflle and Parade of War and of Glory, and vain of great Alliances and the Pomp and Pageantry that attend them. Can it be faid that this Portrait of G Youth t •, .! i Youth does not refemble the prefent young Elector of Bavaria ? tit is a Prince, 'tis true, of great Hopes and Endowments of Mind ^ but is he not young ? Is he not juft flepping into Manhood ? Is he not of that Age when Princes would willingly diflin- fuilh themfclves from the Reft of their pedes, and do fomething for Fame to trumpet to the Public ? He has already confirmed my Opinion of him, and his affumingthe Tft!" of Arch-Duke o^jiujlria gives me no ftroi.ger an Idea of his Ambi- tion than I had before. ^ ^ ' - i France is too fubtil not to fee, and tea tvife not to feize the Opportunity which that young Prince's Fire and Youth affbrds' her. She has embraced and improved it. She has renewed her Engagements with his- Houfe, and offer*d more alluring CdncefH- on? She feeds at once the young Prince's Ambition, and the Avarice of his Creatures and Counfellors. We fuppofe flie has gained nim ; nay, we liave Proof that Hie has, by his alluming tlie Title of Arch-Duke of Aiiflria, All the big deflrudlive Scliemes of that rapacious Court muft dwindle to nothings Had llie not found means to footh the Va- aity of the young Heir of Bavaria, But the Cafe is now quite otherwife j by his Means flic fiipports her Intercft and keeps up o> ■,tf : youiig ce, 'tis ents of lot juft of that diftin- their me to already nd his dufirla Ambi- . ■ > nd too which affords' ved it. ith his- nceffi- rince's :atures gain'd IS, by ke of ' that thing, " ; Va- Biit y his keeps up ( 19 ) ap the Flame of Difcord and War in the Empire. And with half the Expence fhe^ would be at to defend herfelf againft the AuftrianSt either \w Flanden or el fe where, (he will cut them out Work at Home by means of the youthful Elector : Befides, being indulged with the fecret but fenfible Pleafure of feeing Germans fall t y German Hands, and the Empire weakned by its own Members. Thcfe, Sir, were Confiderations with our Statefmen, to guard as early as pofiible againft the Defigns o^ France ; and, let me add, thefe were Confiderations which weighed with them in their late Acquief* cence to all that your Court propofed ta them by the noble Plenipo. You fee then, that the Emperor's Death^ which was thought would impede your AmbafTadorV Negociation, was the very Thing that gave it Life and Vigour. By the Emperor's Death, a hew Field opens to the Intrigues of France in thq Empire j it gives fredi Motion to all her * Machinery, and more than ever bids fair for cutting out Work for Germans in Ger- many. I (hall explain myfelf more ex* piicitly by and by •, but let me fay in the mean while, that this diftant but gloomy Profpedt did not a little contribute to faci- litate l^ord Chejlerjidd'^ Negociation with • our C 7, ':t M'; :' li '5 ^i' ( 20 ) our State. For however agreeable that No- bleman be to us, and however favourable Opinion be of your -lew Minirtry, our I' ' 1? Lucre and Gain, fo rever*d by Mankind^ but no more fp by Dutchmen than other Nations, would have prevailed, had not the new Turn in the Empire alarpied our Statcfinen put of their ideal Notions of Prench Probity and Faith. Hitherto our Chiefs might have thought that France was contented with her prefent PolTefljonSj and had no other View to flan-* ders efpecially, than barely to cut out pre- sent Work for l^nglandy (o as to prevent ou from pbftrudting her Pefigns in the Empire. And we may Jae fure, th^t the adroit Minifters qf that Crown were . not wanting in their Endeavours to inculcate fuch Notiongofthe pifintereftednefs of their Monarch. On this Plan, which I dare fay, was pretty near that on which our Statef- men built, our Conduct for the two lail Campaigns maybe eafily accounted for. We ^.pprebended no Danger from what might happen in Qcrrnany^ provided France got nothing iherp for herfelf ; fpr whether the Poffeffions of the Heifefs olAujiria rem j^in'd |ntire, or y/ere feyerM to enlarge thofe of Prujfia and Bavaria ; they were ftill in the Empire, and poflefs'd by its Members j therefore \ye could not fee that the Liper- I % hat No- ^ourablc 'finirtry, in other lad not led our :ions of thought prefent p flan^ ut pre- prevent in the h^t the Te . not iculcate of their re fay, StatefJ ivo laft or. We might Ke got icr the main'd lofe of ftlll in nbers ^ at the Li{)er- ■I f I I ( 21 ) inberties of the Germanic Body could be affedled by any Diviiion of thofe Territo- ries which France could compafs either by her Force or Addrefs. In this View, we looked upon the Mo- tions of that Crown in Flanders^ as of Ne- ceility rather than Choice ; nor did her at- tacking our Barrier Towns alter our Opi- nion. She had every thing to dread fron^ the Refentment of the Princes at War with her. The Neutrality forced upon Hanover ^ and the Attack at Dettingen, were Motives fufficient to irritate your Prince ; and as for the Provocations given by France to the Queen of Hungary y they are evident to all Europe, The French then could do no Icfs than fecure themfelves as early ^s they could, on that Side they were weakeft. They at- tacked our Barrier to cover themfelves from the Storm they faw gathering, but refolv- ed to part with their Acquifitions as foon as it blew over. They gave us the ftrongeft AfTurances of the Uprightneft of their In- tentions, which we were the readier to be- lieve, becaufe we thought it their Intereft to fpeak Truth for once, ^nd be contented with what ^hey had. Perhaps I may be too eafy and credu- lous, but can't help believing that France bad no view to Conqueft in attacking our farrier i but vvherhcr or no I am well founc)-; U l\ ( 22 ) founded in my Conjedturc, 'tis plain our Statcfmen were in no dread of her Ambition, or they would have fupply'd their Garrifons better, and order'd their Governors to make another fort of Defence than theym^de. They looked upon the attacking, taking and detaining thofe Towns as ads of bfolute Neceflity -, and were no lefs fatisfied that France would reflore them as foon as her Danger ccaled, and her Dread of the Re- fentment of her declared Enemies abated. And they might think like wife, that the in- tended Attack upon Alface by the Au[iriy ans, would fecure the bed of their Barrier Towns, even was the Intention of France not as upright as pretended, by obliging her to weaken her Force in Flanders, If the Emperor had been ftill alivCj J believe our Chiefs would fcarce alter their Opinion or Plan, becaufe, as there woul4 be no Room for France to hope to gain by an Alteration of her Scheme, 'tis probable ihe would not alter her Intentions. But Affairs are greatly vary'd by the Death of the Head of the Empire. And we mud cxpedt that France will vary her Plan and alter her Intentions according to the fluc- tuating Gourfe of Things. She might have no view to Acquifitions on the Side of Flanders the laft Year, becaufe, as Matterai ftppd, i^ woul^ be dangeypus for her to V 'M I (23) draw inore Enemies upon herfelf, confiJer- ing the Power of the Queen of Hungary^ and the Profpcdl of Tranquillity in the Empire. But the Death of the Emperor has diflipated her Fears concerning the Queen, who is like to have Work enough on her Hands at or near Home ; as fbr the Tranquillity of the Empire, it feems far- ther off than ever. ' '' -•'•* Be (ides the Views of the young Elec- tor of Bavaria on Part of the Succeffion of Charles VI. and the Ambition and falfe Gloi*y with which France will be fure to infpire his youthful Breaft, the Choice of a new Emperor will afford Matter enough for that intriguing Nation to Work upon, Moft of the Princes of the Empire were willing to lend a hand towards coniblidating the jarring Interefts of the Powers at vari- ance ; and would rcftore Peace in Germany^ fpight of the Ambition of fome of their own Brethren, and the Ambition and In- trigues of the common Enemy. 'But anew Election dtftroys that pacific Plan, and m^ikes Way for frefh Cabals, Intrigues, and Commotions. And the more Germany is agitated by i lite (line Convulfions, the more will France be at Leifure to extend her Views to ano- ther Quarter. Are the Forces of the Queen of Hungary employed at Home, France is fafe ii;! t;: |l! ( 24) fefe on the Side of Alface and the Mofelle % and therefore may the better JDend mofl of her Strength to gratify her Ambition on that Side flie longs moft to extend her Frontiers, The Fondnefs of France to get PoiTef- fion of Flanders^ was never doubted any .more by us than you ; but the Diiferencc was, that you were fooner alarmed than we. You were frightened if but French Troops approach'd the Frontiers ; but we -were e'fy unlefs we faw a Probability that . France ftiould fucceed in her Views on the "Netherlands, When we faw a Likelihood of her Hands being full elfewhere, we were in no Pain for Flanders, Thus it was, that we v^ere in no Dread of her Conquefts the laft Campaign We .knew (lie mull exert her Power in her own Defence on the Rhine-, and when her Ap- •prehenfion on that Side (hould eeafe, we doubted not, that the Age and Illneis -of the Emperor would difpofe him to feelc Quiet, and put an End to the Broils of his .Country -, and we doubted not, that if Peace were reflored in the Empire, it muft foon follow every where elfe. But now we muft banilliall pacific Ideas. .The Election of an Emperor too furely ; prognofticates an ample Scene of Confuficn .in Germany, and we muft be infenfiblc not to 4. on her we ( 25 ) to fee the Danger and guard againft the Defigns of a People that lie on the Lurch to feize upon favourable Opportunities. We take it then for granted, that the Death of the late Emperor furnifhes France with this favourable Jund>ire,and that having nothing to fear on the Rhine^ fhe will bend all her Force to extend her Conquefts in the Netherlands, And we are far from having fuch an Opinion of her Juftice, as to believe (he will reftore any thing flie can keep. Therefore are we now willing to join you with our utmoft Efforts, not only to prevent the farther Acquifitions of that Crown in Flanders^ but to wreft thofe from her which flie lately made. And I may fay that we flian't flop there, fhou'd Succcfs attend our joint Arms. We fee, perhaps of the latefl:, that the French are a Nation not to be confided in ; that their Ambition is infatiable; and that we muft expedl to be always kept in hot Water by them, unlefs their Nails be pared to the quick. And I am apt to flatter my- felf, that there has not been fo favoura- ble an Opportunity as the prefent thefe fifty Years pall: to force them out of their Strength on the Side of the Netherlands, This would be a Security to us -, and let me fay, it would be fo to you. For (hould ever France enlarge hcrfelf to the Sea Coaft of the Aujlrian Netherlands^ the World muft think your Trade and Liberties in no D littlG 4J.. ';ii 1^ ii I \, I :> " ill Pi * r 26 ) little Danger from her Power and Am- bition. The Strength of France has been great, but it is impaired fo vaftly, that with all the Art and Oflentation of her Inhabitants, ftie finds it impofTible to hide her Weaknefs froai all Europe, She may and probably will make a laft Effort in Flanders the next Campaign ; and I will fuppofe with Ctefar, that the French will exert the old Gaulijh Spirit in their firft Onfet 5 but let us (land them once, and we bid fair to clip the ft rutting Cock's Wings. We are in debt, and lb are you ; but France is much more fo. Our Taxes are heavy, nor are you much lefs burden'd, but then we have Shoulders to bear it. We have a vaft Wealth and Trade to bear us up ; whereas the French have exhaufted their Strength, though the Weight of their Debts i^nd Taxes hourly increafes. Their Trade is already dwindled, and their Mine of Riches falls far (hort of ours 5 as a Proof of which, fee how lickly their Credit is already, whilft ours is adtive and vigorous. 'Tis true, tiieir Prince may command the Wealth of his Subjedts, but Tyranny itfelf can't oblige People to give what they have not. As there is no Proportion between the naval Force of France and Spain , and that o^ England and Holland^ it may naturally b.' luppos'd that we (liall not only ruin her Trade 1 % ■^1 ( 27 ) Trade, but oblige her to keep great Part of her Troops to guard their own extended Coafts. And tho* fhe need have no confide- rable Army of her Natives in the Empire, I becaufe Money will anfwer her Purpofe I there better than her Troops, yet an Army fhe muft have in Germany, was it but to countenance her Schemes and keep her I Allies fteady. She muft likewile join fbme I of her Troops to thofe of Spain, to gratify her Catholic Majefty on the Side of Italy, or that Lady may give France the Slip, I and find her Account in »;rufting to the I Gcnerofity of your Nation. ^ So that notwithftanding the Power of f that Crown, I don't fuppofe (he will be \ able to bring above a hundred thudiand Men into the Field in Flanders^ where (he may be imagin'd to exert herfelf moft and make her boldeft Puflies. And confidering the greater bodily Strength and Goodnefs of your Troops and ours, I think we may hope for Succefs againft an Army, tho' exceeding in Numbers, yet far inferior in Strength, being compofed chiefly of Boys and Striplings. You will perhaps fay, that my Note is much changed of late. I confefs it is fo ; but for your Comfort, I can aflure you, that the Change in me is"no greater than in the Reft of my Countrymen 5 and particu- larly in our Chiefs. The Profpedl before lis is more lowering and gloomy than it D 2 was f ii: r, ii; H n *• •; 'i ! il - ( 28 ) was before the Death of the Emperor 5 at kaft it appears fo to us on this Side the Water. We fee all Europe, and the Em- pire particularly like to be inFlames ; and we fear that France will improve the Oppor- tunity and make her Advantage of the Conflagration. She delights in the Cala- mities of her Neighbours, and never fails attempting to make her Markets while others are employ'd to put out the Fire at their Doors. You may not think it, but we have been at a vafl Charge of late in Subfidies, Augmentations, and many other incidcntid Articles of extraordinary Expence, And we are at laft become wife enough to aik ourfelvej^,. quo bono?. The French have a- mufed us, feized upon our Frontier, and fmiled upon us while they aim'd at thg Heart. And we fufFer'd all this, tho' we were fenfible of her Cunning and had put ourfelves to the Expence of arming. But we are at laft rouz'd from, the Stupor we have been feiz'd with, and fee that with a little more Expence, and much more Re- folution, we might not only have prevent- ed her Conqucft of four of our Barrier Towns, but had a good Chance of adding to tliem at her Expence. We were frightened for our Trade, which niuil fuffer by an open Rupture ; we were loatli to add to our Debts and Taxes -, Wv. were afraid^ in (hoit, to begin a War, v/hich r i;* oa i t (29) our- Fears fuggefled to us would be of long Duration and unfuccefsful. But we are recovered from the Panic which feiz'd us 5 and our Recovery, in great Meafure, is owing to the late Change in your Mi- niflry 5 and I fcruple not to add, to the Choice you made of an Ambaflador extra- ordinary. His found Reafoning and Ad- drefs, and particularly his Charader of Ho- nour and Probity, contributed to our Cure. We faw you purfuing Meafures injurious to both yourfelves and us. We faw you purfuing an Intereft that was neither Eng- lijh nor Dutch. We faw, in fine, your Politics fuch as dcterr'd us to embark with you in a War againil fo powerful an Ene- my a« France. But we are cured of our Jealoufies of your Probity and Steadinefs, from our good Opinion of your new Di- redors. , , We fee France now in the fame Light in which your new Miniftry feem to view her. She docs not appear to us a mecr Bugbear, nor yet fo terrible as to damp our Spirits. We believe her powerful, but not omnipotent. And we begin to think that file will be in good earnefl with us by and by, unlefs we are beforehand v/ith her. The Jundlure feems fl^vourable to us, as your Change of Hands gives us Hopes of a thorough Change in your Meafures. And, Sir, might a Foreigner prefume to interfere in your domeflick Affairs, I would beg ' ' ' h II Ji "^ili Hi i 30 ) beg leave to point out the Meafure which you ought to follow there at this Time, iii order ro give Weight to all your Meafures abroad, and Succefs to your Arms. Tho* the late Change in your Miniftry has been attended with an univerfal Calm in your Empire, yet expedl not it will be of any long Duration, unlefs the People*s Expec- tations be anfwered, in Part at leaft. They have long complain'd of many Hardfhips and of fome Laws. I am not fo verfed in your Conftitution as to be able to point out what Laws to repeal and what to en- adt. But I fhould think it not a very dif« iicult Matter to give Content to a Nation that are as highly fatisfy*d with the prefent Prince and his Royal Family, as I under- hand all Ranks of your People are. I (hall only add on this Head, that I hope the new Miniftry will prevail in obtaining Redrefs of every juft and reafonable Com- plaint of their Fellow-Subjedls, as the lureft Means of prevailing againft France, which is never to be humbled but by a domeftic Union both there and here, and by a reciprocal Confidence between your Di- redars and ours. You will excufe a Freedom flowing from Regard on one Hand and Self-Intereft on the other. I \vi(h the Englljh Nation well, and fincerely fo, as they are a good-natur*d, generous, and humane People j and my good Wiflies for them are no lefs, for their t.1 I ^ which ne, in ?afures Tho' s been 1 your dF any Lxpec- They dflhips •fed in I point to en- :y dif- ^atioii jrefent iinder- Ifhall )e the aining Com- s the by a nd by brDi- from ;fl on well, lur'd, my their (31 ) being a Nation on whom the Safety, of - my own fo greatly depends. Though I believe the Strength of France much impair'd fince the breaking out of the prefent Ferment, I am not fo languine as fome who will have her at her laft Prayer, and at the End of all her Re- fources. For this Reafon I ihould not be for defpifing that Crown, any more than I would fufFer myfelf to be fright- ened at her Power. Either Extream would argue a Weaknefs in myfelf and be im- politic. Therefore, Sir, in my Obferva- tions of France^ I fhall treat her Strength and Weaknefs with an even Hand, hut in the Light (lie appears in to mofl of the Intelligent in thele Provinces. A long Peace has brought great Wealth to France^ but which the Prince will ne- ver be able to come at, becaufe it is dif- pers*d chiefly amongft thofe who vcntur'd for it 5 and who, from their Knowledge of other Nations and of Commerce, know how to fecrete their Fortunes out of their native Country. Thus it will happen, that tho' there be a vafl Treafure in ready- coin'd Bullion in trance^ (I believe no lefs than five or fix hundredMillions ofouiGuil- dersj yet won't the King be able to come at as much of it as he will have occafion for in the Courfe of an expenfive War. And in fuch cafe, he muft neceflarily have recourfe to Credit, which bears over-flretch- ing the word of any thing in Nature. f ;, j : J. i'\ ii ! ( 32 ) 1 reckon then that in a Year or two the Court of France will be obliged to create a Paper Coin, which will fo imk her Cre- dit, that every Cheft will be lock'd up fronn her. This will naturally enhance her Ex- pence ; becaufe he that has neither Money nr ftanch Credit to go to Market with, will pay double for all he purchafes. When the Prince in Fra?ice has Money, no Man in his Kingdom buys cheaper, nor fo cheap as he, which has been pretty much the Cafe fince the breaking out of the prefent War. But when he comes to have neither Money nor Credit, as naturally will be his Cafe, if the War Ipreads and continues, he mufl pay an exceflive Price for what he wants i fo that his Expence will increafe in proportion to his NecefTities and want of Credit. By our prefent Condudl, 'tis obvious that France W\\\ be obliged to break with us openly j which I fhould not be forry for, tho' it fliould be at the Expence of an intire interdidlion of Trade ; becaufe no Step fhe can take would fo foon and effec- tually damp the Credit of the Court of VerJ'ailles, And when once a French King comes to ftretch his Credit, he may be faid to be driven to his laft Shifts indeed. To view France in this light, Ihe may make fome bold Purties this Year and per- haps the next, but they won't be unlike the Struggles of one in a raging Fever. The '% t ^0 the create •Cre- from rEx- loney with, ^hen Man cheap h the )refent leither be his les, he lat he eafe in ant ot fbvious : with : forry nee of ufe no effec- urt of ;King 3e faid ; may d per- anlike Fever* The ( 33 ) The more violently he put« himfelf in Mo- tion, the more he increafes the Difcafe, and the fooner he makes his Exit. *Tis Ukely that the French Minifters, being no lefs fenfible of the fickly Condition of their Country than we are, will now exert the ntmoft Efforts of their Prince's Power, in hopes, that either by the Mitlakes or Un- preparednefs of his Enemies, fome early Conqueft may be made which may be a Security to their Barrier. But if we, by which I mean Engla7jd and Holland and their Allies, are not much wanting to our- felves, we (hall be able to bear up againft any fuch early and rapid Exertion of Pow- er ^ and if we do, France will be foon brought to be on the Defenfive^ a Situation ihe behaves worfe in than any other. I am fenfible that the common Opinion is againft mine with regard to France^ when on the Defenjive, France, they fay, is invincible at home j and to attack her in Flanders^ is the fame as to take the Lord of the Herd by the Horns : *Tis attack- ing her where flie is ftrongeft. This is a Strain of Reafoning I could never bring myfelf to approve, being fatisfied that in private Life, the Man who alfaults has the Advantage of him who is on the Defenfive. The Refoluiion of the latter as furely de- creafes in proportion to the Vigour of the Attack made upon him, as it rifcs with the lirft, whofe Courage keeps pace wich his Hopes of Succcfs. E Be* r 34; Befides, have I not Hiftqry and the Expe- rience of the prefent Century on my fide ? Have I not the Experience of this prefent War in the Empire to u^arrant my Affer- tion ? The French^ in all Ages, have gain'd no Reputation in Arms when reduced to be on the Defenfive, which I fliould hope will be their Cafe very foon, if we exert our natural Superiority of Strength, and adt. with Circumfpedtion. Then as for the Strength of this Gallic Bull, we will fuppofe him flrongeft on the Side of Flanders j and 'tis for that very Rea-. fon that 1 think our mofl: vigorous Attack fliould be on that Side. If you feize a Bull by the Horns, and have a neceflary Portion of Strength and Vigour to keep your bold, you are fure to overcome him ; but attack him any where clfe, you may wound and maim him, but never can tho- roughly reduce hirrj. while he ha^ the Ufe of his Horns. But there is another Confideration why our greatcft Efforts fhould be in Flanders, Every Acquifition we make on that Side is a real Addition to our Strength and to the Common Caufe; and every Inch we lofe there is the fame as a Wound in the noble Parts. France is no Stranger to our Dread of her on that Side, nor to the Advantages refuU- ing from her Acquifitions in that tendereft Part. Therefore we rriay reckon fhe will f -ploy the moft of her Force in Flanders ; for ..I I '' '( for which Reaibn we (hould employ moft of ours to repel her there. We have confidered the prefent Weaknefs of France within herfelf, let us now extend our View to her Allies. Thole who ap- pear as yet, except the Kings of Spain and PruJJia^ are a heavy Burden uj)on her. The youn*^ Eledtor of Bavaria is no lefs Chargeable to her than his Father ; and as for any odier Allies, either open or fecret, {he may have in the Empire, they are infinite- ly more Expenfive than Ufcful. Spain is of no other LFie to France than the keep- ing fo mudi of the Auftrian Force em- ployed in Italy, which might otherwife be employ *d againfl her on the Rhine or elfe-» where. For, as to the King A Sardinia ^un- lefs Spain has provok'd or rather oblig'd him to declare, he would have fate down contentedly to look on without taking Pari with eithe: . Pruffia then, appears to be the only ufeful Ally France feems to have: 'Tis true, that France would make no Figure in Germany y at this Time, without the Al- liance of Pruffia, While flie had the fu- preme Head of the Empire with her, fhe might reckon at leafl that the Germanic Body, tho' it might not ad for her, yet might be Paflive, and not ad againfl an Ally of the Emperor's. But the Cafe is chang'd by the Death of that Prince. And for that Reafon the Alliance of Pruffia is become the more ufeful and neceffary. '11 'i -il f.|;f r .16 ; Princes feldom miftakc their own Intc- red:, or flip Opportunities. They have the Eyes of all their Miniflry to lee for ihem, and the Wifdom of their Council to guide them. We mull fuppofe then that his PrtiJJian Majefty knows of what Import he is to France^ and will make her pay ac- cordingly. And therefore to view the Al- liance of Prujfia m the Light of Expence, 'tis a Doubt whether France can receive any Benefit from it adequate to the Burden it throws upon her. But fuppofing FrancCy by a Profufenefs of Treafure, which will precipitate her want of Credit, and confequently her Ruin, fhould be able to keep PruJ/ia fteady, he is no Match for the Courts of Vienna and DrcjUen. His Situation would be an Obflrudlion, had he really Power, which he wants. So that unlcfs France keep a very large Body of her native Troops in Ger?}iaHy to fupport her other Allies', and keep them firm, the Queen of Hungary and Elector of Saxony will foon reduce both Pru/jia and Bavaria to quit her Alliance, And by keeping fuch a great Part of her Force in the Empire, fbe will be the lefs able to obftrud our Defigns upon her in Fhimkrs. I don't fee any Dread we (hould conceive of PruJJia^ fuppofing France fliould ex- haufl her Treafures to keep him a Party in her QiKirrels during the Continuance of the War. '■^^ Intc- e the hem, uide his rt he t her the her I War. He may, 'tis true, divert part of the Aujlrian Force j hut with an Aug- mentation of Subfidy from us, I make no Doubt but Prince Charles of Lorrain would be loon in condition to pay a. fecond Vifit to Aljace. : ' : ' * But why (hall we fuppofe that a Prince of the King of PruJ!ia\ Sagacity will con- tinue long in Error ? Whatever Views lie might have had during the Life of the late Emperor, he can have none at prefent that can compenfate for the Rifle he runs in adhering to France. The Si- tuation of his Territories fubjedts him to Attacks from many Quarters at once. His Countries lie open to Saxony ^ Hanover^ and to our Provinces, belides the moral Certainty of lofing Silejia and being invad- ed from thence by the moil formidable Power in the Empire. I conclude therefore, that if we can't \\iVK',Pruffia into our Views, we fl}all at lead foon fee him wean'd from his Alliance with France, There is in Nature but one Motive which can poffibly induce him to hazard the Prolongation of making his Peace and declaring himfelf Neuter. And yet I can icarce believe his Ambition would fo far hurry him as to forget his own im- mediate Interefl, fuppoling him more in- different to that of his Country than he ought to be. You will foon conjedure, that I mean a View to the Imperial Dia- i.v •■-' dem, ^ I, ■'-' |l ' r 38J dem, which fo many of our Specula^ tifts impute to that Prince. But let mt wave this Point at prcfent to purfue the- Subjcdt of the Strength of France by her Allies, cither Ad:ual or Expedative* The Views of FruJJta on the Imperial Throne^ Ihall be confidered when we come to its prefent Vacancy and the approach- ing Eledlion. JBefides Spain y Prtiffia and Bavaria^ the King of the two Sicilies is the only Power that we are fure would join the French. As for the Gemefe^ however ill-us'd they ha"e been by the Treaty of Worm 5^ they are more prudent than to provoke the Maritime Powers, who have It fo much in their Power to take down their Pride in the Deftrudiion of their Capital. ^ The fame may be faid in. regard to the Son of Spain, who, had he Power^ as he has not any more than the Genaefe^ would hardly venture being Dethron'd of* Poniarded by his Neapolitan Subjedls, for having provoked the Deftrudion of their Capital. ' r; '. ) I will admit that Spain is an Ally that adds to the Weight of France in the Scale of Power, unlefs you and we, by means t)f our Naval Force, (hall keep this ufe- ful Ally in Want and Indigence. Spain has infinite Refources, but they are diftant from her ; and, if we are not unpardonably Negligent, we may cut off her Communi- cation .u. ■ -t lZ9} cation with her Indies during the War. Without Treafures from Mexico and Peru^ Spain will make no great Figure in the War ; and whatever will be her Efforts, they will be conftantly directed to Italy^ where flie muft bury her Treafures to no Purpofe while we command the Medi" terranean, Denmark would be of little Ule to France^ confidering his Situation and our Power by Sea, even would he declare in favour of France^ of which there is not the leaft Probability. There is. no doubt that the Dafie will be Neuter any more ihan that he will letr. out his Troops to the befl Bidder. And iliould France out- bid us, which is not very likely, the Troops of Denmark would not be of any great Ufe to her, inafmuch as we could always im- pede their joining the Forces of France ; or if join'd, might prevent the recrui::ngfrom their own Country. As for Sweden, we may look upon her at prefent as influenc'd by the Politics of Rujia 'y and for this Reafon, how inclined foever the Swedes may be to recover fome of their late German Dominions, by means of an Alliance with France, the Court of Feterjburg will never permit them to raife the Flames of War in the North to the Prejudice of the Houfe of RuJJia^ which it will always be the Intereft of Aujlria to fee Powerful and Flouriihing, being the " only ^1 , l:j only Second ftie can have againft her for-' midable Neighbour the Turk. And thcte- fore I doubt not, if there fhould be Occa- iion, that the Northern Emprefs would openly efpoufe the Queen of Hungary's In- teveft. We may impute her late Inadti- vity in regard to the Broils of Germany^ partly to the unfettled State of her own do- meftic Affairs, and partly to the good For- . tune of her Hungarian Majcfty, who feenVd an Over-match for her Enemies. But (hpuld die War fprcad, and become lefs fuccefsful to the Court of Vienna, 'tis not to be doubted but that the Aujirian Inte- reil will be fupported by RuJJia. * Befides this unfavourable Portraiture of France, fhe may be confidered like a Man that had exhaufted much of his Strength by an over Violence of Exercife. She has had but a very (hort Breathing- time fince the Death of the late King of Poland, The EleBion of Stanijlaus, and her Wars in Italy in Confequence of her Quarrel with the late Emperor, Charles VI. jftood her in an immenfe Treafure 3 and her Expencc fince the Death of that Prince, would be felt by [her for half a Century, even was (he to enjoy Peace ail that Interval of Time. But her Lois of her befl Officers and Ve- teran Troops, excceeds, if poflible, that of Treafure. 1 can't brag much of the prefent Generation of Officers all over Ettrope-, but I think f t (41) think I may conclude that bad as they are elfc- where, they are worfe inFrance: For 1 can't recolledl one Officer of Reputation among ihtFrench.' Tistrue, moft of yours and our old Soldiers are dead, but our Ally of Himgary has her ConegfegSy I'rautis, and JVallis's as yet, and one of far greater Hopes, the gallant young Prince o^ Lor rain. But fuppofing there was an Equality with regard to Commanders, there is no difput- ing with us the fuperior Excellency of our Troops. Had not France loft all her Ve- terans in the prefent and late War with the Houfe of Auftria^ her Troops would be no Match for ours (meaning thofe of the Alliance) fuppofing her Armies as nu- i^rous and well-appointed ^ but in the rniferable Condition of herTroops, our Com- manders muft be infatuated if the French ftand the Brunt of our Troops at the odds of two to one. After this curfory Review of the Dlf- abilities of the common Enemy, we fhould, in prudence, caft an Eye to the brighter Side of the Pidure. A Man is beft able to guard s^gsinft an Enemy,when he knows his Strer ,tH r nor is it lefs true, that he who under- 'if ; an Enemy puts himfelf in the high Read to Misfortune; France has lar the Advantage of her Enemies, in re- gard to Situation and Government. She has fcarce any thing to fear, but from the Sea to the Rhine in the lower Palatinate ; and 'iitft of that Trad is well fecured by F For- ( 42 ) Frrtrefles. Then as to Government', (he has the Advantage of all Europe. The Prince commands all the Wealth of his Subjedls, and their Perfons too ; and which is more, he commands their Hearts, unlefs he forfeits their Love by fome flagrant Ads of Tyranny or other Stretch of his Power. The French Nobility are very numerous and warlike y and there is no difputing their Gallantry, Would they exert themfelves, as very likely [they would if they faw their King anci Country prefs'd, their united Efforts would nor only be violent and fur- priiing, but would be fetting an Example to the refi r " :he People : Though Francs could not v) . vith us in Naval Force, yet fiom the great Conveniency of her Ports in the Ocean iiua Mediterranean, flie might be able to give us Diverfion enough by Sea in fpightof our Superiority : And the rather that Ihe lias the naval Force and the fafe and commodious Ports- of Spain in her Power. And fhould we not be able or fortunate enough to dam up the vaft Rc- fources of Spain from her new World, that Grown alone would be more ufeful to France in the Profecution of a long War, than all her Allies put together. Our Allies are needy and poor in all things but Men, who can't fuhfill or be ufefnl but by the Power of Wealth. But fl^iould Spain be permitted to draw Home her Tiea'ures from jlmerica^ ll:e would be able to lupport not ouly part of iiie Ex- pence vv ;ni^ {he The of his d which unlefs mt Ads Power. merouG ng their mfelves, their united ind fur- xample Franca irce, yet T Ports e might I by Sea e rather ihe fafe in her able or a Rc- Id, that I ^ful to ' 5 War, I in all or be . But Home luld be e Ex- pence I (43) pence, but the Credit of France, Nor is there aught can prevent thefe Confequences but our Vigilance and Succefs at Sea, and the ill Succefs of the SpaniJJj Arms in Italy, For (hould Spain get into the PoiTelTion of the Milanefe and keep it, (he might by that Means grow formidable in Italy ^ with- out any Expence to herj and then ilie might be able to turn the whole Current of her Wealth to the immediate Service of France. Spain in other Refpeds would be an Ally of Confequence in the Courfe of a durable War. By Means of Naples and Sicily^ (he would not only employ great part of thQ^/lrian Forces in 7^^^^', but con- tribute to the Increafe of the Wealth of France, by laying open to the French the Trade of the Soutb Seas. And if we confider the other Allies of France, we fhall find them no lefs ufeful. The young Elector of Bavaria, though needy and poor, yet his Situation and Rank give him Weight ; and will be more ufe- ful to France, if (lie fets him up, as proba- bly (he will, a Candidate for the Imperial Throne. The Eled:or Palatine is, I am afraid, French by Inclination, and muft be fo by Motives of Intereft and Self-preferva- tion. He can't well find Security with- out an Alliance with France, to whofe Power his Dominions lie fo much expofed. And though this Limb of the Germanic Body be of no great Confequence as fuch fimply, yet when ally*d with fo great a F 2 Power i la'' ■•, (44) Power as France^ he may be deemed an ufeful Ally. I will fuppofe the three Spiritual Eledors to be in a different Intereft with France ; but (liould ihe prevail at this very critical Jundlure on the lower Rhine^ flie would put it out of their Power to be of any great life to the Allies of the Court of Vienna, Therefore till we fee an End of th@ Opera- tions of the prefent Winter Campaign in the Neighbourhood of MentZy one can't with any Degree of Certainty pronounce the Ufefulnefs or Unufefulnefs of the Mi- tred Eledtors. To view the King of FtuJ/ia in the Light I have produced him, his Alliance with France would not be ufeful to that Crown, becaufe it could not be durable. But if we coniider him as a Prince refolved to rifk all to prevent an Increafe of the Power of the Houfe of Aufiria^ we mufl fuppofe he will religiouily adhere to the late League o^ Frankfort J, 2sidL of Confequence be of great Service to France, And fhould a Dread of that Houfe, which has in Turns infulted all the Princes of the Empire, feize the King of Pruffia^ and continue upon liim, I fear he would encourage the Swedes to attempt recovering their late PoffefTjons in the Circle of Lower Saxony, And perhaps the Court oiRuJfia might not care to give Umbrage to a Prince with whom it is in the ftrideft Amity 3 and par- ticularly, when the Rufjiam have fo very little to fear from the Forte, . ■ . We I an !# I (45) We have hitherto confidered the Strenirth a and Weaknefs of France and her Allies, but ought we not likewifc to confider her Superiority in Cunning and Addrefs ? Her Politics are keen and refined, and her Statefmen are no lefs able than faithful. Has (he not her Partizans every where ? They are rhany with us here in Holland ; and, we are mis-infornaed or (lie has an Influence with you in Britain. Should {he prove fuccefsful, it will increafe both there and here ; for good Fortune attracts as well as r* ^ Load-ftone. 1 .'on't think that the Secret Practices of France in our Provinces would avail her much, but am not quite fo clear that they would not have much more Efficacy in your Iflands. The Reafon is obvious j but I am perfwaded your Miniftry have the Power to prevent all ill Effeds of French In- trigue and Corruption . If your People be fatisfied v^ith their Condition, they will be united j and are they unanimous, I defy all the Art and Gold of France to work them up to a Rebellion, or to favour an Invaiion. Your Miniflers may then, with much Safety to ihemfelves, break any Meafures of ,:. France for diflurbing the domeftic Quiet of their Country, by only abrogating fuch few Laws as the People complain of, and enad:ing fuch as may fecure them againft liich regal or miniflerial Power as they may be apprehenfive of. Though I don't pretend to a thorough Knowledge of your Conftitution,yet I think :ij ( 46 ) I know Co much of it as inclines me to believe that your Miniflers may permit an Inlargement of -the popular Power without any Danger t^ the Crown. And therefore mufl (till ^i^ vfe, that the moft effedual Means to pre ent the Defigns of France on your domefticTranquillity,is to content your People. And fhould I fay, that ic would be the moft effedtual too to reduce the pre- fent Power of that ambitious, defigning Crown, I don't think I ftiould be much miftaken. The Nature of your Conftitution ad- mits of more Freedom than ours ; and by Confequence, you may indulge your People with lefs Danger than we can. This leads me almoft neccflarily to confider a Point which I ha.ve always underftood differently from moft of thofe I have argued with of your Country. It is this ; that tho* both you and we are free, yet your Freedom is greater and more extenlive than ours, and that by reafon of your Conftitution. For the Foundation of fuch as yours, a limited Monarchy, being firmer and broader than a Democracy ; there is therefore lefs Dan- ger of its being fubverted. I mention this only to (hew, that I would not advife the giving your People Satisfadlion in their pre- fentDemands/uppofing them not unreafona- ble, unlefs I thought it might be done with Safety to the Government. And now, Sir, after we have examined Fra?ice in her Strength and Weaknefs, how would ( 47 ) would a prudent Man judge of her ? how would he confider her prefcnt Power com- par'd with that of the Powers leagued againft her ? I fhall be extremely glad to hear your Sentiments on the Point ; and that you may oblige me with them the fooner and more willingly, I will tell you mine with the utmoft Candour. The Dangers of the prefent Crifis; in fliort, the Ruin in View, fliould France fucceed in her ambitious Projed:s, would incline me to wi(h taking a fair Fall with her, before it fliould be faid, that fhe put on our Chains without Reliftance. But, upon the moft mature Deliberation, I have weighed her Power and ours in the Scale of my Reafon, and find wf liave greatly the Advantage. I have compared both Alliances with the greateft Nicety and Clr- cumfpedion, and think that our Strength is greater and will laft longer. But, Sir, had the Odds been againft us, ought we not to rely on the Juftice of our Caufe, and the Protedlion of Heaven, in favour of the Innocent and Virtuous ? I (liould be for trufting to Providence and the Chance of War, even tho* I did not think we were a Match for the Enemy. But (ince wc have evidently the Advantage on our Side, it would be downright Frenzy not to feize Opportunity by the Fore-lock, and check the growing Power of a Neighbour, whofe Motto (hould be circttm queer ens quern devo- rety inftead of all thofe vain aod fuperbe Mot- lii ( 48 ) Mottoes invented by Lewis i4th*s Flatterers. I confefs that the approaching Eledion of an Emperor, as it furniflies France with a fiivourable Opportunity of fowing the Seeds of Jealoufy, Envy, and Difcord in the Empire, gives her fome Advantage over us, at leaft on that Side. And which is dill worfe, though we fee the Danger, I can't contrive how it can be well avoided. As your Monarch's religious Principles, and perhaps his peculiar Efteem for the Crown he wears, leave us no Hopes that he fo much as ever thought of the Imperial, we muft necelfarily fupport the Pretenfions of either the Eledor of Saxo?jy or Grand Duke, And there are almofl: infuperable Difficul- ties in the Way of either of thefe Candi- dates to the Imperial Throne. By the Ele- vation of the Grand Duke, the Power of the Houfe of Aujiria would be beft prefer v- ed ', and that is the very Reafon why rnofl: of the Members of the Germanic Body would oppofe him. We, that is, the Mari- time Powers, might wifli that ancient Ploule cftablifh'd in all its Power and Splendor ; but the Thing is impradicable without the Concurrence ofthofe who dread its growing great, or even remaining as powerful as it is. Let us fee how it Hands in regard to the other Candidate. The Princes of the Empire, .^xcept per- haps the P ruffian, who might fee with Un- eafinefs a Diadem of more Luftre ^han his own jull at his Nofe, v/ouid concur in the El^^c-. m 4 w- (A9) Eledlion of the prefent King of Poland^, For the Houfe of Saxony is the befi: be- loved of any in the Empire. But are we to fuppofc that that Prince would abdicate the Polip for the Imperial Crown ? And we ought as little to fuppofe, that he could wear both at once. The Poles are too jea- lous a Nation to fuffer it, and their prefent King too wife to deftroy all Hopes of ren- dering the Crown of Poland hereditary in his Houfe. You will fay, the King of Poland may refign his regalCrown to his Son:'Tis true, he may, but is he fure the Poles will eledt the Son of an Emperor, whofe Power of in- fringing on their Liberties, they may juftly dread ? Befides, would not fuch a Step give the Gallic Caufe new Life ? Would France fit ftill, and Stanislaus alive, when fo fair an Opportunity fliould offer as a new Elec- tion in Poland^ which, probably would be fupported by Prujjia^ and perhaps by RuJJia and Sweden, in favour of her Creature ? No Sir, the Rifk would be too great ; and therefore our Difficulty is the greater, that both thofe Princes whom we would fupport at the enfuing Eleftion, are the un- likclieft to fucceed. The private Intereft of each of the Members of the Germanic Body, obflrudls the Elevation of the Grand Duke 5 and the immediate Intereft of ths Elector of Saxony and his Children in re- gard to Poland-^ oppofes any ambitious Vifews G l^ r 50 ; he lYiay have to be Head of the Empire. Here is the Dilemma we lie under ; and I am notafhanicd to own, that I can't fee how we can well get over it. — But upon )ught, ik ther( fecondTh( ent lefc, which if it have the Approbation of your Court, could not f;iil of fettling the Peace of the Empire, and even that of all Europe. Perhaps you may think me not fomuch in Earned as the Subject requires in the Pro- pofal I am to make of a Candidate for the Imperial Throne,iince there are infurmoun- tablc Difficulties in the Way of thofe two juft mention'd. But I fincerely own to you, that I fcarce fee any other Choice we can make that promifes lefs Danger and Ob- ftru6tion, or is more likely to fuccecd to the Inclination of the Majority of the Eledors. As I look upon Religion to be out of the Cafe, becaufe no Chriftian Syflem is pre- cluded by thofe Conftitutions of the Empire which fettle the Qualifications of an Em- peror, I don't fee that being of the reform- ed Religion, fliould obflrud: the Promo- tion of a Prince of that Pcrfwafion. There- fore, whether his PruJJian Majefty would continue or change his Tenets of Religion, I don't fee any Prince more likely to anfwer the Views of all who wifli well to Germany and to general Freedom, and of fugh par- ticularly as would wifli to fee the Infolence and Power of Frj«cf reduced. ^ ., But But ( SI ) But you rtic to underftand that I would have that Prince obliged to the Maritime Powers for his Elevation ; and I think it won't be deny'd that England and Holland have at this Time, Weight enough to fill the Imperial Throne. The only Difficulty they lie under, is the Choice of a proper Candi- date. From what has been oblerved of the Obftrudions in the Way of King Augujlui and the Grand Duke^ they are out of the Queftlon. On whom then, except the King of Prf/^^7, (hall we turn our Thoughts The Empire probably would willingly caft a longing Eye on your auguft Monarch, but the Jewel he wears is too precious to be exchanged for Tinfel ; and it is likely your Nation, like the Foles^ would not relifh hir dding the Imperial to the Regal Crown, good Earnefl: then, whom (hould we confer our Favours on but a Prince that has Power, and would join us to pull down the Pride of our too afpiring Neighbour ? If we give a fufficient Guarantee to the King of PruJJia with refpedl to Silefia^ and oblige him with the Imperial Diadem, he will be- come as ftaunch d^nAnti-Gaulijl as George II. or the Heroine of Hungary, The King of PruJJia is the only Prince in Germany ^ ex- cluding his Britannic Majefty and the Grand Duke^ able to fupport the Grandeur and Dignity of the Imperial Crown independent of beinga Penfioner to fome foreign Powers. G 2 This ( 52 ; This v/as the Cafe of the late Emperor, and mu A be fo of all fuch weak needy Princes as the Eiedlor of Bavaria and the Palatine, The Princes of the Empire would have no fuch Jealoufy of the Houfe of Branden- hurgh as they have of that of Aujlria, whofe Dominion they have de:ermin'd to fliake off, having already bore it too long. And their Dread of PruJJia would be the lefs, that the Court ofViemta is powerful enough and v/ould be always willing to curb that of Berlin, (hould it exceed the Bounds of Mo- deration. And in regard to Religion, I (hould not doubt that the refornid would find a Proted:or in his PruJ/ian MajcAy, whether he openly retain'd or quitted that Perfuafion. Infomuch, that viewing the Eledlion of that Prince in all Lights, I don't fee any Choice we can make liable to fo few Objedlions. Though the Majority of the Eledloral Votes feems to be on our Side, I can't but think however that the Advantage is on that of France y with regard to a future Eiedion : And the Difficulties we lie under in relation to the King of Poland znd Grand Duki\ as fuggefled above, is what gives her the Afcer.dant. France will find her Account in either of the young Eledtors, and either will be to the Inclination of all the Empire, except the Court of Vienna, And fhould the King of Pruflia be oblig'd to France for the Diadem, we would have reafon to repent our not being beforehand with her. What and :esas ne, have den- hofe lake And (53) rt Wliat 1 infinuate concerning the King o^Pruffia is by way of Hint thrown out for either your Refledion or Amufement, as you and your Friends on that iide the Water may be difpofed. Let me fay, how- ever, that the Thought employs more of cur prolific Brains here than you would imagine, though it may feem that it would not be our Intereft to render the King of Pruffia more Powerful than he is. But the Queftion feems to me to be, not whe- ther we fliould wifh him more or lefs Pow- erful $ but whether being Emperor would make him more Potent than he would be without that eminent Title. And I don't hefitate to own, that I think the Impe- rial Diadem would rather diminifh than add to the Power of his PruJJian Majefty. To mention no other Reafon for the Decreafe of that Prince's Power on an Encreafe of his Titles, than the conftant watchful Jealoufy of the Germanic Body and of the Court of Vienna in particular, it might induce one to fuppofe, that tho' his Power to do good may be enlarged, yet that his Power to do Evil or Injuftice would be curtailed . The principal View of England and Hol- land at this Time, fliould be to take down the Pride of their Common Enemy. And therefore all our Influence and Addrefs fhould be employed, not to gratify this or that Prince or Court in the Eledion of an Em- /' • f/'U; r 54 ) Emperor, but to promote the Defigti !ii View. France is Powerful of herfelf, but more fo by her Alliances. The King of Prtijjia gives her more Weight in the Em- pire than all the reft of her Allies there j wherefore our chief .Bufinefs is to ftrip her of that Prop as foon ?.s we can. The Path to that Prince's Heart is plain and fhort. 'Tis but indulging to his Vanity and he changes Sides : And by changing he leaves France naked and defencelefs. You fee, Sir, the Tendency of all my Reafoning and Politics. France is the hated Objed: ; and (hould be fo with all Englijh- men s-r^dDtac^men : I think the Jundurc k favourable for reducing her Power j and I am fc/ poftponing every other Conlidera- don the better to improve an Opportunity, the like, of which may never offer again. If we can fettle the Peace of the Empire to the good liking of the Majority of it's Members, we fhall not only wean all the Germafjtc Powers from any Attachment to France^ but have them join us to pull her down. ■ ' ^. Therefore, the EIe■ I.. K^(rrv»r' ,-. I I '( 56 ) for pradifing her Arts in the Empire, For tho* you have providentially got herPri- mier Schemiji into your Hands, {he can- ne- ver be i in want of apt Engines, that makes it her^tudy to inveigle and corrupt. The arch Tempter has more Belleijle's than one among a numerous Band of Courtiers, bred up in Art, Diffimulation, and Intrigue. Richelieu and Mazarin will always have Followers in France, And I hope there never will be wanting a Set of Englijh and Dutch Patriots, who will oppofe their Wif- dom and Virtue to the Wiles and Doub- lings of Gallic Statefmen. I am fure you yf\\\ never want fuch while My Lord Chef- Urfield lives ; aftd tho* we have not his E- qual for Parts and Talents, I hope we have tnofe among us who are no left Honeft and Upright, and who loath French Craft and Chains no lefs than his Lordfhip. You fee> Sir, by the Length of this E- piftle, my Willingnefs to oblige you. You would know from me how Affairs and O- pinions flood with us here, ^fince the Arrival of your Ambaffadon ^ and r have given, you the bcft Informations! was able to colled, with the utmoft C&dour.i^If they don't contribute to your Inftfudion, they may TO your Amufement $ and I fhall think my Pains amply recompenc'd, if my Letter but help to make you forget for an Hour, the aiBiding Diftemper that has long beeii your Companion. I am, &c. 1 -;. > jj F I N I §, iC e •*• e f. /- ^& id [id ou 3^ 12X ou a:/ n't lay ny 3Ut ur. «<4