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Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. 1 OXtop i^e MR DELIVER] The I Mr. BA It was from Ohio before the rights in C belligerent away ; bu mates plaii debate, or desired hai Senator frc and in Em Oregon co the 49ih p to say wh« of public ( site, and ui had been a •'ere yet i preparatioi determinec gon — they I cannot the public a war witli fear that I and elsewl versy migl people mi^ in languag aware of tl has 10 a gr misfortune present pu J. f 0. B, SPEECH OP MR. BARROW, OF LOUISIANA, ON THE OREGON QUESTION. DELIVERED IN THE SENATE OF THE U. S., ON THE 30lh OP MARCH, 1846. The resolution in relation to Oregon being under consideration — Mr. BARROW addressed the Senate nearly as follows : It was said, Mr. President, early in the session, by the honorablt Senator from Ohio, (Mr. Allen,) chairman of the Committee on Foreign Relations, that before the American people were called upon take up arms in defence of their rights in Oregon, their hearts should be prepared for war. 1 had imagined the belligerent spirit then manifested on that side of the chamber to have passed away ; but the renewed exhibition of this morning from the same quarter inti- mates plainly that the honorable chairman conceives that, if not by him, by this debate, or by somebody or something else, that preparation of hearts he so much desired has been brought about. For he seemed to kindit up at the idea of the Senator from Massachusetts, (Mr. Webster,) that opinion at large, both at home and in Europe, had settled, or was.fast settling, down to the conclusion that this Oregon controversy ought to be amicably adjusted, substantially on the basis of the 49lh pa.-allel of latitude. Called upon by the Senator from Massachusetts to say whether or not he concurred with him in the supposition of this tendency of public opinion, the honorable chairman declared a persuasion direci'v upoo- site, and unchanged since the beginning of the session. So far, he said, ae> he had been able to arrive at ihe opinion of the people of the United Stales, tht 7 •'ere yet in favor of 5i° 40\ The honorable chairman must then consider iiu preparation of the American heart finisiied ; for, whenever it is by our people determined to assert and maintain their title up to 54° 40' — to the whole of Ore- gon — they must be prepared to go to war, and need indulge no other thought. I cannot agree, sir, with the Senator from Ohio. I cannot believe that either the public feeling or the public understanding of this country is yet prepared for a war with England to obtain the whole of Oregon. Three months ago I did fear that by the deliberate, systematic, and persevering efl'orts put in use here and elsewhere to mould the people to that political purpose, the existing contro- versy might be shaped to a bloody conclusion. I did fear that the American people might be involved in a war with a great nation, their brothers in interest, in language, and in religion, not less than in descent, before they were made aware of the nature and the value of the subsisting controversy. But my fear has 10 a great degree passed away. I do not now apprehend any such national misfortune, unless our Chief Magistrate should abandon what I believe to be his present purposes. , ^ U-^'L T. f G. B, oldeon, pTinltre. L *.H} U» 2 On this question, Mr. President, I have always belonged to the party of peaci and of compromise. I, for one, have not feared to express the desire, the anx ious desire, to see this controversy amicably adjusted by fair concessions on botl sides. From so declaring, no fear of demagogue denunciations has deterred oi shall deter me. I am not (o be frightened into a disloyal and ignominious si lence by the abandoned but too easily popular cry that the friends of modera tion, of reason, and of peace, are " the British party." If against a rash oi a gra «uitou8 quarrel we maintain tlie duty and interests of peace, we are assailed as the friends of England, or of any nation but our own ; if we deprecate a wai as impolitic as it is unnecessary and unnatural — if we point to the losses, the disasters which will follow a contest so causeless, we are instantly charged with an unwillingness to defend the honor of our country, with timidity and sympathy with tile public adversary. Such is the system of perversion and calumny with which we must now con^ tend, in attempting to do our duty as public agents, as legislators, and as stateS' men, in a land oi free debate. We may gpeak, but at the peril of being given over to denunciation, as little less than traitors or cowards. We must speak on no side but one of qiicslions gotten up for tlie express purpose of dividing the country between the frieniis of what is moderate and good, and those who are expected to form a larger party — the favorers of every rabid pretension, of every ■dangerous and violent movement. If we are not personally and in express terms charged with cowardice or want of patriotism, the particular charge is made by iiiuenJo, and the general one by fulmination. There are Qcrtainly those, sir, with whom such political arts as these will succeed; with whom a reputation for courage and patriotism can be made by thus going to extremes on every question here that should be one of grave and sincere deliberation. But I trust that this easy valor and wordy public spirit are not capable of seriously misleading the American people. For myself, I am but one of the many hnnil)le citizens who, with no greater interest or timid- ity than thousands of others, yet fear a conflict with England. I confess that I dread war, and that I have beei. alarmed in "special at the prospect ci" a present war with Great Britain. But was this on account of considerations personal to my- self? No ; they only regarded the country. I consider such a war as the great- est calamity that can i)efall this nation. But, independently of its havoc of life and property, tlie desolation it will leave far and wide behind it, ! believe a war between us and England will involve much of the civilized world ; will inflict upon it an incalculable amount of wo ; and will throw back for half a century the advancing cause of civil and religious liberty. As to danger, a war between us and England could bring none to a member of Congress who wished to keep out of it. If such a war comes, my own State is likely to be one of the chief theatres of deadly conflict. There is too much to induce England again to in vade Louisiana; her beautiful and exposed capital, her crescent city, will not es- cape, and we shall see the waters of the majestic Mississippi stained with the blood of its best citizens. It is for this, and not for any abject individual dread, that I fear war. If I chose, 1 can remain on my plantation, and pursue its avo- cations unmolested by the enemy; for who need fight that can employ a substi- tute? It is not the wealthy who have need to fear a war with England ; the army will not be made up of the rich, the aristocrats so called, unless they see fit volun- tarily to join it. It is tlie poor man wiio is to sutler — the mechanic, tlie day la- borer, the hardy ploughman — torn from his home and family, whose life, the sole stay of that family, will be placed in danger ; tins is the class who will suf- fer, and these are they whom it is meant to fire with phrenzy, and lead on to war by this outcry against men upon whom liie evils of war cannot fall half so heavily. There will, sir, in short, be two sorts of men engaged in this war. ■should it secondly. To wh ^hardly sa them are matter wl these wal tish comi the two h oners of the highe ernment well as C captured xilous, to this great "be as littl It has above all heartily c •what hns ty ? Ha all party but I avei Whig pa "believe to I say, '* •with plea could dri assertion vamped u No, sir affect pai that whic old, of c new ones her sleep constant Herods c feelings « the kindi better thi and do a this desu And wh; Toughly shall, in B party of peace desire, the anx iessions on botJ has deterred oi ignominious si lids of modera a rash ot a gra are asiailed as ieprecale a wai the losses, the y charged with r and sympathy must now con- , Rnd as states- of being given must speak on Df dividing the those who are nsion, of every nd in express ular charge is as these will be made by e of grave and y public spirit For myself, I erost or timid- confess that I 3t cf a present )er8onal to my- sr as the great- havoc of life believe a war J ; will inflict half a century 1 war between ashed to keep le of the ciiief id again to in- y, will not es- lined with the ividual dread, •ursue its avo- ploy a substi- iid ; the army ' see lit volun- c, the day la- hose life, the who will suf- iid lead on to Dt fall half so J in this war. should it eonie : first, those who Iiavc made the speeches to kindle it up ; and, secondly, those who will have to fight it out. To which of these classes members of Congress will generally belong, I need liardly say ; for who will expect them to go into the field, or what proportion of them are likely to expose themselves ? For my own part, I heartily believe, no matter what we iiay hear, that there is as much bravery and patriotism within these walls as without ; quite as much, but not a bit more ; and should the Bri- tish commit the folly of again invading tjiis city, does any body suppose that the two houses of Congress will sit here and suflTer themselves to be made pris- oners of war ? Vain expectation ! rash conjecture ! Congress can adjourn to the highest peak of the Alleghanies. Thither, or still west of them, this Gov- «rnment will probably in that case retire. The President and his Cabinet, as well as ('ongress, would consider it unwise to expose to the hazard of being captured by the British arms so many patriots. It is idle, then, and even ridic- ulous, to talk of fear, of personal fear, or its opposite, as connected wiili us on this great national question. There being to us no occasion for fear, there can Ije as little to vaunt of our bravery. It has been said, Mr. President, that this is a question which ought to soar above all thought of party. The sentiment is a just, a noble one ; and I very heartily concur in it. But, sir, out of this chamber, (for I will say nothing of ■what liHS occurred within it,) has the question so held itself aloft, above all par- ty ? Has it done sdjkrith those who are loudest to claim that we should forget all parly in this matter? I, sir, am a Whig, and trust in God ever to be one; but I aver that, had I this instant to choose between the total annihilation of the Whig party, and a war with England for the whole of Oregon — a war which I "believe to be totally unjust, unnecessary, and impolitic — without hesitation would I say, " Let the Whig party be annihilated." I, for one, should see it perish •with pleasure, if a spirit so unpatriotic, so foul, so abominable directed it, that it could drive, or attempt to drive, this country into a war with England, for the assertion of this fresh territorial dogma — this bold political paradox — our newly vamped up title to the whole of Oregon. No, sir ; were I capable of looking on the question only as by the event it will aflect parlies and decide their fate, I winild ti\ke a course precisely opposite to that which I have chosen as my duty; I would stir the dying embers of every old, of every sottish, of every unchristian animosity or prt-judice, and kindleup new ones ; I would denounce the rapacity of England; her domineering spirit, her sleepless efforts to circumvent, her fixed purpose lo destroy us; her aim as constant to in-iult whenever she cannot injure us. I would, sir, out-Herod all the Herods of Oiegon ; I would do all I could to stir up here at home the worst feelings of our nature, and to excite passions as fierce, as foolish, and as bad in the kindred people on the other side of the Atlantic ; I would, in short, if nothing better than the iiilerests of party swayed me, llame out a furious St" 40' man, and do all in my power to hurry England and America into deadly conflict for this desolate corner of a "erritory uncertain of title and questionable of value. And why, sir, if a mere ptirty man, would I do all tliis ? Because I am tho- Toughly persuadi'd that, if this or any oiher Administration, but this particularly, shall, in the headlong prosecution of an unjust claim, M'hether at the dictate of an electioneering fDUvenlion, plunge this ppiicc-lovinc country into the sin and suilering of a war as needless as it will be ferocious, the People will no sooner have tasted the woes of such a contest than their vcnsTeaiicc will overwhelm those who brought them into it. At- such a time the I'orius of the Constitution will scarcely shield them ; they would be driven from power wilhin a day. if it were possible ivilhoul lramplit\g in the dnst our Consiitutioii. Upon the Presi- ■tJent, the Cabinet, the Parly, ihal had wantonly comiuiited such a crime and such a folly, would rest a public execration that would never let them sec power while the popular memory lasttsd ; and Whigs and Whig principles, a conservative moderation, justice, and prudence, would take a long possession of the people's contidence and affection. Such, sir, would be the consequences of a war for such an object and under such circumstances — so unprovoked, so impolitic, and so certain to be calamitous. For the Whigs, as a party, such a war would ac- complisl) every thing, but at a cost to the country too terrible for any Whig ever to desire. If you will tluis put us into power, it must be in spite of all we can do. God preserve us from an as(;endency purchased so dear ! We can wait until milder means shall effect the same great end. To the Whigs, then, this question it above all party. To the credit of the country this question was long above all party. For more than twcity-tive years no party consented to look on it in any but a national light; nay from its very rise, from the foundation of our claim in that quarter, no Administration nor any party had ever attempted to make of it any but an American question. But, when assembled at Baltimore, a certain cele- brated convention, which (to use the language of one of its members) " was or- ganized by faction and governed by demagogues," (I use the words of the Sen- ator from North Carolina — Mr. IIavwooo — addressed to us the other day,) then and there for the first time this national controversy was seized by party, made to receive its stamp and its spirit, and pushed to extravagance, in order that, b3r this very impress of ultraism and of violence, it might seem to be more distinct- ly their own, and none but their own. And why was thi^onef Through a» extreme party necessity, as the last desperate stake of a party that had played away every thing it could beg or borrow. On all of the old and legitimate ques- tions they saw they were beaten and overthrown, and they knew they must force new issues, upon which excitement and humbuggery had not been exhausted^ or that they were gone. The domestic questions — those of internal adminis- tration, the only proper ones between parlies — ^-had been used to excite and de- lude the people, until these could excite and delude no longer ; it was necessary then to call to tlieir aid still stronger stimulants, such as all before had shrunk from employing — questions of foreign policy, that the most disloyal had never before dared to endanger and corrupt, by committing them to the bad influences of party, and the divisions it must breed. To create those very divisions wa» their object — to produce distractions about national questions, which they coulct no longpr raise abo'it domestic ones. An excitement was their last hope. With- out it their defeat was certain ; with it, at whatever cost to the country, they might still succeed. In this manner and for these motives came to be adopted by this memorable convention the more remarkable resolution that our title to the whole of Oregon was «' clear and unquestionable." The time of its passage was not less singu- lar than its other attendant circumstances. It was, as the Senator from New Jersey (Mr. Miller) has observed, introduced and carried on the third day of the convention, before breakfast, after the departure from Baltimore of more than a majority of the convention. As to the hour, I cannot agree with the Senator from New Jersey, that it was ill chosen. At no other had such discretion reign- ed in the proceedings ; it was well, then, to do one thing at a discreet if an un- usual time of day; and judicious to have the actors at least sober, if the resolu- tions were not. This, sir, was the first time that into the present controversy party views were- introduced, and, as I have said, studiously introduced at an inopportune time^ before an unfit body, in an exaggerated and inflammatory form of assertion, for the purpose of compelling the opposition of prudent and right-thinking men, in the hope that such would prove to be the minority. This, as every body knows, was the entire origin of that declaration which President Polk thought himseir power while conservative the people's of a war for n politic, and ar would ac- Whig ever to 1 we can do. t until milder tion If above ve all party, in any but a claim in that ke of it any certain cele- i) " was or- of the ^ca- !r day,) then party, made rder that, by- ore diHtinct- rhrough ait had playet lead on •arty, his standard, r damn^- '. Now, 3 me feeli hind the Vis, too,, which I •enator's ver, was a. (Mr. oce and ir ifTection of the President, his old school associat«, and perhaps his classmate, ie has assured us that the reading of the 54° 40' gentlemen was toUaily errone- 9U8 ; that the President had planted himself on the parallel of 40^ ; that he couUI neither advance nor recede from it without rendering himself infamous forever; and, moreover, having the Senator turn his back upon him. Sir, I confide ia the revelations of the cool, sagacious, and prudent personal friend of the Piesi* dent, not that I believe it the true reading of the message, but as indicating a later state of the Executive mind, and a wish for the present to compromise withEn^ land at the parallel of 49". But to proceed to another point. We collect sufficiently, from many declara- tions in this and the other House of Congress, and from the voice of various newspapers paij by the Government to give candid information about its acts, that tills Oregon business has been admirably conducted, and that to doubt it is to be exceedingly factious and even unpatriotic. Nevertheless, as I happen to have very strong doubts of that sort, I will state them, at whatever hazard of being charged with taking the British side of the question. That charge does not greatly disturb me ; and I feel an entire willingness, when the charge is formally made, to submit it to the judgment of my constituents. I say, then, that the Oregon question has bean mismanaged from the Presi- dent's first ill-judged inau^<<<-al declaration up to the latest revelation which we have had on the subject. By his message and by his management he cannot have meant or desired or expected war; for in his message he recommends nothing that looks to war; oii^ie contrary, he dilates, as if in the midst of secure peace, against standing armies, as things that should not exist in a Republic ; he reconor mends no increase of our land forces, and but a trifling one of our navy. But, what is still more decisive, he recommends, and his Secretary of the Treasury presents to us, a revenue measure — the repeal of the tariff — which would at once deprive us of the means of carrying on war. On the other hand, he could not have meant to inform us and the nation that he is anxious to settle the Oregon controversy at the line of 49°, for he says the contrary. He long ago submitted the only thing lie ever did that looked to suck a settlement ; and he tells us that the door to compromise is closed forever, and that he now claims the whole territory of Oregon. I myself, then, can draw from his conduct but one conclusion : that the ques- tion being a very knotty question, the Executive intended to place himself "on the fence," so as to be able to get off on either side. He meant, if the message was followed by a strong manifestation of the popularity of 54° 40', war or no war, quietly to slide off on that side ; but if, on the contrary, the deliberate judge- ment of the American people was given in favor of a fair and amicable compromise, then some of his learned and ingenious friends, practised in the art of explaining things, were to rise and show conclusively that from the beginning the President ■was altogether in favor of 49° and against 54° 40'. This, sir, is niy conclusion, after reading the message and hearing the elaborate and ingenious contrary inter* pretations put upon it by honorable Senators, friends of the President. Each inr terpretation is so lucid, forcible, and conclusive, that they destroy each other, and plainly prove that both are wrong ; that the President goes for neither, but places himself impartially upon the fence. Now, to give the main reasons why I hold that the President and his Premier have entirely mismanaged the business, let me, first of all, remark, that such a question, originally broached by the Executive in a mannar that at once made it necessary and yet difficult to settle it, could not but be furliier mismanaged in consequence of this attempt to be on both sides of it. Let me, tV'"" call the Senate's attention to the objectionable grounds taken in the first comniuuicalion from the new Admiuistralion to the British envoy for the purpose of renewing 8 ihe negotiation. To the preceding Secretary, (now the Senator from Soatl met the ca Carolina,) an offer had been made on the British part. It had been rejected by heard that I our Government. The British negotiator had then invited a reference to arbitra tion. That had been, (I think very properly,) declined, but for reasons fair atatesmanly, and friendly, entirely unlike those on which a like offer has lalel been declined on our part. In the first instance, the matter had not arrived a the point of arbitration, and so the former Secretary, (Mr. Calhoun,) simply said ; in the last, the point at which Britain was left, by the abrupt termination of the negotiation, and the retraction of the proposition to settle on the principles of compromise at the parallel of 49°, there was no amicable resort but arbitra tion. Of an unconditional surrender of all further claim to any portion of Oregon Without stopping to discuss the policy of the rejection of that fair and friendly mode of adjustment of our controversy, I must say that the reasons assigned by Mr. Buchanan for declining to submit the question to arbitration are unsound and puerile, and reflect no honor on him as a statesman. In the letter of our Secretary to which I now refer, he sets out with uigingj the question of title ; and, before any offer ^i a settlement is submitted, he tell8| the British Minister many things very unfit to incline him to accept the coming proposition. He tells him that he is bid to say, that had the Oregon question been a new one, the Executive would make to England no proposition at all. Is this not a strange language to hold in a negotiation which we ourselves had invited ? However, (he goes on to say,) the President has found pending nego- tiations, based on principles of compromise, and in consi^ence does not feel at liberty abruptly to break them off. Why this new tone, so unlike the previous negotiations and the terms so repeatedly offered by oui Government ? Why state sudden and haughty pretensions, that are not to be acted upon, and can only surprise and offend ? Why talk of ceasing to treat, when the conference is one of our own seeking, and we have not yet made a single offer ? He proceeds to tell England, that while we believe and know our title to' be unquestionable up to 54° 40', the President feels constrained, as well by existing negotiations as by the acts of his predecessors, to submit a proposition. And now what sort of a proposition? More advantageous to the counter-party than those repeatedly made by his predecessors, in deference to whose admissions he makes it? No, it falls short of them. Is this negotiation to go backwards instead of meeting the advances made on the other side? The President plainly admits, that he yields to the acts of his wise predecessors : either, then, he avows himself bound by some moral, or political, or legal, or diplomatic authority, or by several of these at once. If it binds iiim, why, then, does he not conform to it? If it bound him at all, it bound him to go at least as far as it had gone. He has said that he found pending negotiations on the basis of a compromise : what would that be in the case of a renewed negotiation? Clearly, that setting out from the old concessions on either side, both parties should offer some additional one. Sir, I cannot forbear remarking that these Polk negotiations seem to have been conducted rather on the horse-tradin? principle. I do not, however, mean to quarrel with the President so much for this coming short in the proposition made as with the next act in connexion with it. Its rejection could have been no mat- ter of surprise, and it was at once refused by the British negotiator, in terms, as neither reasonable nor fair. Thereupon it was immediately withdrawn, as if in a huff; the refusal to entertain and transmit it was construed as a kind of insult; and Britain was informed that our Government would now accept of nothing short (if the entire territory. Sir, the British Minister is not responsible to me, nor even to the American people, for his course ; yet I regret that course ; nay, I think he was has';, i ^r- emptory, and committed a great blunder, unless he had explicit instructior.. .. .',ich other. T terms offei tiator for a our Secret added intii except to will read offer of 41 cerely mat Secretary' jection. himself, a construe calamitous .the code Secretary' aerious. Was, adopted ft have fitly and proba taken in ( of reason is less th; was the o fessed dij step was personal : yet know plaint ag Governm tained its propositi comproH aion. W propositi treat. I the odiei may we was sue short of is inforr so that 1 to his C Sir, 1 tion — tl aider, ii draw tl reason, seize tl that thi cepted, have 1< or from Soutl; een rejected by ence to arbitra- reasons fair, offer has lately not arrived at .HouN,) simply •pt termination the principles )rt but arbitra- ion of Oregon, ir and friendly IS assigned by e unsound and t with uiging nitted, he tells pt the coming •egon question )osition at all. ourselves had ponding nego- oes not feel at e the previous ment ? Why , and can only ference is one e proceeds to lestionable up itiations as by vhat sort of a ?e repeatedly ikes it ? No, d of meeting Imifs, that he ows himself or by several itoit? If it He has said what would out from the I ditional one. i ■o have been ver, mean to )sition made een no mat- in terms, as wn, as if in d of insult; of nothing e American hap') , por- tion. .. ,'.ich met the case, which is not improbable. But, be this as it may, I have never heard that a blunder on one part justifies or even extenuates a blunder on the other. The rejection on Mr. Pakenham's part was neither in itself, nor by its terms offensive, and he was warranted by the former example of our own nego- tiator for acting as promptly as he did. The manner of that rejection was, in our Secretary's reply, taken exception to, and the proposition retracted, with the added intimation; in effect, that we should make no other, nor negotiate further, except to receive the abandonment of the whole British claim. If any Senator will read the last paragraph but on > of the Secretary's letter, withdrawing the offer of 49, the conviction will be forced upon his mind, that either it was insin- cerely made, or that there was no better ground for recalling it than tliat the Secretary's or the President's sensibilities were wounded by that l^noruage of re- jection. He evidently considers something in the manner used as iii^-'ilting to himself, or to his superior. That was indeed going back to feudal dim s, when a constructive affront to a King's favorite or his mistress plunged iia ions into calamitous wars ! I say a "constructive affront," for even the licest logic of .the code of honor can make nothing more of it ; and au equa! scrutiny into the Secretary's own corn municalions will detect violations of punctilio ai least as serious. Was, t'len, the serious interest of the country ; was the policy deliberately adopted for it ; were the grave obligations and authorities which 'ould alone have fitly determined the President's offer ; was the peace of two great nations, and probably of th(i world, to be greatly jeoparded, if not abandoned, by a step taken in obedience to menacing and questionable punctilio? Is this age of peace, of reason, of Christianity, of civilization, one in which the substance of things is less than such shadows ? But, sir, again I ask why, if made in good faith, was the offer to compromise on the parallel of 49° withdrawn? I am not a pro- fessed diplomatist; nor, indeed, is the President; but, diplomatically, this grave step was still more indefensible. The offence, if it was one, was clearly the personal act of the Minister only — the manner of his rejecting a proposition not yet known to his Government. At worst, then, it was only a ground of com- plaint against hitn to his Court, nnd not of any change of conduct towards that Government itself — of the angry wiihdrawal of any offer to it, until it had sus- tained its agent in the offence committed. But the President did withdraw his proposition, and by his course in retracting it, and declining formally all further compromise, he converted into an ultimatum that which was not even a conces- sion. N^ow, in no amicable negotiation can an ultimatum be made of a first proposition. To set out in that way would be to prescribe, to dictate, not to treat. But, could ii be done, you would be bound, at least in laying it before the other party for acceptance or rejection, to let them know it is final, that they may weigh the consequences of refusal. Here the nature of the proposition was such as made it impossible for the other party to suppose it final ; it being short of all propositions before made, ho declines to entertain it ; whereupon he is informed, not only that it was an ultimatum, but that it is withdrawn altogether, 80 that he shall now not even have the power to accept it, or even to convey it to his Government for its consideration and decision. Sir, I think I have shown that this management will not bear close examina- tion—the criticism of plain, common, honest sense. But let us proceed to con- sider, in the same way, the consequences. There was clearly no need to with- draw the proposition because declined by the Minister. No need? Yea, no reason, unless it was insincerely made, and the Administration wanted only to seize the first pretext for retracting it ; in which case, it is only to be remarked, that they should never have made it; for unquestionably either we wanted it ac- cepted, or we did not. If we did, we should still want it, and should therefore have left it in the power of the British Government, which could (and, as wa 1# now know, would probably) have acted on it when reported by its Minister. But, if we did not want it accepted, we should never have made it, not only be- cause It was acting in ill faith, but because the offer, the rejection, and the with- drawal inevitably placed both Governments in a much worse position than be- fore ; for now there arc not only puncUlios afloat, popular and party excitement. Presidential electioneering, military plans and preparations, but owr Government, after offering 49°, is peicmplorily contending for 54° 40'; while England, after refusing 49°, is now to treat of giving up to 54° 40', or not to treat at all ! But observe again : Is ilie rejection of a proposition any reason why it should be withdrawn ? If it is, then all propositions must be accepted when made. If withdrawn as soon as declined, what will remain to treat about? How is nego- tiation to go forward but from less advantageous to more advantageous offers-— the former remaining, when refused, as a basis, a scaffolding for the next ? Strike it away each time, and what have you to stand on, or how are you to mount t Then, again, were the British offers withdrawn as soon as declined ? Certainly not. There stand their tender of arbitration, and all their otlier offers, to be re- curred to when we like. True, the offers on both sides in 1826 were withdrawn in the form of a protest, that in future negotiations the parties would not hold, themselves bound or concluded by any concessions then made ; but that was when it was found that nolliing final and satisfactory could be concluded, and tho temporary convention of 1818 was renewed. In a word, they were not even in that manner withdrawn until the negotiation had fallen thiough ; and that is the only time when offers can be, with any propriety, retracted. Then alone is any such shifting not unfriendly and disrespectful. So much as to forms, and now of the effects of that withdrawal. Sir, of it we all now know enough to say, with something like certainty, tliat but for that ill-judged and unfortunate step, a treaty on nearly that basis, quite satisfactory to the mass of this country, and quite honorable to the Administration, would have been by this time not only concluded, but ratified. I need scarcely add my reasons for saying so: the regret subsequently expressed in the House of Com- mons by the British Premier, that the Minister had not transmitted tiie proposi- tion for the coMsideraiion of his Government, instead of declining to entertain it,, is pregnant with meaning. If he (Sir Robert Peel) added, that "he was not pre- pared to say it would have been entirely acceptable," yet that form of expression certainly shows that he regarded it as only requiring some modifications, such a*, should not, with either side, have stood in the way of adjustment. Need I re- peat, then, that the failure is entirely the consequence of the retraction of our offer ? That unhappy punctilio, or that still worse insincerity, is the cause of it all? I fear, sir, that we have not done with that needless and dangerous point of honor. Idle as it is, at best, between nations, and shameful as it would be if such a mere cobweb were stronger than the bonds of brotherhood, peace, and in- terest between two great kindred, Christian, and sagacious States, yet it has so served with its false difficulties to complicate all the real ones of the subject, that I fear it still. Alas! once entangled in such things, the bravest cease to know what they are about, the wisest become weak. 'Too often have I seen so.'ue oC the best men in my State fall a sacrifice to nothing but a punctilio. Well, thus was the negotiation ended — abruptly closed — without cause, with- out excuse, in August last. And now I come to another part of the mischievous machinery which the President has employed throughout this matter. From the beginning, with an openness never before ventured, even by his bold- estpredecessor, he had allowed to be set up here a journal destined to receive every Executive favor, and avowedly speaking in his name, but constantly misleading the public, at home and abroad. I hold the Executive responsible for every thing which has appeared in the "Union" relative to tliis Oregon controversy, not- withstanding the Senator from Indiana (Mr. Hanneoan) denied here in his place» on one mei sident. A the Execut misinterpre matter whii a stop to it ' Union," anything, i live was pr During tha England — tempting to and the Pr< yield the h Ihe " Unio ber from ov such extrer presented— succor of t were well ( Can any oi public of bi if not to be policy and permitted t everybody of public f( itself deper the midst o Well, b) gent us. ( gone befori among wh ginia and 1 glad oraeni saw that, i none," the that that p how anyll: and that t dined. I I themselve yet, in ev( forthcomi What i sent forth an amical breathe tl spcclable cation of it introdu him in ef Sir, su dent info far from its Minister. not only be- nd the with- ion than be- excitement» Government, iigland, after 9i all ! hy it should in made. If ow is nego- ous offers— ext? Strike to mount ? Certainly rs, to be re- ! withdrawn lid not hold, ut that was led, and tho not even in 1 that is tlie lone is any Sir, of it but for that satisfactory tion, would ely add my le of Com- lie proposi- sntertain it^ as not pre- expression IS, such a*. Need I re- ion of our cause of it rous point i^ould be if 3e, and in- t it has so l>ject, that e to know n sorae of use, wilh- schievous. ' his bold> live every 'ading the ery thing ersy, not- Ills place^ on one memorable occasion, that the " Union" expiessed the opinions of the Pre- sident. And why do I hold him to this responsibiliy ? Because all know that, the Executive can control it at pleasure. If, then, its supposed official language misinterprets him, puts him in a false position, does mischief in a great national matter which he is conducting, he is responsible for its course if he does not put a stop to it or disavow its authority to speak for him. Now, the labors of th& " Union," from August last till the meeting of Congress in December, tended U> anything, in this Oregon question, but the promotion of that which the Execu- tive was professing to desire — a peaceful adjustment of the pending controversy. During that time its language was such as to inflame this country and irritate England — to stir up the popular passions of the two countries, instead of at- tempting to aliay them — vehemently asserting our right to the whole territory^ and the President's bounden duty to get it all, when he had already offered to yield the half. What good purpose coult', all this extravagance on the part of the " Union" serve ? While the whole negotiation was concealed up lo Decem- ber from our people, and its existence, I believe, denied in the Executive organ, such extreme pretensidns were urged there — such inflammatory national topics presented — such extraordinary appeals to the Democratic parly to come to the succor of the President, in his patriotic efi'orls to get the whole of Oregon, aa were well calculated to offend England and bewilder and alarm our own people. Can any ono divine why such active pains were taken to deceive and excite the public of both countries ? The public was not conducting the negotiations ; and if not to be enlightened, still less was it to be inflamed. Every consideration of policy and peace forbade the hostile demonstrations in which the " Union" was permitted to indulge all the summer and fall. Their effect in England was, as everybody knew must happen, highly irritating, and could not but beget a stale of public feeling there which made it much more difficull for that Governmert— itself dependent, like our own, on its popularity — to make any concr'ssions ia the midst of conduct and a tone so overbearing. Well, by and by Congress assembles ; the message, with its documents, is »ent us. On the country at large, alarmed with the rattle of preparation that had gone before if, the effect was quite sedative. Some of the friends of peace — among whom may be remembered particularly the Senators near me from Vir- ginia and North Carolina, (Messrs. Archkr and Manoum) — hailed it as giving glad omens of everything pacific. Upon me the effect was quite diflferent. I saw that, notwithstanding all the bluster of the " organ" about the " whole or none," that the President had made an oflfer to settle on the rallel of 49°, and that that proposition had been rejected and withdrawn. I could not perceive how anything was lelt open for the adverse party but a tender of arbitration ;. and that the temper and spirit of the message led me to believe would be de- clined. In a word, .hough I could not believe ihe American people would allow themselves to be drajfged or to be blundered into a war for " all Oregon or none," yet, in every point my apprehensions were increased, not diminished, by the forthcoming of the message. What is its character as to this controversy ? Is it such as should have been sent forth to us and the world, if the Executive desired sincerely and honesdy an amicable adjustment of the question ? In my judgment it is not. It does not breathe thai lone of moderation and peace which must be observed between r-- spectable nations at all times, and particularly in their disputes. I)y the publi- cation of Se extreme ground taken, it made it more difficult to recede from it; it introduced topics by no means necessary, and far from being of a sort to aid him in effecting, at any time, a pc«c ful settlement of the question. Sir, subsequent facts have made it clear that when, by the message, the Presi- dent informed us that he placed little or no further hope in negotialioit. it was far from being at an end. Indeed, it is now apparent that the aanunciaiioii that yte could treat no further was but a feint, partly for domestic politics and partly that, by holding out strong legislative measures as to Oregon, and the hope of a free-trade tariff, we might both intimidate and bribe Great Britain into large con- cessions, which might make a boast for this Administration. This dangerous game of intimidation Congress was to help play. Even now we are kindly told by the " organ" that unanimity in Congress is all that is wanting to enable the Executive to carry triumphantly his point. What that point is none of us know, and about which scarcely two of his friends on this floor agree. One while lec- turing and then cajoling us, the " organ" bids us see that all we have obtained (I should like to know what it is, by-the-by) is by threatening demonstrations. I make no doubt that, from the strong desire of peace displayed by England, some- thing might have been gained in this way ; but they who devised this reputable plan should have had some prudence, some moderation, and known when to strike. They have pushed it too far, have awakened her pride, and will proba- bly get nothing by their game of brag. At all events, the method is a most haz- ardous, and by no means a reputable one. I consider it perfectly clear, from the contemporary recommendations of the Subtreasury and of the reduction of the tariff, that no armed difficulty with Eng- land was designed or expected. The supineness of the Cabinet as to urging on Congress to the military and naval readiness which it recommended, is a further "bm a needless proof that peace only was looked for. Indeed, when a war is really apprehended, a wise and discreet Government does as Great Britain has been doing; it says nothing of it, but goes about preparation quietly and vigor- ously; and if suspicion is excited, and questions are asked, it answers evasively. To the other coercive steps proposed by the Executive, I need but little advert. Except the notice that the existing convention of joint occupation shall terminate after a year — a step hich may probably be harmless, and wh'ch the action of the Executive has rendered necessary — they all have three gri ne while lec- lave obtained nstrations, I igland, some- this reputable )wn when to id will proba- s a most haz- lations of the ty with E'ng- to urging on d, is a further ten a war is t Britain has y and vigor- 3rs evasively. I little advert, lall terminate the action of faults ; they ned; but the deal with a We should (Ti. .lless, in- ve back ; and )e the same, per course on nessage of a en up. It is 1 in his inau- j lould we not f ir difficulties ? Recom- epealedly of- lifferent foot- in the whole Administra- arily offered f ? Did we n a privilege ig to war for !ly conceded s to interest, , (now clas- able. tiything but wise, unless we have no need of even natural sympathies against England, ira the event of conflict with that Power. The unfriendly reference, however, t» Powers whom it is so entir«'ly our business to coQciliate, if we mean to push things to extremity with England, is coupled with a renewal of that claim, to be the guardians and dictators of everything on this continent, which we once made for a special purpose, but in terms far too sweeping, so that ii gave u& some trouble then, and had been willingly left to slumber unrepeatcd until now t I allude, of course, to the famous declaration of President Monroe, now revived by Mr, Polk, to be brandished against the very nation that we have invited to treat with us, and to whom we have offered half the region in dispute. To he'^ we are now made to say, in Mr, Monroe's words, " that no European Power shall now or henceforth be allowed to colonize any portion of llie American con- tinent," Why put forth such an assumption at such a juncture? Was it ne- cessary to secure the American people's rights, to strengthen their title in Ore- gon ? It is a ground so imperative and so comprehensive, that, if it has any validity, no otiier was to be mentioned. It puts aside all forms and sources of title, however recognised by the universal consent of nations, and rides over every thing, with the single annunciation " that we, the United Slates, have said it, and it shall be so." VVhat did we mean, then, by discussing with Great Bri- tain our rights through Gray, through Liwis and Clarke, through the purchase of Louisiana, through the Sp.iuish cession of 1819? Why urge continuity,, contiguity, or even " manifest destiny," or David's psalms or the Pope's bull ? Did we condescend to discuss such petty points while we stood upon this utter- ly overruling one ? Did we offer all beyond 49°, when no where on this conti- nent is any European Power to be allowed to come ' Sir, this is another re- markable instance of the unhesitating manner in which this Administration takes and shifts positions. How can men be dealt with, who enter into a discussioa of claims with you, produce their titles, and then suddenly tell you of one that absolutely estops all others, but not even alluded to in the previous comparisoa of claims ? Why had it not been stated, if it was relied upon ? Why, but simply because it would not have borne to be sifted in a regular negotiation. And why was it only clapped into the message ? Because, in a mere popular and party document, very bad reasons will go down, and public passions only are appealed to. Sir, we may announce this fiat of ours as much as we please to our people, but we can never maintain it in intercourse or discussion with the other powers of the world ; we never have been able to do it; for nations are compelled, if they would be respected, to confine themselves to reasonable and feasible doc- trines. Can we impose this proposition on either the old world or, in spite of them, on the new world, of which this new doctrine would make us the sell-appointed trustees ? Originally we made the declaration in an extravagant form, but for a restricted, a practical, and a justifiable purpose— disinterestedly : for the protec- tion of the weak against the strong ; of young freedom against old despotism ;. of the new-formed Spanish Amijrican Republics against the threatened interfer- ence of the Holy Alliance, to help Spain resubjugate them. Of course, those States that were then to profit by it did not quarrel with its terms ; b.it those States will no longer acquiesce in it now, when, instead of their common pro- lection, we are threatening to become their common enemy. Europe never did and never can submit to the declaration. It is, then, if enforced, to be enforced against the entire earth. What purpose can it answer, then, but to get us into- difficulties, aiul lower our public reputation as a people respecting the right? It never should have been made ; for it never was necessary, even for the tempo- rary and limited purpose for which it was intended. Sufficient for the day the evil and the good ih^-eof; and a wise nation, contenting itself with providing for the one or the Oi r, will entangle itself in its foreign policy with none of 14 iheae extensive pledges. We had only to say on that occasion, that, if the Holy Alliance, which had nothing to do on this continent, interfered in favor of Spain, we should stand by the new republics, and that England was ready to join us in that course. That wiiS really all that the thing meant — the practical paii of it ; and all that exceeded this only served (as may be seen in Mr. Richard Rush's late book) to embarrass us in another important question then pending But mark, in what speedily followed, how valid we ourselves held the declara tion, as capable of being opposed to the subsisting claims of European nations Immediately afterward, we recognised, by treaty, the claims of Russia (never before established) down to 54° 40'. Moreover, in 1827, some two years only after Mr. Monroe's dftilaraiion, we offered Great Britain the line of 49°, and the navigation of the Columbia ; and these being refused, we renewed the con- vention of joint occupation. Both these acts overthrow all pretence of excluding the territorial claims of a European power by a resort to President Monroe's de- ■claration. But, now, what is that declaration, examined by the rules of reason ? Either it is founded on a previously received law of nations or upon one then establish- ed, or it is a mere dictum. I nued not say it was not the first ; if the second, nobody made it but ourselves ; and ive have never put it in force. It is, then, our own occasional dictum only. That dictum is to set aside, at our pleasure, the rights of all others: it is to vacate titles that conflict with it any where on this continent, and to bind, without their consent, not only all European, but all American States. In other words, it is an appeal to arbitrary will and force by this Government against the entire earth ! Or consider it historically. How came we to be independent? In part, by procuring the interference of France upon this continent to aid us. How can that right be denied to other American States at this day ? How came we by Louisiana? We bought it of a European power, which had acquired it only two years before. Mr. Monroe's very declaration was made under a regular understanding with England that she should interfere along with us on this con- tinent. Unpopular as it may be, I, then, hiimlile individual as I am, take this occasion to say, that the principle of this famous declaratmn, and the use to "which it is now put, are mischievous, unsound, wicked ; and that, if it is meant for any thing but an idle boast or pretence — if this Government ever means to net upon it, regularly to enforce it — your present institutions must give way to something stronger, more despotic; they must take an entirely military form und spirit ; we must set on foot an army like that of Russia, and a navy like that of England. While I thus denounce the principle, I am perfectly willing to admit that a «ase may arise (as it had arisen when we interfered for the Spanish colonies in 1824) when the United States would be called on, by every consideration of in- lerest and of legitimate policy, to tell any (iovernmcnt of Europe, '• You shall not touch this or that American island or State ; it will place us in jeopardy." This, however, is the exception. Turn it into the general, it is false, pernicious, and will lead to the overthrow of our Government if the people sanction it. Have we any right to object to the Empire of Brazil ? What is it to us if Eu- ropeans colonize Patagonia or Peru ? An infusion of intelligiMH-e from any where into the South American States would benefit thnm, and indirectly us. In the tiuie of Mi. Monroe we interfered under hopes and sympatliius which have proved to be illusory; the Governments in which* wc expected to see such bles- sings have been little but a scourge to the countries setting them up. We can no longer interpose for lliom, under the idea of sustMininjr the cause of free prin- ciples, but nnist confine ourselves to oases whore we have a direct, important, and just interest of our own to guard. In a word, we must return to that just and peaceful policy so wisely and virtuously recommended by the Father of his country, this declar: very bad d and could end — to sn however, on which In the o us if Eu- from any •tly us. In liicli have sur;h blea- We can f free prin- iniporiant, o that just thcr of his country. For all these reasons, I repeat that I look upon the introduction of this declaration into the message as the revival, for a very bad application of a very bad doctrine. Had it been ever so true, it had no bearing on this question, and could by no possibility have any effect towards that which was the great end — to smooth the way to a fair adjustment of the Oregon controversy. I must, however, ndw pass to other parts of the subject, and particularly to that of title, on which I consider it necessary briefly to explain myself. In the opinion that our tide ought not to be discussed on this floor, I cannot n, and that torial right, ours at As- ia north of hat the real 1 any, from iblishments private per- r of all the lown to the the further int occupa- y^et perfect- become a rrangement 1 not com- I other in a liii north of B. and con- hen, seems ny mind is south of it. ig liiie this ng, should and in the ill hail the ^ulty. On 'e changed notice giv- e, that the at we may