IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) k // K I.I 2.5 m 1^ S 1^ 12.0 1.8 1^ 1^ U4 Sciences Corporation 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 r signifia "A SUIVRE", la symbols V signifia "FIN". Las cartaa, pla'nchaa. tablaaux. ate, pauvant *tra filmte « daa taux da rMuction diffirants. Lorsqua la documant ast trop grand pour Atra raproduit an un saul ciichA, il ast film« A partir da I'angia sup4riaur gaucha, da gaucha A droita, at da haut an baa, an pranant la nombra d'imagas n^casnaira. Las diagrammas auivants illustrant la mAthoda. 1 2 3 4 5 6 HOLD THE FORT! A COLLECTION OF FRESH FACTS AND ARGUMENTS IN SUPPORT OF THE POLICY OF Protection to Home Industry. Published by The American Iron and Steel Association, at No. £65 South Fourth Street, Philadelphia, ai which place copies of this tract may be had on appli- cation by letter. THE PROTECTIVE POLICY. Protection is a principle and not an expedient. If it is right, the reasons for believing in it ancl maintaining it should be so clear and so conclusive that its friends will never be tempted to apologize for it, nor its enemies be abk to delude the unthinking with stories of 'its oppressive burdens. There is nothing compli- cated, nothing metaphysical, nothing hard to understand in the protective policy, and it should be discussed with that simplicity of statement and directness of application which it so eminently admits and so fully Invites. It is a plain question of the duty of a nation to encourage the industry of its own people, in preference to the industry of an alien people. It is a question of the duty and interest of a nation to develop all its resources, rather than allow THE PROTECTIVE POIICY. le of 8ome ot the most important of them to remain undeveloped. It is a question of diversified employments and unbounded possibilities for a nation capable of great achievements, rather than a limitation of its powers to such occupations as will prevent it from becoming independent and its people from going forward. This is the pro- tective policy. It is not the instrument by which monopolies are to be established, but it is the foe of all monopolies, domestic and foreign, for it encourages the widest competition in productive in- dustry. It is not the instrument by which one class of the com- munity is to be benefited at the expense of another class, for it seeks the common weal by affording employment to all classes. It is not a tax upon one industry for the benefit of another industry, for its design is to impose taxes upon foreign producers that domestic con- sumers may obtain cheaper commodities, and this is its effect. It is not a hindrance to commerce, but a help to it, for it stimulates internal commerce when it stimulates the development of resources which could have no value if not exchanged for other products, and it aids foreign commerce when it enables a country, through the competition and increased skill of its people, to produce commodi- ties so cheaply that other countries will be induced to purchase them. It is the policy of patriotism, of progress, of civilization — a policy that defends the weak against the strong, and stands reso- lutely for one's own against all assailants. The protective policy' of the United States has always aimed to advance the welfare of its working people. Protection has benefited them because it has diversified their employments, increased the rewards of their labor, cheapened the cost of the necessaries of life, -Stimulated enterprise, developed the national resources, expanded commerce between the States and with other countries, prevented the evil of direct taxation, and elevated the whole tone of our natioc life. The industrial policy of Great Britain, whether controlled h;^ protective or free-trade influences, has always aimed to advance the interests of her ruling classes, and has never sought the elevation of her working people. It is the glory of the United States that she has not adopted an industrial policy that would degrade all labor, and it is the shame of Great Britain thai her labor has been syste- matically degraded that her aristocracy might prosper. — From The American Iron Trade in 1876. Among the most sacred rights is that of the labor of a country to its own markets. — M. Thiers. THERE 18 NO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE. 8 THERE 18 NO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE. . The opinion has been industriously disseminated that the policy of protecting home industries by means of duties on imports of foreign commodities is almost exclusively confined to the United States. This is an error. Protection is the policy of many nations; free trade the policy of very few. Of all the leading nations of the world, Great Britain is the only one which professes to practice absolute free trade in the exchange of commercial products ; and even Great Britain, as we shall presently show, does this only in a qualified sense. France, Germany, Austria, Russia, Italy, Bel- gium, Holland, Denmark, Sweden, and Switzerland have protective tariffs. Even unhappy Spain is not without its tariff on imported goods, and impoverished Turkey now admits that to the absence of protection is her present condition largely due. The empire of Brazil, the leading nation of South Amerfca, imposes duties on imports which average over forty per cent, of their value. All the South American republics impose similar duties. Many of the colonies of Great Britain refuse to follow the example of th^ mother country, for th^y impose protective duties ; the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria being especially devoted to the protective policy. In India and Canada there are strong parties favorable to the development of home industry by protective duties, and their views have found expression in local legislation. A careful survey of the whole field leads to the conclusion that the protective policy is everywhere stronger to-day than it has been. Only in Germany do we see manifested any disposition to surrender it, and there the effort to establish partial free trade is being most strenuously resisted. It may be said that, with the exception of France, no other country is so strongly protective as the United States; but this criticism does not affect the proposition that protection is the rule and free trade the exception among all leading nations. The measure of this protection each country must decide for itself. To show conclusively that Great Britain alone among leading nations professes devotion to free trade, it is only necessary to refer to the tables of import duties levied by the different European countries on foreign products* published by our government in the Monthly Reports for July, August, and September, 1869, of the Deputy Special Commissioner of the Revenue, Mr. Francis A Walker. It appears from these tables, which are too long to be transferred to these pages, that every Continental European country THERE 18 NO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE. levies an import duty upon the manufactured goods and other products of other countries, and that iron and steel products are especially subjected to these duties. The tariff on iron rails in the leading Continental countries of Europe was as follows in 1869: France, $11.91 per ton of 2,240 pounds; Germany, S12.19; Austria, $24.38; Kussia, $9.74. If it be argued that these duties are not levied for protection, but for revenue, we answer that all or nearly all of the duty-paying articles compete with articles which are produced by the countri(}8 which impose the duties, and that the policy of free trade means the free exchange of commodities between nations. If neither the principle nc: the practice of free trade is adopted by the countries of Continental Europe, then they can not in any sense be properly claimed as its converts, even in part. Protection and revenue are not incompatible elements in the formation of a customs tariff; but free trade and revenue from customs are absolutely incompatible when one country exchanges with another products that are common to both. There may be revenue, but there is no free trade. The tariffs of Continelital Europe embody the principles of protection and revenue in a majority of cases where duties are levied on com- modities which compete with home productions; but where these duties are so high as to preclude the presumption that they are intended to encourage even moderate imports, the principle of protection only is preserved. France, Russia, and some of the other countries named in Mr. Walker's tables are examples of the imposition of such high duties. But France, which has been re- markably consistent in her devotion to the protective policy since the days of the first Napoleon, has gone further than this— gone further than the United States has ever gone. France has posi- tively prohibited, and does now prohibit, in her general tariff the importation of many articles which her own people can produce. The United States can not export to France to-day, upon any con- ditions whatever, refiped sugars, tobacco for private account, certain kinds of cast and forged iron, cutlery, copper in certain forms, cer- tain chemical products, common soaps, fine stoneware and earthen- ware, glass bottles, goblets, etc. The revenue which France derives from these prohibitory duties is not apparent, but the protection which her manufacturers derive from some of them is plain. Her tariff is eminently a protective one, as is her whole fiscal system. A bounty to the exporters of Frencn sugar encourages its produc- tion by facilitating its introduction into foreign markets. But Great Britain herself is not the consistent and zealous devotee THERE 18 NO INTERNATIONAL FREE TRADE. of free trade that she affects to be. Putting aside for the moment the fact that she did not announce her conversion to free trade until within the memory of the present generation, and until it suited the interests of her trading classes to do so, we proceed to inquire whether she now practices the whole of the creed she is so ready to preach to othei-s. We have before us an English reprint of the British tariff that was in force in 1875, with accompanying state- ments, and from this publication we learn that the government of Great Britain derived an income of £20,637,855 (about $100,000,000) as revenue from customs in the fiscal year 1873-4. Examining the items of which this aggregate is composed, we learn that the duty on tobacco realized £7,399,074 r on tea, £3.251,203; on brandy, £2,248,546; on wine, £1,793,112; and on dried fruits, £457,513. Many other articles paid duty in that year, including beer, coffee, rum, whisky, pickles, vinegar, gold and silver plate, and a long list of suoh chemical products as alcohol, chloroform, and varnish. In the nine years from 1866 to 1874 the income of the British govern- ment from customs amounted to £193,658,436 (about $968,000,000). The receipts of the United States from customs during the same nine years amounted to $1,668,349,914. Thus Great Britain, nominally a free-trade country, derived from duties on customs in nine years an income equal to fifty-eight per cent, of that derived from the same source by the United States, a country which has a confessedly pro- tective tariff. The commodities from which Great Britain derives the large customs revenue to which we have alluded are the products of fortign countries, and the duties imposed are a tax upon the indus- tries of those countries for the benefit of the British treasury. Thus, China is made to pay a tax upon her tea sold to the British Islands | Brazil upon her coffee ; Germany upon her beer and spirits ; the South of Europe upon its currants, raisins, and figs; and the United States upon her tobacco and distilled grain, her alcohol, etc. These taxes are a restriction upon the free exchange of commodities, and their existence confutes most completely the pretense that Great Britain is a free-trade country. This pretense appears all the more daring when it is considered that the British government and British manufacturers demand of the countries we have named, and of other countries, that the products of British industry shall not be subjected to the payment of any tax whatever when they enter foreign ports and foreign markets. China is taxed upon her tea, but China must not tax English cottons ; Brazil is taxed upon her coffee, but Brazil must not tax English iron and steel ; the South of Europe 6 THE FARMERS AND PROTECTION. is taxed upon its fniits, but the South of Europe must not tax Eng- lish machinery and cutlery ; the United States is taxed upon her tobacco, whisky, alcohol, varnish, etc., but the United States must not tax English hardware, salt, woolen goods, linen, etc. All the world must be taxed to support the British government, but all the world must maintain its own police regulations and pay its debts as best it can. It is all right, for instance, for the tobacco-growers of the United States to be taxed to help pay the interest on the British national debt ; but it is all wrong for British manufacturers, when they enter our markets, to be taxed to help pay the interest on our debt. British theoretical free trade means the free exchange of com- modities between nations. It nowhere exists : it is a myth. The only real free trade known to civilized nations is that which governs the exchanges between the people of the same country. It is the only kind of free trade that, in the nature of things, ever can exist ; for each nation must care for its own interests, and these interests are never identical with the interests of other nations. Between the different sections of the United States, for instance, all trade is absolutely free ; while all the sections are alike protected against foreign industrial assailants, come they in what guise they may. Great Britain imposes duties upon those commodities entering her ports which it suits her to tax, and upon those which it suits her to admit free of duty she imposes no duty. Yet she asks other nations not to impose duties upon such of her products as seek their markets. This is not free trade, nor the shadow of it. It is not fair trade. It is the policy that gives a glass bead in exchange for a nugget of gold, or an iron hoop for a handful of precious gems.— From The American Iron Trade in 1876. THE FARMERS AND PROTECTION. We would not ignore the fact that the farmer's home market is always his best market ; but, as he annually relies upon foreign markets to take a portion of his surplus crops, he should know that protection opposes no obstacles to his wishes. It should be remembered, too, that the wheat and corn and other farm products which are sold at home or shipped abroad have cost the farmer less labor in their production and transportation during the last fifteen years of protection than in preceding years, for he has had the use of improved machinery and of a wide-reaching railway system, both of which have been largely created by the protective policy. OUR PR08PEKOU8 FARMERS. Protection stimulates labor-saving inventions, and, by building up manufactures and developing the resources of the country, it encourages the construction of railways, and cheapens (he cost of railway material, and consequently of railway transportation. Not only is less labor required to px'oduce and market a given crop in late years than was formerly required, but the money cost of produ- cing and marketing that crop is reduced by the use of improved machinery and by the extension of railway facilities, so that the ability of the American farmer to compete iu foreign markets with foreign farmers is greatly increased. And this is the real secret of the increased exportation of American breadstufTs and provisions in late years. It is frequently alleged that foreign countries will not buy our agricultural products if we do not buy their manufactured goods. But this is a serious mistake, as has been amply demonstrated by experience. To illustrate : In the fiscal year 1872 we imported iron and steel and manufactures thereof aggregating $56,540,188 in value, and we exported 26,423,080 bushels of wheat, valued at 038,915,060, or 81.47 per bushel. In the fiscal year 1874 we im- ported iron and steel and manufactures thereof aggregating $33,- 793,546 in value, and we exported 71,039,928 bushels of wheat, valued at 0101,421,459, or 01.42 per bushel. In 1872 the value of our imports of iron and steel was almost seventeen millions of dollars in excess of the value of our exports of wheat ; whereas, in 1874 the value of our exports of wheat more than trebled the value of our imports of iron and steel. The reader will see at a glance that our agricultural exports do not depend at all upon our willing- ness to take foreign manufactures in exchange for them. Foreign countries will buy our breadstuff's and provisions because they must have them or because they are cheap. When the harvest is good In England, for instance, our exports of food products to that country will always decrease ; when the harvest is poor, will England, in her extremity, higgle about the quantity of iron and steel we are willing to take from her ? She never has done this. — From The American Iron Trade in 1876. OUR PROSPEROUS FARMERS. Under this caption the Chicago Inter- Ocean, an ever- vigilant and sagacious guardian of the interests of Western farmers, publishes some statistics to show that the West has been fairly prosperous 8 OUR PROflPKROUH FARMERS. notwithsUuKling the panic, and that this prosperity has been due to the prosperity of the farmers. It says: Taken as a class, our farmers have been favored, during the last three years, with an extraordinary demand for their breadstufls and provisions, for which they have received steadily remunerative prices. It has been a matter of common comment that while the values of manufactures, of real estate, and, indeed, of nearly all kinds of fixed investments, have been progressively declining, the values of staple articles of food, and even of vegetables, have been well sustained. The purchasing power of farm products, as measured in other articles, has never been so great as now, within the memory of the oldest inhabitant. An unprecedented foreign demand for our agricultural staples, in recent years, by withdraw- ing the superabui: dance of our domestic market, has prevented a glut, maintained good prices, and kept our farmers prosperous, despite the derangement and depression, almost amounting to paralysis, in many other branches of industry. The writer proceeds to adduce Government statistics to show how fully the above statements are sustained by the facts. The exports of wheat, since June 30, 1869, have been as follows, a calculation of average price per bushel each year and for the whole period being added : Years ending June 30. 1870.. 1871.. 1872., 1873.. 1874., 1875. 1876. Bushels. 86,584,115 34,304,000 26,423,080 39,204,28.5 71,039,928 53,047,177 66,073,122 Total Average., 816,676,013 45,096,639 Values. 847,171,229 45,143,424 88,915,060 61,452,254 101,421,459 59,007,863 68,382,889 Average price per bushel. $412,094,178 858,870,597 $1.28.939 1.31.505 1.47.277 1.31.241 1.42.767 1.12.368 1.24.167 $1.30.648 These are significant totals, even standing alone, but a compara- tive view will place them in a still more signal light. An annual statement in detail of our foreig.i trade was first ordered by Congress to begin 'September 1, 1820. From that date to July 1, 1870, em- bracing forty-nine fiscal years, our aggregate exports of American wheat footed up 254,573,057 bushels, valued at $342,233,361. In other words, within the last seven years, or during just one-seventh of the previous period, we exported 61,103,556 bushels more, and 069,860,817 more in value. Exports of wheat flour for the same term offer an exhibit of similar significance : -- OUR PROflPEROUS FARMERS. Yean ending June 80. Btrrtla. 8,463,Ra» 8,60a,H41 4,(HI4,094 8,97!J,IM S,93a,Sl'i 'i4,lM,029 3,4fi6,047 Valuu. Aventee prio* per barrel. •3t,l09,A93 24,0U8,I84 17,9Sn,eHI 19,.'l«l,604 29,2«H,0M 23,712, i4U 24,408,470 tl«0,004,12» 922,807,798 t6. 11.249 6.09.893 7.14.076 7.06.4«O 7.14.641 0.U6.H20 6.20.H40 M.81.M0 Here, as before, we see the totals of both quantity and value augmenting since the panic. These are evidences of thrift, not of industrial depression, throughout the agricultural community. From August 31, 1820, to June 30, 1870 — about forty-nine years — the aggregate exports of wheat flour were 93,674,714 barrels, valued at $590,456,860. Thus, within seven years, we exported 25.83 per cent, of the quantity, and 27.1 per cent, of the value, of the aggre- gate exported during the previous period seven times as long. Next, if we reduce barrels of flour to equivalent bushels of w^.jat, at the standard rate of five bushels to the barrel, we shall have a sum total of 722,946,627 bushels for the forty-nine years, as the aggregate of wheat flour and of wheat combined exported for that term, and, in like manner, 436,669,258 bushels for the last seven years. According to these figures we exported, within the short period, 60.4 per cent, of the entire quantity, and 61,84 per cent, of the entire value, exported within the long period. It is plain, moreover, that higher export prices, on an average, were realized in the seven than in the forty-nine years. Now let us take up the exports of corn, as follows : Years ending June 80. 1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 1875 1876 * Total .... Average Bushels. 1,392,115 9,826,309 84,491,660 38,541,930 34,434,606 28,858,420 49,498,572 187,038,602 28,148,3/2 Values. $1,287,575 $0.92.490 7,458,997 .75.908 23,984,365 .69.537 23,794,694 .61.737 24,769,961 .71.933 24,456,937 .84.748 33,265,280 .67.211 8139,017,799 $19,859,686 Average price per bushel. $0.70.564 Again we see a rapid gain, notwithstanding the panic. Even a monetary revulsion seems to have been unable to visit any of its crushing or prostrating effects upon the farming community as a class. If we repeat the comparison previously made, we shall find 10 SOME OF THE EFjj'ECTS OF PKOTECTION ON PRICES. that the exports of corn, for the forty-nine years specified, were 208,821,522 bushels, valued at 1^157,867,469. It thus appears that during that long period we exported only 11,782,920 bushels more t lan we did dining the last seven years, but with total value greater by $18,849,670. . The Inter- Ocean claims, and with great truth, that the continued prosperity of Western farmers is owing to the policy of protection to home industry. That policy gridironed the North with railroads, and multiplied lines in the South ; cheapened the cost of crop cul- ture by stimulating the inventive genius that has supplied such varied additions of labor-saving machinery for agriculture; reduced the expense of transportation by diminishing the outlay for railway tracks and rolling stock, and by increasing competition for freights ; and prospered our farmers by thus enabling them to undersell Ruasia in the foreign grain markets. SOrJE OF THE EFFECTS OF PROTECTION ON PRICES IN THE UNITED STATES. The following memorial to Congress, signed by more than ninety officers and managers of leading railroads in all parts of the country, was presented in 1870 : Immediatelj'^ before the construction of the first steel-rail manufactory in this country, *)re:gn ir akers charged $150 per ton (equal then to $225 currency) for steel rails. As American v/orks were built, foreign skilled labor introduced, home ip.bor instructed, and domestic irons, clays, ganister, and Spiegel (after many and expensive trials) found to produce excellent rails, tb.e price of the foreign article wae gradually lowered, until it now stands at less than $79 per ton in gold, or f 06.38 currency. Now that several millions of dollars have been expended in machinery, furnaces, and experiments in perfecting the process of manufacture in this country, and numbers of our own citizens are dependent upon it for support, th^ buoinest is threatened with annihilation by the pressure of English and Prussian makers. We, as users of steel rails, and transporters of the food and material for American manu- facturers and the>r numerous employes and skilled laborers, do not desire to be dependent exclusively upon the foreign supply, and therefore join in asking that, incteod of the present nd valorem duty, a specific duty of two cents per pound be placed upon this article. The duty was fixed at $28 per ton, gold, and to-day Bessemer steel rails of best quality can be bought at American mills it 055 currency. Domestic competition, induced by protective duties, has given to American railways cheaper steel rails than English manu- facturers, '.vithcut this competition, would ever have given them. SOME OP THE EFFECTS OF PROTECTION ON PRICES. 11 For more than a yenr foreign steel rails have almost ceased to come into this country, yet in that time American rails' have fallen in price $20 a ton, solely as the result of home competition. The manufacture of cut nails is an American invention, origina- ting near the beginning of the present century. When it was first undertaken in this country, wrought nails, which then cost 25 cents a pound, were largely imported ; hence the necessity for protection to the new industry. By the tariff act of 1824 the duty on all nails was made 5 cents per pound, at which it remained until 1833, since which year it has been reduced. Prices of cut nails have ranged as follows during the past fifty years : In 1828 the price was 7 to 8 cents per pound; in 1829 it fell to 6 and 7 cents fin 1830 to 6 and 6 cents; in 1833 to 4 and 6 cents; from 1835 to 1840 the price was from 5 to 7 cents, falling in 1840 to 5 and 6 cents; in 1842 the price fell to 8 and U cencs; in 1844 and 1846 it was 4 and 5 cents; in 1855 it again fell to 3 cents ; in 1861 it was 3 cents. Like all other products, the price advanced during the era of war prices, but before the panic of 1873 it had again fallen to 3 cents, and on the 1st of January, 1876, the price was 2i cents. It will be noted that, in 1830, six years after the duty was made 5 cents per pound, the price was the 3ame as the duty ; that, in 1833, the price fell below the duty; that, in 1842, it was 2 cents per pound below the duty; and that, on the 1st of last January, it was just one-half the duty of 1824, and about one-fourth the price charged for cut nails when that duty was imposed. Political economists who receive their inspiration from our industrial adversaries sometimes allege that the duty is always added to the price. The history of the manu- facture of cut nails is an illustration of the fallacy of their theory. Protection and home competition brought down the price of cut nails far below the duty, &ne. drove out of our markets the English wrought nails with which they had for many years to compete, and which in 1828 cost from 10 to 17 cents a pound. For a long time we have exported nails to foreign countries, the value of the exports of nails and spikes in the fiscal year 1875 amounting to half a million of dollars. The history of a celebrated American manufactory of saws presents r striking example of the cheapening effects of protective duties. Prior to the Revolution, and for many years after its close, saws were not made here. All our saws came from abroad, and we paid for them just what foreigners were pleased to charge us. In 1840 an American mechanic, Henry Disston, commenced the manufacture of saws in Philadelphia in a small way. At that time 12 SOME OP THE EFFECTS OF PROTECTION ON PRICES. English saws, with the name of the maker marked upon them, sold in our markets'at prices ranging from $15.75 to $19 a dozen. Mr. Disston was obliged to sell his saws for less money, as his goods were unknown, while the English saws had a reputation; but after the Disston saw became known and its reputation was established the English saws were gradually driven out of our markets and prices were still further reduced to consumers. In 1876 Henry Disston & Sons are sending saws to England, warranted equal to the best saws made in that country, and selling them at $10.50 a dozen, fully fifty per cent, less than the price Englishmen charged us in 1840. When Mr. Disston commenced business, inferior saws of foreign manufacture were sold m this country at $4.50 a dozen, and he could not make saws for less than $7 a dozen, but now Henry Diss- ton & Sons ship common saws to South America at $4.50. The exports of their goods in 1875 amounted to fully $100,000. But for protection, Henry Disston and his sons never would have been in a position to compete successfully in this country with foreign makers of saws; they never would have been able to find a market in other lands in one year for $100,000 worth of their products; this country never would have had as cheap saws as are now supplied to it; and all the benefits resulting from the employment of the labor of the country in the manufacture of saws never would have had an existence. The Messrs. Disston make their own steel. Before axes were made in this country, except by country black- smiths, English axes cost our farmers and others from $2 to $4 each. By the tariff of 1828 a protective duty of 35 per cent, was levied upon imported axes. Under this protection the Collins Company, of Hartford, introduced labor-saving machinery, much of which was invented, patented, and constructed by themselves. In 1836 foreign and home-iiade axes were selling side by side, in the American market, at $15 to $16 per dozen, at Which time foreign producers withdrew their competition, abandoning the entire market to American manufacturers. Then home rivalry and improved methods continued the decline in prices. Axes were selling, in 1838, at $13 to $15.25 per dozen; in 1840, at $13 to $14; in 1843, at $11 to $12; in 1845, at $10.50 to $11 ; in 1849, at $8 to $10. In 1876 the price of the best American axes in the market is $9.50 per dozen in currency, and the country exports large quantities to foreign markets. English wi'iters admit the superior cxcclLnee of American axes. The Collins Company makes its own steel, and a letter from the company now before us claims that it is " better SOME OP THE EFFECTS OF PROTEC3TION ON PRICES. 13 than any English steel we can buy, and we have been steel con- sumers for fifty years. We now only make for our own consump- tion, and we have no disposition to cheat ourselves." We are aware that it is claimed by the advocates of the policy of British trade domination that low prices in protective periods are not produced by protection — that they are due to other causes. It is to be remarked that this plea is made by the very same persons who constantly insist that prices are always increased under protec- tion — that the duty is always added to the price, and that the consumer pays the duty. The two theories are not harmonious, but conflicting, and may be permitted to destroy each other. If prices are uniformly cheapened under protection, there must be a cause for it, and if that cause is not protection, who has shown that it is/ anything else ? If prices are not cheapened under that policy, but increased, then the prices of Collins's axes, Disston's saws, cut nails, and Bessemer rails should have advanced after protection had en- couraged the investment of capital which made their manufacture possible. But did they? Did the purchaser of cut nails at three cents a pound pay a duty of five cents a pound in addition to a fair price for the nails ? Does the purchaser of American steel rails at $55 a ton pay a higher price for them than when the English rail- maker had entire control of our market ? The duty on steel rails is now $28 a ton, equal to $32 currency. If this duty were wholly repealed, is it within the bounds of probability that English rail- makers would supply our railroads with steel rails at $23 a ton in currency? The duty on silks averages fifty per cent, of their foreign value. Instead of the price of silk goods having been increased by the amount of the duty, it is a fact that they never were so cheap in this country as they are to-day, and that their use was never so general as now. It is clearly the tendency of protection to decrease prices, and of the denial of protection to increase them, as has been shown. But if protection did not affect prices either way, exercising no influence upon them whatever, it is certainly true of it that it fosters the de- velopment of the national resources, and thus provides employment for our own people. It supplies a market for the skilled labor of our countrymen and a market for the farmer's produce. It gives the home market to the home producer, preferring to foster his in- dustry rather than that of the foreign producer. In accomplishing tliPflA nnfrir^tio nrttl monlir 'niirno'«>° ■n»»r»fon+i/-wr> larrvAlTr o/l/la •*•/-» fV»/i national wealth and increases the prosperity of all classes and their ability to buy at any price. — From The American Iron Trade in 1876. 14 PROTECTION INCREASES OUR EXPORTS. HOW PROTECTION TENDS TO INCREASE OUR EX- PORTS OF MANUFACTURED GOODS. The first effect of protection is to give diversified employment to our people at good wages, and thus the first essential condition necessary to the production of manufactured goods, either for home or foreign consumption, is secured. Being thus employed, the influence of the common school and of republican institutions produces intelligent workmen ; the prospect of some day becoming employers of others produces ambitious workmen ; and all these in- fluences combined afford a constant incentive to achieve the best possible mechanical results. The American mechanic is always striving how to better his condition : the European mechanic, denied the compensation and the opportunities of his Transatlantic brother, is always considering how he can keep his position. He makes but little effort to improve his mechanical methods. If we now add the spirit of competition between employers which protection always ex- cites, and which high wages always compel, we have all the elements necessary to foster the naturally inventive genius of our people, from which come labor-saving machinery, improvements in old methods, novel designs, a simplification of means to ends, and excel- lence of finish. Labor-saving mnchinery cheapens the cost of pro- duction and usually improves the character of the product : joined to the other mechanical accomplishments mentioned, both cheapness and excellence are certainly secured. Possession of the home market is the first result of these achievements, and afterwards the foreign market is entered in competition with the products of mere hand labor and antiquated machinery — this hand labor and antiquated machin ;ry being direct consequences of low wages and a low state of society. Thus do many of our manufactured products find a market abroad. The London Times a few years ago comprehen- sively stated in the following words the philosophy of the increase in this class of American exports : The Americans succeed in supplanting us by novelty of construction and excellency of make. They do not attempt to undersell us in the mere matter of price. Our goods may still be the cheapest, but they are no longer the best, and in the country where an axe, for instance, is an indispensable instrument, the best article is the cheapest, whatever it may cost. Settlers and emigrants 30on find this out, and they have found it out to the prejudice of Birmingham . trade. The American wants the best of everything; the European is content with old styles, coarse materials, and often mith mere > t PROTECTION INCREASES OUR EXPORTS, 15 cheapness without regard to quality. The American mechanic, alike with the American merchant and professional man, will not weAr wooden shoes or coarse brogans, because he can afford good leather shoes ; he will not wear corduroy pantaloons or check shirts, because he can afford to wear pantaloons made of good woolen cloth and white muslin or linen shirts ; he will not wear a coat made of shoddy, or use a^tool that will not " carry an edge " or perform its work well. He is above all these expedients and inventions of a lower industrial plane than that upon which he moves. He will not use these things, and he does not make them. American manu- factured products sent abroad are therefore all that they are repre- sented to be, and they are represented to be the best that can be made. The people of China and Japan, South America, and other countries have been so often deceived by British manufacturers, who have studied cheapness rather than excellence, especially in manufacturing for foreign markets, that American goods have grown in their favor because they are honestly made and are of superior quality. But if we can export certain manufactured products, such as hardware, machinery, leather, etc., in competition with all other countries, why protect these articles by high duties ? We answer : Why kill the goose that lays the golden egg? If protection has wrought results so beneficial to our country, why abandon it in the case stated ? But there is a better reason for maintaining the pro- tective policy without yielding so much of it as a hair's breadth. The assaults of free trade are always concealed and treacherous. If one or two or half a dozen industries be surrendered to its sophis- tries, even although for the time they could retain their vigor, an attack upon the whole line of protected industries would be cer- tain to follow. With the Trojan horse once inside the gates, the whole city would be taken. With industries -destroyed which could only exist with protection; with closed factories and workshops standing as monuments of national folly; with the country robbed of its general prosperity and the home market largely curtailed, how could those other industries, which protection has benefited the most, long remain prosperous? The home market is the most valuable of all markets, and no industry, be it ever so favored, can afford to lose it. Furthermore: protection for even our most firmly established industries • Meded to prevent the possible unloading upon our markets of the surplus products of other countries. England, for instance, manufactures many articles which she sells largely to her colonies and to other non-manufacturing countries at 16 THE "good old times." profitable prices ; but a surplus of theee articles may be left on her hands, which, rather than not sell at all, she can well afford to sell to the people of this country, if permitted, at less than their actual cost. Protection against such competition as this is wise and neces- sary. No man in business — no workingman at his bench or anvil — should be subjected to the risk of such an assault upon his capital or labor. — From The A% \erican Iron Trade in 1876, T t II THE "GOOD OLD TIMES" WHEN THERE WERE NO MANUFACTURES. Before manufactures were fairly established in this country, suj)- plying a home demand for agricultural products and surplus agri- cultural labor, and furnishing manufactu::ed goods at low prices, the condition of American farmers and of all other laborers was one of great hardship and many privations. The following bit of per- sonal history m the life of A. H. Wrenn, of Mount Gilead, Ohio, shows some of the results which followed a general dependence on foreign workshops less than fitly years ago, in a section of the country where domestic manufactures had not been established. In 1829 my father's family emigrated from Alexandria, Virginia, and settled near Salem, Columbiana county, Ohio. A large portion of the inhabitants were thrifty, hospitable Quakers. Let us take a vievr of the prices of articles in those days. The farmer would sell, when he could, wheat at 31 cents ; corn and rye, 15 to 20 cents ; potatoes and cats, 10 cents per bushel ; apples and peaches he would give away ; eggs, 3 cents per dozen ; butter, 5 cents per pound ; pork and beef, 2 cents per pound ; hay, $3 to $4 per ton ; cows, $8 to $10; oxen, per yoke, $30 to $50; good horses, $30 to $50; sheep averaged about $1 ; wool, 20 to 25 cents per pound. The above were the usual prices for several years, except when the scarcity of some article caused higher prices. Farm and other laboring hands $7 to $10 per month and board ; in harvest a little higher. The writer cut many an acre of wheat at 25 cents ; cut and split rails at 40 cents per hundred ; cut wood ai 20 to 25 cente per cord. If any of us youngsters happened to be qualified to teach school in the little log-cabins, and put in our full time, we thought we w^ere doing well to get $12 per month ; mechanics of different kinds got 50 cents to $1 per day. We had generally to be on hand before sunrise. Money was a very scarce article in tho&e days. Let us look at what we had to pay for articles bought from the merchants. Tea, and that not the best, $2 to $2.50 per pound. The writer once took three bushels of wheat and traded it for a half-pound of not very good tea= Coffee, 35 to 50 cents ; pepper and spice, 60 cents ; satinets, at all suitable for a decent suit of clothes, from $2 to $3 per yard ; and those that could afford the luxury » • T SOME OP THE JIDVANTAQES OP MANUFACTURES. 17 ■f t of broadcloth paid from $5 to $8 per yard for none of the best ; salt, $5 per barrel ; shirting, 25 to 40 cents ; calico, 30 to 45 cents ; all dresq goods in the same ratio. The following is an extract from a speech delivered at Great Falls, New Hampshire, February 21, 1872, by Henry Wilson, after- wards Vice-President of the United States. The first month I worked after I was twenty-one years of age, I went into the woods, drove team, cut mill-logs, wood, rose in the morning before. day- light and worked hard until after dark at night, and I received for it the magnificent sum of six dollars. Each of those dollars looked as large to me as the moon looked to-night. On the farm on which I served an apprenticeship I have seen the best men who ever put scythe in grass working for from fifty cents to four shillings a day in the longest days of summer. Yesterday I visited that farm, i asked the men who were there what they paid men in haying-time last summer, and they said from two dollars to two and a half a day. This was paid on the same ground where, men worked forty years ago for from fifty cents to four shillings, and took their pay in farm products, not money. I have seen some of thg brightest women go into the farm-houses and work for from fifty cents to four shillings a week, milking the cows, making butter and cheese, washing, spinning, and weaving — doing all kinds of hard work. I was told yesterday that many young women were earning in the shops a dollar a day, and that those who worked in houses were getting from two dollars and a half a week to three dollars and a half. — From The American Iron Trade in 1876. SOME OF THE ADVANTAGES WHICH MANUFAC- TURES BRING TO A TOWN. 1. A considerable permanent addition is at once made to the pop- ulation, in the shape of many skilled workmen, who prove auxiliary to every other kind of business carried on in the neighborhood. 2. The values of real estate are enhanced by the erection of large buildings in which to carry on the processes of the manufacture, and by the appropriation of larger areas to accommodate the dwellings built for the employes. 3. The sudden increase of numbers involves a correspondingly larger consumption of articles of necessity, comfort, and taste, on the spot, and thus enlarges the sphere and intensifies the activity of the various classes of business previously carried on, besides opening a demand for several new kinds which are generally attracted to a community by any considerable increase of inhabitants. 4. The wages earned by the factory hands are spent on the spot, 18 THE BBGENF.KATION OP THE SOUTH. and help to 8i:t;.gi7,c every material interest of the town, making money plentier, trade brisker, prices cheaper, sales larger, commodi- ties more various, and improvement more ambitious. 5 The tax-paying power of the community is much augmented, leading to a bettered condition of roads, bridges, streets, pavements, public buildings, and the like. 6. There being many more children and many more grown peo- ple, a demand springs up for better school accommodations and for larger churches, bringing not only a higher grade of talent in each department of human needs, but a decided advance in architectural excellence. 7. So many more letters are written and so many more news- papers and magazines are received, that an increase of mail facilities soon follows as an inevitable consequence. 8. One factory having been established, it becomes easier to attract to the place other manufacturing enterprises which are auxiliary to the first. 9. So far as the people are consumers of the articles consumed in the factory, they become direct purchasers from the manufacturers, thus dispensing altogether with the profits extorted by middlemen, and making a gain by greater cheapness of price paid for the articles, such always being the result of placing producer and con- sumer side by side. 10. Farmers in the neighborhood are benefited by securing an improved local market for the sale of their produce ; and sometimes, as in the case of a woolen, flax, or paper mill established, are able to sell their wool direct to the manufacturer, or to obtain a round price per ton for the straw which they formerly burned as a useless incumbrance, worth to them only as ashes for manure.— C^tmgro Inter- Ocean. THE REGENERATION OF THE SOUTH. The building up of the South is to be accomplished only by the use of many instrumentalities, of some of which it would not become us to speak. But there is one which we may properly mention, for it relates to the material prosperity of the South, with which the making of iron is closely identified. We refer to domestic manufactures. The South may educate its children, secure rest from political strife, become a promised land to the sturdy immigrant, receive additions to its banking capital, and be greatiy benefited by THE BEGBNEBATION OP THE SOUTH. 19 all of these, yet it will not attain the degree of prosperity to which it is adapted and which the remainder of the Union has long enjoyed until it becomes the home of manufacturing enterprise — becomes more industrially independent than it now is. The great progress that has been made by some of the States of the South in the manufacture of iron is an example of what the South is capable, and of the benefits which she may derive from a diversification of her pursuits. All of the iron establishments of the South give employment to many thousands of miners, ironworkers, and other workingiaen, and their products contribute to the supply of the home demand for iron, thus keeping the money of the people circulating vX home instead of sending it abroad. They do more than this. They bring money into the South to pay for iron products which other communities must have. Tennessee iron is sold in all the markets of the West ; Alabama iron is used to make car-wheels in Philadelphia, and Alabama iron ore is sold to Indiana furnaces. The Vulcan Ironworks of Richmond ship largely of their products to Cuba and South America, and make fish-bar bolts for the North- western, Canada Southern, New York and Erie, Midland, Chicago, Alton and St, Louis, and other railways. The famous Tredegar Ironworks of the same city have found a new field for their enter- prise in constructing engines and vacuum-pans for the sugar planta- tions of Cuba, and railroad cars for Cuban railroads. What the South has done in iron it should do in other industrial directions. If it would manufacture one-third or even one-fourth of the cotton which grows in its fields ; if it would make its own boots and shoes ; if it would manufacture its own agricultural im- plements, such as axes, hoes, plows, reapers, and mowers; if it would make its own stoves, nails, horse-shoes, steam engines, gas pipe, and water pipe; and, generally, if it would produce more and buy less,, the day of it«« complete regeneration would be close at hand. An influential Southern journal, the Rnral Svn, of Nashville, in an article declaring that manufactures are wanted as " an aid to farm- ing," shows at how low an ebb manufactures are in the compara- tively progressive State of Tennessee. It states, among other facts, that, in 1870, "of the agricultural implements used in the State^ valued at $8,199,487, not one-tenth were manufactured by our own mechanics. Of the 2,500 reapers used in the State, not one wa» manufactured here, and a very small percentage, probably not over one per cent., of the 150,000 plows and hoes, 200,000 axes, 40,000 mattocks, etc. Not a single trace chain, of the 250,000 used, is made in the State, and but few horse collars." The editor of a Georgia 20 THE BEQENERATION OF THE SOUTH. paper recently stated the situation in his State in these words: " A Georgia tarmer uses a Northern axe-helve and axe to cut up the hickory growing within sight of his door, plows his fields with a Northern plow, chops out his cotton with a New England hoe, gins his cotton upon a Boston gin, hoops It with Pennsylvania iron, hauls it to market in a Connecticut wagon, while the little grain that he raises is cut and prepared for sale with Yankee implements. We find the Georgia housewife cooking with an Albany stove, and even the food, especially the luxuries, is imported from the North. Georgia's fair daughters are clothed in Yankee muslins, and decked in Massachusetts ribbons and Rhode Island jewelry." The people who are so dependent upon others as the Tenneaseeans and Georgians are here declared to be can never become prosperous. How much better would it be for every Southern city if it would adopt the policy of Louisville, a sister Southern city, which, on the 31st of August, 1874, had in successful operation more than 600 manufac- turing establishments, representing an investment of $20,000,000, producing wares annually estimated at 056,000,000, employing con- stantly 10,000 persons, and paying out annually for labor about $8,000,000? At Columbus, Georgia, the manufacture of cotton is successfully and profitably prosecuted. There are several mills, running about 40,000 spindles, and the Boston C to the protective policy. He says : " Let not Germans wol ..v..' at this ; for we also in former days utilized the system of protection with the greatest success." And he adds statistical evidence to prove that the United States is prospering under protection, notwithstanding the panic, while Ger- man^ industries are suffering because of the partial withdrawal of protection. No stronger tribute to the value of our protective policv has yet appeared than the elaborate statement of this eminent Ger- man protectionist.