^^1 ^, ^ #^, o^, %.^^^\% IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) €^0 €o signifie "A SUIVRE". le symbols V signifie "FIN". Les cartea. planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre filmte k des taux de rMuction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, il est film^ d partir de Tangle sup^rieur gauche, de gauche i droite, et de haut en bas. en prenant le nombre d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la m^thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 •"^fe V"-'. I" <„ t (From the Canadian Monthly for Fehruartj, 1870.) >' A I'lJiA FOR Tllli MIIJTIA. \1\ TWO MILITI.VMKN. L-. (< e positive si'i.iulus of a ' Trent Dilhculty,' or the negative in- fluence of a Times article, hefore its latent depths are stirred. Hut the national feeling exists. We are justly l)roud of our position as the' lirst colony of the Empire, and of our com- mercial rank among the nations of the world. It is our hoast that we have a commercial marine only sur- passed in numhers and tonnage by four of the leading nations of the earth. We have a territory richer in vegetable and mineral wealth, and larger in area, than any of the king- doms of Euro})e. We have a hardy and intelligent population, and the freest institutions on the face of the globe. How should we maintain those rights, protect our liberties, and retain ouif possessions, w-ere Great Britain's naval and military assistance withheld or withdrawn ? We have no navy to protect our ships : we have developed no sufficient military organization to Population Area Revenue . . Expenditure for military purposes Army ^} Navy (Sliips ., -, (ilUlS . ( Mou . . . . stand tlic crucial tcstof war ; we have no uianufiu-torics foi-warlikc mati rial, and no internal resources for their iui- niodiate creation; We have not even arms and amniunition enough to suj)- ply a single army corps in the lield and to organize its reserve, should hos- tilities comnu'nc(mow. Nothing could be done, therefore, without iJritaui's aid, save to submit peacefully to the tiivst power that attempted forcible annexation. Now, is this a condition that should bcawjuie.sced in by a free people, ac- customed to the exercise of the fullest civil and religious liberty i The mer- chant who will not insure his life against accident, or his proi)erty against fire, is blameworthy, should he suffer loss by these means. The nation which declines or neglects to protect its liberties in not providing for its defence by all means within its power, is equally reprehensible. Contrast our position with that of some of the smaller European Powers : — Dominion of Canada. Militia 3,727,000 3,580,;ilO sq.m. ii4,5OO,000 £^00,000 none IIDIU' 43,729 Ncther- laniU. 3,«)7,263 13,fi80 .sq. ni. i;S,U42,550 £l..''>4],!)i)!) 01,947 men (i7 7o:< '.»,2U0mBn 100,323 men Switzerland. 2,66!),147 15,991 .s(i. ni. £1,580,040 £586,237 84,369 ) *50,069 i" 05,981 * Reserve. Sweden. Norway. 4,383,291 1,817,237 171,750s().m. 122,280sq.ni. £4,;J40,000 £2,177,200 £925,000 7,88§ fi Mi 4,093 ( 29.1)40"" { 94,9,")0 (13,166 12,7.50 peace 18,000 war 20 150 2,393 02,000* 3 classes. * Reserve. Denmark. 1,910,400 15,,')04s(i.ra £2,.'j84,000 £1,114,000 37,000 33 291 1,125 32,393 Greece. I,457,8fl4 19,941 sq. m. £1,380,971 ii336,757 I4,0(U 14 053 24,000 \ ^^ ^v^ A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA. -'^' B'roni tlieso figures it. apiieuis that, with a popuhition almost cinial, and a revenue half as large as the Nether- lands, we Hi)end less than one-seventh as much for military and naval pur- poses, and train for such services less than one-fourth the number of men. We have no ships of war ; she has sixty-seven, some of lirst-class power ; and yet her mercantile marine only numbers 1,835 vessels, of 526,527 tonnage, while we have 6,952 vessels, of 1,205,565 tons burden ! Denmark, with about half our poi)ulation and revenue, trains annually double the number of men that we do, and has a small and well appointed navy. Another striking comparison may be made in the amount paid for mili- tary purpose per head of population annually in different countries. For example, in Great Britain the people are taxed |6.8e per head per annum, in France $4.50 per head, in Prussia $2.20 per head, and in the United States (exclusive of the cost of the State Militia) $1.39 per head, while in Canada we only burden ourselves with the trifling tax of 14 cents per head of our population for militia i)urposes. Certainly no Canadian would object to that tax being doubled or quadrupled. It is not necessary to force these comparisons to an application. There are many circumstances which prevent a comparison with the states of Eu- rope. It is merely to point the fact, that other nations having small popu- lations and resources, do more to en- sure their national rights and liberties than we do. And it is beyond the power of the most prophetic soul to say that our rights and liberties may not be invaded. The question is, how are our means of defence to be developed at the least cost to a young and struggling people, both in the matter of money, and of time 1 There is only one way by which a defensive organization can be main- tained, adequately and inexpensively, and that is by means of a militia. But many of our fellow-citizens are accustomed to ask the (juestion, ' Why expend money to support a militia that in peace is not required, and in war would be inadequate as a protec- tion against invasion 1 ' Let our his- tory answer this (juestion. Barely twelve yiiars after the strug- gle which terminated in the cession of Canada to the British, the arms of the rebellious American colonies were di- rected against C.mada. At that time there were only about 500 British troops in the colony, but General Carleton embodied some 1,800 militia and garrisoned Quebec, defeating the attempt of the enemy to carry the fortress by storm on the 30th Decem- ber, 1775, and holding it until the ar- rival of British reinforcements on the 6th May, 1776. All the country, west of Quebec, had been overrun by the Americans, and had not the mili- tia proved loyal, in spite of the temp- tations oflPered them by the various proclamations of the American Gene- rals, it is probable that, at the present time, Canada would have been one of the States cf th^' TTnion. This time, therefore, the f .dy valour and loy- alty of the Canadian militia, preserved Canada to the British Crown. In 1812 the Americans attacked Canada with two corps, numbering 13,300 men. The British troops in the Province were but 4,500 strong, nearly 3,000 of whom were in garri- son at Quebec and Montreal, only 1,500 being in Upper Ca^-iada. From the capture of MichilimacinRC, the first blow of the campaign, down to its close, the militia took their share in every military operation. Of the force that captured Detroit with its garri- son of 2,500 men, sfiarcely 300 were regular troops. Brock had but 1,200 men to oppose 6,300 Americans on the Niagai'a frontier, and more than half were militia ; yet he confronted the enemy, and in the gallant action in which he lost his life, left an imperish- able record of the steady valour with which Canadians can defend their country. At that time the population ^T7 ■^^^^5rP A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA of Upper Canada, capable of bearing arms, did not exceed 10,000 men, yet the Province supplied ^^,\T^tt otttcei-s and men as its contingent for service during the war. In 1813, Canada was menaced by three separate armies, nuniliering over 30,000 men. The British force con- sisted of 13,000 regulars, and 15,000 militia, scattered over a frontier a thousand miles long. The Americans overran Upper Canada for a while, but by the end of the campaign had been driven across the border. At Chateauguay, Col. de Salaberry showed of what stuff our militia was made. The American force consisted of 7,000 infantry, 10 guns, and 250 cavalry. The Canadian force, under de Sala- berry, was about 1 ,000 .strong — nearly half of whom took no part in the bat- tle — and yet he totally defeated and drove back a force eight times his strength. Of this action, General Sir James Carmichael Smyth says: ' The aflfair upon the Chateauguay Eiver is remarkable as having been fought, on the British side, almost entirely by Canadians. The Republicans were repulsed by a very inferior number of Canadian militia, and of troops raised in Canada, thus affording a practical proof of the good disposition of the Canadians, and the possibility, to say nothing of the policy, of improving the Canadian militia, so as to be fully equal in discipline and instruction to any American troops that may be brought against them at any future opportunity.' He also says, ' Not a single Canadian militiaman was known to desert to the enemy, during the three years the war continued.' At the end of the war, the Americans had gained no foothold upon Canadian territory, and were forced to postpone that concpiest of Canada, originally undertaken as ' a militaiy promenade. ' Yet at that time the entire population of Canada did not exceed 300,000, while that of the United States was 8,000,000,— an odds of 27 to 1 us. For the second time, over against therefore, the efforts of the Canadian militia laigrly contributed to th(^ pre- servation of Canada to the Crown. During 1837, in Upi)er Canada alone, with a population of 450,000, there were 40,000 militia enrolled, in the expectation of a war being ]»ro- voked by the action of the too active sympathisers with the Rebels. Of this number there were 1(! battalions and 35 companies of cavalry, artillery, and riHemen, placed on active service, several of whom did military duty for some years afterward. In 1862, when the ' Trent dithculty ' rendered a war with the United States a matter of extreme probability, the alacrity with which the Canadian mi- litia sprung to arms, resolving to abide by all consequences rather than that their dearly loved flag should be in- sulted with impunity, no doubt had its influence in securing the submis- sion and apology that was made by the American Government. In 1865, it became necessary, in order to restrain tl e Southerners re- sident in Canada from making our territory a basis for warlike operations, to place corps of observation at cer- tain points on the frontier. These battalions were formed from the elite of our militia and they became, after a few months' duty, equal to any sol- diery in the world. How could we at that time have sustained our Inter- national obligations, had we no mili- tia ? From 1866 to 1870 came the Fenian raids. How serious would these small matters have become had we not had our militia leady to repel such attacks ! Those who now cavil at the expense, and argue against the necessity of the Force, were in those days the first to recognize their usefulness, and to seek to place the militia between them- selves and the enemy. In twenty-four hours fro; II the call for active service, 33,751 militiamen had como forward, upwards of 8,000 in excess of the quota allowed by the Militia Act, and 13,000 more than had been on the 'I mr 7T "•— V A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA. strength of companies in tlie preced- ing year. In 18G9, our niilitiii took a part in the exp(>(lition to Ked River, and, hy their soldierlike qualities and cheerful endui'ance, won sucji high considera- tion from tlieii- gallant connnander that in the wilds of Ashanti he; wished for those two corps of Canadian mili- tiamen, wIksu the picked regiments of Imperial troops were at his disposal. Since 1870, have not the (ruihord riots and the 12th of July outrages in Montn-al ; the Grand Trunk riot at Belleville and elsewhere on the lino ; the pilgrimage riots in Toronto, and half a dozen other occasions in which military aid has been invoked to en- force the civil power, proved sulh- ciently th(! imperative neces.iiity for the maintenance in our mid.st of a body of armed and disci[)lined mili- tia, who regard their duty as soldiei-s first, and their prejudices and feelings last ? Suppose that we take it for granted that a militia is a m^cessary adjunct to Government, even in a country where the people have an hereditary respect for the majesty of the law. Upcn what principle, and what de- tail, shall we render that constitu- tional force at once iiiex}>onsive and efficient 'I There are three ways af- forded us by ^ ■ cedent. First, the old feudal system, making the land, through its owners, .vesponsible for the forthcoming of a certain force. This was the system in Canada prior to the conquest, and which, singidarly enough, was engrafted upon JBritisli law by the Quebec Act. Sticond — the ballof, which is the law of this coun- try, though suspended in its opera- tion by the pi'esent .system of volun- tary enlistment. The nearest approach to our system as defined by law, is that in force in Deiini irk, which is based upon the liability of all able-bodied men to serve, but adopts the l)allot as a prac tice, and results. Let us glance at its woriang I'^very male subj(.ct, at the age of 22, has to a.s.semble in his military ■• .4 I'LEA For* THE MILITIA. \ trainod last yoar was i'i'l'Jl.LMu.Or), or little more than a third of tho cost of tbe Mounted Police. Afjain A and B Batteiies Dominion Artillery, about 250 men, ccmt ;?101),»ii» I. ;?.'), or \\ as much as the entire militia were paid for drill. Will any one in his nonses claim that there would he as much military strength in a regular force of 2r)0 or ;50() men, as in a militia num- bering 4r),()0() 1 It is also a mistake to consider that the whole value of the present force consists in the high state of drill in which it is, or should be kept. If we have not absolute etHciency, we have, as a starting point, the organization, the arms, and the equipment — the olKcers fairly efficient, and the rough edge taken off the men. War would not probably come at a day's notice, and every day after our men were mobilized, they would gain in steadi- ness. Had we not our present organi- zation, or were it abolished for ten years, six months of the greatest effoi-ta would not do as much to bring the force to an efficient state, as six weeks would do under the present circum- stances. A great advantage is also realized in the militaiy spirit created in the country. A' -esent almost every young man se^ /es for a longer or shorter period in the ranks of the militia. Many people thiiik that, be- cause they leave the force before they are thoroughly efficient as soldiers, their service is wasted and their train- ing useless. There can be no greater mistake. When a lad of 18 or 20 has donned the uniform and shouldered the lifle, and drilled even for one year, a great deal has been done. The idea that he is a Canadian — that he may some 4ay be called upon to defend his ccuntiy — has entered his mind, and as long as he lives thereafter he will be a better citizen. Twenty years after, if war should break out, his first thought would be ' My country is in danger, I must shoulder my rifle again and go to the front ; ' while, if he had never b(!cn in th(^ force, h(^ would probably say, ' Thi'Pi will be war, and I am afraid our militia will linve more than vhe ' can do to defend the country,' but he will not think of enllHtiny; to help them. Perhaps, like a craven, ho mij,'ht say, 'The odds are too great, we should not ])rovoke the enemy by re- siHtanoc.' From this point of view alone, the militia oiganization is of im- mense service! to the country. Canadians have the historical re- putation of being defensively the most warlike people in the world, and it should be the ])art of our legishitors to cultivate and (Micourage that feeling. Like Switzerland, we will never be aggressive, but who shall say that we may not have to fight desperately for our separate existence as a nat'on in the future, as we have done in tln^ past. Already the muttered thunder from the East has reached our ears — why may not the gathering storm reach and de- vastate our shores ? Can we reconcile it with our duty as loyal subjects and good citi:cens, that we should neglect those measures which may be necek. sary in order to preserve our national existence ; or are we to be ' like dumb driven cattle ' instead of ' heroes in the strife 1 '* When the exigency arises it will be too late for precautionaiy measures. It is necessary to prepare for war in time of peace. But it is to be feared that persua- sions and warnings alike fall upon heedless ears. Because the militia force is not a political organization ; because they have wisely and rightly held aloof from politics, they are ig- nored by our politicians. But though ab.stainirg from taking an active part in politics, the militia has, and can exercise, an important influence in elections. In 1872, Sir George Car- tier, the then Minister of Militia, was defeated in Montreal, because the volunteers and their friends voted * en masse ' against him. In tliis last election the general dissatisfaction of the Force was doubtless one of the causes of the sti'iking defeat of the r T :t?x 8 I I'l.KA FOH rut: MILITIA. Mufkcnzu! UovfiniiH'tit. Iiil, ii|iori |iiiri>ly HoliiHli ^touiuIh, for tlic iiilliiiiK (• ,'111(1 HU|>|ii)if of iiiii' iiicihIkth of I'lirliaiiM'iit,, in oidfr lliii( tho (JovcniiiitMit of tin- iliiv iiiny treat lilinuUy tlu* most ]io|tuliir .'iihI iiillii- niti:il of our national oi'vui'i^'hI ions. 'I'll tlin |»('o|ilt? \vc must also u|i|ioal, to ooii(|m'r that apatliy witli wlii.li they liavo vujwi'd our pa.-)fc sti U!,'jjl( h for exiHtonce. Do tl- y rwnizn tliat if tho prcsout Forc'P is discoiiras^t'd (o (h'iith, tlic law pro' ' Ics for tlio cHtal)- lishuicnt of the ballot, and that ein- ployers, in.itoad of rnipioyeH, may lie forond iuto the ranks ? I )() tlH>y rcalizt? that each younj( inaii who th Jidv? Our dt'sires an; most reasonaltle. We only ask that the provisions of the Militia Law slioiild he slightly uiiKiwhul and r'gitlly enforced, and that a little i.. :e money Hhuuld bo spent in tlm annual training of tliti men. All that is wanted, in addition, is that the Canadian people should take a living interest and jjridt) in their citizen soldiery ; encourage thorn hy precept and exaniple. and stimu- late, ratlier than retard, their efforts to fulfil their duty. (Jive tho militia- man tlui lOciiH stdiHili tliat he deserves to have in the community, and tlie community will reap the reward in the hora* of danger. I