^^1

^ #^,

o^, %.^^^\%

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

€^0

€o

<i.

ts.

K*/

1.0

I.I

M
1.8

•

1.25

1.4 1.6

— —

-< 6"

►

Photographic

Sciences

Corporation

n WEST MAiN STREET

WEBSTER, NY. 14580

(716) 872-4503

K*/

CIHM/ICMH

Microfiche

Series.

CIHM/ICMH
Collection de
microfiches.

Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiques

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques

The Institute has attempted to obtain the best
original copy available for filming. Features of this
copy which may be bibliographically unique,
which may alter any of the images in the
reproduction, or which may signifi'iantly change
the usual method of filming, are checked below.

L'Institut a microfilm^ lu meilleur exemplaire
qu'ii lui a iti possible de se procurer. Les details
de cat exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du
point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier
une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent oxiger une
modification dans la m^thode normale de filmage
sont indiquis ci-dessous.

I
it,

□ Coloured covers/
Couverture de couleur

□ Covers damaged/
Couverture endommag^e

□ Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaurie et/ou pelliculie

□ Coloured pages.'
Pages de couleur

□ Pages damaged/
Pages endommagdes

□ Pages restored and/or laminated/
Pages restaurdes et/ou pellicuJdes

□ Cover title missing/
Le titre de couverture manque

□ Coloured maps/
Cartes giographiquas en couleur

□ Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)

□ Coloured plates and/or illustrations/
Planches et/ou iiEustrations en couleur

Bound with other material/

□ Boun
Reli«

avec d'autres documents

r~^ Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/
Iv^! Pages dicolories, tacheties ou piquees

□ Pages detached/
Pages d^tachdes

r~~k^howthrough/
\1l1 Transparence

□ Quality of print varies/
Quality indgale de I'impression

□ includos supplementary material/
Comprend du materiel supplementaire

Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion
along interior margin/

La re liure serrde peut causer de I'ombre ou de la
dietorsion le long de la marge intdrieure

Blank le&ves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
have been omitted from filming/
U se peut que certaines pages blanches ajout^es
lors d'une rastauration apparaissent dans le texte,
mais, lorsque cela 6tait possible, ces pages n'ont
pas iti film^es.

Only edition available/
Seule Edition disponible

Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata
slips, ti&sues, etc., have been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
les pages totalement ou partiellement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata. une pelure,
etc., ont 6ti filmdes d nouveau de facon d
obtenir la meilleur? image possible.

Additional comments:/
Commentaires suppl^mentaires:

This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/

Ce document est filmd au taux de reduction indiqud ci-desscus.

10X

14X

18X

22X

26X

30X

12X

16X

20X

24X

28X

32X

The copy filmed hsra has Le«n raproducad thanks
to tha ganarosity of:

Archives of Ontario
Toronto

Tha images appearing here are the best quality
possible considering the condition and legibility
of the original copy and in iceeping with the
filming contract specificationa.

Criginai copies in printed paper covers are filmed
beginning with the front cover and ending on
the last page with a printed or illustrated impres-
sion, or the bacx cover when appropriate. All
other original copies are filmed beginning on the
first page with a printed or illustrated imprea-
sion. and ending on the laat page with a printed
or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche
shall contain the symbol —^(meaning "COIM-
TIIMUED"). or the symbol V (meaning "END"),
whichever anpiies.

Maps, plates, charts, etc.. may be filmed at
different reduction ratios. Those too large to be
entirely included in one exposure are filmed
beginning in the upper left hand comef . left to
right and top to bottom, as many frames aa
required. The following diagrama illustrate the
method:

L'axamplaira film^ fut reproduit grdce A la
qin^rosit^ da:

Archives of Ontario
Toronto

Lea images suivantas ont 6tA raproduites avec la
plus grand soin, compta tanu de la condition at
da la natteti de raxemplaira filmA, at an
conformitA avec lea conditions du contrat de
filmage.

Lea axemplairee originaux dont la couvertura en
papier est imprimte sont fiimis en commen^ant
par la premier plat at an tarminant soit par la
demiire page qui comporta una <«mpreinte
d'impresaion ou d'iilustration, soit par la second
plat, seion le eaa. Tous les autres sxemplaires
originaux sont film^s en commandant par la
pramiire page qui comporte une amprainte
dimpreasion ou d'illuatration at an tarminant par
la derniire page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

Un dee symboles suivants apparaitra sur la
dsmiire image de cheque microfiche, seion le
cas: le symbols — »> signifie "A SUIVRE". le
symbols V signifie "FIN".

Les cartea. planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre
filmte k des taux de rMuction diffdrents.
Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre
reproduit en un seul cliche, il est film^ d partir
de Tangle sup^rieur gauche, de gauche i droite,
et de haut en bas. en prenant le nombre
d'images nicessaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la m^thode.

1 2 3

•"^fe

V"-'.

I" <„

(From the Canadian Monthly for Fehruartj, 1870.)

A I'lJiA FOR Tllli MIIJTIA.

\1\ TWO MILITI.VMKN.

L-.

<f^/^^^Ltr'

A S CaniKlians, we aro proud of our
--^-^ nationality. Oiiv atiun- pufrHf,
is not on the surface, and possilily le-
quires t]>e positive si'i.iulus of a
' Trent Dilhculty,' or the negative in-
fluence of a Times article, hefore its
latent depths are stirred. Hut the
national feeling exists. We are justly
l)roud of our position as the' lirst
colony of the Empire, and of our com-
mercial rank among the nations of
the world. It is our hoast that we
have a commercial marine only sur-
passed in numhers and tonnage by
four of the leading nations of the
earth. We have a territory richer in
vegetable and mineral wealth, and
larger in area, than any of the king-
doms of Euro})e. We have a hardy
and intelligent population, and the
freest institutions on the face of the
globe. How should we maintain those
rights, protect our liberties, and retain
ouif possessions, w-ere Great Britain's
naval and military assistance withheld
or withdrawn ? We have no navy to
protect our ships : we have developed
no sufficient military organization to

Population

Area

Revenue . .
Expenditure

for military

purposes
Army

Navy

(Sliips .,

-, (ilUlS .

( Mou . . . .

stand tlic crucial tcstof war ; we have
no uianufiu-torics foi-warlikc mati rial,
and no internal resources for their iui-
niodiate creation; We have not even
arms and amniunition enough to suj)-
ply a single army corps in the lield
and to organize its reserve, should hos-
tilities comnu'nc(mow. Nothing could
be done, therefore, without iJritaui's
aid, save to submit peacefully to the
tiivst power that attempted forcible
annexation.

Now, is this a condition that should
bcawjuie.sced in by a free people, ac-
customed to the exercise of the fullest
civil and religious liberty i The mer-
chant who will not insure his life
against accident, or his proi)erty
against fire, is blameworthy, should
he suffer loss by these means. The
nation which declines or neglects to
protect its liberties in not providing
for its defence by all means within its
power, is equally reprehensible.

Contrast our position with that
of some of the smaller European
Powers : —

Dominion of
Canada.

Militia

3,727,000

3,580,;ilO sq.m.

ii4,5OO,000

£^00,000

none

IIDIU'

43,729

Ncther-
laniU.

3,«)7,263

13,fi80 .sq. ni.

i;S,U42,550

£l..''>4],!)i)!)

01,947 men

(i7
7o:<
'.»,2U0mBn

100,323 men

Switzerland.

2,66!),147

15,991 .s(i. ni.

£1,580,040

£586,237

84,369 )
*50,069 i"

05,981

* Reserve.

Sweden.

Norway.

4,383,291 1,817,237
171,750s().m. 122,280sq.ni.
£4,;J40,000 £2,177,200

£925,000

7,88§
fi

4,093

( 29.1)40""

{ 94,9,")0

(13,166

12,7.50 peace
18,000 war
20
150
2,393

02,000*

3 classes. * Reserve.

Denmark.

1,910,400

15,,')04s(i.ra

£2,.'j84,000

£1,114,000

37,000

291

1,125

32,393

Greece.

I,457,8fl4

19,941 sq. m.

£1,380,971

ii336,757

I4,0(U

053

24,000

^v^

A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA.

-'^'

B'roni tlieso figures it. apiieuis that,
with a popuhition almost cinial, and a
revenue half as large as the Nether-
lands, we Hi)end less than one-seventh
as much for military and naval pur-
poses, and train for such services less
than one-fourth the number of men.
We have no ships of war ; she has
sixty-seven, some of lirst-class power ;
and yet her mercantile marine only
numbers 1,835 vessels, of 526,527
tonnage, while we have 6,952 vessels,
of 1,205,565 tons burden ! Denmark,
with about half our poi)ulation and
revenue, trains annually double the
number of men that we do, and has a
small and well appointed navy.

Another striking comparison may
be made in the amount paid for mili-
tary purpose per head of population
annually in different countries. For
example, in Great Britain the people
are taxed |6.8e per head per annum,
in France $4.50 per head, in Prussia
$2.20 per head, and in the United
States (exclusive of the cost of the
State Militia) $1.39 per head, while in
Canada we only burden ourselves with
the trifling tax of 14 cents per head
of our population for militia i)urposes.
Certainly no Canadian would object to
that tax being doubled or quadrupled.

It is not necessary to force these
comparisons to an application. There
are many circumstances which prevent
a comparison with the states of Eu-
rope. It is merely to point the fact,
that other nations having small popu-
lations and resources, do more to en-
sure their national rights and liberties
than we do. And it is beyond the
power of the most prophetic soul to
say that our rights and liberties may
not be invaded.

The question is, how are our means
of defence to be developed at the least
cost to a young and struggling people,
both in the matter of money, and of
time 1 There is only one way by which
a defensive organization can be main-
tained, adequately and inexpensively,
and that is by means of a militia.
But many of our fellow-citizens are

accustomed to ask the (juestion, ' Why
expend money to support a militia
that in peace is not required, and in
war would be inadequate as a protec-
tion against invasion 1 ' Let our his-
tory answer this (juestion.

Barely twelve yiiars after the strug-
gle which terminated in the cession of
Canada to the British, the arms of the
rebellious American colonies were di-
rected against C.mada. At that time
there were only about 500 British
troops in the colony, but General
Carleton embodied some 1,800 militia
and garrisoned Quebec, defeating the
attempt of the enemy to carry the
fortress by storm on the 30th Decem-
ber, 1775, and holding it until the ar-
rival of British reinforcements on the
6th May, 1776. All the country,
west of Quebec, had been overrun by
the Americans, and had not the mili-
tia proved loyal, in spite of the temp-
tations oflPered them by the various
proclamations of the American Gene-
rals, it is probable that, at the present
time, Canada would have been one of
the States cf th^' TTnion. This time,
therefore, the f .dy valour and loy-
alty of the Canadian militia, preserved
Canada to the British Crown.

In 1812 the Americans attacked
Canada with two corps, numbering
13,300 men. The British troops in
the Province were but 4,500 strong,
nearly 3,000 of whom were in garri-
son at Quebec and Montreal, only
1,500 being in Upper Ca^-iada. From
the capture of MichilimacinRC, the
first blow of the campaign, down to its
close, the militia took their share in
every military operation. Of the force
that captured Detroit with its garri-
son of 2,500 men, sfiarcely 300 were
regular troops. Brock had but 1,200
men to oppose 6,300 Americans on the
Niagai'a frontier, and more than half
were militia ; yet he confronted the
enemy, and in the gallant action in
which he lost his life, left an imperish-
able record of the steady valour with
which Canadians can defend their
country. At that time the population

^T7

■^^^^5rP

A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA

of Upper Canada, capable of bearing
arms, did not exceed 10,000 men, yet
the Province supplied ^^,\T^tt otttcei-s
and men as its contingent for service
during the war.

In 1813, Canada was menaced by
three separate armies, nuniliering over
30,000 men. The British force con-
sisted of 13,000 regulars, and 15,000
militia, scattered over a frontier a
thousand miles long. The Americans
overran Upper Canada for a while,
but by the end of the campaign had
been driven across the border. At
Chateauguay, Col. de Salaberry showed
of what stuff our militia was made.
The American force consisted of 7,000
infantry, 10 guns, and 250 cavalry.
The Canadian force, under de Sala-
berry, was about 1 ,000 .strong — nearly
half of whom took no part in the bat-
tle — and yet he totally defeated and
drove back a force eight times his
strength. Of this action, General
Sir James Carmichael Smyth says:
' The aflfair upon the Chateauguay Eiver
is remarkable as having been fought,
on the British side, almost entirely by
Canadians. The Republicans were
repulsed by a very inferior number of
Canadian militia, and of troops raised
in Canada, thus affording a practical
proof of the good disposition of the
Canadians, and the possibility, to say
nothing of the policy, of improving
the Canadian militia, so as to be fully
equal in discipline and instruction to
any American troops that may be
brought against them at any future
opportunity.' He also says, ' Not a
single Canadian militiaman was known
to desert to the enemy, during the
three years the war continued.' At
the end of the war, the Americans had
gained no foothold upon Canadian
territory, and were forced to postpone
that concpiest of Canada, originally
undertaken as ' a militaiy promenade. '
Yet at that time the entire population
of Canada did not exceed 300,000,
while that of the United States was
8,000,000,— an odds of 27 to 1
us. For the second time,

over

against

therefore, the efforts of the Canadian
militia laigrly contributed to th(^ pre-
servation of Canada to the Crown.

During 1837, in Upi)er Canada
alone, with a population of 450,000,
there were 40,000 militia enrolled, in
the expectation of a war being ]»ro-
voked by the action of the too active
sympathisers with the Rebels. Of
this number there were 1(! battalions
and 35 companies of cavalry, artillery,
and riHemen, placed on active service,
several of whom did military duty for
some years afterward.

In 1862, when the ' Trent dithculty '
rendered a war with the United States
a matter of extreme probability, the
alacrity with which the Canadian mi-
litia sprung to arms, resolving to abide
by all consequences rather than that
their dearly loved flag should be in-
sulted with impunity, no doubt had
its influence in securing the submis-
sion and apology that was made by
the American Government.

In 1865, it became necessary, in
order to restrain tl e Southerners re-
sident in Canada from making our
territory a basis for warlike operations,
to place corps of observation at cer-
tain points on the frontier. These
battalions were formed from the elite
of our militia and they became, after
a few months' duty, equal to any sol-
diery in the world. How could we
at that time have sustained our Inter-
national obligations, had we no mili-
tia ?

From 1866 to 1870 came the Fenian
raids. How serious would these small
matters have become had we not had
our militia leady to repel such attacks !
Those who now cavil at the expense,
and argue against the necessity of the
Force, were in those days the first to
recognize their usefulness, and to seek
to place the militia between them-
selves and the enemy. In twenty-four
hours fro; II the call for active service,
33,751 militiamen had como forward,
upwards of 8,000 in excess of the
quota allowed by the Militia Act, and
13,000 more than had been on the

"•— V

A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA.

strength of companies in tlie preced-
ing year.

In 18G9, our niilitiii took a part in
the exp(>(lition to Ked River, and, hy
their soldierlike qualities and cheerful
endui'ance, won sucji high considera-
tion from tlieii- gallant connnander
that in the wilds of Ashanti he; wished
for those two corps of Canadian mili-
tiamen, wIksu the picked regiments of
Imperial troops were at his disposal.

Since 1870, have not the (ruihord
riots and the 12th of July outrages in
Montn-al ; the Grand Trunk riot at
Belleville and elsewhere on the lino ;
the pilgrimage riots in Toronto, and
half a dozen other occasions in which
military aid has been invoked to en-
force the civil power, proved sulh-
ciently th(! imperative neces.iiity for
the maintenance in our mid.st of a
body of armed and disci[)lined mili-
tia, who regard their duty as soldiei-s
first, and their prejudices and feelings
last ?

Suppose that we take it for granted
that a militia is a m^cessary adjunct
to Government, even in a country
where the people have an hereditary
respect for the majesty of the law.
Upcn what principle, and what de-
tail, shall we render that constitu-
tional force at once iiiex}>onsive and
efficient 'I There are three ways af-
forded us by ^ ■ cedent. First, the
old feudal system, making the land,
through its owners, .vesponsible for
the forthcoming of a certain force.
This was the system in Canada prior
to the conquest, and which, singidarly
enough, was engrafted upon JBritisli
law by the Quebec Act. Sticond — the
ballof, which is the law of this coun-
try, though suspended in its opera-
tion by the pi'esent .system of volun-
tary enlistment.

The nearest approach to our system
as defined by law, is that in force in
Deiini irk, which is based upon the
liability of all able-bodied men to
serve, but adopts the l)allot as a prac
tice,
and results.

Let us glance at its woriang

I'^very male subj(.ct, at the age of
22, has to a.s.semble in his military
<listi'ict for the purpo.se of conscrip-
tion. They are then sorted for the
various arms — the smallest or weake.st
never being called ujjon for duty in
time of peace, and th<( physically in-
capable being rejected altogc^ther.
Aljotit to per company are selected
for active service, and are, to all in-
tents and purposes, regular soldiers
for sixteen months, and after that
time are incoi-poi-ated with those men
of their year, not called upon for ser-
vice, as a rcservr, to be called upon in
i-ase of need. These reserves are
formed into battalions, of which it
will be seen forty per cent are drilled
men. When a man has been in the
reserve for ten years, he goes into the
sacond reserve, and is not called upon for
duty, unless the first reserve is drained
b r war. Oliicers obtain connnissions
only upon examination, and are pro-
moted by seniority,— promotions in
the Artillery and Engineers being
based upon the number of marks
gained by those who are entitled to
compete, and a])pointments being
made to the Staff" from those who pass
the best examinations. In some cases,
however, these i)romotions are made
by merit. Non-commissioned officers
above the rank of coi-porals enlist for
eight years, after which time they are
entirely exempt from military service.
Corporals are selected from among the
recruits of the year, and are kept on
duty for two years, by which time the
new non-commissioned officers are fair-
ly able for duty.

The Danish army is composed of :
Cavalry— 1 Regiment Life Guards.
]| 1 " Hus.sar.s.

■t " Dragoons.
Artillery— 30 Batteries (8 guns each.)
Kngineers— 18 Companies.
Infantry— 1 Battalion Life Guai'ds.
22 Battalions (4 Compan
ies each.)
Or a total of 37,000 of all ranks.
The third system is that wherein the

''^ T

A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA.

entire male population takes it in turn
to serve, as in Swit/orland, a country
which has for centuries pr(!sentetl the
edifyinj,' spectacle of a nation deter-
mined to be independent, butiuiver to
interfere with its nei;^hliours — an ex-
anijile it would bo well for us to fol-
low.

With (!xc«![)tion of the clergy and
certain civil functionaries, every Swiss
is a soldier. From the age of It) to
that of -1-1 he may be at any time
called upon for military service. But
practically a man passes into the re-
serve or Lnndwchr, at about 28 to 30,
serving his time in the ilitc or first
line, before that age. As soon as a
youth attains the age of 1 9 la; is at-
tached to a battalion in his canton and
there undergoes 2S days' drill for tlie
first year, and eight days' drill in the
succeeding years. If he is suitable ho
is ])laced in the engineers or artillery,
and then undergoes 42 days' training
for the first and 1 4 days in the suc-
cteding years. Kiflenien ai-e trained
for 35 days the first, and 14 the follow-
ing years.

Staff officers are obliged to pass
through the military school at Tiuin,
as are also the ollicers of engineers and
artillery. Regimental staff oliic(;rs
also ])ass examinations on promotion.
The nnlitary college at Tliun is self-
sustaining.

'Dm elite or first line, numbers 84,-
369 of all ranks, thi^ irsc.rce or second
line 50,009, of all ranks, and the
Landwehr or third line, 05,981 of all
ranks ; the first two (in roiuid num-
bers 140,000 men) being armed and
equipped.

Thus we see what can be accom-
plished in the way of defensive organi-
zation, by smaller nations, with lesser
revenues than our own. What are
we to do towards the same end'j No
hurried extension of our present sys-
tem is necessary or would be prudent.
Armies are not made in a day, nor can
a militarysystem be perfected in ayear.
But the jruiae work must be built in. time
of j)eac6,nj)oii such solid fomdations that

it will neither shrinJi- nor yive w<iy Jinder
the presnure of wur. Therefore w(! ap-
peal to our legislators, and to our
countrymen at large, to give the mat-
ter serious and instant consideration.
To have an etHcient militia, sullicient
funds must be provided to carry on
the work regularly. It M'ill not do to
spend two nullions in one year, and
half a million in I'iie next. The vote
should be a standing sum, and not
subject to legislative caprice, or chec^se-
paring administration. Let the coun-
try decide, once for all, what it can
afford to spend annually for defensive
purposes, and then hold tho.se ])ersons
resi)onsible for its proper exi)enditure,
who are also responsll)l(! for the
etllciency of the Force.

It is dillicult to understand on what
grounds the successive Governments
have be(!U so parsimonious in reference
to militia expenditure. There is no
item in the Public Accounts less
grudged l.y the uuisses of the people
than that devoted to the support of the
militia ; there is no outlay that is dis-
trii)uted so evenly over the country —
and there is little doubt but that any
(iovernment would be liberally su|)-
ported in a generous policy towards
tiie force.

Members of Parliament have said
that the country would not submit
to an increased expenditure for mili-
tia j)urpose.s. This is either found-
ed on ignorance of the real feelings of
the Canadian jieople, or is but a shal-
low pretence. Ha;ve we not seen year
after year Muni^'ipal Councils all over
the country voting large sums to their
local volunteer corps to su|)plement
the Government Grants'? Do not the
Municipalities meet the Government
half way and build hand.sonie drill
sheds, of which they pay a large por-
tion of the cost ? The municipal bodies
are not bound to expend these sums,
it is no part of their duty any more
than that theyshould give grantsto the
customs and the post ofHce, or for the
erection of light-houses. This liberal-
ity is the most conclusive proof that

A PLEA FOR THE MILITIA.

the people are oven more adviuictjl
tlian their ruhu's, and that they tVel
that ParliauK'iit and Government do
not do thoir full d.:ty in reference to
the dofoiisivo organization of th(^
Stat(!. It is absurd for oui' legislators
to excuse thoniHelvos from not voting
sufficient ruuis t^) the militia, on the
ground tliut pojjular feeling in against
it. There is no doubt that the people
will stand by the Parliamtfiit in any
steps taken in this direction.

The drill pay given to the militia
finds its way into every nook of the
Dominion DU almost every conces-
sion and side line can be found one or
MU)re members of the force — ^whilo
every town and almost every village
is the heachpiarters of a company, in
which the iidiabitants take a deep in-
terest, of whose appearance they are
l)roud, and in which their finest young
men are enrolled. Our politicians
have never yet fully aj)preciated how
deep a hold the militia organization
has taken ujjon the hearts of the
people of this country. It is the most
popular organization, and it has thead-
vantage of being neither religious, sec-
tarian or iiolitical, but purely national
and patriotic. It is the only common
ground upon which all can unite —
where Catholic and Protestant, Con-
servative and Liberal, can vie with
each other in giving our Dominion
that military strength which is .so im-
portant an element of national great-
ness.

For these reasons our statesmen
should devote special pains to foster
in every way an organization which
tends to weld the nation together, to
cultivate a national and patriotic spirit,
and to make the whole nation defen-
sively warlil- '^, and confident in the
future of the State.

Unfortunately our politicians look
at questions solely from party stand-
points, and are little influenced by na-
tional considerations ; consequently
when the expenditure is to be reduced
the first thing to suffer is the militia.
The reduction does not aflfect the staff

— which is maintained at tlu^ same
strength, although th(! force is reduce<l
by one-half — but the whole burden
falls upon the men of the force,
their numbers are cut down, their pay
reduced, their camps dispensed with,
and the morale of the foi'co thereby
greatly diminished, and the efficiency
seriously im])aire(..

Is this reduction necessary ? Is it
advisable even upon purely financial
grounds ? It must not be overlooked
that we are contending against the
reduction of drill pay, etc., for the ac-
tive force only, for there has V)een lit-
tle or no reduction in the cost of tlio
machinery by which the force is gov-
erned. Now, the «lrill ])ay of oHi-tcrs
and men goes directly into the hands
of the tax-payers themselves. There
is scarcely a family in Canada that has
not some relative in the force, and.
the trifling sums paid in this way
go back into the country households,
and in many and many a township is
the only Government money ever
seen, and is, in fact, the only return
they ever seem to get for their taxes.
There may be a fallacy in this, but
they believe it, notwithstanding.

It issometimes urged that the labour
is lost to the country ^/hile the men
are at drill. This may be right in
theory, but it is a mistake in le-
ality. The drills are performed at
night, or in the month of June — be-
tween haying and harvestr — and prac-
tically do not cause one grain of wheat
less to be sown, or one bushel less to be
reaped, while the country has the ad-
ded strength of a trained and effective
military organization.

Some argue that the militia force is
not as efficient as a regular army would
be, and that, therefore, the money
spent upon the organization is wasted.
Granted that a regular force would be
more efficient, but a Canadian regular
army would needs be very small and
disproportionately costly. The Mount-
ed Police, 300 in number, cost for last
year ISO.'i.TiO.OS. The annual diill
pay for the whole number of militia

>■•

.4 I'LEA For* THE MILITIA.

trainod last yoar was i'i'l'Jl.LMu.Or), or
little more than a third of tho cost of
tbe Mounted Police. Afjain A and B
Batteiies Dominion Artillery, about
250 men, ccmt ;?101),»ii» I. ;?.'), or \\ as
much as the entire militia were paid
for drill. Will any one in his nonses
claim that there would he as much
military strength in a regular force of
2r)0 or ;50() men, as in a militia num-
bering 4r),()0() 1

It is also a mistake to consider that
the whole value of the present force
consists in the high state of drill in
which it is, or should be kept. If we
have not absolute etHciency, we have,
as a starting point, the organization,
the arms, and the equipment — the
olKcers fairly efficient, and the rough
edge taken off the men. War would
not probably come at a day's notice,
and every day after our men were
mobilized, they would gain in steadi-
ness. Had we not our present organi-
zation, or were it abolished for ten
years, six months of the greatest effoi-ta
would not do as much to bring the
force to an efficient state, as six weeks
would do under the present circum-
stances.

A great advantage is also realized
in the militaiy spirit created in the
country. A' -esent almost every
young man se^ /es for a longer or
shorter period in the ranks of the
militia. Many people thiiik that, be-
cause they leave the force before they
are thoroughly efficient as soldiers,
their service is wasted and their train-
ing useless. There can be no greater
mistake. When a lad of 18 or 20
has donned the uniform and shouldered
the lifle, and drilled even for one year,
a great deal has been done. The idea
that he is a Canadian — that he may
some 4ay be called upon to defend his
ccuntiy — has entered his mind, and as
long as he lives thereafter he will be a
better citizen. Twenty years after, if
war should break out, his first thought
would be ' My country is in danger, I
must shoulder my rifle again and go
to the front ; ' while, if he had never

b(!cn in th(^ force, h(^ would probably
say, ' Thi'Pi will be war, and I am
afraid our militia will linve more than
vhe ' can do to defend the country,'
but he will not think of enllHtiny; to
help them. Perhaps, like a craven, ho
mij,'ht say, 'The odds are too great, we
should not ])rovoke the enemy by re-
siHtanoc.' From this point of view
alone, the militia oiganization is of im-
mense service! to the country.

Canadians have the historical re-
putation of being defensively the most
warlike people in the world, and it
should be the ])art of our legishitors to
cultivate and (Micourage that feeling.
Like Switzerland, we will never be
aggressive, but who shall say that we
may not have to fight desperately for
our separate existence as a nat'on in
the future, as we have done in tln^ past.
Already the muttered thunder from the
East has reached our ears — why may
not the gathering storm reach and de-
vastate our shores ? Can we reconcile
it with our duty as loyal subjects and
good citi:cens, that we should neglect
those measures which may be necek.
sary in order to preserve our national
existence ; or are we to be ' like dumb
driven cattle ' instead of ' heroes in
the strife 1 '* When the exigency arises
it will be too late for precautionaiy
measures. It is necessary to prepare
for war in time of peace.

But it is to be feared that persua-
sions and warnings alike fall upon
heedless ears. Because the militia
force is not a political organization ;
because they have wisely and rightly
held aloof from politics, they are ig-
nored by our politicians. But though
ab.stainirg from taking an active part
in politics, the militia has, and can
exercise, an important influence in
elections. In 1872, Sir George Car-
tier, the then Minister of Militia, was
defeated in Montreal, because the
volunteers and their friends voted
* en masse ' against him. In tliis last
election the general dissatisfaction of
the Force was doubtless one of the
causes of the sti'iking defeat of the

:t?x

I I'l.KA FOH rut: MILITIA.

'I'll tlin |»('o|ilt? \vc must also u|i|ioal,
to ooii(|m'r that apatliy witli wlii.li
they liavo vujwi'd our pa.-)fc sti U!,'jjl( h
for exiHtonce. Do tl- y rwnizn tliat if
tho prcsout Forc'P is discoiiras^t'd (o
(h'iith, tlic law pro' ' Ics for tlio cHtal)-
lishuicnt of the ballot, and that ein-
ployers, in.itoad of rnipioyeH, may lie
forond iuto the ranks ? I )() tlH>y rcalizt?
that each younj( inaii who <j;oes out to
drill, ir. "Vcry year, sacrKices from !*S
to 810 for their direct lieuelit, and
v'ithout reaping any Kpee:ti<' advan-
tage thorefoi- 1 ho they lealize tlio
ju'otectiou that the presence of the
Force affords their prop<;rty an J their

li\(K? VV'hnt would liave stayed the
liilgriuiage riots in Toronto sav<! tho
presence of an armed force? What
would have stayed tho sacking of
Mont rial, had no volunteers been at
hand on the !i>th Jidv?

Our dt'sires an; most reasonaltle.
We only ask that the provisions of
the Militia Law slioiild he slightly
uiiKiwhul and r'gitlly enforced, and
that a little i.. :e money Hhuuld bo
spent in tlm annual training of tliti
men. All that is wanted, in addition,
is that the Canadian people should
take a living interest and jjridt) in
their citizen soldiery ; encourage thorn
hy precept and exaniple. and stimu-
late, ratlier than retard, their efforts
to fulfil their duty. (Jive tho militia-
man tlui lOciiH stdiHili tliat he deserves
to have in the community, and tlie
community will reap the reward in
the hora* of danger.