CIHM Microfiche Series (Monographs) ICMH Collection de microfiches (monographies) Canadian InatituM for Hiatorical Mieroraproductiont / Inatitiit Canadian da mleroraproductiona hiatoriquaa 1995 Technical and Bibliographic Notes / Notes technique et bibliDgraphiques The Institute tias attempted to obtain the t>est original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibllographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming are checked below. Coloured covers / Couverture de couleur I I Coveid damag-Kl / ' — ' Couverture endoi,imagte I I Covers restored and/or laminated / ' — ' Couverture restaur^ et/ou pellicula I I Cover title missing / Ij litre de couverture manque I I Coloured maps / Cartes g^ographiques en couleur I I Coloured inl< (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) I I Cokxired plates and/or illustrations / ' — ' Planches et/ou Illustrations en couleur I 1 Bound with other material / ' — ' ReM avee d'autres documents I I Only edilkin available / ' — ' Seule edition disponible I I Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion — ' along Interior margin / La reliure serr^e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge interieure. I I Blank leaves added during restorations may appear ' — ' within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming / II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutdes tors cfune restauration appaiaissent dans le tsxte, mais, kxsque cela itait poesiile, ces pages n'ont pas M famtes. L'Instltut a mlcrofilme le mellleur examplaire qu'll lui a et6 possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exem- plaire qui sont peut-6tre uniques du point de vue blbll- ographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduile, ou qui peuvent exiger une modifications dans la m^th- ode nonTiale de fllmage sont indiqufe ci-dessous. D D D D D D D D Cokiured pages / Pages de couleur Pages damaged / Pages endommagtes Pages restored and/or laminated / Pages restaur^es et/ou pellksultos Pages discoloured, stained or foxed / Pages d^colortes, tactiet^es ou pk^udes Pages detached / Pages d6tach6es Showthrough / Transparence Quality of print varies / Quality jnegale de I'impression Includes supplementary material / Comprend du materiel suppl^mentaire Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been returned to ensure the best possible Image / Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6ti filmtes a nouveau de fapon a obtenir la meillsure Image p Opposing pages with varying colouration or discolourations are filmed twice to ensure the best possible Image / Les pages s'opposant ayant des colorations variables ou des dteol- orations sont filmees deux lois afin d'obtenir la mellleur image possible. AddHkxial comments / Commentalres suppKmentaires: Pagination Is « follom : p. t81-19S. Tliis item is f ilmad at the riduclion ratio chMfctd bdow/ C« document tst filmi eu uux d* reduction indiqut ci-d«ftoin. lOX 14X 1«X 22X »X »X J 12X 20X Th* copy filmad hara has baan raproduead thanki 10 tha ganaroaitv of: National Library of Canada L'aicamplaira film* fut raproduil graca * la gintreait* da: Bibllothaque natlonale du Canada Tha imaga* appaaring hara ara tha bait quality pouibia Gonsidaring tha condition and lagibility of tha original copy and in Itaaping with tha filming conwact apacif icationa. La* imagaa luivantat ont ttt raproduiias avac la piut grand soin. compta tanu da la condition at da la nanati da I'axamplaira film*, at »n eonformita avac laa conditiona du contrat da tllmaga. Original copiaa in printad papar covara ara filmad baginning with tha front covar and anding on tha laat paga with a printad or illuatratad impraa- (ion. or tha bacit covar whan appreprlata. All othar briginal copiaa ara filmad baginning on tha first paga with a printad or illuatratad impraa- aion. and anding on tha last paga with a printad or illuatratad improssion. Laa axamplairaa originaux dont ia eouvartura an papiar aat imprimaa sont flimas an eommancant par la pramiar plat at an tarminant soit par la darniara paga qui cemporta una amprainia d'impraaaion ou d'lllustration. soit par la sacond plat, salon la caa. Toua laa autras axamplairas originaux sont fllmaa an eommancant par la pramitra paga qui eomporta una amprainta d'impraaaion ou d'illuatration at an tarminant par la darnitra paga qui eomporta una talla amprainta. Tha last racordad frame on each microfiche shall conuin tha symbol -^ (maening "CON- TINUED"), or tha symbol V (meaning "END"), whiehavar appliaa. Mapa, plataa. charts, etc.. may be filmad at different reduction retios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed baginning in the upper left hand earner, left to right and top to bottom, a* many frames as required. Tha following diagrams illustrate the method: Un dee aymbolaa suivants spparaitra sur la darnitre imaga da cheque microfiche, seion le caa: la symbola —^ aignifia "A SUIVRE". le aymbola V aignifia "FIN". Las cartaa, planchaa, tableaux, etc.. peuvent atre filmaa i dea Uux da rtduction diff*renis. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour atre reproduit en un soul elicha. il est filma t psrtir de Tangle supArieur gaucha. da gauche a droite. at da haut an bes. an prenant le nombre d'imegee nOcessaire. Lee diagrammes suivants illustrent la mathoda. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 MCOPV '••""'noti mi oun (ANSI ind 80 TtSI CHMI n,. 2) i£ JJ_ S us 120 ^s 1 1.8 ^■IPPLIED IN/HBF l„c 1053 Eail Mam SIrHl (Tie) *«2 - 0300 - Choo, "^^ (/IS, IU-5B9a-ra> '>Ti t*:^ /^i». f ^"""'^ "«"' Engl sh elements, and annexation to the 'Jnited States as the only S u tion for either side. But while the French were not aver^ to separation from Britain, the all-powerful clerical element w^ even more averse than the English section to any p^slt^ ^exation to the United States, They very naturaSy St^ the possibihty of retaining their exceptional civil and relil^ powers and privileges within the American Union. cS of more or less continual deadlock between the popular aiembv and the executive government. assemoiy IM THE AHKRICAN POUTICAL SCIENCE REVIEW But, if there was no hopeful solution in sight from the Canadian side, there might be from Britain, and it was ultimately from this direction that relief came. Lord Durham's report of 1838, pre- senting an interesting and striking picture of the impasse at which Canada had arrived, and indicating the necessity for some change which would afford the people more power in their domes- tic affairs, came at the psychological moment, following a rather serious rebellion in Lower Canada and an abortive one in Upper Canada. The British govenunent, reaUzing that something de- cisive must be attempted, in spite of the vigorous protests of practically all the imperialistic elements in both Britain and Canada, decided to attempt the bridging of the gap between the legislative and executive branches of the Canadian government. Convinced that this must be accompanied by some remedy for the fundamental mistake of the past in dividing Canada on racial lines, the British government passed an act for the reunion of Upper and Lower Canada into one province. Recognizing in this the likelihonr' of a British instead of a dual national future for the coimtry, the French section opposed the measure most strenuously, and when it was passed adopted as its policy in the first legislative the repeal of th3 union. This naturally pre- vented the French members being admitted to that share in the executive government to which their numbers and influence would otherwise have entitled them, and to which they were subsequently admitted, when the policy of disrupting the union was largely abandoned The ultra-conservative party in Upper Canada also strongly opposed the union on account of the pro- fessed intention of the British government to meet, as far as pos- sible, the aspirations of the popular party for a voice in the exec- utive government. The first governor of United Canada had, therefore, to find, if possible, a practical solution for the new Canadian problem which confronted him, and which involved, on the one hand, the attempt to maintain a united Canada with nearly half the population bent on its disruption, and, on the other, an attempt to construct an executive government whose personnel and policy would satisfy the majority of the popular representatives in the THI CANADIAN QOVBRNHEHT 187 assembly, prove acceptable to the legislative council, and at the same time meet the approval of the home government. Such was the task entrusted to Lord Sydenham. In addition to a fortunate combination of personal qualities, he was the first Canadian governor who was a trained politician, a member of the British parliament and a member of the British cabinet. Practically all of the imperialists in Britam and in the colony itself, regarded the parliamentary system of cabinet government as quite impossible of operation in the colonies. It was held to be indispensable that the executive government should hold itself aloof from the popular branch of the legislature, and that some such system of distinct powers with mutual checks and balances as that of the United States was the only workable one consistent with the retention of the colony as a part of the British Empire. All these predictions, however, Lord Sydenham completely belied, for he boldly introduced the British parliamentary system into Canada, thus completely revolutionizing the previous system of colonial government. This he accomplisiied by personally under- taking its introduction, directly combining in himself the duties of governor-general, prime minister, and party leader. He initia- ated his personally selected cabinet mto the mysteries of cabinet government, dependent for its Ufe upon retaining the support of a majority of the legislature including the assembly and the coun- cil. To accompUsh this, he organized and maintained for the first time in Canada a government party, of which he was the recognized leader and upon which he depended for getting his numerous and important bills through the legislature, for voting the necessary supplies, and supporting his executivegovemment. It must be admitted that the government party was dependent largely upon the pereonaHty of the governor for its numerical strength and cohesion. Nevertheless on his untimely death, he left to his successor, Sir Charles Bagot, a fairly united government party, to which Bagot was able to add a certain French element which had agreed to abandon the policy of disrupting the union. Of course the maintenance of an organized government party led to the formation of an opposition party on fairly definite lines. This was evidenced when Lord Metcalfe, disagreeing with the in THE AHXBICAH POLITICAL BCISNCE BBVIEW leaders of the government left to him by Ba«ot, virtually accepted the leadership of the opposition and defeated the party organized by Sydenham and Bagot. He formed a new government which held office until the arrival of Lord Elgin in 1847. By this time the two parties were fairly well defined and the essentials of party government sufficiently well organized. The party formed by Lord Sydenham and reorganized by Bagot had naturally gravitated to the Liberal side, while the Metcalfe party, taking its color from its leader, as naturally gravitated to the Conserva- tive side. When Lord Elgin took over the government, finding the polit- ical parties sufficiently organized, and not being particularly enamoured of the party then in power, conditions were at a con- venient stage for his adopting a neutral attitude towards both parties. He therefore declared that he would accept as his ministers the leaders of any party able to secure the support of the popular majority. This new attitude on the part of the governor was bitterly resented by the members of the govern- ment then in power, who expected him to continue the role of party leader as well as of governor-general. Shortly afterwards at the general election the Metcalfe or Con8er\'ative party was decisively defeated, the Liberal party being returned to power. The governor-general was thus able to practically demonstrate the validity of his position. He freely accepted the change of gov- ernment with Messrs Baldwin and Lafontaine jointly assuming the functions of the premiership and party leadership, while Lord Elgin confined himself to the functions of governor-general. Thus from 1848 the Canadian system first definitely assumed its present form, the governor taking virtually the same position in the Canadian parliamentary system as the sovereign does in that of Britain. By simply standing aloof from the strife of parties, the governor threw on his ministers the whole responsibiUty of the government, both legislative and executive. While accepting their advice and sanctioning then- program, so long as they had the confidence and support of the majority of the legislature, he yet decUned to fight their u .ttles or shield them from the consequences of adverse THE CANASUN OOVERNHZNT 189 criticism resulting in adverse votes. One of the most important and far-reaching consequences of the chage effected from Syden- ham to Elgin, was the fact that the executive government, in- cluding the whole civil service, found itself transferred from the service and protection of the governor-general, to the service and disposal of the cabinet composed of the party leaders, who were chosen more frequently perhaps for their political power and influ- ence than for their administrative experience and capacity. Fav- oritism of a very pronounced character had existed under previous administrations, but it was a social and personal favoritism as contrasted with one dictated by party considerations and the necessity for maintaining a political majority. Further inter- esting consequences resulted from the fact that the party lead- ers, who now became the heads of the different sections of the executive government, did not necessarily follow common stand- ards in the detailed administration of their departments. So long as they agreed on the essentials of the party program, they might assume a considerable range of freedom in departmental administration, including the character of appointments and promotions. It is to be noted that the field of Canadian politics to which the responsible parliamentary system applied, did not as yet extend beyond the strict confines of domestic affairs. Foreign relations and the regulation of external trade were still dealt with by the home government, subject, of course, to such influences as peti- tions and addresses from colonial interests might exercise. At the very tune, however, when Lord Elgin was placing the cope- stone on the structure whose foundations Lord Sydenham had laid, questions of fiscal tariffs, trade relations with Britain and the United States, and the reconstruction of the navigation acts, were profoundly agitating the Canadian people and were the subjects of endless petitions to the crown and parliament of Britain, on the part of both houses of the legislature, the execu- tive government and the leading commercial interests. In con- sequence, from this time forward, the definition of domestic affairs has been steadily widening, nor is the end even yet in sight. IW THB AHIBICAN POUTICAL SCIIWCB BBTIEW As regards the iictual relations of the legislative and executive features of the Canadian government at the present time, cer- tain fundamental considerations are to be recognized. In the first place, the Canadian system is a thoroughly democratic one, exhibiting all the strength and most of the weaknesses of such a government. Democratic bodies extending over considerable areas are singularly inarticulate. They are apt to render ver- diccs on simple isolated policies, or more commonly on general administrations with a certain rough vigour, but they cannot give clear expression to their wishes in advance. It is, therefore, the function of the party leaders, after Ustening to a babel of voices, public and private, corporate and personal, to carefully balance, analyse and estimate them, and to piece together from these sporaxiic symptoms of the popular will a policy of legislation and administration which will admit of being successfully com- mended to public support. Rival policies are thus constantly commended to the pubUc, and that is the most .successful form of democracy where the public will can be most constantly and thoroughly tested as to its acceptance or rejection of these rival policies, not only in their inception but, where enacted, during the whole course of their execution. Where responsibiUty for the framing of public measures, for their financing from the pubUc treasu.y, and for their practical realization, is divided between different governmental bodies and even between different political parties, it is impossible to fix responsibility directly, rapidly, and effectively. It is perhaps the chief merit of the Canadian system that f,he same body, the party government for the time in power, has all these functions to perform. It therefore can neither escape responsibility for any particular measure or policy, nor prevent the accumulation of responsibiUty for all that transpires both in the legislature and the administration of the country during its term of office. Nor can the party as a whole escape this responsibility, for the nower of the cabinet is derived entirely from the support which it re- ceives from the rank and file of the party members constituting the majority of the house of commons. Any defection, there- fore, among the supporters of the government is at once a public TBI CANADIAN OOVERNMENT 191 indication of doubt or disapproval of the government's course and the nature and importance of the interests, or of the sections of country which the disaffected members represent, aro the meas- ure of the importance of their criticism upon the government. If, however, the defection is serious enough to destroy the gov- ernment majority in the house, the cabinet goes out of officp and the defeat of the cabinet means the defeat of the whole party for the time being. It is not recessary, therefore, to await a general election, at the end of a given period, to test Canadian public opinion. At any time circumstances may arise, accompanied by various man- ifestations of popular sentiment, forcing the government to submit its policy to the people for their verdict. Or the govern- ment may lose its suppor*. in the house of common.s and be de- feated without a specific appeal to the people at large. In the latter case, with the consent of the governor-general the cabinet may appeal to the r»ople aa against their representatives in par- liament. But without any such decisive measures, which occur only at rare intervals and on special issues, the executive govern- ment, being held responsible for every law passed and for all acts of administration, is constantly on trial before the people. Its parliamentary supporters are equally on trial, though in a somewhat minor degree. Every member of parliament is a touchstone of public opinion in his district and if a supporter of the government he is not backward in admonishing it as to any unpopular line of action which it is taking. The very gov- ernment itself may be divided in opinion on this or that policy. These differences may be due either to personal convictions or to the popular sentiment of the districts which the members of government represent. If they can compromise their differences well and good, but if not, more or less radical reconstruction of the cabinet may be necessary. Thus a continual process of adjustment to public opinion is going on, alike in the ranks of the government and of the opposition. It is in this connection that the Canadian parliamentary system provides a very effective barometer of public opinion and is therefore a very effective instru- ment of democracy. 192 THE AUEBICAN POLITICAL ■CIIWCX MriCW process o?p'ar"iCi't':rer "^hf" "'"r^" ""' the country and of itLlf in^ T. '"-'«»<''»°K mtereste of THE CANADIAN OOVBUniTOT 193 accumulation of power and responaibiUty in the hands of the prune mmister. This i. due to no thirst for power on the part of recent prune mmUters. It is forced upon them to a gnater extent than they altogether relish. Deputations seeking new Illation or urging the enlargement of old or theassumption of new adnumstrative functions, must see the prime minister, under the conviction that his will is the last word in acceptinn or rejectmg amendments to the government policy. It is che premier who has the right to select the personnel of his cabinet, and, therefore, he is held responsible for their actions. The cab- T^A 'f^ ff"" the few advisoiy members without portfolios, conduct the whole administration of the country through the vanous departments, of which they are the chiefs. In virtue of theu- command of the national policy, they require to control the lepslative machinery as well. They may not originate all leg- ^ItT'^ ^°"' """ ^"^^'^^ "' ""y ^Portance can be mtroduced with any certainty of becoming law, it must be ap- N«»T^.. »K "^f^ ^^ """ ""''"*' "« " Kovemment measuiC !! IT^^' "t-^T' """ ^"^^ '^ government measures only such biUs as axe hkely to meet with public favour, and thus add TK P"''*'""' P-iestige an ---■o-';- ■»-