IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) {./ % ^Sl" 'dip iWji ^0 fA f/a ^ 1.0 :f> I.I 1.25 ai 12.5 |>0 2.0 1.8 U_ ill 1.6 V] <^ /a VI •<^i /. :^ > //. -(^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WIST MAIN STRUT WiBSTIR,N.Y MS80 (716) t7a-4S03 ,\ iV * A :\ \ o \ w {/. CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions hiatoriquet Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Nottts techniques et bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may altar any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. D D D D Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur □ Covers damaged/ C Couverture endommagde Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurie et/ou pellicul6e Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque Coloured maps/ Cartes g^ographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noirel I I Coloured plates and/or illustrations/ D Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur Bound with other material/ ReliA avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La re liure serr^e peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distorsion le long de la marge intArieuro Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted t^rom filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajouties lors dune restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela itait possible, ces pages n'ont pas «t« filmies. Additional comments:/ Commentaires supplimentaires: L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a 6ti possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliogtaphique, r^ui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui pecvent exiger une modification dans la m^thode normale de filmage sont indiquAs ci-dessous. The tot I I Coloured pages/ D Pages de couleur Pages damaged/ Pages endommagies Pages restored and/oi Pages re^taur^es et/ou pellicul6es Pages discoloured, stained or foxe< Pages dicolories, tacheties ou piqu6es Pages detached/ Pages ditachees Showthrough/ Transparence Quality of prir Quality inigale de ('impression Includes supplementary materit Comprend du matiriel supplementaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible I I Pages damaged/ [~~] Pages restored and/or laminated/ r^ Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ I I Pages detached/ r^ Showthrough/ I I Quality of print varies/ I I Includes supplementary material/ I j Only edition available/ Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure. etc.. ont iti filmies A nouveau da facon d obtanir la meilleure image possible. The poa oft flllT Orij beg the sioi oth firs slot or i The sha TIN whj Mai diff entl beg rl6^ reqi mat This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Cs document est film* au taux de reduction indiqui ci-dsssous. 10X 14X 18X 22X lax WL A 20X MX 30X 24X 28X 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity off: Douglas Library Queen's University L'exemplaire film* ffut reproduit grAce A la gintrositA de: Douglas Library Queen's University The images appearing here are the best quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the ffiiming contract specifications. Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on tha first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol -^ (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol y (meaning "END"), whichever applies. Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettet* de I'exempiaire f ilm«. et en confformit* avec les conditions du contrat de filmage. Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est ImprimAe sont filmte en commen^ant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la derniire page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration, soit par le second plat, salon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmte en commenpant par la premiere page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustration et en terminant par la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaltra sur la derniire image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE ", le symbols V signifie "FIN". Maps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too ierge to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hend corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre film As A des taux de rAduction diffArents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre reproduit en un seul ciichA, 11 est filmA A partir de Tengle supArieur gauche, de gauche A droite, et de heut en bes, en prenant le nombre d'images nAcesseire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mAthode. 32X 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 ON • » » 5 3 1 . ' . = 1 y 1 ' > il 1 I 1 3 1 > > ,' THE DEFENCE. OF 0U« «• • >• « • COLONIES AND COMMERCE.. O » • 9 •-41 LONDON: WILLIAM RIDGWAT, 169, PICCADILLY. W. 18G5. ^y / .:•• ••• •• • • • ••• . « ••• •• L 1665 C 3 (/ •; •• • ••••• ••••( • • * * 1 >• • •• •«) •••■■ • • • * • • * •••• ••, • *• • ••••» •. ..• . -•• • • • •• • • ... .'. .. • • •• I BELIEVE that the most effective, and neces- sarily the most economical, military protection for the widely-separated dependencies of this Empire will be found to be identical with the most eligible means of providing- for the security of the great courses of our foreign commerce. At all events all authorities, military or political, by whom the sub- ject has been treated, have condemned the dispersion of the regular military force and resources of the Empire, and the multiplication of fixed works at the charge of the Imperial Treasury on grounds of local convenience. It follows that, as a rule, there should be no Im- perial military occupation in any outlying positions not falling strictly within the condition of points to be held in strength and properly organised^ accord- ing to some settled comprehensive policy, for the maintenance of our maritime ascendency. The secu- rity of the whole fabric of colonies and commerce depends on that condition, and with our great and constantly improving means of maritime transport, any remains of a disjointed military occupation can only be sustained as an exceptional measure to be carefully limited by the requirements of the case 'ind to be abandoned as soon as circumstances periuit. Vn g^ 4 Whether the charg-e, in such exceptional instances, is to fall wholly or partially on the Imperial Trea- sury must also remain matter of special considera- tion according" to the varying* circumstances of each incident of the kind. COLONIES CONSENTING TO RECEIVE CONVICTS Under the head of complete payment of the mili- tary charge by the Imperial Treasury, including* transport both ways, would, of course, fall the case of colonies consenting to receive convicts from the mother country to be assig-ned in private labour, and gradually absorbed in the body of the free population as they should be released. Convenient as such a system might have been in several respects, both to the mother country and to the settlers in colonies of recent establishment in the temperate regions, there is little reason to believe that it will in future be consented to on such an extended scale or for such a length of time as would warrant the expence of barracks and other buildings, and remove all the other objections against dispersion of force in positions not forming part of the regular military system of the Empire. The practice only obtains in one colony at present, and, I believe, to a small extent and diminishingly. Beyond the case just considered, it seems difficult to understand that there can be any valid ground for casting" the whole charge of transport and mainte- nance on the Imperial Treasury of any occupation instances, ial Trea- !onsidera- is of each NVICTa the mili- including the case from the e labour, the free onvenient I respects, ettlers in emperate at it will ded scale rrant the id remove >f force in ' military t present, ishing-ly. 3 difficult [•ound for mainte- :cupation by the Queen's forces which Her Majesty's Govern- ment may see fit to sanction from time to time for local convenience in colonies not having* posts which form part of the military system of the empire. COLONIES OF NEW SETTLEMENT. The amount, the nature, and the duration of any military countenance to be afforded to colonies of recent settlement, having* native tribes within their borders, and the share of the expence to devolve on the Imperial Treasury can, of course, only be deter- mined by Her Majesty's Government. But I believe in most, if not in all of these cases, that duty should be entrusted to the navy, the land part of the aid consisting* of such additional 8treng*th of marines and marine artillery as the circum- stances of the case may require. The Staff and supply arrangements of a force of that kind are much simpler and less expensive ; and seamen and marines are, I think, better suited to the exigencies of marooning and desultory hostilities with savage or semi-civilized tribes, in regions without transport, roads, or shelter, than regular troops trained to meet the stress of scientific warfare in settled countries, and therefore perhaps less shifty, if I may use such an expression, than their maritime comrades. When the population becomes dense enough and sees fit to push their settlements into the interior, the policy of such proceedings and the military pro- tection which may be necessary, should, I think, be 6 left entirely to the local Governments and levies, aided by such supplies of arms, ammunition, and military stores, and g-uidance and co-operation of ships of war, as Her Majesty's Government may see fit to afford. Hostilities with native tribes, ordered by Her Majesty's Government, must, of course, be carried on and paid for by the Queen's authority ; but hostilities undertaken by the settlers and local Governments are subject to different consideration. COLONIES FORMERLY CULTIVATED BY SLAVES. The next category of colonies demanding some share of direct countenance by Imperial force is that in which there are a handful of British proprietors and traders, living for the most part isolatedly, sur- rounded by vastly preponderating numbers of people of a different race not long since emancipated from slavery, and in some of these colonies, amongst numbers of Asiatic immigrants under contracts of service. It may, no doubt, be said of both these classes of people that they are generally quiet and docile, and certainly that neither the one nor the other have the slightest cause of discontent against the Governments under which they live or against their employers. They are efficiently protected against abuse of any kind. It must also be acknow- ledged that in those colonies in which there is a mixture of Creole and Asiatic labourers of different regions and creeds there can, of course, be less risk of any general outburst amongst the mass of working nd levies, ition^ and jration of t may see 3, ordered 3ourse, be uthority ; and local ieration. ILAVES. ling* some ce is that roprietors 3dly, sur- of people ited from amongst itracts of )th these [juiet and nor the t against r against protected acknow- here is a different less risk working people. But at the same time, it cannot be denied that in the case of Asiatic immigrants in these colonies, there is always more or less hazard of disturbance, arising probably from some complete misconception of the intentions of the Government or of their employers, or of some accidental jar upon their religious or social prejudices. Upon the other hand, it must be borne in mind of the native la- bouring people of these colonies, that they are too prone, in cases of imaginary or real injustice towards one of their fellows, to take part together under old impulses not difficult to understand. A very small European force, under firm and judicious guidance, will always be sufficient to remind these generally well disposed and well treated people, that the single danger they have to avoid is any violent interference with the due course of law and order. Their dis- position to S3^mpathise and act together in occasional instances is no more than a fugitive reminiscence of a past and vicious condition of things, rapidly wearing* out under the spread of intelligence and that habitual exercise of individual right under individual responsibilities, which most effectually separates the good from the bad, the idle from the industrious, and the prudent from the rash — be they of what complexion they may. I am familiar with Colonies in this situation and should be the last person to undervalue their strong claim to a due measure of countenance by Imperial force j but I cannot think it is at all necessary or (I! rig-ht to afford it in the form of small detachments of the reg-ular army, objectionable on every ground of just reg-ard for the health of the troops, mischief to their efficiency, and unnecessary risk of military disaster in case of any sudden outbreak of hostilities with foreig-n powers ) some of them, it may be, - holding strong- posts, in force, within a few hours steaming- of colonies where they would find no more than weak British detachments and some amount of military stores in exposed positions. THE GREAT COLONIES. Adverting- to the great colonial off-sets of this Em- pire with their vast domain and prodigious natural resource, and advancing- so rapidly and yet so solidly in all those conditions which insure to com- munities an opportunity of winning- a place in the history of human progress, it has long appeared to me, both on grounds of general policy and for the protection of their growing interests (in the contingency of foreign wars) that the mother country should be ready to discharge the duty and undertake a liberal share of the pains and expense of organising such local force as the local legisla- tures may see fit to raise, on the footing best suited to their geographical situation and natural militant advantages. PROPOSAL FOR COMMISSIONS FOR ORGANIZATION OF LOCAL FORCE. In order to carry out these important objects 9 stachments ry ground 8, mischief )f military ■ hostilities ^ may he, few hours d no more le amount f this Em- us natural d yet so 'e to com- ace in the ►peared to and for ;s (in the e mother duty and d expense al legisla- est suited ' military VIZATION \i objects -1 comprehensively, I have for many years believed that Her Majesty's Government, after previous communication with the local Governments, should send out to each group of those Colonies commis- sions, consisting" of a person trained in high colonial oflSce, an Officer of Engineers, and of the Navy, authorized to consult and concert with the local Governments on these points. If the Commissioners should succeed in agreeing with the local Governments on some organization judged to be best suited to their requirements, it would remain for Her Majesty's Government to furnish such supplies of arms and scienti^' instruc- tion as might be necessary to establish the force on a solid and expansive basis. In some of these Colonies the organisation mig'ht, I think, very beneficially embrace academies of military and naval instruction to be maintained partly by Her Majesty's Government and partly at the charge of the local Government, on the con- dition that the appointment of the officers at the head of these Military Academies and of the leading preceptors should be in Her Majesty's Government ; so as to ensure a large field of choice and uniformity of system between the Imperial and Colonial services. I also think (in all cases of local force established by concert between Her Majesty's Government and the local authorities^ that the Crown should consent to appoint and pay the officer in command of the 10 force, with an adequate g-eneral staff, as well as the commanding officers of Eng-ineer, Artillery, Marine or Naval force, which mig-ht form part of the' local organization : and it seems to me that the commissions of all the officers should be under the Sig-n manual, so that if the force or any part of It (with the consent of the local leg-islature) should volunteer, in any pressure of war, to serve beyond the limits of the colony it would fall under the reg-ular military system of the Empire pending, such service. It would remain for the local legislatures to enact such laws as they mig-ht deem necessary tor maintaining, discipline among-st the local force called out for training, or for actual service within the hmits of their jurisdiction. In this way Her Majesty's Government and the local authorities would co-operate in the formation of the nuclei offeree of all arms best suited to the defensive requirements and natural military re- sources of those great regions, affiliated, if I may so speak, in the Imperial array, imbued with the same dutiful devotion to the service to which they belonged, and with the same spirited readiness to adopt all the improvements in armament, equipment and movement which science may devise and the enlarged opportunities of experiments at home should prove to be sound and effective. Whether all the positions abroad, actually in the military occupation of the regular force of the Empire fall within the conditions of the soundest military well as the ry, Marine, ►art of the tie that the be under Jny part of ire) should rve beyond under the iding- such Jg'islatures necessary local force ice within t and the formation ed to the itary re- if I may with the lich they diness to juipment J and the le should 'hj in the Empire, military 11 policy, is a consideration for statesmen on full exami- nation of all the circumstances and liabilities which must govern such dispositions, but I may mention some impressions on that subject which have fixed themselves in my mind in a long foreign service. INDIA. India is, of course, a separate case. A native population, six times larger than that of the United Kingdom, inhabiting conquered or subject regions of ten times that area, at 12,000 miles distance from these shores, can only be restrained by a powerful European army. But with the vast trade and out- lying possessions of this empire scattered over the whole globe and having no more at the centre than comparatively considered a small population, how- ever high in courage, powerful in arts, and rich in capital, it has long appeared to me that what I be- lieve to be the only sound rule of military occupa- tion for a great maritime power under such cir- cumstances of dispersed interests, may be partially applied to the case of India with much advantage. Recent events have confirmed me in the persua- sion that it is essential to a sound military system for India and all our outlying posts, that it should comprise a squadron of at least eight iron troop ships, constructed and fitted in all respects in the most effective manner for speed and capable of transport- ing 2000 men each, from Milford to the Cape of Good Hope within twenty-one days ; four of those Bhil))nth3 from J saving" of t'hich must s to come, bat if any is greatly laval posi- itius, and •n. vigorous troiis rnn- 15 sequences to all the immense British interests, poli- tical, commercial, and fiscal, dependent upon our steady maritime ascendency throughout all the seas and coasts south and east of those positions. In the altered conditions of naval warfare, blockade of the enemy's military ports is impossible, and the security of our outlying dependencies and scattered trade rests entirely on our own means to .. strike vigorous blows in the right directions as I swiftly as possible after the breaking out of hostili- ties. A Adverting to the rapid extension of the telegraph " to the shores of Eastern Asia across regions beyond our control, and weighing some other circumstances connected with that subject, it seems too probable that formidable loss must be encountered within a few weeks of a rupture (premeditated it may well be whilst we were led to hope for peaceful results) unless such an event finds us in steady strength at the great outlying naval posts of the empire, with well de- vised jilans and means of movement and assembly from and between those depots. Most judicious distribution of our owndep6ts of coal and steady security and very effective organization at these points, so that we may be able to make power- ful and swift descents on the enemy's depots of coal on the outbreak of hostilities, appears to me to be a maxim of our military policy, the importance of which cannot be exaggerated. These posts form part of the naval strength of the empire^ and several ( ii n 16 of them, 80 far as their military system is concerned, should, I believe, be placed under the direct autho- rity of the Admiralty — Bermuda, St. Helena, and Mauritius, for example. CANADA. In my examination before the Select Committee of the House of Commons on Military Colonial Expenditure (1861), a question was put to me about the military occupation of Canada. I replied that I had never comprehended the object of it. If the subject had been pursued, I should have said that so far as I understood our relations with those reg^ions and people such an occupation appeared to me to be useless in peace and dang-erous in war. We have no facilities for waging* a defensive war, with the small reg'ular army of this country, broken up into little detachments along- the immense fron- tier extending" between the United States and Canada, and shut out from communication with Europe, for several months of the year, by the only reliable high road open to us in case of war, that is, the River Saint Lawrence. But there are other safe and very powerful means of making the strength of this empire felt for the protection of the Canadian frontier, so lono- as the three millions of people settled in the North American provinces are content to live under the British flag*. Whilst we retain the supremacy at sea, and can assemble in powerful force at the •i.>. m 1 ' 17 pit's mouth of the best steaming coal in the shores of Ameriea, in noble harbours open all the year round, there need be no apprehension for the safety of the Canadian frontier. The retribution would be felt to be too certain, prompt, and dreadful. If the reinforcements recently dispatched to North America had found a state of hostilities existing on their arrival (and they might have done so, for Con- gress was in Session) ther would, of course, have been no attempt to move troops along a snow road in small detachments of 150 and 200 men, but no person competent to speak to such a point would consider that Canada was in greater peril from the want of these troops arriving, if they ever arrived, in detachments of that strength. On the supposition ^.hat hostilities had broken out or were imminent when the reinforcements were arriv- ing from Europe, the force would have been concen- trated at Hahfax, and there could be no better posi- tion for its prompt and powerful action. If we are to defend Canada and the other North American provinces, and I am one of those who deem it our bounden duty to do so at all extremities as long as those people desire to maintain their con- nection with us, we must at least be free to do so with our blood and treasure, ujmn principles of military policy suited to their military means. It would be shameful to expose the Queen's arms to miscarriage and these very people to great dis. asters, by a course of proceeding not warranted on 18 any sound grounds of military reasoning. The best lesson we can ever teach the people of Canada, the best example we can show them, and the best assist- ance we can afford them, will be steadfastly to pursue that plan of military operation for which we are very powerfully competent and carefully to avoid the separation of our regular troops from steady communication with our fleets and shores in pre- texts of local convenience. Those are the only prin- ciples on which we could ever bring a war with the United States or any other Power, to a speedy and triumphant conclusion. I have already expressed my own opinion that the mother country is bound by every considera- tation of sound policy, liberally to assist Colonial communities with responsible Governments desiring to organise force, for their defence or for the occu- pation in peace of such positions as the local Legis- lature may see fit to fortify. But I think they should in all cases be left to raise^ pay, and train their own troops, for it is surely the highest duty of any self-respecting people with great and growing interests, to provide adequately for their own defence. Statesmen will determine whether it is just to de- prive them of all motive to do so, steadfastly and intelligently, at a burthensome cost to the people of England, and in violation of principles of military policy necessary for the security of the whole empire. C. E. London. Feb. 12. 1862. The best anada^ the 3est assist- r to pursue ch we are y to avoid oni steady es in pre- onlj prin- r with the peedy and inion that considera- it Colonial ts desiring ' the occu- cal Legis- hink they and train St duty of I growing n defence, list to de- fastly and the people iciples of ty of the C. E.