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 ""^DESIGN" IN NATURE. 
 
 T^ 
 
 REPLIES TO THE 
 
 S/i 
 
 ^ 
 
 Si 
 
 iristian Suardian 
 
 ■i 
 
 AND 
 
 CHRISTIAN ADTOCATE, 
 
 BY 
 
 e^ALLEN PRINGLE. 
 
 l«MII>i^M"lrf»M*'^»^^i^»^»»^»^ 
 
 X 
 
 TORONTO: 
 
 1 88 1. 
 
 ^^% 
 
 
PREFATORY NOTE. 
 
 As the following reply to the Chrintian Guardian Tras refused insertion 
 in that paper, it has been thought right in the interests of truth and free dis- 
 cussion, to publish it in this form. In order to maintain the entire fairness 
 towards our Christian opponents, which we have always exercised, (but which 
 has not always been accorded to us by them,) we here give the full text of the 
 Guardian's criticism. A brief reply to the Canada (Jhrittian Advocate (which 
 also refused any reply), is also appended. That the Guardian and Advocate 
 should have simultaneously;, (March 16th,) opened their batteries — noisy but 
 not destructive — against my pamphlet, which has been in their hands some 
 months, and both attack but one and the same position, viz : the argument 
 against "Design in Nature," is, to say the least, a little curious. Whether 
 this was the result of design or chance, of course no Materialist cr»n tell ! As 
 both criticisms are directed against the same argument, the reply to the 
 Guardian is, partially, also a reply to the Advocate. In a private reply 
 also which I have received from a prominent theologian of this Province, the 
 same point is selected as the centre of attack. It would, therefore, appear 
 from this consensus of the enemy in their attack, that thi« one position — the 
 argument against "Design in Nature" — is the only vulnerable one our oppon- 
 ents have been able to find in my pamphlet. Hence the necessity of fairly 
 and squarely meeting this fundamental issue between us. 
 
 Sblby, April, 1881. 
 
 A. P. 
 
 ^^^ 
 
EXTRACT FROM REPLY TO WENDLING IN 
 *'lNQER80LL IN CANADA." 
 
 Mr. Wendling'a next argument to prove the (jxistence of a personal God 
 is the once celebrated but now obsolete •* design" argument of Cat well and 
 Paley ; but he seems either not to know or he ignores the fact that this 
 " design argument" has been so thoroughly refuted by the sternest logic and 
 most indisputable natural facts that the more advafticed theologians of the 
 present day have wholly abandoned it. To reproduce these, or to give any 
 elaborate refutation, it is unnecessary here. The whole matter may bo 
 disposed of briefly by one or two syllogisms which everybody can compre- 
 hend. The famous " design argument," then, may be formulated into sim- 
 ple syllogistic propositions thus : — 
 
 Whatever manifests design must have had a designer : 
 
 The world manifests design : 
 
 Therefore, the world must have had a designer. 
 
 This is the whole Christian reasoning on the subject in a nutshell, and 
 it has been considered by them perfectly conclusive and unanswerable. The 
 logic is certainly unexceptional )le, that is, the conclusion is quite legitimate 
 from the premises ; but it so happens that the premises are unsound, and in 
 such a case the most unexceptionable logic goes for naught. If premises be 
 erroneous, though the reasoning be ever so good, the conclusion must be er- 
 roneous. The major premise of the foregoing syllogism, that "whatever mani- 
 fests design must have had a designer," is a pure assumption, if by design is 
 meant adaptation in Nature. So, likewise, is the minor premise an assump- 
 tion if by design is meant anything more than the adaptation prevading 
 the universe, or at least that part cognizable to us. That the ^^nASif and 
 adaptation observable in Nature do not establish intelligent design, is amply 
 shown by the highest authorities — by the most eminent naturalists (Ha3ckel, 
 Darwin, Ac.) of the present day, to whom the reader is referred, and I need 
 not here amplify in that direction. Nor is it at all necessary for my present 
 purpose and work. It is only necessary to apply the reductio ad ahsurdum 
 to the above argument from design to show its utter fallacy. We will 
 admit the premises and carry the reasoning of our Christian friends out a 
 little further. By granting the truth of their major proposition and reason- 
 ing logically from it we can prove more than is wholesome for the theologian, 
 as thus : 
 
 Whatever manifests design must have had a designer : ' 
 
 God, in his alleged personality and attributes, manifests design ; 
 Therefore, God must have had a designer. 
 
It will thus ])o H(!i!T» tliiit Mr. \Vt»n»l liner's <l('si<,'n argument from CatwcU 
 and Paloy proves ontirely too niiich for his own gtJixl, rn<l hence it is that th« 
 HBtuto theologians of the day have altundoned Paley nnd his design argument 
 to their fatt where thcjy have been duly relegated by the inciaiv'e logic of 
 the modern materialist. 
 
 A DEFENDER OF INGERSOLL, 
 
 From the Christian (tuardian, March 10th, 18S1. 
 
 Hitherto our country has been comparatively free from avowed infido 
 ity. While organized socic^ties for the pro}»agation of sceptical principle 
 and literature have been well known in Europe and in the United States, 
 wo have felt but the indirect influence of the movement. But now the 
 battle has come to our own gates ; and we are almost startled by the fact 
 that Canadian publishers are found who make it a business to reproduce the 
 ablest infidel literature, and that there are Canadian booksellers who pub- 
 licly advertise such literature, and find it profitable to court the patronage 
 of an intidel public. Nor is this all. Free thought clubs are organized, 
 public halls opened, weekly meetings for discussion held on Sabbath, and 
 the most eminent lecturers occasionally engaged to call public attention to the 
 new views. The last of these, Mr. Ingersoll, did not receive the favorable 
 attention of the public and the preso which was exi)ected. lint his visit 
 served at least this useful purpose, it awakened the Christian public to 
 recognize the existence of a growing danger, and has led to some effort to 
 fortify the masses of the people, and especially the young, in their Christian 
 faith. In answer to these efforts of the press and platform, there has ap- 
 peared the latest Canadian ex])osition of unbelief, entitled " A Defence of 
 Ingersoll," by Mr. Allen Pringle. Of this two thousand copies have already 
 been sold, and a second edition of four thousand copies is being distributed 
 gratuitously to the clergy and college students of Ontario, a number pi copies 
 of which have been sent tt» the students of our own University at Cobourg. 
 This pamphlet is not so much an investigation of any point of discussion 
 between believers and freethinkers, as a clever reiteration of the most extreme 
 conclusions of modern unbelief, backed up by the authority of great names 
 and assertions about "stern logic" and "indisputable facts." The chief 
 danger of such a work lies in the impression which it makes on the public 
 mind, if its repeated assertions are allowed to pass without rational contra- 
 diction. The writer has very ingeniously woven into his work all the current 
 objections to the authority of^the Bible, and to Christianity as a system of 
 doctrine, which are advanced in "Gregg's Creed of Christendom" and similar 
 works, and which have been so fully answered by Dr. Peabody and others. 
 But these are but outworks to the defence of IngersoU's fundamental position, 
 " There is no God," or, if there is we know nothing of him. 
 
 Our space will not permit us to follow the writer through his attempted 
 
rofutatioii of the livn groat linoa of urgumont «>niployo«l by the Chrwtian 
 Cliurch to establish tlie fiindiimnital trutli of religion ; nor can we consider 
 liis niisreprtsentationa of the teachings of the Bible, or his attacks up(jn its 
 historical uiiity. Wo shall confine! ourselves to a single point, especially as 
 that point lies at the very heart of the controversy. How does he deal with 
 the anjunitnt from dtsign ] 
 
 This argument is not as he seems to suppose the invention of Catwell 
 and Paley. It was stated by Socrates 2,200 years })efore their day, as record- 
 (mI in the fii'st book of the Memoral)ilia, with a clearness and force seldom 
 since equalled and its fundamental principles are as old as the days of David 
 and Job. 
 
 The argument in syllogistic form i'. this : — "Whatevfir manifests design 
 must have had a designer. The world manifests design ; therefore, th<! world 
 must have hail a designer." 
 
 We may accept his definition of design as an adaptation, or the fitness 
 of one thing to another, with the single limitation that it is the fitnet5s of 
 means to an (Mid, and that both means and end must be prvduced or have 
 had a bet/inninf/. The theist in contending with the materialist coukl not 
 fairly adduce the matter of the universe as designed for th(» production of the 
 universe : unless he could first prove that that matter had a beginmnff. Jiut 
 where one or more facts coine to he, containing in themselves the elements of 
 fitness to produce another fact which lies beyond them, this peculiar kind of 
 fitness we call design. That this peculiar kind of adaptation exists in vast 
 numbers of phenomena of nature, few intelligent persons will deny ; and the 
 fact has been admitted, directly or indirectly, by the most eminent modern 
 materialists. The whole theory of Darwin is based upon it in his doctrine 
 of " the survival of the fittest" The fact of this adaptation must be account- 
 ed for. The theist calls it the design, i.e., the intelligent purpose, of the Su- 
 preme Power. This is a simple account of the matter, and one that perfectly 
 satisfies the demands of the problem : but it implies what the materialist is 
 above all other things unwilling to admit, i.e., free, conscious intelligence — or 
 in other words a personal God. Hence we are told that by the incisive logic 
 of the modern materialist, this old notion of a designer has been driven from 
 the field, and has been " abandoned by the most astute theologians," and we 
 are referred to Hseckel and Darwin for a more rational account of the matter. 
 The men of this school a century ago disposed of these wonderful phenomena 
 as chance. It is at least satisfactory to find that they have abandoned this 
 position, and that they now acknowledge that the adaptation of nature must 
 be accounted for. The first method which they propose is the substitution 
 of efficient for final cause; in other words, that the end provides its own 
 means. We select an example from Tyndall. The eye is a wonderful 
 optical instrument, adapted to the light. The theory of the materialist is, 
 not that the laws of light furnish the plan on which an intelligent Creator 
 
^ 
 
 formnd tho ('.y(% but that light itsi^lf «lir«!Ctly funnotl tlu^ oyo, aiul thus adapt- 
 ed it to itsi'lf.- "(liven a .HotjHitiv»5 animal tissue, cspiderinis, and, first, some 
 point 01. which tho li^ht falls is Hcorch«;d and blackened, and thus made more 
 sensitive. IJlack pigment spots are tho most rudimentary forms in which tho 
 eyes appear. This stiige having become permanent, by the same rays of tho 
 sun the cuticle is raised in a blister and serum effused, and thus tho elements 
 of a lens are produced. This is as far as even tho scientific imagination of 
 Tyndall ventures to carry us ; but he infers that the rays of tho sun having 
 done so much, could go on to complete tho whole mechanism of tho age. 
 The sum and substance of all this is that the blind interactions and frictions 
 of tho various objects of nature against each other have made them fit each 
 other as they do. 
 
 "Wo may fairly ask any candid mind to decide whether this is a suf- 
 ficient account even of such adaptations as that of the eye to light. But a 
 careful examination of tlie facts will very soon show us that there are num- 
 berless instances in which it is absolutely impossible thus to conrert the final 
 cause into the physical cause, and thus say that it wrought an adaptation to 
 itself. For instance, here is a species of butterfly {Pierin). Its own food is 
 the r:w«^et juices of the flowers. But as soon as it has arrived at the climax 
 of its short life, it seeks out, not tho petals of flowers, Ijut the thick succulent 
 leaves of the cabbage, or some other plant of that order, and there deposits 
 its eggs. As far as we know, it never sees or knows its young ; and it can 
 scarcely be pretended that the wants of tho young caterpillar that is to be, 
 have been the efficient cause of the instinct of the mother which so perfectly 
 provides for those wants. Hence the partial return in Darwin's theory to 
 the old doctrine of chance. His laws of development by which he accounts 
 for all these phenomena, are, then, accidental variation, heredity, and the 
 survival of the fittest. One butterfly thajictd to drop her eggs on a cabbage 
 leaf ; these lived, all others died. This was repeated over and over again, 
 until the repetition created an instinct by the law of hereditary transmission. 
 A lucky chance, happening over and over again, has thus laid the foundation 
 of this and every other such beautiful provision in nature. This is the ut- 
 most that these boasted authorities can do in the way of accounting for the. 
 universal fact of adaptation, which confronts us at every turn, and in every 
 part of the universe. Not even John Stuart Mill was satisfied with it. He 
 says the induction of design is too broad to be accounted for in any such 
 way as that, and he advises the Theist to hold on to the argument from de- 
 sign. We think the general verdict of common sense will agree with him in 
 this. If the fitnesses of nature are but chance variations, preserved because 
 of their accidental fitness, then the course of "creative history" should be 
 strewn with the myriad wrecks of perishing and perished unfit variations. 
 
 It would appear that our author himself is scarcely satisfied that the 
 argument from design is completely overthrown, for he adds a final demon- 
 stration of his own as follows : "Whatever manifests design must have had 
 
 ^ 
 
a (lo«ign»»r. (Jod, in his allcj^'cd porsonulity ami iittiDmtes, mimifostn desif^'n: 
 therefore (lod must have hail a dusignor." 
 
 Wo arc not favored with an pxiilunutinn of the minor jiromiso of this 
 wyllogiain. But wo can hoc in it only one of two meanings — oithei it atfirniM 
 the fitness of the Divine attributes as iiwards ea<h other, or as towards the 
 work of ereation. Such fitness certainly exists ; hut it lacks one euential 
 characteristic of the fitness of nature. It has no hrginning ; it always was. 
 It is not the mere fact of fitness that implies design, but the oriijiimtion of a 
 fitntas. An eternal fitness is a harmony a» betw«M'n the Divim; attributes, a 
 power as towar«l the universe ; but in neither case is it dtsifjn, unless it ii 
 fir it shown that it had a beginning. 
 
 In taking our leave of this pamphlet, we can only express the hope that 
 it will stir up the Christian Church generally to instruct the young more 
 perfectly in the reasons for our faith ; certainly we have as yet no cause to 
 
 be ashamed of them. 
 
 « 
 
 DESIGN IN NATURE. 
 
 To the Editor of the Christian Guardian. 
 
 Dear Sir, — In a late issue of the Guardian appeared a lengthy editor- 
 ial in refrence to my pamphlet " Ingersoll in Canada" (not "A Defence of 
 IngersoU" as stated) in which you deal with one issue, viz, the argument 
 from design to prove the existence of a personal ( iod, as this you say "lies at 
 the very heart of the controversy." Now, as I am quite willing to accept this 
 as a vital issue between the Christian and Materialist and to rest the whole 
 case on the result, you will, perhaps, give mo space in the Guardian to re- 
 join to your reply. In the first place allow me to thank you for the fair 
 and courteous manner in which you have addressed yourself to the subject. 
 Were our Christian opponents all as fair and courteous there would be less of 
 the untoward feeling between us which, unfortunately, now exists. Since 
 my pamphlet was sent out to the Ontario Clergy a few weeks ago I have re- 
 ceired numerous replies (by courtesy I will call them all replies,) from them 
 through the post. You would, no doubt, be amused as well as surprised to 
 see^some of these documents. Some are perfectly fair and courteous, as well 
 as argumentative — being able replies from the Christian standpoint — while 
 others are quite destitute of either courtesy or argument ; and some, in ad- 
 dition to being so destitute, are personal, insolent, and abusive. It does ap- 
 pear to me that the Christian ought to know — if he knows anything about 
 Free-thinkers — that discourtesy and abuse will not go far towards convert- 
 ing them to Christianity. I would also beg to say further by way of prelim- 
 inary that if I have in any way " misrepresented the teachings of the Bible" 
 in my pamphlet, as you appear to think, it has certainly been unintentional 
 
 • •» r^v.- m i mM ^ tr t^^fff-v 
 
on my part, m I liavo no dfHigii to he in tlu' IciiHt doRron nnfiur in dnnlin^ 
 with tlic (lortrinoM of tlu) Hil>I(5, or tin- i^ositioiiH of opponontfl. I will now 
 proceed, with your kind pomiiHhion, to consider your reply. 
 
 In the pamphlet in queation I Htate<l the Christian argument from doHign 
 to prov(! the exiMteiuu* of a personal (Jod, in Hyllogistic form, which you 
 (piote and accept um fairly stated, as fuUows : — 
 
 Wluitever manifesta design must have had a designer ; 
 
 The world manifests design ; 
 
 Therefore, the world must have had a designer. 
 
 This is the gist of the Christain argument from design to prove a God. 
 In my reply to Wendling I did not enter into an elahorate argument to con- 
 fute the above reasoning, thinking it unnecessary, as the design argument is 
 not much relied upon of lute by Theists ; but to show its absurdity I gave 
 what you are pleased to call, ironically, " a final demonstration," by simply 
 carrying out the Theist's logic a little further, as follows : — 
 
 Whatever manifests design must have had a designer: God, in his alleg- 
 ed personality and attributes, manifests design: Therefore, God must have 
 had a designer. 
 
 Now, if the integrity of this syllogism w> is unimpeachable, the conclusion 
 is certainly fatal to the monotheist, as it proves a thousand Gods as well 
 as one. You, of course, perceive this, and at once attempt to impeach the 
 minor premise. The major premise, being the Theist's own proposition, you, 
 of course, accept ; and I contend that the obnoxious minor premise is equal- 
 ly as sound as the other, on the Theist's own showing ; for if anything in 
 the Universe manifests design, the God of the bible, in his person and attri- 
 butes, n^anifests it. You say "we are not favored with an explanation of 
 the minor premise of this syllogism. But we can see in it only one of two 
 meanings — either it affirms the fitness of the Divine attributes as towards 
 each other, or as towards the work of creation. Such fitness certainly exists; 
 but it lacks one essential characteristic of the fitness of nature. It has no 
 beginning — it always was.". To which I reply the fitness of the universe 
 always was : it had no beginning ; for the Universe is eternal. If fitness, 
 having no beginning, can exist in a God, fitness, having no beginning, can 
 exist in the Universe. Hence, if fitness is no evidence of design " unless it 
 can be shown that it had a beginning," as you admit, the fitness of the uni- 
 verse which is eternal is no evidence of design. Or formulate the argument 
 thus : — 
 
 Fitness is no evidence of design, " unless it is first shown that it had a 
 beginning :" 
 
 The fitness of the Universe cannot be shown to have had a beginning ; 
 Therefore, the fitness in the Universe is no evidence of design. 
 
Rut, you will probably Ray that many of the a(^l()tatlon^^ wu s«m' nround us 
 in Quturt! had a hcgimiinj;. True, hut I ruply that the litiH'SH of iuatt«^r 
 and forco to produce all of th«'8f adaptations, in eternal — luwl no heginning, — 
 for if nuitter and force w L'ternal, its proporiii's aro eternal. It roHts 
 with you to prove that the titness, or plan, of the Universe had a heginning; 
 to do which you will have to prove that tlie Universe itself ha<l a beginning. 
 Modern Science has established that not only is matter indestructilde, but 
 force also is imlestructible. If, then, the smallest parti<.'le of matter or force 
 cannot be annihilated, matter ami force will of necessity continue to be ; and 
 whatever tnuHt always continue to })e must always have been. Whatever 
 hctjins to be crascH to !«! — all organisms, all worlds even. They cease to be 
 tt8 organisms, but persist as matter and force in other forms. Is not the 
 conception of an eternal, uncaused Universe, containing within itsidf the 
 inherent elements of titnesa and adaptation, more reasonable than the 
 conception of an eternal, infinite im ! uncaust-d personal (lod posses.sing 
 the elements of fitness and adai)tati.»n'J The one is, at all eviaits, com- 
 prehensible and intelligible, wl i'l; th'' other Involves the inost pali)'iblo 
 absurdity and contradiction, fo^ j.ersonalit' implies limitation, and whatever 
 is limited cannot be injinite. If (Jot'. . a Pxdng at all. with attributes, he is 
 .omething ^jfir se, whether material ^r ^i)iritaal; and something pn' i*e cannot 
 be infinite, and therefore cannot be liod. If he is not something per h<; but 
 infinite, then the whole UnivcrHo is (roil and evr n the Atheist might accept 
 that definition of the Unknowable. Is it not more reo-MJuaMe then to suppose 
 that matter and force are eternal, containing within themselves the promise 
 and potency of all life, all pl.enomena, fitness and adaptation in nature 
 included, than to suppose the existence of an eternal, anthropomorphic Ciod, 
 with the absurdity that he finally, after an indefinite period of "masterly 
 inactivity," created the whole Universe out of nothing 1 As to lohy the 
 Universe exists we, of course, humbly acknowledge our entir»^ ignorance ; so 
 may the Christian. We cannot fathom tlui absolute, or even conceive it. 
 The Materialist freely admits that of the esi^enee of things he knows nothing, 
 and that the Universe is, indeed, a great mystery ; but ho declines to assume 
 a greater mystery to explain a less. When the Theist says God created and 
 controls the Universe, his solution — God — is a greater mystery *han the 
 Universe itself; and the explanation is more incomprehensible than the 
 thing to be explained. When he says that fitness and adaptation in Nature 
 are evidence of design, and design of a designer, and stops his reasoning 
 there, he is inconsistent and illogical ; for the plan of a thing is as much 
 evidence of design as the thing itself, and therefore, if a God planned and 
 designed the Universe his plans are evidence of design as much as the work 
 itself, and he himself must have had a designer. This conclusion you can- 
 not escape, for the premise you attempt to impeach is tlius shown to be as 
 sound as the one you aver true; and in assuming that fitness in the divine 
 mind does not imply design you stultify yourself. Paley grants that a 
 designer implies a person. Now a person implies an organism; an organism 
 implies organs and faculties; organs and faculties (you say) imply design 
 
^HP 
 
 10 
 
 contrivance; and contrivance implies a contriver. Hence, if the proposition 
 that whatever manifests design must have liad a designer is true; as you 
 say it is, the proposition that God manifests design must also be true and the 
 conclusion is, therefore, inevitable t' at if the fitness in Nature must have 
 had a designer the fitness in this alleged God must have had a designer. You 
 may assume, however, that a person need not necessarily be an organization. 
 Well, then, if nature had a designer, as you say, and that designer is not a 
 person, it must be an element, essence or principle, or in other words. Nature : 
 and in this view we will pretty much agree, for I only claim that the fitness 
 and adaptation observable in Nature are the results of the inherent forces of 
 Nature. Should you further assume that this impersonal essence or force is 
 intelligent, I reply that we cannot conceive of intelligence apart from 
 organization. 
 
 The Theist, when he comes to a first cause which he calls God, stops 
 reasoning; but why should he? Why should he be afraid of his own logic? 
 He says everything must have a maker, everything from a Monenm up to 
 the Universe itself. These are his premises, but where do they lead him to 
 logically ? For instance : — 
 
 Every organization must have had a maker: 
 Paley's God is an organization, being a Person; 
 Therefore Paley's God must have had a maker. 
 
 This reasoning is perfectly fair from the Theist's own premises, but he 
 manages somehow to dodge it. He will say : God is not a person; but the 
 Bible, and Paul, and Paley, say he is. Then again, the Theist tells us that 
 non-intelligent matter and force cannot produce intelligent man — that intel- 
 ligence presupposes a greater intelligence. But as soon as we apply the rules 
 of logic and common sense to his propositions, and turn them into syllogisms, 
 he at once demurs. For instance, again: — 
 
 Whatever manifests intelligence presupposes a greater intelligence : 
 
 The God, who designs, manifests intelligence; 
 
 Therefore there must be an intelligence greater than God. 
 
 Stop ! he says, your minor premise is not true. (These minor premises, 
 though the legitimate offspring of the major, are all it seems bastards). If 
 not true, why not ? For the Theist to say that God does not manifest in- 
 telligence after claiming that he designed and planned the Universe, and that 
 he keeps it in order and motion, is sheer evasion in order to escape the 
 logical effects of his own propositions. Further, he says the Universe was 
 made, but that God is self-made, seK existent. But why may not the 
 Universe be self -existent? When we say the Universe was not made he 
 accuses us of attributing it to chance y but why, then, may not God with as 
 much reason, be attributed to chance, since you say He was not made? 
 
 
11 
 
 les 
 
 he 
 
 he 
 he 
 as 
 
 But 80 far as the argument from design is concerned, I have only 
 admitted the truth of the Theist's premises, to show their absurdity. We 
 deny that the Jitiiesx and adajitation in Nature prove intelligent design at 
 all, much less an omniscient designer. Design, if it exists in Nature at all, 
 must be universal — not a portion of tlie jdicnomena designed, and the rest 
 "at loose ends," undersigned. But does nature, as a whole, show intelligent 
 design, or benevolent design? ' Is Nature perfect? Is .she not rather filled 
 with abortions, monstrosities, waste, "struggle for life," and '-survival of the 
 fittest?" \Vlien Paley showed the savage his watch, to make him understand 
 that as the watch had a maker, the world must \vd.\v had a maker, the savage^ 
 after noting the regularity of the ticking, etc., said, "Pale face wrong; pale 
 face make watch, but Great Chief no make Earth, for Earth no compare with 
 watch. Watch, he go right — but Earth, he no go right. Pale face rob red 
 man — kill red man; red man starve when game is scarce; bear kill red 
 man; storm come, blow down red man's tent; cold come, freeze red man's 
 squaw — kill red man's papoose! Watch, he go right — Earth, no go right! 
 Earth, no compare with watch !" This homely reasoning of the unlettered 
 savage was too much for the theological metaphysics of Mr. Paley. If there 
 is intelligent, benevolent design at the helm of this wonderful Universe, why 
 should these things be? If all species of animals and men were designed 
 and created by a good God, why should they not all be fitted to live and 
 survive without eating and exterminating each other? Why the fierce 
 struggle for life — not only between beast and beast, but between ma.i and 
 man? Was it designed that beast should devour beast, and man eat 
 man? Has a benevolent God fitted and adapted them so to act, or has Nature 
 done it? The jaws of the lion and tiger are nicely fitted and adapted to tear 
 an innocent child to pieces, and eat it; but does this fitness prove a good 
 designer? The potato bugs are nicely fitted and adapted to feed and live 
 upon our potato vines; the weevil, to consume our wheat and peas; but it is, 
 of course, all designed! The numerous human parasites, external and in- 
 ternal, are nicely adapted to feed and thrive upon living human bodies, and 
 I suppose we ought not to object to the arrangement, or attempt to dislodge 
 them — for have they not all been intelligently and tenderly designed to feed 
 upon us? And when hundreds of human beings are consumed alive, in one 
 grand holocaust, in a church or theatre ; or a tornado sweeps a whole district ; 
 or an earthquake swallows up a whole city; or pestilence and famine de- 
 populate a country, we must resign ourselves, for it is all designed ! 
 
 But perhaps the most conclusive evidence of all against the idea of 
 special creation and design in nature is to be found in the useless and pur- 
 poseless rudimentary structures throughout the animal and vegetable 
 kingdoms. There are numerous rudimentary organs, such as eyes, legs, lungs, 
 mammary glands, muscles, teeth, wings, pistils, stamens, etc., to be found 
 both in animal and vegetable bodies, having no functions whatever, and 
 wholly without utility. Were these designed? If so was the design intel- 
 ligent? There are animals that live in the dark, with eyes that do not see, 
 
12 
 
 being covered by a membrane ; but when these animals are removed from a 
 life of darkness to one of light the sight is ultimately restored. Does God 
 or nature do this? In the upper jaws of calves are teeth that never cut; the 
 dugong has tusks that never cut through the gums ; the guinea pig has teeth 
 that are shed before it is born ; the boa-constrictor has little bones under the 
 skin towards the tail, which have no present use, as they are the remains' of 
 hind legs and a pelvis ; some whales and fishes hhve useless bones in the 
 hinder parts of their bodies which are evidently the remains of hind-legs; 
 in a certain worm (Anguis) there is a set of shoulder bones in the body but; 
 no legs attached to them. Were these all designed? In some breeds of sheep 
 we find rudimentary ears, and of cattle small dangling horns. The males of 
 the mammalia all have mammae in a rudimentary condition, and sometimes 
 so developed as to yield milk. Were these designed, and if so what for? 
 They have no earthly use that the keenest naturalist can discover. Was the 
 "bastard wing" in birds designed? Or the teeth in fetal whales which when 
 grown up have no teeth? There are in animal and vegetable life thousands 
 of such facts as these, of irredeemable purposelesmess, so to speak, — facts 
 which can never be reconciled on the theory of creation and design, but 
 which are as plain as day on the Materialistic theory of development. If 
 the Theist can give any rational accounu of them we will be glad to listen. 
 "When we consider," says Haeckel "the attempts which the earlier natura- 
 lists have made in order to explain this mystery, we can scarcely help smil- 
 ing." In the light of Evolution, however, we find the solution of the rudi- 
 mentary organs as well as a thousand other phenomena ; and hence the almost 
 universal acceptance of Evolution at the present day by scholars and 
 scientists. Touching this, Haeckel says, "It no longer occurs to physicists^ 
 chemists, mineralogists or astronomers, to seek to find in the phenomena 
 which continually appear before them in their scientific domain the action of 
 a Creaior acting for a definite purpose. They universally, and without 
 hesitation, look upon the phenomena which appear in their different depart- 
 ments of study as the necessary and invariable effects of physical and 
 chemical forces which are inherent in matter." 
 
 You refer, Mr. Editor, to the adaptation of the eye to light, and ask the 
 candid mind to decide whether Evolution furnishes a sufficient account of it. 
 I freely admit that to the ordinary reader who has not studied carefully and 
 thoughtfully the laws of heredity, of natural selection, of accidental varia- 
 tion, etc., as elaborated by Darwin and Haeckel, it would seem unreasonable. 
 But the account is quite satisfactory to all the greatest living naturalists as 
 well as thousands of others who have looked at the matter without prejudice. 
 To all such the doctrine of development appears more reasonable and less 
 mysterious than that of a personal god and design. Kegarding the adapta- 
 tion of the eye to light, if we had never seen any but the eyes of humans 
 and the higher animals we might think it impossible that they could have 
 been evolved by natural selection. But the belief becomes comparatively 
 easy when we look at the gradual ascent from the lowest eyes in the lowest 
 
IS 
 
 animals to the highest in man; for we learn that "tl^e eye in the lowest 
 an mal s a simple spot or pigment wliieh ,lo„s not y.l refleet my m,"e « 
 
 xternal ohjects, but at most perceives a„,l distingni^Les the , iff e mys o 
 hglit. Later, wo hncl m addition to this a sensitive nerve; then there 
 p^lually develops within the spot of pigment the first heginn n "o tl e 
 
 ens a refractive body which is now able U, concentrate the nTys of li- and 
 to reflect a dehnite image. But all the composite apparatus fcr tl e n, 
 ment of the eye and its accommodation to variatio, s'of light a u di, a ice 
 a^ still absent, naniely, the various i-efractivc media, the higliircliffm it 
 
 hilern"^'""." "^r^" "P*'"."'^™'. '^^- ^vhic'h are „o .erfectly cmisiMit „ 
 higher animals. Comparative anatomy shows us a>, n lintcrruptcd sncc, «i. „ 
 of dl possible stages of transition, from the simple t or,an to „i 1 „ Ii v 
 perfected apparatus, so that we can form a pretty „; rcc i lea t, ''low 
 and gradual formation of even such an exceedingly comple.x organ.". ^>„m 
 the lowest oiganism-the Monera, which are mere proto,.la..m"c speck, of 
 
 cept^le, thus excluding at once and forever the idea of ..p,dal creation or 
 
 With thanks for your space 
 Yours, 
 
 Selby, Lennox Co., Ont. 
 March 30, 1881. 
 
 * Haeckel. 
 
 } • 
 
 ALLEN PKINGLE. 
 
 >«-^3M 
 
MORE '^DESIGN." 
 
 11 * 
 
 (repply to the c. c. advocate.) 
 
 The Canada Chrii^tlaii Adrocafn of Afjircli lOtli contains a lengthy 
 oflitorial undor tlio ciiptiou " f.o^'ic; Run Mad," (a very appropriate heading), 
 ill reply to that portion of my parii[)hl('t which deals with I)/'xi(/n in Nature. 
 In its next issiu; the Adrocdff (evidently, duhions, as to the result of the other 
 hatch of "loj^'ic run uuid,") returns to the suhjcct in another lengthy leader, 
 and, with prais(!-worthy frankness, gives as a n^ason for doing so, that many 
 had "expressed the fear that he" (the pamphleteer,) "had mad«^ out his case," 
 and adds, "if he has, then the ])lainest proof of a Divine existence is taken 
 away ; and if the plainest proof is gone then we need not present one less 
 evident." Pn^ciscly so my Christian friend ! Th(! Advocate struggles through 
 long columns (and there is not even a mi'thod, in the " mad logic,") to try to 
 show that this plainest proof of the Divine existence is not gone ; but he 
 comes no nearer making out his case than his brother of the Guardian. 
 Indeed, less near, for in his zeal towards God he forgets to be courteous 
 towards his opponents, and talks about the "ignorant absurdity" of "un- 
 mitigated simpletons," and reminds the "infidel" for the thousandth time 
 that "the fool hath said in his heart there is no God." When will the 
 Christian polemic learn that such stuff has no weight as evidence or argument? 
 To call Darwin, Hicckel, S))enser, Huxley, Tyndall and thousands of others, 
 who do not believe in the Christians' God "fools," or "unmitigated simple- 
 tons," will not do Christianity much good or the "infidels" much harm. The 
 first duty of a controversialist is to fairly represent an opponent's position, 
 but the Chridian Advocate does not do this. He says: "The infidel says 
 the statement that whatever manifests design in nature must have had a 
 designer, is a pure assumption," and he then goes on with much parade of 
 "logic" and "common sense" to demolish this counterfeit presentment. Now, 
 this is what I said: "Whatever manifests design must have had a designer, 
 is a pure assumption, if by Desirpi is meant adapiation hi Nature;^' and the 
 impeachment of the premise that "whatever manifests design must have had 
 a designer" was, of course, on that ground. But this is quite different from 
 what the Advocate imputes to me, and hence his rattling fusillade of so- 
 called "common sense" against "ignorant absurdity," is ouly a waste of very 
 ?«/common sense and another exhibition of Christian 7/7^fairness. The 
 Advocate, like his brother of the Giiardian, strives to impeach the propo- 
 sition that "God, in his alleged personality and attribhtes, mantfests design." 
 Perceiving that this premise, logically carried out, would foist upon him a 
 whole regiment of gods, he declares the premise, "is not proved, cannot be 
 proved, and is not true." Probably not, but the omiii prohandi of this does 
 not devolve upon me. It does not rest with me to show that this premise, 
 per se, is true, for I deny his fundamental premise of which this is a legiti- 
 mate correlative. The disputed premise is an inevitable corollary of* his 
 
15 
 
 other premises. If tliey an; true // must be true. In this desigu argument 
 the Theist's premises are these: Fitness and adaptation in nature [)rove 
 .intelligent design; intelligent design proves a designer; whatever manifests 
 intelligent design must have had a designer. These are Ids propositions fairly 
 stated. Now, my position, and it is invulnerable, is this: If your primary 
 proposition that fitness and adaptation in nature prove a designer, is true, 
 then its correL^tive that fitness and adaptation in your alleged (lod, prove a 
 designer, is also true. If one position is tenable the other must be, for they 
 both rest upon precisely the same evidence. If fitness, order, and adaptation 
 in the Universe, prove design, will tlu; Adcocate tell us why the same (piaiities 
 in a God do not prove design? If Wm jdan of a steam engine in the mind of 
 a Fitch is evidence of design, wliy is not the plan of a universe in the mijid 
 of a God evidence of design! The A<lrorafr siiy>*, however, that the fitness 
 in Nature is t\s difl'erent from tln' fitness in God as effect is difl'erent from 
 cause, and accuses me of confounding cause and (effect; but by nuiking the 
 following extraordinary statement he shows conclvsively that it is lie who 
 is confounding cause and effect, as well as making distinctions where there 
 is no difference: lie says, "Whoever asks for the cause of a cause falls into 
 an absurdity." This will surely be news to the natural philosojdiers and 
 scientists, for they all know that effects continually become causes. Modern 
 science has shown the indestnid Unlit ij of foro; as well as maftpr, and hence 
 there can be no such thing as a first cause or last effect, for every effect, 
 whether physical or dynamical, become*, in turn, itself an efficient cause. 
 The Advocatc'ii statement, therefore!, that it is absurd to ask for the cause of 
 a cause, is itself a palpable absurdity, and in direct opposition to modern 
 science. Besides, by making such a statement he stultifies himself, for he 
 says man is the cause or contriver of a machine, and that God is the camse 
 or contriver of the man; but on his own showing he has no right to say the 
 man has any cause, for is he not a cause himself? He says fitness in nature 
 is an effect, but fitness in God is not an effect but a cause; but he has no 
 warrant for this assumption, except theology ai.d the Inble, and these will 
 scarcely pass muster to-day, as authority in scientific or philosophical dis- 
 cussion. You simply beg the question, Mr. Advocate, and dogmatically 
 assume what is to be proved. When you say the fitness in God is uncaused, 
 eternal, I reply that the fitness in the TJniverse is uncaused, eternal. If the 
 fitness in God to plan a Universe is without beginning, I reply, the fitness 
 and po>yer inherent in matter to produce all phenomena are without begin- 
 ning. You look at man with his power of thought, his power to plan, to 
 contrive, etc. ; you see the fitness in his nature to do all this, and you say 
 this fitness is evidence of design — that he must have had a designer. Let 
 us now look at your alleged personal God. He, too, you say, has the power 
 to plan — for did he not plan the Universe;; he too, as the power to think, to 
 cogitate, to contrive — for did he not say, "Let tis make man in our own 
 image," and contrive to make him out of a lump of clay; and woman — dear 
 woman ! — out of a rib, aye, a rib 1 Of course he must be wonderfully Jitted 
 to do all these marvellous things. Why, then, is this fitness not evidence 
 
16 
 
 of design? If the fil,no.s.s in one provea a designer, there is no earthly reason 
 why the fitness in the other does not prove a designer, especially as they are 
 both Permnx, and so nearly alike that one is made in the imafie of the 
 other! Yon cannot, my Christian frii^nd, by any sophistry or theological 
 J}iu'm\ escape this conclusion; for you will not venture to deny that the plan 
 of a thing is as much evidence of design as the thing itself. Indeed, one 
 of th(^ best theologians in the Dominion, and a clever scholar, whose able 
 letter to me in rejdy to my pamphlet, is before me, says: "When a man 
 plans a steam engine he has a design. The design is not in the engine, but 
 in the intelligence that plans the engine." 
 
 The Advocate says: — "The first thing to be settled then, is this: Is it 
 true that whatever manifests design must have had a designer?" But who 
 ever said or thought that this is not true? Noljody. And hence his appeal 
 again to logic and "common sense" to prove what nobody ever thought of 
 disputing, becdmes positively ludicrous. The first thing to be selttled is, not 
 wheth(!r "whatever manifests design must have had a designer," but whether 
 the adaptation in Nature proves intelligent desifjn. The Theist claims it 
 does. The Materialist denies it. But the duty of proving rests with the 
 Theist. By all the rules of logic the affirmative must make out. its case. 
 How does the Theist make out this case of "Design in Nature?" After 
 failing metaphysically and logically, how did Mr. Paley try practically to 
 convince the aboriginal, whose primitive mind had not yet been "obfuscated" 
 with theology, that God made the world? Why, he showed his watch to the 
 savage, to make him understand tliat as the watch had a maker, (pale face) 
 the world also must have had a maker (Great Chief.) The rather unsatis- 
 factory result of Mr. Paley's demonstration has already been noticed. 
 
 The Advocate declares: — "There is not a single fact known in nature 
 but that manifests design." Here, for once, he has stated a distinct issue, 
 and I am quite willing to accept it; and being now on the affirmative, the 
 burden of proof fairly falls upon my side. I affirm that there are multitudi- 
 nous facts in nature which do not manifest intelligent design. The moral as 
 well as the physical world is, a's shown in the reply to the Guardian, full of 
 irredeemable purposelessness. But I need not repeat here the argument there. 
 
 Conscious, apparently, of his failure, with all his diffuse logic and 
 "common sense," to make out his case, the Advocate resorts to Authorities 
 to make out design in nature, and disprove the doctrine of Evolution. Of 
 course it is as natural for the Theologian, when hard pressed in argument, 
 to seek refuge in Authority^ or personality, as for a fox, when hard pressed 
 by the hunters, to seek refuge in his burrow with a parting yelp of defiance. 
 But mere Authority dosen't go far in these days, unless it can show the 
 credentials of fact and reason. To be merely a Duke, or Reverend, or Vice- 
 gerent, or Holy Father in God, will not do here. To prove Design, and 
 explode Evolution, the Advocate quotes as witnesses, Rev. W. Mitchell, the 
 
17 
 
 Duke of Agyle, St. George Mivart, Janet, Hugh Miller, Max Muller, "A 
 German Authority," not designated. Principal Dawson, Agassi.r, and even 
 Darwin, Huxley and HaBckel themselves. Just fancy Huxley and Haeckel 
 in the witness-box against Evolution ! To what straits theistic polemics are 
 reduced! Mr. Advocate^ who has been charging others with "confounding" 
 things, is himself confounding not only cause and effect, but plaintiff and 
 defendant. To show its relevancy*on the Advocate's side, I here give his 
 extract from Hasckel: — "Hseckel says, 'Darwin's doctrine is directly opposed 
 to the consideration that the 'vegetajile and animal kingdoms are the pro- 
 ducts of creative agency, working with definite design.'" This is directly 
 and obviously against the Advocate, but he does not see it. So far as 
 Authorities go, I reiterate the assertion that there is not a single living 
 naturalist or scientist in the front rank who has not accepted Evolution. 
 
 Because Materialists do not believe in design in Nature, in gods and 
 devils, in a future life of heaven and hell, and other myths and legends, 
 they are, forsooth, a forlorn lot, with a "creed of cold negations," and are 
 deserving of much commiseration ! So says the Christian. And so it goes : 
 tve pity the poor, deluded dupe of a Christian, with his superstitious beliefs 
 — and lie pities the poor, "God-forsaken" infidel with his "barren, frigid 
 system of negations." The question is: Wliich is the more deserving of the 
 pity of the other? The stigma "cold system of negations" has become so 
 stereotyped with the Christian that he has come to consider it an excellent 
 argument against us. Even the Mail, in its weekly disquisitions on 
 Theology and Agnosticism, and its homilies on Christian Ethics, par excel- 
 lence, also harps upon these threadbare "negations" of infidels. But there is 
 no truth in it! Ours is the positive — yours, the negative. We believe in 
 everything worth believing — every fact, every principle, every truth in the 
 Universe — and who could have a better creed? Moreover, we stand ready 
 to accept any doctrine the Christian holds, the moment he shows its titles. 
 The real "negations" are the dogmatic creeds and confessions, the super- 
 stitious fables and fictions; and these we, of course, deny. We believe, 
 however, in the positive, the real, the natural — while the Christian believes 
 in the negative, the unreal, the supernatural. It is, therefore, he who believes 
 in a "system of negations" — not we. It is said we have no ethical standard, 
 no sanction for morality ; but we have — and it is infinitely superior to the 
 untenable ami arbitrary standards of Christianity. Whatever is useful is good. 
 This is sanction enough for human conduct, and better and higher than the 
 "fear o' hell or hangman's whip." Whatever conduces to the happiness 
 and well-being of my fellows and myself, is right and good ; and this is a 
 better rule of life than to be vainly striving to do the will of an imaginary 
 being who has left his will in such a "slip shod" shape that his followers 
 have been quarrelling for eighteen centuries as to what it really means — and 
 will never probably know — except, indeed, the mystery should be cleared 
 up next month, (May) when we shall have presented to us a new — bran 
 new — "will" or "word of God," duly revised ; and then, peradventure, all 
 
"^fT' 
 
 ••m^ijifiggg^. 
 
 m 
 
 » 
 
 •W 
 
 will be 10 plain (1) thd^h is to be hoped, and is paitly expected, ^at all will 
 be made iafidela together. A new bible ! ! Think of that, dear Chriatian 
 friends! — you who hare been trying honestly to save your souls under the 
 old bible ! Everything mathematical ought now to be put under revision, 
 not even excepting the axioms of Euclid — for if that infallible book, which 
 is the divinely inspired Word and Will of God, was not sound, and needed 
 revising — how much more the merely hifman arrangement that two and two 
 are four, or that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles 9 
 Nothing is safe now — not even the multiplication table! There seems to be 
 nothing certain in this world ! Just imagine the souls that have been lost 
 under the old bible, and the mathematical demonstrations that have been 
 made all in vain ! 
 
 % 
 
 "Great God ! on what a slender thread 
 Eternal life depends !" 
 
 But it is urged by some that it is better to believe even fables that are 
 pleasant than to embrace cold truth. It is said that our doctrine of the 
 everlasting sleep of death is a cold and dreary one, and that the Christian 
 doctrine of a future existence in heaven or hell is a very comfortable one. 
 But let us look at this for a moment. It is perhaps better to be too cold 
 than too hot! Which is to be preferred — a quiet and everlasting sleep, that 
 knows no awakening — or excruciating, never-ending torture, which, if thie 
 bible were true, would be the lot of the majority of mankind] To any 
 benevolent mind it would seem better that cUl should go forever into utter 
 oblivion than that one should be tortured in hell forever. We, therefore, 
 think that to be swallowed up in the soul of the Universe and lost in the 
 eternal forgetfulness of Nirvana, is infinitely more comforting, or less re- 
 pugnant, than the Christian doctrine of conscious existence in a future life 
 of heaven and hell. We do not, however, either affirm or deny a future 
 existence; but simply ditbelieve it because we can see no evidence in Nature 
 that the doctrine is true. Should it prove true, however, we hold that the 
 wisest course for us in this life, and the very best preparation for another, 
 are good works — not mere belief in abeiird creeds and dogmas.