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The Dou^as Library Kington, Ontario- GIFT OF ..lte....T,„_|.,...D,...si^aa C) HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT GEORGE BELL & SONS LONDON : YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN NEW) YORK: 66, FIFTH AVENUE, AND BOMBAY : 53, ESPLANADE ROAD CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO. HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT TRANSLATED BY S. W. DYDE, M.A., D.Sc. PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY. KINGSTON, CANADA LONDON GEORGE BELL AND SONS 1896 LI- o 3;iji^. (^fsP9 CHISWICK PRESS :-CHAKLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO. ■ TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY I.ANE, LONDON. WITH THE NAME OF PEOFESSOR WATSON, WHO GAVE ME MY FIRST LESSONS, NOT IN HEGEL ONLY, BUT IN PHILOSOPHY, IT GIVES ME PLEASUEB TO CONNECT THIS TRANSLATION. llSd 79/ CONTENTS. Tkanslator's Preface page ix Author's Preface page xv Introduction. Conception of the Philosophy of Right, Conception of the Will, of Freedom, and of Right §§ 1-32 Division of the Work 33 FIRST PART. ABSTRACT RIGHT. §§ 34-104. »■ First Section. Property . a. Possession .... b. Use . . . f. Relinquishment . Transition from Property to Contract Second Section. Contract Third Section, Wrong . a. Unpremeditated (Civil) Wrong b. Fraud c. Violence and Crime Transition from Right to Morality §§ 41-71 54-58 59-64 65-70 71 72-81 82-104 84-86 87-89 90-103 104 SECOND PART. MORALITY. §§ 105-141. First Section. Purpose and Responsibility . Second Section. Intention and Well-being . Third Section. The (iood and Conscience Moral Forms of Evil. Hypocrisy, Probability, goo« "^Wience. eo«..wa.dp„a«o.as':::;itr:rot':.5^ c^p.dla of the PMIosopt::, Sc-e^er;; e'^eee"! f;;o. that ,™;a natura, riXteer 1^' ^ the region occupied by the " Philosophy of Rilf " ?l r with the objective spirit, natural riX r ^ '■ ''^''*-' Maf....,, Ti n uaturai riglit reappears in world- history. Dr. flans lueaus that the i-i^ht .,f *i ,, spirit, transcending, as it doe the i, / I ™'"'''- thus /";"/;";'" l^™'*-- »•»- >»4-be summarised he t lb" tr"?""'-" ™""^''"'"" "'■ "■« -"' i"'a ' : ^utiitt,:; s :; ^3)rL::;tat'"' -^'^r' "• '-■ na „ , 1 i.. ^ ^ ^"*^ ^*^ nature may bo viowpfl 3errdl7JX:L:t:T'''""V''™'^^^^ J oy retertucc to tlie exact stage which the ll? -- translator's preface. XI exposition has reached. Hence a right of nature, like sub- jectivity or objectivity, may mean quite different things at different points in the unfolding of the system. The single word here added is meant to accent what is implied in the third of these remarks. The " Philosophy of Right " is really only one part of a system. In the third part of his " Encyclopaedia," when he reaches the subject of Eight, Hegel says {;note to § 487) that he may deal briefly with this topic, since he has already gone exhaustively into it in his "Philosophy of Right." Hence as this work treats of an essential stage in the evolution of spirit, whose whole nature is unfolded scene by scene in the " Encyclo- psedia," it is not accurate to speak of Hegel's ethical prin- ciples as based upon his logic. The more concrete cate- gories of the " Philosophy of Right " are related each to the next m the same way as are the more abstract categories treated of in the logic. But the relation of the ethics to the logic is not tliat of superstructure to foundation or of application to principle, but of the more concrete to the less concrete stage of evolution. One single life runs through the whole organism of the work. Hence, Dr. Gans is not wrong in stating that this work is an essential part of Hegel's philosophy, and adding that with the entire system It must stand or fall. Rather, correcting the dramatic tone of the remark, he says in effect that standing and falhng are not the only possibilities in the case of a great philosophy. Nor, again, can the different works of a genume philosopher be separated into those that are gold and those tliat are alloy. His work as a whole becomes a common possession, and in that way makes ready, as Dr Clans say, for a higher thought. The uufpuilified rejection of any part of a philosopher's work is a challenge to 'his claim to rank as a great thinker. But the only challenge which he could himself accept as geimiue, is the one which is prepared to call in question the basis of his entire system Perhaps in the " Philosoi)hy of Right " the average Xll translator's preface. philosophical worker comes more quickly to understand some hmg of Hegel than in his other writings. At least Hegel m this book is more likely to collide directly with the reader s prepossessions, and therefore more speedily stimulates him to fom his own view. No genuine philo- sopher will hesitate to show what form his principles assume in relation to tangible human interests. Hegel exhibits philosophic breadth by dressing up his ideas for the thoroughfare, where the every-day thinker finds it pos- sible to hob and nob with the master. Yet the student must be a^m cautioned not to fancy that, because he feels sure that Hegel's conception of the family, of the monarch, or of war is defective, he has left his author behind. Such a feeling is at best only a first step, and the student must go on to know how these practical ideas ot Hegel are necessitated by his general conception of the process of spirit. And the sure feeling can survive only if it 18 transformed into a consistent criticism of this funda- mental process. The stronghold of Hegel may not be im- pregnable, but it will not fall on a mere summons to sur- render. The object of the translator is to let Hegel speak at large tor himself. What liberties have been taken with the Hegelian vocabulary are illustrated bv the index of words to be found at the close of this volume. It has been con- sidered quite within the province of a translator to ame borate Hegel's rigid ]>hraseology. Even as it is the il^nghsh would read more smoothly, had the words "the mdividual " " the subject," etc., been more frequently used mstead of "particularity" and "subjectivity," but the substitution casts a different shade over Hegel's thought Apart from the w ^rds, the reader of German will miss also Hegel s brackets and italics. As Dr. Gans has pointed out, the present work is in form made up of three elements, the paragraphs proper, the notes and the additions. The paragraphs comprised the entire translator's preface. Xlll book as it was originally issued. Then Hegel added what he in all his references to them calls Notes, although they are not expressly so designated in the German text. For the sake of simplicity this term has been used throughout the book. After these notes by Hegel are frequently found Additions made by students of Hegel from his oral lectures and com- ments. It is but bare justice to the editors to say that these additions usually cast a welcome light upon the text. Yet as they are mere additions, not even supervised by Hegel, it is no matter of surprise that the student, in beginning a new paragraph must, in order to get the direct connection, revert to the closing sentences not of the addi- tion or note but of the preceding paragraph. It ought to be some comfort to the earnest reader to have in his hand all that Hegel on this subject thought to be worth saying. Mistakes the translator has no doubt made, and it would be for him fortunate if workers in this department were sufficiently interested in this translation to point them out. S. W. Dyde. Queen's Universitv, Kingston, Canada, March 23rd, 1896. I i II I i ' M ERRATA. P. 48, last line, read "consists not in its satisfying." P. 78, 1. 8 from the end, /or " Auf.," read " Anf." P. 87, 1. 6, /or "contijjent," read " contingent." P. 105, 1. 4, /or "soul of freedom," read "soil of freedom " P. 107, 1. 5, delete " purpose or," P. 109, 1. 7 from the end, /or "subjective," read " subjective." P. 115, 1. 34, read "since man in acting nmst deal with exter- nality. " P. 156, 1. 6 from the end, for "independent," read "self-depen- dent. ^ P. 157, 1. 16, read "such discernment as is implied in the judgment that, etc. P. 181, 1. 1,/or "ever," read "even." P. 198, 1. 12, /or "and mutual relation," read "or mutual rela- tion. P. 292, 1. 18, for "mere," read "merely." I*. 302, 1. 23, for "authorities," read "officers." tl n H li cc w to pc T] CO ca ho th id< su COl gr< ex( tas Th for A1 stri AUTHOR'S PREFACE. The immediate occasion for publishing these outlines is the need of placing in the hands of my hearers a guide to my professional lectures upon the Philosophy of Right. Hitherto I have used as lectures that portion of the "Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences" (Heidelberg, 1817,) which deals with this subject. The present work covers the same ground in a more detailed and systematic way. But now that these outlines are to be printed and given to the general public, there is an opportunity of explaining points which in lecturing would be commented on orally. Thus the notes are enlarged in order to include cognate or conflicting ideas, further consequences of the theory advo- cated, and the like. These expanded notes will, it is hoped, throw light upon the more abstract substance of the text, and present a more complete view of some of the ideas current in our own time. Moreover, there is also subjoined, as far as was compatible with the purpose of a compendium, a number of notes, ranging over a still greater latitude. A compendium proper, like a science, hiis res subject-matter accurately laid out. With the exception, possibly, of one or two slight additions, its chief task IS to arrange the essential phases of its material This material is regarded as fixed and known, just as the form IS assumed to be governed by well-ascertained rules A treatise in philosophy is usually not expected to be con- structed on such a pattern, perliaps because people sup- b XVI author's preface. pose that a philosophical product is a Penelope's web which must be started anew every day This treatise differs from the ordinary compendium mamly m Its method of procedure. It must be under- stood at the outset that the philosophic way of advancing method, which IS the only kind of scientific proof avaU- able in philosophy, is essentially different from everv other. Only a clear insight into the necessity for this dif- ference can snatch philosophy out of the ignominious con- dition into which it has fallen in our day. True the logical rules, such as those of definition, classification and inference are now generally recognized to be inadequate say that the inadequacy of the rules has been felt rather than recognized, because they have been counted as mere fetters and thrown aside to make room for free spTech rom the heart, fancy and random intuition. But when reflection and relations of thought were required people unconsciously fell back upon the^ld-fashionld melhodt inference and formal reasoning.-In my "Science of fnZJ T T^ '^' ""*"'^ ^^ speculative science will it L/r'W^^' '''^*^^'^" explanation of method will be added only here and there. In a work which is concrete, and presents such a diversity of phases, we may Tnd LTtT" f' '"^^Tf ^^^^^*^^^ the logical' process' and mav take for granted an acquaintance witli the scien- ific procedure. Besides, it may readily be observed that I the work as a whole, and also the construction of the .parts, rest upon the logical spirit. From this standpoint esr^ecially, is it that I would like this treatise to be u'nder stood and .ludged. In such a work as this we are dealing with a science, and in a science the matter must not be separated from the form. Some, who are thought to be taking a profound view, are heard to say that everything turns upon the subject- I author's preface. XVll matter, and that the form may be ignored. The business of any writer, and especially of the philosopher, is, as they say, to discover, utter, and diffuse truth and adequate conceptions. In actual practice this business usually con- sists in warming up and distributing on all sides the same old cabbage. Perhaps the result of this operation may be ' to fashion and arouse the feelings; though even this small merit may be regarded as superfluous, for " they have Moses and the prophets: let them hear them." Indeed, we have great cause to be amazed at the preten- tious tone of those who take this view. They seem to suppose that up till now the dissemination of truth throughout the world has been feeble. They think that the warmed-up cabbage contains new truths, especially to be laid to heart at the present time. And yet we see that what is on one side announced as true, is driven out and swept away by the same kind of worn-out truth. Out of this hurly-burly of opinions, that which is neither new nor old, but permanent, cannot be rescued and preserved except by science. Further, as to rights, ethical observances, and the state, the truth is as old as that in which it is openly displaved and recognized, namely, the law, morality, and religion. But as the thinking spirit is not satisfied with possessing the truth in this simple way, it must conceive it, and thus acquire a rational form for a content which is already rational implicitly. In this way the substance is justified before the bar of free thought Free thought cannot be satisfied with what is given to it, whether by the external positive authority of the state or human agreement, or by the authority of internal feelings, the heart, and the witness of the spirit, wliich coincides unquestioningly with the heart. It is the nature of free thought rather to pro- ceed out of its own self, and hence to demand that it should know itself as thoroughly one with truth. The ingenuous mind adheres with simple <;onviction to XVIU AUTHOR S PKEFACE. ;i the truth which is publicly acknowledged. On this foun- dation it builds its conduct and way of life. In opposition to this naive view of things rises the supposed difficulty of detecting amidst the endless differences of opinion anything^ of universal application. This trouble may easily be sup- posed to spring from a spirit of earnest inquiry. But in point of fact those who pride themselves upon the exist- ence of this obstacle are in the plight of him who cannot see the woods for the trees. The confusion is all of their own making. Nay, more : this confusion is an indication that they are in fact not seeking for what is universally valid in right and the ethical order. If they were at pains to find that out, and refused to busy themselves with empty opinion and minute detail, they would adhere to and act in accordance with substantive right, namely the com- mands of the state and the claims of society. But a further difficulty lies in the fact that man thinks, and seeks freedom and a basis for conduct in thought. Divine as his right to act in this way is, it becomes a wrong, when it takes the place of thinking. Thought then regards itself as free only when it is conscious of being at variance with what is generally recognized, and of setting itself up as something original. The idea that freedom of thought and mind is indicated only by deviation from, or even hostility to what is every- where recognized, is most persistent with regard to the state. The essential task of a philosophy of the state would thus seem to be the discovery and publication of a new and original theory. When we examine this idea and the way it is applied, we are almost led to think that no state or constitution has ever existed, or now exists. We are tempted to suppose that we must now begin and keep on beginning afresh for ever. We are to fancy that the founding of the social order has depended upon present devices and discoveries. As to nature, philosophy, it is admitted, has to understand it as it is. The philo- author's preface. XIX sophers' stone must be concealed somewhere, we say, in nature itself, as nature is in itself rational. Knowledge must, therefore, examine, apprehend and conceive the reason actually present in nature. Not with the super- ficial shapes and accidents of nature, but with its eternal harmony, that is to say, its inherent law and essence, knowledge has to cope. But the ethical world or the state, which is in fact reason potently and permanently actualized in self-consciousness, is not permitted to enjoy the happiness of being reason at all.' On the contrary the ^ There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of right. The laws of nature are simply there, and are valid as they are. They cannot be gainsaid, although in certain cases they may be transgressed. In order to know laws of njiture, we must set to work to ascertain them, for they are true, and only our ideas of them can be false. Of these laws the measure is outside of us. Our knowledge adds nothing to them, and does not further their operation. Only our knowledge of them expands. The knowledge of right is partly of the same nature and partly different. The laws of right also are simply there, and we have to become ac- quainted with them. In this way the citizen has a more or less firm hold of them as they are given to him, and the jurist also abides by the same standpoint. But there is also a distinction. In connection with the laws of right the spirit of investigation is stirred ujt, and our attention is turned to the fact that the laws, because they are different, are not abscdute. Laws of right are established and handed down by men. The inner voice must necessarily collide or agree with them. Man cannot be limited to what is presented to him, but maintains that he has the standard or right within himself. He may be subject to the necessity and force of external authority, but not in the same way as he is to the necessity of nature ; for always his inner being says to him how a thing ought to be, and within himself he finds the confirmation or lack of confirmation of what is generally accepted. In nature the highest truth is that a law is. In right a thing is not valid be- cause it is, since every one demands that it shall conform to his standard. Hence arises a possible conflict between Avliat is and what ought to be, between absolute unchanging right and the arbitrary decision of what ought to be right. Such division and strife occur only on the soil of the spirit. Thus the unique privi- &x author's preface. I \V. spiritual universe is looked upon as abandoned by God, and given over as a prey to accident and chance. As in this way the divine is eliminated from the ethical world, truth must be sought outside of it. And since at the same time reason should and does belong to the ethical world, truth, being divorced from reason, is reduced to a mere specula- tion. Thus seems to arise the necessity and duty of every thinker to pursue a career of his own. Not that he needs to seek for the philosophers' stone, since the philosophizing of our day has saved him the trouble, and every would-be thinker is convinced that he possesses the stone already without search. But these erratic pretensions are, as it indeed happens, ridiculed by all who, whether they are aware of it or not, are conditioned in their lives by the lege of the spirit would appear to lead to discontent and unhappi- ness, and frequently we are directed to nature in contrast with the fluctuations of lif6. But it is exactly in the opposition arising between absolute right, and that which the arbitrary will seeks fo make right, that the need lies of knowing thorougiily what right is. Men must openly meet and face their reason, and consider the rationality of right. This is the subject-matter of our science in contrast with jurisprudence, which often has to do merely with contradictions. Moreover the world of to-day has an imperative need to make this investigation. In ancient times respect and reverence for the law were universal. But now the fashion of the time has taken another turn, and thought confronts everything Avhich has been approved. Theories now set themselves in opjio- sition to reality, and make as though they were absolutely true and necessary. And there is now more pressing need to know and conceive the thoughts upon right. Since thought has exalted itself as the essential form, we must now be careful to apprehend right also as thought. It would look as though the door were thrown open for every casual opinion, when thought is thus made to super- vene upon right. But true thought of a thiniv is not an opinion, but the conception of the thing itself. The conception of the thing does not come to us by nature. Every man has fingers, and may have brush and colours, Init lie is not by reason of that a painter. So is it with thought. Tlie thought of right is not a thing which every man has at first hand. True thinking is thorough acquaint- ance with the obj'>ct. Hence our knowled; must be scientific. author's preface. XXI state, and find their minds and wills satisfied in it. These, who include the majority if not all, regard the occupation of philosophers as a game, sometimes playful, sometimes earnest, sometimes entertaining, sometimes dangerous, but always as a mere game. Both this restless and frivolous reflection and also this treatment accorded to it might safely be left to take their own course, were it not that betwixt them philosophy is brought into discredit and con- tempt. The most cruel despite is done when every one is convinced of his ability to pass judgment upon, and discard philosophy witho^Jt any special study. No such scorn is heapefl v.von any other art or science. In point of fact the pretentious utterances of recent philosophy regarding the state have been enough to justify any one who cared to meddle with the question, in the con- viction that he could prove himself a philosopher by weaving a philosophy out of his own brain. Notwith- standing this conviction, that which passes for philosophy has openly announced that truth cannot be known. The truth with regard to ethical ideals, the state, the govern- ment and the constitution ascends, so it declares, out of each man's heart, feeling, and enthusiasm. Such declara- tions have been poured especially into the eager ears of the young. The words " God giveth truth to his chosen in sleep " have been applied to science ; hence every sleeper has numbered himself amongst the chosen. But what he deals with in sleep is only the wares of sleep. Mr. Fries,' one of the leaders of this shallow-minded host of philo- sophers, on a public festive occasion, now become celebrated, has not hesitated to give utterance to the following notion of the state and constitution: " When a nation is ruled by a commou spirit, then from below, out of the people, will come life sufiicient for the discharge of all public business. ^ I have already had occasion to notice the siiallowneps of his science. See " Science of Logic " (Niiruberg, 1812), Introduction, p. 17. xxn author's preface. Living associations, united indissolubly by the holy bond of friendship, will devote themselves to every side of national service, and every means for educating the people." This is the last degree of shallowness, because in it science is looked upon as developing, not out of thought or concep- tion, but out of direct perception and random fancy. Now the organic connection of the manifold branches of the social system is the architectonic of the state's rationality, and in this supreme science of state architecture the strength of the whole is made to depend upon the harmony of all the clearly marked phases of public life, and the stability of every pillar, arch, and buttress of the social edifice. And yet the shallow doctrine, of which we have spoken, permits this elaborate structure to melt and lose itself in the brew and stew of the " heart, friendship, and inspiration." Epicurus, it is said, belie\ed that the world generally should be given over to each individual's opinions and whims ; and according to the view we are criticising the ethical fabric should be treated in the same way. By this old wives' decoction, which consists in founding upon the feelings what has been for many centuries the labour of reason and understanding, we no longer need the guidance of any ruling conception of thought. On this point Goethe's Mephistopheles, and the poet is a good authority, has a remark, which I have already used elsewhere : " Veraelite mir V'orstand uiid WiHaensclmft, (It's Mensclien allerliooliHte (Jalien— So hast (lem Teufel dieli erjieben un»' imisst zu (Irunde '^- things go hadly, or at be "Tv V" "^^ "°"'' "' *™« -e must keep tie peace wtrrLTtf^'^'f T"' =""' '■"" .s nothing better to be had 't'"^' "f '■'' ^'^"'"^ t^ere more vital peace. ^"'"'''"Jge creates a much wo?d ^a: r:;rt": r^o^ '^ '-^^ ^ *- «>o at l«lst always comes too late PM ?"'''*'' P"'°'"'P''y ot the world, does not appl; „^,"^"°P,V' ''^ "=« 'hought >ts formative process and ,1. , "'''"■'' '"'^ »mpleted thus corroborates trChing oft,"""' '•"'^^- History ■n the maturity of realittdr^.f f ""-ception that only part to the real appS th ,"'"' "PP*"'"' -""ter! and shapes it imo'^aalnteUeet ,?r "f^ " "^ ^"''»*'»^«'. sophy paints its grev inlrev ™ T^^""'- ^'«" PWlo- old. and by mean's of grerii can, TT "' '* ""' ''«"'"'» only known. The owl of M ' '*J"''»ated, but ^-hent. Shades of nightlttSnr^ "^ '"^''' ""'^ p'ac:\r:;:rti;r-t::ra"d\''p'^'-"'«''» standpoint of the work wwi^ ■!" /"^J^tively „f the sophical account of the cssen Ll '°*'''^''<=«- A philo. and objective treatment s'r'""' ''-'^- --tiflc those which proceed from such „ ,7' ™''""™^' "ther than by the author as unrefle"i?eL„f """■*• """^^ "* ''"^"i Criticisms must be for i:;^ rtr:^,jrne?i-"- Bki!ll\, oT/^mc 25M, 1820. THE PHILOSOPHr OF RIGHT. INTRODUCTION. 1. The philosophic science of right has as its object the idea of right, i.e., the conception of right and the realization of the conception. S --O-* « h f^-^'tA^' ^ /-^«..«-««-a. — . i^o^e.— Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accus- tomed to call mere conceptions. It has indeed to exhibit the onesidedness and untruth of these mere conceptions and to show that, while that which commonly bears the' name " conception," is only an abstract product of the un- derstanding, the true conception alone has reality and gives this reality to itself. Everything, other than the reality which IS established by the conception, is transient surface existence, external accident, opinion, appearance void of essence, untruth, delusion, and so forth. Through the actual shape, which it takes upon itself in actuality, is the conception itself understood. This shape is the other essential element of the idea, and is to be distinguished from the form, which exists only as conception. Addition.— The conception and its existence are two sides distmct yet united, like soul and body. The body is the' same life' as the soul, and yet ihe two can be named inde- pendently. A soul without a body would not be a living thing, and vice versd. Thus the visible existence of the conception is its body, just as the body obeys tlie soul which produced it. Seeds contain the tree and its whole power, B ,!! ^ IIIB PllII.OSOPIlV OF BIGHT. thougli they are not the tree itself; the tree corresnot,,!. aeeuratety to the »i„,ple structure of .he seed. If hill; does not correspond to the soul, it is defective. The unftv mea. It IS not a mere harmony of the two, but their com- plete loterpenetration. There lives nothing, which is n" m some way idea. Thejdea olright is freeC wh ic,," .t .s to be apprehended truly, must be known both n I coneep .on and m the embodiment of the conception. 2. The science of right is a part of philosophv. Henee .t mus develop the idea, which is the reason of "an object out of the conception. It is the same thing to sav that t must regard the peculiar internal developmLo^Ie tht .g tself. b.nce it is a part, it has a definite beginning which .s the result and truth of what goes before, and this tha goes before, constitutes its so-called pro^f. Hen « tl« ot nght The deduction of the conception is prcsun- posad ,u th,s treatise, and is to be considered as aSy 4«-(.« -Philosophy forms a circle. It has, since it must somehow make a begmning, a primary, direc ly g ven matter, wh.ch is not proved and is not a result. But tlTs starting-pomtis simply relative, since frem another pon of view It appears as a result. Philosophy is a conseq„en,.e which does not hang in the air or fo4 a directly Tw be: gmnmg, but is self-cndosed. According t„ the formal uuphilosophic method of the sciences, deflmtion is the first desideratum, as regards at least, he e.tTmal scientific form. The po itive ^^l^ H right, however, is little concerned with definition. sT^ce its particulai phases of the laws. For this reason it has been and in fact the more disconnected and contradictory the phases of a right are, the less possible is a definition ^it INTKODUCTIOxV. 3 A definition should contain" only universal features ; but these forthwith bring to light contradictions, which iL the case of law are injustice, in all their nakedness. Thus in Roman law, for instance, no definition of man was possible, because it excluded the slave. The conception of man was destroyed by the fact of slavery. In the same way to have defined property and owner would have appeared to be perilous to many relations.— But definitions may perhaps be derived from etymology, for the reason, principally, that m this way special cases are avoided, and a basis is found m the feeling and imaginative thought of men. The cor- rectness of a definition would thus consist in its agreement with existing ideas. By such a method everything essen- tially scientific is cast aside. As regards the content there is cast aside the necessity of the self-contained and self- developed object, and as regards the form there is discarded the nature of the conception. In j^hilosophic knowledge the necessity of a conception is the main thing, and the process, by which it, as a result, has come into being, is the proof and deduction. After the content is seen to'be necessary independently, the second point is to look about for that which corresponds to it in existing ideas and modes of speech. But the way in which a conception exists in its truth, and the way it presents itself in random ideas not only are but must be different both in form and structure. If a notion is not in its content false, the conception can be shown to be contained in it and to be already there in its essential traits. A notion may thus be raised to the form of a conception. But so little is any notion the measure and criterion of an independently necessarv and true con- ception, that it must accept truth from the conception be justified by it, and know itself through it.— If the method of knowing, which proceeds by formal definition, inference and proof, has more or less disappeared, a worse one has come to take its place. This new method maintains that Ideas, as, e.g., the idea of right in all its aspects, are to be I! I Mi i ? I! lit i nm iilill i 4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. directly apprehended as mere facts of consciousness, and that natural feeling, or that heightened form of it which is known as the inspiration of one's own breast, is the source of right. This method may be the most convenient of all, but it is also the most un philosophic. Other fea- tures of this view, referring not merely to knowledge but directly to action, need not detain us here. While the first or formal method went so far as to require in definition the form of the conception, and in proof the form of a necessity of knowledge, the method of the intuitive consciousness and feeling takes for its principle the arbitrary contingent consciousness of the subject.— In this treatise we take for granted the scientific procedure of philosophy, which has been set forth in the philosophic logic. 3. Eight is positive in general (a) in its form, since it has validity in a state; and this established authority is the principle for the knowledge of right. Hence we have the positive science of right. (6) On the side of content this right receives a positive element (a) through the particular character of a nation, the stage of its historical develop- ment, and the interconnection of all the relations which are necessitated by nature : (/3) through the necessity that a system of legalized right must contain the application of the universal conception to objects and cases whose qualities are given externally. Such an application is not the specu- lative thought or the development of the conception, but a subsumption made by the understanding : (y) through the ultimate nature of a decision which has become a realitv. ^o^e.— Philosophy at least cannot recognize the authority of feeling, inclination and caprice, when they are set in opposition to positive right and the laws.— It is an acci- dent, external to the nature of positive right, when force or tyranny becomes an element of it. It will be shown later (§§ 211-214), at what point right must become positive. The general phases which are there deduced, are here only mentioned, in order to indicate the limit of philosophic INTRODUCTION. are set in right, and also to forestall the idea or indeed the demand that by a systematic development of right should be pro- duced a law-book, such as would be needed by an actunl state. — To convert the differences between right of nature and positive right, or those between philosophic right and positive right, into open antagonism would be a complete misunderstanding. Natural right or philosophic right stands to positive right as institutions to pandects.— With regard to the historical element in positive right, referred to in the paragraph, it may be said that the true historical view and genuine philosophic standpoint have been pre- sented by Montesquieu. He regards legislation and its specific traits not in an isolated and abstract way, but rather as a dependent element of one totality, connecting it with all the other elements which form the character of a nation and an epoch. In this interrelation the various elements receive their meaning and justification.— .The purely historical treatment of the phases of right, as they develop in time, and a comparison of their results with existing relations of right have their own value ; but they are out of place in a philosophic treatise, except in so far as the development out of historic grounds coincides with the development out of the conception, and the historical exposition and justification can be made to cover a justifica- tion which is valid in itself and independently. This dis- tinction is as manifest as it is weighty. A phase of right may be shown to rest upon and follow from the circum- stances and existing institutions of right, and yet may be absolutely unreasonaible and void of right. This is the case in Eoman law with many aspects of private right, which were the logical results of its interpretation of paternal power and of marriage. Further, if the aspects of right are really right and reasonable, it is one thing to point out what with regard to them can truly tate place through the concep- tion, and quite another thing to portray the manner of their appearance in history, along with the circumstances, 6 TIM-: PHILOSOPHY OF RKJIIT. fl" Is I * cases, wants aiul events, which thej have called forth. Such a demonstration and deduction from nearer or more remote historic causes, which is the occui>ation of i>rag. matic history, is frequently called exposition, or i^referably conception, under the opinion that in such an indication of the historic; elements is found all that is essential to a con- ception of law and institutions of right. In point of fact that whi<-h is truly essential, the conception of the matter has not been so much as mentioned.— So also we are accus-' tomed to hear of Roman or German (jonceptions of right and of conceptions of riglit as they are laid down in this or that statute-book, when indeed nothing about concep- tions can be found in them, but only general phases of right, propositions derived from the understandino-, ut in place of the absolute, and external api)earance in place of the nature of the thing. When the historical vindicatiim substitutes the external origin for the origin from the conception, it uuconsciouslv does the opj>osite of whut it intends. Suppose that an institution, originating under definite circumstances, is shown to be necessary and to answer its i.uri)ose, and that It accomplishes all that is required of it bv the historical 8tandi)oint. Wlien such a ])roof is made 'to stand for a justification of the thing itself, it follows that, when the circumstances are removed, the instituticm has lost its meaning and its right. When, e.g., it is sought to sui>port and defend cloisters on the grounds that thev have served to clear and pe(»ple the wilderness and by teaching and transcribing to i>reserve scholarshij). it follows that just, in so far as the circumstances are changed, cloisters have become aimless and superHuous.— In so far as the historic m INTKODUCTION. 7 significance, or the historical exposition and interpretation of the origin of anything is in different spheres at home with the philosophic view of the origin and conception of the tiling, one might tolerate the other. But, in illustration of the ract that they neither here nor in science, preserve this peaceful attitude, I quote from Mr. Hugo's " Lehrbuch der Geschichte des romischen Rechts." ' In this work Mr. Hugo says (5th edition § 53) that " Cicero praises the twelve tables witli a side glance at philosopliy," " but the philosopher Phavorinus treats them exactly as many a great philosophic since has treated positive right." Mr. Hugo makes the ultimate reply to such a method as that of Phavorinus, when he says of him that he "under- stood the twelve tables just as little as the philosophers understood positive right."— The correction of the philo- sopher Phavorinus by the jurist Sextus Csecilius (Gellius. " Noct. Attic." XX. 1) expresses the lasting and true i)rinciple of the justification of that which is in its content merely positive. " Non ignoras," as Coecilius felicitously remarks to Phavorinus, " legum opportunitates et medelas pro tem- l»orum moribus, et pro rerum publicarum generibus, ac pro utilitatum prresentium ratiouibus, proque vitiorum, quibus medendum est, fervoribus mutari ac flecti, neque uno statu cousistere, quin, ut facies coeli et maris, ita rerum atque fortune tempestatibus varientur. Quid salubrius visum est rogatione ilia Stolonis, etc., quid utilius plebisiito Vocouio, etc., quid tam necessarium existimatum est, quam lex Licinia, etc. ? Omnia tamen haec obliterata et operta sunt civitatis opulentia," etc.— These laws are positive so far as they have meaning and appropriateness under the circumstances, and thus have only an historic value. Fur this reason they are in their nature transient. Whether the legislator or government was wise or not in what it did for its own immediate time and circumstances is a matter quite by itself and is for history to say. ' " Text-ltook of tho History of Koman I^aw." ,i m 4 r:i! -I 8 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. History will the more profoundly recognize the action of the legislator in proportion as its estimate receives support from the philosophic standpoint. -From the vindications of the twelve tables against the judgment of Phavorinus I shall give further examples, because in them Csecilius furnishes an illustration of tlie fraud which is indissolubly bound up with the methods of the understanding and its reasonings. He adduces a good reason for a bad thing and supposes that he has in that way justified the thing.' rake the horrible law which permitted a creditor, after the lapse of a fixed term of respite, to kill a debtor or sell him into slavery. Nay, further, if there were several creditors they weie permitted to cut pieces ofP the debtor, and thus divide him amongst them, with the proviso that if any one of them should cut off too much or too little, no action should be taken against him. It was this clause, it may be noticed which stood Shakespeare's Shylock in "The Merchant of Venice " in such good stead, and was by him most thank- fully accepted. Well, for this law C^cilius adduces the good argument that by it trust and credit were more firmly secured, and also that, by reason of the very horror of the law. It never had to be enforced. Not only does he in his want of thought fail to observe that bv the severity of the law that very intention of securing trust and credit was defeated, but he forthwith himself gives an illustration of the way in which the disproportionate punishment caused the law to be inoperative, namely through the habit of giving false witness.-But the remark of Mr. Hugo that Phavorinus had not understood the law is not to be passed over. Now any school-boy can understand the law iust quoted, and better than anyone else would Shylock liave understood what was to him of such advantage. Hence by "understand "Mr. Hugo must mean that form of understanding which consists in bringing to the support of a law a good reason.— Another failure to understand asserted by Ctecilius of Phavorinus. a philosopher at any ■A.i IiNTRODUCTION. 9 rate may without blushing acknowledge: jumentum, which without any arcera was the only legal way to bring a sick man into court as a witness, was held to mean not only a horse but also a carriage or wagon. Further on in this law C^cilius found more evidence of the excellence and accuracy of the old statutes, which for the purpose of non-suiting a sick man at court distinguished not only between a horse and a wagon, but also, as Csecilius explains, between a wagon covered and cushioned and one not so comfortably equipped. Thus one would have the choice between utter severity on one side, and on the other senseless details. But to exhibit fully the absurdity of these laws and the pedantic defence offered in their behalf would give rise to an invincible repugnance to all scholarship of that kind. But in his manual Mr. Hugo speaks also of rationalitv in connection with Roman law, and I have been struck with the following remarks. He first of all treats of the epoch extending from the origin of the Republic to the twelve tables (§§ 38. 89). noticing tliat in Rome people had many wants, and wei-e compelled in their labour to use draught animals and beasts of burden, as we ourselves do, and that the ground was an alternation of hill and valley, and that the city was set upon a hill, etc. These statements might, perhai)s, have answered to the sense of Montesquieu's thought, though in them it would be well- nigh impossible to find his genius. But after these pre- hminary i)aragrai)hs. he goes on to sav in § 40, that the condition of the law was still very far from satisfying the highest demands of reason. This remark is wholly in place, as the Roman family-right. slavery, etc., give no satisfaction to the smallest demands of reason. Yet when discussing the succeeding ej.oclis, Mr. Hugo forgets to tell us 111 what particulars, if any, the Roman law has satis- factorily met the highest demands of reason. Still of the classic jurists, wh,> flourished in the era of the greatest expansion of R,»man law as a science, it is said (§ 280) >-l 10 THE PHILOSOPHY OK RKJHT. that "it has been long since been observed that the Roman jurists were educated in philosophy," but "few know" (znore will know now through the numerous editions of Mr. Hugo's manual) " that there is no class of writers, who. as regards deduction from principles, deserved to be placed beside the mathematicians, and also, as regards the quite remarkable way in which they develop their conceptions, beside the modern founder of meta physic ; as voucher for this assertion is the notable fact that nowhere do so many trichotomies occur as in the classic iurists and in Kant." This form of logical reason- ing, extolled by Leibnitz, is certainly an essential feature of the science of right, as it is of mathematics and every other intelligible science; but the logical procedure of the men. understanding, spoken of by Mr. Hugo, has nothin.^ to do with the satisfaction of the claims of reason and with philosophic science. Moreover, the very lack of logical procedure, which is characteristic of the Roman jurists and prajtors, is to be esteemed as one of their chief virtues, since by means of it they obviated the conse- quences of unrighteous and horrible institutions. Through their want of logic they were compelled callide to put sense into mere verbal distinctions, as they did when they identified IJomrum possessio with inheritance, and also into silly evasions, for silliness is a defect of logic, in order to save the letter of the tables, as was done in the Jidio or urroKpitTtt that nfiliapatroni was a JiUni^ (Heinccc. " Antio Rom.," lib. i. tit. ii. § 24). But it is absurd to place the classic jurists, with their use of trichotomy, along with Kant, and in that way to discern in them the promise of the development of conceptions. 4. The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and Its more definite place and origin is the will, which is free. Thus freedom constitutes the substance and essen- tial character of the will, and the system of right is the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of INTRODUCTION, 11 spirit, which is produced out of itself, aud is a second nature. Addition.— Freedom of will is best explained by refer- ence to physical nature. Freedom is a fundamental phase of will, as weight is of bodies. When it is said that matter is heavy, it might be meant that the predicate is an accident ; but such is not the case, for in matter there is nothing which has not weight ; in fact, matter is weight. That which is heavy constitutes the body, and is the bodv. Just so is it with freedom and the will; that which is free is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, and freedom becomes actual only as will, as subject. A remark may also be made as to the connection of willing and thinking. Spirit, in general, is thought, and by thought man is distinguished from the animal. But we must not imagine that man is on one side thinking and on another side willing, as though he had will in one pocket and thought in another. Such an idea is vain. The dis- tinction between thought and will is only that between u tlieoretical and a practical relation. They are not two separate faculties. The will is a special way of thinking ; it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the impulse of thought to give itself reality. The distinction between thought and will may be expressed in this way. When I think an object, I make of it a thought, and take from it the sensible. Thus I make of it something which is essentially and directly mine. Only in thought am I self-contained. Conception is the penetration of the object, which is then no longer opposed to me. From it I have taken its own peculiar nature, which it had as an inde- pendent object in opposition to me. As Adam said to Eve, " thou art flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone," so says the spirit, " Tliis object is spirit of my spirit, and all alienation has disappeared." Any idea is a universalizing, and this process belongs to thinking. To make something universal is to think. The " I " is thought and tlie uni- 12 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. versal. When I say " I," I let fall all particularity of character, natural endowment, knowledge, age. The I is emiAj, a point and simple, but in its simplicity active. The gaily coloured world is before me ; I stand opposed to it, and in this relation I cancel and transcend the opposi- tion, and make the content my own. The I is at home in the world, when it knows it, and still more when it has j conceived it. So much for the theoretical relation. The practical, on the other hand, begins with thinking, with the I itself. It thus appears first of all as placed in opposition, because it exhibits, as it were, a separation. As I am practical, I am active; I act and determine myself; and to determine myself means to set up a distinction. But these distinc- tions are again mine, my own determinations come to me ; and the ends are mine, to which I am impelled. Even when I let these distinctions and determinations go, setting them in the so-called external world, they remain mine. They are that which I have done and made, and bear the trace of my spirit. That is the distinction to be drawn between the theoretical and the practical relations. And now the connection of the two must be also stated. The theoretical is essentially contained in the practical. Against the idea that the two are separate runs the fact that man has no will without intelligence. The will holds within itself the theoretical, the will determines itself, and this determination is in the first instance internal. That which I will I place before my mind, and it is an object for me. The animal acts according to instinct, is impelled by something internal, and so is also practical. But it has no will, because it cannot place before its mind what it desires. Similarly man cannot use his theoretic faculty or think without will, for in thinking we are active. The content of what is thought receives, indeed, the form of something existing, but this existence is occasioned by our activity and by it established. These distinctions of theo- INTRODUCTION. 13 ularity of The I is ty active, pposed to le opposi- ; home in en it has -ctical, on tself. It jecause it cal, I am determine B distinc- le to me ; i. Even 3, setting in mine, bear the >e drawn stated, jractical. the fact ill holds self, and 1. That bject for >elled by t has no what it faculty e. The form of 1 by our of theo- retical and practical are inseparable ; they are one and the same ; and in every activity, whether of thought or will, both these elements are found. It is worth while to recall the older way of proceeding with regard to the freedom of the will. First of all, the idea of the will was assumed, and then an effort was made to deduce from it and establish a definition of the will. Next, the method of the older empirical psychology was adopted, and different perceptions and general phenomena of the ordinary consciousness were collected, such as re- morse, guilt, and the like, on the ground that these could be explained only as proceeding out of a will that is free. Then from these phenomena was deduced the so-called proof that the will is free. But it is more convenient to take a short cut and hold that freedom is given as a fact of consciousness, and must be believed in. The nature of the will and of freedom, and the proof that the will is free, can be shown, as has already been ob- served (§ 2), only in connection with the whole. The ground principles of the premises — that spirit is in the first instance intelligence, and that the phases, through which it passes in its development, namely from feeling, through imaginative thinking to thought, are the way by which it produces itself as will, which, in turn, as thepractical spirit in general, is the most direct truth of intelligence — I have presented in my " Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences " (Heidelberg, 1817), and hope some day to be able to give of them a more complete exposition. There is, to my niiud, so much the moi-e need for me to give my contribution to, as I hope, the more thorough knowledge of the nature of spirit, since, as I have there said, it would be difficult to find a philosophic science in a more neglected and evil i)light than is that theory of spirit, which is com- monly called psychology. — Some elements of the conception of will, resulting from the premises enumerated above are mentioned in this and the following paragraphs. As to I 14 TlIK PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT. these, appeal may moreover be made to every individual to see them in his own self-consciousuess. Everyone will in the first place, find in himself the ability to abstract him- self trom all that he is. and in this way prove himself able ot hmiself to set every content within himself, and thus have m his own consciousness an illustration of all the subsequent phases. 5. The will contains (a) the element of pure indetermi- nateness, i.e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought upon Itself. In this process every limit or content, present though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, appe- tite or impulse, or given in any specific way. is dissolved. rhus we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstrac- tion, or universality, the pure thought of itself. iVo^e.-Those who treat thinking and willing as two special peculiar, and separate faculties, and, further, look upon thought as detrimental to the will, especially the good will, show from the very start that they know nothing ot the nature of willing— a remark which we shall be called upon to make a number of times upon the same attitude ot mind.-The will on one side is the possibility of abstrac- tion from every aspect in which the I finds itself or has set Itself up. It reckons any content as a limit, and flees from It. This IS one of the forms of the self-direction of the will and IS by imaginative thinking insisted upon as of Itself freedom. It is the negative side of the will, or free- dom as apprehended by the understanding. This freedom IS that of the void, which has taken actual shape, and is stirred to passion. It, while remaining purely theoretical appears m Hindu religion as the fanaticism of pure con- templation ; but becoming actual it assumes both in politics and religion the form of a fanaticism, which woul.l lace. This form of freedom frequently occurs in history. By the Hindus, e.g., the highest freedom is de- clared to be persistence in the consciousness of one's simple identity with himself, to abide in the empty space of one's own inner being, like the colourless light of pure intuition, and to renounce every activity of life, every purpose and every idea. In this way man becomes Brahma ; there is no longer any distinction between finite man and Brahma, every difference having been swallowed up in this univer- sality. A. more concrete manifestation of this freedom is the fanaticism of ])olitical and religious life. Of this nature was the terrible epoch of the French Revolution, by which all distinctions in talent and authority were to have 16 TIIK PHILOSOPIJY OF KIGUT. been superseded. In this time of upheaval and commotion any specific thmg was intolerable. Fanaticism wills an abstraction and not an articulate association. It finds all distinctions antagonistic to its indefiniteness. and super "lrlT:u ^"'''' '"^ *^' ^''""'^ Revolution the people abolished the institutions which thev themselves had set up. since every institution is inimical to the abstract self, consciousness of equality. 6. (/3) The I is also the transition from blank indefinite- ness to the distinct and definite establishment of a definite content and object, whether this content be given by nature or produced out of the conception of spirit. Through this establishment of itself as a definite thing the I becomes a reality This is the absolute element of the finitudo nr speciahzation of the I. nnitude or Note This second element in the characterization of the I IS just as negative as the first, since it annuls and re- places the first abstract negativity. As the particular is contained in the universal, so this second phase is contained already m the first, and is only an establishing of what the first IS implicitly. The first phase, if taken independently. IS not the true infinitude, i.e., the concrete universal, or the conception, but limited and onesided. In that it is the abstraction from all definite character, it has a definite character Its abstract and one-sided nature constitutes Its defamte character, its defect and finitude. The distinct characterization of these two phases of the I IS found in the philosophy of Fichte as also in that of Kant Only, in the exposition of Fichte the I. when taken as un- limited as It IS in the first proposition of his " Wissen- sohaftslehre." is merely positive. It is the universality and identity made by the understanding. Hence this ab- stract I IS in Its independence to be taken as the truth, to which by way of mere addition comes in the second propo- sition, the limitation, or the negative in general, whether It be in the form of a given external limit or of an activity INTRODUCTION. jmmotion wills an b finds all id super- he people I had set ract self- idefinite- L definite 'y nature ugh this jcomes a itude or n of the and re- icular is •ntained i^hat the idently. rsal, or it is the definite stitutes ^f the I f Kant, as un- ^issen- Tsality Lis ab- uth, to propo- hether ctivitv 17 of the I._To apprehend the negative as immanent in the universal or self-identical, and also as in the I, was the next step, which speculative philosophy had to make. Of this want they have no presentiment, who like Fichte never apprehend that the infinite and finite are, if sepa- rated, abstract, and must be seen as immanent one in the Addition -This second element makes its appearance as the opposite of the first ; it is to be understood in its general form : it belongs to freedom but does not constitute the whole of It. Here the I passes over from blank in- determmateness to the distinct establishment of a specific character as a content or object. I do not will merely, but I will something. Such a will, as is analysed in the pre- ceding paragraph, wills only the abstract universal, and therefore wills nothing. Hence it is not a will The particular thing, which the will wills is a limitation, since the will, m order to be a will, must in general limit itself Limit or negation consists in the will willing something I'articularizing is thus as a rule named finitude. Ordinary reflection holds the first element, that of the indefinite, for the absolute and higher, and the limited for a mere nega- tion of this indefiniteness. But this indefiniteness is itself only a negation, in contrast with the definite and finite ihe I IS solitude and absolute negation. The indefinite will IS thus quite as much one-sided as the will, which continues merely in the definite. 7. (y) The will is the unity of these two elements. It is particularity turned back within itself and thus led back to universality; it is individuality ; it is the self-direction of the 1. Thus at one and the same time it establishes itself as Its own negation, that is to say, as definite and limited and It also abides by itself, in its self-identity and univer-' sality, and m this position remains purely self -enclosed — The I determines itself in so far as it is the reference of negativity to itself; and yet in this self- reference it is in- c 18 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. different to its own definite character. This it knows as its own, that is, as an ideal or a mere possibility, by which it is not bound, but rather exists in it merely because it establishes itself there.— This is the freedom of the will, constituting its conception or substantive reality. It is its gravity, as it were, just as gravity is the substantive reality of a body. JV^o^e.— Every self-consciousness knows itself as at once universal, or the possibility of abstracting itself from everything definite, and as particular, with a fixed object, content or aim. These two elements, however, are only abstractions. The concrete and true,— and all that is true IS concrete,— is the universality, to which the particular is at first opposed, but, when it has been turned back into itself, is in the end made equal.— This unity is individuality, but it is not a simple unit as is the individuality of imaginative thought, but a unit in terms of the conception (" Ency- clopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences," §§ 112-114). In other words, this individuality is properly nothing else than the conception. The first two elements of the will, that it can abstract itself from everything, and that it is definite through either its own activity or something else, are easily admitted and comprehended, because in their separation they are untrue, and characteristic of the mere understand, ing. But into the third, the true and speculative— and all truth, as far as it is conceived, must be thought specu- latively— the understanding declines to venture, always calling the conception the inconceivable. The proof and more detailed explanation of this inmost reserve of specu- lation, of infinitude as the negativity which refers itself to itself, and of this ultimate source of all activity, life and consciousness, belong to logic, as the purely speculative philosophy. Here it can be noticed only in passing that, in the sentences, " The will is universal," " The will directs itself," the will is already regarded as presupposed subject or substratum ; but it is not something finished and uni- INTRODUCTION. knows as by which )ecause it the will. It is its ve reality i at once lelf from d object, are only it is true ular is at ito itself, \lity, but iginative (" Ency- 14). In ;lse than I, that it definite re easily paration erstand- -and all t specu- always oof and P specu- itself to life and culative ig that, i directs subject nd uni- 19 versal before it determines itself, nor yet before this deter- mination is superseded and idealized. It is will only when its activity is self -occasioned, and it has returned into itself. Addition,— Wha,t we properly call will contains the two above-mentioned elements. The I is, first of all, as such, pure activity, the universal which is by itself. Next this universal determines itself, and so far is no longer by itself, but establishes itself as another, and ceases to be the uni-' versal. The third step is that the will, while in this limi-j tation, i.e., in this other, is by itself. While it limits itself, it yet remains with itself, and does not lose its hold of the universal. This is, then, the concrete conception of freedom, while the other two elements have been thoroughly abs-* tract and one-sided. But this concrete freedom we already have in the form of perception, as in friendship and love. Here a man is not one-sided, but limits himself willingly in reference to another, and yet in this limitation knows himself as himself. In this determination he does not feel himself determined, but in the contemplation of the other as another has the feeling of himself. Freedom! also lies neither in indeterminateness nor in determinate-^ ness, but in both. The wilful man has a will which limits itself wholly to a particular object, and if he has not this will, he supposes himself not to be free. But the will is not bound to a particular object, but must go further, for the nature of the will is not to be one-sided and confined. Free will consists in willing a definite object, but in so doing to be by itself and to return again into the universal. 8. If we define this particularizing (/3 § 6) further, we reach a distinction in the forms of the will, (a) In so far as the definite character of the will consists in the formal opposition of the subjective to the objective or external direct existence, we have the formal will as a self conscious- ness, which finds an outer world before it. The process by which individuality turns back in its definiteness into itself, is the translation of the subjective end, through the 20 I THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT, intervention of an activity and a means, into objectivity. In the absolute spirit, in which all definite character is thoroughly its own and true (" Encyclop." § 363), conscious- ness IS only one side, namely, the manifestation or appear- ance of the will, a phase which does not require detailed consideration here. Addition.~The consideration of the definite nature of the will belongs to the understanding, and is not in the first instance speculative. The will as a whole, not only in the sense of its content, but also in the sense of its form, is determined. Determinate character on the side of form is the end, and the execution of the end. The end is at first merely something internal to me and subiective, but it is to be also objective and to cast away the defect of mere subjectivity. It may be asked, why it has this defect. When that which is deficient does not at the same time transcend its defect, the defect is for it not a defect at all. The animal is to us defective, but not for itself, The end, m so far as it is at first merely ours, is for us a defect, since freedom and will are for us the unity of subjective and objective. The end must also be established as objective ; but does not in that way attain a new one-sided character! but rather its realization. 9 (b). In so far as the definite phases of will are its own peculiar property or its particularization turned back into itself, they are content. This content, as content of the will, is for it, by virtue of the form given in (a), an end, which exists on its inner or subjective side as the imagina- tive will, but by the operation of the activity, which con- verts the subjective into the objective, it is realized, completed end. 10. The content or determinate phase of will is in the first instance direct or immediate. Then the will is free only in itself or for us, i.e., it is the will in its cimception. Only wlieu it has itself as an object is it also for itself, and its implicit freedom becomes realized. INTRODUCTION. 21 JV^o^e— At this standpoint the finite implies that what- ever is in itself, or according to its conception, has an existence or manifestation difCerent from what it is for itself. For example the abstract separateness of nature is in itself space, but for itself time. Here, two things are to be observed, (1) that because the truth is the idea, when any object or phase is apprehended only as it is in itself or in conception, it is not as yet apprehended in its truth, and yet (2) that, whatever exists as conception or in itself, at the same time exists, and this existence is a peculiar form of the object, as e.g. space. The separation of existence- in-itself or implicit existence from existence-for-itself or explicit existence is a characteristic of the finite, and con- stitutes its appearance or merely external reality. An example of this is to hand in the separation of the natural will from formal right. The understanding adheres to mere implicit existence, and in accordance with this position calls freedom a capacity, since it is at this point only a possibility. But the understanding regards this phase as absolute and perennial, and considers the relation of the will to what it wills or reality as an application to a given material, which does not belong to the essence of freedom. In this way the understanding occupies itself with mere abstractions, and not with the idea and truth. AdtUlion.— The will, which is will only according to the conception, is free implicitly, but is at the same time not free. To be truly free, it must have a truly fixed content; then it is explicitly free, has freedom for its object, and is freedom. What is at first merely in concep- tion, i.e., implicit, .s only direct and natural, We are familiar with this in pictorial thought also. The child is implicitly a man, at first has reason implicitly, and is at first the possibility of reason and freedom. He is thus free merely ac(!ording to the conc(>ption. That which is only implicit does not yet exist in actuality. A man, who is implicitly rational, must create himself by working I 22 THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT. through and out of himself and by reconstructing himself withm himself, before he can become also explicitly rational. 11. The will, which is at first only implicitly free, is the direct or natural will. The distinctive phases, which the selt-determmmg conception sets up in the will, appear in the direct will, as a directly present content. They are im- pulses, appetites, inclinations, by which the will finds itself determined by nature. Now this content, with all its attendant phases, proceeds from the rationality of the will and IS therefore impHcitly rational ; but let loose in its im- Diediate directness it has not as yet the form of rationality The content is indeed for me and my own, but the form and the content are yet different. The will is thus in itself finite. /^^ J\^o^e.-Empirical psychology enumerates and describes these impulses and inclinations, and the wants which are based upon them. It takes, or imagines that it takes this material from experience, and then seeks to classify it in the usual way. It will be stated below, what the objectiye Bide of iinpulse is, and what impulse is in its truth, apart from the form of irrationality which it has as an impulse and also what shape it assumes when it reaches existence ' Additwn.-lmi,n\Be, appetite, inchnation are possessed by the animal also, but it has not will ; it must obey impulse, if there is no external obstacle. Man, however IS the completely undetermined, and stands above impulse' >ind may fix and sot it „,, a,s l,is. I,„,„,lsi. is iu „at 1 but It depends on my will whether I establish it in the ure, jNor can the will be xxm the fact that the onditionallv called to thi imj)ulse lies iu nature. s action by 12. The system of this content the will, exists only as it occurs directly I)uiseH, every one of which is mine as a multitude or multiplicity of m im- with others, but is at tl n\ a general way along le same time universal and undeter- mined, having many objects and ....... „ The will, by giving itself in this two-fohl ind ways of satisfaction, efiuiteness the IXTRODUCTIOX. 23 form of individuality (§ 7), resolves, and only as resolving is it actual. Note. — Instead of to "resolve," i.e. to supersede the indefinite condition in which a content is merely possible, our language has the expression "decide" ("unfold itself "). The indeterminate condition of the will, as neutral but infinitely fruitful germ of all existence, contains within itself its definite character and ends, and brings them forth solely out of itself. 13. By resolution will fixes itself as the will of a definite individual, and as thereby distinguishing itself from another. However apart from this finite character which it has as consciousness (§ 8), the immediate will is in virtue of the distinction between its form and its content formal. Hence its resolution as such is abstract, and its content is not yet the content and work of its freedom. Note. — To the intelligence, as thinking, the object or content remains univerc.al ; the intelligence retains the form merely of a uuiversul activity. Now the universal signifies in will that which is mine, i.e. it is individuality. And yet, also, the direct and formal will is abstract ; its individuality is not yet filled with its free universality. Hence at the beginning the peculiar fiuitude of the intelli- gence is in will, and only by exalting itself again to thought and giving itself intrinsic universality does the will transcend the distinction of form and content and make itself objective infinite will. It is therefore a mis- understanding of the nature of thought and will to suppose that in the will man is infinite, while in thought and even in reason he is limited. In so far as thought and will are still distinct, the reverse is rather the case, and thinkiuL' reason, when it becomes will, assigns itself to finitude. Addition. — A will which resolves nothing, is not an actual will ; that which is devoid of definite character never reaches a volition. The reason for hesitation may lie in a sensitiveness, which is aware that in determining 24 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Itself It IS engaged with what is finite, is assigning itself a hmit, and abandoning its infinity ; it may thus hold to its decision not to renounce the totality which it intends Such a feeling is dead, even when it aims to be something beautiful " mo will be great." says Goethe. " must be able to limit himself." By volition alone man enters actuality however distasteful it may be to him ; for indo- lence will not desert its own self- brooding, in which it clings to a universal possibility. But possibility is not yet actuality. Hence the will, which is secure simply of itself does not as yet lose itself in any definite reality 14 The finite will, which has merely from the stand- pomt of form doubled itself back upon itself, and has become the infinite and self-secluded I (§ 5), stands 'above Its content of different impulses and also above the several ways by which they are realized and satisfied. At the same time, as it is only formally infinite, it is confined to this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and external actuality, although it is undetermined and not confined to one content rather than another (SS 6 m As to the return of the I into itself such a will is only a possible will, which may or may not be mine, and the I is oiily the possibility of deputing itself to this or that obiect Hence mnongst these definite phases, which in this light are for the I external, the will chooses 15 Freedom of the will is in this view of it caprice, m which are contained both a reflection, which is free and abstracted from everything, and a dependence upon a con- tent or matter either internally or externally provided Since the content is in itself or implicitly necessary as an end and in opposition to this reflection is a defa^nite possibility, caprice, when it is will, is in its nature con- tmgent. Note.~The usual idea of freedom is that of caprice It IS a midway stage of reflection between the will as merely natural impulse and the will as free absolutely. When it INTRODUCTION. 25 IS said that freedom as a general thing consists in doing what one likes, such an idea must be taken to imply an utter lack of developed thought, containing as yet not even a suspicion of what is meant by the absolutely free will, right, the ethical system, etc. Reflection, being the formal universality and unity of self- consciousness, is the will's abstract certitude of its freedom, but it is not yet the truth of it, because it has not as yet itself for content and end ; the subjective side is still different from the objective. Thus the content in such a case remains purely and com- pletely finite. Caprice, instead of being will in its truth, is rather will in its contradiction. In the controversy carried on, especially at the time of the metaphysic of Wolf, as to whether the will is really free, or our consciousness of its freedom is a delusion, it was this caprice which was in the minds of both parties.' Against the certitude of abstract self-direction, determinism rightly opposed a content, which was externally presented, and not being contained in this certitude came from without. It did not matter whether this " without " were impulse, imagination, or in general a consciousness so filled that the content was not the peculiar possession of the self- determining activity as such. Since only the formal element of free self-direction is immanent in caprice, while the other element is something given to it from without, to take caprice as freedom may fairly be named a delusion. Freedom in every philosophy of reflection, whether it be the Kantian or the Friesian, which is the Kantian super- ficialized, is nothing more than this formal self-activity. Addition.— Since I have the possibility of determining myself in this or that way, since I have the power of choice, I possess caprice, or what is commonly called freedom.' This choice is due to tlie universality of *the will, enabling me to make my own this thing or another. This possession is a particular content, which is therefore not adequate to me, but separated from me, and is mine only in possibility; I 26 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. 3ust as I am the possibility of bringing myself into coinci- dence with it. Hence choice is due to the indeterminate- ness of the I, and to the determinateness of a content But as to this content the will is not free, although it has in Itself formally the side of infinitude. No such content corresponds to will ; iu no content can it truly find itself In caprice it is involved that the content is not formed bv the nature of my will, but by contingency. I am de- pendent upon this content. This is the contradiction con- tained m caprice. Ordinaiy man believes that he is free when he is allowed to act capriciously, but precisely in caprice is it inherent that he is not free. When I will the rational I do not act as a particular individual but accord- ing to the conception of ethical observance in general In an ethical act I establish not myself but the thing. A man who acts perversely, exhibits particularity. The rational is the highway on which every one travels, and no one is specially marked. When a great artist finishes a work we say : " It must be so." The particularity of the artist has wholly disappeared and the work shows no mannerism. ±'hidias has no mannerism; the statue itself lives and moves. But the poorer is the artist, the more easily we discern himself, his particularity and caprice. If we adhere to the consideration that in caprice a man can will what he pleases we have certainly freedom of a kind ; but again if we hold to the view that the content is given, then man must be determined by it, and in this light is no longer free. *= 16. What is resolved upon and chosen (§ 14) the will may again give up (§ 5). Yet, even with the possibility of transcending any other content which it may substitute, and of proceeding in this way ad infinitum, the will does not advance beyond finitude, because every content in turn 18 different from the form and is finite. The opposite aspect namely mdeterminateness, irresolution or abstraction, is also one-sided. INTRODUCTION. 27 to coinci- jrminate- content. :h it has '■ content id itself. >rmed bv am de- tion con- > is free, cisely in will the : accord- ral. In A man, -tional is ) one is ivorli we 'tist has inerisra. ves and isilj we i adhere what he Lgain, if en man longer ihe will )ility of stitute, ill does in turn aspect, ;ion, is \ 17. Since the contradiction involved in caprice (§ 15) is the dialectic of the impulses and inclinations, it is mani- fested m their mutual antagonism. The satisfaction of one demands the subjection and sacrifice of the satisfaction of another. Since an impulse is merely the simple tendency of its own essential nature, and has no measure in itself, to subject or sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a contingent decision of caprice. In such a case caprice may act upon the calculation as to which impulse will bring the greater satisfaction, or may have some other similar purpose. Addition.~Im])uhes and inclinations are in the first instance the content of will, and only reflection transcends them. But these impulses are self-directing, crowding upon and jostling one another, and all seeking to be satisfied. To set all but one in the background, and put myself into this one, is to limit and distort myself, since I, in so doing, renounce my universality, which is a system of all the impulses. Just as little help is found in a mere subordination of them, a course usually followed by the understanding. There is available no criterion by which to make such an arrangement, and hence the demand for a subordination is usually sustained by tedious and irrelevant allusions to general sayings. 18. With regard to the moral estimate of impulses, dialectic appears in this form. The phases of the direct or natural will are immanent and positive, and thus good. Hence man is by nature good. But natural characteristics, since they are opposed to freedom and the conception of the spirit, and are, hence, negative, must be eradicated. Thus man is by nature evil. To decide for either view is a matter of subjective caprice. AcMUIon.— The Christian doctrine that man is by nature evil is loftier than the opposite that he is naturally good, and is to be interi)reted philosophically in this way. Man as spirit is a free being, who need not give way to 'impulse. 28 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Hence m his direct and unformed condition, man is in a situation m which he ought not to be, and he must free himself This is the meaning of the doctrine of original fieedTm ""* ""^''^ Christianity would not be the religion of la In the demand that impulses must be purified is found the general idea that they must be freed from the form of direct subjection to nature, and from a content that IS subjective and contingent, and must be restored to their substantive essence. The truth contained in this in- definite demand is that impulses should be phases of will in a rational system. To apprehend them in this way as pro- ceeding from the conception is the content of the science of Note -The content of this science may. in all its several elements, right, property, morality, family, state, be repre- sented in this way, that man has by nature the impulse to right the impulse to property, to morahtv, to sexual love and to social life. If instead of this form, which belongs to empirical psychology, a philosophic form be preferred it may be obtained cheap from what in modern times was re- puted and still is reputed to be philosophy. He will then say that man finds in himself as a fact of consciousness that he wills right, property, the state, etc. Later will be given still another form of the content which appears here in the shape of impulses, that, namely, of duties. 20. The reflection which is brought to bear upon im- pulses, placing them before itself, estimating them, com- paring them with one another, and contrasting them with their means and consequences, and also with a whou of satisfaction, namely happiness, brings the formal uni- versal to this material, and in an external way purifies it of Its crudity and barbarism. This propulsion by the uni- versah y of thought is the absolute worth of civilization (S lo7). Addition.~hi happiness thought has already the upper INTRODUCTION. hand with the force of natural impulse, since it is not satisfied with what is momentary, bat requires happiness as a whole. This happiness is dependent upon civilization to the extent to which civilization confirms the universal. But in the ideal of happiness there are two elements. There is (1) a universal that is higher than all particulars ; yet, as the content of this universal is in turn only uni- versal pleasure, there arises once more the individual, particular and finite, and retreat must be made to impulse • (2) Since the content of happiness lies in the subjective perception of each individual, this universal end is again particular ; nor is there present in it any true unity of content and form. 21. But the truth of this formal universality, which taken by itself is undetermined and finds definite cha- racter in externally given material, is the self-directing universality which is will or freedom. Since the will has as its object, content and end, universality itself, and thus assumes the form of the infinite, it is free not only in itself or implicitly, but for itself or explicitly. It is' the true idea. -ZV^o^e.— The self-consciousness of the will in the form of appetite or impulse is sensible, the sensible in general indicating the externality of self-consciousness, or that condition in which self-consciousness is outside of itself. Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the reflecting will, and the other is the abstract universality of thought. But the absolute will has as its object the will itself as such in its pure universality. In this universality the directness of the natural will is superseded, and so also is the private individuality which is produced by reflection and infects the natural condition. But to supersede these and lift them into the universal, constitutes the activity of thought. Thus the self-consciousness, which purifies its object, content or end, and exalts it to universality, is thought carrying itself through into will. It is at this 30 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. point that it becomes clear that the will is true and free only as thinking intelligence. The slave knows not his thnk himself. The self-consciousness, which by thought Itself the accidental and untrue, constitutes the principle of right, morality, and all forms of ethical observance. They JthLr 7^^^ ^""^ philosophically of right, morality, and ethical observance, would exclude thought and turn to feeling, the heart, the breast, and inspiration, express the it::r ^"^rr r "^^^^^^* ^^^^ ^'-- ^^ Itself, overwhelmed with despair and utter insipidity makes barbarism and absence of thought a principle and sojar as in it lay robbed men of all 'truth' dl^t' -1 Addition.~In philosophy truth is had when the concep- ion corresponds to reality. A body is the reality, and soul s the conception. Soul and body should be adequate to each other. A dead man is still an existence, but no longer a true existence; it is a reality void of conception. For that reason the dead body decays. So with the true w^^^l; that which It wills, namely, its content, is identical with It, and so freedom wills freedom. 22. The will which exists absolutely is truly infinite because its object being the will itself, is for it not another or a limitation. In the object the will has simply reverted into itself. Moreover, it is not mere possibility capacity, potentiality (potentia), but infinitely actual (vnjlmtu^n actu), because the reality of the conception or Its visible externality is internal to itself. fl^f'^'V^T' '"!'''' ^^'' ^''' ^^^^ ^^ '^^^^^ of without the qualification of absolute freedom, only the capacity of freedom is meant, or the natural and finite will rs 11^ and, notwithstanding all words and opinions to the con trary, not the free will. Since the understanding com-" INTRODUCTION. 31 prehends the infinite only in its negative aspect, and hence as a beyond, it thinks to do the infinite all the more honour the farther it removes it into the vague distance, and the more it takes it as a foreign thing. In free will the true infinite is present and real ; it is itself the actually present self-contained idea. Addition.—The infinite has rightly been represented as a circle. The straight line goes out farther and farther, and symbolizes the merely negative and bad infinite, which, unlike the true, does not return into itself. The free will IS truly infinite, for it is not a mere possibility or disposi- tion. Its external reality is its own inner nature, itself. 23. Only in this freedom is the will wholly by itself because it refers to nothing but itself, and a4l dependence upon any other thing falls away.-The will is true, or rather truth itself, because its character consists in its being in its manifested reality, or correlative opposite what It IS in its conception. In other words, the pure conception has the perception or intuition of itself as its end and reality, 24. The will is universal, because in it all limitation and particular individuality are superseded. These one-sided phases are found only in the difference between the con- ception and its object or content, or, from another stand- point, m the difference between the conscious independent existence of the subject, and the will's implicit, or self- mvolved existence, or between its excluding and concluding individuality, and its universality. JVo^e.— The different phases of universality are tabulated m the logic (" Encyclop. of the Phil. Sciences," §§ 118-126). Imaginative thinking always takes universality in an abstract and external way. But absolute universality is not to be thought of either as the universality of reflec tion, which is a kind of concensus or generality, or, as the ' abstract universality and self-identity, which is fashioned by the understanding (§ 6, note), and keeps aloof from the 32 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. individual. It is rather the concrete, self-contained, and self-referring universality, which is the substance, intrinsic genus, or immanent idea of self-consciousness. It is a conception of free will as the universal, transcending its object, passing through and beyond its own specific cha- racter, and then becoming identical with itself.— This abso lute universal is what is in general called the rational, and is to be apprehended only in this speculative way. 25. The subjective side of the will is the side of its self- consciousness and individuality (§ 7), as distinguished from Its imphcit conception. This subjectivity is («) pure form or absolute unity of self-consciousness with itself This unity is the equation " I = I," consciousness being characterized by a thoroughly inward and abstract self- dependence. It is pure certitude of itself in contrast with the truth; (/3) particularity of will, as caprice with its accidental content of pleasurable ends ; (y) in c^eneral a one-sided form (§ 8), in so far as that which is willed is at first an unfulfilled end, or a content which simply belongs to self-consciousness. ° _ 26. (a) In so far as the will is determined by itself and 18 m accord with its conception and true, it is whollv objective will. (/S) But objective self-consciousness, which has not the form of the infinite, is a will sunk in its object or condition, whatever the content of that may be It is the will of the child, or the will present in slavery or superstition, (y) Objectivity is finally a one-sided form m opposition to the subjective phase of will ; it is direct reahty, or external existence. In this sense the will becomes objective only by the execution of its ends. Note.—These logical phases of subjectivity and objec- tivity, since they are often made use of in the sequel are here exposed, with the express purpose of noting thlt it happens with them as with other distinctions and opposed aspects of reflection ; they by virtue of their finite and dialectic character pass over into their opposites For . liNTRODUCTION. 33 imagination and understanding the meanings of antithetic phases are not convertible, because their identity is still internal. But in will, on the contrary, these phases, which ought to be at once abstract and yet also sides of that which can be known only as concrete, lead of them- selves to identity, and to an exchange of meanings. To the understanding this is unintelligible.— Thus, e.g., the will, as a freedom which exists in itself, is subjectivity itself; thus subjectivity is the conception of the will, and therefore its objectivity. But subjectivity is finite in opposition to objectivity, yet in this opposition the will is not isolated, but in intricate union with the object ; and thus Its finitude consists quite as much in its not being subjective, etc.— What in the sequel is to be meant by the subjective or the objective side of the will, has each time to be made clear from the context, which will supply their positions in relation to the totality. Addition.— li is ordinarily supposed that subjective and S-- ^■ objective are blank opposites; but this is not the case. Rather do they pass into one another, for they are not abstract aspects like positive and negative, but have already a concrete significance. To consider in the first instance the expression " subjective ; " this may mean an end which IS merely the end of a certain subject. In this sense a poor work of art, that is not adequate to the thing is merely subjective. But, further, this expression may point to the content of the will, and is then of about the same meaning as capricious; the subjective content then is that which belongs merely to the subject. In this sense bad acts are merely subjective. Further, the pure, empty I may be called subjective, as it has only itself as an object, and possesses the power of abstraction from all further content. Subjectivity has, moreover, a wholly particular and correct meaning in accordance with which anything, in order to win recognition from me, has to become mine and seek validity in me. This is the infinite avarice of D ; UVU^ 34 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. subjectivity, eager to comprehend and consume everything ■withm the simple and pure I. •'6 I (^d^^l^^ SimUarly we may take the objective in different ways By It we may understand anything to which we give existence m contrast to ourselves, whether it be an actual thmg or a mere thought, which we place over against our- selves. By it also we understand the direct reality in ^ which the end is to be realized. Although the end itself IS qmte particular and subjective, we yet name it objective after It has made its appearance. Further, the ob ective will zs also that m which truth is; thus, God's will, the ethical will also are objective. Lastly, we may call the will objective, when it is wholly submerged in its object, as e.g the child's will, wbir>b is confiding and without subjective freedom, and the slave's will, which does not know Itself as free, and is thus a will-less will In this sense any will is objective, if it is guided in its action by a foreign authority, and has not yec completed the infinite return into itself. 27 The absolute character or, if you like, the absolute mpulse of the free spirit (§ 21) is, as has been observed, that Its freedom shall be for it an object. It is to be objective in a two-fold sense : it is the rational system of Itself, and this system is to be directly real (§ 26) There IS thus actualized as idea what the will is implicitly Hence, the abstract conception of the idea of the will is in general the free will which wills the free will 28. The activity of the will, directed to the task of transcending the contradiction between subjectivity and objec ivity. of transferring its end from subjectivity into objectivi y. and yet while in objectivity of remaining with Itself ,s beyond the formal method of consciousness (8 8) m which objectivity is only direct actuality. This activity IS the essenial development of the substantive content of the Idea (§21). In this development the conception moulds the Idea, which is in the first instance abstract Jnto INTRODUCTION. 35 the totality of a system. This totality as substantive is independen of the opposition between mere subjective end same ''^*'^''' ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ oi these forms is the 29^ That a reality is the realization of the free will, this IS what IS meant by a right. Right, therefore, is. in general, freedom as idea. ••T^f ■"~^.\*^''i ^r*^^"" ^^'*"°' (Introduction to Kant's Theory of Right "). now generally accepted. '' the highest factor IS a hmitatiou of my freedom or caprice, in Lev ha It may be able to subsist alongside of every other ind vidua s caprice m accordance with a universal law." Tk.s doctrine contains only a negative phase, that of limitation. And besides, the positive phase, the universal law or so-called law of reason, consisting in the agreement of the caprice of one with that of another, goes beyond the wel -Icnown formal identity and the proposition' ofcon tradiction. The definition of right, Just Quoted, contal the view whu-h has especially since Rousseau spread widelv According to this view neither the absolute and rational will ndividual in their peculiar caprice, are the substantive and primary basis. When once this principle is accepted, the lational can announce itself only as limiting this tr.-euom. Hence it is not an inherent rationality, but onlv a mere external and formal universal. This view is accordingly devoid of speculative thought, and is rejected by the philosophic conception. In the minds of men and m the act.uil world it has assumed a shape, whose horror s without a parallel, except in the shallowness of the thoughts ui)on which it was founded. 30. Right in general is something holy, because it is th embodiment of the absolute conception and self-conscious freedom. But the formalism of right, and after a while of duty al.o. 18 due to distinctions arising out of the development of the conception of freedom. ' In contrast 36 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. Itl With the more formal, abstract and limited right, there is that sphere or stage of the spirit, in whicJi spirit has brought to definite actuality the further elements contained in the idea. This stage is the richer and more concrete • It IS truly universal and has therefore a higher rio-ht Note.-Ewevy step in the development of the idea of freedom has its peculiar right, because it is the embodi- ment of a phase of freedom. When morality and ethical observance are spoken of in opposition to right, only the fii'st or formal right of the abstract personality is meant. Morahty, ethical observance, a state-interest, are every one a special right, because each of these is a definite realiza- tion of freedom. They can come into collision only in so tar as they occupy the same plane. If the moral stand- point of spirit were not also a right and one of the forms of freedom, it could not collide with the right of personalitv or any other i-ight. A right contains the conception of freedom which is the highest phase of spirit, and in opposi- stance Yet collision also implies a limit and a subordina- tion of one j.liase to another. Only the right of the world-spirit IS the unlimited absolute. 31. The scientific method by which the conception is self-evolved, and its phases self-developed and self-pro duced. IS not first of all an assurance that certain relations are given from somewhere or other, and then the applica- tion to this foreign material of the universal. Tl'o true process is found in the logic, and here is presupposed Moe.~.The efficient or motive principle, which is not merely the analysis but the j.roduction of the several elemencs of the universal, I call dialectic. Dialectic is not that process in which an object or proposili^^IT^ivsented to feehng or lie direct consciousness, is analv/ed, en- tangled, taken hither and thither, until at last itJontrary IS derived. Such a merely negative method appears frequently m Plato. It may fix the opposite of anv 1 t r r r 'J t; r( INTRODUCTION. 37 notiou, or reveal the contradiction contained in it, as did ^ the ancient scepticism, or it may in a feeble way consider an approximation to truth, or modern half-and-half attain- ment of it, as its goal. But the higher dialectic of the con- ception does not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and opposite but produces out of this negative a positive con- tent and result. Only by such a course is there develop- ment and inherent progress. Hence this dialectic is not the external agency of subjective thinking, but the private soul of the content, which unfolds its branches and fruit organically Thought regards this development of the Idea and of the peculiar activity of the reason of the idea as only subjective, but is on its side unable to make any addition. To consider anything rationally is not to brin^ reason to it from the outside, and work it up in this way' but to count It as itself reasonable. Here it is spirit in its freedom the summit of self-conscious reason, which gives rtself actuality, and produces itself as the existirc world The business of science is simply to bring the specific work of the reason which is in the thing, to consciousness. 6^ The phases of the development of the conception are themselves conceptions. And yet, because the concep- tion IS essentially the idea, they have the form of manifes- tations. Hence the sequence of the conceptions, which arise in this way, is at the same time a sequence of realiza- tious, and are to be by science so considered. Note.~Ii^ a speculative sense the way, in which a con- ception IS manifested in reality, is identical with a definite phase of the concej)tion. But it is noteworthy that, in the scientific development of the idea, the elements, which resu in a further definite form, although preceding this resu t as phases of the conception, do not in the tern- roral development go before it as concrete realizations. Thus as will be seen later, that stage of the idea which is the family presupposes phases of the coneeption. whoso result It IS. But that these intei-nal presuppositions should 88 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. be present in such visible realizations as right of property contract, morahty, etc., this is the other side of the process' which only in a highly developed civilization has attained to a specific realization of its elements. AddUion.-T:he idea must always 'go on determining Itself within Itself, sinceat the beginning it is only abstract conception. However, this initial abstract conception is never given up, but only becomes inwardly richer, the last phase bemg the richest. The earlier ana merelv implicit phases reach in this way free self-dependence, but in such a manner that the conception remains the soul which holds everything together, and only through a procedure im- manent withm itself arrives at its own distinctions. Hence the last phase falls again into a unity with the first and it cannot be said that the conception ever comes to som'ethinff new. Although the elements of the conception appear to liave fallen apart whru *hey enter reality, this is only a mere appearance. Its superficial character is revealed in the process, since all the particulars finally turn back again into the conception of the universal. The empirical sciences usually analyze what they find in pictorial ideas, and if the mdividual IS successfully brought back to the general the general property is then called the conception. But this is not our procedure. We desire only to observe how the conception determines itself, and compels us to keep at a distance everything of our own spinning and thinking But what we get in this way is one series of thoughts and another series of realized forms. As to these two series it may happen that the order of time of the actual manifesto tions 18 partly different from the order of the conception Thus It cannot, e.g., be said that property existed before the family, and yet, in spite of that it is discussed before the family is discussed. The question might also be raised here. Why do we not be^in with the highest i e with concrete truth ? The answer is. because we desire'to Bee truth ,n the form of a result, and it is an essential part INTRODUCTION. 39 of the process to conceive the conception first of all as ab- stract. The actual series of realizations of the conception IS thus for us in due course as follows, even although in ac uahty the order should be the same. Our process is this, that the abstra<;t forms reveal themselves not as self-sub- sistent but as imtrue. Division of the Work. 33. According to the stages in the development of the Idea ot the absolutely free will, A. The will is direct or immediate; its conception is therefore abstract, i.e., personality, and its embodied reality IS a direct exteraal thing. This is the sphere of abstract or formal right. B. The will passing out of external reality, turns back mto Itself Its phase is subjective individuality, and it is contrasted with the universal. This universal is on its in- ternal side the good, and on its external side a presented world, and these two sides are occasioned only by means of each other. In this sphere the idea is divided, and exists in separate elements. The right of the subjective will IS in a relation of contrast to the right of the world, or the right of the idea. Here, however, the idea exists only implicitly. This is the sphere of morality c. The unity and truth of these two abstract elements. The thought Idea of the good is realized both in the will turned back into itself, and also in the external world. Thus freedom exists as real substance, which is quite as much actuality and necessity as it is subjective will The Idea here is its absolutely universal existence, viz., ethical observance. This ethical substance is again, a. Natural spirit ; the family, b The civic community, or spirit in its dual existence and mere ai)pearance, c. The state, or freedom, which, while established in the 40 THE PHUOSOPHY OF RIGHT. free se f-dependence of the particular will k also universal and objechve^ This actual and organic spirit (a) is TJ^^t of a na .on (S) .s found in the relation to one anothTof nafonal sp,„ts and (y) passing through and bevond hk relation js actnahi=ed and revc-aled in world history as e universal world-spirit, whose right is the highest Note-It is to be found in the speculative logic and here is presupposed, that a thing or content, which fs e'stab .shed first of all according to its conceptio;, or Lph tt has the form of direct existence. The conception, h'wevt' when ,t has the form of the conception is explicit, and no longer IS a direct existence. So, too, the princip e upo„ which the division of thi. .-ork proceeds, is presupposed The divisions might be regarded as already settled by history since the different stages must be viewtd as elements m the development o! uie idea, and therefore a springing from the nature of the content itself. ApUlo sophic division IS not an external classification of any ^ven material, such a classification as would be made TcordZ to one or several schemes picked up at random but tho. herent distinctions of the conception itself Mo^JityV^d' ethica observance, which are usually supposed tHZ the Meanwhile even imaginative thought seems to make a dfs inction between them. In the usage of Kant the „' ference ,s given to the term morality, and tTe , ritkai prmciples of his philosophy limit thenfselves w oily totli standpoint, making impossible the standpoint of eth cl observance, and indeed expressly destroying and abolth Tng Lord nt t„*th'"°". *^ r'' '"''"^ ''"* ""' «->« ■»-"-» nifrfrditLTcr':^^^^^^^^^^ civfiriSrjT":°r '""-"^ "' "«'"- ^0 •»™» -t ™'y a lomo^'it :'■",'? ™'"'' 'i«"«<™'''^ of the word, bul also morality, ethical observance and world-history. These belong to this realm, because the eonception taking tiiemL INTRODUCTION. 41 their truth, brings them all together. Free will, in order not to remain abstract, must in the first instance give itself reality ; the sensible materials of this reality are objects I.e., external things. This first phase of freedom we shall know as property. This is the sphere of formal and abstract right, to which belong property in the more developed form of contract and also the injury of right i e crime and punishment. The freedom, we have here, we name person, or, m other words, the subject who is free, and indeed free independently, and gives himself a reality in things But this direct reality is not adequate to freedom, and the negation of this phase is morality. In morality I am beyond the freedom found directly in this thing, and have a freedom m which this directness is superseded. I am free in myself, i.e., in the subjective. In this sphere we come upon my insight, intention, and end, and externalitv is established as indifferent. The good is now the universal end, which is not to remain merely internal to me, but to realize itself. The subjective will de- mands that its inward character, or ])urpose, shall re- ceive external reality, and also that the good shall be brought to completion in external existence. Morality like formal right, is also an abstraction, whose truth is reached only in ethical observance. Hence ethical observance is the unity of the will in its conception with the will of the indi vidual or subject. The primary reality of ethical observ- ance is m its turn natural, taking the form of love and feeling. This is the family. In it the individual has transcended his prudish personality, and finds himself with his consciousness in a totality. In the next stage is seen the loss of this peculiar ethical existence and substantive unity Here the family falls asunder, and the members become in- dependent one of another, being now held together merely by the bond of mutual need. This is the stage of the civic community, which has frequently been taken for the state Hut the state does not arise until wo reach the third stage 42 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. that stage of ethical observance or smrit in ^i,- i, v ., ^aivaual Mep^oaeneo and uni^XtbTJ^,":* tound m gigantic union. Thft n't^lif ^f +1, j. . . ' foro, higher'than that of the othf s^'' Itt "?' 'T" in its most ooncreto embodiment wS™,?, l '':!?""' but the highest absolute truth of the worCto "^ FIRST PART. ABSTRACT RIGHT. 34. The completely free will, when it is concejy^d abstractly, IS in a condition of(se]f.involved)simplicity ."What actuality it has when taken m this abstract way, consists in a nega- tive attitude towards reality, and a bare abstract reference of itself to itself. Such an abstract will is the individual will of a subject. It, as particular, has definite ends, and, as exclusive and individual, has these ends before itself as an externally and directly presented world. Addition.— The remark that the completely free wiU, when it is taken abstractly, is in a condition of self-in- volved simplicity must be understood in this way. The completed idea of the will is found when the conception has realized itself fully, and in such a manner that the embodi- ment of the conception is nothing but the development of the conception itself. But at the outset the con- ception is abstract. All its future characters are implied in it, it is true, but as yet no more than implied. They are, in other words, potential, and are not yet developed into an articulate whole. If I say, «' I am free," the I here, is still implicit and has no real object opposed to it.' But from the standpoint of morality as contrasted with abstract right there is opposition, because there I am a particular will, while the good, though within me, is the umversal. Hence, at that stage, the will contains within Itself the contrast between particular and universal, and in that way is made definite. But at the beginning such c^ , 44 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. tho marl of" Tf '", "f "' ""' ""■'"■''' ""'' 'h" "«' '"'^ TheTf ,-'^":'"™'™"' "'"■'■'■"'■■' "'■ ™"'<>diate being. The chief tl„ng to notice at this point is that thi« very Absence of determinate character exists where there is a» vet no .hstinction between the will and it., co,.,i;.t B„t when tins lack of dofinitencss is set in opposition o k, ^< ^ ./c ,- the dehn.te, it becomes itself somcthins definite I oM.er f'^ V~-/ ■ 7';'"' itLf »* .ident,% tecomes the distingnishinj; feature •^^^f^ "f "- -11. -d the will thereby becomes an indivTdntl wm t—i rfe,^:„^ or person. /W<-.^ <^ o.^ /v_^ r™ c^.^^(^ 35. This conseionsly free will has a universal side whicli ru^ ^i . c.^«'»^'''- ■" •' orn.al, sin.ple and pure rrf^ee to i sdf « /s . jj.v^" ,7'"'"*': -""^ ""lfe.-Pcrsonality does not arise till the subject has not merely a general consciousness of himself n sol Jctermmate mode of concrete existence, but rl her a Z sciousncss of himself as a completely abstmct I, In tl jch m alid. Hence iwrsonality involves the knowledge of one- el as an object, raised, however, by thought into th^ realm o pure infinitude, a ivalm, that is, in whicVit is purely Identical with itself, [individuals aid people ha™ no personality it they have nS,t reached this pur? I„„!ht and se f.eonscionsness.) In this way, t«o, thc^ibsoSeor complete-d mind or spirit may be distinguished from it abstract of any will has e being, lis very feature, ibere is iontent. ition to n other feature Jal will 5 ?' mJ. a£-C ABSTllACT RIGHT. 45 whicli *"- ^'Self as also a The )nality )Ietely ipulse >r life. V pure ude I t has some I con- v^hich hired one- ) the it is have ught :e or 1 its ■^ mere somblaufie. The semblance, though self-conscious, is aware of itself ouly as a merely natural will with its external objects. The other, as an abstract and pure I, has itself as its end and object, and is therefore a person.' Addition.— The abstract will, the will which exists for itself, is a person. The highest aim of man is to be a person, and yet again the mere abstraction "person" is not held in high esteem. Person is essentially different from subject. Subject is only the possibility of person- ality. Any living thing at all is a subject, while person is a subject which has its subjectivity as an object. As a person I exist for myself. Personality is the free being in pure self-conscious isolation. I as a person am conscious of freedom. I can abstract myself from everything, since nothing is before me except pure personality. Notwith- standing all this I am as a particular person completely limited. I am of a certain age, height, in this space, and so on. Thus a person is at one and the same time so exalted and so lowly a thing. In him is the unity of infinite and finite, of limit and unlimited. The dignity of personality can sustain a contradiction, which neither contains nor could tolerate anything natural. 36, (1) Personality implies, in general, a capacity to possess rights, and constitutes the conception and abstract basis of abstract right. This right, being abstract, must be formal also. Its mandate is : Be a person and respect others as persons. 37. (2) The particularity of the will, that phase of the will, namely, which implies a consciousness of my specific interests, is doubtless an element of the whole conscious- ness of the will (§ 34), but it is noiE^contained in mere abstract personality. It is indeed present in the form of appetite, want, impulse and random desire, but is distinct as yet from the personahty, which is the essence of free- dom.— In treating of formal right therefore, we do not trench upon special interests, such as my advantage or my 46 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT. M-^JjL, ^ well-being, nor have we here to do with any special reason or intention of the will. 1 ^^icii reason AddUion.~^mce the particular phases of the person have not as yet attained the form of freedom, everything relating to these elements is so far a matter of indifference When anyone bases a claim upon his mere formal right" he may be wholly selfish, and often such a claim comes from a contracted heart and mind. Uncivilized man, in genera , holds fast to his rights, while~Ti;^re gener;us disposition IS alert to see all sides of the question. Abstract right IS, moreover, the first mere possibility, and in con- rast with the whole context of a given relation is still formal. The possession of a right gives a certain authoritv It IS true, but It is not, therefore, absolutely necessary that I insist upon a right, which is only one aspect of the whole matter, (in a word, possibility is something, which means that it either may or may not exist.) 38. In contrast with the deeper significance of a concrete act in all its moral and social bearings, abstract right is only a possibility. Such a right is, therefore, only a ner mission or indication of legal power. Because of this abstract character of right the only rule which is uncon- ditionally its own is merely the negative principle not to injure personality or anything which of necessity belongs to It. Hence we have here only prohibitions, the positive form of command having in the last resort a prohibition as its basis. 39 (3) A person in his direct and definite individualitv IS related to a given external nature. To this outer world the personality is opposed as something subjective But to confine to mere subjectivity the personality, which is meant to be infinite and universal, contradicts and destroys Its nature. It bestirs itself to abrogate the limitation by giving Itself reality, and proceeds to make the outer visible existence its own. 40. Eight is at first the simple and direct concrete ABSTRACT RIGHT. 47 existence which freedom gives itself directly. This un- modified existence is (a) Possession or property. Here freedom is that of the abstract will in general, or of a separate person who relates himself only to himself. (6) A person by distinguishing himself from himself becomes related to another person, although the two have no fixed existence for each other except as owners. Their implicit identity becomes realized through a transference of property by mutual consent, and with the preservation of their rights. This is contract. (c) The will in its reference to itself, as in (a), may be at variance not with some other person, (fe), but within itself As a particular will it may differ from and be in opposition to Its true and absolute self. This is wrong and crime ^«'«— The division of rights into personal right, real right and right to actions is, like many other divisions, intended to systematize the mass of unorganized material. But this division utterly confuses rights which presuppose such concrete relations as the family or the state with those which refer to mere abstract personaliiy. An example of this confusion is the classification, made popular by Kant, of rights into Eeal Eights, Personal Eights, and Personal Eights that are Eeal in kind. It would take us too far afield to show how contorted and irrational is the classification of rights into personal and real, a classifica- tion which hes at the foundation of Eoman law The right to actions concerns the administration of justice, and does not fall under this branch of the subject. Clearlv it IS only personality which gives us a right to things, and therefore personal right is in essence real right. A thin^ must be taken in its universal sense as the external opposite of freedom, so that in this sense my bodv an ] my life are hings. Thus real right is the right of personality'as such In the inteiTpretaticn of personal right, found in Eoman law, a man is not a person till he has reached a certain 1 48 TIIIC 1'1IIIX)S()PIIV' OF RIGHT. ^ ^itaius (Hci.u'(Tii " EI<>in. Jur. Civ.," § Ixxv.). In Roman law pcrsonalily is an aliriuiih; oj" a, cIuhh and is contrasted witli Hhyovy. Th,. so-rs,.nal rijrjus which an- real in kind.'- The Roman personal ri^dit is not the ri^'ht of a. person as such, but of a special person. Jt will he aftiM'waiils shown that the fainily relation is really based ni)on Ilu> renunciation of personalify. 1(, cannot but seem an inverted method to treat of the ri.,dits of persons who belons,' to di-fmite classes before the universal ri^dit of perst)nality. Accordiut,' to K'aiit p(>rsona,l ri^dits aris(> out of a, contract, or a^'reement that 1 should ^'ive or perform somethini,'; this is the /««