^>.

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (hAl-S)

1.0

I.I

2.0

lit

■ 40

L25 i 1.4

1.8

1.6

p1^

Hiotographic

Sciences
Corporation

33 WIST MAIN STMIT

WEBSTIR.NY 14580

(716) •73.4503

'^^

# ^

^'<^'
^

^ ^^.

.^ ^

<$■

i/.A

CIHM/ICMH

Microfiche

Series.

CIHiVi/ICIViH
Collection de
microfiches.

Canadian Institute for Historicai I^Microreproductions / Institut Canadian de microreproductions historiquet

Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notas tachniquaa at bibliographiquas

Tha Instituta haa attamptad to obtain the baat
original copy availabia for filming. Faaturaa of thia
copy which may ba bibiiographicaily uniqua,
which may altar any of tha imagaa in tha
reproduction, or which may significantly change
the uaual method of filming, are checked below.

D
D
D
D
D

D
D

Coloured covers/
Couverture de couieur

Covers damaged/
Couverture endommagto

Covers restored and/or laminated/
Couverture restaur^ et/ou pellicula

Cover title miaaing/

La titra de couverture manque

Coloured mapa/

Cartea giographiquea wn couieur

□ Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/
Encre de couieur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire)

I I Coloured plates and/or illuatrationa/

Planchae et/ou illuatrationa en couieur

Bound with other material/
Reli4 avac d'autres documents

Tight binding may cauae shadows or distortion
along interior margin/

La re liure serrie peut causer de I'ombre ou de la
distorslon lo long do la mars • intAriouro

Blank leaves added during restoration may
appear within the text. Whenever possible, these
heve been omitted from filming/
II se peut que certainee pagea blanches sjoutAes
lors d'une reetauratlon apparaiaaent dana la texte,
maia, lorsque cela itait possible, ces pagea n'ont
pea «t« filmtea.

Additional commenta:/
Commantairea supplimentaires;

Various pagingt.

L'Institut a microfilm* la meilleur axemplaira
qu'ii lui a 4t« possible de se procurer. Les details
de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-Atre uniques du
point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier
une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent axi^ar une
modification dans la mithodo normale de filmage
sont indiqute ci-dessous.

The
toti

|~~| Coloured pages/

Pagea de couieur

Pagea damaged/
Pagea endommagies

Pagea restored and/oi

Pages restaurAes et/ou pelliculAes

Psgea discoloured, stained or fOAei
Pages d^color^kes. tachaties ou piquies

Pages detached/
Pagea ditachias

Showthroughy
Tranaparence

Quality of prir

Qualit* inigaia da ('impression

Includes supplementary matarii
Comprend du metiriel supplimentaire

Only edition available/
Seule Edition disponible

r~l Pagea damaged/

p~^ Pagea restored and/or laminated/

r*^ Psgea discoloured, stained or fOAed/

I I Pages detached/

rj\ Showthrough/

I I Quality of print veries/

rn Includes supplementary materiel/

I — I Only edition available/

The
pos)
ofti
film

Oris

begi

the

sior

oth(

first

sion

oril

The

shal
TINI
whi

Mar
diffi
enti
begi
righ
reqi
met

Pages wholly or pertieily obscured by errata
slips, tissues, etc., heve been refilmed to
ensure the best possible image/
Lee peges totalement ou pertieilement
obscurcies par un feuillet d'orrata, una pelure,
etc.. ont Ati film4es i nouveeu de faqon i
obtenir la mailleure image possible.

This item is filmed st the reduction rstio checked below/

Ca document est film* su taux de reduction indiqu* ci-dessous.

10X

14X

18X

22X

26X

30X

12X

IfX

aox

28X

32X

The copy filmad hsre has been reproduced thanks
to the generosity of:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

L'exemplaire filmi fut reproduit grAce A la
ginArosit* de:

Douglas Library
Queen's University

The images appearing here are the best quality
possible considering the condition and ieglbillty
of the original copy and in keeping with the
filming contract specifications.

Original copies in printed paper covers are filmed
beginning with the front cover and ending on
the last page with a printed or Illustrated impres-
sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All
other original copies are filmed beginning on the
first page with a printed or illustrated Impres-
sion, and ending on the last page with a printed
or illustrated impression.

The last recorded frame on each microfiche
shall contain the symbol — »> (meaning "CON-
TINUED"), or the symbol y (meaning "END"),
whichever applies.

Les images suivantes ont 4t4 reproduites avec le
plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et
de la netteti de l'exemplaire fiim«, et en
conformity avec ies conditions du contrat de
filmage.

Les exemplaires orlginaux dont la couverture en
papier est imprimte sont fiimAs en commenpant
par ie premier plat et en terminant soit par la
dernlAre page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impresslon ou d'lllustration, soit par Is second
plat, selon Ie cas. Tous les autres exemplaires
originaux sont filmte en commenpant par la
premiere page qui comporte une empreinte
d'impresslon ou d'illustration et en terminant par
la dernlAre page qui comporte une telle
empreinte.

Un dee symboles suivants apparattra sur la
dernlAre image de cheque microfiche, selon ie
cas: Ie symbols "^ signifle "A SUIVRE", ie
symbols ▼ signifle "FIN".

IMaps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at
different reduction ratios. Those too large to be
entirely included in one exposure are filmed
beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to
right end top to bottom, es many frames as
rsquired. The following diagrams Illustrate the
method:

Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent Atre
flimis i des taux de reduction diffArents.
Lorsque Ie document est trop grend pour Atre
reproduit en un seul clichi. il est film* i partir
de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche i droite.
et de haut en bas, en prenant ie nombre
d'imagas nAcsssaire. Les diagrammes suivants
illustrent la mAthode.

32X

The EDITH and LORNE PIERCE
COLLECTION of CANADI ANA

Queen's University at Kingston

-1

Queen's University
Library .

The Dou^as Library
Kington, Ontario-

GIFT OF

..lte....T,„_|.,...D,...si^aa

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

GEORGE BELL & SONS

LONDON : YORK ST., COVENT GARDEN
NEW) YORK: 66, FIFTH AVENUE, AND
BOMBAY : 53, ESPLANADE ROAD
CAMBRIDGE: DEIGHTON, BELL & CO.

HEGEL'S

PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

TRANSLATED BY

S. W. DYDE, M.A., D.Sc.

PROFESSOR OF MENTAL PHILOSOPHY. QUEEN'S UNIVERSITY.

KINGSTON, CANADA

LONDON

GEORGE BELL AND SONS

1896

LI-

3;iji^. (^fsP9

CHISWICK PRESS :-CHAKLES WHITTINGHAM AND CO.
■ TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY I.ANE, LONDON.

WITH THE NAME OF

PEOFESSOR WATSON,

WHO GAVE ME

MY FIRST LESSONS, NOT IN HEGEL ONLY, BUT IN

PHILOSOPHY, IT GIVES ME PLEASUEB TO

CONNECT THIS TRANSLATION.

llSd 79/

CONTENTS.

Tkanslator's Preface page ix

Author's Preface page xv

Introduction. Conception of the Philosophy of Right,

Conception of the Will, of Freedom, and of Right §§ 1-32
Division of the Work 33

FIRST PART.

ABSTRACT RIGHT.

§§ 34-104.

»■ First Section. Property .

a. Possession ....

b. Use . . .
f. Relinquishment .

Transition from Property to Contract
Second Section. Contract
Third Section, Wrong .

a. Unpremeditated (Civil) Wrong

b. Fraud

c. Violence and Crime
Transition from Right to Morality

§§ 41-71

54-58

59-64

65-70

72-81

82-104

84-86

87-89

90-103

104

SECOND PART.

MORALITY.
§§ 105-141.

First Section. Purpose and Responsibility .
Second Section. Intention and Well-being .
Third Section. The (iood and Conscience

Moral Forms of Evil. Hypocrisy, Probability, goo<l

Intention, Conviction, Irony .... note to § 140

Transition from Morality to the Ethical System . . .141

115-118
119-128
129-141

• ••

TUI

CONTENTS.

THIRD PART.

ETHICAL OBSERVANCE.

§§ 142-360.
First Section. The Family .

A. Marriage. . . ' *

B. Family Means. . * * '

A. The System of Wants .
«. Want and its Satisfaction
o. Labour .

c Wealth and the classes or Estates

B. Administration of Justice
«. Right as Law

b. Law as Established

c. The Court .
c. Police and the Corporation

«. The Police .
V b. The Corporation .
Third Section. The State
A. Constitutional Law .

I. The State Constitution
a. The Prince
*. The Executive .
c. The Legislature

II. Foreign Polity .
International Law .
World-history .

§§ 158-181
16I-169
170-172
173-181
182-256
189-208
190-195
196-198
199-208
209-229
211-214
215-218
219-229
230-256
231-249
250-256
257-360
260-329
272-320
275-286
287-297
298-320
321.329
330-340
341-360

TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

In his preface, Hegel's editor, Professor Eduard Gans.
makes some interesting remarks upon the "Philo3ophy of
Right," and informs us as to the way in which the matter of
the book had been put together. He dates his preface
May 29th. 1833, thirteen years, lacking one month, later
than Hegel's date for the completion of his own preface
and eighteen months after the philosopher's death!
ilegel had, it would appear, lived to see the outbreak
ot unusual opposition to his political conceptions, and
so Dr. Gans begins : " The wide-spread misunderstanding,
which prevents the recognition of the real value of
the present work, and stands in the way of its general
acceptance, urges me, now that an enlarged edition of it
has be^n prepared, to touch upon some things, which
I would rather have left simply to increasing philosophic
msight. He goes on to give three reasons for placing
great value upon this work of Hegel's.

1. He thinks that the highest praise is due to the author
for the way m which he does justice to every side of the
subject, even investigating questions which have only a
slight bearing upon the matter in hand, and thus erecting
a marvellously complete structure. This fact is more
striking thinks Dr. Gans, than the foundation of the
work which had been already in a measure laid by Kant
and Rousseau. ^

• !"u ^ T^^^ achievement of the " Philosophy of Right "
IS the abolition of the distinction, so prominent in the

* TRANSLATOR'S PREFACE.

■nobileandafuolnrLltTwr^L: " li^ """
«ostadtop„nticsasanat„„.yt„°ph;:f;Wv"T;7"'''

:^^^:L^=a-itijSH

of centuries, returns toThetrmrf hf "P .«>« "^Wience.

eo«..wa.dp„a«o.as':::;itr:rot':.5^

c^p.dla of the PMIosopt::, Sc-e^er;; e'^eee"!

f;;o. that ,™;a natura, riXteer 1^' ^
the region occupied by the " Philosophy of Rilf " ?l r

with the objective spirit, natural riX r ^ '■ ''^''*-'
Maf....,, Ti n uaturai riglit reappears in world-

history. Dr. flans lueaus that the i-i^ht .,f *i ,,

spirit, transcending, as it doe the i, / I ™'"'''-

thus /";"/;";'" l^™'*-- »•»- >»4-be summarised
he t lb" tr"?""'-" ™""^''"'"" "'■ "■« -"' i"'a ' :

^utiitt,:; s :; ^3)rL::;tat'"' -^'^r' "• '-■

na „ , 1 i.. ^ ^ ^"*^ ^*^ nature may bo viowpfl

3errdl7JX:L:t:T'''""V''™'^^^^

J oy retertucc to tlie exact stage which the

ll? --

translator's preface.

exposition has reached. Hence a right of nature, like sub-
jectivity or objectivity, may mean quite different things at
different points in the unfolding of the system.

The single word here added is meant to accent what is
implied in the third of these remarks. The " Philosophy
of Right " is really only one part of a system. In the third
part of his " Encyclopaedia," when he reaches the subject of
Eight, Hegel says {;note to § 487) that he may deal briefly
with this topic, since he has already gone exhaustively into
it in his "Philosophy of Right." Hence as this work
treats of an essential stage in the evolution of spirit, whose
whole nature is unfolded scene by scene in the " Encyclo-
psedia," it is not accurate to speak of Hegel's ethical prin-
ciples as based upon his logic. The more concrete cate-
gories of the " Philosophy of Right " are related each to the
next m the same way as are the more abstract categories
treated of in the logic. But the relation of the ethics to
the logic is not tliat of superstructure to foundation or of
application to principle, but of the more concrete to the less
concrete stage of evolution. One single life runs through
the whole organism of the work. Hence, Dr. Gans is not
wrong in stating that this work is an essential part of
Hegel's philosophy, and adding that with the entire system
It must stand or fall. Rather, correcting the dramatic
tone of the remark, he says in effect that standing and
falhng are not the only possibilities in the case of a great
philosophy. Nor, again, can the different works of

genume philosopher be separated into those that are gold
and those tliat are alloy. His work as a whole becomes a
common possession, and in that way makes ready, as Dr
Clans say, for a higher thought. The uufpuilified rejection of
any part of a philosopher's work is a challenge to 'his claim
to rank as a great thinker. But the only challenge which
he could himself accept as geimiue, is the one which is
prepared to call in question the basis of his entire system
Perhaps in the " Philosoi)hy of Right " the average

Xll

translator's preface.

philosophical worker comes more quickly to understand
some hmg of Hegel than in his other writings. At least
Hegel m this book is more likely to collide directly with
the reader s prepossessions, and therefore more speedily
stimulates him to fom his own view. No genuine philo-
sopher will hesitate to show what form his principles
assume in relation to tangible human interests. Hegel
exhibits philosophic breadth by dressing up his ideas for
the thoroughfare, where the every-day thinker finds it pos-
sible to hob and nob with the master. Yet the student
must be a^m cautioned not to fancy that, because he
feels sure that Hegel's conception of the family, of the
monarch, or of war is defective, he has left his author
behind. Such a feeling is at best only a first step, and the
student must go on to know how these practical ideas
ot Hegel are necessitated by his general conception of the
process of spirit. And the sure feeling can survive only if
it 18 transformed into a consistent criticism of this funda-
mental process. The stronghold of Hegel may not be im-
pregnable, but it will not fall on a mere summons to sur-
render.

The object of the translator is to let Hegel speak at large
tor himself. What liberties have been taken with the
Hegelian vocabulary are illustrated bv the index of words
to be found at the close of this volume. It has been con-
sidered quite within the province of a translator to
ame borate Hegel's rigid ]>hraseology. Even as it is the
il^nghsh would read more smoothly, had the words "the
mdividual " " the subject," etc., been more frequently used
mstead of "particularity" and "subjectivity," but the
substitution casts a different shade over Hegel's thought
Apart from the w ^rds, the reader of German will miss also
Hegel s brackets and italics.

As Dr. Gans has pointed out, the present work is in form
made up of three elements, the paragraphs proper, the notes
and the additions. The paragraphs comprised the entire

translator's preface.

Xlll

book as it was originally issued. Then Hegel added what he
in all his references to them calls Notes, although they are not
expressly so designated in the German text. For the sake
of simplicity this term has been used throughout the book.
After these notes by Hegel are frequently found Additions
made by students of Hegel from his oral lectures and com-
ments. It is but bare justice to the editors to say that
these additions usually cast a welcome light upon the text.
Yet as they are mere additions, not even supervised by
Hegel, it is no matter of surprise that the student, in
beginning a new paragraph must, in order to get the direct
connection, revert to the closing sentences not of the addi-
tion or note but of the preceding paragraph. It ought to
be some comfort to the earnest reader to have in his hand
all that Hegel on this subject thought to be worth saying.
Mistakes the translator has no doubt made, and it would
be for him fortunate if workers in this department were
sufficiently interested in this translation to point them out.

S. W. Dyde.

Queen's Universitv,

Kingston, Canada,

March 23rd, 1896.

I i

' M

ERRATA.

P. 48, last line, read "consists not in its satisfying."
P. 78, 1. 8 from the end, /or " Auf.," read " Anf."
P. 87, 1. 6, /or "contijjent," read " contingent."
P. 105, 1. 4, /or "soul of freedom," read "soil of freedom "
P. 107, 1. 5, delete " purpose or,"

P. 109, 1. 7 from the end, /or "subjective," read " subjective."
P. 115, 1. 34, read "since man in acting nmst deal with exter-
nality. "

P. 156, 1. 6 from the end, for "independent," read "self-depen-
dent. ^

P. 157, 1. 16, read "such discernment as is implied in the judgment

that, etc.
P. 181, 1. 1,/or "ever," read "even."

P. 198, 1. 12, /or "and mutual relation," read "or mutual rela-

tion.
P. 292, 1. 18, for "mere," read "merely."
I*. 302, 1. 23, for "authorities," read "officers."

n
H

cc
w

to
pc
T]

ca
ho
th
id<
su

COl

gr<

ex(
tas
Th
for

A1
stri

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

The immediate occasion for publishing these outlines is
the need of placing in the hands of my hearers a guide to
my professional lectures upon the Philosophy of Right.
Hitherto I have used as lectures that portion of the
"Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences" (Heidelberg,
1817,) which deals with this subject. The present work
covers the same ground in a more detailed and systematic
way.

But now that these outlines are to be printed and given
to the general public, there is an opportunity of explaining
points which in lecturing would be commented on orally.
Thus the notes are enlarged in order to include cognate or
conflicting ideas, further consequences of the theory advo-
cated, and the like. These expanded notes will, it is
hoped, throw light upon the more abstract substance of
the text, and present a more complete view of some of the
ideas current in our own time. Moreover, there is also
subjoined, as far as was compatible with the purpose of a
compendium, a number of notes, ranging over a still
greater latitude. A compendium proper, like a science,
hiis res subject-matter accurately laid out. With the
exception, possibly, of one or two slight additions, its chief
task IS to arrange the essential phases of its material
This material is regarded as fixed and known, just as the
form IS assumed to be governed by well-ascertained rules
A treatise in philosophy is usually not expected to be con-
structed on such a pattern, perliaps because people sup-

XVI

author's preface.

pose that a philosophical product is a Penelope's web
which must be started anew every day

This treatise differs from the ordinary compendium
mamly m Its method of procedure. It must be under-
stood at the outset that the philosophic way of advancing

method, which IS the only kind of scientific proof avaU-
able in philosophy, is essentially different from everv
other. Only a clear insight into the necessity for this dif-
ference can snatch philosophy out of the ignominious con-
dition into which it has fallen in our day. True the
logical rules, such as those of definition, classification and
inference are now generally recognized to be inadequate

say that the inadequacy of the rules has been felt rather
than recognized, because they have been counted as mere
fetters and thrown aside to make room for free spTech
rom the heart, fancy and random intuition. But when
reflection and relations of thought were required people
unconsciously fell back upon the^ld-fashionld melhodt
inference and formal reasoning.-In my "Science of
fnZJ T T^ '^' ""*"'^ ^^ speculative science

will it L/r'W^^' '''^*^^'^" explanation of method
will be added only here and there. In a work which is
concrete, and presents such a diversity of phases, we may

Tnd LTtT" f' '"^^Tf ^^^^^*^^^ the logical' process'
and mav take for granted an acquaintance witli the scien-
ific procedure. Besides, it may readily be observed that
I the work as a whole, and also the construction of the
.parts, rest upon the logical spirit. From this standpoint
esr^ecially, is it that I would like this treatise to be u'nder
stood and .ludged. In such a work as this we are dealing
with a science, and in a science the matter must not be
separated from the form.

Some, who are thought to be taking a profound view,
are heard to say that everything turns upon the subject-

author's preface.

XVll

matter, and that the form may be ignored. The business
of any writer, and especially of the philosopher, is, as they
say, to discover, utter, and diffuse truth and adequate
conceptions. In actual practice this business usually con-
sists in warming up and distributing on all sides the same
old cabbage. Perhaps the result of this operation may be '
to fashion and arouse the feelings; though even this
small merit may be regarded as superfluous, for " they
have Moses and the prophets: let them hear them."
Indeed, we have great cause to be amazed at the preten-
tious tone of those who take this view. They seem to
suppose that up till now the dissemination of truth
throughout the world has been feeble. They think that
the warmed-up cabbage contains new truths, especially to
be laid to heart at the present time. And yet we see that
what is on one side announced as true, is driven out and
swept away by the same kind of worn-out truth. Out of
this hurly-burly of opinions, that which is neither new nor
old, but permanent, cannot be rescued and preserved
except by science.

Further, as to rights, ethical observances, and the state,
the truth is as old as that in which it is openly displaved
and recognized, namely, the law, morality, and religion.
But as the thinking spirit is not satisfied with possessing
the truth in this simple way, it must conceive it, and thus
acquire a rational form for a content which is already
rational implicitly. In this way the substance is justified
before the bar of free thought Free thought cannot be
satisfied with what is given to it, whether by the external
positive authority of the state or human agreement, or by
the authority of internal feelings, the heart, and the
witness of the spirit, wliich coincides unquestioningly with
the heart. It is the nature of free thought rather to pro-
ceed out of its own self, and hence to demand that it
should know itself as thoroughly one with truth.
The ingenuous mind adheres with simple <;onviction to

XVIU

AUTHOR S PKEFACE.

the truth which is publicly acknowledged. On this foun-
dation it builds its conduct and way of life. In opposition
to this naive view of things rises the supposed difficulty of
detecting amidst the endless differences of opinion anything^
of universal application. This trouble may easily be sup-
posed to spring from a spirit of earnest inquiry. But
in point of fact those who pride themselves upon the exist-
ence of this obstacle are in the plight of him who cannot
see the woods for the trees. The confusion is all of their
own making. Nay, more : this confusion is an indication
that they are in fact not seeking for what is universally
valid in right and the ethical order. If they were at pains
to find that out, and refused to busy themselves with
empty opinion and minute detail, they would adhere to and
act in accordance with substantive right, namely the com-
mands of the state and the claims of society. But a
further difficulty lies in the fact that man thinks, and seeks
freedom and a basis for conduct in thought. Divine as his
right to act in this way is, it becomes a wrong, when it
takes the place of thinking. Thought then regards itself
as free only when it is conscious of being at variance with
what is generally recognized, and of setting itself up as
something original.

The idea that freedom of thought and mind is indicated
only by deviation from, or even hostility to what is every-
where recognized, is most persistent with regard to the
state. The essential task of a philosophy of the state
would thus seem to be the discovery and publication of a
new and original theory. When we examine this idea and
the way it is applied, we are almost led to think that
no state or constitution has ever existed, or now exists.
We are tempted to suppose that we must now begin
and keep on beginning afresh for ever. We are to fancy
that the founding of the social order has depended upon
present devices and discoveries. As to nature, philosophy,
it is admitted, has to understand it as it is. The philo-

author's preface.

XIX

sophers' stone must be concealed somewhere, we say, in
nature itself, as nature is in itself rational. Knowledge
must, therefore, examine, apprehend and conceive the
reason actually present in nature. Not with the super-
ficial shapes and accidents of nature, but with its eternal
harmony, that is to say, its inherent law and essence,
knowledge has to cope. But the ethical world or the
state, which is in fact reason potently and permanently
actualized in self-consciousness, is not permitted to enjoy
the happiness of being reason at all.' On the contrary the

^ There are two kinds of laws, laws of nature and laws of right.
The laws of nature are simply there, and are valid as they are.
They cannot be gainsaid, although in certain cases they may be
transgressed. In order to know laws of njiture, we must set to
work to ascertain them, for they are true, and only our ideas of
them can be false. Of these laws the measure is outside of us.
Our knowledge adds nothing to them, and does not further their
operation. Only our knowledge of them expands. The knowledge
of right is partly of the same nature and partly different. The
laws of right also are simply there, and we have to become ac-
quainted with them. In this way the citizen has a more or less
firm hold of them as they are given to him, and the jurist also
abides by the same standpoint. But there is also a distinction.
In connection with the laws of right the spirit of investigation is
stirred ujt, and our attention is turned to the fact that the laws,
because they are different, are not abscdute. Laws of right are
established and handed down by men. The inner voice must
necessarily collide or agree with them. Man cannot be limited to
what is presented to him, but maintains that he has the standard
or right within himself. He may be subject to the necessity and
force of external authority, but not in the same way as he is to the
necessity of nature ; for always his inner being says to him how a
thing ought to be, and within himself he finds the confirmation or
lack of confirmation of what is generally accepted. In nature the
highest truth is that a law is. In right a thing is not valid be-
cause it is, since every one demands that it shall conform to his
standard. Hence arises a possible conflict between Avliat is and
what ought to be, between absolute unchanging right and the
arbitrary decision of what ought to be right. Such division and
strife occur only on the soil of the spirit. Thus the unique privi-

author's preface.

\V.

spiritual universe is looked upon as abandoned by God, and
given over as a prey to accident and chance. As in this
way the divine is eliminated from the ethical world, truth
must be sought outside of it. And since at the same time
reason should and does belong to the ethical world, truth,
being divorced from reason, is reduced to a mere specula-
tion. Thus seems to arise the necessity and duty of every
thinker to pursue a career of his own. Not that he needs
to seek for the philosophers' stone, since the philosophizing
of our day has saved him the trouble, and every would-be
thinker is convinced that he possesses the stone already
without search. But these erratic pretensions are, as it
indeed happens, ridiculed by all who, whether they are
aware of it or not, are conditioned in their lives by the

lege of the spirit would appear to lead to discontent and unhappi-
ness, and frequently we are directed to nature in contrast with the
fluctuations of lif6. But it is exactly in the opposition arising
between absolute right, and that which the arbitrary will seeks fo
make right, that the need lies of knowing thorougiily what right
is. Men must openly meet and face their reason, and consider the
rationality of right. This is the subject-matter of our science in
contrast with jurisprudence, which often has to do merely with
contradictions. Moreover the world of to-day has an imperative
need to make this investigation. In ancient times respect and
reverence for the law were universal. But now the fashion of the
time has taken another turn, and thought confronts everything
Avhich has been approved. Theories now set themselves in opjio-
sition to reality, and make as though they were absolutely true
and necessary. And there is now more pressing need to know and
conceive the thoughts upon right. Since thought has exalted itself
as the essential form, we must now be careful to apprehend right
also as thought. It would look as though the door were thrown
open for every casual opinion, when thought is thus made to super-
vene upon right. But true thought of a thiniv is not an opinion,
but the conception of the thing itself. The conception of the thing
does not come to us by nature. Every man has fingers, and may
have brush and colours, Init lie is not by reason of that a painter.
So is it with thought. Tlie thought of right is not a thing which
every man has at first hand. True thinking is thorough acquaint-
ance with the obj'>ct. Hence our knowled; must be scientific.

author's preface.

XXI

state, and find their minds and wills satisfied in it. These,
who include the majority if not all, regard the occupation
of philosophers as a game, sometimes playful, sometimes
earnest, sometimes entertaining, sometimes dangerous, but
always as a mere game. Both this restless and frivolous
reflection and also this treatment accorded to it might
safely be left to take their own course, were it not that
betwixt them philosophy is brought into discredit and con-
tempt. The most cruel despite is done when every one is
convinced of his ability to pass judgment upon, and discard
philosophy witho^Jt any special study. No such scorn is
heapefl v.von any other art or science.

In point of fact the pretentious utterances of recent
philosophy regarding the state have been enough to justify
any one who cared to meddle with the question, in the con-
viction that he could prove himself a philosopher by
weaving a philosophy out of his own brain. Notwith-
standing this conviction, that which passes for philosophy
has openly announced that truth cannot be known. The
truth with regard to ethical ideals, the state, the govern-
ment and the constitution ascends, so it declares, out of
each man's heart, feeling, and enthusiasm. Such declara-
tions have been poured especially into the eager ears of the
young. The words " God giveth truth to his chosen in
sleep " have been applied to science ; hence every sleeper
has numbered himself amongst the chosen. But what he
deals with in sleep is only the wares of sleep. Mr. Fries,'
one of the leaders of this shallow-minded host of philo-
sophers, on a public festive occasion, now become celebrated,
has not hesitated to give utterance to the following notion
of the state and constitution: " When a nation is ruled by a
commou spirit, then from below, out of the people, will
come life sufiicient for the discharge of all public business.

^ I have already had occasion to notice the siiallowneps of his
science. See " Science of Logic " (Niiruberg, 1812), Introduction,
p. 17.

xxn

author's preface.

Living associations, united indissolubly by the holy bond of
friendship, will devote themselves to every side of national
service, and every means for educating the people." This
is the last degree of shallowness, because in it science
is looked upon as developing, not out of thought or concep-
tion, but out of direct perception and random fancy. Now
the organic connection of the manifold branches of the
social system is the architectonic of the state's rationality,
and in this supreme science of state architecture the
strength of the whole is made to depend upon the harmony
of all the clearly marked phases of public life, and the
stability of every pillar, arch, and buttress of the social
edifice. And yet the shallow doctrine, of which we have
spoken, permits this elaborate structure to melt and lose
itself in the brew and stew of the " heart, friendship, and
inspiration." Epicurus, it is said, belie\ed that the world
generally should be given over to each individual's opinions
and whims ; and according to the view we are criticising
the ethical fabric should be treated in the same way. By
this old wives' decoction, which consists in founding upon
the feelings what has been for many centuries the labour of
reason and understanding, we no longer need the guidance
of any ruling conception of thought. On this point
Goethe's Mephistopheles, and the poet is a good authority,
has a remark, which I have already used elsewhere :

" Veraelite mir V'orstand uiid WiHaensclmft,
(It's Mensclien allerliooliHte (Jalien—
So hast (lem Teufel dieli erjieben
un»' imisst zu (Irunde <j;filin."

It is no surprise that the view jusr criticised should
appear in the form of piety. Where, indeed, has this
whirlwind of impulse not sought to justify itself? In
godliness and ti^e Bible it has imagined itself able to find
authority for des^)iping order and law. And, in fact, it is
piety of a sort which has reduced tiie whole organized
system of truth to elementary intuition a-.d feeling. But

author's preface.

xxm

piety of the right kind leaves this obscure region, and!
comes out into the daylight, where tho idea unfolds and
reveals itself. Out of its sanctuary it brings a reverence
for th 5 law and truth which are absolute and exalted above
all subjective feeling.

The particular kind of evil consciousness developed by
the wishy-washy eloquence already alluded to, may be
detected in the following way. It is most unspiritual.
when it speaks most of the spirit. It is the most dead
and leathern, when it talks of the scope of life. When it
is exhibiting the greatest self-seeking and vanity it has
most on its tongue the words " people " and " nation."
But its peculiar mark, found on its very forehead, is its
hatred of law. Eight and ethical principle, the actual
world of right and ethical life, are apprehended in thought,
and by thought are given definite, general, and rational
form, and this reasoned right finds expression in law.
But feeling, which seeks its own pleasure, and conscience,
which finds right in private conviction, regard the law as
their most bitter foe. The right, which takes the shape of
law and duty, is by feeling looked upon as a shackle or
dead cold letter. In this law it does not recognize itself
and does not find itself free. Yet the law is the reason of
the object, and refuses to feeling the privilege of warming
itself at its private hearth. Hence the law, as we shall
occasionally observe, is the Shibboleth, by means of which
are detected the false brethren and friends of the so-called
people.

Inasmuch as the purest charlatanism has won the name
of philosophy, and has succeeded in convincing the public
that its practices are philosophy, it has now become almost
a disgrace to speak in a ])hilo8oj)hic way about the state.
Nor can it be taken ill, if honest men income impatient,
when the subject is broached. Still less is it a surprise
that the government has at last turned its attention to this
false philosophizing. With us philosophy is not practised

[ f

XXIV

author's preface.

t-VV

CJL-^ as a private art. as it was by the Greeks, but has a public
i- ii' J.^ ^'1^7 ^";^^^^«"y^therefore be employed only in the service
U.tU.-f^v^f the state. The government has, up till now, shown
p cvUUc . ^uch confidence in the scholars in this department as to
\ ^. ,. ^leave the subject matter of philosophy wholly in their

hands. Here and there, perhaps, has been shown to this
science not confidence so much as indifference, and pro-
fessorships have been retained as a matter of tradition
in J^ ranee, as far as I am aware, the professional teaching
of metaphysics at least has fallen into desuetude. In anv
case the^ confidence of the state has been ill requited by
the teachers of this subject. Or. if we prefer to see in the
state not confidence, but indifference, the decay of funda-
mental know edge must be looked upon as a severe penance.
Indeed, shallowness is to all appearance most endurable
and most m harmony with the maintenance of order and
peace, when it' does not touch or hint at any real issue.
Hence it would not be necessary to bring it under public
control, if the state did not require deeper teaching and
msight, and expect science to satisfy the need. Yet this
shallowness, notwithstanding its seeming innocence, does
bear upon social life, right and duty generally, advancing
principles which are the very essence of s'uperficialitv
r Ihese. as we have learned so decidedly from Plato, are the
principles of the Sophists, according to which the basis of
right IS subjective aims and opinions, subjective feelintr
and private conviction. The result of such principles is
quite as much the destruction of the ethical system, of the
upright conscience, of love and right, in private persons,
as ot i)ublic order and the institutions of the state The
significance of these facts for the authorities will not be
obscured by tlie claim that the holder of these perilous
doctrines should be trusted, or by the immunity of office.
The authorities will not l)e deterred by the demand that
tliey should protect and give free pluy to a theory which
strikes at the substantial basis of conduct, namely uui.

author's preface.

XXV

versal principles, and thai thev should disregard insolence
on the ground of its being the exercise of the teacher's
function. To him, to ivhom God gives office, He gives also
understanding is a well-worn jest, which no one in our time
would lilce to take seriously.

In the methods of teaching philosophy, which have under
the circumstances been reanimated by the government, the
important element of protection and support cannot be
ignored. The study of philosophy is in many ways in
need of such assistance. Frequently in scientific, religious,
and other works may be read a contempt for philosophy.
Some, who have no conspicuous education and are total
strangers to philosophy, treat it as a cast-off garment.
They even rail against it, and regard as foolishness and
sinful presumption its efforts to conceive of God and
physical and spiritual nature. They scout its endeavour
to know the truth. Keason, and again reason, and reason
in endless iteration is by them accused, despised, con-
demned. Free expression, also, is given by a large number
of those, who are sup])osed to be cultivating scientific
research, to their annoyance at the unassailable claims of
the conception. When we, I say, are confronted with
such phenomena as these, we are tempted to harbour the
thought that old traditions of tolerance have fallen out of
use, and no longer assure to philosophy a place and public
recognition.^

' Tlie saiiio view finds expression in a letter of Joh. v. MiiJler
("Works," I'lirt VIII., ].. ."(l), wlio, speaking of tlie condition of
Rome in the year 1H03, wlien the city was under P^endi rule,
writes, " A professor, asked how the puhlic academies were doinj,',
answered, ' On les tole; ' eoninie les hordels : ' ' Similarly the so'-
called theory of reas(»n or lo;;ie we may still hear commended,
perhaps under <he lielief that it is too dry and unfruitful a science
to claim any one's attention, or, if it be pursued here and there,
that its formuhe are without content, and. thouKli not of much
iiinu], can he of no j-reat iiarm. Hence the reconunendation, so it
is thouj,dit, if useless, can do no injury.

XXVI

author's preface.

These presumptuous utterances, which are in vogue in
our time, are, strange to say, in a measure justified by the
shallowness of the current philosophy. Yet, on the other
hand, they have sprung from the same root as that against
which they so thanklessly direct their attacks. Since that
self-named philosophizing has declared that to know the
truth is vain, it has reduced all matter of thought to the
same level, resembling in this way the despotism of the
Roman Empire, which equalized noble and slave, virtue
and vice, honour and dishonour, knowledge and ignorance.
In such a view the conceptions of truth and the laws of
ethical observance are simply opinions and subjective con-
victions, and the most criminal principles, provided only
that they are convictions, are put on a level with these
laws. Thus, too, any paltry special object, be it never so
flimsy, is given the same value as an interest common to
all thinking men and the bonds of the established social
world.

Hence it is for science a piece of good fortune that that
kind of philosophizing, which might, like scholasticism,
have continued to spin its notions within itself, has been
brought into contact with reality. Indeed, such contact
was, as we have said, inevitable. The real world is in
earnest with the principles of right and duty, and in the
full light of a consciousness of these principles it lives.
With this world of reality philosophic cob-web spinning
has come into open rupture. Now, as to genuine philosophy
it is precisely its attitude to reality which has been mis-
apprehended. Philosophy is, as I have already observed,
[ an inquisition into the rational, and therefore the appre-
I hension of the real and present. Hence it cannot be the
exposition of a world beyond, which is merely a castle in
the air, Iiaving no existence except in the terror of a one-
sided and empty formalism of thought. In the following
treatise I have remarked that even Plato's "Eepublic,"
now regarded as the byword for an empty ideal, has grasped

AUTHOR .S PREFACE.

XXVll

the essential nature of the ethical observances of the
Greeks. He knew that there was breaking in upon Grreek
life a deeper principle, which could directly manifest itself
only as an unsatisfied longing and therefore as ruin.
Moved by the same longing Plato had to seek help against
it, but had to conceive of the help as coming down from
above, and hoped at last to have found it in an external
special form of Greek ethical observance. He exhausted
himself in contriving how by means of this new society to
stem the tide of ruin, but succeeded only in injuring more
fatally its deeper motive, the free infinite personality.
Yet he has proved himself to be a great mind because the
very principle and central distinguishing feature of his
idea is the pivot upon which the world-wide revolution
then in process turned :

What is rational is real ;
And what is real is rational.

Upon this conviction staud not philosophy only but even
every unsophisticated consciousness. From it also pro-
ceeds the view now under contemplation that the spiritual
universe is the natural. When reflection, feeling, or what-
ever other form the subjective consciousness may assume,
regards the present as vanity, and thinks itself to be
beyond it and wiser, it finds itself in emptiness, and, as it
has actuality only in the present, it is vanity throughout.
Against the doctrine that the idea is a mere idea, figment
or opinion, philosophy preserves the more profound view
that nothing is real except the idea. Hence arises the effort
to recognize ni the temporal and transient the substance,
which is immanent, and the eternal, which is present.
The rational is synonymous with the idea, because in((
realizing itself it passes into external existence. It thus'
appears in an endless wealth of forms, figures and phe-
nomena. It wraps its kernel round with a robe of many
colours, in which consciousness finds itself at home.

xxviii

AUTHOR'S PREFACE.

'li

Through this varied husk the conception first of all pene-
trates ,n order to touch the pulse, and then feel it
throbbing in its external manifestations. To brine to
order the endlessly varied relations, which constitute'th:
outer appearance of the rational essence is not the task of
philosophy Such material is not suitable for it, and "t
can well abstain from giving good advice about these
thmgs. Plato could refrain from recommending to the

dandle them m their arms. So could Fiehte forbear to
construe, as hey say, the supervision of passports toTuch
a pom as to demand of all suspects that not on y a
description of them but also their photograph, should be
inserted in the pass. Philosophy now exhibit no face of
such details These superfine concerns it may neglect d
the more safely, since it shows itself of the most iTbe^
spirit in Its attitude towards the endless mass of obS
a,.d circumstances. By such a course science will escane
the hate which is visited upon a multitude of circumstlatel
and institutions by the vanity of a better knowlediT I„
this hate bitterness of mind finds the greatest pWe a"
It can in no other way attain to a feeling of selLtrm:

This treatise, in so far as it contains a political science

8 nothing more than an attempt to conceive of and present'

he state as in itself rational. As a philosophic wrC i

m^t be on its guard against constructing a state as"

ought to be. Philosophy cannot teach the state what t

should be, but only how it, the ethical universe, il t^ be

Uov VoSor, ISov Kai ro 7n'|^,,f^a.
Hie Khodu.s, flic Haltu8.

To appreliend what is is the task of philosophy, because
what IS IS reason. As for the individual, evlry one i a
sou of his time ; so pJiilosoj.hy also is it, time apprehended
in thoughts It ,s just as foolish to fancy tha i„v philo.
sophycan transcend its present world, „ that an M

k:k

author's preface.

XXIX

vidual could leap out of his time or jump over Rhodes. If
a theory transgresses its time, and builds up a world as ifc
ought to be, it has an existence merely in the unstable
element of opinion, which gives room to every wandering
fancy.
With little change the above saying would read :

Here is the rose, here dance.

The barrier which stands between reason, as self-con-
scious spirit, and reason as present reality, and does not
permit spirit to find satisfaction in reality, is some abstrac-
tion, which is not free to be conceived. To recognize reason
as the rose in the cross of the present, and to find delight
in it, is a rational insight which implies reconciliation with
reality. This reconciliation philosophy grants to those
who have felt the inward demand to conceive clearly, to
preserve subjective freedom while present in substantive
reahty, and yet though possessing this freedom to stand
not upon the particular and contingent, but upon what is
self -originated and self- completed.

This also is the more concrete meaning of what was a!
moment ago more abstractly called the unity of form and'
content. Form in its most concrete significance is reason,
as an mtellectual ai)preheusion which conceives its object!
Content, again, is reason as the substantive essence of\
social order and nature. The conscious identity of form '
and content is the i)hilosophical idea. ^

It is a self-assertion, which does honour to man, to re-
cognize nothing in sentiment which is not justified by
thought. This self-will is a feature of modern times, bein.r
indeed the peculiar princii.le of Protestantism, 'what
was mitiated by Luther as faith in feeling and the witness
ot the spirit, the more mature mind strives to apprehend
in conception. In that way it seeks to free it^.elf in the
in-esent, and so find there itself. It is a celebrated savin- ^
that a half philosophy leads away from God, while a true

f f \\

XXX

author's PHEFACE.

philosophj leads to God tit i. tu
^y in passing, which re»ards\„ , '"""^ h^ltness. I may
tion to truthO This sS , ° n'if ff ? "" "PP^^™"-
tie state. Reason cannot Jnttf?: '"• ?* ^"'^''^ »*
proxmation, something ThiltlJ '?* '^ ""« »P-
must be spued out of thrmouth °t ^""" ™' hot, and
teuted with the cold sceptil " ,k * "*'" ""' " '«' <">'^-
things go hadly, or at be "Tv V" "^^ "°"'' "' *™«
-e must keep tie peace wtrrLTtf^'^'f T"' =""' '■""
.s nothing better to be had 't'"^' "f '■'' ^'^"'"^ t^ere
more vital peace. ^"'"'''"Jge creates a much

wo?d ^a: r:;rt": r^o^ '^ '-^^ ^ *- «>o

at l«lst always comes too late PM ?"'''*'' P"'°'"'P''y
ot the world, does not appl; „^,"^"°P,V' ''^ "=« 'hought
>ts formative process and ,1. , "'''"■'' '"'^ »mpleted

thus corroborates trChing oft,"""' '•"'^^- History
■n the maturity of realittdr^.f f ""-ception that only

part to the real appS th ,"'"' "PP*"'"' -""ter!
and shapes it imo'^aalnteUeet ,?r "f^ " "^ ^"''»*'»^«'.
sophy paints its grev inlrev ™ T^^""'- ^'«" PWlo-
old. and by mean's of grerii can, TT "' '* ""' ''«"'"'»
only known. The owl of M ' '*J"''»ated, but

^-hent. Shades of nightlttSnr^ "^ '"^''' ""'^

p'ac:\r:;:rti;r-t::ra"d\''p'^'-"'«''»

standpoint of the work wwi^ ■!" /"^J^tively „f the
sophical account of the cssen Ll '°*'''^''<=«- A philo.
and objective treatment s'r'""' ''-'^- --tiflc
those which proceed from such „ ,7' ™''""™^' "ther than
by the author as unrefle"i?eL„f """■*• """^^ "* ''"^"i

Criticisms must be for i:;^ rtr:^,jrne?i-"-

Bki!ll\, oT/^mc 25M, 1820.

THE PHILOSOPHr OF RIGHT.

INTRODUCTION.

1. The philosophic science of right has as its object the
idea of right, i.e., the conception of right and the realization
of the conception. S --O-* « h f^-^'tA^' ^ /-^«..«-««-a. — .

i^o^e.— Philosophy has to do with ideas or realized
thoughts, and hence not with what we have been accus-
tomed to call mere conceptions. It has indeed to exhibit
the onesidedness and untruth of these mere conceptions
and to show that, while that which commonly bears the'
name " conception," is only an abstract product of the un-
derstanding, the true conception alone has reality and gives
this reality to itself. Everything, other than the reality
which IS established by the conception, is transient surface
existence, external accident, opinion, appearance void of
essence, untruth, delusion, and so forth. Through the
actual shape, which it takes upon itself in actuality, is the
conception itself understood. This shape is the other
essential element of the idea, and is to be distinguished
from the form, which exists only as conception.

Addition.— The conception and its existence are two sides
distmct yet united, like soul and body. The body is the'
same life' as the soul, and yet ihe two can be named inde-
pendently. A soul without a body would not be a living
thing, and vice versd. Thus the visible existence of the
conception is its body, just as the body obeys tlie soul which
produced it. Seeds contain the tree and its whole power,

,!!

^ IIIB PllII.OSOPIlV OF BIGHT.

thougli they are not the tree itself; the tree corresnot,,!.
aeeuratety to the »i„,ple structure of .he seed. If hill;
does not correspond to the soul, it is defective. The unftv

mea. It IS not a mere harmony of the two, but their com-
plete loterpenetration. There lives nothing, which is n"
m some way idea. Thejdea olright is freeC wh ic,,"
.t .s to be apprehended truly, must be known both n
I coneep .on and m the embodiment of the conception.

2. The science of right is a part of philosophv. Henee
.t mus develop the idea, which is the reason of "an object
out of the conception. It is the same thing to sav that t
must regard the peculiar internal developmLo^Ie tht .g
tself. b.nce it is a part, it has a definite beginning which
.s the result and truth of what goes before, and this tha
goes before, constitutes its so-called pro^f. Hen « tl«

ot nght The deduction of the conception is prcsun-
posad ,u th,s treatise, and is to be considered as aSy

4«-(.« -Philosophy forms a circle. It has, since it
must somehow make a begmning, a primary, direc ly g ven
matter, wh.ch is not proved and is not a result. But tlTs
starting-pomtis simply relative, since frem another pon
of view It appears as a result. Philosophy is a conseq„en,.e
which does not hang in the air or fo4 a directly Tw be:
gmnmg, but is self-cndosed.

According t„ the formal uuphilosophic method of the
sciences, deflmtion is the first desideratum, as regards at
least, he e.tTmal scientific form. The po itive ^^l^ H
right, however, is little concerned with definition. sT^ce its

particulai phases of the laws. For this reason it has been

and in fact the more disconnected and contradictory the
phases of a right are, the less possible is a definition ^it

INTKODUCTIOxV. 3

A definition should contain" only universal features ; but
these forthwith bring to light contradictions, which iL the
case of law are injustice, in all their nakedness. Thus in
Roman law, for instance, no definition of man was possible,
because it excluded the slave. The conception of man was
destroyed by the fact of slavery. In the same way to have
defined property and owner would have appeared to be
perilous to many relations.— But definitions may perhaps
be derived from etymology, for the reason, principally, that
m this way special cases are avoided, and a basis is found
m the feeling and imaginative thought of men. The cor-
rectness of a definition would thus consist in its agreement
with existing ideas. By such a method everything essen-
tially scientific is cast aside. As regards the content there is
cast aside the necessity of the self-contained and self-
developed object, and as regards the form there is discarded
the nature of the conception. In j^hilosophic knowledge
the necessity of a conception is the main thing, and the
process, by which it, as a result, has come into being, is
the proof and deduction. After the content is seen to'be
necessary independently, the second point is to look about
for that which corresponds to it in existing ideas and modes
of speech. But the way in which a conception exists in its
truth, and the way it presents itself in random ideas not
only are but must be different both in form and structure.
If a notion is not in its content false, the conception can be
shown to be contained in it and to be already there in its
essential traits. A notion may thus be raised to the form
of a conception. But so little is any notion the measure
and criterion of an independently necessarv and true con-
ception, that it must accept truth from the conception be
justified by it, and know itself through it.— If the method
of knowing, which proceeds by formal definition, inference
and proof, has more or less disappeared, a worse one has
come to take its place. This new method maintains that
Ideas, as, e.g., the idea of right in all its aspects, are to be

I!
I Mi

i ?

lit i

iilill i

4 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

directly apprehended as mere facts of consciousness, and
that natural feeling, or that heightened form of it which
is known as the inspiration of one's own breast, is the
source of right. This method may be the most convenient
of all, but it is also the most un philosophic. Other fea-
tures of this view, referring not merely to knowledge but
directly to action, need not detain us here. While the first
or formal method went so far as to require in definition the
form of the conception, and in proof the form of a necessity
of knowledge, the method of the intuitive consciousness
and feeling takes for its principle the arbitrary contingent
consciousness of the subject.— In this treatise we take for
granted the scientific procedure of philosophy, which has
been set forth in the philosophic logic.

3. Eight is positive in general (a) in its form, since it has
validity in a state; and this established authority is the
principle for the knowledge of right. Hence we have the
positive science of right. (6) On the side of content this
right receives a positive element (a) through the particular
character of a nation, the stage of its historical develop-
ment, and the interconnection of all the relations which are
necessitated by nature : (/3) through the necessity that a
system of legalized right must contain the application of
the universal conception to objects and cases whose qualities
are given externally. Such an application is not the specu-
lative thought or the development of the conception, but a
subsumption made by the understanding : (y) through the
ultimate nature of a decision which has become a realitv.

^o^e.— Philosophy at least cannot recognize the authority
of feeling, inclination and caprice, when they are set in
opposition to positive right and the laws.— It is an acci-
dent, external to the nature of positive right, when force or
tyranny becomes an element of it. It will be shown later
(§§ 211-214), at what point right must become positive.
The general phases which are there deduced, are here only
mentioned, in order to indicate the limit of philosophic

INTRODUCTION.

are set in

right, and also to forestall the idea or indeed the demand
that by a systematic development of right should be pro-
duced a law-book, such as would be needed by an actunl
state. — To convert the differences between right of nature
and positive right, or those between philosophic right and
positive right, into open antagonism would be a complete
misunderstanding. Natural right or philosophic right
stands to positive right as institutions to pandects.— With
regard to the historical element in positive right, referred
to in the paragraph, it may be said that the true historical
view and genuine philosophic standpoint have been pre-
sented by Montesquieu. He regards legislation and its
specific traits not in an isolated and abstract way, but
rather as a dependent element of one totality, connecting
it with all the other elements which form the character of
a nation and an epoch. In this interrelation the various
elements receive their meaning and justification.— .The
purely historical treatment of the phases of right, as they
develop in time, and a comparison of their results with
existing relations of right have their own value ; but they
are out of place in a philosophic treatise, except in so far
as the development out of historic grounds coincides with
the development out of the conception, and the historical
exposition and justification can be made to cover a justifica-
tion which is valid in itself and independently. This dis-
tinction is as manifest as it is weighty. A phase of right
may be shown to rest upon and follow from the circum-
stances and existing institutions of right, and yet may be
absolutely unreasonaible and void of right. This is the case
in Eoman law with many aspects of private right, which
were the logical results of its interpretation of paternal power
and of marriage. Further, if the aspects of right are really
right and reasonable, it is one thing to point out what with
regard to them can truly tate place through the concep-
tion, and quite another thing to portray the manner of
their appearance in history, along with the circumstances,

TIM-: PHILOSOPHY OF RKJIIT.

fl"

Is I *

cases, wants aiul events, which thej have called forth.
Such a demonstration and deduction from nearer or more
remote historic causes, which is the occui>ation of i>rag.
matic history, is frequently called exposition, or i^referably
conception, under the opinion that in such an indication of
the historic; elements is found all that is essential to a con-
ception of law and institutions of right. In point of fact
that whi<-h is truly essential, the conception of the matter
has not been so much as mentioned.— So also we are accus-'
tomed to hear of Roman or German (jonceptions of right
and of conceptions of riglit as they are laid down in this
or that statute-book, when indeed nothing about concep-
tions can be found in them, but only general phases of
right, propositions derived from the understandino-, <r,.neral
maxims, and laws.-By neglect of the distinction, just
alluded to, the true standpoint is obscured and the question
of a valid justification is shifted into a justification based
upon cii-cumstances ; results are founded on presupposi-
tions, which in tliemselves are of little value; and in
general the relative is i>ut in place of the absolute, and
external api)earance in place of the nature of the thing.
When the historical vindicatiim substitutes the external
origin for the origin from the conception, it uuconsciouslv
does the opj>osite of whut it intends. Suppose that an
institution, originating under definite circumstances, is
shown to be necessary and to answer its i.uri)ose, and that
It accomplishes all that is required of it bv the historical
8tandi)oint. Wlien such a ])roof is made 'to stand for a
justification of the thing itself, it follows that, when the
circumstances are removed, the instituticm has lost its
meaning and its right. When, e.g., it is sought to sui>port
and defend cloisters on the grounds that thev have served
to clear and pe(»ple the wilderness and by teaching and
transcribing to i>reserve scholarshij). it follows that just, in
so far as the circumstances are changed, cloisters have
become aimless and superHuous.— In so far as the historic

INTKODUCTION. 7

significance, or the historical exposition and interpretation
of the origin of anything is in different spheres at home
with the philosophic view of the origin and conception of
the tiling, one might tolerate the other. But, in illustration
of the ract that they neither here nor in science, preserve
this peaceful attitude, I quote from Mr. Hugo's " Lehrbuch
der Geschichte des romischen Rechts." ' In this work
Mr. Hugo says (5th edition § 53) that " Cicero praises the
twelve tables witli a side glance at philosopliy," " but the
philosopher Phavorinus treats them exactly as many a
great philosophic since has treated positive right." Mr.
Hugo makes the ultimate reply to such a method as that
of Phavorinus, when he says of him that he "under-
stood the twelve tables just as little as the philosophers
understood positive right."— The correction of the philo-
sopher Phavorinus by the jurist Sextus Csecilius (Gellius.
" Noct. Attic." XX. 1) expresses the lasting and true i)rinciple
of the justification of that which is in its content merely
positive. " Non ignoras," as Coecilius felicitously remarks
to Phavorinus, " legum opportunitates et medelas pro tem-
l»orum moribus, et pro rerum publicarum generibus, ac
pro utilitatum prresentium ratiouibus, proque vitiorum,
quibus medendum est, fervoribus mutari ac flecti, neque
uno statu cousistere, quin, ut facies coeli et maris, ita
rerum atque fortune tempestatibus varientur. Quid
salubrius visum est rogatione ilia Stolonis, etc., quid utilius
plebisiito Vocouio, etc., quid tam necessarium existimatum
est, quam lex Licinia, etc. ? Omnia tamen haec obliterata
et operta sunt civitatis opulentia," etc.— These laws are
positive so far as they have meaning and appropriateness
under the circumstances, and thus have only an historic
value. Fur this reason they are in their nature transient.
Whether the legislator or government was wise or not in
what it did for its own immediate time and circumstances
is a matter quite by itself and is for history to say.
' " Text-ltook of tho History of Koman I^aw."

m 4

r:i!

-I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

History will the more profoundly recognize the action of
the legislator in proportion as its estimate receives support
from the philosophic standpoint. -From the vindications of
the twelve tables against the judgment of Phavorinus I
shall give further examples, because in them Csecilius
furnishes an illustration of tlie fraud which is indissolubly
bound up with the methods of the understanding and its
reasonings. He adduces a good reason for a bad thing
and supposes that he has in that way justified the thing.'
rake the horrible law which permitted a creditor, after the
lapse of a fixed term of respite, to kill a debtor or sell him
into slavery. Nay, further, if there were several creditors
they weie permitted to cut pieces ofP the debtor, and thus
divide him amongst them, with the proviso that if any one of
them should cut off too much or too little, no action should
be taken against him. It was this clause, it may be noticed
which stood Shakespeare's Shylock in "The Merchant of
Venice " in such good stead, and was by him most thank-
fully accepted. Well, for this law C^cilius adduces the
good argument that by it trust and credit were more firmly
secured, and also that, by reason of the very horror of the
law. It never had to be enforced. Not only does he in his
want of thought fail to observe that bv the severity of the
law that very intention of securing trust and credit was
defeated, but he forthwith himself gives an illustration of
the way in which the disproportionate punishment caused
the law to be inoperative, namely through the habit of
giving false witness.-But the remark of Mr. Hugo that
Phavorinus had not understood the law is not to be passed
over. Now any school-boy can understand the law iust
quoted, and better than anyone else would Shylock liave
understood what was to him of such advantage. Hence
by "understand "Mr. Hugo must mean that form of
understanding which consists in bringing to the support of
a law a good reason.— Another failure to understand
asserted by Ctecilius of Phavorinus. a philosopher at any

■A.i

IiNTRODUCTION. 9

rate may without blushing acknowledge: jumentum, which
without any arcera was the only legal way to bring a sick
man into court as a witness, was held to mean not only a
horse but also a carriage or wagon. Further on in this law
C^cilius found more evidence of the excellence and accuracy
of the old statutes, which for the purpose of non-suiting a
sick man at court distinguished not only between a horse and
a wagon, but also, as Csecilius explains, between a wagon
covered and cushioned and one not so comfortably equipped.
Thus one would have the choice between utter severity on
one side, and on the other senseless details. But to exhibit
fully the absurdity of these laws and the pedantic defence
offered in their behalf would give rise to an invincible
repugnance to all scholarship of that kind.

But in his manual Mr. Hugo speaks also of rationalitv
in connection with Roman law, and I have been struck
with the following remarks. He first of all treats of the
epoch extending from the origin of the Republic to the
twelve tables (§§ 38. 89). noticing tliat in Rome people
had many wants, and wei-e compelled in their labour to
use draught animals and beasts of burden, as we ourselves
do, and that the ground was an alternation of hill and
valley, and that the city was set upon a hill, etc. These
statements might, perhai)s, have answered to the sense of
Montesquieu's thought, though in them it would be well-
nigh impossible to find his genius. But after these pre-
hminary i)aragrai)hs. he goes on to sav in § 40, that the
condition of the law was still very far from satisfying the
highest demands of reason. This remark is wholly in
place, as the Roman family-right. slavery, etc., give no
satisfaction to the smallest demands of reason. Yet when
discussing the succeeding ej.oclis, Mr. Hugo forgets to tell
us 111 what particulars, if any, the Roman law has satis-
factorily met the highest demands of reason. Still of the
classic jurists, wh,> flourished in the era of the greatest
expansion of R,»man law as a science, it is said (§ 280)

>-l

THE PHILOSOPHY OK RKJHT.

that "it has been long since been observed that the
Roman jurists were educated in philosophy," but "few
know" (znore will know now through the numerous
editions of Mr. Hugo's manual) " that there is no class of
writers, who. as regards deduction from principles, deserved
to be placed beside the mathematicians, and also, as
regards the quite remarkable way in which they develop
their conceptions, beside the modern founder of meta
physic ; as voucher for this assertion is the notable fact
that nowhere do so many trichotomies occur as in the
classic iurists and in Kant." This form of logical reason-
ing, extolled by Leibnitz, is certainly an essential feature
of the science of right, as it is of mathematics and every
other intelligible science; but the logical procedure of the
men. understanding, spoken of by Mr. Hugo, has nothin.^
to do with the satisfaction of the claims of reason and
with philosophic science. Moreover, the very lack of
logical procedure, which is characteristic of the Roman
jurists and prajtors, is to be esteemed as one of their chief
virtues, since by means of it they obviated the conse-
quences of unrighteous and horrible institutions. Through
their want of logic they were compelled callide to put
sense into mere verbal distinctions, as they did when they
identified IJomrum possessio with inheritance, and also into
silly evasions, for silliness is a defect of logic, in order to
save the letter of the tables, as was done in the Jidio or
urroKpitTtt that nfiliapatroni was a JiUni^ (Heinccc. " Antio
Rom.," lib. i. tit. ii. § 24). But it is absurd to place the
classic jurists, with their use of trichotomy, along with
Kant, and in that way to discern in them the promise of
the development of conceptions.

4. The territory of right is in general the spiritual, and
Its more definite place and origin is the will, which is
free. Thus freedom constitutes the substance and essen-
tial character of the will, and the system of right is
the kingdom of actualized freedom. It is the world of

INTRODUCTION,

spirit, which is produced out of itself, aud is a second
nature.

Addition.— Freedom of will is best explained by refer-
ence to physical nature. Freedom is a fundamental phase
of will, as weight is of bodies. When it is said that
matter is heavy, it might be meant that the predicate is an
accident ; but such is not the case, for in matter there is
nothing which has not weight ; in fact, matter is weight.
That which is heavy constitutes the body, and is the bodv.
Just so is it with freedom and the will; that which is free
is the will. Will without freedom is an empty word, and
freedom becomes actual only as will, as subject. A
remark may also be made as to the connection of willing
and thinking. Spirit, in general, is thought, and by
thought man is distinguished from the animal. But we
must not imagine that man is on one side thinking and on
another side willing, as though he had will in one pocket
and thought in another. Such an idea is vain. The dis-
tinction between thought and will is only that between u
tlieoretical and a practical relation. They are not two
separate faculties. The will is a special way of thinking ;
it is thought translating itself into reality; it is the
impulse of thought to give itself reality. The distinction
between thought and will may be expressed in this way.
When I think an object, I make of it a thought, and take
from it the sensible. Thus I make of it something which
is essentially and directly mine. Only in thought am I
self-contained. Conception is the penetration of the object,
which is then no longer opposed to me. From it I have
taken its own peculiar nature, which it had as an inde-
pendent object in opposition to me. As Adam said to
Eve, " thou art flesh of my flesh and bone of my bone,"
so says the spirit, " Tliis object is spirit of my spirit, and all
alienation has disappeared." Any idea is a universalizing,
and this process belongs to thinking. To make something
universal is to think. The " I " is thought and tlie uni-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

versal. When I say " I," I let fall all particularity of
character, natural endowment, knowledge, age. The I is
emiAj, a point and simple, but in its simplicity active.
The gaily coloured world is before me ; I stand opposed to
it, and in this relation I cancel and transcend the opposi-
tion, and make the content my own. The I is at home in
the world, when it knows it, and still more when it has
j conceived it.

So much for the theoretical relation. The practical, on
the other hand, begins with thinking, with the I itself. It
thus appears first of all as placed in opposition, because it
exhibits, as it were, a separation. As I am practical, I am
active; I act and determine myself; and to determine
myself means to set up a distinction. But these distinc-
tions are again mine, my own determinations come to me ;
and the ends are mine, to which I am impelled. Even
when I let these distinctions and determinations go, setting
them in the so-called external world, they remain mine.
They are that which I have done and made, and bear the
trace of my spirit. That is the distinction to be drawn
between the theoretical and the practical relations.

And now the connection of the two must be also stated.

The theoretical is essentially contained in the practical.

Against the idea that the two are separate runs the fact

that man has no will without intelligence. The will holds

within itself the theoretical, the will determines itself, and

this determination is in the first instance internal. That

which I will I place before my mind, and it is an object for

me. The animal acts according to instinct, is impelled by

something internal, and so is also practical. But it has no

will, because it cannot place before its mind what it

desires. Similarly man cannot use his theoretic faculty

or think without will, for in thinking we are active. The

content of what is thought receives, indeed, the form of

something existing, but this existence is occasioned by our

activity and by it established. These distinctions of theo-

INTRODUCTION.

ularity of
The I is
ty active,
pposed to
le opposi-
; home in
en it has

-ctical, on
tself. It
jecause it
cal, I am
determine
B distinc-
le to me ;
i. Even
3, setting
in mine,
bear the
>e drawn

stated,
jractical.

the fact
ill holds
self, and
1. That
bject for
>elled by
t has no
what it

faculty
e. The
form of

1 by our
of theo-

retical and practical are inseparable ; they are one and the
same ; and in every activity, whether of thought or will,
both these elements are found.

It is worth while to recall the older way of proceeding
with regard to the freedom of the will. First of all, the
idea of the will was assumed, and then an effort was made
to deduce from it and establish a definition of the will.
Next, the method of the older empirical psychology was
adopted, and different perceptions and general phenomena
of the ordinary consciousness were collected, such as re-
morse, guilt, and the like, on the ground that these could
be explained only as proceeding out of a will that is free.
Then from these phenomena was deduced the so-called
proof that the will is free. But it is more convenient to
take a short cut and hold that freedom is given as a fact
of consciousness, and must be believed in.

The nature of the will and of freedom, and the proof
that the will is free, can be shown, as has already been ob-
served (§ 2), only in connection with the whole. The
ground principles of the premises — that spirit is in the
first instance intelligence, and that the phases, through
which it passes in its development, namely from feeling,
through imaginative thinking to thought, are the way by
which it produces itself as will, which, in turn, as thepractical
spirit in general, is the most direct truth of intelligence — I
have presented in my " Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical
Sciences " (Heidelberg, 1817), and hope some day to be
able to give of them a more complete exposition. There is,
to my niiud, so much the moi-e need for me to give my
contribution to, as I hope, the more thorough knowledge
of the nature of spirit, since, as I have there said, it would
be difficult to find a philosophic science in a more neglected
and evil i)light than is that theory of spirit, which is com-
monly called psychology. — Some elements of the conception
of will, resulting from the premises enumerated above are
mentioned in this and the following paragraphs. As to

TlIK PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT.

these, appeal may moreover be made to every individual to
see them in his own self-consciousuess. Everyone will in
the first place, find in himself the ability to abstract him-
self trom all that he is. and in this way prove himself able
ot hmiself to set every content within himself, and thus
have m his own consciousness an illustration of all the
subsequent phases.

5. The will contains (a) the element of pure indetermi-
nateness, i.e., the pure doubling of the I back in thought
upon Itself. In this process every limit or content, present
though it be directly by way of nature, as in want, appe-
tite or impulse, or given in any specific way. is dissolved.
rhus we have the limitless infinitude of absolute abstrac-
tion, or universality, the pure thought of itself.

iVo^e.-Those who treat thinking and willing as two
special peculiar, and separate faculties, and, further, look
upon thought as detrimental to the will, especially the
good will, show from the very start that they know nothing
ot the nature of willing— a remark which we shall be called
upon to make a number of times upon the same attitude
ot mind.-The will on one side is the possibility of abstrac-
tion from every aspect in which the I finds itself or has set
Itself up. It reckons any content as a limit, and flees from
It. This IS one of the forms of the self-direction of the
will and IS by imaginative thinking insisted upon as of
Itself freedom. It is the negative side of the will, or free-
dom as apprehended by the understanding. This freedom
IS that of the void, which has taken actual shape, and is
stirred to passion. It, while remaining purely theoretical
appears m Hindu religion as the fanaticism of pure con-
templation ; but becoming actual it assumes both in
politics and religion the form of a fanaticism, which woul.l
<lestroy the established social order, remove all individuals
suspected of desiring any kind of order, and demolish any
organization which then sought to rise out of the ruins
Only m devastation does the negative will feel that it has

INTUOLUCTION.

reality. It intends, indeed, to bring to pass some positive
social condition, such as universal equality or universal re-
ligious life. But in fact it aoes not will the positive reality
of any such condition, since that would carry in its train a
system, and introduce a separation by way of institutions
and between individuals. But classification and objective
system attain self consciousness only by destroying ueo-ative
freedom. Negative freedom is actuated by a mere solitary
abstract idea, whose realization is nothing but the fury of
desolation.

Addition. — This phase of will implies that I break loose
from everything, give up all ends, and bury myself in ab-
straction. It is man alone who can let go everthing, even
life. He can commit suicide, an act impossible for the
animal, which always remains only negative, abiding in a
state foreign to itself, to which it must merely got accus-
tomed. Man is pure thought of himself, and only in
thinking has he the power to give himself universality and
to extinguish in himself all that is particular and definite.
Negative freedom, or freedom of the understanding, is
one-sided, yet as this one-sidedness contains an essential
feature, it is not to be discarded. But the defect of the
understanding is that it exalts its one-sidedness to the sole
and highest ]>lace. This form of freedom frequently occurs
in history. By the Hindus, e.g., the highest freedom is de-
clared to be persistence in the consciousness of one's simple
identity with himself, to abide in the empty space of one's
own inner being, like the colourless light of pure intuition,
and to renounce every activity of life, every purpose and
every idea. In this way man becomes Brahma ; there is no
longer any distinction between finite man and Brahma,
every difference having been swallowed up in this univer-
sality. A. more concrete manifestation of this freedom is
the fanaticism of ])olitical and religious life. Of this
nature was the terrible epoch of the French Revolution, by
which all distinctions in talent and authority were to have

TIIK PHILOSOPIJY OF KIGUT.

been superseded. In this time of upheaval and commotion
any specific thmg was intolerable. Fanaticism wills an
abstraction and not an articulate association. It finds all
distinctions antagonistic to its indefiniteness. and super

"lrlT:u ^"'''' '"^ *^' ^''""'^ Revolution the people
abolished the institutions which thev themselves had set
up. since every institution is inimical to the abstract self,
consciousness of equality.

6. (/3) The I is also the transition from blank indefinite-
ness to the distinct and definite establishment of a definite
content and object, whether this content be given by nature
or produced out of the conception of spirit. Through this
establishment of itself as a definite thing the I becomes a
reality This is the absolute element of the finitudo nr
speciahzation of the I. nnitude or

Note This second element in the characterization of the
I IS just as negative as the first, since it annuls and re-
places the first abstract negativity. As the particular is
contained in the universal, so this second phase is contained
already m the first, and is only an establishing of what the
first IS implicitly. The first phase, if taken independently.
IS not the true infinitude, i.e., the concrete universal, or
the conception, but limited and onesided. In that it is the
abstraction from all definite character, it has a definite
character Its abstract and one-sided nature constitutes
Its defamte character, its defect and finitude.

The distinct characterization of these two phases of the I
IS found in the philosophy of Fichte as also in that of Kant
Only, in the exposition of Fichte the I. when taken as un-
limited as It IS in the first proposition of his " Wissen-
sohaftslehre." is merely positive. It is the universality
and identity made by the understanding. Hence this ab-
stract I IS in Its independence to be taken as the truth, to
which by way of mere addition comes in the second propo-
sition, the limitation, or the negative in general, whether
It be in the form of a given external limit or of an activity

INTRODUCTION.

jmmotion
wills an
b finds all
id super-
he people
I had set
ract self-

idefinite-
L definite
'y nature
ugh this
jcomes a
itude or

n of the
and re-
icular is
•ntained
i^hat the
idently.
rsal, or
it is the
definite
stitutes

^f the I
f Kant,
as un-
^issen-
Tsality
Lis ab-
uth, to
propo-
hether
ctivitv

of the I._To apprehend the negative as immanent in the
universal or self-identical, and also as in the I, was the
next step, which speculative philosophy had to make. Of
this want they have no presentiment, who like Fichte
never apprehend that the infinite and finite are, if sepa-
rated, abstract, and must be seen as immanent one in the

Addition -This second element makes its appearance as
the opposite of the first ; it is to be understood in its
general form : it belongs to freedom but does not constitute
the whole of It. Here the I passes over from blank in-
determmateness to the distinct establishment of a specific
character as a content or object. I do not will merely, but
I will something. Such a will, as is analysed in the pre-
ceding paragraph, wills only the abstract universal, and
therefore wills nothing. Hence it is not a will The
particular thing, which the will wills is a limitation, since
the will, m order to be a will, must in general limit itself
Limit or negation consists in the will willing something
I'articularizing is thus as a rule named finitude. Ordinary
reflection holds the first element, that of the indefinite, for
the absolute and higher, and the limited for a mere nega-
tion of this indefiniteness. But this indefiniteness is itself
only a negation, in contrast with the definite and finite
ihe I IS solitude and absolute negation. The indefinite
will IS thus quite as much one-sided as the will, which
continues merely in the definite.

7. (y) The will is the unity of these two elements. It is
particularity turned back within itself and thus led back to
universality; it is individuality ; it is the self-direction of
the 1. Thus at one and the same time it establishes itself
as Its own negation, that is to say, as definite and limited
and It also abides by itself, in its self-identity and univer-'
sality, and m this position remains purely self -enclosed —
The I determines itself in so far as it is the reference of
negativity to itself; and yet in this self- reference it is in-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

different to its own definite character. This it knows as
its own, that is, as an ideal or a mere possibility, by which
it is not bound, but rather exists in it merely because it
establishes itself there.— This is the freedom of the will,
constituting its conception or substantive reality. It is its
gravity, as it were, just as gravity is the substantive reality
of a body.

JV^o^e.— Every self-consciousness knows itself as at once
universal, or the possibility of abstracting itself from
everything definite, and as particular, with a fixed object,
content or aim. These two elements, however, are only
abstractions. The concrete and true,— and all that is true
IS concrete,— is the universality, to which the particular is at
first opposed, but, when it has been turned back into itself,
is in the end made equal.— This unity is individuality, but
it is not a simple unit as is the individuality of imaginative
thought, but a unit in terms of the conception (" Ency-
clopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences," §§ 112-114). In
other words, this individuality is properly nothing else than
the conception. The first two elements of the will, that it
can abstract itself from everything, and that it is definite
through either its own activity or something else, are easily
admitted and comprehended, because in their separation
they are untrue, and characteristic of the mere understand,
ing. But into the third, the true and speculative— and all
truth, as far as it is conceived, must be thought specu-
latively— the understanding declines to venture, always
calling the conception the inconceivable. The proof and
more detailed explanation of this inmost reserve of specu-
lation, of infinitude as the negativity which refers itself to
itself, and of this ultimate source of all activity, life and
consciousness, belong to logic, as the purely speculative
philosophy. Here it can be noticed only in passing that,
in the sentences, " The will is universal," " The will directs
itself," the will is already regarded as presupposed subject
or substratum ; but it is not something finished and uni-

INTRODUCTION.

knows as
by which
)ecause it
the will.
It is its
ve reality

i at once
lelf from
d object,
are only
it is true
ular is at
ito itself,
\lity, but
iginative
(" Ency-
14). In
;lse than
I, that it

definite
re easily
paration
erstand-
-and all
t specu-

always
oof and
P specu-
itself to
life and
culative
ig that,
i directs
subject
nd uni-

versal before it determines itself, nor yet before this deter-
mination is superseded and idealized. It is will only when
its activity is self -occasioned, and it has returned into itself.
Addition,— Wha,t we properly call will contains the two
above-mentioned elements. The I is, first of all, as such,
pure activity, the universal which is by itself. Next this
universal determines itself, and so far is no longer by itself,
but establishes itself as another, and ceases to be the uni-'
versal. The third step is that the will, while in this limi-j
tation, i.e., in this other, is by itself. While it limits itself,
it yet remains with itself, and does not lose its hold of the
universal. This is, then, the concrete conception of freedom,
while the other two elements have been thoroughly abs-*
tract and one-sided. But this concrete freedom we already
have in the form of perception, as in friendship and love.
Here a man is not one-sided, but limits himself willingly
in reference to another, and yet in this limitation knows
himself as himself. In this determination he does not
feel himself determined, but in the contemplation of the
other as another has the feeling of himself. Freedom!
also lies neither in indeterminateness nor in determinate-^
ness, but in both. The wilful man has a will which limits
itself wholly to a particular object, and if he has not this
will, he supposes himself not to be free. But the will is not
bound to a particular object, but must go further, for the
nature of the will is not to be one-sided and confined.
Free will consists in willing a definite object, but in so
doing to be by itself and to return again into the universal.
8. If we define this particularizing (/3 § 6) further, we
reach a distinction in the forms of the will, (a) In so far
as the definite character of the will consists in the formal
opposition of the subjective to the objective or external
direct existence, we have the formal will as a self conscious-
ness, which finds an outer world before it. The process by
which individuality turns back in its definiteness into
itself, is the translation of the subjective end, through the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

intervention of an activity and a means, into objectivity.
In the absolute spirit, in which all definite character is
thoroughly its own and true (" Encyclop." § 363), conscious-
ness IS only one side, namely, the manifestation or appear-
ance of the will, a phase which does not require detailed
consideration here.

Addition.~The consideration of the definite nature of
the will belongs to the understanding, and is not in the first
instance speculative. The will as a whole, not only in the
sense of its content, but also in the sense of its form, is
determined. Determinate character on the side of form is
the end, and the execution of the end. The end is at first
merely something internal to me and subiective, but it is
to be also objective and to cast away the defect of mere
subjectivity. It may be asked, why it has this defect.
When that which is deficient does not at the same time
transcend its defect, the defect is for it not a defect at all.
The animal is to us defective, but not for itself, The end,
m so far as it is at first merely ours, is for us a defect, since
freedom and will are for us the unity of subjective and
objective. The end must also be established as objective ;
but does not in that way attain a new one-sided character!
but rather its realization.

9 (b). In so far as the definite phases of will are its own
peculiar property or its particularization turned back into
itself, they are content. This content, as content of the
will, is for it, by virtue of the form given in (a), an end,
which exists on its inner or subjective side as the imagina-
tive will, but by the operation of the activity, which con-
verts the subjective into the objective, it is realized,
completed end.

10. The content or determinate phase of will is in the
first instance direct or immediate. Then the will is free
only in itself or for us, i.e., it is the will in its cimception.
Only wlieu it has itself as an object is it also for itself, and
its implicit freedom becomes realized.

INTRODUCTION.

JV^o^e— At this standpoint the finite implies that what-
ever is in itself, or according to its conception, has an
existence or manifestation difCerent from what it is for
itself. For example the abstract separateness of nature is
in itself space, but for itself time. Here, two things are
to be observed, (1) that because the truth is the idea, when
any object or phase is apprehended only as it is in itself or
in conception, it is not as yet apprehended in its truth, and
yet (2) that, whatever exists as conception or in itself, at
the same time exists, and this existence is a peculiar form
of the object, as e.g. space. The separation of existence-
in-itself or implicit existence from existence-for-itself or
explicit existence is a characteristic of the finite, and con-
stitutes its appearance or merely external reality. An
example of this is to hand in the separation of the natural
will from formal right. The understanding adheres to
mere implicit existence, and in accordance with this position
calls freedom a capacity, since it is at this point only a
possibility. But the understanding regards this phase as
absolute and perennial, and considers the relation of the
will to what it wills or reality as an application to a given
material, which does not belong to the essence of freedom.
In this way the understanding occupies itself with mere
abstractions, and not with the idea and truth.

AdtUlion.— The will, which is will only according to the
conception, is free implicitly, but is at the same time
not free. To be truly free, it must have a truly fixed
content; then it is explicitly free, has freedom for its
object, and is freedom. What is at first merely in concep-
tion, i.e., implicit, .s only direct and natural, We are
familiar with this in pictorial thought also. The child is
implicitly a man, at first has reason implicitly, and is at
first the possibility of reason and freedom. He is thus
free merely ac(!ording to the conc(>ption. That which is
only implicit does not yet exist in actuality. A man, who
is implicitly rational, must create himself by working

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT.

through and out of himself and by reconstructing himself
withm himself, before he can become also explicitly rational.
11. The will, which is at first only implicitly free, is the
direct or natural will. The distinctive phases, which the
selt-determmmg conception sets up in the will, appear in the
direct will, as a directly present content. They are im-
pulses, appetites, inclinations, by which the will finds itself
determined by nature. Now this content, with all its
attendant phases, proceeds from the rationality of the will
and IS therefore impHcitly rational ; but let loose in its im-
Diediate directness it has not as yet the form of rationality
The content is indeed for me and my own, but the form
and the content are yet different. The will is thus in
itself finite. /^^

J\^o^e.-Empirical psychology enumerates and describes
these impulses and inclinations, and the wants which are
based upon them. It takes, or imagines that it takes this
material from experience, and then seeks to classify it in
the usual way. It will be stated below, what the objectiye
Bide of iinpulse is, and what impulse is in its truth, apart
from the form of irrationality which it has as an impulse
and also what shape it assumes when it reaches existence '
Additwn.-lmi,n\Be, appetite, inchnation are possessed
by the animal also, but it has not will ; it must obey
impulse, if there is no external obstacle. Man, however
IS the completely undetermined, and stands above impulse'

>ind may fix and sot it „,, a,s l,is. I,„,„,lsi. is iu „at

but It depends on my will whether I establish it in the

ure,

jNor can the will be xxm

the fact that the

onditionallv called to thi

imj)ulse lies iu nature.

s action by

12. The system of this content

the will, exists only

as it occurs

directly

I)uiseH, every one of which is mine

as a multitude or multiplicity of

im-

with others, but is at tl

n\ a general way along

le same time universal and undeter-

mined, having many objects and ....... „

The will, by giving itself in this two-fohl ind

ways of satisfaction,
efiuiteness the

IXTRODUCTIOX.

form of individuality (§ 7), resolves, and only as resolving
is it actual.

Note. — Instead of to "resolve," i.e. to supersede the
indefinite condition in which a content is merely possible,
our language has the expression "decide" ("unfold itself ").
The indeterminate condition of the will, as neutral but
infinitely fruitful germ of all existence, contains within
itself its definite character and ends, and brings them forth
solely out of itself.

13. By resolution will fixes itself as the will of a definite
individual, and as thereby distinguishing itself from
another. However apart from this finite character which
it has as consciousness (§ 8), the immediate will is in
virtue of the distinction between its form and its content
formal. Hence its resolution as such is abstract, and its
content is not yet the content and work of its freedom.

Note. — To the intelligence, as thinking, the object or
content remains univerc.al ; the intelligence retains the
form merely of a uuiversul activity. Now the universal
signifies in will that which is mine, i.e. it is individuality.
And yet, also, the direct and formal will is abstract ; its
individuality is not yet filled with its free universality.
Hence at the beginning the peculiar fiuitude of the intelli-
gence is in will, and only by exalting itself again to
thought and giving itself intrinsic universality does the
will transcend the distinction of form and content and
make itself objective infinite will. It is therefore a mis-
understanding of the nature of thought and will to suppose
that in the will man is infinite, while in thought and even
in reason he is limited. In so far as thought and will are
still distinct, the reverse is rather the case, and thinkiuL'
reason, when it becomes will, assigns itself to finitude.

Addition. — A will which resolves nothing, is not an
actual will ; that which is devoid of definite character
never reaches a volition. The reason for hesitation may lie
in a sensitiveness, which is aware that in determining

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Itself It IS engaged with what is finite, is assigning itself a
hmit, and abandoning its infinity ; it may thus hold to its
decision not to renounce the totality which it intends
Such a feeling is dead, even when it aims to be something
beautiful " mo will be great." says Goethe. " must be
able to limit himself." By volition alone man enters
actuality however distasteful it may be to him ; for indo-
lence will not desert its own self- brooding, in which it
clings to a universal possibility. But possibility is not yet
actuality. Hence the will, which is secure simply of itself
does not as yet lose itself in any definite reality

14 The finite will, which has merely from the stand-
pomt of form doubled itself back upon itself, and has
become the infinite and self-secluded I (§ 5), stands 'above
Its content of different impulses and also above the several
ways by which they are realized and satisfied. At the
same time, as it is only formally infinite, it is confined to
this very content as the decisive feature of its nature and
external actuality, although it is undetermined and not
confined to one content rather than another (SS 6 m
As to the return of the I into itself such a will is only a
possible will, which may or may not be mine, and the I is
oiily the possibility of deputing itself to this or that obiect
Hence mnongst these definite phases, which in this light
are for the I external, the will chooses

15 Freedom of the will is in this view of it caprice,
m which are contained both a reflection, which is free and
abstracted from everything, and a dependence upon a con-
tent or matter either internally or externally provided
Since the content is in itself or implicitly necessary as
an end and in opposition to this reflection is a defa^nite
possibility, caprice, when it is will, is in its nature con-
tmgent.

Note.~The usual idea of freedom is that of caprice It
IS a midway stage of reflection between the will as merely
natural impulse and the will as free absolutely. When it

INTRODUCTION.

IS said that freedom as a general thing consists in doing
what one likes, such an idea must be taken to imply
an utter lack of developed thought, containing as yet not
even a suspicion of what is meant by the absolutely free
will, right, the ethical system, etc. Reflection, being the
formal universality and unity of self- consciousness, is the
will's abstract certitude of its freedom, but it is not yet the
truth of it, because it has not as yet itself for content and
end ; the subjective side is still different from the objective.
Thus the content in such a case remains purely and com-
pletely finite. Caprice, instead of being will in its truth, is
rather will in its contradiction.

In the controversy carried on, especially at the time of
the metaphysic of Wolf, as to whether the will is really
free, or our consciousness of its freedom is a delusion,
it was this caprice which was in the minds of both parties.'
Against the certitude of abstract self-direction, determinism
rightly opposed a content, which was externally presented,
and not being contained in this certitude came from without.
It did not matter whether this " without " were impulse,
imagination, or in general a consciousness so filled that
the content was not the peculiar possession of the self-
determining activity as such. Since only the formal
element of free self-direction is immanent in caprice, while
the other element is something given to it from without, to
take caprice as freedom may fairly be named a delusion.
Freedom in every philosophy of reflection, whether it be the
Kantian or the Friesian, which is the Kantian super-
ficialized, is nothing more than this formal self-activity.

Addition.— Since I have the possibility of determining
myself in this or that way, since I have the power of choice,
I possess caprice, or what is commonly called freedom.'
This choice is due to tlie universality of *the will, enabling
me to make my own this thing or another. This possession
is a particular content, which is therefore not adequate to
me, but separated from me, and is mine only in possibility;

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

3ust as I am the possibility of bringing myself into coinci-
dence with it. Hence choice is due to the indeterminate-
ness of the I, and to the determinateness of a content
But as to this content the will is not free, although it has
in Itself formally the side of infinitude. No such content
corresponds to will ; iu no content can it truly find itself
In caprice it is involved that the content is not formed bv
the nature of my will, but by contingency. I am de-
pendent upon this content. This is the contradiction con-
tained m caprice. Ordinaiy man believes that he is free
when he is allowed to act capriciously, but precisely in
caprice is it inherent that he is not free. When I will the
rational I do not act as a particular individual but accord-
ing to the conception of ethical observance in general In
an ethical act I establish not myself but the thing. A man
who acts perversely, exhibits particularity. The rational is
the highway on which every one travels, and no one is
specially marked. When a great artist finishes a work we
say : " It must be so." The particularity of the artist has
wholly disappeared and the work shows no mannerism.
±'hidias has no mannerism; the statue itself lives and
moves. But the poorer is the artist, the more easily we
discern himself, his particularity and caprice. If we adhere
to the consideration that in caprice a man can will what he
pleases we have certainly freedom of a kind ; but again if
we hold to the view that the content is given, then man
must be determined by it, and in this light is no longer
free. *=

16. What is resolved upon and chosen (§ 14) the will
may again give up (§ 5). Yet, even with the possibility of
transcending any other content which it may substitute,
and of proceeding in this way ad infinitum, the will does
not advance beyond finitude, because every content in turn
18 different from the form and is finite. The opposite aspect
namely mdeterminateness, irresolution or abstraction, is
also one-sided.

INTRODUCTION.

to coinci-
jrminate-

content.
:h it has
'■ content
id itself.
>rmed bv

am de-
tion con-
> is free,
cisely in

will the
: accord-
ral. In

A man,
-tional is
) one is
ivorli we
'tist has
inerisra.
ves and
isilj we
i adhere
what he
Lgain, if
en man

longer

ihe will
)ility of
stitute,
ill does
in turn
aspect,
;ion, is

17. Since the contradiction involved in caprice (§ 15) is
the dialectic of the impulses and inclinations, it is mani-
fested m their mutual antagonism. The satisfaction of one
demands the subjection and sacrifice of the satisfaction of
another. Since an impulse is merely the simple tendency
of its own essential nature, and has no measure in itself, to
subject or sacrifice the satisfaction of any impulse is a
contingent decision of caprice. In such a case caprice
may act upon the calculation as to which impulse will
bring the greater satisfaction, or may have some other
similar purpose.

Addition.~Im])uhes and inclinations are in the first
instance the content of will, and only reflection transcends
them. But these impulses are self-directing, crowding
upon and jostling one another, and all seeking to be
satisfied. To set all but one in the background, and put
myself into this one, is to limit and distort myself, since I,
in so doing, renounce my universality, which is a system of
all the impulses. Just as little help is found in a mere
subordination of them, a course usually followed by the
understanding. There is available no criterion by which
to make such an arrangement, and hence the demand for a
subordination is usually sustained by tedious and irrelevant
allusions to general sayings.

18. With regard to the moral estimate of impulses,
dialectic appears in this form. The phases of the direct or
natural will are immanent and positive, and thus good.
Hence man is by nature good. But natural characteristics,
since they are opposed to freedom and the conception of the
spirit, and are, hence, negative, must be eradicated. Thus
man is by nature evil. To decide for either view is a matter
of subjective caprice.

AcMUIon.— The Christian doctrine that man is by nature
evil is loftier than the opposite that he is naturally good,
and is to be interi)reted philosophically in this way. Man
as spirit is a free being, who need not give way to 'impulse.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Hence m his direct and unformed condition, man is in
a situation m which he ought not to be, and he must free
himself This is the meaning of the doctrine of original
fieedTm ""* ""^''^ Christianity would not be the religion of

la In the demand that impulses must be purified is
found the general idea that they must be freed from
the form of direct subjection to nature, and from a content
that IS subjective and contingent, and must be restored to
their substantive essence. The truth contained in this in-
definite demand is that impulses should be phases of will in
a rational system. To apprehend them in this way as pro-
ceeding from the conception is the content of the science of

Note -The content of this science may. in all its several
elements, right, property, morality, family, state, be repre-
sented in this way, that man has by nature the impulse to
right the impulse to property, to morahtv, to sexual love
and to social life. If instead of this form, which belongs
to empirical psychology, a philosophic form be preferred it
may be obtained cheap from what in modern times was re-
puted and still is reputed to be philosophy. He will then
say that man finds in himself as a fact of consciousness
that he wills right, property, the state, etc. Later will be
given still another form of the content which appears here
in the shape of impulses, that, namely, of duties.

20. The reflection which is brought to bear upon im-
pulses, placing them before itself, estimating them, com-
paring them with one another, and contrasting them with
their means and consequences, and also with a whou
of satisfaction, namely happiness, brings the formal uni-
versal to this material, and in an external way purifies it of
Its crudity and barbarism. This propulsion by the uni-
versah y of thought is the absolute worth of civilization
(S lo7).

Addition.~hi happiness thought has already the upper

INTRODUCTION.

hand with the force of natural impulse, since it is not
satisfied with what is momentary, bat requires happiness
as a whole. This happiness is dependent upon civilization
to the extent to which civilization confirms the universal.
But in the ideal of happiness there are two elements.
There is (1) a universal that is higher than all particulars ;
yet, as the content of this universal is in turn only uni-
versal pleasure, there arises once more the individual,
particular and finite, and retreat must be made to impulse •
(2) Since the content of happiness lies in the subjective
perception of each individual, this universal end is again
particular ; nor is there present in it any true unity of
content and form.

21. But the truth of this formal universality, which
taken by itself is undetermined and finds definite cha-
racter in externally given material, is the self-directing
universality which is will or freedom. Since the will has
as its object, content and end, universality itself, and thus
assumes the form of the infinite, it is free not only in
itself or implicitly, but for itself or explicitly. It is' the
true idea.

-ZV^o^e.— The self-consciousness of the will in the form of
appetite or impulse is sensible, the sensible in general
indicating the externality of self-consciousness, or that
condition in which self-consciousness is outside of itself.
Now this sensible side is one of the two elements of the
reflecting will, and the other is the abstract universality of
thought. But the absolute will has as its object the will
itself as such in its pure universality. In this universality
the directness of the natural will is superseded, and so also
is the private individuality which is produced by reflection
and infects the natural condition. But to supersede these
and lift them into the universal, constitutes the activity
of thought. Thus the self-consciousness, which purifies
its object, content or end, and exalts it to universality, is
thought carrying itself through into will. It is at this

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

point that it becomes clear that the will is true and free
only as thinking intelligence. The slave knows not his

thnk himself. The self-consciousness, which by thought

Itself the accidental and untrue, constitutes the principle of
right, morality, and all forms of ethical observance. They
JthLr 7^^^ ^""^ philosophically of right, morality, and
ethical observance, would exclude thought and turn to
feeling, the heart, the breast, and inspiration, express the

it::r ^"^rr r "^^^^^^* ^^^^ ^'-- ^^

Itself, overwhelmed with despair and utter insipidity
makes barbarism and absence of thought a principle and
sojar as in it lay robbed men of all 'truth' dl^t' -1

Addition.~In philosophy truth is had when the concep-
ion corresponds to reality. A body is the reality, and soul
s the conception. Soul and body should be adequate to
each other. A dead man is still an existence, but no
longer a true existence; it is a reality void of conception.
For that reason the dead body decays. So with the true
w^^^l; that which It wills, namely, its content, is identical
with It, and so freedom wills freedom.

22. The will which exists absolutely is truly infinite
because its object being the will itself, is for it not
another or a limitation. In the object the will has simply
reverted into itself. Moreover, it is not mere possibility
capacity, potentiality (potentia), but infinitely actual
(vnjlmtu^n actu), because the reality of the conception or
Its visible externality is internal to itself.

fl^f'^'V^T' '"!'''' ^^'' ^''' ^^^^ ^^ '^^^^^ of without
the qualification of absolute freedom, only the capacity of

freedom is meant, or the natural and finite will rs 11^

and, notwithstanding all words and opinions to the con

trary, not the free will. Since the understanding com-"

INTRODUCTION.

prehends the infinite only in its negative aspect, and hence
as a beyond, it thinks to do the infinite all the more
honour the farther it removes it into the vague distance,
and the more it takes it as a foreign thing. In free will
the true infinite is present and real ; it is itself the actually
present self-contained idea.

Addition.—The infinite has rightly been represented as
a circle. The straight line goes out farther and farther, and
symbolizes the merely negative and bad infinite, which,
unlike the true, does not return into itself. The free will
IS truly infinite, for it is not a mere possibility or disposi-
tion. Its external reality is its own inner nature, itself.

23. Only in this freedom is the will wholly by itself
because it refers to nothing but itself, and a4l dependence
upon any other thing falls away.-The will is true, or
rather truth itself, because its character consists in its
being in its manifested reality, or correlative opposite
what It IS in its conception. In other words, the pure
conception has the perception or intuition of itself as its
end and reality,

24. The will is universal, because in it all limitation and
particular individuality are superseded. These one-sided
phases are found only in the difference between the con-
ception and its object or content, or, from another stand-
point, m the difference between the conscious independent
existence of the subject, and the will's implicit, or self-
mvolved existence, or between its excluding and concluding
individuality, and its universality.

JVo^e.— The different phases of universality are tabulated
m the logic (" Encyclop. of the Phil. Sciences," §§ 118-126).
Imaginative thinking always takes universality in an
abstract and external way. But absolute universality is
not to be thought of either as the universality of reflec
tion, which is a kind of concensus or generality, or, as the '
abstract universality and self-identity, which is fashioned
by the understanding (§ 6, note), and keeps aloof from the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

individual. It is rather the concrete, self-contained, and
self-referring universality, which is the substance, intrinsic
genus, or immanent idea of self-consciousness. It is a
conception of free will as the universal, transcending its
object, passing through and beyond its own specific cha-
racter, and then becoming identical with itself.— This abso
lute universal is what is in general called the rational, and
is to be apprehended only in this speculative way.

25. The subjective side of the will is the side of its self-
consciousness and individuality (§ 7), as distinguished
from Its imphcit conception. This subjectivity is («) pure
form or absolute unity of self-consciousness with itself
This unity is the equation " I = I," consciousness being
characterized by a thoroughly inward and abstract self-
dependence. It is pure certitude of itself in contrast with
the truth; (/3) particularity of will, as caprice with its
accidental content of pleasurable ends ; (y) in c^eneral a
one-sided form (§ 8), in so far as that which is willed is at
first an unfulfilled end, or a content which simply belongs
to self-consciousness. °

_ 26. (a) In so far as the will is determined by itself and
18 m accord with its conception and true, it is whollv
objective will. (/S) But objective self-consciousness, which
has not the form of the infinite, is a will sunk in its object
or condition, whatever the content of that may be It is
the will of the child, or the will present in slavery or
superstition, (y) Objectivity is finally a one-sided form
m opposition to the subjective phase of will ; it is direct
reahty, or external existence. In this sense the will
becomes objective only by the execution of its ends.

Note.—These logical phases of subjectivity and objec-
tivity, since they are often made use of in the sequel are
here exposed, with the express purpose of noting thlt it
happens with them as with other distinctions and opposed
aspects of reflection ; they by virtue of their finite and
dialectic character pass over into their opposites For

liNTRODUCTION.

imagination and understanding the meanings of antithetic
phases are not convertible, because their identity is still
internal. But in will, on the contrary, these phases,
which ought to be at once abstract and yet also sides of
that which can be known only as concrete, lead of them-
selves to identity, and to an exchange of meanings. To
the understanding this is unintelligible.— Thus, e.g., the
will, as a freedom which exists in itself, is subjectivity
itself; thus subjectivity is the conception of the will, and
therefore its objectivity. But subjectivity is finite in
opposition to objectivity, yet in this opposition the will is
not isolated, but in intricate union with the object ; and
thus Its finitude consists quite as much in its not being
subjective, etc.— What in the sequel is to be meant by the
subjective or the objective side of the will, has each time
to be made clear from the context, which will supply their
positions in relation to the totality.

Addition.— li is ordinarily supposed that subjective and S-- ^■
objective are blank opposites; but this is not the case.
Rather do they pass into one another, for they are not
abstract aspects like positive and negative, but have already
a concrete significance. To consider in the first instance
the expression " subjective ; " this may mean an end which
IS merely the end of a certain subject. In this sense a
poor work of art, that is not adequate to the thing is
merely subjective. But, further, this expression may point
to the content of the will, and is then of about the same
meaning as capricious; the subjective content then is that
which belongs merely to the subject. In this sense bad
acts are merely subjective. Further, the pure, empty I
may be called subjective, as it has only itself as an object,
and possesses the power of abstraction from all further
content. Subjectivity has, moreover, a wholly particular
and correct meaning in accordance with which anything,
in order to win recognition from me, has to become mine
and seek validity in me. This is the infinite avarice of

; UVU^

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

subjectivity, eager to comprehend and consume everything
■withm the simple and pure I. •'6

I (^d^^l^^ SimUarly we may take the objective in different ways

By It we may understand anything to which we give
existence m contrast to ourselves, whether it be an actual
thmg or a mere thought, which we place over against our-
selves. By it also we understand the direct reality in
^ which the end is to be realized. Although the end itself

IS qmte particular and subjective, we yet name it objective
after It has made its appearance. Further, the ob ective
will zs also that m which truth is; thus, God's will, the
ethical will also are objective. Lastly, we may call the
will objective, when it is wholly submerged in its object,
as e.g the child's will, wbir>b is confiding and without
subjective freedom, and the slave's will, which does not
know Itself as free, and is thus a will-less will In this
sense any will is objective, if it is guided in its action by a
foreign authority, and has not yec completed the infinite
return into itself.

27 The absolute character or, if you like, the absolute
mpulse of the free spirit (§ 21) is, as has been observed,
that Its freedom shall be for it an object. It is to be
objective in a two-fold sense : it is the rational system of
Itself, and this system is to be directly real (§ 26) There
IS thus actualized as idea what the will is implicitly
Hence, the abstract conception of the idea of the will is in
general the free will which wills the free will

28. The activity of the will, directed to the task of
transcending the contradiction between subjectivity and
objec ivity. of transferring its end from subjectivity into
objectivi y. and yet while in objectivity of remaining with
Itself ,s beyond the formal method of consciousness (8 8)
m which objectivity is only direct actuality. This activity
IS the essenial development of the substantive content of
the Idea (§21). In this development the conception
moulds the Idea, which is in the first instance abstract Jnto

INTRODUCTION.

the totality of a system. This totality as substantive is
independen of the opposition between mere subjective end
same ''^*'^''' ^^^ ^^ ^^^^ oi these forms is the

29^ That a reality is the realization of the free will, this
IS what IS meant by a right. Right, therefore, is. in
general, freedom as idea.

••T^f ■"~^.\*^''i ^r*^^"" ^^'*"°' (Introduction to Kant's
Theory of Right "). now generally accepted. '' the highest
factor IS a hmitatiou of my freedom or caprice, in Lev
ha It may be able to subsist alongside of every other
ind vidua s caprice m accordance with a universal law."
Tk.s doctrine contains only a negative phase, that of
limitation. And besides, the positive phase, the universal
law or so-called law of reason, consisting in the agreement
of the caprice of one with that of another, goes beyond the
wel -Icnown formal identity and the proposition' ofcon
tradiction. The definition of right, Just Quoted, contal
the view whu-h has especially since Rousseau spread widelv
According to this view neither the absolute and rational will

ndividual in their peculiar caprice, are the substantive
and primary basis. When once this principle is accepted,
the lational can announce itself only as limiting this
tr.-euom. Hence it is not an inherent rationality, but onlv
a mere external and formal universal. This view is
accordingly devoid of speculative thought, and is rejected
by the philosophic conception. In the minds of men and
m the act.uil world it has assumed a shape, whose horror
s without a parallel, except in the shallowness of the
thoughts ui)on which it was founded.

30. Right in general is something holy, because it is th
embodiment of the absolute conception and self-conscious
freedom. But the formalism of right, and after a while
of duty al.o. 18 due to distinctions arising out of the
development of the conception of freedom. ' In contrast

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Itl

With the more formal, abstract and limited right, there is
that sphere or stage of the spirit, in whicJi spirit has
brought to definite actuality the further elements contained
in the idea. This stage is the richer and more concrete •
It IS truly universal and has therefore a higher rio-ht

Note.-Ewevy step in the development of the idea of
freedom has its peculiar right, because it is the embodi-
ment of a phase of freedom. When morality and ethical
observance are spoken of in opposition to right, only the
fii'st or formal right of the abstract personality is meant.
Morahty, ethical observance, a state-interest, are every one
a special right, because each of these is a definite realiza-
tion of freedom. They can come into collision only in so
tar as they occupy the same plane. If the moral stand-
point of spirit were not also a right and one of the forms
of freedom, it could not collide with the right of personalitv
or any other i-ight. A right contains the conception of
freedom which is the highest phase of spirit, and in opposi-

stance Yet collision also implies a limit and a subordina-
tion of one j.liase to another. Only the right of the
world-spirit IS the unlimited absolute.

31. The scientific method by which the conception is
self-evolved, and its phases self-developed and self-pro
duced. IS not first of all an assurance that certain relations
are given from somewhere or other, and then the applica-
tion to this foreign material of the universal. Tl'o true
process is found in the logic, and here is presupposed

Moe.~.The efficient or motive principle, which is not
merely the analysis but the j.roduction of the several
elemencs of the universal, I call dialectic. Dialectic is not
that process in which an object or proposili^^IT^ivsented
to feehng or lie direct consciousness, is analv/ed, en-
tangled, taken hither and thither, until at last itJontrary
IS derived. Such a merely negative method appears
frequently m Plato. It may fix the opposite of anv

1
t

INTRODUCTION.

notiou, or reveal the contradiction contained in it, as did ^
the ancient scepticism, or it may in a feeble way consider
an approximation to truth, or modern half-and-half attain-
ment of it, as its goal. But the higher dialectic of the con-
ception does not merely apprehend any phase as a limit and
opposite but produces out of this negative a positive con-
tent and result. Only by such a course is there develop-
ment and inherent progress. Hence this dialectic is not
the external agency of subjective thinking, but the private
soul of the content, which unfolds its branches and fruit
organically Thought regards this development of the
Idea and of the peculiar activity of the reason of the idea
as only subjective, but is on its side unable to make any
addition. To consider anything rationally is not to brin^
reason to it from the outside, and work it up in this way'
but to count It as itself reasonable. Here it is spirit in its
freedom the summit of self-conscious reason, which gives
rtself actuality, and produces itself as the existirc world
The business of science is simply to bring the specific work
of the reason which is in the thing, to consciousness.

6^ The phases of the development of the conception
are themselves conceptions. And yet, because the concep-
tion IS essentially the idea, they have the form of manifes-
tations. Hence the sequence of the conceptions, which
arise in this way, is at the same time a sequence of realiza-
tious, and are to be by science so considered.

Note.~Ii^ a speculative sense the way, in which a con-
ception IS manifested in reality, is identical with a definite
phase of the concej)tion. But it is noteworthy that, in
the scientific development of the idea, the elements, which
resu in a further definite form, although preceding this
resu t as phases of the conception, do not in the tern-
roral development go before it as concrete realizations.
Thus as will be seen later, that stage of the idea which is
the family presupposes phases of the coneeption. whoso
result It IS. But that these intei-nal presuppositions should

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

be present in such visible realizations as right of property
contract, morahty, etc., this is the other side of the process'
which only in a highly developed civilization has attained
to a specific realization of its elements.

AddUion.-T:he idea must always 'go on determining
Itself within Itself, sinceat the beginning it is only abstract
conception. However, this initial abstract conception is
never given up, but only becomes inwardly richer, the last
phase bemg the richest. The earlier ana merelv implicit
phases reach in this way free self-dependence, but in such
a manner that the conception remains the soul which holds
everything together, and only through a procedure im-
manent withm itself arrives at its own distinctions. Hence
the last phase falls again into a unity with the first and it
cannot be said that the conception ever comes to som'ethinff
new. Although the elements of the conception appear to
liave fallen apart whru *hey enter reality, this is only a
mere appearance. Its superficial character is revealed in
the process, since all the particulars finally turn back again
into the conception of the universal. The empirical sciences
usually analyze what they find in pictorial ideas, and if the
mdividual IS successfully brought back to the general the
general property is then called the conception. But this is
not our procedure. We desire only to observe how the
conception determines itself, and compels us to keep at a
distance everything of our own spinning and thinking
But what we get in this way is one series of thoughts and
another series of realized forms. As to these two series it
may happen that the order of time of the actual manifesto
tions 18 partly different from the order of the conception
Thus It cannot, e.g., be said that property existed before
the family, and yet, in spite of that it is discussed before
the family is discussed. The question might also be
raised here. Why do we not be^in with the highest i e
with concrete truth ? The answer is. because we desire'to
Bee truth ,n the form of a result, and it is an essential part

INTRODUCTION.

of the process to conceive the conception first of all as ab-
stract. The actual series of realizations of the conception
IS thus for us in due course as follows, even although in
ac uahty the order should be the same. Our process is this,
that the abstra<;t forms reveal themselves not as self-sub-
sistent but as imtrue.

Division of the Work.

33. According to the stages in the development of the
Idea ot the absolutely free will,

A. The will is direct or immediate; its conception is
therefore abstract, i.e., personality, and its embodied
reality IS a direct exteraal thing. This is the sphere of
abstract or formal right.

B. The will passing out of external reality, turns back
mto Itself Its phase is subjective individuality, and it is
contrasted with the universal. This universal is on its in-
ternal side the good, and on its external side a presented
world, and these two sides are occasioned only by means
of each other. In this sphere the idea is divided, and
exists in separate elements. The right of the subjective
will IS in a relation of contrast to the right of the world, or
the right of the idea. Here, however, the idea exists only
implicitly. This is the sphere of morality

c. The unity and truth of these two abstract elements.
The thought Idea of the good is realized both in the will
turned back into itself, and also in the external world.
Thus freedom exists as real substance, which is quite as
much actuality and necessity as it is subjective will The
Idea here is its absolutely universal existence, viz., ethical
observance. This ethical substance is again,
a. Natural spirit ; the family,

b The civic community, or spirit in its dual existence
and mere ai)pearance,
c. The state, or freedom, which, while established in the

THE PHUOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

free se f-dependence of the particular will k also universal
and objechve^ This actual and organic spirit (a) is TJ^^t
of a na .on (S) .s found in the relation to one anothTof
nafonal sp,„ts and (y) passing through and bevond hk
relation js actnahi=ed and revc-aled in world history as e
universal world-spirit, whose right is the highest

Note-It is to be found in the speculative logic and
here is presupposed, that a thing or content, which fs e'stab
.shed first of all according to its conceptio;, or Lph tt
has the form of direct existence. The conception, h'wevt'
when ,t has the form of the conception is explicit, and no
longer IS a direct existence. So, too, the princip e upo„
which the division of thi. .-ork proceeds, is presupposed
The divisions might be regarded as already settled by
history since the different stages must be viewtd as
elements m the development o! uie idea, and therefore a
springing from the nature of the content itself. ApUlo
sophic division IS not an external classification of any ^ven
material, such a classification as would be made TcordZ
to one or several schemes picked up at random but tho.
herent distinctions of the conception itself Mo^JityV^d'
ethica observance, which are usually supposed tHZ the

Meanwhile even imaginative thought seems to make a dfs
inction between them. In the usage of Kant the „'
ference ,s given to the term morality, and tTe , ritkai
prmciples of his philosophy limit thenfselves w oily totli
standpoint, making impossible the standpoint of eth cl
observance, and indeed expressly destroying and abolth Tng

Lord nt t„*th'"°". *^ r'' '"''"^ ''"* ""' «->« ■»-"-»

nifrfrditLTcr':^^^^^^^^^^

civfiriSrjT":°r '""-"^ "' "«'"- ^0 •»™» -t ™'y

a lomo^'it :'■",'? ™'"'' 'i«"«<™'''^ of the word, bul
also morality, ethical observance and world-history. These
belong to this realm, because the eonception taking tiiemL

INTRODUCTION.

their truth, brings them all together. Free will, in order
not to remain abstract, must in the first instance give itself
reality ; the sensible materials of this reality are objects
I.e., external things. This first phase of freedom we shall
know as property. This is the sphere of formal and
abstract right, to which belong property in the more
developed form of contract and also the injury of right i e
crime and punishment. The freedom, we have here, we name
person, or, m other words, the subject who is free, and indeed
free independently, and gives himself a reality in things
But this direct reality is not adequate to freedom, and the
negation of this phase is morality. In morality I am
beyond the freedom found directly in this thing, and have a
freedom m which this directness is superseded. I am free
in myself, i.e., in the subjective. In this sphere we come
upon my insight, intention, and end, and externalitv
is established as indifferent. The good is now the
universal end, which is not to remain merely internal
to me, but to realize itself. The subjective will de-
mands that its inward character, or ])urpose, shall re-
ceive external reality, and also that the good shall be
brought to completion in external existence. Morality like
formal right, is also an abstraction, whose truth is reached
only in ethical observance. Hence ethical observance is the
unity of the will in its conception with the will of the indi
vidual or subject. The primary reality of ethical observ-
ance is m its turn natural, taking the form of love and
feeling. This is the family. In it the individual has
transcended his prudish personality, and finds himself with
his consciousness in a totality. In the next stage is seen the
loss of this peculiar ethical existence and substantive unity
Here the family falls asunder, and the members become in-
dependent one of another, being now held together merely
by the bond of mutual need. This is the stage of the civic
community, which has frequently been taken for the state
Hut the state does not arise until wo reach the third stage

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

that stage of ethical observance or smrit in ^i,- i, v .,
^aivaual Mep^oaeneo and uni^XtbTJ^,":*
tound m gigantic union. Thft n't^lif ^f +1, j. . . '
foro, higher'than that of the othf s^'' Itt "?' 'T"
in its most ooncreto embodiment wS™,?, l '':!?""'
but the highest absolute truth of the worCto "^

FIRST PART.

ABSTRACT RIGHT.

34. The completely free will, when it is concejy^d abstractly,
IS in a condition of(se]f.involved)simplicity ."What actuality
it has when taken m this abstract way, consists in a nega-
tive attitude towards reality, and a bare abstract reference
of itself to itself. Such an abstract will is the individual
will of a subject. It, as particular, has definite ends, and,
as exclusive and individual, has these ends before itself as
an externally and directly presented world.

Addition.— The remark that the completely free wiU,
when it is taken abstractly, is in a condition of self-in-
volved simplicity must be understood in this way. The
completed idea of the will is found when the conception has
realized itself fully, and in such a manner that the embodi-
ment of the conception is nothing but the development
of the conception itself. But at the outset the con-
ception is abstract. All its future characters are implied
in it, it is true, but as yet no more than implied. They
are, in other words, potential, and are not yet developed
into an articulate whole. If I say, «' I am free," the I
here, is still implicit and has no real object opposed to it.'
But from the standpoint of morality as contrasted with
abstract right there is opposition, because there I am a
particular will, while the good, though within me, is the
umversal. Hence, at that stage, the will contains within
Itself the contrast between particular and universal, and in
that way is made definite. But at the beginning such

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

tho marl of" Tf '", "f "' ""' ""■'"■''' ""'' 'h" "«' '"'^
TheTf ,-'^":'"™'™"' "'"■'■'■"'■■' "'■ ™"'<>diate being.
The chief tl„ng to notice at this point is that thi« very

Absence of determinate character exists where there is
a» vet no .hstinction between the will and it., co,.,i;.t
B„t when tins lack of dofinitencss is set in opposition o
k, ^< ^ ./c ,- the dehn.te, it becomes itself somcthins definite I oM.er
f'^ V~-/ ■ 7';'"' itLf »* .ident,% tecomes the distingnishinj; feature
•^^^f^ "f "- -11. -d the will thereby becomes an indivTdntl wm
t—i rfe,^:„^ or person. /W<-.^ <^ o.^ /v_^ r™

c^.^^(^ 35. This conseionsly free will has a universal side whicli

ru^ ^i . c.^«'»^'''- ■" •' orn.al, sin.ple and pure rrf^ee to i sdf «
/s . jj.v^" ,7'"'"*': -""^ ""l<TO"dcnt unit. This reference is also

'i-^* " i:ub,"!T"";r "%*!^"«'' " l"''-'" '"rther content Tl,:
i._.v,,w^V,-. |™Jf « <'"»(Sorara„x.rson. It is implied in personality
I hat I as a d,st,nct being, am on all sides completely
bonnded and limited, on the side of inner caprice, im Z
and wetite, as well as in my direct and visible o'ntTli e
But It IS implied likewise that I stand in absolutely pure
elation to myself. Hence it is that in this finitll I
Imow myself as infinite, universal and free

»>fe.-Pcrsonality does not arise till the subject has
not merely a general consciousness of himself n sol
Jctermmate mode of concrete existence, but rl her a Z
sciousncss of himself as a completely abstmct I, In tl jch

m alid. Hence iwrsonality involves the knowledge of one-
el as an object, raised, however, by thought into th^
realm o pure infinitude, a ivalm, that is, in whicVit is
purely Identical with itself, [individuals aid people ha™
no personality it they have nS,t reached this pur? I„„!ht
and se f.eonscionsness.) In this way, t«o, thc^ibsoSeor
complete-d mind or spirit may be distinguished from it

abstract
of any
will has
e being,
lis very
feature,
ibere is
iontent.
ition to
n other
feature
Jal will
5 ?' mJ. a£-C

ABSTllACT RIGHT.

whicli *"-
^'Self as

also a
The
)nality
)Ietely
ipulse
>r life.
V pure
ude I

t has
some
I con-
v^hich
hired
one-
) the
it is
have
ught
:e or
1 its

■^ mere somblaufie. The semblance, though self-conscious, is
aware of itself ouly as a merely natural will with its
external objects. The other, as an abstract and pure I,
has itself as its end and object, and is therefore a person.'
Addition.— The abstract will, the will which exists for
itself, is a person. The highest aim of man is to be a
person, and yet again the mere abstraction "person" is
not held in high esteem. Person is essentially different
from subject. Subject is only the possibility of person-
ality. Any living thing at all is a subject, while person is
a subject which has its subjectivity as an object. As a
person I exist for myself. Personality is the free being in
pure self-conscious isolation. I as a person am conscious
of freedom. I can abstract myself from everything, since
nothing is before me except pure personality. Notwith-
standing all this I am as a particular person completely
limited. I am of a certain age, height, in this space, and
so on. Thus a person is at one and the same time so exalted
and so lowly a thing. In him is the unity of infinite and
finite, of limit and unlimited. The dignity of personality
can sustain a contradiction, which neither contains nor
could tolerate anything natural.

36, (1) Personality implies, in general, a capacity to
possess rights, and constitutes the conception and abstract
basis of abstract right. This right, being abstract, must
be formal also. Its mandate is : Be a person and respect
others as persons.

37. (2) The particularity of the will, that phase of the
will, namely, which implies a consciousness of my specific
interests, is doubtless an element of the whole conscious-
ness of the will (§ 34), but it is noiE^contained in mere
abstract personality. It is indeed present in the form of
appetite, want, impulse and random desire, but is distinct
as yet from the personahty, which is the essence of free-
dom.— In treating of formal right therefore, we do not
trench upon special interests, such as my advantage or my

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

M-^JjL, ^

well-being, nor have we here to do with any special reason
or intention of the will. 1 ^^icii reason

AddUion.~^mce the particular phases of the person
have not as yet attained the form of freedom, everything
relating to these elements is so far a matter of indifference
When anyone bases a claim upon his mere formal right"
he may be wholly selfish, and often such a claim comes
from a contracted heart and mind. Uncivilized man, in
genera , holds fast to his rights, while~Ti;^re gener;us
disposition IS alert to see all sides of the question. Abstract
right IS, moreover, the first mere possibility, and in con-
rast with the whole context of a given relation is still
formal. The possession of a right gives a certain authoritv
It IS true, but It is not, therefore, absolutely necessary that
I insist upon a right, which is only one aspect of the
whole matter, (in a word, possibility is something, which
means that it either may or may not exist.)

38. In contrast with the deeper significance of a concrete
act in all its moral and social bearings, abstract right is
only a possibility. Such a right is, therefore, only a ner
mission or indication of legal power. Because of this
abstract character of right the only rule which is uncon-
ditionally its own is merely the negative principle not to
injure personality or anything which of necessity belongs
to It. Hence we have here only prohibitions, the positive
form of command having in the last resort a prohibition
as its basis.

39 (3) A person in his direct and definite individualitv
IS related to a given external nature. To this outer world
the personality is opposed as something subjective But
to confine to mere subjectivity the personality, which is
meant to be infinite and universal, contradicts and destroys
Its nature. It bestirs itself to abrogate the limitation by
giving Itself reality, and proceeds to make the outer visible
existence its own.

40. Eight is at first the simple and direct concrete

ABSTRACT RIGHT.

existence which freedom gives itself directly. This un-
modified existence is

(a) Possession or property. Here freedom is that of
the abstract will in general, or of a separate person who
relates himself only to himself.

(6) A person by distinguishing himself from himself
becomes related to another person, although the two have
no fixed existence for each other except as owners. Their
implicit identity becomes realized through a transference
of property by mutual consent, and with the preservation
of their rights. This is contract.

(c) The will in its reference to itself, as in (a), may be at
variance not with some other person, (fe), but within itself
As a particular will it may differ from and be in opposition
to Its true and absolute self. This is wrong and crime

^«'«— The division of rights into personal right, real
right and right to actions is, like many other divisions,
intended to systematize the mass of unorganized material.
But this division utterly confuses rights which presuppose
such concrete relations as the family or the state with
those which refer to mere abstract personaliiy. An example
of this confusion is the classification, made popular by
Kant, of rights into Eeal Eights, Personal Eights, and
Personal Eights that are Eeal in kind. It would take us
too far afield to show how contorted and irrational is the
classification of rights into personal and real, a classifica-
tion which hes at the foundation of Eoman law The
right to actions concerns the administration of justice, and
does not fall under this branch of the subject. Clearlv it
IS only personality which gives us a right to things, and
therefore personal right is in essence real right. A thin^
must be taken in its universal sense as the external opposite
of freedom, so that in this sense my bodv an ] my life are
hings. Thus real right is the right of personality'as such
In the inteiTpretaticn of personal right, found in Eoman
law, a man is not a person till he has reached a certain

TIIIC 1'1IIIX)S()PIIV' OF RIGHT.

^itaius (Hci.u'(Tii " EI<>in. Jur. Civ.," § Ixxv.). In Roman
law pcrsonalily is an aliriuiih; oj" a, cIuhh and is contrasted
witli Hhyovy. Th,. so-<!alio(] pc'ivsonal ri^^ht of Roman law
inclndes not only a ri^'ht to slaves, a class to which
I)rol)a.l)ly lu^lonj,' the children, no«, only a ri^lit over the
class which ha.s Ixvu deprived of r\<rhi (rapHi, <ih,hmtw),
hut also fa,niily relalions. With Ka,nt, family relaiions an*
wholly p(>rs,.nal rijrjus which an- real in kind.'- The Roman
personal ri^dit is not the ri^'ht of a. person as such, but of
a special person. Jt will he aftiM'waiils shown that the
fainily relation is really based ni)on Ilu> renunciation of
personalify. 1(, cannot but seem an inverted method to
treat of the ri.,dits of persons who belons,' to di-fmite classes
before the universal ri^dit of perst)nality. Accordiut,' to
K'aiit p(>rsona,l ri^dits aris(> out of a, contract, or a^'reement
that 1 should ^'ive or perform somethini,'; this is the /««
<ul Vi'Di of Roman law which has its source in an oUhjalio.
Only a person, it is true, can p»«rform a, tiling- throuKdi
contract ; and further, oi.ly a person can accpiire the rifrht
to such a performance. Yet we cannot. tht>refor.'. call
such a ri,y:ht jtersonal. Mvery sort of ri^dit is ri^'ht of a
person; but a rii,dit. which sprin-s out of contract,, is not
a ri.Lfht to a. person, but only to sonu-thiiiLr external to him,
or io be dispose i of by him ; and this is always a thinj,'.

FIK'8'r SEOTION.

I'KOrKUTV.

41. A pers(M> must i,nvt> to his freedom an extc-rnal
spluMV. in onl.M' that he may n>ach the compl.'teness
♦ittjdki_m. the idea. Since a person is as vet the first
abstract phase of the t-ompletely I'xistent. inlinite will, the
external sphere of freedom is n.>t oidy distinj,niisliable from
him but directly dilVereut and separable. ^^;

Addition. — The reasonableness of property consists in

I'liOPHRTV.

its ™ti»fyi„p. „„r „eed8, b„t i„ n, .,„per8c<lh,s and re <^'P^S

""''"'"' "'<■■■ " ■" f"0. but it is the only realization
r-».l.le so U,.,s as tl,„ al,straet personality h'as tW 1 1
hand relation to its object.

spitftim "'"'!' '' ^"^'""^ "' 'Jifl''---«n'>om the free

ind^ithonfr',;;:: "''^""' """■'"""*'' -' '•■■«• '-p"-™'

p, utn we say ihat is tlie tbinir or fact " " Tf

■y tin ,^. that wh„.h ,s real and substantive. Bnt it is
:«o..,,„trasted with ,.erson. which here includes mo ha

. p.»t„ ,lar subj,.c<„ and then it , ,,ns the oj.posite of he

ml and substantive, and is son,e,hin« n,er 1 • e Inal !^
Wh t - .'xtc-nal for the free spirit, which" is ditoent
f..." nuTc conse,ou.,„ess, is absolutelv external. Hence
aature is to bo ooiic(>iv...l .i« fi...+ i S • ^cnto

vorv self. ^^"^^i^^^l '^s that wJuch is extoriial in its

A<hntio,.^-Sir,,, a tiling,, has no subj^^otivitv it is external

txurnai. J, as 8ensiI)I«» am extern-il um-.*;..! i ^
Dornl Mv f'wmif, e •^xruual, hpatial. and tern

An- • '^ ^t'nse-poroeption is external to itself

An annna! may j.ereoive. l>nt the soni of the animal Im^
as IS d>jeet not itself. .>nt something external

43 .10 person in his oHreet eoneeption and as a separate
'" hvKlual has an existence which is pnrelv natunl T 1. !
-istence is something parti, inalieu.ile. j .n^ ^ Jj
n.tnre to the external worhl.-As the imlivi. „ ^ ^n
-h.e,l .n liis first abstract simplicit,. referent W
"-^/' onlv to those features of pirsonllitv wi Hvl , h^
- directly emlowed. not to those whi.-h h,: mi,, t p o eed
to acquire by voluntary effort. ^ ^ ^^

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

^^^

1^^-^

.^'

t-^

(kJ

lA^w

Cff-x^

f^sdJ^^

"^2^

^O^jX/*-^

-ZSTo/e.— Mental endowments, science, art, such matters
of religion as sermons, masses, prayers, blessings of con-
secrated utensils, inventions also, are objects of exchange,
recognized things to be bought and sold. It is possible to
ask, also, if an artist or scholar is in legal possession of his
art, science, or capacity to preach or read mass ; and the
question is put on the presumption that these objects are
things. Yet one hesitates to call such gifts, knowledge,
powers, mere things, because although they may be bar-

^ V"^^^"^*^ ^^^ ^^ ^ *^^°^' *^^®-^ ^'^^^ ^" ^^^®^ spiritual side.
f5 / \ Hence the understanding becomes confused as to how they
,-»are to be regarded at law. Before the understanding always
arises an exclusive disjunction, which in this case is that
/something must be either a thing or not a thing. It is
.^ like the disjunctive judgment that a thing must be either
finite or infinite. But, though knowledge, talents, etc., are
the possession of the free mind, and therefore internal to
it, they may be relinquished and given an external existence.
CSee below.) They would then fall imder the category of
things. They are not direct objects at the first, but the
spirit lowers its inner side to the level of the directly
external.

According to the unjust and immoral finding of the
Roman law. children were things for their father, and
he was in legal possession of tliem. At the same' time
he was related to them , etliically by the tie of love,
although the value of this relation was much weakened by
the legal usage. In this legal relation there occurs a
completely wrong union of thing and not-thing.

The essential feature of abstract right is that its object
is the ])erson as^such, with only those elements added
which, belonging to the external and visible embodiment
of his freedom, are directly different from him and separ-
able. Otlier phases it can include only after the conscious
operation of the subjective will. Mental endowments, the
sciences, etc., come up for treatment only from the stand-

I'ROPKRTV.

the m nd, which is acquired by education, study and habit
s a„ inward property of the spirit, and does not falU„ te
considered here. The process by which a mental posser
™n passe, into the external worid and conies underthe"
category of a legal property, will be taken up later, under

44 A i^erson has the right to direct his will upon any
object, as his real and positive end. The obiect thus ' ^

^'-'-^;- »^-- As_at has no end in ^t..l^ it 'ece es^^^^^^ ^^^^^

lute right to appropriate all that is a thin- ^

Note.-There is a philosophy whicraseribes to the
impersonal, to separate tilings, as they are directly appre!
bended, an independent and absolutely complete reabty
There is also a philosophy which affirms that the mind
cannot know what the truth or the thing in itself is
rhe e philosopues are directly contradicted by the attitude

^i^J''::-^'^ '^ ^'"^ :'^"^'^- ^^^^-"«-^ the so-called
external things seem to have an independent reality in
consciousness as perceiving and imagining, the free will is
the Idealization or truth of such reality.
Addition.~A man may own anything, because he is a

Uent. But the mere object is of an opposite nature

Every man has the right to turn his will upon a thing or

nake he thing an object of his will, that il to sav. to se

>u,ide the mere thing and recreate it as his own. ' As the

nng IS in its nature external, it has no purpose of its own

o tr/f ? "' -"^f' ''^^"""" ''' ^'''^^' 't i-s external

while ^r'n f, '''' ""' " ^'" ""^'"'^^^"^^ -^'^ '^'-J-t.

while all <,ther things m contrast with the will are

merely relative. To appropriate is at bottom only to man !

est the majesty of my will towards things, by demonstrat.

mg that they are not self-complete and have no purpose

r»-»

r -H-***;

'riir; rmiosoi'iiv or lucarr.

of M.olv own. This is hronol.t M.l.onl, l,v n.v \uhI\U\u^ uMo
H> ol.j.H MnoM,..r n„l ll.nn ihni wl.i,-!. ir pri,„„,rilv Im..l.
VM..-n (Ih. hviuK ih\u^ lM>-o,n,.s n.v proppilv !(,' k<'(k
""oduTM.M.IMw.n il,hM,l. I^iv.. i(,,nv will. Fn-owillis
M".N (hoidculisin wl,i..|, ,vruH,.s (o l.oM Ihat (l.inK.s asTh.«v
'"•<'<■'" !'<> .s,.|r.n.,n|.|,.(,.. i:,,,.|isn. „n M... oil,..,- Imnil
<i<><'l!>n>s llw.m I0I.0 „1,soln(,' in ||„.ir liniloronn. Mn|, (jiis
'vmI.sIu. plulo.sopln is not shnrnl in l.v H... a.Mnnl. whi.l,
l»v ronsmn.nK (l.inKs proves (hai (hov a,v not ahsolntolv
uuI(>|H'n»l(Mil.

4r». Tohav.-sonn-d.in.y: in n.v pow.-r. rv.-n iLond. it I.0
oxJornallv. is possession. Tho sp<vi..,l lad, ( ..i 1 „,,,,Ko
«onn-(lnn,u- n.v own (hrouKJ, nMlnn.l w.-,..(. in.p,.ls.. or
••'«l"'<'<'. 'N <!..- sp.via! inl.MVsf of possrssion. |{„(. wla-n I
"^* 11 livo will am in poss.vssion of son.oll.inr, I i^o{ a
l^mK.l.looxisfon.v. ami in (l.is wav li.-st l.....;.n.;. an ad„al
w.ll. l|„s ,s (ho ,n,o an.l \v^;i] nain.v of propo.f v. a.nl
«'ons1i(nf»>s i(s dislin.iiv.' .hai-ii. •(<>!'.

\'ofr Sin.v onr win.ls a.v looK.-.l npon as p,-i,narv fho
possession ol p,-opoHv appoars at li.-s( I0 ho a moans to
tluMrsal.slaotion: hnt i< is roallv H.o (i.-sl omho.iimont of
in^Mlom an.l ..n in(h>p.>.)<lon( omi.

■«'• Sinoo p,"opo,-<v n.akos ohjoolivo n.v porsonal in.livi-
<l.ul w.ll ,, .sri^hllv ,losonho.| as a private possession
On ilu- other l.an.l. eon.mon prope.tv. whirl, mav he pos-
sosse.lhva ""mherorseparateiml.vi.lnakisamarU.ra
WIv .,o„.e.I eompanv. in whi.h a man mav or n.av not,
allow his shan> to ivmain a; his own «-hoiee. "

Xotr. The elements of nature .,,,...01 heeome i.rivate
r'"''P«;'^v. h. the a^-rarian laws of IvN.i.ie mav he fonn.l a
;T"""'' ''^^^''''^" ••''ll.vtiveana private ownership of hunl
I nvate possession is the more r.-asonaMe. an.l. ev,>n at the
.>xpenseot other rights, mnst win the vietorv. IV..pertv
'H>un.l up with familv tn.sts eontains an element whi'-h is
oppose.l to the ri^M.t of personalitv an.l private ownership
lot private pv>ssessio„ must he lv..pt Mihjeet, to (ho higher

I'llOl'KlflT.

-n...n« wlK.„ ,„.ivul.. „»,„.,■» i„ „„„.„„„„, ,„, „t:

uu.., ,,,,,,,,,.,,„; ,,,,,,,,,,, ,,.,,,,,„.„„ ,„„,,,,::

ii, , I K,|Ml,l„. .I.„.H nwri.iiK lo Ml,, pomm. Kjt>.,;^ «. tl

;;„ ; ;'';;""• '■;' "^ •■■■ "V" i.ui«,„-j. i,r„ii„.ri,„„d „^--"-

" "• ," " '"■'■ .'" r™""'"' ''" ""■"■ K 1" i" <■■ "...„, ,u„i t„,

;"".';; ;';" '•"'|« '■• ""■i---,.! i I,„„.,. „^ ,,.,„, ^i

'nt'Vi ;":•""■ ;''"':.■",:"■' •"'".■.vii.i„„„„i,i:.,u»

;,'"""; '■>■ ;." « '»• »'-i.'.i u,,' ,,„ „,,,„,„;

''■'''""""•^"■■:''"-|-'' i'i.'...v .:„.,,i„..

|;« -.■«;,, .,,,„,,,,„,,,,, „„„ ,„„,,,„,,„„,, , ,„, ,. .;

1. i'U)<x. liiiirl. I. X. 11. VI).

A.IMi,.„. 1„ |„..,|,,-,v ,„v will i« ,„„.»„„„|. „„j „,„

.u ., In ,„,„„,,,„„„.,. ,„l ,„, „r tl,i« part.i,„la

"III S„„,. |.,„|„.,|j. ^,,v,..s visil.l.. ,.xi»l ,.,„•,. I„ ,„v will it

"';:' '"■'■'v-.M.«".i.is- ii„ .,..,„i„„:V"',

'"""".';" '"■ ■'""'■'■'■'I '<' ""'■^" 111 itut riv,|„,utiv Md

i.^ . .. „»la,n,.,, ,„a„v „Uh.» hav,. HkI.IIj a ishrf

X;,';::""" '•-"-•" 'i^l'^ t., ,.,.„,,„,,, a» the

•tr Aa a i«.K,.„. I „,„ an i,„liv!.I„„I :„ „„Iy ita simpli.st

■■>..> nsni. aMv l„„lv ,„ „, ,„ iu ,,„„,,„t „„ „„j^,„J
;'-"'.;- «U.n,al ,..i»,..,„.e ; it i.s ,,„ .,,.1 ^..2^

TIIK IMIII.O.SOPIIV OF KIGin.

and body, as I have other things onlv in so far as they ex-
press my will.

Note.—Thii view that the individual, not in his actualized

existence but in his direct eoncei)tiou, is to be taken simply

as living and hjrving a i)hysical organism follows from the

jU- Ct^^^^ conception of that phase of life and spirit, which we know

^nxt <? Svv^. as soul. The details of this conception are found in the

philosophy of nature.

I have organs and life only so far as I will. The
animal cannot mutilate or kill* itself, but a human being
can.

AihUf wv.—Ammnh do in a manner possess them-
selves. Their soul is in possession of their body. But
they have no right to their life, l)ecause thev *do not
will it.

48. The body, merely as it stands, is not adecpuite to
spirit. lu order to be a willing instrument and vitalized
means, it must first be taken i)ossession of by the spirit
(§ 57). Still foi;_c)thers I am essentially a free bein<^ in my
body, as 1 directly have it.

Nofc.~It is only because I in my living body am a free

being, that my body cannot be used as a beast of burden

In so far as the I lives, the soul, which conceives and, what

18 more, is free, is not separate 1 from the body. The body

18 the outward embodiment of fivodom, and in it the I is

sensible. It is an irrational and soj.liistic doctrine, which

separates body and soul, calliiig the soul the thing in itself

and maiutaiuing that it is lu.t touched or hurt when the bodv

IS wrongly treated, or when the existence of aiH'rson is sub-

ject to the ,.ow.'r of another. I can indeed withdraw out of

my existence into mysvK and make my existence something

external. I can regard any present feeling as something

I'.part from my real self, and may in this wav U- free

even in chains. But that is an affair of my will. I exist

for others in my bo<ly ; that I am free for others is the

same thing as that I am free in this outwai-d life If

PllOPEUTY.

my body is treated roughly by others, I am treated! i
roughly. '

Since it is I that am sensible, violence offered to my/l
body touches me instantly and directly. This is the differ-U
ence between personal assault and injury to any external
property. In property my will is not so vividly present Jl
it is in my body.

49. In my relation to external things, the rational element
IS that It is I who own property. But the particular ele-
ment on the other hand is concerned with ends, wants,
caprices, talents, external circumstances, etc. (§ 45) . Upon
them, it is true, mere abstract possession depends, but they
in this sphere of abstract personality are not yet identical
with freedom. Hence what and how much I possess ,
IS from the standpoint of right a matter of indifference.

Note.—li we can speak of several persons, when as yet
no distinction has been drawn between one person and
another, we may say that in personahty all persons are
equal. But this is an empty tautological proposition,
since a person abstractedly considered is notasj^t separate '' --^^f^-

from others, and has no distinguishing attribute. Equality '^^-^-^^-y^— *-'A
is the abstract identity set up by the mere und_erstr..minu; /^. U^ ^
Upon this principle mere reflecting thought, or, in otherA*-^ -<--^
words, spirit in its middle ranges, is apt to fall, when
before it there arises the relation of unity to diftereuoe
Thjs e(iuality would be only the equality of abstract
persons as such, and would exclude all reference to posses-
«ion, which IS the basis of inequality. Sometimes the de-
maud IS made for equality in the division of the soil of the
earth, and even of other kinds of wealth. Such a claim
IS superficial, because differences of wealth a-e due not
only to the accidents of external nature but also t) the infi-
nite variety and difference of mind and character In
short, the quality of an inaividual's possessions depends
u])on his reason, developed into an organic whole. We
cannot say that nature is unjust indistributuig wealth and

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KKiHT.

% ^ c.;v..Wx^'7;/ "f ^^"'' .l"«^' ^«^; "«J»«t. It is in part a moral desire
.^.^ ^'^7 ^" "^«n should have sufficient income forlhdTwajats

and when the wish is left in this indefinite form it is " 1-'
u,eant althou^ it. like ever.thin, merely well-mea^t; as
no counterpart in reality. But, further, income is different
froin possession and belongs to another sphere, that of the
CIVIC community.

Addilion.- Since wealth depends upon application
;e^% in the distribution of goods wou^ if iS.oc^:d;
^oon be disturbed again. What does not permit of being

true, but only as persons, that is, only with reference to

he source of possession. A.-cordingly every one must

have property. This is the only kind of equabty which

IS possible to consider. Beyond this is found the region of

particular persons, and the question for the first time comes

Z' 7 T ^ ^''''''' • ^"'^ '^'^ ^^^«^-ti«^ that the

proptity of every man ought in justice to be equal to that

of every other is false, since justice demands merely tha

every one should have property. Indeed, amongst per on

™sy endowed inequality must occur, and equality ,

would be wron... It is quite true that men^oftendcire the ,^<>^

ut this desire is wronL^. fo"Ti7^^77rT;:Tr i":^.. -'•

l/v»-|»)L<-t-0

I 7a, v^ iyv»_t-'

goods of others^ but this desire is wroi^fo
concerned about differences in individuals.

right is un-^|i>^^>

oO It IS a self-evident and, indeed, almost superfluous
remark that an object belongs to him who is accidentaUy
fiist in possession of it. A second person caimot take int^
possession what is already the property of another.

Addxhon.~So far we have been chieflv concerned with
the proposition that personality must find an embodiment
in property. From what has been said, it follows that he
wlio is first in possession is likewise owner. He is ri<rhtful
o^ncr. not because he is first, but because he is a free will
He IS not first till some one comes after him.

61. In order to fix property as the outward symbol of

«V'

, there-
1 desire
' wants,
is well-
tnt, has
ifferent
; of the

ication,
•duced,

being
lual, it
nice to

must
liich it
:iou of
comes
at the
3 that
Y that

-TSOUS

uality
re the

hious
1 tally
3 into

with

meut

at he

htful

will.

ol of

oV-

PROPEKTY.

^v»*^J(A/'0

2 Personahty, ,t ,s not enough that I represent it a, mine

and .uternally wll it to be mine ; I m„«t aI.o take • "ver

uto my pos.es.ion. The embodiment of mv will can then

which I take possession be unowned is a self-evident „ ,

ue«at,ve condition (§ 50). Eather it is more than a bTrei**^ "^ ■-

negative, smce it gnticiiiates a relation to others vf^ **^ "^

the conception of property, and the ne.,t step is the reining

s mine, must be made recogimable for others. When I makt

festedin itT"'; f™ " \I"-«-li"'*«' *>>ieh mnst be mani-
tos ed in Its outer form, and not remain merely in my inner
w, 1, Children often affirm this earlier act ot'will ^in

such a will IS not enough. The form of subjectivity must

be ™.oved by working itself out into something obfective. .' ,..6,;..<

52. Active possession makes the material of an object my ,.

;^:^^r * '1"^'^™' '^ -^ independently its own.' ^l^:!^!-"

- . ^ i.^>...ooxuu uuiKes tue material of an obiect n

'ToT^' t!"" '': "1"'"^ " "^^^ independently its own..
Jvoje.—ihe material opposes itself to me. Indeed its

t abstiact independence to my abstract or sentient con-
ciousness. The sentient imagination, it may be said in
passing pu s the truth upside down when it regards the
«e.tient side of mind as concrete, and the rational as fb!
s .act. xn reference therefore to the will and property this
absolute independence of the material has no trut!i ic ve
possession, viewed as an external activity, by which the

XT /"-'''V^' appropriating natural things become
actualized, is allied to physical strength, cunning, skill I
the means m short, by which one is able to tak^hold c. .
poreally of a thing. Owing to the qualitative differences
of natural objects, the mM,sfprv ,w.. o,..i ,. _• . ""V , ^^^ W^

^'^j-e^.

of natural objects, the mastery over and po7sesslon7f'Ii^m T^ "^A'

i-sified ;neauing. and a. corresponding t><!^'"'

has an infinitely diver

limitation and contingency. Moreover, no one kind of
matter, such as an element, can be wholly possessed by any

yv<r-'

THK PHiLosoi'iiy or uuiiri.

uurnLer of separate persons. Tu order to become a possible
object of possession, it must be taken in separate parts, as
a breath of an- or drauglit of water. The impossibility of
I ownmg one kind of matter, or an element, dei)ends finally

: not upon external physical incapacity. l>ut upon tlu. fact

that the person, as will, is not only individual, but directly
U oJu^ * mdmduiil, and that the external exists for him. th^^i^^f;;;^
^ a_ W^ <Tv^.^only as a collection of i>articulars. (§ 13, note to § 43.) '
I The process, by which we become master and "external

I owner, is in a sense infinite, and must remain more or less

i undetermined and incomplete. None the less, however, has

the material an essential form, because of which alone it is
anything. The more I appropriate this form, so much the
) more do I come into real possession of the object. The

consumption of food is a through -aud-through" chan.^e of
Its quality. The cultivation of skill in my bodv, and the
oducatum of my mind, are also more or less' an active
possession by means of thorough-going modification. Mind
or s])irit is above all that which I can make mv own.
But this possession is different from proj)erty. Property
is completed in its relation to the free will. In the external
relation of active possession sometiiiug of externality re-
mains as a residue, but with regard to the free will the
owned object has reserved nothing. A matter without
qualities, a something which in propertv is supposed to
remain outside of me, and to belong wholly to the object, is
au empty abstraction, which though t must expose and defeat.
Addition. ~¥'ni\iiQ has raised tin; question, whether, if I
have fashioned an object, its mateiial is also mine. Accord-
lug to his view, if I have made a cup out of gold, any one
may take the gold, provided that he does no injurv to my
handiwork. Though we may imagine that form and sub-
stance are separable in that way, the distinction is an
empty subtlety. If I take possession of a field, and i)lough
It, not only is the furrow mine, but also the ground which
belongs to it. It is my will to take possession of the ma-

PHOPJ^ITV.

terial, even the whole object. Hence the material is not
masterless ; it is not its own. Even if the material remains
outside of the form winch I give the object, the form is a
sign that the object is to be mine. Hence the thing does
not stay outside of my will or purpose. There is con-
sequently nothing in it which can be taken hold of by
another. ''

63. Property has its more direct phases in the relation of
the will to the object. This relation is (a) direct and active
taking of possession, in so far as the will is embodied in
the object as in something positive, (ft) In so far as this
object IS negative towards the will, the will is visibly em-
bodied in It as something to be negated. This is use (y)
• ^Y I£iMnLoLtlie jvill into itself out of the obj pnf ; this is
' relmauishmenty These three phases are the p;Sitrve. nega-
tive, and infigAte judgments of the will concerning the
object. ^

A. The Act of Possession.

54. Taking posscjssion is partly the simple bodily grasp
partly the forming and partly the marking or designating
of the object. ^

Addiiion.—Tlhe^^ modes of taking possession exhibit the
progress from the category of parti(mlaritv to that of uni-
versality. Bodily seizure can be made only of particular // ^^_
objects, whde marking an object is done by a kind of ■ VTTV >
picture-thinking. In m7.^:kiii^keep before me a repre- ^ ^^^^^^l
sentation, by which I intend that the object shall be mine ' ^ ^ZT
in Its totality, and not merely the part which I can hold in'"^^ "^^
my hand. |

55. (o) Corporeal possession, in which I am present di- li

rectly, and my will is directly visible, appeals at once to the
senses, and from that standpoint is the most complete •
kind of possession. But it is after all only subjective. Tj "....^
temporary and greatly limited as well by surroundings as fe^
by the qualities of the object. But if I can connect an ^'^^

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

y4i,

(' £^

z
-%

1.0

I.I

IA£|28 |2.5
u Hi

£ vs. 112.0

11-25 i 1.4

1.6

n;:^

.... <*

v^^

Sciences
Corporation

33 WIST MAIN STRUT

WIBSTIR.N.Y. 14510

(716) •7^-4S09

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

object with anjtbing I have already, or if the two become
connected accidentally, the sphere of direct physical pre-
hension is to some extent enlarged.

Note.— Mechanical forces, weapons, instruments extend
the compass of my power. If my ground is washed by the
sea or a river, or lies adjacent to a bit of good hunting
country or a pasturage, if it contains stone or other minerals,
if there is any treasure in it or upon it, in each of these
ways possession may be enlarged. It is the same if the
enlargement occurs after I have possession and accidentally
as IS the case with so-called natural accretions, such as
alluvial dejiosits, and with objects that are stranded. Every-
thing that is born is also an extension of my wealth, /ce^t^m
as they are called ; but as they involve an organic relation
and are not external additions to an object already in my
possession, they are difCerent from the other accessories
All these adjuncts, some of them mutually exclusive, are
possibilities by which one owner rather than another 'may
the more easily take a piece of land into possession, or work
It up ; they may also be viewed as mere accidental accom-
paniments of the object to which thev ai-e added. They
are in fact external concomitants which do not include any
conception or living union. Hence it devolves upon the
understanding to bring forward and weigh reasons for or
against their being mine, and to apply the positive edicts
of the law, so that a decision may be reached in accordance
with the relative closeness of the connection between the
object and its accessory.

Addition.~The act of possession assumes a separation of
parts in the object. I take no more into my possession
than I can touch with my body. But, secondly, external
things have a wider range than I am al>le to cover physi-
cally. Something else stands in connection with what I
own. Through the hand I exercise the act of ownership
but the compass of the hand can be enlarged. No animal
lias this noble member. What I grasp with it can itself

PROPERTY.

become a means to further prehension. When I come into
possession of a thing, the understanding goes at once over
into it, and as a consequence not only what is directly laid
hold upcn is mine, but likewise what is connected with it.
At this juncture positive law must introduce its prescripts,
because nothing more than this can be deduced from the
conception.

66. (/3) When something that is mine is formed, it be-
comes independent of me, ceasing to be limited to my pre-
sence in this space or time, or to the presence of mV con-
sciousness and will.

Note.— The fashioning of a thing is the kind of active
possession which is most adequate to the idea, because it
unites the subjective and the objective. It varies infinitely
according to the quality of the object and the purpose of
the subject. To this head belongs likewise the formation
or nurture of living things, in which my work does not re-
main something foreign, but is assimilated, as in the culti-
vation of the soil, the care of plants, and the taming, feed-
ing, and tending of animals. It inchides also any arrange-
ment for the more efficient use of natural products or forces,
as well as the effect of one material upon another, etc.

Additio7i.— This act of forming may in practice assume
the greatest variety of aspects. The soil, which I till, is
formed. The forming of the inorganic is sometimes in-
direct. When I, for instance, build a windmill, I have not
formed the air, but I form something which will utilize
the air. Yet, as I have not formed the air, I dare not call
it mine. Moreover the sparing of a wild animal's life mav
be viewed as a forming, since my conduct is the preserva-
tion of the object. It is the same kind of act as the train-
ing of animals, only that training is more direct, and pro-
ceeds more largely from me.

57. In his direct life, before it is idealized by self-con-
sciousness, man is merely a natural being, standing outside
of his true conception. Only through the education of his

'^J-X-wv,^.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

body and miud, mainly by his becoming conscious of him-
self as free, does he take possession of himself, become his
own property, and stand in opposition to others. This
active possession of himself, conversely, is the giving of
actuality to what he is in conception, in his possibilities,
faculties, and disposition. By this process he is for the
first time securely established as his own, becomes a
tangible reality as distinguished from a simple conscious-
ness of himself, and is capable of assuming the form of
an object (§ 43, note).

Note.— We are now in a position to consider slavery.
We may set aside the justification of slavery based upon
the argument that it originates in superior physical force,
the taking of prisoners in war, the saving and preserving
of life, upbringing, education, or bestowal of kindnesses.
These reasons all rest ultimately on the ground that man
is to be taken as a merely natural being, living, or, it may
even be, choosing a life which is not adequate to his
conception. Upon the same footing stands the attempted
justification of ownership as merely the status of masters,
as also all views of the right to slaves founded on history.'
The assertion of the absolute injustice of slavery on the
contrary, clinging to the conception that man, as spiritual,
is free of himself, is also a one-sided idea, since it supposes
man to be free by nature. lu other words, it takes as the
truth the conception in its direct and unreflective form
rather than the ilea. This antinomy, like all others, rests
upon the external thinking, which keeps separate and inde-
pendent each of two aspects of a single complete idea. In
point of fact, neither aspect, if separated from the other, is
able to measure the idea, and present it in its truth. It is A
the mark of the free spirit (§ 21) that it does not exist
merely as conception or naturally, but that it supersedes
its own formalism, transcending thereby its naked natural
existence, and gives to itself an existence, which, being its
own, is free.

PROPERTY.

of him-
ome his
1. This
ving of
bilities,
for the
ames a
iBcious-
orm of

slavery,
d upon
I force,
serving
nesses.
it man
it may
to his
mpted
asters,
i story,
an the
ritual,
pposes
as the

form
, rests
[ inde-
L. In
her, is

It is i
■ exist
•sedes
itural
ig its

Hence the side of the antinomy, which maintains the
conception of freedom, is to be preferred, since it contains
at least the necessary point of departure for the truth.
The other side, holding to the existence, which is utterly
at variance with the conception, has in it nothing reasonable
or right at all. The standpoint of the fiee will, with which
nght and the science of right begin, is already bevond the
wrong view that man is simply a natural being, who, as he
cannot exist for himself, is fit only to be enslaved. This
untrue phenomenon had its origin in the circumstance that
the spirit had at that time just attained the level of con-
sciousness. Hence through the dialectical movement of
the conception arises the first inkling of the consciousness
of freedom. There is thus by this movement brought to
pass a struggle for recognition, and. as a necessary result
the relation of master and slave. But in order that the
objective spirit, ^.l^h gives substance to right, may not
again be apprehended only on its subjective side, and that
It may not agam appear as a mere unsupported command
intimating that man in his real nature is not appointed to
sla .ery, it must be seen that the idea of freedom is in truth
nothing but the state.

Addition.-Ii wo hold fast to the side that man is abso-
lutely free, we condemn slavery. Still it depends on the
person s own will, whether he shall be a slave or not, just
as It depends upon the will of a people whether or not it is to
be m subjection. Hence slavery is a wrong not simply on
the part of tho.e who enslave or subjugate, but of the
slaves and subjects themselves. Slavery occurs in the/
passage from the natural condition of man to his true
moral and social condition. It is found in a world where
a wrong is still a right. Under such a circumstance the
wrong has its value and finds a necessary place

58. (y) The kind of possession, which is not literal but
only representative of my will, is a mark or symbol, whose
meaning is that it is I who have put my will into he ob

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

ject. Owing to the variety of objects used as signs, this

kind of possession is very indefinite in its meaning.

Addition. — Of all kinds of possession this by marking is

■ the most complete, since the others have more or less the

efPect of a mark. When I seize or form an object, in each

case the result is in the end a mark, indicating to others

that I exclude them, and have set my will in the object.

The conception of the mark is that the object stands not

for what it is, but for what it signifies. The cockade, e.g.,

means citizenship in a certain state, although its colour has

no connection with the nation, and represents not itself but

the nation. In that man acquires possession through the

use of a sign, he exhibits his mastery over things.

B. Use of the Ohjed.

59. The object taken into my possession receives the
predicate " mine," and the will is related to it positively.
Yet in this identity the object is established as something
negative, and my will becomes particularized as a want or
desire. But the particular want of one separate will is the
positive, which satisfies itself ; while the object is negative
in itself, and exists only for my want and serves it. Use is
the realization of my want through the change, destruction,
or consumption of the object, which in this way reveals
that it has no self, and fulfils its nature.

Note.— The view that use is the real nature and actuality
of property floats before the mind of those who consider
that pioperty is dead and ownerless, if it is being put to
no use. This they advance as reason for laying violent
and unlawful hands upon property. But the will of an
owner, by virtue of which a thing is his own, is the funda-
mental principle, of which use is only an external, special,
and subordinate manifestation.

Addition.— In use is involved a wider relation than in
liossession by symbol, because the object, when used, is

PROPERTY.

not recognized in its particular existence, but is by me
negated It is reduced to a means for the satisfaction of
my wants. When the object and I come together, one of
the two must lose its qualities, if we are to become iden-
tical. But I am a living thing who wills and truly affirms
himself, while the object is only a natural thing. There-
fore It must go to ground and I preserve myself This
conshtutes the superiority and reason of the organic

^60. Using an object in direct seizure is a single separate
r act. But when we have a recurring need, use repeatedly a

v-' product whuih r^r^lQf.,ic U.,„l£ j _ , . ^ •'

^.v^ A

^(u^^ Z"a T^ Z'T "'^^ "^^^ ^ recurring need, use repeatedly a ^ , ,
r^^ prod uct which replaces itself, and seek to preserve its ^'l:^^
f^i power to replace itself, a direct and single act of seizure "^ ^""^
♦> -^^««o«^e« / s^gn- It is universalized and denotes the pos-
^^session of the elemental or organic basis, the conditions of
production.

61. A thing has in contrast with me. its possessor, no
end of its own (§ 42). Its substance as an independent
thing IS thus a purely external and unsubstantial existence
As this externality when realized is the use. to which I put
It so the total use or service of the object is the object
^ Itself in ,ts whole extent. meiLl.am_a4mitkijAe
com£l^jis^ola,«iing,lamtlie_omi^^^^
the entire range of use, nothing is left over to be the
possession of another.

n«flff t'"T?' relation of use to property is tbe same
as that of substance to accident, of internal to external, of
force to Its manifestation. But the force must be mani-
fested ; a farm is a farm only as it bears produce. He
who has the use of a farm is the possessor of the whole,

abstra'ctTr" '"^''" ^"'"^'^^ ^^ ^"'^^^^^ '^ - -P^^
^ 62. partial or temporary use. and partial or temporarv
pos^sion, or possibility of use, however, are to be dis^
tjnguisTied from actual ownership. The total use of a
thing cannot be mine, while the abstract property is some!

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

body else's. The object would in that case contain a
contradiction. It would be wholly penetrated by my will
and yet contain something impenetrable, namely, the
empty will of another. The relation of my positive will
to the thing would be objective and yet not objective.
Accordingly, possession is essentially free and complete.

Note.— The distinction between right to total use and
abstract possession is due to the empty and formal under-
standing. To it the idea, which in this case is the unity
of possession or the personal will with the realization of
this will, is not true. On the contrary, it holds as true
these two elements in their separation. This distinction
of the understanding implies that an empty mastership of
things is an actual relation. If we could extend the term
" aberration " beyond the mere imagination of the subject,
and the reality, with which he is directly at variance, we
might call such a view of property an aberration of per-
sonality. How can what is mine in one single object be
without qualification my individual exclusive will, and also
the individual exclusive will of someone else ?

lu the "Institut." libr. Ji. tit. iv. it is said: " Usufruciua
est jus alienis rebus utendijruendi salva rerum substantia;*
and again : «' Ne tamen in universum inutiles essent pro-
prietates, semper abscendente usufructu : placuit certis modis
extingui usumfructum et ad proprietateTn reverti." "Placuit "
—as though it were optional, whether or not to give sense
to the formal distinction of the uuderstanding. A pro-
prietas semper abscendente usufructu would not only be
inutiles, but no longer a proprietas. Many distinctions
regarding property, such as that into res mancipi and nee
mancipi, and that into dominium Quiritarium and Boni-
tarium, are merely historical dainties and do not belong to
this place, because they have no relation to the conception
of property. But the relation of the dominium directum
to the dominium utile, and that of the contract which gives
heritable right in another's land, and also the various ways

PROPERTY.

of dealing with estates in fee, with their ground rents
and other rents and impositions, have a cLr bearint
upon the distinction now under discussion. wLn the«e

fh« , • Pf*^'''"', '"'* '' 's again transcended when bv

come the same. It these relations contained no mor« that
the fom.al d.stmction of the understanding, the" would
be opposed to each other not two masters («) bTaf

session. In' this {.eStlon L Tot fold' ZT" r
from property to use, a transition alrXperltnTwhe.";
ownership, which wa^ formerly reckoned as the I
honourable, is given a secondary place while tl,!, -r""

f:f:il?"'"^"'"»----^'«'-ter^
ofctiSS^ret:rs::r''T'"'''^'''''--

and at least in a sma 1 section of thrr" *"' '° "'"'"''''•
as a universal princip L But h """■™™ ""'" '*'"'
there of the prin^of il.ft:^:^^^'^:''^,

=:oSsti;::;iTien^t ';t' -- "'--o-

^ to reach /^— ^nl ^HrXt rtt
the impatience of opinion ^«ouKe also to

a "fxt'ttr: rt s"-kr„ti '--7

»pec,al usefulness, when fixed quantSvely can if 1^
pared w.th other objects capable of bein« ™trth!
u^e, and a special want, served by th^ obfec Id Tt
any want may be compared with'o^her wCt ,^1^^
corresponding objects may be also compared Tht
^.rsa, characteristic, whii proceeds frte ^2^

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

/(Lo i^^j^j-y\jij^

object and yet abstracts from its special qualities is the
""^l"®- Ya]uejs_t he true essence or substance o f the
(2bject,^and throbji^by possessing value becomeTTn
object for consciousness. As complete owner of the object
I am owner of its value as well as of its use.

JVo/d.— The feudal tenant is the owner of use onlv not
of the value. '

Addition.-(^xx2Miy here becomes quantity. Want is a
term common to the greatest variety of things, and enables
ine to compare them. Thought in its progress starts from
the special quality of an object, passes through indifference
with regard to the quality, and finally reaches quantity
So in mathematics the circle, ellipse and parabola are
specifically different, and yet the distinction of one curve
from another is merely quantitative, being reduced to a
mere quantitative difference in the largeness of their co-
efficients. In property the quantitative aspect, which
issues from the qualitative, is value. The qualitative
determmes the quantum, however, and is therefore quite
as much retained as superseded. When we consider the
conception of value, the object is regarded only as a sign '
countmg not for what it is but for what it is worth A
letter of credit, e.g., is not a kind of paper, but a sign of
another universal, namely, its face value. The specific
value of an object varies according to the want, but in
order to express abstract worth, we use money. Money
represents things, but since it does not represent want itself
but IS only a sign of it, it is again governed by the specific
value, which it merely stands for. One can be owner of an
object without being master of its value. A family, which
can neither sell nor pawn its goods, is not master of their
value. But since the restrictions characterizing this form
of property, such as fiefs, property conveyed in trust, etc
are not adequate to the conception of it, they are lareelv
disappearing. ^ ^

64. The form of the object and the mark are themselves

s is the

of the

►mes an

3 object,

»nly, not

mt is a
enables
rts from
fference
uantity.
'ola are
e curve
ed to a
heir co-

which
Llitative
e quite
ier the
a sign,
•th. A
sign of
specific
but in
Money
t itself,
specific
rof an

which
f their
s form
it, etc.,
largely

iselves

PROPERTY.

external circumstances, deprived of meaning and worth if
tation of the subjective will. The presence of the will

of'Thr^b" r"'' ^""^''^ ^'^'^^^^^^ ^^^'^y - --t!L--

lapses the 'T 7 --ifestation. If the manifestation

wm and of ? ' '^'1^'"'^ ^^ '^^ ''^^ ^«--«« oi the
will and of possession, becomes ownerless. Hence I mav

lose or acquire property through prescription ^

Jo^e.-Prescription does not run counter to strict ri^ht

f claims "it""?' ""ff "^"'^ "^^"^^"^ -^- -t of
o d claims It IS founded on the reality of property in

o her words upon the necessity that the will, in order o

keep a thing, must manifest itself in it.-Publi monuments

b ecaise ot thp "'^' T- '"^"^ ""^ self-sufficient ends
hononr t ;^^7^"!»g «oul of remembrance and

honour. Deprived of this soul they are, so far as the
nation IS concerned, without a master, and become casuallv
a private possession, as has happened with the Greek and
Egyptian works of art in Turkey.-The private right of an

reasons. These works become in a sense masterless, since
th y, like the monuments, though in an opposite way. becZe
firstcommon property, and then through various channeTs
private property. To set apart land L a cemetery atd
hen not use it, or to set apart land never to be used! con-
tarns an empty unreal caprice. As to traverse this ac ion
does no injury respect for it cannot be guaranteed

I hit rTfT'^^^'^'" ''''' "P"^ '^' supposition that
I have ceased to look upon the object as mine If a thin^
IS to re„,ain mine, there must be a continuous ac of wHl

The Wr "?:'' ^*r^' *'^^"^^ "«^ - preservation.-
The dechne m the value of public monuments was fre

Zl\TT^ '-"^^^ *^^^ ^^'<>^-^^^on in instTtution
founded tor the saying of masses. The spirit of the old

'nil: PHILOSOPHY of higiit

confession and therefore of these buildings had fled and
the buildings could be taken as private property.

C. Belinquishment of Property.

65. I may relinquish property, since it is mine only bv
virtue of my having put my will into it. I mav let 'a
thing go unowned by me or pass it over to the will and
possession of another; but this is possible only so far as
the object IS m its nature something external

Addihon.~VveBcv\i^iion is relinquishment without direct
declaration of w 11. True relinquishment is a declaration

^iA .A^^ > V^ ^^°^^' ^^^''^^^ *^« object as mine. The

CPU^J^i.^ ^process m all its phases may be taken to be a true takinfof

possession. First there is the direct prehension ; then bv

use property is thoroughly acquired ; and the third step is

wLnt.'^*' '''''' '''-'''''' ^---^- ^^-/re-

Q6. Some goods, or rather substantive phases of life are

nalienable, and the right to them does not perish through

apse of time. These comprise my inner personalitv and

he universa essence of my consciousness of myself, and

are personality m general, freedom of will in the broadest

sense, social life and religion. i>roaaest

Note-^Nh^t the spirit is in conception, or implicitly it
should also be in actuality; it shouli be a person, that' is
to say, be able to possess property, have sociality and reli-
gion. This Idea is itself the conception of spirit As
causa sm, or free cause, it is that, cujus naiura non potest
connpi msx exxstens (Spinoza, "Eth." Def 1) In this
very conception, namely, that spirit shall be what it is only

ts natural and direct reality, lies the possibility of opposi-
hihty of evil„ but in general it is the possibility of the

PROPERTY.

alienation of personality and substantive being ; and this
alienation may occur either unconsciously or intentionally
-Examples of the disposal of personality are slavery, vas'
salage inability to own property or lack of complete control
over It. Eelmquishment of reason, sociality, moralitv or
religion occurs in superstition ; it occurs also if I delegate
to others the authority to prescribe for me what kind of
acts i shall commit, as when one sells himself for robberv
murder, or the possibility of any other crime ; it occurs
when I permit others to determine what for me shall be
duty or religious truth.

The right to nothing that is inalienable can be forfeited
through lapse of time. The act by which I take possession
of my personality and real being, and estabush myself as
havmg rights, responsibilities, and moral and religious obli-
gations, deprives these attributes of that externality, which
alone gives them the capacity of being possessed by another-
Along with the departure of this externality goes the refer-
ence to time or to any previous consent or complaisance.
This return of myself into myself, being the process by
which I establish myself as idea or complete legal and
moral person, does away with the old relation. It removes
the violence which I and others had done to my own con-
ception and reason, the wrong of having treated the infinite
existence of self- consciousness as something merely ex
traneous, and of having suffered others to do the same
This return into myself reveals the contradiction implied
in my having given into the keeping of others my right
morality or religion. I gave them what I did not' myself
possess, what, so soon as I do possess it, exists in essence
only as mine, and not as something external.

Addition.~It lies in thenatureof the matter that the slave
has an absolute right to make himself free, or that when
anyone has hired out his morality for robbery and murder
the transaction is absolutely void. Anyone possesses the
competency to annul such an agreement. It is the same

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

With the letting of religiosity by a priest, who is my con-
tessor. The inner religious condition every one must adjust
by himself. A religiosity, part of which is handed over to
some one else is not genuine, for the spirit is only one, and
must dwell within me. To me it must belong to unite the
act of worship with religious aspiration.

&7. The use of single products of mv particular physical
endowments or mental capacities I may hand over to others
for a limited time, since, when a time limit is recognized
these products may be said to have an external relation to
my genuine and total being. If I were to dispose o. my
whole time, made concrete in work, and all my activity I
would be giving up the essence of my productions. My
whole activity and reality, in short,, my personality, would
be the property of another.

Note.—Thx^ ig the same relation as that (§ 61) between
the substance of an object and its use. As it is only by
limiting use that we can distinguish it from the object so
the use of my powers is to be distinguished from these
powers tiiemselves, only in so far as it has a quantitative
limit. The total number of manifestations of a faculty is
the faculty ; the accidents are the substance ; the parti-
culars, the universal.

Addition.— The distinction, here analyzed, is that between
a slave and a servant or day-labourer in our own time
Ihe Athenian slave had possibly lighter occupation and
higher kind of mental work than is the rule with our
workmen. But he was a slave notwithstanding, since the
whole circle of his activity was controlled by liis master.

68. What is peculiar to a mental product can be exter-
nahzed and directly converted into an object, which it is
possible for others to produce. When another person has
acquired the object, he may make the thought or, it may
be the mechanical genius in it, his own ; a possibility
which m the case of literary works constitutes the reason
and special value of acquisition. But, over and above

PROPERTY.

this the new owner comes at the same time into possession
of the general power to express himself in the same way
and so of making any number of objects of the same kind
.1, fr works of art the form, which images the
thought in an external material, is so conspicuously the
possession of the artist, that an imitation of it is really a
product of the imitator's mental and mechanical skill
But m the case of literature or an invention of some
technical contrivance, the form in which it is externalized
IS of a mechanical sort. In a book the thought is presented
m a row of particular abstract signs; in an invention the
thought has a wholly mechanical content. The way to
reproduce such things, as mere things, is a matter of
ordinary skilled labour. Between the two extremes, on
the one side a work of art. and on the other a product of
manual labour, there are all stages of production, some of
which incline to one of the extremes, some to the other

69. Since the purchaser of such a product of mental
skill possesses the full use and value of his single copy he
IS complete and free owner of that one copy, aUhough the
author of the work or the inventor of the apparatus remains
owner of the general method of multiplying such products.
Ihe author or inventor has not disposed directly of the
general method, but may reserve it for his private
utterance. l€.<j. m^aXsu. fji^ c^^^ ^

Note.-The justification of the right of the author or in-
ventor cannot be sought in his arbitrarily making it a con-
dition, when he disposes of a copy, that the possibility of
bringing out other copies shall not belong to the purchaser,
but slml remam in his own hands. The first question is
whether the separation of the object from the power to re-
produce, which goes with the object, is allowable in thought
and does not destroy full and free possession (§ 62) Does
It depend upon the arbitrary choice of the first producer to
reserve to himself the power to reproduce or dis^>ose of the
product ot his mindv Or. on the other hand, may he

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

I I

count It of no value, and give it freely with each separate
copy? Now there is this peculiarity about this power
th^t through It the object becomes not merelv a possession'
but a means of wealth (see § 170. and foL). This new
feature is a special kind of external use, and is different
and separate from the use to which the object was directly
appomted It is not. as it is called, an acces.no naturoMs
as are fcetura. Hence as the distinction occurs in the

2 r/!."'*"'^''^ "'"' ^^"'^ '' ^^*"^^"^ «^P^We of being
divided the reservation of one part, while another is being
disposed of. IS not the retention of an ownership without

The primary and most important claim of trade and
commerce is to give them surety against highway robbery
In the same way the primaiy though merely negative de-
mand of the sciences and arts is to insure the workers in
these fields against larceny, and give their property protec-
tion But m the case of a mental product the intention is
hat others should comprehend it. and make its imagina-
tion. memory, and thought their own. Learning is not
merely the treasuring up of words in the memory; it is
through thinking that the thoughts of others are seized.
and this after-thinkmg is real learning. Now that which
IS learned becomes in turn something which can be dis-
posed of ; and the external expression of this material may
easily assume a form different from the form into which
the original thinker threw his work. Thus those who have
worked over the material a second time may regard as their
own possession whatever money they may be able to extract
from their work, and may contend that they have a riirht to
reproduce it In the transmission of the sci;nces in general
and especially in teaching positive science, church doctrine'
or jurisprudence, are found the adoption and repetition of
though s whicai are already established and expressed.
This IS largely the case with writings composed for the same
purpose. It IS not possible to state accurately, n.nd establish

PROPERTY.

expUctly by law and right, just how far the new fom
mute the scentific treasure or the thoughts of others

farTothf *''%P^'-»»" who re-constructs them, how
fho'uld bt c!, 7"'':' ^ ^'P'''""" "* "" ™t''°'-'« work
roueshon ! t * P'"*'""™- ^'""^<' P'^Siarism must be

Laws against reprinting protect the property of author

measure. TI e ease with which one can intentionally alter
theform or insert slight modifications into a large Cork
on science or a comprehensive theory which is the work of
anoaer and further, the great diffic'ulty, when dLerursing

autW Itro", " ''"'"f.'^' "Wing '>y the letter of the
author, introduce, in addition to the special purposes re
qumng such a repetition, an endless variety '^f '^1"
which stamp upon the foreign article the more o"Tss
TrS LrT'^"" of ^niething which is oneW
^ith net : --rendnnns, abridgments, compilations,

critical journal, an annual, or a cyclopedia, keep on repeat,
mg under the same or an altered title, although each may
be maintained to be something new and unique Yet"he

fhTflrsT f' "'" "•";' P^"™"^" "- »th„r or invent ri^
the fiist ,.lacc may be wiped out, or the purpose of both

autW and iinitiitor may be defeated, L 'one may be

larcenv ""!rT''' T "'" **"" P"''*'''™™'. «• -'-lar's
of honour has dislodged it, or that the feeling of honour
has vanished or cease, to be directed against phigiarism, o
that a small eomp.Iation or slight change of form is ranked
as an ong.nal and independent production, a,„l so hiizhlv
esteemcd as to banish all thought of plagiarism

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

rO. Since personality is something directly present the
comprehensive totality of one's outer activity, the life is
not externa] to it. Thus the disposal or sacrifice of life is ^
not the manifestation of one's personality so much as the
very opposite. Hence I have no nght to relinquish my ., --
^f^- Only a moral and social ideal , which submerges the ^ V'
direct, simple and separate personality, and constitutes its '^
real power, has a right to life. Life, as such, being direct
and unreflected, and death the direct negation of it, death
must come from without as a result of natural cau'ses or
must be received in the service of the idea from a foreien
hand. ®

AddUxon.~'^\iQ particular person is really a subordinate
who must devote his life to the service of the ethical fabric-
when the state demands his life, he must yield it up. But
should the man take his own life ? Suicide may at first
glance be looked upon as bravery, although it be the poor
bravery of tailors and maid-servants. Or it may be re-
garded as a misfortune, caused by a broken heart But
the point is. Have I any right to kill myself ? The answer
IS that I, as this individual am not lord over my life, since
the comprehensive totality of one's activity, the life', falls
within the direct and present personality. To speak of the
right of a person over his life is a contradiction, since it
implies a right of a person over himself. But no one can
stand above and execute himself. When Hercules burnt
himself, and Brutus fell upon his sword, this action against
their personality was doubtless of an heroic type ; but yet
the simple right to commit suicide must be denied even to
heroes.

Transition from Property to Contract.

71. Outward and visible existence, as definite, is essen-
tially existence for another thing (see note to § 48). Thus
property, as a visible external thing, is determined by its

CONTRACT.

relations to other external things, these relations being
both necessary and accidental. But property is also a
manifestation of will, and the other, for which it exists, is
the will of another person. This reference of will to will is
the true and peculiar ground on which freedom is realized.
The means by which I hold property, not by virtue of the
relation of an object to my subjective will] but by virtue
of another will, and hence share in a common will, is
contract.

JV^o^e.— It is just as much a necesity of reason that men
make contracts, exchange, and trade, as that they should
have property (§ 45, note). In their consciousness it is
some want, benevolence, or advantage, which occasions the
contract, but really it is reason, or the idea as it is embodied
in the realized will of a free person. It is taken for
granted that contracting jmrties recognize one another as
persons and owners. Recognition is contained and pre-
supposed in the fact that contract is a relation of the
objective spirit (§ 35, note to § 57).

Addition.— In contract I hold property through a common
will. It is the interest of reason that the subjective will
become universal, and exalt itself to this level of realiza-
tion. In contract the particular will remains, although it
is now in conjunction with another will. The universal
will assumes here no higher form than co-operation.

SECOND SECTION.
Contract.

72. In contract property is no longer viewed on the side
of its external reality, as a mere thing, but rather as con-
taining the elements of will, another's as well as my own.
Contract is +^e process which presents and occasions the
contradiction by which I, existing for myself and oxclud-
iug another will, am and remain an owner only in so far

Co'crk^-^'^

Sr (l^r-'^J^ <K^^ £^>^ rx-^^-M^^-G-xUL

o^^yfuL^^

^® '^'"1^ PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

as I identify myself with the will of another, and cease to
be an owner.

73. Guided by the conception I must relinquish mj
l>roperty not merely as an external thing (§ 65) but as
property if my will is to become a genuine fictor in
reality. But by virtue of this procedure my will, when
relinquished, is another will. The necessary nature of the
conception is thus realized in a unity of different wills
which neverthless, give up their differences and peculiari-'
ties But this identity implies not that one will is identical
with the other, but rather that each at this stage remains
an independent and private will.

74. For two absolutely distinct and separate owners
there is now formed one will. While each of them ceases
to be an owner through his own distinct will, the one will
remains. Each will gives up a particular property, and
receives the particular property of another, adopting only
that conclusion with which the other coincides.

75. Since the two contracting parties appear as directly
independent persons (a) contract proceeds from arbitrarV
choice ; (/3) the one will formed by the contractlTthe
work merely of the two interested persons, and is thus a
common but not an absolutely universal will ; ly\ the
object of the contract is a single external thing, because
only 9uch a thing is subject to relinquishment at their
mere option (§ 65 and fol.).

J^o^e.-Marriage does not come under the conception of
contract. This view is. we must say it, in all its shameless-
ness propounded by Kant ("IMetaph. Auf. der Rechtslehre."
p. 106) Just as little does the nature of the state conform to
contract, whether the contract be regarded as a compact of
al with all. or of all with the prince or government -The
introduction of the relationsof contract and private property
into the functions of the state has produced the greatest
confusion both in the law and in real life. In earlier
times civil rights and duties were thought and maintained

CONTRACT.

to be a directly private possession of particular individuals
in opposition to the rights of prince and state. In more
recent years, also, the rights of prince and state have been
treated as objects of covenant. They are said to be based
on contract, or the mere general consent of those who wish
to form a state. Different as these two views of the state
are, they agree in taking the phases of private property
mto another and a higher region. This will be referred to
again when we come to speak of ethical observances and
the state.

Addition.~It is a popular view in modern times that
the state is a contract of all with all. All conclude, so the
doctrine runs, a compact with the prince, and he in turn
with the subjects. According to this superficial view, there
is in contract only one unity of different wills ; but in fact
there are two identical wills, both of which are persons,
and wish to remain possessors. Contract, besides, arises
out of the spontaneous choice of the persons. Marriage,
mdeed, has that point in common with contract, but with
the state it is different. An individual cannot enter or
leave the social condition at his option, since every one is
by his very nature a citizen of a state. The characteristic
of man as rational is to live in a state ; if there is no state,
reason claims that one should be founded. A state, it is
true, must grant permission either to enter or to leave it ;
but this permission is not given in deference to the
arbitrary choice of the individual, nor is the state founded
upon a contract which presupposes this choice. It is false
to say that it rests with the arbitrary will of all to estab-
hsh a state ; rather is it absolutely necessary for every one
to be in a state. The great progress of tlie modern state
IS due to the fact that it has and keeps an absolute end,
and no man is now at liberty to make private arrange-
ments m connection with this end, as they did in the
middle ages.

76. Contract is formal when the two elements through

■lil

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

llfU

which the common will arises, the negative disposal of the

thing and the positive reception of it, are so divided, that

fc,e^^^^-^-ctxOne of the contracting parties makes one side of the agree-

/.. j^ ment, and the other, the other. This is £ift. Contract is

^^j^^^^ real when each of the contractors performs both sides of

^i«<A>JL • *^® double agreement, and is and remains an owner. This

is exchange.

Addition.— Contract involves two agreements to two
things; I both give up and acquire a property. p,eal
contract occurs, when each yields up and acquires posses-
sion ; in giving up he remains an owner. Formal contract
occurs when a person only gives up or acquires.

77. In real contract every one both keeps the same
property as he had when he undertook the contract, and
also yields up his property. Hence it is necessarv to dis-
tinguish the property, which in contract remains' perma-
nently mine, from the external objects which change
hands. The universal and self-identical element in ex-
change, that with regard to which the objects to be
exchanged are equal, is the value (§ 63).

Note.— By the very conception of contract a Icesio
enormis annuls the agreement, since the contractor, in dis-
posing of his goods, must remain in possession of a
quantitative equivalent. An injury may fairly be called
enormous, if it exceeds half of the value ; but it is infinite,
when a contract or any stipulation is entered into to dis^
pose of an inalienable good (§ 66). A stipulation is only
one single part or side of the whele contract, or a merely
formal settlement, of which more hereafter. It contains
only the formal phase of contract, the consent of one party
to perform something, and the consent of the other party
to accept the performance. It must, therefore, be classed
amongst the so-called one-sided contracts. The division
of contracts into one-sided and two-sided, and many other
divisions of the same kind in Eoman law, are superficial
combinations, arising from some particular and external

CONTRACT.

consideration, as, for instance, the way in which they are
made. They may also introduce attributes which do not
concern the nature of contract, such as those which have
meaning only in reference to the administration of justice
{actiones), and to the legal consequences of positive laws,
or such as may arise out of wholly external circumstances'
and injure the conception of right.

78. The distinction between property and possessiot
between the substantive and the external side (§ 45),
assumes in contract the form of a distinction between the
common will or agreement and the realization of this will
in performance. The agreement, taken by itself in its
difference from performance, is something imagined or
symbolic, appearing in reality as a visible sign. (" Ency-
clopaedia of the Philosophical Sciences".) In stipula - .^^
tion it may be manifested by gesture or other s^^icZ^X^^'^
act, but usually in an express declaration through speech.^l^^^ U^^^
which IS the most worthy vehicle of thought.

JVo^e.— Stipulation, thus interpreted, is the form in
which the content of a concluded contract is outwardly
symbolized. But this symbol is only the form. By
this is not meant that the content is still merely sub-
jective, merely a desideratum, but that the conclusion of
the actual arrangement is made by the will.

Addition.— k.% in property we had the distinction be-
tween property and possession, the substantive and the
external, so in contract we have the difference between the
common will as agreement and the particular will as per-
formance. It is in the nature of contract that both the
common and the particular wills should be manifested,
because it is the relation of will to will. In civilized com-
munities agreement, manifested by a sign, is separated
from performance, although with ruder peoples they may
concur. There is in the forests of Ceylon a tribe, which in
trading puts down its property and waits patiently for the
arrival of those who will place their property over against

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

it; the dumb declaration of the will is not separated from
performance.

79. As stipulation involves the will, it contains, from
the standpoint of right, the substance of contract. In
contrast with this substantive contract the possession
which remains till the contract is fully carried out, has no
reahty outside of the agreement. I have given up a pos-
session and my private control over it, and it has already
become the property of another. I am legally bound to
carry out the stipulation.

JVo^e.— Mere promise is different from contract. What
I promise to do, give or perform, is future and a mere
subjective qualification of my will. I am at liberty to
change my promise. But stipulation is already the em-
bodiment of my volition. I have disposed of my property •
It has ceased to be mine, and I recognize it as already be-
longmgto another. The Roman distinction between mc^^m
and contractus is not sound.

Fichte once laid it down that the obligation to hold to
the contract began for me only when the other party began
to do his share Before performance I am supposed to be
doubtful whether the other had been really in earnest.
The obhgation before performance is, therefore, said to be
moral and not legal. The trouble is that stipulation is
not merely external, but involves a common will, which has
already done away with mere intention and change of
mind. The other party may of course change his mind
after the engagement, but has he any right to do so?
i^or plainly I may choose to do what is wrong, although
the other person begins to perform his side of the contract.
J^ichte 8 view IS worthless, since it bases the legal side of
contract upon the bad infinite, that is. an infinite series, or
the infinite divisibility of time, material and action The
embodiment of the will in gesture or a definite form of
words 18 Its complete intellectual embodiment, of which
the performance is the merely mechanical result

CONTRACT.

irated from

It does not alter the case that positive law distinguishes
between so-called real contracts and consensual contracts,
real contracts being complete only when the actual per-'
formance {rea, traditio rei) is added to consent. Some-
times in these real contracts the surrender to me of the
object enables me to carry out my part of the engagement,
and my obligation to act refers to the object only in so far
as I have received it into my hands. This occurs in loan,
interest, deposit, and sometimes in exchange also. These
cases do not concern the relation of stipulation to per-
formance, but merely the manner of performance. It is
also optional in the case of contract to bargain that on one
side the obligation shall not arise until the other party fulfils
his share of the engagement.

80. The classification or rational treatment of contracts
IS deduced not from external circumstances, but from dis-
tinctions which are involved in the very nature of contract.
These distinctions are those between formal and real con-
tract, between property and possession or use, and between
value and the specific thing. The subjoined classification
agrees m the main with the Kantian ("Metaphysical
Pnnciples of the Theory of Eight," p. 120). It is sur-
prising that the old method of classification of contracts
into real and consensual, named and unnamed, has not
long ago given way before something that is more
reasonable.

A. Gift.

(1) Gift of an object or gift proper.

(2) Loan of an object— the gift of a portion of it or
of a partial use or enjoyment of it, the lender re-
maining owner; (mutuum and commodatum without
interest). The object is specific, or it may be
regarded as universal, or it is, as in the case of
money, actually universal.

(3) Gift of service, as for example the mere storage

®* iHE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

of a property (depositum). The gift of an obiect
on the spc. ial condition that the receiver shall be
owner on the giver's death, when the giver can
no longer be owner, is bequest, and does^ot come
under the conception of contract. It presupposes
the civic community and positive legislation.

B. Exchange.

(1) Exchange as such.

(a) Exchange of objects, i.e. of one specific thine

tor another of the same kind.
(/3) Purchase or sale (emtio, vendifw). The ex
change of a specific object, for a general object,
which has the phase of value but not of use
namely money.
(2) Eent {locaiio, conductio), relinquishment of the '
temporary use of a property for rent or interest,
(a) Ren ing of a specific thing, renting proper.
(/3) Renting of a universal thing, so that the lessor
remains owner only of the universal or the value

r '! .?ru' T*'''''^ "-"^ commodatum with
interest. Whether the object be a flat, furniture
house, a res fungihilis or non fungihilis, this
question gives rise, here also as in the second
kind of gift, to particular qualifications that are
unimportant.

(3) Contract for wages {locatio o^.r^)-relinquish.
ment, limited in time or otherwise, of my labour or
services, in so far as as they are disposable ( S 67)

• l'^^\^"" '' '^' ^ "'*' '^"^^ «*^^^ '^'^ contracts
in which the performance d., .nds upc o ^haracte '
confidence, or sped.! l.J.^t.s. Here the service
cannot be measured by its money value which
IS not called wages, but an honorarium or fee.

C. Completion of a contract {cautio) through a securitv.

CONTRACT.

In contracts where I dispose of the use of a thing, as in
rent, I am no longer in possession of it, but am still the
owner. In exchange, purchase, or gift, I may have become
owner, without being as yet in actual possession. Indeed, in
every contract, except such as are directly on a cash basis,
this separatioa is to be found. Security or pledge is concerned
with an object which I give up, or an object which is to
be mine. It either keeps or puts me in actual posses-
sion of the value, although in neither case am I in posses-
sion of the specific thing. The thing which I have either
given up, or expect to receive, is my property only as
regards its value ; but as a specific thing it is the property
of the holder of the pledge, who owns also whatever
surplus value the object may have. Pledge is not itself a
contract, but only a stipulation (§ 11), which completes
contract on the side of possession of property.— Mortgao-e
and surety are special forms of the pledge.

Addition.— In contract it was said that by means of an
agreement a property becomes mine, although I have not pos-
session as yet and shall have possession only by perform-
ing my part. If I am out-and-out owner c* the object, the
intention of a pledge is to place me at once in possession of
its value ; thus already in the engagement the possession is
guaranteed. Surety is a special kind of pledge, some one
offering his promise or credit as warrant for my performance.
Here a person does, what in a pledge is done by a thing.

81. When persons are viewed as direct and incomplete,
their wills are still particular, however identical they may
be implicitly, and however much they may, in contract, be i^__; ^-^
subordinated to the common will. So long as they are a^-T^-'-^-^ ^
direct and incomplete, it is a matter of accident whether-^ ^.^^^
their particular wills accord with the general will, which ^-^- _

has existence only by means of them. When the par-

ticular will is actually different from the universal, it is led ^ ,

by caprice, random insight and desire, and is opposed to t^x^Jl^ ^

general right. This is wrong . K^ -i- .^t I

C.j-^'^^'^-^^^-

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT.

Noie.~It IS from the standpoint of logic a higher
necessity which brings about the transition to w^Sg
The two phases of the conception of right are (a), intrinst
nght or the general will, and (b) right as .t exists, or the
particular will. It inheres in the abstract reality of the
conception that these two phases should be opposed and
given independence.-The particular, independent will's
caprice and erratic choice, which I, in exchange, have

a^ttg:the7 ' ""''''' '' °^^^ ^"^ ''^''^ '"^^^^-^ -t
Addition-ln contract the two wills give rise to a

and thus still m opposition to the particular will Ex
change or covenant, it is true, implies the right to demand
performance. But the particular ^iU may act in oppoXion
to he genera abstract right. Hence arises the L'g" t"
which was already implicit in the general wiU.^ Th's
negation is wrong. The general procedure is this to
purify the will of its abstract simplicity, and th"; o

LTuTtaT l*^V?r---ll tbe particular will, which
n turn takes the field against the common will, the par-
ticipants, m contract, still preserve their particular wuTs
Contract is not, therefore, beyond arbitrary caprice and
remains exposed to wrong. ^ '

THIRD SECTION.

Wbgnq.

82. Contract establishes general right, whose inner or
relative universality is merely a generality based on the
capnce of the particular will. I„ this external manifesta-
tion of righ right and its essential embodiment in the
particular will are directly or accidentally in accord In
wrong this external manifestation becomes an empty an
pearance. This seeming reality consists m the oppS

WRONG,

of abstract right to the particular will, involving a par-
ticular right. But this seeming reality is in truth a mere
nullity, since right by negating this negation of itself
restores itself. By turning back to itself out of its negation
right becomes actual and valid, whereas at first it was only
a cont^ent possibility.

Addition. — When intrinsic right or the general will is
determined in its nature by the particular will, it is in
relation with a non-essential. This is the relation of
essence or reality to outward manifestation. Though the
manifestation is in one aspect adequate to the essence, it
is in another aspect inadequate ; as a manifestation is
contiagency, essence is in relation with the unessential.
Now in wrong this manifestation has the form of a seem-
ing reality, which is to be interpreted as an outward reality
inadequate to the essence. It deprives essence of reality,
and sets up the empty abstraction as real. It is conse-
quently untrue. It vanishes when it tries to exist alone.
By its departure the essence is in possession of itself as its
reality, and becomes master over mere semblance. It has
thus negated the negation of itself, and become strengthened
in the process. Wrong is this mere seeming reality, and,
when wrong vanishes, right receives an added fixity and
value. What we call essence or reality is the intrinsically
universal will, as against which the particular will re-
veals itself as untrue, and does away with itself. The
general will had in the first instance only an immediate
being ; but now it is something actual, because it has re-
turned out of its negation. Actuality is active and finds
itself in its opposite, while the implicit is to its negation
passive.

83. Right, as particular and in its diverse shapes, is
opposed to its own intrinsic universality and simplicity, and
then has the form of a mere semblance. It is a mere seem-
ing reality partly of itself and directly ; partly is it so by
means of the subject ; partly is it established as a pure

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

nullity There arise therefore (a) unpremeditated or civic
wrong, (6) fraud, and (c) crime.

Addition.— Wrong is the mere outer appearance of
essence, giving itself forth as independent. If this
semblance has a merely implicit and not an explicit exist-
ence, that is to say, if the wrong is in my eyes a right, the
wrong IS unpremeditated. The mere semblance is such for
right but not for me. The second form of wrong is fraud
here the wi'ong is not such for general right, but by
It I delude another person; for me the right is a mere
semblance. In the first case wrong was for right only a
semblance or seeming wrong ; in the second case right is
tT T'.^^^ wrong.doer, only a semblance or pretence.
Ihe third kind of wrong is crime. This is both of itself
and also for me a wrong. I in this case desire the wrong
and make no use of the pretence of right. The other party
against whom the crime is done, is quite well aware that
this unqualified wrong is not a right. The distinction
between fraud and crime lies in this, that a fraudulent act
IS not yet recognized as a wrong, but in crime the wrong is
openly seen. ^

A. Unpremeditated Wrong.

84. Since the will is in itself universal, possession (S 54)
and contract, in themselves and in their different kinds
and also all the various manifestations of my will imply a
reference to other rights at law. Since these rights are so
external and varied, several different j.ersons may have a
right to one and the same object, each basing his claim to
ownership on his right at law. Thus arise (collisions

8o. A collision, in which the object is claimed on legal
grounds, occurs in the region of civil law. and recognizes
the law as the universal arbiter. The thing is admitted
to belong to him who has the right to it. The legal con
test merely finds whether a thing is mine or another's

WRONG.

This is a purely negative judgment, in which the predicate
" mine " negates only the particular.

86. In law-suits the recognition of right is bound up
with some private interest or view opposed to right.
Against this mera appearance, intrinsic right, which is in
fact implied in it (§ 85), comes on the scene as a reality
purposed and demanded. This right, however, is demanded
only abstractly, because the will as particular is not freed
from direct contact with its private interest, and does not
aim at the universal. Still, the law is here a recognized
reality, as against which the contending parties must
renounce their private views and interests.

Addition. — That which is intrinsically right has a definite (
ground, and I defend my wrong, which I maintain to be
right, also on some ground. It is the nature of the finite -
and particular to make room for accidents. Collisions
must occur, since we are at the stage of the finite. The
first form of wrong negates only the particular will ; but
pays respect to the general right ; it is thus the slightest
of all forms of wrong. When I say that a rose is not red,
I still admit that the object has colour. I thus do not
deny the species, colour, but only the particular colour,
red. It is the same here with right. Everybody wills iLe
right, and for him the right only shall take place; his
wrong consists in his holding that what he wills is right.

B. Frmid.

87. Since intrinsic right, in distinction from particular
and concrete right, is demanded, it is essential ; but just
because it is only demanded and in that light merely sub-
jective, it is non-essential, and becomes simply an appear-
ance. When the universal is degraded from the particular
will to the merely apparent will, when, e.g., contract is
regarded as only an external association of the will, we have
fraud.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Addihon.~In fraud uui- arsal right is abused, but the
particular will is respected. The person on whom the
fraud IS committed, is imposed upon and made to believe
that he gets his rights. The right, which is demanded,
however, is merely subjective and unreal, and in that
consists the fraud.

88. I acquire property by contract for the sake of the
special qualities of the thing. But I acquire it, also,
because of its inner universality which consists partly in
its value, partly in its being the property of another. Now
it is at the option of the other party to produce a false
appearance in the case of contract. There may be the free
consent of both parties to the exchange of the mere given
object in its bare particularity, and so far the transaction
18 not unjust. Yet the object may fail to have any intrinsic
universality. (The infinite judgment in its positive ex-
pression or identical meaning. See " Encyclopaedia of the
philosophical Sciences.")

89. To guard against the acceptance of a thing in its
bare particularity, and in order to be fortified against an
arbitrary will, there is at this juncture only a demand that
the objective or universal side of the thing should be
recognizable, that the objective should be made good as
right, and that the arbitrary will, offending against right,
should be removed and superseded.

Addition.— ^o penalty is attached to mere unpremedi-
tated or unintentional wrong, since in it I have willed
nothing against right. But to fraud penalties are due,
since right is violated.

C. Violence and Grime.

90. Since in property my will is embodied in an external
thing, it follows that just as far as my will is reflected in
that object, I can be attacked in it and placed under
external compulsion. Hence my will may be enforced.

WRONG.

, but the
bom the

believe
manded,

in that

e of the
it, also,
)artlv in
r. Now
> a false
the free
re given
asaction
intrinsic
tive ex-

1 of the

g in its
linst an
nd that
)uld be
?ood as
it right,

remedi-

willed

re due,

xtemal

cted in

under

forced.

1'^

Violence is done to it, when force is employed in order to
obtain some possession or object of desire.

Addition. — In crime, which is wrong in its proper sense,
neither right in general nor my personal right is respected.
Both the objective and the subjective aspects of right are
set at defiance by crime.

91. As a living creature a man may be compelled to do
a thing ; his physical and other external powers may be
brought under the force of another. But the free will
cannot be absolutely compelled (§ 5), but only in so far as
it does not withdraw (§ 7) out of the external, to which it
is held fast, or out of the imaginative reproduction of the
external. It can only be compelled when it allows itself
to be compelled.

92. Since it is only in so far as the will has visible
existence that it is the idea and so really free, and its
realized existence is the embodiment of freedom, force or
violence destroys itself forthwith in its very conception.
It is a manifestation of will which cancels and supersedes
a manifestation or visible expression of will. Force or
violence, therefore, is, according to this abstract treatment
of it, devoid of right.

93. Since it in its very concept ju destroys itself, its
principle is that it must be cancelled by violence. Hence
it is not only right but necessary that a second exercise of
force should annul and supersede the first.

Note. — Violation of a contract through failure to carry
out the agreement, or violation of the legal duties toward
the family or the state, through action or neglect, is the
first violence. It is an exercise of force, if I retain
another's property, or neglect to do some duty. Force
exercised by a teacher upon a pupil, or by any one
against incivility and rudeness, seems to be the first act of
violence, not caused by any previous display of force.
But the merely natural will is of itself a violence to the
universal idea of freedom ; and against the inroads of the

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

uncivilized will the idea of freedom ought to be protected
and made good. Either there must be assumed within
the family or state a moral and social atmosphere, against
which a crude naturalness is an act of violence, or else
there is at first everywhere present a natural condition or
state of violence, over which the idea has the right of
mastery.

Ad(lition.~In the state there can be heroes no more
Ihey appear only in uncivilized communities. The aim of
the hero is right, necessary and in keeping with the state •
but he carried it out, as if it was his own private affair'
1 he heroes, who founded states, and introduced marriage
and husbandry, did not in this realize a recognized right
ihese acts issue merely from their particular wills Yet
as they imply the higher right of the idea against a merely
natural state of things, their violence is lawful. Little
can be effected against the force of nature merely by
goodness. •' •'

I 94. Abstract right is a right to use force. A wrona
' done to this right is a force exercised against my liberty

rea ized m an external thing. The preservation of my
■ realized freedom against force must be itself an external

act and therefore a second force, which removes the first

and takes its place.

Note -To define strict abstract right as the right to use
compulsion is to apprehend it as a result, which enters first
ot all by the roundabout way of wrong.

Addition.— Here may well be observed the difference
between right and morality. In morality or the sphere
in which I turn back into myself there are also two sides
tor m It goodness is for me an end, and in accordance with
this idea I must direct my life. Goodness is embodied in
ray resolution, and I realize it in myself. Yet this resolu
tion is wliolly internal, and, as a consequence, is not sub-
ject to coercion. The civil laws do not seek to stretch their
control over the disposition. In morality I am inde-

WRONG.

pendent, and the application of external force has no
meaning.

95. A first violence, exercised by a free man, and doing
injury to the concrete embodiment of freedom, namely
right as right, is crime. Crime is the negative- infinite
judgment in its complete sense. It negates not only the
particular object of my will, but also the universal or
infinite, which is involved in the predicate * mine,' the very
capacity for possessing rights ; nor does it even utilize my
opinion, as in fraud (§ 88), Here we are in the realm of
criminal law.

Note. — The right, to injure which constitutes crime, has
indeed so far only the features we have pointed out ; and
crime has a meaning determined in each case by these
special features. But the substance of these forms of
right is the universal which remains the same in all its
subsequent developments and modifications. So also crime
remains the same in accordance with its conception.
Hence the phase, noticed iu the next paragraph, refers to
particular and definite contents, as, e.g., perjury, treason,
counterfeiting, forgery, etc.

96. The actualized will, which alone is subject to injury,
has, of course, a concrete existence, and varies, therefore,
both in quality and in quantity. This variation gives rise
to differences in the objective side of crime, which may in-
jure only one side or phase of the will, or again, its whole
concrete character and range, as in murder, slavery, and
religious persecution.

Note. — The Stoic theory that there is but one virtue and
one vice, the Draconian statutes, which punished every
crime with death, and the barbarity of the formal code
of honour, which found in every injury an unpardonable
insult, all in common cling to the abstract view of the free
will and personality, and refuse to take them in that con-
crete and definite realization which they must have, if they
are to realize the idea. — Robbery and theft differ iu quality,

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

because m robbery personal violence is done to me as an
actually present consciousness and as this self-determined
subjects-Many qualitative phases of crime, as, for instance
an act done against public safety, are determined by defi-
mte social relations, and may be deduced from the concep-
tion, although they are often made in a roundabout way to
depend upon consequences. A crime against public peace
is ot Itself in Its own direct composition heavier or lighter
accordmg to its extent and quality. The subjective
moral quality referring to the higher distinction," as to
how tar the act is done consciously, will be dealt with
later.

Addition.— Thought itself cannot determine how every
single crime is to be punished. In many cases the positive
features of the act must be considered. By the progress of
civilization the estimate of crime becomes milder, to-day
the criminal being punished less severely than he was
a hundred years ago. It is not exactly that the crime
or the punishment has become different but the relation
between the two.

97. An injury done to right as right is a positive external
fact; yet it is a nullity. This nullity is exposed in the
actual negation of the injury and in the realization of right
Rignt necessarily brings itself to pass by cancelling the in^
jury and assuming its place.

Addition.-By crime something is altered, and exists as
so altered. But this existence is the opposite of itself, and
so far null. Nullity consists in the usurpation of the place
of right. But right, as absolute, is precisely what refuses
to be set aside. Hence it is the manifestation of the crime
which IS intrinsically null, and this nullity is the essential
result of all crime. But what is null must manifest itself
as such, and make itself known as that which violates
Itself. The criminal act is not the primary and positive, to
which punishment comes as the negative. It is the nega-
tive, and punishment is only the negation of a negation.

WRONG.

Actual right destroys and replaces injury, thus showing
its validity and verifying itself as a necessary factor in
reality.

98. Injury, confined merely to external reality or posses-
sion of some kind, is detriment or damage to property
or wealth. The cancellation of the injury or damage
takes, when possible, the form of civic satisfaction or
compensation.

Note. — When damage consists in the destruction of some-
thing which cannot be restored, compensation must take
the form not of a particular object but of the universal
quality, namely, value.

99. The injury which befalls the intrinsic or general
will, the will, that is, of the injurer, the injured and aU
others, has just as little positive existence in this general
will a& in the bare external result. The general will, i.e.
right or law, is self-complete, has no external existence at
all, and is inviolable. Injury is merely negative also for
the particular wills of the injured and others. It exists
positively, on the other hand, only as the particular will of
the criminal, and to injure this will in its concrete exist-
ence is to supersede the crime, which would otherwise be
positively established, and to restore right.

Note. — The theory of punishmeut is one of the matters,
which in the modern positive science of right has fared
worst. The attempt is made to base this theory upon the
understanding, and not, as should be done, upon the con-
ception. If crime and its removal, or, more definitely,
punishment, are regarded merely as evil, it might indeed
be thought unreasonable to will a second evil merely
because one already existed. (Klein, " Grunds. des
peinlichen Rechts," § 9 fol.) In the different theories of
punishment, that it is preyjntive, deterrent, reformatory,
etc., this superficial notion is taken to be fundamental. In
the same superficial way the result of punishment is
set down as a good. But here we are not dealing with an

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

evil, and this or that good, but with wrong and justice. In
these superficial theories the consideration of justice is set
\ aside, and the moral aspect, the subjective side of crime, is
/made the essential. Also with the moral view are mingled
trivial psychological notions about temptation, and the
strength of sensual impulses opposing reason, about psy-
chological compulsion also, and the influences affecting the
imagination; it being forgotten that the subjective may
/ freely abase itself to something contingent and unreal.
The treatment of punishment in its character as a pheno-
menon, of its relation to the particular consciousness, of the
effect of threats upon the imagination, and of the possi-
bility of reform is of great importance in its proper place,
when the method of punishment is to be decided on. But
such treatment must assume that punishment is abso-
lutely just. Hence everything turns on the point that in
crime it is not the production of evil but the injury of right
as right, which must be set aside and overcome. We must
ask what that is in crime, whose existence has to be
removed. That is the only evil to be set aside, and the
essential thing is to determine wherein that evil lies. So
long as conceptions are not clear on this point, confusion
must reign in the theory of punishment.

Addition. — Feuerbach, in his theory of punishment,
(fonsiders- punishment as a menace, and thinks that if any
j)ne disregards the threat and commits a crime, the punish-
ment must follow, since it was already known to the
criminal. But is it right to make threats? A threat
assumes that a man is not free, and will compel him by
vividly presenting a possible evil. Right and justice, how-
ever, must have their seat in freedom and in the will, and
not in the restriction implied in menace. In this view of
punishment it is much the same as when one raises a cane
against a dog ; a man is not treated in accordance with his
dignity and honour, but as a dog. A menace may incite a
man to rebellion in order that he may demonstrate his free-

WRONG.

ustice. In
itice is set
f crime, is
'e mingled
, and the
bout psy-
ecting the
ctive mav
id unreal.
3 a pheno-
ess, of the
the possi-
per place,
on. But
: is abse-
nt that in
y of right
We must
las to be
I, and the
lies. So
confusion

lishment,
lat if any
e punish-
n to the
A threat
1 him by
tice, how-
will, and
s view of
es a cane
i with his
y incite a
3 his free-

dom, and therefore sets justice wholly aside. Psychological
compulsion may refer to distinctions of quality or quantity
in crime, but not to the very nature of crime. Books of
law, written in accordance with the principle that punish-
ment is a threat, lack their proper basis.

100. The injury which the criminal experiences is in-
herently just because it expresses his own inherent will, is
a visible proof of his freedom and is his right. But more
than that, the injury is a right of the criminal himself, and
is implied in his realized will or act. In his act, the act of
a rational being, is involved a universal element, which by
the act is set up as a law. This law he has recognized in
his act, and has consented to be placed under it as under
his right.

Note. — Beccaria, as is well known, has denied to the
state the right of exacting the death penalty, on the ground
that the social contract cannot be supposed to contain the
consent of the individual to his own death ; rather, as he
thought, must the opposite be assumed. To this it must be
replied that the state is not a contract (§ 75), nor, more-
over, are the protection and security of the life and pro-
perty of individuals in their capacity as separate persons,
the unconditioned object of the state's existence. On the
contrary, the state is the higher existence, which lays claim
to the life and property of the individual, and demands the
sacrifice of them.

Not only has the conception of crime, the reasonable
essence of it, to be upheld by the state, with or without
the consent of the individual, but rationality on its formal
side, the side of the individual will, is contained in the act
of the criminal. The criminal is honoured as reasonable,
because the punishment is regarded as containing his own
right. The honour would not be shared by him, if the
conception and measure of his punishment were not de-
duced from his very act. Just as little is he honoured
when he is regarded as a hurtful animal, which must be

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

made harmless, or as one who must be terrified or re-
formed.-Moreover, punishment is not the only embodi-
ment of justice in the state, nor is the state merely the
condition or possibility of justice.

J^filion--.The desire of Beccaria that men should con-
sent to their own punishment is reasonable, but the criminal
has already yielded consent through his act. It is both in
the nature of crime and in the criminal's own will, that the
mjury caused by him should be superseded. In spite of
this Beccaria s efforts to abolish capital punishment have
had good results. Although neither Joseph 11. nor the
French have ever been able to obtain complete abolition of
the death-penalty, still we have begun to see what crimes
deserve death and what do not. Capital punishment has
thus become less frequent, as indeed should be the case
with the extreme penalty of the law.

101. The doing away with crime is retribution, in so far
as retribution is in its conception injury of an injury, im-
plying that as crime has a definite qualitative and quanti-
tative context. Its negation should be similarly definite.
Thi Identity, involved in the very nature of the case, is
not hteral equality, but equality in the inherent nature of
the injury, namely, its value.

Note.~Ii we were to deduce our definition of punish-
ment, as science usually does, from accepted opinions as to
the psychological experiences of consciousness, we could
prove that m nations and individuals there is and has been

t^auIT l^'l ? *''"* 'T' ^'^^^^^^ punishment, and
that It should be done to the criminal according to his act.
Yet the sciences, which have drawn their decisions from
universal opinion, the very next moment adopt conclu-
sions at variance with their so-called universal facts of
consciousness.

The category of equality has introduced much difficultv
mto the general notion of retribution. The view that it h
just to mete out punishment in proportion to the special

mmm

WRONG.

5ed or re-
ly embodi-
tnerely the

bould con-
le criminal
is both in
1, that the
n spite of
ment have
[. nor the
ijolition of
lat crimes
iment has
i the case

, in so far
ijury, im-
d quanti-
definite.
le case, is
nature of

' punish-
ons as to
we could
has been
lent, and
o his act.
)ns from
conclu-
facts of

difficulty
that it is
e special

context of the crime, of course arises later than the essen-
tial relation of punishment to crime. Although, in order
to make this essential relation specific, we must look about
for other principles than merely the general principle of
punishment, yet this general principle remains as it is.
And more, the conception itself must contain the basis
for special applications of it. The conception, made
thus specific, implies of necessity the judgment that
crime, as the product of a negative will, carries with
it its own negation or punishment. This inner identity
is reproduced by the understanding in the sphere of
actual reality as equality. The quantitative and quali-
tative context of crime and its removal belongs to the ex-
ternal region, in which no absolute rule can be laid down
(compare § 49). In the region of the finite this rule of
equality is only a demand which, as it is important to note,
the understanding must more and more hold in check.
However it goes on ad infinitum, and permits only of a
continual approximation.

If we fail to observe the nature of the finite, and cling to
absolute equality in matters of detail, there arises first of
all the insuperable difficulty of fixing the kind of punish-
ment. To do this satisfactorily psychology would have to
reckon with the magnitude of the sensual motives, and also
with whatever accompanies them as,e.gf.,the greater strength
of the evil will, or the weakness of the will, or its limited
freedom. But that is not the sole difficulty. To adhere
obstinately to the equalization of punishment and crime in
every case would reduce retribution to an absurdity. It
would be necessary to institute a theft in return for theft,
robbery for robbery, and to demand an eye for an eye and
a tooth for a tooth, although the criminal, as we can easily
fancy, might have only one eye or be toothless. For these
absurdities, however, the conception is not responsible.
They are due to the attempt to equate crime and punish-
ment throughout their minute details. Value, as the inner

.' ill

100

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

identity of things specifically different, has already been
made use of in connection with contract, and occurs again
in the civil prosecution of crime (§ 95). By it the imagi-
nation IS transferred from the direct attributes of the object
to Its universal nature. Since the essential character of
crime lies in its infinitude, i.e., in the breach of its own
right, mere external details vanish. Equality becomes
only a general rule for determining the essential, namely
a man's real desert, not for deciding the special external
penalty. Only when we limit ourselves to equalitv in the
external details are theft and robbery unequal to fine and
imprisonment. But from the standpoint of their value and
their general capacity to be injuries, they can be equated
To approach as nearly as possible to th-'s equality in value
IS, as has been remarked, the task of the understanding
If we Ignore the relation of crime to its cancellation and
neglect the idea of value, and the possibility of comparinc.
these two in terms of their value, we can see in punishmen't,
nothing more than the arbitrary attachment of an evil to
an act not permitted (Klein, " Grunds. des peinlichen
Eechts," § 9).

Addition.— Betvihiition is the inner connection and iden-
tity of two things which in outward appearance and in
external reality are different. Requital seems to be some-
tlnng foreign, and not of right to belong to the criminal.
But punishment is only the manifestation of crime, the
other half which is necessarily presupposed in the first.
Retnbutiou looks like something immoral, like revenge
and may therefore seem to be something personal. But it
is the conception, not the personal element, which carries
out retribution. Eevenge is mine, says God in the Bible
and, when some find in the word re-tribution the idea of
a special pleasure for the subjective will, it must be replied
that it signifies only the turning back of crime against
Itself. The Eumenides sleep, but crime wakes them. So
It 18 the criminal's own deed which judges itself. Although

It!

r ^s-

WRONG.

101

'ady been
urs again
be imagi-
:he object
iracter of
f its own

becomes
, namely,

external
ty in the

fine and
^alue and
equated.

in value
itanding.
tion, and
mparing
lisliment
1 evil to
iinliclien

nd iden-

and in

)e some-

rimiual.

me, the

he first.

revenge.

But it

carries

e Bible,

idea of

replied

ii gainst

m. So

thougli

in requital we cannot venture upon equality of details, the
case is different with murder, to which death is necessarily
due. Life is the total context of one's existence, and can-
not be measured by value. Its punishment, therefore,
cannot be measured by value, but must consist in the taking
of another life.

102. In the sphere of direct right the suppression of
crime takes, in the first instance, the form of revenge. This
in its content is just, so far as it is retribution ; but in its
form it is the act of a subjective will, which may put into
any injury an infinite or unpardonable wrong. Hence its
justice is a matter of accident, and for others means only
private satisfaction. As revenge is only the positive act of
a particular will, it is a new injury. Through this contra-
diction it becomes an infinite process, the insult being
inherited without end from generation to generation.

Note. — Wherever crime is punished not as crimina piib-
lica but as privata, it still has attached to it a remnant of
revenge. This is the state of affairs with the Jews, with
the Romans in theft and robbery, and with the English in
some special instances. Differing from private revenge is
the exercise of revenge by heroes, adventurous knights,
and others, all of whom appear when the state is in its
infancy.

Addition. — In that condition of society where there are
no judges and no laws, punishment always takes the form
of revenge. This is defective, as it is the act of a subjective
Avill, and has an inadequate content. Judges are persons,
it is true, but they will the universal meaning of the law,
and insert into punishment nothing which is not found in
the nature of the act. But the injured i)erson, on the other
hand, may view the wrong act not in its necessary limits of
quality and quantity, but simply as a wrong, and may in
requital do wliai would lead to a new wrong. Amongst
uncivilized peoples revenge is undying, as with the Arabs,
amongst whom it can be suppressed only by a superior

102

Tin-: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

force or by impossibility. In several of our i^resent regu-
lations a trace of revenge survives, as when it is at the
option of individuals to bring an ir jury to trial at court.

103. That the contradiction involved in this way of
abolishing crime, and the contradictions found in other
cases of wrong (§§ 86, 89), should be solved, is a demand
made by a justice which is freed at once from all subjective
interests and limits and from the arbitrariness of power.
Justice, therefore, does not revenge but punishes. Here we
have in the first instance the demand of a will, which,
while particular and subjective, wills the universal as such.
But the conception of morality is not simply demanded, but
is in the process created.

Transition from Bight to Morality.

104. Crime and revenging justice represent the visible
outer form of the development of the will as occurring,
first of all, in the distinction between the universal will
and the individual will, which exists independently in
opposition to the universal. Next, by rising above the
opposition, the universal will is turned back into itself and
has become an independent reality. Thus right, when
maintained against the independent private will, has
validity, being realized through its own necessity.

This result is also arrived at by the development of the
conception of will on tlie side of its inner character. The
actualization of the will according to its conception pro-
ceeds in this way. Its first form is the abstract and
simple phase it assumes in abstract right. This first
form must be in the next place set aside and passed be-
yond (§21) in order that the will may become involved
in the opposition of the abstract universal will and the
independent particular will. Then by the removal of this
opposition, i.e., by the negation of a negation, it becomes
an actualized will, free not only abstractly and potentially,

WRONG.

103

but actually, as is necessary in a negativity which is able
to refer itself to itself. Whereas in abstract right the will
was itself mere personality, it now has its personality as
its object. The subjectivity which is its own object isl
infinite, and freedom in its infinite subjectivity constitutes]
the principle of morality.

Note. — Let us for the sake of a closer inspection turn
back to the elements, through which the conception of
freedom progresses from the first abstract phase of the will
to that phase, in which it refers itself to itself, the phase
of the self-determining subject. Thus property being an
external object, we have in it the phase of the abstract
"mine;" in exchange we have the common "mine," the
" mine " brought into existence by two wills ; in wrong the
will which belongs to the province of right, the will in its
abstract, direct, and intrinsic existence, is made contingent
by means of the particular will which is itself contingent.
In morality this whole phase of will is so far transcended
that its contingency is turned back into itself and made
one with itself, and thus becomes a self-referring, infinite
contingency of the will, or in a word subjectivity.

Addition. — To truth it belongs that the conception
should exist, and that its reality should correspond to the
conception. In right the will exists in an external object.
But as it must have its existence in itself, in an internal
thing, it must become its own object ; it must pass into
subjectivity and have itself over against itself. This rela-
tion to itself is affirmative, a relation brought about by
the will only through the transcendence of its direct
existence. When its first-hand existence is transcended
in crime, the way is open, through punishment, the nega-
tion of a negation, to affirmation, that is, to morality.

SECOND PART.

MORALITY.

105. The moral standpoint is the standpoint of the will,
not in its abstract or implicit existence, but in its existence
for itself, an existence which is infinite (§ 104). This
turning back of the will upon itself, or its actual self-
identity, with its associated phases stands in contrast to
•its abstract implicit existence, and converts person into
subject.

—j. 106. Subjectivity is the conception made definite, dif-^
fering therefore from the abstract, general will. Further,
the will of the subject, though it still retains traces of self-
involved simplicity, is the will of an individual, who is an
object for himself. Hence subjectivity is the realizatjon ^
SLthejipnception.— This gives freedom a higher ground.
Now at last there appears in the idea the side of its real
existence, the subjectivity of the will. It is only in the
will as subjective that freedom, or the potentially existing
will, can be actualized.

J\ro<e.— Morality, the second sphere, gives an outline of
the real si de of the conception of freedom. Observe the/-
process through which morality passes. As the will has i-^
now withdrawn into itself, it appears at the outset as ^^-^
(if A^-tw ^'-y-P^^sti^g independently, having merely a potential identity '%^'>-
- ^^ .s ^ ^^^ *^® intrinsic or universal will. Then this abstrat-t (Xji::

i^.x...:^ ^- self-dependence is superseded; and, finally, the will is
£^_ U^*Ji ' ^^^ really and consciously identical with the intrinsic or

.j^xj.

li>

MORALITY.

105

universal will. Now in this movement, as I have said, is
illustrated the conception of freedom. Freedom or sub-
jectivity is at first abstract and distinct from the concep-
tion of it. Then by means of this movement the m^ of S<ril
freedom is so worked up, that for the conception, and
necessarily also for the idea, it receives its true realiza-
tion. The process ends, therefore, when the subjective
;5^Ji5!?-J?_ecome^a^_object^ concrete will. - —

Addition. — In right, taken strictly, nothing depends
upon my purpose or intention. The question of the self-
<letermination, impulse, or mirpose of the will arises for
the first time in morality./^Since a man is to be judged
according to the direction he has given himself, he is in
this act free, let the external features of the act be what
they may. As no one can successfully assail a man's
inner conviction, and no force can reach it, the moral will
is inaccessible. A man's worth is estimated by his inner!
act. Hence the moral standpoint implies the realization]
of freedom. '

107. As self-determination of will is at the same time a
factor of the will's conception, subjectivity is not merely
the outward reality of will, but its inner being (§ 104).
This free and independent Avill, having now become the
will of a subject, and assuming in the first instance the
form of the conception, has itself a visible realization;
otherwise it could not attain to the idea The moral -^^i

standpoint is in its realized form the right of the subjec-
tive will. In accordance with this right the will recog-
nizes and is a thing, only in so far as the thing is the will's
own, and the will in it is itself and subjective.

JVo^e.—The process of the moral standpoint {Note to
preceding paragraph) also appears as the development of
the right of the subjective will, or of the way in which iha
subjective will is realized. Thus the will accounts what in
its object it recognizes to be its own as its true conception,
its objective or universal reality.

jUmJ

106

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

U\ '

l< i

Addition. — Subjectivity of will, as a complete phase, is
in its turn a whole which, by its very nature, must also
have objectivity. Freedom can at first realize itself only
in the subject, as it is the true material for this realiza-
tion. But this concrete manifestation of will, which we
have called subjectivity, is different from absolute will.
From this new one-sidedness of subjectivity must the will
free itself, in order that it may become absolute will. In
morality the interest peculiar to man is in question, and
the high value of this interest consists in man's knowing
himself to be absolute, and determining himself. Un-
civilized man is controlled by the forces and occurrences
of nature. Children have no moral will, but are guided
by their parents. Civilized man is determined from
within, and wills that he shall be in all he does.

108. The subjective will, in so far as it is directly its
own object and distinct from the general will (§ 106,
note), is abstract, limited, and formal. Subjectivity, how-
ever, is not formal merely, but, since it is the infinite self-
direction of the will, is the will itself taken formally.
Since this formal character, as it appears first of all in the
particular will, is not as yet identical with the conception
of will, the moral standpoint is the standpoint of relation,
of obligation or requirement. — Since, too, subjectivity in-
volves difference, that is to say, opposition to objectivity
as to a mere external existence, there arises here also the
standpoint of consciousness (§ 8), the standpoint of dif-
ference in general, of the finite and phenomenal phase of
the will.

Note. — ^The moral is not at once opposed to the immoral,
just as right is not directly opposed to wrong. The
general standpoint of both the moral and the immoral
depends upon the subjectivity of the will .

Addition. — In morality self-determination is to be con-
strued as a restless activity, which cannot be satisfied with
anything that is. Only in the region of established ethical

MORALITY.

107

pi'inciples is the will identical with the conception of it,
and has only this conception for its content. In morality
the will is as yet related to what is potential. This is the
standpoint of difference, and the process of this stand-
point is the identification of the subjective will with the
conception of will. The imperative or ought, which,
therefore, still is in morality, is fulfilled only in the ethical
sphere. This sphere, to which the subjective will is
related, has a twofold nature. It is the substance of the
conception, and also external reality. If the good were
established in the subjective will, it would not yet be
realized.

109. The formal will, by its own determining character,
contains at the outset the opposition of subjectivity and
objectivity, and the appropriate activity (§8). Of this
will we have these further phases. Concrete realization
and determinate character are in the conception identical.
The conception of the subjective will is first to make these
two i^hases separate and independent, and then to estab-
lish them as identical. Determinate character in the
self-determined will (a) is brought about in itself by
itself, the opposition which it creates within itself being a
self-bestowed content. This is the first negation, whose
formal limit consists in its being fixed as merely subjec-
tive. (/3) Since the will returns into itself and is infinite,
this limit exists for it, and it wills to transcend the limita-
tion. Hence it strives to convert its content out of sub-
jectivity into objectivity, i.e., some kind of directly given
reality, (y) The simple identity of the will with itself in
this opposition is the content, which maintains itself amid
these oppositions, and is indifferent to formal distinctions.
This content is the purpose or end.

110. As at the moral standpoint, freedom or self-identity
of will is for the will (§ 105), the simple identity of the
content or end receives a further characteristic peculiar to
itself.

108

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

(a) This content becomes mine in such a way that it in
its identity is not only my inner end, but also, so far as it
is externally realized, contains for me my subjectivity.

Addition. — The content of the subjective or moral will
has a special character. Although it has attained the
form of (Objectivity, it is yet always to contain my sub-
jectivity. An act shall be counted mine only so far as it is
on its inner side issued by me, and was my own proposition
and intention. I do not recognize as mine anything in the
outward act except what lay in my subjective will, and in
the outer act I desire to see my subjective consciousness
repeated.

111. (6) The content, though it contains something
particular, from whatever source it comes, is yet the con-
tent of a self -referring will, which is also self -identical and
universal. Thus it has these two features (a) It aims to
be in itself adequate to the universal will, or to have the
objectivity of the conception ; (/3) yet, since the subjective
will exists for itself, and is therefore independent and

^^^^ formal {§ 108), its aim is only an ought and is possibly

Ir i ■ i^^nj^- not adequate to the conception.

^ Uui^My-) "^"^^' ^^'^ Though I preserve my subjectivity in accom-
^■^^1 ;plishing my ends (§ 110), yet in the objectification of
these ends I pass beyond the simple and elementary sub-
jectivity which is merely my own. This new external
subjectivity, which is identical with me, is the will of
others (§73). The sphere for the existence of the will is
subjectivity (§ 106), and the will of others is the existence,
which, though other than I, I yet give to mj purpose.
Hence the accomplishment of my purpose contains the
identity of my will and that of others, and has to the will
of others a relation which is positive.

iSTo^e.— The objectivity of the realized end has three
senses, or rather contains in union the three following
phases, (a) It is external direct reality (§ 109). (/3) It is
adequate to the conception (§112). (y) It is universal

MORALITY.

109

subjectivity. The subjectivity which preserves itself in
this objectivity implies (o) that the objective end shall be
my own, so that in it I preserve myself as a particular
individual (§ 110). The two phases (/3) and (y) of sub-
jectivity concur with the phases (/3) and (y) of objectivity.
At the moral standpoint these various phases are dis-
tinguished or joined merely in a contradiction. This is
the superficial and finite nature of the moral sphere (§ 108).
The development of the standpoint consists in the de-
velopment of these contradictions and their solution,
an achievement which at the present point of view is
incomplete or merely relative.

Addition. — It was said that formal right contained only
prohibitions, and that from the strict standpoint of legal
right an act had only a negative reference to the will of
others. In morals, on the contrary, the relation of my will
to that of others is positive ; that, which the subjective will
realizes, contains the universal will. In this is present the
production or alteration of some visible reality, and this
has a bearing upon the will of others. The conception of
morality is the internal relation of the will to itself. But
there is here more than one will, since the objectification of
the will implies the transcendence of the onesidedness of
the separate will, and the substitution of two wills having
a positive relation one to the other. In right my will is
realized in property, and there is no room for any reference
of the will of others to my will. But morality treats of !
the well-being of others also. At this point this positive !
relation to others first makes its appearance. ^

113. The expression of the subjective or moral will is
action. Of action it may be said that (a) I know its
external fulfillment to be mine, (/3) it is essentially related
to the conception in its phase as the ought or imperative,
and (y) it is essentially connected with the will of others.

Note. — Firstly, the expression of the moral will is action.
The embodiment achieved by the will in formal right is a

110

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

mere object. This realization is direct, and has in the first
instance no actual express reference to the conception.
Not having as yet come into conflict with the subjective will,
the conception is not yet distinguished from it, and has no
positive relation to the will of others. The commands of
right are, hence, fundamentally prohibitions (§ 38). In
contract and wrong, indeed, there begins to be seen a rela-
tion to the will of others, but the agreement, found at this
point, is based upon arbitrary choice, while the essential
reference to the will of others is in right merely the nega-
tive i>roposal to keep my property or the worth of it, and
to let others keep theirs. Crime does in a way issue from
the subjective will. But the content of a crime is fixed
by written instructions and is not directly imputable to me.
Hence as the legal act contains only some elements of a dis-
tinctively moral act, the two kinds of action are different.

114. The right of the moral will has three factors :

(a) The abstract or formal right. The act, as directly
realized, is to be in its essential content mine, and embody
the purpose of the subjective will.

(6) The specific side of an act or its inner content,
(a) This is intention, which is for me, whose general cha-
racter is fixed, the value and inner substance of the act,
(/3) and well-being, or the content taken as the particular
end of my particular, subjective reality.

(c) The good, or the content taken as universal and
exalted to universality and absolute objectivity. This is
the absolute end of the will. As this is the sphere of
reflection, we have the opposition of the universality, which
is subjective, and hence involves in one aspect evil, and in
another conscience.

Addition. — An act, to be moral, must in the first instance
accord with my purpose, since the right of the moral will
is to recognize as its realization nothing which is not found
internally in the purpose. Purpose concerns the formal
principle that the externalized will must also be internal

PURPOSE AND RESPONSIBILITY.

Ill

to me. In the next place we ask after the intention,
that is, the value of the act relatively to me. The third
factor is not merely the relative, but the universal value of
the act, the good. In the first phase of an act there is a
breach between purpose and reahzation; in the second
between what is given externally as universal will, and the
particular internal character, which I give it; the third
and last phase is the claim of my intention to be the
universal content. The good is the intention exalted to the
conception of the will.

FIRST SECTION.
PuEPosE AND Responsibility.

115. In the direct or immediate act the subjective will
is finite, since it has to do with both an external object and
its varied surroundings, all presupposed. An accomplished
act makes a change in this ready-to-hand material, and
the will is responsible, in so far as the changed material
can be said to be mine.

Note.— An event or resultant condition is a concrete
external reality, having an indefinite number of circum-
stances associated with it. Every particular element,
shown to be in any sense a condition, ground or cause of
such an event, and, therefore, to have contributed its por-
tion, may be regarded as responsible for it, or at least as
sharing in the responsibility. Hence in the case of such a
richly varied event as the French Revolution, the formal
understanding has to select from an untold multitude of cir-
cumstances that one to which it will attribute responsibility.

Addition. — What is contained in my purpose can be laid
at my door, and this is one of the main considerations in
the case of crime. But in simple responsibility there is
found only the quite external judgment as to whether I
have or have not done this thing. Thus merely to be

•v^

v.^A

112

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

responsible does not mean that the whole thing is to be
imputed to me.

116. It is not my deed, if things, which I own, cause
injury to others through some of their many external con-
nections; this may happen even with my body as a
mechanical or living object. Yet I am not wholly free
from responsibility in such a case, since these things are
still mine, although by their very nature they are often
only imperfectly subject to my attention and control.

117. When the self -directing will proposes to act upon
a given material, it has a representation of the circum-
stances. Since the material is supplied, the will is finite,
and the results of the act are for it accidental. Hence
they may contain something very different from the repre-
sentation. But the right of the will in acting is to recog-
nize as its own deed only those results which were con-
sciously in its end and were purposed. That responsibility
shall extend to the will only so far as the results were
known, is the right of knowledge.

Addition. — The will has before it an outer reality, upon
which it operates. But to be able to do this, it must have
a representation of this reality. True responsibility is
mine only in so far as the outer reality was within my
consciousness. The will, because this external matter is
supplied to it, is finite ; or rather because it is finite, the
matter is supplied. When I think and will rationally, I
am not at this standpoint of finitude, nor is the object I
act upon something opposed to me. The finite always has
limit and boundary. There stands opposed to me that
which is other than I, something accidental and externally
necessary ; it may or may not fall into agreement with me.
But I am only what relates to my freedom ; and the act is
the purport of my will only in so far as I am aware of it.
(Edipus, who unwittingly slew his father, is not to be
arraigned as a patricide. In the ancient laws, however,
less value was attached to the subjective side of the act

PURPOSE AND RESPONSIBILITY,

113

than is done to-day. Hence arose amongst the ancients
asylums, where the fugitive from revenge might be received
and protected.

118. An act, when it has become an external reality,
and is connected with a varied outer necessity, has mani-
fold consequences. These consequences, being the visible
shape, whose soul is the end of action, belong to the act.
But at the same time the inner act, when realized as an
end in the external world, is handed over to external
forces, which attach to it something quite different from
what it is in itself, and thus carry it away into strange and
distant consequences. It is the right of the will to adopt
only the first consequences, since they alone lie in the
purpose.

Note. — The division of consequences into necessary and
accidental is not accurate, because the inner necessity,
involved in the finite, is realized as a necessity which is
external, a necessity, that is to say, implying a relation of
sej)arate things, which are independent, indifferent to one
another, and only externally connected. The principle " In
acting neglect the consequences," and the principle " Judge
an act by its consequences, and make them the standard of
what is right and good," belong both alike to the ab«tract
understanding. The consequences are the native form of
the act, simply manifest its nature, and are nothing but the
act itself. The act cannot scorn and disown them. Yet
amongst the consequences is included that which is only
externally attached to them and has no fellowship with
the act itself.

The development of the contradiction involved in the
necessary nature of the finite is in external reality the con-
version of necessity into contingency and vice versa. An
overt act must therefore conform to this law. This law it
is which stands the criminal in such good stead, if his act
has had but few consequences ; so also must the good act
be contented to have few or no consequences. But when

114

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

the consequences of crime have fully developed themselves,
they add to the severity of the punishment.

The self-consciousness of the heroic age, painted in the
tragedy of " CEdipus," for instance, had not risen out of its
simplicity, or reflectively appreciated the difference between
realized deed and inner act, between the outer occurrence
and the purpose and knowledge of surroundings. Nor
did it distinguish between one consequence and another,
but spread responsibility over the whole area of the deed.

Addition. — In the fact that I recognize as mine only
what was in my representation is to be found the transition
from purpose to intention. Only what I knew of the sur-
roundings can be imputed to me. But there are necessary
results attached to even the simplest act, and they are its
universal element. The consequences, which may be pre-
vented from taking effect, I cannot indeed foresee, but I
ought to know the universal nature of each separate con-
crete deed. The thing which I oughft to know is the
essential whole, which refers not to special deta,ils of an
act, but to its real nature. The transition from purpose
to intention consists in my being aware not merely of my
separate act, but of the universal bound up with it. This
universal, when willed by me, is my intention.

SECOND SECTION.
Intention and Well-beino.

119. The external embodiment of an act is composed of
many parts, and may be regarded as capable of bein^'
divided into an infinite number of particulars. An act
may be looked on as in the first instance coming into con-
tact with only one of these particulars. But the truth of
the particular is the universal. A definite act is not con-
fined in its content to one isolated point of the varied
external world, but is universal, including these varied

INTENTION AND WELL-BEING.

115

relations within itself. The purpose, which is the product
of thought and embraces not the particular only but also
the universal side, is intention.

Note. — Intention (in German, " a looking away from ")
implies, according to its etymology, an abstraction, which
has in part the form of universality, and partly is the
extraction of a particular side of the concrete thing. The
attempt to justify oneself by the intention consists, in
general, in asserting that one special isolated phase is the
subjective essence of the act. — To pass judgment upon an
act simply as an external deed, without qualifying it as
right or wrong, imparts to it a universal predicate ; it ia
killing, arson, etc. — When the parts of external reality are
taken one by one, their connection must naturally be
external. Eeality may be, in the first instance, touched
at only a single point. Arson, e.g., may be directly con-
cerned with only a small piece of wood, a statem ^nt which
is merely a proi^osition, but not a judgment. But this
single point has a universal nature, which involves the
extension of it. In life the separate part is not a mere
part, but directly an organ, in which the universal is really
present. Hence in murder it is not a separate piece of
flesh, but the life itself which ia destroyed. On one side
subjective reflection, in its ignorance of the logical nature
of the particular and the universal, permits of a dis-
section into mere particulars and their consequences. On
the other side, the act in its finit»^ and casual character
naturally breaks up into separate parts. — The invention
of the dolus indiredns is due to this way of thinking.

Addition. — Manifestly more or fewer circumstances may-
be included in an act. In the case of arson, e.g., the fire
may not take effect, or it may spread farther than the
agent intended. Yet in neither case is the result due to
good or bad fortune, since man must in acting refuse to
deal with externality. An old proverb rightly enough
says, " A stone flung from the hand is the devil's." In

AU>^u-

116

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

acting I must expose myself to misfortune ; that also has
a right to me, and is the manifestation of my own will.
5f '^ ni. ^20, The right of intention is that the universal quality

;j^cLjl^ I of the act should not only be implicitly present, but should

ron.-)!^rw-v^^i>^^^ be known by the agent, and be part and parcel of his sub-
jective will. Conversely the right of objectivity of action,
as it may be called, is to maintain that it be known and
willed by a subject in his character as thinking.

Note. — This right to this insight involves that children,
imbeciles, and lunatics are completely, or almost com-
pletely, irresponsible for their actions. Just as actions on
the side of their external reality include accidental results,
so also the subjective reality contains an indeterminate
element, which depends upon the strength of self-con-
sciousness and prudence. But this uncertain element
needs to be reckoned with only in the case of imbecility,
lunacy, or childhood. These are the only conditions of
mind which supersede thought and free will, and permit
us to take an agent otherwise than in accordance with his
dignity as free and rational. V

Stt/'Se!C^Aje>'^ 121. The universal quality of actiou is in general the

-CLT '

i^ manifold content reduced to the simple form of univer-
But the subject turned back into himself is par-
in oi>position to the particulars of the objective

<^aM. irp^t^-v^-^/o^sality. But the subject turned back into himself is par-
^•^ . ticular, i

', world. He has in his end his own particular content,
which constitutes the essential soul of his act. In the
cu^ . execution of this particular content of the act consists his
subjective freedom in its concrete character. This is the
subject's right to find in the act his satisfaction.

Addition. — I, as independent and self- referred, am par-
ticular, and opposed to the external side of the act. Its
content is decided by my end. Murder and arson, e.g.,
are quite general and not the positive content of me, a
subject. When anyone has committed a crime, we ask
why ho has done it. Murder is not done for the sake of
murder. There must be besides a particular ])08itive end.

i.i

INTENTION AND WELL-BEING.

117

-I
J

If delight in murder were the motive of the crime, it would
he the positive content of the subject as such, and the
deed would be the satisfaction of his desire. T]ie motive
of a deed contains the moral element, which has the two-
fold signification of the universal in purpose and of the
particular in intention. In modern times we are at pains
to ask after the motive. Formerly the question was
merely, Is this man just ? Does he do his duty ? Now we
scrutinize the heart, and fix a gulf between the objective
side of conduct and the internal subjective side, or motive.
No doubt the subject's own determination must be con-
sidered. What he wills has its ground within him ; he
wills to satisfy a pleasure or gratify a passion. But right
and good are also precisely such a content, due, however,
not to nature but to my reason. To make my own freedom
the content of my will is a pure characteristic of my free-
dom itself. Hence the higher moral phase is to find
satisfaction in the act, not to harp upon a breech between
the objectivity of the deed, and the self-consciousness of
man. This defective mode of interpretation has its epochs
as well in world-history as in the history of individuals.

122. By virtue of the particular element the act has
for me subjective value or interest. In contrast with this
end, whose content is the intention, the direct act in its
wider content is reduced to a means. This end, as far as
it is finite, can again be reduced to a means for a wider
intention, and so on indefinitely.

123. The content of these ends is only (o) formal activity,
that is, the subject's interest or aim is to be effected by
his agency. Men desire to be themselves actively in-
terested in whatever is or ought to be their own. (0)
Furtlier definite content is found for the still abstract and
formal freedom of subjectivity only in its natural sub-
jective embodiment, as inclinaticms, passions, oi)inions,
whiniH. etc. The satisfaction of this content is well-being
or happiness in its particular as also in its universal

118

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT.

features. In this satisfaction consist the ends of finitude
generally.

Note. — This is the standpoint of relation (§ 108). The
subject at this stage emphasizes his distinctive and par-
ticular nature. Here enters the content of the natural
will (§ 11). But the will is not in its simple and direct
form, since the content belongs to a will which is turned
back into itself, and raised to the level of a universal end,
namely, well-being or happiness.

Addition. — In so far as the elements of happiness are
externally provided, they are not the true elements of
freedom. Freedom truly is itself only in an end consti-
tuted by itself, i.e., the good. Here the question may be
raised, Has man a right to set up for himself ends which
are not free, and depend simjily on his being a living
thing ? But life in man is not a mere accident, since it
accords with reason. Man has so far a right to make his
wants an end. There is nothing degrading in one's being
alive. There is open to us no more spiritual region, in
which we can exist, than that of life. Only through the
exaltation of what is externally provided to the level of
something self-created do we enter the higher altitude of
the good. But this distinction implies no intolerance of
either sie of man's nature.

124. Since the subjective satisfaction of the individual,
the recognition for exami)le of oneself as honoured or
famous, is involved in the realization of absolutely valid
ends, the demand that only subjective satisfaction should
appear as willed and attained, and also the view that in
action subjective and objective ends exclude each other,
are empty assertions of the abstract understanding. Nay,
more, the argument becomes a positive evil when it is held
that, because subjective satisfaction is always found in
everv finished work, it must be the essential intention of
the agent, the objective end being only a means to the
attainment of this satisfaction. The subject is the series

INTENTION AND WELL-BEING.

119

of his acts. If these are a series of worthless productions,
the subjectivity of the will is also worthless ; if the acts
are substantial and sound, so likewise is the inner will of
the individual.

Note. — The right of the subject's particular being to
find himself satisfied, the right, in other words, of sub-
jective freedom, constitutes the middle or turning-point
between the ancient and the modern world. This right in
its infinite nature is expressed in Christianity, and has been
made the universal active principle of a new form of the
world. The more definite manifestations of this principle
are love, romance, the hope of the eternal salvation of the
individual, morality also, and conscience. It includes,
moreover, various other forms, which will be, in a measure,
introduced in the sequel as the principle of the civic
society, and as elements of the political constitution, but
partly, however, appear in history generally, especially in
the history of art, the sciences, and philosophy. This
principle of particularity is now, indeed, one side of the
contradiction, and, in the first resort, is at least quite as
much identical with the universal as distinct from it. But
abstract reflection fastens upon this element in its difference
from and opposition to the universal, and propounds the
view that morality must carry on a continued warfare
against the satisfaction of oneself, demanding of us —

'• Mit Abscheu zii thun was die Pflicht gebeut." '

The same abstract standpoint lies at the root of that
psychological view of history, which seeks to disparage all
great deeds and persons. It emphasizes the particular side,
which it has already decreed to be evil, considers as the
chief factor in the act the honour and glory, which may
accrue to the agent, and transforms and converts the in-
clinations and passions, whose satisfaction was only one

•' To do with aversion what duty requires."

120

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

element of the total result, into the agent's main intention
and active principle. This same abstract point of view
asserts that because great acts, and the real result brought
to pass by a series of them, have produced a great effect
upon the world, and have naturally resulted to the agent
in power, honour, and renown, therefore there belongs to
the individual not the greatness, but merely these par-
ticular and external results. The reason assigned is that
the particular consequence, since it was admittedly an end,
must be the sole end. Such abstract thinking sees only
the subjective side of great men, the side which constitutes
its own essence. In its self- constituted vanity it overlooks
their real nature. It takes the view of the •' psychological
valet for whom there are no heroes, not because there are
no heroes, but because he is only a valet."

Addition. — The sentence. In magnis voluisse sat est, is
right, if it means that one should will something great.
But he should also carry it out, otherwise his volition is
vair The laurels of mere willing are dry leaves, which
have never been green.

125. The subjective, whose concern is with the particular
content of well-being, is, when it becomes infinite by being
turned back into itself, at the same time brought into rela-
tion with implicit or general will. This new element,
established, in the first instance, in particularity itself, is
the well-being of others ; in its complete but quite empty
character it is the well-being of all. The well-being of
many other particular persons is therefore an essential end
or right of subjectivity. But since the absolute universal,
which is distinguished from this particular content, is here
defined simply as right, the ends of the particular will may
or may not be in real accordance with the universal.

126. My own particularity, and likewise the particularity
of others are, however, a right, only in so far as I am free.
They cannot maintain themselves in opposition to their real
basis. An intention to further my well-being or that of

INTENTION AND WELL-BEING. 121

others, rightly called a moral intention, cannot justify a* i..*^ * ^i^'' 1i
wrong act. j^f^U - '-^'*

Note. — It is one of the most corrupt maxims of our day ^■^■^*'"^
which, originating in the pre-Kantian period of the good
heart, and furnishing the quintessence of some well-known
touching dramas, undertakes in the case of wrong acts to
excite interest in the so-called moral intention. It pictures
bad persons as having hearts filled with good intentions
and desires for their own well-being, and perhaps for that of
others as well. A heightened form of this theory has been
vamped up in our own time. Inner inspiration and feel-
ing, the very soul of particularity, have been made the
criterion of what is right, reasonable, and excellent. Crime
has been pronounced right, reasonable, and excelkvt, as
also have the thoughts which led to it, merely on the
ground that they proceeded from inspiration and feeling,
though they may have been in fact the most hollow and
commonplace whims and most foolish opinions (§ 140,
note). — Observe further that here under right and well-
being we are considering the formal right and particular
well-being of the individual. The so-called general welfare,
the well-being of the state, the right of the real, concrete
spirit is quite another region, in which formal right and
the particular well-being or happiness of the individual
are subordinate elements. It has already been remarked
that it is one of the most frequent misconceptions of the
abstract intellect to set up private right and private well-
being as absolrtely valid in opposition to the universal
principle of the state.

Addition. — We may quote here the celebrated retort
given to the libeller, who excused himself with the remark,
** Ilfaut done que je vive.^' " Je n^en vols pas la necessite,"
was the reply. Life is not necessary against the higher
fact of freedom. When the holy Crispinus steals leather
to make boots for the poor, his act, though moral, is not
right, and cannot be justified.

122

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT.

127. The particular interests of the natural will, viewed
as a simple whole, constitute personal reality or the life. In
the final resort, life, when in collision witli another's
rightful ownership, can claim the right of necessity, not on
the ground of equity but of right. Observe that on the
one side is placed the infinite destruction of our outer exis-
tence, and therefore the complete loss of rights ; on the
other side an injury to only a particular and limited
embodiment of one's freedom. A slight injury to a
particular possession does not violate the injured man's
right, as such, or his capacity for right.

Note. — From this right of need flows the benefit of com-
petence (beneficium competentice), by virtue of which there is
allowed to the debtor some of his tools, implements, clothes,
and means generally, all of which are of course the property
of the creditor. The allowance covers so much as is deemed
sufficient for the possible maintenance of one in the debtor's
class.

Addition. — Life, or the totality of ends, has a right
against abstract right. For instance, by the theft of a loaf
of bread a property is doubtless inj ured. Still, if the act
was the means of prolonging life, it would be wrong to
consider it as ordinary theft. If the man whose life is in
danger were not allowed to preserve himself, he would be
without rights ; and, since his life is refused him, his whole
freedom is denied to him also. Many things, it is true,
must go to secure life, especially if we regard the future.
But to live now is all that is necessary ; the future is not
absolute, and remains exposed to accidents. Hence only
the need of the ir mediate present can justify a wrong
act. Yet the act is justified, because the agent, abstain-
ing from it, would commit the highest wrong, namely, the
total negation of his realized freedom. The beneficium
competentice implies the right to ask that no man shall be
wholly sacrificed to mere right.

128. Need reveals the finite and contingent character of

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

123

both right and well-being, that is to say, of that abstract
embodiment of freedom, which is not the existence of any-
particular person, and also of the sphere of the particular
will, which excluded the universality of right. The one-
sidedness or ideality of these phases is found in the concep-
tion itself. Eight has already been embodied as the parti-
cular will (§ 106) ; and subjectivity, in the whole range of
its particularity, is itself the embodiment of freedom
(§ 127), and also, in its character as the infinite reference
of the will to itself, is it implicitly the universal side of
freedom. These two elements in their truth and identity,
although, in the first instance, only in relative reference to
each other, are on the one hand the good, as the fulfilled
and absolutely definite universal, and, on the other hand,
conscience, or an infinite subjectivity, which is aware of
itself, and determines in itself its content.

THIED SECTION.

The Good and Conscience.

129. The good is the idea, or unity of the conception
of the will with the particular will. Abstract right,
well-being, the subjectivity of consciousness, and the con-
tingency of external reality, are in their independent and
separate existences superseded in this unity, although in
their real essence they are contained in it and preserved.
This unity is realized freedom, the absolute final cause of
the world.

Addition. — Every stage is properly the idea, but the
earlier steps contain the idea only in more abstract form.
The I, as person, is already the idea, although in its most
abstract guise. The good is the idea more completely de-
termined ; it is the unity of the conception of will with the
particular will. It is not something abstractly right, but

124

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

,0 vV

-» -l***^

has a real content, whose substance constitutes both right
and well-being.

130. In this idea well-being has value, not independently
as the realization of the separate particular will, but only as
universal well-being, as universal, that is, in its essence,
intrinsically or in accordance with freedom. Hence, well-
being is not a good, if separated from right ; nor is right a
good, if separated from well-being. Fiat jtistitia ought not
to have pereat mundus as a consequence. The good, carry-
ing a necessity to be actualized by the particular will, and
comprising the vital essence of such a will, has absolute
right over the mere abstract right of property and the
particular ends of well-being. If either of these elements
is distinguished from the good, it has validity only in
so far as it accords with the good and subordinates itself
to it.

131. The subjective will finds in the good the supremely
essential, and has worth and merit only as its insight and
intention accord with the good. In so far as the good in
this place is still the abstract idea of the good, the subjec-
tive will is not yet carried up into it, and made one with it.
It stands to the good in a relation of the following kind.
As the good is for it what is real and substantial, it ought
to make the good its end and realize it ; and on the other
hand it is only through the medium of the subjective will
that the good can be realized.

Addition. — The good is the truth of the particular will.
But the will is only that to which it sets itself. It is not
inherently good, but becomes what it is only by its work.
On the other side the good apart from the subjective will
is only an abstraction having no reality. Eeality first
comes to the good through the private will. Thus the
development of the good contains these three stages.
(1) For me, as willing, the good should be particular will,
and I should know it. (2) We should say what thing is
good, and develop the particular phases of the good. (3)

; r

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

125

We determine the independent good, particularizing it as
infinite and independent subjectivity. This inner determi-
nation is conscience.

132. It is the right of the subjective will that it should
regard as good what it recognizes as authoritative. It is
the individual's right, too, that an act, as the outer realiza-
tion of an end, should be counted right or wrong, good or
evil, lawful or unlawful, according to his knowledge of the
worth it has when objectively realized.

Note.— The good is in general the essence of the will in its
substantive and universal character, the will in its truth.
It exists solely in and by means of thought. The doctrines
that man cannot understand the truth but must deal with
appearances only, and that thinking does harm to the good
will, take away from spirit all its intellectual and ethical
merit and value. The right to admit nothing, which I do
not regard as reasonable, is the highest right of the subject.
But because of its subjective character it is a formal right.
So that on the opposite hand the right to the subject of the
reasonable or objective remains.

Because of its formal nature insight may be either truth
or mere opinion and error. Whether or not the individual
attains to the right of his insight belongs, at least from the
moral standpoint, to his particular subjective character. I
can make it a claim upon myself, and regard it as a subjec-
tive right, that I should be convinced that the grounds of
an obligation are good. I may even claim that I should
know them in their conception and nature. But my
demand for the satisfaction of my conviction as to what is
good, what allowed and what not allowed, and also as
to my responsibility, does not infringe upon the right
of objectivity.

Eight of insight into the good is different from right of
insight (§ 117) with regard to action as such. The right
of objectivity means that the act must be a change in the
actual world, be recognized there, and in .general be

126

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

adequate to what has validity there. Whoso will act
in this actual world has thereby submitted to its laws, and
recognized the right of objectivity. Similarly in the state,
which is the objectivity of the conception of reason, legal
responsibility does not adapt itself to what any one person
holds to be reasonable or unreasonable. It does not adhere
to subjective insight into right or wrong, good or evil, or
to the claims which an individual makes for the satisfaction
of his conviction. In this objective field the right of in-
sight is reckoned as insight into what is legal or illegal, or
the actual law. It limits itself to its simplest meaning,
namely, knowledge of or acquaintance with what is lawful
and binding. Through the publicity of the laws and
through general customs the state removes from the right
of insight that which is for the subject its formal side. It
removes also the element of chance, which at our present
standpoint still clings to it.

The right of the subject to know the act as good or evil,
legal or illegal, has the result of lessening or abolishing
responsibility in the case of children, imbeciles, and
lunatics, although the conditions of this responsibility
cannot be definitely stated. But to take into consideration
momentary fascination, the allurement of passion, drunken-
ness, or the strength of what are called sensual impulses
generally, that impulse alone being excepted which forms
the basis of the right of need (§ 120), to consider these
things in estimating the character of a crime and its
liability to punishment, or to suppose that these circum-
stances will remove the guilt of a criminal act, is to neglect
right and the true dignity of manhood (§ 100, and § 119,
note). The nature of man is essentially universal. His
consciousness does not exist as a mere abstract moment of
time or in isolated parts. Just as the incendiary sets on
fire not a separate piece of wood an inch long, which
he touches with his match, but the universal involved in it,
namely the house, so he does not exist merely in one single

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

127

moment, or in one isolated passion for revenge. If so, he
would be an animal, which, because of its dangerous and
passionate nature would have to be be killed. It is claimed
that the criminal in the moment of his act must have pre-
sented clearly to himself the nature of the wrong he is doing
and of his liability to punishment, if the act is to be
counted to him for a crime. This claim seems to preserve
to him the right of his moral subjectivity, but it really
denies to him that indwelling intelligent nature, which in
its active presence has no affinity with the clear images of
purely animal psychology. Only in the case of lunacy
is intelligence so distorted as to be separated from the con-
sciousness of particular things and the doing of them.
The sphere, in which circumstances are adduced as
grounds for leniency, is not that of right but of mercy.
I 133. Since the good is the essence of the will of the par- (
'ticular subject, it is his obligation. As the good is
distinct from particularity, and particularity occurs in the
subjective will, the good has at the outset only the charac-
ter of universal abstract essence. This abstract universal
is duty. Hence duty, as is required by its character, must
be done for duty's sake.

Addition. — The essence of the will is for me duty. Tet !
if I know no more than that the good is my duty, it is for
me still abstract. Duty should be done for duty's sake,
and it is my objective nature in the truest sense which
I realize in duty ; in doing it I am self-centred and free.
It is the signal merit of the standpoint of the Kantian phi-
losophy of action that it has made prominent this significa-
tion of duty.

134. Since an act requires its own special content and (
definite end, and duty in the abstract contains no such end,
there arises the question. What is duty ? No answer is at
once forthcoming, except "To do right, and to consider
one's own well-being, and the general well-being, the well-
being of others " (§ 119).

j^^-Y-tc

rl ^"--^

\ 1

I I

128

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Addition. — Precisely the same question was proposed to j
Jesus, when it was aslced of him, " What should be done to
obtain eternal life?" The universal good cannot, if
abstractly taken, be realized. ( If it is to be realized, it '
must be given a particular content. (

135. The two points of this answer, being each of them
conditioned and limited, are not in fact contained in duty
itself, but effect the transition into the higher sphere of the
unconditioned, or duty. In so far as duty is the universal
or essence of the moi'al consciousness, and merely refers
itself to itself within itself, it is only an abstract univer-
sality, and has for its characteristic an identity without
content, an abstract positive, an absence of definite
character.

Note. — It is important to be clear that the pure uncondi-
tioned self- direction of the will is the root of duty. This
doctrine of volition attained to a firm basis and starting-
point first of all in the Kantian philosophy through the
thought of the infinite autonomy of the will (§ 133). Yet)
if this merely moral standpoint does not pass into the con-
ception of the ethical system, this philosophical acquisition
is reduced to empty formalism, and moral science is con-
verted into mere rhetoric about duty for duty's sake.
From such a position can be derived no inherent doctrine
of duties. Materials, it is true, may be introduced from
without, and in this way specific duties may be secured ;
but from duty, whose characteristic is an absence of con-
tradiction or formal concord with itself, a characteristic
which is no more than the establishment of abstract indefi-
nitenecjs, no specific duties can be deduced. Nor, further,
if any specific content of action comes up for consideration,
is there in this principle any way of judging whether it is
a duty or not. On the contrary, all manner of wrong
and immoral acta may be by such a method justified.

The more detailed Kantian statement, the suitability of
an act to be presented as a universal rule, imi^lies indeed

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

129

the more concrete notion of a condition, but really contains
no other principle than absence of contradiction, or formal
identity. The rule that there should be no private pro-
perty contains of itself no contradiction, nor does the
proposition that this or that particular nation or family
should not exist, or that no one should live at all. Only
if it is really fixed and assumed that private property and
human life should exist and be respected, is it a contradic-
tion to commit theft or murder. There can be no con-
tradiction except of something that exists or of a content,
which is assumed to be a fixed principle. Only such a
content can an act agree with or contradict. But duty
which must be willed only as such, and not for the sake of
a content, is a formal identity excluding all content and
specific character.

Other antinomies and developments of the Kantian
position, in which is shown how the moral standpoint of
relation wanders aimlessly around without being able to
find a way of escape from the mere abstract imperative, I
have given in the " Phiinomenologie des Geistes."

Addition. — Although we exalted the standpoint of the
Kantian philosophy, in so far as it nobly insists that duty
should accord with reason, yet its weakness is that it lacks
all organic filling. The proposition, "Consider if thy
maxim can be set up as a universal rule " would be all
right, if we already had definite rules concerning what
should be done. A princii)le that is suitable for universal
legislation already presupposes a content. If the content
is present, the application of the law is an easy matter.
But in the Kantian tneory the rule is not to hand, and the
criterion that there should be no contradiction produces
nothing. Where there is nothing, there can be no con-'( ' "^

tradiction. L^O'*-* »^'v*, <

136. Owing to the abstract nature of the good, the other ^

side of th(i idea, i.e., particularity in general, falls within
subjectivity. This subjectivity, universalized by being

130

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

turned back into itself, is absolute certitude^ of itself
within itself. In this character it establishes particularity,
it determines and judges. This is conscience.*

Addition. — We may speak in a lofty strain of duty, and
this way of speaking elevates mankind, and widens the
heart. Yet if nothing definite comes of it, it at last grows
tedious. Spirit demands and is entitled to a particular
content. But conscience is the deepest internal solitude,
from which both limit and the external have wholly dis-
appeared. It is a thorough-going retreat into itself. Man
in his conscience is no longer bound by the ends of par-
ticularity. This is a higher standpoint, the standpoint of
the modern world. We have now arrived at the stage of
consciousness, which involves a recoil upon itself. Earlier
ages were more sensuous, and had before them somethirg
external and given, whether it was rehgion or law. But
conscience is aware of itself as thought, and knows tLa,t
my thought is for me the only thing that is binding.

137. True conscience is the disposition to desire what is
absolutely good. It has therefore fixed rules, which are
for it independently objective phases and duties. Dis-
tinguished from this, which is its content or truth, con-
science is only the formal side of the activity of the will,
and the will as pai'ticular has no content peculiarly its own.
The objective system of rules and duties and the union of
them with the subjective consciousness appear first in the
sphere of ethical observance. But at the formal stand-
point of morality, conscience is devoid of objective content.
It is merely an infinite certitude of itself and is formal
and abstract. It is the certitude of a ])articular subject.

Note. — Conscience expresses the absolute claim of the
subjective self-consciousness to know in itself and from
itself what right and duty are, and to recognize nothing
except what it thus knows to be good. It asserts also that

GewibsheiU

^ Gewissen.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

131

what it so knows and wills is right and duty in veiy truth.
Conscience, as the unity of the subject's will with the
absolute, is a holy place which it would be sacrilege to
assault. But whether the conscience of a certain indi-
vidual is proportionate to this idea of conscience, in other
words, whether what the individual conscience holds and
gives out to be good is really good, can be ascertained only
by an examination cf the contents of the intended good.
Eight and duty, viewed as absolutely reasonable phases of
will, are not in essence the particular property of an indi-
vidual. Nor do they assume the form of perception or
any other phase of mere individual sensuous consciousness.
They are the universal products of thought, and exist in
the form of laws and principles. Conscience is therefore
subject to the judgment whether it is true or not, and its
appeal merely to itself is directly opposed to what it wills
to be, the rule, that is, of a reasonable absolutely valid
way of acting. For this reason the state cannot recognize
conscience in its peculiar form as subjective consciousness, \
just as subjective opinion, or the dogmatic appeal to a '
subjective opinion, can be of no avail in science.

The elements which are united in true conscience can be
separated. The determining subjectivity of consciousness
and will may separate itself from the true content, proceed
to establish itself, and reduce the true conteut to a form
and unreality. Thus the term conscience is ambiguous.
On the one hand it is presupposed in the identity of sub-
jective consciousness and will with the true good, and is
therefore maintained and recognized to be a holy thing. ^'^'
On the other hand it is the mere subjective return of cou-"; ,r '
sciousuess into itself, claiming the authority which con-
science in its first form possesses solely because of its
al)solutely valid and rational conteut. Now, at the moral
standpoint, distinguished as it is in this treatise from
ethical obser\ance, there occurs only the formal conscience.
The true conscience is mentioned here only to emj)hasize

132

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

the difference between the two and to remove the possi-
bility of supposing that here, where the formal conscience
alone is considered, the argument is concerned with the
true. But to repeat, the true conscience looms up only in
the sequel, and has to do with the properly social disposi-
tion. The religious conscience, however, does not belong
to this sphere at all.

Addition. — When we speak of conscience, it may easily
be 'ipposed that because of its abstract inner form, it is
already the absolutely true conscience. But conscience as
true wills absolute good and absolute duty. As we must
here deal with the abstract good, conscience is so far devoid
of this objective content, and is at first only the infinite
certitude of itself.

138. Subjectivity, as abstract self-determination and
pure certitude only of itself, dissolves within itself all
definite realization of right and duty. It passes judgment
within itself, determines solely out of itself what is good,
and makes this self-produced good its content. It bestows
reality upon a good which is at first only presented and
intended.

Note. — The self-consciousness, which has reached abso-
lute return into itself, is conscious of itself as something
over which nothing that exists or is given to it can or
ought to have any power. This tendency to look within,
and know and decide from oneself what is right and good,
assumes a more general form in history, appearing at
epochs such as that of Socrates, the Stoics, etc., when the
accepted ethical principles could not satisfy the better will.
When the visible Avorld has become untrue to freedom, the
will no longer finds itself in the established morality, and
is forced to seek the harmony, which the actual world has
lost, in the inner ideal life. Since the right, which self-
consciousness acquires in this way, is formal, everything
depends upon the nature of the content, which it gives
itself.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

133

Addition. — In the simple conception of conscience all
definite phases of will are dissolved, and must proceed out
of it again. Everything that is recognized as right or
duty can in the first instance be proved by thought to be
worthless, limited, and merely relative. But subjectivity,
though it dissolves all content, must develop it again out
of itself. Everything which comes to jmss in ethical
observance, is to be produced by this activity of spirit.
But, on the other side, this standpoint is defective, because
it is merely abstract. When I am conscious of my freedom
as inner substantive reanty, I do no act ; yet if I do act
and seek principles, I mi;st try to obtain definite characters
for my act. The demaud is then made that this definite
context shall be deduced from the conception of the free
will. Hence, if it is right to absorb right and duty into
subjectivity, it is on the other hand wrong if this abstract
basis of action is not again evolved. Only in times when
reality is a hollow, unspiritual, and shadowy existence, can
a retreat be permitted out of the actual into an inner life.
Socrates appeared at the time of the decay of the Athenian
democracy. He dissolved what was established, and fled
back into himself, to seek there what was right and good.
In our own time also it occurs more or less frequently that
reverence for the established is wanting, and that man
holds his own will as for himself valid and authoritative.

139. Self-consciousness, affirming to be vanity all other-
wise valid marks of action, and itself consisting of pure
inwardness of will, may possibly convert the absolute uni-
versal into mere caprice. It may make a priuci])le out of
what is i^eculiar to particularity, placing it over the uni-
versal and realizing it in action. This is evil.

Note. — If conscience is taken as formal subjectivity, it is
on the verge of being transformed into evil. In a self-
certitude, which exists for itjelf, knows aiHi decides for
itself, both morality and evil have tl\eir common root,

The origin of evil in general lies in the mystery, it., the

134

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

speculative process, of freedom, in the necessity of freedom
to rise out of its natural state, and find itself within itself
in opposition to the natural. In this opposition the natural
will is contradictory of itself and incompatible with itself,
and comes in this divided state into existence. Hence the
particularity of the will itself receives the further mark of
evil. Particularity has a twofold character, exhibited here
in the opposition of the natural to the inner will. Through
this opposition the inner phase of will gets only a relative
and formal existence, and therefore has to create its content
out of the elements of the natural will, such as desire, im-
pulse, and inclination. These desires and impulses may be
either good or evil. But again, owing to their mere natural-
ness, they are contingent, and the will, as at present con-
stituted, takes them in their contingent character as its
content and brings them under the form of particularity.
It thus becomes opposed to universality, the inner objective
reality or the good, which, since it involves the return of
the will into itself and a consciousness aware of itself,
stands at the other extreme from the direct objectivity of
what is merely natural. Thus also is this inner condition
of the will evil. Man is consequently evil at once by nature
or of himself and through his reflection within himself.
Evil is not limited solely either to nature as such, unless
it were the natural condition of a will which confines itself
to its particular content, or to the reflection which goes
into itself and includes cognition, unless it were to adhere
to an antagonism to the good.

Along with the phase, that evil of necessity is, goes in-
separably the phase that evil of necessity shall not be. In
other words, evil is that which is to be superseded. Never-
theless, evil from the first standpoint of disruption must
make its appearance, since it constitutes the division be-
tween the unreasoning beast nud man. We must not, how-
ever, remain at this standpcvitit, or chng to the particular as
though it in contrast wiilii the universal were essential.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

135

but must overcome it, and set it aside as null and void.
Further, as to this necessity of evil, it is subjectivity, or
the infinity constituted by the reflex action of conscious-
ness, which has this opposition before itself and exists in
it. If it remains there, i.e., if it is evil, it exists simply for
itself, counts itself as independent, and is mere caprice.
Hence the individual subject as such has the guilt of his
evil.

Addition. — Abstract certitude, which is aware of itself as
the basis of evei'y thing, involves the possibility of willing
the universality of the conception, but also the possibility
of making a principle out of a particular content and
realizing it. This second possibility is evil. To evil always
belongs the abstraction implied in self- certitude, and man
alone, just in so far as he can be evil, is good. Good and
evil are inseparable, their unity lying in this, that the con-
ception becomes objective to itself and forthwith, as an
object, involves distinction. The evil will wills something
that is opposed to the universality of will ; but the good
will is in accordance with its true conception.

The difficulty as to how the will can be evil is due usually
to our thinking of the will as in only a positive relation to
itself, and to our representing it as some definite thing
existing for itself, i.e., as the good. The question as to
the origin of evil may be put better thus : How does the
negative enter into the positive ? If God in the creation of
the world is supposed to be the absolutely positive, then, let
man turn where he will, he cannot in the positive find the
negative. The view that God permitted evil to exist, in-
volving a passive relation of God to evil, offers no satis-
factory solution of the problem. In the religious myth the
origin of evil is not rationally conceived ; the negative is
not recognized to be in the positive. One is supposed to
come after the other or to exist side by side with it, so that
the negative comes to the positive from the outside. With
this view thought cannot be satisfied. Thouglit desires a

VS6

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

!■

reason and a necessary relation, and insists that the negative
and positive spring from the self-same root. The solution
of the diflficulty from the standing-ground of the conception
is already contained in the conception. The conception, or,
to speak more concretely, the idea, must in its very essence
find distinctions in itself and establish itself as negative.
To adhere to the positive merely, that is to say to the pure
good, which shall be in its origin nothing but good, is an
empty effort of the understanding, which creates difficulty
by introducing one-sidedness and abstraction. But from
the ground of the conception the positive phase is appre-
hended as an activity distinguishing itself from itself.
Evil as well as good has its origin in the will, and the will
in its conception is both good and evil. The natural will
is, as it stands, a contradiction, implying a distinction of
itself from itself, in order that it may be consciously for
itself, and attain its inward nature.

The proposition, that owing to the nature of evil man is
evil, in so far as his will is natural, is opposed to a current
idea that it is precisely the natural will which is innocent
and good. But the natural will is opposed to the content
of freedom. The child, or uneducated man, possessing only
the natural will, is not fully responsible. When we speak
of man, we mean not children but self-conscious men.
When we speak of good, we irdude a knowledge of it.
Now, the natural or the ingenuous is of itself neither good
nor evil, but when related to will, as freedom and know-
ledge of freedom, it is not free, and hence evil. When the
natural is willed by man, it is no longer simply the natural,
but the negative of the good, or the negative of the con-
ception of the will.

If we were to say that, since evil lies in the conception,
and exists of necessity, men are no longer responsible when
they adopt it, it must be replied that their decision is their
own deed, the act of their freedom, and therefore to be laid
at their door. In religious fable it is said that man is like

THE GOOD AND CONSCIE^X'E.

137

G-od in his having a knowledge of good and evil. The
resemblance to God is a fact so far as the necessity is not a
necessity of nature, but rather a decision transcending the
state in which good and evil are involved alike. Since both
good and evil confront me, I may choose either, resolve
upon either, and take up either into my subjectivity. It is
the nature of evil that man may will it, although he is not
forced by necessity to do so. .*■

140. As every end belongs to the purpose of actual con-
Crete action, it necessarily has a positive side (§ 130), which
self-consciousness knows on occasion how to bring forward.
But as self-consciousness implies a turning back into one-
self, and is aware of the universal of the will, an act has also
a negative side. The positive side of an act, whose nega-
tive content stands in open contrast with the universal,
may be looked on as a duty and an excellent motive, and
be maintained by self-consciousness to be good for others
as well as for itself. To hold it good for others is hypocrisy ;
and to hold it good for itself is a still higher summit of the
subjectivity, which maintains itself to be the absolute.

Note. — The final most abstruse form of evil, that in
which evil is turned into good and good into evil, in which,
too, consciousness knows itself as the transforming power,
and therefore as absolute, is the very summit of subjectivity
from the moral standpoint. It is the form to which evil
has risen in our time, and that, too, through philosophy,
or rather a shallowness of thought, which has contorted a
deep conception, and presumes to give itself the name of
philosophy, just as it presumes to give to evil the name of
good. In this note I shall mention briefly the chief forms
of this subjectivity, which are in v^gue.

(a) Dissimulation, or hypocrisy. In it are contained the
following elements : (a) knowledge of the true universal,
whether it be in the form of the feeling of right and duty,
or in the form of a thorough knowledge of them ; (/3) the
willing of the particular, which is in open strife with the

138

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

univei'sal ; and (y) explicit comparison of the universal and
) .i'-.", nlar, so that, for the willing consciousness itself, its
[: .riicular will is understood to be evil. These three
elements comprise the act done with evil conscience, but
ai'e not yet hypocrisy as such. — It was at one time a very
important question whether an act is evil only iu as far as
it is done with an evil conscience, i.e., with a developed
consciousv.ev;; if tii..' elements involved in the act. Pascal
(" Les Provinc." 4e lettre) well draws out the consequences
of an affirmative answer to this question. He says, " lis
seront tons damncs ces demi pccheurs, qui ont quelque
amour pour la vertu. Mais pour ces francs-pccheurs,
pccheurs endurcis, pccheurs sans melange, pleins et acheves,
I'enfer ne les tient pas : ils ont trompc le diable a force de
s'y abandonner." ^

The subjective right of self-consciousness, to know
whether the act falls under the category of good or evil,
must not be thought of as colliding with the absolute
right of the objectivity of this category. At least, the two

* Pascal quotes also in the same jdace the i)rayer of Christ on
the cross for liis enemies, " Father, foryive them, for they know
not what they do." He calls it a superfluous request, if the cir-
cumstance that they were not conscious of what they had done
deprived the act of its taint of evil, since in that case it would not
need to be forgiven. In the same way he quotes the view of
Aristotle (" Nicomach." Etli. III. 2), wlio draws a distinction
lietween the a<i;ent who is oi'ik ill'oxj and one who is ciyroioy. In the
first case the a<?ent acts involuntarily, the lack of knowledge
having to do with extern.al circunistances (§ 117), and is thus not
responsible for the act. But with regard to the other case, Aristotle
says, "No bad man really knows what should be done and left
undone, and it i.- this lack {(i^tapTia) which makes him unjust and
evil. Ignorance of the choice between good and evil does not make
an act involuntary or the agent irresiionsible, but only makes the
act bad." Aristotle has indeed a deeper insight into the connec-
tion of knowing and willing than is in vogue in the superficial
philosophy, which teaches that ignorance, feeling, and inspiration
are the truest principles of ethical conduct.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

139

are not to be represented as separable, indifferent to each
other, and related only casually. And yet this is just the
view which lay at the basis of the old-time question about
-/. saving grace.* Evil on its formal side is that which is
most peculiarly the individual's own, since it is his sub-
jectivity setting itself up as wholly and purely its own.
For it he is, therefore, responsible (§ 139 and note). On
the objective side, man in his conception as spirit is rational,
and has solely in himself a universality, which is aware of
itself. Hence we fail to ti'eat him in accordance with the
dignity of his conception, when we separate from him
either the goodness of a good act or the evil of an evil act,
and refuse to impute it to him as good or evil. How
definite may be the consciousness of these two distinguish-
able sides in man, with what degree of clearness or obscurity
this consciousness may become knowledge, or how far in an
evil act conscience may be formal, are questions with which
we are not much concerned. They belong to the empirical
side of the subject-matter.

(b) But evil and to act with evil conscience are not vet
hypocrisy. We must add the formal phase of untruth, in
which evil is maintained to be good and good for others.
The agent represents as good, conscientious, and pious an
act, which is merely an artifice for the betrayal of others.
But by means of what is otherwise good and pious, namely,
by good reasons generally, an evil man may find a justifica-
tion of his evil, transforming evil into something good for
himself. The possibility of such a transformation is found
in the abstract and negative subjectivity, which is conscious
that all phases must submit to and spring from it.

(c) Allied to the foregoing is what is known as prob-
ability. Its principle is that if considousness can trump up
one good reason, be it only the authority of a single theo-
logian, whose judgment, it may be, is disapproved by

Wiiksanie Gnaile.

140

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

others, the act is permissible, and conscience may be at
ease. Such a reason or authority, it is acknowledged,
gives at best only probability, but that is supposed to be
enough to confirm the conscience. It is admitted also
that a good reason does not exclude others, which may be
quite as good. Further, in this form of subjectivity there
is a touch of the objective in the concession that conduct
should be based on a ground or reason. But to the many
good reasons and authorities, which might be adduced in
favour of a certain line of action, may be opposed just as
many good reasons for an opposite course. Hence the
decision is intrusted not to the objectivity of the thing,
but to subjectivity ; liking and caprice are made the
discerners between good and evil, and ethical observance
and religion are undermined. But since it is given out
that some reason, and not private subjectivity, is the basis
of decision, probability is so far a form of hypocrisy.

(d) The next higher stage is the assertion that the good
will shall consist in willing the good ; the willing of the
abstract good shall be the sole requisite for a good act.
Since the act, as a definite volition, has a content, while
the abstract good determines nothing, it devolves upon the
private individual to give the good filling and definiteness.
In probability there must be obtained from some Ri;verencl
Pire authority to bring a definite content under the
general category of the good. But here every subject,
simply as he stands, is invested with the dignity of giving
a content to the abstract good, or, what is the same thing,
of bringing a content under the universal. But this con-
tent is only one of several sides of a concrete act, which
may, on another of its sides, be bad or criminal. And yet
my subjective estimate of the good is the good as known
by me in the act ; it is my good intention (§ 111). Thus
arises an opposition between different phases, in accordance
with one of which the act is good, but in accordance with
another, criminal. Here, too, would seem to come up the

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

141

question, if, in the actual act, the intention is really good.
But at this standpoint, at which abstract good is the deter-
mining motive, the good not only may but must be the
real intention. And, however bad and criminal they may
be in other directions, the results of an act, which com-
pletes a good intention, are also good. We seem forced to
ask which of these sides is essential. But this objective
question cannot here be put ; or rather the only objective
is the decision of the subjective consciousness itself.
Besides, at this standpoint the terms essential and good
have the same meaning. Both are abstractions. Good is
that which in regard to the will is essential; and the
essential in regard to the will is that an act shall be for
me good. But here one may place any pleasurable content
he likes under the abstract good, because this good, having
no content of its own, is reduced to mean merely a bare
positive, something, that is, which may have value from
some point of view, and also in its direct phase may be
made to count as an essential end. Such a positive action
might be, e.g., to do good to the poor, or to provide for my-
self, my life, or my family. Further, as the good is
abstract, the bad also must be without content, and must
receive definiteness from my subjectivity Hence arises the
moral end to hate and root out the bad.

Theft, cowardice, murder, as acts of a subjective will,
imply at the very outset the satisfaction of this will,
and are therefore something positive. Now, that the act
may be good, I simply need to know this positive side of it
as my intention. Hence the act is at once decided to be
good, because to know it as good is involved in my inten-
tion. Theft for the benefit of the poor, theft or flight
from battle, in order to fulfil the duty of caring for one's
life or one's family, which may be poor, murder through
hate aid revenge, i.e., to satisfy a sense of right, or of my
right, or of the wickedness of another, or to satisfy a sense
of the wrong done by him to me or others, or the world, or

142

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

people generally, by extirpating him as thoroughly bad,
and thus contributing something to the extermination of
evil, — all these acts are on their positive side good in in-
tention and so good in act. There is needed a superlatively
small effort of the understanding to discover, as did the
learned divines aforesaid, for every act a positive side, and
a good reason or intention. — Hence it has been said that
there are no evil men, because no one wills evil for evil's
sake, an act which would be purely negative. He always
wills something positive, and therefore, from this point of
vision, good. In this abstract good the distinction between
good and evil, and all real duties also, have disappeared.
Accordingly, merely to will the good, merely to have a
good intention when we act, is evil because the willed good
is an abstraction, and the ascertainment of what is good is
left to the caprice of the subject.

To this place belongs the famous sentence, "The end
justifies the means" This expression, as it stands, is
trivial, because one could as vaguely rejily that a just end
justifies the means, but an unjust end does not. The ex-
pression would then be tautological, since the means, if they
are real means, are nothing of themselves but are only for
the sake of something else, from which they derive their
worth. — But this saying is not meant in a merely formal and
indefinite sense. It justifies the use for a good end of some-
thing not strictly a meaus at all. It justifies and inculcates
as a duty even crime and the violation of what is of itself
just, as means for effecting a good end. In this saying there
floats a general consciousness of the dialectic of the positive
element, alluded to above, as it liears upon right and ethics,
and upon such indefinite propositions as " Thou shalt not
kill," "Tliou shalt care for thy own will-being and that of
thy family." In law and war, to kill is not only a right
but a duty ; but in these cases there is an accurate descrip-
tion of the ciri.'umstances under which, and also of the
kind of men whom it is permitted or enjoined to kill. In

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

143

the same way my well-being and the well-being of my
family must yield to higher ends, and be reduced to means.
But a crime is not an indistinct generality, which has to
undergo a process of dialectic, but something definitely and
objectively limited. Yet the end which is to oppose this
crime and deprive it of its nature, the holy and just end, is
only the subjective opinion of what is good or better.
Thus, here again the will holds to the abstract good ; and
every absolutely valid marie of the good and bad, of right
and wrong, is superseded by and handed over to the feel-
ing, opinion, and liking of the individual.

(e) Subjective opinion is openly pronounced to be the
rule of right and duty, when the conviction that a thing
is right is declared to be the criterion of the ethical cha-
racter of an act. As the good, which is here willed, is still
without content, the principle of conviction implies that it
is simply for the subject to decide whether the act is good
or not. Thus here also all semblance of ethical objectivity
has vanished. Such a theory has direct affinity with the
so-called philosophy, already repeatedly alluded to, which
denies the possibility of knowing the truth, and, in so
doing, denies also the moral laws, which are the truth and
reason of spirit as will. Such philosophizing, as it j^ro-
claims a knowledge of the truth to be vanity, and the
circle of knowledge to be mere ap])earance, must obviously
make appearance the principle c ac^= )n also. Thus
ethical i)rinciples are decided by the lual's jieculiar

view of life and his private conviction nis degradation
of i)hilosophy appears, indeed, to outsiders as of supremely
small importance, and to be confined merely to the idle
talk of the school. But the view necessarily makes its
way into ethics, which is an essential pi; t of philosoidiy.
The real world sees the meaning of thesH views only when
they have become a reality.

By the spread of the view that subjective conviction
alone decides the ethical value of an act, it l)as come to

! H

144

TIIK IMIILOSOPIIV OF lUGH'l".

pass that hypocrisy, foniu'vly much discussed, is uow
hardly spokeu of at all. To mark hypocrisy as evil is tc)
believe that certain acts are heyoud all question trespasses,
vices, and crimes ; that also, he who commits them must
know what they are. Ivnowin*,' and recofi;nizin^, as he does,
the principles and outward acts of i»iety and ri<;ht, even in
the false j]fuise under which he misus»'s them. Or, per-
haps, with rejj;ard to evil, it was assumed that it is a duty
to know the ^ood and to distinguish it from evil. In any
case it was unconditionally claimed that men should do
notlung vicious or criminal, and that if they did, they
must, just so far as they are men, not cattle, ]>e hold
responsible. But whcu the o;ood heart, good intentions,
and subjective conviction are said to decide the value of
action, there is no longer any hypocrisy, or, for that
matter, evil at all Since whatever an individual does he
can convert into good by the reflective intervention of good
intentions and motives ; and by virtue of his conviction
i! his act is good.' There is no longer any absohite vice or
crime. Instead of frank and i"ree, hardened and un-
troubled transgression - appears the consciousness of com-
plete justification through intenticm and convicti<m ; my
good intention and my conviction that the act is good
make it good. To jjass sentence upon an act is merely to
judge of the intention, conviction, or faith of tbe agent.

' " Tlmt lit' fods fully convincod I do not in tlie least donbt.
Vet iiiiuiy coiiiiiiit the worst ontni^'cs from just such a convic-
tion. lU'sidos, if that reason conlil avail cvcrywlici.? as an cxcnsc,
tluMT wonld no lon;;cr Ito any rational judj;ni(>nt upon j^ood and
evil, lionouraltlo and mean con<luot. buruu-y would have the same
rij^hts as reason, or rather reason wouhl no longer have any rij^ht
or esteem. Its voi<'e would he a thin;j;of naujrht. Who docs not
ilouht is in the truth ! I tremhle at tiic results of Much a tolera-
tion, which wonld he exclusively to the advanta;;e of nmeason."
Fr. H. .bieolti to ('(mnt Holmer. Eutin 5th Aujj;., 180(), Concern-
ing Count Stolherg'x Conversion (Ureninis, IJerlin, Aug., 1802).

■■' Alluded to hy l*a>»cal above.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

145

Faith is not used here in the sense in which Christ
demands faith in objective truth. In that sense, if a man
has a bad faith, i.e., a conviction which is in its content
evil, he must accordingly be condemned. But faith h.-re
means simply fidelity to conviction. When we ask if a
man has remained true to his conviction, we refer to the
merely formal subjective faith, which is supi)osed of itself
to contain his duty.

Because the principle of conviction is subjective, there
is forced upon us the thought of the possibility of error,
and in this thought is the implication of an absolute law.
But a law does not act ; it is only a real human being wlio
acts. If wo are to estimate the worth of his acts accord-
ing to this subjective principle, we can ask merely how far
he has embodied the law in his conviction. Thus, if the
acts are not to be judged and measured according to the
law, it is not easy to perceive what purpose the law sub-
serves. It is degraded to a mere external letter or empty
word ; and inevitably, since it is made a binding law and
obligation only by my conviction.

Such a law may have the authority of God, of the state,
and of centuries, in which it united men and gave sub-
stfuice to their acts and destiny. It may thus include the
convictions of an untold number of individuals. And yet
to it I opi^ose the authority of my private conviction— a
conviction which has no other footing than authority.
Tins, to all a}ii»('aninc(\ stuj)endous presumption is ignored
by the principle which makes subjective conviction to be
the rule.

Although reason and conscience, never wliolly driven
away by shallow science and sophistry, with bad logic but
a higher insight concede the possibility of error, they yei
reduce crime and evil to a minimum by calling "..em
errors. To err is human. Who has not often erred with
regard to one thing and another, whether yesterday at
dinner he had fresh or pickled cabbage, and in numbeilesH

Till-: IMIII.OSOl'IIY OK UK JUT.

oihor thiii^H of ^nvat<>r or U'ss iinportiiiiccrr' And yet llio
«ii8iim'(i«»n l>i'iw(M'n importaui. and tminiporlanl. vanishcH,
if wo rlin^' obstinati'ly to \novo Hiibjtvrl ivt* <'onvidion. Hut
the natural, thou^'h illo^'ical, admission of tlio ])ossil»ility
of orror, wIumi it allows that a l)ad conviction is only an
tMTor, is turiud into anothor d<»f(Mi of lo^'ic, thai, namely,
of dishonesty. At »mo time it is said that upon subjoctivo
convirtio;. rests the (>thiea.l structure and tln^ highest
worth of man, and this conviction is declared to \w most
hi|;;h and holy. At )uu>ther time we an^ dealinjjf with a
more error and my conviction has beconn^ trivial, contin-
j^eut, and .c«'identiil. In point of fact, my conviction is of
trilling imnnent if I cannot know the truth. In such a
case it is also a nuitt«'r of iudift'erence how 1 think, and
there remains ft»r my thought mendy that. (>mpty good,
whii'h is an abstraction of the uudorstanding.

The principle of justitication on the ground (»f convie-
tion bears als** iipon others in their treaiment. *)f my
action. They a,r(> (piitc right, to hold my a.cts to be
crimes, if this is in aci-ordance with their belief and con-
viction. Thus I not. only cannot anticipate any uivouiablo
treatmer.t. but. on the contrary, am reduced f'-om a posi-
tion of freedom and hont)\ir to one of dishonour and
slavery. And tliis h.ip.p.c'.is through that, very justice
which I have adopted as my *>wn. by the exercise of which
I experionce only an alien subjective conviction, and tho
working i>f a njcrely external fori'O.

( (') Fimillv. the highest form in which this subjectivity
fully grasps and expresses itself, is that which we, bor-
rowing the name frim\ I'lato. have called irony. But it is
onlv the name whi»'h is taken fnun Plato, who, like
Socrates, used it in personal conversalit)n against tho
opinions of the ordinary and of the sophistic conscious.
U088, in order to bring oat the idea of truth aud jiistico ;
but iu treating the suj^miiial consciousness in this way
ho expressly excepts tho idea. Irony is employed by him

TIIIC (;()()l) AND CONSriKNCK.

147

in convcrHation. only a<,'ainst pcrsoiiH ; othorwiHO tlu^
0H8cnt.al inov.'uun.t of liin tliouKht is dialectic. S«, far
was I'lato from HuppoHJUK' <l»o couvoi-Hational proccHs to
ho comphio. in itself, or irony to ho the idea or ultimate
onu of thou-ht, that he, on the contrary, terminated the;
l)a<;Ivward an<l forwar<l motion of thou^'ht, which prevails
in 8ul)iective opinion, by siuiciuf,' it in the sul)stantive idea.'

'My .Iccms,..! (.„II,,a;r,H,, |.,,,fe.s,s„r HoIk^,,,-, a.lo,.te.l the i,.tcr-
|.nU,ati..M of „„„y wl,i..h |.',i,,,l. V. Sd,k-d I,a,l u ai. ,,a.Iy neii,„|
of h.H I,(,,.ntiy ,.am.r work..l up till it l.^nuno i,. his l.a„,|„ ti.at
s.i hjcvtivity, wl.idi is vnmvmiH <,f itself as tim lii^r|„.st. Hut
Solders H.i|.o,i.M- ,jii.ljr„u!nt ami more pl.il„s„i,|,ie insi-rlit sei/e.!
an.l n,tun.(..I of this view only the phase of .lialectie ..roper ti'ie
iMov.M- puis.! <,f (h.., sp,!CMlative n.etho.l. INMle.-tly clear how-
rver he .•ainiot he sai.l to he, nor can I a-ree with the c.,ncepti.,n«
wlm-h he . eveIop,Ml in his recent th..n-htful an.l .letaile.l criticisni
of Schle-;el s lectures.*

"Tnu, irony," says Solder (p. «)2), " procee.ls from the view
U.at man, so lonj.^ as he lives in this pr.-sent worl.l, can .lo liis
hi-hest appointed task only in this world. To helievc, ourselves
to ho transcen.lin- iinite ends is a vain ima-inaticm ; " also -the
hi^'luvst <'xists f(u- our , onduct only in limited, finite form " This
H, n-iitly un.Ierstood, {'latonic, and very trulv sp„ken a-ainst
the strivni- to attain th.^ ahstra.^t infinite!. Hut to say that
the highest presents itself in a limited and finite form, as in ethics
and ..hat (he ethical is essentially reality an.l acti.m, Ih very
.litlcr."nt fr..m sayin}„' that th.« ethical is „nly a finite end Tim
Imite f..rm .leprives the ethical matter ..f muw ..f its real snh-
stanct, an.l inlinitu.l.>. He -oes „n : " An.l just for this reas.m
the hi-h.^st IS f.„' us as empty as the h.west, ami necessarily ,.„|.
apses alouK with us ami our vain un.lerstan.lin- i.'„r truly the
hijrhest exists „nly in (Jo.l, an.l r.neals itself as divine in our
••oilapse. In the .livine we have n.* shar.., unless its imm.Mliate
presence he reveale.l in the .lisappearan.-.> ..f ..ur reality. The .lis-
poH.tK.n. t.. which this prin.uple .,f life is .d.-arly present, is trairic
imny. 1 he name ir.,ny may he arhitrarily us.-.l to .lescrihe any
-^atoof nun.l, hut it is far from dear how the liij-hest ^..es d.>wn

* "Kritik iihcr .lie Vorlesun-en t]^ Iferrn August Wilhelm v
N^dcKel uher .lranuiti«cho Kunst un.l l.iteratur" (Wiener .lahrb
Bd. vii. S. {»() fl". ). X u,. i .,.

148

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

ill

The summit of the subjentivity, which apprehends itself
as ultimate, consists in a consciousness of itself as judge
of truth, right, and duty. It is aware, indeed, of the
objective ethical principle, but does not forget oi; renounce
itself, or make any earnest effort to sink itself in this
principle and act from it. Although it is in relation to
this principle, it holds itself free from it, and is conscious
of itself as willing and deciding in a certain way, and as
being able quite as well to will and decide otherwise. —
You, let us suppose, honestly take a law to be something
absolute ; but, as for me, I too have a share in it, but a

with our nothingness, or how the divine is revealed only in the
disappearance of Our reality. This i)()sition is also maintained in
a passage on p. 91, which runs : " "NVe see heroes in error in both
thought and feeling, with regard not only to the etl'ects of the most
noble and the most beautiful, but also to their source and value ; yes,
we are exalted in the destruction of the best itself." The righteous
destruction of ranting villains aiul criminalis of whom the hero in
a modern tragedy, " Die Scluild," is an example, has indeed an
interest for criminal law, but none for true art. lint the tragic
destruction of highly moral personages may interest, exalt, and
reconcile us to itself, wlien they contract guilt by becoming
opposing champions of equally just ethical forces, which by some
misfortune come into collision. Out of this antagonism proceed
the right and wrong of each party. There ai)pears also the true
ethical idea, purilied aiul triumphant over onesidedness, and
therefore reconciled with and in ourselves. Hence it is not the
highest in us which is overwhelmed, nor is it when the best is
submerged that we are exalted, but, on the contrary, when the
truth triumphs. This, as I have explained, in the " Phiinome-
iu)logie des tleistes," is the true and pure ethical interest of the
ancient tragedy, although in the romantic drama this functicm of
tragedy sulVersa further modification. But, apart altogether from
ihe''misfortune of tragic; collision, and the <lestruction of the indi-
viduals caught in this misfortune, the ethical idea has a real and
present existence in the ethical world, and the ethical reality,
namely, the i*tate, has as its purpose and result that tluM highest
shall not present itself in the real world as something valueless.
Tliis aim or object of the state the ethical consciousness possesses
intuitively, ami the thinking consciousness conceives.

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

149

much grander one than you, for I have gone through and^
beyond it, and can turn it as I please. It is not the '
subject-matter which is excellent, but I am the excellent
thing, and am master of law and fact. I toy with them
at my pleasure, and can enjoy myself only when I ironi-
cally know and permit the highest to be submerged. This
form, indeed, makes vain the whole ethical content of
right, duty, and law, being an evil and in itself a wholly
universal evil. Yet to it we must add the subjective
vanity of knowing itself as empty of all content, and yet
of knowing this empty self as the absolute.

This absolute self-complacency may in some cases pass
beyond a solitary worship of itself, and frame some kind
of community, the bond and essence of which would be
the mutual asseveration of conscientiousness, good inten-
tions, and reciprocal delight in purity. The members of
this union would disport themselves in the luxury of self-
knowledge and self-utterance, and would cherish them-
selves to their heart's content. In those jjersons, who
have been called beautiful souls, we find even a more
sublime subjectivity, making void all that is objective and
shining by the light of its own unreality. These and other
phases, which are in some measure connected with the
foregoing forms of subjectivity, I have treated in the
" Phiinomenologie des Geistes." In that work the whole
section on Conscience, especially the paragraphs dealing
under a different heading with the transition into a higher
stage, may be compared with the present discussion.

Addition. ~lmiig'ma.tion may go further and convert the
evil will into the pretence of the good. Though it cannot
alter the substance of evil, it can lend to it the outer form
and semblance of good. Every act contains something
positive, aui} the demonstration that a thing is good, as
opposed to evil, is effected by eliminating all but this
positive. Thus I can maintain an act to be good in
respect of my intention. Moreover, not only in conscious.

160

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

ness, but also on the positive practical side of action, evil
is connected with good. If self-consciousness gives out
that the act is good only for others, it assumes the form
of hypocrisy. But if it ventures to maintain that the act
is good for itself, it rises to the still higher summit of a
subjectivity, which is conscious of itself as absolute. For
it good and evil, as they are in and of themselves, have
wholly disappeared, and it can, therefore, give itself out
for what it pleases. This is the standpoint of absolute
jsophistrv, which itself assumes the style of lawgiver, and
(refers the distinction between good and evil to caprice.
Most pronounced in hypocrisy are the religious dis-
semblers, the Tartiiffes, who j^erform all kinds of cere-
monies, and are in their own eyes pious, although doing
what they please. To-day we seldom speak of hypocrites,
partly because the accusation seems too strong, but also
because hypocrisy in its direct form has disappeared.
Direct falsehood and complete cloaking of the good have
become too transparent. Nor is the total severance of
good and evil any longer so simple and available, since
their limits have been made uncertain by growing culture.
The more subtle form of hypocrisy now is that of pro-
bability, by which one seeks to represent a transgression
as something good for his own conscience. This occurs
only where morals and the good are fixed by authority, so
that the reasons for maintaining the evil to be the good
are as numerous as the authorities. Casuistic theologians,
especially Jesuits, have worked up these cases of con-
science, and multiplied them ad wfinitmn. Owing to this
over-subtlety, good and evil come into collision, and are
subject to such fluctuations that they seem to the indi-
vidual to run into each other. The chief desideratum is
only what is probable, an approximate good, for which a
single reason or authority can be secured. Another pecu-
liarity of this standpoint is that it contains only what is
abstract, while the concrete filling is represented as un-

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

161

essential, or rather is left to mere opinion. Thus anyone
may have committed a crime and yet willed the good.
When, for instance, a wicked person is murdered, the
positive side c the act may be asserted to be a desire to
oppose and diminish evil.

The next stage of probability is reached when the
subject depends not upon the authority and assertion of
another, but upon himself. He relies upon his own con-
viction, and his belief that only through his conviction can
a thing be good. The defect of this attitude is the deter-
mination to refer to nothing but the conviction itself,
involving a rejection of the substance of absolute right,
and a, retention of the mere form. It is, of course, not a
matter of indifference whether I do something through
use and wont, or through the force of its truth. Yet
objective truth is different from my conviction. Con-
viction holds no distinction at all between good and evil,
for it is always only conviction ; the bad would be only
that of which I am not convinced. This highest stand-
point, in extinguishing good and evil, is admittedly exposed
to error, and is cast down from its high estate to mere
contingency and disregard. This is irony, the conscious- !
ness that the highest criterion, the principle of conviction,
is ruled by caprice, and is, therefore, ineffective. For this
view the philosophy of Fichte is chiefly responsible, as it
claims that the I is absolute. At least it maintains that
absolute certitude marks the general condition of the I,
which by a further development passes into objectivity.
Of Fichte, however, it cannot properly be said that in the
practical realm he has made the caprice of the subject a
principle. But after him the particular, interpreted as
the condition of the individual subject, and applied by
Friedrich v. Schlegel to the good and beautiful, has
been set up as God. Hence the objective good is only an
image formed by my conviction, receiving its substance
only through me, and appearing and vanishing at the

152

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

pleasure of me, its lord and master. The objective, to
which I am related, is brought to naught, and thus T
hover over a dim and monstrous space, calling up phantoms
and dispersing them at will. This last extreme of sub-
jectivity arises only at a time of high culture, where
serious faith has crumbled away, and all things have
become vanity.

Transition from Morality to Ethical System.

i 141. In behalf of conscience, or the mere abstract
principle of determination, it is demanded that its phases
shall be universal and objective. In the same way in
behalf of the good which, though it is the essential uni-
versal of freedom, is still abstract, are also required definite
phases ; and for these phases is further demanded a prin-
ciple which must, however, be identical with the good.
The good and conscience, when each is raised into a
sei)arate totality, are void of all definiteness, and yet claim
to be made definite. Still, the construction of these two
relative totalities into an absolute identity is already ac-
complished in germ, since even the subjectivity or pure
self-certitude, which vanishes by degrees in its own vacuity,
is identical with the abstract universality of the good. But
the concrete identity of the good and the subjective will,
the truth of these two, is completed only in the ethical
system.

Note. — A more detailed account of the transition of the
conception is to be found in the "Logic." Here it is
enough to say that the limited and finite by its very nature
contains the opposite in itself. Such a finite thing is either
the abstract good, which is as yet unrealized, or the ab-
stract subjectivity, which is good only in intention. Abstract
good implicitly contains its opposite, i.e., its realization,
and abstract subjectivity, or the element in which the
ethical is realized, implicitly contains its opposite, i.e., the

THE GOOD AND CONSCIENCE.

163

good. Thus, when either of these two is taken in a one-
sided way, it has not yet positively realized all that it is
capable of being. The good, apart from all subjectivity
and definite character, and the determining subjectivity,
apart from anything that it may become, arrive at a
higher actuality by a negative process. Each clings at
first to its one-sided form, and resolves not to accept what
it possesses potentially, thus constituting itself an abstract
whole. Then it annuls itself in that capacity, and thereby
reduces itself to the level of one element in a whole. Each
of them becomes one element of the conception. The con-
ception, in turn, is manifested as their unity, and, having
received reality through the establishment of its elements,
now exists as idea. The idea is the conception, when it
has fashioned its elements into reality, and at the same
time exists in their identity as their dynamic essence.

The simplest realization of freedom is right. When
self-consciousness is turned back upon itself, freedom is
realized as the good. The third stage, which is here in its
transition exhibited as the truth of the good and of sub-
jectivity, is likewise quite as much the truth of right. The
ethical is subjective disposition, and yet contains right im-
plicitly. But that this idea is the truth of the conception
of freedom must not be an assumption derived from such
a source as feeling, but must in philosophy be demon-
strated. This demonstration is made on?y when right and
the moral self -consciousness are proved to exhibit of them-
selves the tendency to run back into this idea as their re-
sult. Those who believe that proof and demonstration can
be dispensed with in philosophy, show that they are still a
long distance from the first thought of what philosophy is.
They may speak of other things indeed, but they have no
right to discuss philosophy, if they have not understood
the conception.

Addition. — The two principles which we have so far con-
sidered, both the abstract good and conscience, are as yet

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

7:,

1.0 ^1^ 1^

1.1 f.-^l^

1.6

IL25 i 1.4

Photographic

Sciences
Corporation

-X

33 WIST MAIN STRHT

WiBSTIR, N.Y. I4S80

(716) •71-4S03

154

THE PHILOSOPHY OF BIGHT,

w,tho« their opposing principles. The abrtmct good is
ethereahzed .nto something wholly devoid of power some-
thing into which I can introduce any content at aU. And

t ha??o1'"T' 'P'"' '^ equally withont content, since
t has no objective significance. Heno« there may arise a
onging after objectivity. Man would debase hfmself t!

rZ«v 1 r "^f\^»d "-^ga'^ty- Many Protectants

they found no substance in their own inner life. Thev
were willing to accept any fijed and tangible authority

thought. The social order is the unity, and according to
th, conception the reconciliation also of the subiective
good with the objective absolute good. MorallTthe
general form of the will as subjective, but the^thicd
order IS not simply tJie subjective form and the self-deter
mination of the will, but contains their conception, namd;,
den«rb„t "'?': "•'"',' ""' ■"°™"'^ '^ exists indepen.
In right IS wanting the element of subjectivitv, and in
morality is wanting the objective, so that neither" by itself
has any actuality. '

a ^™If ''"V"*";'"; "" '^"^ '' »*"'• Kight exists only as

THIRD PART.

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.

142. The ethical system is the idea of freedom. It is the
hvmg good, which has in self-consciousness its knowing
and willing, and through the action of self-consciousness
Its actuality. Self-consciousness, on the other hrnd, finds
m the ethical system its absolute basis and motive. The
ethical system is thus the conception of freedom developed
into a present world, and also into the nature of self-con-
sciousness.

143. The conception of the will, when united with the
realization of the will, or the particular will, is knowing
Hence arises the consciousness of the distinction between
these two phases of the idea. But the consciousness is
now present in such a wuy that each phase is separately
the totahty of the idea, and has the idea as its content and
foundation.

144. The objective ethical principle which takes the
place of the abstract good is in its substance concrete
through the presence m it of subjectivity as its infinite
toi-m. Hence it makes differences which are within itself
and therefore are due to the conception. By means of
these differences, it obtains a sure content, which is inde-
pendent and necessary, and reaches a standing ground
raised above subjective opinion and liking. This content
18 the self-originated and self-referring laws and regu-
lations.

156

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

■T

Addition.— In the ethical principle as a whole occur both
the objective and the subjective elements; but of this
principle each is only a form. Here the good is substarce,
or the filling of the objective with subjectivity. If we con-'
template the social order from the objective standpoint, we
can say that man, as ethical, is unconscious of himself. In
this sense Antigone proclaims that no one knows whence
the laws come ; they are everlasting, that is, they exist
absolutely, and flow from the nature of things. None the
less has this substantive existence a consciousness also,
which, however, is only one element of the wnole.

145. The ethical material is rational, because it is the
system of these phases of the idea. Thus freedom, the
absolute will, the objective, and the circle of necessity, are
all one principle, whose elements are the ethical forces.
They rule the lives of individuals, and in individuals as
their modes have their shape, manifestation, and actuality.

Addition.— Since the phases of the ethical system are the

conception of freedom, they are the substance or universal

essence of individuals. In relation to it, individuals are

. merely accidental. Whether the individual exists or not

t Si ^^ ^ ^^^^^^ of indifference to the objective ethical order,

v^^iA*^ which alone is steadfast. It is the power by which the

life of individuals is ruled. It has been represented by

nations as eternal justice, eras deities who are absolute, in

contrast with whom the striving of individuals is an empty

game, like the tossing of the sea.

146. (/3) This ethical reality in its actual self-conscious-
ness knows itself, and is therefore an object of knowledge.
It, with its laws and forces, has for the subject a real exis-
tence, and is in the fullest sense independent. It has an
absolute authority or force, infinitely more sure than that
of natural objects.

Note.— The sun, moon, mountains, rivers, and all objects
of nature doubtless exist. They not only have for con-
sciousness the authority of existence in general, but have

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.

157

also a particular nature. This nature consciousness re-
gards as valid, and in its varied relation and commerce
with objects and their use comports itself accordingly.
But the authority of the social laws is infinitely higher,
because natural things represent reason only in a quite ex-
ternal and particular way, and hide it under the guise of
contingency.

147. On the other hand, the various social forces are not
something foreign to the subject. His spirit bears witness
to them as to his own being. In them he feels that he is
himself, and in them, too, he lives as in an element indis-
tinguishable from himself. This relation is more direct
and intuitive than even faith or trust.

Note. — Faith and trust belong to the beginning of re-
i/aV^v^iulflec^ion, presupposing picture thought and such disceni-
jU* Ho. ment as^hat to believe in a hea.then religion is different
^'*^'*~**^ from being a heathen. The ; 'ation, or rather identity
without relation, in which the ethical principle is the actual
life of self-consciousness, can indeed be transformed into a
relation of faith and conviction. By further reflection, also,
it may pass into an insight based on reasons, which origi-
nate in some particular end, interest, or regard, in fear or
hope, or in historical presuppositions. But the adequate
knowledge of these belongs to the conception arrived at
through thought.

148. The individual may distinguish himself from these
substantive ethical factors, regarding himself as subjective,
as of himself undetermined, or as determined to some
particular course of action. He stands to them as to his
substantive reality, and they are duties binding upon his
will.

Note. — The ethical theory of duties in their objective
character is not comprised under the empty principle of
moral subjectivity, in which, indeed, nothing is determined
(§ 134), but is rightly taken up in the third part of our
work, in which is found a systematic development of the

158

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

sphere of ethical necessity. In this present method of
treatment, as distinguished from a theory of duties, the
ethical factors are deduced as necessary relations. It is,
then, needless to add, with regard to each of them, the
remark that it is thus for men a duty. A theory of duties,
so far as it is not a philosophic science, simply takes its
material out of the relations at hand, and shows how it is
connected with personal ideas, with widely prevalent prin-
ciples, and thoughts, with ends, impulses, and experiences.
It may also adduce as reasons the cc'i sequences, which
arise when each duty is referred to other ethical relations,
as well as to general well-being and common opinion. But
a theory of duties, which keeps to the logical settlement of
its own inherent material, must be the development of the
relations, which are made necessary through the idea of
freedom, and are hence in their entire context actual. This
is found only in the state.

149. A duty or obligation appears as a limitation merely
of undetermined subjectivity and abstract freedom, or of
the impulse of the natural will, or of the moral will which
fixes upon its undetermined good capriciously. But in
j ( point of fact the individual finds in duty liberation. He
is freed from subjection to mere natural impulse ; he is
freed from the dependence which he as subjective and
particular felt towai'ds moral permission and command ;
he is freed, also, from that indefinite subjectivity, which
does not issue in the objective realization implied in
action, but remains wrapped up in its own unreality. In
duty the individual freely enters upon a liberty that is
substantive.

Addition. — Duty limits only the caprice of subjectivity,
and comes into collision only with abstract good, witli
which subjectivity is so firmly allied. When men say we
will to be free, they have in mind simply that abstract
liberty, of which every definite organization in the state is
regarded as a limitation. But duty is not a limitation of

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.

159

r-\

freedom, but only of the abstraction of freedom, that is /to ]
say, of servitude. In duty we reach the real essence, ^nd I
gain positive freedom.

150. The ethical, in so far as it is reflected simply in the
natural character of the individual, is virtue. When it
contains nothing more than conformity to the duties of the
sphere to which the individual belongs, it is integrity.

Note.~Wha.t a man ought to do, or what duties he
should fulfil in order to be virtuous, is in an ethical com-
muruty not hard to say. He has to do nothing except
what IS presented, expressed and recognized in his estab-
lished relations. Integrity is the universal trait, which
should be found in his character, partly on legal, partly on
ethical grounds. But from the standpoint of morals a
man often looks upon integrity both for himself and others
as secondary and unessential. The longing to be unique
and peculiar is not satisfied with what is absolute and
universal, but only with some situation that is ex-
ceptional.

The name " virtue " may quite as well be applied to the
different aspects of integrity, because they, too, although
they contain nothing belonging exclusively to the individual
in contrast with others, are yet his possession. But discourse
about the virtues easily passes into mere declamation, since '
its subject matter is abstract and indefinite, and its reasons
and declarations are directed to the individual's caprice
and subjective inclination. In any present ethical circum-
stance, whose relations are fully developed and actualized,
virtue in the strict sense has place and reality only when
these relations come into collision. But genuine collisions
are rare, although moral reflection can, on the slightest
provocation, create them. It can also provide itself with
the consciousness that, in order to fulfil its special mission,
it must make sacrifices. Hence, in undeveloped conditions
of social life virtue as such occurs more frequently, because
ethical principles and the realization of them are more

160

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

a matter of private liking, belonging indeed to the nature
of peculiarly gifted individuals. Thus, the ancients have
attributed virtue in a special way to Hercules. So, too, in
the ancient states, where ethical principles had not ex-
panded into a system of free self-dependent development
and objectivity, ethical defects had to be compensated for
by the genius of the private individual. Thus the theory of
the virtues, so far as it differs from a mere theory of duties,
embraces the special features of character due to natural
endowments, and thus becomes a spiritual history of the
natural in man.

Since the virtues are the ethical reality applied to the par-
ticular, and are on this subjective side indefinite, there
arises, in order to make them definite, a quantitative distinc-
tion of more and less. Hence the consideration of the
virtues calls up the opposing vices as defects. Thus
Aristotle defines a particular vii-tue, when rightly under-
stood, as the mean between too much and too little.

The content, which receives the form of duties and also
of virtues, is the same as that which has the form of
appetites (§ 19, note). Besides, they all have the same con-
tent as their basis. But because the content of the appe-
tites still belongs to unformed will and natural perception,
and is not developed to an ethical order, the only object
which they have in common with the content of duties and
virtues is abstract. Since it in itself is indeterminate, it does
not contain for the appetites the limits of good and evil.
Thus appetites, if we consider their positive side, are good,
if their negative side evil (§ 18).

Addition. If a man realizes this or that social project,
he is not at once virtuous, though such, indeed, he is, when
this way of behaving is a fixed element of his character.
Virtue is not wholly objective ; it is rather ethical vir-
tuosity. To-day we do not speak of virtue as formerly, for
the reason that ethical principles are not now so much a
feature of a particular individual. The French speak most

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.

161

Of virtue, because amongst them the individual is more his
own peculiar property, and acts according to the dictates of
nature. The Germans, on the other hand, are more reflec-
tive, and amongst them the same content attains the form
ot universality.

151 The ethical, when simply identical with the reality
ot individuals, appears as a generally adopted mode of
action or an observance. This is the custom, which as a
second nature has been substituted for the original and
merely natural will, and has become the very soul, meaning,
and reality of one's daily life. It is the living spirit
actualized as a world ; by this actualization does the sub-
stance of spirit exist as spirit.

AddUion-K^ nature has its laws, as the animals, trees,
the sun fulfil their law, so observance belongs to the spirit
of freedom. What right and morality are not as yet, the
ethical prmciple is, namely, spirit. The particularity in-
volved IS not yet that of the conception, but only of
the natural will. So, too, from the standpoint of morality,
self-consciousness is not yet spiritual consciousness. It is
occupied simply with the value of the subject in himself-
the subject, who frames himself according to the good and
agamst evil, has yet the form of caprice. But, here at the
ethical point of view, will is the will of spirit, and has
a correspondingly substantive content. Pedagogy is the
art of making men ethical. It looks upon man as natural,
and points out the way in which he is to be born again.
His first nature must be converted into a second spiritual
nature, m such a manner that the spiritual becomes in him
a habit In the spiritual disposition the opposition of the
natural and subjective will disappears, and the struggle of
the subject ceases. To this extent habit belongs to ethics
It belongs also to philosophic thought, which demands that
the mind should be armed against sallies of caprice, rout
and overcome them, in order that rational thought mav
have free course. It is true, on the other hand, that mere

162

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

habit causes death, which ensues when one gets thoroughly
used to life, and has become physically and mentally dulled.
Then the opposition due to subjective consciousness and
spiritual activity has disappeared. Man is active only in
so far as he has not attained something which he desires to
effect. When this is fully accomplished, activity and
vitality vanish, and the lack of interest, which then per-
vades him, is mental or physical death.

162. Substantive ethical reality attains its right, and this
right receives its due, when the individual in his private
will and conscience drops his self-assertion and antagonism
to the ethical. His character, moulded by ethical principles,
takes as its motive the unmoved universal, which is open
on all its sides to actual rationality. He recognizes that his
' worth and the stability of his private ends are grounded
upon the universal, and derive their reality from it. Sub-
jectivity is the absolute form and the existing actuality of
ithe substance. The difference between the subject and
I substance, as the object, end, and power of the subject,
forthwith vanishes, like the difference between form and
matter.

Note. — Subjectivity, which is the foundation for the real
existence of the conception of freedom (§ 106), is at
the moral standpoint still distinguished from the con-
ception. In ethics it is adequate to the conception, whose
existence it is.

153. In that individuals belong to the ethical and social
fabric they have a right to determine themselves sub-
jectively and freely. Assurance of their freedom has its
truth in the objectivity of ethical observance, in which
they realize their own peculiar being and inner universality

(§ 147).

Note. — To a father seeking the best way to bring up
his son, a Pythagorean, or some other thinker, replied,
'* Make him a citizen of a state which has good laws."

Addition. — The attempts of speculative educators to

THE ETHICAL SYSTEM.

163

Withdraw people from their present social life and brine
them up in the country, a proposal made by Rousseau in
JLmile, have been vain, because no one can succeed in
alienatmg man from the laws of the world. Although the
education of young men must take place in solitude, we
cannot believe that the odour of the world of spirits does
not m the end penetrate their seclusion, or that the power
of the spirit of the world is too feeble to take possession of
even the remotest corner. Only when the individual is a
citizen of a good state, does he receive his right.

154. The right of individuals to their particularity is
contained m the concrete ethical order, because it is in
particularity that the social principle finds a visible outer
manifestation.

155. Right and duty coincide in the identity of thev
universal and the particular wills. By virtue of the ethical
tabric man has rights, so far as he has duties, and duties so
tar as he has rights. In abstract right, on the contrary I
have the right and another person the corresponding duty •
and in morals I resolve to consider as an objective duty
only the right of my own knowledge and will and of mW
own well-being. "^

Addition.~The slave can have no duties, but only the
free man. If all rights were on one side and all duties on
the other, the whole would be broken up. Identity is the
only principle to which we must now adhere.

156. The ethical substance, as the union of self-conscious-
ness with its conception, is the actual spirit of a family and
a nation.

Addition.-The ethical framework is not abstract like the
good, but in a special sense real. Spirit has actuality, and
the accidents or modes of this actuality are individuals.
Hence as to the ethical there are only two possible views
Either we start from the substantive social system, or we
proceed atomically and work up from a basis of indi-
viduality. This latter method, because it leads to mere

164

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

juxtaposition, is void of spirit, since mind or spirit is
not something individual, but the unity of individual and

universal.

167. The conception of this idea exists only as spirit, as
active self-knowledge and reality, since it objectifies itself
by passing through the form of its elements. Hence

it is,

A. The direct or natural ethical spirit, the family. This
reality, losing its unity, passes over into dismember-
ment, and assumes the nature of the relative. It thus
becomes

B. The civic community, an association of members or
independent individuals in a formal universality. Such an
association is occasioned by needs, and is preserved by the
law, which secures one's person and property, and by an ex-
ternal system for private and common interests.

C. This external state goes back to, and finds its central
principle in, the end and actuality of the substantive
universal, and of the public life dedicated to the main-
tenance of the universal. This is the state-constitution.

FIRST SECTION.

The Family.

168. The family is the direct substantive reality of
spirit. The unity of the family is one of feeling, the feel-
ino- of love. The true disposition here is that which
esteems the unity as absolutely essential, and within it
places the consciousness of oneself as an individuality.
Hence, in the family we are not independent persons but
members.

Addition. — Love is in general the consciousness of the
unity of myself with another. I am not separate and
isolated, but win my self -consciousness only by renouncing
my independent existence, and by knowing myself as unity

THE FAMILY.

165

of myself with another and of another with me. But love
is feeling, that is to say, the ethical in the form of the
natural. It has no longer a place in the state, where one
knows the unity as law, where, too, the content must be
rational, and I must know it. The first element in love is
that I will to be no longer an independent self-sufficing
person, and that, if I were such a person, I should feel
myself lacking and incomplete. The second element is
that I gain myself in another person, in whom I am recog-
nized, as she again is in me. Hence love is the most |
\ tremendous contradiction, incapable of being solved by the
lunderstanding. Nothing is more obstinate than this
scrupulosity of self-consciousness, which, though negated, I
yet insist upon as something positive. Love is both the
source and solution of this contradiction. As a solution ii
is an ethical union.

159. A right, which comes to the individual by reason
of the family and constitutes his life in it, does not appear
in the form of a right, that is, the abstract element of a
definite individuality, until the family is dissolved. Then
those, who should be members, become in fueling and
reality self-dependent persons. What was theirs by right
of their position in the family, they no^ receive in separa-
tion in an external way, in the form of money, main-
tenance, or education.

Addition.— The family has this special right, that its
substantive nature should have a sphere in actuality.
This right is a right against external influences and against
abandonment of the unity. But, on the other hand, love is
subjective feeling, which, if it oppose the unity of the
family, destroys it. If in such a case a unity is insisted
on, it can comprehend only things that are external and
independent of feeling.

160. The family when completed has the three following
phases :

(a) The form of its direct conception, marriage.

u-*c' r^^<---

166

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

(6) External reality, the family property and goods

and the care of them,
(c) Education of children and dissolution of the

family.

A. Marriage.

161. Marriage, as the elementary social relation, con-
tains firstly the factor of natural life. As marriage is also
a substantive fact, natural life must be viewed in its
totality as the realization of the species, and the process
which the realization involves. But, secondly, the merely
inner, potential and, when actualized, external unity of
the sexes is transformed in self-consciousness into the
spiritual unity of self-conscious love.

Addition. — Marriage is essentially an ethical relation.
Formerly, in the majority of what are called rights of
nature, marriage was interpreted on its physical or natural
side. It has thus been looked upon simply as a sexual
relation, and as excluding all the other features of marriage.
But such a view is no more crude than to conceive of
marriage merely as civil contract, a view found in Kant.
In accordance with this view, individuals form a compact
through mere caprice, and marriage is degraded to a
bargain for mutual use. A third doctrine, equally repre-
hensible, bases marriage on love only. Love, which is
feeling, admits the accidental on every side, as the ethical
/ cannot do. Hence, marriage is to be defined more exaotlj
\ as legal ethical love. Out of marriage has disajipeared
I the love, which is merely subjective.

162. As a subjc'-tive starting-point for marriage either
the special inclination of two persons for each other may
be tHe more observable, or else the provision and general
arrangements of the parents. The ol>jective point of
departure, however, is the free consent of the two to
become one person. They give up their natural and
private personality to enter a unity, which may be regarded

THE FAMILY.

167

as a limitation, but, since in it they attain to a substantive
self-consciousness, is really their liberation.
' Note.— Thsit an individual may be objective, and so fulfil
his ethical duty, he should marry. The circumstances
attending the external starting-point are naturally a matter
of chance, depending largely upon the state of reflective
culture. In this there may be either of two extremes.
Either well-meaning parents arrange beforehand for the
marriage of two persons, who, when they have made each
other's acquaintance as prospective husband and wife, are
then expected to love each other. Or, on the other hand,
inclination is supposed first to appear in the two persons,
left absolutely to their private selves. The extreme, in
which marriage is resolved on prior to inclination, and
both resolution and inclination are then present in the
actual marriage, is the more ethical. In the other extreme,
it is the individual's private and unformed nature, whicb
makes good its pretensions. This extreme is in close
alliance with the subjective principle of the modern world
(§ 124, note).

Modern dramas and other works of art produce an
atmosphere of the chilliest indifference, by the way in
which they represent the motive of sexual love. Tliis
feeling of indifference is due to the association in the
drama of ardent passion with the most utter contingency,
the whole interest being made to depend simply upon
merely private persons. The event is, doubtless, of the
very last importance to these persons, but not in itself.

Addition. — Amongst nations where women are held in
slight o: teem, parents arrange the marriage of their
children, without ever consulting them. The children
submit, because the particularity of feeling as yet makes
no claim at all. The maiden is simply to have a husband,
the mau a wife. In other circumstances regard may be
had to means, connections, political hopes. To make
marriage the means for other ends may cause great hard-

168

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

■

ship. But in modern times the subjective point of depar-
ture, i.e., being in love, is thought to be the only thing of
consequence. In this it is taken for granted that each
one must wait till his hour has struck, and that he can
bestow his love upon one and only one individual.

163. The ethical side of marriage consists in the con-
sciousness that the union is a substantive end. Marriage
thus rests upon love, confidence, and the socializing of the
whole individual existence. In this social disposition and
reality natural impulse is reduced to the mode of a merely
natural element, which is extinguished in the moment of
its satisfaction. On the other hand, the spiritual bond of
union, when its right as a substantive fact is recognized, is
raised above the chances of passion and of temporarv par-
ticular inclination, and is of itself indissoluble.

Note. — It has already been remarked that there is no
contract in connection with the essential character of
marriage (§ 75). Marriage leaves behind and transcends
the standpoint of contmct, occupied by the person who is
sufficient for himself. Substance is such as to be in essen-
tial relation to its accidents.' The union of personalities,
whereby the family becomes one person, and its members
its accidents, is the ethical spirit. The ethical spirit,
stripped of the many external phases which it has in par-
ticular individuals and transitory interests, has been by
picture-thought given independent form, and reverenced
as the Penates, etc. In this attitude of mind is found
that religious side of marriage and the family, which is
called piety. It is a further abstraction, when the divine
and substantive reality is separated from its physical em-
bo Mment. The result of this procedure is that feeling and
the consciousness of spiritual unity become what is falsely
called Platonic love. This separation is in kee})iug witli
the monastic doctrine, in which natural vitality is regarded

See " EncyclopiiHlia of the Philosoiiliical ScienceH."

THE FAMILY.

169

simply as negative, and is given by this very separation an
infinite importance.

AddUion.—Ma.Yn&ge is distinguished from concubinage
sance in concubinage the chief factor is the satisfaction of
natural impulse, while in marriage this satisfaction is sub-
ordinate. Hence, in marriage one speaks without blushing
of occurrences, which apart from the marriage relation cause
a sense of shame. Therefore, also, is marriage to be
esteemed as in itself indissoluble. The end of marriage is
ethical, and therefore occupies so high a place that every-
thing opposing it seems secondary and powerless. Marriage
shall not be liable to dissolution through passion, since
passion IS subject to it. But, after all, it is only in itself
indissoluble, for, as Christ says, divorce is permitted, but
only because of hardness of heart. Marriage, since it con-
tains feeling, is not absolute, but open to fluctuations, and
has in It the possibility of dissolution. Yet the laws must
make the possibility as difficult as can be, and must retain
intact the right of the ethical against inclination.

164. Just as in the case of contract it is the explicit
stipulation, which constitutes the true transference of pro-n
perty (§ 79), so in the case of the ethical bond of marriage \ i^lr^^-vC^
the public celebration of consent, and the corresponding (\ ^'y f
recognition and acceptance of it by the family and the'
community, constitute its consummation and realitv. The
function of the church is a separate feature, which is not
to be considered here. Thus the union is established and
com|)leted ethically, only when preceded by social ceremony,
the symbol of language being the most* spiritual embodi-'
ment of the spiritual (§ 78). The sensual element pertain-
mg to the natural life has place in the ethical relation only
as an after result and accident belonging to the external
reality of the ethical union. The union can be expressed
fully only in mutual love and assip tnce.

Note.— When the question as to the chief end of marriage
is asked with a view to enact or recast laws, it means :

i \

Ilii

170

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Which particular side of the reality of marriage must be
accepted as the most essential ? But no one separate phase
of marriage comprises the whole range of its absolute
ethical content; and one or other phase of its existence
may be wanting without injury to its essence. — In the
celebration of marriage the essence of the union is clearly
understood to be an ethical principle, freed from the accidents
/ of feeling and private inclination. If the solemnization be
\ taken for an external formality, or a so-called mere civil
requisition, the act loses all purpose except that of edifica-
tion, or of an attestation to the civic regulation. Indeed,
there may perhaps remain only the positive arbitrariness
of a civil or ecclesiastical command. Now, not only is a
command of this kind indifferent to the nature of marriage,
but in so far as the two persons have because of it ascribed
value to the formality, and counted it as a condition pre-
cedent to complete abandonment to each other, it is an
alien thiuer, bringing discord into the disposition of love,
and thwarting the inner nature of the union. The opinion
that the marriage ceremony is a mere civic mandate
professes to contain the loftiest conception of the freedom,
intensity, and completeness of love; but in point of fact it
denies the ethical side of it, which implies a limitation and
repression of the mere natural tendency. Eeserve is alreadv
found naturally in a sense of shame, and is by the more
articulate spiritual consciousness raised to the higher form
of modesty and chastity. In a word, the view of marriage
just criticised rejects the ethical side, by virtue of which
consciousness gathers itself out of its native and subjective
condition, and attains to the thought of the substantive. In-
stead of always holding before itself the accidental character
of sensual inclination, it casts oft" the fetters of this state and
engages itself to what is substantive and binding, namely,
the Penates. The sensual [element is reduced and con-
ditioned by the recognition of marriage as an ethical bond.
Insolent is the view of the mere understanding, which is

THE FAMILY.

171

unable to apprehend marriage in its speculative nature.
This substantive relation, however, is in harmony with the
unsophisticated ethical sense, and with the laws of Chris-
tian nations.

Addition.—Jt is laid down by Friedrich v. Schlegel, in
" Lucmde," and by a follower of his in the " Letters of an
Unknown " (Liibeck and Leipzig, 1800), that the marriage-
ceremony IS a superfluous formality. They argue that bv
the form of marriage love, which is the substantive factor,
loses Its value ; they represent that the abandonment to
the sensual is necessary as proof of the freedom and inner
reality of love. This style of argument is usual with
seducers. Besides, as regards the relation of man to
woman, it is woman who, in yielding to sense, gives up "^
her dignity, whereas man has another field than the family '
for his ethical activity. The sphere of woman is essentialh ,
marriage. Her rightful claim is that love should assume the
form of marriage, and that the different elements existing
in love should be brought into a truly rational connection.

165. The natural office of the sexes receives, when
rationalized, intellectual and social significance. This
significance is determined by the distinction which the
ethical substance, as conception, introduces by its own
motion into itself, in order to win out of the distinction
its own life or concrete unity.

166. In one sex the spiritual divides itself into two phases,
independent, personal self-sufficiency, and knowing and
willing of free universality. These two together are the
self-consciousness of the conceiving thought, and the
willhig of the objective final cause. In the" other sex the
spiritual maintains itself in unity and concord. This sex
knows and wills the substantive in the form of concrete
individuality and feeling. In relation to what is without
one sex exhibits power and mastery, while the other is
subjective and passive, ^enw the husband has his real
essential life in the state, the sciences, and the like, in

2, jt4.:jA-oji

172

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

battle and in struggle with the outer world and with him-
self. Only by effort does he, out of this disruption of
himself, reach self-stifficing concord. A peaceful sense of
this concord, and an ethical existence, which is intuitive
and subjective, he finds in the family. In the family the
wife has her full substantive place, and in the feeling of
family piety realizes her ethical disposition.

i\ro^e.— Hence piety is in the "Antigone" of Sophocles
most superbly j^resented as the law of the woman, the law
of the nature, which realizes itself subjectively and intui-
tively, the law of an inner life, which has not yet attained
complete realization, the law of the ancient gods, and of
the under-world, the eternal law, of whose origin no one
knows, in opposition to the public law of the state. This
opposition is in the highest sense ethical, and hence also
tragic ; it is individuahzed in the opposing natures of man
and woman.

. Addition.—Women can, of course, be educated, but their
I minds are not adapted to the higher sciences, philosophy,
\ or certain of the arts. These demand a universal faculty!
Women may have happy inspirations, taste, elegance, but
they have not the ideal. The difference between man and
woman is the same as that between animal and pUnt.
The animal corresponds more closely to the character of
the man, the plant to that of the woman. In woman
there is a more peaceful unfolding of nature, a process,
whose principle is the less clearly determined unity of
feeling. If women were to control the government, the
state would be in danger, for they do not act according
to the dictates of universality, but are influenced by acci-
dental inclinations and opinions. The ediuiation of woman
goes on one hardly knows how, in the atmosphere of
picture-thinking, as it were, more through life than through
the acquisition of knowledge. Man attains his position
only through stress of thought and much specialized effort.
167. Marriage in its essence is monogamy, because in

THE FAMILY.

173

this relation it is the personality, the directly exclusive
individuality which subsides and resigns itself. The true
inner side of marriage, the subjective form of the real
substantive institution, issues only out of such a mutual
renunciation of personality as is shared in by no one else.
Personality acquires the right of being consdous of itself
in another, only in so far as the other appears in this
identity as a person or atomic individuality.

JVo^e.— Marriage, or monogamy, rather, is one of the
principles on which the ethical life of a community de-
pends most absolutely. Hence the institution of marriage
is represented as one of the features of the divine or heroic
founding of the state.

168. Since marriage proceeds out of the free resignation
by both sexes of that personality which is infinitely peculiar
to themselves, it must not occur within the bounds of
natural identity, which involves great intimacy and un-
limited familiarity. Within such a circle individuals have
no exclusive personality. Marriage must rather take place
in families that are unconnected, and between persons
who are distinct in their origin. Between persons related
by blood, therefore, marriage is contrary to the conception
of it. It is an ethical act done in freedom, and not con-
trolled by direct natural conditions and their impulses.
Marriage within these limits is likewise contrary to true
natural feeliugr.

Note.— To regard marriage as grounded not on a right
of nature but on natural sexual impulse, to view it a's a
capricious contract, to give such an external reason for
monogamy as the number of men in relation to the
number of Avonieu, and to give only vague feelings as
cause sufficient to prohibit marriage 'between blood con-
nections, all such theories are due to the current idea of a
state of nature, and to the opinion that such a state
possesses rights. They are, however, devoid of the con-
ception of rationality and freedom.

174

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Addition. — Consanguineous marriages find opposition, in
the first instance, in the sense of shame. This feeling of
hesitation is justified by the conception. What is ah-eady
united cannot be first of all united by marriage. As to
the relation of mere nature, it is known that amongst
animals copulation within one stock produces weaker off-
spring. What is to be joined ought to be at first distinct
and separate. The power of production, both of spirit and
body, is greater, the deeper are the oppositions out of
which it restores itself. Familiarity, intimacy, habituation
due to the same course of action, ought not to occur pre-
vious to marriage, but should be found for the first time in
the married state. Their appearance after marriage has
richer results and a higher value, the more numerous have
been the points of difference.

169. The family, as person, has its external reality in
property. If it is to furnish a basis for the substantive
personality of the family, it must take the form of means.

B. The Family Means.

170. It is not enough that the family has property, but,
as a universal and lasting person, it needs a permanent
and sure possession, or means. When property is treated
abstractly, there occur at random the particular needs of
the mere individual, and also the self-seeking of the appe-
tites. These now take on an ethical aspect, and are changed
into provision for a common interest.

Note. — In the wise sayings concerning the founding of
states, the institution of a sure property makes its ap-
pearance in connection with the institution of marriage, or
at least with the introduction of an orderly social life.—
When we come to the civic community, we shall see in
what family competence consists, and how it is to be
secured.

171. The husband is the head of the family, and when

THE FAMILY.

175

It, as a legal person, collides with other families, he is its
representative. It is expected of him, further, to go out
and earn its hviug, care for its needs, and administer the
family means. This means is a common possession, to
which each member has a common but not a special right.
This general right and the husband's right to dispose of

/^^KT''*^ "^^^ ''''''^'''*' ^^'"''^^^ *^^ et^^^^al sentiment
(M58). which m the family is still in its simplest form, is
subject to chance and violence.

172. Marriage establishes a new family, which has its
own independent footing as against the stems or houses
from which it has proceeded. The connection of the new
family with these stems is consanguinity, but the principle
ot the new family is ethical love. Thus, the individual's
property is essentially allied to his marriage, and less in-
timately to his original stock or house.

Note.— A marriage-settlement, which imposes a limit to
the common possession of goods by the wedded couple, or
any other arrangement by which the right of the wife is
retained, is intended to be security against the dissolution
of the marriage-tie by death or divorce. In such an event
the different members of the family are by this arrange-
ment apportioned their shares of the common possession.

Addition.— In many law codes the more extended range
of the family circle is retained. It is looked upon as the
real bond of union, while the tie of the single family is re-
garded as comparatively unimportant. Thus in the older
Roman law the wife of the lax marriage is more closely
allied to her relatives than to her husband and children
In feudal times, also, the necessity of preserving the
splendor familiae led to reckoning under the family only
Its male members. Thus the whole family connection was
the chief object of concern, and the newly-formed family
was placed in the background. Notwithstanding this
every new family is more essential than the wider circle
bouuded by the tie of consanguinity. A married couple

176

THE PHILOSOPHY OF lllGHT.

with their children form a nucleus of their own in opposi-
tion to the more extended household. Hence the financial
status of individuals must be more vitally connected with
marriage than with the wider family union. ^

C. Education of the

Children and
Family.

Dissolution of the

173. The unity of marriage which, as substantive, exists
only as an inner harmony and sentiment, but, so far as it
exists actually, is separated in the two married persons,
becomes in the children a unity, which has actual inde-
pendent existence, and is an independent object, This new
object the parents love as an embodiment of their love. —
The presupposition of the direct presence of the two people
as parents becomes, when taken on its merely natural
side, a result. This process expands into an infinite series
of generations, which beget and are presupposed. At this
finite and natural standpoint the existence of the simple
spirit of the Penates is represented as species or kind.

Addition. — Between husband and wife the i*elation of
love is not yet objective. Though feeling is a substantive
unity, it has as yet no footing in reality. This foothold
parents attain only in their children, in whom the totality
of their alliance is visibly embodied. In the child tho
mother loves her husband, and the father his wife. In
the child both parents have their love before their eyes.
Whereas in means the marriage tie exists only in an
external object, in children it is present in a spiritual
being, in whom the parents are loved, and whom they
love.

174. Children have the right to be supported and
educated out of the common family means. The right of
parents to the service of their children, as service, is
limited to and based upon family cares. The right of
parents over the free choice of their children is just as

THE FAMILY.

177

I opposi-
financial
ited with

I of the

ve, exists

far as it

persons,

aal inde-

Tliis new

ir love. —

^o people

r natural

lite series

At this

le simjjle

:ind.

lation of
bstantive
foothold
3 totality
jhild tho
(vife. In
leir eyes,
ly in an
spiritual
Lom they

:ted and
! right of
?rvice, is
right of
3 just as

clearly hniited to correction and education. The purpose
of chastisement is not mere justice; it has a subjective I
moral side its object being to restrain a freedom, which is
still bound to nature, and to instill the universal into the /
cniid 8 consciousness and will.

Addition.~Man does not possess by instinct what he is
to be but must first of all acquire it. Upon this is based •

the cWs right to be educated. As it is with children, so
IS It with nations under paternal government; the people
are supplied with food out of storehouses, ;nd are nol
looked upon as self-dependent or of age. The services
required of children must bear upon their education and
promote their good. To ignore this good would destrov
the ethical element of the relation, and make the child a
slave. A prominent feature in the education of children is
correction, intended to break their self-will, and eradicate
what 18 merely sensual and natural. One must not expect ^'
to succeed here simply with goodness, because the direct >
volition of children is moved by immediate suggestions (
and hkmgs, not by reasons and ideas. iTwe'gi^^dreu
reasons, we leave it open to them whether to act upon them U^ ^^
r?f/';!u''''^^'''^^^*^^°^^^P^"'^«"P«n their pleasure. ?- <>^-
tial k f ^ *^^*P\^^^*« ««°«titute the universal and^^en- (rCi^,
tial 18 included the necessity of obedience on the part of
c^riddren When no care is taken to cherish in children the
feelmg of subordination, a feeling begotten in them by the
longing to be big, they become forward and impertinent.

175. Children are potentially free, and life is the direct
embodiment of this potential freedom. Hence they are 9
not thmgs, and cannot be said to belong to any one their '
parents or others. But their freedom is as yet only ^
potentiah The education of children has with regard to
family hfe a two-fold object. Its positive aim is to exalt
the ethical nature of the child into a direct perception free
from all opposition, and thus secure that state of mind
which forms the basis of ethical life. The child thus

r.{»!tiA<v

\. Y^Cvr > **c H.- hT f

178

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

passes his earlier years in love, trust, and obedience. Its
negative aim is to lift the child out of the natural sim-
plicity, in which it at first is, into self-dependence and free
personality, and thus make it able to leave the natural
unity of the family.

Note. — That the children of Roman parents were slaves
is one of the facts which most tarnishes the Eoman law.
This wounding of the ethical life in its most intimate
quarter is an important element in forming an estimate of
the world-historical character of the Romans, as well as of
their tendency towards formal right.

The necessity for the education of children is found in
their inherent dissatisfaction with what they are, in their
impulse to belong to the world of adults, whom they
reverence as higher beings, and in the wish to become big.
The sportive method of teaching gives to children what is
childish under the idea that it is in itself valuable. It makes
not only itself ridiculous, but also all that is serious. It
is scorned by children themselves. Since it strives to
represent children as complete in their very incompleteness,
of which they themselves are already sensible. Hoping to
make them satisfied with their imperfect condition, it
disturbs and taints their own truer and higher aspiration.
The result is indifference to and want of interest in the
substantive relations of the spiritual world, contempt of
men, since they have posed before children in a childish
and contemptible way, and vain conceit devoted to the
contemplation of its own excellence.

Addition. — Man, as child, must have been included with
his parents in the circle of love and mut^ial confidence, and
the rational must appear in him as his ovrn. jtrost private
subjectivity. At the outset the edit^atioTi gion by the
mother is of greater importance, since social character
must be planted in the child as feeling. It is noticeable
that children as a rule love their parents less than the
parents do the! children. Children are on the way to

II I

THE FAMILY.

179

ice. Its

ral sim-

and free

natural

re slaves
lan law.
intimate
imate of
rell as of

found in
, in their
jm they
ome big.
1 what is
It makes
ious. It
trives to
>leteness,
[oping to
iition, it
ipiration.
3t in the
tempt of
childish
d to the

ded with
ence, and
it private
a by tJue
character
Loticeable
than the
3 way to

nieet independence and wax in strength ; besides they have
their parents in a sense behind them : but parents possess
in their children the objective embodiment of their union

176. Marriage is only the direct form cf the ethical
idea, and has its objective reality in the inwardness of
subjective sentiment and feeling. In this is found its first
exposure to accident. Just as no one may be forced to
marry, so there must be no positive legal bond to hold
together persons, bet ween whom have arisen hostile thoughts
and acts. A third authority must, however, intervene to
hold intact the right of marriage and the right of the
ethical fabric against the inroads of mere opinion, and the
accidents of fleeting resolves. It must also distinguish
between the effervescence of feeling and total alienation,
and have proof of alienation before permitting divorce.

Addition.— As marriage rests only upon a subjective
sentiment which is liable to change, it may be dissolved,
ihe state, on the contrary, is not subject to division, since
It rests upon the law. Marriage should be indissoluble,
but this desirable state of things remains a mere moral
command. Yet, since marriage is ethical, it canuot be
dissolved at random, but only by a constituted ethical
authority, be it the church or the law. If total alienation
has taken place on account of adultery, for example, then
the religious authority also must sanction divorce.

177. The ethical or social dismemberment of the family
occurs when the children have grown to be free per-
sonalities. They are recognized as legal persons, when
they have attained their majority. They are then capable
both of possessing free property of their own and of found-
mg their own families, sons as heads of the family, and
daughters as wives. In the new family the founders have
now their substantive office, in contrast with which the
hrst family must occupy a subordinate place as mere basis
and point of departure. The family stock is an abstrac-
tion which has no rights.

180

Till-: piiiLosornv of lur.iir.

178. The natural disruptiou of tho family by tlio death
of tlie parents, ospecaally of tho husband, necessitates in-
heritance of the family means. Inheritance is tho entering
into peculiar possession of the store that is in itself
common. The terms of inheritance dt^pend on deforce of
relation and on the extent of the dispersion throughout
the community of the individuals and families, who have
broken away from the oriujinal faiaily and become inde-
jiendent. Hence inheritance is indefinite in proi)ortion to
the loss of the sense of unity, since every marriajjje is thc!
renunciation of former connec^tions, and tho founding of a
new independent family.

Note, — It has been supposed that on the occasion of a
death a fortune loses its ownt>r, and falls to him who first
gets possessivin of it. Actual possession, however, so tlie
8U})i)osition runs, is generally made by relatives, since they
are usually in the immediate neighbourhood of the de-
ceased. Hence what customarily happens, is, for the sake
of order, raised by positive law into a rule. This theory is
little more than a whim, and altogether overlooks the
nature of the family relation.

179. Through the dismemberment of the family by
death there is afforded free scope for the cai)ricious fancy
of the testatc»r, who nuiy bestow his means in accordance;
with his personal likings, opinions, and ends. He may
leave his ])osse8sions to friends and acquaintances instead
of to the family, adopting the legal nu)de of bequest by
embodying his declaration in a will.

Noti'. — Into the formation of a circle of friends by a
bequest, which is authorized by ethical observance, there
outers, os]>ecially in the case of wills, so much of arbitniri-
uess, wilfulness, and selfishness, that the ethical clement
becomes extremely shadowy. Indeed the h>gal permissicm
to be arbitrary in drawing up a will is rather the cause of
injury to ethical institutions and, also, of underhand
exertions and servility, it occasions and j ustifics the absurd

THK FAMILY.

181

and ever malign desire to link to .so-called benefactions
and bequests of property, which in any case ceases at
death to be mine, conditions that are vain and vexatious.

180. The pnnciple that the members of a family become
ind<.pendent legal j.ersons (§ 177) allows something of
capricious discrimination with regard to the natural heirs
to enter ins.de even the family circle. But this discrimi-
nation is greatly limited in order not to injure the funda.
mental relation of the family.

Note.~Tho. simple direct freedom of c^ioice of the
deceased cannot be construed as the principle at the basis
of the right to make a will. More particularly is this the
case If this wilfulness is opposed to the substantive right

would be the chiet reason for c-arrying out after his death
luH wayward behest. Such a will contains nothing so
wor hy of respect as the family right. Formerly the
validity of a last will and testament lay only in its arbi-
rary recognition of others. This validity can be conc-eded
to a t<.8tamentary disposition only when the family rela-
tioij. 1.1 which it would otherwise be absorbed, is weak and ,
nieftective But to ignore the province of the family i
rela ion when it is real and present, is unethical; and it,'
would also wcaia-n its inlierent ethic-al value to exteirdthe'
boundaries of a testator's caprice.

The harsh and unethical Koman law makes unlimited
vai>nce inside the family the <1.icf principle of succession.
In accordance with this law the son could be sold by the
lather, and would, if freed, again come under liis fatiier's
power. Only after being freed from slaverv the third
tnne, was he really free. According to f hese laws the son
d d not ,/e,„n> come of age, and was not a legal person.
Only what he took in war. pecdunn ra.fren.e, was he

i leed, pnnsed out of his father's power, he did not
inherit along with those, who had remained in family

182

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

servitude, except hy the insertion of a special clause in the
will. Similarly, the wife, in so far as she had entered
marriage not as a slave, in wanuni conveniret, in niancipio
esaet, but as a matron, did not so much belong to the
family, which had by her marriage been established, and
was actually hers, as to the family of her birth. Hence
she was excluded from inheriting wealth, which belonged
to what was really her own family. Though wife and
mother she was disinherited.

It has already been observed (§ 3, note) that, as the
feeling of rationality developed, efforts were made to escape
from the unethical elements of thesf I other laws. The
expression bonorvm possessio, which, as every learned jiirist
knows, is to be distinguished from possessio honorum, was
drawn into service by the judges instead of hereditas,
through the employment of a legal fiction, by means of
which a^//a was changed by a second baptism into afiUus.
It thus sometimes became the sad necessity of tlie judges
slyly to smuggle in the reasonable as an offset to bad laws.
Hence, the most important institutions became pitifully
unstable, and evils arose, which necessitated in turn a
tumultuous mass of counter legislation.

The unethical results, flowing from the right of free
choice allowed bv Roman law to testators, are well known
from history and from the descriptions of Luciau and
others. As to marriage it is a direct and simple ethical
relation, and implies a mingling of what is substantive
with natural contingency and inner caprice. By making
children slaves, and by kindred regulations, conspicuously
by ready and easy divorce, preference is openly conceded to
wilfulness over the right of the substantive ethical fact-
Thus Cicero himself, who, in his *' Officiis " and other
works has written many a fine thing about the Honcsfiim
and Decor II in, devised the scheme of sending away his wife
in order that he might witn a second wife get a sufficient
dowry to pay his debts. When such things occur, a way

!■

THE FAMILY.

183

IS paved by the law for the ruin of morals ; or rather the
laws are the necessary product of this ruin and decay.

The institution of heirs-at-law is introduced in order to
preserve the glory of the family stock. It makes use of
substitutions and family trusts by excluding from the in-
heritance the daughters in favour of the sons, or the rest
of the family in favour of the eldest son, or bv sanctioning
some other inequality. By it injustice is done to the
prmciple of freedom of property (§ 62). Besides, it rests
upon an arbitrary will, which has absolutely no right to
be recognized, since it aims to preserve a particular stock
or house rather than a particular family. But the family,
and not the stock or house is the idea, which has the right
to be preserved. Moreover, the ethical fabric is as likely
to be maintained by the free disposal of property and
equality of succession, as family trees are to be preserved
by an opposite course.

In institutions like the Eoman the right of marriage
(§ 172) is everywhere misinterpreted. Marriage is the
complete founding of a new and actual family, in contrast
with which the family, as the stlrps or gens is called, is an
abstraction, becoming, as the generations pass by, ever
more shadowy and unreal (§ 177). Love, the ethical
element in marriage, is a feeling for real i)resont indi-
viduals, and not for an abstraction. It is shown further
on (§ 356) that the world-historical })rincii>Ie of the Roman
empire is an abstraction of the understanding. It is also
shown further on (§ 306) that the higher political sphere
introduces a right of primogeniture and an inalienable
family fortune, based, however, not on an arbitrary act of
will, but on the necessary idea of the state.

Additum.—AmouiTst the Romans in earlier times a
father could disinherit his children, and even put them
to death. Afterwards neither of these acts was allowed.
Efforts were made to bring both the unethical and also the
illogical attempt to make it ethical into one system, the

li'i

184

THK PHILOSOPHY OF RKniT,

roti'iition of wliicli constitut^'s tlio difficulty and woiilvnoss
of our law of iuhcritanco. Wills may certainly bo per-
mitted, but in thom should i>rovail the idea that tho rif^'hl
of arbitrary do(nsii)n grows only with tho dispersion and
separation of the members of tho family. Tho KO-(;allod
family of friendship, which bequest brings into existence,
should appear only when there ar(> no children or near
relatives. Something offensive and disagreeable is a,s8o-
ciated with tcstanumtary dispositions generally. In them
I reveal those to whom I have indinatiim. But infilination
is arbitrary, can be obtained surreptitioiisly, and is allied to
whim and fancy. It nniy even b(> recpiired in a will that an
(\Ji^^^,x.t.,:^^ '»<*"' shall subject himself to the great<>st indignities. In
/ ^ England, where they are given to riding all sorts of hobbies.
*^- »i» intinite number of absurdities are attached to wills.

Traiiitition of the Fainihj info the Civic Coinmuuity.

IHl. In a natural way and essentially through tlie
princijile of personality, the family separates into a number
of families, which then exist as independent concrete
persons, and are therefore related externally to one another.
The elements bound up in the unity of the family, which
is the social idea still in the form of tho conception, must
now be released from the conception and giv(>u inde])en-
dent reality. This is the stage of difference. Here, at th«!
outset, to use abstract ex])ressions, we have the determina-
tion of particularity, which is nevertheless in relation to
universality. The universal is, in fact, the basis, which is,
however, as yet only internal, and therefore exists in the
particular only foinially, and in it is manifested externally.
Hence in this relaticm occasioned by reflection the ethical
is, as it were, lost ; or rather since it, as essence, of neces-
sity appears or is manifested, it occurs in its phenomenal
form. This is the civic community.

Note.— The extension of the familv or the transition of

TIIK CIVIC, COMMITNn'V. Jg^

it into .mother principk, l.as i„ tlio actual wi.rld two
phasoH. It i« on one side the poacefnl expansion of
tho lam.ly into a people or nation, whose e<.mj>onent parts
have a <u>mn.on natural orijrin. On the other side it is the
(•ollection of scattered groups of families l.y suj.erior forc(.
or It 18 their voluntary asso.dation, in order to satisfy by
i;o.oi)eration their eomrnon wants. '

^.Mt7/or,._Univer8aIity has hen. a point of outlet in the
.ndependenee of particularity. At this point the ethical
app;..ir8 ,> be lost. ConsciousncHs finds in the identity of
the fanuly what is j.roperly its first divine and obligatory
pnncip 0. But now Ihere ap,,ears a relation, iu which the
particular is to be the prime factor in determining my (.on-
duct Ihus the ethical seems to bo discarded and super-
sodod. But in this view I am really in error, for, while I
believe myself to be retaining the i)articular, the universal
and also the necessity of social unity still remain for me
tundamental and essential. Besides, I am at the stage of
appearance, and although my particular nature remains for
•ne the determining fa.tor and en<l, I serve in this way the
tmiversal, which do(.s not relax its own si,ecial hold
of me. ^

SECOND SECTION.
The Civic Community.

18^. The concrete person, who as particilar is an end to
himself, IS a totality of wants and a mixt,ire of necessity
and caprice. As such he is one of the principles of
the CIVIC community. But the particular i,erson is essen-
tially c<mnected with others. Hence each establishes and
satisfies himself by means of others, and so must call in
the assistance of the form of universality. This univer
aal.ty IS the other principle of the civic (.)mmuiTity

Addihon.~T:iK^ civic community is the realm of dif-
torenco, intermediate between the family and the state

180

Till'] PIIILOSOPIIV OF llKillT,

s Ijl

althouj:^h its constriu'tion followed in point of timo the con-
Htructioii of tlie state. It, as tlio difference, must presup-
pose the state. On the self-dependent state it must roly
for its stibsisteuee. Further, the creation of the civic com-
munity helon^'s to the modern world which alone lias jier-
mitted every element of the idea to receive its due. When
the state is represented as a union of different persons, that
is, a unity which is merely a community, it is only the civic
community which is meant. Many modern teachers of
political science have not been able to develop any other
view of the state. In this society every one is an end
to himself ; all others are for him nothinf?. And yet with-
out cominu: into relation with others he cannot realize his
ends. Hence to each particular person others are a means
to the attainment of his end. But the particular ]>urpose
j?ives itself throufj,h reference to others the form of univer-
sality, andjii satisfying itself accomplishes at the same
time the well-being of others. Since particularity is bound
up with the condititming universal, the joint whole is the
ground of adjustment or mediation, upon which all in-
dividualiti(>s, all talents, all accidents of birth or fortune
disport themselves. Here the fountains of all the passions
are let loose, being merely governed by the sun of reason.
Particularity limited by imiversality is the only standard
to which the particular person conforms in promoting his
well-being.

188. Tht» self-seeking end is conditioned in its realization
by the universal. Hence is formed a system of mutual de-
pendence, a system which interweaves the stibsistence,
happiness, and rights of the individual with the subsistence,
happiness, and right of all. The general right and well-
being form the basis of the individual's right and well-
being, which only by this connection receives actuality and
security. Tliis system we may in the first instance call the
external state, the state which satisfies (me's needs, and
meets the requinunents of the understanding.

TMK CIVIC COMMUNITY.

187

184, When tlio idea is tlitis at variance with it8(af,
it imparts to tlio pliases of the peculiarly individual life,
i,e., to particularity, the rif?ht to develop and publish
themselves on all sides, and to universality it eon<!edes the
rif^ht to evince; itself as the foundation and necessary form,
overruling' power and final end of the particular. In this
system the ethical order is lost in its own extremes. It is
a system characterized hy external ai)pearance and C(m.
stituted hy the abstratit side of the reality of the idea. In
it the idea is found only as relative totality, and inner
necessity.

AdiUHon.~Tho direct unity of tin; family is here broken
up into a multiplicity, and the ethical' is lost in its
extremes. Reality is at this sta^'e externality, involving
the dissolution of th(! conception, the liberation and inde-
pendence of its reaJized elements. Althou^'li in the civic
community parti(Milar and universal fall apart, they are
none the less mutually connected and conditioned. While
the one seems to be just tlu! oi)po8ite of the other, and is
supposed to be able to exist only by keeping the other
at arm's length, each nevertheless has the other as a condi-
tion. Thus most i)eople, for example, regard th(> i)ayment
of taxes as injuring their parti(!ularity, and as op])()singand
crippling their plans. True as this may seem to be, the
particular i)urpose cannot be carried out apart fn^m the
universal. A land, in which no taxes were paid, would
not be aUowed to distinguish itself for the strength of its
individuals. In the same way it might api)ear as if it
would be better for the universal to draw to itself the
resources of the individual, and become a society such
as was delineated by Plato in his "Eepublic." But this,
too, is only a mere ai)pearance, since both elements exist
only through and for each other, and are wraj.ped u].
in each other. When I promote my end, I i)romote
th(> universal, and the universal in turn promotes my
end.

188

Tin.: PHILOSOPHY of right,

185. When independent particularity gives free rein
to the satisfaction of want, caprice, and subjective liking
It destroys in its extravagance both itself and its substantive
conception. On the other hand the satisfaction whether of
necessary or of contingent want is contingent, since it con-
tains no inherent limit, and is wholly dependent on ex-
J ternal chance, caprice, and the power of the universal In
j these conflicts and complexities the civic community
I aftords a spectacle of excess, misery, and physical and
; social corruption.

Note.~The independent development of particularity

(compare § 124, note), is the element which was revealed

in the ancient states as an inflow of immorality causino-

ultimately their decay. These states, founded as they

were partly upon a^triarchal and religious principle

partly upon a spiritual though simple ethical life, and

originating in general in native intuitions, could not with-

stand the disunion and infinite reflection involved in self

consciousness. Hence, so soon as reflection arose the

state succumbed, first in sentiment and then in fact Its

as yet simple principle lacked the truly infinite power

implied in a unity, which permits the opposition to reason

to explode with all its force. In this way it would rise

superior to the opposition, preserve itself in it, and take it

into itself.

Plato in his "Eepublic" represents the substantive
ethical life in its ideal beauty and truth. But with the
principle of independent particularity, which broke in upon
Greek ethical life at his time, he could do nothing except
to oppose to it his '• Republic," which is simply substantive.
Hence he excluded even the earliest form of subjectivity as
It exists in private property (§ 46, note) and the family, and
also m Its more expanded form as private liberty and
choice of profession. It is this defect, which prevents the
large and substantive truth of the " Republic " from being
understood, and gives rise to the generally accepted view

TIIK CIVIC COMMUMTV.

189

that It IS a mere dream of abstract thought, or what we are
used to calling an ideal. In the merely substantive form
of the actual spirit, as it appears in Plato, the principle of
self-dependent and in itself infinite personality of the indi-
vidual, the pnnciple of subjective freedom does not receive
Its due. This principle on its inner side issues in the
Christian religion, aud on its outer side in the Roman
world, where it was combined with abstract universality
It is historically later than the Greek world. So, too, the
philosophic reflection, which fathoms the depth of 'this
principle, is later than the substantive idea found in Greek
thought.

^rfrfi^w^i.— Particularity, taken abstractly, is measureless
in Its excess, and the forms of excess are likewise measure-
less. A man's appetites, which are not a closed circle like
the instinct of the animal, are widened by picture-thought _
and reflection. He may carry appetite even to the spurious (
mfimte. But on the other side privation and want are '
also measureless. The confusion, due to the collision of
appetite and privation, can only be set to rights by the
state. If the Platonic state excludes particularity, no hope
can be held out to it, as it contradicts the infinite right of
the idea to allow to particularity its freedom. In the
Christian religion, the right of subjects and also the
existence, which is self-referring and self-dependent, have
received a marked expansion. And at the same time the
whole is sufficiently strong to establish harmony between
particularity and the ethical unity.

186. But the princii)le of particularity develops of its
own accord into a totality, and thus goes over into uni-
versality. In this universality it has its truth and its
right to positive realization. Smce at the standpoint of
dualism, which we now occupy (§ 184), the principles of
particularity and universality are independent, their unity
is not an ethical identitv. It does not exist as freedom,
but as a necessity. That is to say the particular has to

190

Till': PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

raise itself to the foriii of universality, and in it it has to
seek and find its subsistence.

187. Individuals in the civic community are private
persons, who pursue their own interests. As these interests
are occasioned by the universal, which appears as a means,
they can be obtained only in so far as individuals in their
desire, will, and conduct, conform to the universal, and
become a link in the chain of the whole. The^ interest of
: *ke_i<lea as such does not, it is true, lie in the consciousness
of the citizens ; yet it is not wholly wanting. It is found
in the process, by means of which the individual, through
necessity of nature and the caprice of his wants, seeks to
raise his individual natural existence into formal freedom
and the formal universality of knowing and willing. Thus,
without departing from its particular nature, the indi-
vidual's character is enlarged.v^

Note.— The view that civilization is an external and
degenerate form of life is allied to the idea that the natural
condition of uncivilized peoples is one of unsophisticated
innocence. So also the view that civilization is a mere
means for the satisfaction of one's needs, and for the
enjoyment and comfort of one's particular life, takes for
granted that these selfish ends are absolute. Both theories
manifest ignorance of the nature of spirit and the end of
reason. Spirit is real only when by its own motion it
divides itself, gives itself limit and finitude in the natural
needs and the region of external necessity, and then, by
moulding and shaping itself in them, overcomes them, and
secures for itself an objective embodiment. The rational
end, therefore, is neither the simplicity of nature nor the
enjoyments resulting from civilization through the develop-
ment of particularity. If rather works away from the
condition of simple nature, in which there is either no self
or a crude state of consciousness and will, and transcends
the naive individuality, in which spirit is submerged. Its
externality thus in the first instance receives the rationalitv

y f

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

191

of which it is capable, namely, the form of universality
characteristic of the understanding. Onlv in this way is
spirit at home and with itself in this externality as such.
Hence in it the freedom of spirit is realized. Spirit,
becoming actualized in an element, which of itself was'
foreign to its free character, has to do only with what is
produced by itself and bears its own impress.— In this way
the form of universality comes into independent existence
in thought, a form which is the only worthy element for
the existence of the idea.

Culture or education is, as we may thus conclude, in
its ultimate sense a liberation, and that of a high kind.
Its task is to make possible the infinitely subjective sub-
stantiality of the ethical life. In the process we pass
upwards from the direct and natural existence to what is
spiritual and has the form of the universal— In the indi-
vidual agent this liberation involves a struggle against
mere subjectivity, immediate desire, subjective vanity and
capricious liking. The hardness of the task is in part the
cause of the disfavour under which it falls. None the less
is it through the labour of education that the subjective
will Itself wins possession of the objectivity, in which alone
it is able and worthy to be the embodiment of the idea.—
At the same time the form of universalitv, into which
particularity has moulded itself and worked itself up, gives
rise to that general principle of the understanding in
accordance with which the particular passes upward into
the true, independent existence of the individual. And
since the particular gives to the universal its adequate
content and unconditioned self-direction, it even in the
ethical sphere is infinitely independent and free subjectivity.
Education is thus proved to be an inherent element of the
absolute, and is shown to have infinite value.

Addition.— Yife call those men educated or cultured, who
can perform all that others do without exhibiting any
oddities of behaviour. Uneducated men thrust their

192

TIIK PIIILOSOPIIY OF RIGHT.

eccentricities upon your notice, and do not act according
to the universal qualities of the object. It easily happens
that the uneducated man wounds the feelings of others,
since he lets himself go, and does not trouble himself about
their sensibilities. Not that he desires to injure them at
all, but his conduct is not in unison with his will. Educa-
li55_refines particularity, and enables it to conduct itself
m harmony with the nature of the object. True originality,
which creates its object, desires true culture, while untrue
originality adopts insipidities, which are characteristic of a
lack of culture. ^

188. The civic community contains three elements :

A. The recasting of want, and the satisfaction of the
individual through his work, through the work of all
others, and through the satisfaction of their wants. This
is a system of wants.

B. Actualization of the general freedom required for
this, i.e., the protection of property by the administration
of justice.

C. Provision against possible mischances, and care for
the particular interest as a common interest, by means of
police and the corporation.

A. The System of Wants.

189. The particularity, which is in the first instance
opposed to the universal will (§ 60), is subjective want.
It gets objectivity, i.e., is satisfied (a), through external
objects, which are at this stage the property of otliers, and
the product of their needs and wills, and (/3) through
active labour, as connecting link between subjective and
objective. Labour has as its aim to satisfy subjective
particularity. Yet by the introduction of the needs and
free choice of others universality is realized. Hence
rationality comes as an appeai-ance into the sphere of the
finite. This partial presence of rationality is the under-

THE CIVIC COMMTOITV. I93

Standing to which is assigned the function of reconciling
the opposing elements of the finite sphere '""""^'""e

^»fe.-It is the task of political science, which originates
at this point, to detect the law, governing the movement o
the masses ,n the intricn.^ of their qualiLive and Tuanti

modern times Its development reveals the interestimr
process by which thought (see Smith, Say, B clrZ
examines the infinite mnltitude of particuiars ly n"i
It and exposes their simple, active, regulating prrncTples
These principles belong to the understanding As oT he
one side the principle of reconciliation involves a recogli!
tion of the external presence or appearance in the sXrtrf
want of the reason which is active n the oWect so o„ th.
exact contrarv is this also tl.. 1. • ',' ^°- ">" the
.*„ 1- ..7'. '"''° '"« sphere m whch the under

standing with its subjective aims and moral opinions let
loose Its discontent and moral vexation
^A(.(;o„. It depends altogether on accident how such

to be satisfied. The soil is more fertile in one place than
ano her; years differ in their yield, one man is dS. enT
while another is lazy. But this swam of arbitrar7 hing '
begets universal features, and what appears to be purrab
straction and absence of thought becomes bound bv a
necessity which enters of itself. To discover the element
of necessity is the object of political science, a science w"kh

action Of the irTnVLtlnr t tr^l^.-t.-
group themselves influence others, and inturnreete
from them help or hindrance. So remarkable is this Z
pre tatioi. of tacts in a sphere, where everything seems to be

p^rrTeliS "it'"'' "^1'/' '^ '"•>"-'-'• *^* "^"o
passes belief. It resembles the planets, which though to

the eye always complex and irregular in their movements
are yet governed by ascertained laws. »™ments,

194

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

ULCt

c.«^

y •v* *^^

iJL.-t4_-

(a) Want and its Satisfaction.

^ 190. The animal has a limited range of ways and means
for satisfying his limited wants. Man in his dependence
proves his universality and his ability to become indepen-
dent, firstly, by multiplying his wants and means, and,
secondly, by dissecting the concrete want into parts. The
parts then become other wants, and through being special-
ized are more abstract than the first.

Note. — The object is in right a person, in morals a sub-
ject, in the family a member, in the city generally a
burgher (bourgeois) ; and here, at the standpoint of want
(§ 123, note), he is the concrete product of picture-thought
which we call man. Here, and properly only here, is it
that we first speak of man in this sense.

Addition. — The animal is particular in its being, having
instinct, and a strictly limited means of satisfaction. Some
insects are confined to a certain kind of plant; other
animals have a wider circle and can inhabit different
climates, but still their range is limited in contrast with
that of man. Man's need of shelter and clothing, his
having to destroy the natural form of food, and adapt it
by cooking to his changed taste, give him less aplomb than
the animal. Indeed, as spirit, he ought to have less. The
understanding, with its grasp of differences, brings multi-
plicity into wants: and, when taste and utility become
criteria of judgment, they change even the wants them-
selves. It is in tlie end not the appetite, but the opinion
which has to be satisfied. It is the province of education
or culture to dissect the concrete need into its elements.
When wants are multiplied, the mere appetites are re-
stricted ; for, when man uses many things, the propulsion
to any one of them is not so strong, a sign that the force
of physical need in general is diminished.

191. The means for satisfying the specialized wants are
similarly divided and increased. These means become in

Pi!

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY. 195

their turn relative ends and abstract wants. Hence the
mut.pheat,on expands into an infinite series of distinctions
with regard to these phases, and of jndgn.ents concern ng
the snitabihty of the means to their ends. This is re
nnement. ^

Addition.~Wh^t the English call "comfortable" is
comS? '1 r^ ^.-^^-"«tible. Every cond^.tion of
comfort reveals m turn xts discomfort, and these discoveries
go on for ever Hence the new want is not so much a want
ot those who have it directly, but is created by those who
hope to make profit from it.

192. The satisfaction of want and the attainment of means
thereto become a realized possibility for others, through
whose wants and labour satisfaction is in turn coiditione'd

m nf ATo T; r'"''^ '^"^^"^^ " "i^'^^^y «f --«ts and
means (§191) helps to determine the mutual relation of
individuals This general recognition of others is the
element which nuikes the isolated abstract wants and
means concrete and social.

Addition.~Throush the compulsion I am under to

fashion myself according to others arises the form of

universality. I acquire from others the means of satisfac

tion, and must accordingly fall in with their opinions. At

he same time I am compelled to produce the means for

other and the two are interdependent. Everything parti-
cular becomes in this way social. In the matter of dress
time of eating, etc.. we follow convention, because it is not'
worth while exercising our insight and judgment. He L
the most prudent who does as others do.

193. The social element is a special instrument both of
the simple acquisition of the means, and also of the re-
duphc-ation o the ways by which want is satisfied. Fu her
It contains directly the claim of equality with othe s

others, and also the desire of each person to be unique.

196

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

become real soui'ces of the multiplication and extension of
wants.

194. Social want joins the direct or natural want with
the .spiritual want due to picture-thinking ; but the si^iritual
or universal factor outweighs the other. The social element
brings a liberation, by which the stringent necessity of
nature is turned aside, and man is determined by his own
universal opinion. He makes his own necessity. He has
arbitrary choice, being in contact with a contingency which
is not external but internal.

Note. — It has been held that man as to want is free in a
so-called state of nature, in which he has only the so-called
simple wants of nature, requiring for their satisfaction
merely the means furnished directly and at random by
nature. In this view no account is taken of the freedom
which lies in work, of which more hereafter. Such a view
is not true, because in natural want and its direct satisfac-
tion the spiritual is submerged by mere nature. Hence, a
state of nature is a state of savagery and slavery. Freedom
is nowhere to be found except in the return of spirit and
thought to itself, a i)rocess by which it distinguishes itself
from the natural and turns back upon it.

195. This liberation is formal, since the particular side
of the end remains the fundamental content. The ten-
dency of the social condition indefinitely to increase and
specialize wants, means, and enjoyments, and to distinguish
natural from unrefined wants, luis no limits. Hence arises
luxury , in which the augmentation of dependence and dis-
tress is in its nature infinite. It operates upon an infinitely
unyielding material, namely, an external means, which has
the special cpiality of being the possession of the free will.
Hence it meets with the most obdurate resistance.

Additio7i. — Diogenes in his completely cynical character
is pi'operly only a i)roduct of Athenian social life. That
whidi gave birth to him was the ])ublic opinit)n, against,
which his behaviour was directed. His wav of life

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

197

(

was therefore not independent, but occasioned by his social

XZeX '' ""'' '''''' ^" ""^^^^^^^ Product'of rx^:;^
Wherever luxury is extreme, there also prevail distress

obiter' '""''"' '- ^-^-^ ^' ^^^-

(h) Labour.

dZf^r^" '"^''"™"* «»■• P'«P^ri°8 and acquiring spe.
cahzed means adequate to specialized wants is labour By
abour the material, directly handed over by natu^ for
these numerous ends, is speciahzed in a varfety of ways
Th s fashmnmg of the material gives to the means vaTue
andjurcose so.that in consumption it is chiefly human
products and human effort that ore used up

AMiUon.-^The direct material, which requires no work-

..g up, ,s small. Even air must be acquired, since H has 1

to be made warm. Perhaps w^ter is the only thhu whtl '

nan can use, simply as it is. Human sweat and toU w n '

i»?. Irammg on its theoretical side is developed bv the
great var.ety of objects and interests, and consilnot'ol
n a mberless ,,,cture-tl,„„ghts and items of knowledge

arertnesVin": "' "f """""*'' "' "-^'-a""". a menS
lertnes m passing tr,un one image, or idea, to another

and n, tl e apprehension „f intricate general relations ThU

.s the traunug of the understanding, with which ILlZ

;levelop„,cnt of language. Practica trai iilg „r tn'.it

>>y latour, consists in habitua.iou to an cmphn ,lTw i ,!

-at,sfles a sel ...aused want. Its action is li niW pX by

he mtu^ of the material, but chiefly by the dpr"^ of

otl e s. It u,vo Ives an habitual use „f skill acquired by

rract,ce and .mplying objective conditi,.ns ^

^rfrW;„„. The barbarian is lazy, and is .listinguished

.-..m the ,.,v,l,zed n,an by his brooding stupidily. Pra cll

a,„u,g co„s..t» in habitual en.ploy.nent Ld 'the n ^d "

"f .t. The unskilled workmau always „n.kes something

198

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

dUf'

different from what lie intended, because he is not master
of his own hands. A workman is skilled, who produces
what he intended, whose subjective action readily accords
with his purpose.

^t 198. The universal and objective in work is to be found
iji the abstraction which, giving rise to the specialization
of means and wants, causes the specialization also of pro-
duction. This is the division of labour. By it the labour
of the individual becomes more simple, his skill in his
abstract work greater, and the amount he produces larger.

_ The result of the abstraction of skill and means is that
men's interdependence and mutual relation is completed. It
becomes a thorough necessity. Moreover, the abstraction
of production causes work to be continually more me-
chanical, until it is at last possible for man to step out and
let the machine take his place.

199. Through the dependence and co-operation involved
in labour, subjective self-seeking is converted into a con-
tribution towards the satisfaction of the wants of all others.
The universal so penetrates the particular by its dialectic

j movement, that the individual, while acquiring, producing,
land enjoying for himself, at the same time produces and
I acquires for the enjoyment of others. This is a necessity,
and in this necessity arising out of mutual doiiendence is
contained the fact of a genei'al and permanent wealth
|(§ 170). In it each person may share by means of his
I education and skill. Each, too, is by it assured of subsist-
jeace, while the results of his labour preserve and increase
I the general wealth.

200. But particular wealth, or the possibility of sharing
in the general wealtli, is based partly on skill, ])artly on
something which is directly the individiml's own, namely,
capitah Skill in its turn depends on capital, and on many
accidental circumstances. These also in their manifold

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY. J 99

variety make more pronounced the differences in the de
velopment of natural endowments, physical and mentll
which were unequal to begin with. These differences are
consp , ,^ ^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^ particu arit"

They, along with other elements of chance and accident
necessanly produce inequalities of wealth and skill '

^ i^o^e.-^ature is the element of inequality. Yet' the ob
jective nght of particularity of spirit, contained in the idea
Itself does not in the civic community supersede the in

hiuXi7f'^ "r% ""'' ''' -traViti:::

inequality out of spirit and exalts it to an inequality of

:^:TerT' r' '^'"^^^''^ ^^^^ --^^ eduXn %o
oppose to the objective right a demand for equality is a

aTsILf " 7''' -n<l-tanding, which tak'e^ ts^ow^
ab tiaction and mandate to be real and reasonable. In
he sphere of particularity the universal images itself
forming with the particular merely a relative identity The
particular thus retains both the natural and the c ^riciou
pa .icularity, and also a remnant of the state of nature I
IS the reason immanent in the system of human wants and
then activi les which fashions this system into an orgai'e
wlmle, of which the differences are members. (See next
-01. The infinitely varied means and their infinitely

La«; "iT '7 1 "^^'"' ^^^-^^^^^^^^^ -^^ exchange a e
gatliered together by virtue of the universality inherent in

Ihe whole IS thus formed into particular systems of wants
moans and labour, ways and methods of 'satisfact oHnd

heore ical and practical training. Amongst these systems
the individuals are apportioned, and compose a cluste o
classes or estates. ^^usitr 01

Addition.~The manner of sharing in the general wealth
IS left to each particular individual, but the general differ

essential. The lamily is the first basis of the state, and
classes or estates are the second. This second is of con.

200

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

sequence because private persons, through self-seeking, are
compelled to turn themselves out towards others. This is
the link by which self-seeking is joined to the universal or
the state, whose care it must be to keep the connection
strong and steadfast.

202. Classes are, in terms of the conception, (a) the sub-
stantial or direct, (6) the reflecting or formal, and (c) the
universal.

203. (a) The wealth of the substantial class is contained
in natural products obtained by cultivation. The soil is
capable of being an exclusive, private possession, and
demands not merely the taking from it what it bears
naturally, but an objective working up. Since the returns
of labour depend on the seasons, and harvests are influenced
by variable weather and other natural conditions, provision
for wants must take account of the future. However,
owing to the natural conditions, this way of life involves
but little reflection, and is but slightly modified by sub-
jective volition. It therefore embodies in substantive feel-
ing an ethical life resting directly upon trust and the
family relation.

Note. — States are rightly said to come into existence
with the introduction of agriculture along with the intro-
duction of marriage. The principle of agricuP-.re involves
the cultivation of the soil, and therefore, also, private
ownership of property (compare § 170, note). It takes the
life of nomadic tribes back to the repose of private right
and to the secure satisfaction of wants. Joined also to
the agricultural life are the limitation of sexual love to
marriage, the extension of this bond to an enduring uni-
versal relation, the extension of want to family maintenance
and of possession to family wealth. Safety, protection by
fortification, and uninterrupted satisfaction of wants are
all commendable prima facie characteristics of these two
fundamental ethical institutions. They are forms of uni-
versality, or ways by which reason or the absolute end seeks

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

201

to realize itself. In this connection nothing can be more
interesting than the ingenious and learned explanations
which my much honoured friend, Mr.Creuzer. has given in
the fourth volume of his " Mythologie und Symbolik " with
regard to the agrarian festivals, images, and sanctuaries of
the ancients. In these customs and rites the introduction
ot agriculture and kindred institutions was known and
revered as a divine act.

From the side of private-right, especially the adminis-
tration of justice, and from the side of instruction, culture
and also of religion, the substantive character of this class
undergoes modifications. These modifications, however
are due to the development of reflection, and affect not the
substantive content but the form.-Thev occur also in the
other classes.

Addition.— In our time agriculture, losing some of its
naturalness, is managed in a reflective way like a factorv
and acquires the character of the second class. Yet it will
always retain much of the substantive feeling, which
pervades the patriarchal life. In it man accepts what is
given with a simple mind, thanks God for it, and lives in
the assurance that the goodness of God will continue
What he gets suffices him. and he uses it because it comes
again. This is the simple disposition unafliected by the
desire for wealth. It may be described as the type of the
old nobihty, who consumed simply what was there. In
tins class nature does the chief share of the work and
man's diligence is in comparison secondary. In the second
class the understanding is the essential factor, and the

mltlt] ^''"^"'*' '"'" "'^^'''"^''^ '""^'^^ ^' furnishing
204. (b) The business of the industrial class is to alter
the form of the products of nature. This class is indebted
for Its subsistence to its labour, to reflection, and also to
the interposition of the wants and labours of others For
that which It produces and enjoys it has to thank mainly

202

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

its own activity.— Its field of action is again divided into
three parts:— (i.) Labour for individual wants of the
more concrete kind, and at the request of particular
persons. This is manual labour, or the work of single
artisans, (ii.) The more abstract collective mass of labour,
which, is also for particular needs but due to a general
demand. This is manufac_ture. (iii.) Business of exchange,
by which one special means of subsistence is given for
others, chiefly through money, the general medium of
exchange, in which is realized the abstract value of all
merchandise. Thisjs commerce.

Addition. — The individual in the industrial class is re-
ferred to himself, and this self-reference is intimately con-
nected with the demand for a legal status. Consequently
the sense for freedom and order has mainly arisen in
cities. The first class needs to think little about itself.
What it acquires is the gift of a stranger, nature. With
it the feeling of dependence is primary. With this feeling
1 easily associated a willingness to submit to whatever
occurs. The first class is therefore more inclined to sub-
jection, the second to freedom.

205 (c) The business of the universal class is with the
universal interests of society. Hence it must be relieved
of the direct task of providing for itself. It must possess
private means, or receive an allowance from the state,
which claims his activity. His private interest may thus
find satisfaction in his labour for the universal.

206. A class is a particularity which has become objec-
tive, and the foregoing are the general divisions in accor-
dance with the conception. Yet capacity, birth, and other
circumstances have their influence in determining to what
class an individual shall belong. But the final and
essential factor in the case is subjective opinion and private
freedom of choice. In this sphere free choice has its right,
honour, and dignity. If a thing happens in this sphere
according to internal necessity, it is ipso facto occasioned

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

203

by free arbitrary choice, and for the subjective conscious-
ness bears the stamp of its will.

Note.— In reference to the principle of particularity or
subjective caprice may be clearly discerned the difference
between the political life of the East and that of the West,
between the ancient and the modern world. In the ancient
world the division of the whole into classes was produced
objectively of itself, because it is implicitly rational. But
the principle of subjectivity does not receive its due, since
the separation of individuals into classes is either a func-
tion of the rulers, as in Plato's " Eepublic " (Rep. iii. 120),
or else it rests upon mere birth, as in the caste system of
India. Now subjective particularity is an essential element
of communal life, and, when it is not taken up into the
organization of the whole and reconciled in the whole, it
must prove a hostile force and pave the way for the ruin
of the social order (see § 185, note). It either overturns
society, as was the case in the Greek states and the
Roman republic, or, when the existing order is able to
preserve itself by force or by religious authority, it then
manifests itself as internal corruption and complete degra-
dation. This happened in a measure amongst the Lace-
demonians, and now is completely the case with the in-
habitants of India.

But when subjective particularity is welcomed by ob-
jective order, and given its rights and place, it becomes
the animating principle of the civic community, stimulates
thought and promotes merit and honour. The recognition
of the claim that whatever in the civic community and the
state is rationally necessary should occur through subjec-
tive free choice is a fuller definition of the popular idea of
freedom (§ 121).

207. The particularity of the individual becomes de-
finitely and actually realized, only by his limiting himself
exclusively to one of the particular spheres of want. In
this system the ethical sense is that of rectitude or class-

204

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

honour. It involves the decision of the individual by
means of his own native activity, diligence, and skill to
make himself a member of one of these classes, preserve
himself in it, and provide for himself only through the
instrumentality of the universal. He should acknowledge
this position, and also claim to have it recognized by
others.— Morality has its peculiar place in this sphere,
where the ruling factor is reflection upon one's action, or
consideration of the end involved in particular wants and
in well-being. Here also the element of chance in satisfy-
ing these ends makes random and individual assistance a
duty.

Note. — Youth is specially apt to struggle against the
proposal that it should decide upon a particular vocation,
on the ground that any decision is a limitation of its
universal scope aud a mere external necessity. This aloof-
ness is a product of the abstract thinking, which clings to
the universal and unreal. It fails to recognize that the
conception must experience a division into conception and
its reality, if it is to have a definite and particular realiza-
tion (§ 7), and to win for itself reality and ethical
objectivity.

Addition. — By the sentence that a man must be something
we understand that he must belong to a definite class ; for
this something signifies a substantive reality. A human
being without a vocation is a mere private person, who
has no place in any real universal. Still, the individual in
his exclusiveness may regard himself as the universal, and
may fancy that when he takes a trade or profession, he is
sinking to a lower plane. That is the false notion that a
thing, when it attains the realization which properly
belongs to it, limits itself and gives up its independence.

208. The principle of the system of wants, namely the
particularity of knowing and willing, contains absolute
universality, or the universality of freedom, only in the
abstract form of right of property. But here right is no

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

205

longer merely implicit, but is found in valid reality as
protection of property through the administration of
.lustice. I

^. Administration of Justice.
209. The relative principle of the mutual exchange of
wants and labour for their satisfaction has in the first
instance its return into itself in the infinite jjersonality
generally, i.e., in abstract right. Yet it is the very sphere
of the relative which in the form of education gives em-
bodiment to right, by fixing it as something universally
acknowledged, known, and willed. The relative also, through
the interposition of knowledge and will, supplies right with
validity and objective actuality.

JV^o^e.— It is the essence of education and of thought,
which is the consciousness of the individual in universal
form, that the I should be apprehended as a universal person,
in whom all are identical. Man must be accounted a uni-
versal being, not because he is a Jew, Catholic, Protestant,
(xerman, or Italian, but because he is a man. This think-
ing or reflective consciousness, is of infinite importance.
It is defective only when it plumes itself upon being
cosmopolitan, in opposition to the concrete life of the
citizen.

Addition.— From one point of view it is by means of the
system of particularity that right becomes externally
necessary as protection of individuals. Although right
proceeds out of the conception, it enters into being only
because it is serviceable for wants. To have the thought
of right, one must be educated to the stage of thinking,
and not linger in the region of the merely sensible. We
must adapt the form of universality to the objects, and
direct the will according to a universal principle. Only after
man has found out for himself many wants, the acquisition
of which is an inseparable element of his satisfaction, is he
able to frame laws.

206

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

210. The objective actuality of right consists partly in
existing for consciousness, or more generally in its being
known, and partly in having, and being generally recog-
nized as having, the validity and force of a reality.

(a) Right as Law.

211, What is in essence right becomes in its objective
concrete existence constituted,' that is, made definite for
consciousness through thought. It, having right and
validity, is so recognized, and becomes law.' Eight in this
characterization of it is positive right in general.

Note. — To constitute something as universal, i.e., to bring
it as iiniversal to consciousness, is to think (§13, note, and
§ 21, 7iote). The content in thus being brought back to
its simplest form is <given its final mould. Only when
what is right becomes law does it receive not merely the
form of universahty, but its own truest character. It is to
select only one phase of law, if we consider it merely as a
valid rule of conduct imposed upon all. Preceding this
feature is the internal and essential element of law, namely,
the recognition of the content in its definite universality.
Even the rights of custom exist as thought and are known.
Animals have law in the form of instinct ; man alone has
law in the form of custom. The difference between custom
and law consists merely in this, that customs are known in
a subjective and accidental way, and hence are in their
actual form more indefinite than laws. In custom, the
universality of thought is more obscured, and the know-
ledge of right is a partial and accidental possession of a
few. The idea that customs rather than laws should pass
over into life is a deception, because the valid laws of a
nation, when written and collected, do not cease to be
customs. People speak nowadays, indeed, most of all of
life and of things passing over into life, when they are

Gesetzt.

* Gesetz.

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

207

conversant with nothing but the deadest material and the
deadest thoughts. When customs come to be collected
and grouped, as takes place with every people which reaches
a certain grade of civilization, there is formed a statute- n
book. It IS somewhat difPerent from a statute-book properly f!
so-called. A collection is formless, indefinite, and frag-1
mentary, whereas a real statute-book apprehends and ex-''
presses in terms of thought the principles of law in their '
universality. England's land-law or common law is, as is '
well known, made up both of statutes, having the forms of
laws, and of so-called unwritten laws. However, this un-
written law is written with a vengeance, and a knowledge
of It IS possible only by reading the many quartos which it
tills. The monstrous confusion which prevails in that
country, both in the administration of justice and in the
subject-matter of the law, is graphically portrayed by
those who are acquainted with the facts. They specially
notice that, since the unwritten law is contained in the
decisions of law-courts and judges, the judges are con-
tinually the lawgivers. Further, the judges are both
directed and not directed to the authority of their pre-
decessors. They are so directed, because their predecessors
are said to have done nothing but interpret the unwritten
law. They are not so directed, because they are supposed
to have in themselves the unwritten law, and hence have a
right to determine whether previous decisions are in keep-
ing with it or not.

To avoid a similar confusion, which would have arisen
m the administration of justice at Eome, when in later
times the views of all the celebrated lawyers were made
authoritative, one of the emperors hit upon an ingenious
expedient. He passed a law. by which was founded a kind
of college consisting of the jurisconsults who were longest
deceased. This body had a president, and came to decisions
through a majority of votes (Mr. Hugo's "History of
Eoman Law," § 354)._It is the task of a nation, or at

lc«

J L

-et, '»

208

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

least of its jurisconsults, not indeed to make a system of
laws entirely new in content, but to recognize the existing'
content of laws in its definite universality. They should
apprehend it in thought, while also making additions with
regard to its application to special cases. To refuse to
a people or its lawyers this right would be a flagrant
insult.

Addition. — The sun and the planets have laws, but they
do not know them. Barbarians are ruled by impulses,
customs, feelings, but have no consciousness of them.
When right is established as law and known, all random
intuitions and opinions, revenge, compassion, and self-
interest, fall away. Only then does right attain its trm;
character and receive its due honour. In being appre-
IJhended right is piu'ified from all mixture of chance elements,
and thus becomes for the first time capable of universal
^ application. Of course, in the administration of the laws
1 collisions will necessarilv occur, which must be settled bv
I the understanding of the judge ; otherwise, the execution of
the law would be merely mechanical. But to do away
with collisions by giving full sco])e to the judge's well-
meant opinions would bo the poorest solution of the diffi-
1 culty. Collisions, in fact, belong to the nature of thoiight,
the thinking ccmsciousness and its dialectic, while the
mere decision of a judge is arbitrary.

In favour of rights of custom it is usually adduced that
they are living ; but life, consisting in simple identity witli
the subject, does not constitute the essence of the mattel'.
((Right must be known in thought. It must be a system in
itself, and only as a system can it be valid for civilized
peo])les. Very recently the vocation of making laws has
been abolished. This is not only an aft'ront, but also
implies the absurdity that to no individual has been given
the ca})acity to systematize the infinite multitude of existing
laws, and expose the universal contained in them, when
this ta sk is precisely the most pressing need of the day

Tin; CIVIC COMMUKITY.

209

S m,,a,Oy, .t ,„, ^^^ ,,3U „,^j ^ ^.^^^^ ^j ^^^.^,_^_^

M the torpu^ju,-,., ,s preferable to a statute-book giving a

deta,W exlnb,t.onof the universal. A cortain particularitv

tained ■„ the dec.s.ous, and in a statute-book it is thought
that these advantages would be wanting. But the ,nh
c uevous nature of a mere collection is clearly ma Lt "
the practice of the English law. ^ mMUest in

212. Through this identity of the abstract or implicit

w.th what ,s actually constituted,' only that right is bind

ng wh,eh has beconre law." But since to constitute a tUng

■s to give .t outer reality, there may creep into the process a

con n,genc,v due to self-will and other elements of' artieu"

!: i?^tseS:S'. ■ ^""' '" '"'' "' '''--' ^™- '■'-

.ffrT^""^'' '" P°'"'™ "«'>' """ "'»«'> is lawfully
estabhshed « the source of the knowledge of what is ri^.f
or, n.oreaccurately. is the hual resort in ligation Po"? J
junsprudence IS to that extent an historical science based
on au h«r.ty. Additions are a matter of the understaTd

efuh f, T."""' r"'™"''' ""■'"■S5'""™*''. con,binations,

esults further apphcat.ons, and the like. But when the

understamhng n,eddles with the essential substance of the

matter it n,ay serve up singular theories, of which those

the nsl t but the necessary duty of positive science it
« true, t« deduce out of its positive data the histol pro
gr^ss and also applications a,.d ramitications. Yet'it an
not be wondered at if it be regarded as a fair cross oustion
whether a specific finding is after all wholly in acrrdaZ
mth reason (co„,pare on this point § 3 no J). ~-
yiU. Kight is realized in the first instance in the form

real,Mt,on. It must apply to the matter of the rela'ion.

Gesetzt.

* Gesetz.

210

THE PHILOSOPHY OF EIGHT.

bearing on property and contract, complicated and rami-
fied as these relations in the civic community become. It
must apply also to the ethical relations of feeling, love, and
confidence, but only in so far as they contain the phase of
abstract right (§ 159). The moral commands, touching
the will in its most private subjectivity and particularity,
cannot be the object of positive legislation. But additional
material for legislation is furnished by the rights and
duties which flow from the administration of justice itself
and from the state.

Addition. — Of the higher relations of marriage, love,
religion, and the state, only those aspects can be objects of
legislation, which are by their nature capable of having an
external embodiment. Here the laws of different nations
are very different. Amongst the Chinese, for example, it
is a law of the state that the husband shall love his first
wife more than any of the others. If he is convicted of
the contrary, he is flogged. So, too, in the older laws may
be found many prescripts concerning integrity and honour,
things that are wholly internal and do not fall within the
province of legislation. But as to the oath, where the
matter is laid upon the conscience, integrity and honour
must be viewed as in it outwardly substantive.

214. Besides a})plying to tlie particular as a whole, the
constituted law apjJies to the special case. Here it enters
the quantitative region left unoccupied by the conception.
This is, of course, the abstract quantitative, which is found
in exchange as value. The conception furnishes in this
region only a general limit, inside of which there is room
for considerable uncertainty. But fluctuations of opinion
must be cut short, and a conclusion reached. Hence, in-
side of this limit a decision has the character of accident
and caprice.

Note. — To whittle the universal down not only to the
particular but to the individual case is the chief function of
the purely positive in law. It cannot, for example, be de-

THE CIVIC COMMUKITY.

211

tion Itself, whether forty lashes or thirty-nine, a fine of four

dollarsor three dollars andninety.ninecents/imprTsonmen
for ayear or three hundred and sixty-four or three hundred

a" inlu^tt "'' '' ' ''' *^^ -^^^ - *- ^i^tle is

anfann? '^''^^ T'^f '' *^"* contingency, contradiction.

it t Td ' f'"' '^'" '^^''' ^^ ^^^^*' limited though

Here'Te " " "' ^f "' '^ ^^^*^^^ *^««« oontraditions.
Here the purpose is solely to reach actuality, that is. some-

or Iht «f "^^^«^t ^« the office of formal self-certitude

or abstract subjectivity, which, observing the prescribed

X ' X't ""'*'' r'*^^^^ '''^' Bimpl^forsLementt
sake Or Its reasons for its decision are. if it has any, of
this kind, that It should use round numbers, or that the
number should be forty less one.

thJV' f/""- "^^V^^^^ifi^^"^^ that the law does not make
the i.ual decision demanded by reality, but hands it over to

mum' Ti; "^'"^' '^" ™^"^^ '^ ^ '"--"- -<i -i^i-
mum. The maximum and minimum are themselves round

tZZ "f '? r '^ ^"^^ ^^*^^ *^- requirement
hat the judge shall pronounce a finite purely positive

^c/^i^.0. Undoubtedly the laws and the administra-
tion of justice contain in one of their aspects something
contingent, since the law. though of a unitersal character
must nevertheless be applied to special cases. If we were
to declare against this element of contingency, we would
pronounce in favour of an abstraction. The exact quanti y
of punishment cannot be found in any factor of the con-
ception; and whatever judgment may be made, it is to
some extent arbitrary. But this contingency i« itsd?
necessary. If one were to argue from the presence of con

,i'

1 ^

1 ,.

212

THE PIIILOSOPIIY OF RIGHT.

tingenoy that a code of laws was imperfect, lie would over-
look the fact that perfection of such a kind is not to
be attained. Law must, hence, be taken as it stands.

(b) Law as Incorporated.

215. Since the binding force of law rests upon the right
of self-consciousness (§ 132 and note), the laws ought to be
universally made known.

Note. — To hang up the laws, as did Dionysius the
Tyrant, so high that no citizen could read them, is a wrong.
To bury them in a cumbrous apparatus of learned books,
collections of decisions and opinions of judges, who have
deviated from the rule, and, to make matters worse, to
write them in a foreign tongue, so that no one can attain a
knowledge of them, unless he has made them a special sub-
ject of study, is the same wrong in another form. — The
rulers, who have given their people a definite and system-
atized book of common law, or even an unshapely collection
such as that of Justinian, should be thanked and lauded as
public benefactors. Moreover, they have done a decisive act
of justice.

Addition. — Jurists, who have a detailed knowledge of the
law, often look on it as their monopoly. He who is not of
their profession, they say, shall not be heard. The
physicists treated Groethe's theory of colours harshly, be-
cause he was not of their vocation, and was a poet besides.
But we do not need the services of a shoemaker to find out
if the shoe fits, nor do we need to belong to a particular
trade in order to have a knowledge of the objects which are
of universal interest in it. Kight concerns freedom, the
wortliiest and holiest thing in man, the thing which he
must know in so far as he is answerable to it.

216. We are in the presence of an antinomy. Simple
universal characteristics are needed in a public statute-book
and yet the finite material by its nature gives rise to end-
less definition ; the context of any law should le a rounded-

Tin-: CIVIC COMMUMTY.

213

off and complete whole, and yet there must continually be
new legal findings. But the riglit to a completed statute-
book remains unimpaired, since this antinomy does not
occur in the case of fixed general principles, but only with
their specialization. General principles can be apprehended
and presented apart from special cases.

Note.— One chief source of complexity in legislation
occurs in the case of any historic institution, which in its
origin contains an injustice. In the course of time it is
sought to infuse into this institution reason and absolute
right. An illustration of this procedure was cited above
from Eoman law (§ 180, note). It occurs also in the old
feudal law and elsewhere. But it is essential to under-
stand that, owing to the nature of finite material, any
application to it of principles, absolutely reasonable and in
themselves universal, must be an infinite process To
require of a statute-book that it should be absolutely
finished, and incapable of any modification-a malady
which IS mainly German-and to base this demand upon
the reason that, if the book cannot be completed, it cannot
come up to the so-called imperfect and therefore falls
short of reality, rest upon a twofold misunderstanding
Ihis view implies a misconception of the nature of such
finite objects as private right, whose so-called perfection
consists simply in a perennial approximation. It implies
too, a misconception of the difference between the universal
of the understanding and that of reason, and also of their
application to the finite and particular material, which goes
on to infinity. Le plus grand emmni du Bien c'est le Meilleur
18 the expression of the truly sound human understanding
in contrast with empty reasonings and reflections.

Addition.— If c()mi.leteiiess means the complete collection
of every individual thing or instance which belongs to a
given spliere, no science can be complete. If we say that
philosophy or any other science is incomplete, it seems like
saying that we must wait till it is perfected, as the best

tm i

214

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

thing may yet be lacking. In this way there is no getting
on at all, neither in the seemingly completed science of
geometry, in which, nevertheless, new elements are being
introduced, nor in philosophy, which, though dealing Avith
the universal idea, may be continually more and more
specialized. The universal law cannot be forever merely
the ten commandments. Yet it would be absurd to refuse
to set up the law " Thou shalt not kill " on the ground
that a statute-book cannot be made complete. Every
statute-book can, of course, be better. It is patent to the
most idle reflection that the most excellent, noble, and
beautiful can be conceived of as still more excellent, noble,
and beautiful. A large old tree branches more and more
without becoming a new tree in the process ; it would be
folly, however, not to plant a new tree for the reason that
it was destined in time to have new branches.

217. In the civic society what is intrinsically right
becomes law. What was formerly the simple and abstract
realization of my private will becomes, when recognized, a
tangible factor of the existing general will and conscious-
ness. Acquisition of property and other such transactions
must therefore be settled in accordance with the form
assigned to this realized right. Hence, property now
depends upon contract, and, in general, upon those for-
malities, which furnish legal proof of possession.

Note. — The original or direct titles to property and
methods of acquisition (§ 54 and fol.) disappear in the
civic community, or occur in it only as separate accidents
and limited elemeuts.^ — Forms are rejected by feeling,
which holds to the subjective, and by reflection, which
clings to the abstract side of the necessary formality. On
the other hand the dead understanding clings to formali-
ties in opposition to the thing itself, and infinitely increases
their number. — For the rest it is involved in the whole
process of education to win oneself free by hard and long
endeavour from the sensuous and direct form, and attain

THE CIVIC COMMUNI'iy.

216

to the form of thought with its appropriate simple expres-
sion. It is only in the earliest stages of legal science that
ceremony and formalities are significant. They are then
esteemed as the thing itself rather than its outer symbol
In Eoman law is found a host of details and expressions
which formerly belonged to religious ceremonies, and
should in law have given place to phases of thought and
their appropriate expression.

Addition.— In law what is in itself right is constituted.
In property I possess something which was without an
owner ; this must now be recognized and constituted as
mine. Hence, with regard to property arise in a community
legal forms. We place boundary stones as a sign for
others to take notice of; we have registers of mortgages
and lists of properties. In the civic community property
IS generally obtained by contract, a legal process which is
fixed and definite. Against forms the objection may be
urged that they exist merely to bring money to the
authorities. Or they may be held to be objectionable asf
indicating a lack of confidence. It may be said that the
maxim " A man is his word " has lost its force. But the
essential thing about the form is that what is really right
should be constituted as right. My will is rational- it '
has validity; and this validity is to be recognized by'
others. Here my subjectivity and that of others must fail
away, and the will must attain a certainty, assurance, and
objectivity, which can be realized only through the form.

218. In the civic community property and personalitv
havd a legal recognition and validity. Hence, crime is
injury done not merely to an infinite subject, but to a
universal fact, which has firm and sure reality. Here
occurs, therefore, the view that crime is a menace to societv
On the one hand the magnitude of the crime is increased
but on the other hand the security, felt by society, lessens
the external importance of the injury. As a result, crime
is now often punished more lightly.

i .»■

216

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

e..,^ r Ctr-i

Note. — The fact that, when one member of a community
suffers, all others suffer with him, alters the nature of
crime, not indeed in its conception, but in its external
existence. The injury now concerns the general thought
and consciousness of the civic community, and not merely
the existence of the person directly injured. In the heroic
ages, portrayed in the tragedies of the ancients, the
citizens did not regard themselves as injured by the crimes
which the members of the royal houses committed against
one another. — Crime, which in its inner nature is an infinite
injury, must as a realized fact submit to a qualitative and
quantitative measure (§ 96). This outward fact is con-
ditioned by the general idea and consciousness of the validity
of the laws. Hence, the danger to the civic community is
one way of measuring the magnitude of a crime, or one of
its attributes. — The quality or magnitude varies with the
condition of a community. In the circumstances lies the
justification of inflicting upon a theft of a few cents or a
turnip the penalty of death, while it imposes a mild
punishment upon a theft of a hundred or several hundred
times the amount. Although the idea of danger to the
>^r^ .civic community seems to aggravate the crime, it has really
ameliorated the penalty. A penal code belongs to its time
and to the condition in which the civic community at that
time is.
I Addition. — An offence seems to be aggravated, if it is
perpetrated in a community, and yet in such a case it is
treated with more leniency. This appears to be self-con-
tradictory. But although a crime could not be allowed by
the community to go unpunished, since it would then be
constituted as right, yet, because a community is sure of
itself, a crime is always merely a single, isolated act of
hostility without any foothold. By means of the very
steadfastness of tiie community crime becomes a mere sub-
jective act, which appears to spring not so much out of
deliberate will as out of natural impulse. Hence, a moi*e

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

217

lenient view is taken of crime, and punishment also is
ameliorated. If the community is still unsettled, an
example must be made by means of punishment, for
punishment is itself an example against the example of
crime. But m the sure and firm community the position i
of crime is so unstable, that a lesser measure of punish-
inenYs sufficient to supersede it. Serere punishments are I
not absolutely iinjust. but are due to the condition of the I
time. A criminal code cannot apply to all times, and
crimes are mere seeming existences, which draw after them
a greater or less rejection of themselves. '

(c) The Court of Justice.
219. Right, having entered reality in the form of law.
and having become an actual fact, stands in independent
opposition to the particular will and opinion of right, and
has to vindicate itself as a universal. The recognition and
reahzation of right in each special case without the sub-
jective instigation of private interests, is the office of a
public power, the court of justice.

J^o^e.-The office of judge and the court of justice may
have originated historically in the patriarchal 'relation, in
force, or m voluntary choice. This is for the conception of
the object a matter of indifference. To regard the ad-
ministration of justice by princes and rulers merely as a
courtesy and favour, as docs Herr von Haller in his
Restoration of Political Science," is to have no inkling of
the fact that, when we speak of law and the state, we
mean that its institutions are reasonable and absolutelv
necessary;. and that, when we consider the reasonable
basis of the laws, we have nothing to do with the form of
their origin The extreme opposite to this view is the 11
crude Idea that the administration of justice is club-law or '
despotism, which suppressed liberty by violence. But the
administration of the law is to be looked upon as the ' ^
duty quite as much as the right of the public authoritv.

218

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

^v.

. ,„'-f-.v<^-*^

*4-'^<'

Whether to delegate the discharge of this office to some
power or not is not at the option of any individual.

220. Revenge, or the right against crime (§ 102), is right
only in itself. It is not right in the form of law, i.e., it is
not in its actual existence just. The place of the injured
person is now taken by the injured universal, which is
actualized in a special way in the court of justice. To
pursue and punish crime is its function, which therefore
ceases to be a mere subjective retaliation or revenge, and
is in punishment transformed into a true reconciliation of
right with itself. In the act of punishment, viewed objec
tively, right is reconciled to itself, and restores itself by
siipersediug the crime and realizing its own inherent
validity. In punishment, viewed subjectively, or from the
standpoint of the criminal, the law, known by him and
available for his protection, is atoned for. The execution
of the law upon him, or the satisfaction of justice, he finds
to be simply the completed act of his own law.

221. A member of the civic community has the right to
bring a cause before the court of justice, and is also in
duty bound to appear in the court, and accept from it the
decision of the point in dispute.

Addition. — Every individual has the right to bring his
case before the court. But he must know the laws, other-
wise the privilege would be of no service to him. But it is
also a duty for him to appear before the court. Under the
feudal system the prince or noble defied the court, and
refused to appear, regarrding it as a wrong if the court
summoned him before it. This condition of things is con-
tradictory of the real function of the court. In more
^*'*^recent times the prince has in private affairs recognized
the courts as superior to him, and in free states his cases
are usually lost.

222. By the court it is required that a right be proved.
The legal process gives the contending parties an oppor-
tunity to substantiate their claim by evidence, and put the

(

• TIIK CIVIC COMMUNITY. 219

judge in possession of a knowledge of the case. The
necessary steps are themselves rights ; their course must
be legally fixed ; and they form an essential part of theo-
retical jurisprudence.

Addition -It may stir men to revolt if they have a
right which IS refused to them on the score that it cannot be
proved. But the right, which I have, must be at the same
time constituted. I must be able to present and prove it
and only when that, which it really is, is constituted as
law, IS It of any avail to me in a community

223. The stages of the legal process may be more and
more minutely subdivided, and each stage has its right.
As this subdivision has no inherent limit, the legal pro-
cess, which IS already of itself a means, may be opposed to
the end, and become something external. Though this
extensive formality is meant for the two contending parties
and belongs to them as their right, it may become an evil
and an instrument of wrong. Therefore, in order that the
wo parties and right itself as the substantive basis, may
be protected against the legal process and its misuse, it k
by way of law made a duty for them to submit themselves
to a simple court, the civil court of arbitration, for a
preliminary trial, before going to the higher court

i\ro<e -Equity includes a departure from formal right i

through moral and other regards, and refers directly to 1

he conten of the suit. A court of equity decides upon ^

the particular case, without adhering to the formalities of

the legal process. It is not confined to the objective evi

dence, as is formal law. It decides upon the interest

peculiar to each particular suit. Its judgment is not

meant to be applied generally. ^ ^*

224. As the public promulgation of the laws is one of

the rights of the subjective consciousness (S 216) so also

is the possibility of knowing how in any specia case th

aw IS earned out. The course of the external proceedint

should be public, and also the legal principles involved

./!

. I<

220

THE PHILOSOPHY OP RIGHT.

The oi'der of pi-ocedure is of iLself a thing of general value.
Though the special content of the case is of interest only
to the contending parties, the universal content, involving
right and a legal decision, is of interest to all. Hence is
demanded the publicity of the administration of the law.

Note. — Deliberations by the members of a court amongst
themselves over the judgment to be given, are only private
opinions and views, and are not of public import.

Addition — Honest common sense holds that the pub-
licity of legal proceedings is right and just. A strong
reason to the contrai-y was always the rank of the judiciary.
They were not to be seen by everybody, and regarded
themselves as the warders of a law, into which laymen
ought not to intrude. But law should possess the con-
fidence of the citizens, and this fact calls for the publicity
of the sentence. Publicity is a right, because the aim of
the court is justice, which as a universality iDelongs to all.
Moreover, the citizens should be convinced tliatt^" right
sentence has actually been pronounced.

225. In the application of the law by the judicial
authorities to special cases are to be distinguished two
separate aspects. There must be firstly an acquaintance
with the direct facts of the case, whether a contract has
taken place, an injurious act done, and who the doer is.
( In criminal law the act must be known also in its mten-
Ition, which contains its substantive criminal quality
(§ 119, note). In the second place the act must be brought
under the law of the restoration of right. This in criminal
law includes the punishment. Decisions in connection
with theie two aspects are tw^o different functions.

Note. — In the constitution of the Koman law-courts these
two functions occurred in this way. The Prcvtor gave his
decision on the condition that the case was of such and
such a kind, and then he commanded a certain Judex to
makes inquiries into its exact nature. The fixing of the
exact criminal quality of an act, whether, for example,

THJi CIVIC COMMUNITY.

221

It be murder or manslaughter, is in English judicial pro-
cedure left to the insight or caprice of the accuser, and the
court IS restricted to his view, even if it is seen to be
wrong.

226. To conduct the whole inquiry, to arrange the pro-
cedure of the parties, which is itself a right (§ 222), and to
pass sentence, are the special functions of the judcre (§ 225)
For him, as the organ of the law, the case must be prepared
and brought under some law. It must be raised out of its
empirical nature, and made a recognized fact with general
attributes.

227. That aspect of the case, which consists in know-
mg and estimating the direct facts, contains no distinc-
tively judicial elements. The knowledge is possible to an v
intelhgent man. When, in order that an estimate of the
act may be made, the subjective factor of the insight or in-
tention of the agent is essential (see Second Part), when
the evidence concerns no abstract object of reason or the
understanding, but mere particulars, circumstances, and
objects of sensible perception and subjective certitude,
when the case contains no absolutely objective element'
and the duty of deciding must fall to subjective conviction
and conscience (a7iimi sententia), and when the evidence
rests on depositions and statements, the oath, though a
subjective confirmation, is ultimate^^

^^ote.-In this question it is a cardinal point to keep
before our eyes the nature of the available evidence, and to
distinguish it from knowledge and evidence of other kinds.
To prove a phase of reason, such as is the conception of
right itself, that is, to recognize its necessity, requires
another method than the proof of a geometrical theorem.
Moreover, in a theorem the figure is determined bv the
understanding, and is already abstractly made according to
a law. But in the case of an empirical content, such as a
fact, the material for knowledge is composed of sense-per-
ceptions, and attestations based on the subjective certitude

222

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

of sense. These depositions, testimonies, and circum-
stances , must be put together, and from them a conclusion
must be drawn. With such material and such a means of
making it indei>endent and objective there is attained only
partial proofs. In obedience to a true logic, which never-
tlieless is formally illogical, the punishments are conse-
quently exceptional. This objective truth is quite different
from the truth of a rational principle or of a proposition,
whose matter has already been abstractly fixed by the
understanding. In so far as an empirical truth can be
recognized in the specific judicial finding of a court, and so
far as in the finding can be shown to lie an unique quality,
that is, an exclusive implicit right and necessity, the formal
judicial court is entitled to pass judgment upon the fact as
well as upon the point of law.

Addition. — There is no reason for supposing that the
judge is the only one to decide upon matters of fact. For
this not +)ie legal mind alone but any man of ordinary in-
telligence is competent. Judgment as to matter of fact
depends upon em|>irical circumstances, witnesses of the
act, and similar data of perception. There may also be
other facts, by means of which one can infer the nature
and probability of the act in disjiute. Here at most we
reach an assurance, but not a truth in the sense of some-
thing eternal. Assurance is subjective conviction or con-
science, and the question to decide is what form to give
this certitude at a law court. The demand, usually made
in German law, for a confession on the i)art of the
criminal has this right, that by it satisfaction is given to
the right of the subjective consciousness. The judge's de-
/ cision must agree with the criminal's consciousness ; and,
not until the culprit has confessed, is the sentence free
from an element which is foreign to him. But the
criminal may deny the act, and thus imperil the course of
justice. Yet it is a harsh measure to treat him according
to the subjective conviction of the judge, since then he is no

THE CIVJC COMMUNITY.

223

longer regarded as free. Hence, it is still required that the
decree of gmlt or innocence should come from the soul of
the criminal, and this requisite is secured through trial by
jury. ^ "J

228. When the facts of the case have been decided on
and the judge in his sentence brings the case, so qualified!
under a certain law, the accused's right of self-conscious-
ness IS not violated. In the first iplace, the law is known
and IS Itself the law of the accused. In the second place
the proceedmgs, by which the case is brought under a
certain law, are public. But when a decision is not yet
reached upon the particular subjective and external con-
tent of the matter, a knowledge of which comes under the
hrst ot the two aspects given in § 2 5, the accused's right
ot self-consciousness is prowerved by intrusting the case to
the subjectivity of jurors. This procedure is based on the '
equahty of the jurors with the accused, both as regards
class and in general. ^ '

Note.-The right of self-consciousness, or the element of
subjective freedom, can be regarded as the substantive
point of view in the question of the necessity of a public
trial, or tria by a jury. To this point of view all that is
essential and needful in these institutions may be reduced
From any other standpoint disputes may arise as to
whether this or that feature is an advantage or disadvan-
tage. but such reasonings either are of secondary conse-
quence and decide nothing, or they are taken from other
and iHu-haps higher spheres. It is possible that the law
might be as well administered by courts of judges, or even
better by them tiian by other institutions. But grant the
possihihty. or let the possibility become a probability or

the light of self-consciousness, wL h maintains its claims
and must be satisfied. Because ot the general nature of
the law. It can happen that the knowledge of right the
course of legal proceedings, and the possibility of p;ose!

224

TIIK PHILOSOPHY OF RlfJIIT.

eutiiii,' the law, may become the exclusive property of a
class. This class may use a lanjjfuaj^e which is to those in
whose interest it was made a foreign tongue. The members
of a civic community , who have to rely for their subsistence
upon their own activity, Icnowledge, and will, then become
strangers not only to what is most private and personal in
tiie law, but also to its substantive and rational essence.
Hence, they fall luuler a kind of bodily vassalage to the
legal class. They nniy have the right to present themselves
in person befon^ the court (in jndicio stare), but of what
use is that, if they are not present as intelligent spirits ?
The justice, which they receive, remains for them an ex*
ternal fate.

229. In the civic comminiity the idea is lost in particu-
larity, and dispersed by the separation of inner and outer.
But in the administration of justice the commiuiity is
brought back to the concei)tion, that is, to the unity of the
intrinsic universal with subjective particularity. But as
subjective particularity is present only as one single case,
and the xmiversal only as abstract right, the unification is
in the first instance relative. The nnilization of this rela-
tive unity over the whole range of particularity is the
function of the police, and within a limiiod but concrete
totality constitutes the corjjoration.

Addiiioti. — In the civic cominunitv universalitv is only
necessity. In the relation of wants, right as such is the only
steadfast principle. But the sphere of this right is limited,
and refers merely to the protection of what I have. To right
as such, happiness is something external. Yet in the
system of wants well-being is an essential clement. The
universal, which is at first only right, has to spread itself
over the whole field of particularity. Justice, it is true, is
a large factor in the civic community. The state will
flourish, if it has good laws, of which free property is the
fundamental condition. But since I am wholly environed
by my particularity, I have a right to demand that iu

I'UE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

225

connecting myself with others I shall further my special
happiness Eegard to my particular well-being is taken
by the police and the corporation.

C. Police and Corjjnration.

230. In the system of wants the subsistence and happi-
ness of every individual is a possibility, whose realization
IS conditioned by the objective system of wants. By the
administration of justice compensation is rendered for
nijury done to property or person. But th<) right, which
is actualized in the particular individual, contains the two
following factors. It asks firstly that person and pror.ertv
should be secured by the removal of all fortuitous hindrances
and secondly that the security of the individual's subsist '
ence and happiness, his particular well-being should be
regarded and actualized as a right.

(a) Police.

231. So far as the particular will is the principle of a
purpose, the force, by which the universal guarantees
security, is limited to the realm of mere accident, and is
an external arrangement.

232. Crimes are in their nature contingent or casual,
taking the form of capricious choice of evil, and must be
prevented or brought to justice by the general force
Apart from them, however, arbitrary choice must be
allowed a place in connection with acts in theiaselves law-
ful, such as the private use of property. Here it comes
into external relation with other individuals, and also with
public institutions for realizing a common end. In this
way a private act is exposed to a haphazard play of cir-
cumstances, which take it beyond my control. It thus

""Zr^f "''"^ *^"''' "^^"'^ ^" ^"j""y ^^ ^r^"^' to others.
i'U. This IS, indeed, only a possibility of harm. But

..ft ^-

226

TlIK PHILOSOPHY OF lUlillT,

\ ■

that no actual injury is clone is now no longer a matter of
accident, since the aspect of wrony; in private acts is the
ultimate ground for the right of police control.

234. The relations of externnl renlity occur within the
realm of the infinity created by the understanding, and
have accordingly no inherent limit. H(>nce, as to what is
dangerous and what not, what suspicious and what free
from suspicion, what is to be forbidden, or kept under
inspection, or pnrdoncd with a reprimand, what is to be
retained after pardon under police supervision, and what is
to be dismissed on suspended sentence, no boundary can be
laid down. Custom, the spirit of the constitution as a
whole, the condition of the tinu', the danger of the moment,
etc., furnish means for a decision.

Addition. — No iixed definition can here be given, or
absolute boundary drawn. Here everything is personal
and influenced by subjective o])inion. To the spirit of the
constitution or the danger of the times are due any more
decisive characteristics. In time of war, e.g., many things
niornlly harmless are looked on as harmful. Because of
the jnvseuce of this aspect of contingency and arbitrary
personality the police are viewed with odium. They can by
far-fetched conclusions draw every kind of thing within
their sphere ; for in anything may be found a possibility
of harm. Hence, the ])olice may go to work in a pedantic
spirit, and disturb the moral life of individuals. But
great as the nuisance nniy be, an olijective limit to their
action cannot be drawn.

235. Although every one relies on the untrammelled ])ossi-
bility of sal isfying his daily wants, yet, when in the indefinite
multiplication and limitation of them it is sought to procure
or exchange the means and it is desired to expedite the
transaction, there comes into sight a common interest, which
nuikes the business of one subserve the interest of all.
There ap])ear. likewise, ways and means, which may bo of
public utility. To oversee and foster the ways and means

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

227

calculated to promote the public welfare is the function
ot a public power.

236. The different interests of producers and consumers
may come into conflict, and, although the right relation
between the two may on the whole arise of its own accord.
yet the adjustment of. the two calls for a regulation stand-
nig above both sides and put into operation consciously.
Ihe right to make such a regulation in any particular case
{e.g., taxation of the articles most necessary to sustain life)
consists in this, that the public offer of goods, in wide and
daily use, is not to the individual, as such, but ^- him as Ua--^^^^^ ff
a universal i.e., to the public. The people's right to honest l^L k 1-^ J. /
dealing and inspection of goods to prevent fraud may be ^ '

D-vwi

enforced by a public functionary. But more especially f.^'lY 7 t^ .

does the dependence of great branches of industry upon '^L' ,
foreign conditions and distant combinations, which the ^M ^
individuals engaged in these industries cannot themselves '
oversee, make necessary a general supervision and control
Note.— In contrast with freedom of business and trade
in the CIVIC community stands the other extreme of the
establishment and direction of the work of all by means of
official regulation. Under this head comes ])erhaps the
construction of the pyramids and other monstrous Egyptian
and Asiatic works. They were built for public ends with-
out the intervention of any work done by the individual to
turther his own private interests. Private interest summons
tlie principle of freedom against interference from above
but the more blindly it is sunk in self-seeking ends'
the more it stands in need of regulation, in order that it
may be led back to the universal. Thus what might be a
dangerous upheaval becomes largely harmless, and shorter
time IS left for conflicts to adjust themselves merely by
unconscious necessity.

^ AihUtion.~Vo\i^^i control and i)rovision are intended to
intervene between the iu.lividual and the universal pos-
sibihty of obtaining his wants. It takes charge of Hghting

*.JC

L;:fl

228

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

the streets, building bridges, taxation of daily wants, even
of health. Two main views stand out at this point. One
view is that it falls to the police to look after everything,
the other that the police should not interfere at all, since
eveiy one will he guided by the need of others. The in-
dividual, it is true, must have the right to earn his bread
in this or the other way, but on the other hand the ])ublic
has a right to ask that what is necessary shall be done.
Both claims should be met, and the f I'eedora of trade ought
not to be of such a kind as to endanger the general weal.

237. The possibility of sharing in the general wealth is
open to the individual and secured to him by public
regulations. This security, however, cannot be complete,
and in any case the possibility of sharing in the general
wealth is from the subjective side open to casualties, just
in proportion as it presupposes conditions of sldll, health,
and capital.

238. In the first instance the family is the substantive
whole. To it falls the duty of providing for the particular
side of the individual's life, both in regard of the means
and talents requisite for winning his maintenance out of
the common stock, and in regard of subsistence and pro-
vision in case of disability. But the civic community tears
the individual out of the family bonds, makes its members
strangers to one another, and recognizes them as indepen-
dent persons. Instead of external inorganic nature and
the paternal soil, from which the individual drew sub-
sistence, the community substitutes its own ground, and
subjects the whole family to fortuitous dependence upon
itself. Thus the individual has become the son of the
civic community, which makes claims upon him, at the
same time as he has rights to it.

Addition. — The family has, of course, to provide bread
for individuals ; but in the civic community the family is
subordinate and merely forms a basis. After that it is no
longer of such extensive efficacy. R'ttiior is the

CIVIC

THE CIVIC COMML'iMTY.

229

community the monster, which snatches man to itself
claims from him that he should toil for it and that he
should exist through it and act by means of it. If man is
a member of such a community, he has just such rights in
it or claims uijon it as he had in and upon the family. The / ,
civic community must protect its members, and defend their /
rights, as they iu turn are engaged to obey its mandates. ' '

239. The civic community, in its character as universal
family, has the right and duty to supersede, if necessary,
the will of the parents, and superintend the education of
the young, at least in so far as their education bears upon
their becoming members of the community. Especially is
this the case if the education is to be completed not by the
parents but by others. Further, the community must f^ [^l- fl
undertake general arrangements for education, in so far as i V / ^
they can be made. '^'^^ ^^ '^

Addition.— The boundary line between the rights of '''^^' ^'^~*'^''^'^*^
parents and those of the civic community is hard to define. *<-'^f ^ J^
The parents generally suppose themselves to possess com- r^ci**^^'
plete liberty with regard to education, and to be able to do
whatever they wish. Whenever instruction is made public,
the chief opposition usually comes from the parents, who
cry out and make acclaim about teachers and schools
merely because they are displeased with them. In spite
of this, the community has the right to proceed according
to tried methods, and to compel parents to send their -)
children to school, to have them vaccinated, etc. Contests .
occur in France between ihe demands of free instruction,
i.e., oe the pleasure of parents, on the one side, and the
oversight of the state on the other.

240. Similarly, the community lias the duty and right to
take under its guardianship those who wantonly squander
their subsistence and that of their family. In tlie jdace of
this extravagance it substitutes their real end, which it
seeks to promote along with the purpose of the community.
Addition. — It was a law in Athens that every citizen

230

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

should give an account of his way of life. Our view is
that this is no one's business. Of course every individual
is in one way independent, hut he is also a member of the
system of the civic community. In so far as every man
has the right to ask maintenance from it, it must also
protect him against himself. It is not simply that starva-
tion must be guarded against. The wider view is that
there never shall arise a rabble, or mass. Since the civic
community is obliged to support individuals, it has also
the right to insist that individuals should care for its
subsistence.

241. Not the arbitrary will only, but accidental circum-
stances, which may be physical or external (§ 200), mav
bring the individual to poverty. This condition exposes
him to the wants of the civic community, which has
already deprived him of the natural methods of acquisition
(§ 217), and superseded the bond of the family stock
(§ 181). Besides, poverty causes men to lose more or less
the advantage of society, the opportunity to acquire skill
or education, the benefit of the administration of iustice
the care for health, oven the consolation of religion.
Amongst the poor the public power takes the place of the
family in regard to their immediate need, dislike of work,
bad disposition, and other vices, which spring out of
poverty and the sense of wrong.

242. The subjective element of poverty, or ^.enerally the
distress, to which the individual is by nature exposed,
requires subjective assistance, both in view of the special
circumstances, and out of sympathy and love. Here,
amidst all general arrangements, morality finds ample room
to work. But since the assistance is in its own nature and
in its effects casual, the effort of society shall be to discover
a general remedy for penury and to do without random
help.

Note. — Haphazard almsgiving and such foundations as
the burning of lamps beside holy images, etc.. are replaced

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

231

by public poor-houses, hospitals, street lighting, etc. To ]
charity enough still remains. It is a false view for charitv '
to restrict its help to private methods and casual sentiment
and knowledge, and to feel itself injured and weakened
by regulations binding ui.on the whole community. On
the contrary, the public system is to be regarded as all the
more complete, the less remains to be done by special
effort.

243. When the civic community is untrammelled in its
activity. It increases within itself in industry and popula-
tion. By generalizing the relations of men by the way of
their wants, and by generalizing the manner in which the
means of meeting these wants are prepared and procured,
large fortunes are amassed. On the other side, there occur
repartition and limitation of the work of the individual
labourer and, consequently, dependence and distress in the
artisan class. With these drawbacks are associated callous-
ness of feeling and inability to enjoy the larger possibilities
ot freedom, especially the mental advantages of the civic
community.

244. When a large number of people sink below the
standard of living regarded as essential for the members of
society, and lose that sense of right, rectitude, and honour
which IS derived from self-support, a pauper class arises,
and wealth accumulates disproportionately in the hands of
a few.

Additio?i.-The way of living of the pauper class is the
lowest of all, and is adopted by themselves. But with
different peoples the minimum is very different. In
England even the poorest man believes that he has his
right, and with him this standard is different from that
which satisfies the poor in other lands. Povert:y does not
of itself make a pauper. The pauper state implies a frame
of mmd, associated often with poverty, consisting in inner
rebellion against the wealthy, against society, and against
constituted authority. Moreover, in order to descend to

232

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RI(;H'r.

the class, which is at the mercy of the cliangesand chances
of life, men must be heedless and indifferent to work, as are
tlie Lazzaroni in Naples. Hence, in this section of the
communi ,;- i. sw i'.o evil thinj,' that a man has not self-
respe< I .noujrb f., earn his own living hy his work, and
still he claims support as a right. No man can maintain
a right against nature. Yet, in social conditions want
assumes the form of a wrong done to one or other class.
The important question, lio«' |inverty is to be done away
with, is one which Las disturbed and agitated society,
especially in modern times.

245. If upon the more wealthy classes the burden were
directly laid of maintaining the poor at the level of their
ordinary way of life, or if in public institutions, such as
rich hospitals, foundations, or cloisters, tlie poor could
receive direct support, they would be assured of sul>sist-
ence without requiring to do any work. This would be
contrary both to the principle of the civic community and
to the feeling its members have of independence and
honour.

Again, if subsistence were provided not directly but

through work, or opportunity to work, the quantity of

produce would be increased, and the consumers, becoming

themselves producers, would be proportionately too few.

Whether in the case of over-production, then, or in the

case of direct help, the evil sought to be removed would

^ remain, and, indeed, would by either method be enhanced.

' There arises the seeming paradox that the civic community

when excessively wealthy is not rich enough. It has not

sufficient hold of its own wealth to stem excess of poverty

and the creation of paupers.

Note.—Thcse phenomena may be studied in England,
where they occur on an extensive scale. In that country
may also be observed the consequences of poor rates, of
vast foundations, of unlimited private benevolence, and.
above all, of the discontinuance of the corporation. In

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

233

England, and especially in Scotland, the most direct
romedy against poverty and against laziness and extrava-
gance, which are the cause of poverty, has been proved by
practical experience to be to leave the poor to their fate
a.id direct them to public begging. This, too, has been
tound to bo the best means for preserving that sense of
shame and honour, which is the subjective basis of
society.

246. By means of its own dialectic the civic community
IS driven beyond its own limits as a definite and self-com-
plete society. It must find consumers and tlie necessary
means of life amongst other peoples, who either lack the
means, of which it has a superfluity, or have less developed
industries. "yC

247. As ilie firm-set earth, or the soil, is the basis
of family hfe, so the basis of industry is the sea. the
natural element which stimulates intercourse with foreign
lauds. By the substitution for the tenacious grasp of the
801 , and for the limited round of appetites and enjoyments
embraced within the civic life, of the fluid element of
danger and destruction, the passion for gain is transformed
By means of the sea. the greatest medium of communica-
tion, the desire for wealth brings distant lands into an in-
tercourse, which leads to commercial exchange. In this
intercourse is found one of the chief means of culture,
and in it, too, trade receives world-historical significance. '

JVTo/e.— Rivers are not natural boundaries, though people
have in modern times tried to make them so. Eather
do they, and more especially the sea. bind men together.

That Horace (Carm. I. 3) is wrong when he says :

"... deuH ahscidit
Pnidens Oceano dissociabili
Terras, ..."

is shown by the general fact that basins of rivers are
inhabited by one nation or race. This is proved even more

234

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

conspicuously by the relations of ancient Greece with Ionia
and Magna Graecia, of Brittany with Britain, of Denmark
with Norway, of Sweden with Finland and Lapland,
in contrast with the slight intercourse obtaining between
the inhabitants of the coast and those of the interior. We
have only to compare the position of the nations, who
have frequented the sea, with that of the nations who have
avoided it, in order to discover what a means of culture
and commerce it really is. Observe how the Egyptians
I and Hindoos have become dull and insensible, and are sunk
in the grossest and most shameful superstitions, while all
the great aspiring nations press to the sea.

248. The wider connection due to the sea becomes a
means for colonization, to which, be it sporadic or system-
atic, the full-grown civic community finds itself impelled.
Thus for a part of its population it provides on a new soil
a return to the family principle, and also procures for
itself at the same time a new incentive and field for
work.

Addition.— The civic society is forced to found colonies,
owing to the increase of population, but more especially
because production oversteps the needs of consumption, and
the growing numbers cannot satisfy their needs by their
work. Sporadic colonization occurs mainly in Germany,
the colonists, finding a home in America or Eussia, being
without any connection with and of no benefit to their
native land. A different kind of colonization is the system-
atic, which is conducted by the state consciously and
with suitable appliances. Of this kind of colonization
many forms occurred amongst the ancients, especially the
Greeks. In Greece the citizens did not engage in severe
toil, but directed their energies to public affairs. When
the population grew to such an extent that it was difiicult
to provide for them, the youth were sent into a new neigh-
bourhood, which was sometimes chosen for them, some-
times left to the accident of discovery. In modern

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

235

times colonists have not been granted the rights pos-
sessed by the inhabitants of the j^arent country. The
result has been war and ultimate independence, as may
be read in the history of the English and Spanish colonies.!
The independence of the colonies has turned out to be
of the greatest advantage to the mother land, just as the
liberation of the slaves was of the greatest advantage to
the masters.

249. Tlie universal, which is contained in the particu-
larity of the civic community, is realized and preserved by
the external system of police supervision, whose purjwse is
simply to protect and secure the multitude of private ends
and interests subsistmg within it. It has also the higher
function of caring for the interests which lead out beyond
the civic community (§ 246). In accordance with the idea
particularity itself makes the universal, which exists in its
special interests, the end and object of its will and en-
deavour. The ethical principle thus comes back as a con-
stituent element of the civic community. This is the
corporation.

(b) The Corporation.

250. In its substantive family life and life of nature the
agricultural class contains directly the concrete universal in
which it lives. The universal class, again, has this universal
as an independent end of its activity, and as its ground and
basis. The middle or commercial class is <'ssentially en- 1
gaged with the particular, and hence its peculiar province is |
the corporation.

251. The work of the civic community spreads in dif-
ferent directions in obedience to the nature of its particu-
larity. Since the implicit equality, contained in par-
ticularity, is here realized as the common purpose of an
association, the particular and self-seeking end becomes
something actively universal. Each member of the civic
community is with his special talent a member of the cor-

236

TIIK PHILOSOPHY OF ItlGHT.

poration. The universal aim of the corporation is accord-
ingly quite concrete, and has no wider application than
what lies in trade and its distinctive interests.

25-2. In keepino^ with this view, the corporation, under
the oversight of the public authority, has the riglit to look-
after its own clearly-defined interests, according to the ob-
jective qualifications of skill and rectitude to adopt mem-
bers, whose number is determined by the general system,
to make provision for its adherents against fortuitous
occurrences, and to foster the cai)acity necessary in any one
j desiring to become a member. In general it must stand to
Its members as a second family, a position which remains
1 more indefinite than the family relation, because the
general civic community is at a farther remove from indi-
viduals and their special needs.

Note.— The tradesman is different from the day-labourer,
as well as from him who is ready for any casual employ-'
ment. The trader, be he em])loyer or employee, is a mem-
ber of an association, jiot for mere accidental gain but for
the whole circuit of gain, or the universal involved in his
particular maintenance. The i)rivileges, which are rights
of a corporate branch of the civic community, an; not
the same as special i)rivileges in the etymological sense of
tlie term. Special privileges are hai)hazard excei)tion8 to a
general law, but the other i)rivile-es are legal pliases of
the iiarticularity of an essential branch of the ct)mniunity.
253. The corporation provides for tii^' family a basis and
steady means (§ 170), by securing for it a subsistence
varymg according to capacity. Moreover, both socuritv and
cai)a(iry are in the corporation publicly recognised. Hence,
the member of a corjtoration does not need to certify his
capacity or the reality of his regular income to any larger
outside organization. It is also recognized that lie belongs
to and lias active interest in a whole, wluse aim is to pro-
mote the welfare of society in general. Thus, in his class he
has honour.

THE CIVIC COMMUNITY.

237

Note.~The corporaticn, in making secure the means of
the family, corresponds to agriculture and private property
ni another sphere (§ 203, note).-When it is complained
that the luxury and extravagance of the commercial class
give rise to paupers (§ 244), it must not be overlooked that
these conditions have an ethical or social basis in such
causes as the increasingly mechanical nature of work.
If the individual is not a meml)er of an authorized cor-
poration, and no combination can be a corporation unless
it IS authorized, he has no class-honour. By limiting him-
self to the self-seeking side of trade and his own subsist-
euce and enjoyments, he loses standing. He perhaps seeks,
in that case, to obtain recognition by displaying his success
11) his trade; but his disi)lay has no limit, because he has
no desire to live in a way l)ecoming his class. Indeed, he
has no class at all, since only what is of general purport
really exists in a civic community, and can be established
and recognized. As he has no class, he has not the more
universal life characteristic of the class.— In tlic cori)oration
the assistance received by poverty loses its lawless character,
and the humiliation wrongly associated with it. Tlie
opulent, by i)erforming their duty to their associates, lose
their pride, and cease to stir up envy in others. Integrity
receives its due honour and recognition.

254. Thecorporati.m sets a limit to the so-called natural
right to make acquisitions by tlic exercise of an^ Vil' )nlv
so far a^ the limit is a rational one. This righ us
freed fnnn mere opinion and random influences, ai .om
dang(>r to itself and others. In tliis way it wins recognition
and an assured place, and is exalted to the levd of a
conscious effort to attain a common i»uri)ose,

255. As the family was the first, so the corporuJon.
grounded upon the civic community, constitutes the second
ethical root or basis of the state. The family contains the
elements of subj.'ctive particularity and objective univer-
sality in substantive unity. Then, in the civic community,

238

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT.

these elements are in the first instance dissociated and
Lecome on the one side a particularity of want and satis-
faction, which is turned back into itself, and on the other
side abstract legal universality. The corporation joins
these two iu an internal way, so that particular well-beino.
exists and is realized as a right. "

Note.— Sanctity in the marriage tie and honour in the
corporation are the points which tlie disorganizing forces
' of tlie civic community assail.

Addition.— In modern times the corporation has been
superseded, with the intention that the individual should
care for himself. Grant tliat the intention is wise, yet the
obligation of the individual to procuio his own liveliliood is
not by the corporation alti-rcd. In our modern slates the
citizens participate only slightly in the general business.
It 18. however, needful to i.rovide the ethical man with a
universal activity, one above his private ends. This uni-
versal. with which the modern state does not alwavs supi)]y
him, IS giv,>n by tli,> corporation. We have already seen
that the individual, while maintaining himself in the civic
community, acts also for others. Hut this unconscious
I necessity is not enough. It is in the corporati.m that a
! conscious and reflective ethical realitv is first reached. The
superintendence ef the state is higher, it is true, and must
be given an upper idace; otlu-rwis*. the cori>oration would
become fo.ssili/e<l ; it would waste itself ui)on its,.|f, and
be reduced to the level of a wretched dub. But the cor-
poration is not in its absolute nature a secret societv, but
rather the socializing of a trade, wliich without it would
stiiud in isolation. It takes the trade up into a circle, iu
which it secures strength and honour.

25(1. The limited and linite end of the corporation has
Its truth in the absolutely universal end ami the absolute
actuality of this end. This actualized end is also the truth
of the divisn.n involved in the external svstem of police,
which 18 merely a relative identity of the divided elements

Till': CIVIC COMMUNITY.

239

Thus, the sphere of the civic cominunity passes into the
state,

Note.-Ciiy and country are the two as yet ideal con-
stituents out of which the state proceeds. The city is the
seat of the civic society, and of tlie reflection which g<,e8
into Itself and causes separation. The country is the seat
ot the ethical whicli rests upon nature. The one comprises
the individuals, who ^ain their livelihood by virtue of their
relation to other i)ersons possessed of rights. Tlie other
comprises the family. The state is the true meaning and
ground of both. ^

The development of simple ethical observance into the
disineinberment marking the civic community, and then
forward into the state, which is shown to be th'e true foun-
dation of these more abstract phases, is the only scientific
proof of the concci.t.on of the state—Although in the
course of the scientific exposition the state has the appear-
ance of a result, it is in reality the true foundation and
cause. Tins appearance and its j.rocess are provisional,
and must now bo replaced l>y the state in its direct existence
In actual fact the state is in general primary. Within it
t he lamily grows into the civic communitv. the idoa of the
state being that which sunders itself into (h'ese two dements
1.1 the <levelopiaent of the civic community the etl.ical sub-'
stance nnu.lics its infinite form, which contains the follow-
Hig e emeuts:-(l) infinite differentiation even to the points
at winch consciousness as it is in itself exists for itself
aud (. ) the term of universaHty, wiiich in civilisation is the
form ot thought, that form by which spirit is itself in its
aws and institutions. They are its th<.ught will, and it
and they together become objective and real ia an organic

ill

240 THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

THIRD SECTION.

The State.

257. The state is the realized ethical idea or ethical
spirit. It is the will which manifests itself, makes itself
clear and visible, substantiates itself. It is the will which
thinks and knows itse^i, and carries out what it knows, and
in so far as it knows. The state finds in ethical custom its
direct and unreflected existence, and its indirect and re-
fleeted existence in the self-consciousness of the individual
and in his knowledge ud activity. Self-consciousness in
the form of social disposition has its substantive freedom
in the state, as the essence, purpose, and product of its
activity.

Note.— The Penates are the inner and lower order of
gods ; the spirit of a nation, Athene, is the divinity which
knows and wills itself. Piety is feeling, or ethical behaviour
in the form of feeling ; political virtue is the willing of the
thought-out end, which exists absolutely.

258.— The state, which is the realized substantive will,
having its reality in the particular self-consciousness raised
to the plane of tlie universal, is absolutely rational. This
substantive unity is its own motive and absolute end. In
this end freedom attains its highest right. This end has
the highest right over the individual, whose highest duty
in turn is to be a member of the state.

Note.— Were the state to be considered as exchangeable
with the civic society, and were its decisive features to be
regarded as the security and protection of property and
personal freedom, the interest of the individual as such
would be the ultimate purpose of the social union. It would
then be at one's option to be a member of the state.— But
the state has a totally different relation to the individual.
It is the objective spirit, and he has his truth, real existence,

TIIK .SlATi:.

and elliioal status only in being a member of it.

241

... - -o v....^^. y^^ iL. Union,

as such, IS Itself the true content and end, since the indi-
vidual IS intended to pass a universal life. His particular
satisfactions, activities, and way of life have in this authen-
ticated substantive principle their origin and result.

Rationality, viewed abstractly, consists in the thorough
unity of universality and individualitv. Taken concretely,
and from the standi>oint of the content, it is the unity of
objective freedom with subjective freedom, of the general
substantive will with the individual consciousness and the
individual will seeking particular ends. From the stand-
point of the form it consists in action determined liv
thought-out or universal laws and principles.— This ide'a
IS the absolutely eternal and necessary being of spirit.-
lh(. Idea of the state is m.t concerned with the historical
origin of either the state in general or of anv particulnr
state with Its special rights and characters. Hence it is
indiiterent whether the state arose out of the patriarchal
condition, out of fear or confidence, or out of the corpora-
tion. It does not care whether the basis of state rights is
declared to be in the divine, or ni positive right, or con-
tract, or custom. When we are dealing simply with the
science of the state, these things are mere appeamnces. and
belong to history The causes or grounds of the authority
oi an a<-tual state, in so far as they are required at all,
must be derived from the forms of right, which have
validity m the state.

Philosophic investigation deals with only the inner side
of all this, tlie thought conception. To Rousseau is to be
ascribed the merit of discovering and [.resenting a prin-
cipl.'. which comes up to the standard of the thought, audi
IS indeed thinking itself, not only in its form, 'such as '
would be a social impulse or divin<' authoritv, but in its -
very esr,t me. This i)rincii.le of Rousseau is will. But he (
conceiv<..^ v,f die will only in the limited form of the indi- /
vidual w.ll. a8 did also Fichte afterwards, and regards the '

- ti

242

rut: piiiLosopiir of RKiirr,

universal will not as the absolutely reasonable will, but
only as the common will, proceeding out of the individual
will as conscious. Thus the union of individuals in a state
becomes a contract, which is based upon caprice, opinion,
and optional, explicit consent. Out of this view the under-'
standing deduces consequences, which destroy the abso-
lutely divine, and its absolute authority and majesty.
Hence, when these abstractions attained to power, there
was enacted the most tremendous spectacle which the
human race has ever witnessed. All the usages and
institutions of a great state were swept away. It was then
proposed to begin over again, starting from the thought,
and as the basis of the state to will only what was judged
to be rational. But as the undertaking was begun with
abstractions void of all ideas, it ended in sc2nes of tragic
cruelty and horror.

As against the principle of the individual will we must
bear in mind the fundamental conception that the objective
will is in itself rational in its very conception, whether or
not it be known by the individual or willed as an object of
his good pleasure. We must also keep in mind tliat the
opposite principle, the subjectivity of freedom, i.e., such
knowing and willing as are retained in that principle, con-
tains only one, and that a one-sided factor of the idea of
the reasonable will. The will is reasonable only if it is so
both in itself and when it is actualized.

The otlier contrary of the thought, which apprehends
the state as au embodiment of reason, is the theory whi^-h
takes such external appearances as the accidents of distress,
need, protection, strength, and wealth, for the substance of
the state, when they are n)ere elements of its histt)rical
development. Moreover, it i^ in iiuique and isolated indi-
viduals that the principle of knowledge is here said to be
found, not however in their thought, but in the attributes
<.f their merely empirical {personalities, such as strength or
weakness, wealth or i>overty. The I'reak

of disreganliuir

THE STATE.

243

what IS absolutely infinite and reasonable in the state and of
banishing thought from the constitution of the state's
mner nature has never appeared so undisguisedlv as in
Mr. V. Haller s " Eestauration der Staatswissenschaft " In
all genuine attempts to reach the real nature of the"state
though the principles adduced be ever so one-sided and
superficial, there is yet implied that rightly to conceive of
the state is to attain to thoughts and universal characters
But m the book alluded to. the author not only consciously
renounces both the rational content, which is the state, and
the form of thought, but passionately invei-.hs ac^ainst
t em. One of .hat he himself calls the far-reachi^g S
of his work IS due to the circumstance that in his inquiry
he knew how to fasten the whole into one piece without
the help of thought. Hence, he says, are absent the con-
fusion and disturbance, which arise when into a discussion
of the contingent is foisted a suggestion about the substan-
tive, and into a discussion of the empirical and external is
injected a reminder of the universal and rational. Hence
when engaged with the inadequate and imperfect he is not
contmually reminding his readers of what is hi.^her and
infinite -Yet even this method of inquiry lias consequences,
bince the fortuitous is taken as the essence of the state
anu not the substantive, there results from the absence of
thought an incoherence, which jogs on without looking
back, and finds itself quite at hon.e in the very opposite of
wnat it had commended a moment before.*

ui^t Irill^'r "^ T-'"'^';'"' '^'"^'- '^'••^ '"-''"'-'"r of the author
m.f^ ht in itsel he not ,jr„ohIe. since he was stiiml to indignation
;v he false thoones to whi.-h is attached especially the n^a e o
Kou..eau, and hy the a.ten.pt to pnt then, in operation. B„t
-Vi>. . Jlaller, ,n onler to save himself, has tluown himself into a

efo.e l,e .aul to have any stan.lin;.,^.^,nnd. He expresses the
l.itteres hatred of ail law. legislation, and all forn.allv and le^a llv

ri: h ': he nn- , r'T' '' ^''^" '''''' '""^ '' legally eonstiulnid
uj,lit IS the shihholeti., by .neuns of wl.ieh are revealed and mav

111

4! {I

244

TIIK PHII.O.SOl'HY OF RKMIT.

Addition.— The state as a (.'onipleted reality is tlic
ethical whole and the actualization of freedom. It is
the absolute i)uriH)se of reason that freedom should ho
actualized. The state is the sj)irit, which abides in the

l»e mfallibiy leeojjfMizod fanaticism, mental inihocility, and the
hypocrisy of jjood intention.s, let them disj,'ui,se them.selves as they
will.

Sucii an originality as that of Mr. v. IlallerV is always a note-
wortliy phenomenon, and for those of my readers wiio do not yet
know the work, I shall (jnote a few i)assaues in l)roof of my con-
tention. Mr. V. H. (p. U2 tr., vol. i.) thus exhil.its his funda-
mental proposition : "In the inorj-anic realm the f:reater oppresses
the smaller, and the mij-hty the feehle ; so is it also with animals,
and the .same law in more honourable forms, and often indeed iil
dishonourahle forms, appears a-iain in man." " It is tiie eternal,
unchan^reahle decree of (Jod that the m(»re powerful rules, nuist
rule, and will ever rule." From these sentences, and from' those
jjiven further on, it nuiy he seen in what sense the word " power"
is here used. It not the power of ri^dit and the etliioai, hut the
eontin<,'ent force of nature. This he ])roceeds to make j,M)od upon
this amonjjst other grounds (p. mr^ and fol.), that by an adn)irahle
and wise ])rovision of nature the feel in*;- of one's own superiority
irresistibly eiuiches the character, and favours the develoi)ment of
the very virtues which are most necessary in dealinj- with sub.
ordinates. He asks, with nuich rhetoric, " whether in tlie kin-,n!om
of science it is the stronjr or the weak, who are flie more inclined
to use authority and trust, in order to aid their lowsellish jiurposes,
and for the ruin of conlidin;;' men, whether the 'iiajorily of the
lawyers are nor. pettifojrjrtMs and pedants, wiio betray the hoi»es of
confiding' clients, make white black and black white, u.se the law
as a vehicle of wroiiy, brino; ihose wiio seek their protection to
bejrj:ary. and, like the hunyry vulture, tear in pieces the innocent
lamb, etc." Mr. v. H. has here for<,^ot)en that he is employin;;
this rlietoric in support of his sentence that the rule of the stroufrcT
is the eternal ordinance of (Jod, the very same ordinance by virtue
of which the vulture tears to pieces the innocent lamli. He seems
to .say that the .stronj^er are quite ri<:lit in usin;; their kmmled^'e
of the law to jdiuider the feeble trustinj; clients. |{ut it would be
asking' too much of him to brinu two thou<,'hts iiUo relatiftn when
he has not one.

It is .self-evident that Mr. v. II. is an enemy of statute-books.
Civil laws in <;eneral are in liis view " uiuiecessary, since they Issue

■nil-: .STATK

241

is th«'

It is

onkl ho

s in the

,Vil i! ,"■? '■'""?" "*''f -'»«»"»'>■ ; whilu i„ nature
w reahzed ouly as ti.e „ther „f it.el( or tlu, deepiug spirit
0..b- when It IS preseut in o„„«ei„„suess, kuowint/itJlt is an
it. self-evident fioiM imtiiml U». states ,i„,.e ,,..,„. ,T

with the will .,f tl.. J '. ', -^ "'*^"' ""^"'^ «i^'<]uainted

I. ^i: Vt '-1 !'". ^ " '^''"""i^f'atiun of the htw (vol. i.

I'- -.'/ , pt. 1. p. 2o4, and elsewhere) i« not a duty of the state l.n
. < onahon o.- a.si.tan.e l,v the stron,, and i. '^,.1 t.^ L.'. ^
ary. Of the means tor the pn.tec.tion of rights the enn I 3t

obs u of 1 'V ' ""'^ ""'• '""•'«'■" 'a^v.seholar.s, and

lobs us o tl e three other means, which lea.l most cnicklv -md
certainly to the end. the means which friemllv n-Lt„riT.
.nan for the security of his ri.htfnl freelh'^ 't ::: 'Z^^

.« w^. frieiidly nature : >• C.:^t;::J':u^-Z::Z'\

^^ipie this siih;:;:i^:'e;;;:: u^:^::t':::\i^::;::^ixr

stronger ) <. W,.„. no n.an who does not w .. ?tl " 'l t ..:!
notlnng hut what he owes thee." ,»ut what does'i.e ^e - ' Ve
.tnd more, love thy nei,^hhour an.l use hin. when thou c' nst " U
«8 to be the planting of this law which is to n.ake le isl ti „ ...
-n.tUuti.u>s useless. It wouhl be worth se ^^, ^^"m "^ ''"^
n.akes n u.teihgible that, irrespective of this phu.tin" ie /isl ui n
ami constitutums have con.e into the world 't„>sl.ition

">t Its, tliat IS, the laws and constituti(ms of nations Kverv

ega Iv const.tute.1 right is in this larger use of the word a libmv

Of hese laws he says this, an.ongst other things, " that 1 ei o /

en .s usua ly very insignilicant, although in I^h ks -n-eat t ess is

;"«l "l-n these ,lo,.u,nentary liberties." When w^ r alLe hat

t e autlmr me,u.s the national liberties of the (JernI Km ^ "

o he KngUsh nation (the C/nrrta Ma.,nu, '.which h mCer s

l.ttle read, ami, Wcause of its anti-iuated expressi, .s, ^^^^^^^

stoo.l, and the lU// of lU.nts), and the national liberties fie

iJI

■

1 \

ill

246

THK PirrLOSOPIIV OF RIGHT,

existiii<r object, is it the state. In thinking of freedom we
iniist not take our de])arture from individuality or the
individual's self-oonsciousness, but from the essence of

|»eoi)Ie of Hmijrfiry and other hmcU, we are surprised to learn tliat

as insifjnifioant. As
aws, wliioh are of daily and

lie reo;ards these so hi «,dily- valued ])ossessions
great a surprise is it to hear that the 1

hourly concern, dealiuMr with every piece of cloth tliat is worn and
every piece of bread that is eaten, should have a value nierelv in
books, ''

As for the {.-eneral statute-hook of Prussia, to quote only one
thuifr more, Mr. v, H, has not one good word to say for it (vol. i.
p. 18.-) fol.), because upon it the unphilosoidiical errors (not as yet
the Kantian philosophy, at any rate, I must add, against which Mr
y. H, invei-hs nu)st bitterly of all) have had a bad ettect, especially
in tlie matters of the state, nati(m,al wealth, the end of the state
the head of the state, his duties, the servants of the state, an<i
such things. What most annoys Mr. v. H. is " the right to lew
contributions upon private possessions, occupations, ]>i"oductions,
and consumptions, in order to defray the expenses of the state.'
As state-wealth is not the i)rivate possession of the prince, but is
qualitied as the wealth of the state, neither the king himself nor
any Prussian citizen has anything his own, neither body norgooi^,
and all the subjects becmne legal bondmen. They dare not with-
draw themselves from tlie service of the state."

In all this incredil>le crudity there is a touch of the ludicnms in
the unspeakable pleasure which Mr. v. H. feels in his (.wn revela-
tions (vol. i.,p,rf(m'). It was "a joy, such as only a friend of
truth can feel, when he aftei- an honest investigation is assured
that he has hit upon as it were" (yes, indeed, J.v it nrrr .') "the
voice of nature or the W(.rd of God." (The won! of (;o<l is in its
revelation quite distinct from the voice of nature and of the
natural man.) "And when he might have sunk dc.wn in sheer
amazement, a stream of joyous tears sprang from his eyes, and
from that moment living religiosity arose within him." Mr. v. H.
ought rather, in his religiosity, to have wept over his fate as the
hardest chastisement of (Jod. It is the most severe imnishment
which can be experienced to wander so far from tlK)ught and
reason, from reverence for the law and from the knowledge of how
inhnitely important and divine it is that the duties of the state
and the rights of the citizens, as also the rights of the state and
the duties of the citizens, shonld be legally determined, to wander
so far from this as t«. substitute an absurdity for the word of (Jod.

THE STATE,

247

self.consciousness. Let man be aware of it or not. this
essence realizes itself as an independent power, in which
particular persons are only phases. The state is the march) A; L^-U^-.-* ^
of God in the world; its ground or cause is the power of^T V^xUc. J-Jl
i-eason_real,zing itself as will. When thinking of the ide"^ ^ 0^^^,'-^-IM
of the state, we miist not have in our mind any particular
state, or particular institution, but must rather contem-
plate the idea, this actual God. by itself. Although a
state may be declared to violate right principles and to be
defective m various ways, it always contains the essential
moments of its existence, if. that is to say, it belongs to
the full formed states of our own time. But as it is more
easy to detect short-comings than to grasp the j.ositiv.
meaning, one easily falls into the mistake of dwellin.. so
mucli upon special aspects of the state as to overlook its
inner organic being. The state is not a work of art It
IS in the world, in the sphere of caprice, accident, and
error. Evi behaviour can doubtless disfigure it in mauv
ways but the ugliest man. the criminal, the invalid, th;
cripple are living men. The positive thing, the life, is
present in spite of defects, and it is with this affirmative
that we liave here to deal,

259 (a) The idea of the state has direct actuality in the
individual state. It. as a self-referring organisn^ is the i

cons itution or internal state-organization or politv «

(6) It passes over into a relation of the individual
state to other states. This is its external organization or
polity. o J

(c) As universal idea, or kind, or species, it has absolute ^
authority over individual states. This is the spirit wliich

gives Itself reality in the process of world-history. M

^^/,o„.__The state as an actual thing is pre-eminentlv I

indrvidual. and. what is more, particular. Individ ualirV I

as distinguished from particularity is an element of ihr ll

Idea of the state itself, while particularitv belongs to f

history. Any two states, as such, are independent of each |

;i fi

ftH^ ^.^''

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

.«' -^ 4

1.0

I.I

b;|2j8 |2.5

|jo "^ w^m

^ 1^ 12.2
1^ 12.0

1.25 1 U j^

^ 6"

►

Photographic

Sciences
Corporation

33 WIST MAIN STRUT

WMSTIR,N.Y. MSSO

(716) 17^-4503

A"^
W^'

^^4^

21.8

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT.

Other Any relation between the two must be external.
A third must therefore stand above and unite them. Now
th,s third 18 the spirit, which gives itself reality in world-

ttrYl' T . ''^1^'"' ''''^^ "^^"^"*^ J"^^« -- states.
Several states indeed might form an alliance and pass

judgment upon others, or interstate relations may arise of
the nature of the Holy Alliance. But these things are
always relative and limited, as was the everlasting peace.
The sole, absolute judge, which always avails against the
particular, is the self-caused self-existing spirit, wh ch
presents itself as the universal and efficient leaven of world
history.

A. Internal Polity.

260. The state is the embodiment of concrete freedom
i In this concrete freedom, personal individuality and its
particular mterests. as found in the family and civic com-
munity. have their complete development. In this con-
•Tete freedom, too. the rights of personal individuality
receive adequate recognition. These interests and rights
pass partly of their own accord into the interest of the
umversal. Partly, also, do the individuals recognize by
their own knowledge and will the universal as their own
siibstantive spirit, and work for it as their own end
Hence, neither is the universal completed without the
assistance of the particular interest, knowledge, and will
nor. on the other hand, do individuals, as private persons'
, jve merely for their own special concern. They regard
he general end. and are in all their activities consciou's of
this end. The modern state has enormous strength and
depth, in that it allows the principle of subjecUvity to
(omple e itself to an independent extreme of personal
particularity, and yet at the same time brings it blck into
he substantive unity, and thus preserves particularity in
tlie principle of the state. ^

Additiou.-The peculiarity of the idea of the modern

THE STATE.

249

state IS that it is the embodiment of freedom, not accord- -.
ng to subjective liking, but to_the cojiception of the will, 7
the wil, that ,s, m its universal and divine ihamcter *
Incomplete states are they, in which this idea is still only
a germ, whose particular phases are not permitted to
ma ure mto self-dependence. In the republics of classical
antiquity universality, it is true, is to be found. But in
those ages particularity had not as yet been released from
Its fetters, and led back to universality or the universal
purpose of the whole. The essence of'the modern stat
binds together the universal and the full freedom of par-
ticularity. including the welfare of individuals. It inslts
hat the interests of the family and civic community shall
nk themselves to the state, and yet is aware that the
miiversal purpose can make no advance without the private
knowledge and will of a particularity, which mustldher^
o Its right. The universal must be actively furthered

v^ali:? , '''7 i'': ^"'^'^^"^^^^ ^-«* be- wholly and
vitally developed. Only when both elements are present ?

261. In contrast with the spheres of private right and
pnvate good, of the family and of the civic community,
he state is on one of its sides an external necessity. It f
thus a higher authority, in regard to which the laws and U
interests of the family and community are subject and ^
dependent. On the other side, however, the state is the'-^ U.w^.
nulwelhng end of these things, and is strong in its union '^--^'■'-* ^^--^
of the universal end with the particular interests of in- U '' ' '

Uiv^duals Thus just so far as people have duties to fulfil I
towards It, they have also rights (§ 155).

Note.--Welmve already noticed (§ 3, note) that Mon-
U'Hquieu in his famous work. '• The Spirit of the Laws "
has kept before his mind, and sought to prove in detail
the thought that the laws, especially those of private right
a^e dependent upon the character of the state. He has

250

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGH'I'

[maintained the philosophic view that the part is to be
; regarded only in relation to the whole.

Duty is, in the first instance, a relation to something,
which IS for me a substantial and ^elf-subsisting nniversal
Kight, on the other hand, is in general some embodiment
of this substantive reality, and hence brings to the front
Its particular side and my particular freedom. These two
thuigs, treated formally, appear as deputed to different
phases or persons. But the state as ethical, implying
thorough mterpenetration of the substantive and the par-
ticular, brings into light the fact that mv obligation to the
substantive reality is at the same time the realization of
my particular freedom. In the state, dutv and right are
bound together in one and the same referenc'e. But because
in the state the elements of right and duty attain their
peculiar shape and reality, the difference between them
once more becomes manifest. While they are identical in
themse.ves or formally, they differ in content. In private
right and morals the necessity inherent in the relation
fails to be realized. The abstract equality of content is
alone brought forward. In tliis abstract region what is
right for one is right for another, and what is one man's
duty IS also another man's duty. This absolute identity
«t right aud duty occurs, when transferred to the content,
simply as equality. This content, which is now to rank as
the comp ete universal and sole principle of duty and
nght, IS the personal freedom of men. Hence, slaves have
no duties, because they have no rights, and vice versa,
religious duties, of course, falling outside of this dis-
eussion.

But when we turn from abstract identity to the concrete
Idea, the idea which develops itself within itself, right and
auty are distinguished, and at once become different in con-
tent. In the family, for example, the rights of the son are
"ot the same m content as his duties towards his father,
nor are the rights of the citizen the same in content as his

THK STATK

ive

duties to his prince or government.— The conception of the|
union of duty and right is one of the most important!
features of states, and to it is due their internal strength .r^xvU^'uj'^
—The abstract treatment of duty insists upon casting aside
and banishing the particular interest as something un-
essential and even unworthy. But the concrete method,
or the idea, exhibits particularity as essential, and the
satisfaction of the particular as a sheer necessity. In
carrying out his duty the individual must in some way or
other discover his own interest, his own satisfaction and
recompense. A right must accrue to him out of his rela-
tion to the state, and by this right the universal concern
becomes his own private concern. The particular interest
shall in truth be neither set aside nor suppressed, but Ic
placed in open concord with the universal. In this concord
both particular and universal are inclosed. The individual, I
who from the point of view of his duties is a subject, finds, |
in fulfilling his civic duties, protection of person and '
property, satisfaction of his real self, and the consciousness
and self-respect implied in his being a member of this
whole. Since the citizen discharges liis duty as a per-
formance and business for the state, the state is per-
manently preserved. Viewed from the plane of abstrac-
tion, on the other hand, the interest of the universal would
be satisfied, if the contracts and business, which it demands ,
of him, are by him fulfilled simply as duties.

Addition.— Eyerythin^ depends on the union of imiver-
sality and particularity in the state. In the ancient states
the sul)jective end was out-and-out one with the volition
of the state. In modern times, on the contrary, we
demand an individual view, and individual will and con-
science. Of these things the ancients had none in the sanir
sense. For them the final thing was the will of the state.
While in Asiatic despotisms the individual had no inner/
nature, and no self-justification, m the modern world man's)
inner self is honoured. The conjunction of duty and rigJi^

252

THE PHILOSOPHY OK lUCUT.

has the twofold aspect that what the state demands as
duty should forthwith be the right of iudividuality, since
the state's demand is nothing other than the organization
of the conception of freedom The prevailing characters
of the individual will are by the state brought into obiec
tive reality, and in this way first attain to their truth and
realization. The state is the sole and essential condition
^ ot the attainment of the particular end and good.
' 262. TM_actjiaUd£a, the spirit, divides itself, as we
have said, into the two ideal spheres of its conception, the
telly and tlJeJayic_cowmunit>^ It descends into its tv^o
Ideal and finite spheres, that it may out of them become
actually infinite and real. Hence, spirit distributes to in-
dividuals as a mass the material of its finite realization in
these spheres, in such a way that the portion of the in-
dividual has the appearance of being occasioned by his
circumstances, < caprice, and private choice (S 185 and
note). '

j Addition.~ln the Platonic state subjective freedom ha.
not as yet any place, since in it the rulers assigned to in-
dividuals their occupations. In many oriental states occu-
pation depends upon birth. But subjective freedom, which
must be respected, demands free choice for individuals.

263 In these tw.) spheres, in which the elements of sinrit
individuality, and particularity, have in one their direct
and in the other their reflected reality, spirit is their objec-
tive universality in the form of appearan(.e. It is the power
ot tlie rational in the region of necessity (§ 184) and
becomes the institutions, which have already been ini^sed
ill review. '

^,''^'''"""- The state, as spirit, divides itself according
to the i)articular determining attributes of its conception
in order to exist in its own way. W<' mav adduce an
Illustration out of the region of nature. The nerve-system
is especially the sensitive system ; it is the abstract element
which aims, so to speak, to exist bv it^'lf, and in this

THE STATE.

263

existence to have its own identity. Now feeling, when
analyzed, furnishes two separate sides, dividing itself so
that the differences ap])ear as complete systems. On one
side is the abstract sense of feeling, which withdraws by
itself ; it is the smothered movement going on internallV
in reproduction, internal self-nourishment, assimilation,
and digestion. On the other hand this withdrawal int(i
oneself has over against itself the element of difference, or
the movement outwards ; and this outward movement of
feeling is irritability. These two form a system of their
own, and there are lower orders of animals, in which this
system alone is developed, being without that iinity of
feeling which marks the complete soul. If we compare
these facts of nature with the facts of spirit, we may place
together family and sensibility on the one side, civic com-
munity and irritability on the other. The third is the
state, corresponding to the actual nervous system as an in-
ternally organized whole. But it is a living unity only in
so far as both elements, the family and the civic com-
munity, are developed within it. The laws which govern
these two are the institutions of the rational ; it makes its
appearance in them. The foundation and final truth of
these institutions is the spirit, which is their universal
purpose and conscious object. The family is, indeed, also
ethical, but its purpose is not a conscious one. In the
civic community, on the other hand, sej)arati()u is the de-
finitive feature.

264. The individuals of a multitude are spiritual beings,
and have a twofold character. In them is the extreme of
the independently conscious and willing individuality, and
also the extreme of the imiversality, which knows anil wills
what is substantive. They obtain the rights of both these
aspects, only in so far as they themselves are actual, both
as private persons and as persons substantive. One right
they have directly in the family, the other in the civic
community. In these two institutions, which implicitly

254

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

universalize all particular interests, individuals have their
real self-conscious existence. And in the corporation thev
provide for these particular interests a wider scope, and an
activity directed to a universal end.

265. These institutions comprise in detail the constitu.
tion, that is, the developed and actualized rationality. They
are the steadfast basis of the state, determining the temper
of individuals towards the state, and their confidence in it.
They are, moreover, the foundation-stones of public free-
dom, because in them particular freedom becomes realized
in a rational form. They thus involve an intrinsic union
of freedom and necessity.

Addition.— It has been already remarked that both the
sanctity of marriage, and also the institutions, in which
the ethical character of the civic community makes its
appearance, constitute the stability of the whole. The
universal is the concern of every particular person. Every-
thing depends on the law of reason being thoroughly in-
corporated with the law of particular freedom. Mv
particular end thus becomes identical with the universal.
In any other case the state is a mere castle in the air. In
the general self-cousciousness of individuals the state is
actual, and in the identity of particularity and universality
it has its stability. It has often been said that the end of
the state is the happiness of tiie citizens. That is indeed
true. If it is not well with them, if their subjective aim is
not satisfied, if they find that the state as such is not the
medium through which tomes their satisfaction, the state
stands upon an insecure footing.

266. But spirit is realized and becomes its own object
not only as this necessity and as a kingdom of appearances'
but as their ideality or inner being. Substantive univer-'
sahty is thus an object and end for itself, and necessitv
assumes the form of freedom.

267. By the necessity, which lies within this ideality, is
meant the development of the idea within itself. As sub-

TIIK STATK.

2S5

ave their
tion they
?, and an

constitu-
ty. They
e temper
ice in it.
)lic free-
realized
ic union

both the
Q which
akes its
3. The

Every-
ghly in-
x>. My
liversal.
lir. lu
state is
ersality
'■ end of

indeed
3 aim is
not the
le state

object,
ranees,
univer-
cessity

lity, is
.s sub-

jective substantiahty the idea is a political temper of
mmd, and in distinction from this it, as objective, is the
organism of the state, i.e., the strictly political state, and
its constitution.

Addition.-The unity of the freedom, which knows and
wills Itself, exists in the first instance as necessity. Here
the substantive is found as the subjective existence of
mdividuals. But there is a second necessitv, and that
.18 the organism. In this case spirit is a prJcess within
Itself, makes within itself distinctions, divides itself into
orgamc members, through which it passes in living circu-
lation. °

268. Political disposition.or, in general terms, patriotism
may be defined as the assurance which stands on truth
and the will which has become a custom. Mere subjective
assurance does not proceed out of truth, and is only opinion
Genuine patriotism is simply a result of the institutions
which subsist in the state as in the actualitv of reason
Hence, patriotic feeling is operative in the acU which is in
accord with these institutions. Political sentiment is
m general, a confidence, which may pass over into a more
or less intelligent insight; it is a consciousness that
my substantive and particular interest is contained and
preserved in the interest and end of another, here the state
in Its relation to me, the individual. Wherefore the state
IS for me forthwith not another, and I in this consciousness
am free.

Note.~By patriotic feeling is frequently understood
merely a readiness to submit to exceptional sacrifices or do
exceptional acts. But in reality it is the sentiment which
arises in ordinary circumstances and ways of life, and is
wont to regard the commonweal as its substantive basis
and end. This consciousness is kept intact in the routine
of hfe, and upon it the readiness to submit to exceptional
effort IS based. But as men would rather be magnanimous
than merely right, they easily persuade themselves that

266

Tills l'HII.OSO[>Hy o|.- ||„;itT.

they possess this eKtmordinary patriotism, iu order to
spare themselves the burden of the true sen iment and t,!

thmg wh eh provides its own I^^Mnniug, and can proceed
out of sub]eet,ve imaginations and thoughts, it s T,
founded wuh mere opinion, and in that case is devoid ofrts
true basis m objective reality

I in.1t!!dt;it''rd""'"'r? ''^"«'" '» -*— on.
I ngs and fault-findings. Pault-flnding is an easv matter

hut hard is it to know the good and its inn rue"!^ t?

Education alwajs begins with fault-finding, but wlen mI

and complete sees in everything the positit. In the ^^^

of rehgion one may say off-hand that this or that is suSr

stition, but it is infinitely harder to conceive t"e tr^th

involved in It. Political sentiment, as a mere ap Llo^

IS also o be distinguished from what men tr^^wm

They will mfact the real matter, but thev hold f J t^, ^

trust m the stability of the state, and suppose that i^
.t only the particular interest can come into teTn„ B^t

ZT If '"'''"' "'^' "P"" "'"'" o- -hoiref istenc
it r.; r^ ""' T' '"'" *''"'"8'' *'« «t'«ets at night
tfTffr"" *" '■''" ""'^ " «""" '>« "tlerwise. The'
habit of feeling secure has become a second nature and we
do not reflect that it is first brought about by the a-enlv

LTZ rf """"""■ 0"^" ■' '» imagined hat S
holds the state together, but the binding cord is nothhi!

elsejhan the deep-seated feeling of order, Ihich is Xs2

269. Political disposition is given definite content by the
different phases of the organism of the state. This o^U^
ism IS the development of the idea into its difference'
which are objectively actualized, These differenTar^
Uie different functions, affairs, and activities of sZT By
means of them the universal uninterruptedlv produces
Itself, by a process which is a necessary one, -siuce thele

i order to
ent, and to
d as some-
an proceed
it is con-
ivoid of its

ce-reason-
sy matter,
necessity,
when full
n the case
t is super-
the truth
>pearance,
'uly will.
3t to bits,
ts. Men
5 that in
ng. But
existence
at night,
36. The
?, and we
e aj'encv
I at force
nothiug^
'ossessed

t by the
s organ-
erences,
ices are
te. By
roduces
e these

lirii STATE.

257

various ofhces proceed from the nature of the conception
The umyersal is, however, none the less self-contained,
ZZ ^l^ ""^-"^ Pr««»PPosed in its own productive
process. This organism is the political constitution.

Mddxon.~-^\,^ state is an organism or the deyelopment
of the Idea into its differences. These different sides are
the different functions, affairs and actiyities of state
^ means ot which the uniyersal unceasingly produces
tself by a necessary process. At the same time it is self-con-
tamed, since it is presupposed in its own productive actiyity.
This orgamsm is the political constitution. It proceeds
eternally out of the state, just as the state in tur^ is self!
contained by means of the constitution. If these two
things fall apart, and make the dift-erent aspects inde-
pendent, the unity produced by the constitution is no

abfrn. it'- ?^^^^ *"" ^^^"^^^^^ ^« i""«trated by the .
fable of the belly and the limbs. Although the parts of an
organism do not constitute an identity, yet it is of such a
nature that, if one of its parts makes itself independent, all
must be harmed. We cannot by means of predicates, pro-
positions etc.. reach any right estimate of the state, which
should be apprehended as an organism. It is much
the same with the state as with the nature of God. who
cannot be through predicates conceiyed, whose life rather
IS within itself and must be perceived.

270. (1) The abstract actuality or substantiality of the^
state consists in this, that the end pursued by the state is '
the general interest, which, being the substance of all/
particular interests, includes the preservation of them
aJso. (2) But the actuality of the state is also the
necessity of the state, since it breaks up into the various
distinctions of state-activity, which are implied in the
concep ion. By means of the state's substantiaUty these

public offices. (3) This substantiality, when thoroughly
permeated l>y education, is the spirit which knows and

258

THE PHILOSOPHY OF WIGHT.

wills itself. Hence, what the state wills it knows, and
knows it in its universality as that which is thought out.
The state work« and acts in obedience to conscious ends,
known princii^les and laws, which are not merely implied,
but expressly before its consciousness. So, too, it works
with a definite knowledge of all the actual circumstances
and relations, to which the acts refer.

JVb^e.— We must here touch upon the relation of the
state to religion. In modern times it is often repeated
that religion is the foundation of the state, and accom-
panying this assertion is the dogmatic claim that outside
of religion nothing remains to political science. Now, no
assertion can be more confusing. Indeed, it exalts con-
fusion to the place of an essential element in the con-
stitution of the state, and of a necessary form of know-
ledge. — luj the first place it may seem suspicious that
religion is principally commended and resorted to in times
of public distress, disturbance, and oppression; it is
thought to furnish consolation against wrong, and the
hope of compensation in the case of loss. A proof of
religious feeling is considered to be indifference to worldly
afl'airs and to the course and tenor of actual life. But the
state is the spirit, as it abides iu the world. To refer
people to religion is far from calculated to exalt the interest
and business of the state into a really earneso purpose. On
the contrary, state concerns are held to be a matter of pure
caprice, and are therefore rejected. The ground for this
step is that in the state only the purposes of passion and
unlawful power prevail, or that religion, when taken by
itself, is sufficient to control and decide what is right. It
would surely be regarded as a bitter jest if those who were
oppressed by any despotism were referred to the consola-
tions of religion ; nor is it to be forgotten that religion
may assume the form of a galling superstition, involving
the most abject servitude, and the degradation of man
below the level of the brute. Amongst the Egyptians and

THE STATE.

259

[nows, and
lought out,
cious ends,
tly implied,
3, it works
3umstances

;ion of the
n repeated
nd aocom-
bat outside
Now, no
exalts con-
a the con-
i of know-
icious that
to in times
ion ; it is
f, and the
L proof of
to worldljr
. But the
T»» refer
he interest
rpose. On
ter of pure
id for this
assion and
taken by
right. It
s who were
e con sola-
it religion
, involving
n of man
ptians and

Hindoos animals are revered as higher creatures than man.
Such a fact leads us to observe that we cannot speak of
religion in general, and that when it assumes certain
forms security must be found against it in some power
which will guarantee the rights of reason and self-con-
sciousness.

But the ultimate judgment upon the connection of
religion with the state is obtained only when we go back
to their conception. Eeligion has as its content absolute
truth, and, therefore, also the highest kind of feeling.
Religion, as intuition, feeling, or imaginative thought, the
object of whose activity is God, the unlimited basis and
cause of all things, advances the claim that everything
should be apprehended in reference to it, and in it should
receive its confirmation, justification, and certitude. By
this relation state and laws, as well as duties, attain for
consciousness to their highest verification and most binding
power, since they, as a determinate reality, pass up into
and rest upon a higher sphere. (See " Encyclopedia of
the Philosophical Sciences.") For this reason in all the
changes and chances of life religion preserves the con-
sciousness of the unchanging and of the highest freedom
and contentment.^

Religion, so interpreted, is the foundation of the ethical
system, and contains the nature of the state as the divine

» Reli-ion, knowledge, and science have as principles forms
peculiar to themselves and ditlerent from that of the state. Hence
they enter the state partly as aids to education and sentiment'
partly as ends for themselves, having an external reality. In botli
cases the principles of the state are merely applied to these spheres
In a fully concrete treatise on the state these spheres, as well as
art and the mere natural relations, would have to be .onsidered
and given their proper place. But in this treatise, where the
principle of the state is traversed in its own peculiar sphere in
accordance with its idea, these other principles, and the applica
tion to them of the right of the state, can receive only a passin*'
notice. •'I. o

' I

M i

260

THK PHILOSOPHY OF HlfiHT.

• will; jt't it is only the foundation. This is tho point at
which state and religion separate. The state is the divine
will as a present spirit, which unfolds itself in the actual
shape of an organized world.

They who adhere to the form of religion, as opposed to
the state, conduct themselves like persons who in know-
ledge think that they are right when they cling to a meie
abstract essence and never proceed to reality, or like those
who will only the abstract good, and arbitrarily postpone
deciding what in fact is good (§ 140, vote). Religion is
the relation to the absolute in the form of feeling, imagina-
tion, faith; and within its all-embracing <ircumferoncel
everything is merely accidental and transient. If this
form is obstinately maintained to be the only real and
valid determination for the state, the state, as an organiza-
tion developed into stable differences, laws, and regulations,
is hand(>d over as booty to feebleness, uncertainty, and dis-
order. By enveloping everything definite this vague form
becomes a subjective principle. In contrast with it, the
laws, instead of having validity and self-subsistence as the
objective and universal, are counted as sonu'thing merelv
negative. There result the following practical maxims:
"The righteous man is not subject to law; only be juous
and you may do what you please ; yon may yield to yoiu-
own arbitrary will and passion, and direct those, who
suffer harm by your acts, to the comfort and hope of
\ religion, or you may brand them as irreligious." But this
negative relation sometimes refuses to remain merelv an
inner sentiment, and nuikes itself felt in external reality.
There then arises the form of religious fanaticism, whicii,
like political fanaticism, regards all state-maiiagement and
lawful order as restrictive barriers, and discards them as
unsuited to the inner lif,> and infinitude of feeling. It
banishes i)rivate jn-operty, marriage, and the rehitions and
tasks of the civic community, as unworthy of love and of
the freedom of feeling. But since in daily walk and action

THE STATK.

261

? point at
he diviiio
lit' actual

Imposed to
ill kuow-

a lueiv
like those

postpoiu'
'lifjiou is
iiimj,'ina-
mfercncf
If this
real and
oi'f^aniza-
nilations.
, and dis-
ixne form
h it, the
('(' as the
L,' nicrelv
maxims :
be j)ious

to your
Dse, who

hope of
But this
lerely an

1 reality.
1, which,
nent and
them as
lin^'. It
ions and
e and of
id action

some decision must he made, then here, as is always tlie
<-ase with the subjective will, whose subjectivity is aware
of Itself as absolute (§ 140), the decision proceeds from
subjective picture-thinking, that is, from opinion and
arbitrary inclination.

lu opposition to that kind of truth which wraps itself up
iu t le subjectivity of feeling and imagination, the real
truth consists in the tremendous transition of the inner
mto the outer, of the visions of reason into reality. By
this process the whole of world-history has been wrought
out, and civilized man has at length won the actuality and
the consciousness of a reasonable pohtical life. There are /
those who, as they say, seek the Lord, and in their un-
tutored opinion assure themselves of possessing ail things
<l"-^'<tly. They make no effort to raise their subjective
exi.enence into a knowledge of the truth and a con;ci(,us-
•less ot objective right and duty. From such persons can
proceed nothing except abomination and f,.llv, and the
<le.nolit.on of all ethical relations. These consequences'
are inevitable, if religious sentiment holds exclusively to
Its torm, and turns against reality and the truth, which is
present in the form of the universal, that is, of the laws.

.Stdl, this sentiment may not invade reality. On the
contrary, it may retain ijs merely negative character, thus
remammg something internal, suiting itself to the laws
and atlairs of state, and acp.iescing either with sighs
or with scorn and wishing. It is not strength, but weak-
Mess which has in our times made religiosity a polemic
kind of piety, be it conjoined with a true need, or with
iiothmg but disc-ontented vanity. Instead of mouldii...
<»ue8(,j>,nion through study, and subjecting one's will to
<Ii^cn.lim'. and thus exalting it to free oi.e.lience it is
"in.ch the cheaper j-lan to take a h-ss arduous course We
renounce all knowU-dge of t.bjective truth, treasure up a
teeling ot oppression and |u-ide, and claim to possess before-
liand all the holiness recpiisite for discerning the laws and

Hi
II

I I

262

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

institutions of state, for prejudging them, and specifying
what their nature ought to be. The ground for this" be-
haviour is that everything issues from the pious heart
unquestionably and infallibly. Thus, as intentions and
assertions go to religion for their support, neither by ex-
posing their shallowness nor their erroneousness is it
l)0ssible to prevail against them.

In so far as religion is of a true sort, not displaying a
negative and hostile spirit towards the state, but rather
recoguizing and supporting it, it has its own special place
and station. Public worship consists in acts and doctrine ;
it needs possessions and property, and likewise individuals
devoted to the service of the congregation. Out of this
arises between church and state a relation, which it is not
(iifficult to define. It is ii^ the nature of the case that the
state fulfils a duty by giving assistance and protection to the
religious ends of a congregation. More than that, since to
the deepest religious feeling there is present the state as a
whole, it may fairly be demanded by the state that every
individual should connect himself with some cougregatioii.
Of course, with its special character, depending on inner
imaginative thinking, the state cannot interfere. When
well organized and strong, the state can afford to be liberal
in this matter, and may overlook small details affecting
itself. It may even give room within itself to congregatitmr,
whose creed prevents them from recognizing any direct,
duties to it. But this concession must dei»end upon the
numerical strength of the sects in question. The members
of these religious boiliea the state is content to leave to the
laws of the civic community, and to accept a i)assive
fulfilment of their direct duties to it by means of sul)-
stitutes.'

' Of Quakers, Aiml.aptists, etc., it may be said tliat tliev arc

merely active inenil»ers of tlie oivie ooi unity, iiavir as private

perMoiis only piivato relations witli otliers. Kveu liere, liowever.
thoy liave l)een i)erniitte(l to fore^r,, the use of tiie oatii. Direet

THE STATE.

263

speoifying
r this be-
ous heart
tioiis and
lei' by ex-
less is it

playing a
ut rather
!cial place
doctrine ;
divicluals
it of this
1 it is not
i that the
ion to the
:, since to
it ate as a
lat every
[relation,
on inner
. When
lie liV)eral
affect inj^'
egations,
ly direct
upon the
members
ve to thi'
I ])as8ive
of 8ub-

tliey lire
iH IM'ivatc

how over.
I. Direct

So far as the ecclesiastical body owns property, performs
overt acts of worship, and maintains individuals for this
service, it leaves the inner realm and enters that of the
world. Hence it places itself directly under the jurisdic-
tion of the state. The oath, ethical observances generallv,
as well as marriage, all carry with them the inner recon-
struction and elevation of that disposition of mind which
finds in rehgiou its deepest confirmation. Since ethical
state duties they fulfil passively. To one of the .r ,.st important of
these, that of detence against an enemy, they openly refuse to
sulmnt. an.l are yrante.l release from it on condition of their huI,-
stitutmj;' .some other service. T<»wards these sects the state is
expected to exercise toleration. Since they do not recognize their
duties to It, they cannot claim the right to be me.nbers of it. (Jnce
in a North American Congress, when the abolition of the slavery
of the negroes was being strongly advocated, a deputy from the
Nouthern States made the apposite remark, " Let us have negroes-
we let you have tiuakers."-Only because the state is otherwise
s nmg can it ov-erlook and tolerate these anomalies. It relies upon
the strength of its moral observances, and upon the inner reason
of Its institutions to diminish and overcome <livisions, which it
Avouhl nevertheless be within its strict right to abolish. So, too,
states have had a formal right against the Jews in regard to tic'
concession to them of even civil rights, because they are not
merely a rehgious body, but claim to look upon themsdves as a
foreign nati.m. But the outcry raised against them on this and
other grounds has overlooked the fact that thev are first of all
.ncn and that to be a man is more than a superfioial abstra<-t
qualification i^ 20 ), ../.)• The civil rights implied in it give rise
to a feeling of self-respect, the sense of counting as a lawful pers.m
in the c.v.c community. This feeling of being infinite and free
Iron, all others i.s the root out <»f wbh-h springs the needed balamv
of he various kinds of thought and sentiment. The isolation
with wln.'h the dews have been blamed it is better to preserve K
would have been a reproach an.l wrong for any state to Iwue
t^eluded them tor this reason. To do so would be t.. misun.Ier-
stand Its own principle, the nature and power of its objective
institutions (^ '2.W, nuf of ,n.tc). To expel the Jews on the prc-
ence that this course is in accor.lance with the highest justice
has pn.ved an unwise measure, whil,. the actual method emi.loyed
by the government has been shown to be wise an.l hononral'le

^ I

i: \\

264

THE PHlLO«OPHV OF K] JHT.

relations are essentially relations of actual rationality, the
rights of these relations are the first to be maintained in
reality, and to them is added ecclesiastical confirmation,
simply as their inner and more abstract side.— As to other
forms of ecclesiastical communion, such as doctrine, the in-
ternal is more important than the external. The same is
true of overt acts of worship and kindred matters, whose
legal side appears as independent, and belongs to the state.
The ministers and property of churches, it is true, are
exempt from the power and jurisdiction of the state.
Churches have also assumed jurisdiction over worldly
persons in all matters involving the co-operation of re-
ligion, such as divorce and the administration of the oath.—
In all affairs bearing the aspects of both church and state,
the political side, owing to its nature, is ill-defined. This
is observable even in relation to acts which are wholly civic
(§ 234). In so far as individuals, assembling for religious
worship, have formed themselves into a congregation or
corporation, they come under the supervision of the superior
' officers of state.

Doctrine has its province in conscience, and is founded
upon the right of the subjective freedom of self-conscious-
ness. This is the inner region, which as such does not
come within the sphere of the state. However, the state
also has a doctrine, in which its regulations, and whatever
in right, in the constitution, etc., is valid generally, exist
essentiaUy in the form of thought, as law. And as the
state is not a mechanism, but the reasonable life of self-
conscious freedom and the system of the ethical world, so
sentiment or feeling for it, and the conscious expression of
this feeling in the form of principles, are an essential
element in the actual state. Then, again, the doctrine of
the church is not merely the edict of conscience, but in the
form of doctrine is rather an outward expression, and that,
too. regarding a content, which has the most intimate <'on.'
uection with ethical i)rinciples and :l,v laws, and may

'•'Ill-: .STATK.

lality, the
Dtained in
firmation,
s to other
ne, the in-
le same is
3rs, whose
the state,
true, are
he state.
• worldly
on of re-
le oath. —
md state,
id. This
oily civic
religious
jation or
superior

founded
mscious-
does not
the state
^'hatever
Uy, exist
I as the
of self-
t^orld, so
!ssiou of
essential
trine of
t in the
lid that,
ate con-
id may

265

ween the T"" f " " ''^^'"'"" ^'^ ^^^^^^^«« ^-
Itrem a' :: "^^"%r^ ^^ ^^^'^^ ^^ ^^e church to

tnent lid t,f T^'7 "^f^ --template the spiritual
element and therefore the ethical element also, as is own

tLdoTTft' T fr^'- ^' --^y -teem itself as the

Ph re of tl 7 T *'? ''"^^^™ ^^ *^- --^<J. the

■spheie ot the transient and finite. It may count itself

rhlul ::T ' ^"^ ^ ''''''^' -rely a mfans.""uS
chunrti Vr''""P'"^"' ^"^tude is the denmnd of the
church t lat the state should let it have its own way and
should show to its doctrines unreserved respecrsiZi; be

r^m^^r T""'"' "^ T'' -'■^' '^' ^^'^^

theTonn ti n >i ' T''^ '^"""^'^^ ^^ '^' '^'^''^' i« that
the toimation oi doctrine is exclusively its function. Just,

spi tal r' ; " ''" ^^r ^" ^^^^ ^^^^^'--<1 that the
spmtual las been entrusted solely to its keeping science

and Wledge generally may occupy a similr^Xi '

Like the dmrch. they may fashion themselves into an

independent, exclusive organization, and mav with even

fhTiru^i'^^"^' "1- t;r-^-« - «iiing-;h:pLro"

tne chuich. Hence would be asked for science also indp
pendence of the state ; the state would be onl ^^ ZZnst
It, while it would l)e its own end.

In this connection it is unimportant whether the individuals
and i^nvsentatives, who minister to the congivgatrn have
gone the length of secluding themselves, leling ZiytZ
congregat.ons at large in subjection to the state, or w et 1 e

luiactei This general position, it may first of all be ob-
nerved coincides with the view that the sta^e in its fuida
n-t.ds takes into its protection and care the m^^
and trce-will of every person, simply in so far i ^ Xis

266

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

not lujuro tlie life, property, and free-will of any other.
Ihe state is thus considered as answoriiij? simply to our
needs. The higher spiritual element, absolute truth, is
counted as subjective religiosity or theoretical science, and
placed outside of the state. The state is merely the laity,
and must be absolutely respectful. That which is i)ecu-
harly ethical falls beyond its reach. Now it is a matter of
history that there have been barbaric times and circum-
stances, in which all high spiritual matters had their seat in
the church, and the state was only a worldly rule of force,
lawlessness, and passion. Abstract opposition was then
the main ])rinciple of actuality (§ 358). But it is too
blind and shallow a ]n-()ceedin<,^ to consider this view as
true and in accordance with the idea. The development of
the idea has rather demonstrated that the spirit as free and
rational is in itself ethical, that the true idea is actualized
rationality, and that this rationality exists as the state.
From this idea it is quite easy to 'infer that its ethical
truth assumes for the thinkin.? consciousness a content,
whi(!h is worked up into the form of universality, and is
realized as law. The state in general knows its own ends,
recognizes them with a clear consciousness, and busies
Itself with them in accordance with fundamental i>rin-
ciples.

As before remarked, religion has truth for its universal
object, but this content is merely given, and its funda-
mental princii.les are not recognized through thinking and
conceptions. Thus the individual is under an obligation,
which is grounded upon authority, and the testimony of
his own s[.irit and heart, in which is contained the element
of freedom, takes the form of faith and feeling. But it is
philosophic insight, which clearly recognizes 'that chur(;h
and state are not oppos*>d to each other on the question of
truth and rationality, but differ only in form. There were,
it is true, and still are, churches, which have nothing more
than a form of public worship ; but there are others, which,

II!
ill

TIIK STAT]:.

my other,
ply to GUI'

truth, is
ieiice, and

the laity,
1 is pecu-
matter of
d circum-
eir seat iu
B of force,
was then

it is tot>
s view as
)pment of
s free and
Lctualized
the state.
ts ethical
' content,
y, and is
)wn ends,
id busies
tal ])rin-

uuiversal
;s funda-
Inug and
Jlifjation,
imony of
' element
But it is
t church
estiou of
ere were,
ini]; more
•s, which,

267

though in them the form of worship is the main thing,
have also doctrine and instruction. Whenever the church
takes uj) the point of doctrine, and deals in its teaching
with objective thought and the principles of the etjiical and
rational, it passes over into the province of the state. It
pronounces authoritatively upon the ethical and right, uijoii
the law and institutions, and its utterance is believed. In
contrast with faith and the authority of the church, in con-
trast also with the subje(;tive convictions whicli it requires,
the state is that which knows. In its principles the con-
tent does not remain in the form of feeling and faith, but
belongs to the formed thought.

In so far as the self-caused and self-existing conteni
makes its appearance in religion as a particular content,
namely, in the form of doctrines peculiar to tlu> church as
a religious community, it does not fall within the scope of
the state. In Protestantism, it may be said, there are no
clergy who are considered to be the sole depositary ol' 7
church doctrine, because in this form of religicm there i.s •
no laity. Since ethical and political principFes i)ass over
into the realm of religion, and not only are established, but
must be established, in reference to religion, tlie state i.s
thus on the one hand furnished with religious confirmation.
On the other hand there remains to the state the right and
the form of self-conscious objective rationality, the right,
that is, to maintain objective reascm against the assertions,'
which have their source in the subjective form of truth, no
matter what deptli of certitude and authority surrounds
them Because the princi])le of the state's form is uni-
versal, and hence essentially the thought, freedom of
thought and scientific investigation issue from the state
It was a church that burnt Giordano Bruno, and forced
Galileo, who advocated the Copernican system, to recant
upon his knees.' Hence science, also, has' its place on the

' Laplace, in his " Darstellun- «les WeUsysterns," Hook V
oh. 4. writes. " Wl,,,,, (lalllco ,.i,hHshea his <Iiscoyerie«, to which

268

nil': PiiiLosoi'iiv OK HKiiir

side of the state, as it has the same element ».f form as tlie
stato ; Its end is knowledge, and ind(>ed tliou^rht out obiee-
tive trutli and rationality. Thou<,^it knowled^^e may, it is
true, fall trom science to mere opinion, and from princiijles
to mere reasonin-s. Applying, itself to ethical ohjc-cts and
l.e Mas Hs.siste.1 hy tl.. teIe.o..,,o an.l the phases „f Venus he
provcl ineontestahly that the eartli nu.vo.l. Unt the view h t
he eartl, .s u. .....Mon wan .lechtred by a„ asse,„hlv „f canlina

to he heretical. Wherenp.,,. (Jalileo, the fa.neus a,lvocate of tl s
view, was sunnmmecl before the [nquisition, an,l eo.r.pdle.I to re-
tract on paui o a severe in.pri.sonn.ent. 1„ a man of n.in.l the
pass.on for truth ,s one of the stn.n^^est ,.assions.-( Jalileo, co^^
vmce. by Ins own observations of the n.otion of the earth, thonj^ht
« . lonj, tune upon a new work in which he would un.l -rtake to
levelop all the proofs of his theory. Hut in <,nler at the s,u, e
.me to escape the persecution, of which he would have been the
ictun, he resolved t.» issue bis work in the form of a dialo-n.e
Letween three persons. Naturally, the advantage lav witl U e
advocate of .he Topernican syston.. 15ut since'^^Jaliieo d not
decide between then., a,.d ^ave every possible weight to e ob
.,ec .ons of the folh.wer of PtoIe,naus,'he had a rild.t to xp t
that he would not be distu.-bed in the enjoyn.ent Of that L
^^hlcl his ;r,.eat a-e and services deserved. Hut in his sixtieth
year he was a second time s,„Mm<.ne.l before the tribunal of the
I.i(luis,t.o,, was in.pnsoned, ami a;cai., asked to retract his views
under the threat of the ,.unish.nent which is meted out to a heietic
twice fallen. They induced hi,., to subscribe to the f<dlowin.. f o, m
of abjuration : ' I (Jalileo, who in my sixtieth year find myself
... perso,. betme the court. k,.eelin.. and looking, upon the holy
(.cspels w nch I touch with my hands, f<,rswear,;bj;ue, a,.d exe-
e.ate with h,mest l.ea.t a..,l true faith, the p.eposterous, false, a,.d
he,-etical .loct.-.ue of the m.»ti<.,. of the ea.th, et,..' What a .spec-
tacle ! An honou.abIe old ...an, celel>.ated tl.n.uj;!, a lon-r life
devoted to the investijraticm of nature, a^^ainst the witness of his
..wn consc.e.ice, .e.-ants upon his knees the t.-,.tl., which I... had
so eonv.nc.,.oly p.-oved. Hy the sentence of the rnquisition he
was co...le.....e.l to perpetual i...priso„n.e..t. A year afterwa.-.ls

tl.ro.,gh the ,ne.l.at.on of the (J.and-duke <,f Fhu-ence, he was set
a liberty -He .Led in 1642. His loss was .lephued by Eu,-ope
wh.cl. had been enl.f,d.tened by his labours an.l sti.-.ed to indi-ma:
t.on by the sentence j.assed by so detested a t.ibunal upon so
L'reat a man. ' '■

THE STATr;.

26!)

the orf?anizati<)u of the state, it may oppose their funda-
mental principles. This it may do with somethinfr „f the
same ]>retentiou,s claims, as tlie church nuikes with regard
to its peculiar belongings. It may rely upon mere oi)ininK.
as if It were reason, and upon the right, advanced hv sub-
jective self-consciousness, to be in its opinion and con-
viction free.

Already (§ 140, note) the princii.le of the subjectivity of
knowledge has been examined, and only a single remark
need now be added. On the one hand the state may treat
with infinite indifference oi)inion, in so far as it is mere
opinion, and has hence a mere subjective content. This
opinion, let it plume itself to any extent it pleases, contains
no true strength or force. The state is in the position of
the i)ainter, who in his work confines himself to the three
ground colours, and may treat with indifference the school-
wisdom which maintains that there are seven. But there
IS another side to the question. This opining of bad
principles constitutes itself a universal fact and corrodes
actuality. It is manifested as th«; formalism of uncon-
ditioned subjectivity, which would adopt as a ba-is the
scientific starting-point, would exalt the state-academies to
the presumptuous level of a church, and would then turn
them against the state. In opposition to this proceeding
the state must take und(>r its protection obiective truth and
the principle of the ethical life; and on the other .side in i
opposition to the church, which claims unlimited and un- \
<ronditional authority, the state has to uphoM as a general (
thing the formal right of self-consciousness to its own (
insight, conviction, and thought of what shall be reckoned ;
as objective truth.

There may also be mentioned here the unitv of state and
church, a union which is much canvnssed in modern times
and praised as the highest ideal. If the essential unity of
these two is the unity of true j,rincii)les with sentiment, it
IS also essential that along with this unitv should come into

270

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

specific existence the difference, which is in the form of
their consciousness. In an oriental despotism there already
exists the so frequently wished for unity of church and
state. Yet in it the state is not present, at least not that
self-conscious form of it, which is alone worthy of spirit
and includes right, free ethical life and organic develop-
ment. If the state is to have reality as the ethical self-
conscious realizati(m of spirit, it must be distinguished from
the form of authority and faith. But this distinction
arises only in so far as the ecclesiastical side is in itself
divided into separate churches. Then only is the state
seen to be superior to them, and wins and brings into
existence the universality of thought as the principle of its
form. To understand this we must know what universality
is, not only in itself, but also in its existence. It is far
from being a, weakness or misfortune for the state that
the church has been divided. Only through this division
has the state been able to develop its true character, and
become a self-conscious, rational, and ethical reality. This
division was an event of the happiest augury, telling
in behalf of the freedom and rationality of the church, and
also in behalf of the freedom and rationality of thought.

Addition.— The state is real. Its reality consists in its
realizing the interest of the whole in particular ends.
I Actuality is always the unity of universality and particu-
larity. Universality exists piecemeal in particularity.
Each side appears as if self-sufficient, although it is
upheld and sui^tained only in the whole. In so far as
this unity is absent, the thing is unrealized, even though
existence may be predicated of it. A bad state is one
which merely exists. A sick body also exists, but it has
no true reality. A hand, which is cut off, still looks like a
hand and exists, though it is not real. True reality is
necessity. What is real is in itself necessary. Necessity
consists in this, that the whole is broken up into the dif-
ferences contained in the conception. Then, as so broken

'iiri': STATK.

e form of
ire already
Imrch and
: not that
' of spirit
3 develop-
hical self-
shed from
iistinction
s in itself
the state
•ings into
iple of its
iversality
It is far
tate that
3 division
cter, and
:y. This
', telling
irch, and
ought.
sts in its
ar ends.

particu-
icularitj.
rh it is
far as

though
e is one
t it has
ks like a
?ality is
ecessity
the dif-

broken

271

up, it furnisiies a fast and enduring character, not that of
he fossil, but of that which in giving itself up always
begets itself anew. •"'

.J^V^^Tt"^^ '*''*' essentially belong consciousness
and thought. Hence the state knows what it wills, and
knows It as something thought. Since consciousness has
Its seat only in the state, science has its place also there
and not in the church. In despite of that, much has in
modern times been said to the effect that the state has
sprung into existence out of religion. The state is the
developed spirit, and exhibits its elements in the daylight
of consciousness. Owing to the fact that what lies in the
Idea walks forth into visible being, the state appears to be
somethmg finite, whose province is of this world, while
religion represents itself as the realm of the infinite Thus
he state seems to be subordinate, needing, since the finite
canno subsist by itself, the basis of the church. As finite
It IS thought to have no verification, and only in and

nfinitf tfZ '' "^"""^ ''''' ^"' ^PI--^^^ '^^ the
infinite. But th.s version of the matter is highlv one-
sided. The state is certainly in its essence of the' world
and finite having particular ends and functions. But its
being worldly is only one side of it. Only to a perception,
wh ch IS void of spirit, is the state merely finite. The
state has a vital soul, and this vitalizing powder is sub-

ectivity, which both creates distinctions and yet preserves
their unity. In the kingdom of religion there are also
distinctions and hnitudes. God is triune. Thus there are
three deter.ninations, whose unity alone is the spirit If
we would apprehend in a concrete way the divine nature,
we do so only through distinctions. In the divine kingdom
as in the worldly occur limits, and it is a one-sided view to
say that the worldly spirit or the state is merely finite for
reality is nothing irrational. A bad state is indeed pu'rely
finite and worldly, but the rational state is in itself
infinite. ,

27'^

THK PlIFLOSOPIIV OF KK.IIT.

I i

Secondly, it is said that the state luust accept iU iustifi-
cation from religion. The idea, as present in religion, is
spirit m the inner condition of feeling, but this same idea
It 18 which gives Itself worldliness in the state, and procures
tor Itself in consciousness and will an outward place and
reality. If we say that the state must be grounded on
religion, we mean only that the state must rest upon and
proceed from rationality. But this sentence can be under-
J'tood wrongly to mean that when the spirit of man is
bound by a religion which is not free, he is most adroitly
brougiit to political obedience. The Christian religion
however, is the religion of freedom. Yet even Christianit;
.nay be infected by superstition, and converted into an in-
strument of bondage. Thus, the doctrine that the state
should be founded on religion is perverted, when it is in-
terpreted to, mean that individuals must have religion in
order that their spirit, enchained by it, may be the more
readily oppressed in the state. But if we m'ean that rever-
ence should be felt for the state as the whole, of which
individua s are the branches, this feeling flows most easily
from philosophic insight into the nature of the statJ.
although If that insight should be lacking, religious senti,
ment may lead to the same result. So the state mav need
religion and faith. It yet remains essentially distinguished
from religion in that its commands are a legal ,luty it
being a matter of indifference in what spirit the duty is
performed, while the empire of religion, on the contrar/. is
the internal. Just as the state, if it were to make such a
claim as religion makes, would endanger the right of the
inner mind, so the church degenerates into a tyrannical
religion, if it acts as a state and imposes punishments

A third distinction, related to the foregoing, is that the
content of religion is and remains veiled ; feeling, sensi-
bility, and fancy are the ground on which it is built and
on this ground everything has the form of subiectivitv
The state, on the other hand, actualizes itself, and' gives its

THE STATE.

273

i its justifi-

rcligion, is
I same idea
lid procures

place and
ouuded on
t upon and
t be under-
of man is
ist adroitly
1 religion,
Inistianitv
into au in-

the state
n it is in-
I'eligion in

the more
ihat rever-

of which
lost easily
the state,
ous senti,
niay need
iuguished
1 duty, it
e duty is
utrary, is
ce such a
It of the
yrannical
ents.

that the
ig, sensi-
uilt, and
jectivity.

gives its

mXZVt 'f ''-'• ^' ''^'^'''''''y ^«- to i-«i«t upon
na..„g ,tsei good within the state, as it is wont to do in

s own territory, at would overturn the political organiza-
H;. f ^ Tf ^^«*'"«*ion has a broad and fair field

o thP f f ^:7^"t"/'^'^"" '""'^y'^^S - -l--y« referred
to the totality If this totality were to seize upon all the

political relations, it would be fanaticism. It would be

couldlT '^^^"^*!^^-^«l^^ - --y particular part, and
could not accomphsh Its desire except by the destruction
o the par icular. Fanaticism will not allow particular
difterences to have their way. The expression, " The pious

W" '"' *^"' ^'" '" '' "°*^^"^ --' *h- ^he decr'ee o
toreratrth;t ^,^fV''. "^//* ^P^-- «- «tate, cannot
tolerate that which is definitely constituted and destroys it.
A kindred type of mind is shown by him who permits
conscience or mternality to judge, and does not deddTon
general grounds. This internality does not in its develop-
ment proceed to principles, and gives itself no justification

IJTI,7 f V^' ''^^''y ^^ '^' «*^t^''^ll 1^^« are
cast to the wmds, and subjective feeling legislates. This

feeling niay be nothing but caprice, and yet this cannot b

ascertained except by its acts. But in so far as it becomes

acts or commands, it assumes the shape of laws, and is

Ob ect of this feehng, may also be regarded as a being who
determines But God is the universal idea, and is i/feet
mg the undetermined, which is not mature enough to deter-

ZZ .t^t""^^^^ T'' ^" " ^^"^^^P^*^ f^^- i« the state.
Ihe fact that every thmg in the state is firm and secure is

a bulwark against caprice and positive opinion. So religion
as such, ought not to rule. ^

Jill' J^^ ^'f !r^ constitution is (1) the organization
ot the state and the process of its organic life in reference
to Its own self. In this process the state distinguishes
withm Itself Its elements, and unfolds them into self-
subsistence.

274

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

(2) It is a single, exclusive iudividuality, and as such is
related to another. It turns its distinctive features towards
foreign states, and in so doing estaVdishes its self-subsisting
distinctions within itself in their ideality.

Addition. — Just as irritability in the living organism is
in one of its phases something internal, belonging to the
organism as such, so here also the reference to foreign
states has a bearing upon what is within. The internal
state as such is the civil power ; the direction outwards is
the military power, which, however, has a definite side
within the state itself. To balance both phases is one of
the chief matters of statesmanship. Sometimes the civil
power has been wholly extinguished, and rests only upon
the military power, as happened during the time'ol the
Roman emperors and Pretorian Guards. Sometimes, as in
modern days, the military power proceeds only out of the
civil power, as when all citizens are bound to bear arms.

I. Internal Constitution.

272. The constitution is rational in so far as the active
working divisions of the state are in accord with the
nature of the conception. This occurs when every one of
its functions is in itself the totality, in the sense that it
effectually contains the other elements. These elements,
too, though expressing ilie distinctions of the conception,
remain strictly within its ideality, and constitute one indi-
vidual whole.

JVo/e.— Concerning the constitution, as concerning reason
itself, there has in modern times been an endless babble,
which has in Germany been more insipid than anywhere
else. With us there are those who have persuaded them-
selves that it is best even at the very threshold of govern-
ment to understand before all other tiiiugs what a con-
stitution is. And they think that they have furnished
invincible proof that r^igion and piety should be the

THE STATE.

275

basis of all their shallowness. It is small wonder if this
prating has made for reasonable mortals the words reason,
illumination, right, constitution, liberty, mere empty
sounds, and men should have become ashamed to talk
about a political constitution. At least as one effect of
this superfluity, we may hope to see the conviction be-
coming general, that a philosophic acquaintance with such
topics cannot proceed from mere reasonings, ends, grounds,
and utilities, much less from feeling, love, and inspiration,
but only out of the conception. It will be a fortunate
thing, too, if those who maintain the divine to be incon-
e%wable and an acquaintance with the truth to be wasted
effort, were henceforth to refrain from breaking in upon
the argument. What of undigested rhetoric and edification
they manufacture out of these feelings can at least lay no
claim to philosophic notice.

Amongst current ideas must be mentioned, in connection
with § 269, that regarding the necessary division of the
functions of the state. This is a most important feature,
v/hich, when taken in its true sense, is rightly regarded as
the guarantee of public freedom. But of this those, who
thmk to speak out of inspiration and love, neither know
nor will know anything, for in it lies the element of de-
termination through the way of reason. The principle of
the separation of functions contains the essential element
of difference, that is to say, of real rationality. But as
apprehended by the abstract understanding it is false when
it leads to the view that these several functions are abso-
lutely independent, and it is one-sided when it considers
the relation of these functions to one another as negative
and mutually limiting. In such a view each function in
hostility to or fear of the others acts towards them as
towards an <»vil. Each resolves to oppose the others,
effecting by this oi)po8ition of forces a general balance, it
may be, but not a living unity. But the internal self-
Uiiection of the conception, and not any other purpofce or

276

THK PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

utility, contains the absolute source of the different func-
tions. On their account alone the political organization
exists as intrinsically rational and as the image of eternal
reason.

From logic, though indeed not of the accepted kind, we
know how the conception, and in a concrete way the idea,
determine themselves of themselves, and thereby abstractly
set up their phases of universality, particularity, and indi-
viduality. To take the negative as the point of departure,
and set up as primaiy the willing of evil and consequent
mistrust, and then on this sui^position cunningly to devise
breakwaters, which in turn require other breakwaters to
check their activity, any such contrivance is the mark of a
thought, which is at the level of the negative under-
standing, and of a feeling, which is characteristic of the
rabble (§ 244)._The functions of the state, the executive
and the legislative, as they are called, may be made inde-
pendent of each other. The state is, then, forthwith over-
thrown, an occurrence which we have witnessed on a vast
scale. Or, in so far as the state is essentially self-con-
tained, the struggle of one function to bring the other into
subjection effects somehow or other a closer unity, and
thus preserves only what is in the state essential' and
fundamental.

Addition.~In the state we must have nothing which is
not an expression of rationality. The state is the world,
which the spirit has made for itself. Hence it has a
definite self-begun and self-related course. Often we
speak of tlie wisdom of Ood in nature, but we must not
therefor,' believe that the physical world of nature is
higher than the world of sjiirit. Just so high as the spirit
stands above nature, the state stands above the jihysical
life. We must iience honour the state as the divine on
earth, and learn that if it is difficult to conceive of nature,
It is infinitely harder to apjirehend the state. That we in'
modern times have attained definite views concerning the

THE STATE.

277

ate m general and are perpetually engaged in speaking
about and manufacturing constitutions, is a fact of much
nnportance. But that does not settle the whole matter
It IS necessary further that we approach a reasonable
question xn the mind of rational beings, that we know
what IS essential, and distinguish it from what is merely
stnkmg. Thus, the functions of the state must indeed be
ais inguished ; and yet each must of itself form a whole
and also contain the other elements. When we speak of
the distinctive activity of any function, we must not fall
into the egregious eijor of supposing that it should exist
n abs ract independence, since it should rather be dis-
tmguishea merely as an element of the conception. If the
distinctions were to subsist in abstract independence, it is
as clear as light that two independent things are not able
to constitute a unity, but must rather introduce strife As
a result, either the whole world would be cast into' dis-
order or Jie unity would be restored by force. Thus, in the
Brench Revolution at one time the legislative function had
swallowed up the executive, at another time the executive
had usurped the legislative function. It would be stupid
m such a case to present the moral claim of harmony.
If we cast the responsibility of the matter upon feeling
we have indeed got rid of the whole trouble. But neces'
sary as ethical feeling is. it cannot evolve from itself the
unc ions of state. Whence it comes to pass that since
the dehnite functions are the whole implicitly, they com-
prise in their actual existence the total <.mception We
usually speak of the three functions of state, the legislative
.'xecutive. and judicial. The legislative corresponds to
niiiversality, and the excn-utive to particularitv ; but the
.]u<iicial IS not the third element <,f the conception. The'
.ndividuality uniting the other two lies bevond these
s])heres.

273 The political state is divided into three substantive
branches :

278

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

(ft) The power to fix and establish the uuiversal. This
is legislation. ^

(b) The power, which brings particular spheres and
individual cases under the universal. This is the function
of government,

(c) The function of the prince, as the subjectivity with
which rests the final decision. In this function the other
two are brought into an individual unity. It is at once
the culmination and beginning of the whole. This is
constitutional monarchy.

Note.— The perfecting of the state into a constitutional
monarchy is the work of the modern world, in which the
substantive idea has attained the infinite form. This is
the descent of the spirit of the world into itself, the free
perfection by virtue of which the idea sets loose from itself
its own elements, and nothing but its own elements, and
makes them totalities ; at the same time it holds them
within the unity of the conception, in which is found their
real rationality. The story of this true erection of the
ethical life is the subject matter of universal world-history.

The old classification of constitutions into monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy is based upon the substantive
unity which has not yet been divided. This unity has no
internal distinctions, is not an intrinsically developed
organization, and has not attained d(>pth and concrete
I rationality. From the standpoint of the ancient world the
classification is correct, because the imity of the ancient
state was a substantive whole, not as yet fully mature and
unfolded. The distinctions predicated of it must hence be
external, and refer merely to the number of persons in
whom this substantive unity should find an abode. But
these various forms of the state, which belong in this way
to different wholes, are in constitutional monarchy lowered
to their i)roj)er place as elements. In monarchy we have
a single person, in its executive several, in legishition the
multitude. But, as we have said, such merely quantita-

THE STATE.

279

tive distinctions are superficial, and do not account for the \
conception. Similarly, it is not to the point to speak so ^
much as we do of the democratic or aristocratic element in
the monarchy for the phases, described by these terms,
just in so far as they occur in a monarchy, are no longer
demwratic and aristocratic.

^ It is thought by some that the state is a mere abstrac
tion vhich orders and commands, and that it may be left
undecided, or be regarded as a trifle, whether one or several
or all stand in the chief place in the state.—" All these
forms" says Fichte (" Naturrecht," Pt. I., p. 196), "are
right, xnd can produce and preserve universal right, if only
there k present an ephorat." The ephorat was invented
by Fichte, and defined as a needful counterpoise to the
highes^power. Such a view springs from a shallow con-
ceptioi. of the state. It is true, indeed, that in a primitive
conditbn of society these distinctions have little or no
meanicg. So Moses, when giving rules to the people in
the cas3 of their choosing a king, made no other alteration
in the institutions than to command that the king's horses
and wi-es should not be too numerous, or his treasure of
gold aid silver too large (Deut. xvii. 16, and fol.).—
Furthe-, it is true that in one sense these three forms are
even fo- the idea a matter of no concern. I mean monarchy
in its limited and exclusive signification, in accordance with
which it stands by the side of democracy and aristocracy.
But sudi a remark has a moaning the opposite of Fichte's.
It would mean that these forms are a matter of indifference,
becaust they collectively are not in accordance with the
idea inits rational development (§ 272) ; nor can the idea
in anyone of them attain its right and actuality. Hence,
it is itle to ask which of these forms is to be preferred!
We speak of them now as having only an historical
interest.

Here, as in so many other places, must be recogn'.zed
the paietrating vision of Montesquieu, who discusses v.his

280

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

II f "'" : e^^lebrated description of the principles of
these fornas of government. But this description we must
lot misunderstand, if we are to do it justice. He, as is well
known, stated that virtue was the principle of democracy.
Democracy does m fact rest upon sentiment as upon a form
which IS merely substantive. And it is still under this
torm that the rationality of the absolute will exists in
democracy But he goes on to say that England in the
seventeenth century proved by a beautiful spectacle that its
fforts to found a democracy were unavailing owin^ to a
lack of virtue m the leaders. And he adds that, witen in
a republic virtue disappears, ambition seizes upo« those
whose minds are capable of it, and greed seizes upon all.
and the state becoming a general prey, maintains its
streng h only through the power of some individuils and
the extravagance of all. Upon this view it must be re-
niarked that when society becomes civilized, and thepowers
of particularity are developed and freed, the virtue of the
rulers IS not enough. Not mere sentiment, but tie form

In rr/ . '"^ 'i' ''"l""''^' ^ '^'' ^^^«^« ^« t^ ^^ aWe to
keep Itself together, and give to the developed pcwers of

particularity the right to expand positivelv as well as
negatively. ' ^

Similarly should be set aside the misconcei.tiai that
8mce in a democratic republic the sentiment of virtue is
the substantive form, it is wanting, or at least unneeessary
m a monarchy; and also the misconception tlat the
legally constituted agencies of a systematized orgaiization
are opposed to and incompatible with virtue

Moderation, or the principle of aristocracy, impies the
incipient separation of public power and private iiterest
And yet these two are here in such close contact that
aristocracy is always by its very nature on the va-cje of
passmg into the severest form of tyranny or anarcliyt and
so bnnguig on itself destruction. Witness Roman Hstory
Montesquieu, by crediting monarchy with the principle

THE STATE.

281

onour, „. er», .t is cfear, not to the patriarchal or any
ot the ancient monarchies, nor, on tho other side, to the

o7 Si? 1 r "' ■'""'^ P™P<"-*-^ »"'' *•>" privileges
this fo „ r "; . "?T™t-'" -« coufirn,ed. Since in
this form of constitution state-life depends upon privileged

be done for the maintenance of the state, the objective
clement of these transactions is grounded n^t on ^^Z
«n ™»Smat,ve thonght and opinion. Thns, instead o
duty It IS only hononr which keeps the state together.

Here It ,s natnral to put a second question :-Who shallf
f amo the constitution ? Tliis question seems intelli^ Ue>
at first glance, hut on closer examination turns out to he
meaningless. It presupposes that no constitution exists
h„t merely a eollection of atomic individuals. How a h I p
..£ Wd^iduals s to obtain a constitution, whether ly Us
own efforts or by means ot others, whether by goodness
thought, or force, must be left to itself to decide^for with
a mere mass the conception has nothing to do If the,
question, h,,wever, takes for granted the°e,iste„ee of a„i
actual constitution, then to make a constitution means'

unpl .ng that any change must be made constitutionally.)
Bn It IS strictly essential that the constitution, though it(
s begotten in time, should not be contemplated as mje

inade''t"'.M '" '."™^"" "' '^' ^'•"- "'"1 '-■-Vond what t
petuli ''^•"•'" ="""■■' ^""1 «'lf-eentred, as diWne and per-/

is frSiw'"'^ '"T!'''" "' ""■• '""1™ ™''d as a whole

is-ctto ."e ''"•r'r''Y',*''" """"'''" *"■-* all essential
aspects o the spiritual whole should attain their ri.-ht by

uuse the Idle question, as to which form is the better
monarchy or democracy. We venture to reply siniplyMiat

282

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

the forms of all constitutions of the state are one-sided, if
thej are not able to contain the principle of free sub-
jectivity, and do not know how to correspond to completed
reason, y.

274. Spirit is real only in what it knows itself to be
The state, which is the nation's spirit, is the law which
permeates all its relations, ethical observances, and the
consciousness of its individuals. Hence the constitution
of a people depends mainly on the kind and character of
Its self-consciousness. In it are found both its subiective
freedom and the actuality of the constitution.

Note.-To think of giving to a people a consitution d
prion IS a whim, overlooking precisely that element which
renders a constitution something more than a product of
thought. Every nation, therefore, has the constitution
which suits it and belongs to it.

Addition.-The state must in its constitution penetrate
all Its aspects. Napoleon insisted upon giving to the
Spanish a constitution a priori, but the project failed A
constitution is not a mere manufacture, but the work of
Icenturies. It is the idea and the consciousness of what is
ireasonable, in so far as it is developed in a people. Hence
no constitution is merely created. That which Napoleon
gave to the Spanish was more rational than what they had
before, yet they viewed it as something foreign to them,
and rejected it because they were not sufficiently developed'
In a constitution a people must embody their sense of right
and reproduce their conditions. Otherwise the constitu-
tion may exist externally, but it has no significance or
truth. Often, indeed, the need of and longing for a better
constitution may arise in individuals, but that is different
from the whole multitude's being saturated by such a
notion. This general conviction comes later. The principle
of morality and inner conviction advocated by Socrates
came of necessity into being in his day ; but time had to
elapse before it could reach general self-consciousness.

THE STATE.

283

ae-sided, if
free sub-
completed

self to be.
law which
, and the
mstitution
laracter of
subjective

isitution a
ent which
product of
nstitution

penetrate
g to the
failed. A
3 work of
»f what is
?. Hence
Napoleon

they had

to them,
'eveloped.
e of right

constitu-
icance or
r a better

different
Y such a

principle

Socrates
le had to
aess.

A. The Function of the Prince.
275. The function of the prince contains of itself the
three elements of the totality (§ 272), (1) the universality
of the constitution and the laws ; (2) counsel, or reference
of the particular to the universal ; and (3) the final de-
cision, or the self-determination, into which all else returns
and from which it receives the beginning of its actuality.
This absolute self-determination, constituting the dis-
tinguishing principle of the princely function, as such,
must be the first to be considered.

Addition.— We begin with the princely function or the
factor of individuality, because in it the three phases of
the state are inter-related as a totality. The I is at once
the most individual and the most universal. The in-
dividual occurs also in nature, but there reality is equal to
non-ideality, and its parts exist externally to one another.
Hence it is not self-complete existence ; in it the different
individualities subsist side by side. In spirit, on the other
hand, all differences exist only as ideal or as a unity. The
state as spiritual is the interpretation of all its elements,
but individuality is at the same time the soul, the vital
and sovereign principle, which embraces all differences.

276. (1) The basal principle of the political state is the
substantive unity, which is the ideality of its elements. («)
In this ideality the particular functions and offices of the
state are just as much dissolved as retained. Indeed, they
are retained only as having no independent authority, but
such and so extensive an authority as is yielded them in the
idea of the whole. They proceed, therefore, from the power
of the state, and are the flexible limbs of the state as of their
own simplified self.

Additio?i.-~This ideality of elements is like the life of an
organized body. Life exists in every part. There is but
one life in all points, and there is no opposition to it. Any
part separated from it is dead. Such is also the ideality

llji

if ^11

284

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

I'liorations,

of all individual occupations, functions, and

great as may be their impulse to subsist and

selves. It is as in the organism, where the stomach
assumes independence, and yet is at the same time super-
seded and sacrificed by becoming a member of one whole.

277. (/3) The particular offices and agencies of the state,
being its essential elements, are intimately connected with
it. To the individuals, who manage and control them,
they are attached in virtue not of their direct personality
but of their objective and universal qualities. With
particular personality, as such, they are joined only ex-
ternally and accidentally. The business and functions of
the state cannot therefore be private propertv.

Ad(Ution.~The agencies of the state are attached to in-
dividuals, who nevertheless are not authorized to discharge
their offices through natural fitness, but by reason of their
objective qualification. Capacity, skill, character, belong
to the particularity of the individual, who must, however,
be adapted to his special business by education and train-'
ing. An office can, therefore, be neither sold nor be-
queathed. Formerly in France seats in parliament were
saleable, and this is still the case with any position of
officer in the English army below a certain grade. These
facts depended, or depend, upon the medieval constitution
of certain states, and are now gradually vanishing.
V 278. These two characteristics, namely (/3) tiiat the par-
ticular offices and fimctions of the state" have independent
and firm footing neither in themselves, nor in the particular
will of individuals, but (a) ultimately in the unity of the
state as in their simple self, constitute the sovereignty of
the state. '^ *

Note.— This is sovereignty on its inner side. It has an
outer side also, as we shall see— lu the older feudal
monarchy the state had an outer aspect, but on its inner
side not only was the monarch at no time sovereign, but
neither was the state. Partly were the several offices and

THE STATE.

285

porations,
for tliera-

stomach
me super-
e whole,
the state,
cted with
rol them,
jrsonality
3. With

only ex-
ictions of

led to in-
lischarge
L of their
•, belong
however,
nd train-
nor be-
ent were
sition of
. These
stitution

the par-
'pendent
articular
y of the
ignty of

b has an
r feudal
ts inner
ign, but
ices and

functions of the state and civic life dispersed in independent
corporations and communities (§ 273, note), while the
whole was rather an aggregate than an organism. Partlv,
too, were these functions the private property of individuals
who, when it was proposed that they should act, consulted
their own opinion and wish.

The idealism, which constitutes sovereignty, is tliat
point of view in accordance with which the so-called parts
of an animal organism are not jmrts but members or
organic elements. Their isolation or independent subsist-
ence would be disease. The same principle occurs in the
abstract conception of tlie will (see note to next §) as the
negativity, which by referring itself to itself reaches a
universality, which definitely moulds itself into individuality
(§ 7). Into this concrete universality all particularity and
definiteness are taken up, and receive a new significance.
It is the absolute self-determining ground. To apprehend
It we must be at home with the conception in its true sub-
stance and subjectivity.

Because sovereignty is the ideality of all particular
powers, It easily gives rise to the common misconception,
which takes it to be mere force, empty wilfulness, and
a synonym for despotism. But despotism is a condition of
lawlessness, in which the particular will, whether of
monarch or people (ochlocracy) counts as law, or rather
instead of law. Sovereignty, on the contrary, constitutes
the element of the ideality of particular spheres and offices,
in a condition which is lawful and constitutional. No par-'
ticular sphere is independent and self-sufficient in its aims
and methods of working. It does not immerse itself in its
own separate vocation. On the contrary, its aims are led by
and dependent upon the aim of the whole, an aim which
has been named in general terms and indefinitely the well-
being of the state.

This ideality is manifested in a twofold way. (1) In
times of peace the particular spheres and businesses go

286

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

I ;

their way of satisfying their particular offices and ends.
According to mere unconscious necessity self-seeking here
veers round to a contribution in behalf of mutual preserva-
tion and the preservation of the whole (§ 183). But, also,
through a <^irect influence from above is it that these em-
ployments are continually brought back and limited by the
aim of the whole (see " Function of Government," § 289),
and led to make direct efforts for its preservation. (2) In
circumstances of distress, internal or external, the organism
consisting of its particuhirs, conies together into the simple
conception of sovereignty, to which is intrusted the safety
of the state, even at the sacrifice of what is at other times
justifiable. It is here that idealism attains its peculiar
realization (§ 321).

279. (2) Sovereignty, at first only the universal thought
of this ideality, exists merely as a subjectivity assured
of itself, and as the abstract and so far groundless self-
direction and ultimate decision of the will ; by virtue of
this quality the state is individual and one. But in the
next place subjectivity exists in its truth only as a subject,
and personality as a person. In the constitution, which
has matured into rational reality, each of the three elements
of the conception has its own independent, real, and separate
embodiment. Hence, the element which implies absolute
decision is not individuality in general but one individual,
the monarch.

Note.— The internal development of a science, whose
whole content is deduced out of the simple conception— the
only method which is deserving of the name philosophic,—
reveals the peculiarity that one and the same conception,
here the will, which at the beginning is abstract because it
is the beginning, yet <!ontaius itself, condenses of itself its
own characteristics, and in this way acquires a concrete
content. Thus it is fundamental in the personality, which
is at first in simple right abstract. It then develops
itself through the different forms of subjectivity, and

THK STATE.

287

and ends,
iking here
preserva-
But, also,
these em-
ed bv the
," § 289),
. (2) In
organism
he simple
■he safety
her times
peculiar

1 thought
' assured
Hess self-
virtue of
it in the
I subject,
n, which
elements
separate
absolute
dividual,

e, whose
ion — the
iophic, —
aception,
ecause it
itself its
concrete
V, which
develops
ity, and

at last in absolute right, the state

the complete, concrete
oDjectivity of the will, attains to the personality of the
state and its conscious assurance of itself. This final term
gives to all particularities a new form by taking them up
into Its pure self. It ceases to hesitate between reasons
i^ro and con., and deciding by an " I will," initiates all action
and reality.

Personality, further, or subjectivity generally, as infinite
and self-referring, has truth only as a person or inde-
pendent subject. This independent existence must be one
and the truth which it has is of the most direct or imme'
diate kind. The personality of the state is actuahzed only
as a person, the monarch.— Personality expresses the con-
ception as such, while person contains also the actuality of
the conception. Hence the conception becomes the idea or
truth, only when it receives this additional character. -A
so-called moral person, a society, congregation, or family,
be It as concrete as it may, possesses personality only as an
element and abstractly. It has not reached the truth of
Its existence. But the state is this very totality, in which
the moments of the conception gain reality in accordance
with their peculiar truth.— All these phases of the idea
have been already explained, both in their abstract and in
their concrete forms, in the course of this treatise. Here
however, they need to be repeated, because we, while easily
admitting them piecemeal in their particular forms, do not
so readily recognise and apprehend them in their true place
as elements of the idea.

The conception of monarch offers great difficulty to
abstract reasonings and to the reflective methods of the
understanding. The understanding never gets beyond
isolated determinations, and ascribes merit to mere reasons,
or finite points of view and what can be derived from them.'
Thus the dignity of the monarch is represented as somei
thing derivative not only in its form but also in its essen-
tial character. But the conception of the monarch is not

288

Tin-: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

iiili:

I
illl i

riginated.

1!!'

derivative, but purely sel

taken notion is tlie idea that the right of the monarch is
based upon and receives its unconditional nature from
divme authority. The misconceptions that are allied to
this idea are well-known; besides, philosophy sets itself
the task of conceiving the divine.

The phrase "sovereignty of the i)oople," can be used in
the sense that a people is in general self-dependent in its
foreign relations, and constitutes its own state. Such are
the people of Great Britain, for example. But the people
of England, Scotland, Ireland, Venice, Genoa, or Ceylon,
have ceased to be a sovereign people, since they no lonc/er
have independent princes, and the chief government is not
exclusively their own. Further, it may be said that internal

out (§§ 277-278), we speak m general terms, and mean
that sovereignty accrues to the whole state. But the
sovereignty of the people is usually in modern times
opposed to the sovereignty of the monarch. This view of
the sovereignty of the people may be traced to a confused
idea of what is meant by " the people." The people apart
from their monarch, and the common membership neces-
sarily and directly associated with him, is a formless mass.
It IS no longer a state. In it occur none of the charac-
teristic features of an equipped whole, such as sovereignty
government, law-courts, magistrates, professions, etc.? etc'
When these elements of an organized national life make
their appearance in a people, it ceases to be that undefined
abstraction, which is indicated by the mere general notion
*' people."

If by the phrase " sovereignty of the peo])le " is to be
understood a republic, or more precisely a democracy, for
by a rei)ublic we understand various empirical mixtures
which do not belong to a philosophic treatise, all that is
necessary has already been said (§ 273, note). There can
no longer be any defence of such a notion in contrast witli

TI[K STATl-:

289

) this mis-
monarch is
Lture from
3 allied to
sets itself

be used iu
ient in its

Such are
the people
or Ceylon,
no longer
leut is not
it internal
iy pointed
ind mean

But the
srn times
is view of

confused
•pie apart
iil> neces-
ess mass,
e charac-
ereignty,

etc., etc.
ife make
ludefined
al notion

is to be
racy, for
mixtures
I that is
liero can
ast with

the developed idea.- When a people is not a patriarchal
tribe, havmg passed from the primitive condition, which
made the forms of aristocracy and democracy possible, and
IS represented not as in a wilful and unorganized condition,
but as a self-developed truly organic totalitv, in such a
people sovereignty is the personality of the" whole, and
•exists, too, in a reality, which is proportionate to the con-
ception, the person of the monarch.

The element of the ultimate self-determining decision of
will does not appear as an immanent vital element of the
actual state in its peculiar reality, so long as the dassifica-
tion of constitutions into democracy, aristocracy, and
monarchy can be made. When this classification prevails
we are, as we have said, at the stage of the undeveloped
substantive unity, which has not yet reached infinite
difference and self-immersion. But even in these incom-
plete forms of the state the summit must be occupied bv
an individual. Either he appears in actual fact, as ili
those monarchies, which are of this type. Or, under
aristocratic, or more especially under democratic govern-
ments, he appears in the person of statesmen or generals,
according to accident and the particular need of the time!
Here all overt action and realization have their origin and
comi)letion in the unity of the leader's decision. But this
subjectivity of decision, confined within a primitive and
unalloyed unity of functions, must l)e accidental in its
origin and manifestation, and also on the whole sub-
ordinate. Accordingly, a pure and unmixed decision was
looked for outside of and Ix-yond this conditional summit,
and was found in a fate which pronounced judgment from
without. As an element of the idea it had "to enter actual
existence, but yet it had its root outside of human freedom,
and the compass of the state.— To this source is to be
traced the need of oracles, the da 1, 1,0,1 of Socrates, the
consultation of the entrails of animals, the Hight of birds,
and their way of eating, etc., methods resorted to on great

290

Till': PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT.

occasions, when it was necessary to have final judgment upon
weighty affairs of state. As mankind had not yet realized
the profundity of self-consciousness, or come forth from
the pure virginity of the substantive unity into self-conscious
existence, they had not yet strength to discover such a
judgment within the pale of human existence.— In the
daimon of Socrates (§ 138) we can discern the beginning
of a change ; we can see that the will, formerly set upon an
object wholly outside of itself, has begun to transfer itself
into itself, and recognize itself within itself. This is the
beginning of self-conscious and therefore true freedom!
This real freedom of the idea, since it gives its own present
self-conscious reality to everyone of the elements of ration-
ality, imparts to the function of consciousness the final
self-determining certitude, which in the conception of the
will is the cope-stone. But this final self-determination
can fall within the sphere of human liberty only in so far
as it is assigned to an independent and separate pinnacle,
exalted above all that is particular and conditional. Only
when so placed, has it a reality in accordance with the
conception.

Addition.— In the organization of the state, that is to
say, in constitutional monarchy, we must have before us
nothing except the inner necessity of the idea. Every
other point of view must disai)pear. The state must be
regarded as a great architectonic building, or the hieroglyph
of reason, presenting itself in actuality. Everything re-
ferring merely to utility, externality, etc.. must be excluded
from a philosophic treatment. It is easy for one to grasp
the notion that the state is the self-determiuing and com-
pletely sovereign will, whose judgment is final. It is more
difficult to apprehend this " I will " as a person. By this
is not meant that the monarch can be wilful in his acts.
Rather is he bound to the concrete content of the advice of
his councillors, and, when the constitution is established,
he has often nothing to do but sign his name. But this

THE STATE.

291

gment upon
yet realized
forth from
If-conscious
>ver such a
'e. — In the
? beginning
set upon an
msfer itself
This is the
e freedom.
»wn present
s of ration-
is the final
tion of the
ermiuation
y in so far
e pinnacle,
nal. Only
e with the

that is to
before us
}a. Every
e must be
hieroglyph
ything re-
e excluded
e to grasp
and corn-
It is more
. By this
ii his acts.
3 advice of
itablished,
But this

name is weighty. It is the summit, over which nothing
can climb. It may be said that an articulated organiza-
tion has already existed in the beautiful democracy of
Athens. Yet we see that the Greeks extracted the ulti-
mate judgment from quite external phenomena, such as
oracles, entrails of sacrificial animals, and the flight of
birds, and that to nature they held as to a power, which in
these ways made known and gave expression to what was '
good for mankind. Self-consciousness had at that time
not yet risen to the abstraction of subjectivity, or to the
fact that concerning the matter to be judged upon must be
spoken a human " I will." This " I will" constitutes the
greatest distinction between the ancient and the modem
world, and so must have its peculiar niche in the great
building of state. It is to be deplored that this character-
istic should be viewed as something merely external, to be
set aside or used at pleasure. 7<

280. (3) This ultimate self of the state's will is in this
its abstraction an individuality, which is simple and direct.
Hence its very conception implies that it is natural. Thus
the monarch as a specific individual is abstracted from all
other content, and is aj)pointed to the dignity of monarch
in a directly natural way, by natural birth.

Note.—Thia transition from the conception of pure self-
determination to direct existence, and so to simple natural-
ness, is truly speculative in its nature. A systematic
account of it belongs to logic. It is on the whole the
same transition which is well-known in the nature of the
will. It is the process of translation of a content out of
subjectivity, as represented end, into tangible reality
(§ 8). But the peculiar form of the idea and of the trausi-
tion, here passed in review, is the direct conversion of the
pure self-determination of the will, the simple conception
itself, into a specific object, a " this," or natural visible
reality, without the intervention of any particular content,
such as an end of action.

Il^

292

THE piiiLosoi'irv of kigui'.

In the so-called ontological proof of the existence of
God there is the same conversion of the absolute conceptimi
into being. This conversion has constituted the depth of
the idea in modern times, although it has been recently
pronounced to be inconceivable. On such a theory, since
the unity of conception and embodiment is the truth
(§ 23), all knowledge of the truth must be renounced.
Although the understanding does not find this unity in its
consciousness, and harps upon the separation of the two
elements of the truth, it still permits a belief in a unity.
But since the current idea of the monarch is regarded as
issuing out of the ordinary consciousness, the understand-
ing, with its astute reasonings, holds all the more
tenaciously to the principle of separation and its results.
It thereupon denies that the element of ultimate decision
in the state is absolutely, that is, in the conception of
reason, conjoined with direct nature. It maintains, on the
contrary, the mefc^ccidental character of the conjunction
of these two, and hence regards as rational their absolute
divergence. Finally, from the irrationality of the co-rela-
tion of these two ])hases proceed other consequences, which
destroy the idea of the state.

Addition.— It is often nuiintained that the position of
monarch gives to the aftairs of .state a haphazard
character. It is said that the monarch may be ill-educated ,
and unworthy to stand at the helm of state, and that it is
absurd for such a i;ondition of things to exist under the
name of reason. It must be replied that the assumption
on which these ol)jections proceed is of no value, since
there is here no reference to jxirticularity of character. In
a completed organization we have to do' with nothing but
the extreme of formal decision, and that for this office is
needed only a man who says " Yes," and so puts the dot
upon the " i." The pinnacle of state must be such that
the private character of its occupant shall be of no.signiti-
cance. What beyond this final judgment belongs to the

TIIK STATIC

293

sisteuce of
coticeiJtimi
e depth of
!u recently
eorv, since
the truth
renounced,
initv in its
>f the two
n a unity.
»f?arded as
aderstand-
the more
ts results,
e decision
"eption of
ins, on the
)i)junctiou
r absolute
lie co-rela-
ces, which

osition of
liai)luii5ard
-educated ,
that it is
under the
^sumption
lue, since
acter. In
thing but
s office is
8 the dot
such that
lo.signifi-
igs to the

monarch devolves upon particularity, with which we have
no concern. There may indeed arise circumstances, in
which this particularity alone has prominence, but in that
case the state is not yet fully, or else badly constructed.
In a well-ordered monarchy only the objective side of law
comes to hand, and to this the monarch subjoins merely
the subjective " I will,"

281. Both elements, the final motiveless self of the will,
and the like motiveless existence on the side of nature,'
indissolubly unite in the idea of that which is beyond the
reach of caprice, and constitute the majesty of the monarch.
In this unity lies the actualized unity of the state. Only
by means of its uumotived directness on both its external
and its internal side is the unity taken beyond the pos-
sibility of degradation to the wilfulness, ends, and views
of particularity. It is thus removed also from the en-
feeblement and overthrow of the functions of state and
from the struggle of faction against faction around the
throne, v

iSTo/e,— Right of l)irth and right of inheritance constitute
the basis of legitimacy, not as regards positive right merely,
but likewise in the idea.— Through the self-determined or
natural succession to the vacant throne all factious dis-
putes are avoided. This has rightly been reckoned as
one of the advantages of inheritance. However, it is only
a consequence, and to assign it as a motive is to drag
majesty down into the sphere of mere reasonings. The
character of majesty is unmotived directness, and final
self-involved existence. To speak of grounds is to pro-
pound as its basis not the idea of the state, which is
internal to it, but something external in its nature and
alien, such as the thought of the well-being of the state
or of the people. By such a method inherititnce can
indeed be deduced through meAlii iermitii ; but there
might be other medii termhii, with quite other conse-
quences. And it is only too well known what conse-

Ilii

Hi!
ji 1 1

li ; i

294

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

queuces may be drawn from the well-being of the people
(salut du i>eM^Ze).— Hence, philosophy ventures to contem-
plate majesty only in the medium of thought. Every
other method of inquiry, except the speculative method
of the infinite self-grounded idea, absolutely annuls the
nature of majesty.

Freely to elect the monarch is readily taken as the most
natural way. It is closely allied to the following shallow
thought :— " Because it is the concern and interest of the
people which the monarch has to provide for, it must be
left to the people to choose whom it will depute to provide
for them, and only out of such a commission arises the
right of govemiug." This view, as well as the idea that
the monarch is chief-officer of state, and also the idea of a
contract between him and the people, proceed from the
will of the multitude, in the form of inclination, opinion,
and caprice. These views, as we long ago remarked, first
make themselves good, or rather seek to do so, in the civic
community. They can make no headway against the
principle of the family, still less that of the state, or, in
general, the idea of the ethical system.— That the election
of a monarch is the worst of proceedings may be even bv
ratiocination detected in the consequences, which to it
appear only as something possiljle or probable, but are in
fact inevitable. Through the relation involved in free
choice the particular will gives the ultimate decision, and
the constitution becomes a free-capitulation, that is, the
abandonment of the functions of state to the discretion of
the particular will. The specific functions of state are
thus transformed into j>rivate property, and there ensue
the enfeeblement and injury of the sovereignty of tW
state, its iniernal dissolution and external overthrow.

Addition.~Ii we are to apprehend the idea of the
monarch, it is not sufficient for us to say that God has
established kings, since God has made everything, even
the worst of things. Nor can we proceed very fui^ under

THE STATK

295

the jjeople
to contem-
it. Every
ve method
iiinuls the

s the most
ag shallow
rest of the
t must be
to provide
arises the

idea that
3 idea of a

from the
11, opinion,
irked, first
1 the civic
gainst the
ate, or, in
le election
e even by
lich to it
)ut are in
1 in free
ision, and
It is, the
cretion of
state are
ere ensue
y of the
■ow.

I of the

God has

ng, even

ar under

the guidance of the principle of utility, since it is always
open to point out disadvantages. Just as little are we
helped by regarding monarchy as positive right. That I
should have property is necessary, but this specific pos-
session is accidental. Accidental also appears to be the
right that one man should stand at the helm of state, if this
right, too, be regarded as abstract and positive. But this
right is present absolutely, both as a felt want and as a
need of the thing itself. A monarch is not remarkable
for bodily strength or intellect, and yet millions permit
themselves to be ruled by him. To say that men permit
themselves to be governed contrary to their interests, ends,
and intentions is preposterous, since men are not so stupid.
It is their need and the inner power of the idea which urge
them to this in opposition to their seeming consciousness,
and retain them in this relation.

Although the monarch comes forward as summit and
essential factor of the constitution; it must be admitted
that in the constitution a conquered people is not identical
with the prince. An uprising occurring in a province con-
quered in war is different from a rebellion in a well-
organized state. The conquered are not rising against
their prince, and commit no crime against the state, be-
cause they are not joined with their master in the intimate
relation of the idea. They do not come within the inner
necessity of the constitution. In that case only a contract
is to the fore, and not a state-bond. " Je ne suis pas voire
prince, je suis voire viaiire," replied Napoleon to the delega-
tion from Erfurt.

282. Out of the sovereignty of the monarch flows the //
right of pardoning, criminals. Only to sovereignty belongs -
that realization of the power of the spirit, which consists //
m regarding what has happened as not having happened, //
and cancels crime by forgiving and forgetting.

Note.— The right of pardon is one of the highest recogni-
tions of the majesty of spirit. This right belongs to the

.:!

i|i

296

THE PHILOSOPHY OF iiUlUT.

retrospective application of the character of a higher sphere
to a lower and antecedent one.-Similar applications are
tound in the special sciences, which treat of objects in their
empirical environment (§ 270, footnote). -It belongs to
applications of this kind that injury done to the state
generally or to the sovereignty, majesty, and personality
ot the prince, should fall under the conception of crime as
It has already been discussed (§§ 95-102), and should
indeed be declared to be a specific crime of the gravest
character. ^

\l Addition.-Fardon is the remission of punishment, but
does not supersede right. Bather right remains, and the
pardoned is a criminal as much after the pardon as he
was before. Pardon does not imply that no wrong has
been committed. Remission of the penalty may occur in
religion, for by and in spirit what has occurred can be
laade not to have occurred. But in so far as remission
of penalty is completed in the world, it has place only
. m majesty, and (.-an be effected only by its unmotived
edict.

^ 283. The second element contained in the princely func-
^ tion IS that of particularity, involving a definite content
- and the subsumption of it under the universal. In so far
as It receives a particular existence, it is the supreme
council, and is composed of individuals. They present to
the monarcli for his decision the content of the affairs, as
they arise, and of the legal cases which necessarily spring out
of ax^tual wants. Along with these they furnish also their
objective sides, namely, the grounds for decision, the laws
which bear on the case, the circumstances, etc. As the in-
dividuals who discharge this office have to do with the
monarch's immediate ])erson, their appointment and dis-
missal he in his unlimited, free, arbitrary will.

284. The objective aide of decision, including knowledge
ot the special content and circumstances, and the legal and
other evidence, is alone responsible. It, that is to say is

THE STATl-:

[her sphere
cations are
:;ts in their
belongs to
the state
)ersonalitj
f crime, as
id should
lie gravest

ment, but
s, and the
Ion as he
vrong has
y occur in
id can be
remission
'lace only
mmotived

2ely func-
e content
In so far
supreme
•resent to
iffairs, as
pring out
xlso their
the laws
Ls the in-
with the
and dis-

297

lowledge
legal and
o sav, is

t^^t I '"■'" "^ »''i«tWty. It murt, there,

fore, c-ome before a council other than the personal will „t
the monarch as such. These councils, advising toards or
mdividual advsers, are alone answerable. The pecu ia •

ment ' '"'P^^iWlity for the acts of sovern-

the absolutely universal, which consists subjectively in the
conscience of the monarch, objectively in ke whole c „!

ZTl , T- ""'^ ''""^"'y ""■*«» presupposes
^86. The objective guarantee of the princely office, or the
securing of the lawful succession to the throne by in-'
hentance lies m Ihe fact that, just as this office has -v
reality distinct from the other elements determined bv
.•ea.on, so he others have also their independent and
peculiar rights and duties. Every member if a rational
or^nism, while preserving itself in independence. pCve
also the iieculiarities of the others

fioaTilt7f*^r "* "'" 'f."r''*» <"• '"^tory is such a modi-
fo « e tin "■^■»7r■'"•''' "'■'**"«» that the succession
to he throne is determined by the law of primogeniture.
Ihis is,as itwere.a retuni to the patriarchal m-inciple
out of winch this mode of succession has historically aris™
aUhongh 1 now bears the higher form of an absolve
pinnacle of an organically developed state. This result
has a most significant bearing upon public Kbertv, and is

tion, a though, as has already been observed, it is not so
general^v understood as it is respected. Thi earlier and
.nerelytendal monarchies, and Jespotism also. T taf "n
their history the alternation of revolutions, high-handed
dealings of princes, rebellion, overthrow of prCly i^.
dividuals and houses, and a general desolation a id de-
«truction, internal and external. The reason is that theL

298

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

lii

division of state offices, entrusted as they were to vassals,
pashas, etc., was only mechanical. It was not a distinc-
tion inherent in the essential character and form, but one
of merely greater or less power. Accordingly, each ])art,
preserving and producing only itself, did not preserve and
produce the rest. All the elements were thus completely
isolated and independent.

In the organic relation, in which members, and not i)arts,
are related to one another, each one preserves the rest while
fulfilling its own sphere. The preservation of the other
members is the substantial end and product of each one in
preserving itself. The guarantees asked for, be they for
the stability of succession, for the stability of the princely
office generally, or for justice and public liberty, are
secured in institutions. Love of the people, character,
oaths, force, etc., may be regarded as subjective guaran-
tees ; but when we speak of a constitution, we are engaged
with only objective guarantees, institutions, or organically
intertwined and self-conditioned elements. Thus, public
freedom and hereditary succession are mutual guarantees,
and are absolutely connected. Public liberty is the rational
constitution, and hereditary succession of the princelv
function lies, as has been shown, in the conception of the
constitution.

B. The Executive.

287. Decision is to be distinguished from its execution
and application, and in general from the prosecution and
preservation of what has been already resolved, namelv, the
existing laws, regulations, establishments for common ends,
and the like. This business of subsumption or application
I is undertaken by the executive, including the judiciary and
police. It is their duty directly to care for each particular
thing in the civic community, and in the^e private ends
make to prevail the universal interest.

tiih: state.

299

288. Common interests of private concern occur within
the CIVIC community, and fall outside of the self -constituted
and self-contained universal of the state (§ 256). They
are administered in the corporations (§ 251) of the
societies, trades, and professions, by their superintendents
and representatives. The affairs, overseen by them, are
the private property and interest of these particular
spheres, whose authority depends upon the mutual trust
ot the associates, and confidence in the securities. Yet
t^e circles must be subordinate to the higher interest of
the state. Hence, in filling these posts generallv, there
wH occur a mingling of the choice of the interested parties
with the ratification of a higher authority.

289. To secure the universal interest of the state and to
preserve the law in the province of parti(mlar rights, and also
to lead these rights back to the universal interest, require
the attention of subordinates of the executive. These
subordinates are on one side executive officers and on the
.^^Fjifollege of advisers. These two meet together in
the highest offices of all, which are in contact with the
monarch.

Note.—The civic community is, as we saw, the arena for
the contest of the private interests of all against all. It is
also the seat of battle between private interest and the
collective special interest, and likewise of both private and
collective special interests with the higher standj>oint and
order of the state. The spirit of the corporation, bec^otteu
m the course of regulating the particular spheres, becomes
by a proce5.s internal to itself converted into the spirit of
the state. It finds the state to be the means of preserving-
particular ends. This is the secret of the patriotism of the
citizens in one of its phases. They are aware that the
slate is their substantive being, because it preserves their
particular spheres, sustains their authority, and considers
their welfare. Since the spirit of the corporation contains
directly the riveting of the particular to the universal it

300

Tin-: piiiLosopirv of right.

I> I

exhibits the depth and strength of the state as it exists in
sentiment.

The administration of the business of the corporation
through its own representatives is often chimsy, because,
while they see and know their own peculiar interests and
affairs, thoj do not discern the connection with remote
conditions or the universal standpoint. Other elements
contribute to this result, as, e.g., an intimate private
relation between the representatives and their subordi-
nates. Circumstances often tend to equalize these two
classes which are in many ways mutually dependent.
This peculiar territory can be looked on as handed over to
the element of formal freedom, in which the knowledge,
judgment, and practice of individuals, as also their small
l)assions and fancies, may have room to wrestle with one
another. This may all the more easily happen, the more
trivial from the universal side of the state is the mis-
managed affair, especially when the mismanagement stands
of itself in direct relation to the satisfaction and opinion,
which are derived from it.

290. In the business of _ the, executive also there is a
division of labour (§ 198). The organiz-d executive officers
Eave therefore a formal 1 hough difficult task before them.
The lower concrete civil life must be governed from below
in a concrete way. And yet the work must be divided into
its abstract branches, specially officered by middlemen,
whose activity in connection with those below them must
from the lowest to the highest executive offices take the
form of a continuous cimcrete oversight.

Addition.— The main point which crops up in connection
with the executive is the division of offices. This division
is concerned with the transition from the universal to the
2»articular and singular ; and the business is to be divided
according to the different branches. The difficulty is that
the different functions, the inferior and superior, must
Avor k in ha rmony. The police and the judiciary proceed

TIIK STATK.

301

each on its own course, it is true, but they yet in some
office or other meet again. The means used to effect this
conjunction often consists in appointing the chancellor of
state and the prime minister, ministers in council. The
matter is thus simplified on its upper side. In this way
also everything issues from above out of the ministerial
power, and business is, as they say, centralized. With
this are associated the greatest possible despatch and
efficiency in regard to what may affect the universal
interests of state. This r>'fjime was introduced by the
French Revolution, developed by Napoleon, and in France
IS found to this day. But France, on the other hand, has
neither coriwrations nor communes, that is to say, the
sphere in which particular and general interests coincide
In the Middle Ages this sphere had acquired too great an ^UCU
independence. Then there were states within the state, u. 1 1^^-^
who persisted in behaving as if they were^sej^subsistent ^^ U h.
Hlies. Though this ought not to occur, yet the peculiar "
strength of states lies in the com?nunities. Here the govern-
ment meets vested interests, which must be respected by
it. These interests are insjiected, and may be assisted by Ij
the government. Thus the individual finds protection in/'
the exercise of his rights, and so attaches his pai-ticular
interest to the preservation of the whole. For some time
past the chief task has been that of organization carried on
from above : while the lower and bulky part of the whole
was readily left more or less unorganized. Yet it is of
high importance that it also should be organized, because
only as an organism is it a power or force. Othenvise it
{ I IS a mere heap or mass of broken bits. An authoritative
power IS found only in the organic condition of the par^
ticular spheres.

291. Tlie offices of the executive are of an objective
nature, which is already independently marked out in
accordance with their substance (§ 287)'. They are at the
same time conducted by individuals. Between the objective

ji ^ ,tf

302

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

cll

f»«e «•«

clf*^

element and individuals there is no direct, natural con-
necting tie. Hence individuals are not set aside for these
offices by natural personality or by birth. There is required
(\l in them the objective element, namely, knowledge and
proof of fitness. This j^roof guarantees to the state what
it needs, and, as it is the sole condition, makes it possible
for any citizen to devote himself to the universal class. Y^

292. The subjective side is found in this, that out of
many one individual must be chosen, and empowered to
discharge the office. Since in this case the objective
element does not lie in genius, as it does in art, the number
of persons from whom the selection may be made is neces-
sarily indefinite, and whom finally to prefer is beyond the
possibility of absolute determination. The junction of
individual and office, two phases whose relation is always
accidental, devolves upon the princely power as decisive
and sovereign.

29o. The particular state- business, which monarchy
transfers to executive officers, constitutes the objective
side of the sovereignty inherent in the monarch. The
distingiiishing feature of this state-business is found
in the nature of its matter. Just as the activity of the
iiiilliiiiitiiiii is the discharge of a duty, so their office is not
subject to chance but a right.

294. The individual, who by the act of the sovereign
(§ 292) is given an official vocation, holds it on the
<'Oudition that he discharges his duty, which is the sub-
stantive factor in his relation. Hy virtue of this factor
the individual finds in his official employment his livelihood
p ul the assured satisfaction of his particularity (§ 264),
and in his external surroundings and official activity is
free from subjective dependence and influences.

Note. — The state cannot rely upon service which is
r capricious and voluntary, such, for example, as the ad-
ministration of justice by knights-errant. This service
reserves to itself the right to act in accordance with sub-

iral con-
foi* these
required
dge and
ate what
; possible
3lass. Y
it out of
wered to
objective
? number
is neces-
yond the
ictiou of
is always
decisive

aonarchy
objective
•h. The
is found
ty of the
ice is not

sovereign
; on the

the snb-
lis factor
ivelihood

(§ 264),
ctivity is

which is
I the ad-
8 servitre
ivith sub-

THE STATE. $03

jective views, and also the right to withhold itself at will,
or to realize subjective ends. The opposite extreme to the
knight-errant in reference to public service would be the
act of the public servant, who was attached to his employ-
ment merely by want, without true duty or right.

"The public service requires the sacrifice of independent
self-satisfaction at one's pleasure, and grants the right of
finding satisfaction in the performance of duty, but no-
where else. Here is found the conjunction of universal
and particular interests, a union which constitutes the
conception and the internal stability of the state (§ 260).

Official position is not based upon contract (§ 75),
although it involves the consent of the two sides and also
a double performance. The public servant is not called to
a smgle chance act of service, as is the attorney, but finds
in his work the main interest of both his spiritual and his
particular existence. So also it is not a matter merely
external and particular, the performance of which is in-
trusted to him. The value of such a matter on its inner
side IS different from the externality of it, and thus is not as
yet injured, as a stij)ulation is (§ 11), merely by non-
performance. That which the public servant has to per-
form IS as it stands of absolute value. Hence positive injury I
or non-performance, either being opposed to the essence of
service, is a wrong to the universal content (§ 95, a nega- '
tive-infinite judgment), and therefore a fault or crime.

The assured satisfaction of particular want does away
with external need. There is no occasion to seek the
means for alleviating want at the cost of official activity
and duty. In the universal function of state those who
are commissioned with the affairs of state are protected
a so against the other subjective side, the private passion
ot subjects, whose private interests, etc.. may be injured
by the furtherance of the universal, n!^

295. Security for the state and iti^ubjects against mis-
use of power by the authorities an.l their officers is found

304

THE PHILOSOPHY OF lUGHT,

directly iu their responsibility arising out of their nature as
a hierarchy. But it is also found in the legitimate societies
and corporations. They hold in check the inflow of sub,
jective wilfulness into the power of the officers. They also
supplement from below the control from above, which
cannot reach down to the conduct of individuals.

^'ote.— In the conduct and character of the officers the
laws and decisions of government touch individuality, and
are given reality. On this depend the satisfactioii and
confidence of the citizens in the government. On this also
depends the execution of the government's intentions, or
else the weakening and frustration of them, since the
manner in which the intention is realized is bv sensibilitv
and sentiment easily estimated more highly than the act
itself, even though it be a tax. It is due to this direct and
personal contact that the control from above may incom-
pletely attain its end. This end mav find an obstacle in
the common interest of the official class, which is distinct
from both subjects and superiors. Especiallv when in-
stitntion.7 are perhaps not yet perfected, the higher inter-
ference of sovereignty for the removal of these hindrances
(as for exainj.le that of Friedrich II. in the famous Miiller-
Arnold affair) is demanded and justified.

25>(). Whether or no integrity of conduct, gentleness, and
freedom from passion pass into social ciLstoni de])en(ls ui)on
the nature of the direct ethical life and thought. These
phases of character maintain the si)iritual balance over
against the merely mental acquisition of the so-called
sciences, dealing with the objects of these spheres of govern-
ment, against also the necessary practice of business, and the
actual labour of mechanical and other trades. The great,
ness of the state is also a controlling element, by virtue of
which the imi)ortance of family relations and other private
ties is diminished, and revenge, hate, and the like passions
become inoperative and powerless. In concern for the
great interests of a large state, these subjective elements

THE STATE.

305

Qature as
? societies
f of sub-
riiey also
e, which

ficers the
ility, and
tioii and
this also
itious, or
iuco tlie
?nsibilitv
I the act
irect and
y inconi-
stacle in
I distinct
?^hen in-
er intcr-
tidvances
I Miiller-

less, and
kIs upon
. These
ice over
3o-called
' govern -
, and the
le great-

ircue of
• l)rivate
passions

for tlie
dements

sink out of sight, and there is produced an habitual regard
for universal interests and affairs. -^

297. The members of the executive and the state officials
constitute the main part of the middle class, in which are
found the educated intelligence and the consciousness
of right of the mass of a people. The institutions of
sovereignty operating from above and the rights of corpora-
tions from below prevent this class from occupying the
position of an exclusive aristocracy and using their educa-
tion and skill wilfully and despotically.

Note.— At one time the administration of justice, whos,'
object is the peculiar interest of all individuals, had been
converted into an instrument of gain and despotism. The
knowledge of law was concealed under a pedantic or foreign
speech, and the knowledge of legal procedure under an in-
volved formalism.

Addition.~The state's consciousness and the most con-i
spicuous education are found in the middle class, to which!
the state officials belong. The members of this class \
therefore, form the pillars of the state in regard to recti-* 1
tude and intelligence. The state, if it has no middle class, i
is still at a low stage of development. In Eussia, for
examj^le, there is a multitude of serfs and a host of rulers.
It is of great concern to the state that a middle class should
be formed, but this can be effected only in au organization
such as we have described, namely, by the legalization of
particular circles, which are relatively independent, and by
a force of officials, whose wilfulness lias no power over these
legalized circles. Action in accordance with universal right,
and the habit of such action, are consequences of the oppo-
sition produced by these self-reliant independent circles.

C. The LcgiHlatvrc.
298. The legislature i nterprets the laws and also those i^UiUi.
uiternal affairs of the state whose content is universal. ~ ' ~
This function is itself a part of the constitution. In it the

III ,

!i.

306

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

constitution is presupposed, and so far lies absolutely be-
yond direct delimitation. Yet it receives development in
the improvement of the laws, and the progressive character
of the universal affairs of government.

Addition. — The constitution must unquestionably be the
solid ground, on -which the legislature stands. Hence, the
prime essential is not to set to work to make a constitution.
It exists, but yet it radically becomes, that is, it is formed
progressively. This progress is an alteration which is not
noticed, and has not the form of an alteration. For
example, the wealth of princes and their families was
at first a private possession in Germany ; then, without any
struggle or opposition it was converted into domains, that
is, state wealth. This came about through the princes
feeling the need of an undivided possession and demanding
from the country, and the landed classes generally, security
for the same. There was in this way developed a kind of
possession, over which the princes had no longer the sole
disposition. In a similar way, the emperor was formerly
judge, and travelled about in his kingdom giving the law.
Through the merely seeming or extei'nal progress of civili-
zation, it has become necessary that the emperor should
more and more delegate this office of judge to others. Thus
the judicial function passed from the person of the prince
to colleagues. So the j^rogress of any condition of things is
a seemingly calm and unnoticed one. In the lapse of
time a constitution attains a position quite other than it
had before,

299, These objects are defined in reference to individuals
more precisely in two ways, (a) what of good comes to in-
dividuals to enjoy at the hands of the state, and (/3) what
they must jierform for the state. The first division em-
braces the laws of private right in general, also the rights
of societies and corporations. To these must be added
universal institutions, and indirectly (§ 298) the whole ot
the constitution. But that which, on the other hand, is to

THE STATE.

307

)lutely be-
opment in
! character

.bly be the
Hence, the
nstitution.

is formed
liich is not
tion. For
ailies was
ithout any
lains, that
be princes
lemanding
y, security

a Idnd of
sr the sole
s formerly
^ the law.
s of civili-
'or should
ers. Thus
the prince
if things is
i lapse of
er than it

iidividuals
nies to in-
l (/3) what
iriisiou em-
the rights
be added
e whole ot
land, is to

be performed, is reduced to money as the existing universal
value of things and services. Hence, it can be determined
only in so equitable a way that the particular tasks
and services, which the individual can perform, may be
effected by his private will.

Note.— The object-matter of universal legislation may be
in general distinguished from that of the administrative
and executive functions in this way. Only^what is wholly^,
^iXersal in its content falls under legislation, while
administration deals with the particular and also the
special way of carrying it out.^' But this distinction is not*
absolute, since the law, as it is a law, and not a mere \
general command such as "Thou shalt not kill" (§ 140, |
note, p. 142), must be in itself definite, and the more
definite it is, the more nearly its content apj^roaches
the possibility of being carried out as it is. But at the /
same time such a complete settlement of the laws would
give them an empirical side, which in actual execution
would make them subject to alteration. This would be
detrimental to their character as laws. The organic unity
of the functions of state implies that one single spirit both
fixes the nature of the universal and also carries it out to its
definite reality.

It may occur that the state lays no direct claim upon
the many kinds of skill, possessions, talents, faculties, with
the manifold personal wealth which is contained in them
and is tinged with subjective sentiment, but only upon
tliat form of wealth which appears as money.— The services
referring to the defence of the state against enemies belong
to the duty discussed in the next section of this treatise.
Money is, in fact, not a special kind of wealth, but the <^ -
universal element in all kinds, in so far as they in ]»ro.
duction are given such an external reality as can be appre-
hended as an object. Only at this external point of view
is it i)ossible and just to estimate performances quantita-
tively.

«..lv*^

308

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT

i ',

Plato in his "Republic" allows the rulers to appoint
individuals to their particular class, and assign to them
their particular tasks (§ 185, note). In feudal-monarchy
vassals had to perform a similarly unlimited service, and
simply in their particularity to discharge such a duty as
that of a judge. Services in the East, such as the vast
undertakings in architecture in Egypt, are also in quality
particular. In all these relations there is lacking the

f principle of subjective freedom. In accordance with this
principle, the substantive act of the individual, which even
in the above-mentioned services is in its content particular,
should proceed from his particular will. This right is

I possible only when the demand for work rests upon the

' basis of universal value. Through the influence of this
right the substitution of money for services has been
introduced.

Addition. — The two aspects of the constitution refer to
the rights and the services of individuals. The services
are now almost all reduced to money. Military duty is

/ perhaps the only remaining personal service. In former
times claim was made to the concrete individual, who was
summoned to work in accordance with his skill. Now the
state buys what it needs. This may seem abstract, dead,
and unfeeling. It may also seem as if to be satisfied with
abstract services were for the state a retrograde step. But
the principle of the modern state involves that everything
which the individual does should be occasioned by his will.
By means of money the justice implied in equality can be
much better substantiated. The talented would be more
heavily taxed than the man without talents if respect were
had to concrete capacity. But now, out of reverence for
subjective liberty, the principle is brought to light that
only that shall be laid hold upon which is of a nature to
be laid hold upon.

300. In the legislative function in its totality are active
both the monarchical element and the executive. The

THE STATE.

309

appoint
to them
lonavchy
vice, and
, duty as
the vast
a quality
king the
ivith this
lich even
irticular,

right is
ipon the
e of this
las been

1 refer to
! services
T dutv is
n former
who was
Now the
ict, dead,
ified with
:ep. But
i^erything
'^ his will.
:y can bo
be more
pect were
rence for
ight that
Qature to

ire active

monarchical gives the final decision, and the executive U
element advises. The executive element has concrete \
knowledge and oversight of the whole in its many sides
and in the actual principles firmly rooted in them. It has
also acquaintance with the wants of the offices of state.
In the legislature are at last represented the different
classes or estates.

Additio7i.~lt proceeds from a wrong view of the state
to exclude the members of the executive from the legis-
lature, as was at one time done by the constituent
assembly. In England the ministers are rightly members
of parliament, since those who share in the executive
should stand in connection with and not in opposition to
the legislature. The idea that the functions of govern-
ment should be independent contains the fundamental
error that they should check one another. But this inde-
pendence is apt to usurp the unity of the state, and unity
is above all things to be desired, ^i^

301. By admitting the classes the legislature gives not
simply implicit but actual existence to matters of general
concern. The element of subjective formal freedom, the
public consciousness, or the empirical universahty of the
views and thoughts of the many, here becomes a reality.

Note.— The expression " The Many " (ol toXXoi) charac-
terizes the empirical universality better than the word
'• All," which is in current use. Under this " all," children,
women, etc., are manifestly not meant to be included.
Manifestly, therefore, the definite term " all " should not
be employed, when, it may be, some quite indefinite thing
is being discussed.

There are found in current opinion so unspeakably many
perverted and false notions and sayings concerning the
people, the constitution, and the classes, that it would be
a vain task to specify, explain, and correct them. When
it is argued that an assembly of estates is necessary and
advantageous, it is meant that the people's deputies, or.

810

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

indeed, the people itself, must best understand their own
interest, and that it has undoubtedly the truest desire to
secure this interest. But it is rather true that the people,
in so far as this term signifies a special part of the
citizens, does not know what it wills. To know what we
will, and further what the absolute will, namely reason,
wills, is the fruit of deep knowledge and insight, and is
therefore not the property of the people.

It requires but little reflection to see that the services
performed by the classes in behalf of the general well-being
and public liberty cannot be traced to an insight special to
these classes. The highest state officials have necessarily
deeper and more comprehensive insight into the workings
and needs of the state, and also greater skill and wider
practical experience. They are able without the classes to
secure the best results, just as it is they who must con-
tinually do this when the classes are in actual assembly.
General well-being does not therefore depend upon the
particular insight of the classes, but is rather the achieve-
ment of the oflicial deputies. They can inspect the work
of the officers who are farthest removed from the observa-
tion of the chief functionaries of state. They, too, have a
concrete perception of the more urgent special needs and
defects. But to this intelligent oversight must be added
]Athe possibility of public censure. This possibility has the
eft'ect of calling out the best insight upon public affairs
and projects, and also the purest motives ; its influence is
felt by the members of the classes themselves. As for the
conspicuously good will, which is said to be shown by the
classes towards the general interest, it has already been
remarked (§ 272, note) that the masses, who in general
adopt a negative standpoint, take for granted that the will
of the government is evil or but little good. If this
assumption were replied to in kind, it would lead to the
recrimination that the classes, since they originate in
individuality, the private standpoint and particular in-

THE STATE.

311

terests, are apt to pursue these things at the expense of
the universal interest ; while the other elements of the
state, being already at the point of view of the state, are
devoted to universal ends. As for the pledge to respect
the public welfare and rational freedom, it should be given
especially by the classes, but is shared in by all the other
institutions of state. This guarantee is present in such
institutions as the sovereignty of the monarch, hereditary
succession, and the constitution of the law-courts, much
more pronouncedly than in the classes. The classes, there-
fore, are specially marked out by their containing the sub-
jective element of universal liberty. In them the peculiar
insight and peculiar will of the sphere, which in this
treatise has been called the civic communitv, is actualized
in relation to the state. It is here as elsewhere by means
of the philosophic point of view that this element is
discerned to be a mark of the idea when developed to a
totality. This inner necessity is not to be coifounded with
the external necessities and utilities of this phase of state
activity.

Addition. — The attitude of the government to the classes
must not be in its essence hostile. The belief in the
necessity of this hostile relation is a sad mistake. The
government is not one party which stands over against
another, in such a way that each is seeking to wrest some-
thing from the other. If the state should find itself in
such a situation, it must be regarded as a misfortune and
not as a sign of health. Further, the taxes, to which the
classes give their consent, are not to be looked upon as a
gift to the state, but are contributed for the interest of the
contributors. The peculiar significance of the classes or
estates is this, that through them the state enters into and
begins to share in the subjective consciousness of the
people.

302. The classes, considered as a mediating organ, stand
between the government and the people at large in their

•U^^O'"

^Ir-' .<f^'

'■>r

312

Till-: PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

several spheres and individual capacities. This specific
designation of the classes requires of them a sense and
sentiment both for the state and government and for the
interests of special circles and individuals. Tliis position
of the classes has, in common with the organized executive,
a mediatorial function. It neither isolates the princely
function as an extreme, causing it to appear as a mere
ruling power acting capriciously, nor does it isolate the
particular interests of communities, corporations, and indi-
viduals. Furthermore, individuals are not in it contrasted
with the organized state, and thus are not presented as a
mass or heap, as unorganized opinion and will, or as a
mere collective force.

Note. — It is one of the fundamental principles of logic,
tliat a definite element, which, when standing in opposition,
has the bearing of an extreme, ceases to be in opposition
and becomes an organic element, when it is observed to be
at the same time a mean. In this present question it is
all the more important to make prominent this principle,
since the prejudice is as common as it is dangerous, which
presents the classes as essentially in opposition to the
government. Taken organically, that is, in its totality, the
element of the classes proves its right only through its
ofiice of mediation. Thus the opposition is reduced to mere
appearauce. If it, in so far as it is manifested, were not
concerned merely with the superficial aspect of things but
became a substantive opjjosition, the state would be con-
ceived of as in decay. — That the antagonism is not of this
radical kind is shown by the fact that the objects, against
which it is directed, are not the essential phases of the
political organism, but things that are more special and
indifferent. The passion, which attaches itself to this
opposition, becomes mere party seeking for some subjective
interest, perhaps for one of the higher offices of state.

Addition. — The constitution is essentially a system of
mediation. In despotic lands where there are only princes

THE STATE.

313

I specific
3nse and
i for the
1 position
xecutive,

princely
1 a mere
)late the
md indi-
mtrasted
ited as a

or as a

of logic,
^position,
^position
red to be
tion it is
)rinciple,
IS, which
L to the
ility, the
ough its
L to mere
were not
lings but

be con-
t of this
, against
s of the
cial and

to this
ibjective
ate.

i^stem of
Y princes

and people, the pci^ple act, if they act at all, in such a way
as to disturb or destroy the political organization. But
when the multitude has an organic relation to the whole, it
obtains its interests in a right and orderly way. If this
middle term is not present, the utterance of the masses is
always violent. Therefore, the despot treats the people
with indulgence, while his rage affects only those in his
immediate neighbourhood. So also the people in a des-
potism pay light taxes, which in a constitutional state be-
come larger through the people's own consciousness. In
no other land are taxes so heavy as they are in England. -^

303. The universal class, the class devoted to the service*
of the government, has directly in its structure the universal^
as the end of its essential activity. In that branch of the
legislative function, which contains the classes, the private
individual attains political significance and efficiency.
Hence, private persons cannot appear in the legislature
either as a mere undistinguished mass, or as an aggregate
of atoms. In fact, they already exist under two distinct
aspects. They are found in the class, which is based on
the substantive relation, and also in the class based upon
particular interests and the labour by which they are
secured (§ 201 andfol.). Only in this way is the actual
particular in the state securely attached to the universal. /

Note. — This view makes against another widespread idea,
that since the private class is in the legislature exalted to
participation in the universal business, it must appear in
the form of individuals, be it that representatives are
chosen for this purpose, or that every person shall exercise
a voice. But even in the family this abstract atomic vieAv
is no longer to be found, nor in the civic community, in
both of which the individual makes his appearance only as
a member of a universal. As to the state, it is essentially
an organization, whose members are independent spheres,
and in it no phase shall show itself as an unorganized
multitude. Tlie many, as individuals, whom we are prone

'If

314

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

to call the people, are indeed a collective whole, but merely
as a multitude or formless mass, whose movement and
action would be elemental, void of reason, violent, and
terrible. When in reference to the constitution we still
hear the peojile, that is, this unorganized mass, spoken of,
we may take it for granted that we shall be given only
generalities and warped declamations.

The view leading to the disintegration of the common
existence found in the various circles, which are elements in
the political world or highest concrete universality, would
seek to divide the civic from the political life. The basis
of the state would then be only the abstract individuality
of wilfulness and opinion, a foundation which is merelv
accidental, and not absolutely steadfast and authoritative.
That would be like building political life in the air. Although
in these so-called theories the classes of the civic com-
munity generally and the classes in their political signi-
ficance lie far apart, yet speech has retained their unity, a
union which indeed existed long ago.

304. The distinction of classes, which is already present
in the earlier spheres, is contained also within the strict
circumference of the political classes generally. Their
abstract position is the extreme of empirical universality
in opposition to the princely or monarchical principle. In
this abstract position there is only the possibility of agree-
ment, and hence quite as much the possibility of an-
tagonism. It becomes a reasonable relation, and* leads to
the conclusion of the syllogism (§ 302, note), only if its
middle term, or element of mediation, becomes a reality.
Just as from the side of the princely function the execu-
tive (§ 300) has already this character of reconciliation, so
also from the side of the classes should one of theii- elements
be converted into a mediating term.

305. Of the classes of the civic community one contains
the principle, which is really capable of filling this political
position. This is the class, whose ethical character is

THE STATE.

315

natural. As its basis it has family life, and as regards
subsistence it has the possession of the soil. As regards
its particularity it has a wilD^hich rests upon itself, and,
in common with the princely function, it bears the mark of
nature.

306. In its i:)olitical position and significance this class
becomes more clearly defined, when its means are made as
independent of the wealth of the state as they are of the
uncertainty of trade, the desire for gain, and the fluctuations
of property. It is secure from the favour at once of the
executive and of the multitude. It is further secured even
from its own caprice, since the members of this class, who
are called to this office, do without the rights exercised by
the other citizens. They do not freely dispose of their
property, nor do they divide it equally among their
children, whom they love equally. This wealth becomes
an inalienable inheritance burdened by primogeniture.

Addition. — This class has a more independent volition.
The class of property owners is divided into two broad
parts, the educated and the peasants. In contradistinction
to these two kinds stand both the industrial class, which is
dependent on and directed by the general wants, and the
universal class, which is essentially dependent upon the
state. The security and stability of this propertied class
may be increased still more by the institution of primogeni-
ture. This, however, is desirable only in reference to the
state, since it entails a sacrifice for the political purpose of
giving to the eldest son an independent Jife. Primogeni-
ture is instituted that the state may reckon upon, not the
mere possibility belonging to sentiment, but upon some-
thing necessary. Now sentiment, it is true, is not bound
up with a competence. But it is relatively necessary that
some having a sufficient property and being thereby freed
from external pressure, should step forth without hindrance
and use their activity for the state. But to establish and
foster primogeniture where there are no political institu-

ill

316

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

tions would be nothini,' but a fetter clogging the freedom
of private right. Unless this freedom is supplemented by
tlie political sense, it goes to meet its dissolution.

307. The right of this part of the substantive class
is based upon the nature-principle of the family. But
through heavy sacrifices for the state this principle is
transformed, and by the transformation this class is set
ai)art for political activity. Hence it is called and entitled
to this sjihere by birth, without the accident of choice. It
thus receives a stable substantive situation intermediate
between the subjective caprice and the accidents of the two
extremes. While it resembles the princely function
(§ 306), it participates in the wants and rights of the other
extreme. It thus becomes a support at once to the throne
and to the communitv.

308. Under the other part of the general class element
is found the fluctuating side of the civic community, which
externally because of its numerous membership, and neces-
sarily because of its nature and occupation, takes part in
legislation only througli deputies. If the civic community
appoints these deputies, it does so in accordance with its
real nature. It is not a number of atoms gathering to-
gether merely for a particular and momentary act witliout
any further bond of union, but a body systematically
composed of constituted societies, communities, and (!or-
[»orations. These various circles receive in this wav political
unity. Through the just cilaim of this i)art to "be rc|)re-
scnted by a deputation to be summoned by the jirincely
j.ower, and also through the claim of the first part to make
an appearance (§ 307), the existence of tjv. classes and of
their assembly finds its i)eculiar constitutional guarantee.

Note.— It is held that all should share individually in
tile cotmsels and decisions regarding ih. general affairs of
state. The reason assigned is tliat all acq members of the
state, its affairs arc the affai/s of all, and for the transac-
tion of these affairs all with their knowledge and will liave

THE STATE.

817

e freedom
Qented by

tive class
ily. But
inciple is
ass is set
d entitled
iioice. It
armediate
>f the two
function
the other
he throne

i element
ty, which
nd neces-
s part in
mm unity
3 with its
erinp^ to-
t without
matically
and (;or-
' political
be re])re-

j>rincely
t to make
?8 and of
Iran tee.
Inally in
affairs of
srs of the

transac-
vvill liave

a right to be present. This is a notion which, although it
has no reasonable form, the democratic element would
insert into the organism of state, notwithstanding the fact
that the state is an organism only because of its reasonable
form. This superficial view fastens upon and adheres to
the abstraction " member of the state." But the rational
method, the consciousness of the idea, is concrete and is
combined with the true practical sense, which is itself
nothing else than the rational sense or the sense for the
idea. Yet this sense is not to be confounded with mere
business routine, or bounded by the horizon of a limited
sphere. The concrete state is the whole, articulated into
its particular circles, and the member of the state is the
member of a circle or class. Only his objective character
can be recognized in the state. His general character con-
tains the twofold element, private person and think-
ing person, and thinking is the consciousness and will-
ing of the universal. But consciousness and will cease
to be empty only when they are filled with particularity,
and by particularity is meant the characteristic of a
particular class. The individual is species, let us say, but
has his intrinsic general actuality in the s}>eciea next abov**
it. He attains actual and vital contact with the universal
in the sphere of the corporations and societies (§ 251). It
remains oj)en to him by means of his skill to make his way
into any class, for which he has the capacity, including the
universal class. Another assumption, found in the current
idea that all should have a share in the business of state, is
that all understand this business. This is as aV)8urd as it,
despite its absurdity, is widespread. However, through the
channel of public opinion (§ 31(5) every one i^ free to
express and make good his subjective o])iniim concerning
the universal.

309. Counsels and decisions upon universal concerns re-
quire delegates, who are chosen under the belief that they
luive a better understanding of state business than the

318

THK PHILOSOPHY OF KKHIT.

electors themselves. They are trusted to prosecute not the
pai-ticular interest of a community or a corporation in opposi-
tion to the universal, hut the universal only. Hence, to the
deputies are not committed specific mandates or explicit
instructions. But just as little has the assembly the cha-
racter merely of a lively gathering of persons, each of whom
is bent upon instructinf:^, convincint,', and advising the rest.

Aihl'dlon. — In the case of represen:;ation c<msent is not
given directly by all, but by those wIk* are qualified, since
here the individuitl voter is no longer a mere infinite
person. Representation is based upon (confidence ; but
confidence is different from simply casting a vote. To
be guided by the maj(n-ity of votes is antagonistic to
the prin(!i])le that I must meet my duty as a ])articular
])erson. We have confidence in a person when we believe
in his insight and his willingness to treat my affair as his
own according to the best light of his knowledge and con-
science. The principle of the individual subjective will
also disapj>ears, for confidence is con(*(>rned Avith a thing,
the guiding ideals of a man, his behaviour, Jiis acts, his
concrete understanding. A represenlative must have a
character, insight, and will (uipable of ])arti('ipating in
universal business. He sjieaks not in his chiu-acter as an
abstract individual, but as one who se(>lcs to niaice good his
interests in an assembly occupied with the universal. And
the electors merely ask for soine guarantee tlvt the dele-
gate shall carry out and fui'tlu>r this universal.

310. Independent means has its right in the first ])art of
the classes. The guarantee im])]ied in a qualit'cation and
sentiment adequate to ])ubli(' (mkIs is found in .\w second
part, which arises out of the fiuctuating, varia''!e element
of the civic community. It is chicHy found in sentiment,
skill, and i>ractical knowledge of the interests of the state
and civic community, all of which (pialities ar" acquired
through actual conduct of business in tjie magistracies and
})ublic olfices, and are preserve 1 by practical use. it is found

THE STATE.

319

present, too, in the official or political sense, which is
fashioned and tested hy actual experience.

Note. — Subjective <)])inion readily finds the demand for
ijuarantees sui)erfiuous or injurious, when it is made upon
the so-called j)eo])l('. But the state contains the objective
as its distin«^niisliiii<,' trait, and not su)>jective opinion with
its self-confidence. Individuals can he for the state only
what in them is objectively recognizalile and apj)roved.
Since this second part of the class-element has its root in
[)articular interests and concerns, where accident, change,
and caprice have the right to disport tliemselves, the state
must here look the more closely iifter the objective.

The external (qualification of a certain property a])[)ears,
when taken abstractly, a one-sided external(!xtreme,rn con-
trast with the other just as one-sided extreme, namely, the
mere subjective coiifiden(;e and opinion of the electors.
Each in its abstraction is distinguished from the concrete
qualifications, iudicattid in § 302, which are required of
those who advise concerning the business of state. — Never-
theless, in the choice of a magistrate or other officer of a
society or an association, a property qualification is rightly
ma<le a condition, especially as much of the business is ad-
min istered without remimeration. This qualification has
also direct value in regard to the i>olitical business of the
classes, if the membei's receive no salary.

311. Deputies from the civic community should be
acquainted with the particular needs and interests of the
body which they rej>res<'nt, an.l also with the special
olistacles which ought to be removed. They should there-
t\)re be chosen from annmgst themselves. Such a delega-
tion is naturally ai)pointed by the different corporations of
the civic community (§ 308) l)y a simple process, which is
not disturbed by abstractions and atomistic notions. Thus
they fulfil the point of view of the community directly, and
cither an election is altogether superfluous, or the play of
opinion and caprice is reduced to a minimum.

320

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Note. — It is a manifest advantage to have amongst the
delegates individuals who represent every considerable
special branch of the community, such as trade, manu-
facture, etc. These individuals must be thoroughly ac-
quainted with their branch and belong to it. In the idea
of a loose, indefinite election this important circumstance
is given over to accident. Every branch, however, has an
^ equal right to be represented. To regard the deputies as
^representatives has a significance that is organic and
jrational, only if they are not representatives of mere
separate individuals or of a mere multitude, but of one
of the essential spheres of the community and of its lari?er
interests. Eepresentation no longer means tint one person
should take the place of another. Eather is the interest
itself actually present in the person of the representative,
since he is there in behalf of his own objective nature.

Of elections by means of many separate persons it mav
be observed that there is necessarily little desire to vote,
because one vote has so slight an influence. Even when
those who are entitled to vote are told how extremelv
valuable their privilege is, they do not vote. Hence occurs
just the opposite of what is sought. The selection passes
into the hands of a few, a single ])arty, or a special acci-
dental interest, which should rather be neutralized. -Jit

312. Of the two elements comprised under the classes,
each brings into council a particular modification. As one
of these elements has within the sphere of the classes the
peculiar function of mediation, and that, too, between two
things which both exist, it has a se]>arate existence. The
assembly of the classes is thus divided into two chambers.

313. By this separation the number of courts is in-
creased, and there is a greater certainty of mature judg-
ment. Moreover, an accidental decision, secured on tlie
8j)ur of the moment by a simple majority of the votes, is
rendered much less probable. But these are not the main
advantages. There is, besides, smaller opportunity or

THE STATE.

321

occasion for direct opposition to arise between the class
element and the p;overninent. Or in the case when the
mediating element is also found on the side of the lower
chamber, the insight of this lower house becomes all the
stronger, since it in this case appears to be more unpartisan
and its opposition to be neutralized.

314. The classes are not the sole investigators of the
affairs of state and sole judges of the general interest.
Rather do they form merely an addition (§ 301). Their
distinctive trait is tliat, as they represent the members of
the civic community who have no share in the government,
it is through their co-operating Icnowdedge, counsel, and
judgment that the element of formal freedom attains its
right. Besides, a general acquaintance with state affairs
is more widely extended through the publicity given to the
transactions of the classes.

315. By means of this avenue to knowledge public
opinion first attains to true thoughts, and to an insight
into the condition and conception of the state and its
concerns. It thus first reaches the ca]iacity of judging
rationally concerning them. It learns, besides, to know
and esteem the management, talents, virtues, and skill of
the different officers of state. While these talents by re-
ceiving i^ublicity are given a strong impulse towards
development and an honourable field for exhibiting their
worth, they are also an antidote for the pride of indi-
viduals and of the multitude, and are one of the best
means for their education.

Addition. — To o[)en the i)roceedings of the assembly of
classes to the public is of great educational value, especially
for the citizens. By it the people learn most certainly the
true nature of their interests. There prevails extensively
the idea that everybody knows already what is good for
tlie state, and that tins ireneral knowledge is merely given
utterance to in a stai" assembly. But, indeed, the very
opposite is the fact. Here, first of all are developed

322

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

virtues, talents, skill, which have to serve as examples.
Indeed, these assemblies may be awkward for the ministers,
who must here buckle on their wit and eloquence to resist
the attacks of their opponents. Publicity is the greatest
opportunity for instruction in the state interests gener-
ally. Amongst a. people, where publicity is the rule,
there is seen quite a different attitude towards the state
than in those places where state assemblies are not found
or are secret. By the publication of every proceeding, the
chambers are first brought into union with the larger
general opinion. It is shown that what a man fancies
when he is at home with his wife and friends is one thing,
and quite another thing what occurs in a great gathering
where one clever stroke annihilates the preceding.

316. Formal subjective freedom, implying that indi-
viduals as sucli should have and express their own judg-
ment, opinion, and advice concerning affairs of state, makes
its appearance in that aggregate, which is called public
opinion. In it what is absolutely universal, substantive,
and true is joined Avith its opposite, the independent,
peculiar, and partic\ilar opinions of the many. This phase
of existence is therefoi-e the actual contradiction of itself ;
knowledge is appearance, the essential exists directly as
the unessential.

Addition. — Public opinion is the unorganized means
through which what a people wills and thinks is made known.
That which is effective in the state must indeed be in
organic relation to it ; and in the constitution this is the
case. But at all times public opinion has been a great
power, and it is especially so in our time, when the prin-
ciple of subjective freedom has such importance and sig-
nificance. What now sliall be confirmed is confirmed no
longer through force, and but little through use and wont,
but mainly by insight and reasons.

317. Public opinion contains therefore the eternal sub-
stantive principles of justice, the true content and result

examples,
ninisters,
) to resist
5 greatest
ts gener-
the rule,
the state
lot found
(ding, the
le larger
n fancies
)ne thing,
gathering

hat indi-
wn judg-
ie, makes
ed public
bstantive,
ependent,
'his phase
of itself;
irectly as

3d means
de known.
3ed be in
;his is the
n a great
the prin-
3 and sig-
firmed no
and wont,

ernal sub-
i,ud result

THE STATE.

323

of the whole constitution, of legislation, and of the universal
condition in general. It exists in the form of sound human
understanding, that is, of an ethical principle which in the
shape of prepossessions runs through everything. It con-
tains the true wants and right tendencies of actuality.

But when this inner phase comes forth into conscious-
ness, it appears to imaginative thinking in the form of
general propositions. It claims to be of interest partly on
its own separate account ; but it also comes to the assist-
ance of concrete reasoning upon felt wants and upon the
events, arrangements, and relations of the state. When
this happens, there is brought forward also the whole
range of accidental opinion, with its ignorance and per-
version, its false knowledge and incorrect judgment. Now,
as to the consciousness of what is peculiar in thought and
knowledge, with which the present phenomenon has to do,
it may be said that the worse an opinion is, the more
peculiar and unique it is. The bad is in its content wholly
particular and unique : the rational, on the contrary, is the
absolutely universal. Yet it is the unique upon which
o])inion founds its exalted self-esteem.

Note. — Hence it is not to l)e regarded merely as a
difference in the subjective point of view when it is declared
on one side

"Vox popnli, vox del ;"

and on the other side (in Ai-iosto, for example),^

"Che '1 Vo1<,'are i^rnorante ojrn' un riprenda
E parli i)iu di (luel clie lueno intenda ; "

both phases are found side by side in public opinion.
Sincie truth and endless error are so directly united in it.

Or in Goethe

" Zusclilajien kann die Masse,
Da ist sie roHpektal»el ;
Urtlieilen ijeliiiyt ihr miserabel."

324

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

1 'tl

either the one or the other is not truly in earnest. It may
seem hard to decide which is in earnest ; and it would still
be hard, even if we were to confine ourselves to the direct
expression of public opinion. But since in its inner being
public opinion is the substantive, it is truly in earnest only
about that. Yet the substantive cannot be extracted from
public opinion ; it, by its very nature as substantive, can
be known only out of itself and on its own account. No
matter what passion is expended in support of an opinion,
no matter how seriously it is defended or attacked, this is
no criterion of its practical validity. Yet least of all would
opinion tolerate the idea that its earnestness is not earnest
at all.

A great mind has publicly raised the question, whether
it be permitted to deceive a people. We must answer that
a people does not allow itself to be deceived in regard to
its substantive basis, or the essence and definite character
of its spirit ; but in regard to the way in which it knows
this, and judges of its acts and phases, it deceives itself.

Addition. — The principle of the modern world demands
that what every man is bound to recognize must seem to
him justified. He, moreover, has had a voice in the
discussion and decision. If he has given his word and
indicated that he is responsible, his subjectivity is satisfied,
and he allows many things to go unchallenged. In France
freedom of speech has always j^roved less dangerous than
silence. One fears that if a man is silent he will retain his
aversion to an object; but reasoning upon it furnishes a
safety-valve and brings satisfaction, while the object, in
the meantime, pursues its way unmolested.

818. Public opinion deserves, therefore, to be esteemed
and despised; to be despised in its concrete consci-.'isness
and expression, to be esteemed in its essential basis. At
best, its inner nature makes merely an appearance in its
concrete expression, and that, too, in a more or less
troubled shape. Since it has not within itself the means of

THE STATE.

325

It may

ould still
he direct
ler being
nest onh'
ited from
itive, can
unt. No
L opinion,
d, this is
allwould
>t earnest

, whether
swer that
regard to
character

it knows
3 itself,

demands
t seem to
e in the
^rord and

satisfied,
[n France
•ous than
retain his
irnishes a
object, in

esteemed

5ci-,'isness
»asis. At
nee in its
e or less
I means of

drawing distinctions, nor the capacity to raise its substan-
tive side into definite knowledge, independence of it is the
first formal condition of anything great and reasonable,
whether in actuality or in science. Of any reasonable end
we may be sure that public opinion will ultimately be
pleased with it, recognize it, and constitute it one of its
prepossessions.

Addition. — In public opinion all is false and true, but to ,
find out the truth in it is the afi:air of the great man. He
who tells the time what it wills and means, and then
brings it to completion, is the great man of the time. In
his act the inner significance and essence of the time
is actualized. Who does not learn to despise public
opinion, which is one thing in one place and another in
another, will never produce anything great.

319. The liberty of taking part in state affairs, the
pricking impulse to say and to have said one's opinion, is
directly secured by police laws and regulations, which,
however, hinder and punish the excess of this liberty. In-
direct security is based upon the government's strength,
which lies mainly in the rationality of its constitution and
the stability of its measures, but partly also in the publicity
given to the assemblies of the classes. Security is
guaranteed b^' piiblicity in so far as the assemblies voice
the mature and educated insight into the interests of
the state, and pass over to others what is less significant,
especially if they are disabused of the idea that the utter-
ances of these others are peculiarly important and effica-
cious. Besides, a broad guarantee is found in the general
indifference and contem])t, with which shallow and malicious
utterances are quickly and effectually visited.

Note. — One means of freely and widely participating in
public affairs is the press , which, in its more extended
range, is superior to speech, although inferior in vivacity. —
To define the liberty of the press as the liberty to speak and
write what one pleases is jiarallel to the definition of liberty

k-^

326

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

in general, as liberty to do what one pleases. These views
helong to the undeveloped crudity and superficiality of
I'anciftil theorizing. Nowhere so much as in this matter
does formalism hold its ground so obstinately, and so little
permits itself to be influenced by reasons. And this was to
be expected, because the object is hei-e the most transient,
accidental, and particular in the whole range of opinion,
with its infinite variety of content and aspect. Of course,
there is no obscurity about a direct summons to steal,
murder, or revolt. But, aside from that, much depends on
the manner and form of expression. The words may seem
to be quite general and undefined, and yet may conceal
a perfectly definite significance. Besides, they may have
consequences, which are not actually expressed. Indeed, it
may even be debated whether these consequences are really
in the expression and properly follow from it. This indefi-
niteness in the form and in the substance does not admit of
the laws attaining in this case the precision usually de-
manded of laws. Since in this field crime, wrong, and in-
justice have their most particular and subjective shape, the
indefiniteness of the wrong causes the sentence also to be
completely subjective. Besides, the injury is in this matter
sought to be done to and make itself real in the thought,
opinion, and will of others. But it thus comes into contact
with the freedom of others, upon whom it depends whether
the act is actually an injury or not.

Hence, the laws are open to criticism because of their in-
definiteness. By the skilful use of terms they may be
evaded ; or, on the other hand, it may be contended that
the sentence is merely subjective. It may be maintained
further that an expression is not a deed but only an opinion,
or thought, or a simple saying. Thus, from the mere sub-
jectivity of content and from the insignificance of a mere
opinion or saying the inference is drawn that these words
should pass unpunished. Yet in the same breath there is
demanded as gi'eat a respect and esteem for that very

THE STATE.

327

opinion of mine as foi' my real mental possession, and for
the utterance of that opinion as for the deliberate utterance
of a mental possession.

The fact remains that injury to the honour of individuals
generally, as libel, abuse, disdainful treatment of the
government, its officials and officers, especially the person of
the prince, contempt for the laws, incitement to civil broil,
etc., are all crimes or faults of different magnitudes. The
greater indefiniteness of these acts, due to the element
in which they find utterance, does not annul their real
character. It simply causes the subjective ground, on
which the ofEence is committed, to decide the nature and
shape of the reaction. It is this subjective nature of the
ofEence, which in the reaction converts subjectivity and un-
certainty into necessity, whether this reaction be mere pre-
vention* of crime by the police or specific x>unishment.
Here, as always, formalism relies on isolated aspects,
belonging to the external appearance, and seeks by these
abstractions of its own creation to reason away the real and
concrete nature of the thing.

As to the sciences, they, if they are sciences in reality, /
are not found in the region of opinion and subjective
thought, nor does their method of presentation consist in
the adroit use of terms, or allusions, or half -uttered, half-
concealed opinions, but in the simple, definite, and open
expression of the sense and meaning. Hen:;e, the sciences
do not come under the category of public opinion

(§ 316).

For the rest, the element in which public opinion finds
utterance and becomes an overt and tangible act is, as we
have already observed, the intelligence, principles, and
opinions of others. It is this element which determines
the peculiar effect of these acts or the danger of them
to individuals, the community or the state (§ 218), just as
a spark, if thrown upon a heap of gunpowder, is much
more dangerous than if thrown on the ground, where

I VvjAj:-'^

!'•:

328

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

it goes out and leaves no trace. — Hence, as the right
of science finds security in the content of its matter, so
also may an uttered wrong find security, or, at least,
toleration, in the cont empt with which it is received.
Offenc es, which are in strictness punishable at law, may
tlius partly come under a kind of nemesis. Internal
impotence, by opposing itself to the talents and virtues, by
which it feels oppressed, comes in this way to itself,
and gives self-consciousness to its own nothingness. A
more harmless form of nemesis was found amongst the
Koman soldiers in the satirical songs directed against their
emperors on the triumphal march. Having gone through
hard service, and yet failing to secure mention in the list of
honours, they sought to get even with the emperor in this
jesting way. But eveu the nemesis which is bad and
malevolent is, when treated with scorn, deprived of its
effect. Like the public, which to some extent forms a
circle for this kind of activity, it is limited to a meaningless
delight in others' misfortunes and to a condemnation, which
is inherent in itself.

320. There is the subjectivity, which is the dissolution of
the established state life. It has its external manifestation
in the opinion or reasoning, which, in seeking to make good
its own random aims, destroys itself. This subjectivity has
its true reality in its oi)posite, namely, in that subjectivity,
which, being identical with the substantive will, and
(instituting the conception of the princely power, is the
ideality of the whole. This higher subjectivity has not
as yet received in this treatise its right and visible embodi-
ment.

Addition. — We have already regarded subjectivity as
existing in the monarch, and in that capacity occupying
the pinnacle of the state. The other side of subjectivity
manifests itself arbitrarily and quite externally in public
opinion. The subjectiv;ty of the monarch is in itself
abstract, but it should be concrete, and should as concrete

THE STATE.

529

be the ideality which difEuses itself over the whole. In
the state which is at peace, all branches of the civic life
have their subsistence, but this subsistence beside and out-
side of one another the branches have only as it issues out
of the idea of the whole. This process or idealization of

the whole must also have its own manifestation.

II. External Sovereignty.

321. Internal sovereignty (§ 278) is this ideality in so
far as the elements of spirit, and of the state as the em-
bodiment of spirit, are unfolded in their ne(!essity, and
subsist as organs of the state. But spirit, involving a
reference to itself, which is negative and infinitely free,
becomes an independent existence, which has incorporated
the subsistent differences, and hence is exclusive. So
constituted, the state has an individuality, which exists
essentially as an individual, and in the sovereign is a real,
direct individual (§ 279).

322. Individuality, as exclusive and independent exist-
ence, appears as a relation to other self-dependent states.
The independent existence of the actual spirit finds an
embodiment in this general self-dependence, which is,
therefore, the first freedom and highest dignity of a
people.

Note. — Those who, out of a desire for a collective whole,
which will constitute a more or less self-dependent state,
and have its own centre, are willing to abandon their own
centre and self-dependence, and form with others a new
whole, are ignorant of the nature of a collective whole, and
underrate the pride of a people in its independence. — The
force, which states have on their first appearance in history,
is this self-dependence, even though it is quite abstract
and has no further internal development. Hence, in its
most primitive manifestation, the state has at its head an
individual, whether he be patriarch, chief, or what not.

ill

330

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

323. In actual reality, this negative reference of the
state to itself appears as reference to each other of two
independent things, as though the negative were some
external thing. This negative reference has, therefore, in
its existence the form of an event, involving accidental
occurrences coming from without. But it is in fact its
own highest element, its real infinitude, the idealization of
all its finite materials. The substance, as the absolute
power, is here brought into contrast with all that is
individual and particular, such as life, property, the i-ights
of proi)erty, or even wider circles, and makes their relative
worthlessness a fact for consciousness.

324. The phase, according to which the interest and
right of individuals is made a vanishing factor, is at the
same time a positive element, forming the basis of their,
not accidental and fleeting, but absolute individuality.
This relation and the recognition of it constitute their
substantial duty. Property and life, not to speak of
opinions and the ordinary routine of existence, they must
sacrifice, if necessary, in order to preserve the substantive
individuality, independence, and sovereignty of the state.

Note. — It is a very distorted account of the matter when
the state, in demanding sacrifices from tlir citizens, is
taken to be simply the civic community, whose object is
merely the security '>f life and property. Security cannot
possibly be obtained by the sacrifice of what is to be
secured.

Herein is to be found the ethi<ial element in war. Wa
is not to be regarded as an absolute evil. It is not a
merely external accident, having its actidental ground in
the passions of powerful individuals or nations, in acts
of injustice, or in anything which ought not to be. Acci-
dent befalls that which is by nature accidental, and this
fute is a necessity. So from the standpoint of the con-
ception and in philosophy the merely accidental vanisiies,
because in it, as it is a mere ap])earance, is recognized its

THE STATE.

331

essence, namely, necessity. It is necessary that what is
finite, such ••' ; life and property, should have its contingent
nature exposed, since contingency is inherent in the con-
ception of the finite. This necessity has in one phase of
it the form of a force of nature, since all that is finite is
mortal and transient. But in the ethical life, that is to
say, the state, this force and nature are separated. Ne-
cessity becomes in this way exalted to the work of freedon),
and becomes a force which is ethical. What from the
standpoint of nature is transient, is now transient because
it is willed to be so ; and that, which is fundamentally
negative, becomes substantive and distinctive individuality
in the ethical order.

It is often said, for the sake of edification, that war
makes short work of the vanity of temporal things. It is
the element by which the idealization of what is particuhir
receives its right and becomes an actuality. Moreover, by
it, as I have elsewhere expressed it, " finite pursuits are
rendered unstable, and the «.'thieal health of peoples is
preserved. Just as the movement of the ocean j)revents
the corruption which would be the result of per\)etual
calm, so by war people escape the corru])ti(>n which wou-'d
be occasioned by a continuous or eternal peace." — The
view tliat this quotation contains merely a i)liilosophi<'al
idea, or, as it is sometiiiu's called, a justification of provi-
dence, and that actual war needs another kind of justifica-
tion, will be taken up later. The idealization, which conies
to the surface in war, viewed as an accidental foreign
relation, is the same as tlie ideality by virtue of which the
internal state functions are orgiinic elements of the whole.
This j)rinciple is found in history in sucli a fact as that
successful wars have prevented civil l»roils and stn'ugthened
the internal i)ower of the state. So, too, ]»eople8, who
liave been unwilling or afraid to endure internal sove-
reignty, liave been subjugated by others, and in their
struggles for inde])endence have had hont)ur an<l success

I ^

332

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

small in proportion to their failure to establish within
themselves a central political power; their freedom died
through their fear of its dying. Moreover, states, which
Tiave no guarantee of indepeiideuce in the strength of their
army, states, e.g., that ai'e very small in comparison with
their neighbours, have continued to subsist because of their
internal constitution, which mei*ely of itself would seem to
promise them neither internal repose nor external security.
These phenomena are illustrations of our principle drawn
from history.

Addition. — In peace the civic life becomes more and
more extended. Each separate sphere walls itself in and
becomes exclusive, and at last there is a stagnation of
mankind. Their })articularity Itecomes more and more
fixed and ossified. Unity of the liody is essential to liealth,
and where the organs become hard death eusues. Ever-
lasting ])eace is frequently demanded as the ideal towards
which mankind must move. Hence, Kant jiroposed an
alliance of priut-es, wliich should settle the controversies of
states, and the Holy Alliance was probably intended to be
an institution of this kind. But tlie state is individual,
and in imlividuality negation is essentially implied.
Although a number of states may make themselves into a
familv. the union, because it is an individual itv, must
create an opposition, and so beget an enemy. As a result
of war ])e()|>les -uv strengtl'.ened, nations, which are in-
volved in civil (juarrels. winaing repose at home by means
of war abroad. It is true that war occasions iusecvirity of
jx)sses8ions, but this real insecurity is simply a necessary
commotiou. From the ]>ul])it we hear nnich regarding the
uncertainty, vanity, :ind instability of ffinporal things. At
the very same time every one. no niatttT how much he is
impressed by these utterances, thinks that he will maiiago
to retain liis own stock and store. Hut if the uncertainty
comes iu the form of hussars with glistening sabres, and
begins to work in downright earnest, this touching editica-

THE STATE.

333

tion turns right about face, and hurls curses at the invader.
In spite of this, wars arise, when they lie in the nature of
the matter. The seeds spring up afresh, and words are
silenced before the earnest repetitions of history. A^

325. Sacrifice for the salce of the individuality of the
state is the substantive relation of all the citizens, and is,
thus, a universal duty. It is ideality on one of its sides,
and standi in contrast to the reality of particular sub-
sistence. Hence it itself becomes a specific relation, and to
it is dedicated a class of its own, the class whose virtue is
bravery.

326. Dissensions between states may arise out of any
one specific side of their relations fco each other. Througli
these dissensions the sjjccific part of the state devoted to
defence receives its distinguishing character, But if the
whole state, as such, is in danger cf losing its independence,
duty summons all the citizens to its defence. If the whole
becomes a single force, and is torn from it.s internal
position and goes abroad, defence becomes converted into
a war of conquest,

Note. — The weaponed force of the state constitutes its
standing army. The sj)ecitic function of defending the
state must bo intrusted to a sei)arare clas.«. This i)ro-
ceediug is due to the same necessity by which each of the
other particular elements, interests, or affairs, has a
separate place, as in marriage, tlie industrial class, the
business class, and the political class. Theorizing, wliich
wanders up and down with its reasons, goes about to (^on-
teuij»late the greater advantages or the greater disadvan-
tages of ii standing army. Mere opinion decides against
an armv, beeause the conception of tlie matter is liarder to
understand than are separate and external sides. Another
rea8t)n is that the interests and aims of particularity,
expenses, cousecpient liigher taxation, etc., are counted of
greater concern l)y the civic conuiiunity than is the abso-
lutelv necessary. On this view the necesyarv is valuable

ill

334

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

only as a means to the preservation of the various special
civic interests.

327. Bravery taken l)y itself is a formal virtue, since in
it freedom is farthest removed from all special aims,
possessions, and enjoyments, and even from life. But it
involves a negation or renunciation of only external
realities, and does not carry with it a completion of the
sjtiritual nature. Thus, the sentiment of courage may be
based upon any one of a variety of grounds, and its actual
result may be not for the brave themselves, but only for
others.

Addition. — The military class is the class of universality.
To it are assigned the defence of the state and the duty of
bringing into existence the ideality implicit in itself. In
other words it must sacrifice itself. Bravery is, it is true,
of different sorts. The courage of tlie animal, or the
robber, Ihe braverv due to a sense of honour, the braverv
of chivalrv, are not vet the true forms of it. True braverv
in civilized peoples consists in a readiness to offer up one-
self in the service of the state, so that the individual coimts
only as one amongst many. Not ]X'rson;il fearlessness, but
the taking of one's place in a universal cause, is the
valuable feature of it. In India five Innidred men con-
(|uered twenty tliousanc', who were by no means cowardly
but lacked the sense of co-operation.

328. Tlie content of bravery as a sentiment is found in
the true absolute fimil end, the sovereignty of the state.
Bravery realizes this end, and in so doing gives up personal
reality. Hence, in this feeling are found the most rigorous
and direct antagonisms. Tliere is i)resent in it a self-
sacrifice, wliicli is yet the existence of freeditm. In it is
found the highest self-control or independence, wliich yet
in its existence submits to tlie mechanism of an external
order and a lif'- ;)f service. An utter obedience or com-
plete abnegation uf ime'sown opinion and reasonings, even
an absence of o\.r\. own s])irit, is coupled with the most

THE STATE.

335

intense and comprehensive direct presence of the spirit and
of resolution. The most hostile and hence most personal
attitude Towards individuals is allied with perfect indif-
ference, or even, it may be, a kindly feeling towards them as
individuals.

Note. — To risk one's life is indeed something more than
fear of death, but it is yet a mere negative, having no
independent character and value. Only the positive ele-
ment, the aim and content of the act, gives significance to
the feeling of fearlessness. Eobbers or murderers, having
in view a crime, adventurers bent upon gratifying merely
their own fancy, risk their lives without fear. — The prin-
ciple of the modern world, that is, the thought and the
universal, have given bravery a higher form. It now seems
to be mechanical in its expression, being the act not of a
particular person, but of a member of the whole. As
antagonism is now directed, not against separate persons,
but against a hostile whole, personal courage appears as
impersonal. To this change is due the invention of the
gun ; and this by no means chance invention has trans-
muted the merely personal form of bravery into the more
al>stract.

329. The state has a foreign aspect, because it is an
individual subject. Hence, its relation to other states falls
within the princely function. Upon this function it de-
volves solely and directly to command the armed force, to
entertain i-elations with other states through ambassadors,
to decide upon peace and war, and to conduct other
negotiations.

Addiiion. — In almost all European countries the in-
dividual summit is the princely function, which has charge
of foreign affairs. Wherever the constitution reipiires the
existence of classes or estates, it may be asked whether the
classes, which in any case control the su])plies, should not
also resolv*; ujion war and peace. In England, for
examjile, no unpopular war can be waged. But if it is

336

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

meaut that princes and cabinets are more subject to
passion than the houses, and hence that the houses should
decide whether there should be war or peace, it must
be replied, that often whole nations have been roused to a
pitch of enthusiasm surpassing that of their princes.
Frequently in England the whole people have insisted upon
war, and in a certain measure com])elled the ministers to
wage it. The popularity of Pitt was due to his knowing
how to meet what the nation willed. Not till afterwards
did calm give rise to the consciousness that the war
was utterly useless, and undertaken without adequate
means. Moreover, a state is connected not only with
another but with several others, and the complications are
so delicate that they can be managed only by the highest
power.

B. International Law.

330. International law arises out of the relation to one
another of independent states. Whatever is absolute in
this relation receives the form of a command, V)ecauso its
reality depends upon a distinct sovereign will.

Addition. — A state is not a private person, but in itself
a completely independent totality. Hence, the relation of
states to one another is not merely that of morality and
private right. It is often desired that states should bo
regarded from the standpoint of private right and morality.
But the position of private persons is such that they have
over them a law court, which realizes what is intrinsically
right. A relation between states ought also to be intrinsi-
cally right, and in mundane aifairs that which is intrinsi-
cally right ought to have power. But as against the state
there is no power to decide what is intrinsically right and
to rmlize this decision. Hence, we must here remain by
the absolute command. States in their ri'lation to one
another are independent and look u]wn the stipulations
which they make one with another as j)rovisi(>nal.

THE STATE.

337

331. The nation as a state is the spirit substantively
realized and directly real. Hence, it is the absolute power
on earth. As regards other states it exists in sovereign
independence. Hence, to exist for and be recognized by
another as such a state is its primary absolute right. But
this right is yet only formal, and the state's demand to be
recognized, when based on these external relations, is
abstract. Whether the state exists absolutely and in
concrete fact, depends upon its content, constitution, and
condition, Even then the recognition, containing the
identity of both inner and outer relations, depends upon
the view and will of another.

Note. — Just as the individual person is not real unless
related to others (§ 71 and elsewhere), so the state is not
really individual unless related to other states (§ 322).
The legitimate province of a state in its foreign relations,
and more especially of the princely function, is on one
side wholly internal; a state shall not meddle with the
internal affairs of another state. Yet, on the other side, it
is essential for its completeness that it be recognized by
others. But this recognition demands as a guarantee
that it shall recognize those who recognize it, and will have
respect for their independence. Therefore they cannot be
indifferent to its internal affairs.— In the case of a nomadic
people, or any people occupying a lower grade of civiliza-
tion, the question arises how far it can be considered as
a state. The religious opinions formerly held by Jews
and Mahomedans may contain a still higher opposition,
which does not permit of the universal identity implied in
recognition.

Addition..~W\\en Napoleon, before the peace of Campo-
formio, said, " The French Republic needs recognition as
little as the sun requires to be recognized," he really
indicated the strength of the existence, which already
carried with it a guarantee of recognition, without its
having Kvn exi)ressed.

I i

338

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

332. The direct reality, in which states stand to one
another, sunders itself into various relations, whose nature
proceeds from independent caprice on both sides, and
hence has as a general thin^ the formal character of a
contract. The subject matter of lese contracts is, how-
ever, of infinitely narrower ran^e than of those in the civic
community. There individuals are dependent upon one
another in a great variety of ways, while independent
states are wholes, which find satisfaction in the main
within themselves.

333. International law, or the law which is universal,
and is meant to hold absolutely good between states, is to be
distinguished from the special content of positive treaties,
and has at its basis the proposition that treaties, as they
involve the mutual obligations of states, must be kept
inviolate. But because the relation of states to one another
has sovereignty as its principle, they are so far in a con-
dition of nature one to the other. Their rights have
reality not in a general will, which is constituted as a
superior power, but in their particular wills. Accordingly
the fundamental proposition of international law remains a
good intention, while in the actual situation the relation
established by the treaty is being continually shifted or
abrogated.

Note.— There is no judge over states, at most only a
referee or mediator, and even the mediatorial function is
only an accidental thing, being due to ])articular wills.
Kant's idea was that eternal peace should be secured by an
alliance of states. This alliance should settle every dispute,
make impossible the resort to arms for a decision, and be
recognized by every state. This idea assumes that states
are in accord, an agreement which, strengthened though it
might be by moral, religious, and other considerations,
nevertheless always rested on the private sovereign will,
and was therefore liable to be disturbed by the element of
continteucv.

THE STATE.

339

to one
) nature
es, and
ter of a
is, how-
the civic
pen one
pendent
le main

niversal,
i, is to be
treaties,
, as they
be kept
i another
n a con-
hts have
;ed as a
jordingly
emains a
! relation
hifted or

it only a
mction is
lar wills,
red by an
y dispute,
n, and be
liat states
though it
derations,
?ign will,
lement of

334. Therefore, when the particular wills of states can(
come to no agreement, the controversy can be settled only /
by war. Owing to the wide field and the varied relations
of the citizens of different states to one another, injuries^
occur easily and frequently. What of these injmies is to
be viewed as a specific breach of a treaty or as a violation
of formal recognition and lionour remains from the nature
of the case indefinite. A state may introduce its infinitude!
and honour into every one of its separate compartments.
It is all the mo^-e tempted to make or seek some occasion
for a display of irritability, if the individuality within it
has been strengthened by long internal rest, and desires an
outlet for its pent-up activity.

335. Moreover, the state as a spiritual whole cannot be
satisfied merely with taking notice of the fact of an injury,
because injury involves a threatened danger arising from
the possible action of the other state. Then, too, there is
the weighing of probabilities, guesses at intentions, and
so forth, all of which have a part in the creation of
strife.

336. Each self-dei>eudent state has the standing of a
particular will ; and it is on this alone that the validity of
treaties depends. This particular will of the whole is in
its content its well-being, and well-being constitutes the
highest law in its relation to another. All the more is
this so since the idea of the state involves that the opposi-
tion between right or abstract freedom on one side and the
complete specific content or well-being on the other is
superseded. It is to states as concrete wholes that recog-
nition (§ 331) is first granted.

337. The substantive weal of the state is its weal as a
particular state in its definite interests and condition, its
peculiar external circumstances, and its particular treaty
obligations. Thus the government is a particular wisdom
luid not luiiversal providence (§ 324, note). So, too, its
(md in relation to other states, the principle justifying its

%■,

340

THE l>HlLO«01'HY OF HKJHT.

ill'

wars and treaties, is not a general thought , such as philan-
thropy, but the actually wronged or threatened weal in its
definite particularity.

JVo/e. At one time a lengthy discussion was held with

regard to the opposition between morals and politics, and
the demand was made that politics should be in accordance
with morality. Here it may be remarked merely that the
commonweal* has quite another authority than the weal of
the individual, and that the ethical substance or the state
has directly its reality or right not in an abstract but in a
concrete existence. This existence, and not one of the
many general thoughts held to be moral (commands, must
^ be the principle of its conduct. The view that politics in
'this assumed opposition is presumptively in the wrong
depends on a shallow notion both of morality and of the
nature of the state in relation to morality.

338. Although in war there prevails force, contmgency,
and absence of right, states continue to recognize one
another as states, lu this fact is implied a covenant, by
virtue of which each state retains absolute value. Hence,
war, even when actively prosecuted, is understood to be
temporary, and in international law is recognized as contain-
ing the possibility of peace. Ambassadors, also, are to be
respected. War is not to be waged against internal insti-
tutions, or the i)eaceable family and private life, or private

pei'sons.

Addition.— Modern wars are (tarried on humanely. One
person is not set in hate over against another. Personal
hostilities occur at most in the case of the pickets. But in
the army as an army, enmity is something undetermined,
and gives place to the duty which each person owes to

another.

339. For the rest, the capture of prisoners in time of
war, and in time of peace the concession of rights of
private intercourse to the subjects of another state, depend
principally upon the ethical observances of nations. In

THE STATE.

341

them is embodied that inner universality of behaviour, j
which is preserved under all relations.

Addition. — The nations of Europe form a family by
virtue of the universal principle of their lefjislation, their
ethical observances, and their civilization. Amonj^st them
international behaviour is ameliorated, while there prevails
elsewhere a mutual infliction of evils. The relation of one S
state to another fluctuates ; no judi,'e is j)resent to compose \
differences ; the hi<ifher judfj^e is simply the universal and )
absolute spirit, the spirit of tlie world. (jLtt^'-*'*'*'*

• 340. As states are particular, there is manifested in their
relation to one anotlier a shiftin"^ play of internal particu-
larity of passions, intci-ests, aims, talents, virtues, force,
wrong, vice, and external contingency on the very largest
scale. In this play even the ethical whole, national inde-
pendence, is exposed to chance. The spirit of a nation is
an existing individual having in particularity its objective
actuality and self-consciousness. Because of this particu-
larity it is limited. The destinies and deeds of states in
their connection with one another are the visible dialectic
of the finite nature of these spirits. Out of this dialectic
the universal s{)irit, the spirit of the world, the unlimited
spirit, produces itself. It has the highest right of all, and
exercises its right upon the lower spirits in world-history.
The history of the world is the world's court of judgment.

C. World-history.

341. The universal spirit exists concretely in art in the
form of percei)tion and image, in religion in the form of
feeling and j^ictorial imaginative thinking, and in philo-
sophy in the form of pure free thought. In world-history
this concrete existence of spirit is the spiritual actuality in
the total range of its internality and externality. It is a
court of judgment because in its absolute universality the
particular, namely, the Penates, the civic community, and

^>.

.o>rt.-"

IMAGE EVALUATION
TEST TARGET (MT-3)

1.0

I.I

11.25

1^128

|50 ■^"

^ m

lU
lU

2.5

12.2

12.0

LA. Ill 1.6

Photographic

Sciences
Corporation

23 WfST MAIN STHET

WCBSTeR.N.Y. Msao

(716) S7)-4303

€<

fh"-

%/^

342

THK PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

the national spirit in their many-coloured reality are all
merely ideal. The movement of spirit in this case consists
in visibly presenting these spheres as merely ideal.

342. Moreover, world-history is not a court of judgment,
whose principle is force, nor is it the abstract and irrational
necessity of a blind fate. It is self-caused and self-
realized reason, and its actualized existence in spirit is
knowledge. Hence, its development issuing solely out of

I the conception of its freedom is a necessary development
of the elements of reason. It is, therefore, an unfolding
of the spirit's self-consciousness and freedom. It is the
exhibition and actualization of the universal spii'it.

343. The history of spirit is its overt deeds, for only
what it does it is, and its deed is to make itself as a spirit
the object of its consciousness, to explain and lay hold
upon itself by reference to itself. To lay hold upon itself
is its being and principle, and the completion of this act is
at the same time self-renunciation and transition. To
express the matter formally, the ^^pirit which again appre-
hends what has already been grasped and actualized, or,
what is the same thing, passes thi-ough self-renunciation
into itself, is the spirit of a higher stage.

Note. — Here octiurs the question of the perfection and
education of humanity. They who have argued in favour
of this idea, have surmised something of the nature of
8i)irit. They have understood that s])irit has FfwOi (reavruv
as a law of its being, and that when it lays hold upon what
it itself is, it assumes a higher form. To those who have
rejected this idea, spirit has remained an empty word and
history a superficial play of accidental and so-called mere
human strife and passion. Though in their use of the
words "providence" and "design of providence," they
express their belief in a higher control, they do not fill up
the notion, but announce that the design of providence is
for them unknowable and inconceivable.

344. States, peoples, and individuals are established

THE STATE.

343

upon their own particular definite principle, which has
systematized reality in their constitutions and in the
entire compass of their surroundings. Of this systematized
reality they are aware, and in its interests are absorbed.
Yet are they the unconscious tools and organs of the
world-spirit, through whose inner activity the lower forms
pass away. Tlius the spirit by its ow^u motion and for its
own end makes readv and works out the transition into its
next higher stage.

346. Justice and virtue, wrong, force, and crime, talents
and their results, small and great passions, innocence and
guilt, the splendour of individuals, national life, inde-
pendence, the fortune and misfortune of states and indi-
viduals, have in the sphere of conscious reality their definite
meaning and value, and find in that sphere judgment and
their due. This due is, however, as yet incomplete, in
world-history, which lies beyond this range of vision, the
idea of the world-spirit, in that necessary phase of it
whi(;h constitutes at any time its actual stage, is given its
absolute right, Tlie nation, then really flourishing, attains
to happiness and renown, and its deeds receive completion.

346. 8ince history is the embodiment of spirit in the
form of events, that is, of direct natural reality, the stages
of development are present as direct natural principles.
Because tiiey are natural, they conform to the nature of a
multiplicity, and exist one outside the other. Hence, to
each nation is to be ascribed a single principle, com-
prised under its geographical and anthropological exist-
ence. A

347. To the nation, whose natural principle is one of these
stages, is assigned the accomi)lishmeut of it througli the
process characteristic of the self-developing self-conscious-
ness of the world-spirit. In the history of the world this
nation is for a given epoch dominant, although it can make
an epoch bi'.t once (§ 34(3). In contrast with the absolute
right of this nation to be the bearer of the current phase

844

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

in the development of the world-spirit, the spirits of other
existing nations are void of right, and they, like those
whose epochs are gone, count no longer in the history of
the world.

Note. — The special history of a world-historic nation
contains the unfolding of its principle from its undeveloped
infancy up to the time when, in the full manhood of free
ethical self-consciousness, it presses in upon universal
history. It contains, moreover, the period of decline and
destruction, the rise of a higher principle being marked in
it simply as the negative of its own. Hence, the spirit
passes over into that higher principle, and thus indicates to
world-history another nation. From that time onward
the first nation has lost absolute interest, absorbs the
higher principle positively, it may be, and fashions itself
in accordance with it, but is, after all, only a recipient, and
has no indwelling vitality and freshness. Perhaps it loses
its independence, perha])s continues to drag itself on as a
particular state or circle of states, and spends itself in
various random civil enterprises and foreign broils.

348. At the summit of all actions, including world-
historical actions, stand individuals. Each of these indi-
viduals is a subje itivity who realizes what is substantive
(§ 279, note). He is a living embodiment of the substan-
tive deed of the world-spirit, and is, therefore, directly
identical with tins deed. It is concealed even from him-
self, and is not his object and end (§ 344). Thus they do
not receive honour and thanks for tlieir acts either from
their contemporaries (§ 344), or from the ])ubli(! opinion
of posterity. By this opinion tiiey are viewed merely as
formal subjectivities, and, as such, are simply given their
part in immortal fame.

349. A people is not as yet a state. Tlie transition from
the family, horde, clan, or multitude into a state constitutes
tho formal realization in it of the idea. If the ethical
substance, which every people has implicitly, lacks this

THE STATE.

345

form, it is without that objectivity which comes from laws
and thought-out regulations. It has neither for itself nor
for others any universal or generally admitted reality. It
will not be recognized. Its independence, being devoid of
objective law or secure realized rationality, is formal only
and not a sovereignty.

Note. — From the ordinary point of view we do not call
the patriarchal condition a constitution, or a people iu this
condition a state, or its independence sovereignty. Before
the beginning of actual history there are found uninterest-
ing stupid innocence and the bravery arising out of the
formal struggle for recognition and out of revenge (§§ 331,
57, note).

350. It is the absolute right of the idea to come visibly
forth, and proceeding from marriage and agriculture
(§ 203, note) realize itself in laws and objective institu-
tions. This is true whether its realization appears in the
form of divine law and beneficence or in the form of force
and wrong. This right is the right of heroes to found
states.

351. In the same way civilized nations may treat as
barbarians the peoples who are behind them in the essential
elements of the state. Thus, the rights of mere herdsmen,
hunters, and tillers of the soil are inferior, and their
independence is merely formal.

Note. — Wars and contests arising under such circum-
stances are struggles for recognition in behalf of a certain
definite content. It is this feature of them which is
significant iu world-history.

352. The concrete ideas, which embody the national
minds or spirits, has its trutli in the concrete idea in its
absolute universality. This is the spirit of the world,
around whose throne stand the other spirits as perfecters
of its actuality, and witnesses and ornaments of its splen-
dour. Since it is, as si)irit, only the movement of its
activity iu order to know itself absolutely, to free its con-

846

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

sciousness from mere direct naturalness, and to come to
itself, the principles of the different forms of its self-con-
sciousness, as they appear in the process of liberation, are
four. They are the principles of the four world- historic
kingdoms.

353. In its first and direct revelation the world-spirit
has as its principle the form of the substantive spirit, in
whose identity iudividuaUty ?s in its essence submerged
and without explicit justification.

In the second principle the substantive spirit is aware of
itself. Here spirit is the positive content and filling, uud
is also at the same time the living form, which is in its
nature self-referred.

The third principle is the retreat into itself of this con-
scious self -referred existence. There thus arises an abstract
universality, and with it an infinite opposition to objectivity,
whicli is regarded as bereft of spirit.

In the fourth principle this opposition of the spirit is
overturned in order that spirit may receive into its inner
self its truth and concrete essence. It thus becomes at
home with objectivity, and the two are reconciled. Because
tne spirit has come back to its formal substantive reality
by returning out of this infinite opposition, it seeks to
produce and know its truth as thought, and as a world of
established reahty.

354. In accordance with these four principles the four
world-historic empires are (1) the Oriental, (2; the (ireek,
(3) the Koman, and (4) the Grermanic.

355. (1; The Oriental Empire : — The first empire is
the substantive world-intuition, which proceeds from the
natural whole of patriarchal times. It has no internal
divisions. Its worldly government is theocracy, its ruler
a hi^h priest or God, its constitution and legislation are at
the saine time its religion, and its civic and legal regula-
tions are religious and moral commands or usages. In the
splendour of this totality the individual personality siuktt

THE STATE.

347

without rights ; external nature is directly^ divine or an
ornament of God, and the history of reality is poetry. The
distinctions, vvhich develop themselves in customs, govern-
ment, and the ptate, serve instead of laws, being converted
by mere social usage into clumsy, diffuse, and superstitious
ceremonies, the accidents of personal power and arbitrary
rule. The division into classes becomes a caste fixed as
the laws of nature. Since in the Oriental empire there is
nothing stable, or rather what is firm is petrified, it has
life only in a movement, which goes on from the outside,
and becomes an elemental violence and desolation. Internal
repose is merely a private life, which is sunk in feebleness
and lassitude.

Note. — The element of substantive natural spirituality
is present in the first forming of every state, and constitutes
the absolute starting-point of its history. This assertion
is presented and historically established by Dr. Stuhr iu
his well-reasoned and scholarly treatise " Vom Untergange
der Naturstaaten " (Berlin, 1812), who, moreover, suggests
in this work a rational method of viewing constitutional
history and history in general. The principle of sub-
jectivity and self-conscious freedom he ascribes to the
German nation. But since the treatise is wholly taken up
witli the decline of the natiire-states, it simply leads to the
point at which this modern principle makes its appearance.
At that time it assumed in part the guise of restless move-
ment, human caprice, and corruption, in part the particular
guise of feeling, not having as yet developed itself into the
objectivity of self-conscious substantivity or the condition
of organized law.

356. (2) The Greek Empire : — This empire still con-
tains the earlier substantive unity of the finite and infinite,
but only as a mysterious background, supjjressed and kept
down in gloomy reminiscence, in caves and in traditional
imagery. This background under the influence of the self-
distinguishing spii-it is recreated into individual spirituality,

348

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

and exalted into the daylight of consciousness, where it is
tempered and clarified into beauty and a free and cheerful
ethical life. Here arises the principle of personal indi-
/viduality, although it is not as yet self-centred, but held in
its ideal unity. One result of this incompleteness is that
the whole is broken up into a number of particular national
minds or spirits. Further, the final decision of will is not
as yet intrusted to the subjectivity of the independent self-
consciousness, but resides in a power, which is higher than,
and lies beyond it (§ 279, note). Moreover, the particularity,
which is found in wants, is not yet taken up into freedom,
but segregated in a class of slaves.

357. (3) The Roman Empire : — In this empire the
distinctions of spirit are carried to the length of an infinite
rupture of the ethical life into two extremes, personal
jDrivate self-consciousness, and abstract universality. The
antagonism, arising between the substantive intuition of an
aristocracy and the principle of free personality in demo-
cratic form, developed on the side of the aristocracy into
superstition and the retention of cold self-seeking power,
and on the side of the democracy into the corrupt mass.
The dissolution of the whole culminates in universal mis-
fortune, ethical life dies, national individualities, having
merely the bond of union of a Pantheon, perish, and indi-
viduals are degraded to the level of that equality, in which
they are merely private persons and have only formal
rights.

358. (4) The German Empire : — Owing to the loss of
itself and its world, and to the infinite pain caused by it, a
loss of which the Jewish people were already held to be the
type, spirit is pressed back into itself, and finds itself in
the extreme of absolute negatiwty. But this extreme is the
absolute turning-point, and in it spirit finds the infinite
and yet positive nature of its own inner being. This new
discovery is the unity of the divine and the human. By
means of it obieetive truth is reconciled with freedom, and

THE STATE.

349

that, too, inside of self-consciousness and subjectivity.
This new basis, infinite and yet positive, it has been
charged upon the northern principle of the Germanic
nations to bring to completion.

359. The internal aspect of this northern principle exists
in feeling as faith, love, and hope. Although it is in this
form still abstract, it is the reconciliation and solution of
all contradiction. It proceeds to unfold its content in
order to raise it to reality and self-conscious rationality.
It thus constructs a kingdom of this world, based upon
the feeling, trust, and fellowship of free men. This king-
dom in this its subjectivity is an actual kingdom of rude
caprice and barbarism in contrast with the world beyond.
It is an intellectual empire, whose content is indeed the
truth of its spirit. But as it is yet not thought out, and
still is veiled in the barbarism of picture-thinking, it exists
as a spiritual force, which exercises over the actual mind
a despotic and tyrannical influence.

360. These kingdoms are based upon the distinction,
which has now won the form of absolute antagonism, and
yet at the same time are rooted in a single unity and idea.
In the obdurate struggle, which thus ensues, the spiritual
has to lower its heaven to the level of an earthly and
temporal condition, to common worldliness, and to ordinary
life and thought. On the other hand the abstract actuality
of the worldly is exalted to thought, to the principle of
rational being and knowing, and to the rationality of right
and law. As a result of these two tendencies, the contra-
diction has become a marrowless phajitasm. The present
has stripped off its barbarism and its lawless caprice, and
truth has stripped off its beyond and its casualness. The
true atonement and reconciliation has become objective,
and unfolds the state as the image and reality of reason.
In the state, self -consciousness finds the organic develop-
ment of its real substantive knowing and will, in religion
it finds in the form of ideal essence the feeling and the

350

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

vision of this its truth, and in science it finds the free
conceived knowledge of this truth, seeing it to be one and
the same in all its mutually completing manifestations,
namely, the state, nature, and the ideal world.

THE END.

INDEX OF WORDS.

(The figures refer to the page and the line. )

An sich, (= fiir uns), 20, 34 ; im-

Bestimmen, depute, 24, 23 ; mould.

plicit, 20, 36; in itself, 20,

34, 36 ; determine.

34, etc. ; potential, 43, 18 ;

bestimmt, definite, 2, 14 ;%nited.

general, 85, 36 ; abstract, 87, 1 ;

16, 23; fxed, 18, 10; deter-

intrinsic, 87, 33 ; { = nnmittel-

mined, 24, 19 ; certain, 33, 24 ;

bar), 87, 33 ; inherently, 97, 7 ;

described, 142, 34.

dynamic, 153, 16 ; really, 215,

Bestimmtheit, •xde^nite character,
Bestimmung, / 19, 31 ; cha-

22 ; 219, 9 ; in its inner nature,

216, 10.

racter, 20, 22; phase, 2, 36;

An sich seyend, qe)ieral, 85, 32 ;

feature, 3, 1 ; aspect, 3, 36 ;

(-allgemein), i04, 23.

essential character, 10, 34 ; de-

An und fiir sich, self-originated

termination, 12, 15 ; charac-

and self -completed, xxix, 19 ;

terization, 16, 16; definite na-

self-contained and self-de-

ture, 20, 7 ; specific character.

veloped, 3, 15 ; in itself and in-

17, 12 ; determinateness, 19, 21 ;

dependently, 5, 25 ; absolute.

determinate character, 20, 11 ;

20, 2 ; completely, 43, 1 ; self-

standpoint, 21, 1 ; decisive fea-

contained and self-dependent.

ture, 24, 18 ; not translated, 34,

51 , 24 ; self-complete, 52, 6 ;

29 ; 56, 30, etc. ; condition.

beyond all question, 144, 3 ; as

43, 2 ; mark, 52, 26 ; category.

completed reality, 244, 1 ; self-

50, 19 ; 138, 19 ; rule, 99, 15 ;

caused, self -existing, 248, 10 ;

function, 148, 32 ; aim, 178, 2 ;

self-begun and selfrelaied, 276,

office, 171, 20; attribute, 216,

28 ; self-begotten and self-

16.

centred, 281, 29.

Aufheben, supersede, 16, 1 ; an-

Dasein, surface existence, 1, 12;

md and replace, 16, 17 ; tran-

visible existe^ice, 1, 23; embodi-

scend, 34, 29.

ment, 2, 9 ; 35, 33 ; 43, 13 ;
reality, 15, 1 ; 16, 14 ; 35, 5 ; ( =

Begriff, (differs from Idee), 21, 8 ;

Erscheinung) external reality.

(= an sich), 21, 8; uniformly

21, 14; realization, 35, 5; 49,

translated conception.

5 ; manifestation, 217, 23 ; ( =

852

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT,

Gestaltimy), 37, 2(5 ; emhodial
renliti/, ',i\), U ; viitinin/ sym-
bol, 50, ;J0 ; ( = KeiiliHiition), iu,
9 ; (= Aeusserlichkeit), 77, 27 ;
visible exjn-ission, 91, 20 ; visible
proof, 97, 8.

Erscheinnng, manifestation, 21,
3; appearance, 21, 14.

Fiirsich, independently, 16, 21 ; in
{their) separation, 18, 28 ; de-
tailed, 20, ri ; for itself, 20, 18 ;
21, 3, etc. ; realized, 20, 36 ;
explicitly, 29, 20 ; self -referring,
32, 2 ; consciously, 44, 14 ; in
strictness, 328, 5 ; of itself, 142,
27 ; «'« </<««• o?r/t ti^es, 150, 14.

Fiirisichseyn, self-conscious isola-
tion, 45, 13.

Geataltunj;, 1 actual shape, 1, 15 ;

Ciestalt, / realization,'iil,25;

form, 38, 28 ; embodiment, 42, 5.

Idee, idea, preceded by the ad-
jective the.

Idealitttt ( = Einseitigkeit), 123,
6.

Uiiiuittelbar, immediate, xv, 1 ;
20, 33 ; unquestioningly, xvii,
32; direct, xxii, 6; 20, 33;
directly given, 2, 22 ; forthwith,
3, 2 ; 8, 25 ; 252, 2 ; directly.

11, 27 ; simple, 18, 10 ; to hand,
21, 15 ; nnniodijied, 47, *1; first-
hand, 49, 0; 103, 30; as it
stands, 54, 10 ; vividly, 55, 6 ;
naked, 02,34 ; (= zufiillig), 80,

34 ; (— an sich), 87, 35 ; bare,
90, 14 ; direct and incomplete,
85, 27 ; mere, 110, 1 ; (= ur-
H[)iiinglich), 214, 20 ; w«i(;c,190,
35.

Unniittelltarkeit, (= Seyn\ 40,
10 ; 44, 4 ; self involved sim-
jdieity, 43, 2 ; 44, 4 ; simplicity,
178, 2.

• Veriuittelung, intervention, 20, 1;
operation, 20, 29 ; modification,
44, '1', recasting, 192, 13; ««-
strnmcnt, 197, ; interposition,
201, 35; medium, 124, 25.

Voistellen (sich), suj)posc, xv, 27 ;
imagine, 11, 10; jo/«c<; ir/ore
//<(! v/twif^, 12, 28 ; represent, 63,

35 ; theorize fanciftdly, 326, 3.
Vorstelluiig, imaginative thought,

3, 11 ; 13, 23 ; i«fca, 3, 13, etc.;
notion, 3, 28, etc. ; pietorial
idea, 38, 21 ; also picture-
thought and picture-thinking ;
general idea, 210, 13 ; general
thought, 216, 4.

Znfiillig, ( = nnniittelbar), 80, 29.
Zufiilligkeit, ( = Erscheinnng), 87,
12.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

(n. = note, add. = addition ; the figures refer to the paragraph, and
the figures in parentheses to the page ; thus— 273, n. (280), means
that portion of the note to paragraph 273 wliich is found on page
280).

Action, phases of, 113.
Administration of Justice, 188,
219, «.,229.
implies the universal person,

209, 209, n.
Haller's view of, 219, n.
is club law, 219, n.
Agriculture, in the founding of
states, 203, 7i.
modification of, 203, add.
Anabaptists, 270, n. (262, foot-
note).
Antigone, 144, add., 166, n.
Appetites, nature of, 11.
in relation to one another, 17.
in relation to the understand-
ing, 17, add.
in relation to the will, 17, add.,

139, n.

in relation to freedom, 18, 139,
n.

possibility of ijurification of, 19.

in relation to civilization, 20.
Aristocracy, 273, n.

principle of, 273, n. (280).

in Roman empire, 357.
Aristotle, conception of action,

140, M. {138, footnote).

Aristotle, conception of virtue,

150, n. (160).
Army, 325, 326, 328, n.

Barbarism, and civilization, 351.

Beccaria. See Punishment.

Beyond. Sec Infinite.

Body, in relation to soul, 48, n.

Bravery, 325, 327, 327, add., 328,
328, n.

Brotherhood, relation of, to pro-
perty, 46, n.

CfBcilius, Sextus, 3, n. (7).
Caprice, definition of, 15, 15; add.

contrasted Avith freedom, 15, n.,
15, add.

and evil, 139, n.

and sovereignty, 278, n. (2S5).

and elections, 311, 311, n.

See also Contingency.
Chambers, two, 312, 313.

public deliberations of, 315, 315,
add.
Children, status of, in the family,
173.

rights of, 174, 174, add.

education of, 174, add., 175.

854

THE PHILOSOPHY OF KIGHT,

Children, in lionian law, 1/5, ».,

180, «., 180, add
Christianity, its doctrine of evil,
18, nd'il.
and freedom, 02, ii. (07), 185,
II. (189), 185, add., 270, iidd.
(272).
and vij^htof the subject, 124, u.
and niarriajfo, 104, ii. (171).
Church, and state, 270, «., 270,

add.
Cicero, and the twelve tables, 3,
n. (7).
and divorce, ISO, n. (182),
Civic connnunity, lo;,'ical ])lace of,
157, 182, 182, add., 255, 256,
«.,262, 263, add., 290, add.
(301).
nature of, 184, 184, add., 238,
add., 239, 204, 265, 265, add.,
280, H., 303, II.
elements of, 188.
rij,'hts of, 239, 240, 240, add.
duties of, 240, 241.
limit of, 256, 260, 289, /(.
and the classes, 301, ii. (311),

303, II.
and representation, 311, ii.
Civilization, and state of nature,
187, >i.
of the newspaper, 319, n.
and barbarism, 351.
Classes, how arise, 201.

h)}iical place of, 201, add., 314,
division of, 202.

the substantial class, 203,2.")0,
304, 305, 306, 306, ai/d.,
307.
the industrial class and its
parts, 204, 250, 303, 306,
add.
tlie universal class, 205, 250,
303, 306, add.

Classes, Plato's view of, 206, n.
in India, 206, n., 355.
and morality, 207.
a necessity of reason, 207, 207,

add.
and the le<?islature, 301, 301, n.,
301, aifd., 302, ;/., 303, 333, n.
a mediating orj^an, 302, 302,

add., 307.
and the prince, 304.
the military, 325, 327, add.
Colonization. Sre Sea.
Completeness, nature of, 216, add.
Conception, delinition of, 1, n.,
279, )i. (287).
not mere conception, 1, n.
and reality, 1, add., 280, n.
and evil, U^), add. (136).
of will, 278, n. (285), 279, n.
(286).
Concul)ina}j;e. Sec Marriiif^e.
Confession, of crime, 227, adtf.
Conscience, nature of, 136, 136,
add., 137, 137, «.
and subjective conaciousness,

137, ii\ 138, add.
ambii^uous character of, 137, n.

(131).
the formal and the true, 137,

add.
and the good, 141.
Consequences of an act, 1 1 8,
118, H.
necessary and accidental, 118,
»., 118, add.
Constitution of the state is
rational, 272, 272, ii. (281),
274, ai/d.
classilieation of ccmstitutions,

273, /^,279, ii., (289).
national, 274, 274, v., 274, add.
Contingency, in law. Scr Law.
in private action, 232, 233.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS,

355

Contin<j;en<'y, in police-control,
234,234, add.
in Htate, 303, n.
in elections, 311, n.
in relations between states,
333, //., 340.
Contract, loirical justification of,
71.
nature of, 72, 217, add.
involves two wills, 73, 74.
involves a common will, 75.
based on arbitrary choice, 75.
and marria<,'e, 75, n., 75, a(f(f.
and the state, 75, «., 75, add.,

258,71. (242), 281, ;/.
real and formal, 7(j.
and value, 77.
and stipulation, 77, n., 78, 78,

n., 79.
consensual, 79, ii., 80.
classification of contracts, 80.
and office, 290, n.
Conviction, is subjective, 140, )i.

(144-45), 140, add. (151).
Co-operation, eflect of, 199.
Corporation, lo<,ncal i)lace of, 188,
229, 229, «fW., 255.
function of, 230, 249, 250, 251,

254, 255, add.
and class, 252, ti., 253, 253, u.
is limited, 250, 288.
in Middle A<,rcs, 290, add.
in Trance, 290, ((dd.
and individuals, 'AOH. n.
('rime, definition of, 40, 90, 90,
add.,S\:y, 97, add.
(liflerences in, 90, (Hi, n.
logical intermediate between
riffht and morality, 104, 104,
II., 104, adil.
amon;,'st the ancients, 218, n.
and Society, 218, 218, «., 218
add.

Crime, and the state, 282, add.
Criminal, has rights, 132, n.
(120-127).
pardon of, 282, 282, n., 282, add.
Crispiuus, 126, add.

Definition, value of, 2, add.
Democracy, 273, n.
principle of, 273, v.. (280).
in Roman em])ire, 357.
Deputies, in legislation, 308, 308,
«., 309, 309, add., 310, 310,
M.,311
Determinism, 15, n.
Development, of the idea, 31, v.,
32, 32, add.
in relation to time, 32, n. , 32 add.
in contrast with generalization,

32, add.
of the conception, 34, add.
Dialectic, the true, 31, n.
the negative, of I'lato, 31, n.
of the conception aj)plied to

slavery, 57, n.
involves collisions, 211, add.
in the civic community, 246.
Diogenes, character of, 195, add.
I)issimulati(m, 140, v. (137).
Divorce, 176,1 76, add. , 1 SO, «. ( 1 82).
Duty, nature of, 1.33, 133, add.,
135, 135, n., 149.
and fn>c(i(mi, 149, 149, add.
and right, 155, 261, n. (250),
2{S\,add.

Education, I'ousseau's view of,
153, add.
of children, 160.
of women, 160, add.
and state of nature, 187, /(.
(191).
Enjpire, Oriental, 355.
(J reek, 356.
Konum, 357.

356

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Empire, German, 358, 359.

Encyclopaedia of the Philosophical

Sciences, general references

to, 4, add., 7, n., 8, 24, n.,

78, »., 88, 163, n., 270, n.

" End, justifies the means," 140,

n. (142).
English, -wills, 180, add.

conception of " comfort," 191,

add,, 244, add.
common law, 211, n. (207), 211,

add.
procedure at law, 225, n.
treatment of poverty, 245, n.
colonization, 248, add.
constitution, 300, add.
taxes, 302, add.
idea of war, 329, add.
Epicurus, his conception of a

common property, 46, n.
Equality, conception of by the
understanding, 49, n., 49,
add, 200, «., 261, n. (250).
in the sphere of wants, 193.
Equity. See Law.
Estates. See Classes.
Ethical observance, the truth of
morality, 33, add., 135, «.,
\5\,add., 152, 152, At.
unity of good and conscience,

141, 141, add.

and freedom, 141, «., 141, add,,

142, 153.

and the laws, 144.

and the individual, 145, add.,

147, 148, 148, H., 154.
the natural, 150, 150, n.
the trutli of right, 151, add.
and cuHtom, 151, 151, add.
realized in the family, 156, 157,

175, add.
Evil, in relation to good, 18.
possibility of, 66, n.

Evil, definition of, 139, 140, 140, n.
in relation to morality, 139, n,,

139, add.
origin of, 139, n., 139, add. (135).
twofold meaning of, 139, n.
necessity of, 139, n,
and responsibility, 139, add.

(136).
Exchange, 80.
Executive, branch of state, 273,

294, n.
function and relations of, 287,

288, 289, 292, 294, 295, 297,

297, n.
contains judiciary and police,

287.
divisi(m of, 290, 290, add., 291.
twofold character of, 291, 292.
duties of, 294, 294, n., 295.
Explicit, definition of, 10, add.
related to implicit, 66, n.

Faith, 147, n.

Family, logical place of, 156, 157,
262, 263, 263, add.
nature of, 158, 163, n., 238,
add., 264, 265, 265, add.,
303, M.
and right, 159.
phases of, 160.
right of, 159, add., 180, n.
means of, 170.

disruption of by divorce, 176.
disruption of by death, 178.
Family-stock, in relation to mar-
riage, 172.
in relation to inheritance, 180,
n. (183).
Feeling, in religion, 270, n. (260).

in German Empire, 359.
Feudal Law, the tenant in, 63, «.,
63, add.
the family in, 172, add.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

367

Feuerbach, See Punishment.
Fichte, his view of the I, 6, «.,

140, add. (151).
his view of the material of a

formed object, 52, add.
his view of contract, 79, n.
his view of the principle of

the state, 258, n. (241), 273, n.
Finite, character of, 141 , n. , 324, n.
Force, in abstract right, 94, 94, n.
Form, relation of to material, 52,

add.
Fraud, nature of, 87, 87, add.
Freedom, is substance of the

will, 4.
general interpretation of, 4,

add., 121, add.
is negative, one-sided, or formal,

5, add., 123, 123, add., 195,

208, 228, 11., 258, n. (242),

289, «.,(300), 301,314, 316.
of the understanding, 5, add.
Hindu conception of, 5, add.
liow manifested in French Re-
volution, 5, add. See French

Revolution,
tlevelopment of, 33, add., 186.
is concrete, 33, add., 123, add.,

260.
Kantian conception of, 15, n.
Friesian conception of, 15, n.
and Christianity, 62, n. ((57),

185, n. (189), 185, add.
ground of, 71.
realized in sul)jectivity, 106,

106, 11., 106, add.
and evil, 139, n.
and necessity, 145, 266, 267, add.
and tl»e etliical Hy.Mteni, 142,

143, 145, 145, add.
and duty, 149, 149, add.
in the civic community, 187,

206, 206, »., 208, "H^^ add.

Freedom, and the state, 257, 260,
261, n. (250), 314.
in German empire, 358.
is subjective, 299, n. (308), 299,
add., 301.
French, the, 150, add.
French Revolution, the, 115, n.
view of freedom found in the,
5, n., 5, add., 258, ii. (242).
Fries, his conception of freedom,
15, n.

Germans, the, 150, add.
God, and evil, 139, add. (135).
Goethe, 13, n., 215, add.
Good, in relation to evil, 18.

nature of the, 129.

stages of the, 131, add,

and subjectivity, 136.

and intention, 140, n. (140-2).

and conscience, 141.
Greek, life and freedom, 185, n.
(188).

colonization, 248, add.

Habit, and mere habit, 151,

add.
Haller, his conception of law,

219, n.
his conception of the state,

258, n. (243 a.n6i footnote).
Happiness, and thouglit, 20, add.

and impulse, 20, add.
Hindu, religion characterized, 5,

11., 5, add.
Holy Alliance, the, 259, cdd.,

324, add.
Honour, the principle of monarchy ,

273, ». (280-1).
Hugo, his text-lK)ok of the his-
tory of Roman law, 3, n. (7-

10), 211, H. (207).
Humanity, perfection of, 343, n.

358

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Hypocrisy, 140, n. (137), 140,
add.

Idea, what it is, 1, 1, add.,
267.
its relation to reality, 1, add.,

280, H., 350.
its stages, 129, add., 184, 270,

n. (266).
its relation to the good, 129,

129, add.
in the civic community, 187.
necessity of tlie, 267.
its differences, 269, 269, add.
Implicit, relation to explicit, 10,

add., 66, n.
Impulse. See Appetites.
Individual, and the ethical sys-
tem, 145, add., 147, 148, 148,
«., 258, 258, n.
and the civic community, 187,

258, n.
and the state, 308, 308, n., 314,

315.
and the world spirit, 348.
Individuality, in the Greek em-
pire, 356.
Inequality, in nature, 200, n.

in spirit, 200, 7i.
Infinite, nature of the, 22, 22,
add,
as understood by the under-

tanding, 22, ».
the bad, 79, n.
Inheritr.nce, 178, 178, n., 179,
179, /I., 180, 180, n., 180,
a(/(f.
and family right, 180, n.
in Roman law, 180, n.
of the throne, 281, »., 286.
Intention, universal implied in,
118, add., 119.
two meanings of, 119, n.

Intention, right of, 120.
and M-rong, 126, 126, n.
and evil, 140, add.
Irony, 140, n. (146), 140, add.
(151).
of Plato, Socrates, the Sophists,
140, n. (146).

Jacobi, 140, «. {144, footnote).
Jews, in world history, 358.
Judge, office of, 214, n., 226.

historic origin of the, 219, ti.
Judiciary, branch of the execu-
tive, 287, 290, add.
Jury, office of, 227, 227, n., 227,
add., 228.

composition of, 228.

reason of, 228, 71.

Kant, Hugo's idea of, 3, n. (10).
his conception of the I, 6, n.
his conception of freedom, 15,

n.
his conception of right, 29, 11,.
his conceptiim of morality, 33,

v., 135, a/fd.
his classification of right, 40, n.
his conception of marriage, 75,

n., 161, add.
his classification of contracts,

80.
his conception of duty, 133,

add., 135, «., 135, add.
and alliance of princes, 324,

add., 3.33, n.
Klein. See Punishment.

Lab(»ur, place of, 196.

division of, 198.
Law, of del)tors, 3, n.

involves thinking, 209, add.,
2U, 211, add., 215.

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

359

Law is constituted right, 211 , 217,

217, add., 219.
differs from custom, 211, n.
contains an element of accident,

212,214, n., 2U,add.
application of, 213, 214, 214, n.,

225.
limits of, 213, 213, add.
publicity of, 215, 215, n., 215,

add., 224, 224, add.
procedure of, 217, add., 219,

223, 224.
and equity, 223, «.
international, 330, 333.
Law-court, function of, 221, 221,

add., 222.
in Roman law, 225, n.
Legislature, a branch of state,

273, 298.
function of, 298, 298, add., 299.
object-matter of, 299, 299, n.
includes monarchical and exe-
cutive elements, 300, 30),

add.
publicity of, 319,
Leibnitz, his view of trichotomy,

3, II. (10).
Logic, procedure of taken for

granted here, 2, add., 7, n.,

141, n.
exhibits true process of the con-
ception, 31, 33, n.
position of in wrong, 81, n.
Life, in relation to personality,

70.
and freedom, 123, add.
nature of, 127.
right to, 127, 127, add
Love, is the basis of the family,

158, 159, odd.
nature of, 158, add., 163.
two aspects of, 161, add.
and marriage, 162, 102, add.

Love in modern dramas, 162, «.

Platonic, 163, n.

and the civil requirements, 164,
n.f 164, add.

realized in children, 173.
Luxury, 195.

Man, in his generalization, 190,

190, n., 190, add.
Mark. See Possession.
Marriage, and contract, 75, n.,
75, add., 163, ».
Kant's conception of, 75, «.,

161, add.
a phase of the family, 160.
two features of, 161, 161, add.
subjective and objective bases

of, 162, 162, n., 176, add.
ethical nature of, 163, 165,

168.
different from concubinage, 163,

add.
in itself indissoluble, 163, add.
public celebration of, 164, 164,

n., 164, add.
is monogamy, 167, 167, n.
and consanguinity, 168, 168,

add.
and family-stock, 172, 177.
in lloman law, 180, n. (183).
at the foundation of states,
203, 71.
Material, in relation to the form,

52, add.
Matter, character of, 52, ti.
Middle class, 297, 297, add.
Moderation, tlie principle of aris-
tocracy, 273, n. (280).
Monarch, 280, 2S0, «., 280, add.,

281, 281, /(., 320, add., 321.
election of, 281, ?).

his right of pardon, 282, 282, m.,

282, add.

360

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Monarch, and council, 283, 284.

objective side of the, 293.
Monarchy, constitutional, 273,
273, «.
principle of, 273, n. (280-1),

279, H., 281.
feudal, 278, n., 299, n. (208).
objective side of, 293.
Money, a universal service, 299,

add.
Monogamy. See Marriage.
Montesquieu, his view of legisla-
tion, 3, n. (5), 26J, n.
his view of monarchy, aristo-
cracy and democracy, 273, n.
Morality, nature of, 105, 106, n.,
112, «., 112, add.
distinct from ethical observ-
ance, 33, n., 108, 108, add.,
135, M.
Kant's conception of, 135, n.

135, add.
and poverty, 242, 242, n.
and politics, 337, n.
Motive, twofold nature of, 121,
add.

Napoleon, 274, add., 281, add.

290, add., 331, add.
Nation, the, and the world-spirit,

345, 346, 347, 347, n.
Nature, how understood, 42, n,,
146, n.
state of, 187, n., 194, n., 333.
Necessity, of the idea, 267.

is twofold, 267, add.
Need, and right, 127, 128.

Objectivity, meanings of, 26.

relation to 8ul)jectivity, '26.add.

in German empire, 358.
Opinion. >S^e(^ Subjectivity, Public.

and science, 319, n. (327).

j Particularity, and universality,

181, 181, add., 182, add.,

183, 186, 260, 261, add., 265,

add.

and ancient states, 185, n., 260,

add.
in civic community, 185, 185,

add., 206, n.,229.
and the monarch, 280, add.
and the classes, .301, n. (311),

308, n.
in Greek empire, 356.
Pascal, 140, n. (138).
Patriotism, 268, 268, n., 268, add.,

263, 289, n.
Paupers, origin of, 243, 244, 244,
add.
character of, 244, add.
Pedagogy, scope of, 151, add.
People. See Public.

is not a state, 349, 349, n.
Person, natural existence of, 43.
endowments of, 43, n.
as particular, 182.
Personality, in relation to ethical
observance, 33, add. (41).
implications of, 35-39.
distinct from subject, 35, add.
and slavery, 66, add.
and life, 70.
and contract, 72.
and the family, 181,
in Oriental empire, 355.
Phanomenologie des Geistes, 135,
71. (129), 140, n. {UH, footnote,
149).
Phavorinus, criticised, 3 n.
Phidias, 15, add.
Philosophy of Nature, 47, n.
Plagiarism, 69, n.
Plato, negative dialectic of, 31, n.
his "Republic" wrongs the
person, 46, »., 184, add,, 186,

INDEX OF SUBJECTS.

361

n., 185, add., 262, add., 299,
n. (308).
his view of irony, 140, v. (146).
his view of classes, 206, n.
Police, logical place of, 188, 229,
229, add.
function of. 230, 232-7, 287.
nature of, 231, 238.
Political Science, aim of, 189. n.
Politics, and morality, 337, n.
Polity, internal, of the state, 259.

external, of the state, 259.
Possession, modes of, 54.
as direct seizure, 55, 55, «., 55,

add.
as forming, 56.
of self, 57.

by a mark, 58, 58, add.
Poverty, treatment of, 244, add. ,
245, 253, n.
claims of, 241, 242.
Practical, in relation to theoreti-
cal, 4, add., 5, n.
Prescription. See Property.
Press, 319, n.
Primogeniture, 286, n., 306, 306,

add., 307.
Prince, function of, 273, 275, 275,
add., 283-5, 292, 329, 329,
add., 333.
Probability, 140, n. (139), 140,

add. (150).
Proof, nature of in philosophy,
141, n.
nature of in law, 227, n,
ontological, 280, n.
Property, nature of, 41, etc., 45,
51, add.
reasonableness of, 41 add.
is first embodiment of freedom,

45, n.
U first embodiment of person-
ality, 51.

Property is first embodiment of
will, 51.
is private, 46, 46, add.
phases of, 53.
and use, 59, n.
and prescription, 64, 64, «., 64,

add., 65, add.
and relinquishment, 65.
in mental products, 68, 69.
of the family, 160, 169, 170, 171.
and law, 217, 217, n., 217, add.
in civic community, 218.
Protestantism, 270, n. (267).
Providence, and history, 343, n.
Psychology, empirical, 11, n.

jiiethod of, 19, n.
Public, meanings of the, 301, n.
influence of the, 301, n.
the, and government, 302, 302, n.
the, and the state, 303, n.
opinion, 316, 316, add., 317,
317, «., 318, 318, add.
Punishment, of crime, 96, add.,
97, add., 98, 98, n.
definition of, 97, add.
Klein's theory of, 99, n.
various theories of, 99, n.
Feuerbach's theory of, 99, add.
is just, 100, 100, n.
Beccaria's theory of capital,

100 n., lOOorfrf.
is retribution. See Retribution,
of crime as a social factor, 218,
n., 218, add.
Purpose, is factor of the moral
will, 114, 114, add.
nature of, 115.

Quakers, 270, n. (262, footnote).

Rational, opposed to sentient,

52, n.
Rationality, meaning of, 268, n.

862

THE PHILOSOPHT OF RIGHT.

Reason, universal of, 216, n.
Recognition, is the right of the
state, 331, 331, n., 331, add.,
336.
Reflection, subjective, in relation
to an act, 119, n.
and morality, 124, n.
and history, 124, «.
Reformation, and public monu-
ments, 64, add.
Relation, standpoint of, 123, «.

and morality, 108. 135, u. (129).
Religion, relation to the state,

270, n., 270, add.
Relinquishment. See Property.
Rent, 80.

Responsibility, for an act, 115,
115, n., 115, add., 116, 117,
117, add.
in ancient laws, 117, add.
of children, etc., 120, n., 132,

»., (126).
and evil, 139, add. (136).
Retribution, 101, 101, n., 101,
add.
is not absolute equality, 101, n.
considers value, 101, n.
. differs from revenge, 102, 102,

n, 102, add., 103.
Revenge, is subjective, 220.

See Retribution.
Right, science of, 2, 3, 19, 19, «.
positive, 212, n.
history of, 3, v.
definition of, 29, 40, 94.
diflfers from morality, 94, add.
' of the criminal, 132, n. (126-
127).
extent of, 33, add.
Rousseau's view of, 29, n.
a mere semblance, 83.
varied manifestations of the
subject's, 124, n.

Right, formal and concrete, 126,
n., 132, n.
limited by need, 128.
and the good, 129, 130.
of the subject, 132, n. i
and duty, 155, 261, n. (250),

261, add.
in the family, 159.
of the family, 159, add.
of children, 174.
becomes law, 211, 211, n.
of state, 331, 331, n.
Roman Law, 217, n.
estimate of by Caicilius, Phavo-

rinus, Cicero, 3, n.
division of rights founded on,

40, n.
treatment of children in, 43 n.,

175 ».
agrarian, 46, n.
conception of use in, 62, n.
treatment of contract in, 79, n.
and the family, 172, add.
and inheritance, 180, n.
and the wife, 180, n. (182).
constitution of law-court in,

225, n.
Roman world, and freedom, 186,

n. (189).
Rousseau, his view of right, 29, n.
his view of education, 153, add,
and the principle of the state,

268, «. (241).

Sacrifice, for the state, 325, 328,

328, n.
Scepticism, the ancient, 31, n.
Schlegel, 140, 7i. (147, footnote),
140, add. (151).
view of marriage, 164, add.
Sea, means of communication,
247, 248, 248, add.
and intelligence, 247, «.

INDEX OF SUB.TECTS.

363

Self-certitude, and evil, 139, add.
Self-consciousness, as subjective,
139.
right of, 228, n.
and the state, 257.
in Greek state, 279, add.
Self-determination, is an element
of will, 107, 107, add., 108,
add.
Sense-perception, of the animal,
42, add.
opposed to the rational, 52, n.
Sexes, different spheres of the,

166, 166, w., 166, add.
Shakespeare, 3, n. (8).
Sin, original, 18, add.
Slave, his will merely objective,
26, add,
and workman, 67, add.
Athenian, 67, add., 356.
has no duties, 155, add.
Slavery, 21, n.
general consideration of, 57i n.,

57, add.
in relation to personality, 66,

add.
found in a state of nature,
194, n.
Socrates, subjectivity of, 138, n.,
138, add., 274, add.
irony of, 140, n. (146).
daimon of, 279, n. (289-290).
Solger, 140, n. (147, footnote).
Sophistry, absolute, 140, add.

(150).
Soul, and body, 48, n.
Sovereignty of people, 279, n.

(288). '
Sovereignty of state, has two
sides, 278, «., 321.
ideality of, 278, n. (285).
and sovereign, 279, n. (288-289),
279, a(;rf.,280, 280, ».

Sovereignty of state, external,

321, 323, 324, 324, «.
Space, 10, n.
Spinoza, 66 n.

Spirit, conception of, 66, n., 187,
n., 274, 275, add.
its own end, 266.
of a nation, 345, 346, 352.
State, and contract, 75 n., 75 add.
is completion of the civic com-
munity, 256, 11., 258, n., 260,
261.
nature of, 257, 258, 258, add.,

273, n.,214, 215, add.
in its historic development,

258, n. (242).

aspects and functions of, 259,

259, add., 270, 271, 272, n.
(275), 272, add., 273, 277,
277, add.

Completion of personal ii.dividu-

ality, 260, 360.
realization of freedom, 260, 260,

add.
ancient and modern, 260, add.,

261, add., 273, n.
completion of the family, 261.
is an organism, 269, 269, add.,

271, 276, 286, n., 308, n.
relation to religion, 270, n.,

270, add.
branches of, 273.
basis of, 276.
sovereignty of, 277, 278, 278, n.,

321,322,331.
and monarch. Sec monarch,
and conquered peoples, 281,

add.
and the individual, 302, 302, n.,

303, n., 308, 308, h., 310, n.,

314, 315, 325.
and war, 326, 326, n., 329.
States, relations of, 330-340.

864)

THE PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT.

Stipulation. See Contract.
Stoics, subjectivity of, 138, n.
Subject, different from person,

105.
Subjectivity, meanings of, 25,
106, 108, 320, 320, add.
and conscience, 137, n, 138,

138, n.
and freedom, 106.
and objectivity, 26, n.
in relation to others, 112, 112,

add.
phases of, 112, n., 140, n.
and the good, 136.
and evil, 140, 140, n.
and ethical observance, 152,

320.
and law, 217, add.
in religion, 270, add. (272).
is the principle of the modern

world, 273, add.
and subject, 279, 279, n.
and the classes, 301, add., 308.
and the state, 308, n, 310, n,

317, add, 320, 320, add.
in the Oriental empire, 355.
in the Greek empire, 356.
Succession. See Inheritance.
Suicide, not permitted, 70, add.

Theoretical, and practical, 4, add. ,

5, n.
Thing, two meanings of, 42, n.
viewed as independently real,

44, n.
in relation to use, 61.
Thinking, and willing, 4, add.
(11).
definition of, 211, n.
involves collisions, 211, add.
Time, 10, n.

Tragedy, meaning of, 140, n. (148,
footnote).

Training, twofold nature of, 197.
Truth, unknowable, 44, n., 280, n.
unity of conception and em-
bodiment, 280, n.

Understanding, view of will in
the, 8, add., 10, n.
its view of law, 212, n.
its view of impulses, 17, add.
its view of equality, 49, n.
its view of evil, 139, add. (136)
its view of marriage, 164, n.

(171).
universality characteristic of

the, 187, n., 216, n.
function of in wants, 189, 189, n.
training of, 197.
limits of, 217, n., 280, ».
the infinite of the, 234.
its view of the state, 258, n.

(242), 272, n. (275).
its view of the monarch, 280, n.
Universality, definition of, 24, n.
formal or relative, 157, 229,

229, add.
and particularity, 181, 181,
add., 182, add., 183, 186,260,
261, add., 265, add.
origin of the form of the, 192,

add.
agriculture a form of, 203, n.
marriage a form of, 203, n.
Use, nature of, 59.
and property, 59, »., 61, add.
and possession, 59, add., 62,

62, n.
and the object, 61.
conception of, in Roman law,

62, n.
time-limit of, 67, 67, m.

Value, definition of, 63.
and contract, 77.

INDEX OF SUBJEC IS.

365

Violence, nature of, 90, etc.

cancels itself, 93.

two stages of, 93, n.
Virtue, 150, add.

is the principle of democracy,
273, n. (280).
Virtues, nature of the, 150, n.

Wants, system of, 188.

satisfaction of, 189.

specialized, 190.
War, is ethical, 324, n., 324, add.

is necessary, 334.

limit of, 338, 338, add.

and Europe, 339, add.
Wealth, general, 199.

particular, 200.
Well-being, deduction of from the
subjective, 125.

particular and general, 126, n.

limited by need, 128.

in relation to the good, 129, 130.

basis of a state, 336.
Wife, in Roman law, 180, n.

(182).
Will, nature of, 7, 7, add., 91,
278, n. (285).

detailed consideration of, 8-13.

contrasted with thought, 13, n.

is infinite, 22.

a common, 75, 81, add., 82,
add.

collision of wills, 81.

is free, 92.

in morality, 105.

Will, phases of subjective, 109.
subjective right of, 107, 107, «.,

110, add., 117, 132.
as moral has three factors, 114.
subjective and the good, 131.
autonomy of, 135, n.
as natural, 139, n.
and evil, 139, add. (136).
and the state, 258, ?». (241-2),

320.
the state as, 334, 336, 337.
Wolff, his view of freedom, 15, n.
Woman, sphere of, 164, add,,

166.
the law of, 166, n.
limitations of , 166, add.
World-history. See World-spirit.
World-spirit, in relation to states,

340.
nature of, 341, 352.
history of, 343.
operation of, 344.
and nationality, 345, 346, 352.
development of, 346.
and individuals, 348.
has had four forms, 352, 353,

354.
Wrong, definition of, 40, 82, 82,

add.
as collision of wills, 81,81, add.,

86, add.
as unpremeditated, 83, 83, add.,

84-86.
subdivisions of, 83, 83, add.
and intention, 126.

CHISWICK PRESS :— CHARLES VVHITTINGHAM AND CO.
TOOKS COURT, CHANCERY LANE, LONDON.