IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I 1.25 uu 2.2 ^ *- IIIIIM 1-4 11.6 om. -M f>i J> .<>■ •T; /; / /A T\i rnoTograpriic Sciences Corporation <^ ^ % S ^< fV ,v \ \ <-"* > <■■' ^^^<> .^m^ 6^ 23 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, NY 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^ '^ £p< CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CIHM/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques 198 Technical and Bibliographic Notas/Notas techniques et bibliographiquas The Institute has attempted to obtain tha best original copy available fo' filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may altar any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. L'Institut a microfilme le meiileur exemplaire qu il lui a ete possible de se procurer Les details da cat exemplaire qui sont paut-^tre uniques du point de vue bibliographique. qui oeuvent modifier une image reproduite. ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dan& la m^thode normale de filmago sont indiquAs ci-dessous. V E u n D D D n □ a Coloured covers/ Couverture de coulevir Covers damaged/ Couverture endommagee Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaur^e et/ou pellicul^e Cover title missing/ Le titre de couverture manque Coloured maps/ Cartes g^ographiques en couleur Coloured ink lie. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleua ou noirel Coloured plates and/or illustr• -•*^ J Freedom as Ethical Postulate BY JAMES SETH, M.A. GEORGE MUNRO PROFESSOR OF PHILOSOPHY, DALHOUIKE COLLEGE, HALIFAX, ee.l(.ii, of the AVill" is (lescrihed hy I'lcfessor I'aulseii. ii, liis tm.tise ,„, Ethics, irnhhshrd t->v.. years a^^o. as -a prol^leiii whicli aicse uiulei- certain cciiditioiis. and has ilisappeaivd with the (hsappearance ..f tliese C(>n(h"ti()iis, a iirchleni which exists (.nl>- tor a tht'(.l(.o-ica] or sch.ulastic j.hilosophy." ^ Professor Paulsen is not alone in thus releo;atin_«;- the (|nes- tion to the re-'ion of metaphysical anti(iiiities. Leading- ethical writers amon^- (.urselves a^-Tee with hiin 111 considerill^• this •• jnost contHntiou.s M'le.'.ion as one with which Ethics, at any rate, need not concern itself Ainon>;' others, JVofessor Side-wick (especially in the earlier editions of his ■ Methods of Ethics '). as well as Mr Leslie Stephen .•did other Evolutitaiists. share this view of the ' Etliik. I. ;5.-.i. 377-i(-. rrcciioni as ILtliical Postidatc. ,|„.-sti..ii. 1 N.'iituiv f. (liritT frnm ill. -sf authors, iUKlwill riHl.;ivnur ill this f'ssay to show the hviii-' .^,,,1 |,;,r.iino]ii,t .■tliic-al iiitt'irst of the |.rohleiu ,,f tivrdMin. It is, 1 think, onr ..f th^- central ,,uestions of philos..i)hv, winch ean nt^ver l.eeonie (»l)s.lete. its form may chanu'e, hut th.- ([tiestion itself r.-mains. likr all the deepest (iuesti..ns, to he dealt with hy each succeecUn^i;' age in its own w a\'. For us. ;is f.r Kant, the (jU.-stioii of freedom takes the f.rm ..f a (leei)-seated antithesis i)e- tween the interests of th.- scientiric or intellectual consciousness ..n the one hand, and tho moral and r.'li^ious convietions of mankind on the other. From the scientitic oi" theoretical |).»int of view, man must regard himself as ])art of a totahty («t things, animals. and i)ersons. In the eyes of science, •• human nature "" is a jiart of the universal "■ na- ture of things" : mai'"s life is a j)art of the wider life of the universe itself The universal Order can a.hnit of no real exceptions: what src/z/.v e.\-cei)tional iinist cease to he so in the light of advancing knowledge. This, its fundamental ])os- tulate. science is constantly veritying. Accoi'dingly. when science— psvchological and physiological, as well as -physical— attacks the i)rohl.-m of human life, it inuuediatelv proceetls to hreak down mans Frccthvii (IS FJ/iical Posfitlafc iiiKi-iiifd iii(lr|)eiiilfiice of nature, and seeks to deiiioiistrate i:is entire clejiendeiice. The scientitic doctrine now |iietei's. indeed, to eall it'^flf 1)V the ■■ fairer nniiie '■ of I )etei';ninisni : l»ut if it has the C'oin'au't' of its coiiNic'tions. it will aeknow ledt^r,^ the oMer and truer n;iiiu' of Necessity. For thi»Uiih the toret's which oind man are priniarilv the inner torces of ni.itive and disposition and estaMished eharactei-. vet hetwi-en tiiese inner forces ami the outer torces of lature there can h*^ no real Iireak. 1 he foice. outer and iinier. is ultiniatelv one: ■■human nature" is part of the "nature of thini;s. ' The orii;inal soui'ce of mans acti\itv lies therefore without lather tlian within himself; tor the outer force is the lar^'er and lIic stroiiu'ei'. and includes the inner. 1 L;-et mv "nature " I'V heredity from •" Nature herscif. and. once i;(»t. it is t'urtlier fornied liy ^orce of circmnstances and education. All that / do is to react — as anv plant or e\"en stone does also in its measure — on the influences which act ujxui me. Such action and reaction, together, yield tlie whole series of occurrences which c<.institute mv life. 1. there- fore, am not free (as 1 )t4erminists are apt to insist that 1 am. though mv will is determined) ; '■ moti\es are. after all. external forces operating upon my " nature, ' which resjxuids to them, and 'M o Fncdoni as litliical Postulate over iit'ltlit^i- ■nintivf" noi- '•natuiv" have / aiiv ooiiti'ol. I aiii coiistiaiiu'd !)v tin; necessity <'t' i.atuie — its law is iiiiiic ; and thus Deteniiinisni really means ( 'onstraiiit. The necessity that entwines my lite is conceiyed, it is true, ratliei' as an iniiei' than as an outer necessity ; hut the outer and the inner necessity are seen, in tiieir ultimate analysis, to he one and the same. The necessity that n'oyerns our life is "a maoic weh woven through and throuo-ji us, like tiiat magnetic system of which modern science s})eaks, penetrat- in<4- us with a network suhtler than (»ur suhtlest neryes, yet hearino- in it the central forces of the world. " ^ The distinction hetween the new Determinism and the old Necessitarianism has heen finally in- validated, so far as science is concerned, l)y the scientitic concejjtion of Evolution. Science now insists upon leo-arding man, like ail else, as an evolved product ; and evolution must ultimatelv he reg'ard" d as, in its very nature, one and continu- ous. The scientitic or modern i'tshion of sjjeakinu- of a man's life as the result of certain '• forces," into which it is the business of the biog-rapher and historian to resolve him, is no mere fishion of speech. In literal truth, the individual is, to the ' Mr Putui', in ' The KL-uai.<>aiiCL'/ i 1 /^n\u/oiii as rjliica! rott-i!t as a cliiM in tlit-ir lianils. The scientific ex]»lan;iti«>ii of Innnan life and cliar- • cter is the exliihition cf them as takin*:- theii- phice anion;^' the other prochicts of cosniical evo- hition. In oni- da\'. accordintdv, it is no hue'ei' '■ scientitic '" to ivco^rise such a hreak as Mill, following- Edwards's hint, insisted upon, hetween outward " consti.iint " and inwai'd '" detennina- tion." All the interests of the .icientitic ambition are hound up with the denial of Freedom in anv and every sense of the word ; its admission n)eans emharrassment to the scientitic conscicnisness. and th^^ surrender of the claim of science to finalitv in its view of human life. With the assertion (tf freedom, on the other hand, are as mideniahly hound up all the interests of the moral and reli^'ious consciousness; Kant's saying- still holds, that freedom is the postulate of morality. The moral consciousness dissolves at the touch of such scientitic "explanation" as I have iust referred to. The determinist mav trv to pr( ■;> it u}), and to construct a pseudo-moralitv on the hasis of necessitv; l»ut the attempt is docMiied to failure. Tlie livini;' throhbin^' exjieri- ence of the moral man, — remorse and retril>ution, a}»probation and reward, all the grief and humili?- 8 Freedom as Efliieal Posfiilafe. tioii of liis life, all its j(._v aiul exaltation, Imply a (lee|) ail. I ineradicable conviction that liis destiny, if j)ai-t.'y shaped f(«i- him hv a J*ower beyond him- self. IS yet, m its i^rand outhne. in his own hands, t.. make it or to mar it. as he will. As man can- not, without ceasino- to he man, escape the im- perative of (hity. so he cainiot surrender his free- •l-Mn and hecme .1 child of nature. All the passion of his moral ex])erience o-athers itself uj) m the conviction of his intinite and eternal supe- iK'nty to Nature : she - cannot do otherwise," he r\ is ultimately a meta])hysical one, is indicated by the fact that all deterministic theories base themselves, either explicitly or im})licitly, upon a definite meta- physic. The denial of individual freedom is, for instance, the obvious corollary of such a pan- theistic metaphysic as Spinoza's. Human per- sonality Ijeing -esolved into the all-com})rehend- ini^' Divine Nature, from the necessity of which all things, without exception, follow, man's con- ception of his freedom and of his resulting- im- })ortance as an " imperium in imperio " is explained away as an illusion of his ignorance, destined to disap[)ear i'l an '"adeipiate " knowledg-e of the universe. The conse(|uence is strictly logical. If I am not a j)ersi>n, but merely an '"aspect"' or "expression ' of the universe or Crod, I cannot bt^ free. The life of the uni\erse is mine also: frcetlom can be ])redicate(l of (iod alone. ^Materialism, ag' in, carries with it the same ethical fi>nse(|uence. If matter is evervthing. and spirit merelv its last and most C'>m])lex manifcstiitioii once more freedom is an illusion. Freedom means spiritual indej^endence ; and if M Freedom as Etiucal Postulate 1 1 spirit is the mere product of matter, its lite cannot in the end escaj)e the bondage of material law. The evolutional metaphysic, whetlier of the hiolooical or "answ. ,••' consists, as is wvll known, in Freedom as Ethical Postulate 13 the witluliiiwHl of freedoiu from the pheiionieiuil ti> tlie iiounieiial world. ( 'oiieediiiy' to Ffunie and his followers that the ))heiioiueiial Kt^'o is detennined, that its life is subject t<» the neces- sity of nature, Kant still maintains that the true or nonmenal P]*;'o. the p]^()-in-itself. which we can ne\er " know," hut which we nnist '•think" nsiif: himself out- side, to I'ealise that ho is free. We ai-e contined within the prison-Iiousc of desu'e and ])assion, of sensihihty and nioti\e force, and the onlv life \\e know is that of prl-^oners. What matters it to us that there Is freedom if we cannot make it our ' ' l.'Mvolutioiiui.-iiiu iK.- liUi',~-i"iiH(.'s,' IiitiiKl. 7(i. H Frccdoju as Ethical Postulate (twii .'' Mut t'scapc we Ciiinmt. witlioiit ceasiiii;- to l)e men ; (tur \>'i"V iiiaiiliDod is oni' ])i'is()ii-li(tuse. But, it may Ke ur^^ed, the Kantian tVerdom is the true freedom at'tt-r alh inasmuch as. timuu'li not a'-tnah it is vet the ideal or »'-oal towards Aviiich the moral man is alwavs approxiniatini;-. But t'\-en iv^ardtMl as an ideal, it is hut a one- sided freedom, as the lite of dutv which realises it is hut a one-sifled life. W^\^. accordini;- to Kant s \iew. man is free onlv in so fn' as he acts rationally or without im])ulse of sensihilitv : '\\\ So far ;is he acts froui im})ulse nr even witli impuls". he acts iirationally, and is not free. But freedom, if it is to have anv moral sit-iiiti- cance. nuist inean freedom in choosine- x\\v evil eijually \\ith the eood ; oidv such a (lo\ihle free- dom can he ivu'arded as the l)asis of res])onsihilitv or ohligatien. Freedom is that which makes evil evil, as it is that which makes ^ond n-ood. If freedom is to he of real nutral sio'niticance. it unist he realised in the concrete litit' of motived acti\-ity. in the apparent necessitv of nature. ^\hich is therehy ci>n\-erted into the mechanism of freedom: not a])art from this actual life of man. in a life of sheer ])assionless I'easoii. which is not human life as we know it. }5v withdi'awiiio' it Irom the sj)liere of nature and mechanism, of , Freedom as II f /ileal Postulate 15 feeling- and impulse, and const itutino- t'oi- it a purely rational sphere of Its own, Kant lias re- duced frees simjtly the potential self of goodness \\hich, in the L;do(l ninii. is ever passing' into actualitv ; it is smiplv the ideal, of which the i^dod W'iki is tlie proo're.ssive realisation. Hut, if Kants view be true, freedom is lost in the verv act of its rt'.ilisation. It " never is, but alwavs is to be. ' Tlie ethical process is suicidal ; the u'oal, so soon as readied, turns out to be illusorv, 'J'he etlbrt 1 6 Freedom as Ethical Postulate. t.. escape the (iMiniiiioii of ii. -essity is as futile as the attempt to escape fr<'iii one's own shadow. The luonil man casts the shadow of liis cluuns hetore hull, and when he thinks to throw *^iieni ort". he is Init I'ivetin^- tliem anew. The oiilv positive lueauiuu- which we can put into Kant's tlieorv of freedom, its onlv hearing upon moral reality, is that not man hut (lod is free. If (Jod is conceived as pure reason enerois- in^•. we may admit that, for such a Being. Kant has vindicated freedom. But so far as man's life is concerned, he has, at hest. given a merely ne*'ative vindication, in his proof that morality im])lies a freedom which we cannot know, and in his resulting disproof of the adeijuacv or tina itv <»f the scieiititic interju'etation of human life. In other W(U(ls, Kant has shown that, here as elsewhere, hevoiid the facts which science dis- covers lies their real meaning, of which the ]ihenomena are but the (r man is free. Such an attempt is made by the Nto-Hegelian School wl.o, I'ere as else- 1 8 I'nrdom as litJiical Postulate. wliei-e. sevk t.. siil.stitutr tor Kantian -il.stractions a conm'te view. an;'est motive survives. It is nut even to he conceived as a conHict in which the self intervenes to make the stron^u'est motive. All stren^-th, all motive force, really comes from the self ^vhich, l.v its activity, tirst constitutes the motive. So "far is tlu^ self from being a mere inert somethino-, acted upon hy iiiHuences from with.mt. that <.nly through its reaction upon the ^vant or stimulus does the latter become a raotive or object of desire. Kanfs tw(, '• worlds •' or two 1 Prule..-,..uc.na t.< Ktlms, Bk. II. The parallel U-tw..n the in- tellectuarana the luuval activity of the self is strikin-ly eutn-ce-l by Pr..f>'ssnr Laurie in his eumpanion vohuue., ' MetaphvM.a Nuvaet Vetii^ta' aii'l • Ethiea." \ Fyccdoni as Etliical Postitlatc 19 '• })<)int.s()f view " rt'inalii. therefore, no loiiuer apart aii(le([nallyvali(l; his 'iorei^M (leterininin^'- causes" (motives or impulses) are seen to l)e not reallv "toreic,qi" to the E^o. hut its own creation, so that in heino- determined hy them, it is after all self-determined. The scientific or i)svcholo<'ical view is now seen to have l)een ahstract and pio- visional ; the metaphysical is seen to he alone concrete and Hnal. The issue hetween Freedom and Xecessitv hecomes now very clear. It resolves itself into the question: Has He^el (or (neen) "• aiiswered Hume"/ I have already pointed out that the (juestion of freedom resolves itself ultimatelv into a conflict hetween two alternative views of the moral self^vi/., the emi)irical and the transcen- dental. If. on the one hand, the self is resolval)le into its phenomenal states, if these exhaust its nature, the case for freedom is lost ; for these states determiiie :uid are detei'rnined hv one another in theunhr.)ken nexus ofanrecedent and conseipient. If, on the other hand, sucli a resolution of the .self into its successive expei'ienc^s is inipossihle, if moral experience presu])poses at each staj^e the presence and operation of a permanent self, the case for freedom is made <;-ood. That the latter, and not the former, is the true statement of the case, has, 20 FrccLloiii (fs rjliical Postulate I tliiiik. l>ffii liii.illy |)r(.\('(l l»y tli.' traiisceiideiitiil .■iiialvsisot'expt-r' ■iicf. It is still ])<>ssii)le, of Course, to rest ill the scieiititic or j»syclioloi^ical view ot moral activitv ; one may not l»e j)re|)are(l to adopt the tianscendental standjjoint. and may fall hack upon the jtsvfholoulcal or empirical view, as more in accordance with "• commoii-stnse. ' Moral, like intellectual scepticism, and even ai^niosticism, are still, even after Kant and lleo-el, intellio-ihle atti- tudes of tliouo'ht. P>ut miless it is shown that the scientific or psvcholot^ical is the tiiial and ade(|Uate or metaphysical view; unless, that is, the whole self is res(»lved into its several states or its ••experience." — freedom is not dis])roved. Now, such an empirical resolution of the self is as inipossihle in the moral as in ilie intellectual sphere ; the phenomenal or em])ivical \iew, iv}iv)i offered ^(s (I mctapJnjslv, is at once seen to be abstract and inadeipiate. To understand or think out the moral, e(jually with the intellectual life, we must re(;-ard the f(»rmer as, like the latter, the product of the activity of the Ei;'o. That activity is the heart and centre «'f the process, from which alone its real nature is re^ou'iiised. Neither the moral nor the intellectual man can he resolved into his '•experience.' Jf implies /mn; for, 7'"? "experience,' it is not a mere series or sum of N Frciuiom lu lif/iical rostitlatc 21 *• states," Init tl.r ^at Iit'i'inu- up ,,f tin ■ in ihf roiitiiHK.iis and sini^K- lift' .4" an i-lr-it icd m-IK ^lotive. C'ii-cuinstanct\ tt'ni|H'ranifiit. chaiacttT the several stdies ot' the determinist stnictur* — all imply such an activity of the self, if thev are t<> ente>- as far-tors into the moral situation. And the self which is shown to he the s(.urce of this orii^-inal formative activity is tliei'el>y j>roved to l»e free. But the further (pie.stion will i...t i)e lald- What of t''.is all-imi)ortant '•self" What, and iioloo-ical and ine- whence is it I And if the h ciianical evolutionists, refusinu- to reo-ard the individual self as ultimate and self-explainiiio-. trace it to u past hevond itself, and see in it the .h lit uo-!)ly complex result. int of \ast cosmic forces, the Al)S()lute Idealist of the Neo-Het.>-elian tvjie. hel e\" nt;- as lie loes \\\ tiie evolution c .f .1 i\ iiu^ reason in tl le universe, finds in the life of the self the mani- festrdion or rt {)roduction in time of the eternal Self-consci(!Usness of (lod. Now. such an account of the .self a])])*;ars to me t" deprive lis of freedoni ist when it seems witlii n our i^rasp. If I am l)ut ill the vehicle of the divine self-manifestation, if. iiniscif, in my o.vn proper s^'lf-hood or personalitv. I am nuthin*;-, it Is ilhisoi \ .o talk of mv freedom. 22 Freedom as FltJiical Postulate. Gcd iii.iv reveal Himself in nie in another way tlian He does in tlie world ; but my life is, after all. onlv His in a fuller manifestation, a hlo-her stai^^e, reallv as necessaiy as any of the lower, in the realisation of the divine nature. Such a view, like the Kantian, may conserve the freedom of God; it inevitahly invalidates that of man. If man can he said, to ite free at all, it is only in so far as he is identical with God. If it he con- tende\oral self or jiersoiialit w as itself the heart iiiid centre of the nw*r;il hfe. tlie ke\- to thf nior;ii situation. \Vhene\er w t' trv to "account for" 24 Frcedojji us Ethical Posfulatc, the self, the result is that we lose it ; the verv ;itteinpt to urasp and define it seems destined to destroy it. May it not be that the (jiiestion of the m-Kjh, of self-hood is itself niiphilosophical May not j)ersonality be an ultimate term ljhiloso])hical explanation? Is not the (piest HI Whence the self a ( [uest ion o f tl le s;inie ion, kind as that of the child who. when told that God made God.^ evervtliim still asks. But \\ho I) fidt (» \\ e not here reach the ultimate in pluloso])hical explanation.' Must we not ceive the universe as to admit, in all the ful "i'its moral and intellectual of personality ? Mav not tl So con- ness sioniricance. the fact le conception, instead of l)ein^- secondary and dei'ivative. and therefore r'-duciljle to others more primary, be central and ultimate even for ])hilosophy What( •ver may be the case with the intellectual ])robIem, the facts whicl I we call ••moral," the suj)ivme facts of our human experience, do. as insisted, demand such ref Kant erence tc a freely acting j.eis.-nality. The -rand characteristic ..f the moral life of man. whicli ti>rl)ids its i-esol lif. utioii into the '-ith( r of Xatui •r ( )bliwati "11. e or of (iod. is I'esponsibilit v lis is more than expectation of [•uiiishmeiit."' to which Mill '■> latliei piinishabiliM-. desert of \\oul(l reduce it. It pUMishnitMit or Fyccdoni as Ethical Postulate. 25 of reA\ard. The element of " retahution," instead of beiiio- accidental, \^ essential to the conception. In the conunon human experience of remorse then- is implied the conviction tliat diti'eivnt possihili- ties of action were open, and the)' ■-' that tlie ao-eiit is accountable for what he diu accountable not necessarily Uh fvro c.rfenio, human or divine, but primarily and inevitably to himself, to the Inner tribunal of his own nature in its varied possibilities. And retribution comes, if not from without, yet with sure and certain foot from within. Our moral nature, in its high possiVjili- ties, is inexcn-able in its demands and relentless in its ])enalties for failure to satisfv them. To say that tlie actual and tlie })ossible in luunan life are, in the last analysis, identical, to resolve the " (»ught to l)e" into the '"is," would be to falsify tlie healthy moral consciousness of man- kind. , ( )n the other hand, the admission of the full claim of that consciousness may mean the sur- render of metaphysical completeness in our scheme of the universe. For it means the recognition of a spiritual '"force,"' di;;; rent in kind from the natur.d or mechanical, and tlieref ire the surn^nder of a materialistic Monism or a '" seieiititic " syn- thesis. It means also the reco^-nitioii of a phi- 26 Frccdo'.u as Ethical Postulate ralitv (»f sj)ii'itual "forces," and tlierefore the sui'iender of a spiritual or idealistic Monism. It niav even mean, as Professor James insists that 't does, the e-itire ahandonment of the monistic j)oint of view, or the conception of a '' hlock- nuiverse." Tlie admission of free personidity nuiy cleave the miiverse asunder, and leave us with a seemin^'lv hel[)less "pluralism" in place of the variou-s "• monisms" of nietaj)hysical theory. Such an admission means further the recoo-nition of evil, real and positive, alori;'sidc of i^'ood in the universe. It may therefore mean the surrender of optimism, philosophical and relii^'ious. or at mv rate force us to ])ass to it throu<;-h the " stiait U'ate ' of [)essiunsm. All this darkness and dif- ticultv mav result to metaphysics from the rec- (•i;:iition and candid concession of the demands of the moral consciousness. Nor will this seem straiiL;'** when we rememher that the moi'al ])rob- lem of frt^edom is just the pi'ohlem of personality itself, whicli cannot l)Ut prove a stone of stum- hlinu' t" everv met.ij)hvsical svstem — " Dark is tlie world to thee : /Ji i/xrlr' a.rt the refisoii wliy ; For is \\r not all liut thou, that hast power to feel ' I am I ' ? " Kecoi^iiisiii^' these -litHculties. and I'c^^jn'dnii;' them as iiisu[)ei ahle. wc mav stid accept freedom as Freedom as RtJiical Posfiiliie. 27 the ethical postulate, as the hypothesis, itself iiiex])licable. npoii which al<»iie morality becomes intellio'il)le. This is the "moral methyl," Avhich some livini,'' thinkers share with Kant rot'essor ('am])hell Fraser has called it the staiHl])()int of "• moral faith." ^ The method or standpoint has received a brilliant exposition and de+ence from Professor \\'iiliam James in a lecture delivered at Harvard on "• The Dilenmia of Determinism." - '• I for one," says the latter writer, " feel as free to try the conception of moral as of mechanical or of b'gical reality. . . . If a certain foi-mula for expressin*;- the nature 0+' the world violates mv moral demand, 1 shall feel as free to throw it overboard, or at least to doubt it, as if it disap- [xiinted mv demand for uniformitv of secpience, for example." Insisting; u})on the " intei;'ritv of our moral ' as well as of our intellectual iudu'- ments, and es])eciallv u}ion that of the " judgment of ren'ret. and upon the ecpial le^'itimacv of the ■■ })ostulate •'f moral " with that of " ])hysical co- herence." Professor James thus states his coii- chisioii : " While 1 freelv admit that the jjlurahsm and restlessness [of a universe with freedom in it] ' Cf. !iis 'InTkrU'V " ill '• I'liil-.-ni.liical Cla-io," la>t cluiptrr. * l'i|li!i-lii(l in till' ' riiiiariaii lu-virw.' S-ntciiilier l^^t (lii'-tim. r.s.A.) 28 Frcciioni (fs ILfliical Postulate I . .lit' it'[»ii^ii;iiit ;iii(l irnitioiial in a certain way. 1 tiiid that tilt' altt'iiiativt' t<> tl'c-iu is irrational in a ,'"fj»fi' \\\\\. Tilt' indeterniinisni utiends tH'S' tlit^ iiati\(' al).s«>lii' i.-iii <>t" my intellect — an ahsn- liitisiii which, after all, perhaps deserves t<» he siiiihhetl anil kept in check. Hut the deterniinisni . . . \ittl;ites in\' .sense of moral realitv tlu't)iit;h ant! thi-oui;ii. ' Now. such a solution ol'the prohlem of freedom Is, to sav the vei'v least, a })lausil)le one; Imt let us in>te ex.ictlv what it means. It reco^'iiises and i;i\-es a new emphasis to the Kantian antithesis l)et\\t'en the intellectual or scientitic ct>nsciousness on the tine hand, and the mtiral and I'eliy'ious tin the titlier; and the stilutitm tittered consists in an assertitiii ot' the ri^iits of the latter ;donu' with antl t\t'n in precetlence tif those ^^i the former. The tlt'cisitiii in ta\'our t>f t'reedom is thus a kintl ot" ■■ moral wa^er." as M. Ueiitiuvier has well calletl it : the titlds st^em to he on the sitle of morality, aiiil tlu'ret'ore tht> otitis are taken. Ami prohahlv t he i[Ut'st KMi is i^-eneralK' answered on sdine^uch UfouiiiU. lllou^_.■h iK't so explicitlv t'ormulated. 'I'lic pliil'isopher is the num. after -dl : and the st r, v< iv 1,1 id on the one sitle of the (pie^tioii • 'i' the other, acciirdiii^- to the temper ot' the iudi\idual. One man t'eels m.-re keenK' the tli-^appointmeiit ot' Freedom as Ef /ileal Postulate 29 liis moral expectation. Another feels more keen- ly the disappointment of his intellectual or scien- tific aml)ition. For the ethical and the scientific temper are n.ot i;'enerally found in e(jual proportions in the same man. As men are horn Platoi'';^ts or Aristotelians, so are they l)orn moralists or intel- lectualists, men of practice or men of theorv ; and this original hent of nature will generally deter- mine a man's attitude to such an ultimate question. "Vhile the " intellectualists " will, with Spinoza, rutlilessly sacrifice freedom to completeness and finality of speculative view, the "moralists" will be content, with Kant and Lotze, t(» " recognise th..-, theoretically indemonstraMe freedom as 'a postulate of the practical reason.'" The latter position, if it confessedly fdls short of knowledt>-e, is at any rate entitled to the name which it claims for itself, that of a '" rational faith '" ; it is a faith i'/ourtded in the moral or practical rei(|ue,' i(J2 tf. Free dor,, as Ethical Postulate. 31 exponent of tlie universe Itself, an- catt' is Ilunio.^ () •• of its latest and iiot least ])frsuasive advocates is ."^.Ir Sliadwortli Hodt^'son, \\li(» insists- that "the true and j)i'()])ei- ineaiiiiii;- of Freedom is t'reedoni as oj)j)osed to (■(iiiiju'/snni ; and the true and |)ro])er ineanini;' of Xn-cssifi/ is necessity as oj»])ose(l to nmti injcnvii. Thus, freedom hein*^^ C'})})osed to compulsion, and neces- sity to contingency, thei'e is no antithetical oj)j)o- sition bet^veen freedom and necessity. ' Deter- minism maintains the uniformity of nature, c»r necessity, as opposed to c:'ntingency, not to free- dom ; and accordingly '"a deteir.iinist is perfectly at liberty to maintain the freedom of the will." Accordiny,ly, while " indeterminism inuudnes u freedom apart iW)m necessity . , . necessity is the inseparable condition, or rather let us say co-clc- iDi'ut, of freedom. And Avithout that co-element^ freedom is as incapable of being construed to though,, is something as impossible as walking \\ithout i-Toinul to tread on, or fiyinfj ^yithout air to beat. ''^ This, Mr Hodgson furthei- niaintains, is the only freedom that interests the ordiiiary man. " 'y freedom, Avhether of the \viil or ;iny- thinif els'". men at larw mean freedom from com- 1 'Eiii[Tiiry conci-rnin^L,' Human I'nilri'?tan;-ether a war of words. And ,.ne camiot hut iiot.^ tliat such an eva])oration of the dehate into the thin air of nure vrhia-e is always e.piivalent to Its settlement in favom- of Deiermlnism. Tl c le 34 l''i\\\huii (IS I-J/iicol Post III tit, c. \ iiitfrprrt.itif'ii of ■• XfO'ssit \',"' su<"'<'>'.stt>(| in tin- st'iitciict's just (|iii>tr(| tVoiti Mr Hodgson, is inter- est in^- .iiid siwiiiticmt . It indicates that tliec(.ni- |i|»-.\in of it Kv Kdwards. Dt'terniinisni no lon^vr takes tlir •• liioii prioi'i ' road of the older Xrcfssitai-ians ; it is now content to t'ojlow the liuniMei- j)atli of" scientific nietliod." Hunn' has. oiict' for all, emptied the conception of Necessity, for the sc^^ntitic mind, antl tin- the mind of the v mj)iricist in philosophv. of all sii^- y-estion of mystery and f(.rce ; and it would seem that the mere "• u.:.it'ormity " which is left is a very innocent atfaii'. a id (piite consistent with freedom. Vet I cannot Jiink that this is the case. •' Non-compulsion " is certainlv one element 111 the notion of freedom, hut it is not the whole notion. If it were, man coul'' De called frt^e oiilv In a sense in which nature is also free. For, as we have Just seen. Necessity has no dvnamical c(»ntent evei: in the si)here of natural occurrences ; the •■ laws of nature " are simj)ly the uniformities which characterise the behaviour of Kodies. But there is. as Professoi' dames insists, an additional and no less essential element in the notion of freedom — vi/.. the element of •• contin^encv " or '■ chance." A!)solute uniformity would he, no less !. k F.'in/oi/i as Ilt/iUal Posiitlatc tli.'il I roiiiliulsid .1^ •II. tl If llf M.lt Kill (it' t'l>'t' of freedom itself, with a view to its more exact definition, and, it may he. liiiiitati(»n. Freedom means, we have just .seen, contingency ; hut it does not therefore mean meie and altfiolute indetiniteness or caprice. < "ertain liin s are laid d<»wn for each man. in his inner " natni ■"" and outward cii'cumstances. alono- which to df^velop a •' chai'acter.'" A man has not the univei-sal field of possibilities ti» himself; each has his own moral " sphere." This is determined for him, it is the "given"' element in his life. Freedom as Btliieai Postulate 37 Two factors, an internal and an external, contrilj- ute t( siicli (leterniination. The internal factor is the " nature," " (hsj)osition,"' or '" teni})(nanient," psychological and physiological, which constitutes his initial e(|iii})nient for the moral life. The external factor consists in the "force of circmn- srance," the places and opjxntunities of his life, what is often called his '• environment,' 'physical and social. So far there is determination ; so ftir the field of his activity is detined for each man. But unless out of these two factors, the external and the internal, you can construct the moral man. room is still left for freedom. Its '"sphere" may he determined; the specific form and complexion of the moral task may i)e differ- ent for each and (h'te; mined for e;'ch. But the moral alternative lies within this sphere. All that is necessarv to constitute it is the possibility for the man of i;"<»<»d or evil, not of anv or everv i)artic\dar fortn of (-ood and evil. Thev mav take anv form, and what form they shall take is deter- mined /''/• the individual, not />// him. But the choice between the alternatives is essentially the same in all cases; it is a choice between (;'ood and evil, and that choice lteloiii;s to tln^ individual, inner "nature " and outward "circumstances" art% as it were, a law material out of which he 38 Fnwioin as Ethical Postulate. has to vraaiv a moral cliai'acter — a plastic mate- rial which, like the sculptor, he has to sulxliie to his own formative itlea. The ^n-aiid moral limitation is iiulividnal'tv. It is just because we are individuals th.-t the moral ideal takes a different complexion for each of us, and that no man's moral task is exactlv like his brothers. Yet, amid all the variety of detail, the grand outlines of the task remain the same for all. In its very nature that task is universal ; and thouo'h it must he realised in a varietv of concrete })articulars. it inn,i he i-ealised in i and in all ])articulars. witliout losini;' its universal sii;-niiicance. Yw each man there is an ideal, an ouiji'ht-to-he ; for each man there is the same choice, with the same momentous meaning, he- tween good and evil. To each there is set funda- mentally the same task — out of "nature" and " circumstance "'--the e(piipment given and the occasion offered, to create a character. For character /.v a creation, as the statue is, thouLdi. like the statue, it implies certain given materials. \V hat. in detail, character shall he. In irhat ii-a ,i good ami III trhaf ivnij evil, depends upon the '■gi\en elements of nature and ciicumst.mce ; ti-liitlii r it shall i»e t^ood "/• evil dej)ends uiion the man himself Out oi* th.' j»lastic material to I , Freedom as EtJiical Posfidai c. 39 creute a cliuvacter, tV>niied after the pattern of th- heavenly heauty, that is the pecuHar human task. I.< net the material of the moral life essentially plastic f Out of the most un- promising material have we not often seen surprisino- moral creations I Just when the task seemed liardest, and came nearest to l)ein,i;- im- :K)Ssil)l«-, have we not sometimes seen the highest fullilments of it? And with the most promisin.i;- material do we not often see conspicuous moral failure? Must we not admit that success or failure liere is determined ultimately not by the material, Imt h- the free play of the eneru-y of the self.^ But the concepti««n ..f freedom needs stdl more exact detinition. The freedom of moral life is not of that al.stra.ct and absolute kin.l for which Libertarians have uenerally contended. >b»ral freedom— that is. the freedom which morality implies and moral experience illustrates— is not freedom in each and every act of the life, but freedom on thr >rhulr. Freedom of initiative )s l,n| ,-ed. but it does not foll-.w that all the actions of the life ; cases of -uch froe initiation. The recognition of this further limitation of fre-dom is iu?].orta.nt for the proper understanding of the whole (,uestion. In three .litievent aspects, at 40 Freedom as ilt/iieal Postulate. least, we find such a li.iiltiition (wliicli is not e(|uiva!:"nt ti> iieu'atioii) of freedom. (I.) Tlie ^>i'iiiciple of ec./.ioinv of spiritual force iin[)lies tlie siu'icder of lar^-e tracts of our life to inecliaiiisni. Sucli a siuTender is made in the case Hot only of purely })hysic!'! activities, hut also generally in the case o+* the routine of daily life. To deliherate and choose ahout such thini;s as whicli hoot we shall put on. tirst, or which side of the garden '.^alk we shall tiike, is an entirely ij^raiuitous assertion of oui' freedom : it is the mark of a weak (»r diseased rather than of a stronu and liealthy will. Decision and strength of character i'- shown in the choice of certain rixed lines of conduct in such particulars, and in the ahidin*.;' l»y the choice once made. But, inasnuich as the surrender of such activities to mechanism is its. If a free act, wt^ can reclaim them, if we will, from its dominion. Jn other words, the force of hahit can he hroken, how- ever i;raduall\' : the spirit can reassert its powei', and. e\en in sucli actions, make a new heui'in- nini;'. (•_'.) The continuitv of the moral Hie also im- plies a lar^e surreudei- of its several acts to mechanism or halut. The moral life is not a series of isolateil choices. < 'hoices "' cr\st.tllise, ' Fyccdoni as lit Ideal Postulate 41 or ratlier tliev are seer evil, seems to he determined hy moments of choice in da\s and years of even temn-. The commission of which I have spoken is ([uickly g'iven, its execution takes lon^'. The moral crises of our lives are i^w, and soon over; hut it seems as if all the strenirth of our si)irit u'athered itself up for such su])reme etforts. and as if wliat follows in the lonu'-drawu vears were hut t]i>')i- conse>: of will-power so nuich p^ 42 rl'ccdom as Ethical Postulate. as tix itv"' of character — itself the creation of itb ^vill — deuradatioi" of the will, a choicr, a})parently Hiial and irrevocahle. of the lower and the evil. This is the tragedy of the story in either case. Is not tliis ao-ain the meaning;- of the weird Faust le^-end which has so iin]))'essed die ima^'in- ntion of E'U'o})e ? Faust's "celling his soul" to Mephistopheles, and signing the contract with his life's hlood. is no single transaction, done deliheratfclv, on one occasion; rather that is the lurid meaning of a life which consists of inininier- ahle individual acts. — the life of evil im'f science and philosophy, do all moral " explana.tions."' as 1 tnink, presup})ose the conception of moral personality. These are supreme catei;-ories which include all others, and are not themselves included. With God. they are the three constitutive metaphysical realities. And as Theoloo-v takes God. and the IMiilosophv of Nature takes the World, so nmst Moral Philoso- phy take I'^'rsonality (an 1 with it Freedom) as its supreme and i^aildiui,' conception. The final task of Metaphysics, as the hi^i,diest and total svnthesis, is to exhibit these in their 46 /'nn/oiii (IS ILtJiical Postulate IV lati • lis to olH' aiiotlit'r •r, iiioi'f strictlv, to t'xliiliit iiaturt' and Immaii pei'sonalu y in tlieii- rt'latioii t" tlu' (liviiK \initv. 1 Hut tneii Meti idivsK's must l»t'\\ .irt* 01 in*'r< 'jiidj anv of tlit'se Victors of ultimate ivalitv in the otliers, or losing;- hilr s, w tlie distinctions hetwt-en tliem. Its task i j)ieservin^' the (hstincti\e character of each, to accompHsh tlieir reconciUation. and to see thtMu their real unitv. 1 have insisted, tlu'refore. \\\ \\ poll the intep'itv of the moral [)ersoiiahty : •ith that, it seems to me, freedom stands or w falls. That inte^'rity may l)e tam})ered with, as we lune found, in either of two ways. Man mav he de-})ers(»nalised eithei' into Xatinv or into (jod. The former is the favourite course of recent Determinism, and I have i;iven my reasons for dissentini;' from it. Tl le '•reater (lant-er les. )erhai)s th .tl le otner ( lirect ion and it Avas here that Edwards and the older Determinists, with a truer meta})hy.sical instinct than their successors, wa^vd the keenest warfare. The relation of man as a free moral personality to (iod is even more ditiicult to C(»iicei\e than his relation to Nature. To think of ( Jod as all in and vet to retain oiu; liold on liuman Id h freed om or personalitv. that is the real nietaphvsicd dif- ficult'' The ultimate reconciliation of divine I Fycciioiii (fs rjliical rostiilatc. 47 IlfMl liUMiiiii iifrsniialit V iii;i\ Uf hcxdiHl us Itut 1 do not set' liow fitlitT (•(iii('«'|»ti<>ii can l)e ii'lVt'II UJ). w hctli •r tor a I'-li^iou^ Mvst K'lsiii or tor an al)--olute jdiilosopliical Mealisui. At'tf. all, the chief (■uavantee of a woithv \ lew ( t' (iod is a woi'tliv view of man. It is through the conviction of liis own supei' itx' to Nature, of liis own essential f Fate and the Christian thouirht of a divine I^'ovidence have hi<;h nieta- physical warrant. All human experience " Should t«?ach us There's a divinity that shapes our ends, llovaih-hew them huw we will." Yet man cannot regard himself as a mere in- strument in the divhie hands, a passive vehicle 48 /■nYi/oiii ns EtJiua! Postu late. ^ ^,,. ^^,, ,,„.,..,. ..fCn.l: li." must tl.ink of l.-.n.s..lt' '^^ :,s;, cn-uorkrr. Mv to i.l.-ntitV l.linsflf w.tl. tl.r Divin.- rnr,.Ms<. in his lifr .-.ihI in th- universe, .,,,,1 l,v such active ident iiicat i-.n. t.. make that ,.„,,,.,se his own. This is his hi-h human Uiithriuht. whicli he may not scU. rUlNTt.l. UV WILLIAM L.LA.KWl"'!' A S l> SONS. ^