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Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajoutdes lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque ce " ^""^ ^^^^^^^^^^ patriotism. Comb nl "ll .^ ^^dent and consuming i^^pulses n one individi '!i^""^^'^"^ ^"^ ^" ^hesf Boer-the most ^ormi^M ' ^"^'^ ^°" ^^^« ^he modern the path of Im^^^^^^^ ever crossed la Jly consitTe? -n ^ot^ conflicS^^irh ^f"^ ""'T' ^^^ Poleon and all his veterans hL ""^^ ^^ ^^' roughly as these harclbitfenf "^'.^' ^'^^^^^ "« so theology a.. d theirtcon^^^^^ -cient 1 THE GREAT BOER WAR Look at the map of South Africa, and there, in the very centre of the British possessions, like the stone in a peach, lies the great stretch of the two republics, a mighty domain for so small a people. How came they there? Who are these Teutonic folk who have burrowed so deeply into Africa? It is a twice-told tale, and yet it must be told once again if this story is to have even the most superficial of introductions. No one can know or appreciate the Boer who does not know his past, for he is what his past has made him. It was about the time when Oliver Cromwell was at his zenith — in 1652, to be pedantically accurate — that the Dutch made their first lodgment at the Cape of Good Hope. The Portuguese had been there before them, but, repelled by the evil weather, and lured forward by rumors of gold, they had passed the true seat of empire, and had voyaged farther to settle along the eastern coast. Some gold there was, but not much, and the Portuguese settle- ments have never been sources of wealth to the mother country, and never will be until the day when Great Britain signs her huge check for Delagoa Bay. The coast upon which they settled reeked with malaria. A hundred miles of poisonous marsh sepaiated it from the healthy inland plateau. For centuries these pioneers of South African colonization strove to obtain some farther footing, but save along the courses of the rivers they made little progress. Fierce natives and an enervating climate barred their way. But it was different with the Dutch. That very rude- ness of climate which had so impressed the Portuguese adventurer was the source of their success. Cold and poverty and storm are the nurses of the qualities which make for empire. It is the men from the bleak and barren lands who master the children of the light and the heat. And so the Dutchmen at the Cape prospered and grew stronger in that robust climate. They did not penetrate far inland, for they were few in number and all they wanted was to be found close at hand. But they built themselves houses, and they supplied the Dutch THE BOI.R NATIONS 3 h I y h Kast India Company with food and water, gradually budding off little townlets, Wynberg, Stellenbosch, and pushing their settlements up the long slopes which lead to that great central plateau which extends for fifteen hundred miles from the edge of the Karoo to the valley of the Zambesi. Then came the additional Huguenot emigrants — the best blood of France — three hundred of them, a handful of the choicest seed thrown in to give a touch of grace and soul to the solid Teutonic strain. Again and again in the course of history, with the Noi • mans, the Huguenots, the Emigres, one can see the gre.it hand dipping into .hat storehouse and sprinkling the nations with the same splendid seed. France has not founded other countries, like her great rival, but she has made every other country the richer by the mixture with her choicest and best. The Rouxs, Du Toits, Jouberts, Dupleixs, Villiers, and a score of other French names are among the most familiar in South Africa. For a hundred more years the history of the colony was a record of the gradual spreading of the Africanders over the huge expanse of veldt which lay to the north of them. Cattle -raising became an industry, but in a country where six acres can hardly support a sheep, large farms are necessary for even small herds. Six thousand acres was the usual size, and five pounds a year the rent payable to Government. The diseases which follow the white man had in Africa, as in America and Australia, been fatal to the natives, and an epidemic of smallpox cleared the country for the newcomers. Farther and farther north they pushed, founding little towns here and there, such as Graaf-Reinet and Swellendam, where a Dutch Reformed church and a store for the sale of the bare necessaries of life formed a nucleus for a few scattered dwellings. Already the settlers were showing that independence of control and that detachment from Europe which has been their most prominent character- istic. Even the mild sway of the Dutch Company (an older but weaker brother of John Company in India) had caused them to revolt. The local rising, however, was THK GRKAT BOl'.R WAR I hardly noticed in the universal cataclysm which followed the French Revolution. After twenty years, during which the world was shaken by the Titanic struj^gle be- tween Kngland and France, in the final counting up of the game and paying of the stakes the Cape Colony was added in 1814 to the British Empire. In all our vast collection of states there is probably not one the title-deeds to which are more incontestable than to this one. We had it by two rights, the right of conquest and the right of purchase. In 1806 our troops landed, defeated the local forces, and took possession of Cape Town. In 18 14 we paid the large sum of six million pounds to the Stadholder for the transference of this and some South American land. It was a bargain which was probably made rapidly and carelessly in that general redistribution which was going on. As a house of call upon the way to India the place was seen to be of value, but the country itself was looked upon as un- profitable and desert. What would Castlereagh or Liver- pool have thought could they have seen the items which we were buying for our six million pounds? The in- ventory would have been a mixed one of good and of evil : nine fierce Kafiir wars, the greatest diamond mines in the world, the wealthiest gold mines, two costly and humiliating campaigns with men whom we respected even when we fought with them, and now at last, we hope, a South Africa of peace and prosperity, with equal rights and equal duties for all men. The future should hold something very good for us in that land, for if we merely count the past we should be compelled to say that we should have been stronger, richer, and higher in the world's esteem had our possessions there never passed beyond the range of the guns of our men-of-war. But surely the most arduous is the most honorable, and, look- ing back from the end of their journey, our descendants may see that our long record of struggle, with its mixture of disaster and success, its outpouring of blood and of treasure, has always tended to some great and enduring goal. ! THE BOER NATIONS 5 The title-deeds to the estate are, as I have said, good ones, but there is one singular and ominous llaw in their provisions. The ocean has marked three boundaries to it, but the fourth is undefined. There is no word of the "Hinterland,'' for neitiier the term nor the idea had then been thought of. Had Great llritain bought those vast regions wiiich extended beyond tiie settlements? Or were the discontented Dutch at liberty to pass onward and found fresh nations to bar the path of the An[!;lo- Celtin colonists? In that question lay the germ of all the trouble to come. An American would realize the poinL at issue if he could conceive that after the found- ing of the United States the Dutch inhabitants of the State of New York had trekked to the westward and established fresh communities under a new flag. Then, when the American population overtook these Western States, they would be face to face with the problem which this country has had to solve. If they found these new States fiercely anti-American and extremely unpro- gressive, they would experience that aggravation of their difficulties with which our statesmen have had to deal. At the time of their transference to the I>ritish Hag the colonists — Dutch, French, and German — numbered some thirty thousand. They were slaveholders, and the slaves were about as numerous as themselves. The prospect of complete amalgamation between the British and the original settlers would have seemed to be a good one, since they were of much the same stock, and their creeds could only be distinguished by their varying degrees of bigotry and intolerance. Five thousand British emi- grants were landed in 1820, settling on the eastern borders of the colony, and from that time onward there was a slow but steady influx of Fnglish-speaking colo- nists. The Government had the historical faults and the historical virtues of British rule. It was mild, clean, honest, tactless, and inconsistent. On the whole, it might have done very well had it been content to leave things as it found them. But to change the habits of the most conservative of Teutonic races was a dangerous THK GRKAT BOKR WAR venture, and one wliich has led to a lonji; series of com- plications, making up the troubled history of South Africa. The Imperial Government has always taken an honor- able and philanthropic view of the rights of the native and the claim which he has to the protection of the law. VV'e hold, and rightly, that Uritish justice, if not blind, should at least be color-blind. The view is irreproach- able in theory and incontestable in argument, but it is apt to be irritating when urged by a l^oston moralist or a London philanthropist upon men whose whole society has been built upon the assumption that the black is the inferior race. Such a people like to find the higher morality for themselves, not to have it imposed upon them by those who live under entirely different condi- tions. They feel — and with some reason — that it is a cheap form of virtue which, from the serenity of a well- ordered household in Beacon Street or ]>elgrave Square, prescribes what the relation shall be between a white employer and his half-savage, half-childish retainers. Both branches of the Anglo-Celtic race have grappled with the question, and in each it has led to trouble. The British Government in South Africa has always played the unpopular part of the friend and protector of the native servants. It was upon this very point that the first friction appeared between the old settlers and the new administration. A rising with bloodshed followed the arrest of a Dutch farmer who had maltreated his slave. It was suppressed, and five of the participants were hanged. This punishment was unduly severe and exceedingly injudicious. A brave race can forget the victims of the field of battle, but never those of the scaffold. The making of political martyrs is the last insanity of statesmanship. However, the thing was done, and it is typical of the enduring resentment which was left behind that when, after the Jameson raid, it seemed that the leaders of that ill-fated venture might be hanged, the beam was actually brought from a farm- House at Cookhouse Drift to Pretoria, that the English- 1 \ TUl' HOI R NATIONS -: men might die as the Dutchmen had died in iSt6. Slagter's Nek marked the dividing of thi- ways between the British Government and the Africanders. And the separation soon became more marked. There were injudicious tamperings with the local government and the local ways, with a substitution of English for Dutch in the law courts. With vicarious generosity, the I'.nglish Ciovernment gave very lenient term^ to the Kaffir tribes who in 1834 had raided the border farmers. And then, finally, in this same year there came the emancipation of the slaves throughout tiie British Em- pire, which fanned all smouldering discontents into an active flame. It must be confessed that on this occasion the British philanthropist was willing to pay for what he thought was right. It was a noble national action, and one the morality of which was in advance of its time, that the l^ritish Parliament should vote the enormous sum of twenty million pounds to pay compensation to the slave- holders, and so to remove an evil with which the mother country had no immediate connection. It was as well that the thing should have been done when it was, for had we waited till the colonies affected had governments of their own it could never have been done by constitu- tional methods. With many a grumble the good British householder drew his purse from his fob, and he paid for what he thought to be right. If any special grace attends the virtuous action which brings nothing but tribulation in this world, then we may hope for it over this emancipation. We spent our money, we ruined our West Indian colonies, and we started a disaffection in South Africa, the end of which we have not seen. Yet if it were to be done again we should doubtless do it. The highest morality may prove also to be the highest wisdom when the half-told story comes to be finished. But the details of the measure were less honorable than the principle. It was carried out suddenly, so that the country had no time to adjust itself to the new condi- tions. Three million pounds were ear-marked for South I 8 THE GREAT BOER WAR Africa, which gives a price per slave of from sixty to seventy pounds, a sum considerably below the current local rates. Finally, the compensation was made pay- able in London, so that the farmers sold il-Qir claims at reduced prices to middlemen. Indignation meetings were held in every little townlet and cattle camp on the Karoo. The old Dutch spirit was up — the spirit of the men who cut the dikes. Rebellion was useless. But a vast untenanted land stretched to the north of them. The nomad life was congenial to them, and in their huge ox-drawn wagons — like those bullock-carts in which some of their old kinsmen came to Gaul — they had vehicles and homes and forts all in one. One by one they were loaded up, the huge teams were inspanned, the women were seated inside, the men, with their long- barrelled guns, walked alongside, and the great exodus was begun. Their herds and liocks accompanied the migration, and the children helped to round them in and drive them. One tattered little boy of ten cracked his sjambok whip behind the bullocks. He was a small item in that singular crowd, but he was of interest to us, for his name was Paul Stephanus Kruger. It was a strange exodus, only comparable in modern times to the sallying forth of the Mormons from Nauvoo upon their search for the promised land of Utah. The country was known and sparsely settled as far north as the Orange River, but beyond there was a great region which had never been penetrated save by some daring hunter or adventurous pioneer. It chanced — if there be indeed such an element as chance in the graver affairs of man — that a Zulu conqueror had swept over this land and left it untenanted, save by the dwarf bushmen, the hideous aborigines, lowest of the human race. There were fine grazing and good soil for the emigrants. They travelled in small detached parties, but their total num- bers were considerable — from six to ten thousand accord- ing to their historian, or nearly a quarter of the whole population of the colony. Some of the early bands perished miserably. A large number made a trysting \ THK BOFR NATIONS \ place at a high peak to the east of Bloemfontein in what was lately the Orange Fiee State. One party of the emi- grants was cut off by the formidable Matabeli, a branch of the great Zulu nation. The survivors declared war upon them, and showed in this, their first campaign, the extraordinary ingenuity in adapting their tactics to their adversary which has been their greatest military char- acteristic. The commando which rode out to do battle with the Matabeli numbered, it is said, a hundred and thirty-five farmers. Their adversaries were twelve thou- sand spearmen. They met at the Marico River, near Mafeking. The Boers combined the use of their horses and of their rilles so cleverly that they slaughtered a third of their antagonists without any loss to themselves. Their tactics were to gallop up within range of the enemy, to fire a volley, and then to ride away again be- fore the spearmen could reach them. When the savages pursued the Boers tied. When the pursuit halted the Boers halted and the rifle fire began anew. The strategy was simple but most effective. When one remembers how often since then our own horsemen have been pitted against savages in all parts of the world, one deplores that ignorance of all military traditions save our own which is characteristic of our service. This victory of the " voortrekkers " cleared all the country between the Orange River and the Limpopo, the sites of what has been known as the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In the mean time another body of the emigrants had descended into what is now known as Natal, and had defeated Dingaan, the great Chief of the Zulus. Being unable, owing to the presence of their families, to employ the cavalry tactics which had been so effective against the Matabeli, they again used their inge- nuity to meet this new situation, and received the Zulu warriors in a square of laagered wagons, the men firing while the women loaded. Six burghers were killed and three thousand Zulus, Had such a formation been used forty years afterward against these very Zulus, we should not have had to mourn the disaster of Isandhhvana. ^ lO THP: great BOER WAR And now at the end of their great journey, after over- coming the difficulties of distance, of nature, and of savage enemies, the Boers saw at the end of their travels the very thing which they desired least — that which they had come so far to avoid — the flag of Great Britain. The Boers had occupied Natal from within, but England had previously done the same by sea, and a small colony of Englishmen had settled at Port Natal, now known as Durban. The home Government, however, had acted in a vacillating way, and it was only the conquest of Natal by the Boers which caused them to claim it as a British colony. At the same time they asserted the unwelcome doctrine that a British subject could not at will throw off his allegiance, and that, go where they might, the wandering farmers were still only the pioneers of British colonies. To emphasize the fact three companies of soldiers were sent in 1842 to what is now Durban — the usual corporal's guard with which Great Britain starts a new empire. This handful of men was waylaid by the Boers and cut up, as their successors have been so often since. The survivors, however, fortified themselves, and held a defensive position — as also their successors have done so many times since — until reinforcements arrived and the farmers dispersed. It is singular how in history the same factors will always give the same result. Here in this first si '•'mish is an epitome of all our military re- lations with these people. The blundering headstrong attack, the defeat, the powerlessness of the farmer against the weakest fortifications — it is the same tale over and over again in different scales of importance. Natal from this onward became a British colony, and the majority of the Boers trekked north and east with bitter hearts to tell their wrongs to their brethren of the Orange Free State and of the Transvaal. Had they any wrongs to tell? It is difficult to reach that height of philosophic detachment which enables the historian to deal absolutely impartially where his own country is a party to the quarrel. But at least we may allow that there is a case for our adversary. Our annexa- \ THE BOER NATIONS 1 1 ( tion of Natal had been by no means definite, and it was they and not we who first broke that bloodthirsty Zulu power which threw its shadow across the country. It was hard after such trials and such exploits to turn their back upon the fertile land which they had conquered, and to return to the bare pastures of the upland veldt. They carried out of Natal a heavy sense of injury, which has helped to poison our relations with them ever since. It was, in a way, a momentous episode, this little skir- mish of soldiers and emigrants, for it was the heading off of the Boer from the sea and the confinement of his ambition tc the land. Had it gone the other way, a new and possibly formidable flag would have been added to the maritime nations. The emigrants who had settled in the huge tract of country between the Orange River in the south and the Limpopo in the north had been recruited by newcomers from the Caoe Colony until they numbered some fifteen thousand souls. This population was scattered over a space as large as Germany, and larger than Pennsylvania, New York, and New P2ngland. Their form of govern- ment was individualistic and democratic to the last de- gree compatible with any sort of cohesion. Their wars with the Kaffirs and their fear and dislike of the British Government appear to have been the only ties which held them together. They divided and subdivided within their own borders, like a germinating egg. The Trans- vaal was full of lusty little high-mettled communities, who quarrelled among themselves as fiercely as they had done with the authorities at the Cape. Lydenburg, Zoutpansberg, end Potchefstroom were on the point of turning their rifles against each other. In the south, be- tween the Orange River and the Vaal, there was no form of government at all, but a welter of Dutch farmers, Basutos, Hottentots, and half-breeds living in a chronic state of turbulence, recognizing neither the British authority to the south of them nor the Transvaal republics to the north. The chaos became at last unendurable, and in 1848 a garrison was placed in Bloemfontein and the i 12 THE GREAT BOER WAR district incorporated in the British Empire. The emi- grants made a futile resistance at Eooniplats, and after a single defeat allowed themselves to be drawn into the settled order of civilized rule. At this period the Transvaal, where most of the Boers had settled, desired a formal acknowledgment of their independence, which the British authorities determined once and for all to give them. The great barren country, which produced little save marksmen, had no attractions for a Colonial Office which was bent upon the limitation of its liabilities. A convention was concluded between the two parties, known as the Sand River Convention, which is one of the fixed points in South African history. By it the British Government guaranteed to the Boer farmers the right to manage their own affairs, and to govern themselves by their own lav^s without any inter- ference upon the part of the British. It stipulated that there should be no slavery, and with that single reserva- tion washed its hands finally, as it imaginecj, of the whole question. So the South African Republic came formally into existence. In the very year after the Sand River Convention a second republic, the Orange Free State, was created by the deliberate withdrawal of Great Britain from the terri- tory which she had for eight years occupied. The Eastern Question was already becoming acute, and the cloud of a great war was drifting up, visible to all men. British statesmen felt that their commitments were very heavy in every part of the world, and the South African annexations had always been a doubtful value and an undoubted trouble. Against the will of a large part of the inhabitants, whether a majority or not it is impossible to say, we withdrew our troops as amicably as the Romans withdrew from Britain, and the new republic was left with absolute and unfettered independence. On a petition being presented against the withdrawal, the Home Government actually voted forty-eight thousand pounds to compensate those who had suffered from the change. Whatever historical grievance the Transvaal THE BOER NATIONS 13 may have against Great Britain, we can at least, save perhaps in one matter, claim to have a very clear con- science concerning our dealings with the Orange Free State. Thus in 1852 and in 1854 were born those sturdy states who have been able for a time to hold at bay the united forces of the empire. In the mean time Cape Colony, in spite of these seces- sions, had prospered exceedingly, and her population — English, German, and Dutch — had grown by 1870 to over two hundred thousand souls, the Dutch still slightly pre- dominating. According to the Liberal colonial policy of Great Britain, the time had come to cut the cord and let the young nation conduct its own affairs. In 1872 com- plete self-government was given to it, the governor, as the representative of the Queen, retaining a nominal unexercised veto upon legislation. According to this system the Dutch majority of the colony could, and did, put their own representatives into power and run the government upon Dutch lines. Already Dutch law had been restored, and Dutch put on the same footing as English as the official language of the country. The ex- treme liberality of such measures, and the uncompromis- ing way in which they have been carried out, however distasteful the legislation might seem to English ideas, are among the chief reasons which made the illiberal treatment of British settlers in the Transvaal so keenly resented at the Cape. A Dutch Government was ruling the British in a British colony, at a moment when the Boers would not give an Englishman a vote upon a mu- nicipal council in a city which he had built himself. Unfortunately, however, " the evil that men do lives after them," and the ignorant Boer farmer continued to imagine that his southern relatives were in bondage, just as the descendant of the Irish emigrant still pictures an Ireland of penal laws and an alien church. For twenty-five years after the Sand River Convention the burghers of the South African Republic had pursued a strenuous and violent existence, fighting incessantly with the natives and sometimes with each other, with an I H THE GREAT BOER WAR ii' occasional fling at the little Dutch republic to the south. The semi-tropical sun was waking strange ferments in the placid Friesland blood, and producing a race who added the turbulence and restlessness of the south to the formidable tenacity of the north. Strong vitality and violent ambitions produced feuds and rivalries worthy of mediaeval Italy, and the story of the factious little com- munities is like a chapter out of Guicciardini. Disorgan- ization ensued. The burghers would not pay taxes and the treasury was empty. One fierce Kaffir tribe threatened them from the north, and the Zulus on the east. It is an exaggeration of English partisans to pretend that our intervention saved the Jioers, for no one can read their military history without seeing that they were a match for Zulus and Sikukuni combined. But certainly a for- midable invasion was pending, and the scattered farm- houses were as open to the Kaffirs as our farmers' home- steads were in the American colonies when the Indians were on the warpath. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, the British Commissioner, after an inquiry of three months, solved all questions by the formal annexation of the country. The fact that he took possession of it with a force of some twenty-five men shov*'ed the honesty of his belief that no armed resistance was to be feared. This, then, in 1877 was a complete reversal of the Sand River Convention and the opening of a new chapter in the history of South Africa. There did not appear to be any strong feeling at the time against the annexation. The people were depressed with their troubles and weary of contention. Burgers, the President, put in a formal protest, and took up his abode in Cape Colony, where he had a pension from the British Government. A memorial against the measure received the signatures of a majority of the Boer inhabi- tants, but there was a fair minority who took the other view. Kruger himself accepted a paid office under Government. There was every sign that the people, if judiciously handled, would settle down under the British flag. It is even asserted that they would themselves J ,,-1^^ THK BOER NATIONS 15 M have petitioned for annexation had it been longer with- held. With immediate constitutional government it is possible that even the most recalcitrant of them might have been induced to lodge their protests in the ballot boxes rather than in the bodies of our soldiers. Ijut the empire has always had poor luck in South Africa, and never worse than on that occasion. Through no bad faith, but simply through preoccupation and delay, the promises made were not instantly fulfilled. Simple primitive men do not understand the ways of our circumlocution offices, and they ascribe to duplicity what is really red tape and stupidity. If the Trans- vaalers had waited they would have had their Volksraad and all that they wanted. But the British Government had some other local matters to set right, the rooting out of Sikukuni and the breaking of the Zulus, before they would fulfil their pledges. The delay was keenly re- sented. And we were unfortunate in our choice of governor. The burghers are a homely folk, and they like an occasional cup of coffee with the anxious man who tries to rule them. The three hundred pounds a year of coffee money allowed by the Transvaal to its President is by no means a mere form. A wise adminis- trator would fall into the sociable and democratic habits of the people. Sir Theophilus Shepstone did so. Sir Owen Lanyon did not. There was no Volksraad and no coffee, and the popular discontent grew rapidly. In three years the British had broken up the two savage hordes which had been threatening the land. The finances, too, had been restored. The reasons which had made so many favor the annexation were weakened by the very power which had every interest in preserving them. It cannot be too often pointed out that in this annexa- tion, the starting-point of our troubles. Great Britain, however mistaken she may have been, had no obvious selfish interest in view. There were no Rand mines in those days, nor was there anything in the country to tempt the most covetous. An empty treasury and two i6 THE GREAT BOER WAR II ,, ]'• j; 'I native wars were the reversion which we took over. It was honestly considered that the country was in too d's- tracted a state to govern itself, and had, by its weakness, become a scandal and a danger to its neighbors. There was nothing sordid in our action, though it may have been both injudicious and high-handed. In December 1880 the lioers rose. Every farmhouse sent out its riflemen, and the trysting-place was the outside of the nearest liritish fort. All through the country small detachments were surrounded and besieged by the farmers. Standerton, Pretoria, Potchefstroom, Lydenburg, Wakker- stroom, Rustenberg, and Marabastad were all invested and all held out until the end of the war. In the open country we were less fortunate. At Pronkhorst Spruit a small British force was taken by surprise and shot down without harm to their antagonists. The surgeon who treated them has left it on record that the average number of wounds was five per man. At Laing's Nek an inferior force of British endeavored to rush a hill which was held by Boer riflemen. Half of our men were killed and wounded. Ingogo may be called a drawn battle, though our loss was more heavy than that of the enemy. Finally came the defeat of Majuba Hill, where four hundred infantry upon a mountain were defeated and driven off by a swarm of sharpshooters who advanced under the cover of bowlders. Of all these actions there was not one which was more than a skirmish, and had they been followed by a final British victory they would now be hardly remembered. It is the fact that they were skirmishes which succeeded in their object which has given them an importance which is exaggerated. At the same time they may mark the beginning of a new military era, for they drove home the fact — only too badly learned by us — that it is the rifle and not the drill which makes e the soldier. It is bewildering that after such an experi- ence the British military authorities continued to serve out only three hundred cartridges a year for rifle prac- tice, and that they still encouraged that mechanical volley firing which destroys all individual aim. With the ex- THE BOER NATIONS 17 perience of the first Boer war behind them, little was done, either in tactics or in musketry, to prepare the soldier for the second. The value of the mounted rifle- man, the shooting with accuracy at unknown ranges, the art of taking cover— all were equally neglected. The defeat at Majuba Hill was followed by the com- plete surrender of the Gladstonian Government, an act which was either the most pusillanimous or the most magnanimous in recent history. It is hard for the big man to draw away from the small before blows are struck, but when the big man has been knocked down three times it is harder still. An overwhelming British force was in the field, and the General declared that he held the enemy in the hollow of his ho'^d. Our military cal- culations have been falsified before now. by these farmers, and it may be that the task of Wood and Roberts would have been harder than they imagined; but on paper, at least, it looked aj if the enemy could be crushed without difficulty. So the public thought, and yet they consented to the upraised sword being stayed. With them, as apart from the politicians, the motive was undoubtedly a moral and Christian one. They considered that the annexation of the Transvaal had evidently been an in- justice, that the farmers had a right to the freedom for which they fought, and that it was an unworthy thing for a great nation to continue an unjust war for the sake of a military revenge. It was the height of idealism, and the result has not been such as to encourage its repetition. An armistice was concluded upon March 5, 188 1, which led up to a peace upon the 23d of the same month. The Government, after yielding to force what it had repeatedly refused to friendly representations, made a clumsy compromise in their settlement. A policy of idealism and Christian morality should have been thorough if it were to be tried at all. It was obvious that if the annexation were unjust, then the Transvaal should have reverted to the condition in which it was before the annexation, as defined by the Sand River Convention. But the Government for some reason would not go so far f8 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR as this. They niggled, and quibbled, and bargained until the state was left as a curious hybrid thing such as the world has never seen. It was a republic which was part of the system of a monarchy, dealt with by the Colonial Office, and included under the heading of the " Colonies " in the news columns of the Times. It was autonomous, and yet subject to some vague suzerainty, the limits of which no one has ever been able to define. Altogether, in its provisions and in its omissions, the Convention of Tretoria appears to prove that our political affairs were as badly conducted as our military in this unfortunate year of 1881. It was evident from the first that so illogical and con- tentious an agreement could not possibly prove to be a final settlement, and indeed the ink of the signatures was hardly dry before an agitation was on foot for its re- vision. The lioers considered, and with justice, that if they were to be left as undisputed victors in the war then they should have the full fruits of victory. On the other hand, the P'nglish-speaking colonies had their allegiance tested to the uttermost. The proud Anglo-Celtic stock is not accustomed to be humbled, and yet they found them- selves through the action of the home Government con- verted into members of a beaten race. It was very well for the citizen of London to console his wounded pride by the thought that he had done a magnanimous action, but it was different with the British colonist of Durbar or Cape Town, who by no act of his own, and without any voice in the settlement, found himself humiliated before his Dutch neighbor. An ugly feeling of resentment was left behind, which might perhaps have passed away had the Transvaal accepted the settlement in the spirit in which it was meant, but which grew more and more dangerous as during eighteen years our people saw, or thought that they saw, that one concession led always to a fresh demand, and that the Dutch republics aimed not merely at equality, but at dominance in South Africa. Professor Eryce, a friendly critic, after a personal exam- ination of the country and the question, has left it upon i\^ ~4 THE BOER NATIONS ^'J iw, or iiys to Id not rica. ixam- upon ^ record that the Boers saw neither generosity nor humanity in our conduct, but only fear. An outspoken race, they conveyed their feelings to their neighbors. Can it be wondered at that South Africa has been in a ferment ever since, and that the British Africander has yearned with an intensity of feeling unknown in England for the hour of revenge? The Government of the Transvaal after the war was left in the hands of a triumvirate, but after one year Kruger became President, an office which he continued to hold for eighteen years. His career as ruler vindicates the wisdom of that wise but unwritten provision of the American Constitution by which there is a limit to the tenure of this office. Continued rule for half a generation must turn a man into an autocrat. The old president has said himself, in his homely but shrewd way, that when one gets a good ox to lead the team it is a pity to change him. If a good ox, however, is left to choose his own direction without guidance, he may draw his wagon into trouble. During three years the little State showed signs of a tumultuous activity. Considering that it was as large as France and that the population could not have been more than 50,000, one would have thought that they might have found room without any inconvenient crowding. But the burghers passed beyond their borders in every direction. The president cried aloud that he had been shut up in n kraal, and he proceeded to find ways out of it. A great trek was projected for the north, but fortunately it miscarried. To the east they raided Zulu- land, and succeeded, in defiance of the British settlement of that country, in tearing away one-third of it and adding it to the Transvaal. To the west, with no regard to the three-year-old treaty, they invaded Bechuanaland, and set up the two new republics of Goshen and Stella- land. So outrageous were these proceedings that Great Britain was forced to fit out in 1884 a new expedition under Sir Charles Warren for the purpose of turning these freebooters out of the country. It may be asked 20 'Jill-: ciRi'.AT boi:r war li i I Why should these men be called freebooters if the founders of Rhodesiii were pioneers? The answer is that the Transvaal was limited by treaty to certain bound- aries which these nun trans the place of the first. The point is so technical that it appears to be eniinently one of those questions which might with propriety be sub- mitted to the decision of a board of foreign jurists — or possibly to the Supreme Court of the United States. If the decision were given against Great JJritain, we might accept it in a chastened spirit as a fitting punishment for the carelessness of the representative who failed to make our meaning intelligible. Carlyle has said that a politi- cal mistake always ends in a broken head for somebody. Unfortunately the somebody is usually somebody else. We have read the story of the political mistakes. Only too soon we shall come to the broken heads. This, then, is a synopsis of what had occurred up to the signing of the Convention, which finally established, or failed to establish, the position of the South African Republic. We must now leave the larger questions, and descend to the internal affairs of that small State, and especially to that train of events which has stirred the mind of our people more than anything since the Indian Mutiny, and humiliated our arms as they have not been humiliated in this century. i Chapter Two THE CAUSE OF QUARREL There might almost seem to be some subtle connection between the barrenness and worthlessness of a surface and the value of the minerals which lie beneath it. The craggy mountains of Western America, the arid plains of West Australia, the ice-bound gorges of the Klondike, and the bare slopes of the Witwatersrand veldt — these are the lids which cover the great treasure chests of the world. Gold had been known to exist in the Transvaal before, but it was only in 1886 that it was realized that the de- posits which lie some thirty miles south of the capital are of a very extraordinary and valuable nature. The proportion of gold in the quartz is not particularly high, nor are the veins of a remarkable thickness, but the peculiarity of the Rand mines lies in the fact that throughout this* banket' formation the metal is so uni- formly distributed that the enterprise can claim a certainty which is not usually associated with the industry. It is quarrying rather than mining. Add to this that the reefs which were originally worked as outcrops have now been traced to enormous depths, and present the same features as those at the surface. A conservative estimate of the value of the gold has placed it at seven hundred millions of pounds. Such a discovery produced the inevitable effect. A great number of adventurers flocked into the country, some desirable and some very much the reverse. There wepj circumstances, however, which kept away the rowdy and desperado element who usually make for a newly opened gold field. It was not a class of mining which A \ ^ ve he ve ren A tre THK CAUSK OF QUARK I,!. 21 encouraged the individual adventurer. There were none of those nuggets which gleamed through the mud of the dollies at Ballarat, or recompensed the forty-»^iners in California for all their trc.vels and their toils. It was a field for elaborate machinery, which could only be pro- vided by capital. Managers, engineers, miners, techni- cal experts, and the tradesmen and middlemen who live upon them, these were the Uitlanders, drawn from all the races under the sun, but with the Anglo-Celtic vastly predominant. The best engineers were American, the best miners were Cornish, the best managers were Kng- lish, the money to run the mines was largely subscribed in England. As time went on, however, the German and French interests became more extensive, until their joint holdings are now probably as heavy as those of the British. Soon the population of the mining centres be- came greater than that of the whole Boer community, and consisted mainly of men in the prime of life — men, too, of exceptional intelligence and energy. The situation was an extraordinary one. I have already attempted to bring the problem home to an American by suggesting that the Dutch of New York had trekked wesl and founded an anti- American and highly uii progressive State. To carry out the analogy we will now suppose that that State was California, that the gold of that State attracted a large inrush of American citizens, who came to outnumber the original inhabitants, that these citizens were heavily taxed and badly used, and that they deaf- ened Washington with their outcry about their injuries. That wouK? be a fair parallel to the relations between the Transvaal, the Uitlanders, and the liritish Govern- ment. That these Uitlanders had very real and pressing grievances no one could possibly deny. To recount ihtm all would be a formidable task, for their whole lives were darkened by injustice. There was not a wrong which had driven the Boer from ('ape Colony which he di(.l not now practise himself upon others and a wrong may be excusable in 1835 which is monstrous in 1895. 24 THE GREAT BOER WAR The primitive virtue which had characterized the farmers broke down in the face of temptation. The country Boers were little affected, some of them not at all, but the Pretoria Government became a most corrupt oligarchy, venal and incompetent to the last degree. Officials and imported Hollanders handled the stream of gold which came in from the mines, while the unfortunate Uitlander who paid nine-tenths of the taxation was fleeced at every turn, and met with laughter and taunts when he en- deavored to win the franchise by which he might peace- ably set right the wrongs from which he suffered. He was not an unreasonable person. On the contrary, he was patient to the verge of meekness, as capital is likely to be when it is surrounded by rifles. But his situation was intolerable, and after successive attempts at peace- ful agitation, and numerous humble petitions to the Volksraad, he began at last to realize that he would never obtain redress unless he could find some way of winning it for himself. Without attempting to enumerate all the wrongs which embittered the Uitlanders, the more serious of them may be summed up in this way: 1. That they were heavily taxed and provided about seven-eighths of the revenue of the country. The revenue of the South African Republic — which had been 154,000/. in 1886, when the gold fields were opened — had grown in 1899 to four million pounds, and the country through the industry of the newcomers had changed from one of the poorest to the richest in the whole world (per head of population). 2. That in spite of this prosperity which they had brought, they, the majority of the inhabitants of the country, were left without a vote, and could by no meani> influence the disposal of the great sums which they were providing. Such a case of taxation without representa- tion has never been known. 3. That they had no voice in the choice or payment of officials. Men of the worst private character might be placed with complete authority over valuable interests. 'A \ THE CAUSE OF QUARREL 25 Upon one occasion the Minister of Mines attempted him- self to jump a mine, having officially learned some flaw in its title. The total official salaries had risen in 1899 to a sum sufficient to pay 40/. per head to the entire male Boer population. 4. That they had no control over education. Mr. John Robinson, the Director General of the Johannesburg Edu- cational Council, has reckoned the sum spent on Uit- lander schools as 650/. out of 63,000/. allotted for educa- tion, making one shilling and tenpence per head per annum on Uitlander children, and eight pounds six shil- lings per head on Boer children — the Uitlander, as al- ways, paying seven-eighths of the original sum. 5. No power of municipal government. Watercarts instead of pipes, filthy buckets instead of drains, a cor- rupt and violent police, a high death rate in what should be a health resort — all this in a city which they had built themselves. 6. Despotic government in the matter of the press and of the right of public meeting. 7. Disability from service upon a jury. 8. Continual harassing of the mining interest by vexa- tious legislation. Under this head come many griev- ances, some special to the mines and some affecting all Uitlanders. The dynamite monopoly, by which the miners had to pay 600,000/. extra per annum in order to get a worse quality of dynamite; the liquor laws by which one-third of the Kaffirs were allowed to be habitu- ally drunk; the incompetence and extortions of the State- owned railway ; the granting of concessions for numerous articles of ordinary consumption to individuals, by which high prices were maintained; the surrounding of Johan- nesburg by tolls from which the town had no profit — these were among the economical grievances, some large, some petty, which ramified through every transaction of life. And outside and beyond all these definite wrongs, imagine to a free-bcrn progressive man, an American or a Briton, the constant irritation of being absolutely ruled I' ! 26 THK GRKAT BOI.R WAR I , !• by a body of twenty-five men, twenty-one of whom had in the case of the Selati Railway Company been publicly and circumstantially accused of bribery, with full details of the bribes received, while lO their corruption they added such crass ignorance that they argue in the pub- lished reports of the Volksraad debates that using dyna- mite bombs to bring down rain was firing at God, that it is impious to destroy locusts, that the word "participate" should not be used because it is not in the Bible, and that postal pillar boxes are extravagant and effeminate. Such obiter dicta may be amusing at a distance, but they are less entertaining when they come from an autocrat who has complete power over the conditions of your life. From the fact that they were a community extremely preoccupied by their own business, it followed that the Uitlanders were not ardent politicians, and that they de- sired to have a share in the government of the State for the purpose of making the conditions of their own in- dustry and of their own daily lives more endurable. How far there was need of such an interference may be judged by any fair-minded man who reads Hie list of their com- plaints. A superficial view may recognize the Boers as the champions of liberty, but a deeper insight must see that they (as represented by their elected rulers) have in truth stood for all that history has shown to be odious in the form of exclusiveness and oppression. Their con- ception of liberty has been a selfish one, and they have consistently inflicted upon others far heavier wrongs than those against which they had themselves rebelled. As the mines increased in importance and the miners in numbers, it was found that these political disabilities alTected some of that cosmopolitan crowd far more than other >, in proportion to the amount of freedom to which their home institutions had made them accustomed. The continental Uitlanders were more patient of that which was unendurable to the American and the Briton. The Americans,.however. were in so great a minority that it was upon the British that the brunt of the struggle for freedom fell. Apart from the fact that the British were \ \ \\ fS ts in Ih le h e t THE CAUSK OF QUARRF-L 27 more numerous than all the other Uitlanders combined, there were special reasons why they should feel their humiliating position more than the members of any other race. In ♦ihe first place, many of the British were British South Africans, who knew that in the neighboring countries which gave them birth the most liberal possible institutions had been given to the kinsmen of these very Boers who were refusing them the management of their own drains and water supply. And again, every Briton knew that Great Britain claimed to be the paramount power in South Africa, and so he felt as if his own land, to which he might have looked for protection, was con- niving at and acquiescing in his ill treatment. As citizens of the paramount power, it was peculiarly galling that they should be held in political subjection. The British, therefore, were the most persistent and energetic of the agitators. But it is a poor cause which cannot bear to fairly state and honestly consider the case of its opponents. The Boers had made, as has been briefly shown, great efforts to establish a country of their own. They had travelled far, worked hard, and fought bravely. After all their efforts they were ^ated to see an influ.v of strafj^ers into their country, some of them men of questionable char- acter, who outnumbered the original inhaliitants. If the franchise were granted to these, there could be no doubt that though at first the Boers might control a majority of the votes, it was only a question of time before the new- comers would dominate the Raad and elect their own president, who might adopt a policy adhorrent to the original owners of the land. Were the Boers to lose by the ballot box the victory which they had won by their rifles? Was it fair to expect it? These new-comers came for gold. They got their gold. Their companies paid a hundred per cent. Was not that enough to satisfy them? If they did not like the country why did they not leave it? No one compelled them to st ly there. But if they stayed, let them be thankful that they were toler- ated at all, and not presume to interfere with the laws I,: f fr 28 THE GREAT BOER WAR IH H U, M' of those by whose courtesy they were allowed to enter the country. That is a fair statement of the ]joer position, and at first sight an impartial man might say that there was a good deal to say for it; but a closer examination would show that, though it might be tenable in theory, it is un- just and impossible in practice. In the present crowded state of the world a policy of Thibet may be carried out in some obscure corner, but it cannot be done in a great tract of country which lies right across the main line of industrial progress. The position is too absolutely artificial. A handful of people by the right of conquest take possession of an enormous country over which they are dotted at such intervals that it is their boast that one farmhouse cannot see the smoke of another, and yet though their numbers are so dispropor- tionate to the area which they cover, they refuse to admit any other people upon equal terms, but claim to be a privi- leged class who shall dominate the new-comers completely. They are outnumbered in their own land by immigrants who are far more highly educated and progressive, and yet they hold them down in a way which exists nowhere else upon earth. What is their right? The right of con- quest. Then the same right may be justly invoked to reverse so intolerable a situation. This they would themselves acknowledge. " Come on and fight! Come on ! " cried a member of the Volksraad when the fran- chise petition of the Uitlanders was presented. " Vrotest! Protest! What is the good of protesting? " said Kruger to Mr. W. Y. Campbell ; " you have not got the guns, I have." There was always the final court of appeal. Judge Creusot and Judge Mauser were always behind the President. Again, the argument of the Boers would be more valid had they received no benefit from theie immigrants. If they had ignored them they might fairly have stated that they did not desire their presence. But even while they protested they grew rich at the Uitlander's expense. They could not have it both ways. It would be consis- THE CAUSE OF QUARREL 29 tent to discourage him and not profit by him, or to make him comfortable and build the State upon his money; but to ill-treat him and at the same time to grow strong by his taxation must sur-^ly be an injustice. And again, the whole argument is based upon the narrow racial supposition that every naturalized citizen not of Boer extraction must necessarily be unpatriotic. This is not borne out by the examples of history. The new-comer soon becomes as proud of his country and as jealous of her liberty as the old. Had President Kruger given the franchise generously to the Uitlander, his pyramid would have been firm upon its base and not bal- anced upon its apex. It is true that the corrupt oligarchy would have vanished, and the spirit of a broader, more tolerant freedom infiuenced the counsels of the State. But the republic would have become stronger and more permanent, with a population who, if they differed in de- tails, were united in essentials. Whether such a solution would have been to the advantage of British interests in South Africa is quite another question. In more ways than one President Kruger has been a good friend to the empire. So much upon the general question of the reason why the Uitlander should agitate and why the Boer was ob- durate. The details of the long struggle between the seekers for the franchise and the refusers of it may be quickly sketched, but they cannot be entirely ignored by any one who desires to understand the inception of that great contest which was the outcome of the dispute. At the time of the Convention of Pretoria (1881) the rights of burghership might be obtained by one year's residence. In 1882 it was raised to five years, the reasonable limit which obtains both in Great Britain and in the United States. Had it remained so, it is safe to say that there would never have been either an Uitlander question or a great Boer war. Grievances would have been righted from the inside without external interfer- ence. In 1890 the inrush of outsiders alarmed the Boers, and 'i\ ^1 30 THK GREAT BOER WAR the franchise was raised so as to be only attainable by those who had lived fourteen years in the country. The Uitlanders, who were increasing rapidly in numbers and were suffering from the formidable list of grievances al- ready enumerated, perceived that their wrongs were so numerous that it was hopeless to have them set right seriatim, and that only by obtaining the leverage of the franchise could they hope to move the heavy burden wl-ich weighed them down. In 1893 a petition of 13,000 Uitlanders, couched in most respectful terms, was sub- mitted to the Raad, but met with contemptuous neglect. Undeterred, however, by this failure the National Re- form Union, an association which organized the agitation, came back to the attack in 1894. They drew up a petition which was signed by 35,000 adult male Uit- landers, a greater number than the total Boer male popu- lation of the country. A small liberal body in the Raad supported this memorial and endeavored in vain to obtain some justice for the new-comers. Mr. Jeppe was the mouthpiece of this select band. "They own half the soil, they pay at least three quarters of the taxes," said he. "They are men who in capital, energy, and educa- tion are at least our equals. What will become of us or our children on that day when we may find ourselves in a minority of one in twenty without a single friend among the other nineteen, among those who will then tell us that they wished to be brothers, but that we by our own act have made them strangers to the republic?" Such reasonable and liberal sentiments were combated by members who asserted that the signatures could not be- long to law-abiding citizens since they were actually ag'tating against the law of the franchise, and others whose intolerance was expressed by the defiance of the member already quoted, who challenged the Uitlanders to come out and fight. The champions of exclusiveness and racial hatred won the day. The memorial was re- jected by sixteen votes to eight, and the franchise law was, on the initiative of the president, actually made more stringent than ever, being framed in such a way I s je s Is THE CAUSE OF QUARREL 31 that during the fourteen years of probation, the applicant should give up his previous nationality, so that for that period he would really belong to no country at all. No hopes were held out that any possible attitude upon the part of the Uitlanders would soften the determination of the president and his burghers. One who remonstrated was led outside the State buildings by the President, who pointed up at the national flag, "You see that flag?" said he. " If I grant the franchise, I may as well pull it down." His animosity against the immigrants was bitter. " Burghers, friends, thieves, murderers, new- comers, and others," is the conciliatory opening of one of his public addresses. Though Johannesburg is only thirty-two miles from Pretoria, and though the State of which he was the head depended for its revenue upon the gold fields, he paid it only three visits in nine years. This settled animosity was deplorable, but not un- natural. A man imbued with the idea of a chosen people, and unread in any book save the one which culti- vates this very idea, could not be expected to have learned the historical lessons of the advantages which a state reaps from a liberal policy. To him it was as if the Ammonites and Moabites had demanded admission into the twelve tribes. He mistook an agitation against the exclusive policy of the State for one against the ex- istence of the State itself. A wide franchise would have made his republic firm-based and permanent. It was a small minority of the Uitlanders who had any desire to come into the British system. They were a cosmopolitan crowd only united by the bond of a common injustice. But when every other method had failed, and their petition for the rights of freemen had been flung back at them, it was natural that their eyes should turn to that flag which waved to the north, the west, and the south of them — the flag which means purity of government with equal rights and equal duties for all men. Constitu- tional agitation was laid aside, arms were smuggled in, and everything prepared for an organized rising. The events which followed at the beginning of 1896 -1' 32 THE GREAT BOER WAR have been so thrashed out that there is, perhaps, nothing left to tell — except the truth. So far as the Uitlanders themselves are concerned, their action was most natural and justifiable, and they have no reason to exculpate themselves for rising against such oppression as no men of our race have ever been submitted to. Had they trusted only to themselves and the justice of their cause, their moral and even their material position would have been infinitely stronger. But unfortunately there were forces behind them which were more questionable, the nature and extent of which have never yet, in spite of two commissions of investigation, been properly re- vealed. That there should have been any attempt at misleading inquiry, or suppressing documents in order to shelter individuals, is deplorable, for the impression left — I believe an entirely false one — must be that the British Government connived at an expedition which was as immoral as it was disastrous. It had been arranged that the town was to rise upon a certain night, that Pretoria should be attacked, the fort seized, and the rifles and ammunition used to arm the Uitlanders. It was a feasible device, though it must seem to us, who have had such an experience of the military virtues of the burghers, a very desperate one. But it is conceivable that the rebels might have held Johannesburg until the universal sympathy which their cause excited throughout South Africa would have caused Great Britain to intervene. Unfortunately they had complicated matters by asking for outside help. Mr. Cecil Rhodes was Premier of the Cape, a man of im- mense energy, and one who had rendered great services to the empire. The motives of his action are obscure — certainly, we may say that they were not sordid, for he has always been a man whose thoughts were large and whose habits were simple. But whatever they may have been — whether an ill-regulated desire to consolidate South Africa under British rule, or a burning sympathy with the Uitlanders in their fight against injustice — it is certain that he allowed his lieutenant, Dr. Jameson, to A THR CAUSE OF QUARREL :^:i assemble the iiKHinted police of the Chartered Company, of which Rhodes was founder and director, for the pur- pose of co-operating with the rebels at Johannesburg. Moreover, when the revolt at Johannesburg was post- poned, on account of a disagreement as to which Hag they were to rise under, it appears that Jameson (with or with- out the orders of Rhodes) forced the hand of the con- spirators by invading the country with a force absurdly inadequate to the work which he had taken in hand. Five hundred policemen and three field guns made up the forlorn hope who started from near Mafeking and crossed the Transvaal border upon December 29, 1895. On Januo y 2d they were surrounded by the Boers amid the broken country near Dornkop, and after losing many of their number killed and wounded, without food and with spent horses, they were compelled to lay down their arms. Six burghers lost their lives in the skirmish. The Uitlanders have been severely criticised for not having sent out a force to help Jameson in his difficulties, but it is impossible to see how they could have acted in any other manner. They had done all they could to pre- vent Jameson coming to their relief, and now it was rather unreasonable to suppose that they should relieve their reliever. Indeed, they had an entirely exaggerated idea of the strength of the force which he was bringing, and received the news of his capture with incredulity. When it became confirmed they rose, but in a half- hearted fashion which was not due to want of courage, but to the difficulties of their position. On the one hand, the British Government disowned Jameson entirely, and did all it could to discourage the rising; on the other, the President had tlie raiders in his keeping at Pretoria, and let it be understood that their fate depended upon the behavior of the Uitlanders. They were led to believe that Jameson would be shot unless they laid down their arms, though, as a matter of fact, Jameson and his people had surrendered upon a promise of quarter. So skilfully did Kruger use his hostages that he succeeded, with the help of the British Commissioner, in getting the thousands 3 34 THE GREAT BOER WAR of excited Johannesburgers to lay down their arms with- out bloodshed. Completely out-inaiUL'Uvred by the astute old President, the leaders of the reform movement used all their influence in the direction of peace, thinking that a general amnesty would follow; but the moment that they and their people were helpless the detectives and armed burghers occupied the town, and sixty of their number were hurried to Pretoria jail. To the raiders themselves the President behaved with great generosity. Perhaps he could not find it in his heart to be harsh to the men who had managed to put him in the right and won for him the sympathy of the world. His own illiberal and oppressive treatment of the new-comers was forgotten in the face of this illegal inroad of filibusters. The true issues were so obscured by this intrusion that it has taken years to clear them, and perhaps they will never be wholly cleared. It was forgotten that it was the bad government of the country which was the real cause of the unfortunate raid. From then onwards the government might grow worse and worse, but it was always possible to point to the raid as justifying everything. Were the Uitlanders to have the franchise? How could they expect it after ' raid? Would Britain object to the enormous impo n of arms and obvious preparations for war? They were only precautions against a second raid. For years the raid stood in the Vv'ay, not only of all progress, but of all re- monstrance. Through an action over which they had no control, and which they had done their best to prevent, the British Government was left with a bad case and a weak- ened moral authority. The raiders were sent home, where the rank and file were very properly released, and the chief officers were condemned to terms of imprisonment which certainly did not err upon the side of severity. Cecil Rhodes was left unpunished, he retained his place in the Privy Council, and his Chartered Company continued to have a corporate existence. This was illogical and incon- clusive. As Kruger said, " It is not the dog which j THE CAUSK OF QUARRKL 35 lie ;re lid [as vy Ive j)n- Ich should be beaten, bul the man who set him on to me." Public opinion — in spite of, or on account of, a crowd of witnesses — was ill informed upon the exact bearings of the ([uestion, and it was obvious that as Dutch sentiment at the Cape ajipuared already to be thoroughly hostile to us, it would be dangerous to alienate the IJritish Afri- canders also by making a martyr of their favorite leader. Hut whatever arguments may be founded upon expediency, it is clear tl.at the IJoers bitterly resented, and with justice, the inimunity of Rhodes. That great man has done good service to the Queen both before and since, but it must be a jirejudiced admirer who will not ac- knowledge that our position in Africa would in some respects have been stronger had he never devoted his energy to imperial politics. In the mean time, both President Kruger and his burghers had shown a greater severity to the political prisoners from Johannesburg than to the armed followers of Jameson. The nationality of these prisoners is in- teresting and suggestive. There were twenty-three Kng- lishmen, sixteen Soutu Africans, nine Scotchmen, six Americans, two Welshmen, one Irishman, one Australian, one Hollander, one Bavarian, one Canadian, one Swiss, and one Turk. The prisoners were arrested in January, but the trial did not take place until the end of April. All were found guilty of high treason. Mr. Lionel Phillips, Colonel Rhodes (brother of Mr. Cecil Rhodes), George Farrar, and Mr. Hammond, the American en- gineer, were condemned to death, a sentence which was afterward commuted to the payment of an enormous fine. The other prisoners were condemned to two years' im- prisonment, with a fine of 2,000/. each. The imprison- ment was of the most arduous and trying sort, and was embittered by the harshness of the jailer, Du Plessis. One of the unfortunate men cut his throat, and several fell seriously ill, the diet and the sanitary conditions be- ing equally unhealthy. At last at the end of May all the prisoners but six were released. Four of the six soon followed, two stalwarts, Sampson and Davies, refusing to 36 THE GRKAT BOFR WAR li II sign any petition and remaining in prison until they were set free in 1897. Altogether the Transvaal Government recei\ ed in fines from the reform prisoners the enormous sum of 212,000/. A certain comic relief was immedi- ately afterward given to so grave an episode by the pres- entation of a bill to Great J5ritain for 1,677,938/. 3^. 3//. — the greater part of which was under the heading of moral and intellectual damage. It is to be feared that even the ^s. 3^/. remain still unpaid. The r-'id was past and the reform movement was past, but the causes which produced them both remained. It is hare'" conceivable that a statesman who loved his country would have refrained from making some effort to remove a state of things which had already caused such grave dangers, and which must obviously become more serious with every year that passed. But Paul Krugerhad hardened his heart, and was not to be moved. The grievances of the Uitlanders became heavier than ever. The one po\^er in the land to which they had been able to appeal for some sort of redress amid their grie - ances was the law courts. Now it was decreed that the courts should be dependent on the Volksraad. The chief justice protested against such a degradation of his high office, and he was dismissed in consequence without a pension. The judge who had condemned the reformers was chosen to fill the vacancy, and the protection of a fixed law was withdrawn from the Uitlanders. A commission appointed by the State was sent to ex- amine into the condition of the mining industry and the grievances from which the new-comers suffered. The chairman was Mr. Schalk Burger, one of the most liberal of the Boers, and the proceedings were thorough and im- partial. The result was a report which amply vindicated the reformers, and suggested remedies which would have gone a long way toward satisfying the Uitlanders. With such enlightened legislation their motives for seeking the franchise would have been less pressing. But the President and his Raad would have none of the recom- mendations of the commission. The rugged old autocrat \ THE CAUSE OF QUARREL 37 declared that Schalk Burger was a traitor to his coup fry for having signed such a document, and a new reactioh- ary connnittee was chosen to report upon the report. Words and papers were the only outcome of the affair. No amelioration came to the new-comers. But at least they had again put their case publicly upon record, and it had been endorsed by the most respected of the burgh- ers. Gradually in the press of the Knglisli-speaking countries the raid was ceasing to obscure the issue. More and more clearly it was coming out that no perma- nent settlement was possible where the majority of the population was oppressed by the minority. They had t: ied peaceful means and failed. They had tried warlike means and failed. What was there left for them to do? rheir own country, the paramount power of South Africa, had never helped them. Perhaps if it were directly appealed to it might do so. It could not, if only for the snke of its own imperial prestige, leave its children for- ever in a state of subjection. The L'itlanders determined upon a petition to the Queen, and in doing so they brought their grievances out of the limits of a local con- troversy into the broader field of international politics. Great Britain must either protect them or acknowledge that their protection was beyond her power. A direct petition to the Queen praying for protection was signed in April 1899 by twenty-one thousand Uitlanders. From that time events moved inevitably toward the one end. Sometimes the surface was troubled and sometimes smooth, but the stream always ran swiftly and the roar of the fall sounded ever louder in the ear;>. { ird — prosaic travellers all, with rug and handbag, but never in picturesque days of old did a more knightly company ride in the forefront of England's battle. On August 15th, at a time when the negotiations had already assumed a very serious phase, after the failure of the Ploemfontein conference and the despatch of Sir Alfred Milner, the British forces in South Africa were absolutely and absurdly inadequate for the purpose of the defence of our own frontier. Surely such a fact must open the eyes of those who, in spite of all the evidence, persist that the war was forced on by the British. A statesman who fc^es on a war usually prepares for a war, and this is exactly what Mr. Ivruger did do and the British authorities did not. The overbearing suzerain power had at that date, scattered over a huge frontier, two cavalry regiments, three field batteries, and six and a half infantry battalions — say six thousand men. The innocent pastoral States could put in the field forty or fifty thousand mounted riHemen, whose mobility doubled their numbers, and a most excellent artillery, including the heaviest guns which have ever been seen upon a battlefield. At this time it is most certain that the Boers could have made their way easily either to Durban or to Cape Town. The British force, condemned to act upon the defensive, could have been masked and afterward destroyed, while the main body of the invaders would have encountered nothing but an irregular local resistance, which would have been neutralized by the apathy or hostility of the ")utch colonists. It is extraordinary that our authorities seem never to have contemplated the pos- sibility of the Boers taking the initiative, or to have understood that in that case our belated reinforcements would certainly have had to land under the fire of the re- publican guns. In July Natal had taken alarm, and a strong repre- 52 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR sentation had been sent from the prime n>inister of the colony to the Governor, Sir W. Hely Hutchinson, and so to the Colonial Office. It was notorious that the Transvaal was armed to the teeth, that the Orange Free State was likely to join her, and that there had been strong attempts made, both privately and through the press, to alienate the loyalty of the Dutch citizens of both the British col- onies. Many sinister signs were observed by those upon the spot. The veldt had been burned unusually early to ensure a speedy grass-crop after the first rains, there had been a collecting of horses, a distribution of rifles and ammunition. The Free State farmers, who graze their sheep and cattle upon Natal soil during the winter, had driven them off to places of safety behind the line of the Drakensberg. Everything pointed to approaching war, and Natal refused to be satisfied even by the despatch of another regiment. On September 6th a second message was received at the Colonial Office, which states the case with great clearness and precision. "The prime minister desires me to urge upon you by the unanimous advice of the Ministers that sufficient troops should be despatched to Natal immediately to en- able the colony to be placed in a state of defence against an attack from the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. I am informed by the General Officer Commanding, Natal, that he will not have enough troops, even when the Manchester Regiment arrives, to do more than occupy Newcastle and at the same time protect the colony south of it from raids, while Laing's Nek, Ingogo River, und Zululand must be left undefended. My Ministers know that every preparation has been made, both in the Trans- vaal and the Orange Free State, which would enable an attack to be made on Natal at short notice. My Min- isters believe that the Boers have made up their minds that war will take place almost certainly, and their best chance will be, when it seems unavoidable, to deliver a blow before reinforcements have time to arrive. Infor- mation has been received that raids in force will be made by way of Middle Drift and Grey town and by way of THE EVE OF WAR 53 Bond's Drift and Stangar, with a view to striking the rail- way between Pietermaritzburg and Durban and cutting off communications of troops and supplies. Nearly all the Orange Free State farmers in the Klip River Divi- sion, who stay in the colony usually till October at least, have trekked, at great loss to themselves; their sheep are lambing on the road, and the lambs die or are destroyed. Two at least of the Entonjanani district farmers have trekked with all their belongings into the Transvaal, in the first case attempting to take as hostages the children of the natives on the farm. Reliable reports have been received of attempts to tamper with loyal natives, and to set tribe against tribe in order to create confusion and detail the defensive forces of the colony. Both food and warlike stores in large quantities have been accumulated at Volksrust, Vryheid, and Standerton. Persons who are believed to be spies have been seen examining the bridges on the Natal Railway, and it is known that there are spies in all the principal centres of the colony. In the opin- ion of ministers, such a catastrophe as the seizure of Laing's Nek and the destruction of the northern portion of the railway, or a successful raid or invasion such as they have reason to believe is contemplated, would pro- duce a most demoralizing effect on the natives and on the loyal Europeans in the colony, and would afford great encouragement to the Boers and to their sympathizers in the colonies, who, although armed and prepared, will probably keep quiet unless they receive some encourage- ment of the sort. They concur in the policy of her Majesty's Government of exhausting all peaceful means to obtii redress of the grievances of the Uitlanders and authoritatively assert the supremacy of Great Britain be- fore resorting to war; but they state that this is a ques- tion of defensive precaution, not of making war." In answer to these and other remonstrances the gar- rison of Natal was gradually increased, partly by troops from P^urope, and partly by the despatch of five thousand Jiritish troops from India. The Second Berkshires, the Royal Munster Fusiliers, the Manchesters, and the First 54 THK GRKAT BOI.R WAR i Dublin Fusiliers arrived in succession with reinforce- ments of artillery. The I'ifth Dragoon Guards, Ninth Lancers, and Nineteenth Hussars came fronj India, with the First Devonshires, First (iloucesters. Second King's Royal Rifles, and Second Gordon Mighlanders. These, with the Forty-second, Fifty-tirst, and Fifth-third batteries of Field Artillery, made up the Indian Contingent. Their arrival late in September raised the number of troops in South Africa to 22,000, a force which was inadequate to a contest in the open field with the numerous, mobile, and gallant enei .y to whom they were to be opposed, but which proved to be strong enough to stave off that over- whelming disaster whi' h, with our fuller knowledge, we can now see to have been impendin<^'. As to the disposition of these troops a difference of opinion broke out between the ruling powers in Natal and the military chiefs at the spot. Prince Kraft has said, " J)Oth strategy and tactics may have to yield to politics " ; but the political necessity should be very grave and very clear when it is the blood of soldiers which has to pay for it. Whether it arose from our defective intelligence, or from that caste feeling which makes it hard for the professional soldier to recognize (in spite of deplorable past experiences) a serious adversary in the mounted farmer, it is certain that even while our papers were pro- claiming that this time, at least, we would not underrate our enemy, we were most seriously underrating him. The northern third o^ Natal is as vulnerable a military position as a player of kriegspiel could wish to have sub- mitt«jd to him. It runs up into a thin angle, culminating at the apex in a difficult pass, the ill-omened Laing's Nek, dominated by the even more sinister bulk of Majuba, Fach side of this angle is open to invasion, the one from the Transvaal and the other from the Orange Free State. A force up at the apex is in a perfect trap, for the mobile enemy can flood into the country to the south of them, cut the line of supplies, and throw up a series of entrench- ments which would make retreat a very dif!icult matter. Farther down the country, at such positions as Lady- Till', KVK OK WAR 55 smith or Dundee, the danger, though not so imminent, is still an obvious one, unless the defending force is strong enough to hold its own in the open field and mobile enough to prevent a mounted enemy from getting round its flanks. To us, who are endowed with that i)rofound military wisdom which only comes with a knowledge of the event, it is obvious that with a defending force which could not place more than twelve tiiousand men in the lighting line, the true defensible frontier was the line of the Tugela. As a matter of fact, Ladysmith was chosen, a place almost indefensible itself, as it is dominated by high hills in at least two directions. Such an event as the siege of the town appears never to have been contem- plated, as no guns of position were asked for or sent. In spite of this, an amount of stores, which is said to have been valued at more than a million of pounds, was dumped down at this small railway junction, so that the position could not be evacuated without a crippling loss. The place was the point of bifurcation of the main line, which divides at this little town into one branch running to Harrismith in the Orange Free State, and the other lead- ing through the Dundee coal fields and Newcastle to the Laing's Nek tunnel and the Transvaal. An importance, which appears now to have been an exaggerated one, was attached by the Government of Natal to the possession of the coal fields, and it was at their strong suggestion, but with the concurrence of General Penn Symons, that the defending force was divided, and a detachment of be- tween three and four thousand sent to Dundee, about forty miles from the main body, which remained under General Sir George White at Ladysmith. General Sy- mons underrated the power of the invaders, but it is hard to criticise an error of judgment which has been so nobly atoned and so tragically paid for. At the time, then, which our political narrative has reached, the lime of suspense which followed the despatch of the cabinet message of September 8th, the military situation had ceased to be desperate but was still precarious. Twenty- two thousand regular troops were on the spot who might r fi 56 THE GREAT BOER WAR hope to be reinforced by some ten thousand colonials, but these forces had to cover a great frontier, the attitude of Cape Colony was by no means whole-hearted and might become hostile, while the black population might conceivably throw in its weight against us. Only half the regulars could be spared to defend Natal, and no re- inforcements could reach them in less than a month from the outbreak of hostilities. If Mr. Chamberlain was really playing a game of bluff, it must be confessed that he was bluffing from a very weak hand. For purposes of comparison we may give some idea of the forces which Mr. Kruger and Mr. Steyn could put in the field, for by this time it was evident that the Orange Free State, with which we had had no shadow of a dis- pute, was going, in a way which some would call wanton and some chivalrous, to throw in its weight against us. The general press estimate of the forces of the two re- publics varied from 25,000 to 35,000 men. Mr. J. B. Robinson, a personal friend of President Kruger's and a man who had spent much of his life among the Boers, considered the latter estimate to be too high. The calcu- lation had no assured basis to start from. A very scat- tered and isolated population, among whom large families were the rule, is a most difficult thing to estimate. Some reckoned from the supposed natural increase during eighteen years, but the figure given at that date was it- self an assumption. Others took their calculation from the number of voters in the last presidential election; but no one could tell how many abstentions there had been, and the fighting age is five years earlier than the voting age in the republics. We recognize now that all calculations were far below the true figure. It is prob- able, however, that the information of the British Intelli- gence Department was not far wrong. According to tliis the fighting strength of the Transvaal alone was 32,000 men, and of the Orange Free State 22,000. With mer- cenaries and rebels from the colonies they would amount to 60,000, while a considerable rising of the Cape Dutch would bring them up to 100,000. In artillery they were THE EVE OF WAR 57 known to have about a hundred guns, many of them (and the fact will need much explaining) more modern and powerful than any which we could bring against them. Of the quality of this large force there is no need to speak. The men were brave, hardy, and fired with a strange religious enthusiasm. They were all of the seven- teenth century, except their riHes. Mounted upon their hardy little ponies, they possessed a mobility which prac- tically doubled their numbers and made it an impossi- bility ever to outflank them. As marksmen they are su- preme. Add to this that they had the advantage of acting upon internal lines with shorter and safer com- munications, and one gathers how formidable a task lay before the soldiers of the empire. When we turn from such an enumeration of their strength to contemplate the 12,000 men, split into two detachments, who awaited them in Natal, we may recognize that, far from bewailing our disast 'rs, we should rather congratulate ourselves upon our escape from losing that great province which, situated as it is between Britain, India, and Australia, must be regarded as the very keystone of the imperial arch. At the risk of a tedious but very essential digression, something must be said here as to tiie motives with which the JJoers had for many years been quietly prepar- ing for war. That the Jameson raid was not the cause is certain, though it probably, by putting the Boer Govern- ment into a strong position, had a great effect in accel- erating matters. What had been done secretly and slowly could be done more swiftly and openly when so plausible an excuse ccJuld be given for it. As a mattei of fact, the preparations were long antecedent to the raid. The building of the forts at Pretoria and Johannesburg was begun nearly two years before that wretched incursion, and the importation of arms was going on apace. In that very year, 1895, a very considerable sum was spent in military equipment. But if it was not the raid, and if the Boers had no reason to fear the British Government, with whom the Transvaal might have been as friendly as the Orange 58 THE GREAT BOER WAR ' J Free State had been for forty years, why then should they arm? It was a difficult question, and one in answering which we find ourselves in a region of conjecture and suspicion rather than of ascertained fact. But the fairest and most unbiassed of historians must confess that there is a large body of evidence to show that into the heads of some of the Dutch leaders, both in the northern repub- lics and in the cape, there had entered the conception of a single Dutch commonwealtli, extending from Cape Town to the Zambesi, in which flag, speech, and law should all be Dutch. It is in this aspiration that many shrewd and well-informed judges see the true inner mean- ing of this persistent arming, of the constant hostility, of the forming of ties between the two republics (one of whom had been reconstituted and made a sovereign inde- pendent State by our own act), and finally of that intrigu- ing which endeavored to poison the affection and al- legiance of our own Dutch colonists, who had no political grievances whatever. They all aimed at one end, and that end was the final expulsion of British power from South Africa and the formation of a single great Dutch republic. The large sum spent by the Transvaal in secret service money — a larger sum, I believe, than that which is spent by the whole British Empire — would give some idea of the subterranean influences at work. An army of emissaries, agents, and spies, whatever their mission, were certainly spread over the British colonies. Newspapers were subsidized also, and considerable sums spent upon the press in France and Germany. In the very nature of things a huge conspiracy of this sort to substitute Dutch for British rule in South Africa is not a matter which can be easily and definitely proved. Such questions are not discussed in public documents, and men are sounded before being taken into the confi- dence of the conspirators. But there is plenty of evidence of the individual ambition of prominent and representa- tive men in this direction, and it is hard to believe that what many wanted individually was not striven for collec- tively, especially when we see how the course of events THK KVK OF WAR 59 [ did actually work toward the end which they indicated. Mr. J. P. FitzPatrick, in "The Transvaal from Within" — a book to which all subsequent writers upon the sub- ject must acknowledge their obligations — narrates how in 1896 he was approached by Mr. I). P. Graaff, formerly a member of the Cape Legislative Council and a very prominent Africander Pondsman, with the proposition that Great Britain should be pushed out of South Africa. The same politician made the same jjroposal to Mr. Jleit. Compare with this the following statement of Mr. Theo- dore Schreiner, the brother of the Prime Minister of the Cape: "1 met Mr. Reitz, then a judge of the Orange Free State, in Bloemfonttin between seventeen and eighteen years ago, shortly after the retrocession of the Transvaal, and when he was busy establishing the Africander JJond. It must be patent to every one that at that time, at all events, England and its Government had no intention of taking away the independence of the Transvaal, for she had just 'magnanimously ' granted the same ; no intention of making war on the republics, for she had just made peace ; no intention to seize the Rand gold fields, for they were not yet discovered. At that time, then, I met Mr. Reitz, and he did his best to get me to become a member of his Africander ]]ond, but, after studying its constitu- tion and programme, I refused to do so, whereupon the following colloquy in substance took place between us, which has been indelibly imprinted on my mind ever since : ''''Reitz: Why do you refuse? Is the object of getting the people to take an interest in political matters not a good one? ^''Myself : Yes, it is; but I seem to see plainly here be- tween the lines of this constitution much more ultimately aimed at than that. ''Reitz: What? ''^Myself: I see quite clearly that the ultimate object aimed at is the overthrow of the British power and the expulsion of the British flag from South Africa. ' ,) ^ 6o TFII': GRI.AT BOI.R WAR " Hcitz (ic'ith hi^ pleasant conscious smile, as of one whose scctct thoni::;ht atid purpose had been discoiered, and who 7oas not altoi^ethcr displeased that such 7C'as the ease) : Well, what if it is so? ^'Myself: You don't suppose, do you, that that flag is going to disappear from South Africa without a tremen- dous struggle and fight? '' Reitz {loith the same pleasant^ self-conscious^ selfsat- isfed, and yet senii-apolo^etic smile) ; Well, I suppose not; but even so, what of that? " My self : Only this, that when that struggle takes place you and I will be on opposite sides; and what is more, the God who was on the side of the Transvaal in the late war, because it had right on its side, will be on the side of England, because He must view with abhorrence any plotting and scheming to overthrow her power and position in South Africa, which have been ordained by Him. ''Reitz: We'll see. "Thus the conversation ended, but during the seven- teen years that have elapsed I have watched the ])rop- aganda for the overthrf> of British power in South Africa being ceaselessly .-iiread by every possible means — the press, the pulpit, the philform,the schools, the col- leges, the legislature — until it has culminated in the present war, of which Mr. Reitz and his eo-workers are the origin and the cause. ]]elieve me, the day on which F. W. Reitz sat down to pen his ultimatum to (Ireat Britain was the proudest and happiest moment of his life, and one which had for long years been looked forward to by him with eager longing and expectation." Compare with these utterances of a Dutch politician of the Ca[ie. and of a Dutch politician of the Orange Free State, the following passage from a speech delivered by Kruger at Bloemfontein in the year 18S7 : "I think it too soon to speak of a United South Africa under one flag. Whieh flag was it to be? The Queen of England would object to having her flag hauled down, and we, the burghers of the Transvaal, object to hauling oursdjwn. What is to be done? We are now small and l> I THK KVK OF WAR 6i of Utile importance, l)ut we are growing, ami are pre|)ar- ing (he way to lake our place among the great nations of the world." " 'I'he dream of our life," said another, "is a union of the States of South Africa, and this has to come from within, not from without. When that is accomplished. South Africa will be great." A 'ways the same theory from all quarters of Dutch thought, to be followed by many .signs that the idea was being prepared for in practice. 1 repeat that the fairest and most unbiassed historian cannot dismiss the con- spiracy as a myth. And to this one may retort: Why should they not con- spire? Why should thty not have their own \ lews as to the future of South Africa.** Why should they not en- deavor to have one universal Hag and one common speech? Why should they not win over our colonists, if they can, and push us into the sea? I see no reason why they should not. Let them try if they will. And let us try to prevent them. Ihxt let us have an end of talk about British aggression, of capitalist designs upon the gold fields, of the wrongs of a pastoral people, and all the other veils which have been used to cover the issue. Let those who talk about British designs upon the repub- lics turn their attention for a moment to the evidence which there is for republican designs upon the colonies. liCt them reflect that in the one system all white men are equal, and that in the other the minority of one race has persecuted the majority of the other, and let tiiem con- sider under v.hich the truest freedom lies, which stands for universal liberty and which for reaction and racial hatred. Let them ponder and answer all this before they determine where their sympathies lie. Leaving these wider questions of politics, and dismiss- ing for the time those military considerat ons which were soon to be of such vital moment, we may now return to the course of events in the dip'omatic struggle between the Government of the Transvaal and the Colonial Office. On September 8th, as already narrated, a final message i : 6a Till': GRl'AT BOKR WAR was sent to Pretoria, which stated the minimum terms which the Jiriiish Government could accept as being a fair concession to her subjects in the Transvaal. A definite answer was demanded, and the nation waited with sombre patience for tlie reply. There were few illusions in this country as to the diffi- culties of a Transvaal war. It was clearly seen that little honor and immense vexation were in store for us. The first Boer war still smarted in our minds and we knew the prowess of the indomitable burghers. But our people, if gloomy, were none the less resolute, for that national instinct which is beyond the wisdom of statesmen had borne it in upon them that this was no local quarrel, but one upon which the whole existence of the empire hung. The cohesion of that empire was to be tested. Men had emptied their glasses to it in time of peace. V\'as it a meaningless pouring of wine, or were they ready to pour their hearts' blood also in time of war? Had we really founded a series of disconnected nations, with no com- mon sentiment or interest, or was the empire an organic whole, as ready to thrill with one emotion or to harden into one resolve as are the several States of the Union? That was the question at issue, and much of the future history of the world was at stake upon the answer. Already there were indications that the colonies ap- preciated the fact that the contention was no affair of the mother country alone, but that she was upholding the rights of the empire as a whole, and might fairly look to them to support her in any quarrel which might arise from it. As early as July 1 1 th, Queensland, the fiery and semi-tropical, had offered a contingent of mounted in- fantry with machine guns; New Zealand, Western Aus- tralia, Tasmania, Victoria, New South Wales, and South Australia followed in the order named. Canada, with the strong but more deliberate spirit of the north, was the last to speak, but spoke the more firmly for the delay. Her citizens were the least concerned of any, for Aus- tralians were many in South Africa but Canadians few. None the less, she cheerfully took her share of the com- THF". KVF, OF WAR 63 mon burden, and grew the readier and the cheerier as that burden came to weiji;h more heavily. From all the men of many hues who make up the IJrilish Kmpire, from Indian Rajahs, from West African Iloussas, from Malay police, from Western Indians, there came offers of service. Hut this was to be a white man's war, and if the Jiritish could not work out their own salvation then it were well that em])ire should pass from such a race. The magnificent Indian army of one hundred and fifty thousand soldiers, many of them seasoned veterans, was for the same reason left untouched. England has claimed no credit or consideration for such abstention, but an ir- responsible writer may well ask how many of those foreign critics whose respect for our public morality appears to be as limited as their knowledge of our principles and history would have advocated such self-denial had their own countries been placed in the same position. On September i8th the official reply of the Boer Government to the message sent from the Cabinet Council was published in London. In manner it was unbending and unconciliatory ; in substance, it was a complete re- jection of all the Uritish demands. It refused to recom- mend or propose to the Raad the five years' franchise and the other measures which had been defined as the mini- mum which the Home Government could accept as a fair measure of justice toward the Uitlanders. The sug- gestion that the debates of the Raad should be bilingual, as they are in the Cape Colony and in Canada, was ab- solutely waved aside. The British Government had stated in their last despatch that if the reply should be negative or inconclusive they reserved to themselves the right to " reconsider the situation de novo and to formulate their own proposals for a final settlement." The reply had been both negative and inconclusive, and on September 2 2d a council met to determine what the next message should be. It was short and firm, but so planned as not to shut the door upon peace. Its purport was that the British Government expressed deep regret at the rejection of the moderate proposals which had been r 64 TflF. GREAT BOFR WAR II > submitted in their last despatch, and that now, in accord- ance with their promise, they would shortly put forward their own plans for a settlement. The message was not an ultin;atum, but it foreshadowed an ultimatum in the future. In the mean time, upon September 21st the Raad of the Orange Free State had met, and it became more and more evident that this republic, with whom we had no possible quarrel, but, on the contrary, for whom we had a great deal of friendship and admiration, intended to throw in its weight against Great Britain. Some time before, an offensive and defensive alliance had been concluded be- tween the two States, which must, until the secret history of these events comes to be written, appear to have been a singularly rash and unprofitable bargain for the smaller one. She had nothing to fear from Great Ihitain, since she had been voluntarily turned into an independent re- public by her and had lived in peace with her for forty years. Her laws were as liberal as our own. J'ut by this suicidal treaty she agreed to share the fortunes of a State which was deliberately courting war by its persist- ently unfriendly attitude, and whose reactionary and narrow legislation would, one might imagine, have alienated the sympathy of her prof^ressive neighbor. There may have been ambitions like those already quoted from the report of Dr. Reitz's conversation, or there may have been a complete hallucination as to the comparative strength of the two combatants and the probable future of South Africa; but hov/ever that may be, the treaty was made, and the time had come to test how far it would hold. The tone of President Steyn at the meeting of the Raad, and the support which he received from the majority of his burghers, showed unmistakably that the two republics would act as one. In his opening speech Steyn declared uncompromisingly against the British con- tention, and declared that his State was bound to the Transvaal by everything which was near and dear. Among the obvious military precautions which could no THK EVE OF WAR 65 longer be neglected by the Uritish Government was the sending of some small force to protect the long and ex- posed line of railway which lies just outside the Trans- vaal border from Kimberley to Rhodesia. Sir Alfred Miliier communicated willi President Steyn as to this movement of troops, pointing out that it v.as in no way directed against the Free State. Sir Alfred Milner added that the Imperial Government was still hopeful of a friendly settlement with the Transvaal, but if this hope were disappointed they looked to the Orange Free State to preserve strict neutrality and to prevent military inter- vention by any of its citizens. They undertook that in that case the integrity of the Free State frontier would be strictly prcseived. Finally, he stated that there was ab- solutely no cause to disturb the good relations between the Free State and Great JJritain, since we were animated by the most friendly intentions toward them. To this the president returned a somewhat ungracious answer, to the effect that he disapproved of our action toward the Transvaal, and that he regretted the movement of troops, which would be considered a menace by the burghers. A subsequent resolution of the Free State Raad, ending with the words, "Come what may, the Free State will honestly and faithfully fulfil its obligations toward the Transvaal by virtue of the political alliance existing be- tween the two republics," showed how impossible it was that this country, formed by ourselves and without a shadow of a cause of quarrel with us, could be saved from being drawn into the whirlpool. FverywhciC, from over both borders, came the news of martial preparations. Already at the end of September troops and armed burghers were gathering upon the frontier, and the most incredulous were beginning at last to understand that the shadow of a great war was really falling across them. Artillery, war munitions, and stores were being accumu- lated at Volksrust upon the Natal border, showing where the storm might be expected to break. On the last day of September, twenty-six military trains were reported to have left Pretoria and Johannesburg for that point. At ■> 66 THE GREAT BOER WAR the same time news came of a concentration at Malmini, upon the Bechuanaland border, threatening the railway line and the British town of Mafeking, a name destined before long to be familiar to the world. On October 3d there occurred what was in truth an act of war, although the British Government, patient to the verge of weakness, refused to regard it as such, and con- tinued to draw up their final state paper. The mail train from the Transvaal to Cape Town was stopped at Vereenig- ing, and the \ve;jK's shipment of gold for England, amount- ing to about half a million pounds, was taken by the Boer Government. In a debate at Cape Town upon the same day the Africander Minister of the Interior admitted that as many as four hundred and four truck- had passed from the Government line over the frontier and had not been returned. Taken in conjunction with the passage of arms and cartridges through the Cape to Pretoria and Bloemfontein, this incident aroused the deepest indigna- tion among the Colonial English and the British public, which was increased by the reports of the difficulty which border towns, such as Kimberley and Vryburg, had had in getting cannon for their own defence. The Raads had been dissolved, and the old President's last words had been a statement that war was certain, and a stern invo- cation of the Lord as final arbiter. England was ready less obtrusively but no less heartily to refer the quarrel to the same dread Judge. On October 2d President Steyn informed Sir Alfred Milner that he had deemed it necessary to call out the E'ree State burghers — that is, to mobilize his forces. Sir A. Milner wrote regretting these preparations, and declar- ing that he did not yet despair of peace, for he was sure that any reasonable proposal would be favorably consid- ered by her Majesty's Government. Steyn's reply was that there was no use in negotiating unless the stream of British reinforcements ceased coming into South Africa. As our forces were still in a great minority, it was im- possible to stop the reinforcements, so the correspond- ence led to nothing. On October 9th the army reserves THE EVR OF WAR 67 for the First Army Corps were called out in Great IJritain and other signs shown that it had been determined to send a considerable force to South Africa. Parliament was also summoned, that the formal national assent might be gained for those grave measures which were evidently pending. It was on October 9th that the somewhat leisurely pro- ceedings of the British Colonial Office were brought to a head by the arrival of an unexpected and audacious ulti- matum from the Hoer Government. In contests of wit, as of arms, it must be confessed that the laugh has up to now been usually upon the side of our simple and pastoral South African neighbors. The present instance was no exception to the rule. While our Government was cautiously and patiently leading up to an ultimatum, our opponent suddenly played the very card which we were preparing to lay upon the table. The document was very firm and explicit, but the terms in which it was drawn were so impossible that it was evidently framed with the deliberate purpose of forcing an immediate war. It de- manded that the troops upon the borders of the republic should be instantly withdrawn, that all reinforcements which had arrived within the last year should leave South Africa, and that those who were now upon the sea should be sent back without being landed. Failing a satisfac- tory answer within forty-eight hours, "the Transvaal Government will with great regret be compelled to regard the action of her Majesty's Government as a formal declaration of wr^r, for the consequences of which it will not hold itself responsible." The audacious message was received throughout the empire with a mixture of derision and anger. The answer was despatched next day, through Sir Alfred Milner. " loth October. — Her Majesty's Government have re- ceived with great regret the peremptory demands of the Government of the South African Republic, conveyed in your telegram of the 9th October. You will inform the Government of the South African Republic in reply that the conditions demanded by the Government of the h "'^.. 68 THE GREAT BOER WAR South African Republic are such as her Majesty's Govern- ment deem it impossible to discuss." And so we have come to the end of the long road, past the battle of the pens and tiie wrangling of tongues, to the arbitrament of the Lee-Metford and the Mauser. It was pitiable that it s'lould come to this. These people were as near akin to us as any race which is not our own. They were of the same Frisian stock which peopled our own shores. In habit of mind, in religion, in respec' for law, they were as ourselves. Brave, too, they were, and hospitable with those sporting instincts which are dear to the Anglo-Celtic race. There was no people in the world who had more qualities which we might ad- mire, and not the least of them was that love of independ- ence which it is our proudest boast that *ve have en- couraged in others as well as exercised ourselves. And yet we had coi le to this pass, that there was no room in all vast South Africa for both of us. We cannot hold ourselves blameless in the matter. '' The evil that men do lives after them," and it has been told in this small superficial sketch where we have erred in the past in South Africa. On our hands, too, is the Jameson raid, carried out by Englishmen and led by officers who held the Queen's Commission; to us, also, the blame of the shuffling, half-hearted inquiry into that most unjustifiable business. These are matches which helped to set the great blaze alight, and it is we who held them. But the fagots which proved to be so inflammable, they were not of our setting. They were the wrongs done to half the community, the settled resolution of the minority to tax and vex the majority, the determination of a people who had lived two generations in a country to claim that country entirely for themselves. Behind them all there may have been the Dutch ambition to dominate South Africa. It was no petty object for which Britain fought. When a nation struggles uncomplainingly through months of disaster she may claim to have proved her conviction of the justice and necessity of the struggle. Shall Dutch 'deas or Engli.sh ideas of government prevail throughout THK KVK OF WAR __69 that huge country? The one means racial freedom, the other means equal rights to all white men beneath one commoM law. What each means to the colored races ht history declare. This was the main issue to be deter- nnned from the instu.t that the clock struck fne upon the afternoon of Wednesday. October n, ,800. That moment marked the opening of a war destined to deter- TV^ 'r "'. ^""^'^ '''''''^ '^ ^-••'^ ^-'-^t changes in n tl iJ""^''.'':' '"^ ^^'■•^^"■'^ly ''^<"f^ct the future history o the world and incidentally to alter many of our views as to the art of war. It is the story of this war which candor'^r^h'"^'''^'' ^"f '''''^' '""^^ ^'l^'^'^^'^on to care and canaor, 1 shall new endeavor to tell. <• V * r, Chapter Five TALANA HILL It was on the morning of October 12th, amid cold and mist, that the Boer camps at Sandspruit and Volksrust broke up, and the burghers rode to the war. Some twelve thousand of them, all mounted, with two batteries of eight Krupp guns each, were the invading force from the north, which hoped later to be joined by the Free Staters and by a contingent of Germans and Transvaalers who were to cross the Free State border. It was an hour before dawn that the guns started, and the riflemen followed close behind the last limber, so that the first light of day fell upon the black sinuous line winding down between the hills. A spectator v.pon the occasion says of them : " Their faces were a study. For the most part the expression worn was one of determination and bulldog pertinacity. No sign of fear there, nor of wav- ering. Whatever else may be laid to the charge of the Boer, it may never truthfully be said that he is a coward or a man unworthy of the Briton's steel." The words were written early in the campaign, and the whole empire will indorse them to-day. Could we have such men as willing fellow-citizens they are worth more than all the gold mines of their country. This main Transvaal body consisted of the commando of Pretoria, which comprised one thousand eight hundred men, and those of Ileidelburg, Middleburg, Krugersdorp, Standerton, Wakkerstroom, and Ermelo, with the State Artillery, an excellent and highly organized body who were provided with the best guns that have ever been brought on to a battlefield. Hesides their sixteen Krupps, they dragged with them two heavy six-inch Creusot guns, i TALANA HILL 7' which were destined to have a very important effect in the earlier part of the campaign. In addition to these native forces there were a certain number of European auxilia- ries. The greater part of the German corps were with the Free State forces, but a few hundred came down from the north. There was a Hollander corps of about two hun- dred and fifty and an Irish — ^or perhaps more properly an Irish-American — corps of the same number, who rode under the green flag and the harp. The men might, by all accounts, be divided into two very different types. There v/ere the town IJuers, smart- ened and perhaps a little enervated by prosperity and civilization, men of business and professional men, more alert and quicker than their rustic comrades. These men spoke English rather than Dutch, and indeed there were many men of English descent among them. lUit the others, the most formidable both in their numbers and in their primitive qualities, were the back veldt Boers, the sunburned, tangled-haired, full-bearded farm- ers, the men of the Bible and the rifle, imbued with the traditions of their own guerilla warfare. These were perhaps the finest natural warriors upon earth, marks- men, hunters, accustomed to hard fare and a harder couch. They v/ere rough in their ways and speech, but, in spite of many calumnies and some few unpleasant truths, they might compare with most disciplined armies in their humanity and their desire to observe the usages of war. A few words here as to the man who led this singular host. Piet Joubert was a Cape Colonist by birth -a fel- low-countryman, like Kruger himself, of those whom the narrow laws of his new country persisted in regarding as outside the pale. He came from that French Huguenot blood which has strengthened and refined every race which it has touched, and from it he derived a chivalry and generosity which made him respected and liked even by his opponents. In many native broils and in the British campaign of i88i he had shown himself a capa- ble leader. His record in standing out for the inde- 72 THE GRF\T BOKR WAR pendence of the Transvaal was a very consistent one, for he had not accepted office under the JJritish, as Kruger had done, but had remained always an irreconcilable. Tall and burly, with hard gray eyes and a grim mouth half hidden by his bushy Leard, he was a fine type of the men whom he led. He was now in his sixty-fifth year, and the fire of his youth had, as some of the burghers urged, died down within him; but he was experienced, crafty, and warwise, never dashing and never brilliant, but steady, solid, and inexorable. Besides this northern army there were two other bodies of burghers converging upon Natal. One, consisting of the commandoes from Utrecht and the Swaziland districts, had gathered at Viyheid on the flank of the British position at Dundee. The other, much larger, not less probably than six or seven thousand men, were the contingent from the Free State and a Transvaal corps, together with Schiel's Germans, who were making their way through the various passes, the Tintwa Pass and Van Reenen's Pass, which lead through the grim range of the Drakensburg and open out upon the more fertile plains of Western Natal. The total force may have been something between twenty and thirty thousand men. By all accounts they were of an astonishingly high heart, convinced that a path of easy victory lay before them, and that nothing could bar their way to the sea. If the British commanders underrated their ojiponents, there is ample evidence that the mistake was reciprocal. A few words now as to the disposition of the British forces, concerning which it must be borne in mind that Sir George White, though in actual command, had only been a few days in the country before war was declan'd, so that the arrangements fell to General Penn Symons, aided or hampered by the advice of the local political authori- ties. The main position was at Ladysmith, but an ad- vance post was strongly held at Glencoe, which is five miles from the station of Dundee and forty from Lady- smith. The reason for this dangerous division of force was to secure each end of the Biggarsberg section of the one, for Kruger icilable. I mouth le of the th year, )urghers rienced, rilliant, r bodies nsisting 'aziland : of the larger, d men, ansvaal making *ass and II range e fertile ve been sn. By 1 heart, e them, If the there is liritish ind that ad only ared, so s, aided authori- t an ad- is five 1 Lady- 3f force \ of the I ^! { I I J^ORTHERN N t eoupt— IKRX KAT ALi ^ Bstcoupt imuSuaik. Ildme &C». v^- A 6^ ' * i (J I 114 THE GREAT BOER WAR their line he roared in his "Damn thee! Get thee to staff officer pranced before rough North-country tongue, hell, and let's fire! " In the golden light of the rising sun the men set their teeth and dashed up the hills, scrambling, falling, cheering, swearing, gallant men, gal- lantly led, their one thought to close with that grim bristle of rifle barrels which fringed the rocks above them. Lord Methuen's intention had been an attack from front and from flank, but whether from the Grenadiers losing their bearings, or from the mobility of the Boers which made a flank attack an impossibility, it is certain that all became frontal. The battle resolved itself into a number of isolated actions in which the various kopjes were rushed by difftjrent British regiments, always with success and always with loss. The honors cf the fight, as tested by the grim record of the casualty returns, lay with the Grenadiers, the Coldstreams, the Northumber- lands, and the Scots Fusiliers. The brave Guardsmen lay thickly on the slopes, but their comrades crowned the heights. The Boers held on desperately and fired their rifles in the very faces of the stormers. One young officer had his jaw blown to pieces by a rifle which almost touched him. Another, Blundell of the Guards, was shot dead by a wounded desperado to whom he was offer- ing his water-bottle. At one point a white flag was waved by the defenders, on which the British left cover, only to be met by a volley. It was there that Mr. E. F. Knight, of the "Morning Post," became the victim oi a double abuse of the usages of war, since his wound, f r on; which he lost his right arm, was from an explosive bullet. The man who raised the flag was captured, and it says much for the humanity of British soldiers that he was not bayonetted upon the spot. Yet it is not fair to blame a whole people for the misdeeds of a few, and it is prob- able that the men who descend to such devices, or who deliberately fire upon our ambulances, are as much exe- crated by their own comrades as by ourselves. The victory was an expensive one, for fifty killed and LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE 115 a > lei. lys lot a )b- JO ce- Ind two hundred wounded lay upon the hillside, and, like so many of our si irmishes with the Boers, it led to small material results. Their losses appear to have been much about tiie same as ours, and we captured some fifty prisoners, whom the soldiers regarded with the utmost interest. They were a sullen, slouching crowd, rudely clad, and they represented probably the poorest of the burghers, who now, as in the Middle Ages, suffer most in battle, since a long purse means a good horse. Most of the enemy galloped ver}' comfortably away after the action, leaving a fringe of sharpshooters among the kopjes to hold back our pursuing cavalry. The want of horse- men and the want of horse artillery are the two reasons which Lord Methuen gives why tiie defeat was not con- verted into a rout. As it was, the feelings of the retreat- ing Boers were exemplified by one of their number, who turned in his saddle* in order to place his outstretched fingers to his nose in derision of the victors. He exposed himself to the fire of half a battalion while doing so, but he probably was aware that with our present musketry instruction the fire of a British half -battalion against an individual is not a very serious matter. The rerriainder of the 23d was spent at Belmont Camp, and next morning an advance was made to Graspan, some ten miles farther on. Here lay the plain of i'.nslin, bounded by a formidable line of kopjes as dangerous as those of Belmont. Lancers and Rimington's Scouts, the feeble but very capable cavalry of the army, came in with the report that the hills were strongly held. Some more hard slogging was in front of the relievers of Kim- berley. The advance had been on the line of the Cape Town- Kimberley Railway, and the damage done to it by the Boers had been repaired to the extent of permitting an armored train with a naval gun to accompany the troops. It was six o'clocl-. upon the morning of Saturday, the 25th, that this gun came into action against the kopjes, closely followed by the guns of the field artillery. One of the lessons of the war has been to disillusion us as to the ■I ii6 THE GREAT BOER WAR effect of shrapnel fire. Positions which had been made theoretically untenable have again and again been found to be most inconveniently tenanted. Among the troops actually engaged the confidence in the effect of shrapnel fire has steadily declined with their experience. Some other method of artillery fire than the curving bullet froiu an exploding shrapnel shell must be devised for deal- ing with men who lie close among bowlders and behind cover. These remarks upon shrapnel might be included in the account of half the battles of the war, but they are particularly apposite to the action at Enslin. Here a single large kopje formed the key to the position, and a considerable time was expended upon preparing it for the British assault, by directing upon it a fire which swept the face of it and searched, as was hoped, every corner in which a rifieman might lurk. One of the two batteries engaged fired no leu than five hundred rounds. Then the infantry advance was ordered, the Guards being held in reserve on account of their exertions at Belmont. The Northumberlands, Northamptons, North Lancashires, and Yorkshires worked round upon the right, and, aided by the artillery fire, cleared the trenches in their front. The honors of the assault, however, must be awarded to the sailors and marines of the Naval brigade, who under- went such an ordeal as men have seldom faced and yet come out as victors. To them fell the task of carrying that formidable hill which had been so scourged by our artillery. With a grand rush they swept up the slope, but were met by a horrible fire. Every rock spurted flame, and the front ranks withered away before the storm of the Mausers. An eye-witness has recorded that the brigade was hardly visible amid the sand knocked up by the bullets. For an instant they fell back into cover, and then, having taken their breath, up they went again, with a deep-chested sailor roar. There were but four hundred in all, two hundred seamen and two hundred marines, and the losses in that rapid rush were terrible. Yet they swarmed up, their gallant officers, some of them A \ LORD MKTHUKN'S ADVANCE iiy little boy-middies, cheering them on. Ethelston, the commander of the " Powerful," was struck down. Plumbe and Senior of the Marines were killed. Captain Prothero of the " Doris "' dropped while still yelling to his seamen to "take that kopje and be hanged to it! " Little Hud- dart, the middy, died a death which is worth many in- glorious years. Jones of the Marines fell wounded, but rose again and rushed on with his men. It was jn these gallant marines, the men who are ready to fight anywhere and anyhow, moist or dry, that the heaviest loss fell. When at last they made good their foothold upon the crest of that murderous hill they had left behind them 3 officers and 88 men out of a total of 206— a loss within a few minutes of nearly 50 per cent. The blue- jackets, helped by the curve of the hill, got off with a toll of 18 of their number. Half the total British losses of the action fell upon this little body of men, who upheld most gloriously the honor and reputation of the service from which they were drawn. With such men under the white ensign we leave our island homes in safety behind us. The battle of Enslin had cost us some two hundred of killed and wounded, and beyond the mere fact that we had cleared our way by another stage toward Kimberley it is difficult to say what advantage we had from it. We won the kopjes, but we lost our men. The Boer killed and wounded were probably less than half of our own, and the exhaustion and weakness of our cavalry forbade us to pursue and prevented us from capturing their guns. In three days the men had fought two exhausting actions in a waterless country and under a tropical sun. Their exertions had been great and yet were barren of result. Why this should be so was naturally the subject of keen discussion both in the camp and among the public at home. It always came back to ;.ord Methuen's own complaint about the absence of cavalry and of horse artillery. Many very unjust charges have been hurled against our War Office— a department which in some matters has done extraordinarily and unexpectedly well— •. I- * i ii8 THE GREAT BOER WAR but in this question of the delay in the despatch of our cavalry and artillery, knowing as we did the extreme mobility of our enemy, there is certainly ground for an inquiry. The J^oers who had fought these two actions had been drawn mainly from the Jacobsdahl and Fauresmith com- mandoes, with some of the burghers from Boshof. The famous Cronje, however, had been descending from Mafeking with his old guard of Transvaalers, and keen disappointment was expressed by the prisoners at Bel- mont and at Knslin that he had not arrived in time to take command of them. There* were evidences, however, at this latter action, that reinforcements for the enemy were coming up and that the labors of the Kimberley relief force were by no means at an end. In the height of the engagement the Lancer patrols thrown out upon our right flank reported the approach of a considerable body of Boer horsemen, who took up a position upon a hill on our right rear. Their position there was distinctly menacing, and Colonel VVilloughby Verner was despatched by Lord Methuen to order up the brigade of Guards. The gallant officer had the misfortune in his return to injure himself seriously through a blunder of his horse. His mission, however, succeeded in its effect, for the Guards moving across the plain intervened in such a way that the reinforcements, without an open attack, which would have been opposed to all Boer traditions, could not help the defenders, and were compelled to witness their defeat. This body of horsemen returned north next day, and were no doubt among those whom we encountered at the following action of the Modder River. The march from Orange River had begun upon the Wednesday. On Thursday was fought the action of Bel- mont, on Saturday that of Graspan. There was no pro- tection against the sun by day nor against the cold at night. VVater was not plentiful, and the quality of it was occasionally vile. The troops were in need of a rest, so on Saturday night and Sunday they remained at Enslin. t LORD METHUFN'S ADVANCF', 119 On the Monday morning (November 27th) the weary march to Kimberley was resumed. On Monday, November 27th, at early dawn, the little British army, a dust-colored column upon the dusty veldt, moved forward again toward their objective. That night they halted at the pools of Klopfontein, having for once made a whole day's march without coming in touch with the enemy. Hopes rose that possibly the two successive defeats had taken the heart out of them and that there would be no further resistance to the advance. Some, however, who were aware of the presence of Cronje, and of his formidable character, took a juster view of the situation. And this perhaps is where a few words might bs said about the celebrated leader who played upon the western side of the seat of war the same part which Joubert did upon the east. Commandant Cronje was at the time of the war sixty- five years of age, a hard, swarthy man, quiet of manner, fierce of soul, with a reputation among a nation of resolute men for unsurpassed resolution. His dark face was bearded and virile, but sedate and gentle in ex- pression. He spoke little, but what he said v/as to the point, and he had the gift of those fire-words which brace and strengthen weaker men. In hunting expeditions and in native wars he had first won the admiration of his countrymen by his courage and his fertility of resource. In the war of 1880 he had led the Boers who besieged Potchefstroom, and he had pushed the attack with a re- lentless vigor which was not hampered by the chivalrous usages of war. Eventually he compelled the surrender of the place by concealing from the garrison that a gen- eral armistice had been signed, an act which was after- ward disowned by his own Government. In the succeed- ing years he lived as an autocrat and a patriarch amid his farms and his herds, respected by many and feared by all. For a time he was Native Commissioner, and left a reputation for hard dealing behind him. Called into the field again by the Jameson raid, he grimly herded his enemies into an impossible position and desired, as it is I20 THK GREAT BOHR WAR I Stated, that the hardest measure should be dealt out to the captives. This was the man, capable, crafty, iron- hard, magnetic, who lay with a reinforced and formidable army across the path of Lord Methuen's tired soldiers. It was a fair match. On the one side the hardy men, the trained shots, a good artillery, and the defensive; on the other the historical British infantry, duty, discipline, and a fiery courage. With a high heart the dust-colored column moved on over the dusty veldt. So entirely had hills and Boer fighting become asso- ciated in the minds of our leaders, that when it was known that Modder River wound over a plain, the idea of a resistance there appears to have passed away from their minds. So great was the confidence or so lax the scouting that a force equalling their own in numbers had assembled with many guns within seven miles of them, and yet the advance appears to have been conducted without any expectation of impending battle. The sup- position, obvious even to a civilian, that a river would be a likely place to meet with an obstinate resistance, seems to have been ignored. It is perhaps not fair to blame the general for a fact which must have vexed his spirit more even than ours — one's sympathies go out to the gentle and brave man, who was heard calling out in his sleep that he " should have had those two guns " — but it is repugnant to common sense to suppose that no one, neither the cavalry nor the Intelligence Department, is at fault for so extraordinary a state of ignorance. On the morning of Tuesday, November 2 ever. As the afternoon wore on, a curious < "tion of things was established. The guns could not advance and would not retire. The infantry could not advance and would not retire. The Guards on the right were pre- vented from opening out on the fiank and getting round the enemy's line by the presence of the Riet River, which joins the Modder almost at a right angle. All day they lay under n blistering sun, the sleet of bullets whizzing over their heads. "It came in solid streaks like tele- graph wires," said a graphic correspondent. The men gossiped, smoked, and many of them slept. They lay on the barrels of their rifles to keep them cool enough for use. Now and again there came the dull thud of a bullet which had found its mark, and a man gasped, or drummed with his feet; but the casualties at this point were not numerous, for there was some little cover and the piping bullets passed for the most part overhead. But in the mean time there had been a development upon the left which was to turn the action into a British \ LORD MKTHUKN'S ADVANCE 125 victory. At this side there was ample room to extend, and the Ninth iJri{^ade spread out, feeling its way down the enemy's line, until it came to a point where the fire was less murderous and the approach to the river more in favor of the attack. Here the Yorkshires and Lanca- shires--or some of them succeeded in getting across, and were reinforced by the First Coldstreams and the Argylls. Karlier in the day Colonel Codrington with a party of the Ouards had made his way over on the right, but had found the position untenable and had been com- pelled to fall back. Jiut now that a way had been found upon the left, the men came swarming across. "Now, boys, who's for otter hunting?" cried Major Coleridge, of the North I.ancashires, as he sprang into the water. How gladly on that baking, scorching day did the men jump into the river and splash over, to climb the oppo- site bank with their wet khaki clinging to their figures! Some blundered into holes and were rescued by grasping the unwound puiiies of their comrades. And so between three and four o'clock a strong party of the Ikitish had established their position upon the right flank of the Boers, and were holding on like grim death with an in- telligent appreciation that the fortunes of the day de- pended upon their retaining their grip. ""Hollo, here is a river!" cried Codrington when he led his forlorn hope to the right and found that the Riet had to be crossed. " I was given to understand that the Modder was fordable everywhere," says Lord Methuen in his official dispatch. One cannot read the account of the operations without being struck by the casual, sketchy knowledge which cost us so dearly. The soldiers slogged their way through, as they have slogged it before; but the task might have been made much lighter for them had we but clearly known what it was that we were try- ing to do. On the other hand, it is but fair to Lord Methuen to say that his own personal gallantry and un- flinching resolution set the most stimulating example to his troops. No general could have done more to put heart into his men. i ■I ■it r 126 THE GRFAT BOER WAR And now as the long, weary, scorching, hungry day came to an end, the JJoers began at last to Hinch from their trenches. The shrapnel was finding them out, and this force upon their flank filled them with vague alarm and with fears for their precious guns. And so as night fell they stole across the river, the cannon were withdrawn, the trenches evacuated, and next morning, when the wenry IJritish and their anxious general turned them- selves to their grim task once more, they found a deserted vi l-^ge, a line of empty houses, and a litter of empty Mauser cartridge-cases to show where their tenacious enemy had stood. Lord Methuen, in congratulating the troops upon their achievement, spoke of "the hardest-won victory in our annals of war," and some such phrase was used in 1 is official despatch. It is hypercritical, no doubt, to look too closely at i. term used by a wounded man with tlie flush of battle still upon him, but still a student ot mili- tary history must smile at such a comparison between this action and such others as Albuera or Inkerman, where the numbers of IJritish engaged were not dissimilar. A fight in which five hundred men are killed and wounded cannot be classed in the same category as those stern and desperate encounters where more of the victors were car- ried than walked from the field of battle. And yet there were some special features which will differentiate the fight at Modder River from any of the hundred actions which adorn the standards of our regiments. It was the third battle which the troops had fought within the week, they were under fire for ten or twelve hours, were water- less under a tropical sun, and weak from want of food. For the first time they were called upon to face modern rifle fire and modern machine guns in the open. The result tends to prove that those who held that it will from now onwards be impossible ever to make such fron- tal attacks as those which the English made at the Alma or the French at Waterloo, are justified in their belief. It is beyond human hardihood to face the pitiless beat of bullet and shell which comes from modern quick-firing LORD METHUEN'S ADVANCE 127 weapons. Had our flank not made a lodgment across the river, it is impossible that we could have carrieil the position. Once more, too, it was demonstrated how powerless the best artillery is to disp-^rse resolute and well-placed riflemen. Of the minor 'points of interest there will always remain the record of the forced march of the Sixty-second Battery, and artillerymen will note the use of gun-pits by the Boers, which insured that the range of their positions should never be permanently ob- tained. The honors of the day upon the side of the British rested with the Argyll and Sutherland Hi^^h landers, the Second Coldstreams, and the artillery. Out of a total cas- ualty list of about 450, no less than 1 12 came from the gallant Argylls and 69 from the Coldstreams. The loss of the Boers is exceedingly difikult to gauge, as they throughout the war took the utmost pains to conceal it. The number of desperate and long-drawn actions whicli have ended, according to the official Bretorian account, in a loss of one wounded burgher may in some way be better policy, but do not imply a higher standard of pub- lic vrtue than those long lists which have saddened our hearts in the halls of the war office. What is certain is that the loss at Modder River could not have been far in- ferior to our own, and that it arose almost entirely from artillery fire, since at no time of the action was any large number of their riflemen visible. So it ended, this long pelting match, the dark Cronje sullenly withdrawing under the cover of darkness with his resolute heart filled with fierce determination for the future, while the British soldiers threw themselves down on the ground which they occupied and slept the sleep of exhaustion. mm Chapter Nine BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN Lord Methuen's force had now fought three actions in the space of a single week, losing in killed and wounded about a thousand men, or rather more than one-tenth ^f its total numbers. Had there been evidence that the enemy had been seriously demoralized, the General would no doubt have pushed on at once to Kimberley, which was some twenty miles distant. The information which reached him was, however, that the Boers had fallen back upon the very strong position of Spytfon- tein, that they were full of fight, and that they had been strongly reinforced by a commando from Mafeking. Under these circumstances Lord Methuen had no choice but to give his men a well-earned rest, and to await rein- forcements. There was no use in reaching Kimberley unless he had completely defeated the investing force. With the history of the first relief of Lucknow in his memory he was on guard against a repetition of such an experience. It was the more necessary that Methuen should strengthen his position, since with every mile which he advanced the more exposed did his line of communica- tions becon^e to a raid from Fauresmith and the southern districts of tht. Orange Free State. Any serious danger to the railway behind them would leave the British army in a very critical position, and precautions were taken for the protection of the more vulnerable portions of the line. It was well that this was so, for on the 8th of De- cember Commandant Prinsloo, of the Orange Free State, with a thousand horsemen and two light seven-pounder BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTEIN 129 ■ m guns, appeared suddenly at Enslin and vigorously at- tacked the two companies of the Northampton Regiment who held the station. At the same time they destroyed a couple of culverts and tore up three hundred yards of the permanent way. For some hours the Northamptons un- der Captain Godley were closely pressed, but a telegram had been despatched to Modder Camp, and the Twelfth Lancers with the ubiquitous Sixty-second Battery were sent to their assistance. The Boers retired with their usual mobility, and in ten hours the line was completely restored. Reinforcements were now reaching the Modder River force, which made it more formidable than when it had started. A very essential addition was that of the Twelfth Lancers and of G Battery of Horse Artillery, which would increase the mobility of the force and make it possible for the General to follow up a blow after he had struck it. The magnificent regiments which formed the Highland Brigade — the Second Black Watch, the First Gordons, the Second Seaforths, and the First High- land Light Infantry— had arrived under the gallant and ill-fated VVauchope. F,Q}if five-inch howitzers had also come to strengthen the artillery. At the same time the Canadians, the Australians, and several line regiments were moved up on the line from De Aar to Belmont. It appeared to the public at home that there was the mate- rial for an overwhelming advance; but the ordinary ob- server, and even perhaps the military critic, had not yet appreciated how great is the advantage which is given by modern weapons to the force which acts upon the defen- sive. With enormous pains the dark Cronje and his men were entrenching a most formidable position in front of our advance, with a confidence, which proved to be justi- fied, that it would be on their own ground and under their own conditions that in this, as in the three preceding actions, we would engage them. On the morning of Saturday, December 9th, the British General made an attempt to find out what lay in front of him amid that semi-circle of forbidding hills. To this 9 ofl 6> u '/ ijo THE GREAT BOER WAR end he sent out a reconnoissance in the early morning, which included G Battery Horse Artillery, the Ninth Lancers, and the ponderous 4.7 naval gun, which, pre- ceded by the majestic march of thirty-two bullocks and attended by eighty seamen gunners, creaked forward over the plain. What was there to shoot at in those sunlit, bowlder-strewn hills in front? They lay silent and un- tenanted in the glare of the African day. In vain the great gun exploded its huge shell with its fifty-two pounds of lyddite over the ridges, in vain the smaller pieces searched every cleft and hollow with their shrap- nel. No answer came from the far-stretching hills. Not a flash or twinkle betrayed the fierce bands who lurked among the bowlders. The force returned to camp no wiser than when it left. There was one sight visible every night to all men which might well nerve the rescuers in their enterprise. Over the northern horizon, behind those hills of danger, there quivered up in the darkness one long, flashing, quivering beam, which swung up and down, and up again, like a seraphic sword-blade. It was Kimberley praying for help, Kimberley solicitous for news. Anxiously, distractedly, the great De Beers searchlight dipped and rose. And back across the twenty miles of darkness, over the hills where the dark Cronje lurked, there came that other southern column of light which answered, and promised, and soothed. " Be of good heart, Kimberley. We are here! The Empire is behind us. We have not forgotten you. It may be days, or it may be weeks, but rest assured that we are coming." About three in the afternoon of Sunday, December loth, the force which was intended to clear a path for the army through the lines of Magersfontein moved out upon what proved to be its desperate enterprise. The Third or Highland Brigade included the Black Watch, the Sea- forths, the Argyll and Sutherlands, and the Highland Light Infantry. The Gordons had only arrived in camp that day, and did not advance until next morning. Be- sides the infantry, the Ninth Lancers, the mounted in- BATTLE OF MAGERSFONTKTN 131 th, my lat or ja- id lip Je- lin- fantry, and all the artillery moved to the front. It was raining hard, and the men with one blanket between two soldiers bivouacked upon the cold damp ground, about three miles from the enemy's position. At one o'clock, without food, and drenched, they moved forward tlirough the drizzle anu the darkness to attack those terrible lines. Clouds drifted low in the heavens, and the falling rain made the darkness more impenetrable. The Highland IJrigade was formed into a column — the lilack Watch in front, then the Seaforths, and the other two behind. To prevent the men from straggling in the night the four regiments were packed into a mass of quarter column as densely as was possible, and the left guides held a rope in order to preserve the formation. With many a trip and stumble the ill-fated detachment wandered on, un- certain where they were going and what it was that they were meant to do. Not only among the rank and file, but among the principal officers also, there was the same absolute ignorance. Brigadier Wauchope knew, no doubt, but his voice was soon to be stilled in death. The others were aware, of course, that they were advancing either to turn the enemy's trenches or to attack them, but they may well have argued ^-om their own formation that they could not be near the riHemen yet. Why they should be still advancing in that dense clump we do not now know, nor can we surmise what thoughts were pass- ing through the mind of the gallant and experienced chieftain who walked beside them. There are those who speak of fierce disagreement between him and his Gen- eral, and his proud spirit may have been raging within him. There are others who claim on the night before to have seen upon his strangely ascetic face that shadow of doom which is summed up in the one word "fey." The hand of coming death may already have lain cold upon his soul. Out there, close beside him, stretched the long trench, fringed with its line of fierce, staring, eager faces, and its bristle of gun-barrels. They knew he was com- ing. They were ready. They were waiting. But still, with the dull murmur of many feet, the dense column, 132 THE GREAT BOER WAR nearly four thousand strong, wandered onward through the rain and the darkness, death and mutilation crouch- ing upon their path. It matters not what gave the signal, whether it was the flashing of a lantern by a IBoer scout, or the tripping of a soldier over wire, or the firing of a gun in the ranks. It may have been any, or it may have been none of these things. As a matter of fact I have been assured by a Boer who was present that it was the sound of the tins which had been attached to the alarm wires which dis- turbed them. However this may be, in an instant there crashed out of the darkness into their faces and ears a roar of point-blank fire, and the night was slashed across with the throbbing flame of the rifles. At the moment before this outflame some doubt as to their whereabouts seems to have flashed across the mind of their leaders. The order to extend had just been given, but the men had not had time to act upon it. The storm of lead burst upon the head and right flank of the colum'n, which broke to pieces under the murderous volley. Wauchope was shot, struggled up, and fell once more forever. Rumor has placed words of reproach upon his dying lips, but his nature, both gentle and soldierly, forbids the supposition "What a pity! " was the only utterance which a brother Highlander ascribes to him. Men went down in swaths, and a howl of rage and agony, heard afar over the veldt, swelled up from the frantic and struggling crowd. By the hundred they dropped — some dead, some wounded, ^ome knocked down by the rush and sway of the broken ranks. It was a horrible business. At such a range and in such a formation a single Mauser bullet may well pass through many men. A few dashed forward, and were found dead at the very edges of the trench. The head of the brigade broke and, disentangling themselves with difficulty from the dead and the dying, fled back out of that accursed place. Some, the most unfortunate of all, became caught in the darkness in the wire defences, and were found in the morning hung up " like crows," as one spectator describes it, and riddled with bullets. I BATTLE OF MAGKRSFONTKIN 133 Who shall blame the Highlanders for retiring when they did? Viewed, not by desperate and terrified men, but in all calmness and sanity, it may well seem to have been the very best thing which they could do. Dashed into chaos, separated from their officers, with no one who knew what was to be done, the first necessity was to gain shelter from this deadly fire, which had already stretched six hundred of their number upon the ground. But the danger was that men so shaken would be stricken with panic, scatter in the darkness over the face of the coun- try, and cease to exist as a military unit. But the High- landers were true to their character and their traditions. There was shouting in the darkness, noarso voices calling for the Seaforths, for the Argylls, for Company C, for Company H, and everywhere in the gloom there came the answer of the clansmen. Within half an ho ir with the break of day the Highland regiments had re-formed (a company and a half left of the Black Watch), and, shattered and weakened, but undL mted, prepared to renew the contest. Some attempt at an advance was made upon the right, ebbing and flowing, one little band even reaching the trenches and coming back \vith prison- ers and reddened bayonets. For the most part the men lay upon their faces, and fired when they could at the enemy; but the cover which the latter kept was so excel- lent that an officer who expended one hundred and twenty rounds has left it upon record that he never once had seen anything positive at which to aim. Lieutenant Lindsay brought the Seaforths' Maxim into the firing-line, and, though all her crew except two were hit, it continued to do good service during the day. The Lancers' Maxim was equally staunch, though it also was left finally v;ith only the lieutenant in charge and one trooper to work it. Fortunately the guns were at hand, and, as usual, they were quick to come to the aid of the distressed. The sun was hardly up before the howitzers were throwing lyddite at foui; thousand yards, the three field batteries (Kighteenth, Sixty-second, Seventy-fifth) were working with shrapnel at a mile, and the troop of Horse Ar- 1 134 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR tiTcry was up at the right front trying to enfilade the trenches. The guns kept down the ritie fire, and gave the wearied Highlanders some respite from their troubles. The whole situation had resolved itself now into another Dattle of Modder River. The infantry, under a fire at from six hundred to eight hundred paces, could not ad- vance and would not retire. The artillery only kept the battle going, and the huge naval gun from behind was joining with its deep bark in the deafening uproar. But the Uoers had already learned — and it is one of their most valuable military qualities that they assimilate their ex- perience so quickly — that shell fire is less dangerous in trench than among rocks. These trenches, extraordinarily elaborate in character, had been dug some hundreds of yards from the foot of the hills, so that there was hardly any guide to our artillery fire. Yet it is to the artillery fire that all the losses of the ])oers that day were due. The cleverness of Cronje's disposition of his trenches some hundred yards ahead of the kopjes is accentuated by the fascination which any rising object has for a gunner. Prince Kraft tells the story of how at Sadowa he unlim- bered his guns two hundred yards in front of the church of Chlum, and how the Austrian reply fire almost invari- ably pitched upon the steeple. So our own gunners, even at a two-thousand-yard mark, found it difficult to avoid overshooting the invisible line, and hitting the obvious mark behind. As the day wore on reinforcements of infantry came up from the force which had been left to guard the camp. The Gordons arrived with the first and second battalions of the Coldstream Guards, and all the artillery was moved nearer to the enemy's position. At the same time, as there were some indications of an attack upon our right fiank, the Grenadier Guards with five companies of the Yorkshire Light Infantry were moved up in that direction, while the three remaining companies of Barter's York- shiremen secured a drift over which the enemy might cross the Modder. This threatening movement upon our right flank, which would have put the Highlanders into f BATTLI', OF MAGl'.RSrONTKIN T35 It ir 10 an impossible position had it succeeded, was most gal- lantly held bick all morning, before the arrival of the Guards and the Yorkshires, by the mounted infantry and the Twelfth Lancers, skirmishing on foot. It was in this long and successful struggle to cover the Hank of the Third Brigade that Major Milton, Major Ray, and many another brave man met his end. The Coldstreams and (Irenadiers relieved the pressure upon this side, and the Lancers retired to their horses, having shown, not for the first time, that the cavalryman with a modern carbine can at a pinch very quickly turn himself into a most use- ful infantry soldier. Lord Airlie deserves all praise for his unconventional use of his men, and for the gallantry with which he threw both himself and them into the most critical corner of the fight. While the Coldstreams, the Grenadiers, and the York- shire Light Infantry were holding back the Hoer attack upon our right flank the indomitable Gordons, the men of Dargai, furious with the desire to avenge their com- rades of the Highland Brigade, had advanced straight against the trenches and succeeded without any very great loss in getting within four hundred yards of them. liut a single regiment could not carry the position, and any- thing like a general advance upon it was out of the ques- tion in broad daylight after the punishment which we had received. Any plans of the sort which may have passed through Lord Methuen's mind were driven away forever by the sudden unordered retreat of the stricken brigade. They had been very roughly handled in this, which was to most of them their baptism of fire, and they had been without food and water under a burning sun all day. They fell back rapidly for a mile, and the guns were for a time left partially exposed. Fortunately the lack of initiative on the part of the Boers which has stood our friend so often came in to save us from disaster and humiliation. It is due to the brave unshaken face which the Guards presented to the enemy that our repulse did not deepen into something still more serious. The Gordons and the Scots Guards were still in attend- 1: l\ 136 THK GRKAT BOl^R WAR ance upon the guns, but they had been advanced very close to the enemy's trenches, and there were no other troops in support. Under these circumstances it was imperative that the Highlanders should rally, and Ma- jor Ewart with other surviving officers rushed among the scattered ranks and strove hard to gather and to stiffen them. The men were dazed by what they had undergone, and nature shrank back from that deadly zone where the bullets fell so thickly. But the pipes blew, and the bugles sang, and the poor tired fellows, the Lacks of their legs so flayed and bjistered by lying in the sun that they could hardly bend them, hobbled back to their duty. They worked up to the guns once more, and the moment of danger passed. But as the evening wore on it became evident that no attack could succeed, and that therefore there was no use in holding the men in front of the enemy's position. The dark Cronje, lurking among his ditches and his barbed wire, was not to be approached, far less defeated. There are some who think that, had we held on there as we did at the Modder River, the enemy would again have been accommodating enough to make way for us during the night, and the morning would have found the road clear to Kimberley. I know no grounds for such an opinion — but several against it. At Modder Cronje abandoned his lines, knowing that he had other and stronger ones behind him. At Magersfontein a level plain lay behind the Boer position, and to abandon it was to give up the game altogether. Besides, why should he abandon it.-* He knew that he had hit us hard. We had made abso- lutely no impression upon his defences. Is it likely that he would have tamely given up all his advantages and surrendered the fruits of his victory without a struggle ? It is enough to mourn a defeat without the additional agony o'^ thinking that a little more perseverance might have turned it into a victory. The Boer position could only be taken by outflanking it, and we were not numer- ous enough nor mobile enough to outflank it. There lay the whole secret of our troubles, and no conjectures as to m I jht lid er- lay to If BATTLr: OF MAGKRSKONTI'.IN \}j what might under other circumstances have happened can alter it. About half-past five the Boer guns, which had for some unexplained reason been silent all day, opened upon the cavalry. Their appearance was a signal for the general falling back of the centre, and the last attempt to retrieve the day was abandoned. The Highlanders were dead- beat; the Coldstreams had had enough; the mounted in- fantry was badly mauled. There remained the Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, and two or three line regiments who were available for a new attack. There are occasions, such as Sadowa, where a General must play his last card. 'I here are others where, with reinforcements in his rear, he can do better by saving his force and trying once again. General Grant had an ixioni that the best time for an advance was when you were utterly exhausted, for that was the moment when your enemy was probably ut- terly exhausted, too, and of two such forces the attacker has the moral advantage. Lord Methuen determined — and no doubt wisely — that it was no occasion for coun- sels of desperation. His men were withdrawn — in some cases withdrew themselves — outside the range of the Boer guns, and next morning saw the whole force with bitter and humiliated hearts on their way back to their camp at Modder River. The repulse of Magersfontein cost the British nearly a thousand men, killed, wounded, and missing, of which over seven hundred belonged to the Highlanders. Fifty- seven officers had fallen in that brigade alone, including their Brigadier and Colonel Downman of the Gordons. Colonel Codrington of the Coldstreams was wounded early, fought through the action, and came back in the evening on a Maxim gun. Lord Winchester of the same battalion was killed, after injudiciously but heroically exposing himself all day. The Black Watch alone had lost nineteen officers and over three hundred men killed and wounded, a catastrophe which can only be matched in all the bloody and glorious annals of that splendid regiment by their slaughter at Ticonderoga in 1757, when 'J« THK GRKAT BOI-R WAR no fewer than five hundred fell before Montcalm's mus- kets. Never has Scotland had .: more grievous day than this of Magersfontein. She has always given her best blood with lavish generosity for the Kmpire, but it may be doubted if any single battle has ever put so many families of high and low into mourning from the Tweed to the Caithness shore. There is a legend that when sorrow comes upon Scotland the old Edinburgh Castle is lit by ghostly lights and gleams white at every window in tile mirk of midnight. If ever the watcher could have seen so sinister a sight it should have been on this, the fatal night of December ii, 1899. ^^^ ^^ ^'^^" V>otr loss it is impossible to determine it. Their ofUlcinl returns stated it to be seventy killed and two hundred and fifty wounded, but the reports of prisoners and deserters placed it at a very much higher figure. One unit, the Scandi- navian corps, was placed in an advanced position at Spytfontein, and was overwhelmed by the Seaforths, who killed, wounded, or took the eighty men of whom it was composed. The stories of prisoners and of deserters all speak of losses very much higher than those which have been officially acknowledged. In his comments upon the battle next day Lord Meth- uen is said to have given deep offence to the Highland ]}rigade by laying the blame of the failure upon them, and stating that ha! they advanced instead of retiring the position would have been taken. The attack, he held, had been correctly timed, and only needed to be pushed home. The reply to this is the obvious one that the brigade had certainly not been prepared for the attack, and that it is asking too much that unprepared men after such terrible losses should carry out in the darkness a scheme which they do not understand. From the death of Wauchope in the early morning, until the assumption of the command of the brigade by Hughes-Hallett in the late afternoon, no one seems to have taken the direction. " My lieutenant was wounded and my captain was killed," says a private. "The General was dead, but we stayed where we were, for there was no order to retire." That ■i RATTM' OF MAGl'RSKONTI.IN 1,^9 was the story of the whole brigade, until the flanking niovcnient of thj Hoers compelled them to fail ')ack. The most striking lesson of the engagement is the ex- treme bloodiness of modern warfare under some condi- tions, and its bloodlessness under others. Here, out of a total of something under a thousand casualties, seven hundred were incurred in about five minutes, and the whole (lay of ;>iiell, machine-gun, and rille fire only fur- nished the odd tliree hundred. So also at Lombard's Ivop the liritish forces (White's column) were under heavy fire from 5 : 30 to 1 1 :3o, and the loss again was something under three hundred. VV^ith conservative gen- eralship the losses of the battles of the future will be much less tlian those of the past, and as a consequence the battles themselves will last much longer, and it will be the most enduring rather than the most fiery which will win. The supply of food and water to the comijatants will become of extreme importance to keep them up dur- ing the prolonged trials of endurance, which will last for weeks rather than days. On the other hand, when a General's force is badly compromised, it will be so pun- ished that a quick surrender will be the only alternative to annihilation. On the subject of the quarter-column formation which proved so fatal to us, it must be remembered that any other form of advance is hardly possible during a night attack, though at Tel-el-Kebir the exceptional circum- stance of the march being over an open desert allowed the troops to move for the last mile or two in a more ex- tended formation. A line of battalion double company columns is most difficult to preserve in the darkness, and any confusion may lead to disaster. The whole mistake lay in a miscalculation of a few hundred yards in the position of the trenches. Had the regiments deployed five minutes earlier it is probable (though by no means certain) that the position would have been carried. The action was not without those examples of military virtue which soften a disaster, and hold out a brighter promise for the future. The Guards withdrew from the 140 THE GREAT BOER WAR field as if on parade, with tiie Boer shells bursting over their ranks. Fine, too, was the restraint of G Battery of Horse Artillery on the morning after the battle. An armistice was understood to exist, but the naval gun, in ignorance of it, opened on the extreme left. The Boers at once opened fire upon the Horse Artillery, who, recog- nizing the mistake, remained motionless and unlimbered in a line, with every horse, and gunner, and driver in his place, without taking any notice of the fire, which pres- ently slackened and stopped as the enemy came to under- stand the situation. But of all the corps who deserve praise, there was none more gallant than the brave surgeons and ambulance bearers, who encounter all of the dangers and enjoy none of the thrills of warfare. All day under fire these men worked and toiled among the wounded. Beevor, Ensor, Probyn — all were equally devoted. It is almost incred- ible, and yet it is true, that by ten o'clock on the morn- ing after the battle, before the troops had returned to camp, no less than five hundred wounded were in the train and on their way to Cape Town. i r, u Chapter 'Ten THE BATTLE OF STORMBERG Some attempt has now been made to sketch the succes- sion of events which had ended in the investment of Ladysmith in Northern Natal, and also to show the for- tunes of the force which on the western side of the seat of war attempted to advance to the relief of Kimberley. The distance oetvveen these forces may be expressed in terms familiar to the European reader by saying that it was that which separates Paris from P>ankfort or to the American by suggesting that Ladysmith was at IJoston and that Methuen was trying to relieve Philadelphia. Waterless deserts and rugged mountain ranges divided the two scenes of action. In the case of the British there could be no connection between the two move- ments, but the Boers by a land journey of something over a hundred miles had a double choice of a route by which Cronje and Joubert might join hands, either by the Bloemfontein-Johannesburg-Laing's Nek Railway, or by the direct line from Harrismith to Ladysmith. The possession of these internal lines should have been of enormous benefit to the Boers, enabling them to throw the weight of their forces unexpectedly from the one flank to the other. In 'X future chapter it will be recorded how the army corps arriving from England was largely diverted into Natal in order in the first instance to prevent the colony from being overrun, and in the second to rescue the be- leaguered garrison. In the mean time it is necessary to deal with the military operations in the broad space be- tween the eastern and western armies. After the declaration of war there was a period of some ^ 142 THE GREAT BOER WAR weeks during which the position of the Uritish over the whole of the northern part of Cape Colony was full of danger. Immense supplies had been gathered at De Aar which were at the mercy of a Free State raid, and the burghers, had they possessed a cavalry leader with the dash of a Stuart or a Sheridan, might have dealt a blow which would have cost us a million pounds' worth of stores and dislocated the whole plan of campaign. How- ever, the chance was allowed to pass, and when, on No- vember the first, the burghers at last in a leisurely fash- ion sauntered over the frontier, arrangements had been made by reinforcement and by concentration to guard the vital points. The objects of the British leaders, until the time for a general advance should come, were to hold the Orange River Bridge (which opened the way to Kim- berley), to cover De Aar Junction, where the stores were, to protect at all costs the line of railway which led from Cape Town to Kimberley, and to hold on to as much as possible of those other two lines of railway which led, the one through Colesberg and the other through Stormberg, into the Free State. The two bodies of invaders who entered the colony moved along the line of these two railways, the one crossing the Orange River at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie. They enlisted many re- cruits among the Cape Colony Dutch as they advanced, and the scanty British forces fell back in front of them, abandoning Colesberg on the one line and Stormberg on the other. We have, then, to deal with the movements of two British detachments. The one which operated on the Colesberg line — which was the more vital of the two, as a rapid advance of the Boers upon that line would have threatened the precious Cape Town-Kimberley line — consisted almost entirely of mounted troops, and was under the command of the same General French who had won the battle of Elandslaagte. By an act of foresight which was only too rare upon the British side in the earlier stages of this war, French, who had in the recent large manoeuvres on Salisbury Plain shown great ability as a cavalry leader, was ^nt out of Ladysmith in the BATTLE OF STORMBKRG 143 ht Int h he very last train which made its way through. His opera- tions, with his instructive use of cavalry and horse artil- lery, may be treated separately. The other British force which faced the Boers who were advancing through Stormberg was commanded by Gen- eral (iatacre, a man who bore a high reputation for fear- lessness and tireless energy, though he had been criti- cised, notably during the Soudan campaign, for having called upon his men for undue and unnecessary exertion. "General Back-acher " they called him, with rough sol- dierly chaff. A glance at his long thin figure, his gaunt Don Quixote face, and his aggressive jaw would show his personal energy, but might not satisfy the observer that he possessed those intellectual gifts which qualify for high command. At the action of the Atbara he, the brigadier in command, was the first to reach and to tear down with his own hands the zareeba of the enemy — a gallant exploit of the soldier, but a questionable position for the General. The man's strength and his weakness lay in the incident. General Gaticre was nominally in command of a divi- sion, but so cruelly had his men been diverted from him, some to Buller in Natal and some to Methuen, that he could iiot assemble more than a brigade. Falling back before the Boer advance, he found himself early in De- cember at Sterkstroom, while the Boers occupied the very strong position of Stormberg, some thirty miles to the nort' of him. With the enemy so near him it was Gat- acre 6 nature to attack, and the moment that he thought himself strong enough he did so. No doubt he had pri- vate information as to the dangerous hold which the Boers were getting upon the Colonial Dutch, and it is possible that while Buller and Methuen were attacking east and west they urged Gatacre to do something to hold the enemy in the centre. On the night of December the 9th he advanced. The fact that he was about to do so, and even the hour of the start, appear to have been the common property of the camp some days before the actual move. The "Times" correspondent, under the i ■ i I fi i 144 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR date December the 7th, details all that it is intended to do. It is to the cred't of our generals as men, but to their detriment as soldiers, that they seem throughout the campaign to have shown extraordinarily little power of dissimulation. They did the obvious, and usually allowed it to be obvious what they were about to do. One thinks of Napoleon striking at Egypt; how he gave it abroad tl it the real object of the expedition was Ire- land, but breathed into the ears of one or two intimates that in verv truth it was bound for Genoa. The leading official at 1 oulon had no more idea where the fleet and army of France had gone than the humblest caulker in the yard. However, it is not fair to expect the subtlety of the Corsican from the downright Saxon, but it remains strange and deplorable that in a country filled with spies any one should have known in advance that a so-called "surprise" was about to be attempted. The force with which General Gatacre advanced con- sisted of the Second Northumberland Fusiliers, 960 strong, with one Maxim; the Second Irish Rifles, 840 strong, with one Maxim; 250 Cape Mounted Rifles, with four light guns, and 250 Mounted Infantry. There were two batteries of Field Artillery, the Seventy-fourth and Seventy-seventh. The total force was well under 3,000 men. It hr.: been stated that of the two infantry bat- talions engaged one had been out early upon a field day on the day of march and the other had been engaged in laborious fatigue work. About three in the afternoon the men were entrained in open trucks under a burning sun, and for some reason, at which the impetuous spirit of the General must have chafed, were kept waiting for three hours. At eight o'clock they detrained at Mol- teno, and thence after a short rest and a meal they started upon the night march which was intended to end at the break of day at the Boer trenches. One feels as if one were describing the operations of Mag- ersfontein once again, and the parallel continues to be painfully exact. It was nine o'clock and pitch dark when the column — -^ -'— '•"^' BATTLE OF STORMBERG 145 the lumn moved out of Molteno and struck across the black gloom of the veldt, the wheels of the guns being wrapped i n thi hide to deaden the rattle. It was known tance was not more than ten miles, and so when hour followed after hour and the guides were still unable to say that they had reached their point it must have become perfectly evident that they had missed their way. The men were dog tired, a long day's work had been followed by a long night's march, and they plodded along drow- sily through the darkness. The ground was broken and irregular. The weary soldiers stumbled as they marched. Daylight came and revealed the column still looking for its objective, the fiery General walking in front and lead- ing his horse behind him. It was evident that his plans had miscarried, but his energetic and hardy temperament would not permit him to turn back without a blow being struck. And yet, however one may commend his energy, one cannot but stand aghast at his dispositions. The country was wild and rocky, the very places for those tactics of the surprise and the ambuscade in which the Hoers excelled. And yet the column still plodded aim- lessly on in its dense formation, and if there were any attempt at scouting ahead and on the flanks the result showed how ineffectively it was carried out. It was at a quarter past four in the clear light of a South African morning that a shot, and then another, and then a rolling crash of musketry, told that we were to have one more rough lesson of the result of neglecting the usual precau- tions of warfare. High up on the face of a steep line of hill the Hoer riflemen lay hid, and from a short range their fire scourged our exposed flank. The men appear to have been chielly colonial rebels, and not lioers of the back veldt, and to that happy chance it may be that the comparative harmlessness of their fire was due. Even now, in spite of the surprise, the situation might have been savjd had the bewildered troops and their harried officers known exactly what to do. It is easy to be wi^e after the event, but it appears now that the only course that could commend itself would be to extricate the 10 '•1 : 146 THE GREAT BOER WAR troops from their position, and then, if thought feasible, to plan an attack. Instead of this a rush was made at the hillside, and the infantry made their way some dis- tance up it only to find that there were positive ledges in front of them which could not be climbed. The advance was at a dead stop, and the men lay down under the bowlders for cover from the hot fire which came from in- accessible marksmen above them. Meanwhile the artil- lery had opened behind them, and their fire (not for the first time in this campaign) was more deadly to their friends than to their foes. At least one prominent officer fell among his men, torn by British shrapnel bullets. Talana Hill and Modder River have shown also, though perhaps in a less tragic degree, that what with the long range of modern artillery fire, and what with the diffi- culty of locating infantry who are using smokeless pow- der, it is necessary that officers commanding batteries should be provided with the coolest heads and the most powerful glasses of any men in the service, for a respon- sibility which will become more and more terrific rests upon their judgment.' The question now, since the assault had failed, was how to extricate the men from their position. Many withdrew down the hill, running the gauntlet of the enemy's fire as they emerged from the bowlders on to the open ground, while others clung to their positions, some from a soldierly hope that victory might finally incline to them, others because it was clearly safer to lie among the rocks than to cross the bullet-swept spaces beyond. Those portions of the force who extricated themselves do not appear to have realized how many of theii comrades had remained behind, and so as the gap gradually in- creased between the men who were stationary and the men who fell back all hope of the two bodies reuniting became impossible. All the infantry who remained upon ' A suggestion wliicli appears to me to be admirable has been made by Major Hanwell, Thirty-ninth R. F. A. It is that advancing infantry should show a flag or other signal, not in their tiring line, but at a pre-arranged distance behind them. was iany the the iome ;line hong lond. !sdo lades in- the |ting ipon Ibeen Icing I. but BATTLE OF STORM BKRG 147 the hillside were captured. The rest rallied at a point fifteen hundred yards from the scene of the surprise, and began an orderly retreat to Molteno. In the mean while three powerful Boer guns upon the ridge had opened fire with great accuracy but fortunately with defective shells. Had the enemy's contractors I ;en as trustworthy as their gunners in this campaign our losses would have been very much heavier, and it is pos- sible that here we catch a glimpse of some consequences of that corruption which was one of the curses of the country. The guns were moved with great smartness along the ridge, and opened fire again and again, but never with great result. Our own batteries, the Seventy- fourth and Seventy-seventh, with our handful of mounted men, worked hard in covering the retreat and holding back the enemy's pursuit. It is a sad subject to discuss, but it is the one instance in a campaign containing many reverses which amounts to demoralization among the troops engaged. The Guards marching with the steadiness of Hyde Park off the field of Magersfontein, or the men of Nicholson's Nek chafing because they were not led in a last hopeless charge, are, even in defeat, object-lessons of military virtue. liut here fatigue and sleeplessness had taken all fire and spirit out of the men. They dropped asleep by the roadside and had to be prodded up by their exhausted officers. Many were taken prisoners in their slumbers by the enemy who gleaned behind them. Units broke into small straggling bodies, and it was a sorry and be- draggled force which about ten o'clock came straggling into Molteno. The place of honor in the rear was kept throughout by the Irish Rifles, who preserved some mili- tary formation to the end. Our losses in killed and wounded were not severe — military honor would have been less sore had they been more so. Twenty-six killed, sixty-eight wounded — that is all. But between the men on the hillside and the somnambulists of the column, six hundred, about equally divided between the Irish Ritles and the Northumberland H I 148 rWl. (iiRI.AT B()i:k WAR I''ii.silieis, had biuMi left as prisoners. Two guns, too, hail boon lost in the iuuricd retreat. it is not for the historian esjjecially for a civilian historian to say a wonl unnecessarily to aggravate the pain of tiiat brave man who, having done all that per- sonal courage could do, was seen afterward sobbing on the table of the waiting-room at Molteno, and bewailing h IS poor men. He had a tlisaster. but Nelson had one at TenerilVe and Napi)leon at Acre, and built their great reputatit)ns in sjiite of it. JUit the one good thing of a disaster is that by examining it we may learn to do lid indeed be il< future, thing if we agreed that our reverses were not a lit subject for open and frank discussion. It is not to the detriment of an enterprise that it shoulil be daring and call for considerable physical effort upon the part of those who are engaged in it. On the contrary, the conception of such plans is one of the signs of a great military mind. I5ut in the arranging of the details the same military mind should assiiluously occupy itself in foreseeing and preventing every unnecessary thing which may make the execution of such a plan more dilVicult. The idea of a swift sudden attack upon Storm- berg was excellent — the details of the operation are con- tinually open to criticism. Passing over the fact — the root, probably, of all the trouble — that the plan was known in the camp at least two days before it was carried out, what can one say about the work to which the troops were subjected before starting on their tiring expedition.'' What also for those three hours in open trucks which alone were enough to jade them.'' When the column had traversed a longer distance than that between ISIolteno and the place to be attacked, was it not time to halt and reconsider the whole position? Wh'n daylight found the column wandering in an enemy's country, was it not advisable to advance in open order with flanking scouts? Could not the attack be guided into some direction which was not inaccessi- ble? There were troops, the Royal Scots, in Molteno. f BATTTJ'. OF STORM RKRG 149 111 the least e say efore those |igh to jonger to be kvhole ering ce in ttack :essi- teno. Could they not have been left on the line of retreat so as to form a rallying-point in case of a mishap? These are a few of the (|uestions which suggest themselves to the mind of the least censorious of observers. How far the Hocrs suffered at Stormberg is unknown to us, but there secerns in this instance no reason to doubt their own statement tliat their losses were very slight. At no time was any body of them exposed to our lire, wiule we, as usual, fought in the open, 'I'heii numbers were probably less tiian ours, and the (juality oj their shooting and want of energy in jmrsuit make the defeat the more galling. On the other hand, their guns were served with skill and autlacity. They consisted of commandoes from l)i;thulie, Kouxville, and Smithlleld, under the orders of Olivier, with those colonials whom they had seduced from their allegiance. This defeat of (leneral Oatacre's, occurring, as it did, in a disaffected district and one of great strategic impor- tance, might have produced the worst consequences. Fortunately no very evil result followed. No doubt the recruiting of rebels was helped, but there was no forward movement and Molteno remained in our hands. In the meanwhile Gatacre's force was reinforced by a fresh bat- tery, the Seventy-ninth, and by a strong regiment, the Derbyshires, so that with the First Koyal Scots and the wing of the JJerkshires he was strong enough to hold his own until the time for a general advance should come. So in the Stormberg district, as at the Modder River, the same humiliating and absurd position of stalemate was established. Chapter Eleven BATTIJ; OK COLKNSO Two serious defeats had within the week been inflicted upon the JJritish forces in South Africa. The dark Cronje, lurking behind his trenches and his barbed wire entanglement, barred Methuen's road to Kiniberley, while in the northern part of Cape Colony (latacre's wearied troops had been defeated and driven by a force which consisted largely of JJritish subjects. J>ut the public at home steeled their hearts and fixed their eyes steadily upon Natal. T' 're was their senior general and there the main body « . their troops. As brigade after brigade and battery after battery touched at Cape Town, and were sent on instantly to Durban, it was evident that it was in this quarter that the sni)reme effort was to be made, and that there the light might at last break. In club, and dining-room, and railway car — wherever men met and talked — the same words might be heard: "Wait until I'uller moves." The hopes of a great empire lay in the phrase. It was upon October 30th that Sir George White had been thrust back into Ladysmith. On November 2d telegraphic communication with the town was interrupted. On November 3d the railway line was cut. On Novem- ber loth the JJoers held Colenso and the line of the Tugela. On the i8th the enemy were near Estcourt. On the 2 1 St they had reached the Mooi River. On the 23d Hildyard attacked them at Willow (Iiange. All these actions will be treated elsewhere. This last one marks ihe turn of the tide. From then onwards Sir Redvers Buller was massing his troops at Chieveley in preparation for a great effort to cross the river and to relieve Lady- RA'niJ: OF COM.NSO »5» inflicted ^ 'he dark bed wire ey, while wearied - :e which public at steadily nd there V • bri<;ade -\ )wn, and ,, t that it as to be 1 eak. In vpr men Ti ^1 "Wait ipire lay ite had nber 2d rrupted. Novem- of the irt. On the 23d 11 these 2 marks Redvers Daration Lady- ■■« smith, the guns of which, calling from behiiMl tiie line of northern hills, told their constant tale of restless attack and stubborn defence. Jkit the task was as severe a one as the most fighimg general could ask for. On the southern side the banks lormed a long slope which could be shaved as with a razor by the riile lire of the enemy. How to advance across that broad open zone was indeed a problem. It was one of m;riy occasions in this war in which one won- dered why, if a bullet-proof shield capable of sheltering a lying man could be constructed, a trial should not be given to it. Alternate rushes of com pan it . with a safe rest after each rush would save the troops from the con- tinued tension of that deadly, never-ending fire. How- ever, it is idle to discuss what might have been done to mitigate their trials. The open ground had to be passed, and then they came to — not the enemy, but a broad and deep river, with a single bridge, probably undermined, and a single ford, whicli was found not to exist in prac- tice, lieyond the river was tier after tier of hills, crowned with stone walls and seamed with trenches, defended by ten or twelve thousand of the best marksmen in the world, supported by an admirable artillery. If, in spite of the advance over the open and in spite of the passage of the river, a ridge could still be carried it was only to be commanded by the next, and so, one behind the other, like the billows of the ocean, a series of hills and hollows rolled northwards to Ladysmith. All attacks must be in the open. Ail defence was from under cover. It was a desperate task and yet honor forbade that the garrison should be left to its fate. The venture must be made. The most obvious criticism upon the operation is that if the attack must be made it should not be made under the enemy's conditions. We seem almost to have gone out of our way to make every obstacle the glacis-like approach, the river, the trenches — as diftlcult as possible, b'uture operations were to prove that it was not so difficult to deceive Boer vigilance and by rapid movements to cross the Tugela. A military authority has stated, I know i .1 152 THK GRKAT BOI.R WAR not with what truth, that there is no instance in history of a determined army being stopped by the line of a river, and from Wellington at the Douro to the Russians on the Danube many examj)les of the ease with which they may be passed will occur to the reader. J!ut iUiller had some exceptional difTiculties with which to contend. He was weak in mounted troops, and was opposed to an enemy of exceptional mobility, who miglit attack his llank and rear if he exposed them. He had not that con- siderable preponderance of numbers which came to him later, and which enabled him to attempt a wide turning movement. One advantage he had, the possession of a more powerful artillery, but his heaviest guns were naturally his least mobile, and the more direct his ad- vance the more effective would his guns be. J*"or these or other reasons he determined ujion a frontal attack on the formidable JJoer position, and he moved out of Chieveley Camp for that purpose at daybreak upon Fri- day, December 15th. The force which General J»uller led into action was the finest which any British general had handled since the Jiattle of the Alma. Of infantry he had four strong brigades, the Second (Hildyard's) consisting of the Sec- ond Devons, the Second (Queen's or West Surrey, the Second West Yorkshire, and the Second Kast Surrey; the Fourth Brigade (Lyttelton's) comprising the Second Cameronians, the Third Rifles, the F'irst Durhams, and the First Rifle Brigade; the F'ifth Brigade (Hart's) with the First Inniskilling Fusiliers, the First ('onnaught Rangers, First Dublin Fusiliers, and the Border Regi- ment, this last taking the place of the Second Irish Rifles, who were with Gatacre. There remained the Sixth Brigade (Barton's), which included the Second Royal Fusiliers, the Second Scots Fusiliers, the First Welsh Fusiliers, and the Second Irish Fusiliers — in all about sixteen thousand infantry. The mounted men, who were commanded by Lord Dundonald, included the Thirteenth Hussars, the First Royals, Bethune's Mounted Infantry, Thorneycroft's Mounted Infantry, three squadrons of 1 BATTLK OK COLKNSO »5.^ of South African Horse, with a composite re;j;imenl formed from the mounteil infantry of the Rilles and of the Dub- lin l''usiliers with scjuadrcjus of the Natal Carabineers and the Imperial lA> i^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 23 WES' MAIN sTREET WEBSTER, NY. 14580 (7)6) 872-4503 ^ i66 THE GREAT BOER WAR had no inkling that thei . front trenches were down at the river. Wiih the imperfect means at his disposal he did such scouting as he could, and if his fiery and im- petuous spirit led him into a position which has cost him so dearly it is certainly more easy for the critic to extenu- uate his fault than that subsequent one which allowed the abandoned guns to fall into the hands of the enemy. Nor is there any evidence that the loss of these guns did seriously affect the fate of the action, for at those other parts of the field where the infantry had the full and un- ceasing support of the artillery the result was not more favorable than it was at the centre. So much for Colenso. It was an action which taught us nothing save that we had failed to grasp what had been taught us before. But this time the lesson was learned. Not again should we deliberately fight upon the ground which had been prepared by our enemy. Not again should we in cold blood make frontal attacks upon strong positions. Not again should troops in close forma- tion come under the Boer rifles. We had taken long to learn and had paid dear for our lesson, but now we had mastered it at last. In this darkest hour was born the knowledge which was to lead us to the light. \ •'•! % I *!■ J I Chapter 'Twelve THE DARK HOUR The week which extended from December lo to De- cember 17, 1899, was the blackest one which has been known during our generation, and the most disastrous for British arms which has occurred during this century We had in the short space of seven days lost, beyond all extenuation or excuse, three separate actions. No single one was of great importance in itself, but the cumulative effect, occurring as they did to each of the main British forces in South Africa, was very great. The total loss amounted to about three thousand men and twelve guns while th.^ indirect effects in ;;he way of loss of prestige to ourselves and increased confidence and more numerous recruits to our enemy were incalculable. It is singular to glance at the extracts from the Euro- pean press at that time and to observe the delight and foolish exultation with which our reverses were received Ihat this should occur in the French journals is not un- natural, since our history has been largely a contest with that power, and we can regard with complacency an enmity which is the tribute to our success. Russia too as the least progressive of European States, has a natural antagonism of thought, if not of interests, to the power which stands most prominently for individual freedom and liberal institutions. The same poor excuse may be made for the organs of the Vatican. But what are we to say of the insensate railing of Germany, a country whose ally we have been for centuries.? In the days of Marl- borough m the darkest hours of Frederick the Great, in the great world struggle of Napoleon we have been the ; I 1^ ( * hi:. i68 THE GREAT BOER WAR brothers-in-arms of these people. So with the Austrians also. If both these countries were not finally swept from the map by Napoleon it is largely to iJritish subsidies and British tenacity that they owe it. And yet these are the folk who turned most bitterly against us at the only time in modern history when we had a chance of dis- tinguishing our friends from our foes. Never again, I trust, on any pretext will a British guinea be spent nor a British soldier or sailor shed his blood for such allies. The political lesson of this war has been that we should make ourselves strong within the empire, and let all out- side it, save only our kinsmen of America, go their own way and meet their own fate without let or hindrance from us. It is amazing to find that even the Americans could understand the stock from which they are themselves sprung so little that such papers as the New York •^ Herald " should imagine that our defeat at Colenso was a good opportunity for us to terminate the war. The other leading American journals, however, took a more sane view of the situation, and realized that ten years of such defeats would not find the end either of our resolu- tion or of our resources. In the British Islands and in the empire at large our misfortunes were met by a sombre but unalterable deter- mination to carry the war to a successful conclusion and to spare no sacrifices which could lead to that end. Amid the humiliation of our reverses there was a certain undercurrent of satisfaction that the deeds of our foemen should at least have made the contention that the strong was wantonly attacking the weak an absurd one. Un- der the stimulus of defeat the opposition to the war sensibly decreased. It had become too absurd even for the most unreasonable platform orator to contend that a struggle had been forced upon the Boers when every fresh detail showed how thoroughly they had prepared for such a contingency and how much we had to make up. Many who had opposed the war simply on that sporting instinct which backs the smaller against the larger began to realize that what with the geographical THK DARK HOUR 169 1 ¥ I position of these people, what with the nature of their country, and what with the mobility, number, and hardi- hood of their forces we had undertaken a task which would necessitate such a military effort as we had never before been called upon to make. When Kipling at the dawn of the war had sung of " fifty thousand horse and foot going to Table Bay " the statement ' ad seemed ex- treme. Now it was growing upon the public mind that four times this number would not be an excessive esti- mate. Hut the nation rose grandly to the effort. Their only fear, often and loudly expressed, was that Parlia- ment would deal too tamely with the situation and fail to demand sufficient sacrifices. Such was the wave of feel- ing over the country that it was impossible to hold a peace meeting anywhere without a certainty of riot. The only London daily which had opposed the war, though very ably edited, was overborne by the general sentiment and compelled to change its line. In the provinces also opposition was almost silent, and the great colonies were even more unanimous than the mother country. Misfor- tune had solidified us where success might have caused a sentimental opposition. On the whole, the energetic mood of the nation was reflected by the decided measures of the Government. Before the deep-sea cables had told us the lists of our dead, steps had been taken to prove to the world how great were our latent resources and how determined our spirit. On December i8th, two days after Colenso, the following provisions were made for carrying on the cam- paign: 1. That as General Buller's hands were full in Natal the supervision and direction of the whole campaign should be placed in the hands of Lord Roberts, with Lord Kitchener as his chief of staff. T'^us the famous old soldier and the famous young one were called together to the assistance of the country. 2. That all the remaining army reserves should be called out. 3. That the Seventh Division (ten thousand men) lyo THE GREAT BOER WAR A U i ; ( I' I \ U; l-W should be despatched to Africa, and that an Eighth Di- vision should be formed ready for service. 4. That considerable artillery reinforcements, includ- ing a howitzer brigade, should go out. 5. That eleven militia battalions be sent abroad. 6. That a strong contingent of volunteers be sent out. 7. That a yeomanry mounted force be despatched. 8. That mounted corps be raised at the discretion of the Commander-in-Chief in South Africa. 9. That the patriotic offers of further contingents from the colonies be gratefully accepted. By these measures it was calculated that from seventy to a hundred thousand men would be added to our South African armies, the numbers of which were already not short of a hundred thousand. It is one thing, however, to draw up paper reinforce- ments and it is another, in a free country where no com- pulsion would be tolerated, to turn these plans into actual regiments and squadrons. I'ut if there were any who doubted that this ancient nation still glowed with the spirit of its youth his fears must soon have passed away. P'or this far-distant war, a war of the unseen foe and of the murderous ambuscade, there were so many volunteers that the authorities were embarrassed by their numbers and their pertinacity. It was a stimulating sight to see those long queues of top-hatted, frock-coated young men who waited their turn for the orderly room with as much desperate anxiety as if hard fare, a veldt bed, and Boer bullets were all that life had that was worth the holding. Especially the Imperial Yeomanry, a corp of riders and shots, appealed to the sporting instincts of our race. Many could ride and not shoot, many could shoot and not ride, more candidates were rejected than were ac- cepted, and yet in a very short time eight thousand men from every class were wearing the gray coats and bando- liers. This singular and formidable force was drawn from every part of England and Scotland, with a contin- gent of hard-riding Irish fox-hunters. Noblemen and grooms rode knee to knee in the ranks, and the officers !' 1 THE DARK HOUR ^7T and race, and ac- men n do- awn itin- and peers included many well-known country gentlemen and masters of hounds. Well horsed and well armed, a better force for the work in hand could not be imagined. So high did the patriotism run that corps were formed in which the men not only found their own equipment but contrib- uted their pay to the war fund. Many young men about town justified their existence for the first time. In a single club which is peculiarly consecrated to the j'eu/iesse dorce^ three hundred members rode to the wars. Without waiting for these distant but necessary rein- forcements, the generals in Africa had two divisions to look to, one of which was actually arriving while the other was on the sea. These formed the P'ifth Division under Sir Charles Warren, and the Sixth Division under General Kelly-Kenny. Until these forces should arrive it was obviously best that the three armies should wait, for, unless there should be pressing need of help on the part of the besieged garrisons or imminent prospects of European complications, every week which passed was in our favor. There was therefore a long lull in the war, during which Methuen strengthened his position at Modder River, Gatacre held his own at Sterkstroom, and Buller built up his strength for another attempt at the re- lief of Ladysmith. The only connected series of opera- tions during that time were those of General French in the neighborhood of Colesburg, an account of which will be found in their entirety elsewhere. A short narrative may be given here of the doings of each of these forces until the period of inaction came to an end. Methuen after the repulse at Magersfontein had fallen back upon the lines of Modder River, and had fortified them in such a way that he felt himself secure against assault. Cronje, on the other hand, had extended his position both to the right and to the left, and had strength- ened the works which we had already found so formidable. In this way a condition of stalemate was established which was really very much to our advantage, since Methuen retained his communications by rail, while all supplies to Cronje had to come a hundred miles by road. A ^'1 ij 172 THi: GR1:AT BOl.R WAR i; |.?>i ' 111' Ml II 1^ I I ■ I' Ml lit The British troops, and especially the Highland Brigade, were badly ii. need of a rest after the very severe ordeal which they had undergone. General Hector MacDonald, whose military record had earned the soldierly name of " Fighting Mac," was sent for from India to take the place of the ill-fated VVauchope. Pending his arrival and that of reinforcements, Methuen remained quiet, and the l)0crs fortunately followed his example. From over the northern horizon those silver flashes of light told that Kimberley was dauntless in the present and hopeful of the future. On January 1st the British post of Kuruman fell, by which twelve officers and one hundred and twenty police were captured. The town was isolated, and its capture could have no effect upon the general operations, but it is remarkable as the only capture of a fortified post made by the Boers up to that date. The monotony of the long wait was broken by one dashing raid carried out by a detachment from Methuen's line of communications. This force consisted of 200 Queenslanders, 100 Canadians (Toronto Company), 40 mounted Munster Fusiliers, a New South Wales Ambu- lance, and 200 of the Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry with one horse battery. This singular force, so small in numbers and yet gathered from the ends of the earth, was under the command of Colonel Pilcher. Moving out suddenly and rapidly from Iklmont, it struck at the extreme right of the ]>oer line, which consisted of a laager occupied by the colonial rebels of that part of the country. Nothing could exceed the enthusiasm of the colonists at the prospect of action. "At last!" was the cry which went up from the Canadians when they were ordered to advance. The result was an absolute success. The rebels broke and fled, their camp was taken, and forty of them fell into our hands. Our own loss was slight, three killed and a few wounded. The flying column occupied the town of Douglas and hoisted the British flag there ; but it was decided that the time had not yet come when it could be held, and the force fell back upon Belmont. The rebel prisoners were sent down to Cape Town for ■i\ THK DARK HOUR ^7.^ trial. Ill the four days of this successful little expedition Colonel I'ilcher's force, which consisted partly of infantry, had covered twenty-two, twenty, lifteen, and twenty-four miles. The movement was covered by the advance of a force under Habington from Methuen's force. This de- tachment, consisting of the Ninth and 'I'welfth Lancers, with some i lounted infantry and Cr troop of horse artillery, prevented any interference with Pilcher's force from the north. It is worthy of record that though the two bodies of troops were operating at a distance of thirty miles, they succeeded in preserving a telephonic connection, seven- teen minutes being the average time taken over question and reply. Encouraged by this small success, Methuen's cavalry upon January 9th made another raid over the Free State border, which is remarkable for the fact that save in the case of Colonel Plumer's Rhodes i an force it was the first time that the enemy's frontier had been violated. The expedition under I^abington consisted of the same regiments and the same battery which had covered Pilcher's advance. The line taken was a southeasterly one, so as to get far round the left flank of the Boer position. With the aid of a party of the Victorian Mounted Rifles a considerable tract of country was over- run, and some farmhouses destroyed. The latter extreme measure may have been taken as a warning to the Boers that such depredations as they had carried out in parts of Natal could not pass with impunity, but both the policy and the humanity of such a course appear to be open to question, and there was some cause for the remonstrance which President Kruger shortly after addressed to us upon the subject. The expedition returned to Modder Camp at the end of two days without having seen the enemy. Save for one or two similar cavalry reconnois- sances, an occasional interchange of long-range shells, a little sniping, and one or two false alarms at night, which broke the whole front of Magersfontein into yellow lines of angry light, nothing happened to Methuen's force which is worthy of record up to the time of that move- i*' t^ i\ I" if'. 174 THE GREAT BOER WAR ment of Oetieral Hector MacDonakl to Koodoos Herg which may be considend in connection with Lord Roi)- erts's decisive operations, of which it was really a part. The doings of (Jeneral (Jatacre's force during the long interval which passed between his disaster at Storniberg and the final general advance may be rapidly chronicled. Although nominally in command of a division, Gatacre's troops were continually drafted off to eas; and to west, so that it was seldom that he had more than a brigade under his orders. During the weeks of waiting, his force consisted of three field batteries, the Seventy-fourth, Seventy-seventh, and Seventy-ninth, some mounted police and irregular horse, the remains of the Royal Irish RiHes and the Second Northumberland Fusiliers, the First Royal Scots, the Derbyshire regiment, and the Berkshire, the whole amounting to about fifty-five hundred men, who had to hold the whole district from Sterkstroom to Fast London on the coast, with a victorious enemy in front and a rebel population around. Under these circumstances he could not attempt to do more than to hold his ground at Sterk- stroom, and this he did unflinchingly until the line of the Boer defence broke down. Scouting and raiding expedi- tions, chiefly organized by Captain De Montmorency — whose early death cut short the career of one who pos- sessed every quality of a partisan leader— broke the monotony of inaction. During the week which ended the year a succession of small skirmishes, of which the town of Dordrecht was the centre, exercised our men in irregu- lar warfare. On January 3d the Boer forces advanced and attacked the camp of the Cape Mounted Police, which was some eight miles in advance of Gatacre's main position. The movement, however, was a half-hearted one, and was beaten off with small loss upon their part and less upon ours. From then onwards no movement of importance took place in Gatacre's column until the general advance along the whole line had cleared his difficulties from in front of him. In the mean time General Buller had also been playing M\ rWK DARK HOUR '75 longf ng a waiting game, and, socure in the knowlcdj^e that Lad}- sniith could stil! hohl out, he had been l)uihlin«; up his strength for a second attempt to relieve the hard-pressed and much-enduring garrison. After the repulse at Co- lenso, Hildyard's and I'arton's brigades had remained at Chieveley with the mounted infantry, the naval guns, and two field batteries. The rest of the force retired to Frere, some miles in the rear. Mmholdened by their success, the Hoers sent raiding parties over the Tugela on either tiank, which were only checked by our patrols being ex- tended from Springfield on the west to Weenen on the east. A few plundered farndiouses and a small list of killed and wounded horsemen on either side represented all the result of these spasmodic and half-hearted opera- tions. Time here as elsewhere wa> working for the British, for reinforcements were steadily coming to ]>uller's army. By the new year Sir Charles Warren's division (the Fifth) was nearly complete at Estcourt, whence it could reach the front at any moment. This division included the Tenth Brigade, which consisted of the Second Royal Warwick, the First Yorkshire, the Second Dorsets, and the Second Middlesex; also the Eleventh Brigade, also called the Lancashire Brigade, which was formed by the Second Royal Lancaster, the Second Lancashire Fusiliers, the First South Lancashire, and the York and Lancashire. The division also included the Thirteenth Hussars and the Nineteenth, Twentieth, and Twenty-eighth Batteries of Field Artillery. Other batteries of artillery, including one howitzer battery, came to strengthen Buller's force, which amounted now to more than thirty thousand men. Lnmense transport preparations had to be made, however, before the force could have the mobility necessary for a flank march, and it was not until January nth that Gen- eral Buller's new plans for advance could be set into action. Before describing what these plans were and the disappointing fate which awaited them, we will return to the story of the siege of Ladysmith, and show how nar- rowly the relieving force escaped the humiliation — some t\- I V . .1 i ' 176 IHK GRl<:Ar B()h:R WAR would say the cli.s<^race()f seeing the town which looked to them for help fall beneath their very eyes. That this did not occur is entirely due to the tierce tenacity and savage endurance of the disease-ridden and half-starved men who held on to the frail lines which covered the town. , 1 )()ke(l t this y and arvecl d the ti k Chapter Thirteen LxADYSMITH fc Monday, October 30, 1899, is not a date which can be looked back to with satisfaction by any Briton. In a scrand)linj< and ill-managed action \vc iiad lost our ile- tachod left wing almost to a man, while our right had been hustled with no great loss but with some ignominy into Ladysmith. Our guns had been outshot, our infantry checked, and our cavalry paralyzed. Eight hundred prisoners may seem no great loss when compared with a Sedan, or even with an Ulm, but such matters are com- parative, and the force which laid down its arms at Nicholson's Nek is the largest British force which has surrendered since the days of our great-gr' ndf athers, when the egregious Duke of York commanded in I'landers. Sir George White was now confronted with the certainty of an investment, an event for which apparently no prep- aration had been made, since with an open railway be- hind him so many useless mouths had been permitted to remain in the town. Ladysmith lies in a hollow and is dominated by a ring of hills, some near and some distant. The near ones were in our hands, but no attempt had been made in the early days of the wu to fortify and hold Bulwana, Lombard's Kop, and the other positions from which the town might be shelled. Whether these might or might not have been successfully held has been much disputed by military men, the balance of opinion being that Bulwana, at least, which has a water-supply of its own, might have been retained. This question, how- ever, was already academic, as the outer hills were in the hands of the enemy. As it was, the inner line — Caesar's 12 I ' ' \-.' \ \ I 178 THK GREAT BOER WAR Camp, Wagon Hill, RiHenian's I'ost, and round to Help- makaar Hill — made a perimeter of fourteen miles, and the difficulty of retaining so extensive a line goes far to exonerate General White, not only for abandoning the outer hills, but also for retaining his cavalry in the town. After the battle of Lombard's Kop and the retreat of the British, the Boers in their deliberate b^t effective fashion set about the investment of the town, while the British commander accepted the same as inevitable, con- tent if he could stem and hold back from the Colony the threatened flood of invasion. On Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and t'riday the commandoes gradually closed in upon the south and east, harassed by some cavalry operations and reconnoissances upon our part, the effect of which was much exaggerated by the press. On Thurs- day, November 2d, the last train escaped under a brisk fire, the passengers upon the wrong side of the seats. At 2 P.M. on the same day the telegraph line was cut, and the lonely town settled herself sombrely down to the task of holding off the exultant Boers until the day — supposed to be imminent — when the relieving army should appear from among the labyrinth of mountains which lay to the south of them. Some there were who, knowing both the ("nemy and the mountains, felt a cold chill within their hearts as they asked themselves how an army was to come through; but the greater number, from general to private, trusted implicitly in the valor of their comrades and in the luck of the British army. One example of that historical luck was ever before their eyes in the shape of those invaluable naval guns which had arrived so dramatically at the very crisis of the fight, in time to check the monster on Pepvvorth Hill and to cover the retreat of the army. But for them the besieged must have lain impotent under the muzzles of the huge Creusots. But in spite of the naive claims put forward by the Boers to some special Providence — a proc- ess which a friendly German critic described as "com- mandeering the Almighty "' — it is certain that in a very peculiar degree, in the early months of this war, there *P 1. 1 '}. ii I, LADYSMITH 179 1 guns isis of li Hill m the es of IS put proc- com- Ji very there came aj;iiin and again a happy chance, or a merciful in- terposition, which saved the Jkitish from disaster. Now in til is first week of November, when every hill, north and south, and east pnd west, flashed and smoked, and the great nincty-six-pound shells groaned and screamed over the town, it was to the long, thin 4.7 's and to the hearty, bearded men who worked them, that soldi rs and townfolks looked for help. If they could not save, they could at least hit back, and prnishment is not so bad to bear when one is giving as well as receiving. hy the end of the tirst week of November the Boers had established their circle of fire. On the east of the town, broken by the loops of the Klip River, is a broad green plain, some miles in extent, which furnished graz- ing ground for the horses and cattle of the besieged. Beyond, it rises into a long, Hat-topped hill, the famous BuKvana, upon which lay one great Creusot and several smaller guns. To the north, on l*epworth Hill, was an- other Creusot, and between the two were the Boer bat- teries upon Lombard's Kop. The British naval guns were placed upon this side, for, as the open loop formed by the river lies at this end, it is the part of the defences which is most liable to assault. From thence all round the west down to Beslers in the south was a continuous series of hills, each crowned with Boer guns, which if they could not harm the distant town, were at least effec- tive in holding the garrison to its lines. So formidable were these positions that, amid much outspoken criti- cism, it has never been suggested that White would have been justified with a limited garrison in incurring the heavy loss of life which must have followed an attempt to force them. The first few days of the siege were clouded by the death of Lieutenant Egerton of the " Powerful," one of the most promising officers i*: the navy. One leg and the oth- er foot were carried ofT, as he lay upon the sand bag par- apet watching the effect of the British fire. "There's an end of my cricket," said the gallant sport>man, and was carried to the rear with a cigar between his clenched teeth. II ! i8o THE GREAT BOER WAR On November 3d a strong cavalry reconnoissance was pushed down the Colenso road to ascertain the force which the enemy had in that direction. Colonel Brocklehurst took with him the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Hussars, the Fifth Lancers, and the Fifth Dragoon Guards, with the Light Horse and the Nr.tal Volunteers. Some desul- tory fighting ensued which achieved no end, and was chiefly remarkable for the excellent behavior of the colonials, who showed that they were the equals of the regulars in gallantry and their superiors in the tactics which such a country requires. The death of Major Taunton, Captain Knapp, and young IJrabant, the son of the general who did such good service at a later stage of the war, was a heavy price to pay for the knowl- edge that the Boers were in considerable strength to the south. By the end of this week the town had already settled down to the routine of the siege. General Joubert, with the chivalry which had always distinguished him, had permitted the garrison to send out the non-combatants to a place called Intombi Camp (promptly named Funkers- dorp by the facetious) » where they wer^ safe from the shells, though the burden of their support still fell, of course, upon the much-tried commissariat. The hale and male of the townsfolk refused for the most part to avoid the common danger, and clung tenaciously to their shot-torn village. Fortunately the river has worn down its banks until it runs through a deep channel, in tlie sides of which it was found to be possible to hollow out caves which were practically bomb-proof. Here for some months the townsfolk led a troglodytic existence, return- ing to their homes upon that much-appreciated seventh day of rest which was granted to them by their Sabbata- rian besiegers. The perimeter of the defence had been divided off so that each corps might be responsible for its own section. To the south was the Manchester Regiment upon the hill called Caesar's Camp. Between Lombard's Kop and the town, on the northeast, were the Devons. To the north. •I LADYSMITH i8i at what seemed our vulnerable point, were the Rifle Brigade, the Rifles, and the remains of the Eighteenth Hussars. To the west vv^re the Fifth Lancers, Nine- teenth Hussars, and Fifth Dragoon Guards. The rest of the force was encamped round the outskirts of the town. There appears to have been some idea in the Boer mind that the mere fact tiiat they held a dominant position over the town would soon necessitate the surrender of the army. At the end of a week they had realized, however, just as the Ikitish had, that a siege lay before us. Their tire upon the town was heavy but not deadly, though it became more effective as the weeks went on. Their prac- tice at a range of five miles v/as exceedingly accurate. At the same time their riflemen became more venture- some, and on Tuesday, November 7th, they made a half- hearted attack upon the Manchesters' position on the south, which was driven back without difficulty. Upon the 9th, however, their attempt was of a more serious and sustained character. It began with a heavy shell-fire and with a demonstration of rifle-fire from every side, which had for its object the prevention of reinforcements for the true point of danger, which again was Caisar's Camp at the south. It is evident that the Boers had from the beginning made up their minds that here lay the key of the position, as the two serious attacks — that of Novem- ber 9th and that of January 6th — were directed upon this point. The Manchesters at Caesar's Camp had been reinforced by the First Battalion Sixtieth Rifles, who held the pro- longation of the same ridge, which is called Wagon Hill. With the dawn it was found that the Boer riflemen were within eight hundred yards, and from then till evening a constant fire was maintained upon the hill. The Bc^r, however, save when the odds are all in his favor, is not, in spite of his considerable personal bravery, at his best in attack. His racia' traditions, depending upon the necessity for economy oi" human life, are all opposed to it. As a consequence two regiments well \m 182 THK GREAT BOER WAR posted were able to hold them off all day with a loss which did not exceed thirty killed or wounded, while the enemy, exposed to the shrapnel of the Forty-second battery, as well as the rifle-fire of the infantry, must have suffered very much more severely. The result of the action was a well-grounded belief that in daylight there was very little chance of the Boers being able to carry the British lines. As the date was that of the P'-ince of Wales's birthday, a salute of twenty-one shotted naval guns wound up a successful day. The failure of the attempt upon Ladysmith seems to have convinced the enemy that a waiting game, in which hunger, shell-fire, and disc, se would be their allies, would be surer and less expensive than an open assault. From their distant hill-tops they continued to plague the town, while garrison and citizens sat grimly patient, and learned to endure if not to enjoy the crash of the ninety-six-pound shells, and the patter of shrapnel upon their corrugated- iron roofs. The supplies were adequate, and the besieged were fortunate in the presence of a first- class organizer, Colonel Ward of Islington fame, who with the assistance of Colonel Stoneman systematized the collection and issue of all the food, civil and military, so as to stretch it to its utmost. With rain overhead and mud underfoot, chafing at their own idleness and humiliated by their own position, the soldiers waited through the weary weeks for the relief which never came. On some days there was more shell-fire, on some less; on some there was sniping, on some none; on some they sent a little feeler of cavalry and guns out of the town, on most they lay still— such were the ups and downs of life in Ladysmith. The inevitable siege paper, "The Ladysmith Lyre," appeared, and did something to relieve the monotony by the exasperation of its jokes. Night, morning, and noon the shells rained upon the town until the most timid learned fatalism if not bravery. The crash of the percussion, and the strange musical tang of the shrapnel sounded ever in their ears. With their glasses the garrison could see the gay frocks and parasols if LADYSM ITH ■83 ;| si« J i'l ■a of the Boer ladies who had come down by train to see the torture of the doomed town. The Boers were sufficiently numerous, aided by their strong positions and excellent artillery, to mask the Ladysmith force and to sweep on at once to the conquest of Natal. Had they done so it is hard to see what could have prevented them from riding their horses down to salt water. A few odds and ends, half battalions ah 1 local volunteers, stood between them and Durban. But here, as on the Orange River, a singular paralysis seems to have struck them. When the road lay clear before them the first transports of the army corps were hardly past St. Vincent, but before they had made up their mind to take that road the harbor of Durban was packed with our shipping and ten thousand men had thrown them- selves across their path. For a moment we may leave the fortunes of Ladysmith to follow this southerly movement of the Boers. Within two days of the investment of the town they had swung round their left flank and attacked Colenso, twelve miles south, shelling the Durban Light Infantry out of their post with a long-range fire. The British fell back twenty- seven miles and concentrated at Kstcourt, leaving the all- important Colenso railway bridge in the hands of the enemy. From this onward they held the north of the Tugela, and many a widow wore crepe before we got our grip upon it once more. Never was there a more critical week in the war; but having got Colenso, the Boers did little more. They formally annexed the whole of Northern Natal to the Orange Free State— a dangerous precedent when the tables should be turned. With amazing assur- ance the burghers pegged out farms for themselves and sent for their people to occupy these newly v.on estates. On November 5th the Boers had remained so inert that the British returned in small force to Colenso and removed some stores— which seems to suggest that the original retirement was premature. Four days passed in inactivity — four precious days for us — and on the even- ing of the fourth, November 9th, the watchers on the w \ I, ■ i hi u . If vA V I (] V tc ■ Mi; ' 1 1 ! i 1' ] 1' ■ '! 184 thf: great bokr war signal station at Table Mountain saw the smoke of a great steamer coming past Robben Island. It was the "Roslin Castle" with the first of the reinforcements. Within the week the "Moor," "Yorkshire," " Aurania," "Hawarden Castle," "Gascon," "Armenian," "Ori- ental," had passed for Durban with 15,000 men. Once again the command of the sea had saved the Empire. But, now that it was too late, the Boers suddenly took the initiative, and in dramatic fashion. North of Est- court, where General Hildyara was being daily reinforced from the sea, there are two small townlets, or at least geographical (and railway) points. Frere is about ten miles north of Estcourt, and Chieveley is five miles north of that and about as far to the south of Colenso. On November 15th an armored train was despatched from Estcourt to see what was going on up the line. Already one disaster had befallen us in this campaign on account of these clumsy contrivances, and a heavier one was now to confirm the opinion that, acting alone, they are totally inadmissible. As a means of carrying artillery for a force operating upon either flank of them, with an assured retreat behind, there may be a place for them in modern war, but as a means of scouting they appear to be the most inefficient and also the most expensive that has ever been invented. An intelligent horseman would gather more information, be less visible, and retain some free- dom as to route. After our experience the armored train may steam out of military history. The train contained ninety Dublin Fusiliers, eighty Durban Volunteers, and ten sailors, with a naval seven- pounder gun. Captain Haldane of the Gordons, Lieuten- ant Frankland (Dublin Fusiliers), and Winston Churchill, the well-known correspondent, accompanied the expe- dition. What might have been foreseen occurred. The train steamed into the advancing Boer army, was fired upon, tried to escape, found the rails blocked behind it, and upset. Dublins and Durbans were shot helplessly out of their trucks, under a heavy fire. A railway accident is a nervous thing and so is an ambuscade, but the com- til) I . I LADYSMITH i8s » bination of the two must be appalling. Yet there were brave hearts which rose to the occasion. Haldane and Frankland rallied the troops, and Churchill the engine- driver. The engine was disentangled and sent on with its cab full of wounded. Churchill, who had escaped upon it, came gallantly back to share the fate of his comrades. The dazed, shaken soldiers continued a futile resistance for some time, but there was neither help nor escape and nothing for them but surrender. The most Spartan military critic cannot blame them. A few slipped away besides those who escaped upon the engine. Our losses were two killed, twenty wounded, and about eighty taken. It is remarkable that of the three leaders both Haldane and Churchill succeeded in escaping from Pretoria. A double tide of armed men was now pou.ing into Southern Natal. From below, trainload after trainload of British regulars were coming up to the danger point, feted and cheered at every station. Lonely farmhouses near the line hung out their Union Jacks, and the folk on the stoep heard the roar of the choruses as the great trains swung upon their way. From above the Boers were flooding down, as Churchill sav/ them, dour, reso- lute, riding silently through the rain, or chanting hymns round their camp-fires — brave, honest farmers, but stand- ing unconsciously for mediaevalism and corruption, even as our rough-tongued Tommies stood for civilization, progress, and equal rights for all men. The invading force, the numbers of which could not have exceeded some few thousands, formidable only for their mobility, lapped round the more powerful but less active force at Estcourt, and struck behind it at its com- munications. There was for a day or two some discus- sion as to a further retreat, but Hildyard, strengthened by the advice and presence of Colonel Long, determined to hold his ground. On November 2 ist the raiding Boers were as far south as Nottingham Road, a point thirty miles south of Estcourt and only forty miles north of the considerable city of Pietermaritzburg. The situation was serious. Either the invaders must be stopped, or li I '»■! t86 THK GRKAT BOI.R WAR ■J u \ \ ;^: I U v. 1 ip I, the second largest town in the colony would be in their hands. From all sides came tales of plundered farms and broken households. Some at least of the raiders be- haved with wanton brutality. Smashed pianos, shattered pictures, slaughtered stock, and vile inscriptions, all ex- hibit a predatory and violent side to the paradoxical Jloer character." The next British post behind Hildyard's at B'.stcourt was Barton's upon the Mooi River, thirty miles to the south. Upon this the ]}oers made a half-hearted attempt, but Joubert had begun to realize the strength of the Brit- ish reinforcementsand the impossibility with the numbers at his disposal of investing a succession of ]>ritish posts. He ordered ]^otha to withdraw from Mooi River and be- gin his northerly trek. His movements were accelerated by a sally made by General Hildyard from Estcourt to clear the Boers out of the strong position which they had taken up to the south of him. With this object a force was sent out which con- sisted of the East Surreys, the West Surreys, and the West Yorkshires, with No. 7 Field Battery, two naval guns, and some hundreds of the excellent colonial cavalry. This small army, starting from Willow Grange (which has given its name to the engagement), climbed a steep hill and attacked the enemy at early dawn. A scrambling and confused skirmish, in which once at least we suffered from our own fire, ended in our attaining the object of clearing the position, but at a cost of fourteen killed and fifty wounded or missing. From the action of Willow Grange the Boer invasion receded until General Iiuller, coming to the front on November 27th, fc md that the enemy were once more occupying the line of the Tugela. He himself moved up to Frere, and devoted his time and energies to the collection of that army with which he was destined after three failures to force his way to Ladysmith. ' More than once T have heard the farmers in the Free State acknowledge that the ruin which had come upon them was a just retribution for the excesses of Natal. LADYSMITH 187 Leaving IJuller to organize his army at Frere, and the I^oer commanders to draw their screen of formidable de- fences along the Tugela, we will return once more to the fortunes of the unhappy town round which the interest of the world, and possibly the destiny of the Empire, were centring. It is very certain that had Ladysmith fallen, and ten thousand British soldiers with a million pounds' worth of stores fallen into the hands of the invaders, we should have been faced with the alternative of abandoning the struggle, or of reconquering South Africa from Cape Town northward. South Africa is the keystone of the Empire, and ^or the instant Ladysmith was the key- stone of South Africa. ]]ut the courage of the troops who held the shell-torn townlet, and the confidence of the public who watched them, never faltered for an instant. December 8th was marked by a gallant exploit on the part of the beleaguered garrison. Not a whisper had transpired of the coming sortie, and a quarter of an hour before the start officers engaged had no idea of it. O si sic omnia ! At ten o'clock a band of men slipped out of the town. There were six hundred of them, all irregu- lars, drawn from the Imperial Light Horse, the Natal Carabineers, and the Border Mounted RiHes, under the command of Hunter, youngest and most dashing of ])rit- ish generals. Edwards and Royston were the sub-com- manders. The men had no knowledge of where they were going or what they had to do, but they crept silently along under a drifting sky, with peeps of a quarter moon, over a mimosa-shadowed plain. At last in front of them there loomed a dark mass — it was Gun Hill, from which one of the great Creusots had plagued them so. A strong support (four hundred men) was left at the base of the hill, and the others, one hundred Imperials, one hundred Borders and Carabineers, ten sappers, crept upward with Major Henderson as guide. A Dutch outpost challenged, but was satisfied by a Dutch-speaking Carabineer. Higher and higher the men crept, the silence broken only by the occasional slip of a stone or the rustle of their own breathing. Most of them had left their boots be- l88 THI', (iRl'.AT BOI'K WAR Jul I J^ tl ! r ;l ' low. Even in the darkness they kept some formation, and the right wing curved forward to outllank the de- fence. Suddenly a Mauser crack and a spurt of flame — then another and another! "Come on, boys! Fix bay- onets!" yelled Karri Davies. There were no bayonets, but that was a detail. At the word the gunners were off, and there in the darkness in front of the storming party loomed the enormous gun, gigantic in that uncertain light. Out with the huge breech-block! Wrap the long lean muzzle round w ilh a collar of gun-cotton ! Keep the guard upon the run until the work is done! Hunter stood by with a night light in his hand until the charge was in position, and then, with a crash which brought both armies from their tents, the huge tube reared upon its mountings and toppled backward into the pit. A howitzer lurked beside it, and this also was blown into ruin. The attendant Maxim was dragged back by the exultant captors, wliO reached the town amid shoutings and laughter with the first break of day. One man wounded, the gallant Henderson, is the cheap price for the best-planned and most dashing exploit of the war. Secrecy in conception, vigor in execution — they are the root ideas of the soldier's craft. So easily was the enter- prise carried out, and so defective the Boer watch, that it is probable that if all the guns had been simultane- ously attacked the Boers might have found themselves without .. single piece of ordnance in the morning.' On the same morning (December 9th) a cavalry re- connoissance was pushed in the direction of Pepworth Hill. The object no doubt was to ascertain whether the enemy were still present in force, and the terrific roll of the Mausers answered it in the affirmative. Two killed and twenty wounded was the price which we paid for the ' The destruction of the Creusot was not as complete as was hoped. It was taken back to Pretoria, three feet were sawed off the muzzle, and a new breech-block provided. The gun was then sent to Kimberley, and it was the heavy cannon which arrived late in the history of that siege and caused considerable consternation among the inhabitants. N LADYSMITH 189 information. Tliere had Ijeen tiiree such reconnoissances in the five weeks of the sie}2;e, and it is difficult to see what advantage they gave or how they are to be justified. Far be it for the civilian to dogmatize upon such matters; but one can repeat, and to the best of one's judgment indorse, the opinion of the vast majority of officers. There were heartburnings among the regulars that the colonial troops should have gone in front of them, so their martial jealousy was allayed three nights later by the same task being given to them. Four companies of the Second RiHe lirigade were the troops chosen, with a few sappers and gunners, the whole under the command of Colonel Metcalfe of the same battalion. A single gun, the 4.7 howitzer upon Surprise Mill, was the objective. Again there was the stealthy advance through the dark- ness, again the support was left at the bottom of the hill, again the two companies carefully ascended, again there was the challenge, the rush, the flight, and the gun was in the hands of the stormers. Here and only here the story varies. For some reason the fuse used for the gun-cotton was defective, and half an hour elapsed before the explosion destroyed the howitzer. When it came it came very thoroughly, but it was a weary time in coming. Then our men descended the hill, but the Boers were already crowding in upon them from either side. The English cries of the soldiers were answered in English by the Boers, and slouch hat or helmet dimly seen in the mirk was the only badge of friend or foe. A singular letter is extant from young Reitz (the son of the Transvaal secretary), who was present. According to his account there were but eight Boers present, but assertion or contradiction is equally valueless in the darkness of such a night, and there are some obvious discrepancies in his statement. " We fired among them," says Reitz. "They stopped and all cried out ' Rifie Brigade.' Then one of them said ' Charge! ' One officer. Captain Paley, advanced, though he had two bullet wounds already. Joubert gave him another shot and he fell on the top of us. Four Englishmen got hold 1. 190 THK GRI'AT BOI.R WAR 1,, I : I I I f ' ^ I'i of Jan Luttig and struck him on the head with their rifles and stabbed hint in the stomach with a bayonet. He seized two of them by the throat ami shouted, 'Help, boys! ' His two nearest comrades shot two of them and the other two bolted. Then the Knglish came up in numbers, about eight hundred, along the footpath " (the''e were two hundred on the hill, but the exaggeration is pardonable in the darkness), "and we lay as quiet as mice along the bank. Farther on the Knglish killed three of our men with bayonets and wounded two. In the morning we found Captain I'aley and twenty-two of them killed and wounded." It seems evident that Keitz means that his own little party were eight men, and not that that represented the force which intercepted the re- tiring riHemen. Within his own knowledge five of his countrymen were killed in the scuffle, so the total loss was probably considerable. Our own casualties were eleven dead, forty-three wounded, and six prisoners, but the price was not excessive for the howitzer and for the monr/e which arises from such exploits. Had it not been for that unfortunate fuse the second success might have been as bloodless as the first. " I am sorry," said a sympathetic correspondent to the stricken Paley. " liut we got the gun," Paley whispered, and he spoke for the brigade. Amid the shell-fire, the scanty rations, the enteric and the dysentery, one ray of comfort had always bright- ened the garrison, liuller was only twelve miles away — they could hear his guns — and when his advance came in earnest their sufferings would be at an end. But now in an instant this single light was shut off and the true nature of their situation was revealed to them. Buller had indeed moved, . . . but backward. He had been defeated at Colenso, and the siege was not ending, but beginning. With heavier hearts but undiminished reso- lution the army and the townsfolk settled down to the long, dour struggle. The exultant enemy replaced their shattered guns and drew their lines closer still round the stricken town. LADYSMITH 191 :^& A recoTcl of the siL'<,"e onward until the break of the New Year centres upon the sordid details of the sick re- turns and! of the price of food. Fifty on one day, seventy on the next, passed under the hands of the overworked and devoted doctors. Fifteen hundred, and later two thousand, of the garrison were down. The air was l)oisoned by foul sewage and dark with obscene Hies. 'I'hey speckled the scanty food. Fggs were already a shilling each, cigarettes sixpence, whiskey five pounds a bottle: a city more free from gluttony and drunkenness has never been seen. Shell-fire has shown Itself in this war to be an excellent ordeal for those who desire martial excitement with a minimum of d;;nger. Jlut now and again some black chance guides a bomb — one in five thousand perhaps- to a most tragic issue. Such a deadly missile falling among IJoers near Kitnberley is said to have slain nine and wounded seventeen. In Ladysmith too there are days to be marked in red when the gunner shcjt better than he knew. One shell on December 17th killed six men (Natal Carabineers), wounded three, and destroyed fourteen horses. The grisly fact has been recorded that five separate human legs lay upon the ground. On De- cember 2 2d another tragic shot killed fiv " nnd wounded twelve of the Devons. On the same day four officers of the Fifth Lancers (including the colonel) and one ser- geant were wounded — a most disastrous day. A little later it was again the turn of the Devons, who lost one officer killed and ten wounded. Christmas set in amid misery, hunger, and disease, the more piteous for the grim attempts to amuse the children and live up to the joyous season, when the present of Santa Claus was too often a ninety-six-pound shell. On the top of all other troubles it was now known that the heavy ammunition was running short and must be husbanded for emergen- cies. There was no surcease, however, in the constant hail which fell upon the town. Two or three hundred shells were a not unusual daily allowance. The monotonous bombardment with which the New l't-1 ! 3 s\\ 'f\i 1 : ' I 192 THE GREAT BOER WAR Year had commencd was soon to be varied by a most gallant and spirit-stirring clash of arms. Upon January 6th the Boers delivered their great assault upon Lady- smith — an onfall so gallantly made r^nd gallantly met that it deserves to rank among the classic fights of British military history. It is a tale which neither side need be ashamed to tell. Honor to the sturdy infantry who held their grip so long, and honor also to the rough men of the veldt, who, led by untrained civilians, stretched us to the utmost capacity of our endurance. It may be that the ]ioers wished once for all to have done at all costs with the constant menace to their rear, or it may be that the deliberate preparations of Buller for his second advance had alarmed them, and that they realized that they must act quickly if they were to act at all. At any rate, early in the New Year a most deter- mined attack was decided upon. The storming party consisted of some hundreds of picked volunteers from the Heidelberg (Transvaal) and Harrismith (Free State) contingents, led by de Villiers. They were supported by several thousand riHemen, who might secure their success or cover their retreat. Eighteen heavy guns had been trained upon the long ridge, one end of which has been called Caesar's Camp and the other Wagon Hill. This hill, three miles long, lay to the south of the town, and the Boers had early recognized it as being the most vulnerable point, for it was against it that their attack of November 9th had been directed. Now, after two months, they were about to renevvr the attempt with greater resolution against less robust opponents. At twelve o'clock our scouts heard the sounds of the chant- ing of hymns in the Boer camps. At two in the morning crowds of barefooted men were clustering round the base of the ridge, and threading their way, rifle in hand, among the mimosa-bushes and scattered bowlders which cover the slope of the hill. Some working parties were moving guns into position, and the noise of their labor helped to drown the sound of the Boer advance. Both at Caisar's Camp, the east end of the ridge, and at J. -. LADYSMITH 193 their after with At :h ant- Wagon Hill, the west end (the points being, I repeat, three miles apart), the attack came as a complete sur- prise. The outposts were shot or driven in, and the stormers were on the ridge almost as soon as their pres- ence was detected. The line of rocks blazed with the tlash of their guns. CcEsar's Camp was garrisoned by one sturdy regiment, the Manchesters, aided by a Colt automatic gun. The defence had been arranged in the form of small sangars, each held by from ten io twenty men. Some few of these were rushed in the darkness, but the Lancashire men pulled themselves together and held on strenuously to those which remained. The crash of musketry woke the sleeping town, and the streets resounded with the shout- ing of the ofticers and the rattling of arms as the men mustered in the darkness and hurried to the points of danger. Three companies of the Gordons had been left near Cx'sar's Camp, and these, under Captain Carnegie, threw themselves into the struggle. Four other companies of Gordons came up in support from the town, losing upon the way their splendid colonel, Dick-Cunyngham, who was killed by a chance shot at three thousand yards, on this his first appearance since he had recovered from his wounds at Klandslaagte. Later four companies of the Ritle brigade were thrown into the firing line, and a total of two and a half infantry battalions held that end of the position. It was not a man too much. With the dawn of day it could be seen that the lioers held the southern and we the northern slopes, while the narrow plateau between formed a bloody debatable ground. Along a front of a quarter of a mile fierce eyes glared and ritle barrels Hashed from behind every rock, and the long fight swayed a little back or a little forward with each upward heave of the stormers or rally of the soldiers. For hours the combatants were so near that a stone or a taunt could be thrown from one to the other. Some scattered sangars still held their own, though the Boers had passed them. One such, manned by fourteen privates i3 I. ' I m I mi ! \[. 194 THE GREAT BOER WAR of the Manchester Regiment, remained untaken, but had only two defenders left at the end of the bloody day. With the coming of the light the Fifty-third F'.eld Battery, the one which had already done so admirably at Lombard's Kop, again deserved well of its country. It was impossible to get behind the Boers and fire straight at their position, so every shell fired had to skim over the heads of our own men upon the ridge and so pitch upon the reverse slope. Yet so accurate was 'he fire, carried on under an incessant rain of shells from the big Dutch gun on Bulwana, that not one shot miscarried, and that Major Abdy and his men succeeded in sweep- ing the farther slope without loss to our own fighting line. Exactly the same feat was equally well performed at the other end of the position by Major Blewitt's Twenty-first Battery, which was exposed to an even more searching fire than the Fifty-third. Any one who has seen the iron endurance of British gunners and marvelled at the answering shot which flashes out through the very dust of the enemy's exploding shell, will understand how fine must have been the spectacle of these two batteries working in the open, with the ground round them sharded with splinters. Eye-witnesses have left it upon record that the sight of Major Blewitt strolling up and down among his guns, and turning over with his toe the last fallen section of iron, was one of the most vivid and stirring impressions which they carried from the fight. Here ..'so it was that the gallant Sergeant Bosley, his arm and his leg stricken off by a Boer shell, cried to his comrades to roll his body off the trail and go on working the gun. At the same time as — or rather earlier than — the on- slaught upon Caesar's Camp, a similar attack had been made with secrecy and determination upon the western end of the position, called Wagon Hill. The barefooted Boers burst suddenly with a roll of rifle-fire into the little garrison of Imperial Light Horse and sappers who held the position. Mathias of the former, Digby-Jones and Dennis of the latter, showed that "two-in-the-morning" •■i : LADYSMITH 195 but had day. d F\e\d rably at itry. It straight :im over 10 pitch he fire, rom the icarried, sweep- fighting rformed 3lewitt's en more las seen slled at he very ind how satteries [sharded record down le last id and e fight. ey, his to his /orking le on- been western footed e little held s and ning" ^^^■ courage which Napoleon rated as the highest of military virtues. They and their men were surprised but not disconcerted, and stood desperately to a slogging match at the closest quarters. Seventeen sappers were down out of thirty, and more than half the little body of irregu- lars. This end of the position was feebly fortified, and it is surprising that so experienced and sound a soldier as Ian Hamilton should have left it so. The defence had no marked advantage as compared with the attack, neither trench, sangar, nor wire entanglement, and in numbers they were immensely inferior. Two companies of the Sixtieth Rifles and a small body of the ubiquitous Gordons happened to be upon the hill and threw them- selves into the fray, but they were unable to turn the tide. Of thirty-three Gordons under Lieutenant MacNaughten, thirty were wounded. As our men retired under the shelter of the northern slope they were reinforced by an- other hundred and fifty Gordons under the stalwart Miller-Wallnutt, a man cast in the mould of a Berserk viking. To their aid also came two hundred of the Imperial Light Horse, burning to assist their comrades. Another half battalion of Rifles came with them. At each end of the long ridge the situation at the dawn of day was almost identical. In each the stormers had seized one side, but were brought to a stand by the de- fenders upon the other, while the British guns fired over the heads of their own infantry to rake the farther slope. It was on the Wagon Hill side, however, that the Boer exertions were most continuous and strenuous and our own resistance most desperate. There fought the gallant de Villiers, while Ian Hamilton rallied the de- fenders and led them in repeated rushes against the enemy's line. Continually reinforced from below, the Boers fought with extraordinary resolution. Never will any one who witnessed that Homeric contest question the valor of our foes. It was a murderous business on both sides. Edwardes of the Light Horse was struck down. In a gun emplacement a strange encounter took place at point-blank range between a group of Boers and of (■l f \v i96 THE GREAT BOER WAR Britons. De Villiersof the Free State shot Miller-Wall- nut dead; Ian Hamilton fired at de Villiers with his re- volver and missed him. Young Albrecht of the Light Horse shot de Villiers. A ]>oer named de Jaeger shot Albrecht. Digby-Jones of the Sappers shot de Jaeger. Only a few minutes later the gallant lad, who had already won fame enough for a veteran, was himself mortally wounded, and Dennis, his comrade in arms and in glory, fell by his side. There has been no better fighting in our time than that upon Wagon Hill upon that January morning, and no better fighters than the Imperial Light Horsemen who formed the centre of tlie defence. Here, as at Elands- laagte, they proved themselves worthy to stand in line with the cracl<. regiments of the British army. Through the long day the fight maintained its equilib- rium along the summit of the ridge, swaying a little that way or this, but never amounting to a repulse of the storrners or to a rout of the defenders. So intermixed were the combatants that a wounded man more than once found himself a rest for the rifles of his enemies. One unfortunate soldier in this position received six more bullets from his own comrades in their efforts to reach the deadly rifleman behind him. At four o'clock a huge bank of clouds which had towered upward unheeded by the struggling men burst suddenly into a terrific thunder- storm with vivid lightnings and lashing rain. It is curious that the British victory at Elandslaagte was heralded by just such another s*^''/rm. Up on the bullet- swept hill the long fringes of fighting men took no more heed of the elements than would two bulldogs who have each other by the throat. Up the greasy hillside, foul with mud and with blood, came the Boer reserves, and up the northern slope came our own reserve, the Devon Regiment, fit representatives of that virile county. Ad- mirably led, the Devons swept the Boers before them, and the Rifles, Gordons, and Light Horse joined in the wild charge which finally cleared the ridge. But the end was not yet. The Boer had taken a risk LADYSMITH ler-Wall- h his re- he Light ger shot Jaeger. already mortally n glory, ne than ing, and ncn who Elands- in line equilib- tle that of the jrmixed an once One X more ) reach a huge ded by lunder- It is te was bullet- more o have e, foul is, and Devon . Ad- them, in the a risk T97 over this venture and now he had to pay the stakes. Down the hill he passed, crouching, darting, but the spruits behind him were turned into swirling streams, and as he hesitated for an instant upon the brink the re- lentless sleet of bullets came from behind. Many were swept away down the gorges and into the Klip River, never again to be accounted for in the lists of their field- cornet. The majority splashed through, found their horses in their shelter, and galloped off across the great Ikilwana Plain, as fairly beaten in as fair a fight as ever brave men were yet. The cheers of victory as the Devons swept the ridge had heartened the weary men upon Cassar's Camp to a similar effort. Manchesters, Gordons, and Rifles, aided by the fire of two batteries, cleared the long-debated po- sition. Wet, cold, weary, and without food for twenty- six hours, the bedraggled Tommies stood yelling and waving, amid the litter of dead and of dying. It was a near thing. Had the ridge fallen the town must have followed, and history perhaps have been changed. In the old stiff-rank Majuba days we should have been swept in an hour from the position. But the wily man behind the rock was now to find an equally wily man in front of him. The soldier had at last learned something of the craft of the hunter. He clung to his shelter, he dwelled on his aim, he ignored his dressings, he laid aside the eighteenth-century traditions of his pig- tailed ancestor, and he hit the Boers harder than they have ever been hit in history yet. No return may ever come to us of their losses upon that occasion; 133 dead bodies were returned to them from the ridge alone, while the slopes, the dongas, and the river each had its own separate tale. No possible estimate can make it less than 700 or 800 of dead and of wounded, while some place it at a much higher figure. Our own casualties were very serious and the proportion of dead to wounded unusually high, owing to the fact that the greater part of the wounds were necessarily of the head. In killed we lost 13 officers, 135 men; in wounded 28 officers, 244 \ It 1, ', i ■, \ ^; 198 THE GREAT BOER WAR men — a total of 420. Lord Ava, the honored son of an honored father, the fiery Dick-Cunyngham, stalwart Miller-Wallnutt, the brave boy sappers Digby-Jones and Dennis, Adams and Packman of the Light Horse, the chivalrous Lafone — we had to mourn quality as well as numbers. The grim test of the casualty returns shows that it was to the Imperial Light 'Horse (ten oflficers down, and the regiment commanded by a junior captain), the Manchesters, the Gordons, the Devons, and the Second Rifle Brigade that the honors of the day are due. Of the First and Second Rifles nothing could exceed the gallantry and devotion of the officers, though these quali- ties appear not to have been always reflected in the ranks. In the course of the day two attacks had been made upon other points of the British position, the one on Observation Hill on the north, the other on the Help- makaar position on the east. Of these the latter was never pushed home and was an obvious feint, but in the case of the other it was not until Schutte, their com- mander, and forty or fifty men had been killed and wounded, that the stormers abandoned their attempt. At every point the assailants found the same scattered but impenetrable fringe of riflemen, and the same energetic batteries waiting for them. It was their first direct attack upon a British fortified position, and it is likely to be their last. Throughout the Empire the course of this great struggle was watched with the keenest solicitude and with all that painful emotion which springs from impotent sympathy. By heliogram to BuUer, and so to the farthest ends of that great body whose nerves are the telegraphic wires, there came the announcement of the attack. Then after an interval of hours came '* Everywhere repulsed, but fighting continues." Then, "Attack continues. Enemy reinforced from the south." Then, "Attack renewed. Very hard pressed." There the messages ended for the day, leaving the Empire black with apprehension. The darkest forecasts and most dreary anticipations were in- LADYSMITH T99 duged by the most temperate and best- informed London papers. For the first time the very suggestion that the campaign might be above our strength was made to the public. And then at last there came the official news of the repulse of the assault. Far away at Ladysmith, the weary men and their sorely tried officers gathered to re- turn thanks to God for his manifold mercies, but in London also hearts were stricken solemn by the greatness of the crisis, and lips long unused to prayer joined in the devotions of the absent warriors. ,M \\ ^ •3 ' \ Chapter Fourteen THE COLESBERG OPERATIONS Of the four British armies in the field I have attempted to tell the story of the western one which advanced to help Kimberley, of the eastern one which was repulsed at Colenso, and of the central one v»rhich was checked at Stormberg. There remains one other central one, some account of which must now be given. It was, as has already been pointed out, a long three weeks after the declaration of war before the forces of the Orange Free State began to invade Cape Colony. But for this most providential delay it is probable that the ultimate fighting would have been, not among the moun- tains and kopjes of Stormberg and Colesberg, but amid those formidable passes which lie in the Hex Valley, im- mediately to the north of Cape Town, and that the armies of the invader would have been doubled by their kins- men of the Colony. The ultimate result of the war must have been the same, but the sight of all South Africa in flames might have brought about those Con- tinental complications which have always been so grave a menace. The invasion of the Colony was at two points along the line of the two railways which connect the countries, the one passing over the Orange River at Norval's Pont and the other at Bethulie, about forty miles to the east- ward. There were no British troops available (a fact to be considered by those, if any remain, who imagine that the British entertained any design against the Republics), and the Boers jogged slowly southward amid a Dutch population who hesitated between their unity of race and THE COLFSBERG OPERATIONS -oi speech and their knowledge of just and generous treat- ment by the Empire. A certain number were won over by the invaders, and, like all apostates, distinguished themselves by their virulence and harshness toward their loyal neighbors. Here and there in towns which were off the railway line, in Barkly East or ]^ady Grey, the farmers met together with rifle and bandolier, tied orange pugrees round their hats, and rode off to join the enemy. Possibly these ignorant and isolated men hardly recognized what it was that they were doing. They have found out since. In the mean while, the ]?ritish leaders had been strenu- ously endeavoring to scrape together a few troops with which to make some stand against the enemy. For this purpose two small forces vvere necessary — the one to op- pose the advance through IJethulie and Stormberg, the otlier to meet the invaders, who, having passed tiie river at Norval's Pont, had now occupied Colesberg. The former task was, as already shown, committed to General Gatacre. The latter was allotted to General French, the victor of Elandslaagte, who had escaped in the very last train from Ladysmith, and had taken over this new and important duty. French's force assembled at Arundel and Gatacre's at Sterkstroom. It is with the operations of the former that we have now to deal. General French, for whom South Africa has for once proved not the grave but the cradle of a reputation, had before the war gained some name as a smart and energetic cavalry officer. There were some who, watching his hand- ling of a considerable body of horse at the great Salis- bury manoeuvres in 1898, conceived the highest opinion of his capacity, and it was due to the strong support of General Buller, who had commanded in these peaceful operations, that French received his appointment for South Africa. In person he is short and thick, with a pugnacious jaw. In character he is a man of cold persist- ence and of fiery energy, cautious and yet audacious, weighing his actions well, but carrying them out with the dash which befits a mounted leader. He is remarkable 202 THK GRKAT BOI.R WAR for the quickness of his decision — "can think at a gallop," as an admirer expressed it. Such was the man, alert, resourceful, and determined, to whom was entrusted the holding back of the C'olesberg Jioert.. Although the main advance of the invaders was along the lines of the two railways, they ventured, as they realized how weak the forces were which opposed them, to break off both to the east and west, occupying Dor- drecht on one side and Steynsberg on the other. Noth- ing of importance accrued from the possession of these points, and our attention may be concentrated upon the main line of action. French's original force was a mere handful of men, scraped together from anywhere. Naauwpoort was his base, and thence he made a reconnoissance by rail upon November 23d toward Arundel, the next hamlet along the line, taking with him a company of the Black Watch, forty mounted infantry, and a troop of the New South Wales Lancers. Nothing resulted from the expedition save that the two forces came into touch with each other, a touch which was sustained for months under many vicissitudes, until the invaders were driven back once more over Norval's Pont. Finding that Arundel was weakly held, French advanced up to it, and established his camp there toward the end of December, within six miles of the Boer lines at Rensburg, to the south of Coles- berg. His mission — with his present forces — w \s to prevent the farther advance of the enemy into the Colony, but he was no^ strong enough yet to make a serious at- tempt to drive them out. Before the move to Arundel on December 13th his de- tachment had increased in size, and consisted largely of mounted men, so that it attained a mobility very unusual for a British force. On December 13th there was an at- tempt upon the part of the Boers to advance south, which was easily held by the British cavalry and horse ar- tillery. The country over which French was operating is dotted with those singular kopjes which the boer loves — kopjes which are often so grotesque in shape that !!;'» n it. ■ > ; THI". COM.SRI'RG OIM-RATIOXS 20.] i la one feels as if they must be due to some error of refrac- tion when one looks at them. JJut, on the other hand, between these hills there lie wide stretches of the green or russet savannah, the noblest field that a horseman or a horse gunner could wish. The rillemen clung to the hills, French's troopers circled warily upon the plain, gradually contracting the Jioer position by threatening to cut off this or that outlying kopje, and so the enemy was slowly herded into Colesberg. The small but mobile Jiritish force covered a very large area, and hardly a day passed that one or other part of it did not come in contact with the enemy. With one regiment of infantry (the lO'tO Berkshires) to hold the centre, his hard-riding Tasma- nians, New Zealanders, and Australians, with the Scots Greys, the Inniskillings, and the Carabineers, formed an elastic but impenetrable screen to cover the Colony. They were aided by two batteries, O and R, of horse artillery. Every day General French rode out and made a close personal examination of the enemy's position, while his scouts and outposts were instructed to main- tain the closest possible touch. On December 30th the enemy abandoned Rensburg, which had been their advanced post, and concentrated at Colesberg, upon which French moved his force up and seized Rensburg. The very next day, December 31st, he began a vigorous and long-continued series of opera- tions. At five o'clock on Sunday evening he moved out of Rensburg camp, with R and half of O Batteries R. H. A., the Tenth Hussars, the Inniskillings, and the Berkshires, to take up a position on the west of Colesberg. At the same time Colonel Porter, with the half-battery of O, his own regiment (the Carabineers), and the New Zealand Mounted Rifles, left camp at two on the Monday morning and took a position on the enemy's left flank. The Berk- shires under Major McCracken seized a hill, driving a Boer picket off it, and the horse artillery enfiladed the enemy's right flank, and after a brisk artillery duel suc- ceeded in silencing his gun. Next morning, however (January 2, 1900), it was found that the Boers, strongly Il; 204 r\\i\ c.Ri'.Ar B()i:r war reinforced, were back near their old positions, and French had to be content to hold them and to wait for more troops. Tliese were not long in coming, tor the Suffolk Regi- ment had arrived, followed by the Composite Regiment (chosen from the Household Cavalry) and the Fourth Battery R. F. A. The i>oers, however, had also been re- inforced, and showed great energy in their effort to break the cordon which was being drawn round them, l^pon the 4th a determined effort was made by about a thou- sand of them under General Shumann to turn the left flank of the British, and at dawn it was actually found that they had eluded the vigilance of the outposts and had established themselves upon a hill to the rear of the position. They were shelled off 01 it, however, by the guns of O Battery, and in their retreat across the plain they were pursued by the Tenth Hussars and by one squadron of the Inniiikillings, who cut off some of the fugitives. At the same time, De Lisle with his mounted infantry carried the position which they had originally held. In this successful and well -managed action the Boer loss was 90 and we took in addition 21 prisoners. Our own casualties amounted only to 6 killed, including Major Harvey of the Tenth, and to 15 wounded. Encouraged by this success an attempt was made by the Suffolk Regiment to carry a hill which formed the key of the enemy's position. The town of Colesberg lies in a basin surrounded by a ring of kopjes, and the pos- session by us of any one of them would have made the place untenable. The plan has been ascribed to Colonel Watson of the Suffolks, but it is time that some protest should be raised against this devolution of responsibility upon subordinates in the event of failure. When success has crowned our arms we have been delighted to honor our general; but when our efforts end in failure our at- tention is called to Colonel Watson, Colonpl Long, or Colonel Thorneycroft. It is fairer to state that in this instance General French ordered Colonel Watson to make a night attack upon the hill. y THK C0LKSBI:RG OPl .rations 205 TIic result was disastrous. At iniilnissex, and First Yorkshires; his cavalry, of the Tenth Hussars, the Sixth Dragoon Guards, the Inniskillingo, the New Zealanders, the N. S. W. Lancers, some Reming- ton Guides, and the composite Household Regiment; his artillery, the R and O Batteries of R. H. A., the Fourth R. F. A., and a section of the Thirty-seventh Howitzer Baltery. At the risk of tedium I have repeated the units of this force, because there are no operations during the war, with the exception perhaps of those of the Rhodesian column, concerning which it is so difficult to get a clear impression. The fluctuating forces, the vast range of country covered, and the petty farms which give their names to positions, all tend to make the issue vague and the narrative obscure. The British still lay in a semi- circle extending from Slingersfontein upon the right to 1 208 THE GREAT BOER WAR \t St ! i I Kloof Camp upon the left, and the general scheme of operations continued to be an enveloping movement upon the right. General Clements commanded this section of the forces, while the energetic Porter carried out the suc- cessive advances. The lines had gradually stretched until they were nearly fifty miles in length, and some- thing of the obscurity in which the operations have been left is due to the impossibility of any single correspond- ent having a clear idea of what was occurring over so ex- tended a front. On January 25th French sent Stephenson and Brabazon to push a reconnoissance to the north of Colesberg, and found that the Boers were making a fresh position at Rietfontein, nine miles nearer their own border. A small action ensued, in which we lost ten or twelve of the Wiltshire Regiment, and gained some knowledge of the enemy's dispositions. For the remainder of the month the two forces remained in a state of equilibrium, each keenly on its guard, and neither strong enough to penetrate the lines of the other. General French de- scended to Cape Town to aid General Roberts in the elaboration of that plan which was soon to change the whole military situation in South Africa. Reinforcements were still dribbling into the British force, Hoad's Australian Regiment, which had been changed from infantry to cavalry, and J Battery R. H. A. from India, being the last arrivals. But very much stronger reinforcements had arrived for the Boers — so strong that they were able to take the offensive. De la Rey had left the Modder with three thousand men, and their presence infused new life into the defenders of Colesberg. At the moment, too, that the Mcddei Boers were coming to Colesburg the British had begup to send cavalry reinforcements to Modder in preparation tor the march to Kimberley, so that Clements's force (as \\ had now become) was depleted at the very instant when that of the enemy was largely increased. The result was that it was all they could do, not merely to hold their own, but to avoid a very serious disaster. THE COLESBERG OPERATIONS 209 De la Key's movements were directed toward turning the rigiit of the position. On February 9th and loth the mounted patrols, principally the Tasmanians, the Australians, and the Inniskillings, came in contact with the Boers, and some skirmishing ensued, with no heavy loss upon either side. A British patrol was surrounded and lost eleven prisoners, Tasmanians and Guides. On the 12th the Boer turning movement developed itself, and the position on the right at Slingersfontein was strongly attacked. The key of the British position at this point was a kopje held by three companies of the Second Worcester Regiment. Upon this the Boers made a fierce onslaught, but were as fiercely repelled. They came up in the dark between the set of moon and rise of sun, as they had done at the great assault of Ladysmith, and the first dim light saw them in the advanced sangars. The Boer gen- erals do not favor night attacks, but they are exceedingly fond of using darkness for taking up a good position and pushing onward as soon as it is possible to see. This is what they did upon this occasion, and the first intima- tion which the outposts had of their presence was the rush of feet and loom of figures in the cold misty light of dawn. The occupants of the sangars were killed to a man, and the assailants rushed onward. As the sun topped the line of the veldt half the kopje was in their possession. Shouting and firing, they pressed onward. But the Worcester men were steady old soldiers, and the battalion contained no less than foi'i hundred and fifty marksmen in its ranks. Of these the companies upon the hill had their due proportion, and their fire was so accurate that the Boers found themselves unable to advance any farther. Through the long day a desnerate duel was maintained between the two lines of rihemen. Colonel Coningham and Major Stubbs were killed while endeavoring to recover the ground which had been lost. Hovel and Bartholomew continued to encourage their men, and the British fire became so deadly that that of the Boers was dominated. Under the direction of Racket 2IO THE GREAT BOER WAR 11 ir t sc !^ , Pain, who commanded the nearest post, guns of J battery were brought out into the open and shelled the portion of the kopje which was held by the Boers. The latter were reinforced, but could make no advance against the accurate rifle fire with which they were met. The Bisley champion of the battalion, with a bullet through his thigh, expended a hundred rounds before sinking from loss of blood. It was an excellent defence, and a pleas- ing exception to those too frequent cases where an iso- lated force has lost heart in face of a numerous and persistent foe. With the coming of darkness the Boers withdrew with a loss of over two hundred killed and wounded. Orders had come from Clements that the whole right wing should be drawn in, and in obedience to them the remains of the victorious companies were called in by Hacket Pain, who moved his force by night in the direction of Rensburg. The British loss in the action was twenty-eight killed and nearly a hundred wounded or missing, most of which was incurred when the sangars were rushed in the early morning. While this action was fought upon the extreme right of the British position, pnother as severe had occurred with much the same result upon the extreme left, where the Second Wiltshire Regiment was stationed. Some companies of this regiment were isolated upon a kopje and surrounded by the Boer riflemen, when the pressure upon them was relieved by a desperate attack by about a hundred of the Victorian Rifles. The gallant Australians lost Major Eddy and six officers out of seven, with a large proportion of their men, but they proved once for all that amid all the scattered nations who came from the same home there is not one with a more fiery courage and a higher sense of martial duty than the men from the great island continent. It is the misfortune of the historian when dealing with these contingents that, as a rule, by their very nature they were employed in detached parties in fulfilling the duties which fall to the lot of scouts and light cavalry — duties which fill the casualty lists but not the pages of the chronicler. Bo it said, however, once ,..' 1 :''^,f THE COLESBERG OPERATIONS 2ti for all, that throughout the whole African army there was nothing but the utmost admiration for the clash and :,|jirit of the hard-riding, straight-shooting sons of Australia and New Zealand. In a host which held many brave men there were none braver than they. . It was evident from this time onward that the turn- ing movement had failed, and that the enemy had devel- oped such strength that we were ourselves in imminent danger of being turned. The situation was a most serious one, for if Clements's force could be brushed aside there would be nothing to keep the enemy from cutting the communications of the army which Roberts had assembled for his march into the Free State. Clem- ents drew in his wings hurriedly and concentrated his whole force at Rensburg. It was a difficult operation in the face of an aggressive enemy, but the movements were well timed and admirably carried out. There is always the possibility of a retreat degenerating into a panic, and a panic at that moment would have been a most serious matter. One misfortune occurred, through which two com- panies of the Wiltshire regiment were left without definite orders, and were cut off and captured after a resistance in which a third of their number were killed and wounded. No man in that trying time w >rked harder than Colonel Carter of the Wiltshires (the night of the retreat was the sixth which he had spent without sleep), and the loss of the two companies is to be set down to one of those ac- cidents which may always occur in warfare. Some of the Inniskilling Dragoons and Victorian Mounted Rifles were also cut off in the retreat, but on the whole Clements was very fortunate in being able to concentrate his scat- tered army with so few mishaps. The withdrawal was heartbreaking to the soldiers who had worked so hard and so long in extending the lines, but it might be re- garded with equanimity by the generals, who understood that the greater strength the enemy developed at Coles- berg the less they would have to oppose the critical move- ments which were about to be carried out in the west. Meanwhile Coleskop had also been abandoned, the guns i...' ,' ! J I I t ,1 212 THE GREAT BOER WAR removed, and the whole force upon February 14th passed through Rensburg and fell back upon Arundel, the spot from which l'x weeks earlier French had started upon this stirring series of operations. It would not be fair, however, to suppose that they had failed because they ended where they began. Their primary object had been to prevent the farther advance of the Free Staters into the colony, and, during the most critical period of the war, this had been accomplished with much success and little loss. At last the pressure had become so severe that the enemy had to weaken the most essential part of their general position in order to relieve it. The object of the operations had really been attained when Clements found nimself back at Arundel once more. French, the stormy petrel of the war, had flitted on from Cape Town to Modder River, where a larger prize than Coles- berg awaited him. Clements continued to cover Naauw- poort, the important railway junction, until the advance of Roberts's army caused a complete reversal of the whole military situation. s • Chapter Fifteen SPION KOP Whilst Methuen and Gatacre were content to hold their own at the Modder and at Sterkstroom, and whilst the mobile and energetic French was herding the Boers into Colesberg, Sir Redvers 13uller, the heavy, obdurate, inex- orable man, was gathering and organizing his forces for another advance upon Ladysmith. Nearly a month had elapsed since the evil day when his infantry had retired, and his ten guns had not, from the frontal attack upon Colenso. Since then Sir Charles Warren's division of infantry and a considerable reinforcement of artillery had come to him. And yet in view of the terrible nature of the ground in front of him, of the fighting power of the Boers, and of the fact that they were always acting upon internal lines, his force even now was, in the opinion of competent judges, too weak for the matter in hand. There remained, however, several points in his favor. His excellent infantry were full of zeal and of confidence in their chief. This valiant and imperturbable soldier possessed the gift of impressing and encouraging those around him, and, in spite of Colenso, the sight of his square figure and heavy impassive face conveyed an assur- ance of ultimate victory to those around him. In artillery he was very much stronger than before, especially in weight of metal. His cavalry was still weak in proportion to his other arms. When at last he moved out upon January loth to attempt to outflank the Boers, he took with him nineteen thousand infantry, three thousand cavalry, and sixty guns, which included six howitzers capable of throw- ing a fifty-pound lyddite shell, and ten long-range naval I f if: , I i ( • ir i ' ''!) (i f 1 ti Hildyard's Brigade 214 THK GREAT BOKR WAR pieces. Barton's Brigade and other troops were left be- hind to hold the base and line of communications. An analysis of Buller's force shows that its details were as follows: aery's Division. " Second West Surrey Second Devonshire "] Second West Yorkshire [^ Second East Surrey \ First Inniskilling Fusiliers tr ^, T» • 1 Borderers Hart s Brigade < ,.. , .^ .. ^ =* j tirst Connaught Rangers [ First Royal Dublin P'usiliers Field artillery, three batteries, Nineteenth, Twenty- eighth, Sixty-third; one squadron Thirteenth Hussars; Royal Engineers. Warrcii^s Division. Lyttelton's Brigade Woodgate's Brigade ' Second Cameronians Third King's Royal Rifles First Durham Light Infantry First Rifle Brigade Second Royal Lancaster Second Lancashire Fusiliers ^ First South Lancashire [ York and Lancashires Field artillery, three batteries. Seventh, Seventy- eighth, Seventy-third; one squadron Fifteenth Hussars. Corps Troops. ( Second Royal Warwicks ^ , , ^ . J First Somersets Coke s Brigade -{0 j i^ ^ I Second Dorsets [ Second Middlesex Sixty-first Howitzer Battery; two 4.7 naval guns; eight naval twelve-pounder guns; one squadron Thirteenth Hussars; Royal Engineers. U_ SIMON KOP 215 left be- Is were lers s iliers 'wenty- ussars ; les antry Hers 2venty- ssars. ; eight rteenth Cavalry. First Royal Dragoons Fourteenth Hussars Four Squadrons South African Horse One Squadron Imperial Light Horse Bethune's Mounted Infantry Thorneycrofl's Mounted Infantry One Squadron Natal Carabineers One Squadron Natal Police One Company King's Royal Rifles Mounted Infantry Six Machine Guns This is the force whose operations I shall attempt to describe. About sixteen miles to the westward of Colenso there is a ford over the Tugela River which is called Potgeiter's Drift. General Buller's plan was to seize this, together with the ferry which runs at this point, and so to throw himself upon the right flank of the Colenso Boers. Once over the river there is one formidable line of hills to cross, but if this were once passed there would be com- paratively easy ground until the Ladysmith hills were reached. With high hopes Buller and his men sallied out upon their adventure. Dundonald's cavalry force pushed rapidly forward, crossed the Little Tugela, a tributary of the main river, at Springfield, and established themselves upon the hills which command the Drift. Dundonald largely exceeded his instructions in going so far, and while we applaud his courage and judgment in doing so, we must remember and be charitable to those less fortunate officers whose private enterprise has ended in disaster and reproof. There can be no doubt that the enemy intended to hold all this tract, and that it was only the quickness of our initial movements which forestalled them. Early in the morning a small party of the South African Horse, under Lieutenant Carlyle, swam the broad river under fire and brought back the ferry boat, an enterprise which was for- h i , 2i6 THE GREAT BOER WAR ,f tunately bloodless, but which was most coolly planned and gallantly carried out. The way was now open to our advance, and could it have been carried out as rapidly as it had begun the Boers might conceivably have been scattered before they could concentrate. It was not the fault of the infantry that it was not so. They were trudging, mud-spattered and jovial, at the very heels of the horses. But an army of twenty thousand men cannot be conveyed over a river twenty miles from any base with- out elaborate preparations being made to feed them. The roads were in such a state that the wagons could hardly move, heavy rain had just fallen, and every stream was swollen into a river; bullocks might strain, and traction engines pant, and horses die, but by no human means could the stores be kept up if the advance guard were al- lowed to go at their own pace. And so, having insured an ultimate crossing of the river by the seizure of Mount Alice, the high hill which commands the Drift, the forces waited day after day, watching in the distance the swarms of strenuous dark figures who dug, and hauled, and worked upon the hillsides opposite, barring the road which they would have to take. Far away on the horizon a little shining point twinkled amid the purple haze, coming and going from morning to night. It was the heliograph of Ladysmith, explaining her troubles and calling for help, and from the heights of Mount Alice an answering star of hope glimmered and shone, soothing, encouraging, ex- plaining, while the stern men of the veldt dug furiously at their trenches in between. " We are coming! We are coming!" cried Mount Alice. "Over our bodies," said the men with the spades and mattocks. On Thursday, January 12th, Dundonald seized the heights, on the 13th the ferry was taken and Lyttleton's Brigade came up to secure that which the cavalry had gained. On the 14th the heavy naval guns were brought up to cover the crossing. On the 15th Coke's Brigade and other infantry concentrated at the Drift. On the i6th the four regiments of Lyttelton's Brigade went across, and then, and only then, it began to be apparent that Bul- !* 1 SPION KOP 217 ler's plan was a more deeply laid one than had been thought, and that all this iDusiness of Potgieter's Drift was really a demonstration in order to cover the real crossing which was to be effected at a ford named Trich- ard's Drift, five miles to the westward. Thus, while Lyttelton's and Coke's Brigades were ostentatiously at- tacking Potgeiter's from in front, three other brigades (Hart's, Woodgate's, and Hildyard's) were marched rapidly upon the night of the i6th to the real place of crossing, to which Dundonald's cavalry had already ridden. There, on the 17th, a pontoon bridge had been erected, and a strong force was thrown over ii. such a way as to turn the right of the trenches in front of Potgeiter's. It was admirably planned and excellently carried out, certainly the most strategic movement, if there could be said to have been any strategic movement upon the Brit- ish side, in the campaign up to that date. On the i8th the infantry, the cavalry, and most of the guns were safe- ly across without loss of life. The IJoers, however, still retained their formidable in- ternal lines, and the only result of a change of position seemed to be to put them to the trouble of building a new series of those terrible entrenchments at which they had become such experts. After all their combinations the Jiritish were, it is true, upon the right side of the river, but they were considerably farther from Ladysmith than when they started. There are times, however, when twenty miles are less than fourteen, and it was hoped that this might prove to be among them. Put the first step was the most serious one, for right across their front lay the Poer position upon the edge of a lofty plateau, with the high peak of Spion Kop forming the left corner of it. If once that main ridge could be captured or com- manded it would carry them half way to their goal. It was for that essential line of hills that two of the most dogged races upon earth were about to contend. An immediate advance might have secured the position at once, but for some reason which is inexplicable, an aim- less march to the left was followed by a retirement to the 2i8 THK GRI.AT BOIIR WAR I I ■ { { !i ^^ f h -^ ■•ii orijj;inal position of Warren's division, and so two inval- ual)le days were wasted. A small success, the more welcome for its rarity, came to the JJritish arms on this first day. Dundonald s men had been thrown out to cover the left of the infantry ad- vance and to feel for the right of the IJoer position. A strong l)0er patrol, caught napping for once, rode into an ambuscade of irregulars. Some escaped, some held out most gallantly in a kopje, but the final result was a sur- render of twenty-four unwounded prisoners, and the find- ing of thirteen killed and wounded, including de Mentz, the field-cornet of Heilbronn. Two killed and two wounded were the British losses in this well-managed affair. Dundonald's force then took its position upon the extreme left of Warren's advance. The British were now moving upon the Boers in two separate bodies, the one which included Lyttelton's and Coke's Brigades from Botgeiter's Drift, making what was really a frontal attack, while the main body under Warren, who had crossed at Trichard's Drift, was swinging round upon the Boer right. Midway between the two movements the formidable bastion of Spion Kop "♦ood clearly out- lined against the blue Natal sky. Tb Mvy naval guns on Mount Alice (two 4.7 's and eigh. ...olve-pounders) were so placed as to support either advance, and the howitzer battery was given to Lyttelton to help the frontal attack. For two days the British pressed slowly but steadily on to the Boers under the cover of an incessant rain of shells. Dour and long-suffering, the Boers made no reply, save with sporadic rifie-fire, and refused until the crisis should come to expose their great guns to the chance of injury. On January 19th Warren's turning movement began to bring him into closer touch with the enemy, his thirty-six field guns and the six howitzers which had returned to him crushing down the opposition which faced him. The ground in front of him was pleated into long folds, and his advance meant the carrying of ridge after ridge, In the earlier stages of the war this m SIMON KOV 219 al- pMf would have entailed a murderous loss; but we had learned our lesson, and the infantry now, with intervals of ten paces, and every man choosing his own cover, went up in proper Jioer form, carrying position after position, the enemy always retiring with dignity and decorum. 'I'here was no victory on one side or rout on the other — only a steady advance and an orderly retirement. Tiiat night the infantry slept in their fighting line, going on again at three in the morning, and light broke to find not only riiles, but the long-silent J>oer gui.s all blazing at the Jiritish advance. Again, as at C'olt-nso, the brunt of the fighting fell upon Mart's Irish Ilrigade, who upheld that immemorial tradition of valor with which that name, either in or out of the Jiritish service, has invariably been associated. Slowly but surely the inexorable line of the British lapped over the ground which the enemy had held. A gallant colonial, Tobin of the South African Horse, rode up one hill and signalled with his hat that it was clear. His comrades followed closely at his heels, and occupied the position with the loss of Childe, their major.' During this action Lyttelton had held the Boers in their tenches opposite to him by advancing to within fifteen hundred yards of them, but the attack was not pushed farther. On the evening of this day, January 20th, the British had gained some miles of ground, and the total losses had been about three hundred killed and wounded. The troops were in good heart, and all promised well for the future. Again the men lay where they had fought, and again the dawn of day heard the crash of the great guns and the rattle of the musketry. The operations of this day began with a sustained can- nonade from the field batteries and the Sixty-First Howitzer Battery, which was as fiercely answered by the enemy. About eleven the infantry began to go forward ' His curious presentiment of coming death may be added to the many well-attested examples of such prescience. lie discussed it with his comrades upon the night before, requesting, as a play of words dpon his own name, that the inscription, " Is it well with the child ? It is well, " should be placed upon his grave. It was done. 220 THE GREAT BOER WAR I: r>/ ! / ' >l with an advance which would have astonished the mar- tinets of Aldershot, an irregular fringe of crawlers, wrig- glers, writhers, crouchers, all cool and deliberate, giving away no points in this grim game of death. Where now were the officers with their distinctive dresses and flash- ing swords, where the valiant rushes over the open, where the men who were too proud to lie down? — the tactics of three months ago seemed as obsolete as those of the middle ages. All day the line undulated forward, and by rvening yet another strip of rock-strewn ground had been gained, and yet another train of ambulances was bearing ■^ hundred of our wounded back to the base hospitals at Frere. It was on Hildyard's Brigade on the left that the fighting and the losses of this day principally fell. By the morning of January 2 2d the regiments were cluster- ing thickly all round the edge of the Boer main position, and the day was spent in resting the weary men, ai d in determining at what point the final assault should be de- livered Or. the right front, commanding the Boer lines on either side, towered the stark eminence of Spion Kop, so-called because from its summit^ the Boer voor-trekkers had first in 1835 g^zed down upon the promised land of Natal. If that could only be seized and held! Buller and Warren swept its bald summit with their field-glasses. It was a venture. But all war is a venture ; and the brave man is he who ventures most. One fiery rush and the master-key of all these locked doors might be in our keep- ing. That evening there came a telegram to London which left the whole Empire in a hush of anticipation. Spion Kop was to be attacked that night. The troops which were selected for the task were eight companies of the Second Lancashire Fusiliers, six of the Second Royal Lancasters, two of the First South Lanca- shires, one hundred and eighty of Thorneycroft's, and half a company of sappers. It was to be a North of England job. Under the friendly cover of a starless night the men, in Indian file, like a party of Iroquois braves upon the war trail, stole up the winding and ill-defined path which led SPION KOP (221 ght Ithe ka- ind of in kvar led to the summit. Woodgate, the Lancashire brigadier, and Blomfield of the Fusiliers, led the way. It was a severe climb of two thousand feet, coming after arduous work over broken ground, but the affair was well-timed, and it was at that blackest hour which precedes the dawn that the last steep ascent was reached. The Fusiliers crouched down among the rocks to recover their breath, and saw far down in the plain beneath them the placid lights which showed where theii comrades were resting. A fine rain was falling, and rolling clouds hung low over their heads. The men with unloaded riHes and fixed bayonets stole on once more, their bodies bent, their eyes peering through the mirk for the first sign of the enemy — that enemy whose first sign has usually been a shattering volley. Thorney- croft's men with their gallant leader had threaded their way up into the advance. Suddenly the leading rifles found that they were walking on the level. The crest had been gained. With slow steps and bated breath, the open line of skirmishers stole across it. Was it possible that it had been entirely abandoned! Suddenly a raucous shout came out of the darkness, then a shot, then a splutter of musketry and a yell, as the Fusiliers sprang onward with their bayonets. The Boer post of Vryheid burghers clattered and scrambled away into the darkness, and a cheer that roused both the sleeping armies told that the surprise had been complete and the position won. In the gray-light of the breaking day the men advanced along the narrow undulating ri ige, the prominent end of which they had captured. Another trench faced them, but it was weakly held and easily carried. Then the men, uncertain what remained beyond, halted and waited for full light to see where they were, and what the work was w.ilch lay before them — a fatal halt, as the result proved, and yet one so natural, that it is hard to blame the officer who ordered it. Indeed, he might have seemed more culpable had he pushed blindly on, and so lost the advantage which had been already gained. About eight o'clock, with the clearing of the mist, I ^ I : .!;[ IS 'IP I h-\': > I • r 222 THE GREAT BOER WAR General Woodgate saw how matters stood. The ridge, one end of which he held, extended away, rising and falling for some miles. Had he the whole of the end plateau, and had he guns, he might hope to command the rest of the position. But he held only half the plateau, and at the farther end of it the Boers were strongly en- trenched. The ridge took a curve too, so that the Spion Kop summit was somewhat behind the general line of it, and as our men faced the Boer trenches, a cross fire came from their left. Beyond were other eminences which sheltered strings of riflemen and several guns. The plateau which the British held was very much nar- rower than was usually represented in the press. In many places the possible front was not more than a hun- dred yards wide, and the troops were compelled to bunch together, as there was not room for a single comp? ly to take an extended formation. The cover upon this plateau was scanty, far too scanty for the force upon it, and the shell fire — especially the fire of the pom-poms — soon be- came very murderous. To mass the troops under the cover of the edge of the plateau might naturally suggest itself, but with great tactical skill the Boer advanced line from the Heidelberg and Carolina commandoes kept so aggressive an attitude that the British could not weaken their lines opposed to them. Their skirmishers were creeping round too in such a way that the fire was really coming from three separate points, left, centre, and right, and every corner of the position was searched by their bullets. Early in the action the gallant Woodgate and many of his Lancashire men were shot down. The others spread out and held on, firing occasionally at the whisk of a rifle barrel or the glimpse of a broad-brimmed hat. From morning to midday, the shell, Maxim, and rifle fire swipt across the Kop in a continual driving shower. The British guns in the plain below failed to localize the position or the enemy's, and they were able to vent their concentrated spite upon the exposed infantry. No blame attaches to the gunners for this, as a hill intervened to screen the Boer artillery. i']n Um SPION KOP 223 !■ Upon the fall of Woodgate, Thorneycroft, who bore the reputation of a determined fighter, was placed at the suggestion of Buller in charge of the defence of the hill, and he was reinforced after noon by Coke's brigade, the Middlesex, the Dorsets, and the Somersets, together with the Imp'jrial Light Infantry. The addition of this force to the defenders of the plateau tended to increase the casualty returns rather than the strength of the defence. Three thousand more rifles could do nothing to check the fire of the invisible cannon, and it was this which was the main source of the losses, while on the other hand the plateau had become so cumbered with troops that a shell could hardly fail to do damage. There was no cover to shelter them and no room for them to extend. The pressure was most severe upon the shallow trenches in the front, which had been abandoned by the Boers and were held by the Lancashire Fusiliers. They were en- filaded by rifle and cannon, and the dead and wounded outnumbered tiie hale. Once a handful of men, tor- mented beyond endurance, sprang up as a sign that they had had enough, but Thorneycroft, a man of huge phys- ique, rushed forward to the advancing Boers. " You may go to hell! " he yelled. "I command here, and allow no surrender. Go on with your firing." Nothing could ex- ceed the gallantry of Louis Botha's men in pushing the attack. Again and again they made their way up to the British firing line, exposing themselves with a reckless- ness which, with the exception of the grand attack upon Ladysmith, was unique in our experience of them. About two o'clock they rushed one trench occupied by the Fusiliers and secured the survivors of two companies as prisoners, but were subsequently driven out again. Hour after hour of the unintermitting crash of the shells among the rocks and of the groans and screams of men torn and burst by the most horrible of all wounds had shaken the troops badly. Spectators from below who saw the shells pitching at the rate of seven a minute on to the crowded plateau marvelled at the endurance which held the de- voted men to their post. Men were wounded and wounded i \ I jl 224 THE GREAT BOER WAR and wounded yet again, and still went on fighting. Never since Inkerman had we had so grim a soldier's battle. The company officers were superb. Captain Muriel of the Middlesex was shot through the cheek while giving a cigarette to a wounded man, continued to lead his com- pany, and was shot again through the brain. Scott Mon- crieff of the same regiment was only disabled by the fourth bullet which hit him. Young Murray of the Scot- tish Rifles, dripping from five wounds, still staggered about among his men. And the men were worthy of such officers. "No retreat! No retreat!" they yelled when some of the front line were driven in. In all regiments there were weaklings and hang-backs, and many a man was wandering down the reverse slopes when he should have been facing death upon the top, but as a body British troops have never stood firm through a more fiery ordeal than on that fatal hill. The position was so bad that no efforts of officers or men could do anything to mend it. They were in a murderous dilemma. If they fell back for cover the Boer riflemen would rush the position. If they held their ground this horrible shell fire must continue, which they had no means of answering. Down at Gun Hill in front of the Boer position we had no less than five batteries, the Seventy-eighth, Seventh, Seventy-third, Sixty-third, and Sixty-first Howitzer, but a ridge intervened between them and the Boer guns which were shelling Spion Kop, and this ridge was strongly entrenched. The naval guns from distant Mount Alice did what they could, but the range was very long, and the position of the Boer guns uncertain. The artillery, situated as it was, could not save the infantry from the horrible scourging which they were enduring. There remains the debated question whether the British guns could have been taken to the top. Mr. Winston Churchill, the soundness of whose judgment has been frequently demonstrated during the war, asserts that it might have been done. Without venturing to contradict one who was personally present, I venture to think that P SPION KOP 225 f there is strong evidence to show that it could not have been done without blasting and other measures, for which there was no possible time. Captain Hanwell, of the Seventy-eigJith R. F. A., upon the day of the battle had the very utmost difficulty with the help of four horses in getting a light Maxim on to the top, and his opinion, with that of other artillery officers, is that the feat was an impossible one until the path had been prepared. When night fell Colonel Sim was despatched with a party of sappers to clear the track and to prepare t\v'o emplace- ments upon the top, but in his advance he met the retiring infantry. Throughout the day reinforcements had pushed up the hill, until two full brigades had been drawn into the fight. From the other side of the ridge Lyttelton sent up the Scottish Riiles, who reached the summit, and added their share to the shambles upon the top. As the shades of night closed in, and the glare of the bursting shells be- came more lurid, the men lay extended upon the rocky ground, parched and exhausted. They were hopelessly jumbled together, with the exception of the Dorsets, whose cohesion may have been due to superior discipline, or to the fact that their khaki differed somewhat in color from that of the others. Twelve hours of so terrible an experience had had a strange effect upon many of the men. Some were dazed and battle struck, incapable of clear- understanding. Some were as incoherent as drunkards. Some lay in an overpowering drowsiness. The most were doggedly patient and long-suffering, with a mi'-hty longing for water obliterating every other emotion. Before evening fell a most gallant and successful at- tempt had been made by the third battalion of the King's Royal Rifles from Lyttelton's Brigade to relieve the pressure upon their comrades on Spion Kop. In order to draw part of the Boer fire away they ascended from the northeni side, and carried the hills which formed a con- tinuation of the same ridge. The movement was meant to be no more than a strong demonstration, but the rifle- men pushed it until, breathless but victorious, they stood 15 t ! 1: 1 i 1, |4 Ji I 1' I I! 226 THE GREAT BOER WAR upon the very crest of the position, leaving nearly a hundred dead or dying to show the path which they had taken. Their advance being much farther than was de- sired, they were recalled, and it was at the moment that Buchanan Riddell, their brave colonel, stood up to read Lyttelton's note that he fell with a Boer bullet through his brain, making one more of those gallant leaders who died as they had lived, at the head of their regiments. Chisholm, Dick-Cunyngham, Downman, Wilford, Gun- ning, Sherston, Thackeray, Sitwell, Airlie — they have led their men up to and through the gates of death. It was a fine exploit of the Third Rifles. " A finer bit of skir- mishing, a finer bit of climbing, and a finer bit of fighting, I have never seen," said their brigadier. It is certain that if Lyttelton had not thrown his two regiments into the fight the pressure upon the hilltop might have become unendurable. And now, under the shadow of night, but with the shells bursting thickly over the plateau, the much-tried Thorneycroft, wounded and wearied, had to make up his mind as to whether he should hold on for another such day as he had endured, or whether now, in the friendly darkness, he should remove his shattered force. Could he have seen the discouragement of the Boers and the preparations which they had made for retirement he would have held his ground. But this was hidden from him, while the horror of his own losses was but too apparent. Forty per cent, of his men were down. Thirteen hundred dead and dying are a grim sight upon a wide-spread battlefield, but when this number is heaped upon a con- fined space, where from a single high rock the whole litter of broken and shattered bodies can be seen, and the groans of the stricken rise in one long droning chorus to the ear, then it is an iron mind indeed which can resist such evidence of disaster. In a harder age Wellington was able to survey four thousand bodies piled in the narrow compass of the breach of Badajos, but his resolution was sustained by the knowledge that the military end for which they died had been accomplished. Had his •■ •! 'r SPION KOP 227 ith the ch-tried up his er such riendly Could md the would him, Darent. undred spread con- litter groans le ear, : such on was narrow lution y end ad his task been unfinished it is doubtful whether even his stead- fast soul would not have flinched from its completion. Thorneycroft saw the frightful havoc of one day, and he shrank from the thought of such another. " Better six battalions safely down the hill than a mop up in the morning," said he, and he gave the word to retire. One who had met the troops as they staggered down has told me how far they were from being routed. In mixed array, but steadily and in order, the long thin line trudged through the darkness. Their parched lips would not ar- ticulate, but they whispered, " Water! Where is water? " as they toiled upon their way. At the bottom of the hill they formed into regiments once more, and marched back to the camp. In the morning the blood-spattered hill- top, with its piles of dead and of wounded, was in the hands of Botha and his men — who^e va' jr and persever- ance deserved the victory which they had won. How shall we sum up such an action save that it was a gallant attempt, gallantly carried out, and as ^^allantly met. On both sides the results of artillery fire during the war have been disappointing, ut at Spion Kop be- yond all question it was the Boci guns which won the action for them. So keen was the disappointment at home that there was a tendency to criticise the battle with some harshness, but it is difficult now, with the evidence at our command, to say what was left undone which could have altered the result. Had Thorneycroft known all that we know he would have kept his grip upon the hill. On the face of it one finds it difficult to under- stand why so momentous a decision, upon which the whole operations depended, should have been left entirely to the judgment of one who in the morning had been a simple lieutenant-colonel. "Where are the bosses?" cried a Fusilier, and the historian can only repeat the question. General Warren was at the bottom of the hill. Had he ascended and determined that the place should still be held he might have sent down the wearied troops, brought up smaller numbers of fresh ones, ordered the sappers to deepen the trenches, and tried to bring up 2lS THE GREAT BOER WAR ■ ! i M 1 1> ''i. I ' I 'J ivf '' !l water and guns. It was for the divisional commander to lay his hand upon the reins at so critical an instant, to relieve the weary man who had struggled so hard all day. There may be some very good reason why this should not be so, but the matter would bear explana- tion.' On account of the crowding of four thousand troops into a space which might have afforded tolerable cover for five hundred the losses in the action were very heavy, not less than fifteen hundred being killed, wounded, or missing, the proportion of killed being, on account of the shell fire, abnormally high. The Lancashire Fusiliers were the heaviest sufferers, and their Colonel Blomfield was wounded and fell into tiie hands of the enemy. The Royal Lancasters also lost heavily. Thornevcroft's had 80 men hit out of 180 engaged. The Imperial Light In- fantry, a raw corps of Rand refugees who were enduring their baptism of fire, lost 130 men. In officers the losses were particularly heavy, 60 being killed or wounded. The IJoer returns show some 50 killed and 150 wounded, which may not be far from the truth. Without the shell fire the Jirilish losses would not have been much more. General Buller had lost nearly two thousand men since he had crossed the Tugela, and his purpose was still un- fulfilled. Should he risk the loss of a large part of his force in storming the ridges in front of him, or should he recross the river and try for an easier route elsewhere? To the surprise and disappointment both of the public and of the army, he chose the latter course, and by Janu- ary 27 th he had fallen back, unmolested by the Boers, to the other side of the Tugela. It must be confessed that his retreat was admirably conducted, and that it was a military feat to bring his men, his guns, and his stores in safety over a broad river in the face of a victorious enemy. Stolid and unmoved, his impenetrable demeanor ' The criticism here, and in the case of Stormberg also, was writ- ten before the publication of the official despatches. It has not been found necessary to alter the text. :lVV lR SPION KOP commander an instant, so hard all ti why this ir explana- and troops able cover i^ery heavy, ounded, or 3unt of the i P'usiliers Blomfield imy. The :roft's had Light In- i enduring the losses wounded. and 150 Without )een much 229 restored serenity and confidence to the angry and disap- pointed troops. There might well be heavy hearts among both them and the public. After a fortnight's campaign, and the endurance of great losses and hardships, both Ladysmith and her relievers found themselves no better off than when they started. Ikiller still held the com- manding position of Mount Alice, and this war all that he had to show for such sacrifices and such exertions. Once more there came a weary pause, while Ladysmith, sick with hope deferred, waited gloomily upon half rations of horseilesh for the next movement from the isouth. men since J still un- irt of his should he isevvhere ? le public by Janu- Boers, to ssed that it was a lis stores victorious iemeanor , was writ- is not been t i ».; Si i' ! / i f Chapter Sixteen VAALKRANZ Nki I'HER General Jiullcr nor his troops were dismayed by the failure of their phms, or by the heavy losses which were entailed by the movement which culminated at Spion Kop. The soldiers grumbled, it is true, at not being let go, and swore that even if it cost them two- thirds of their number they could and would make their way through this labyrinth of hills with its fringe of death. So doubtless they might. ])Ut from first to last their general had shown a great — some said an exag- gerated—respect for human life, and he had no intention of winning a path by mere slogging, if there were a chance of finding one by less bloody means. On the morrow of his return he astonished both his army and the Kmpire by announcing that he had found the key to the position and that he hoped to be in Ladysmith in a week. Some re- joiced in the assurance. Some remembered a previous promise, that there should be no retreat, and shrugged their shoulders. Careless of friends or foes, the stolid Huller proceeded to work out his nev/ combination. In the next few days reinforcements trickled in which more than made up for the losses of the preceding week. A battery of horse artillery, two heavy guns, two squad- rons of the Fourteenth Hussars, and infantry drafts to the number of twelve or fourteen hundred men came to share the impending glory or disaster. On the morning of P'ebruary 5th, the army sallied forth once more to have another try to win a way to Ladysmith. It was known that enteric was rife in the town, that shell, and bullet, and typhoid germ had struck down a terrible proportion of the garrison, and that the rations of starved horse and ■U \ VAALKRANZ 231 ismayed .'s which ated at , at not -'in tvvo- ce their inge of t to last 1 exag- itention chance now of pi re by on and )me re- revious rugged stolid which ; week, squad- . to the ) share ing of ) have known bullet, ortioii >e and coniiiissariat nmle were running low. With their com- rades in many cases their linked battalions- in such straits within fifteen miles of them, liuUer's soldiers had liigh motives to brace them fur a suprcmt; effort. The previous attempt had been upon the line imme- diately to the west of Spion Kop. If, hoN.ever, one were to follow to the east of Spion Kop, one would come upon a high mountain called JJoornkloof. I'etween these tvvo peaks, there lies a low ridge, called Drakfontein, anil a small detached hill named Vaalkranz. IJuller's idea was that if he could seize this small Vaalkranz, it would enable him to avoid the high ground altogether and pass his troops tlirough on to the plateau beyond. He still held the ford at ^'otgeiter's and commanded the country beyond with heavy guns on Mount Alice and at Swartz Kop, so that he could pass troops over at his will. He would make a noisy demonstration against J>rakfontein, then suddenly seixe Vaalkranz, and so, as he hoped, hold the outer door which opened on to the passage to Lady- smith. The getting of the guns up Swartz Kop was a prelim- inary which was as necessary as it was difficult. A njountain battery, two field guns, and six naval twelve- pounders were slung up by steel hawsers, the sailors yo- hoing on the halyards. The ammunition was taken up by hand. At six o'clock upon the morning of the sth the other guns opened a furious and probably harmless fire upon Brakfontein, Spion Kop, and all the I>ocr positions opposite to them. Shortly afterward the feigned attack upon Hrakfontein was commenced and was sustained with much fuss and appearance of energy until all was ready for the development of the true one. VVynne's Brigade, which had been Woodgate's, recovered already from its Spion Kop experience, carried out this part of the plan, supported by six batteries of field artillery, one howitzer battery, and two 4.7 naval guns. Three hours later a tele- gram was on its way to Pretoria to tell how triumphantly the burghers had driven back an attack which was never meant to go forward. The infantry retired first, then the I ii^! '• 232 THK GRKAT BOh.K WAR artillery "n alternate batteries, preserving a beautiful order and decorum. The last battery, the Seventy-eightii, re- mained to receive the concentrated fire of the 15oir guns, and was so enveloped in the dust of the exploding shells that spectators could only see a gun here or a limber there. Out of this whirl of d*'ath it cpiietly walked, without a bucket out of its place, the gunners drawing one wagon, the horses of which had perished, and so effected a leisurely and contemptuous withdrawal. The gallantry of the gunners has been one of the most striking features of the war, but it has never been more conspicuous than in this feint at Ikakfontein. While the attention of the lioers was being concentrated upon the Lancashire men, a pontoon bridge was suddenly thrown across the river at a place called Munger's Drift, some miles to the eastward. 'I'hree infantry brigades, those of Hart, Lyttelton, and Hildyard, had been massed all ready to be let slip when the false attack was sufficiently absorbing. The artillery fire (the Swartz Kop guns, and also the batteries which had been with- drawn from the Brakfontein demonstration) was then turned suddenly, with the crashing effect of seventy pieces, upon the real object of attack, the isolated Vaalkranz. It is doubtful whether any position has ever been sub jected to so terrific a bombardment, for the weight of metal thrown by single guns was greater than that of a whole German battery in the days of their last great war. The four-pounders and six-pounders of which Prince Kraft discourses would have seemed toys bes;de these mighty ho^^tzers and 4.7 's. Yet though the hillside was sharded oil m great flakes, it is doubtful if this terrific fire inflicted much injury upon the cunning and invisible riflemen with whom we had to contend. About midday the infantry began to stream across the bridge, which had been most gallantly and efficiently constructed under a warm fire, by a party of sappers, under the command of Major Irwin. The attack was led by the Durham Light Infantry of Lyttelton's Brigade, followed by the Third Rifles, with the Scottish Rifles, VAALKRANZ ^.^3 fill order ghtli, rc- )er guns, ig shells 'cr I here, ithoiit a J wagon, leisurely of the 3s of the > in this entrated Liddeiily s J)rift, rigades, massed ck was Swartz .*n wi th- is then pieces, Ikranz, ;n suh ght of at of a at war. Prince these de was terrific visible >ss the iently ppers, as led gade, iifles. and the First Ritles in support. Never did the old Light Division of Peninsular fanie go up a ispanish hillside with greater spirit and dash than these, their descendants, facing the slope of Vaalkranz. In open order they moved across the plain, with a superb disregard of the crash and patter of the shrapnel, and then up they went, the llitting figures, springing from cover to cover, stoop- ing, darting, crouching, running, until with their glasses the spectators on S'vartz Kop could see the gleam of the bayonets and the strain of furious rushing men upon the summit, as the last Boers were driven from their trenches. 'I'jie position was gained, but little else. Seven oflicers and seventy men were lying killed and wounded among the bowlders. A few stricken Poers, five un wounded prisoners, and a string of Pasuto ponies were the poor fruits of victory — those and the arid hill from which so much had been hoped, and so little was to be gained. It was during this advance that an incident occurred of a more picturesque character than is usual in modern warfare. The invisibility of combatants and guns, and the absorption of the individual in the mass, have robbed the battlefield of those episodes which adorned, if they did not justify it. On this occasion, a Poer gun, cut off by the Pritish advance. Hew out suddenly from behind its cover like a hare from its tussock, and raced for safety across the plain. Here and there it wound, the horses stretched to their utmost, the drivers stooping and lash- ing, the little gun bounding behind. To right, to left, behind and before, the Pritish shells burst, lyddite and shrapnel, crashing and driving. Over the lip of a hollow, the gallant gun vanished, and within a few minutes was banging away once more at the Pritish advance. With cheers, and shouts, and laughter, the llritish infantry- men watched the race for shelter, their sporting spirit rising high above all racial hatred, and hailing with a whoop the final disappearance of the gun. The Durhams had cleared the path, but the other regi- ments of Lyttelton's Prigade followed hard at their heels, and before night they had firmly established themselves T I -; ►'1 'li ' 1! i 'I 234 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR upon the hill. But the fatal slowness which had marred General Buller's previous operations again prevented him from completing his success. His spirit appears to be lethargic, but tenacious, and for the sake of the tenacity we are content to forgive much of the lethargy. But twice at least in the course of these operations there is evidence of sudden impulse to drop his tools in the midst of his task and to do no more for the day. So it was at Colenso, where an order was given at an early hour for the whole force to retire, and the guns which might have been covered by infantry fire and withdrawn after nightfall were abandoned. So it was also at a critical moment at this action at Vaalkranz. In the original scheme of operations it had been planned that an adjoining hill, called the Green Hill, which partly commanded Vaal- kranz, should be carried also. The two together made a complete position, while singly each was a very bad neighbor to the other. On the aide-de-camp riding up, however, to inquire from General BuUer whether the time had come for this advance, he replied, " VVe have done enough for the day," and left out this essential portion of his original scheme, with the result that all miscarried. Speed was the most essential quality for carrying out his plan successfully. So it must always be with the attack. The defence does not know where the blow is coming, and has to distribute men and guns to cover miles of groand. The attacker knows where he will hit, and behind a screen of outposts he can mass his force and throw his whole strength against a mere fraction of that of his enemy. But in order to cl . so he must be quick. One tiger spring must tear the centre out of the line be- fore tlic Hanks can come to its assistance. If time is given, if the long line can concentrate, if the scattered guns can mass, if lines of defence can be reduplicated behind, then the one great advantage which the attack possesses is thrown away. Both at the second and at the third at- tempts of lUilIer the British movements were so slow that had the enemy been the slowest instead of the most mobile of armies, they could still always have made any fe .>. VAALKRANZ K\S dispositions wiiich they chose. Warren's dawdling in the first days of the movement which ended at Spion Kop might with an effort be condoned on account of possible difficulties of supply, but it would strain the ingenuity of the most charitable critic to find a sufficient reason for the lethargy of Vaalkranz. Though daylight comes a little after four, the operations were not commenced be- fore seven. Lyttelton's Brigade had stormed the hill at two, and nothing more was done during the long evening, while officers chafed and soldiers swore, and the busy Hoers worked furiously to bring up their guns and to bar the path which we must take. With some surprise Gen- eral |]uller remarked a day or two later that the way was not quite so easy as it had been. One might have de- duced the fact without the aid of a balloon. The brigade tiien occupied Vaalkranz, and ere( ;d sangars and dug trenches. On the morning of the 6th, the position of the British force was not dissimilar to that of Spit . Kop. Again, the) had some thousands of men upon a hilltop, exposed to shell fire from several di'ec- tions and without any guns upon the hill to support them. In one or two points the situation was modified in their favor, and hence their escape from loss and dis- aster. A more extended position enabled our infantry to avoid bunching, and the isolation of their position pre- vented them from being seriously harassed by the Boer riflemen. But in other respects our position was parallel to that in which we had found ourselves a fortnight before. The original plan was that the taking of Vaalkranz should be the first step toward the outflanking of JJrak- fontein and the rolling up of the whole Boer position. But after the first move the British attitude became one of defence rather than of attack. There is only one ex- planation which could cover the singularity of this whole movement. It is that Buller had received secret instruc- tions from Lord Roberts to keep the Boers busy by attacks winch looked serious but were not pressed home, so as to engage their attention while the great coup was being prepared upon the Kiniberley side. No evidence has 11 !*l 1 U J ,» 2^]6 THE GREAT BOER WAR yet been forthcoming that this is so; but if in the future history of the war it should be shown that this is the case, then General lUiller will be of all men the one most to be admired for a lofty patriotism which did not fear criticism or temporary loss of reputation, so long as his action was ultimately of the greatest benefit to the cause for which he fought. Such a subordination of self to country would, if this should indeed prove to be the correct ex- planation of the mystery, be the very highest test of large- ness of mind and nobility of character. Whatever the general and ultimate effect of these opera- tions may have been, it is beyond question that their con- templation was annoying and bewildering in the extreme to those who were present. The position upon P'ebruary 6th was this. Over the river upon the hill was a single British brigade, exposed to the fire of one enormous gun — a ninety-six-pound Creusot, the longest of all Long Toms — which was stationed upon Doornkloof, and of several smaller guns and pom-poms which spai at them from nooks and crevices of the hills. On our side were seventy-two guns, large and small, all very noisy and im- potent. It is not too much to say, as it appears to me, that the Boers have in some way revolutionized our ideas in regard to the use of artillery, by bringing a fresh and healthy common sense to bear upon a subject which had been unduly fettered by pedantic rules. The Boer system is the single stealthy gun crouching where none can see it. The British system is the six brave guns coming into action in line of full interval and spreading out into ac- curate dressing visible to all men. " Always remember," says one of our artillery maxims, " that one gun is no gun." Which is prettier on a field-day, is obvious, but which is business, — let the many duels between six Boer guns and sixty British declare. With black powder it was useless to hide the gun, as its smoke must betray it. With smokeless powder the guns are so invisible that it was only by the detection with powerful glasses of the dust from the trail on the recoil that our officers were ever able CO localize the guns against which they were fight- I VAALKRANZ 237 ing. But if the Boers had had six guns in line, instead of one behind that kopje and another between those distant rocks, it would not have been so difficult to say where they were. Again, British traditions are all in favor of planting the guns close together. At this very action of Vaalkranz the two largest guns were so placed that a single shell bursting between them would have disabled them both. The officer who placed them there, and so disregarded in a vital matter the most obvious dictates of common sense, would probably have been shocked by any want of technical smartness, or irregularity in the routine drill. An over-elaboration of trifles, and a want of grip of common sense and of adaptation to new ideas, is the most serious and damaging criticism which can be levelled against our army. That the function of infantry is to shoot, and not to act like spearmen in the middle ages ; that the first duty of artillery is, so far as is possible, to be invisible — these are two of the lessons which have been driven home so often during the war, that even our hide-bound conservatism can hardly resist them. Lyttelton's Brigade, then, held Vaalkranz; and from three parts of the compass there came big shells and little shells, with a constant shower of long-range rifle bullets. Behind them, and as useful as if it had been on Woolwich Common, there was drawn up an imposing mass of men, two infantry divisions, and two brigades of cavalry, all straining at the leash, prepared to shed their blood until the spruits ran red with it, if only they could win their way to where their half-starved comrades waited for them. But nothing happened. Hours passed and noth- ing happened. An occasional shell from the big gun plumped among them. One, through some freak of gun- nery, lobbed slowly through a division, and the men whooped and threw their caps at it as it passed. The guns on Swartz Kop, at a range of nearly five miles, tossed shells at the monster on Doornkloof, and finally blew up his powder magazine amid the applause of the infantry. For the army it was a picnic and a spectacle. But it was otherwise with the men up on Vaalkranz. t ! ) il 'ff '.I r , fi'' 1 238 THE GREAT BOER WAR In spite of sangar and trench, that cross fire was finding them out; and no feint or demonstration on either side came to draw the concentrated fire from their position. Once there was a sudden alarm at the western end of the hill, and stooping, bearded figures with slouch hats and bandoliers were right upon the ridge before they could be stopped, so cleveily had their advance been conducted. But a fiery rush of Durhams and Rifles cleared the crest again, and it was proved once more how much stronger is the defence than the attack. Nightfall found the position unchanged, save that another pontoon bridge had been constructed during the day. Over this Hild- yard'j Brigade marched to relieve Lyttelton's, who came back for a rest under the cover of the Swartz Kop guns. The''' losses in the two days had been under two hundred and fifty, a trifle if any aim were to be gained, but exces- sive for a mere demonstration. That night Hildyard's men supplemented the defences made by Lyttelton, and tightened their hold upon the hill. One futile night attack caused them for an instant to change the spade for the rifle. When in the morning it was found that the Boers had, as they naturally would, brought up their outlying guns, the tired soldiers did not regret their labors of the night. It was again demon- strated how innocuous a thing is a severe shell fire, if the position be an extended one with chances of cover. A total of forty killed and wounded out of a strong brigade was the result of a long day under an incessant cannon- ade. And then at nightfall came the conclusion that the guns Wv.re too many, that the way was too hard, and down came all our high hopes with the order to withdraw once more across that accursed river. Vaalkranz was aban- doned, and Hildyard's Brigade, seething with indigna- tion, was ordered back once more to its camp. «' ':i Chapter Seventeen BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE The heroic moment of the siege of Ladysmith was that which witnessed the repulse of the great attack. The epic should have ended at that dramatic instant. IJut instead of doing so the story falls back to an anti-climax of crowded hospitals, slaughtered horses, and sporadic shell fire. For another six weeks of inactivity the brave garrison endured all the sordid evils which had steadily grown from inconvenience to misfortune and from mis- fortune to misery. Away in the south they heard the thunder of Buller's guns, and from the hills round the town they watched with pale faces and bated breath the tragedy of Spion Kop, preserving a firm conviction that a very little more would have transformed it into their salvation. Their hearts sank with the sinking of the cannonade, and rose again with the roar of Vaalkranz. But Vaalkranz also failed them, and they waited on in the majesty of their hunger and their weakness for the help which was to come. It has been already narrated how General Buller, slow but indomitable, had made his three attempts for the re- lief of the city. Undismayed by these successive losses, and inspirited by the cheering news from Lord Roberts on the Kimberley side, the Colenso army now prepared itself for its supreme effort. This time, at least, the soldiers hoped that they would be permitted to burst their way to the help of their starving comrades or leave their bones among the hills which had faced them so long. All they asked was a fight to a finish, and now they were about to have one. ,i ( .1. i p' N I u 240 THE GREAT BOER WAR General Buller had tried the Boers* centre, he had tried their extreme right, and now he was about to try their extreme left. There were some obvious advantages on this side which make it surprising that it was not the first to be attempted. In the first place, the enemy's main position upon that flank was at Hlangwane mountain, which is to the south of the Tugela, so that in case of defeat the river ran behind them. In the second, Hlang- wane mountain was the one point from which the Boer position at Colenso could be certainly enfiladed, and there- fore the fruits of victory would be greater on that flank than on the other. Finally, the operations could be con- ducted at no great distance from the railhead, and the force would be exposed to little danger of having its flank attacked or its communications cut, as was the case in the Spion Kop advance. Against these potent con- siderations there is only to be put the single fact that the turning of the Boer right would threaten the Free Staters' line of retreat. On the whole, the balance of advantage lay entirely with the new attempt, and the whole army advanced to it with a premonition of success. Of all the examples which the war has given of the enduring quali- ties of the British troops there is none more striking than the absolute confidence and whole-hearted delight with which, after three bloody repulses, they set forth upon another venture. On February 9th the movements were started which transferred the greater part of the force from the extreme left to the centre and right. By the nth Lyttelton's (formerly Clery's) second division and Warren's fifth division had come eastward, leaving Burn Murdoch's cavalry brigade to guard the western side. On the 12th Lord Dundonald, with all the colonial cavalry, two bat- talions of infantry, and a battery, made a strong recon- noissance toward Hussar Hill, which is the. nearest of the several hills which would have to be occupied in order to turn the position. The hill was taken, but was abandoned again by General Buller after he had used it for some hours as an observatory. A long-range BULLKR'S FINAL ADVANCE 241 action between the retiring cavalry and the Boers ended in a few losses upon each side. What BuUcr had seen during the hour or two which he had spent with his telescope upon Hussar Hill had evidently confirmed him in his views, for two days later (February i4tli) the whole army set forth for this point. By the morning of the 15th twenty thousand men were concentrated upon the sides and spurs of this eminence. On the 16th the heavy guns were in position, and all was ready for the advance. Facing them now were the formidable Boer lines of Hlangwane Hill and Green Hill, which would certainly cost several thousands of men if they were to take them by direct storm. Beyond them, upon the Boer Hank, were the hills of Monte Christo and Cingolo, which appeared to be the extreme outside of the Boer po- sition. The plan was to engage the attention of the trenches in front by a terrific artillery fire and the threat of an assault, while at the same time sending the true Hank attack far round to carry the Cingolo ridge, which must be taken before any other hill could be approached. On the 17th, in the early morning, with the first tinge of violet in the east, the irregular cavalry and the second division (Lyttelton's) with Wynne's Brigade started upon their widely curving flanking march. The country through which they passed was so broken that the troopers led their horses in single file, and would have found them- selves helpless in face of any resistance. Fortunately, Cingolo Hill was very weakly held, and by evening both our horsemen and our infantry had a firm grip upon it, thus turning the extreme left flank of the Boer position. F'or once their mountainous fortresses were against our enemies, for a mounted Boer force is so mobile that in an open position, such as faced Methuen, it is very hard and requires great celerity of movement ever to find a flank at all. On a succession of hills, however, it was evident that some one hill must mark the extreme end of their line, and we had found it at Cingolo. Their answer 16 ,1; t I M f- P <.!': ' I . ; !i 242 THE GREAT BOER WAR to this movement was to throw their flank back so as to face the new position. Even now, however, the Boer leaders had apparently not realized that this was the main attack, or it is possi- ble that the intervention of the river made it difficult for them to send reinforcements. However that may be, it is certain that the task which the British found awaiting them upon the i8th proved to be far easier than they had dared to hope. The honors of the day rested with Hild- yard's English Brigade (East Surrey, West Surrey, West Yorkshires, and Second Devons). In open order and with a rapid advance, taking every advantage of the cover — which was better than is usual in South African war- fare — they gained the edge of the Monte Christo ridge, and then swiftly cleared the crest. One at least of the regiments engaged, the Devons, was nerved by the thought that their own first battalion was waiting for them at Ladysmith. The capture of the hill made the line of trenches which faced Buller untenable, and he was at once able to advance with Barton's Fusilier Bri- gade and to take possession of the whole Boer position of Hlangwane and Green Hill. It was not a great tacti- cal victory, for they had no trophies to show save the worthless (/eMs of the Boer camps. But it was a very great strategical victory, for it not only gave them the whole south side of the Tugela, but also the means of commanding with their guns a great deal of the north side, including those Colenso trenches which had blocked the way so long. A hundred and seventy killed and wounded (of whom only fourteen were killed) was a trivial price for such a result. At last from the captured ridges the exultant troops could see far away the haze which lay over the roofs of Ladysmith, and the besieged, with hearts beating high with hope, turned their glasses upon the distant mottled patches which told them that their comrades were approaching. By February 20th the British had firmly established themselves along the whole south bank of the river, Hart's brigade had occupied Colenso, and the heavy guns had been BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE 243 pushed up to more advanced positions. The crossing of the river was the next operation, and the question arose where it should be crossed. The wisdom which comes with experience shows us now that it would have been infinitely better to have crossed on their extreme left flank, as by an advance upon this line we should have turned their strong Pieter's position just as we had al- ready turned their Colenso one. With an absolutely master card in our hand we refused to play it, and won the game by a more tedious and perilous process. The as- sumption seems to have been made (on no other hypothesis can one understand the facts) that the enemy were de- moralized and that the positions would not be strongly held. Our flanking advantage was abandoned and s, direct advance was ordered from Colenso, involving a frontal attack upon the Pieter's position. On February 21st Puller threw his pontoon bridge over the river near Colenso, and the same evening his army began to cross. It was at once evident that the Poer resistance had by no means collapsed. Wynne's Lancashire Prigadewere the first across, and found them- selves hotly engaged before nightfall. The low kopjes in front of them were blazing with musketry fire. The brigade held its own, but lost the Brigadier (the second in a month) and one hundred and fifty rank and file. Next morning the main body of the infantry was passed across, and the army was absolutely committed to the formidable and, as some think, unnecessary enterprise of fighting its way straight to Ladysmith. The force in front had weakened, however, both in numbers and in morale. Some thousands of the Free Staters had left in order to defend their own country from the advance of Roberts, while the rest were depressed by as much of the news as was allowed by their leaders to reach them. But the Boer is a tenacious fighter, and many a brave man was still to fall before Buller and White should shake hands in the High Street of Ladysmith. The first obstacle which faced the army, after crossing the river, was a belt of low rolling ground, which was il ■9 ■fe' % t , hh iif. ^ 244 THK gki:at boi,r war gradually cleared by the advance of our infantry. As night closed in the advance lines of JJoers and ISritish were so close to each other that incessant rille fire was maintained until morning, and at more than one point .small bodies of desperate rillemen charged right up to the bayonets of our i fantry. The morning found us still holding our positions all along the line, and as more and more of our infantry came up and gun after gun roared into action, we began to push our stubborn enemy north- ward. On the 2 I St the J )orsets, Middlesex, and Somer- sets had borne the heat of the day. On the 2 2d it was the Royal Lancasters followed by the South Lancashires who took up the running. It would take the patience and also the space of a Kinglake in this scrambling, broken fight to trace the doings of those groups of men who strove and struggled througii the rille fire. All day a steady advance was maintained over the low kopjes, until by evening we were faced by the more serious line of the Pieter's Hills. The operations had been carried out with a monotony of gallantry. Always the same ex- tended advance, always the same rattle of Mausers and clatter of pom-poms from a ridge, always the same victorious;^ 'diersonthe barren cresl,with a few crippled fJoers before them and many crippled comrades behind. They ^vere expensive triumphs, and yet every one brought them nearer to theii goal. And now, like an advancing tide, they lapped along the base of Tieter's Hill. Could they gather volume enough to carry themselves over? The issue of the long-drawn battle and the fate of Lady- smith hung upon the question. Brigadier Fitzroy Hart, to whom the assault was en- trusted, is in some ways as singular and picturesque a type as has been evolved in the war. A dandy soldier, always the picture of neatness from the top of his helmet to the heels of his well-polished brov/n boots, he brings to military matters the same precision which he affects in dress. Pedantic in his accuracy, he actually at the battle of Colenso drilled the Irish Brigade for half an hour before leading them into action, and threw out "1I i! i'K rulli-:r's kfnal advanci: 245 markers under a deadly fire in order that his change from close to extended formation might be acad'Mnically cor- rect. The heavy loss of the brigade at this action was to some extent ascribt;d to him and alTected his popular- ity; but as his men came to know him better, his roman- tic bravery, his whimsical soldierly humor, their dislike changed into admiration. His personal disregard for danger was notorious and reprehensible. " Where is General Hart.'' " asked some one in action. " I have not seen him, but I know where you will find him. (Jo ahead of the skirmish line and you will see him standing on a rock," was the answer. He bore a charmed life. It was a danger to be near him. " Whom are you going to?" "General Hart," said the aide-de-camp. "Then good-by ! " cried his fellows. A grim humor ran through his nature. It is gravely recorded and widely believed that he lined up a regiment on a hill-top in order to teach them not to shrink from lire. Amid the laughter of his Irishmen, he walked through the open files of his firing line holding a laggard by the ear. This was the man who had put such a spirit into the Irish IJrigade that amid that army of valiant men there were none who held such a record. "Their rushes were the fjuickest, their rushes were the longest, anc' they stayed the shortest time under cover," said a shrewd military observer. To Hart and his brigade was given the task of clearing the way to Ladysmith. The regiments which he took with him upon his perilous enterprise were the First Inniskilling Fusiliers, the First Dublin Fusiliers, the First Connaught Rangers, and the Imperial Light Infantry, the whole forming the famous Fifth r>rigade. They were already in the extreme l>ritish advance, and now, as they moved forward, the Durham Light Infantry and the First RiHe Brigade from Lyttel- ton's J^rigade came up to take their place. The hill to be taken lay on the right, and the soldiers were compelled to pass in single file under a heav • fire for more than a mile until they reached the spot which seemed best for their enterprise. There, short already of sixty of their i c lii 246 THK GRKAT BOKR WAR comrades, they assembled and began a cautious advance upon the lines of trenches and sangars which seamed the brown slope above them. For a time they were able to keep some cover and the casualties were comparatively few. But now at last, as the evening sun threw a long shadow from the hills, the leading regiment, the Inniskillings, found themselves at the utmost fringe of bowlders with a clear slope between them and the main trench of the enemy. Up there where the shrapnel was spurting and the great lyddite shells crashing they could dimly see a line of bearded faces and the black dots of the slouch hats. With a yell the Innis- killings sprang out, carried with a rush the first trench, and charged desperately onward for the second one. It was a supremely dashing attack against a supremely steady resistance, for among all their gallant deeds the Boers have never fought better than on that February evening. Amid such a smashing shell fire as living mortals have never yet endured they stood doggedly, these hardy men of the vcldt, and fired fast and true into the fiery ranks of the Irishmen. The yell of the storm- ers was answered by the remorseless roar of the Mausers and the deep-chested shouts of the farmers. Up and up surged the infantry, falling, rising, dashing bull-headed at the crackling line of the trench. But still the beard- ed faces glared at them over the edge, and still the sheet of lead pelted through their ranks. The regiment stag- gered, came on, staggered again, was overtaken by sup- porting companies of the Dublins and the Connaughts, came on, staggered once more, and finally dissolved into shreds, who ran swiftly back for cover, threading their way among their stricken comrades. Never on this earth was there a retreat of which the survivors had less reason to be ashamed. They had held on to the utmost capacity of human endurance. Their colonel, ten officers, and more than half the regiment were lying on the fatal hill. Honor to them, and honor also to the gallant Dutchmen who, rooted in the trenches, had faced the rush and fury of such an onslaught ! To-day to them, to-morrow to us : » w u i jS' m . BULM.R'S FINAL ADVANCK -47 — but it is for a soldier to thank the God of battles for worthy foes. It is one thing, however, to repulse the I^ritish soldier and it is another to rout him. Within a few hundred yards of their horrible ordeal at Magersfontein the High- landers re-formed into a military body. So now the Irish- men fell back no farther than the nearest cover, and there held grimly on to the ground which they had won. If you would know the advantage which the defence has over the att.ick, then do you come and assault this line of tenacious men, now in your hour of victory and exul- tation, friend IJoer! Friend IJoer did attempt it, and skilfully too, moving a flanking party to sweep the posi- tion with their fire. l>ut the brigade, though sorely hurt, held them off without difficulty, and was found on the morning of the 23d to be still lying upon the ground which they had won. Our losses had been very heavy. Colonel Thackeray, of the Inniskillings, Colonel Sitwell, of the Dublins, three majors, twenty officers, and a total of about six hundred out of twelve hundred actually engaged. To take such punishment and to remain undemoralized is the supreme test to which troops can be put. Could the loss have been avoided ? By following the original line of advance from Monte Christo, perhaps, when we should have turned the enemy's left. But otherwise, no. The hill was in the way and had to be taken. In the war game you cannot play without a stake. You lose and you pay forfeit, and where the game is fair the best player is he who pays with the best grace. The attack was well pre- pared, well delivered, and only miscarried on account of the excellence of the defence. We proved once more what we had proved so often before, that all valor and all discipline will not avail in a frontal attack against brave, cool-headed men armed with quick-firing riries. In the whole campaign Talana Hill is the only action in which a direct attack has been successful against an approxi- mately equal number of our enemy. While the Irish Brigade assaulted Railway Hill an at- ^^h (■ "I If' ^1 u y . I \ I !■ ( \ti I 'I 248 THK GREAT BOKR WAR tack had been made upon the left, which was probably meant as a demonstration to keep the Boers from rein- forcing their comrades rather than as an actual attempt upon their lines. Such as it was, however, it cost the life of at least one brave soldier, for Colonel Thorold, of the Welsh Fusiliers, was among the fallen. Thorold, Thackeray, and Sitwell in one evening. Who can say that British colonels have not given their men a lead.? The army was now at a deadlock. Railway Hill barred the way, and if Hart's men could not carry it by assault it was hard to say who could. The 23d found the two armies facing each other at this critical point, the Irish- men still clinging to the slopes of the hill and the Boers lining the top. Fierce rifle firing broke out between them during the day, but each side was well covered and lay low. The troops in support suffered somewhat, however, from a random shell fire. Mr. Winston Churchill has left it upon record that within his own observation three of their shrapnel shells fired at a venture onto the reverse slope of a hill accounted for nineteen men and four horses. The enemy can never have known how hard those three shells had hit us, and so we may also hope that our artillery fire has often been less futile than it appeared. General Buller had now realized that it was no mere rear-guard action which the Boers were fighting, but that their army was standing doggedly at bay, so he reverted to that flanking movement which, as events showed, should never have been abandoned. Hart's Irish Bri- gade was at present almost the right of the army. His new plan — a masterly one — was to keep Hart pinning the Boers at that point, and to move his centre and left across the river, and then back to envelop the left wing of the enem •. By this manoeuvre Hart became the ex- treme left instead of the extreme right, and the Irish Bri- gade would be the hinge upon which the whole army should turn. It was a large conception, finely carried out. The 24th was a day of futile shell fire — and of plans for the future. The heavy guns were got across m BULLKR'S FINAL ADVANCF. 249 once more to the Monte Christo ridge and to Hlangwane, and preparations made to throw the army from the west to the east. The enemy still snarled and occasionally snapped in front of Hart's men, but with four companies of the Second Rifle Brigade to protect their flanks their position remained secure. In the mean time, through a contretemps between our outposts and the Boers, no leave had been given to us to withdraw our wounded, and the unfortunate fellows, some hundreds of them, had lain between the lines in agonies of thirst for two whole days — one of the most painful in- cidents of the campaign. Now, upon the 25th, an armis- tice was proclaimed, and the crying needs of the survivors were attended to. On the same day the hearts of our soldiers sank within them as they saw the stream of our wagoiii. and guns crossing the river once more. What, were they foiled again? Was the blood of these brave men to be shed in vain ? They ground their teeth at the thought. The higher strategy was not for them, but back was back and forward was forward, and they knew which way their proud hearts wished to go. The 26th Vk^as occupied by the large movements of troops which so complete a reversal of tactics necessitated. Under the screen of a heavy artillery fire, the British right became the left and the left the right. A second pontoon bridge was thrown across near the old Jioer bridge at Hlangwane, and over it was passed a large force of infantry. Barton's Fusilier Brigade, Kitchener's i^t'ke Wynne's, vice Woodgate's) Lancashire Brigade, and two battalions of Norcott's (formerly Lyttelton's) Brigade. Coke's Brigade was left at Colenso to prevent a counter attack upon our left flank and communications. In this way, while Hart with the Durhams and the First Rifle Bri- gade held the Boers in front, the main body of the army was rapidly swung round onto their left flank. Uy the morning of the 27th all was in place for the new attack. Opposite the point where the troops had been massed were three Boer hills; one, the nearest, may for conveni- ence' sake be called Barton's Hill. As the army had H ti ,. M i i t f ' 'i 250 THE GREAT BOER WAR formerly been situated the assault upon this hill would have been a matter of extreme difficulty; but now, with the heavy guns restored to their commanding position, from which they could sweep its sides and summits, it had recovered its initial advantage. In the morning sunlight Barton's P'usiliers crossed the river, and ad- vanced to the attack under a screaming canopy of shells. Up they went and up, darting and crouching, until their gleaming bayonets sparkled upon the summit. The mas- terful artillery had done its work, and the first long step taken in this last stage of the relief of Ladysmith. The IcjJ had been slight and the advantage enormous. After they had gained the summit the Fusiliers were stung and stung again by clouds of skirmishers who clung to the flanks of the hill, but their grip was firm and grew firmer with every hour. Of the three Boer hills which had to be taken the nearest (or western one) was now in the hands of the British. The farthest (or eastern one) was that on which the Irish brigade was still crouching, ready at any mo- ment for a final spring which would take them over the few hundred yards which separated them from the trenches. Between the two intervened a central hill, as yet untouched. Could we carry this the whole position would be ours. Now for the final effort! Turn every gun upon it, the guns of Monte Christo, the guns of Hlangwane! Turn every rifle upon it — the rifles of Bar- ton's men, the rifles of Hart's men, the carbines of the distant cavalry! Scalp its crown with the machine gun fire. And now, up with you, Lancashire men, Norcott's men! The summit c a glorious death, for beyond that hill your suffering comrades are awaiting you! Put every bullet and every man and all of fire and spirit that you are worth into this last hour; for if you fail now you have failed forever, and if you win, then when your hairs are white your blood will still run warm when you think of that morning's work. The long drama had drawn to an end, and one short day's work is to show what that end was to be, V %l/* BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE 251 But there was never a doubt ot it. Hardly for one in- stant aid the advance waver at any point of its extended line. \lt was the supreme instant of the Natal campaign, as, waVe after wave, the long lines of infantry went shimmering up the hill. On the left the Lancasters, the Lancashini Fusiliers, the South Lancashires, the York and LancasWw*i, with a burr of North Country oaths, went racing for the summit. Spion Kop and a thousand com- rades were calling for vengeance. On the right the Light JJrigade, the Cameronians, the Third rRifles, the First Rifle Brigade, the Durhams, and th-^i gallant Irishmen, so sorely stricken and yet so eager, were all pressing up- ward and onward. The Boer fire lulls, it ceases — they are running! Wild hat waving men upon the Hlangwane uplands see the silhouette of the active figures of the stormers along the sky-line and know that the position is theirs. Exultant soldiers dance and cheer upon the ridge. The sun is setting in glory over the great Dra^en Jotrg mountains, and so also that night set forever the hopes of the Boer invaders of Natal. Out of doubt and chaos, blood and labor, had come at last the judgment that the lower should not swallow the higher, that the world is for the man of the twentieth and not of the seventeenth century. After a fortnight of fighting the weary troops threw themselves down that night with the assurance that at last the door was ajar and the light breaking through. One more effort and it would be open before them. Behind the line of hills which had been taken there extended a great plain as far as Bulwana — that evil neighbor who had wrought such harm upon Ladysmith. More than half of the Pieter's position had fallen into Bull- er's hands upon the 27th, and the remainder had become untenable. The Boers had lost some five hundred in killed, wounded, and prisoners, together with some " materi- al." ' It seemed to the British General and his men that one more action would bring them safely into Ladysmith. ' Accurate figures will probably never be obtained, but a well- known lioer in 1 rotoria informed me that Pieter's was the most ex- pensive light to them of the whole war. — A. C D. -/Cu^'^ ^1 h I is ' ^ I f .:« . 252 THi: GRKAT BOKR WAR But here they miscalculated, and so often have they mis- calculated on the optimistic side in this campaign that it is pleasing to find for once that their hopes were less than the reality. The Boers had been beaten — fairly beaten and disheartened. It will always be a subject for conjecture whether they were so entirely on the strength of the Natal campaign, or whether the news«f the Cronj' disaster from the western side had warned them that they must draAV in upon the east. For my own part I believe that the honor lies with the gallant men of Natal, and that, moving on these lines, they would, Cronje or no Cronje, have forced their way in triumph to Ladysmith. And now the long-drawn story draws to a swift close. Cautiously feeling their way with a fringe of horse, the British pushed over the great plain, delayed here and there by the crackle of musketry, but finding always that the obstacle gave way and vanished as they approached it. At last it seemed clear to Dundonald that there really was no barrier between his horsemen and the beleaguered city. With a squadron of Imperial Light Horse and a squadron of Natal Carabineers he rode on until, in the gathering twilight, the Ladysmith picket challenged the approaching cavalry, and the gallant town was saved. It is hard to say which had shown the greater endur- ance, the rescued or their rescuers. On both sides it bids fair to rank among the great achievements of the British army. The town, indefensible, lurking in a hol- low under commanding hills, had held out for 118 days. They had endured two assaults and an incessant bom- bardment, to which, toward the end, owing to the failure of heavy ammunition, they were unable to make any adequate reply. It was calculated that 16,000 shells had fallen within the town. In two successful sorties they had destroyed three of the enemy's heavy guns. They had been pressed by hunger, horseflesh was already running short, and they had been decimated by disease. More than 2,000 cases of enteric and dysentery had been in hospital at one time, and the total number of adi.iissions had been nearly as great as the total number of the gar- ''..■j^'ji BULLER'S FINAL ADVANCE 253 rison. One-tenth of the men had actually died of wounds or disease. Ragged, bootless, and emaciated, there still lurked in the gaunt soldiers the martial spirit of warriors. On the day after their relief 2,000 of them set forth to pursue the Boers. One who helped to lead them has left It upon record th-^t the most piteous sight that he has ever seen was these wasted men, stooping under their rifles and gasping with the pressure of their accoutre- ments, as they staggered after their retreating enemy. A Verestchagen might find a subject in these 2,000 in- domitable men with their emaciated horses pursuing a formidable foe. It is God's mercy that they failed to overtake them. If the record of the besieged force was great, that of the relieving army was no less so. Through the blackest depths of despondency and failure they had struggled to absolute success. At Colenso they had lost i,2oo men, at Spion Kop 1,700, at Vaalkranz 400, and now, in this last long-drawn effort, 1,600 more. Their total losses were over 5,000 men, more than 20 per cent, of ^,he whole army. Some particular regiments had suffered horribly. The Dublin Fusiliers headed the roll of honor with only five officers and 40 per cent, of the men left standing. Next to them the Inniskillings, the Lanca- shire Fusiliers, and the Royal Lancasters had been the hardest hit. It speaks well for Buller's power of winning and holding the confidence of his men that in the face of repulse after repulse the soldiers still went into battle as steadily as ever under his command. On March 3 Buller's force entered Ladysmith in state between the lines of the defenders. For their heroism the Dublin Fusiliers were put in the van of the proces- sion, and it is told how, as the soldiers who lined the streets saw the five officers and small clump of men the remains of what had been a strong battali'^i . -'^alizing, for the first time perhaps, what their relief nad cost, many sobbed like children. With cheer after cheer the stream of brave men flowed for honrs between banks formed by men as brave. But for the purposes of war the garrison iiii \}' hi ¥ 5 A r I I'f <: I 'I i I I. 254 THE GREAT BOER WAR was useless. A month of rest and food would be neces- sary before they could be ready to take the field once more. So the riddle of the Tugela had at last been solved. Even now, with all the i ^ht which has been shed upon the matter, it is hard toap^ '>rtion praise and blame. To the cheerful optimism of Symons must be laid some of the blame of the original entanglement; but man is mortal, and he laid down his life for his mistake. White, who had been but a week in the country, could not, if he would, alter the main facts of the military situation. He did his best, committed one or two errors, did brilliantly on one or two points, and finally con- ducted the defence with a tenacity and a gallantry which is above all praise. It did not, fortunately, develop into an absolutely desperate affair, like Massena's defence of Genoa, but had the relief failed them it is an open secret that White and his garrison would never have hoisted the white flag. He was fortunate in the troops whom he commanded — half of them old soldiers from India' — and exceedingly fortunate in his officers, French (in the operations before the siege), Archibald Hunter, Ian Hamilton, Dick-Cunyngham, Knox, De Courcy Hamil- ton, and all the other good men and true who stood (as long as they could stana) by his side. Above all, he was fortunate in his commissariat officers, and it was in the offices of Colonels Ward and Stoneman as much as in the trenches and sangars of Caesar's camp that the siege was won. Buller, like White, had to take the situation as he found it. It is well known that his own belief was that the line of the Tugela was the true defence of Natal. When he reached Africa, Ladysmith was already be- leaguered, and he, with his troops, had to abandon the scheme of direct invasion and to hurry to extricate White's ' An officer in high command in Ladysmith has told me, as an illustration of the nerve and discipline of the troops, that thougli false alarms in the Boer trenches were matters of continual occurrence from the beginning to the end of the siege, there was not one sinj^le occasion when the British outposts made a mistake. BULLKR'S FINAL ADVANCE 155 division. Whether they might not have been more rapidly extricated by keeping to the original plan is a question which will long furnish an excellent subject for military debate. Had Buller in November known that Ladysmith was capable of holding out until March, is it conceivable that he, with his whole army corps and as many more troops as he cared to summon from Eng- land, would not have made such an advance in four months through the Free State as would necessitate the abandonment of the sieges both of Kimberley and of Ladysmith? If the Boers persisted in these sieges they could not possibly place more than 20,000 men on the Orange Riv^r to face 60,000 whom Buller could have had there by the first week in December. Methuen's force, French's force, Gatacre's force, and the Natal force, with the exception of garrisons for Pietermaritzburg and Dur- ban, would have assembled, with a reserve of another 60,000 men in the colony or on the sea ready to fill the gaps in his advance. Moving over a flat country with plenty of flanking room it is probable that he would have been in Bloemfontein by Christmas and at the Vaal River late in January. What could the Boers do then ? They might remain before Ladysmith, and learn that their capital and their gold mines had been taken in their absence. Or they might abandon the siege and trek back to defend their own homes. This, as it appears to a civilian critic, would have been the least expensive means of fighting them; but after all the strain had to come somewhere, and the long struggle of Ladysmith may have meant a more certain and complete collapse in the future. At least, by the plan actually adopted we saved Natal from total devastation, and that must count against a great deal. Having taken his line Buller set about his task in a slow, deliberate, but pertinacious fashion. Let it be ac- knowledged that his was the hardest problem of the war, and that he solved it. The mere acknowledgment goes far to silence criticism, Biit the singular thing is that in his proceedings he showed qualities which had not ) fl i i if 256 TFII'. GRKAT BOJJl WAR been giMicrally itiibuted to him, ami was wantiiijjj in those very points which the public had imaginetl to be characteristic of him. He had gone out with tiie reputa- tion of a downright Joh.i Jiull (ightir, who would take punishment or give it, but sUjg his way through without wincing. There was no reason for attriljuting any particular strategical ability to him. JUit as a matter of fact, setting the Coienso attempt aside, the crossing for the S|)ion Kop enterprise, the withdrawal of lh(^ compro- mised army, the Vaalkranz crossing with the clever feint upon l?rakfontein, the final operations, and espe- cially tiie complete change of front after the third day of I'ieter's, were strategical movements largely conceived and admirably carrieil out. On the other hand, a hesita- tion in pushing o iw.xrd, and a disinclination to take a risk or to endure hea\y punishment, even in the case of tenijiorary failure, were consistent characteristics of his generalship. The Vaalkranz operations are particu- larly dill'icult to defend from the charge of having been needlessly slow and half-hearted. 'I'his "saturnine fighter," as he had been called, proved to be exceedingly sensitive al)out the lives of his men — an admirable (lual- ily in itself, but there arc occasions when to spare them to-day is to needlessly imperil them to-morrow. The victory was his, and yet in the very moment of victory he disjilayed the ([ualities which marred him. With two cavalry brigades in hand he did not push the pursuit of the routed Jkiers with their guns and endless streams of wagons. It is true that he might have lost heavily, but it is true also that a success might have ended the ]>oer invasion of Natal, and the lives of our troopers would be well spent in such a venture. If cavalry is not to be used in pursuing a retiring enemy encumbered with much baggage, then its day is indeed past. However, when all is said, we come back to the fact that General Buller carried out his appointed task with success, and that this task was the most onerous one of the whole campaign. The relief of Ladysmith stirred the people of the em- pire as nothing save perhaps the subsequent relief of BULIJ:irs KINAI. ADVANCF^ 257 Mafokin^ lias done duriuj^ our generation. Iwen sober, unemotional l.ondon found its soul for once and Muttered with joy. Men. women, and c. dren, rich and poor, clubman and cabman, joined in the universal delight. The thought of our garrison, of their privations, of our impotence; to relieve them, of the impending humiliation to them and to us, had lain dark for many months across our spirits. It had weighed upon us, until the subject, though ever present in our thoughts, was too painful for general talk. And now, in an instant, the shadow was lifted. The outburst of rcijoichig was not a. triumph over the gallaiU Hoers. At the worst period of the war, if a company of those brave farmers had ridden through Lon- don, they would havi* bet;n cheered from l*all Mall to the City. iJut 11 was our own escape from humiliation, the knowledge that the blood of our sojis had not been shed in vain, above all tiie conviction that tlu; darkest hour had now passed and that tlK; light of peace was dimly breaking far away- that was why London rang with joy bells that March morning, and why thos<; bells echoed back from every town and hamlet, in tro|)ical sun and in Arctic snow, over which the Hag of liritain wavetJ, 17 ^T li I .1 I I' I <': ■i , aU '('. Chapter Eighteen SIEGE AND RELIEF OF KIMBERLEY It has already been narrated how, upon the arrival of the army corps from England, the greater part v as drafted to Natal, while some went to the western side, and started under Lord Methuen upon the perilous enterprise of the relief of Kimberley. It has also been shown how, after three expensive victories, Lord Methuen's force met with a paralyzing reverse, and was compelled to remain inac- tive within twenty miles of the town which they had come to succor. Before describing how that succor did eventually arrive, some attention must be paid to the incidents which had occurred within the city. "I am directed to assure you that there is no reason for apprehending that Kimberley or any part of the Colony either is, or in any contemplated event will be, in danger of attack. Mr. Schreiner is of opinion that your fears are groundless and your anticipations in the matter entirely without foundation." Such is the official reply to the remonstrance of the inhabitants, when, with the shadow of war dark upon them, they appealed for help. It is fortunate, however, that a progressive British town has usually the capacity for doing things for itself without the intervention of officials. Kimberley was particularly lucky in being the centre of the wealthy and alert De Beers Company, which had laid in sufficient ammunition and supplies to prevent the town from being helpless in the presence of the enemy. But the cannon were pop-guns, firing a seven-pound shell for a short range, and the garrison contained only seven hundred regulars, while the remainder were mostly untrained 1 THK SIKG!-: OF KIMBI.KM.Y 259 I LEY rival of drafted started i of the w, after let with in inac- ley had succor d to the reason of the will be, on that in the official in, with led for British )r itself ey was hy and fficient (1 being cannon short lundred trained ^^ • -:!:r millers and artisans. Among them, however, there was a sprinkling of dangerous men from the northern wat.s, and all were nerved by a knowledge that the ground which they defended was essential to the Kmpire. Lady- smith was no more than any other strategic position, but Kimberley was unique, the centre of the richest tract of ground for its size in the whole world. Its loss would have been a heavy blow to the liritish cause, and an enormous encouragement to the Boers. On Octol)er 12th, several hours after the expiration of Kruger's ultimatum, Cecil Rhodes threw himself into Kimberley. This remarkable n>an, who stands for the future of South Africa as clearly as the Dopper Boer stands for its past, has, both in features and in character, some traits which may, without extravagance, be called Napoleonic. The restless energy, the fertility of re- source, the attention to detail, the wide sweep of mind, the power of f^rse comment -all these recall the great emperor. So does the simplicity of private life in the midst of excessive wealth. And so finally does a svant of scruple where an ambition is to be furthered, shown, for example, in that enormous donation to the Irish party by which he made a bid for their parliamentary support, and in the story of the Jameson raid. A certain cyni- cism of mind and a grim humor complete the parallel. But Rhodes is a Napoleon of peace. The consolidation of South Africa under the freest and most progressive form of government is the large object on which he has expended his energies and his fortune, but the develop- ment of the country in every conceivable respect, from the building of a railway to the importation of a pedigree bull, engages his unremitting attention. It was on October 15th that the fifty thousand inhabi- tants of Kimberley first heard the voice of war. It rose and fell in a succession of horrible screams and groans which travelled far over the veldt, and the outlying farmers marvelled at the dreadful clamor from the sirens and the hooters of the great mines, which told that their wire-nerve had been cut, and that they were isolated from Kl .-\aj t> ^fl>^^^-^^ A^%~^^ IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) == 15. 112 ^n I.I ill 1.8 1.25 i.4 |l.6 ^ 6" — ► Photographic Sciences Corporation S 4< >v •1>' ^i :.l I U I 'if ] * *« f ..,-,'1 :^ 1 THE SIEGE OF KIMBERLEY 261 the former being offered an asylum in his camp. This offer was made known, and half a dozen persons took advantage of it. The suggestion, however, in the case of the English carried with it no promise that they would be conveyed to Orange River, and a compliance with it would have put them as helpless hostages into the hands of the enemy. As to not publishing the message, it is not usual to publish such official documents, but the offer was shown to Mr. Rhodes, who concurred in the impos- sibility of accepting it. It is difficult to allude to this subject without touching upon the painful but notorious fact that there existed during the siege considerable friction between the mili- tary authorities and a section of the civilians, of whom Mr. Rhodes was chief. Among other characteristics Rhodes bears any form of restraint very badly, and chafes mightily when unable to do a thing in the exact way which he considers best. He may be a Napoleon of peace, but his warmest friends could never describe him as a Napoleon of war, for his military forecasts have been erroneous, and the management of the Jamieson fiasco certainly inspires no confidence in the judgment of any one concerned. That his intentions were of the best, and that he had the good of the Empire at heart, may be freely granted; but that these motives should lead him to cabal against, and even to threaten, the military gov- ernor, or that he should attempt to force Lord Roberts's hand in a military operation, is most deplorable. Every credit may be given to him for all his aid to the military — he gave with a good grace what the garrison would otherwise have had to commandeer — but it is a fact that the town would have been more united, and therefore stronger, without his presence. Colonel Kekewich and his chief staff officer, Major O'Meara, were as much plagued by intrigue within as by the Boers without. On November 7th the bombardment of the town com- menced from nine nine-pounder guns to which the artillery of the garrison could give no adequate reply. The result, however, of a fortnight's fire, during which seven hundred 1 y ^m rl I I" .fi r^vs ■J f1 : 262 THE GREAT BOER WAR shells were discharged, was the loss of two non-comba- tants. The question of food was recognized as being of more importance than the enemy's tire. An early relief appeared probable, however, as the advance of Methuen's force was already known. One pound of bread, two ounces of sugar, and half a pound of meat were allowed per head. It was only on the small children that the scarcity of milk told with tragic effect. At Ladysmith, at Mafeking, and at Kimberley hundreds of these inno- cents were sacrificed. November 25th was a red-letter day with the garrison, who made a sortie under the impression that Methuen was not far off, and that they were assisting his opera- tions. The attack was made upon one of the Boer posi- tions by a force consisting of a detachment of the Light Horse and of the Cape Police, and their work was bril- liantly successful. The actual storming of the redoubt was carried out by some forty men, of whom but four were killed. They brought back thirty-three prisoners as a proof of their victory, but the Boer gun, as usual, es- caped. In this brilliant affair Scott-Turner was wounded, which did not prevent him, only three days later, from leading another sortie, which was as disastrous as the first had been successful. Save under very exceptional circumstances it is in modern warfare long odds always upon the defence, and the garrison would probably have been better advised had they refrained from attacking the fortifications of their enemy — a truth which Baden- Powell learned also at Game Tree Hill. As it was, after a temporary success, the British were blown back by the fierce Mauser fire, and lost the indomitable Scott-Turner, with twenty-one of his brave companions killed and twenty-eight wounded, all belonging to the colonial corps. The Empire may reflect with pride that the people in whose cause mainly they fought showed themselves by their gallantry and their devotion worthy of any sacrifice which has been made. Again the siege settled down to a monotonous record of decreasing rations and of expectation. On December I- I , j.\'^ m. ! m a THE SIKGK OF KIMBERLKY 26;^ loth there came a sign of hope from the outside world. P'ar on the southern horizon a little golden speck shim- mered against the blue African sky. It was Methuen's balloon gleaming in the sunshine. Next morning the low grumble of distant cannon was the sweetest of music to the listening citizens. But days passed without further news, and it was not for more than a week that they learned of the bloody repulse of Magersfontein, and that help was once more indefinitely postponed. Heliographic communication had been opened with the relieving army, and it is on record that the first message Hashed through from the south was a question ab( it the number of a horse. With inconceivable stupidity this has been cited as an example of military levity and incapacity. Of course the object of the question was a test as to whether they were really in communication with the garrison. It must be confessed that the town seems to have contained some very querulous and unreasonable people. The New Year found the beleaguered town reduced to a quarter of a pound of meat per head, while the health of the inhabitants began to break down under their con- finement. Their interest, however, was keenly aroused by the attempt made in the De Beers workshops to build a gun which might reach their opponents. This remark- able piece of ordnance, constructed by an American named Labram by the help of tools manufactured for the purpose and of books found in the town, took the shape eventually of a twenty-eight-pound rifled gun, which proved to be a most efficient piece of artillery. With grim humor, Mr. Rhodes's compliments had been inscribed upon the shells; a fair retort in view of the openly expressed threat of the enemy that in case of his capture they would carry him in a cage to Pretoria. The Boers, though held off for a time by this unex- pected piece of ordnance, prepared a terrible answer to it. On February 7th an enormous gun, throwing a ninety- six-pound shell, opened from Kamfersdam, which is four miles from the centre of the town. The shells, follow- ing the evil precedent of the Germans in 1870, were fired i i SI Pi ,f. if. ( :! I' i i\iv c^: 264 THE GRKAT B01:R WAR not at the forts, but in the thickly popuhited city. Day and night these huge missiles exploded, shattering the houses and occasionally killing or maiming the occu- pants. Some thousands of the women and children were conveyed down the mines, where, in the electric-lighted tunnels, they lay in comfort and lafety. One surprising revenge the Boers had, for by an extraordinary chance one of the few men killed by their gun was the ingenious Labram who had constructed the twenty-eight-pounder. By an even more singular chance, Leon, who was responsi- ble for bringing the big Boer gun, was struck immediately afterward by a long range riHe-shot from the garrison. The historian must be content to give a tame account of the siege of Kimberley, for the thing itself was tame. Indeed " siege " is a misnomer, for it was rather an in- vestment or a blockade. Such as it was, however, the inhabitants became very restless under it, and though there were never any prospects of surrender the utmost impatience began to be manifested at the protracted delay on the part of the relief force. It was not till later that it was understood how cunningly Kimberley had been used as a bait to ^old the enemy until final preparations had been made for his destruction. And at last the great day came. It is on record how dramatic was the meeting between the mounted outposts of the defenders and the advance guard of the relievers, whose advent seems to have been equally unexpected by friend and foe. A skirmish was in progress on February 15th between a party of the Kimberley Light Horse and of the Boers when a new body of horsemen, unrecognized by either side, appeared upon the plain and opened fire upon the enemy. One of the stranger^ rode up to the patrol. " What the dickens does K. L. H. mean on your shoulder-strap? " he asked. " It means Kimberley Light Horse. Who are you ? " "I am one of the New Zea- landers." Macaulay in his wildest dream of the future of the much-quoted New Zealander never pictured him as heading a rescue force for the relief of a British town in the heart of Africa. THE SIKGR OF KIMBKRLKY 265 The population had assembled to watch the mighty cloud of dust which rolled along the southeastern hori/.on. What was it which swept westward within its reddish heart? Hopeful and yet fearful they saw the huge bank draw nearer and nearer. An assault from the whole of Cronje's army was the thought which passed through many a mind. And then the dust cloud thinned, a mighty host of horsemen spurred out from it, and in the extended far-llung ranks the glint of spear-heads and tiie gleam of scabbards told of the Hussars and Lancers, while denser banks on either Hank marked the position of the whirling guns. Wearied and spent with a hundred miles' ride the dusty riders and the panting, dripping horses took fresh heart as they saw the broad city before them, and swept with martial rattle and jingle toward the cheer- ing crowds. Amid shouts and tears French rode into Kimberley while his troopers encamped outside the town. To know how this bolt was prepared and how launched the narrative must go back to the beginning of the month. At that period Methuen and his men were still faced by Cronje and his entrenched forces, who, in spite of oc- casional bombardments, held their position between Kimberley and the relieving army. French, having handed over the operations at Colesberg to Clements, had gone down to Cape Town to confer with Roberts and Kitchener, Thence they all three made their way to the Modder River, which was evidently about to be the base of a more largely conceived series of operations than any which had yet been undertaken. In order to draw the Boer attention away from the thunderbolt which w^as about to fall upon their left flank, a strong demonstration ending in a brisk action was made early in February upon the extreme right of Cronje's position. The force, consisting of the Highland Brigade, two squadrons of the Ninth Lancers, and the Sixty-second Battery, was under the command of the famous Hector Macdonald. " Fighting Mac," as he was called by his men, had joined his regiment as a private, and had worked through the grades of corporal, sergeant, captain, major, 266 THF. GRF.AT BOI.R WAR '! » , •tl •■ rl ■''i/, ii and colonel, until no»v, still in the prime of his manhood, he found himself riding at the head of a brigade. A bony, craggy Aberdonian, with a square fighting head and a bull- dog jaw, he had conquered the exclusiveness and routine of the JJritish service by the same dogged qualities which made him formidable to Dervish and to lioer. With a cool brain, a steady nerve, and a proud heart he is an ideal leader of infantry, and those who saw himmanctuvre his brigade in the crisis of the battle of Omdurman speak of it as the one great memory which they carried back from the engagement. A certain affectation of manner and fastidiousness, which seem strange in such a man, show themselves in time of peace, but on the field of battle he turns to the speech of his childhood, the jagged, rasping, homely words which brace the nerves of the northern soldier. This was the man who had come from India to take the place of poor Wauchope, and to put fresh heart into the gallant but sorely stricken brigade. The four regiments which composed the infantry of the force — the Black Watch, the Argyle and Sutherlands, the Seaforths, and the Highland Light Infantry — left Lord Methuen's camp upon Saturday, February 3d, and halted at Phraser's Drift, passing on next day to Koodoosberg. The day was very hot, and the going very heavy, and many men fell out, some never to return. The drift (or ford) was found, however, to be undefended, and was seized by Macdonald, who established himself strongly among the kopjes on the south bank. A few Boer scouts were seen hurrying with the news of his coming to the head laager. The effect of these messages was evident by Tuesday (February 6th), when the Boers were seen to be assem- bling upon the north bank. By next morning they were there in considerable numbers, and began an attack upon a crest held by the Seaforths. Macdonald threw two companies of the Black Watch and two of the Highland Light Infantry into the fight. The Boers made excellent practice with a seven-pounder mountain gun, and their rifle fire, considering the good cover which our men had, was THE SIKGK OK KIMBI'.RLI.Y -67 very deadly. Poor Tait, of the IMack Watch, good sports- man and gallant soldier, with one wound hardly healed upon his person, was hit again. "They've got nie this time," were his dying words. lUair, of the Seaforths, had his carotid cut by a shrapnel bi'llet, and lay '.or hours while the men of his company took turns to squeeze the artery. Jkit our artillery silenced the JJoer gun, and our infantry easily held their rillemen. Ijai)ingion with the cavalry brigade arrived from the camp about i 130, mov- ing along the north bank of tlie river. In spite of tlio fact that men and horses were weary from a tiring march, it was hoped by Macdonald's force that thry would work round the Jioers and make an attempt to capture either them or their gun. i>ut the horsemen seem not to have realized the position of the parties, or the possibility of bringing off a considerable coup, so that the action came to a tame conclusion, the IJoers retiring unpursued from their attack. On Thursday, February 8th, they were found to have withdrawn, and on the same evening our own force was recalled, to the surprise and disappointment of the public at home, who had not realized that in directing their attention to their right Hank the column had already produced the effect upon the enemy for which they had been sent. They could not be left there, as they were needed for those great operations which were pending. It was on the 9th that the brigade returned; on the loth they were congratulated by Lord Roberts in person ; and on the nth those new dispositions were made which were destined not only to relieve Kimberley,but to inflict a blow upon the Boer cause f "^m which it was never able to recover. Small, brown, and wrinkled, with puckered eyes and alert manner, Lord Roberts in spite of his sixty-seven years preserves the figure and energy of youth. The ac- tive open-air life of India keeps men fit for the saddle when in England they would only sit their club arm- chairs, and it is hard for any one who sees the wiry figure and brisk step of Lord Roberts to realize that he has spent forty-one years of soldiering in what used to be ' il •J 268 THE GREAT BOER WAR i'^. *(: • i i 'i regarded as an unhealthy climate. He had carried into late life the habit of martial exercise, and a Russian traveller has left it upon record that the sight which sur- prised him most in India was to see the veteran com- mander of the army ride forth with iiis spear and carry off the peg with the skill of a practised trooper. In his early youth he had shown in the Mutiny that he possessed the fighting energy of the soldier to a remarkable degree, but it was only in the Afghan War of 1880 that he had an opportunity of proving that he had rarer and more valuable gifts, the power of swift resolution and deter- mined execution. At the crisis of the war he and his army disappeared entirely from the public ken only to emerge dramatically as victors at a point three hundred miles distant from where they had vanished. It is not only as a soldier, but as a man that Lord Roberts possesses some remarkable characteristics. He has in a supreme degree that magnetic quality which draws not merely the respect but the love of those who know him. In Chaucer's phrase, he is a very perfect gentle knight. Soldiers and regimental officers have for him a feeling of personal affection such as the unemo- tional British Army has never had for any leader in the course of our history. His chivalrous courtesy, his unerr- ing tact, his kindly nature, his unselfish and untiring de- votion to their interests have all endeared him to those rough loyal natures, who would follow him with as much confidence and devotion as the grognards of the Guard had in the case of the Great Emperor. There were some who feared that in Roberts's case, as in so many more, the donga and kopje of South Africa might form the grave and headstone of a military reputation, but far from this being the case he has consistently shown a wide sweep of strategy and a power of conceiving the effect of scat- tered movements over a great extent of country which has surprised his warmest admirers. In the second week of February his dispositions were ready, and there followed the swift series of blows which brought the Boers upon their knees and the war eventually to a termination. Of THE SIEGE OF KIMBERLEY 269 i "fffi: these we shall only describe here the exploits of the fine force of cavalry which, after a ride of a hundred miles, broke out of the heart of that reddish dust cloud and swept the Boer besiegers away from hard-pressed Kimberley. In order to strike unexpectedly. Lord Roberts had not only made a strong demonstration at Koodoosdrift, at the other end of the Uoer line, but he had withdrawn his main force some forty miles south, taking Liiom down by rail to Belmont and Enslin with such secrecy that even commanding officers had no idea whither the troops were going. The cavalry which had come from French's com- mand at Colesberg had already reached the rendezvous, travelling by road to Naauwpoort, and thence by train. This force consisted of the Carabineers, New South Wales Lancers, Inniskillings, composite regiment of Household Cavalry, Tenth Hussars, with some mounted infantry and two batteries of Horse Artillery, making a force of nearly three thousand sabres. To this was added the Ninth and Twelfth Lancers from Modder River, the Sixteenth Lancers from India, the Scots Greys, which had been pa- trolling Orange River from the beginning of the war, Rimington's Scouts, and two brigades of mounted infan- try under Colonels Ridley and Hannay. Five other bat- teries of Horse Artillery were added to the force, making seven in all, with a pontoon section of Royal Engineers. The total number of men was about five thousand. By the night of Sunday, February nth, this formidable force had concentrated at Ramdam, twenty miles northeast of Belmont, and was ready to advance. At two in the morn- ing of Monday, February 12th, the start was made, and the long sinuous line of night riders moved off over the shadowy veldt, the beat of twenty thousand hoofs, the clank of steel and the rumble of gun-wheels and tumlDrils swelling into a deep, low roar like the surge upon the shingle. Two rivers, the Riet and the Modder, intervened be- tween French and Kimberley. By daylight on the 12th the head of his force had reached VVaterval Drift, which was found to be defended by a body of Boers with a gun. w^ mmmm ■ f 4 f !■■ ( m ' ■ \ f { i I 270 THE GREAT BOER WAR Leaving a small detachment to hold them French passed his men over Dekiel's Drift, higher up the stream, and swept the enemy out of his position.' At the cost of a very small loss he held both sides of the. ford, but it was not until midnight that the whole long column was brought across, and bivouacked upon the northern bank. In the morning the str'ingth of the force was enormously increased by the arrival of one more horseman. It was Roberts himself, who had ridden over to give the men a send-off, and the sight of his wiry, erect figure and ma- hogany face bent them full of fire and confidence upon their way. But the march of this second day (February 13th) was a military operation of some difficulty. Thirty long, waterless miles had to be done before they could reach the Modder, and it was possible that even then they might have to fight an action before winning the drift. The weather was very hot, and through the long day the sun beat down from an unclouded sky, while the soldiers were only shaded by the dust bank in which they rode. A broad, arid plain, swelling into stony hills, surrounded them on every side. Here and there in the extreme dis- tance, mounted figures moved over the vast expanse — Boer scouts who marked in amazement the advance of this great array. Once or twice these men gathered to- gether, and a sputter of rifle fire broke out upon our left flank, but the great tide swept on and carried them with it. Often in this desolate land the herds of mottled springbok and of grey rekbok could be seen sweeping over the plain, or stopping with that curiosity upon which the hunter trades, to stare at the unwonted spectacle. So all day they rode, hussars, dragoons, and lancers, over the withered veldt, until men and horses drooped with the heat and the exertion. A front of nearly two miles was kept, the regiments moving two abreast in open order, and the sight of this magnificent cloud of horse- ' This considerable force of Boers had come from Jacobsdal, and were just too late to get into position to resist the crossing. Had we been ten minutes later the matter would have been more serious. ■ THE SIEGE OF KIMBERLEY 271 men sweeping over the great barren plain was a glorious one. The veldt had caught fire upon the right, and a black cloud of sn.oke with a lurid heart to it covered the flank. The beat of the sun from above and the swelter of dust from below were overpowering. Gun horses fell in the traces and died of pure exhaustion. The men, parched and silent, but cheerful, strained their eyes to pierce the continual mirage which played over the hori- zon, and to catch the first glimpse of the Modder. At last, as the sun began to slope down to the west, a thin line of green was discerned, the bushes which skirt the banks of that ill-favored stream. With renewed heart the cavalry pushed on and made for the drift, while Major Rimington,towhom the onerous duty of guiding the force had been entrusted, gave a sigh of relief as he saw that he had indeed struck the very point at which he had aimed. The essential thing in the movements had been speed — to reach each point before the enemy could concentrate to oppose them. Upon this it depended whether they would find five hundred or five thousand waiting on the farther bank. It must have been with anxious eyes that French watched his first regiment ride down to Klip Drift. If the Boers should have had notice of his com- ing and had transferred some of their forty-pounders, he might lose heavily before he forced the stream. But this time, at last, he had completely out-manoeuvred them. He came with the news of his coming, and Broadwood with the Twelfth Lancers rushed the drift. The small Boej force saved itself by flight, and the camp, the wag- ons, and the supplies remained with the victors. On the night of the 13th he had secured the passage of the Modder, and up to the early morning the horses and the guns were splashing through its coffee-colored waters. French's force had now come level to the main posi- tion of the Boers, but had struck it upon the extreme left wing. The extreme ri^ht wing, thanks to the Koodoos- drift demonstration, was sixty miles off, and this line was naturally very thinly held, save only at the central posi- n. i t 272 THE GREAT lOER WAR tion of Magersfontein. Cronje could not denude this central position, for he saw Methuen still waiting in front of him, and in any case Klip Drift is twenty-five miles from Magersfontein. But the Boer left wing, though scattered, gathered into some sort of cohesion upon Wednesday (February 14th), and made an effort to check the victorious progress of the cavalry. It was necessary on this day to rest at Klip Drift, until Kelly-Kenny should come up with the infantry to hold what had been gained. All day the small bodies of Boers came riding in and taking up positions between the column and its objective. Next morning the ad v nee was resumed, the column being still forty miles from Kimberley with the enemy in unknown force between. S'ome four miles out French came upon their position, two hills with a long low nek between, from which came a brisk rifle fire supported by artillery. But French was not only not to be stopped, but could not even be retarded. Disregarding the Boer fire completely the cavalry swept in wave after wave over the low nek, and so round the base of the hills. The Boer riflemen upon the kopjes must have seen a magnifi- cent military spectacle as regiment after regiment, the Ninth Lancers leading, all in very open order, swept across the plain at a gallop, and so passed over the nek. A few score horses and half as many men were left be- hind them, but forty or fifty Boers were cut down in the pursuit. It appears to have been one of the very few occasions in the campaign when that obsolete and ab- surd weapon the sword was anything but a dead weight to its bearer. And now the force had a straight run in before it, for it had outpaced any further force of Boers which may have been advancing from the direction of Magersfontein. The hoises, which had come a hundred miles in four days with insufficient food and water, were so done that it was no uncommon sight to see the trooper not only walking to ease his horse, but carrying part of his mon- strous weight of saddle gear. But in spite of fatigue the !P li THE SIEGE OF KIMBERLEY 273 force pressed on until in the afternoon a distant view was seen, across the reddish plain, of the brick houses and corrugated roofs of Kimberley. The Boer besiegers cleared off in front of it, and that night (February 15th) the relieving column camped on the plain two miles away, while French and his staff rode in to the rescued city. The war has been a cruel one for the cuvalry, who have been handicapped throughout by the nature of the country and by the tactics of the enemy. They are cer- tainly the branch of the service which has had least op- portunity for distinction. The work of scouting and patrolling is the most dangerous which a soldier can un- dertake, and yet from its very nature it can find no chronicler. The war correspondent, like Providence, is always with the big battalions, and there never was a campaign in which there was more unrecorded heroism, the heroism of the picket and of the vidette which finds its way into no newspaper paragraph. But in the larger operations of the war it is difficult to say that cavalry, as cavalry, have justified their existence. In the opinion of many the tendency of the future will be to convert the whole force into mounted infantry. How little is re- quired to turn our troopers into excellent foot soldiers was shown at Magersfontein, where the Twelfth Lancers, dismounted by the command of their colonel, Lord Airlie, held back the threatened fiank attack all morning. A little training in taking cover, leggings instead of boots, and a rifie instead of i: carbine would give us a formi- dable force of twenty thousand men who could do all that our cavalry does, and a great deal more besides. It is undoubtedly possible on many occasions in this war, at Colesberg, at Kimberley, at Diamond Hill, to say " Here our cavalry did well." They are brave men on good horses, and they may be expected to do well. But the champion of the cavalry cause must point out the occasions where the cavalry did something which could not have been done by the same number of equally brave and equally well-mounted infantry. Only then will the existence of the cavalry be justified. The lesson both of 18 ■^T!^ i :\ l''i •,y 274 THE GREAT BOER WAR the South African and of the American civil war is that the light horseman who is trained to fight on foot is the type of the future. A few more words as a sequel to this short sketch of the siege and relief of Kimberley. Considerable sur- prise has been expressed that the great gun at Kamfers- dam, a piece which must have weighed twenty-eight tons and could not have been moved by bullock teams at a rate of more than two or three miles an hour, should have eluded our cavalry. It is indeed a surprising circum- stance, and yet it was due to no inertia upon the part of our leaders, but rather on account of one of the finest ex- amples of Boer tenacity in the whole course of the war. The instant that Kekewich was sure of relief he mustered every available man and sent them out to endeavor to get the gun. It had already been removed, and its re- treat was covered by the strong position of Dron field which was held both by riflemen and by light artillery. Finding himself unable to force it, Murray, the com- mander of the detachment, remained in front of it. Next morning (Friday) at three o'clock the weary men and horses of two of French's brigades were afoot with the same object. But still the Boers were obstinately hold- ing on to Dronfield, and still their position was too strong to force, and too extended to get round with ex- hausted horses. It was not until the night after that the Boers abandoned their excellent rear-guard action, leav- ing one light gun in the hands of the Cape Police, but having gained such a start for their heavy one that French, who had other and more important objects in view, could not attempt to follow it. Chapter Nineteen PAARDEBKRG Lord Rorerts's operations, prepaud with admirable secrecy and carried out with extreme energy, aimed at two different results, each of which he was fortunate enough to attain. The first was that an overpowering force of cavalry should ride round the JJoer position and raise the siege of Kimberley: the fate of this expedition has already been described. The sefc^ftd was that the in- fantry, following hard on the heels of the cavalry, and holding all that they had gained, should establish itself upon Cronje's left Hank and cut his connection with Bloemfontein. It is this portion of the operations which has now to be described. The infantry force which General Roberts had assem- bled was a very formidable one. The Guards he had left under Methuen in front of the lines of Magersfon- tein to contain the Boer force. With them he had also left those regiments which had fought in the Ninth Brigade in all Methuen's actions. These, as will be remembered, were the First Northumberland Fusiliers the First Yorkshire Light Infantry, the Second North- amptons, and one wing of the Loyal North Lancashire regiment. These stayed to hold Cronie in his posi- tion. ^ There remained three divisions of infantry, one of which, the Ninth, was made up on the spot. These were constituted in this way:— l^^W V/, !l 276 THE GREAT BOER WAR \V. 2 c Q ' .2 t^ c o • 1-4 /^^ > o Twelfth Brigade (Knox) Thirteenth Brigade (Stephenson) Fourteenth Brigade (Chermside) Fifteenth Brigade (Wavell) Highland Brigade (MacDon«aU^ Nineteenth Brigade (Smith-Dorrien) Oxford Light Infantry Gloucesters (Second) West Riding Buffs Essex Welsh Warwicks Yorks Scots Borderers Lincolns Hampshires Norfolks North Staflfords Cheshires S. Wales Borderers East Lancashires Black Watch Argyle and Sutherlands Seaforths Highland Light Infantry Gordons Canadians Shropshire Light Infantry Cornwall Light Infantry With these were two brigade divisions of artillery under General Marshall, the first containing the Eigh- teenth, Sixty-second, and Seventy-fifth batteries (Colonel Hall), the other the Seventy-sixth, Eighty-first, and Eighty-second (Colonel Macdonald). Besides these there were a howitzer battery, a naval contingent of four guns, and four twelve-pounders under Captain Bearcroft of the "Philomel." The force was soon increased by the transfer of the Guards and the arrival of more artillery; but the numbers which started on Monday, February 12th, amounted roughly to twenty-five thousand foot and eight thousand horse with 98 guns — a considerable army to handle in a foodless and almost waterless country. Seven hundred wagons drawn by eleven thousand mules and ( -■- 1 paardp:berg 277 ■# oxen, all collected by the genius for preparation and or- ganization which characterizes Tritish activity. On the night then of Friday, February i6thf Cronje lay upon the northern bank of the Modder, with his stores and guns still intact, and no enemy in front of him, though Knox's brigade and Hannay's mounted in- fantry were behind. It was necessary for Cronje to cross the river in order to be on the line for JUoemfontein. As the river ^ndedto the north the sooner he could cross the better. (m\ the south side of the river, however, were considerable British forces, and the obvious strategy was to hurry them forward and to block every drift at which he could get over. The river runs between very deep banks, so steep that one might almost describe them as I 1 "f ]• • I itnAPI 282 THK GRKAT BOl-R WAR small cliffs, and there was no chance of a horseman, far loss a wagon, crossing at any point save those where the convenience of traffic and the use of years had worn slop- ing paths down to the shallows. The British knew ex- actly, therefore, what the places were which had to be blocked. On the use made of the next few hours the success or failure of the whole operation must depend. The nearest drift to Cronje was only a mile or two dis- tant, Klipkraal the name; next to that the Taardebirg J Drift; next to that the Koodoos Rand Drift, each about seven miles from the other. Had Oonje pushed on in- stantly after the action he might have got across at Klip- kraal. But men, horses, and bullocks were equally ex- hausted after a long twenty-four hours of marching and lighting. He gave his weary soldiers some hours' rest, and then, abandoning seventy-eight of his wagons, he pushed on before daylight for the farthest off of the three fords (Koodoos Rand Drift). Could he reach and cross it before his enemies, he was safe. But Lord Roberts's energy had infused itself into his divisional conmianders, his brigadiers, his colonels, and so down to the humblest Tommy who tramped and stum- bled through the darkness with a devout faith that " Jlobs " was going to catch " old Cronje '' this time. The mounted M^ infantry had galloped round from the north to the^jijwrrtiof y the river, crossing at Klip Drift and securjj»g the southern ' end of Klijikraal. Thither also cp.nf^btephenson's bri-| gade (♦^♦^•teenth) from C 'o lv » le s division, while Knox,) llnding in the morning that Cronje was gone, marched along the northern bank to the same spot. As Klipkraal was safe the mounted infantry pushed on at once and secured the southern end ot the I'aardeberg Drift, whither they were followed the same evening by Stephenson and Knox. There remained only the Koodoos Rand Drift to block, and this had already been done by as smart a piece of work as any in the war. Wherever French has gone he has done well, but his crowning r^lory was the movement from Kimberley to head ofT Cronje's retreat. The exertions which the mounted men had made in the s V I'r' PAARDI.Bl/kG ^<^J ichef of kimberley have been already recorded. Thev arrived there on Thursday xvith their horses dead beat I hey were afoot at three o'clock on l^iday n.ornincj, and two brigades out of three were hard at work all day in an endeavor to capture the I )ronrield position. Vet when on the same evening an order came that French should start again instantly from Kimberley and endeavor to head Cronjes army off, he did not plead inability as many a commander might, but taking everv man whose horse was stil t,t to carry him (something under (wo housand out of a column which liad been 'at least ihe thousand strong), he started within a few hours and pushed on through the whole night. Horses died under their riders, but still the column marched over the shadowv ve dt under the brilliant stars. J!y happy chance or splendid calculation they were heading straight for the one drift which was still open to Cronje. It was a close thing At midday on Saturday the IJoer advance guard was a ready near to the kopjes which command it. Jkit Jaar- deberg Drift and Wolveskraal J)rift, hoping to force his way across This was the situation upon the night of Saturday. Pebruary 17th. '^ In the course of that night the Ihitish brigades, stag- gering with fatigue but indomitably resolute to crush their evasive enemy, were converging upon Paardeberg. The Highland brigade, exhausted by a heavy march over soft sand from Jacobsdal to Klip Drift, were nerved to fresh exertions by the word " Magersfontein," which (lew from hp to hp along the ranks, and pushed on for another twelve ri, ^v^ . I This surprise of our cavalry post had more serious consequences than can be measured by the loss of men, for by it the Boers obtained possession of a strong kopje called Kitchener's Hill, lying about two miles distant on the southeast of our position. The movement was an admirable one strategically upon their part, for it gave their beleaguered comrades a first station on the line of their retreat. Could they only win their way to that kopje, a rear-guard action might be fought from there which would cover the escape of at least a portion of the force. De Wet, if he is indeed responsible for the mancbuvres of these southern Boers, certainly handled his small force with a discreet audacity which marks him as the born leader which he afterward proved himself to be. If the position of the Boers was desperate upon Sun- day, it was hopeless upon Monday, for in the course of the morning Lord Roberts came up, closely followed by the whole of Tucker's division (seventh) from Jacobsdal. Our artillery also was strongly reinforced. The Eighteenth, Sixty-second, and Seventy-fifth Field Batteries came up with three naval 4.7 guns and two naval twelve-pounders. Thirty-five thousand men with sixty guns were gathered round the little Boer army. It is a poor spirit which will not applaud the supreme resolution with which the gallant farmers held out, and award to Cronjethe title of one of the most grimly resolute leaders of whom we have any record in modern history. For a moment it seemed as if his courage was giving way. On Monday morning a message was transmitted by him to Lord Kitchener asking for a twenty-four-hours' armistice. The answer was of coarse a curt refusal. To this he replied that if we were so inhuman as to pre- vent him from burying his dead there was nothing for him save surrender. An answer was given that a mes- senger with power to treat should be sent out, but in the interval Cronje had changed his mind, and disappeared with a snarl of contempt into his burrows. It had be- come known that women and children were in the laager and a message was sent offering them a place of safety, ■ft I i^l'h PAARDEBHRG 289 e r li but even to this a refusal was given. The reasons for this last decision are inconceivable. Lord Roberts's dispositions were simple, efficacious, and aDove all bloodless. Smith-Dorrien's brigade, who were winning in the western army something of the reputation which Hart's Irishmen had won in Natal, were placed astride of the ri/er to the west, with orders to push gradually up, as occasion served, using trenches for their approach. Chermside's brigade occupied the same position on the east. Two other divisions and the cavalry stood round, alert and eager, like terriers round a rat-hole, while all day the pitiless guns crashed their common shell, their shrapnel, and their lyddite into the river-bed. Already down there, amid slaughtered oxen and dead horses under a burning sun, a horrible pest- hole had been formed which sent its mepiiitic vapors over the countryside. Occasionally the sentries down the river saw amid the brown eddies of the rushing water the floating body of a Boer which had bev»n washed away from the Golgotha above. Dark Cronje, betrayer of Potchefstroom, iron-handed ruler of natives, reviler of the British, stern victor of Magersfontein, at last there has come a day of reckoning for you! On Wednesday, the 21st, the British, being now sure of their grip of Cronje, turned upon the Boer force which had occupied the hill to the southeast of the drift. It was clear that this force, unless driven away, would be the vanguard of the relieving army which might be ex- pected to assemble from Ladysmith, Bloemfontein, Coles- berg, or wherever else the Boers could detach men. Al- ready it was known that reinforcements who had left Natal whenever they heard that the Free State was in- vaded were drawing near. It was necessary to crush the force upon the hill before it became too powerful. For this purpose the cavalry set forth, Broadwood with the Tenth Hussars, Twelfth Lancers, and two batteries going round on one side, while French with the Ninth and Six- teenth Lancers, the Household Cavalry, and two other bat- teries skirted the other. A force of Boers was met and ^9 290 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR ... i 1 defeated, while the defenders of llie hill were driven ort with considerable loss. In this well-managed affair the enemy lost at least a hundred, of whom fifty were prison- ers. On Friday, February 23d, another attempt at rescue was made from the south, but again it ended disastrously for the JJoers. A party attacked a kopje held by the Yorkshire regiment and were blown back by a volley, upon which they made for a second kopje, where the Buffs gave them an even rougher reception. Eighty prisoners were marched in. Meantime hardly a night passed that some of the JJoers did not escape from their laager and give themselves up to our pickets. At the end of the week we had taken six hundred in all. In the mean time the cordon was being drawn ever tighter, and the fire became heavier and more deadly, while the conditions of life in that fearful place were such that the stench alone might have compelled sur- render. Amid the crash of tropical thunderstorms, the glare of lightning, and the furious thrashing of rain there was no relaxation of British vigilance. A balloon float- ing overhead directed the fire, which from dpy i^ day became more furious, culminating upon the 26th with the arrival of four five-inch howitzers. But still there came no sign from the fierce Boer and his gallant followers. Buried deep within burrows in the river-bank the greater part of them lay safe from the shells, but the rattle of their musketry when the outposts moved showed that the trenches were as alert as ever. The thing could only have one end, however, and Lord Roberts, with admir- able judgment and patience, refused to hurry it at the expense of the lives of his soldiers. The two brigades at either end of the Boer lines had lost no chance of pushing in, and now they had come within striking distance. On the night of February 26th it was determined that Smith-Dorrien's men should try their luck. The front trenches of the British were at that time seven hundred yards from the Boer lines. They were held by the Gordons and by the Canadians, the latter being the nearer to the river. It is worth while fi t i paardkbi:rg i()i re at lines. lians, /hile H>'ii entering into details as to the arrangement ot the attaci<, as the success of the campaign was at least accelerate^^ by it. The orders were that the Canadians were to ad^^c*^ vance, the Gordons to support, and the Shropshircs to take such a position on the left as would outflank any counter attack upon the part of the JJoers. The Canadi- ans advanced in the darkness of the early morning be- ^iF^ fore the rise of the moon. The front rank held their riHes in the left hand and each extended right hand grasped the sleeve of the man next it. The rear rank had their rilles slung and carried spades. Nearest the river bank w<'re two companies (G and H), who were followed by the seventh company of K.oyal Engineers carry- ing bags full of earth. The long line stole through a pitchy darkness, knowing that at any instant a blaze of fire such as flamed before the Highlanders at Magers- fontein might crash out in front of them. A hundred, two, three, four, five hundred paces were taken. They knew that they must be close upon the trenches. If they could only creep silently enough they might spring upon the defenders unannounced. On and on they stole, step by step, praying for silence. Would the gentle shuffle of feet be heard by the men who lay within stone-throw of them? Their hopes had begun to rise when — good God, what noise was that? A resonant metallic rattle, the thud of a falling man, an empty clatter! They had _a h walked into a line of meat cans slung upon a wire. ByJffW C#fr^ measurement it was only fifi^Li^ards from the trench. ILiTikli^ji At that instant a single rifle sounded and the Canadians pi»WO» hurled themselves down upon the ground. Their bodies had hardly touched it when from a line six hundred yards long there came one furious glare of rifle fire, with a hiss like water on a red-hot plate, of speeding bullets. In that terrible red light the men as they lay and scraped desperately for cover could see the heads of the Boers pop up and down, and the fringe of rifle barrels quiver and gleam. How the regiment, lying helpless under this fire, escaped destruction is extraordinary. To rush the trench in the face of such a continuous blast of lead 'iJ!'^ 'I: I ' i' il 1.(1 1 292 THi: gr1':at bokr war •VVNH^ A \o ^4^ i* 1 >-• seemed imjDossible, and it was equally inii:)ossil)le to re- nain where they were. In a short time the mocn would _e up, and they would be picked off to a man. The \ outer companies upon the plain were ordered to retire. . MJreaking up into loose order, they made their way back with surprisingly little loss; but a strange co)itrctcmps occurred, for, leaping suddenly into a trench held by the Gordons, they were mistaken by the men, who seem to have been asleep, for IJoers. A subaltern and twelve men received bayonet thrusts — none of them fortunately of a very serious nature — before the mistake was discovered. A better fate meanwhile had befallen the two com- panies who had been followed by the Engineers. It is difficult to understand why in the whole regiment the rear rank man might not have carried a sackful of earth instead of a spade. With these two Hank companies the expedient was most succe-^sful. On the outbreak of the fire the sacks were cast down, the men crouched behind them, and time was given for further trenching. By the morning they were not only secure themselves, b' chcy found themselves in such a position that they could en- filade the first lines of Boer trenches. No doubt Cronje had already realized that the extreme limit of his resist- ance had come, but it was to those two companies of Canadians that the credit is immediately due for that white flag which fluttered upon the morning of Majuba day over the lines of Paardeberg. It was six o'clock in the morning when General Prety- man rode up to Lord Roberts's headquarters. Behind him upon a white horse was a dark-bearded man, with the quick, restless eyes of a hunter, middle-sized, thickly built, with grizzled hair flowing from under a tall brown felt hat. He wore the black broadcloth of the burgher with a green summer overcoat, and carried a small whip in his hands. His appearance was that of a respectable London vestryman rather than of a most redoubtable soldier with a particularly sinister career behind him. The Generals shook hands and it was briefly intimated to Cronje that his surrender must be unconditional, to PAARDI RI.RG ^-9.] rety- hind with ickly trown rgher whip table table which, after a short silence, he agreed. His only stipu- lations were personal, that his wife, his grandson, his secretary, his adjutant, and his servant might accompany him. The same evening he was despatched lo Cape Town, receiving those honorable attentions whi( h were due to his valor rather than to his character. Ills men, a pallid, ragged crew, emerged from their holes aiul burrows, and delivered up their rifles. It is pleasant to add that, with much in their memories to exasperate them, the J]ritish privates treated their enemies with as large-hearted a courtesy as Lord Roberts had shown to their leader. Our total capture numbered some three thousand of the Transvaal and eleven hundred of the Free State. That the latter were not far more numerous was due to the fact that many had already shredded off to their farms, besides Cronje, Wolverans of the Transvaal, and the German artillerist Albrecht, with forty-four other field cornets and commandants, fell into our hands. Six small guns were also secured. The same afternoon saw the long column of the prisoners on its way to Modder River, there to be entrained for Cape Town, the most singular lot of people to be seen at that moment upon earth — ragged, patched, grotesque, some with goloshes, some with um- brellas, coffee-pots, and Bibles, their favorite baggage. So they passed out of their ten days of glorious history. A visit to the laager showed that the horrible smells which had been carried across to the Ikitish lines and the swollen carcasses which had swirled down the muddy river were true portents of its condition. Strong-nerved men came back white and sick from a contemplation of the place in which women and children had for ten days been living. From end to end it was a festering mass of corruption, overshadowed by incredible swarms of flies. Yet the engineer who could face evil sights and nauseous smells was repaid by an inspection of the deep narrow trenches in which a rifleman could crouch with the mini- mum danger from shells, and the caves in which the non- combatants remained in absolute safety. Something less than two hundred wounded in a donga represented their t :. 294 'TTn*: GKI.AT BOI.K WAR losses, not only duriiiji; a bonibardmcnt of ten days, but also in that Taardcberj; en^a<;iincnt which had cost us eleven hundred casualties. No more convincing; example could be adchiced both of the advanla^'e of the defen j over tile attacis, and of the liarmlesfcness of tlie fiercest shell tire if those who are exposed to it have space and time to make preparations. A fortnight had elapsed since Lord Roberts had launched his forces from RauKlam, and that fortnight had wrought a complete revolution in the campaign. It is hard to recall any instance in the history of war where a single movement has created such a change over so many different operations. On February i4ih Kiinberley was in danger of capture, a victorious IJoer army was facing Methuen, the lines ot Magersfontein appeared im- 13regnable, Clements was being pressed at Colesberg, Gatacre was stopped at Stormberg, J5uller could not pass the Tugela, and Ladysmith was in a perilous condition. On the 28th Kimberley had been relieved, the l>oer army was scattered or taken, the lines of Magersfontein were in our possession, Clements found his assailants retiring before him, Gatacre was able to advance at Stormberg, liuller had a weakening army in front of him, and Lady- smitli was on the eve of relief. And all this had been done at the cost of a very moderate loss of life, for most of v.hich Lord Roberts was in no sense answerable. Here at last was a reputation so well founded that even South African warfare could only confirm and increase it. A single masterhand had in an instant turned Eng- land's night to day, and had brought us out of that night- mare of miscalculation and disaster which had weighed sf long upon our spirits. His was the masterhand, but tht.re were others at his side without whom that hand might have been paralyzed: Kitchener the organizer, French the cavalry leader — to these *;wo men, second only to their chief, are the results of the operations due. Henderson, the most capable head of intelligence, and Richardson, who under all difficulties fed the army, may each claim his share in the success. j 1 I i I ;ht- led ut id er, ly le. ind lay Chapter I'wenty ADVANCK ON BLOI-M KOMRTN TnK surrender of Cronje had taken place or. Jt briiary 27th, obliterating forever the triuin[)hant memories whicli the Hoers had for twenty years associated with that date. A halt was necessary to provide food for the hungry troops, and above all to enable the cavalry horses to pick up. The supply of forage had been most iiiadecjuate^ and the beasts had not yet learneil to find a living from the dry withered herbage of the veldt.' In addition to this, they had been worked most desperately during the fortnight which had elapsed. Lord Roberts waited therefore at Osfontein, which is a farmhouse close to I'aardeberg, until his cavalry were (it for an advance. On March 6th he began his march for JUoenifontein. The force which had been hovering to the south and east of him during the I'aardeberg operations had mean- while been reinforced from Colesberg and from Lady- smith until it had attained considerable proportions. This army, under the leadership of l)e Wet, had taken up a strong position a few miles to the east, covering a considerable range of kopjes. Upon March 3d a recon- noissance was made of it, in which some of our guns were engaged; but it was not until three days later that the army advanced with the intention of turning or forc- ing it. In the mean time reinforcements had been arriv- ' A battery which turned out its horses to t^raze found that the puzzled creatures simply galloped about the plain, and could only be reassembled by blowinjr the call which they associated with feedin}^, when they rushed back and waited in lines for tiieir nose-ba^s to be put on. '* i f!|, -!', h m tui 296 THK GREAT BOER WAR I ing in the British camp, derived partly from the regiments which had been employed at other points during these operations, and partly from newcomers from the outer Kmpire. The Guards came up from Klip Drift, the T'ity Imperial ^'^jlunteers, the Australian Mounted Infantry, the Burmese Mounted Infantry, and a detachment of light horse from Ceylon helped to form this strange invading army which was drawn from five continents and yet had no alien in its ranks. The position which the enemy had taken up at Poplars Grove (so called from a group of poplars round a farm- house in the centre of their position) extended across the Modder River and was buttressed upon either side by well-marked hills, with intermittent kopjes between. With guns, trenches, rifle-pits, and barbed wire a bull- headed general might have found it another Magersfon- tein. But it is only just to Lord Roberts's predecessors in command to say that it is easy to do things with three cavalry brigades which it is difficult to do with two regi- ments. The ultimate blame does not rest with the man who failed with the two regiments, but with those who gave him inadequate means for the work which he had to do. And in this estimate of means our military au- thorities, our politicians, and our public were all in the first instance equally mistaken. Lord Roberts's plan was absolutely simple, and yet, had it been carried out as conceived, absolutely effective. It was not his intention to go near any of that entangle- ment of ditch and wire which had been so carefully erected for his undoing. The weaker party, if it be wise, atones for its weakness by entrenchments. The stronger party, if it be wise, leaves the entrenchments alone and uses its strength to go round them. Lord Roberts meant to go round. With his immense preponderance of men and guns the capture or dispersal of the enemy's army might be reduced to a certainty. Once surrounded, they must either come out into the open or they must surrender. On March 6th the cavalry were brought across the river, and in the early morning of March 7th they were sent iT ADVANCE ON BLOKMFONTKI N 297 '4 -I off in the darkness to sweep round the left win- of the Boer, and to establish thei.iselves upon the line of their retreat. J ucker's division (Seventh) had orders to follow and support this movement. .Afeanwhile Kelly-Kenny vyas to push straight along the southern bank of the river though we may surmise that his instructions were in case of resistance, not to push his attack home. Mac- donald s Highlanders, with part of the naval bri-ade were north of the river, the latter to shell the drifts in case the Loers tried to cross, and the infantry to execute a turning movement which would correspond with that ot the cavalry upon the other flank r^Ju^f'Ti '"^^"";^''^^ based, however, upon one sup- h?v nf, ""^^ r''^^ 1^ ^" fallacious. It was that after sto ?. f^If ^^^V'°,'^'^'"'''^^" ^ P°^^^'«" the enemy would stop at least a little time to defend it. Nolhini/ of the sort occurred, however, and on the instant that they realized that the cavalry was on their flank they made oft. 1 he infantry did not fire a shot. The result of this very decisive flight was to derange all calculations entirely. The cavalry was not yet in Its place when the Boer army streamed off between the kopjes. One would have thought, however, that they would have had a dash for the wagons and tlie guns even if they were past them. It is unfair to critic^ e a movement until one is certain as to the positive orders k ills h' ""r"i ;r^ '''"' '''''''^^ '^"t - tj-' ^-^^ It It is clear tnat the sweep of our cavalry was not wide orto^th^"^ i^'' '^'^ ''''"^ ^y ^^^^^'"g ^« 'he left inste d ir^sidr^^^'hrm.^^^^'"^ '''' ''''' ^"^'"- ^i->-^ - As it was, however, there seemed every possibility of heir getting the guns, but De Wet very cleverly covW them by his skirmishers. Taking possession of a farm house upon the right flank they kept up a spirited he upon the Sixteenth Lancers and upon P Battery, R. HA When at last the latter drove them out of their shelter" hey again formed upon a low kopje and poulot upon and the f Chapter Twenty-one EFFECTS OF ROBERTS'S MARCH From the moment that Lord Roberts with his army ad- vanced from Ramdam all the other British forces in South Africa— the Colesberg force, the Stormberg force, Brabant's force, and the Natal force— had the pressure relieved in front of them, a tendency which increased with every fresh success of the main body. A short chapter must now be devoted to following rapidly the for- tunes of these various armies, and tracing the effect of Lord Roberts's strategy upon their movements. They may be taken in turn from west to east. The force under General Clements (formerly French's) had, as has already been told, been denuded of nearly all its cavalry and horse artillery, and so left in the presence of a very superior body of the enem>. Under these cir- cumstances Clements had to withdraw his immensely ex- tended line, and to concentrate at Arundel, closely fol- lowed by the elated enemy. The situation was a more critical one than has been appreciated by the public, for if the force had been defeated the Boers would have been in a position to cut Lord Roberts's line of communica- tions and the main army would have been in the air. Much credit is due, not only to General Clements, but to Carter of the VViltshires, Racket Pain of the Worcesters, Butclier of the Fourth R. F. A., the admirable Australians,' and all the other good men and true who did their best to hold the gap for the Empire. The Boer idea of a strong attack upon this point was strategically admirable, but tactically there was not suffi- cient energy in pushing home the advance. The British wings succeeded in withdrawing, and the concentrated 20 ) \. t 306 THIS gri:at boi:r war force at Arundel was too strong for attack. Yet there was a time of suspense, a time wiien every man had be- come of such importance that even fifty Indian syces were for the first and last time in the war, to their own supreme gratification, permitted for twenty-four hours to play their natural part as soldiers.' Hut then with the rapid strokes in front the hour of danger passed, and the J)oer advance became first a halt and then a retreat. On February 27th, Major Butcher, supported by the Inniskillings and Australians, attacked Rensburg and shelled the enemy out of it. Next morning Clements's whole force had advanced from Arundel and took up its old position. The same afternoon it was clear that the JJoers were retiring, and the British, following them up^ marched into Colesberg, around which they had manoeu- vred so long. A telegram from Sleyn to De Wet found in the town told the whole story of the retirement: "As long as you are able to hold the positions you are in with the men you have, do so. If not, come here as quickly as circumstances will allow, as matters here are taking a serious turn." The whole force passed over the Orange River unimpeded, and blew up the Norval's Pont railway bridge behind it. Clements's brigade fol- lowed upon March 4th, and succeeded in the course of a week in throwing a pontoon bridge over the river and crossing into the Orange Free State. Roberts having in the mean while seized Bloemfontein, communication was restored by railway between the forces, and Clements was despatched to Phillipolis, Faursmith, and the other towns in the southwest to receive the submission of the inliabitants and to enforce their disarmament. In the mean time the F'ngineers worked furiously at the restora- tion of the railway bridge over the Orange River, which was not, however, accomplished until some weeks later. ' There was something piteous in the chagrin of these fine Sikhs at being held back from their natural work as soldiers. A deputa- tion of them waited upon Lord Roberts at Bloemfontein to ask, with many salaams, whether " his children were not to see one little fight before they returned." i, R i:itate, and ice, since lation in Hildyard In this til Lord necessi- tion and pecially , was at s march -r, upon a chap- ch had f on tein though i inter- vruger jingle d ask- singu- :» m EFFECTS OF ROBERTS'S MARCH 313 lar example of it than this. The united Presidents pre- pare for war for years, spring an insulting ultimatum upon us, invade our unfortunate Colonies, solemnly an- nex all the portions invaded, and then, when at hist driven back, propose a peace which shall secure for them the whole point originally at issue. It is difficult to believe that the proposals could have been seriously meant, but more probable that the plan may have been to strengthen the hands of the Peace deputation who were being sent to endeavor to secure European intervention. Could they point to a proposal from the Transvaal and a refusal from England, it might, if not too curiously examined, excite the sympathy of those who follow emo- tions rather than facts. The documents were as follows: — " 77/ e Presidents of the Oran^^e Free State and of the South African Republic to the Marquess of Salisburv. IJloeinfontein : March 5, 1900. "The blood and the tears of the thousands who have suffered by this war, and the prospect of ail the moral and economic ruin with which South Africa is now threat- ened, make it necessary for both belligerents to ask them- selves dispassionately and as in the sight of the Triune God for what they are fighting and whether the aim of each justifies all this appalling misery and devastation. " VVith this object, and in view of the assertions of various British statesmen to the effect that this war was begun and is carried on with the set purpose of under- mining Her Majesty's authority in South Africa, and of setting up an administration' over all South Africa inde- pendent of Her Majesty's Government, we consider it our duty to solemnly declare that this war was undertaken solely as a defensive measure to safeguard the threatened independence of the South African Republic, and is only continued in order to secure and safeguard the incontest- * Note that this solemn declaration was made after annexation, and a hostile administration had been proclaimed in every yard of the l^ueen's territory which could be seized.— A. C. D. IX 1 1 m\ 314 THE GREAT BOER WAR able independence of both Republics as sovereign inter- national States, and to obtain the assurance that those of Her Majesty's subjects who have taken part with us in this war shall suffer no harm whatsoever in person or property. "On these conditions, but on these conditions alone, are we now as in the past desirous of seeing peace re-es- tablished in South Africa, and of putting an end to the evils now reigning over South Africa; while, if Her Majesty's Government is determined to destroy the inde- pendence of the Republics, there is nothing left to us and to our people but to persevere to the end in the course already begun, in spite of the overwhelming pre- eminence of the British Empire, conscious that that God who lighted the inextinguishable fire of the love of freedom in our hearts and those of our fathers will not forsake us, but will accomplish His work in us and in our de- scendants. " We hesitated to make this declaration earlier to your Excellency as we feared that, as long as the advantage was always on our side, and as long as our forces held defensive positions far in Her Majesty's Colonies, such a declaration might hurt the feelings of honor of the British people. But now that the prestige of the British Empire may be considered to be assured by the capture of one of our forces, and that we are thereby forced to evacuate other positions which we had occupied, that difficulty is over and we can no longer hesitate to inform your Government and people in the sight of the whole civilized world why we are fighting and on what condi- tions we are ready to restore peace." Such was the message, deep in its siniplicity and cun- ning in its candor, which was sent by the old President, for it is Kruger's style which we read in every line of it. One has to get back to facts after reading it, to the enor- mous war preparations of the Republics, to the unpre- pared state of the British Colonies, to the ultimatum, to the annexations, to the stirring up of rebellion, to the JV^..._^ lR EFFKCTS OF ROBKRTS'S MARCH 315 reign inter- at those of with us in person or ons alone, )eace re-es- end to the e, if Her y the in de- left to us ind in the iiing pre- that God »f freedom >t forsake n our de- Jr to your dvantage rces held ies, such )r of the e British - capture orced to ied, that 3 inform le whole t Condi- nd cun- esident, le of it. le enor- unpre- tum, to to the 1 I J 4. silence about peace in the days of success, to the fact that by "inextinguishable love of freedom" is meant inextin- guishable determination to hold other white men as helots — only then can we form a just opinion of the worth of his message. One must remember also, behind the homely and pious phraseology, that one is dealing >vith a man who has been too cunning for us again and again — a man who is as wily as the savages with whom he has treated and fought. This Paul Kruger with the simple words of peace is the same Paul Kruger who with gentle sayings insured the disarmament of Johannesburg, and then instantly arrested his enemies— the man whose name was a by-word for "slimness " throughout South Africa. With such a man the best weapon is absolute naked truth, with which Lord Salisbury confronted him in his reply: — Foreign Office : March nth. " I have the honor to acknowledge your Honors' tele- gram dated March 5th from Bloemfontein, of which the purport was principally to demand that Her Majesty's Government shall recognize the ' incontestable inde- pendence' of the South African Republic and Orange Free State as ' sovereign international States ' and to offer on those terms to bring the war to a conclusion. "In the beg.i.ning of October last peace existed be- tween Her Majesty and the two Republics under the conventions which then were in existence A discussion had been proceeding for some months between Her Maj- esty's Government and the South African Republic, of which the object was to obtain redress for certain very serious grievances under which British residents in the Republic were suffering. In the course of those nego- tiations the Republic had, to the knowledge of Her Maj- esty's Government, made considerable armaments, and the latter had consequently taken steps to provide corre- sponding reinforcements to the British garrisons of Cape Town and Natal. No infringement of the rights guaran- teed by the conventions had up to that time taken place on the British side. Suddenly, at two days' notice, the I 316 THE GREAT BOKR WAR South African Republic, after issuing an insulting ulti- matum, declared war, and the Orange Free State, with whom there had not even been any discussion, took a similar step. Her Majesty's dominions were immedi- ately invaded by the two Repuiilics, siege was laid to three towns within the Jiritish frontier, a large portion of the two Colonies was overrun with great destruction to property and life, and the Republics claimed to treat the inhabitants as if those dominions had been annexed to one or other of them. In anticipation of these opera- tions the South African Republic had been accumulating for many years past military stores upon an enormous scale, which by their character could only have been intended for use against Great ]jritain. " Your Honors make some observations of a negative character upon the object with which these preparations were made. I do not think it necessary to discuss the questions which you have raised. ]Uit the result of these preparations, carried on with great secrecy, has been that the British Empire has been compelled to confront an invasion which has entailed a costly war and the loss of thousands of precious lives. This great calamity has been the penalty which Great Britain has suffered for having in recent years acquiesced in the existence of the two Republics. "In view of the use to which the two Republics have put the position which was given to them, and the ca- lamities which their unprovoked attack has inflicted upon Her Majesty's dominions. Her Majesty's Government can only answer your Honors' telegram by saying that they are not prepared to assent to the independence either of the South African Republic or of the Orange Free State." . With this frank and uncompromising reply the Em- pire, with the exception of a small party of dupes and doctrinaires, heartily agreed. The pens were dropped, and the Mauser and the Lee-Metford once more took up the debate. '^imr^iftflRs^ < il m -I .4 ST Chapter Twenty-two THE HALT AT BLOEMFONTEIN Upon March 13th Lord Roberts occupied the capital of the Orange Free State. On May ist, more than six weeks later, the advance was resumed. This long delay was absolutely necessary in order to supply the place of the ten thousand horses a..d mules which are said to have been used up in the severe work of the preceding month. It was not merely that a large number of the cavalry chargers had died or been abandoned, but it was that of those which remained the majority were in a state which made tht n useless for immediate service. How far this might ha e been avoided is open to aues- tion, for it is notorious that General French's reputation as a horsemaster does not stand so high as his fame as a cavalry leader. But besides the horses there was urgent need of every sort of supply, from boots to hospitals, and the only way by which they could come was by two sin- gle-line railways which unite into one single-line rail- way, with the alternative of passing over a precarious pontoon bridge at Norval's Pont, or truck by truck over the road bridge at Bethulie. To support an army of fifty thousand men under these circumstances, eight hun- dred miles from a base, is no light matter, and a orcma- ture advance which could not be thrust home would be the greatest of misfortunes. The public at home and the army in Africa became restless under the inaction, but it was one more example of the absolute soundness of Lord Roberts's judgment and the quiet resolution with which he adheres to it. He issued a proclamation to the in- habitants of the Free State promising protection to all who should bring in their arms and settle down upon 3i8 THE GREAT BOER WAR their farms. The most stringent orders were issued against looting or personal violence, but nothing could exceed the gentleness and good humor of the troops. Indeed ^^here seemed more need for an order which should protect them against the extortion of their con- quered enemies. " If the French ever take London I'll turn tobacconist," said a Tommy, as he laid down his shilling for two cigarettes. It is strange to think that we are separated by only ninety years from the savage soldiery of Badajos and San Sebastian. The streets of the little Dutch town formed during this interval a curious object-lesson in the resources of the Empire. All the scattered Anglo-Celtic races had sent their best blood to fight for the coimnon cause. Peace is the great solvent, as war is the powerful unifier. For the British as for the German Empire much virtue had come from the stress and strain of battle. To stand in the market square of Bloemfontein and to see the warrior types around you was to be assured of the future of the race. The middle-sized, square-set, weather-tanned, straw-bearded British regulars crowded the footpaths. There also one might see the hard-faced Canadians, iho loose-limbed dashing Australians, fire-blooded and keen, the dark New Zealanders, with a Maori touch here and there in their features, the gallant men of Tasmania, the gentlemen troopers of India and Ceylon, and everywhere the wild South African irregulars with their bandoliers and unkempt wiry horses. Remington's men with the raccoon bands, Roberts's Horse with the black plumes, some with pink puggarees, some with birdseye, but all of the same type, hard, rugged, and alert. The man who could look at these splendid soldiers, and, remembering the sacrifices of time, money, and comfort which most of them had made before they found themselves fighting in the heart of Africa, doubt that the spirit of the race burned now as brightly as ever, must be devoid of judg- ment and sympathy. The real glories of the British race lie in the future, not in the past. The Empire walks, and may still walk, with an uncertain step, but -siMMiMi R re issued ling could le troops, ier which their con- ndon I'll down his hink that le savage iring this ss of the had sent . Peace er. For rtue had stand in ; warrior re of the -tanned, (otpaths. ans. tho id keen, ere and nia, the rywhere idoliers ith the )Iumes, 3ut all in who bering lost of ing in race judg- Jritish mpire 3, but •n 'T HALT AT BLOLMFONTEIN 319 with every year its tread will be firmer, for its weakness is that of waxing youth and not of waning age. The greatest misfortune of the campaign, one which it was obviously impolitic to insist upon at the time, began with the occupation of Bloemfontein. This was the great outbreak of enteric among the troops. For more than two months the hospitals were choked with sick. One general hospital with five hundred beds held seven- teen hundred sick, nearly all enterics. A half field hos- pital with fifty beds held three hundred and seventy cases. The total number of cases could not have been less than six or seven thousand — and this not of an evan- escent and easily treated complaint, but of the most per- sistent and debilitating of continued fevers, the one too which requires the most assiduous attention and careful nursing. How great was the strain only those who had to meet it can tell. The exertions of the military hospi- tals and of those others which were fitted out by private benevolence sufficed, after a long struggle, to meet the crisis.' At Bloemfontein alone, as many as fifty men died in one day, and more than one thousand new graves in the cemetery testify to the severity of the epidemic. No men in the campaign served their country more truly than the officers and men of the medical ser'/ice, nor can any one who went .through the epidemic forget the bravery and unselfishness of those admirable nursing sisters wno set the men around them a higher standard of devotion to duty. Enteric fever is always endemic in the country, and especially at Bloemfontein, but there can be no doubt that this severe outbreak had its origin in the Paarde- berg water. All through the campaign, while the ma- chinery for curing disease was excellent, that for pre- venting it was elementary or absent. If bad water can * The cost of the struggle was considerable. A single general hospital had sixty orderlies down with enteric, all contracted from the patients. In the small hospital in which I was privileged to serve, out of thirty-six who were in contact with the sick, eighteen got the disease. — A. C. D. V I II II, ) \ . \ i« > i I li ,i I If i'i 320 THK GREAT BOER WAR cost us more than all the bullets of the enemy, then surely it is worth our while to make the drinking of un- boiled water a stringent military offence, and to attach to every company and squadron the most rapid and effi- cient means for boiling it — for filtering alone is useless. An incessant trouble it would be, but it would have saved a division for the army. It is heartrending for the medi- cal man who has emerged from a hospital full of water- born pestilence to see a regimental water-cart being filled, without protest, at some polluted wayside pool. With precautions and with inoculation all those lives might have been saved. The fever died down with the advance of the troops and the coming of the colder weather. To return to the military operations: these, although they were stagnant so far as the main army was con- cerned, were exceedingly and inconveniently active in other quarters. Three small actions, two of which were disastrous to our arms, and one successful defence marked the period of the pause at Bloemfontein. To the north of the town, some twelve miles distant, lies the ubiquitous Modder River, which is crossed by a railway bridge at a place named Glen. The saving of the bridge was of considerable importance, and might, by the universal testimony of the farmers of that district, have been effected any time within the first few days of our occupation. We appear, however, to have imper- fectly appreciated how great was the demoralization of the Boers. In a week or so they took heart, returned, and blew up the bridge. Roving parties of the enemy, composed mainly of the redoubtable Johannesburg po lice, reappeared even to the south of the river. Young Lygon was killed, and Colonels Crabbe and Coddring- ton with Captain Trotter, all of the Guards, were se- verely wounded by such a body, whom they gallantly but injudiciously attempted to arrest when armed only with revolvers. These wandering patrols who kept the country unset- tled, and harassed the farmers who had taken advantage ■ ! i \R \ enemy, then nking of un- id to attach nd and efFi- le is useless. 1 have saved for the medi- uU of water- r-cart being ayside pool, those lives >vvn witli the ' the colder se, although ny was con- ly active in which were iful defence :ein. liles distant, crossed by lie saving of and might, :hat district, few days of lave imper- alization of rt, returned, the enemy, lesburg po er. Young Coddring- s, were se- llantly but only with I ,« i HALT AT BLOKMKONTEIN 321 ntry unset- advantage of Lord Roberts's proclamation, were found to have their centre at a point some six miles to the north of Glen, named Karee. At Karee a formidable line of hills cut the Uritish advance, and these had been occupied by a strong body of the enemy with guns. Lord Roberts de- termined to drive them off, and upon March 28th Tuck- er's Seventh Division, consisting of Chermside's brigade (Lincolns, Norfolks, Hampshires, and Scottish Jior- derers), and Wavell's brigade (Cheshires, Kast Lanca- shires, N'orth Staffords, and South Wales Borderers) was assembk 1 at (Men. The artillery consisted of the vet- eran Kighteentii, Sixty-second, and Seventy-fifth R. F. A. Three attenuated cavalry brigades with some mounted infantry completed the force. The movement was to be upon the old model, and in result it proved to be only too truly so. French's cav- alry were to get round one Hank, Le Gallais's mounted infantry round the other, and 'i'ucker's division to at- tack in front. Nothing could be more perfect in theory and nothing apparently more defective in practice. Since on this as on other occasions the mere fact that the cav- alry were demonstrating in the rear caused the complete abandonment of the position, it is difficult to see what the object of the infantry attack could be. The ground was irregular and unexplored, and it was late before the horsemen on their weary steeds found themselves behind the tlank of the enemy. Some of them, Le Gallais's mounted infantry and Davidson's guns, had come from ]}loemfontein during the night, and the horses were ex- hausted by the long march, and by the absurd weight which the liritish troop-horse is asked to carry. Tucker advanced his infantry exactly as Kelly-Kenny had done at Driefontein, and with a precisely similar result. The eight regiments going forward in echelon of battalions imagined from the silence of the enemy that the position had been abandoned. They were undeceived by a cruel fire which beat upon two companies of the Scottish Bor- derers from a range of two hundred yards. They were driven back but re-formed in a donga. About half-past 2i 4 ' • I i s \t I I I ':, '* » 322 THE GREAT BOER WAR two a lioer gun burst shrapnel over the Lincohishires and Scottish Borderers with some effect, for a sinj^le shell killed five of the latter regiment. Cliermsidt's brigade was now all involved in the fight, and WavcU's came up in support, but the ground was too open and the position too strong to push the attack home. Fortu- nately, about four o'clock, the horse batteries with French began to make their presence felt from behind, and the iioers instantly quitted their position and made off through the broad gap which still remained between French and Le Gallais. The iJrandfort plain appears to be ideal ground for cavalry, but in spile of that the enemy with his guns got safely away. 'Ihe loss of the infantry amounted to one hundred and sixty killed and wounded, tlie larger share of the casualties and of the honor falling to the Scottish Uorderers and the Fast Fan- cashires. The infantry was not well handled, the cav- alry was slow, and the guns were intfTicient — altogether an inglorious day. Yet strategically it was of impor- tance, for the ridge captured was the last before one came to the great plain which stretched, with a few intermis- sions, to the north. From March 29th until May 2d Karee remained the advanced post. In the meanwhile there had been a series of operations in the east which had ended in a serious disaster. Im- mediately after the occupation of I'loemfontein (upon March 18th) Lord Roberts despatched to the east a small column consisting of the Tenth Hussars, the composite regiment, two batteries (Q and U) of the Horse Artillery, some mounted infantry, Roberts's Horse, and Riming- ton's Guides. On the eastern horizon, forty miles from the capital,; but in that clear atmosphere looking only half the distance, there stands the impressive mountain named Thabanchu (the black mountain). To all Boers it is an historical spot, for it was at its base that the wagons of the Voortrekkers, coming by devious ways from various parts, assembled. On the farther side of Thabanchu, to the north and east of it, lies the richest grain-growing portion of the F^ree State, the centre of \^'.i lR ncolnshires )r a single Jheimsult'st ul WavfU's pen and the lie. I'orlu- teries with om behind, 1 and made ed between lin appears of that the loss of the killed and and of the e Kast Lan- ;d, the cav- — altogether > of impor- re one came !\v intermis- il May 2d operations aster. Im- tein (upon ast a small composite Artillery, 1 Riming- niles from king only mountain all Boers that the lous ways Ir side of le richest :entre of HALT AT BLOI.MKON'n.IM yr^ which is I.adybrand. 'I'he forty miles which intervene between Hloemfontcin and 'rhabanchu are iniersecti-d midway by the Modder River. At this point are the waterworks, erected recently with inodiTn machiniry, to take the place of the unsanitary wells on which the town had been dependent. The force met with no resistance and the small town of Thabanchu was occupied. Colonel JMlcher, the leader of the 1 )()Uglas raid, was inclined to explore a little farther, and with three scpiad- rons of inf)unted men he rode on to the eastward. Two conunandoes, supj^osed to be (fr()i)ler's and ( )livier's, were seen by them, moving on a line which suggested that they were going to join Steyn, who was known to be ral- lying his forces at Kroonstad, his ne^v seat of government in the north of the I'ree State. Pilcher, with great tlar- ing, pushed onward until with his little band on their tired horses he found himself in Ladybrand. thirty miles from his nearest supports. Kntering the town he seized the landrost and the field-cornet, but found that strong bodies of the enemy were moving upon him and that it was impossible for him to hold the place. He retired, therefore, holding grimly on to his prisoners, and got back with small loss to the place from which he started. It was a dashing piece of bluff, and, when taken with the Douglas exploit, leads one to hope that Tilcher may have a chance of showing what he can do with larger means at his disposal. Finding that the enemy was following him in force he pushed on the same night for Thaban- chu. His horsemen must have covered between fifty and sixty miles in the twenty-four hours. Apparently the effect of Pilcher's exploit was to halt the march of those commandoes which had been seen trekking to the northwest, and to cause them to swing round upon Thabanchu. Broadwood, a young cavalry commander who had won a name in Egypt, considered that his position was unnecessarily exposed and fell back upon Bloemfontein. He halted on the first night near the waterworks, half-way upon his journey. The Boers are great masters in the ambuscade. Never li ; F I 1/ ' '; I l(>i I ! XIfr-a>A; 3^4 THE GREAT BOER WAR has any race shewn such aptitude for this form of war- fare — a legacy from a long succession of contests with cunning savages. ]5ut iiever also have they clone any- thing i^o, clever and jia audacious as De Wet's disposi- tions, in this action, which is called Sanna's Post by the ]ioers and Korn Spruit by the British. One cannot go over the ground without being amazed at the ingenuity of their attack, and also at the luck which favored them, for the trap which they had laid for others might easily have proved an absolutely fatal one for themselves. The position beside the Modder at which the British camped had numerous broken hills to the north and east of it. A force of Boers, supposed to number about two thousand men, came down in the nigiit, bringing with them several heavy guns, and with the early morning opened a brisk fire upon the camp. The surprise was complete. But the refinement of the ]joer tactics lay in t'le fact that they had a surprise within a surprise — and it was the second which was the more deadly. The force which ]]roadwood had with him consisted of the Tenth Hussars and the composite regiment, Riming- ton's Scouts, Roberts's Horse, the New Zealand and l^ur- mah Mounted Infantry, with Q and U Batteries of Horse Artillery. With such a force, consisting entirely of mounted men, he could not storm the hills upon which the Boer guns were placed, and his^j^ine pounders were unable to reach the heavier cannon of the enemy. His best game was obviously to continue his march to Bloem- fontein. He sent on the considerable convoy of wagons and the guns, while he with the cavalry covered the rear, upon which the long-range pieces of the enemy kept up the usual well-directed but harmless fire. Ikoadwood's retreating column now found itself on a huge plain which stretches all the way to Bloemfontein, broken only by two hills, both of which were known to be in our possession. The plain was one which was continually traversed from end to end by our troops and convoys, so that once out upon its surface all danger seemed at an end. Broadwood had additional reasons R rm of war- itests with done ally- 's disposi- 'ost by the cannot go ingenuity )red them, ight easily Ives. he liritish h and east about two iging with y morning irprise was :tics lay in prise — and insisted of t, Riniing- i and liur- s of Horse ntirely of on which ders were my. His to Bloeni- of wagons the rear, y ko'Dt up be If on a tmfontein, Iknown to 'hich was •oops and 11 danger [1 reasons HALT A'r BLOl.MKONTI.IN x'~S for feeling secure, for he knew that, in answer to his own wise request, Colvile's division had been sent out before daybreak that morning from Ulc emfontein to meet him. In a very few miles their van-guard and his must come together. There were obviously no Doers upon the plain, but if there were they would find themselves between two fires. He gave no thought to his front, therefore, but rode behind, where the JJoer guns were roaring, and whence the J^oer riflemen might ride. J)Ut in spitj of the obvious there 7t'roadwood's mounted men would wheel swiftly to right atul left and secure the ends of the long donga. Should that happen, not a man of them could possibly escajie. lUit they took their chances like brave men, and fortune was their friend. The wagons 326 THK GRKAT BOKR WAR came on without any scouts. Ilehind them was U IJat- tery, then Q, with Roberts's Horse abreast of them and the rest of the cavalry behind. As the wagons, occupied for the most part only by unarmed sick soldiers and black transport drivers, came down into the drift the IJoers cjuickly but quietly took possession of them, and drove them on up the farther slope. Thus the troops behind saw their wagons dip down, reapi^ear, and continue on their course. The idea of an ambush could not suggest itself. Only one thing could avert an absolute catastrophe, and that was the appearance of a hero who would accept certain death in order to warn his comrades. Such a man rode by the wagons — Sergeant Green, of the Army Service Corp.'-, who furnished as fine an example of devotion as this war or military history can show. Trained in the prosaic though essential duties of his own department, he had preserved a fine courage and a warrior soul. With Boer rifles converging upon him he drew his revolver, fired, and fell shot to pieces. That outburst of firing was the signal which saved the column. Not often is it given to man to die so choice a death as that of Sergeant Green. But the detachment was already so placed that nothing could save it from heavy loss. The wagons had all passed but nine, and the leading battery of artillery was at the very edge of the donga.' Nothing is so helpless as a limbered-up battery. In an instant the teams were shot down and the gunners were made prisoners. A ter- rific fire burst at the same instant upon Roberts's Horse, who were abreast of the guns. " Files about! gallop! " yelled Colonel Dawson, and by his exertions and those of Major Pack-Heresford the corps was extricated and re-formed some hundreds of yards farther off. Jkit the loss of horses and men was heavy. Major Pack-Beres- ford and other officers were shot down and every un- horsed man remained necessarily as a prisoner under the very muzzles of the rifiemen in the donga. ' I saw gunner horses lyiujj within lifty yards of the edge. — A. C. L). ['■! : iP ' 1 li: R HALT AT BLOF.MFONTFIN ri- -> -^ 'as U IJat- them and I only by vers, came lietly took he farther agons clip The idea one thing It was the n death in Dde by the ice Corp-, as this war he prosaic nt, he had With lioer )lver, fired, ng was the it given to nt Green, at nothing s had all tillery was o helpless earns were s. A ter- s's Horse, gallop!" and those ated and Jkit the ck;-]5eres- every un- 1 under the edge. — A. I I. I As Roberts's Horse turned and galloped for dear life across the flat, four out of the six guns' of Q 1 lattery and one gun (the rearmost) of U JJattery swung round and dashed frantically for a place of safety. At the same instant every IJoer along the line of the donga sprang up and emptied his magazine into the mass of rushing, shouting soldiers, plunging horses, and screaming Kaf- firs. It was for a few moments a sniriC-qui-f^ent. Ser- geant-Major Martin of U, with a single driver on a wheeler, got away the last gun of his battery. The four guns which were extricated of Q, under Major J'hipps- Hornby, whirled across the plain, pulled up, unlimbered, and opened a brisk fire of shrapnel from about a thou- sand yards upon the donga. Had the battery gone on for double the distance its action would have been more effective, for it would have been under a less deadly rifle fire, but in any case its sudden change from flight to dis- cipline and order steadied the whole force. Roberts's men sprang from their horses, and with the IJurmese and New Zealanders flung themselves down in a skirmish line. The cavalry moved to the left to find some drift by which the donga could be passed, and out of chaos there came in a few minutes calm and a settled purpose. It was for Q Battery to cover the retreat of the force, and most nobly it did it. A fortnight later a pile of horses, visible many hundreds of yards off across the plain, showed where the guns had stood. It was the Colenso of the horse gunners. In a devilish sleet of lead they stood to their work, loading and firing while a man was left. Some of the guns were left '.vith two men to work them, one was loaded and fired by a single officer. When at last the order for retirement came, only ten men, several of them wounded, were left upon their feet. With scratch teams from the limbers, driven ' Of tlic other two one overturned and coulci not be riplitcd, the otlier luul the wheelers shot and could not be extricated from the tumult. It was ollicially stated that tiie guns of () Battery were halted a thousand yards off the donga, but my impression was, from examining the ground, that it was not more tlian six hundred. .3^8 THK GRKAT BOKR WAR \MtJiiluS9 . > .1 1 i ' ' Av^^ by single gunners, the irmc-pounders staggered out of action, and the skirmish line of mounted infantry sprang to their feet amid the hail of bullets to cheer them as they passed. It was no slight task to extricate that sorely stricken force from the close contact of an exultant enemy, and to lead it across that terrible donga. Yet, thanks to the coolness of Iiroadwood and the steadiness of his rear- guard, the thing was done. A practicable passage had been found two miles to the south by Captain Chester- Master of Rimington's. This corps, with Roberts's, the New Zealanders, and the Third Mounted Infantry, cov- ered the withdrawal in turn. It was one of those actions in which the horseman who is trained to fight upon foot did very much better than the regular cavalry. In two hours' time the drift had been passed and the survivors of the force found themselves in safety. The losses in this disastrous but not dishonorable en- gagement were severe. About thirty officers and three hundred men were killed, wounded, or missing. The prisoners came to more than two hundred. They lost a hundred wagons, a considerable quantity of stores, and seven iVH*«-pounder guns — five from U J^>attery and two from Q. Of U i>attery only Major Taylor and Sergeant- Major Martin seem to have escaped, the rest being cap- tured e// bloc. Of Q Battery nearly every man was killed or w^ounded. Robert's Horse, the New Zealanders, and the mounted infantry were the other corps which suffered most heavily. Among many brave men who died, none was a greater loss to the service than Major Booth of the Northumberland Fusiliers, ser.'ing in the mounted infan- try. With four comrades he held a position to cover the retreat, and refused to leave it. Such men arc inspired by the traditions of the past, and pass on the story of their own deaths to inspire fresh heroes in the future. Broadwood, the instant that he had disentangled him- self, faced about, and brought his guns into action. He was not strong enough, however, nor were his men in a condition to seriously attack the enemy. Martyr's i, AR HALT AT BLOKMFONTRIN v> '29 ;erecl out of "antry sprang iieer them as )rely stricken t enemy, and thanks to the i of his rear- passage had )tain Chester- Roberts's, the Infantry, cov- those actions ght upon foot airy. In two the survivors honorable en- ers and three iiissing. The They lost a of stores, and ttery and two and Sergeant- st being cap- an was killed alanders, and vhich suffered lo died, none Booth of the ounted infan- n to cover the 1 arc inspired the story of he future, itangled him- action. He his men in iiy. Martyr's mounted infantry had come up, led by the Queensland- ers, and at the cost of some loss to themselves hel])cd to extricate the disordered force. It does not appear, how- ever, that Martyr, knowing that powerful reinforcements were coming up, threw his men into the fight with the fire and energy which the occasion demanded. Colvile's division was behind IJughman's Kop, only a few miles off, and there were hopes that it might push on and pre- vent the guns and wagons from being removed. Col- vile did make an advance, but slowly and in a Hanking direction instead of dashing swiftly forward to retrieve the situation. Had Colvile acted upon the excellent rule of the German commanders in 1870, and marched upon the canoiientioniicr the instant that it broke upon his ears in the early morning, he might not have prevented the disaster, but at least he would have avenged it. It was a great opportunity — and a lost one.' The victory left the Boers in possession of the waterworks, and Bloemfontein had to fall back upon her wells — a change which reacted most disastrously upon the enteric which was already decimating the troops. The effect of the Sauna's Post defeat was increased by the fact that only four days later (on April 4th) a second even more deplorable disaster befell our troops. This was the surrender of five companies of infantry, two of them mounted, at Reddersberg. So many surrenders of small bodies of troops had occurred during the course of the war that the public, remembering how seldom the word " surrender " had ever been heard in our endless succession of European wars, had become very restive upon the subject, and were sometimes inclined to ques- tion whether this new and humiliating fact did not im- ply some deterioration of our spirit. The fear was natu- ' It may be urjjed in General Colvile's defence that his division had already done a long march from Bloemfontein. A division, however, which contains two such lirigades as Macdonaid's and Smith-Dorrien's may safely l)e called upon for any exertions. The gunner oflicers in (.!oIviIe's division heard tlieir comrades' guns in "section tire" and knew it to be the sign of a desperate situation. Officers and men chafed at the deplorable delay. Bd ^5''VJM\^s' T'^ ( I 330 THR GREAT BOKR WAR ral, and yet nothing could be more unjust to this the most splendid army which has ever marched under the red-crossed flag. The fact was new because the condi- tions were new, and it was inherent in those conditions. In that country of huge distances small bodies must be detached, for the amount of space covered by the large bodies was not sufficient for all military purposes. In reconnoitring, in distributing proclamations, in collect- ing arms, in overawing outlying districts, weak columns must be used. Very often these columns must contain infantry soldiers, as the demands upon the cavalry were excessive. Such bodies, moving through a hilly country with which they were unfamiliar, were always liable to be surrounded by a mobile enemy. Once surrounded the length of their resistance was limited by three things: their cartridges, their water, and their food. When they had all three, as at VVepener or Mafeking, they could hold out indefinitely. When one or other was wanting, as at Reddersberg or Nicholson's Nek, their position was impossible. They could not break away, for how can men on foot break away from horsemen ? Hence those repeated humiliations, which did little or nothing to im- pede the course of the war, and which were really to be accepted as one of the inevitable prices which we had to pay for the conditions under which the war was fought. Numbers, discipline, and resources were with us. Mo- bility, distances, nature of the country, insecurity of sup- plies, were with them. We need not take it to heart therefore if it happened, with all these forces acting against them, that our soldiers found themselves some- times in a position whence neither wisdom nor valor could rescue them. To travel through that country, fash- ioned above all others for defensive warfare, with trench and fort of superhuman size and strength barring every path, one marvels how it was that such incidents were not more frequent and more serious. It is deplorable that the white flag should ever have waved over a com- pany of British troops, but the man who is censorious upon the subject has never travelled in South Africa. I , f,f HALT AT BLOKMFONTEIN 3J51 The facts of the capture of the detachment at Redders- berg are exceedingly difficult to gather, since the whole force was taken to a man, and had no opportunity of tell- ing its own tale. Three of the companies were of the Irish Rifles, and two of the Second Northumberland Fusiliers— the same unfortunate regiments which had already been cut up at Stormberg. They had been de- spached from Gatacre's Third Division, the headquar- ters of which was at Springfontcin. On t..e abandon- ment of Thabanchu and the disaster of Sauna's Post, it was obvious that we should draw in our detached parties to the east; so the five companies were ordered to leave Dewetsdorp, which they were garrisoning, and to get back to the railway line. Either the order was issued too late, or they were too slow in obeying it, for they were only half-way upon their journey, near the town of Reddersberg, when the enemy came down upon them with five guns. Without artillery they were powerless, but, having seized a kopje, they took such shelter as they could find, and waited in the hope of succor. Their assailants seem to have been detached from De Wet's force in the north, and contained among them many of the victors of Sauna's Post. The attack began at 1 1 A.M. of April 3d, and all day the men lay among the stones, subjected to the pelt of shell and bullet. The cover was good, however, and the casualties were not heavy. The total losses were under fifty killed and wounded. More serious than the enemy's fire was the absence of water. A message was passed through of the dire straits in which they found themselves, and by the late afternoon the news had readied headquarters. Lord Roberts instantly despatched the Camerons, just arrived from Kgypt, to Bethany, which is the nearest point upon the line, and telegraphed to Gatacre at Springfontein to take measures to save his compromised detachment. The telegram should have reached Gatacre early on the evening of the 3d, and he had collected a force of fifteen hundred men, entrained it, journeyed forty miles up the line, detrained it, and reached Reddersberg, which is ten 4 I ! . I ( If /T^ I I .'I I ! f '■ 3X2 THE GRKA'r BOKR WAR or twelve miles from the line, by 10:30 next morning. Already, however, it was too late, and the besieged force, unable to face a second day without water under that burning sun, had laid down their arms. No doubt the stress of thirst was dreadful, and yet one cannot say that the defence rose to a high point of resolution. Knowing that help could not be far off, the garrison should have held on while they could lift a rille. If the ammunition was running low, it was bad management which caused it to be shot away too fast. Not only the troops but General Gatacre also was involved in the disaster. Blame may have attached to him for leaving a detach- ment at Devvetsdorp, and not having a supporting body at Reddersberg upon which it might fall back; but it must be remembered that his total force was small and that he had to cover a long stretch of the lines of com- munication. As to General Gatacre's energy and gal- lantry it is a byword in the army; but coming after the Stormberg disaster this fresh mishap to his force made the continuance of his command impossible. Much sympathy was felt with him in the army, where he was universally liked and respected by officers and men. He returned to England, and his division was taken over by General Chermside. In a single week, at a time when the back of the war had seemed to be broken, we had lost nearly twelve hun- dred men and seven guns. The men of the Free State — • for the fighting was mainly done by commandoes from the Ladybrand, Winberg, Bethlehem, and Harri.'imith districts — deserve great credit for this fine effort, and their leader, De Wet, confirmed the reputation which he had already gained as a dashing and indefatigable leader. His force was so Vv-eak that when Lord Roberts was able to really direct his own against it, he brushed it away before him; but the manner in which De Wet took advantage of Roberts's enforced immobility, and uared to get behind so mighty an enemy, was a fine exhi- bition of courage and enterprise. The public at home chafed at this sudden and unexpected turn of affairs; HALT AT BLOKMFONTKIN 233 Init the (leneral, constant to his own fixed purpose, did not permit his strength to be wasted, and his cavalry to be ?gain disorganized, by Hying excursions, but waited grimly until he should be strong enough to strike straight at Pretoria. In this short period of depression there came one gleam of light from the west. This was the capture of a commando ot sixty JJoers, or rather of sixty foreigners fighting for the lioers, and the death of the gallant Frenchman, I)e Villebois-Mareuil, who appears to have had the ambition of playing Lafayette in youth Africa to Kruger's Washington. From ihe time that Kimberley had been iieoccupied the Ihitish had been accumulating their force there so as to make a strong movement which should coincide with that of Roberts from Blocmfontein. Hunter's division from Natal was being moved round to Kimberley, and Methuen already commanded a consider- able body of troops, which included a number of the newly arrived Imperial Yeomanry. With these Methuen pacified the surrounding country, and extended his out- posts to Barkley West on the one side, to Boshof on the other, and to Warrenton upon the Vaal River in the cen- tre. On April 4th news reached Boshof that a Boer commando had been seen some ten miles to the east of the town, and a force, consisting of Yeomanry, Kimber- ley Light Horse, and half of Butcher's veteran Fourth Battery, was sent to attack them. They were found to have taken up their position upon a kopje which, con- trary to all Boer custom, had no other kopjes to support it. F'rench generalship was certainly not so astute as Boer cunning. The kopje was instantly surrounded, and the small force upon the summit being without artillery in the face of our guns found itself in exactly the same position which our men had been in twenty-four hours before at Reddersberg. Again was shown the advantage which the mounted rifleman has over the cavalry, for the Yeomanry and Light Horsemen left their horses and as- cended the hill with the bayonet. In three hours all was over and the Boers had laid down their arms. Vil- I I i , I Jl / C 7 1^ I ; I ■j 'I i li ^l I .'I ' '.'i \ I 334 THE GRI'AT BOKR WAR lebois was shot with seven of his companions, and thert- were nearly sixty prisoners. It sfjeaics well for the skir- mishing of the Yeomanry and the way in whicii they were handled ijy Lord Chesham tiiat though they worked their way up the hill under fire they only lost four killed and a few wounded. The affair was a small one, but it was complete, and it came at a time when a success was very welcome. One bustling week had seen the exptn- sive victory of Karee, the disasters of Sanna's Post and Reddersberg, and the successful skirmish of IJoshof. Another chapter must be devoted to the movement toward the south of the Jioer forces and the dispositions which Lord Roberts made to meet it. I, i ( I .. Chapter 'Twenty-three CLKAKFNCi Till", SOUTMI'.AST LoKi) RoF^ERTs never showed his self-command and fixed purpose more clearly tlian during his six weeks' halt at JMoemfontein. l)c Wet, the most enterprising and aggressive of the JJoer comiuinders, was attacking his eastern posts and menacing hiS line of communica- tions. A fussy or nervous general would have harassed his men and worn out his horses by endeavoring to pur- sue a number of will-of-the-wisp commandoes. Roberts contented himself by l)uilding up his strength at the cap- ital, and by spreading nearly twenty thousand men along his line of r lil from JJloemfontein to liethulie. When the time came he would strike, but until then he rested. His army was not only being rehorsed and reshod, but in some respects was being reorganized. One powerful weapon which was forged during those weeks was the col- lection of the mounted infantry of the central army into one division, which was placed under the command of Ian Hamilton, with Hutton and Ridley as brigadiers. Hutton's brigade contained the Canadians, New South Welshmen, West Australians, Queenslanders, New Zea- landers, Victorians, South Australians, and Tasmanians, with four battalions of Imperial Mounted Infantry, and several light batteries. Ridley's brigade contained the South African irregular regiments of cavalry, with some imperial troops. The strer gth of the whole division came to over ten thousand ritles, and in its ranks there rode the hardiest :ind best from every corner of the earth over which the old flag is flying. A word as to the general distribution of the troops at ^ .1' i iTT 3J6 'nil-: c,Ri<:A'r boi-:r war • 1/ 1 ») f this instiint while Roberts \v;is gathering himself for his final spring. KU^ven divisions of infantry were in the field. Of these the I'irst ( Methuen's) and half the Tenth (I lunter's) were at Kiinberley, forming really the hun- dred-mile-distant left wing of J.ord Roberts's army. On that side also was a considerable force of yeomanry, as General Villebois discovered. In the centre with Rob- erts was the Sixth Division (Kelly-Kenny's) atBloemfon- tein, the Seventh (Tucker's) at Karee, twenty miles north, the Ninth (Colvile's), an(l the Kleventh (Pole-Carew's) near IJloemfontein. l-'rench's cavalry division was also in the centre. As one descended the line toward the Cape one came on the Third Division (C'hermside's, late (iatacre's), which had now moved up to Reddersberg, and then, farther south, the I'-ighth (Rundle's), near Roux- ville. To the south and east was the other half of Hun- ter's division (Hart's brigade), and l>rabant's Colonial Division, half of which was shut up in Wepener and the rest at Alivval. These were the troops operating in the Free State, with the addition of the division of mounted infantry in process of formation. There remained the three divisions in Natal, the Sec- ond (Clery's), the Fourth (Lyttelton's), and the Fifth (Hildyard's, late Warren's), with the cavalry brigades of liurn-Murdoch, Dundonald, and Brocklehurst. These, with numerous militia and unbrigaded regiments along the lines of communication, formed the British army in South Africa. At Mafeking some nine hundred irregulars stood at bay, with another force about as large under Plumer a little to the north, endeavoring to relieve them. At ljeira,a Portuguese port through which we have treaty rights by which we may pass troops, a curious mixed force of Australians, New Zealanders, and others was be- ing disembarked and pushed through to Rhodesia, so as to cut off any trek which the lioers might make in that direction. Carrington, a fierce old soldier with a large experience of South African warfare, was in command of this picturesque force, which moved amid tropical forests over crocodile-haunted streams, while their comrades were \ ■.,) CLKAKING THK SOUTH FAST jjy shivt'riii^ in tlu; cold southerly winds of a Cape winter. Neither our (lovernnient, our people, nor the world un- derstood at the beginning of this campaign how grave was the task which we had undertaken, hut, having once realized it, it must l)e acknowledged that it was carried through in no half-hearted way. So vast was the scene of operations that the Canadian might almost find iiis na- tive climate at one end of it and the Queenslander at the other. To follow in close detail the movements of the lioers and the counterinovements of the Uritish in the south- east portion of the J-'ree State during this period would ta.v the industry of the historian and the patience of the reader. Let it be told with as much general truth and as little geographical detail as possible. The narrative which is interrupted by an eternal reference to the map is a narrative spoiled. The main force of the Free Staters had assembled in the northeastern corner of their State, and from this they made their sally southward, attacking or avoiding at their pleasure the eastern line of British outposts. Their first engagement, that of Sanna's Post, was a great and deserved success. Three days later they secured the five companies at Reddersberg, Warned in time, the other small British bodies closed in upon their supports, and the railway line, that nourishing artery which was neces- sary for the very existence of the army, was held too strongly for attack. The Bethulie Bridge was a particu- larly important point, but though the Boers approached it, and even went the length of announcing officially that they had destroyed it, it was not actually attacked. At VVepener, however, on the Basutoland border, they found an isolated force, and proceeded at once, according to their custom, to hem it in and to bombard it, until one of their three great allies, want of food, want of water, or want of cartridges, should compel a surrender. On this occasion, however, the Boers had undertaken a task which was beyond their strength. The troops at VVepener were one thousand seven hundred in number, 22 n \ i 33^ THK GRKAT BOKR WAR ' I ■Ml t i and formidable in quality. The place had been occupied by part of Brabant's Colonial Division, consisting of hardy irregulars, men of the stuff of the defenders of Mafeking. Such men are too shrewd to be herded into an untenable position and too valiant to surrender a ten- able one. 7'he force was commanded by a dashing sol- dier. Colonel Dalgety, of the Cape Mounted Rifles, as tough a fighter as his famous namesake. There were with him nearly a thousand men of Brabant's Horse, four hundred of the Cape Mounted Rifles, four hundred Kaf- frarian Horse, with some scouts, and one hundred regu- lars, including twenty invaluable sappers. They were strong in guns — two seven-pounders, two naval twelve- pounders, two fifteen-pounders, and several machine guns. The position which they had taken up, Jammersberg, three miles north of Wepener, was a very strong one, and it would have taken i\ larger force than De Wet had at his disposal to turn them out of it. The defence had been arranged by Major Cedric Maxwell, of the sappers, and though the huge perimeter, nearly eight miles, made its defence by so small a force a most difficult matter, the result proved how good his dispositions were. At the same time, the Boers came on with every con- fidence of victory, for they had a superiority in guns and an immense superiority in men. But after a day or two of fierce struggle their attack dwindled down into a mere blockade. On April gth they attacked furiously, both by day and by night, and on the loth the pressure was equally severe. In these two days occurred the vast ma- jority of the casualties. But the defenders took cover in a way to which British regulars have not yet attained, and they outshot their opponents both with their rifles and their cannon. Captain Lukin's management of the artillery was particularly skilful. The weather was vile and the hastily dug trenches turned into ditches half full of water, but neither discomfort nor danger shook the courage of the gallant Colonials. Assault after assault was repulsed, and the scourging of the cannon was met with stolid endurance. The Boers excelled all their pre- CLEARING THE SOUTHEAST .^39 upied ng of jrs of 1 into a ten- g sol- les, as ; were e, four d Kaf- i regu- y were :welve- e guns. y, three and it I at his id been irs, and [lade its Iter, the jry con- ins and or two a mere |both by re was ast ma- over in Ittained, |ir rifles of the ivas vile alf full lok the assault [vas met eir pre- vious feats in the handling of cannon i)y dragging two guns up to the sunnnit of the lofty Jammersberg, whence they fired down upon the camp. Nearly all the horses were killed and three hundred of the troopers were hit, a number which is double that of the official return, for the simple reason that the spirit of the force was so high that only those who were very severely wounded reported themselves as wounded at all. Only the serious cases ever reached the hands of Dr. h'askally, who did admira- ble work with very slender resources. How many the enemy lost can never be certainly known, but as they pushed home several attacks it is impossible to imagine that their losses were less than those of the victorious defenders. At the end of seventeen days of mud and blood the brave irregulars saw an empty laager and abandoned trenches. Their own resistance and the ad- vance of Brabant to their rescue had caused a hasty re- treat of the enemy. Wcpener, Mafeking. Kimberley, the taking of the first "guns at Ladysmith, the deeds of the Imperial Light Morse -it cannot be denied that our ir- regular South African forces have a brilliant record for the war. They are associated with many successes and with few disasters. Their fine record cannot, I think, be fairly ascribed to any greater hardihood which one por- tion of our race has when compared with another, for a South African must admit that in the best Colonial corps at least half the men were Britons of Britain, In tht im- perial Light Horse the proportion was very much higher. But what may fairly be argued is that their exploits have proved, what the American war proved long ago, that the German conception of discipline is an obsolete fetish, and that the spirit of free men, whose individualism has been encouraged rather than crushed, is equal to any feat of arms. The clerks and miners and engineers who went up Elandslaagte Hill without bayonets, shoulder to shoulder with the Gordons, and who, according to Sir George White, saved Ladysmith upon January 6th, have shown forever that with men of our race it is the spirit within, and not the drill or the discipline, that makes a 1/ ^ 340 THE GRKAT BOER WAR :> i i'(l formidable soldier. An intelligent appreciation of the fact might in the course of the next few years save us as much money as would go far to pay for the war. It may well be asked how for so long a period as sev- enteen days the British could tolerate a force to the rear of them whe" with their great superiority of numbers they could have readily sent an army to drive it away. The answer must be that Lord Roberts had despatched his trusty lieutenant, Kitchener, to Aliwal, whence he had been in heliographic communication with Wepener, that he was sure that the place could hold out, and that he was using it, as he did Kimberley, to hold the enemy while he was making his plans for their destruction. This was the bait to tempt them to their ruin. Had the trap not been a little slow in closing, the war in the Free Stale might have ended then and there. From the glh to the 25th the Uoers were held in front of Wepener. Let us trace the movements of the other British detachments during that time. IJrabant's force, with Hart's brigade, which had been diverted on its way to Kimberley, where it was to form part of Hunter's division, was moving on the south toward Wepener, advancing through Rouxville, but going slowly for fear of scaring the Boers away before they were sufficiently compromised. Chermside's third divi- sion approaciied from the northwest, moving out from the railway at Bethany, and passing through Reddersberg toward Deweisdorp, from which it would directly threaten the Boer line of retreat. The movement was made with reassuring slowness and gentleness, as when the curved hand approaches the unconscious fly. And then sudden- ly, upon April 21st, Lord Roberts let everything go. Had the action of the agents been as swift and as ener- getic as the mind of the planner, De Wet could not have escaped us. What held Lord Roberts's hand for some few days after he was ready to strike was the abominable weather. Rain was falling in sheets, and those who know South African roads, South African mud, and South African drifts will ;(l^ of the e us as as sev- the rear lumbers it away, ipatched ence he ^^epener, and that e enemy truction. Had the the Free the gth ner. Let achments had been s to form ^he south Dut going ore they rd divi- from the dersberg threaten ade with tie curved sudden- thing go. as ener- not have lays after r. Rain li African Irifts will CLEARING THK SOUTHEAST u^ understand how impossible swift military movements are under those circumstances. Jiut with the first clearing of the clouds the hills to the south and east of Bloemfon- tein were dotted with our scouts. Rundle with his Kightii Division was brought swiftly up from the soutli, united with Chermside to the east of Reddersberg, and tiie whole force, numbering thirteen thousand rilles with thirty guns, advanced upon Dewetsdorp, Rundle, as senior officer, be- ing in command. As they marched the blue hills of VVcpener lined the sky some twenty miles to the south, eloquent to every man of the aim and object of their march. On April 20th, Rundle as he advanced found a force with artillery across his path to Uewetsdorp. It is always di.^cult to calculate the number of hidden men and lurk- ing guns which go to make up a lioer army, but with some knowledge of their total at Wepener it was certain that the force opposed to him must be very inferior to his own. At Constantia Farm, where he found them in po- sition, it is difficult to imagine that there were more than three thousand men. Their left Hank was their weak point, as a movement on that side would cut them off from Wepener and drive them up toward our main force in the north. One would have thought that a containing force of three thousand men, and a Hanking movement from eight thousand, would have turned them out, as it has turned them out so often before and since. Yet a long range action began on Friday, April 20th, and lasted the whole of the 21st, the 22d, and the 23d, in which we sustained few losses, but made no impression upon the enemy. Thirty of the First Worcesters wandered at night into the wrong lines and were made prisoners, but with this exception the four days of noisy fighting do not appear to have cost either side fifty casualties. It is probable that the lethargy with which the operations were conducted was due to Rundle's instructions to wait until the other forces were in position. His subsequent move- ments showed that he was not a general who feared to strike. J 104 342 THK GRKAT BOFR WAR ^ * 1^ On Sunday night (April 22d) Pole-Carew sallied out from Hloemfontein on a line which would take him round the right flank of the Boers wiio were facing Rundle. The Boers had, however, occupied a strong position at Leeuw Kop, which barred his path, so that the liewets- dorp Boers were covering the Wcpener Boers, and being in turn covered by the Boers of Leeuw Kop. Before any- thing could be done, ihey must be swept out of the way. Pole-Carew, who is one of those finds which help to com- pensate us for the war, acted with energy and discretion. His cavalry threatened the Hanks of the enemy, and Ste- phenson's brigade carried the position in front at a small cost. On the same evening (ieneral I'rench arrived and took over the force, which consisted now of Stephenson's and the Gua^'ds brigades (making up the Eleventh Divi- sion), with two brigades of cavalry and one corps of mounted infantry. The next day, the 23d, the advance was resumed, the cavalry bearing the brunt of the fight- ing. That gallant corps, Roberts's Horse, whose behav- ior at Sauna's Post had been admirable, again distin- guished itself, losing among others its colonel. Brazier Creagh. On the 24th again it was to the horsemen that the honor and the casualties fell. The Ninth Lancers, the regular cavalry regiment which bears away the honors of the war, lost several men and officers, and the Eighth Hussars also suffered, but the Boers were driven from their position, and lost more heavily in this skirmish than in some of the larger battles of the campaign. The " pom-poms," which had been supplied to us by the be- lated energy of the Ordnance Department, were used with some effect in this engagement, and the Boers learned for the first time how unnerving are those noisy but not par- ticularly deadly fireworks which they had so often crack- led round the ears of our gunners. On the Wednesday morning Rundle, with the addition of Pole-Carew's division, was strong enough for any attack, while French was in a position upon the flank. Every requisite for a great victory was there except the presence of an enemy. The Wepener siege had been I CIJ.ARING THK SOUTHI.AST u.? ied out 1 round bundle, ition at iJewets- :1 being ore any- he way. to com- cretion. md Ste- a small ved and lenson's th Divi- corps of advance ;he fight- le behav- 1 distin- , Brazier men that Lancers, |e honors le Eighth en from kirmish n. The the be- sed with rned for not par- n crack- laddition for any i\e flank. :ept the id been raised and the force in front of Rundle had disappeared as only Jioer armies can disappear. The combined move- ment was :in admirable piece of work on the part of the enemy. Finding no force in front of them, the combined troops oi French, Kundle, and Chermside occupied Dew- etsdorp, where the latter remained, while the others pushed on to Thabanchu, the storm centre from which all our troubles had begun nearly a month before. All the way they knew that I)e Wet's retreating army was just in front of them, and they knew also that a force had been sent out from Hloemfonttnn to Thabanchu to head off the JJoers. Lord Roberts might naturally suppose, when he had formed two cordons through which I)e \Vet must pass, that one or other must hold him. Dut with extraordinary skill and mobility, I)e Wet, aided by the fact that every inhabitant was a member of his intelligence department, slipped through the double net which had been laid for him. The first net was not in its place in time, and the second was too small to hold him. While Rundle and French had advanced on Dewets- dorp as described, the other force which was intended to head off De Wet had gone direct to Thabanchu. The advance begr.n by a movement of Ian Hamilton upon April 2 2d with eight hundred mounted infantry upon the waterworks. The enemy, who held the hills beyond, allowed Hamilton's force to come right down to the Mod- der before they opened fire from three guns. The movmted infantry fell back, and encamped for the niglit out of range.' Before morning they were reinforced by Smith- Dorrien's brigade (Gordons, Canadians, and Shropshires — the Cornwalls had been left behind) and some more mounted infantry. With daylight r. ;.i.e advance was begun, the brigade moving up in very extended order and the mounted men turning the right Hank of the defence. JJy evening we had regained the waterworks, a most im- ' This was a remarkable exhibition of the harmlcssness of shell-fire ajjainst troops in open formation. 1 myself saw at least forty shells, all of which burst, fall amon^ the ranks of the mounted infantry, who retired at a contemptuous walk. There were no casualties. — A. C. D, u. f I 'i 344 THE GREAT BOER WAR • ) ilf, I portant point for 15' infontein, and we held all the line of hills which comm nd it. This strong position would not have been gained so easily if it had not been for Tole- Carew's and French's actions two days before, on their way to join Rundle, which enabled them to turn it from the south. Next morning Ian Hamilton's force was reinforced by the Highland brigade, tiie Corn walls, and two heavy naval guns, bringing his whole strength up to seven or — eight thousand men. With thes e, having left a garrison y^ . jj, . ^ at the waterworks, he continued his advance over the ^i^W"*^ '^ rTiill country which lies between them and Thabanchu. AA>vtvyx/' rni^^ One position, Israel Poort, a nek between two hills, . ^kjj^^JJaIa**^.'^ was held against them on April 25th, but was gained /1i- ii ou/'/V''/( • without much trouble, the Canadians losing one killed ^^^ Atfiw "^ and ,i,^a wounded. Colonel Otter, their gallant leader, was one of the latter, while Marshall's Horse, a Colonial corps raised in Grahamslown, had no less than seven of their officers and several men killed or wounded. Next morning the town of Thabanchu was seized and Hamil- ton found himself u^ on the direct line of the IJoer re- treat. He seized the pass which commands the road, and all next day he waited eagerly, and the hearts of his men beat high when at last they saw a long trail of dust wind- ing up to them from the south. x\t last the wily De Wet had been headed off! Deep and earnest were the curses when out of the dust there emerged a khaki column of horsemen, and it wis realized that this was French's pur- suing force, closely followed by Rundle's infantry from Dewetsdorp, The Boers had slipped round and were already to the north of us. It is impossible to withhold our admiration for the way in which the Boer force was manct-uvred throughout this portion of the campaign. The mixture of circum- spection and audacity, the way in which French and Rundle were hindered until the Wepener force had dis- engaged itself, the manner in which these covering forces were then withdrawn, and finally the clever way in which they all slipped past Hamilton, make a brilliant bit of I ) t CLKARING TMK SOUTHI'.ASI^ J45 2 line Aould Tole- their , from :ed by heavy 'cn or irison er the hu. ) hills, [;;aine(i killed leader, alonial ven of Next Haniil- oer re- d, and s men wind- e Wet curses min of s pur- y from were or the nghout ircum- h and d dis- torces which bit of L° 0^1 strategy." Louis Jiotha, the generalissimo, held all the strings in his hand, and the way in which he pulled them showed that his countrymen had chosen the right man for thai liigh office, and that his was a master sjjirit even auKMig those fine natural warriors who led the separate commandoes. Having got to the north of the British forces, IJotha made no effort to get away, biU turned at bay on the first good position which he could find. This was lloutnek, to the nortiivvest of Thalianchu, on the Winhurg road. Out of this he was driven in a two days' action by Ham- ilton, Smith- Horrien's brigade working its way up the hillside, sleeping that night on the summit, and clearing next morning the ridge beyond. On May ist the position had been carried by the gallantry of the (iordons, the Canadians, and the Shroj^shires : the IJocrs escaping down the reverse slope of the hill came under a heavy fire of our infantry, and fifty of them were wounded or taken. It was in tliis action, during the fighting on the hill, that Captain Towse, of the Gcjrdons, though siiot through the eyes and totally blind, encouraged his men to charge througn a group of the enemy who had gathered round them. After this victory Hamilton's men, who had fought for seven days out of ten, halted for a rest at Jacobsrust, where they were joined l)y IJroadwood's cav- , . airy and JJnjceJjamiltpiVs infantjxjjn^^nde. With this a£^W<.«^t1«Ji '-(^flLi force in constant touch witiniotlia's reaT-guarcT, Ian Ham'i.w*^ Pj'^^o/^. ' ilton pushed on once more upon May 4th. On May 5 di -^'iw)!^ A**^*^u ^^ /jf he fought a brisk cavalry skirmish, in which Kitchener's w^vtU ♦ ^^ * i. Horse and the Twelfth Lancers distinguished them-t^AwVv^**^,*^ selves, and on the same day he took possession of Win- Ca/^^ ^t^^^jj^^^ burg, thus covering the right of Lord Roberts's gi'^'^t ^f^'*''^'^>^^/i!u advance. \xri*»-*^ '-^ the Free State w^as at the time of this, the final advance wnMu- of the main army, as follows: Ian Hamilton witii his mounted infantry, Smith-Dorrien's brigade, Macdonald's brigade, Bruce Hamilton's brigade, and liroadwood's cavalry were at Winb^rg. Rundle was at Thabanchu, ti . Hi }1 346 TT K GRKAT BOKR WAR .111(1 Brabant's Colon'al Division was moving irp to tlie same point. Chermside was at Dewetsdorp, and had de- tached a force under Lord Castletown to garrison Wepen- er. Hart occupied Smithfield, whence he and his brigade were shortly to be transferred to the Kimberley force. Altogether there could not have been less than thirty thousand men engaged in clearing and holding down this part of the country. French's cavalry and Pole- Carew's division had returned to take part in the central advance. liefore entering upon a description of that great and decisive movement, one small action calls for commeni. This was the cutting off of twenty men of Lumsden's Horse in a reconnoissance .it Karee. The small post under Lieutenant Crane found themselves by some mis- understanding isolated in the midst of the enemy. Re- fusing to hoist the flag of shame, they fought their way out, losing half their number, while of the other half it is said that there was not one who could not show bullet marks upon his clothes or person. The men of this corps, volunteer Anglo-Indians, had abandoned the ease and even luxury of Eastern life, for the hard fare and rough fighting of this most trying campaign. In coming they had set the whole Empire an object lesson in spirit, and now on their first field they set the army an example of military virtue. The proud traditions of Outram's Vol- unteers have been upheld by the men of Lumsden's Horse. This phase of the war was marked by a certain change in the temper of the British. Nothing could have been milder than the original intentions and proclamations of Lord Roberts, and he was most ably seconded in his attempts at conciliation by General Pretyman, who had been made civil administrator of the State. There was evidence, however, that this kindness had been construed as weakness by some of the burghers, and during the Boer incursion to VVepener many who had surrendered a worthless firearm reappeared with the Mauser which had been concealed in some crafty hiding place. Troops were CLP:ARING IHK SOUTIIKAST 347 e was trued 5 the red a 1 had were fired at from farmhouses which flew the white flag, and the good liousewife remained behind to charge the " rooi- nek " extortionate prices for milk and fodder while her husband shot at him from the hills. It was felt that the burghers might have peace or might have war, but could not have both simultaneously. Some examples were made therefore of offending farmhouses, and stock was confiscated where there was evidence of double dealing upon the part of the owner. In a country where property is a more serious thing than life, these measures, together with stringent rules about the possession of horses and arn)^, did much to stamp out the chances of an insurrec- tion in our rear. The worst sort of peace is an enforced peace, but if that can be established time and justice may do the rest. The operations which have been here described may be finally summed up in one short paragraph. A IJoer army came south of the British line and besieged a lirit- ish garrison. Three British forces, those of French, Rundle, and Ian Hamilton, were despatched to cut it off. It successfully threaded its way among them and escaped. It was followed to the northward as far as the town of Winburg, which remained in the British possession. Lord Roberts had failed in his plan of cutting off De Wet's army, but, at the expense of many marches and skir- mishes, the southeast of the State was cleared of the enemy. It ,\ I Chapter T'wenty-J'our THK SIKGK OK MAKKKING This small place, which sprang in the course of a few weeks from obscurity to fame, is situated upon the long line of railway which connects Kimberley in the south with Rhodesia in the north. In character it resembles one of those western American townlets which possess small present assets but immense aspirations. In its litter of corrugated iron roofs, and in the church and the race course, which are the first fruits everywhere of Anglo-Celtic civilization, one sees the seeds of the great city of the future. It is the obvious depot for the west- ern Transvaal upon one side, and the starting point for all attempts upon the Kalahari Desert upon the other, The Transvaal border runs within a few miles. It is not clear why the Imperial authorities should de- sire to hold this place, since it has no natural advantages to help the defence, but lies exposed in a widespread plain. A glance at the map must show that the railway line would surely be cut both to the north and south of the town, and the garrison isolated at a point some two hundred and fifty miles from any reinforcements. Con- sidering that the Boers could throw any strength of men or guns against the place, it seemed certain that if they seriously desired to take possession of it they could do so. Under ordinary circumstances any force shut up there was doomed to capture. But what may have seemed short-sighted policy became the highest wisdom owing to the extraordinary tenacity and resource of Kaden- Powell, the officer in command. Through his exertions the town acted as a bait to the Boers, and occupied a considerable force in a useless siege at a time when their I'm: SII.GK OV MAFI'.KING U9 up led "g en- )ns :1 a eir prt'senrc at other seats of war mi«j;ht have proved dis- aslroi..; to the lliitish cause. Colont'l Haden Powell is a soldier of a type which is exceedingly popular with the British i)ubli(.. A skilled hunter and an expert at many p;ames, there was always sf)nielhin^ y;A Photographic Sciences Corporation iV fv •% •^ Wis^^ ^ \ '^^'-^ ^^2i"'^^ P..» 23 WEST MAIN STREET WCBSTER.N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 ^^o- -^. ri^ &? 6^ ir < V 1 1 ^ 3 so THK GRKAT BOER WAR Weil, a \vcll-kno\vn South African contractor, who had shown great enerj^y in provisioning the town. On the other hand, the South African Government displayed the same stupidity or treason which had been exhibited in the case of Kimberley, and had met all demands for guns and reinforcemer ts with foolish doubts as to the need of such precautions. In the endeavor to supply these press- ing wants the first small disaster of the campaign was encountered. On October 12th, the day after the declara- tion of war, an armored train conveying two seven-pound- ers for the Mafeking defences was derailed and captured by a Jioer raiding party at Kraaipan, a place forty miles south of their destination. The enemy shelled the shat- tered train until after five hours Captain Nesbitt, who was in command, and his men, some twenty in number, surrendered. It was a small affair, but it derived im- portance from being the first blood shed and the first tactical success of the war. The garrison of the town, whose fame will certainly live in the history of South Africa, contained no regular soldiers at all with the exception of the small group of excellent officers. They consisted of irregular troops, three hundred and forty of the Protectorate Regiment, one hundred and seventy police, and two hundred volun- teers, made up of that singular mixture of adventurers, younger sons, broken gentlemen, and irresponsible sports- men who have always been the voortrekkers of the British Empire. These men were of the same stamp as those other admirable bodies of natural fighters who did so well in Rhodesia, in Natal, and in the Cape. With them there was associated in the defence the Town Guard, who included the able-bodied shopkeepers, business men, and residents, the whole amounting to about nine hundred men. Their artillery was feeble in the extreme, two seven- pounder toy guns and six machine guns, but the spirit of the men and the resource of their leaders made up for every disadvantage. Colonel Vyvyan and Major Panzera planned the defences, and the little trading town soon began to take on the appearance of a fortress. THK SII:GK of MAFKKING 351 On October 13th the Boers appeared before Mafeking, On the same day Colonel Jiaden-rowell sent two truck loads of dynamite out of the place. They were fired into by the invaders, a\ ith the result that they exploded. On October 14th the pickets around the town were driven in by the Boers. On this the armored train and a squadron of the Protectorate Regiment went out to support the pickets and drove the Jloers before them, A body of the latter doubled back and interposed between the J^)ritish and iMafeking, but two fresh troops with a seven -pounder throwing shrapnel drove them off. In this spirited little action the garrison lost two killed and fourteen wounded, but they inHicted considerable damage on the enemy. To Captain Williams, Captain FitzClarence, and Lord Charles IkMitinck great credit is due for the way in which they handled their men; but the whole affair was ill ad- vised, for if a disaster had occurred Mr-^jking must have fallen, being left without a garrison. No possible results which could come from such a sortie could justify the risk which was run. On October i6th the siege began in earnest. On that date the lioers brought up two twelve-pounder guns, and the first of that interminable flight of shells fell into the town. The enemy got possession of the water supply, but the garrison had already dug out wells. Before Oc- tober 20th five thousand Boers, under the formidable Cronje, had gathered round the town. " Surrender to avoid bloodshed," was his niessage. " When is the bloodshed going to begin ? " asked Powell. When the Boers had been shelling the town for some weeks the light-hearted Colonel sent out to say that if they went on any long'^T he should be compelled to regard it as equiva- lent to a declaration of war. It is to be hoped that Cronje also possessed some sense of humor, or else he must have been as sorely puzzled by his eccentric op- ponent as the Spanish generals were by the vagaries of Lord Peterborough. Among the many diflficulties which had to be met by the defenders of the town the most serious was the fact fS" il, k V h i . '':n 3S^- THE GREAT BOER WAR that the position had a circumference of five or six miles to be held by twelve hundred men against a force who at their own time and their own place could at any moment attempt to gain a footing. An ingenious system of small forts was devised to meet the situation. Kach of these held from ten to forty riflemen, and was furnished with bomb-proofs and covered uays. The cen- tral bomb-proof was connected by telephone with all the outlying ones, so as to save the use of orderlies. A system of bells was arranged by which each quarter of the town \vas warned when a shell was coming in time to enable the inhabitants to scuttle off to shelter. Every detail showed the ingenuity of the controlling mind. The armored train, painted green and tied round with scrub, stood unperceived among the clumps of bushes which surrounded the town. On October 24th a savage bombardment commenced, which lasted with intermissions for five months. The l>oers had brought an enormous gun across from Pretoria, throwing a ninety-four-pound shell, and this, with many smaller pieces, played upon the town. The result was as futile as our own artillery fire has so often been when directed against the Boers. As the Mafeking guns were too weak to answer the enemy's fire, the only possible reply lay in a sortie, and upon this Colonel Powell decided. It was carried out with great gallantry upon the evening of October 27th, when about n. '-undred men under Captain FitzClarence moved out against the Boer trenches with instructions to use the bayonet only. The position was carried with a rush, and many of the Boers bayoneted before they could disengage themselves from the tarpaulins which covered them. The trenches behind fired wildly in the darkness, and it is probable that as many of their own men as of ours were hit by their rifle fire. The total loss in this gallant affair was six killed, eleven wounded, and two prisoners. The loss of the enemy, though shrouded as usual in darkness, was certainly very much higher. On October 31st the Boers ventured upon an attack s the and out :7th, ;nce IS to a )uld ;red less, of Ithis two as tack THE SIEGE OF MAFEKING 353 on Cannon Kopje, which is a small fort and eminence to the south of the town. It was defended by Colonel Wal- ford,of the IJritish South African Police, with fifty-seven of his men and three small guns. The attack was re- pelled with heavy loss to the Hoers. The Lritish casual- ties were six killed and five wounded. Their experience in this attaci' seems to have deter- mined the IJoers to make no furtner expensive attempts to rush the town, and for some weeks the siege degener- ated into a blockade. Cronje had been recalled for more important work, and Commandant Snyman had taken over the uncompleted task. From time to time the great gun tossed its huge shells into the town, but boardwood v/alls and corrugated iron roofs minimize the dangers of a bombardment. On November 3d the garrison rushed the brickfields, which had been held by the enemy's sharpshooters, and on the 7th another small sally kept the game going. On the i8th Powell sent a message to Snyman that he could not take the town by sitting and looking at it. At the same time he despatched a mes- sage to the P)Oer forces generally, advising them to return to their homes and their families. Some of the com- mandoes had gone south to assist Cror.'je in his stand against Methuen, and the siege languished more and more, until it was woken up by a desperate sortie upon December 26th, which caused the greatest loss which the garrison had sustained. Once more the lesson was to be enforced that with modern weapons and equality of forces it is always long odds on the defence. On this date a vigorous attack was made upon one of the Boer forts on the north. There seems to be little doubt that the enemy had some inkling of our intention, as the fort was found to have been so strengthened as to be impregnable without scaling ladders. The attacking force consisted of two squaarons of the Protectorate Regiment and one of the Bechuanaland Rifles, backed up by three guns. So desperate was the onslaught that of the actual attacking party— a forlorn hope, if ever there was one — fifty-three out of eighty were killed and 2Z i I ^1 ' ) hi\ t } I r|. 354 THE GREAT BOER WAR wounded, twenty-five of the former and twenty-eight of the latter. Several of that gallant band of officers who had been the soul of the defence were among the in- jured. Captain FitzClarence was wounded, Vernon, Sandford, and Paton were killed, all at the very muzzles of the enemy's guns. It must have been one of the bit- terest moments of Baden-l^owell's life when he shut his field glass and said, "Let the ambulance go out! " Even this heavy blow did not damp the spirits nor diminish the energies of the defence, though it must have warned Baden-Powell that he could not afford to drain his small force by any more expensive attempts at the offensive, and that from then onward he must content himself by holding grimly on until Plumer from the north or Methuen from the south should at last be able to stretch out to him a helping hand. Vigilant and in- domitable, throwing away no possible point in the game which he was playing, the new year found him and his hardy garrison sternly determined to keep the flag flying. January and February offer in their records that monotony of excitement which is the fate of every be- sieged town. On one day the shelling was a little more, on another a little less. Sometimes they escaped scathe- less, sometimes the garrison found itself the poorer by the loss of Captain Girdwood or Trooper Webb or some other gallant soldier. Occasionally they had their little triumph when a too curious Dutchman, peering for an instant from his cover to see the effect of his shot, was carried back in the ambulance to the laager. On Sun- day a truce was usually observed, and the snipers who had exchanged rifle-shots all the week met occasionally on that day with good-humored chaff. Snyman, the Boer general, showed none of that chivalry at Mafeking which distinguished the gallant old Joubert at Ladysmith. Not only was there no neutral camp for women or sick, but it is beyond all doubt or question that the Boer guns were deliberately turned upon the women's quarters in- side Mafeking in order to bring pressure upon the in- habitants. Many women and children were sacrificed THK SI'^GE OF MAFEKING 355 :1 his ying. that ■y be- fore, athe- r by some ittle or an was Sun- who nally Boer 'hich Not ,but guns s in- i in- ficed to this brutal policy, which must in fairness be set to the account of the savage leader, and not of been bor- rowed from the /aiIus. The solid centre coula hold any force which facvid it, while the mobile flanks, Hutton upon the left and Hamilton upon the right, could lap round and pin it, as Cronje was pinned at Paardeberg. It seems admirably simple when done upon a small scale. But when die scale is one of forty miles, since your front must be broad enough to envelo^; the front which is op- posed to it, and when the scattered wings have to be fed with no railway line to help, it takes such a master of administrative detail as Lord Kitchener to bring the operations to complete success. On May 3d, the day of the advance from our most northern post, Karee, the disposition of Lord Roberts's army was briefly as follows: On his left was Hutton, with his mixed force of mounted infantry drawn from every quarter of the Empire. This formidable and mo- bile body, with some batteries of horse artillery and of pom-poms, kept a line some miles to the west of the rail- road, moving northward parallel with it. Roberts's main column kept on the railroad, which was mended with extraordinary speed by the Railway Pioneer regi- ment and the Engineers, under Girouard and the ill-fated Seymour. It was amazing to note the shattered culverts as one passed, and yet to be overtaken by trains within a day. This main column consisted of Pole-Carew's Elev- enth Division, which contained the Guards, and Stephen- son's Brigade (Warwicks, Essex, Welsh, and Yorkshires). With them were the Eighty-third, Eighty-fourth, and Eighty-fifth R. F. A., with the heavy guns, and a small force of mounted infantry. Passing along the widespread British line one would then, after an interval of seven or IHK M^ARCH ON PRKTORIA 367 ei^lit miles, come upon Tucker's Division (the Seventh) whicii consisted of Maxwell's (formerly Chermsicle's) Urigade (the Norfolks, Lincolns, Hamj)shires, and Scot- tish Jiorderers), and Wavell's JJrigade (North Staffords, Cheshires, Kast Lancashircs, South Wales Horderers)' To the right of these was Ridley's mounted infantry.' JJeyond these, extending over very many miles of country and with considerable spaces between, there came {road- wood's cavalry, J'.ruce Hamilton's J5rigade (l)erbyshires Sussex, Camerons, and C. I. V.), and finally on the extreme right of all Ian Hamilton's force of HjgiiJand- ers, Canadians, Shropshires, and Cornwalls, with cavalry and mounted infantry, starting forty miles from Lord Roberts, but edging westward all the way, with Winb* as a first objective. This was the army, between foin and fifty thousand strong, with which Lord Roberts ad vanced upon the Transvaal. In the mean time he had anticipated that his mobile and enterprising opponents would work round and strike at our rear. Ample means had been provided for deal- ing with any attempt of the kind. Rundle with the Kighth Division and J^rabant's Colonial Division re- mained in rear of the right Hank to head off any force which might turn it. At Bloemfontein were Kelly-Ken- ny's division (the Sixth) and Clements's (the Third), with a force of cavalry and guns. Methuen, working 'from Kimberley toward JJoshof, formed the extreme left wing of the main advance, though distant a hundred miles from It. With excellent jidgment Lord Roberts saw that It was on our right Hank :hat danger was to be feared and here it was that every precaution had been taken to meet it. The objective of the first day's march was the little town of Brandfort, ten miles north of Karee. The head of the main column faced it, while the left arm swept round and drove the Boer force from their position. Tucker's division upon the right encountered some op- position, but overbore it with artillery. May 4th was a day of rest for the infantry, but on the 5th they advanced, ^5^yjA«vv% i \ li r I u./ 368 THE GREAT BOER WAR in the same order as before, for twenty miles, and found ' r ' V o I themselves to the south of the Vet River, where the ene- y^jj^fJiXMvJ^-^^J^J^ I jy^y j^.^(j prepared for an energetic resistance. A vigorous \w«A oo.e>^5 iW artillery duel ensued, the British guns in the open as usual against an invisible enemy. After three hours of a very hot fire the mounted infantry got across the river upon the left and turned the Boer flank, on which they hastily withdrew. The rushing of a kopje by twenty-three West Australians was one gallant incident which marked this engagement, in which our losses v/ere insignificant. A Maxim and twenty or thirty prisoners were taken by Hutton's men. The next day (May 6th) the army moved across the difficult drift of the Vet River, and halted that night at Smaldeel, some five miles to the north of it. At the same time Ian Hamilton had been able to advance to Winbfrg, so that the army had contracted its front by about half, but had preserved its relative positions. Hamilton, after his junction with his reinforcements at Jacobsrust, had under him no less than twelve thousand men and thirty-tv;o guns, with which he overbore all resistance. He had fought a skirmish before entering Winbfrg in which the German cammando with the Boers had been roughly treated. The informal warfare which was made upon us by citizens of many nations without rebuke from their own governments is a matter of which pride, and possibly policy, have forbidden us to com- plain, but it will be surprising if it does not prove that their laxity has established a very dangerous precedent, and they will find it difficult to object when, in the next little war in which either France or Germany is engaged, they find a few hundred British adventurers carrying a rifle against them. The record of the army's advance is now rather geo- graphical than military, for it rolled northward with never a check save that which was caused by the con- struction of the railway, diversions which atoned for the destruction of the larger bridges. The infantry now, as always in the campaign, marched admirably, for though twenty miles in the day may seem a moderate allowance y THE MARCH ON PRETORIA 369 to a healthy man upon an English roar', it is a consider- able performance under an African sun with a weight of between thirty and forty pounds to be carried. The good humor of the men was admirable, and thviy eagerly longed to close with the elusive enemy who flitted ever in front of them. Huge clouds of smoke veiled the northern sky, for the Boers had set fire to the dry grass, partly to cover their own retreat, and partly to show up our khaki upon the blackened surface. Far on the flanks the twinkling heliographs revealed the position of the widespread wings. On May loth Lord Roberts's force, which had halted for three days at Smaldeel, moved onward to VVelgele- ,y \, . gen. French's cavalry had come up by road, and quickly! */*^^'^****'*^!^* strengthened the centre and left wing of th i army. Upon) '">'*^ ^ ^*^ V the morning of the i oth the invaders found themselves con-/«> cUcm** (^^''^ fronted by a formidable position which the Boers had taken^ff^^X*• n.*J], up on the northern bank of the Sand River. Their army '-A/iW^vyR.'C^ extended over twenty miles of country, the two Bothas were in command, and everything pointed to a pitched battle. Had the position been rushed from the front there was every material for a second Colenso. but we had learned that it was by brains rather than by blood that such battles may be won. French's cavalry turned them on one side, and Bruce Hamilton's infantry on the other. There was never any real fighting, but rather a steady advance upon the British side and a steady retirement upon that of the Boers. On the left the Sussex regiment distinguished itself by the dash with which it stormed an important kopje. The losses were slight, save among a detached body of cavalry which found itself suddenly cut off by a strong force of the enemy and lost Captain Elworthy killed, and Haig of the Inniskillings, Wilkinson of the Australian Horse, and twenty men prisoners. We also secured forty or fifty prisoners, and the enemy's casualties amounted to about as many more. The war in its later phases certainly has the pleasing characteristic of being the nost bloodless, considering the number of men engaged and the amount of powder 34 It 370 THE GRKAT BOKR WAR ;i u, iv ^ ^roiDA^A burned, that has been known in history. It was at the expense of their boots and not of their lives tiiat tiie in- fantry won their way. On May iith I^ord Roberts's army .idvanced twenty miles to Geneva Siding, and every preparation was made for a battle next day, as it was thought certain that the Boers would defend their new capital, Kroonstadl. It proved, however, that even here they would not make a stand, and on May 12th, at one o'clock. Lord Roberts rode into the town. Steyn, Botha, and Do W^et escaped, and it was announced that the village of Lindley iiad become the new seat of government. The JJritish had now accomplished half their journey to Pretoria, and it was obvious that on the south side of the Vaal no serious resistance awaited them, liurghers were freely surren- dering themselves with their arms, and returning to their farms. In the southeast Rundleand Brabant were slowly advancing while the Boers who faced them fell back toward Lindley. On the west. Hunter had crossed the Vaal at VVindsorton and Barton's Fusilier Jirigade had fought a sharp action at Ru^dam, while Mahon's Mafe- king relief column had slipped past their Hank, escaping the observation of the British pviblic but certainly not that of the Boers. Our losses in the Raidam action were five killed and twenty-six wounded, buc the liocr losses were for once considerably more than our own. The yeomanry had an opportunity of showing once more that there are few more high-mettled troops in South Africa than these good sportsmen of the shires, who showed only a trace of their origin in their irresistible inclina- tion to burst into a "tally-ho! " when ordered to attack. The Boer forces fell back after the action along the line of the Vaal, making for Christiana and Bloemhof. Hunter entered into the Transvaal in pursuit of them, being the first to cross the border, with the exception of raiding Rhodesians early in the war. Methuen, in the mean while, was following a course parallel to Hunter but south of him, Hoopstad being his immediate objec- tive. The little Union Jacks which were stuck in the i,i'i THK MARCH ON PKl.TOklA jyi war maps in so many JJritish liouseholds were now njov- ing swiftly upward. Huller's forc:c was also sweeping northward, and the time had come when the J.adysmith garrison, restored at last to health and strength, should have a chance of striking back at those who had tormented them so long. Many of the best troops had l)een drafted away to other portions of the seat of war. Hart's IJrigade and ]Jarton's Fusilier JJrigade had gone with Hunter to form the Tenth Division upon the Kimberley sitle, and the Imperial Light Ilorse had been brought over for the relief of Mafekin<^ There remained, however, a formidable force, the regiments in which had been strengthened by the addition of drafts and volunteers from home. Not less than twenty thousand sal)res and bayonets were ready and eager for the passage of the Diggarsberg mountains. This line of rugged hills is pierced by only three passes, each of which was held in strength by the enemy. Considerable losses must have ensued from any direct attempt to force them. ]}uller, however, with excellent judgment, demonstrated in front of them with Hildyard's men, while the rest of the army, marching round, out- flanked the line of resistance, and on May 15th pounced upon Dundee. Much had happened since that October day when Penn Symons led his three gallant regiments up Talana Hill, but now at last, after seven weary months, the ground was reoccupied which he had gained. His old soldiers visited his grave, and the national flag was raised over the remains of as gallant a man as ever died for the sake of it. The Boers, whose force did not exceed a few thousands, were now rolled swiftly back through northern Natal into their own country. The long strain at Ladysmith had told upon them, and the men whom we had to meet were very different from the warriors of Spion Kop and Nichol- son's Nek. They had done magnificently, but there is a limit to human endurance, and no longer would these peasants face the bursting lyddite and the bayonets of angry soldiers. There is little enough for us to boast of 37'i THE gri:a'i bokk war ll '\ in this. Sonic pride niij^lit i)i' taken in the campaign when at a clisacivanta«^e we were facing superior num- bers, but now we couhl but deplore the situation in which these poor valiant burghers found themselves the victims of a rotten Government and of their own delusions. Hofer's 'J'yrolese, Charette's Vendeans, or JJruce's Scotch- men never fought a finer fight than these children of the veldt, but in each case they combated a real and not an imaginary tyrant. It is heart-sickening to think of the butchery, the misery, the irreparable losses, the blood of men and the bitter tears of women, all of which might have been spared had one obstinate and ignorant man been persuaded to allow the state which he ruled to con- form to the customs of every other civilized state upon the earth. Jjuller was now moving with a rapidity and decision which contrast pleasantly with some of his earlier oper- ations. Criticism is an unpleasant but a stimulating experience, and it really seemed as if the plain comments of Lord Roberts had infused new energy into his col- league. Although Dundee was only occupied upon May 15th, on May i8th his vanguard was in Newcastle, fifty miles to the north. In nine days the army had covered one hundred and thirty-eight miles. On the 19th the army lay under the loom of that Majuba which had cast its sinister shadow for so long over South African poli- tics. In front was the historical Laing's Nek, the pass which leads from Natal into the Transvaal, while through it runs the famous railway tunnel. Here the Boers had taken up that position which had proved nineteen years before to be too strong for British troops. The Roineks had come back after many days to try again. A halt was called, for the ten days' supplies which had been taken with the troops had been exhausted, and it was necessary to wait until the railway should be repaired. This gave time for Hildyard's Fifth Division and Lyt- telton's Fourth Division to close up on Clery's Second Division, which with Dundonald's cavalry had formed 'r>ur vanguard throughout. Our only losses of any conse- 1. --*■ OKANGE RIVER COLO JtonHfln.: Smith Eldeg ^* L^.- <^01«OyV, NORTHERN PART andan.: Swritli EMea? So Co. Sian^n^^iGfio^^SstahfZfjnaoTi. THK MARCH ON PRKTORIA 373 quence during this fine march fell upon a single squad- ron of Bethune's mounted infantry, who being thrown out in the direction of Vryheid, in order to make sure that our flank was clear, fell into an ambuscade and was al- most annihilated by a close range fire. Sixty-six casual- ties, of which nearly half were killed, were the result of this action, which seems to have depended, like most of our reverses, upon defective scouting. Buller, having called up his two remaining divisions and having mended the railway behind him, proceeded now to manoeuvre the Boers out of Laing's Nek exactly as he had manceuvred them out of the Biggarsberg. At the end of May Hi Id- yard and Lyttelton were despatched in an eastern direc- tion to see if it were possible to turn the pass from the direction of Utrecht. ^ It was on May 12th that Lord Roberts occupied Kroonstadt, and he halted there for eight days before he resumed his advance. At the end of that time his rail- way had been repaired, and enough supplies brought up to enable him to advance again without anxiety. The country through which he passed swarmed with herds and flocks; but with as scrupulous a regard for the rights of property as Wellington showed in the south of J< ranee, no hungry soldier was allowed to take so much as a chicken as he passed. The punishment for looting was prompt and stern. It is true that farms were burned occasionally and the stock confiscated, but this was as a punishment for some particular offence and not part of a system. The limping Tommy looked askance at the fat geese which covered the dam by the roadside, but it was as much as his life was worth to allow his fingers to close round those tempting white necks. On foul water and bully beef he tramped through a land of plenty. Lord Roberts's eight-days halt was spent in consoli- dating the general military situation. We have already shown how Buller had crept upward to the Natal border. On the west Methuen reached Hoopstad and Hunter Christiana, settling the country and collecting arms as they went. Rundle in the southeast took possession of <'^^ i ; ! 374 THK GRKAT BOl-R WAR the rich grain lands, and on May 21st entered Ladybrand. In front of him lay that difficult hilly country about Senekal, Ficksberg, and Bethlehem which was to delay him so long, Ian Hamilton was feeling his way north- ward to the right of the railway line, and for the moment cleared the district between Lindley and Heilbron, pass- .ing through both towns and causing Steyn to again jl;^? ■^ftj^-*. ivV ''^^''^ /change his capital, which became Vrede in the extreme '^HENO^T'ER- northeast of the State. During these operations Hamil- -^-- . ton had the two formidable l)e Wet brothers in front of him, and suffered nearly a hundred casualties in the continual skirmishing which accompanied his ad- vance. On May 22d the main army resumed its advance, moving forward fifteen miles to Honing's Spruit. On the 23d another march of twenty miles over a fine rolling prairie brought them to Rhenoster River. The enemy had made some preparations for a stand, but Hamilton was at Heilbron upon their left, and French was upon their right liank. The river was crossed without opposi- tion. On the 24th the army was at Vredefort Road, and on the 26th the vanguard crossed the Vaal River at Vil- •1 'iJ ' i^^en's Drift, the whole army following upon the 27th. ^^ ■ Here agnin preparations for resistance had been made tl^xiy^Jfk. »»Jlv^on the line of the railway, but the wide turning move- ments on the flanks by the indefatigable French and Hamilton rendered all opposition of no avail. The British columns llowedover and onward without a pause, tramping steadily northward to their destination. The bulk of the Free State forces refused to leave their own country and moved away to the '^astern and northern por- tion of the State, where the British generals thought — incorrectly, as the future was to prove^ — that no further harm would come from them. The State which they were in arms to defend had really ceased to exist, for al- ready it had been publicly proclaimed at Bloemfontein in the Queen's name that the country had been annexed to the empire, and that its style henceforth was that of '* The Orange River Colony." Those who think this THK MARCH ON PRKTORIA ^^75 measure unduly harsh must remember that every mile of land which the Free Staters had conquered in the early part of the war had been solennly annexed by them. At the same time those p:nglishmen who knew the his- tory of this state, which had once been the model of all that a state should be, were saddened by the thought that they should have deliberately committed suicide for the sake of one of the most corrupt governments which has ever been known. Had the Transvaal been governed as the Orange Free State was, such an event as the second I3oer war could never have occurred. Lord Roberts's tremendous march was now drawing to a close. On May 28th the troops advanced twenty miles, and passed Klip River without fighting. It was observed with surprise that the Transvaalers were very much more careful of their own property than they had been of that of their allies, and that the railway was not damaged at all by the retreating forces. The country had become more populous, and far away upon the low curves of the hills were seen high chimneys and gaunt iron pumps which struck the north of England soldier with a pang of homesickness. This long distant hill was the famous Rand, and under its faded grasses lay such riches as Solomon never took from Ophir. It was the prize of victory; and yet the prize is not to the victor, for the dust-grimed officers and men looked with little personal interest at this treasure-house of the world. Not one penny the richer would they be for the fact that their blood and their energy had brought justice and freedom to the gold fields. They had opened up an industry for the world, men of all nations would be the better for their labors, the miner and the financier or the trader would equally profit by them, but the men in khaki would tramp on, unrewarded and uncomplaining, to India, to China, to any spot where the needs of their world-wide empire called them. The infantry, streaming up from the Vaal River to the famous ridge of gold, had met with no resistance upon the way, but great mist banks of cloud by day and huge 376 THE GREAT BOER WAR i. VI ll \>*Vv twinkling areas of flame by night showed the handiwork of the enemy. Hamilton and P'rench, moving upon the left flank, found Boers thick upon the hills, but cleared them off in a well-managed skirmish which cost us a dozen casualties. On May 29th, pushing swiftly along, French found the enemy posted very strongly with several guns at a point west of Klip River Berg. The position being too strong for nim to force, Hamilton's infantry (Nineteenth and Twenty-first brigades) were called up, and the Boers were driven out. That splendid corps, the Gordons, lost nearly a hundred men in their advance over the open, and the C. I. V.'s on the other flank fought like a ^^ ._. , regiment of veterans. There had been an inclination to W^t- k^^^^"*^ smile at these citizen soldiers when they first came out, ' '^ ^ but no one smiled now save the general who felt that he had them at his back. Henry's mounted infantry moved straight upon the important junction of Germiston, which lies amid the huge white heaps of tailings from the mines. At this point, or near it, the lines from Johannesburg and from Natal join the line to Pretoria. Colonel Henry's advance was an extremely daring one, for the infantry was half a day's march behind; but after an irregular, scrambling skirmish, in which the Boer snipers had to be driven off the mine heaps and from among the houses, the mounted infantry got their grip of the railway and held it. The exploit was a very fin<; one, and stands out the more brilliantly as the conduct of the campaign can- not be said to afford many examples of that wtll-con- sidered audacity which deliberately runs the risk of the minor loss for the sake of the greater gain. French was now on the west of the town, Henry had cut the railway upon the east, and Roberts was coming up from the south. His infantry had covered one hundred and thirty miles in seven days, but the thought that every step brought them nearer to Pretoria was as exhilarating as their fifes and drums. On M a rch 30th the victorious troops camped outside the city while Botha retired with his army, abandoning without a battle the treasure-house of his country. Inside the town were chaos and confusion. ^^Jjui- V THK MARCH ON PRKTORIA J577 The richest mines in the world lay for a clay or more at the mercy of a lawless rabble drawn from all nations. The ]3oer officials were themselves divided in opinion, Krause standing for law and order while Judge Koch advocated violence. A spark would liave set the town blazing, and the worst was feared when a crowd of mer- cenaries assembled in front of the Robinson mine with threats of violence. By the firmness and tact of Mr. Tucker, the manager, and by the strong attitude of Com- missioner Krause, the situation was saved and the danger passed. Upon March 31st, without violence to life or de- struction to property, that great town which IJritish hands have done so much to build found itself at last under the British flag. May it wave there so long as it covers just laws, honest officials, and clean-handed administrators — so long and no longer. And now the last stage of the great journey had been reached. Two days were spent at JohanneslDurg while supplies were brought up, and then a move was made upon Pretoria thirty miles to the north. Here was the Boer capital, the seat of Government, the home of Kru- ger, the centre of all that was anti-British, crouching amid its guardian hills, with costly forts guarding every face of it. Surely at last the place had been found where that great battle should be fought which should decide for all time whether it was with the Briton or with the Dutchman that the future of South Africa lay. On the last day of May, under the command of Major Hunter Weston, with Burnham the scout, a man who has played the part of a hero throughout the campaign, two hundred Lancers had struck off from the main army and endeavored to descend upon the Pretoria-Delagoa rail- way line with the intention of blowing up a bridge and cutting the Boer line of retreat. It was a most dashing attempt; but the small party had the misfortune to come into contact with a strong Boer commando, who heaoed them off. After a skirmish they were compelled to make their way back with a loss of five killed and fourteen wounded. in III '! t' yi I r J 378 THK GRlsAI BOI'R WAR The cavalry under French had waited for the issue of this enterprise at a point nine miles north of Johannes- burg. Upon June 2d it began its advance with orders to make a wide sweep round to the westward, and so skirt the capital, cutting the Pietersburg railway to the north of it. The country in the direct line between Johannes- burg and Pretoria consists of a series of rolling downs which are admirably adapted for cavalry work, but the detour which French had to make carried him into the wild and broken ground which lies to the north of the Crocodile River. Here he was fiercely attacked on ground where his troops could not deploy, but with ex- treme coolness and judgment beat off the enemy. To cover thirty-two miles in a day and fight a way out of an ambuscade in the evening is an ordeal for any leader and for any troops. Two killed and seven wounded were our crivial losses in a situation which might have been a serious one. The Eoers appear to have been the escort of a strong convoy which had passed along the road some miles in front. Next morning both convoy and opposi- tion had disappeared. The cavalry rode on amid a country of orange groves, the troopers standing up in their stirrups to pluck the golden fruit. There was no further fighting, and on June 4th French had established himself upon the north of the town, where he learned that all resistance had ceased. Whilst the cavalry had performed this enveloping movement the main army had advanced swiftly upon its objective, leaving one brigade behind to secure Johan- nesburg. Ian Hamilton advanced upon the left, while Lord Roberts's column kept the line of the railway, Colonel Henry's mounted infantry scouting in front. As the army topped the low curves of the veldt they saw in front of them two well-marked hills, each topped by a low squat building. They were the famous southern forts of Pretoria. Between the hills was a narrow neck, und beyond the Boer capital. For a time it appeared that the entry was to be an ab- solutely bloodless one, but the booming of cannon and THK MARCH ON PRKTORIA ,^79 the crash of Mauser fire soon showed that the enemy was in force upon the ridge. Botha had left a strong rear- guard to hold off the British while his own stores and valuables were being withdrawn from the town. The silence of the forts showed that the guns had been re- moved and that no prolonged resistance was intended; but in the mean while fringes of determined riflemen, supported by cannon, held the approaches, and must be driven off before an entry could l3e effected. Kach fresh corps as it came up reinforced the firing line. Henry's mounted infantry men supported by the horse-guns of J Battery and the guns of Tucker's division began the action. So hot was the answer, both from cannon and from rifie, that it seemed for a time as if a real battle were at last about to take place. The Guards brigade, Stephenson's brigade, and Maxwell's brigade streamed up and waited until Hamilton, who was on the enemy's right flank, should be able to make his presence felv. The heavy guns had also arrived, and a huge cloud of debris rising from the Pretorian forts told the accuracy of their fire. But either the burghers were half-hearted or there was no real intention to make a stand. About half-past two their fire slackened, and Pole-Carew was directed to push on. That debonair soldier with his two veteran brigades obeyed the order with alacrity, and the infantry swept over the ridge, with some thirty or forty casualties, the majority of which fell to the VVarwicks. The position was taken, and Hamilton, who came up late, was only able to send on De Lisle's mounted infantry, who ran down one of the Boer Maxims in the open. The action had cost us altogether about seventy men. Among the injured was the Huke of Norfolk, who had shown a high sense of civic virtue in laying aside the duties and dig- nity of a Cabinet Minister in order to serve as a simple captain of volunteers. At the end of this one fight the capital lay at our mercy. Consider the fight which they made for their chief city, compare it with that which the British made for the village of Mafeking, and say on Ji 3^o THK GRKAT BOKR WAR which side is that stern spirit of self-sacrifice and resolu- tion which are the signs of the better cause. In the early morning of June 5th, the Coldstream (luards were mounting the hills which commanded the town. Pjeneath them in the clear African air lay the famous city, embowered in green, the fine central build- ings rising grandly out of the wide circle of villas. Through the Nek Maxwell's brigade had passed, and had taken over the station, from which at least one train laden with horses had streamed that morning. Two others, both ready to start, were only just stopped in time. The first thought was for the British prisoners, and a small party headed by the Duke of Marlborough rode to their rescue. Let it be said once for all that their treat- ment by the Boers was excellent and that their appear- ance would alone have proved it. One hundred and twenty-nine officers and thirty-nine soldiers were found in the Model Schools, which had been converted into a prison. A day later our cavalry arrived at Waterval, which is fourteen miles to the north of Pretoria. Here were confined three thousand soldiers, whose fare had certainly been of the scantiest, though in other respects they appear to have been well treated.' Nine hundred of their comrades had been removed by the Boers, but Porter's cavalry was in time to release the others, under a brisk shell fire from a Boer gun upon the ridge. Many pieces of good luck have we had in the campaign, but this recovery of our prisoners, which left the enemy with- out a dangerous lever for exacting conditions of peace, is the most fortunate of all. In the centre of the town there is a wide square deco- rated or disfigured by a bare pedestal upon which a statue of the President was to have been placed. Hard by is the bleak, barnlike church in which he preached, and on either side are the Government offices and the Law Courts, buildings which would grace any European capi- ' Further information unfortunately shows that in the case of the sick and of the Colonial prisoners the treatment was by no means good. -ft^nSSiifJrftit^.f any I, but ith- ;ace, Vm'/^ WC Bkfi, THK MARCH ON PRETORIA 381 tal. Here, at two o'clock upon the afternoon of Juiu? 5tli, Lord Roberts sat liis horse and saw pass in front of him the men who had followed him so far and so faith- fully: the Guards, the Essex, the VVelsh, the Vorks, the Warwicks, the guns, the mounted infantry, the dashing irregulars, the Gordons, the Canadians, the Shropshires, the Cornwalls, the Camerons, the Derbys, the Sussex, and the London Volunteers. For over two hours the khaki waves with their crests of steel went sweeping by. High above their heads from the summit of the Hiiad- t^j(jg^ [t^ kaal the broad Union Jack streamed for the first time. 'Through months of darkness we had struggled onward to the light. Now at last :he strange drama was drawing to its close. The God of battles had given the long- withheld verdict. But of all the hearts which throbbed high at that supreme moment there were few who felt one touch of bitterness toward the brave men who had been overborne. They had fought and died for their ideal. We had fought and died for ours. The hope for the fu- ture of South Africa is that they or their descendants may learn that that banner which has come to wave above Pretoria means no racial intolerance, no greed for gold, no paltering with injustice or corruption, but that it means one law for all and one freedom for all, as it does in every other continent in the whole broad earth. When that is learned it may happen that even they will come to date a happier life and a wider liberty from that 5th of June which saw the symbol of their nation pass forever from among the ensigns of the world. ^^! leco- tatue )y is on ILaw :api- If the leans mi^t^^-it.i .aiiiiuJ^iJt 1 -: 'n , ^ n Chapter Twenty-six DIAMOND HILL— RUN DLE'S OPERATIONS The military situation at the time of tiie occupation of Pretoria was roughly as follows: Lord Roberts with some thirty thousand men was in possession of tiie cap- ital, but had left his long line of communications very imperfectly guarded behind him. On the Hank of this line of communications, in the eastern and northeastern corner of the Free State, was an enerj^etic force of un- conquered Free Staters who had rallied round President Steyn. They were some eight or ten thousand in number, well horsed, with a fair number of guns, under the able leadership of ]3e Wet, Prinsloo, and Olivier. Above all, they had a splendid position, mountainous and broken, from which, as from a fortress, they could make excursions to the south or west. This army included the commandoes of Ficksburg, Senekal, and Harrismith, with all the broken and desperate men from other districts who had left their farms and fled to the mountains. It was held in check as a united force by Rundle's Division and the Colonial J)ivision upon the south, while Col- vile, and afterward Methuen, endeavored to pen them in upon the west. The task was a hard one, however, and though Rundle succeeded in holding his line intact, it appeared to be impossible in that wide country to coop up altogether an enemy so mobile. A strange game of hide-and-seek ensued, in which De Wet, who led the Boer raids, was able again and again to strike our line of rails and to jret back without serious loss. The story of these instructive and humiliating episodes will be told and ake the with ricts It sion Col- Bn in and :t, it :oop J of the line tory told DIAMOND HILL 383 ill their order. The energy and skill of the guerilla chief c:hallenge our achniration, and the score of his successes would be amusing were it not tl.at the points of the game are marked by tlie lives of Jiritish soldiers. General lUdler had spent the latter half of May in making his wMy f rom Ladysmith to Laing's Nek, and the beginning of June found him with twenty thousand men in front of that diilicult position. Some talk of a sur- render had arisen, and Christian Jlotha, who commanded the lioers, succeeded in gaining several days' armistice, which ended in nothing. The Transvaal forces at this point were not more than a few thousand in number, but their position was so formidable that it was a serious task to turn them out. Van Wyk's II ill, however, had been left unguarded, and as its possession would give us the command of J'.otha's J'ass, its unopposed capture by the South African Light Horse was an event of great im- portance. With guns upon this eminence the infantry was able, upon June 8th, to attack and to carry with little loss the rest of the high ground, and so to get the Pass into their complete possession. IJotha fired the grass behind him. and withdrew sullenly to the north. On the 9th and loth the convoys were passed over the Pass, and on the nth the main body of the army fol- lowed them. The operations were now being conducted in that ex- tremely acute angle of Natal which runs up between the Transvaal and the Orange Free State. In crossing Potha's Pass the army had really entered what was now the Orange River Colony. Put it was only for a very short time, as the object of the movement was to turn the Laing's Nek position, and then come back into the Trans- vaal through AUeman's Pass. The gallant South African Light Horse led the way, and fought hard at one point to clear a pathway for the army, losing six killed and eight wounded in a sharp skirmish. On the morning of the 12th the flanking movement was far advanced, and it only remained for the army to force AUeman's Nek, >T JS4 \\\\\ (^KI.A'I' BO IK WAR 'O H ,1 /• S m \^ whiti) would placi' il to the rear of Liiing's Nek, aiul close to llif 'I'raiisv iuil town of \^)lksru.st. Had the iloers been the nien of Colenso and of Spion Kop, this stornung of Alleinan's Nek would have heen a bloody business. 'I'he position was strt)ng, the cover was slight, and there was no way lound. Hut the in- fantry came on with the old dash without the old stub- born resolution being opposed to them. The guns pre- |)ari'il the way. and then the Donsets, the l)ul)lins, the Miikllesex, the (Jueen's, and the I'-ast Surrey did the rest. I'he door was open and the Transvaal lay before u.s. 'I'he next day Volksrust was in our hands. The whole series of operations was excellently con- ceived and carried out. A position which the JJoers had been preparing for months, scored with trenches and topped by heavy artillery, had been rendered untenable by a clever llank movement, our total casualties in the whole affair being less than two hundred killed and wounded. Natal was cleared of the invader, JJuller's foot was on the high plateau of the Transvaal, and Rob- erts could count on twenty thousand good men coming up to him from the southeast. More important than all, the Natal railway was being brought up, and soon the central J'ritish army would depend upon Durban instead of Cape Town for its sujiplies — a saving of nearly two- thirds of the distance. The fugitive ]>oers made north- ward in the Middelburg direction, while Jkdler advanced to Standerton, which town he continued to occupy until Lord Roberts could send a force down through Heidel- berg to join hands with him. Such was the position of the Natal f/ild force at the end of June. From the west and the southwest British forces were also converg- ing upon the capital. The indomitable Baden-Powell sought for rest and change of scene after his prolonged trial by harrying the Boers out of Zeerust and Rusten- burg. The forces of Hunter and of Mahon converged upon Potchefstroom, from which, after settling that dis- trict, they could be conveyed by rail to Krugersdorp and Johannesburg. DIAMOND HILL 38s bnged isten- ;rged clis- and l?ef()rr hrielly recounting the sciii-s of events which took place upon the line of communications, the narrative must return to Lord Roberts at J'retoria, and descrihe the operations which followed his occupation of that city. In leaving the undefeated forces of the l''ree State behind him, the Jirilish general had unciuestionably run a grave risk, and was well aware that his railway coininunicali(jn was in danger of being cut. V>y the rapidity of his move- ments he succeeded in gaining the enemy's capital be- fore that which he h.id foreseen came to pass; but if JJotha had held him at Pretoria while De Wet struck ;.< him behind, the situation would iiave been a serious one. Having once attained his main object Roberts could re- ceive with e(juanimity the expected news that De Wet with a mobile force of less than two thousaiul men had, upon June 7th, cut the line at Roodeval to the north of Kroonstadt. IJoth rail and telegraph were destroyed, and for a few days the army was isolated. Fortunately, there were enough supplies to go on with, and immediate steps were taken to drive away the intruder, though, like a mosquito, he was brushed from one place only to settle upon another. Leaving others to restore his broken communications, Lord Roberts turned his attention once more to JJotha, who still retained ten or fifteen thousand men under his command. The President had Hed from Pretoria with a large sum of money, estimated at over two millions sterling, and was known to be living in a saloon railway carriage, which had been transformed into a seat of gov- ernment even more mobile than that of l*resident Steyn. From Waterval-Boven, a point beyond Middelburg, he was in a position either to continue his journey to Delagoa Bay, and so escape out of the country, or to travel north into that wild Lydenburg country which had always been proclaimed as the last ditch of the defence. Here he remained with his gold-bags waiting the turn of events. Botha and his stalwarts had not gone far from the capital. Fifteen miles out to the east the railway line 25 .,7/J 386 THE GREAT BOER WAR runs through a gap in the hills called Pinnaars J'oort, and here was such a position as the Boer loves to hold. It was very strong 'n front, and it had widely spread formidable flanking hills to hamper those turning move- ments which had so often been fatal to the Boer gener- als. Behind was the uncut railway line along which the guns could in case of need be removed. The whole position was over fifteen miles from wing to wing, and it was well known to the Boer general that Lord Roberts had no longer that preponderance of force which would enable him to execute wide-turning movements, as he had done in his advance from the south. His army had decreased seriously in numbers. The mounted men, the most essential branch of all, were so ill-horsed that brigades were not larger than regiments. One brigade of infantry (the P'ourteenth) had been left to garrison Johannesburg, and another (the Eighteenth) had been chosen for special duty in Pretoria. Smith-Dorrien's Brigade had been detached for duty upon the line of com- munications. With all these deductions and the wastage caused by wounds and disease, the force was in no state to assume a vigorous offensive. So hard pressed were they for men that the three thousand released prisoners from Waterval were hurriedly armed with Boer weapons and sent down the line to help to guard the more vital points. Had Botha withdrawn to a safe distance Lord Roberts would certainly have halted, as he had done at Bloem- fontein, and waited for remounts and reinforcements. But the war could not be allowed to languish when an active enemy lay only fifteen miles off, within striking distance of two cities and of the line of rail. Taking all the troops that he could muster, the British general moved out once more upon Monday, June nth, to drive Botha from his position. He had with him Pole-Carew's Eleventh Division, which numbered about six thousand men with twenty guns; Ian Hamilton's force, which in- cluded one infantry brigade (Bruce-Hamilton's), one cavalry brigade, and a corps of mounted infantry, say, DIAMOND HILL 387 s Toort, to hold. y spread ig move- r gener- hich the ,e whole ring, and Roberts ch would ts, as he irmy had men, the rsed that i brigade garrison had been •Dorrien's leof com- le wastage n no state ;ssed were prisoners r weapons more vital rd Roberts at Bloem- 'orcements. ,h when an in striking Taking all sh general th, to drive ole-Carew's ix thousand e, which in- Iton's), one ifantry, say, cceded twelve huLred 'silbres I'^rit^'^C^^V'- "«cii, \Min aoout seventy ofuns Thpir t-,^u advance. Han.ilton un\ cavalry had their orders to the Boers, ^na'l^:i::Zri^j:"-^:tl!:;ll tf"' rate actions. Of tlieso tlie Int T ' , t i •- '"''-''■' ""i'"' owtng totheiropen formation thaftLeyeoL' thirty casualties w.vk r> ""■ ''^> ^^caped with about even on h s e,; fT. H , m ""• '",' ^"'"'' ^'"^ ^''"^' •''"d retreat npj;]^-:;r.!;t^^-^-;^-:---:^ II! 388 THE GRKAT BOER WAR ' ', ! other points of the British advance. At night his weary men slept upon the ground which they had held. All Monday and all Tuesday French kept his grip at Kameels- drift, stolidly indifferent to the attempt of the enemy to cut his line of communications. On Wednesday, Hamil- ton, upon the other flank, had gained the upper hand, and the pressure was relaxed. French then pushed for- ward, but the horses were so utterly beaten that no effec- tive pursuit was possible. During the two days that French had been held up by the Boer right wing Hamilton had also been seriously engaged upon the left — so seriously that at one time the action appeared to have gone against him. The fight pre- sented some distinctive features, which made it welcome to soldiers who were weary of the invisible man with his smokeless gun upon the eternal kopje. It is true that man, gun, and kopje were all present upon this occasion, but in the endeavors to drive him off S3::ie new develop- ments took place, which formed for one brisk hour a re- version to picturesque warfare. Perceiving a gap in the enemy's line, Hamilton pushed up the famous Q battery — the guns which had plucked glory out of disaster at Sanna's Post. For the second time in one campaign they were exposed and in imminent danger of capture. A body of mounted Boers with great dash and hardihood galloped down within close range and opened fire. In- stantly the Twelfth Lancers were let loose upon them. How they must have longed for their big-boned long- striding English troop horses as they strove tor^ii^e 2 gal- lop out of their spiritless over-worked Argentines! For once, however, the lance meant more than five pou f Is "cad weight and an encumbrance to the rider. The guns were saved, the Jioers fled, and a dozen were left upon the ground. But a cavalry charge has to end in a re-forma- tion, and that is the instant of danger if any unbroken enemy remains within range. Now a sleet of bullets hissed through their ranks as they retired, and the gallant Lord Airlie, as modest and brave a soldier as ever drew sword, was struck through the heart. " Pray moderate ■ t DIAMOND HILL --i89 your language," was his last characteristic remark, made to a battle-drunken sergeant. Two officers, seventeen men, and thirty horses went down with their colonel, the grecit majority only slightly injured. In the mean time the increasing pressure upon his right caused IJroadwood to order a second charge, of the Life Guards this time, to drive off the assailants. The appearance rather than the swords of the Guards prevailed, and cavalry as cavalry had vindicated their existence more than they had ever done during the campaign. The guns were saved, the flank attack was rolled back, but one other danger had still to be met, for the Heidelberg com- mando — a corps if elite of the l^oers — had made its way outside Hamilton's flank and threatened to get past us. VVith cool judgment the British general detached a bat- talion and a section of a battery, which pushed the Boers back into a less menacing position. The rest of Jiruce- Hamilton's brigade were ordered to advance upon the hills in front, and, aided by a heavy artillery fire, they had succeeded, before the closing in of the winter night, in getting possession of this first line of the enemy's de- fences. Night fell upon an undecided fight, which, after swaying this way and that, had finally inclined to the side of the liritish. The Sussex and the City Imperial Volunteers were clinging to the enemy's left Hank, while the Eleventh Division were holding them 1 1 front. All promised well for the morrow. By order of Lord Roberts the Guards were sent round early on Tuesday, the 12th, to support the tlank attack of Bruce-Hamilton's infantry. It was afternoon before all was ready for the advance, and th^ n the Sussex, the London Volunteers, and the Derbyshires won a position upon the ridge, followed later by the three regiments of Guards. J)Ut the ridge was the edge of a considerable plateau, swept by ]^oer fire, and no advance could be made over its bare expanse save at a considerable loss. The infantry clung in a long fringe to the edge of the position, hut for two hours no guns could be brought up to their support, as the steepness of the slope was in- u ■ n ? t 5' ' ■; I if V ' 1 ' -I. 390 THE GREAT BOER WAR surmountable. It was all that the stormers could do to hold their ground, as they were enfiladed by a Vickers- Maxim, and exposed to showers of shrapnel as well as to an incessant rille fire. Never were guns so welcome as those of the Eighty-second battery, brought by Major Conolly into the firing line. The enemy's riflemen were only a thousand yards away, and the action of the artillery might have seemed as foolhardy as that of Long at Co- Icnso. Ten horses went down on the instant, and a quarter of the gunners were hit; but the guns roared one by one into action, and their shrapnel soon decided the day Undoubtedly it is with Conolly and his men that the honors lie. At four o'clock, as the sun sank toward the west, the tide of fight had set in favor of the attack. Two more batteries had come up, every rifle was thrown into the firing line, and the Doer reply was decreasing in volume. The temptation to an assault was great, but even now it might mean heavy loss of life, and Hamilton shrank from the sacrifice. In the morn'.Tghis judgment was justified, for l)Otha had abandoned the position, and his army was in full retreat. The mounted men followed a'i far as Klands River Station, which is twenty-five miles from Pretoria, but the enemy was not overtaken, save by a small party of West Australians, a corps which has sev- eral times distinguished itself by its individuality and its reckless courage. This force, less than a hundred in number, gained a kopje which overlooked a portion of the Boer army. Had they been more numerous the effect would have been incalculable. Asit was, the Westralians fired every cartridge which they possessed into the throng, and killed many horses and men. It would bear examina- tion why it was that only this small corps was present at so vital a point, and why, if they could push the pursuit to such purpose, others should not be able to do the same. Time was bringing some curious revenges. Already Paardeberg had come upon Majuba Day. Buller's vic- torious soldiers had taken Laing's Nek. Now, the Spruit at which the retreating Boers were so mishandled by the T \. ^//A RUNDLI/S OPKRATIONS ^9^ vic- )ruit the Westralians was that same/Bronkhorst Spruit at which, nineteen years before, thevf^ginient had been shot clown. Iviany might have prophesied that the deed would be avenged; but who could ever have guessed the men who would avenge it? Such was the battle of Diamond Hill, as it was called, from the name of the ridge which was opposite to Hamil- ton's attack. The prolonged two days' strup^gle showed that there was still plenty of fight in the burghers. Lord Roberts had not routed them, nor had he captured their guns; but he had cleared the vicinity of the capital, he had inflicted a loss upon them which was certainly as great as our own, and he had again proved to them that it was vain for them to attempt to stand. A long pause followed at Pretoria, broken by occasional small alarms and excursions, which served no end save to keep the army from ennui. In spite of occasional breaks in his line of communications, horses and supplies were coming up rapidly, and, by the middle of July, Roberts was ready for the field again. At the same time Hunter had come up from Potchefstroom, and H milton h?d taken Heidel- berg, and his force was about to join hands with Buller at Standerton. Sporadic warfare broke out here and there in the west, and in the course of it Snyman of Mafeking had reappeared, with two guns, which were promptly taken from him by the Queensland Mounted Rifles. On all sides it was felt that if the redoubtable De Wet could be captured there was every hope that the burghers might discontinue a struggle which was dis- agreeable to the British and fatal to themselves. As a point of honor it was impossible for Botha to give in while his ally held out. We will turn, therefore, to this famous guerilla chief, and give some account of his ex- ploits. To understand them some description must be given of the general military situation in the Free State. When Lord Roberts had swept past to the north he had brushed aside the flower of the Orange Free State army, who occupied the considerable quadrilateral which is formed by the northeast of that State. The function of 39^ THK GRKAT BOKR WAR ( '!• Rundle's Eighth Division and of Brabant's Colonial Divis- ion was to separate the sheep from the goats by preventing the fighting burghers from coming south and disturbing those districts which had been settled. For this purpose Rundle formed a long line which should serve as a cor- don. Moving up through Trommel and Clocolan, PMcks- burg was occupied on May 2Sth by the Colonial Divi- sion, while Rundle seized Senekal, forty miles to the northwest. A small force of forty Yeomanry, who en- tered the town some time in advance of the main body, was suddenly attacked by the Boers, and the gallant Dal- biac, famous rider and sportsman, was killed, with four of his men. He was a victim, as so many have been in this campaign, to his own proud disregard of danger. The Boers were in full retreat, but now, as always, they were dangerous. One cannot take them for granted, for the very moment of defeat is that at which they are capa- ble of some surprising effort. Rundle, following them up from Senekal, found them in strong possession of the kopjes at Biddulphsberg, and received a check in his endeavor to drive them off. It was an action fought amid great grass fires, where the possible fate of the wounded was horrible to contemplate. The Second Grenadiers, the Scots Guards, the Yorkshires, and the West Kents were all engaged, with the Second and Sev- enty-ninth Field Batteries and a force of Yeomanry. Our losses incurred in the open from unseen rifles were thirty killed and one hundred aud thirty wounded, in- cluding Colonel Lloyd of the Grenadiers. Two days later Rundle, from Senekal, joined hands with Brabant from Ficksburg, and a defensive line was formed between those two places, which was held unbroken for two months, when the operations ended in the capture of the greater part of the force opposed to him. Clements's Bri- gade, consisting of the First Royal Irish, the Second Bed- fords, the Second Worcesters, and the Second Wiltshires, had come to strengthen Rundle, and, altogether, he may have had as many as twelve thousand men under his or- ders. It was not a large force with which to hold a mo- !!t RUNDLK'S OPKRATIONS 393 al Divis- sventing sturbing purpose as a cor- 1, Ficks- al Divi- s to the who en- ■in body, ant Dal- vith four been in tiger, ays, they nted, for are capa- ng them Dn of the :k in his fought of the Second and the ind Sev- omanry. fles were ded, in- wo days Brabant between for two e of the its's Bri- nd Bed- Itshires, he may ■ his or- d a mo- ■ bile adversary at least s'iven thousand strong, who might attack him at any point of his extended line. So well, however, did he select his positions that every attempt of the enemy, and there were many, ended in failure. ]iadly supplied with food, he, and his half-starved men, held bravely to their task, and no soldiers in all that great host deserve better of their country. At the end of May, then, the Colonial Division. Run- die's Division, and Clements's Brigade, held the Boers from Ficksburg on the Basuto border to Senekal. This prevented them from coming south, ikit what was there to prevent them from coming west and falling upon the railway line? There was the weak point of the Ihitish position. Lord Methuen had been brought across from ])Oshof, and was available with six thousand men. Col- vile was on that side also, with the Highland Ikigade. A few details were scattered up and down the line, wait- ing to be gathered up by an enterprising enemy. Kroon- stadt was held by a single militia battalion; each sepa- rate force had to be nourished by convoys with weak escorts. Never was there such a field for a mobile and competent guerilla leader. And, as luck would have it, such a man was at hand, ready to take full advantage of his opportunities. f/' f 11 ) 11 •■ iil* ill: J- : J lii' ( I I- Chapter 'Twenty-seven THE LINES OF COMMUNICATION Christian De Wet, the elder of two brothers of that name, was at this time in the prime of life, a little over forty years of age. He was a burly, middle-sized, bearded man, poorly educated, but endowed with much energy and common sense. His military experience dated back to Majuba Hill, and he had a large share of that curious race hatred which is intelligible in the case of the Trans- vaal, but inexplicable in a Free Stater who has received no injury from the British Empire. Some weakness of his sight compels the use of tinted spectacles, and he haa now turned these, with a pair of particularly observ- ant eyes behind them, upon the scattered British forces and the long exposed line of railway. De Wet's force was an offshoot from the army of Free Staters under De Villiers, Olivier, and Prinsloo, who lay in the mountainous northeast of the state. To him were committed five guns, fifteen hundred men, and the best of the horses. Well armed, well mounted, and oper- ating in a country which consisted of rolling plains with occasional fortress kopjes, his little force had everything in its favor. There were so many tempting objects of attack lying before him that he must have had some diffi- culty in knowing where to begin. The tinted spectacles were turned first upon the isolated town of Lindley. Col vile with the Highland Brigade had come up from Ventersburg with instructions to move onward to Heil- bron, pacifying the country as he passed. The country, however, refused to be pacified, and his march from Ven- tersburg to Lindley was harassed by snipers every mile of the way. Finding that De Wet and his men were close upon him, he did not linger at Lindley, but passed on to LINKS OF COMMUNICATION 395 his destination. By evil fortune, however, a force of five hundred yeomanry, including the Duke of Cambridge's Own and the Irish companies, had been sent from Kroon- stadt to join Colvile at Lindley. Colonel Spragge was in command. On May 27th this body of horsemen reached their destination only to find that Colvile had already abandoned it. The Yeomanry were escorting a convoy, so that it was not possible for them honorably to return, and they appear to have determined to halt for a day in Lindley, and then follow Colvile to Heilbron. VVithin a few hours of their entering the town they were fiercely attacked by I)e Wet. Colonel Spragge seems to have acted for the best. Under a heavy fire he withdrew his convoy and his men to a point five miles out upon the Kroonstadt Road, where three defensible kopjes sheltered a valley in which the cattle and horses could be horded. A stream ran through it, and the wagons must have contained supplies of food and ammunition. There were all the materials there for a stand which would have brought glory to the Hritish arms. The men were of peculiarly fine quality, many of them from the public schools and from the universities, and if any would fight to the death these with their sport- ing spirit and their high sense of honor might have been expected to do so. They had the stronger motive for holding out as word of their difficulty had been conveyed to Colvile and to Methuen. The former continued his march to Heilbron, and it is hard to blame him for doing so,' but Methuen on hearing the message, which was con- veyed to him at great personal peril by Corporal Hankey of the Yeomanry, pushed on instantly with the utmost energy, though he arrived too late to prevent, or even repair, a disaster. Colonel Spragge's men had held their own for the first three days of their investment, during which they had ' It must be remembered that Colvile was under orders to reacli Heilbron on a certain date, that he was himself fij^hting his way. and that the force which he was asked to relieve was much more mobile than his own. I:' ,/ }1 \ ■ ;i ^ V \ 39f) THF, GREAT BOI R WAR been simply exposed to a long-range ritle tire which in- flicted no very serious loss upon thcni. TIk- spirit of the troopers was admirable. Several dashing sorties were carried out under the leadership of Captains Humby, Maude, and Lord Longford. On the fourth day tiie Boers brought up two guns. One would iiave thought that during so long a time as three days it would have been possible for the officer in command to have made such preparations against this obvious possibility as were so successfully taken at a later stage of the war by the handful who garrisoned Ladybrand. Surely in this period, even Vi'ithout engineers, it would not have been hard to construct such trenches as the Jioers have again and again opposed to our own artillery. IJut if any preparation were made, it proved to be quite inadequate. One of the two smaller kopjes was carried, and the gar- rison filed to the other. This also was compelled to sur- render, and finally the main kopje also hoisted tiie white flag. It must be confessed that the action is a disap- pointing one — to those who believe in quality of troops as against quantity, the most disappointing of the whole war — and no doubt it will be the subject of a searching inquiry. Some explanation is needed of Lord Methuen's appear- ance upon the central scene of warfare, his division hav- ing, when last described, been at lioshof, not far from Kimberley, where early in April he fought the successful action which led to the death of Villebois. Thence he proceeded along the Vaal and then south to Kroonstadt, arriving there upon May 28th. He had with him the Ninth Brigade (Douglas'), which contained the troops which had started with him for the relief of Kimberley six months before. These were the Northumberland Fusiliers, Loyal North Lancashires, Northamptons, and Yorkshire Light Infantry. With him also were the Munsters, Lord Chesham's Yeomanry (five companies), with the Fourth and Thirty-seventh Batteries, two how- itzers and two pom-poms. His total force was about six thousand men. On arriving at Kroonstadt he was given the % I :' i k : \ LINKS OF COMMUNICATION 397 tusk of relieviii<^ Hcilbron, where Colvile, with the High- land r.ri<;ade, some colonial horse, two na\al ^uiis, and the Fifth IJatlery, were short of foot! and ammunition. 'I'iie more urgent message from the Yeomen at Lindley, however, took him on a fruitless journey to that town on the 3d of June. Here a garrison was left under I'aget, and the rest of the force pursued its original mission ta Heilbron, arriving there on June 7th, when the High- landers had been reduced to quarter rations. "The Sal- vation Army " was the nickname by which they expressed their gratitude to ihe relieving force. A previous convoy sent to the same destination had less good fortune. On June ist tifty-five wagons started from the railway line to reach Heilbron. The escort con- sisted of one hundred and sixty details belonging to High- land Regiments without any guns, Captain Cobrallis in command. Hut the gentleman with the tinted glasses was waiting on the way. " I have twelve hundred men and five guns. Surrender at once! " Such was the message which reached the escort, and in their defenceless condi- tion there was nothing for it but to comply. Thus one disaster leads to another, for, had the Yeomanry held out at Lindley, l)e Wet would not upon the 4th of June have laid hands upon our wagons; and had he not recruited his supplies from our wagons it is doubtful if he could have made his attack upon Roodeval. This was the next point upon which he turned his attention. Two miles beyond Roodeval station there is a well- marked kopje by the railway line, with other hills some distance to the right and left. A militia regiment, the Fourth Derbyshire, had been sent up to occupy this post. There were rumors of Boers on the line, and Major Haig, who with one thousand details of various regiments com- manded at railhead, had been attacked on June 6th but had beaten of¥ his assailants. De Wet, acting sometimes in company with, and sometimes independently of, his lieutenant Nel, passed down the line looking for some easier prey, and on the night of June 7th came upon the militia regiment, which was encamped in a position 'I i i i itJ I i 1] n *rU !| I !' 398 rm-. (iRI'AT BOI'.R w/... which could be comi)k'tt'ly comniandocl by artillery. It is not true that they had neglected to occupy the k()|)j<; under whirh they lay, f(;r two companies had hien poslt-d upon it. J)Ut there seems to have been no thought of imminent danger, and the regiment had pitched its tents and gone very comfortably to sleep without a thought of the gentleman in the tinted glasses. In the middle of the night he was upon them with a hissing sleet of bul- lets. At the first dawn the guns opened and the shells began to burst among them. It was a horrible ordeal for raw troops. The men were miners and agricultural laborers, who had never seen more blood shed than a cut finger in their lives. They had been four months in the country, but their life had been a picnic, as the luxury of their baggage shows. Now in an instant the picnic was ended, and in the gray cold dawn war was upon them — grim war with the whine of bullets, the screams of pain, the crash of shell, the horrible rending and riving of body and limb. In desperate straits, which would have tried the oldest soldiers, the brave miners did well. They never from the beginning had a chance save to show how gamely they could take punishm ^, but that at least they did. Bullets were coming froi ' sides at once, and yet no enemy was visible. They lined one side of the embankment, and they were shot in the back. They lined the other, and were again shot in the back. Baird- Doulgas, the colonel, vowed to shoot the man who should raise the white flag and he fell dead himself before he saw the hated emblem. But it had to come. A hundred and forty of the men were down, many of them suffering from the horrible wounds which shell inflicts. The place was a shambles. Then the flag went up and the Boers at last became visible. Outnumbered, outgeneralled, and without guns, there is no shadow of stain upon the good name of the only militia regiment which was ever serious- ly engaged during the war. Their position was hopeless from the first, and they came out of it with death, mutila- tion, and honor. Two miles south of the Rhenoster Kopje stands Roode- : i. LINKS OK COMMUNICAIION ,^99 llery. It he kopjir Ml posted lought of its tents lought of liddle of t of bul- le shells rdeal for icultural I an a cut Js in the e luxury le picnic )on them earns of d riving h would lid well, to show I at least once, side of They Baird- should ore he undred iffering place oers at d, and e good rious- tpeless nutila- t.oode- val Station, in which, on that June niortiing, there stood a train containing the mails for the arnjy, a supply of great-coats, and a truck full of onornious shells. A num- ber of details of various sorts, a lunulrcd or more, had alighted from the train, twenty o{ thoin post-otTice volun- teers, some of the pioneer railway corps, a few Shrop- shires, and other waifs and strays. To them in the early morning came the gentleman with the tinted glasses, his hands :>till red with the blood of the Derbies, " I have fourteen hundred nien and four guns. Surrender!" said the messenger. l>ut it is not in nature for a postman to give up his postbag without a struggle. " Never! " cried the valiant postmen. IJut shell after shell battered the corrugated iron buildings about their ears, and it was not possible for them to answer the guns which were smash- ing the life out of them. There was no help for it but to surrender. De Wet added samples of the British vol- unteer and of the British regular to his bag of militia. The station and train were burned down, the great-coats looted, the big shells exploded, and the mails burned. The latter was ihe one unsportsmanlike action which can be laid to I)e Wet's charge. Fifty thousand men to the north of him could forego their coats and their food, but they yearned greatly for those home letters, charred frag- ments of which are still blowing about the veldt.' For three days De Wet held the line, and during all that time he worked his wicked will upon it. For miles and miles it was wrecked with most scientific complete- ness. The Rhenoster Bridge was destroyed. So for the second time was the Roodeval Bridge. The rails were blown upward with dynamite until they looked like an unfinished line to heaven. De Wet's heavy hand was everywhere. Not a telegraph-post remained standing within ten miles. His headquarters continued to be the kopje at Roodeval. ' F'ragments continually met the eye which must have afTorded curious reading for the victors. " I hope you have killed all those Boers by now, " was the beginning of one letter which I could not help observing. I i // /, (..',■ 400 THE GREAT BOER WAR Upon June the loth two P>ritish forces were converging upon the point of danger. One was Mcthuen's, from Heilbron. The other was a small force consisting of the Shropshires, the South Wales Ijorderers, and a battery which had come south with Lord Kitchener. The ener- getic Chief of the Staff has been always sent by Lord Roberts to the point where a strong man was needed, and it is seldom that he has failed to justify his mission. Lord Methuen, however, was the first to arrive, and at once attacked I)e Wet, who moved swiftly away to the eastward. With a tendency to exaggeration, which has been too common during the war, the affair was described as a victory. It was really a strategic and almost blood- less move upon the part of the Boers. It is not the busi- ness of Guerillas to fight pitched battles. Methuen pushed for the south, having been informed that Kroon- stadt had been captured. Finding this to be untrue, he turned again to the eastward in search of I)e Wet. That wily and indefatigable man was not long out of our ken. On June 14th he appeared once more at Rhenoster, where the construction trains, under the famous Girouard, were working furiously at the repair of the damage which he had already done. This time the guard was sufficient to beat him off, and he vanished again to the eastward. He succeeded, however, in doing some damage, and very nearly captured Lord Kitchener himself. A permanent post had been established at Rhenoster under the charge of Colonel Spens of the Shropshires, with his own regi- ment and several guns. Smith-Dorrien, one of the youngest and most energetic of the divisional command- ers, had at the same time undertaken the supervision and patrolling of the line. An attack had at this period been made by De Wet's brother at the Sand River to the south of Kroonstadt, where there is a most important bridge. The attempt was easily frustrated by the Royal Lancaster militia regi- ment, and the Railway Pioneer regiment, helped by some Yeomanry. The skirmish is only remarkable for the death of Major Seymour of the Pioneers, a noble American, \ II inverging n's, from ng of the a battery rhe enor- t by Lord eded, and i mission, e, and at ay to the fhich has described ost blood- : the biisi- Methuen at Kroon- untrue, he ,'et. ; out of our ^henoster, Girouard, age which sufficient eastward. and very ermanent fhe charge own regi- of the :ommand- ision and De Wet's Iroonstadt, le attempt [litia regi- by some the death imerican, LINES OF COMMUNICATION 401 who gave his services and at last his life for what, in the face of all slander and representation, he knew to be the cause of justice and of liberty. It was hoped now, after all these precautions, that the last had been seen of the gentleman with the tinted glasses, but on June 21st he WPii back in his old haunts once more. Honing vSpruil Station, about midway be- tween Kroonstadt and Roodeval, was the scene of his new raid. On that date his men appeared suddenly as a train waited in the station, and ripped up the r?ils on either side of it. There were no guns at this point, and the only available troops were three hundred of the pris- oners from Pretoria, armed with Martini-Henry rifles and obsolete ammunition. A good man was in command, however — the same Colonel Bullock of the Devons who had distinguished himself at Colenso, and every tattered, half-starved wastrel was nerved by a recollection of the humiliations which he had already endured. For seven hours they lay helpless under the shell-fire, but their con- stancy was rewarded by the arrival in the evening of Lancers, Yeomanry, and C. L V. guns from the South. The Boers fled, but left some of their number behind them; while of the British, Major Hobbs and four men were killed and nineteen wounded. This defence of three hundred half-armed men against seven hundred Boer riflemen, with three guns firing shell and shrapnel, was a very good performance. The same body of burgh- ers immediately afterward attacked a post held by Colo- nel Evans with two companies of the Shropshires and fifty Canadians. They were again beaten back with loss, the Canadians under Inglis especially distinguish- ing themselves by their desperate resistance in an ex- posed position. All these attacks, irritating and destructive as they were, were not able to hinder the general progress of the war. After the battle of Diamond Hill the captured po- sition was occupied by the mounted infantry, while the rest of the forces returned to their camps round Pretoria, there to await the much-needed remounts. At other parts 26 I. I I I ,! // la , 'I' , ft ■A li !,•■; tH 402 THE GREAT BOER WAR of the seat of war the British cordon was being drawn more tightly round the Boer forces. Buller had come as far as Standerton, and Ian Hamilton, in the last week of June, had occupied Heidelberg. A week afterward the two forces were able to join hands, and so completely to cut off the Free State from the Transvaal armies. Ham- ilton in these operations had the misfortune to break his collar-bone, and for a time the command of his division passed to Hunter — the one man, perhaps, whom the army would regard as an adequate successor. It was evident now to the British commanders that there would be no peace and no safety for their commu- nication while an undefeated army of seven or eight thousand men, under such leaders as De Wet and Olivier, was lurking amid the hills which Hanked their lailroad. A determined effort was made, therefore, to clear up that corner of the country. Having closed the only line of escape by the junction of Ian Hamilton and of Buller, the attention of six separate bodies of troops was concen- trated upon the stalwart Free Staters. These were the divisions of Rundle and of Brabant from the south, the brigade of Clements on their extreme left, the garrison of Lindley under Paget, the garrison of Heilbron under MacDonald, and, most formidable of all, a detachment under Hunter which was moving from the north. A crisis was evidently approaching. The nearest Free State town of importance still untaken was Bethlehem — a singular name to connect with the operations of war. The country on the south of it for- bade an advance by Rundle or Brabant, but it was more accessible from the west. The first operation of the Brit- ish consisted, therefore, in massing sufficient troops to be able to advance from this side. This was done by effect- ing « junction between Clements from Senekal, and Paget who coi.?manded at Lindley, which was carried out upon July I St near the latter place. Clements encountered some opposition, but besides his excellent infantry regi- ments, the Royal Irish, Worcesters, Wiltshires, and Bed- fords, he had with him the Second Brabant's Horse, with g drawn come as week of zarcl the letely to Ham- reak his division he army ers that commu- 3r eight Olivier, ailroad. up that ►' line of Buller, concen- were the mth, the garrison 1 under ichment rth. A jntaken 'ith the it for- is more e Brit- s to be effect- Paget upon intered y regi- d Bed- |e, with LINKS OF COMMUNICATION 403 yeomanry, mounted infantry, two five-inch guns, and tiie Kighth K. V. A. Aided by a demonstration upon the part of Grenfell and of Brabant, he pushed his way through after three days of continual skirmish. On getting into touch with Clements, Paget sallied out from Lindley, leaving the Buffs behind to garrison the town. He had with him a cavalry brigade one thousand strong, eight guns, and two battalions of infantry, the Munster Fusiliers and the Yorkshire Light Infantry. On July 3d he found a considerable force of Boers with three guns opposed to him, Clements being at that time too far off upon the Hank to assist him. Four guns of the Thirty- eighth R. F. A. (Major Oldfield) and two belonging to the City Volunteers came into action. The Royal Artil- lery guns appear to have been exposed to a very severe fire, and the losses were so heavy that for a time they could not be served. The escort was inadequate, insuffi- ciently advanced, and badly handled, for the JJoer rifle- men were able to get right into the Thirty-eighth JJattery, and the gallant major, with Lieutenant J5elcher, was killed in the defence of the guns. Captain FitzGerald, the only other officer present, was wounded in two places, and twenty men were struck down, with nearly all the horses of one section. It was a narrow escape from a serious disaster, for two of the guns were actually in the hands of the Boers, who damaged their sights, but the Australian horsemen came gallantly to the rescue, and were able to beat them off. At the same time the infantry, Munster Fusiliers, and Yorkshire Light Infantry, which had been carrying out a turning movement, came into action, and the position was taken. The force moved onward, and on July 6th they were in front of Bethlehem. The place is surrounded by hills, and the enemy was found strongly posted. Clements's force was now on the left and Paget's on the right. From both sides an at- tempt was made to turn the Boer tlanks, but they were found to be very wide and strong. All day a long-range action was kept up while Clements felt his way in the hope of coming upon some weak spot in the position, but in the 404 THE GRKAT BOER WAR evening a direct attack was made by Paget's two infantry regiments upon the right, which gave the British a footing on the JJoer position. The Minister Fusiliers and the Yorkshire Light Infantry lost forty killed and womided, including four officers, in this gallant affair, the heavier loss and the greater honor going to the men of Munster, The centre of the position was still held, and on the morning of July 7th Clement gave instructions to the colonel of the Royal Irish to storm it if the occasion should seem favorable. Such an order to such a regi- ment means that the occasion will seem favorable. Up they went in three extended lines, dropping forty or fifty on the way, but arriving breathless and enthusiastic upon the crest of the ridge. IJelow them, upon the farther side, lay the village of Jiethlehem. On the slopes beyond hundreds of horsemen were retreating and a gun was being hurriedly dragged into the town. For a moment it seemed as if nothing had been left as a trophy, but suddenly a keen-eyed sergeant raised a cheer, which was taken up again and again until it resounded over the veldt. Under the crest, lying on its side with a broken wheel, was a gun — one of the fifteen-pounders of Storm- berg which It was a point of honor to regain once more. Many a time had the gunners been friends in need to the infantry. Now it was the turn of the infantry to do something in exchange. That evening Clements had occupied Bethlehem, and one more of their towns had passed out of the hands of the Free Staters. A word now as to that force under General Hunter which was closing in from the north. The gallant and energetic Hamilton, lean, aquiline, and tireless, had, as already stated, broken his collar-bone at Heidelberg, and it was as his lieutenant that Hunter was leading these troops out of the Transvaal into the Orange River Col- ony. Most of his infantry was left behind at Heidel- berg, but he took with him Broadwood's cavalry (two brigades) and Bruce Hamilton's Twenty-first Infantry Brigade, with Ridley's mounted infantry, some six thou- sand men in all. On the 2d of July this force reached \i h «, r ! ' t * LINKS OF COMMUNICATION 405 Frankfort in the north of the Free State without resist- ance, and on July 3d they were joined there by MacDon- aid's force from Heilbron, so that Hunter found himself with nearly ten thousand men under his command. Mere was an instrument with which surely the co///» de ^i^nrre could be given to the dyin^ State. Passing south, still without meeting serious resistance, Hunter occupied Reitz, and finaMy sent on Broadwood's cavc Iry to liethle- hem, where upon July 8lh they joined i*aget and Clements. The net was now in position, and about to be drawn tight, but at this last moment the biggest fish of all dashed furiously out from it. Leaving the main Free State force in a hopeless position behind him, I)e Wet, with fifteen hundred well-mounted men and five guns, broke through Slabbert's Nek between IJethlehem and Ficks- burg, and made swiftly for the northwest, closely followed by Paget's and JJroadwood's cavalry. It was on July i6th that he made his dash for freedom. On the 19th Little, with the Third Cavalry Jirigade, had come into touch with him near Lindley. De Wet shook himself clear, and with splendid audacity cut the railway once more to the north of Honing Spruit, gathering up a train as he passed, and taking a hundred Welsh Fusiliers prison- ers. On July 2 2d De Wet was at Vredefort, still close- ly followed by Broadwood and Little, who gleaned his wagons and his stragglers. T ence he threw himself into the hilly country some miles to the south of the Vaal River, where he lurked for a week or more while Lord Kitchener came south to direct the operations which would, as it was hoped, lead to a surrender. Leaving the indomitable guerilla in his hiding-place, the narrative must return to that drawing of the net which still continued in spite of the escape of this one important fish. On all sides the iJritish forces had drawn closer, and they were both more numerous and more formidable in quality. It was evident now that by a rapid advance from j>ethlehem in the direction of the Basuto border all Boers to the north of Ficksburg would be hemmed in. On July 2 2d the columns were moving. I '. (I 1 .f:i| i h \ // \ \ n V'l I' I ' \» 1. I 406 THK GRKAT BOJ.R WAR On that date Paget moved out of Bethlehem, and Rundle took a step forward from Ficksburg. Bruce Hamilton had already, at the cost of twenty Cameron Highlanders, got a grip upon a bastion of that rocky country in which the enemy lurked. On the 23d, Hunter's force was en- deavoring to storm two of those neks, which are the gate- ways of the great natural fortress, held by Prinsloo and Olivier. The Black Watch carried the ridge which com- manded one of them, while Clements and J'agct forced another. At every opening of the hills the British guns were thundering and the indefatigable infantry pressing to the assault. The Highland JJrigade had a stiff fight iit Retief's Nek, and with a loss of a hundred men the Highland Light Infantry, with the Seaforths and the Sussex, forced their way through. The outworks of the great mountain fortress were all carried, and on July 26th the British columns were converging upon Fouriesburg, while Naauwpoort on the line of retreat was held by MacDonald. It was evidently only a matter of time now with the Boers. On the 28th the Scots Guards, with supreme dash, carried the position of Slaapkrantz. Upon July 29th, Prinsloo sent in a request for an armistice, which was refused. Later in the day he despatched a messenger with the white flag to Hunter with an an- nouncement of his unconditional surrender. On July 30th the motley army which had held the British off so long emerged from among the mountains. But it soon became evident that in speaking for all Prins- loo had gone beyond his powers. Discipline was low and individualism high in the Boer army. Every man might repudiate the decision of their con^mandant, as every man might repudiate the white flag of h's comrade. On the first day no more than eleven hundred nien of the Ficksburg and Ijadybrand commandoes, with fiftem hun- dred horses and two guns, were surrendered. Next day seven hundred and fifty more men came in with eight hundred horses, and by August 6th the total of the pris- oners had mounted to four thousand one hundred and fifty with three guns, two of which were our own. But id Rundle Hamilton ghlanders, r in which ;e was en- i the gate- nsloo and hich coni- ^et forced itish guns y pressing stiff fight :1 men the ) and the rks of the July 26th uriesburg, > held by r of time lards, with itz. Upon armistice, atched a 1 an an- LINIvS OK COMMUNICATION 407 Olivier, with fifteen hundred men and several guns, broke away from the captured force and escaped through the hills. On August 4th Harrismith surrendered to Mac- Donald, and thus was secured the opening of the Van Reenen's Pass and the end of the Natal system of rail- ways. This was of the very first importance, as the utmost difficulty had been found in supplying so large a body of troops so far from our Cape base. In a day the base was shifted to Durban, and the distance shortened by two-thirds, while the army came to be on the railway instead of a hundred miles from it. This great success assured Lord Roberts's communications from serious at- tack, and was of the utmost importance in enabling him to consolidate his position at Pretoria. a held the ountains. 11 Prins- was low ery man ndant, as comrade, en of the em hun- ^e\t day th eight the pris- red and m. But ''^ il ft ; i n I \' I 1 fi r. Chapter twenty-eight THE HALT AT PRETORIA Lord Rohkrts had now been six weeks in the capital, and British troops had overrun the greater part of the south and west of the Transvaal, but in spite of this there was continued Boer resistance, which flared sud- denly up in places which had been nominal' pacified and disarmed. It was found, as has often been shown in history, that it is easier to defeat a republican army than to conquer it. From Klerksdorp, from Ventersdorp, from Rustenburg, came news of risings against the newly imposed British authority. The concealed Mauser and the bandolier were dug up once more from the tra'npled corner of the cattle kraal, and the farmer was a warrior once again. Vague news of the exploits of I)e Wet stim- ulated the fighting burghers and shamed those who had submitted. A letter was intercepted from the guerilla chief to Cronje's son, who had surrendered near Rusten- burg. De Wet stated that he had gained two great vic- tories and had fifteen hundred captured rifles with which to replace those which the burghers had given up. Not only were the outlying districts in a state of revolt, but even round Pretoria the Boers were inclined to take the offensive, while both that town and Johannesburg were filled with malcontents who were ready to fly to their arms once more. Already at the end of June there were signs that the Boers realized how helpless Lord Roberts was until his remounts should arrive. The mosquitoes buzzed round the crippled lion. On June 29th there was an attack upon Springs near Johannesburg, which was easily beaten off by the Canadians. Early in July some of the cavalry •«Aiiiiiiiiil1iltil ; capital, It of the ; of this .red sud- pacified ;n shown :an army itersdorp, he newly luser and trampled a warrior Vet stim- ho had guerilla Rusten- reat vic- th which ip. Not volt, but take the irg were to their that the intil his d round attack y beaten cavalry THi: TTAF.T AT PRI'TO'UA 409 and mounted infantry patrols were snapped up in the neigiiborhood of the capital, l.ord Roberts gave orders accordingly that Ifutton and Mahon should sweep the Jk)ers back upon his right, and push them as far as J5ronkhorst Sj)ruit. This was done upon July 6lh antl 7th, the JJritish advance meeting with considerable re- sistance from artillery as well as rilles. I!y this move- ment the pressure upon the right was relieved, which might have created a dangerous unrest in b^hannesburg, and it was done at the moderate cost of thirty-four killed and wounded, half of whom belonged to the Imperial Light Horse. This famous corps, which had come across with Mahon from the relief of Mafeking, had, a few days before, ridden with mixed feelings through the streets of Johannesburg and past, in many instances, the deserted houses which had once been their homes. On July 9th the Doers again attacked, but were again pusiied back to the eastward. It is probable that all these demonstrations of the enemy upon the right of Lord Roberts's extended position were really feints in order to cover the far-reaching plans which Botha had in his mind. The disposition of the I)oer forces at this time appears to have been as follows: Jjotha with his army occupied a position along the J)ela- goa railway line, farther east than Diamond Hill, wiience he detached the bodies which attacked Hutton upon the extreme right of the Jkitish position to the southeast of Pretoria. To the north of Pretoria a second force was acting under Grobler, while a third under Delarey had been despatched secretly across to the left wing of the British, northwest of Pretoria. While Botha engaged the attention of Lord Roberts by energetic demonstrations on his right, Grobler and Delarey were to make a sudden attack upon his centre and his left, each point being twelve or fifteen miles from the other. It was vve!l de- vised and very well carried out; but the inherent defect of it was that, when subdivided in this way, the Boer force was no longer strong enough to gain more than a mere success of outposts. 1 4 i / .0- 4IO THi: GKI'.AT BOKR WAK I ' Delarty's attiick was delivered at break of day upon July iith at Nitral's Nek, a post some eighteen miles west of the capital. This position could not be said to be part of Lord Roberts' line, but rather to be a link to connect his army with Rustenburg. It was weakly held by three companies of the Lincolns with two others in support, one scjuadron of the Scots Oreys, and two guns of O Battery R. H. A. The attack came with the first gray light of dawn, and for many hours the small garri- son bore up against a deadly fire, waiting for the help which never came. All day they held their assailants at bay, and it was not until evening that their ammunition ran short and they were forced to surrender. Nothing could have been better than the behavior of the men, both infantry, cavalry, and gunners, but their position was a hopeless one. The casualties amounted to eighty killed and wounded. Nearly two hundred were made prisoners and the two guns were taken. With the ten guns of Colenso, two of Stormberg, and seven of Sannji's Post, this made twenty-one ]}ritish guns which the Boe/s had the honor of taking. On the other hand, the Ikitisl. had captured up to the end of July two at Elandslaagte, one at Kimb^rley, one at Mafeking, six at Paardeberg, one at Bethlehem, three at Fouriesberg, two at Johannes- burg, and two in the west, while early in August Methuen took one from De Wet and Hamilton took two at Olifant's Nek — which made the honors easy. On the same day that Delarey made his coup at Nitral's Nek, Grobler had shown his presence on the north side of the town by treating very roughly a couple of squad- rons of the Seventh Dragoons which had attacked him. By the help of a section of the ubiquitous O Battery and of the Fourteenth Hussars, Colonel Lowe was able todi^- engage his cavalry from the trap into which they had fallen, but it was at the cost of between thirty and forty officers and men, killed, wounded, or taken. The old "Black Horse " sustained their historical reputation, and fought their way bravely out of an almost desperate situa- tion, where they were exposed to the fire of a thousand THh: HAI/I' Ar 1Motha that every train from the south was bringing horses for Lord Roberts' army, and that it had become increasingly difficult for De VVet and I 4ii TFTF, GRKAT BOI.U WAR ,'. ! i M his men to hinder their arrival. 'I'lic last horse must win, and thr Kmpire had the world on which to draw. Any movement which the Jloers would make must lu; made at once, for alrc-dy both the cavalry and the mounted infantry were rapidly cominjj back to their full strength once more. This consideration must have urged IJotha to deliver an attack upon July i6th, which liad some success at Inst, but was afterward beaten off with heavy l:>ss to the enemy. The fighting fell principally u|)on .'•( 'e-Carew and llutton, the corps chielly engaged being the Royal Irish Fusiliers, the New Zealanders, the Shropshires, and the Canadian Mounted Infantry. The enemy tried repeatedly to assault the position, but were beaten back each time witii a loss oi nearly a hundred killed and wounded. The Jhitish loss was about sixty, and included two gallant young Canadian officers, J^or- den and Birch, the former being the only son of the minister of militia. So ended the last attempt made by IJotha upon the I'ritish positions round I'retoria. 'J'he end of the war was not yet, but already its futility was abundantly evident. This had become more api)arent since the junction of Hauiilton and of liuller had cut off the Transvaal army from that of the Free Slate. Cnable to send their prisoners away, and also unable to feed them, the Free Staters were compelled, before their own collapse, to deliver up in Natal the prisoners whom they had taken at Lindley and Koodeval. These men, a ragged an 1 starving battalion, emerged at Ladysmith, having maue their way through Van Reenen's Pass. It is a singular fact that no parole appears on these and similar occasions to have been exacted by the Uoers. Lord Roberts, having remounted a large part of his cavalry, was ready now to advance eastward and give Botha battle. The first town of any consequence along the Delagoa Railway is Middelburg, some seventy miles from the capital. This became the Iiritish objective, and the forces of Mahon and Hamilton on the north, of Pole- Carew in the centre, and of F'rench and Hutton to the south, all converged upon it. There was no serious re- K lorse imist I to draw, must he and the ) tlu'ir full line ur<:;i;(l vliich liad u off with uincipall)' y t'nM 'i i i 4i6 THK GREAT BOKR WAR he had followed the rebels up to a point within twelve miles of Douglas. Here at the end of May they turned upon him and delivered a fierce night attack, so sudden and so strongly pressed that much credit is due both to general and to troops for having repelled it. The camp was attacked on all sides in the early dawn. The greater part of the horses were stampeded by the firing, and the enemy's rillemen were found to be at very close quarters. For an hour the action was warm, but at the end of that time the Boers fled, leaving a number of dead behind them. The troops engaged in this very creditable action, which might have tried the steadiness of veterans, were four hundred of the Duke of Edinburgh's volunteers, some of Paget's horse and of the Eighth Regiment Imperi- al Yeomanry, four Canadian guns, and twenty-five of War- ren's Scouts. Their losses were eighteen killed and thirty wounded. Colonel Spence, of the volunteers, died at the head of his regiment. A few days before, on May 27th, Colonel Adye had won a small engagement at Kheis, some distance to the westward, and the effect of the two actions was to put an end to open resistance. On June 20th De Villers, the Boer leader, finally surrender to Sir Charles Warren, handing over two hundred and twenty men with stores, rifles, and ammunition. The last sparks had been stamped out in the colony. There remain to be mentioned those attacks upon trains and upon the railway which had spread from the Free State to the Transvaal. On July 19th a train was wrecked on the way from Potchefstroon to Krugersdorp, without serious injury to the passengers. On July 31st, however, the same thing occurred with more murderous effect, the train running at full speed off the metals. Thirteen of the Shropshires were killed and thirty-seven injured in this deplorable affair, which cost us more than many an important engagement. On August 2d a train coming up from Bleomfontein was derailed by Sarel Theron and his gang some miles south of Kroonstadt. Thirty-five trucks of stores were burned, and six of the passengers (unarmed convalescent soldiers) were killed THK HALT AT PRETORIA 417 twelve J turned , sudden both to he camp 2 greater , and the quarters, d of that d behind le action, ans, were olunteers, it Imperi- /e of War- and thirty iied at the May 27 th, .heis, some wo actions r\e 20th De ^ir Charles men with s had been ipon trains 1 the Free train was ugersdorp, I July 3is^» murderous :he metals, [hirty-seven more than 2d a train , by Sarel iroonstadt. six of the ere killed ( or wounded. A body of mounted infantry followed up the Hoers, who numbered eighty, and succeeded in kill- ing and wounding several of them. This was the last train molested in the Orange River Colony. On July 2ist the l^oers made a determined attack upon the railhead at a point thirteen miles east of Heidelberg, where over a hundred Royal Engineers were engaged upon a bridge. They were protected by three hundre^i Dublin Fusiliers under Major English. For some hours the little party was hard pressed by the burghers, who had two field-pieces and a pom-pom. They could make no impression, however, upon the steady Irish infantry, and after some hours the arrival of General Hart with re- inforcements scattered the assailants, who succeeded in getting their guns away in safety. At the beginning of August it must be confessed that the general situation in the Transvaal was not reassur- ing. Springs near Johannesburg had in some inexplic- able way, without fighting, fallen into the hands of the enemy. Klerksdorp, an important place in the south- west, had also been reoccupied. Rustenburg was about to be abandoned, and the British were known to be fall- ing back from Zeerust and Otto's Hoop, concentrating upon Mafeking. The sequel proved, however, that there was no cause for uneasiness in all this. Lord Roberts was concentrating his strength upon those objects which were vital, and letting the others drift for a time. At present the two obviously important things were to hunt down De Wet and to scatter the main Boei army under Botha. The latter enterprise must wait upon the former, so for a fortnight all operations were in abeyance while the flying columns of the British endeavored to run down their extremely active and energetic antagonist. At the end of July De Wet had taken refuge in some exceedingly difficult country near Reitzburg, seven miles south of the Vaal River. The operations were proceed- ing vigorously at that time against the main army at Fouriesberg, and sufficient troops could not be spared to attack him, but he was closely observed by Kitchener 27 ' I' /'/I 4t8 the great BOER WAR with a force of cavalry and mounted infantry. Witii the surrender of Prinsloo a large army was disengaged, and it was obvious that if De Wet remained where he was he must soon be surrounded. On the other hand, there was no place of refuge to the south of him. With great au- dacity he determined to make a dash for the Transvaal, in the hope of joining hands with Delarey's force, or else of making his way across the north of Pretoria, and so reaching Botha's army. President Steyn went with him, and a most singular experience it must have been for him to be harried like a mad dog through the country in which he had once been an honored guest. l)e Wet's force was exceedingly mobile, each man having a led horse, and the ammunition being carried in light Cape carts. In the first week of August the British began to thicken round his lurking-place, and De Wet knew that it was time for him to go. He made a great show of fortifying a position, but it was only a ruse to deceive those who watched him. Travelling as lightly as possible, he made a dash upon August 7th at the Drift which bears his own name, and so won his way across the Vaal River, Kitch- ener thundering at hisheels with his cavalry and mounted infantry. Methuen's force was at that time at Potchef- stroom, and instant orders had been sent to him to block the Drifts upon the Northern side. It was found as he approached the river that the vanguard of the enemy was already across and that it was holding the spurs of the hills which would cover the crossing of their comrades. By the dash of the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the ex- ertions of the artillery, ridge after ridge was carried, but before evening De Wet with supreme skill had got his convoy across, and had broken away, first to the eastward and then to the north. On the 9th Methuen was in touch with him again, and the two savage little armies, Methuen worrying at the haunch, De Wet snapping back over his shoulde', swept northward over the huge plains. Wher- ever there was ridge or kopje the Boer riflemen staved off the eager pursuers. Where the ground lay flat and clear the British guns thundered onward and fired into With the iged, and le was he there was great au- 'ransvaal, ce, or else ia, and so with him, ^n for him y in which ^et's force led horse, pe carts, to thicken that it was ,f fortifying I those who ,le, he made ;ars his own iver, Kitch- nd mounted ; at Potchef- lim to block found as he ; enemy was jpurs of the r comrades, and the ex- carried, but had got his he eastward .as in touch .es, Methuen Lck over his ans. Wher- [emen staved lay flat and d fired into THE HALT AT PRKTORIA 419 the lines of wagons. Mile after mile the running light was sustained, but the other iJritish columns, Ihoadwood's men and Kitchener's men, had for some reason not come up. Methuen alone was numerically inferior to the men he was chasing, but he held on with admirable energy and spirit. The J5oers were hustled off the kopjes from which they tried to cover their rear. Twenty men of the Yorkshire Yeomanry carried one hill with the bayonet, though only twelve of them were left to reach the top. l)e Wet trekked onward during the night of the 9th, shedding wagons and stores as he went. Hing of Lord Roberts, was broken up by the arrest of the deviser, Hans Cordua, a (icinian lieutenant in the Transvaal Artillery. On its merits it is unlikely that the crime would have been met by the extreme penalty, especially as it was a question whether the agent proi'oaitcur had not played a part. But the repeated breaches of parole, by which our prisoners of one day were in the field against us on the next, called imperatively for an example, and it was probably ratlier fur his broken faith than for his hare-brained scheme that Cordua died. At the same time it is impossible not to feel sorrow for the idealist of twenty-three who died for a cause which was not his own. lie was shot in the garden of Pretoria jail upon August 24th, A fresh and more Stringent proclamation from Lord Roberts showed that the J'ritish commander was losing his patience in the face of the wholesale return of paroled men to the field, and proclaimed that such perfidy would in future be severely punished. 1 .■ Chapter I'lvcnty-n'inc THI. I'.Nl) OK IHi: WAR Thk time had now come for the great combined move- ment which was to sweep the main JJoer army off the line of the Dehigoa railway, cut its source of supplies, and follow it into that remote and mountainous J.ydenburg district which had always been proclaimed as the last refuge of the burghers. JJefore entering upon this most difficult of all his advances Lord Roberts waited until the cavalry and mounted infantry were well mounted again. Then, when all was ready, the fust step in this last stage of the campaign was taken by Grneral Jluller, who moved his army of Natal veterans off the railway line and advanced to a position from which he could threaten the tlank and rear of llotha if he held his ground against Lord Roberts. lUdler's cavalry had been rein- forced by the arrival of Strathcona's Horse, a fnie body of Canadian troopers, whose services had been presented to the nation by the public-spirited nobleman whose name they bore. They were distinguished by their fine physique, and by the lassoes, cowboy stirrups, and large spurs of the Northwestern plains. It was in the tirst week of July that Clery joined hands with the Heidelberg garrison, while Coke with the Tenth Iirigade cleared the right flank of the railway by an expe- dition as far as Amersfoort. On July 6th the Natal communications were restored, and on the 7th J'uller was able to come through to Pretoria and confer with the Commander-in-chief. A Hoer force with heavy guns still hung about the line, and several small skirmishes were fought between Vlakfontein and Greylingstad in order to drive it away. By the middle of July the immediate vi- TUP KM) OK rUh. WAR 42.^ l:(1 move- f the line ilios. and yclc-nbint; i tlic last this most iled until mounted ,'p in this lal lUiller, le railway lu- could lis ground )cen rcin- fnie body presented an whose their fine and large ned hands the Tenth y an expe- the Natal kdler was with the guns still ishes were n order to lied i ate vi- cinity of tlu' railway was clear save for some small ma- rauding parlies who endeavored to tamper with tlu; rails and the hritlges. Vp to the end of the month the whole of the Natal army remained strung along the line of com- munications from Heidelbt rg to Standerton, waiting for the collection of forage and transport to enable them to march north against llotha's positi(jn. On August Sth lUiller's troops advanced to the north- east from I'aardekop, pushing a weak JJoer force with five guns in front of theni. At the cost of twenty-live wounded, principally of the Sixtieth Rilles, the enemy was cleared off, and the town of Amersfoort was occu- pied. On the 13th, moving on the same line, and meet- ing with very slight opposition, JiuUer took possession of Krmelo. His advance was having a good effect upon the district, for on the 12th the Standerton comnuindo, which numbered one hundred and eighty-two men, sur- rendered to Clery. On the 15th, still skirmishing, Hull- er's men were at Twyfelaar, and had taken possession of Carolina. Here and there a distant horsenuin riding over the olive-colored hills showed how closely and in- cessantly he was watched; but, save for a little sniping upon his flanks, there was no fighting. He was coming now within touch of French's cavalry, operating from Middleburg, and on the 14th heliographic comnumica- tion was established with (lordon's lirigade. l^uller's column had come nearer to its friends, but it was also nearer to the main body of Hoers who were waiting in that very rugged piece of country which lies between Belfast in the west and Machadodorp in the east. From this rocky stronghold they had thrown out mobile bodies to harass the British advance from the south, and every day brought Buller into closer touch with these advance guards of the enemy. On August 2 I St he had moved eight miles nearer to Belfast, French operating upon his left flank. Here he found the Boers in considerable numbers, but he pushed them northward with his cavalry, mounted infantry, and artillery, losing between thirty and forty killed and wounded, the greater ft: I llMn V, \l'. 1-1 4 . . I I M • 1 'I 424 THF, GRKAT BOF.R WAR part from the ranks of the Eighteenth Hussars and the Gordon Highlanders. This march brought him wiliiin fifteen miles of Jielfast, which lay due north of him. At the same time Pole-Carew with the central column of Lord Roberts's force had iidvanced along the railway line, and on August 24th he occupied IJelfast with little resistance. He found, however, that the enemy were holding the formidable ridges which lie between that place and Dalmanutha, and that they showed every sign of giving battle, presenting a firm front to lUiUer on the south as well as to Roberts's army on the west. On the 23d some successes attended their efforts to check the advance from the south. During the day Jiul- ler had advanced steadily, though under incessant fire. The evening found him only six miles to the south of Dalmanutha, the centre of the Uoer position. IJy some misfortune, however, after dark two companies of I'le Liverpool Regiment found themselves isolated from their comrades and exposed to a very heavy fire. There were fifty-six casualties in their ranks and thirty-two, includ- ing their wounded captain, were taken. 'J'he total losses in the day were one hundred and twenty-one. On August 25th it was evident that important events were at hand, for on that date Lord Roberts arrived at lielfast and held a c^onference with Buller, French, and Pole-Carew. The general communicated his plans to his three lieutenants, and on the 26th and following days the fruits of the interview were seen in a succession of rapid manoeuvres which drove the Jjoers out of this, the strongest position which they had held since they left the banks of the Ti.^ela. The advance of Lord Roberts was made, as his wont is, with two widespread wings, and a central body to connect them. Such a movement leaves the enemy in doubt as to which flank will really be attacked, while if he denudes his centre in order to strengthen both flanks there is the chance of a frontal advance which might cut him in two. French with two cavalry brigades formed the left advance, Pole-Carew the coitre, and Buller the ■ akm^i '' THE KND OF THE WAR ^-S and the I within im. At lumn of railway ith little ny were t;en that ery sign :r on the jfforts to clay JUil- iant fire, south of JJy some s of the rom their lere were I, includ- ;al losses t events Irrived at Inch, and IS to his Ing days Ission of this, the left the lis wont )ody to riemy in khile if Hanks ight cut 1 formed Her the right, the whole operations extending over thirty miles of infamous country. It is probable that Lord Roberts had reckoned that the Boer right was likely to be their strongest position, since if it were turned it would cut off their retreat upon Lydenburg, so his own main attack was directed upon their left. This was carried out by General duller upon August 26th and 27th. On the first day the movement upon Jiuller's part con- sisted in a very deliberate reconnoissance of and closing in upon the enemy's position, his troops bivouacking upon the ground which they had won. C)n the second, finding that all further progress was barred by the strong ridge of IJcigendal, he prepared his attack carefully with artillery and then let loose his infantry upon it. It was a gallant feat of arms upon either side. The Boer posi- tion was held by a detachment of the Joiiannesburg I'o- lice, who may have been bullies in peace, but were cer- tainly heroes in war. The attack was carried out across an open glacis by the Second Ritle IJrigade, supported by the Inniskilling Fusiliers, the men of Pieter's Hill. Through a deadly fire the gallant infantry swept over the position, though Metcalfe, the brave colonel of the Rities, with eight other officers and seventy men were killed or wounded. A pom-pom and twenty prisoners, including the commander of the police, were the trophies of the day. An outwork of the J^oer position had been carried, and the rumor of defeat and disaster had already spread through their ranks. Ihaver men than the burghers have never lived, but th^y had reached the limits of human endurance, and a long experience of defeat in the field had weakened their nerve and lessened their morale. They were no longer men of the same fibre as those who had crept up to the trenches of Spion Kop, or faced the lean warriors of Ladysmith on that grim January morn- ing at Caesar's Camp. Dutch tenacity would not allow them to surrender, and yet they realized how hopeless was the fight in which they were engaged. Nearly fifteen thousand of their best men were prisoners, ten thousand at the least had returned to their farms and taken the n! If \\ 426 rill, (JKI.Ar HOIK WAR { oath, Aiiotlior (on had htoii killed, womulrd, oi iiua- paiitatcd. Most of the Kui()|)iMn luoKeiiaiiis had left; Ihoy held only the idliinate coiner of llu'ir own country, they had lost their ^rip u|)on the railway line, and their supply of stores ;ind of uniniuiition was dwindling. To such a pass iiad ele\en months of war reduced that for- midable army who had so confidenily ailvanced to the contp,' st of South Africa. >Vhile lUdler had establislicd himself lirndy njion the left of tiie l)()er position, l*ole-C'arc!W had moved forward to the north of the railway line, anil I'ri'iich had advan(t;d as far as Swart Kopjes upon the Hoer right. These ojier- ations on Auj;ust 26th, 27th, were met with .some resist- ance and entailetl a loss of forty or fifty killed and wounded; hut it soon becajue evident that the punish- ment which they hail received at l)i>r;;c'ndal had taken the tight out of the Moers, and that this formidable posi- tion was to be abandoned as the others had beiMi. On the 2Sth the burghers were retreating, aiul Machadodorp, where Kruger had sat so long in his railway carriage, protesting that he would eveniually move west and not east, was occupied by HuUer. French, moving on a more northerly route, entered VVatervalonder with his cavalry upon the same date, driving a small IJoer force before him. Amid rain and mist the British columns were jiushing rapidlv forward, l)ut still the burghers held to- gether, and still their artillery was uncaptured. The retirement was swift, but it was not yet a rout. On the 30th the J^ritish cavalry were within touch of Nooitgedacht, and saw a glad sight in a long trail of ragged men who were hurrying in their direction along the railway line. They were the i>ritish prisoners, eigh- teen hundred in number, half of whom had been brought from VVaterval when Pretoria was captured, while the other half represented the men who had been sent from the south by De Wet, or from the west by Delarey. Much allowance must be made for the treatment of prisoners by a belligerent who is himself short of food, but nothing can excuse the harshness which the Hoers i. rill*: i-.Ni) Oh rm: war 427 showed to the Colonials who fell into their power, or the Ciillous nej^lect of the sick prisoners at Waterval. It is a humiliating but an interesting fact that from fust to last no less than seven thousand of our men passed into their power, all of whom were now recovered save some sixty oflicers, who had been carried off by IIkmu in their (light. On September 1st Lord Roberts siiowed his sense of the decisive nature of these recent operations by publish- ing the proclamation wiiich had beiii issued as early as July .|th, by which the Transvaal became a |K)ition of the Ihitish J'",inpire. On the same day (leneral JJulier, who had ceased to advance to the east and retraced Ills steps as far as Helvetia, began his northerly movement in the direction of I.ydenburg, whicli is nearly fifty miles to the north of the railway line. On that date his force made a march of fourteen miles, which brought them over the Crocodile River to Uadfontein. Here, (jn September 2d, iJuller found that the indomitable iiotha was still turning back upon him, for he was faced by so heavy a shell lire, coming from so formidable a jjosition, that he had to be content to wait in front of it until some other C(jlumn should outflank it. The days of unnecessary frontal at- tacks were forever over, and his force, thougii ready for anything which might be asked of it, had gone through a good deal in the recent oi)erations. Since August 2i.st they had been under fire almost every day, and their losses, though never great on any one occasion, amounted in the aggregate during that time to three hundred and sixty- five. They had crossed the Tugela, they had relieved Lady- smith, they had forced Laing's Nek, and now it was to them that the honors had fallen of following the enemy into this last fastness. Whatever criticism may be di- rected against some episodes in the Natal campaign, it must never be forgotten that to Duller and lo his men have fallen the hardest tasks of the war, and that these tasks have always in the end been successfully carried out. On September 3d Lord Roberts, fmding how strong a position faced Huller, despatched Ian Hamilton with a force to turn it "pon the right. Jhocklehurst's brigade =37! 428 THE GRFAT BOER WAR ( t i i \ 1 of cavalry joined Hamilton in his advance. On the 4th he was within signalling distance of liuller, and on the edge of the Boer position. The Hanking movement had the usual effect and the burghers once again abandoned their ridges. On the 6th Lydenburg had been occupied by the British cavalry. The Boers had split into two parties, the larger one witli the guns falling back upon Kruger's I'ost, and the others retiring to Pilgrim's Rest - both of them places the names of which seem to bear a relation to the peripatetic I'resident. Amid cloud-girt peaks and hardly passable ravines the two long-enduring armies still wrestled for the final mastery. To the northeast of T.ydenburg, between that town and Spitzkop, there is a formidable ridge called the Mauch- berg, and here again the enemy were found to be stand- ing at bay. They were even better than their word, for they had always said that they would make their last stand at Lydenburg, and now they were making one be- yond it. But the resistance was weakening. Even this fine position could not be held against the rush of the three regiments, the Devons, the Royal Irish, and the Royal Scots, who were let loose upon it. Mountain mists saved the defeated burghers from a close pursuit, but the hills were carried. The British losses on this day, September Slh, were thirteen killed and twenty-five wounded; but of these thirty-eight no less than half were accounted for by one of those strange malignant freaks which can neither be foreseen nor prevented. A shrap- nel shell, fired at an incredible distance, burst right over the Volunteer Company of the Gordons who were march- ing in column. Nineteen men fell, but it is worth re- cording that, smitten so suddenly and so terribly, the gallant Volunteers continued to advance as steadily as before this misfoitune befell them. On the 9th Buller was still pushing forward to Spitzberg, his guns ana the First Riries overpowering a weak rear-guard resistance of the Boers. On the loth he had reached Klipgat, which is half-way between the Mauchberg and Spitzkop. So close was the pursuit that the Boers, as they streamed h\ THE END OK THK WAR 4-9 I the 4th id on the Tient had )andoned occupied into two ick upon im's Rest II to bear cloud-girt -enduring town and e Maucii- be stand- word, for their hist g one be- Kven this ish of the I, and the Mountain ie pursuit, s on this wenty-hve half were ant freaks A sh rap- right over re march- worth re- |ribly, the |teadily as th Buller s ana the istance of at, which kop. So streamed through the passes, flung thirteen of their annnunition wagons over the cliffs to prevent iheni from falling into the Lands of the l*>rii'.:h horsemen. I'inally demoralized after their magnificent struggle of eleven months, the burghers were now a beaten and disorderly rabble tlying wildly to the east^vard, and only held together by the knowledge that in their desperate situation there was more comfort and safety in numbers. 'J'he war was swiftly approaching its close. On the 15th lUiller occu- pied Spitzkojj in the north, capturing a quantity of stores, while on the 14th I'rench took llarberton in the south, releasing all the remaining Hrilish prisoners and taking possession of forty locomotives, which do not appear to have been injured by the enemy. Meanwhile Tole-Carew had worked along the railway line, and had occupied Kaapmuiden, which was the junction where the IJarberton line joins that to Lorenzo Marques. On September nth an incident had occurred which must Lave shown the most credulous believer in I^oer prowess that their cause was indeed lost. On that date Paul Kruger, a refugee from the country which he had ruined, arrived at Lorenzo Marcjues, abandonitig his beaten commandoes and his deluded burghers. How much had happened since those distant days when as a little herdsboy he had walked behind the bullocks on the great northward trek! How piteous this ending to all his strivings and his plottings! A life which might have closed amid the reverence of a nation and the admiration of the world was destined to finish in exile, impotent and undignified. Strange thoughts must have come to him during those hours of flight, memories of his virile and turbulent youth, of the first settlement of thoa, great lands, of wild wars where his hand was heavy upon the natives, of the triumphant days of the war of independ- ence, when England seemed to recoil from the rifles of the burghers. And then the years of prosperity, the years when the simple farmer found himself among the great ones of the earth, his name a household word in F.urope, his state rich and powerful, his coffers fdled with the I #1 4JO Tin: (iKI.AT HOI.K WAR spoil of the poor (Inid^cs w ' <> worked so hard ami paitl taxes as readily. 'I'hose \V( ■ his ^ri'al tiays, the days when he hardened his heart a^.iinst their ap|)eals for jus- tice aiul looked beyond his own borders to his kinsmen in the hope of a South Africa which should he all his own. And now what had come of it all.'' A handful of faithful attendants, and a fuj^itive old man, clutching; in his tii^ht at his papers and his money-l)ap;s. The last of the old-world I'uritans, he dejiarted poring over his well- tlunnbed I'liiile, and proclaiming that the troubles of his country arose, not from his own narrow and corrupt ad- ministration, but from some departure on the part of his fellow-burghers from the stricter tenets of the dopper sect. So I'aul Kruger passed out from the active history of the world. While the main army of l^otha had been hustled out of their jiosition at Machadodorp and scattered at Lyd- enburg and at Uarberton, a number of other isolated events had occurred at dilTerent points of the seat of war, each of which deserves some mention. 'I'he chief of these was a sudden and shor lived revival of the war in the Orange River Colony, where the band of Olivier was still wandering in the northeastern districts. Hunter, moving northward after the capitulation of I'rinsloo at Fouriesburg. came into contact on August 15th with this force near lleilbron, and had forty casualties, mainly of the Highland Light Infantry, in a brisk engagement. For a time the IJritish seemed to have completely lost tcuch with Olivier, who suddenly on August 24th struck at a small detachment of Imperial Yeomanry under Colo- nel Ridley, who were reconnoitring near VVinburg. The troopers made a gallant defence and held out until next day, when they were relieved and the enemy driven away. Ridley's defence with two hundred and fifty men against one thousand lioers with two guns was an excellent per- formance. His casualties amounted to thirty men. Nothing daunted by his failure, Olivier turned upon the town of Winburg and attempted to regain it, but was de- feated again and scattered, he and his three sons being tup: j.nj) ok tju-: war 43 r I ml paid lIk' days s for jus- kinsim'U ; all his uulful of Lching in lie last of his Well- es of his )rrupt ad- [irt of liis e dopper irc history istled out ;d at Lyd- r isolated -at of war, ; chief of the var in ^livier was Hunter, insloo at with this mainly of cjagement. etely lost 4th struck nder Colo- urg. The until next ven away, en against -Uent p'jr- irty men. upon the ut was de- s being taken. 'VUv ri^snlt is said to have \n'A'U due to the gal- lantly and craft of ;i haiidlid of the (,)ueensto\vn V^)luti- teers, who laid an anihuscadc in a donga, and disariiicci tlu! I'.oers as they passed, ,\{tcr the pattern of Sauna's I'ost. r.y this action one of the most daring and rt;- sonrceful of the Dutch leaders fell into the hands of the ilritish. jouhert dead, (!ronje taken, Villebois dead, Olivier taken, Krnger lied, there oidy remained De Wet, llotha, I )(larey, ami drohler of all the Kaders who had taken the field. ( )n September 2d aiiollu;r conunando of I'ree State r)Ot;rs under I'ourie ("merged from the nujuntain country on the Uasuto border, and fell upon l.adybrand, which was held by a feeble garrison consisting of one company of the Worcester regiment and forty-three men (jf the Wiltshire Yeomanry. The lioers, who had several guns with them, appear to have been the same force whi( h had been rt.'|)ulsed at Win burg. Major V\'hite. '\ gallant marine, whose lighting (pialities do not seem to have de- teriorated with his distance from salt water, had arranged his defences upon a hill, after the Wepener ukkIcI, and held his own most stoutly. So great was the dis))arity of tlie forces that for days acute anxiety was felt lest another of those humiliating surrenders should inlerruj^t the record of victories, and encourage the Hoers to further resist- ance. The point was distant, and it was some time be- fore relief could reach them. J Jul the dusky chiefs, who from their native mountains looked down on the military drama which was played so close to their frontier, were again, as on the Jammersl)erg, to see the J}oer attack l.vjaten back by the constancy of the JJritish defence. The thin line of soldiers, one hundred and lifty of them covering a mile and a half of ground, endured a heavy shell and rifle fire with unshaken resolution, repulsed every attempt of the burghers, and held the Hag Hying until relieved by the forces under White and Bruce Ham- ilton. In this march to the relief Hamilton's infantry covered eighty miles in four and a half diys. Lean and hard, inured to warfare, and far from every temptation of \li' l,li If 432 THE GREAT BOER WAR wine or women, the British troops at this stage of the campaign were in such training, and marched so splen- didly, that the infantry was often very little slower than the cavalry. The City Imperial Volunteers covering two hundred and twenty-four miles in fourteen days, with a single forced march of thirty miles in seventeen hours, the Shropshires forty-three miles in thirty-two hours, Bruce Hamilton's march recorded above, and many other fine efforts serve to show the spirit and endurance of the troops. In spite of the defeat at Winburg and the repulse at Ladybrand, there still rem.xined a fair number of broken and desperate men in the Free State who held out among the difficult country of the east. A party of these came across in the middle of September and endeavored to cut the railway near Brandfort. They were pursued and broken up by Macdonald, who, much aided in his opera- tions by the band of scouts which Lord Lovat had brought with him from Scotland, took several prisoners and a large number of wagons and of oxen. A party of these Boers attacked a small post of sixteen Yeomanry under Lieutenant Slater at Bultfontein, but were held at bay until relief came from Brandfort. At two other points the Boer and British forces were in contact during these operations. One was to the im- mediate north of Pretoria, where Grobler's commando was faced by Paget's brigade. On August i8th the Boers were forced with some loss out of Hornies Nek, which is ten miles to the north of the cai. 1. On the 2 2d a more important skirmish took place ai . ienaar's River, in the same direction, between Baden-Powell's men, who had come thither in pursuit of De Wet, and Grobler's band. The advance guards of the two forces galloped into each other, and for once Boer and Briton looked down the muz- zles of each other's rifles. The gallant Rhodesian Regi- ment, which had done such splendid service during the war, suffered most heavily. Colonel Spreckley and four others were killed, and six or seven wounded. The Boers were broken, however, and fled, leaving twenty-five THK END OF THE WAR 433 of the ) splen- ver than ring two j, with a n hours, hours, iny other :e of the jpulse at f broken ut among ese came red to cut sued and lis opera- ,0V at had prisoners \ party of Veomanry re held at )rces were to the im- ando was [the Boers , which is d a more er, in the who had r's band, into each the muz- lian Regi- uring the and four .ed. The enty-five prisoners to the victors. Baden -Powell and Paget pushed forward as far as Nylstroom, but finding themselves in wild and profitless country they returned toward l^retoria, and established the British northern posts at a place called Warm Baths. Here Paget commanded, while Baden-Powell shortly afterward went down to Cape Town to make arrangements for taking over the police force of the conquered cnunuies, and to receive the enthusias- tic welcome of his colonial fellow-countrymen. Plumer, with a small for< c operating from Warm Baths, scattered a Boer commando on September ist, capturing a few prisoners and a considerable (|uantity of miniilions of war. On the 5th there was anoilier skirmish in the same neighborhood, during which the enemy attacked a k(jpje held by a company of Munster Pusiliers, and was diiven off with loss. Many thousands of cattle were captured by the British in this part of the field of operations, and were sent into Pretoria, whence they helped to supply the army in the east. There was still considerable effervescence in the west- ern districts of the Transvaal, and a force of cavalry, including some of the 'I'hird Brigade and of the Colonial Division, met with fierce opposition at the end of August on their journey from Zeerust to Krugersdorp. A suc- cession of small skirmishes and snipings cost them no less than sixty casualties. Lord Methuen's force, after its long marches and arduous work, arrived at Mafeking upon August 28th for the purpose of refitting. Since his departure from Boshof on May 14th his men had been marching with hardly a rest, and he had during that time fought fourteen engagements. He was off upon the war-path once more, with fresh horses and renewed energy upon September 8th, and on the 9th, with the co-operation of General Douglas, he scattered a Boer force at Malopo, capturing thirty prisoners and a great quantity of stores. At the same time Clements was de- spatched from Pretoria with a small mobile force for the purpose of clearing the Rustenburg and Krugersdorp districts, which had always been storm centres. These »i h 434 THK GREAT BOKR WAR U two forces, of Methuen and of ClenuMits, moved through ihf country, sweepinj^ the scattered Hoer bands before thenj, and hunting them down until they dispersed. At Kckepoort and at Hckspoort Clements fought successful skirmishes, losing at the latter action Lieutenant Stan- ley of the Yeomanry, the Somersetshire cricketer, who showed, as so many have done, how close is the connec- tion between the good sportsman and the good soldier. On the 1 2th Douglas took thirty-nine prisoners near Lichteni)urg. On the i8th Rundle captured a gun at Bronkhorstfontein. Hart at I'otchefstroom, Hildyard in the Utrecht district, MacDonald in the Orange River Colony, everywhere the British generals were busily stamping out the last embers of what had been so terri- ble a conflagration.' Much trouble but no great damage was inflicted upon the liritish during this last stage of the war by the inces- sant attacks upon the lines of railway by roving bands of Hoers. The actual interruption of traffic was of little consequence, for the assiduous sappers with their gangs of Basuto laborers were always at hand to repair the break. But the loss of stores, and occasionally of lives, was more serious. Hardly a day passed that the stokers and drivers were not made targets of by snipers among the kopjes, and occasionally a train was entirely de- stroyed. Chief among these raiders was the wild Theron, who led a band which contained men of all nations — the same gang who had already, as narrated, held up a train in the Orange River Colony. On August 31st he de- railed another at Klip River to the south of Johannes- burg, blowing up the engine and burning thirteen trucks. Almost at the same time a train was captured near Kroon- stadt, which appeared to indicate that the great De Wet ' 1; ' It is to be earnestly hoped that those in authority will see that these men obtain the medal and any other reward which can mark our sense of their faithful service. One of them in the Orange Kiver Colony, after narrating to me his many hair-breadth escapes, proph- esitd bitterly that the memory of his services would pass with the need for them. * Ml THE KND OF THK WAR 435 rovigh before I. At :essful Slan- r, who :onnec- loUUer. rs nei\r gun at yard in ; River busily JO terri- :ed upon je inces- g bands i of Utile ;ir gangs pair the of lives, e stokers s among irely de- Theron, ions— the |p a train ,t he de- ohannes- ;n trucks. ix Kroon- De Wet 111 see that can mark ange Kiver pes, proph- ss with the was hack in his old huntin|j:-grounds. On the sanie day tlu' line was cut at Staiulei Ion. A few days lattr, how- evt'i, the inipimity with which these feats had been per- fi)iiiu(l was broken, for in a similar venture near Krugers- dorp the dashing Theron and several of his associates lost their lives. Two otlier small actions performed at this jieriod of the war demand a passing notice before we reach the final debacle. One was a smart engagement near Kraai Railway Station, in which Major JJrooke of the Sappers with a hundred men attacked a superior Jloer force upon a kopje and drove tliem off with loss — a feat which it is safe to say he coulil not have accomplished six months earlier. The other was tlu' fine defence made by one hundred and twenty-five of the Canadian Mounted Rilles, who, while guarding over the railway, were attacked by a considerable I'oer force w ith two guns. They proved once more, as Ladybrand had shown, that with provis- ions, cartridges, and brains, the smallest force can success- fully hold its ow n if it confines itself to the defensive. And now the Doer cause was visibly tottering to its fall. The Hight of the President had accelerated that process of disintegration which had already set in. Botha resigned his command, which was taken over by Viljoen, a man who had distinguished himself by his virulence in politics before the war. Lord Roberts had issued an extremely judicious proclamation, in which he pointed out the uselessness of further resistance, de- clared that guerilla warfare would be ruthlessly sup- pressed, and informed the burghers that no less than fifteen thousand of their fellow-countrymen were in his hands as prisoners, and that none of these could be re- leased until the last rifle had been laid down. Trom all sides on the third week of September the British forces were converging on Komatipoort, the frontier town. Already wild figures, stained and tattered after nearly a year of warfare, v/ere walking the streets of Lorenzo Alarques, gazed at with wonder and some dis- trust by the Portuguese inhabitants. The exiled burghers IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) /. w "> 1.0 [ri- IIM I.I 1.25 )23 •^ IM 12.2 12.0 1^ 1.8 LA. Ill 1.6 V] <^ 7^ .^ m Photographic Sciences Corporation S ,V M k h, i\ \ %^ A c> 23 WEOT MAIN STREET WL'BSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 873-4503 ^ <^ ' w ^ 436 THE GRI:AT BOER WAR r iJi 'M moodily piicing the streets saw their exiled Tresidcnt seated iu his corner of the Governor's verandah, the well- known carved pipe still dangling from his mouth, the Bible by his chair. Day by day the number of thesie refugees increased. On September 17th special trains were arriving crammed with the homeless burghers, and with the mercenaries of all nations — French, German, Irish-American, and Russian — all anxious to make their way home. By the 19th no less than seven hundred had passed over. At dawn on September 22d a half-hearted attempt was made by the commando of Erasmus to attack Elands River Station, but it was beaten back by the garrison. While it was going on Paget fell upon the camp which Erasmus had left behind him, and captured all his stores. Erom all over the country, from Plumer's liushmen, from Barton at Krugersdorp, from the Colonials at Heilbron, from Clements on the west, came the same reports of dwindling resistance and of the abandoning of cattle, arms, and ammunition. On September 24th came the last chapter in the cam- paign in the Eastern Transvaal, when at eight in the morning Pole-Carew and his Guardsmen occupied Ko- matipoort. They had made desperate marches, one of them through thick bush, where they went for nineteen miles without water, but nothing could shake the cheery gallantry of the men. To them fell the honor, an honor well deserved by their splendid work throughout the whole campaign, of entering and occupying the ultimate point which the Boers could hold. Resistance had been threatened and prepared for, but the grim, silent advance of that veteran infantry took the heart out of the defence. With hardly a shot fired the town was occupied. The bridge which would enable the troops to receive their supplies from Lorenzo Marques was still intact. Gen- eral Pien naar and the greater part of his force, amount- ing to over two thousand men, had crossed the frontier and had been taken down to Delagoa Bay, where they met the respect and attention which brave men in mis- idcnt svell- 1, the these trains >, and nnan, 5 their ;d had pt was bLlands rrison. I which stores, n, from eilbron, 3orts of : cattle, the cam- in the ied Ko- one o£ ineteen |e cheery n honor liout the ultimate liad been advance defence, d. ^'he ve their t. C^en- amount- frontier lere they in mis- THK KND OF THF, WAR 437 fortune deserve. Small bands had slipped away to the north and the south, but they were insignificant in num- bers and depressed in spirit, 'i'he hunting of them down becomes a matter for the mounted policeman rather than part of an organized campaign. One find of the utmost importance was made at Komati- poort, and at Hector Spruit on the Crocodile River. 'J'hat excellent artillery which had fought so gallant a fight against our own more numerous guns was found de- stroyed and abandoned. Tole-C'arew at Komatipoort got one Long Tom (ninety-six pound:) Creusot and one smaller one. Ian Hamilton at Hector Spruit found the remains of many guns, which included two of our horse artillery twelve pounders, two large Creusot guns, two Krupps, one Vickers-Maxini quick-firer, two pom-poms, and four mountain guns. 'J'he most incredulous must have recognized, as he looked at that heap "f splintered and shattered gun -metal, that the long war had at last drawn to a close. And so at this very point I may stop the chronicle of these doings — a chronicle which has necessarily grown less complete, and possibly less accurate, as the events have come more closely up to date. The sins of com- missior: may be few but those of omission are many. There is still to be told the story of the suppression of the scattered bands of Boer warriors, of the fate of De Wet, of the clearing of the northeastern part of the Orange River Colony, and of the final suppression of a form of warfare which was approaching every week more closely to brigandage and even to murder. My time and my space forbid the inclusion of these last incidents, which could have no bearing upon the ultimate result. So at last, after nearly a year of fighting, ended the strange war which it has been my task to chronicle. Between forty and fifty thousand dead, wounded, or in- valids in the official returns show how serious was the task which fell to the British Empire. That it was borne without a murmur is surely evidence enough how deep was the conviction of the nation that the war was not |J ii, I 1 1 11 1 f i'i 1 '! hi 1 ' : i 1 *^' fji ' .'iii 1' ■• I it 1' 4 n; >s If ; Wi i HL :^i 43 « TFTI'- GRF.AT BOKR WAR only just but essential — that the possession of South Africa and the unity of the Knipire were at stake. Could it be shown, or were it even remot'^ly possible, that min- isters had incurred so immense a responsibility, and en- tailed such tremendous sacrifices upon their people with- out adequate cause, is it not certain that, the task once done, an explosion of rage from tlie deceived and the bereaved would have driven them forever from public life? Among high and low, in England, in Scotland, in Ireland, in the great Colonies, how manyhigli hopes had been crushed, how often the soldier son had gone forth and never returned, or come back maimed and stricken in the pride of his youth! Everywhere was the voice of pity and of sorrow, but nowhere the voice of reproach. By an unprecedented effort upward of a million pounds was subscribed by private benevolence to alleviate the lot of those who had suffered, but at no time was it sug- gested that their fate should lead us to reconsider the policy which had caused it. The deepest instincts of the nation told it that it must fight and win, or forever abdicate its position in the world. The Doers approached the war with the firm conviction of ultimate success. Hence the impossible ultimatum, the invasion, the wanton manner in which the Orange Free State joined in the quarrel. Their papers made no secret of their sentiments. But we were almost as much mis- taken in our estimate of the gravity of our task. Our statesmen, our military authorities, our press, and our public equally underrated it. Now that it is over we see how mighty was the enterprise, to conquer fifty thousand formidable mounted v.arriors operating in their own country many hundreds of miles from the sea, and six thousand from the centre of our power. When on the top of these difficulties we had to contend also with pes- tilence in our own army, the undertaking does indeed seem the most formidable that we have ever attempted. But it was done, and so thoroughly done that there are hopes that it will never need to be done again. Through dark days which brought out the virtues of our race as min- d en- vvith- once id the public .nd, in es had e forth :ricken oice of proach. pounds : the lot it sug- der the incts of forever nviction imatum, ge Free o secret ich mis- k. Our and our r we see lousand eir own and six I on the ath pes- indeed tempted. Ihere are Through race as THE END OF THi: WAR 4,^9 nothing has done in our generation we struggled grimly on until the light had fully broken once again. And of all gifts that God has given to liritain there is none to compare with those days of sorrow, for it was in them that the nation was assured of its unity and learned for all time that blood is stronger to bind than salt water is to part. The only difference in the point of view of the Driton from Britain and the Briton from the ends of the earth, was that the latter with energy of youth was more whole-souled in the Imperial cause. Who has seen that arm.y and can forget it — its spirit, its picturescpieness — above all, what it stands for in the future history of the world? Cowboys from the vast plains of the North- West, gentlemen who ride hard with the Quorn or the I'elvoir, gillies from the Sutherland deer forests, bush- men from the back blocks of Australia, exquisites of the Raleigh Club or the liachelor's, hard men from Ontario, dandy sportsmen from India and Ceylon, the horsemen of New Zealand, the wiry South African irregulars — these are the reserves whose existence was chronicled in no blue-book, and whose appearance came as a shock to the pedant soldiers of the Continent who had sneered so long at our little army, since long years of peace have caused them to forget its exploits. On the plains of South Africa, in common danger and in common priva tion, the blood brotherhood of the Empire was sealed. And what, after all, is to be the end of the task? Will the brave but ignorant and prejudiced mrn who have fought us so valiantly accept the ordeal by battle which they demanded, or will they lie brooding until the day when other perils shall have come to draw away the attention of the Empire, and enable them to strike once more for revenge and for independence? The answer may perhaps depend upon the teniperament of him who answers it, but for my own part I have high hopes for the future. We shall never have anything but active hatred, or at the best sulky acquiescence, from the present or perhaps fronn the next generation of Boers. But time and self-government, with the settled order and vested 1 ii 1! M' I:. 't 1 ' i! f, r r tv u •i' 440 THE GREAT BOl.R WAR interests which will spring up under I^ritish rule, will all combine to make a party which M'ill be averse from any violent separation from the Empire. As helots so fine a race could never be reconciled, but as equal fellow-citi- zens they may come at last, when the tragedies of the past are softened by distance, to blend ihemselves with us, and to invigorate us by their robust and primitive virtues. In the great commercial activity which must follow the war the old burghers, seriously thinned by the long struggle, will, in the Transvaal at least, find themselves very soon in a minority. With every year this minority will increase, until at last, even without the aid of the Imperial forces, the loyal inhabitants will be strong enough to hold the others in check. There will be a strict registration of rilles and horses, a limit to the supply of cartridges, and a complete stoppage, of course, of all possible munitions of war. Under such circumstances, with a powerful police force, severe laws against treason, and immediate deportation of all unde- sirable foreigners, it should not be hard to secure the Transvaal. Indeed, in a very few years I should expect to find it the most British of all the South African States. The Orange River Colony may give more trouble, for, unless there should come mineral discoveries, it is hard to see what can prevent that district from remaining ex- clusively Dutch. In any system of franchise founded upon population it will, however, be the weakest factor among the four confederated South African States. But in the end we must reap as we sow. If we are worthy of the trust it will be left to us. If we are unworthy of it it will be taken away. Kruger's downfall should teach us that it is not rifles but Justice which is the title-deed of a nation. The British flag under our best administra- tors will mean clean government, honest laws, liberty, and equality to all men. So long as it continues to do so we shall hold South Africa. When, out of fear, or sloth, or greed we fall from that ideal we may know that we are stricken with that disease which has killed every great Empire which has gone before us. EiEir-:;;-^.™ will all om any jo fine a low-citi- s of the ves with rimitive ch must nned by last, find ery year without ants will . There 5, a limit ppage, of der such ;ere laws all unde- ecure the Id expect in States, uble, for, ,t is hard ining ex- founded ist factor tes. 15ut worthy of rthy of ir lid teach title-deed ministra- ,, liberty, ues to do |f fear, or now that led every Chapter Thirty SOMK LKSSONS OF THE WAR The very first of all the lessons of the war, as it seems to me, is that there must be no more leaving of the army entirely to the professional soldier and to the ofticial, but that the general public must recognize that the defence of the Empire is not the business of a special warrior caste but of every able-bodied citizen. It is an enervat- ing thing for a nation when it comes to be accepted that its protection depends upon a small special class. With modern weapons every brave man with a ritle is a formi- dable soldier, and there is no longer the need for a hard training and a rigid discipline which existed when men fought in platoons and performed complicated evolutions upon the field of battle. With his pen, with his voice, and with his rifle every man who has the privilege of a vote must do what he can to strengthen the fighting force of his country. How many criticisms made by civilians in the last few years have been proved by the stern test of this war to have been absolutely justified! It is the fresh eye, undimmed by prejudice or tradition, which is most likely to see clearly. From the War Office, declar- ing that infantry and not cavalry were necessary for the campaign, to the general on the spot who considered that with ten thousand men he could march to Pretoria, our professional soldiers have not shown that they were en- dowed with clear vision. In the face of their manifest blunders and miscalculations, a civilian need not hesitate to express his own opinion. A few strong impressions were left upon my mind by what I heard and saw of the n i (' f ! .' 7? W0f I ' \ I I 1 1; ' 1 1 ; J , j; t' .r t I I 442 THK GRKAT B()I:R WAR \v;ir, i'lid these, for better or worse, I shall endeavor here to place upon record. One of the most certain lessons of the war, as regards ourselves, is once for all to reduce the bugbear of an in- vasion of Great J>ritain to an absurdity. With a moder- ate efficiency with the rille the able-bodied popidation of this country could without its fleet and without its pro- fessional soldiers defy the united forces of lunope. A country of hedgerows would with modern weapons be the most terrible entanglement into which an army could wander. The advantage of the defence over the attack, and of the stationary force against the one which has to move, is so enormous and has been so frequently proved by \\\\i Boers against ourselves, as well as by ourselves against the Boers, that the man who still dreads the in- vasion of Kent or Sussex must be either the most nervous or the most stupid of his sex. So much national con- solation can we draw from the ordeal through which we have passed. While we can depend for the defence of our own shores upon some developed system of militia and volunteers we can release for the service of the Empire almost all the professional soldiers. The lesson of the war, as I read it, is that it is better and cheaper for the country to have fewer soldiers which shall be very highly trained than many of a mixed quality. If, in order to secure that keenness and individual push and intelligence which modern warfare demands, you have to pay your soldier half-a-crown or three shillings a day, you can by securing a higher type do with fewer numbers, and so save in transport, clothing, accoutrements, and barrack accom- modation. At such a wage you could pick your men carefully, eliminate the unfit, insist upon every man be- ing a highly proficient marksman, and make dismissal from the service a very real punishment. In the wars of the future, where a soldier has to be conveyed to the centre of Africa, the interior of China, or the frontier of Afghanistan, it is most necessary that the army so con- veyed should be of the highest quality. It costs as much avor here IS regards of an in- a moder- ulation of It its pro- irope. A Dns be the my could he attack, ich has to tly proved ourselves ds the i li- st nervous .onal con- which we )\vn shores volunteers almost all war, as le country ly trained to secure nee which lur soldier securing ,o save in k accom- your men |y man be- dismissal lie wars of ed to the trontier of '>' J so con- as m uch SOMI^ Li:SS()NS OF J'lIK WAR 443 to convey and feed a worthless man as a good one. If he is not a dead shot with a rille what is the use of carry- ing him seven thousand miles in order to place him in a firing line? One man who hits his mark outweighs ten who miss it, and only asks one-tenth of the food and transport. If by paying three times as much we can secure tha. one man, it is an obvious economv to the country to do so. i'.liminate the useless soldiers and in- crease the pay ot the useful ones, even if it reduces our army to a hundred thousand men. With our reserves, our militia, and our volunteers we can always fill up liie ranks if it is necessary to increase their numhe s. To take the various arms of the service in turn, our infantry has shown itself to be as good as ever it was. The Generals have winced long before the soldiers have done so, and whether it was in such advances as those of Talana Hill and Klandslaagte, or in such passive accept- ance of punishment as at Spion Kop or Modder River, they have shown all their old qualities of dash and steadi- ness. Their spirit was extraordinarily good. 1 do not know where in our military history we can match the fact that the troops who were hurled JDackward at Colenso in December, who were cut to pieces at Spion Kop in Janu- aryj who were driven oflf Vaalkranz early in February, were the same men who went roaring over the Jloer en- trenchments in the last week of that month. Nothing could demoralize or even dishearten them. As to their patient endurance of pain and of hardship, one could not be a witness to it in the hospitals without a higher sense of the dignity of human nature. Their marching was unexpectedly good. With burdens of forty pounds they covered their twenty miles a day with ease, and on occa- sion they rose to greater efTorts. The forty miles done by the Guards before ]>loemfontein, and the marching of Yule's retiring column, and of the Queenslanders and Canadians who joined Plumer before the relief of Mafe- king, were all very fine performances. So much for the men themselves, but it is in their training that there is the room for criticism. The idea i i' :, 1 i ' 444 THJ: GRKAT BOI^K WAR that an infantry soldier is a pikenum has never quite de- parted in our army. Ht; is still to march in ste; as the pikemen did, to go steadily shoulder to shoulder, to rush forward with his pike advanced. All this is mediajval and dangerous. There is only one thing which wins a modern battle, and that is straight shooting. To hit your enemy and to avoid being hit yourself are the two points of the game, and the one is as important as the other. After the lessons which we had in the first Boer war, the musketry instruction in the British army has been simply disgraceful. The number of cartridges served out annually for practice vary from fifty in the militia to three hundred in a few select regiments. Three thousand should be the absolute minimum. If a man is not a marksman he should be cast from the army, for why should a useless man be paid and fed by the country? The difficulty about ranges has been very much exaggerated. A closed range with small moving figures could be erected in the barrack square, and the man who shot well at those would need no great training to be efficient at longer ranges. At present we take im- mense pains to give a man the best modern rifle and the best ammunition, but instead of teaching him to use it we waste his life i.. the barren and often childish exer- cises of the parade ground. The taking of cover, the most important of all in- fantry exercises, appears to be even more neglected than our musketry. In the Salisbury Plain manoeuvres of 189S I saw with my own eyes lines of infantry standmg and firing upon each other at short ranges without rebuke either from their officers or from the umpires. A Colo- nel who stood upon the position to be attacked, and praised or blamed the company officers according to their success in concealing their men in their advance, would soon teach them to use cover. A sleet of Mauser bullets has the same efifect, but it is hard that our peace training should have so small a relation to war. Entrenching also is one of the weak points of our in- fantry. As Mr. Bennet Burleigh has observed, the sap- ■I f- 'm r quite de- ite; as the er, to rush mediaeval ich wins a . To hit ire the two tant as the i first Boer army has cartridges fifty in the regiments. mum. If a n the army, fed by the been very all moving ire, and the eat training ,ve take im- [ifie and the to use it Idish exer- of all in- ected than noeuvres of ry sta?idifig lout rebuke A Colo- acked, and ng to their mce, would ser bullets ce training s of our in- id, the sap- so MK LKSSONS OF THE WAR 445 pels ha\'e a bad intiueiice upon tlie infantry, for tht-y teach the fool soldier thai lie will liave things done for him which he should be able to do for himself. Kvery infantry officer should know how to plan trenches, ami every infantry soldier how to make them. All through the war our trenches have been the merest rabbit scratch- ings compared with those of the amateur soldiers who were opposed to us. Sometimes they were even ludicrous, like some which 1 saw myself — in a position which might well have been attacked — where the sides of the loopholes in the parapet were made of empty jam pots. At Spion Kop, at Reddersberg, at Nicholson's Nek, at TJndley — • on these and many other occasions better entrenching would have saved lives, if not the day. JJetter shooting, better knowledge of cover — these are the main desiderata in our iniantry. The latter will in the near future be attained, I believe, by some portable bullet-proof shield. There are many smaller improve- ments which will be wrought by the war. Never again should the most valuable lives be exposed by the fatuous idea of giving them a different dress. The officer will carry a rifle like his men. And, above all, the officer must take his profession more seriously, lie must re- member that the lives of his men are in his keeping, and that if through any fault of his they are lost his guilt is not far removed from murder. A braver man than the British ofiicer, or one with a more indomitable and sport- ing spirit, is not to be found. But he treats his work too lightly. Military conversation, though commoner than it once was, is still much too rare. During five months' intercourse with officers I have only once seen one of them reading a professional book. Young lawyers and young doctors cannot take their profession in this dilettante spirit. As a point of honor it is surely inde- fensible to accept certain duties and to be paid for them without carrying them out with all the industry and energy that is possible. A young officer must remember that if he leaves all the thinking to his superiors, and refuses to use his own mind, he will have lost the power 1'' I 446 ITIK GRI.AT BOKR WAR iij of (loiiiyj so 1))' the lime that he comes to l)e a superior himself. Our junior company olhcers should be con- stantly i:ncourage(l to think and to act for themselves. l'assin<; on to the cavalry, we come to the branch of the service which appears to nie to be the most in need of reform. In fact, tiie simplest and most effective re- form would be one which should abolish it altogether, re- taining the household regiments for public functions. One absolutely certain lesson of this war is that there is — outside the artillery — only one weapon in the world, and that weapon is the magazine rille. Lances, swords, and revolvers have only one place — the museum. How many times was the lance or the sword lleshed in this war, and how many men did we lose in the attempts, and how many tons of useless metal have our overburdened horses carried about the country? But if these various weapons are discarded, and we come down to the uni- formity of the riHe, then of course we must teach the trooper to use his rifle on foot and dress him so that he can do so. So in an automatic and unavoidable way he becomes mounted infantry. But when I say mounted infantry I do not mean the vamped-up horseman who is converted by battalions as Charlemagne converted the Saxons. Considering his genesis, this man has done very well ; but, as Albrecht remarked, it is some time before he has ceased holding his hat on. What 1 mean are regiments of the type of the Imperial Light Horse, as well horsed and as highly trained in peace time as our cavalry are now. We have not yet realized what first-class mounted infantry can do, for we have never trained any first-class mounted infantry. Let a man be a fine rider, a trained horse-master, a good skirmisher, and a dead shot, and he becomes more valu- able than any mere cavalryman can be. Cavalry, as it seems to me, would be equally unable to attack such a force or to resist it. If they attacked, the magazine fire would shoot them out of their saddles. If they were at- tacked, the best shots and best skirmishers must win. When we compare the doings of cavalry and of mounted i 'I SOMl', LI'.SSONS OK 'I'll I', WAR 447 superior be con- ^elves. I)r;inch of t in need ective re- p;ether, re- functions. \t there is he world, s, swords, im. How ud in this inipts, and rburdened se various o the imi- teach the so that he j\e way he mean the ttalions as [ering his Albrecht jd holding he type of as highly We have ry can do, :1 infantry, er, a good iiore valu- |alry, as it k such a azine fire :y were at- bt win. f mounted infantry in this war we nuist reinenibt-r that it is not a fair comparison, as the one force was highly trained while l\\c other was rapidly im|)r()\ ised. lint oven so, the com- parison nmy be suslaiiu-d by tiie junior branch. 1 ha\'e more than once asked cavalry otticcrs whether they couUl point to any single exploit in the whole war which could not have been as well (h)ne by ecpially well horsed mounted infantry. 'J'he relief of Kimberley, the heading off of C'ronje, the pursuit after Klandslaagle, tiiere is not one which is essentially a cavalry exploit. I'ut on the ollur hand the mounted infantry did things which cavalry as at present constituted could never iuive done — such as the ascent of Klandslaagte, or the surprise of Ciunhill. Let us preserve all our old historic regiments with their traditions and their <•.»//// (/<• lor/^s — and let them be called cavalry also, if the name is dear to them— but let them have only a rifle and let them be trained to fight on foot. Then, if less ornamental, they will become more work- manlike and more formidable. Hoer tactics with Ilritish courage would make a combination which would carry everything before it. I)Ut whatever we may finally call our horseman there is one change which fiiiisf be effected. That is to relieve him of the seven stone of extra weight which is carried by each horse, and which briigs the creature on to the field of battle too weary for h s work. With the heavy military saddle, the rug, the oat bag, the saddlebags, and all the other hangings, the poor beast is weighed down. It is not an exaggeration to say that the ]]oer war was prolonged for months by this one circ^ ^stance, for we should certainly have cut off the Boer retreat and cap- tured their guns had our horses not been handicapped so severely. Whether spare horses should carry the things, or galloping carriages, or whether they should lie dispensed with, must be left to the leaders. But that seven stone must in some way be removed if we are ever to get full value out of our mounted force. In dealing with our artillery it must be acknowledged that for personal gallantry and for general efficiency they 448 THE GREAT BOER WAR .1 »; take the honors of the campaign. Nothing could exceed the devotion with which officers and men stood to their guns under the most deadly fire. The accuracy of our shooting left something to be desired, but in some actions it reached a very high standard. Our gunners, however, were always fr-m the beginning paying the penalty of being the attacking party. As a rule they were firing at guns which were in a position higher than their own, and they were continually engag- ing guns which they could not see. That the Boers were at the beginning of the war able to bring on to the battle- field very much heavier guns than we could set against them must have been foreseen by our military authorities, who knew, by the report of the Intelligence Department, that they possessed four heavy Creusots and sixteen 4.7 howitzers. To some extent these were neutralized by our own use of naval guns — a most dangerous and hand- to-mouth expedient. Outside these special guns, which were not field guns at all, our fifteen-pounders were as good as anything which the Boers could set against them. In quality of ammunition we had an immense advantage. Had the Boer fuses been as good as their guns and their gunners, our losses would — especially in the early part of the war — have been much more severe. We imagined that we held another advantage in the possession of lyddite, but it appears that a careful in- quiry should be made into this substance before we com- mit our artillery further to its use. Its destructive power upon buildings, etc., is beyond doubt, but it is by no means equally fatal when used against troops in an open formation. I have spoken to several Boers upon the subject, and none of them expressed a high opinion of it. We imagined that there was a considerable area of destruction round each bursting shell, but I know of at least one case where a shell burst within seven yards of a man with no worse effect than to give him a bad head- ache. But the very great advantage w^hich the Boers possessed — one which enabled half a dozen Boer guns to hold as ' .J%L/ UgaMitOn-fifc il\i*M--* It— .^- Id exceed d to their cy of our Tie actions beginning rty. As a a position illy engag- Boers were the battle- set against authorities, )epartment, sixteen 4.7 itralized by 5 and hand- guns, which ers were as gainst them, i advantage, ns and their [early part of |ntage in the careful in- ;ore we corn- active power it is by no L in an open Is upon the opinion of tble area of know of at ;en yards of ja bad head- irs possessed to hold as SOME LESSONS OF THE WAR 449 many British batteries — was that their cannon were as invisible as their riHes. The first use which a Boer makes of his guns is to conceal them. The first use which a British major makes of his is to expose them in a straight line with correct interspaces, each gun so near its neighbor- that a lucky shell dropping between them might cripple the crews of each. The artillery are a highly educated scientific corps, so the outsider waist conclude that there is some deep reason for this arrange- ment, but whatever the reason may be it most certainly does not apply to a war like this. From first to last it has put us at a most serious disadvantage. Sometimes it is unavoidable that the attacking force should be in the open, but it 's seldom that some broken ground, bushes, boulders, or other cover cannot be found if the officer will be content to scatter his guns a little and to break his symmetrical line. I have seen a British bat- tery under a heavy fire from unseen opponents, itself in the open, while within a few hundred yards was a high maize field from which it could have fired unseen. There is a magnificent insolence in the way in which the Bri^^ish guns are worked, but many a man has paid for it with his life. There are times and places where a gunner must think nothing of himself — so it was with Abdy's and Blewitt's batteries at the assault on Ladysmith, when everything depended upon their getting the proper posi- tion, which could only be done by coming out into the open — but one of the lessons of the war, as it appears to a civilian, is that a battery should not be exposed save for some special purpose. Another prejudice which may be quite justified in European warfare has exercised an evil influence upon our artillery in the campaign. This is the extreme re- luctance of commanding officers to split up a battery and to act with any unit less than six guns. " One gun is no gun," says an artillery maxim, but there have been oc- casions in the campaign when a single gun would have saved us from disaster. While majors preserved their perfect six-gun batteries the troops at Reddersburg, at 29 ■'-. 'I I 450 THE GREAT BOl-R WAR Lindley, at Roodewal, at Honning's Spruit, were all in dire need of the two guns which might easily have been spared them. The Boers sent their small parties about the country with guns. We sent ours without, and when the parties met ve were at a fatal disadvantage. And the root of the matter lay in the disinclination of our officers to divide up a battery. There is another subject so painful that one would be tempted to avoid it but for its vital importance. It is the danger of the artillery firing into their own infantry, as occurred again and again in the campaign. AtTalana Hill our guns opened v/ith shrapnel at less than two thousand yards upon our own stormers, and drove them with some loss off the crest which they had captured. Surely officers could be provided with a glass which would make it impossible to mistake Boer for Briton at so close a range. At Stormberg the same thing hap- pened, with tragic results. So also at Colenso. It is difficult to know how to show your own gunners what point the advancing infantry have gained. The best suggestion is that of Major Hanwell, of the Thirty-ninth Battery, that a conspicuous flag ^nould be carried at a prearranged distance behind the firing line. The very best glasses and the most cool-headed men are needed to prevent a disaster which must become more probable as the range of artillery increases and infantry improve in taking cover. As far as our equipment goes most artillery officers seem satisfied, in spite of all criticism, with the fifteen- pounder field gun, and argue that any gun which fires faster fires too fast to be controlled by its commander. A battery at present can discharge from fifteen to twenty shots a minute. They hold, also, that any increase in weight of the gun must be at the expense of mobility. On the other hand, they have learned that the shrapnel time fuses are too short, and that batteries should be pro- vided with common shell for use against sangars, houses, and other solid defences. It is for a committee of inquiry to decide whether such SOME LESSONS OF THE WAR 451 all in ; been about t, and intage. ;ion of 3uld be , It is ifantry, Talana lan two ^e them aptured. s which iriton at ing hap- 3. It is ers what rhe best rty-ninth ried at a The very lee.ded to ibable as prove in officers fe fifteen- lich fires imander. to twenty -rease in fmobilit). 1 shrapnel Id be pro- Is, houses, Ither such small changes as these are all which we can gather from our experience in this war. A certain conservatism and loyalty prompt a man to stand by the weapons which he knows how to handle as against those of which he lias no experience. But surely it must be admitted that one gun which fires very rapidly is equal to several guns which fire slowly, and offers a smaller mark. Also that a dif- ference of mobility, which may or may not be of any im- portance, is more than atoned for by the certain fact that with the heavier gun you can hit your enemy a mile beyond the range at which he can hit you. The twelve-pounder Elswick gun, for example, cannot be much less mobile than the service weapon, and yet its effective range is nearly double the distance. In the wars of the future it is certain that very much heavier guns will be employed than in the past. The bullock guns of the l^oers are the forerunners of an artillery which in a country of good roads with steam traction available may assume the most monstrous proportions. The greatest cannon of our bat- tleships and fortresses may be converted into field pieces. To those who have seen a six-inch gun taken across a South African drift nothing seems impossible in the use of heavy artillery. The lesson of the war as regards the effect of artillery is that while it is comparatively harmless where troops are extended or entrenched, it is most deadly when, through faulty leadership or the accident of the ground, troops are compelled to bunch. Spion Kop was won entirely by the Boer artillery — the one example in the war where infantry have been mastered by guns. The small Vickers-Maxim quick-firer established an evil reputation there and elsewhere ; but as the war went on it was appreciated that its shells might as well be solid, as they have small penetrating power after their explosion, and are usually only to be feared on direct impact. The engineers in every branch have done splendidly in the war. The balloon department was handicapped by the height of the scene of operations, which only gave them a narrow margin (a few hundred feet) of elevation. 452 THE GREAT BOER WAR ('■ . !M' But in spite of this they did fine work, and their presence will become more essential as the trench and the hidden gun become universal in the battles of the future. The pontoon section also did well, but it is the railway sappers who have really won the first honors of the campaign upon the side of the British. They were, of course, im- mensely assisted by the presence of the Pioneer Regi- ment, with its skilled officers and trained workers, and also by the presence of cheap black labor; bat the energy and ingenuity with which every difficulty was surmounted and the line was kept up to the army will always remain a wonder to those who saw it and a glory to those who did it. One branch of the service which proved to be most useful, and which might well be enlarged, is the mounted engineer. As the horseman threatens to play so great a part in the wars of the future, it is necessary to have your horse-sapper who will keep up with him, tap telegraphs, break bridges, cut lines, and get the full ad- vantage out of each advance. Our transport and our commissariat have been among the few pleasant surprises of the war. The former showed the organizing genius of Lord Kitchener, who centralized it in such a way that the greatest possible amount of work was got out of it. The latter was really marvellously good, considering the difficulties which had to be overcome. Colonel Ward, of Ladysmith fame, and Colonel Richardson, who worked the supplies from Cape Town, rank high among the heroes of the campaign. There are few men more deserving of the gratitude of the country. There remains that Medical Department upon which so fierce a light has beaten. It has had less than justice done to it, because the desperate nature of the crisis which it had to meet was not realized by the public. For reasons of policy the grave state of the army in Bloem- fontein was never made known, and at the moment when the public was reading optimistic reports the town was a centre of pestilence and the hospitals were crammed to their utmost capacity. The true statistics of the out- .t»,a,ss^sia resence hidden 2. The sappers impaign irse, im- ir Regi- :ers, and le energy mounted s remain lose who ^ed to be ed, is the s to play cessary to 1 him, tap le full ad- een among |he former [lener, who X possible was really which had fame, and from Cape 1 campaign. Itude of the |>n which so lan justice ' the crisis tblic. For in Bloem- Iment when [town was a ]rammed to Df the out- SOME LKSSONS OF THK WAR 453 break will probably never come out, as the army returns permit the use of such terms as " simple continued fever " — a diagnosis frequently made, but vague and slovenly in its nature. If these cases were added to those which were returned as enteric (and they were undoubtedly all of the same nature), it would probably double the num- bers and give a true idea of the terrible nature of the epidemic. Speaking roughly, there could not have been fewer than from seven to ten thousand in Bloemfontein alone, of which thirteen hundred died. At the time of this terrible outbreak the army depended for its supplies upon a single precarious line of rails, which was choked with the food and the remounts abso- lutely necessary for the continuance of the campaign. The doctors had the utmost difficulty in getting the tents, medicines, and other essentials for their work. They were overwhelmed with cases at the very moment when their means for treating them were at the lowest, and un happily enteric is of all diseases the one which needs careful nursing, special nourishment, and constant atten- tion. The result was in many cases deplorable. There were hospitals where the most necessary utensils were wanting. In supplying these wants locally there was, as it seemed to me, a want of initiative and of energy, but it sprang largely from an exaggerated desire on the part of the authorities to conciliate the Free Staters and reconcile them to our rule. Il was thought too high- handed to occupy empty houses without permission, or to tear down corrugated iron fercing in order to make huts to keep the rain from the sick soldiers. This policy, which sacrificed the British soldier to an excessive respect for the feelings of his enemies, became modified after a time, but it appeared to me to increase the diffi- culties of the doctors. Where the Department seemed to be open to criticism was in not having more men upon the spot. Cape Town was swarming with civil surgeons, and there was no diffi- culty in conveying them to Bloemfontein, Kroonstadt, or wherever else they were needed. For example, a man 45 -I- THi: gri:at b()i<;r war \i 1 1 I .!(; should certainly have been on duty night and day at the station to meet all incoming trains and receive the sick and wounded. There were cases where men lay on the platform for long periods before being removed. So also it was obvious that a rest camp should have been formed early, so as to relieve the congestion of the hospitals by taking away the lighter cases. J>ut the situation was a most difTicult one, and the men upon the spot, from Gen- eral Wilson to the humblest orderly, were worked to their extreme capacity. It is easy now to criticise what they did not do, but it is just also to remember what they did. The fact is that the true blame in the matter rests not with the Medical Department, but with the composition of the South African army. The Medical Department is arringed to meet the wants of such a body of regular troops as Great JJritain could put in the field, but not to provide for a great army of irregulars and Colonials very much larger than could ever have been foreseen. It is unjust to blame the Medical Department for not being prepared for that which was a new thing, totally unfore- seen by any one, even after the outbreak of hostilities. One consoling fact we find amid much that is sad, and that is that we can at any moment draw upon the very best both of the senior and of the junior surgeons in our civil hospitals, and so supplement our army organization. A medical reserve could be formed at very small cost which would ensure to the soldier the very best skill which the country can pioduce. At the same time, it cannot be denied that there is room for improvement in the personnel of the department and in the spirit in which they approach their work. There are many con- spicuous exceptions, but it appears to the civilian that there is too much that is military and too little that is medical in the relations between the department and those whom they serve, .better pay and a higher stand- ard of ^examination (periodical, if possible) are the only methods by which any lasting improvement can be effected. |! '. SOMl, IJvSSONS Ol*' I'Jll': WAK 455 y at the the sick y on the So also 1 {ormecl pitals by 311 was a om Gen- orkecl to cise what vhat they rests not niposition irtment is of regular but not to mials very :en. It is not being lly unfore- stilities. is sad, and n the very ons in our anization. small cost best skill le time, it >vement in spirit in many con- ilian that ;tle that is ment and ^her stand- [e the only t can be Leaving these hasty and superficial iiof-'s of the way in which each brant h of the service Itas been affected by the war, I should desire to add a ft;vv words uj^on the army of the future. 1 believe that if we could lay the lessons of this war rightly to heart we might become as strong upon land as we are on sea, and that the change might be effected without atiy increase of expense. It will probably be represented that the hsson of the war is that the army should be increased; Init my own im- l)ression, which I advaua; with all diffidence, is that the true reading is different, and that we should decrease the army in luunbers and so save the money which will en- able us to increase its efficiency and mobility. When 1 say decrease the army 1 mean decrease the number of professional soldiers; but 1 shouK! increase the total number of armed nu;n upcjii whom wt; can call by a liberal encouragement of volunteering and such an extension of the Militia Act as would give us at least a million men ior home defence, setting free the whole of the highly trained soldiers for the work of the Kmpire. These volunteers and miliiia should not be plagued by drill beyond the very simplest re(|uirements, but their shooting should be sedulously encouraged, and every hunt in the kingdom should furnish its commando of mounted infantry. The present yeomanry should also be trained as mounted infantry. With these troops, the household infantry and cavalry, and a good proportion of highly disciplined artillery, the country could be left in absolute security. The army proper should, according to this scheme, be drawn from a higher class than is done at present, for modern warfare demands more intelligence and individ- uality than is to be found in the |)easant or unskilled laborer classes. To get these men a good wage must be paid — ^not less than half a crown a day. with a pension in reserve. For this we should get picked men, and insure that instead of the recruiting sergeant seeking the man the man shall seek the recruiting sergeant. Having secured the best material, the soldier should then be w 456 THE GREAT BOER WAR most carefully trained, so that the Empire may never have the expense of sending out a useless unit. Grant- ing that the professional army should consist of a hun- dred thousand men, which is ample for every require- ment, I should divide them roughly into forty thousand mounted infantry, who should be the elite^ trained to the last point, with every man a picked shot and rider. Twenty thousand I should devote to forming a powerful corps of artillery, who should be armed with the best weapons which money could buy. Ten thousand would furnish the engineers, the army service corps, and the medical orderlies. There is no use in feeding and pay- ing men in time of peace when we know that we can get them easily in time of war and rapidly make them effi- cient. In all these three departments it would be prac- ticable to fill up the gaps by trained volunteers when they are needed. For example, the St. John's ambulance men showed themselves perfectly capable to do the hos- pital duties in South Africa. From the various engineer battalions of volunteers .the sappers could extend to any dimensions. There remain thirty thousand men out of the original number, which should form the infantry of the line. These should preserve the old regimental names and traditions, but should consist of mere " cadres " — skel- eton regiments to be filled up in time of war. There might, for example, be one hundred regiments, each con- taining three hundred men. But these men, paid on the higher scale, are all picked men and good rifle shots, trained to the highest point in real warlike exercises — not in barrack square evolutions. Where the standard of intelligence is higher, drill is not so necessary to give cohesion to a regiment. Thi Li force would in itself (with the aid of the mounted infantry and artillery) be able to cope with any ordinary task i but when the nation desired to use its whole strength, the regiments would at once be increased to one thousand each by drafts from the huge volunteer and militia reserves. This new material would take some digesting, but with three hundred old soldiers already in the ranks it would not take long before the SOME LESSONS OF THK WAR 457 y never Grant- a hun- require- housand ;d to the ■\ rider, powerful the best id would and the and pay- i can get ,hem etTi- [ be plac- ers when mbulance the hos- i engineer ;nd to any en out of nfantry of tal names |s"— skcl- |r. There each con- id on the tie shots, ^ercises — [andard of •y to give ;elf (with .e able to n desired .t once be the huge ial would soldiers lefore the regiments would become formidable. Our infantry force would thus rise at once to a hundred thousand men, with behind them a million or so of the picked manhood of the country ready to form fresh battalions or to fill the gaps in the old ones. Add to this the Indian army, and the splendid material of Australia, South Africa, and Canada, each of which should be separately organized, and we should have such a force as the Kmpire has never yet had at its command. In spite of tlie higher pay to every officer and man, I believe that the economies would be so great, owing to the smaller numbers — which count, not merely upon a pay list, but in our bills for transport, for food, for pensions, and for barracks — that we could do it at a considerably smaller cost if the nation can be persuaded to extend the Militia Act for short periods of home service. ]]ut, above all, let the army become a serious profession, let us have done with the "fuss and the feathers," the gold lace and the frippery, which were needed to catch the ploughboy, but are repellant to the reasonable man. Let us have done also with the tailor- ing, the too luxurious habits of the mess, the unneces- sary extravagances which make it so hard for a poor man to accept a commission. If only this good came from all our trials and our efforts, they would be well worth all that they have cost us. I 11 'iiil V 'If \ ' I f,' f ' « !>:■ ' h APPFNDIX. C,s,. °'"'""*'' '"""■"■ '" CASUALTIES '-ASl'Al.TIHS tN THE FlKI P Casualties in Action. Casualties reported aunng the week.. Total casualties re- ported up to and including t h e week— Kelniont, Nov. 23 Colenso, Dec. 15 " nriefontein,Mar."io. Dundee, Oct. 20. . |;,.landslaagte,Oct. 2i t-nslin (Graspan) Nov. 25 Karquhar's"'F"a'rm and Nicholson's Nek, Oct. 30 ... . Johannesburg and t'retona, capture of "^ Karee, near' Brand - fort, Mar. 29. I-adysmith, Relkf of, I'eb. ,9 to 27.. -waj.-ersfontein, Dec II Monte Christo (Co. lenso),etc.,Feb. ic to 18 4^o rill'. ciKi'.AT B()i:r war OKFICIAI- TAHl.IC OK CASUALTIKS. iontinut,/. CuHiialticA in Actiuii, Miuliicr Rivrr, Nov. v8 l'aai. i6 to ^7 I'otXit'tcr's Drift, Vv\i. 5 to 7 Pie-ioria, rast «>f, Jiini' II and 1.2 ... Kfilili'islxiri;, April \ and 4 KirtfiiiUciii, < )i't. 34. Sauna's I'ost, Mar. (i Sciu'lial, May ag. . . . Spiuii Klip, I'lcjaii. 17 •" -'4 StormlMT).:, Di'c. k^. Uitval's Nek, July II Willow (!raiiK«',Ni)v. 23 At I.adysnuth diir- inn Invi'stiiu'iit Battle of Jan. o. . . OtluT i-asnaltii's . . At Kinibcrlcy dur- ing Invfstiiu'iit — At MafekinK durinj^' Investment Other casualties .... Total casualties in action reported up to Sept. 8 KlI.I.KD. t u 4 «7 2 8 I ^ 27 14 6 5 102 283 ■ c 66 6 10 II !■; 38 350 3' 16 II 164 60 36 64 799 2, 683 WOI'NDKD. J 30 3').i 74 1,13^' 18 326 16 128 2 6 33 98 16 121 7 127 5.1 1,050 7 5> 3 53 I (.6 3.S 3^' 287 280 »5 124 10 417 »5a 3,86s ,064 1^,868 1 ) 1 F 1 ) iii. Wol NI.S II IN Sol Ill Akkk A (IM 1 ri )KII IN WoUNDKli^ (/; e <-.* 8 u e m u T3 'W' y, s — 3» 6 1 66 8 3 I I - 4 a 7 I 5 6 4" I .} 2 — 4 as 3 29 4 — 9 45 329 85 779 Mlss|N(, ANIl Pkisonkks N.C. 0*s and men. — 2 7 62 I 5 3 8 397 — 2 18 408 12 7 347 i< 620 4 186 I 8 2 — 12 I 3 I 127 4' 3,606 *a8j *7,33<' I 'I'OTAI. Kll I Kli, WorNimi), MiSMNi,, ANIl I'KtSONRKS. e t£ O 34 98 30 a5 13 7 37 7 87 20 47 42 18 16 646 1,630 461 «.437 354 137 440 III 544 177 1,642 707 245 85 453 352 163 257 8,270 23, 881 * Of these, 240 offieers and 6.?qo men have been released or have escaped, and 3 ofTicers and Sb men have died in captivity. I 1 I AIMM'.NDIX 461 OFKICIAI, TAIM.K OF CASU/\I.TI^:S.--^<'«^>'(lw^<^'. ToTAI. VII 1 Hli, 'Ol NltKK, AN1> NRKS. 34 461 98 1,437 30 354 ■iS »37 13 7 37 7 440 III 544 177 87 1,643 7"7 in 2»5 ■J 85 47 4- 453 i 353 18 16 646 y(\^<^ 163 257 8,270 23, 881 Othrr CuHiiultirs. < )lh. ' rs. N.l'.n.s and inni. Ufportrd tliiritiv; thr wcik — 1 >ir n 3 t 6 1 1 38l 85 40 3 149 3 1,219 1,783 !• 38 Died of wounds in South Africa 31 Missinv; and prisotwrs 43 140 6 I )ii'd of disease in South Africa Accidental deaths in South Africa Sent home as invalids Total 337 Total losses reported up to and including the week — Killed in action 3,683 779 945* 86 Died of wotindH Missinji and prisoners (excliidini; those who have been recovered or have died in c,ipti\ity) Prisoners who have died in captivity 1 )ied of disease 5,473 Aicidental deaths , 101 Sent home as invalids , . , , 37.957+ Total ■^8,ooT Total losses reported Cexrlusive of sick and wounded men now in British hospitals in South Africa) ,785 ♦This total probably includes a large number of men rejjortcd "niissinji;" who subsecpiently rejoined, but whose ri turn was not notitied. + ()f these, 173 have died, 740 have been discharged from t!ie service as unfit, and 930 are in nospital. caped, and •^^ .- t 'k INDEX Abdy. Major. 194, 4^5 Abram's Kraal, 2gn Acton Homes, 74 Adams, Colonel Gould, iq8 349 ^ ' Adye, Colonel, 415 Adye, Major. 96. 102 Africander Bond. 43, eg Airhe. Earl of. ^sfAl, 273. Albrecht. German artillerist ^293.443 Albuera, allusion to, 126 Alderson, 299 Aldvvorth, Colonel, 286 Aliwal, 309 310, 336 Alleman's Pass, 383 Ambulance. St. John's, 453 Amersfoort, 4i9,-'42o ^" Argyll and Sutherland Hijrh- landers (Princess Louise's) ist Battalion. 120, 122,125 127, 133. 266, 286, 412 ^' Artillery, Royal, Field Bat- teries: (4th) , 204, 207, 333 396; (5th), 396; (7th) 153' 161, 186. 214. 224; (8th) t°f^('3th), 73. 76,' 94 99': /r^;t,^^3• 276, 288, 321- (rgth), 175,2^4. (20th), X75 : l7f]'^V3'?^-^94;(2Sth ; 175.214; (37th), 396; (3Sth 402.403: (39th). 447 ;(42d), 54, 73. SO. 91, 1S2; (51st) 54; (53d), 54. 73. 91. 99 194: (62d), 123 27 120' ;33. 265, 276,' 288 • 32?- (f^3d), 153,214,224; 64th)' X53;(66th).x53.i58; 6'7tS; 77' Qa-''rUit^''^^'33. 76, ]l\ti?{^' /73d). 214. 224; J2 '*;o.-^-^' '-^7: (75th). "?;, /23, 133, 288, 321- 76th. 276, 285; ;77?h).' 224. 232, 410; (7,jth), 149 174. 309. 310; (8 1st) "76 28 r. 2S5; (82d) 276.' 2I5 390; (83d). 366; ^(84th)' 366; (85th), 366 ^ ^"^' \Z ,J^}i, ^29. 130. 140, 387 ' M) ^^l '^^' '^^' 378. 307, (M), 362, 412; (O) 29?'-7A/°^'3^7.409: (P; ?88' ^,%\' ^"' ^^-^^ 32^ 32s, 3S8. (R). 203, 207; (U) 301 322. 324.326.32s ^^' Bar^' ^">^^'' H«^vitzer Batteries: (37th), 206, 207 239; (6ist) 214, 219 22a 240.276; (65th).' 285 ■*' BaiSes^S) ^r-f ^'^ Arundel. 2or, 202, 212, 305. Asvogel Kop, 30I 464 THE GREAT BOER WAR I I H ♦ At])ara, Battle of, 143, 159 Australian Bushmen, 412, 414 AusLralian Contingents, 203, 208, 209, 296, 305, 403 Ava, Lord, igS B Baiunoton, Colonel, 173, 267 Badajus, allusion to, 22O, 318 Baden - Powell, Major - Gen- eral, 51, 262, 348, 364, 384, 412, 418 Badfontein, 424 Baird-Douglas, Colonel, 398 Bamboo Creek, 363 Baptie, Surgeon, 160 Barberton, 426 Barkly East, 201, 310 Barkly West, 333 Bartholomew, Captain, 209 Barton, General, 242, 362, 370 Barton's Hill, 249 Basutos, II Bearcroft, captain of the "Philomel," 276 Bechuanaland, 19, 312 Bechuanaland Rifles, 353 Bedfordshire Regiment, 2d Battalion, 392, 402 Bi "vor, of the R. A. M. C, 140 Beira, 312, 336, 363 Beit, Mr., 59 Belcher, Lieutenant, 403 Belfast, 420, 421 Belmont, iii, 112, 114, 118, 172, 269, 277 Bentinck, Lord Charles, 351 Bergendal, 422, 423 Berkshire Regiment (Prin- cess Charlotte of Wales's Royal), 2d Battalion, 53, III, 174, 203, 207, 412 Besters, 179 Besters Station, 74 Bethany, 331 Bethlehem, 402, 404, 409 Bethlehem Commando, 332 Bethulie, ?oo, 201, 309 Bethulie Bridge, 142, 301, 30S, 317. 337 Bethulie Commando. 149 Bethune's MounLed Infantry, 152, 214, 373 Bevan, of the Northumber- lands, II.? Biddulphsburg, 392 Biggarsberg Range, 72. 311, 371 Bird, Special Service officer, 51 Birch, Canadian officer, 411 Blackburn, of the Mafeking Defence Force, 35S Blair, of the Seaforths, 267 Blewitt, Major, 194 Bloemfontein, 11, 295, 301, 302, 304, 306, 312, 318, 319, 322, 329, 336, 342, 367, 415, 450 Bloemfontein Conference, 43, 51 Bloemhof, 370 Blomtield, Colonel, 228 Blilcher, allusion to, 301 Blundell, of the Guards, 114 Bond's Drift, 53 Booth, Major, 328 Borden, Canadian officer, 411 Border Mounted Rifles, 73, 94, 187 Border Regiment, ist Battal- ion, 152, 214, 276, 321, 412 Boshof, 333, 393 Booley, Sergeant, 194 Botha, Commandant, 428 Botha, Christian and Louis, 186, 223, 227, 345, 369, 370, 376, 378, 383. 385, 390, 391. 40S, 410, 411, 416, 424, 432 Botha's Pass, 383 Brabant, General, 309, 311, 338, 339. 345. 367. 370, 402 Brabant, young, 180 Brabant's Horse, 309, 310, 33S, 402 Brabazon, Colonel, 208 Brakfontein, 231, 255, 256 INDEX orthumber- Brandford 287 000 r BridleDrift ic'^f;367, 429 Briti«5li Tj ' 1^^' ^54. 163 Bechuanaland ' '^^ Broadwood. General 271 2Sn Bronkhorst Spruit, ,6, 3,,. Brooke, Colonel, 156 Brooke, Major, \J Buffalo Rivir 7I «;;ff'^. The, ^^,]\^ ■DUiawayo, 363 Buller. Ge.:eral S,r Redvers, 1.4. 186, 213-229, 240, 243 ?7V III' ^^^^ ^94. 311. 372 373, 383. 419, 421, 423: 424: Bullock, Colonel, 161 401 Bu fontein, 429 '' ^°' Buhvana, 177, j^g Burgers. PresidJnt, ,^ Burnham, the scout 17, Burn-Murdoch, CoL^'l! .40, Bushman's Kop ^20 Butcher, Major. 'AV p. A., Byrne, Private, 307 Cabul allusion to. 365 '-assar s camp. 177 .st , Cameron H7criii„ , t-ampbell. Mr. W. Y. 28 30 Canadian Contingent. 62. 290 367' So' ^^'' 3'*^' 345. 363 307, 3»o. 407. 411 .J. ^f"f;,an Mounted RiflL 432 Candahar. allusion to ^6<; SSe Col^'^PJ^' 353 ' '' ^ape Lolony, 13 ,,„ Lape Mounted 'Rifies ,,, ^310,338 '^^^- '■<+ Cape Police, 1,0, ,7, ,fo Sr3r3stf;o=''^'^-- cS^o^'SS.'-^ Carnegie, Captain, 193 Carolina, 420 ' ^^ Carnngton. General, 336, 363, Carter. Colonel, 211 -^o^; Castletown, Lord, 340^°^ Cecil, Lord Edward ct .. Ceylon Contingent 'V' ^"^^ Chamberlain Mr i r . CharlemaJ-ne nh"^ ' '^^'' 5^' Charlestofell'Vf '^' ^^^ Cfefe^- 33. 34 ^^:S^:^:S^ -' 330. Chesham, Lord, 334, 3.6 2a?£^r3^S2r"^-B- |S;:&,^P-n, 3.3 Chi^sholm, Colonel, 84. 38, 92, Chlum, allusion to, 1,4 Christiana, 370 ' '^4 Churchill. Winston. 184, 224. Cingolo Hill, 241 Jf Imperial Volunteers 296, 389, 401, 402, 417 420 ' Clements, General." U '2^0 466 THE GREAT BOER WAR ■ 'H Clery, General, i6i, 162, 311, 419. 420 Clochlan, 392 Cloughlan, of the Locomotive Department, 355 Cobrallis, Captain, 397 Codrington, Colonel, 125,137, 320 Coke, General, 419 Coldstream Guards, ist Bat- talion, 112, 114, 122, 125, 127, 134, 135, 379, 380; 2d Battalion, 112, 134 Colenso, 150. 183, 213, 234, 256, 285, 327, 409 ; Battle of, 150-166 Colenso Bridge, 153, 183, 311 Coleridge, Major, 125 Colesberg, in, 200-212, 265, 273, 294, 306 Coleskop, 211 Colvile, General, 325, 329, 336, 382, 393, 394, 395 Commando Nek, 418 Congreve, Lieutenant, 161 Coningham, Colonel, 92, 209 Connaught Rangers, 152, 154, 165, 214, 245, 246 Connely, of the Locomotive Department, 355 Conning tower, 355 Connor, Captain, death, 78 Conolly, Major, 390 Constantia Farm, 341 Cookhouse Drift, 6 Cordua, Lieutenant Hans, 418 Cornwall's, Duke of, Light Infantry, see Duke of Corn- wall's Light Infantry Coster, Dr., 90 Crabbe, Colonel, 320 Crane, Lieutenant, 346 Creagh, Colonel Brazier, 342 Crocodile River, 377, 418, 424 Cromwell, Oliver, 2 Cronje, Commandant, 118, 119, 121, 122, 127, 129, 134. 136, 171, 265, 272, 279. 280, 281, 283, 284, 288, 292, 295, 351. 353 Cronje, the younger, 407 D Dalbiac, Major, 392 Dalgety, Colonel, 338 Dalmanutha, 4rji Daniels, of the Police, 356 Dartnell, Colonel, 82 Davidson, ?\rtillery officer, 32X Davies, Karri, 35, 84, 188 Dawson, Colonel, 326 De Aar Junction, no, in, 142 De Beers Company, 258, 263 Dekiel's Drift, 270 Delagoa Bay, 2, 46, 385, 433 Delagoa Railway, 408, 419 Delarey, Commandant, 208, 408, 409, 410, 412, 417, 418 De Lisle, of the Mounted In- fantry, 204, 379 Dennis, Sapper, 194, 196, 198 Derby, Lord. 20 Derbyshire Regiment (Sher- wood Foresters) , ist Battal- ion, 149, 367, 389; 4th Bat- talion, 397 Devonshire Regiment, ist Battalion, 54, 73, 85, 87, 89, 91, 96, 98, 165, 174, 180, 191, 196, 198, 380, 425 ; 2d Bat- talion, 152, 158, 174, 214, 242, 380 De Wet, Christian, and his brother, 206, 278, 288, 295, 297. 306, 324, 332, 335, 338, 3-^3. 344. 370. 374. 382, 385, 394, 397, 399, 400, 402, 40^, 407, 410, 414, 416, 418. 434 De Wet's Drift, 417 Dewetsdorp, 331, 341 Diamond Fields Horse, 260, 362 Diamond Hill, 273, 382-393, 401, 408 #f 1 INDEX 467 292, 295. 407 18 ;e, 356 officer, 4, 188 26 o, III, 142 258, 263 , 385. 433 p8, 419 iant, 208, 417. 418 junted In- 4, 196, 198 nt (Sher- ist Battal- I; 4th Bat- lent, ist I85. 87, 89, [, 180, 191, ; 2d Bat- 174. 214. and his 288, 295, 335. 338, 382, 385. I, 402, 404, 1418. 434 Drse, 260, 382-393. Dick - Cunyngham, Colonel, 193, 198, 226, 254 Digby-Jones, sapper, 194, 196, 198 Dingaan, Zulu chief, 9 Dolverkrantz, 410 Doornberg Commando, 74 Doornkloof, 231 Dordrecht, 174, 202, 309, 310 Dorsetshire Regiment, 2d Battalion, 175, 214, 223, 225, 244. 384 Douglas, 172, 414 Downman, Colonel, 137. 226 Dublin Fusiliers, ist Battal- ion, 152, 154, 214, 384 Dragoon Guards, 5th (Prin- cess Charlotte of Wales's), 54, 73, 86, 94, 180, 181 Dragoons, ist (Royals), 73, 214; 6th (Inniskillings), 207 ; 7th, 409 Drakensberg Range, 52, 72, 251. 311 Driefontein, 299, 301, 302, 304 Dronfield, 274, 283 Dublin Fusiliers, ist Battal- ion, 54, 74, 76, 77, 80, 94, 96, 184. 245, 246, 253, 416; 2d Battalion, 73, 153 Duke of Cornwall's Light Infantry, 2d Battalion, 172, 284, 285, 286, 367, 380 Duke of Edinburgh's Volun- teer Rifles, 415 Dundee, 55, 72. 76, 311, 371, 372 Dundonald, Lord, 152, 153, 215, 218, 240, 251, 311 Dupleix (Huguenot family), 3 Du Plessis (Boer jailer), 35 Durban (Port Natal), 10, 51, 53, 216, 312, 384 Durban Light Infantry, 74 Durham Light Infantry, ist Battalion, 152, 183, 214, 232, 233, 238, 245, 249, 251 East Kent Regiment (Buffs), 2d Battalion, 214. 276. 280 East Lancashire Regiment, ist Battalion, 278, 321, 322, 367 East London Volunteers, 174 East Saxons, 300, 310 East Surrey Regiment, 2d Battalion, 152, 158, 186, 242, 384 Eddy, Major, 210 Edict of Nantes, i Edinburgh Castle, legend concerning, i Edwardes, Colonel, of the Mounted Infantry, 187, 195 Egerton, Lieutenant, of the "Powerful," death of, 179 Elandslaagte, 82, 84-S9, 311, 339, 409 Elands River, 414 Elands River Station, 390, 435 Eloff, Commandant Sarel, 358, 361 Elswick Battery, 412 Elswick Gun, 448 Elworthy, Captain, 369 Engineers, Royal, 7th Com- pany, 73, 214, 2gi, 306, 366, 416; 23d, 291 English, Major, 416 Enslin, action of, iiS, 129, 269, 277 Ensor, of the R. A. M. C, 140 Entonjanani District, 53 Erasmus Commando, 433 Ermels, 70, 420 Essex Regiment, ist Battal- ion, 205, 207, 276, 286, 366, 380 Estcourt, 150, 175, 183 Ethelston, Commander, 117 Eudon, Major, 363 Ewart, Major, 136 468 THE GREAT BOER WAR f'li Fauersi'ruit, 414 Faskally, Major, 339 Farrar, Mr. George, 35 Fauresmith, 306 Fauresmith Commando, iiS Ficksburg, 392, 405 Ficksburg Commando, 3S2, 406 Fischer, Mr., 43 FitzClarence, Captain, 351, 353, 354 FitzGerald, Captain, 403 FitzPatrick, Mr. J. P., 59 Fort Wylie, 159 Fourie Commandant, 428 Fouriesburg, 406, 409, 41G Fourteen Streams, 360 Frankfort, 404 Frankland, Lieutenant, 184 Fraser, Mr., 302 Fraser's Drift, 268 Frederick the Great, allusion to^ 167 French, General, 73, 83, 85, 86, 142, 201, 203, 204, 206, 207, 20S, 212, 254, 265, 269, 272, 273, 2S3, 294, 298, 299, 321, 333. 336, 342, 343, 369, 376, 420, 421, 423, 426 Frere, 175, 1S4, 220 G Gaberones, 359 Game Tree Hill, 262 Gatacre, General, 143, 144, 174, 201, 294, 307, 311, 332 Geneva Siding, 370 Germiston, 376 Girdwood, Captain, 354 Girouard, railway pioneer, 366 Glen, 320, 321 Glencoe, 72, 74, 83 Glencoe Station, 81 Gloucester Regiment, ist Bat- talion, 54, 73, 91, 92, 94, 96, 102 ; 2d Battalion, 276. 281 Godley, Captain, 129 Goldie, Captain, 160 Gordon Highlanders, ist Bat- talion, 73, 85, 87, 96, 98, 129, 134, 193, 195, 198. 2S4, 290, 291, 292, 339, 345, 3S0, 420 ; 2d Battalion, 54 Gordon Volunteers, 425 Goshen, 19 Gough, Colonel, in Graaf, Mr. D. P., 59 Grant, Captain, 309 Grant, General, allusion to, 137 Graspan, see Enslin Green, Sergeant, 326 Green Hill, 234, 241 Gregorowski, 301 Grenadier Guards, 2d Bat- talion, 303, 392 ; 3d Battal- ion, 112, 114, 134, 135, 137 Grenfell, 402 Greylingstad, 419 Grey town, 52 Grimwood, Colonel, 96 Griqualand, 414 Grobler, 323 Gun Hill, 187, 224 Gunning, Colonel, 78, 92, 226 H Hadders Spruit, 74 Haig, Major, 369, 397 Haldane, Captain, 184 Hall, of the Northumber- lands, 112 Hall, Colonel, 112 Hambro, Lieutenant, 79 Hamilton, Bruce, 345, 367, 369, 389, 404, 428 Hamilton, De Courcy, 254 Hamilton, Ian, General, 73, 86, 96, 195, 196, 254, 335, 343, 345, 366, 368, 374, 376. 387, 388, 401, 404, 412, 418, 424, 428, 434\ INDEX Hammond, Mr., 35 S'r'"^ Regiment, 2d *>attalion, 321 367 Hankey, Corporal, 305 Hannay, Colonel, 269, 277 28r, 286 ^ "' Hanwell, Major, 225, 447 Hare. Captain, 358 Ilarrismith. 55, 406 Harnsmith Commando, 3-12 382 •''' ' Hart. General, 157, 244. 346, Harvey, Major, 204 Hazench, Lieutenant, isS Head, Captain. 278 Hector Spruit, 434 Heidelberg, 70, 3S4, 391, 401, 416, 41Q. 420 ' Heidelberg Commando. 380 Heilbron, 374. 394. 399- 427, Helpmakaar Hill, 178, ing Helvetia. 424 Henderson, Major. 187, iSS Henry. Colonel, 376 Herkoldt, Mr., 43 Herschel, 310 Hex Valley, 200 Highland Light Infantry, ist iJattalion, 120, 129, 130 26^ 266, 284, 291, 297, 367,' 4„6; 427 Hildyard, General, 150 ms 163, 1S4, 185. 186, 312' ' HlangwaneHill, 153, 163, 241, 249. 250 Hobbs, Major, 401 Hofmeyer, Mr.. 430 Holdsworth, Colonel. 413 Honing Spruit Station. 374 400 •^'"*' Hoopctad. 370, 373 Hore, Colonel, 349, 361, 413 Hornies Nek, 429 Hoskin, Colonel, 307 Hottentots, u Household Cavalry, Compos- ite Regiment, 205, 2S9, 322 469 Houtnek, 345, 36S Hovel, of the Worccsters, 209 Howard, General, 311 Howe. Sergeant. 307 Huddart. Midshii)man, 117 Hughes-Hallett, Colonel, 138 Hunt, Colonel, 160 Hunter, General, 73, 1S7 iSS 254, 311, 312, 338, 370,' 373,' 4or, 404. 406, 427 ^'^' Hunter-Weston, Major, 301 377 J > J , Hussar Hill, 240 Hussars, 8th (King's Royal Irish), 342; loth (Prince of Wales s Own Royal) , 203 204, 207, 269, 289. 322 ^oT- ;3th. 152. i64.'2:'4:'Mt'h (^;"^-s),i75. 214, 230, 40.J. So\r-^= ^8th, 73,75.80, ISO. IS I, 421; ifjth (Prin- cess of Wales's Own r . 73. 90, 94, 180 ^■*' Hutchinson. Sir W. He^' ^50 Hutton, General, 335, 366,408, 411 I Imi'Krial Lkjht Hoksk. 73 ^3. 87,91, 94. 153, 1S7, 194,' 195, 19S, 221, 245. 252 -xv^ ^ 339, 362, 370 ^ ' ^^5' Imperial Light Infantry. 214 22S "^' Imperial Yeomanry, 362 -xa^ ^ 415, 427. 429 ' Ingogo. 16 Ingogo River, 52 Inkerman, Battle of, allusion tvJ. 77. 126 Inniskilling Fusiliers, see Royal Inniskilling Fusi- liers Intombi Camp ("Funkers- dorp '), 180 Irish Rifles. 147 Irwin, Major, 232 Isaudhlwana, 9 470 THK GRKAT BOKR WAR i I \ I H ■ /' / jACOBSnAL, 277, 2S3 Jacobsdal Commando, ii8 Jacobsrust, 345 Jaeger, de, ig6 Jameson, Dr., and the Raid, 33 Jameson Raid, 20, 39, 57, 68 Jamestown, 310 Jammersburg, 32, 338, 339 Jenner, Special Service Offi- cer, 51 Jeppe, Mr., 30 Johannesburg, 31, 33, 46, 377, 378, 384, 407, 409, 418 Johannesburg Contingent, 84 Johannesburg Police, 300, 320, 422 Jones, of the Marines, 117 Joubert (Huguenot family). 3 Joubert. General Piet, 71, 95, 180, 186, 189, 354 K Kaai, Struit, 301 Kaffirs, II, 25 Kaflfi-arian Mounted Rifles, 310, 338 Kalahari Desert, 348 Kameelsdrift, 388 Kamfersdam, 263, 274 Kapmuiden, 426 Karee. 321, 322, 336, 346, 364 Keith-Falconer, Colonel, 112 Kekewich, Colonel, 109, 260, 261, 274 Kelly-Kenny, General, 272, 277, 284, 297, 298, 299, 336, 367 Kent Regiment, East, see East Kent Regiment Kheis, 415 Kimberley, 65, 109, 128, 130, 258-274, 277, 280, 294, 303, 312, 336, 409 Kimberley Light Horse, 260, 262, 264, 333, 362 King's Royal Rifles, ist Bat- talion, 73-77. 233 ; 2d Bat- talion, 54, 73, 91, 94, 196, 225 ; 3d Battalion, 214, 226, 232 Kipling, 169 Kitchener, Lord, 280, 284, 288, 294, 310, 340, 405. 414, 416, 449 Kitchener's Hill, 288 Kitchener's Horse, 278, 279, 287 Klerksdorp, 407, 416 Klip Drift, 271, 272, 277, 280, 282, 296 Klipgat, 425 Klipkraal, 282 Klip River, 375 Klip River Division, 53 Kloof Camp, 208 Knapp, Captain, iSo Knight, Mr. E. F., 114 Knox, General, 99, 254, 280, 281, 282, 285, 286, 311 Knox, Major, 80 Koch, General, 83, 88 Koch, Judge, 376 Komantipoort, 432, 433 Koodoosberg, 174, 266 Koodoosdrift, 269 Koodoosrand, 362 Koodoosrand Drift, 282 Korn Spruit, see Sanna's Post Kraaipan, 350 Kraai Railway Station, 432 Kraft, Prince, allusions to, 54, 134, 165, 232 Krause, Commissioner, 376 Kroonstadt, 323, 370, 373, 385, 395. 39^'. 413. 450 Kruger, President Paul Ste- phanus, 8, 14, 28, 29, 33, 34. 35, 39. 41. 43. SL 56. 60, 173, 259, 298, 377, 423, 426; his peace proposals, 312, 314. 315, 333 Krugersdorp, 70, 384, 410, 413. 433 ii tt^ INDEX 47' I St Bat- 2d Bat- 94, 196, !I4, 226, io, 284, 405. 414. 278, 279, 277, 280, 53 14 254, 280, 311 •33 .6 J82 Sanna's 5n, 432 bions to, ler, 376 I373. 385. laul Ste- 29, 33. [, 56. 60, +23, 426; Us, 312, 54, 410, Kruger's Post, 425 Kuruman, Fall of, 172 Lakram, Mr., 263, 264 Labuschague's Nek, 310 Ladybrand, 323, 374 ; allusion to, 432 Ladybrand Commando, 332, 406, 428 Lady Grey, 310 Ladysmith, 54, 55, 72, 73, 177-199. 215. 262, 294; allu- sion to, 422 "Ladysmith Lyre," 182 Lafayette, allusion to, 333 Lafone, S. L., killed at Lady- smith, 198 Laing'-i Nek, 16, 52, 53, 54, 55. 372, 383 Laing's Nek Railway, 55, 141 Lambert, Commandant, 206 Lancashire Fusiliers, 2d Bat- talion, 175, 214, 220, 223, 228, 243. 251, 253 Lancashire Regiments, see East, South, and Loyal North Lancashire Lancaster Regiment (King's Own Royal), 2d Battalion, 175, 193, 220, 228, 243, 244, 251. 253 Lancers, 5th (Royal Irish) , 73, 83, 86, 89, 91, 94, 98, 180, 181, 191 ; 9th (Queen's Royal), 54, 86, iii, 112, 130', 173, 265, 269, 272, 289, 342 ; i2th (Prince of Wales's Royal), 86, 129, 135, 173, 269, 271, 273, 289, 345, 3S8 ; i6th, 269; (Queen's), 297 Landsman's Drift, 74 Lanyon, Sir Owen, 15 Leary, Chaplain J. W., 358 Leeuw Kop, 34.! Le Gallais, Colonel, 321 Leicester Regiment, ist Bat- talion, 73, 76, 81, 96 Leon, Mr., 264 Leyds, Dr., jo, 108 Lichtenburg, 349 Life Guards, 389 Limpopo, 9, n Lincoln Regiment, 2d Bat- talion, 276, 321, 322, 366, 409 Lindley, 370, 374, 394, 396, 411 Lindsay, Lieutenant, 133 Little, Colonel, 405 Liverpool Regiment (King's) 1st Battalion, 73, 91, 96 Livingstone, Private, 156 Lloyd, Colonel, 392 Lobatsi, 357, 359 Lombard's Kop, Battle of, 178 Lombard's Kop, allusion to, 139. 177. 179 London Volunteers, 3S0 Long, Colonel, 158, 159, 160, 165, 185 Lorenzo Marques, 426, 433 Lova*, Lord, 429 Lowe, Colonel, 409 Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, ist Battalion, 109, III, 112, 116, 125, 260, 275, 396, 400; 2d Battalion, 214 Lukin, Captain, 338 Lumsden's Horse, 346 Luttig, Jan, 190 Lydenburg, 11, 16, 385, 419, 424, 425 Lygon, Lieutenant, 320 Lyttelton, General, 226, 311 M McCracken, Major, 203 Macdonald, General Hector (" Fighting Ma? "), 172, 174, 265, 266, 276, 286, 345, 402, 406, 429 Machadodorp, 420, 423, 427 472 THE GREAT BOER WAR Maclaren of the Rhodesian Force, 359- McMicking, Special Service officer, 51 MacNaughton, Lieutenant, 195 Madocks, Captain, 206 Mafeking, 33, 66, 262, 330, 33f>. 348-3fJ4. 35'J. 4"9. 4if> Magersfontcin, Battle of, 128- 140, 247, 272, 283, 294 Mahan, Captain, 312 Mahon, Colonel, 362, 370, 408 Majuba Hill, 16, 17, 54, 372, 392, 394 Manchester Regiment, ist Battalion, 52, 53, 73, 83, 87, 96, 98, 180, 193, 194, 198 Marabastad, 16 Marandellas, 363 Marico River, 9 Marlborough, Duke of, 167, 379 Marshall, General, 276 Marshall's Horse, 344 Martin, Sergeant-Major, 327, 328 Martyr, Colonel, 329 Masibi Stadt, 363 Massena, allusion to, 254 Motabele Campaign, 349 Matabele, the, 9 Mathias, of the Imperial Light Horr.e, 194 Mauchberg, 425 Maxwell, General, 379 Maxwell, Major Cedric, 338 Medical Department, 449, 451 Mentz, de, Field-Cornet, 218 Mercer, allusion to, 159 Metcalf, Colonel, 189, 422 Methuen, General Lord, 108- 127, 171, 262, 265, 279, 336, 354, 360, 367, 370, 373, 382, 393. 399. 400, 413, 417 Meyer, Lucas, 78 Middleburg, 70, 411 Middle Drift, 52 Middlesex Regiment (Duke of Cambridge's Own), 2d Battalion, 175,214, 221, 244, 384 Miller-Wallnutt, of the Gor- dons, 195, i9(), 198 Milligan, Lieutenant, 359 Millner, Sir Alfred, 40, 41, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48. 51. (>5, 66, 67 Milton, Major, 135 Modder River, i2(}- 127, 265, 269, 285, 296, 320, 323, 343 Model schools, 380 Molteno, 144, 147, 307 Moncrieff, Scott, 224 Monte Christo, 241, 249, 250 Montmorency, Captain de, 175, 307 Mooi River, 150, 186 Mount Alice, 216, 224 Mounted Battery, 73, 91, 94, 96, '03 Munger's Drift, 232 Muriel, Captain, 224 Murray, of the Kimberley Force, 274 Murray, of the Scottish Rifles, 224 JV NaAUPOORT, III, 202, 212, 269, 406 Napoleon, allusions to, i, 144, 167, 168. 195, 261, 286 Natal, 9, 48, 51, 53, 56, 150 Natal Carabineers, 73, 83, 94, 153, 187, 191, 214, 252, 269 Natal Field Artillery, 73, 83, 85 Natal Mounted Police, 73, 74, 214 Natal Naval Volunteers, 91, 180 Natal Royal Rifles, 74 National Reform Union, 30 Nek, the, 379 Nel, Commandant, 397 Nesbitt, Captain, 350 I :. INDEX 47.^ Newcastle, 52, 74, 372 Newcastle Road, 311 New South Wales Contin- j^ent, 62, 172, 202, 205, 206, 207, 269, 335 New York "Merakl," 168 New Zealand Continj^ent, 62, 203, 205, 207, 264, 324, 327, 335, 411 Nitral's Nek, 409 Nooitgedacht, 423 Norfolk Regiment, 2d Battal- ion, 321 Northamptonshire Regiment, 2d Battalion, 112, 116, 129, 275. 3f/> North Staffordshire Regi- ment (Prmce of Wales's), 2d Battalion, 321, 367 Northumberland Fusiliers, ist Battalion, iii, 112, 114, 116, 275, 328, 396; 2d Bat- talion, 144, 147, 174, 331, 396 Noorval's Pont, 142, 200, 201, 202, 306, 309, 317 Nottingham Road, 185 Nugent, of the Royal Rifles, 78 Nurse, Corporal, i6i O Observation Hill, 198 Ogilvy, Lieutenant of the '"Terrible," 159 Oldfield, Major, 402 Olifant's Nek, 409 Olive Siding, 308 Olivier, Commandant, 149, 323. 382, 394. 402. 406, 427 O'Meara, Major, 261 Omdurman, 267, 307 Orange Free State, 9, 10, 12, 42, 56, 309, 375 Orange River. 8, 9, 11, no, HI, 112, 118, 306 Orange River Bridges, 142, 308 Orange River Colony. 302, 374. 3S3. 4«6. 427. 437 Orr, Captain, 206 Osfontein, 295 Otter, Colonel, 344 Otto's IIooj), 416 Outran! 's Volunteers, 34^) Oxfordshire Light Infantry, ist Battalion, 276, 280, 286 Paarpehkro, Battle of, de- scribed, 275-294 ; allusions to, 304, 390, 409 Paardeberg Drift, 283 Paardekop, 420 Pack-Beresford, Major, 32^) Packman, of the Light Horse, 198 Page, Sergeant, 356 Paget. General, 397, 402, 433 Paget 's Horse, 415 Pain, Hacket, Colonel, 210, 305 Paley, Captain, 189 Panzera, Major, 350 Pa ton, of the Rhodesian Force, 354 Pepworth Hill, 98, 178, 179, 188 Phillipolis, 306 Phillips, Mr. Lionel, 35 Phipps-Hornby, Major, 327 Pienaar, General, 433 Pienaar's Poort, 386 Pietermaritzburg, 53 Pieters, 243, 251 Pilcher, Colonel, 172, 323 Pilgrim's Rest, 425 Pilson, Special Service officer, 51 Plumbe, of the Marine?, 117 Plume, Colonel, 358 Plumer, Colonel, 51, 336, 354, 359. 363. 433 Pole-Carew, General, 309, 336, 342, 346. 379, 411, 420, 421, 423, 426, 433, 434 474 THK GRKAT BOKR WAR ■. i Popham, of the Derbyshires, Poplars Grove, 296, 299, 304 port Elizabeth, 46, 205 Port Natal, srt' Durban Porter, Colonel, 203, 205, 208, 380 Potchefstroom, 13, 16, 289, 384, 415 Potj^eiter's Drift, 215 Pretoria, 16, 31, 32. 46, 62, 301, 312, 382, 407-418, 423 Pretoria Convention, 18, 20, 29 Pretoria - Delagoa Railway, 377 Pretoria Jail, 34, 418 Pretorius, Commandant, 90 Pretyman, General, 292, 346 Prieska District, 310 Prinsloo, Commandant, 12S. 382, 394, 406, 416 Probyn, of R. A. M. C, 140 Protectorate Regiment, 350, 351. 353 Prothero, Captain, 117 Q QuKKNsi.ANi) Contin(;knt, 62, 335. 363. 391 Queen stown Volunteers, 172, 310, 384, 428 Raad-saa',, at Pretoria, 380 Railway Hill, 247, 248 Railway Pioneer Regiment, 366, 400 Ralph, Mr. Julian, 113 Ramathlabama, 359, 360 Ramdam, 269, 277, 294, 305 Rand, the, 15 Ray, Major, 135 Reddersberg, 329, 331, 337, 338 Reed, Captain, 161 Reit/, 404 Reitz, Dr. F. W., 60, 64 Reitz (the younger), 189 Reitzburg, 416 Rensburg, 203, 210, 212, 306 Rfteif's Nek, 405 Rhenostcr, 374, 4(x> Rhenoster Bridge, 399 Rhenoster River, 374 Rhodes, Colonel, 35 Rhodes, Mr. Cecil, 32, 33, 34, 109, 259, 261, 263 Rhodesia, 20, 64, 356, 357, 3f'4 Rhodesian Regiment, 414, 429 Rice, Captain, 107 Richardson, Colonel, 449 Riddell, Colonel Huchanan, 226 Ridley, Colonel, 269, 277, 335. 427 Riet River, 269, 301 Rietfontein, 82, 208 Rifles, 2d Irish, 144, 198 Rifle Brigade, ist Battalion, 73, 152, 193, 198, 214, 232, 245, 249, 251, 425; 2d Bat- talion, 73, 94, 96, 99, 189. 193, 198, 245, 422, 492; 3d Battalion, 232, 251 Rifleman's Post, 178 Rimington, Major, 271 Rimington Guides, or Scouts, 115, 207, 269, 322, 324 Robben Island, 184 Roberts, Lieutenant, 161 Roberts, General, 208, 239, 267, 270, 278, 279. 282, 2S8, 289, 290, 294, 295, 296, 298, 300, 302, 303, 305, 306, 312, 317, 321, 3';i, 332, 335, 340, 343. 346, 347. 360, 365. 370, 373, 374. 380, 385, 391, 408, 411, 419. 424 Roberts's Horse, 322,324, 326, 327. 343 Robertson, Captain Crewe, 359 t; INDI.X 475 64 l8(; 212, 306 2, 33 34. 35f>. 357. snt, 414. 1, 449 .uchanan. , 277, 335. , 198 Hattal ion. 214. 232, ; 2cl Bat- . 99. 189. !, 492 ; 3cl 8 271 or Scouts, 324 ;, t6i 208, 239. 282, 2S8, 296, 298, 306, 312, 335. 34". 3f'5. 37". 391. 408, 1,324. 326, Crewe, R()l)iiison, Mr. John, of Jo- hannesburg, 25, 56 Rf)binson Mine, 376 Rolt. of the Rhodesian force, 359 Roodeval, 3S5, 411 Roodeval Bridge, 399 Roodeval Station, 398 R.<)()idam. 302 Roux, Huguenot family, 3 Rouxville, 149, 310, 33S Royal Fusiliers, 2d Battalion, 152 Royal Highlanders (Black Watch), 2d Battalion, 129, 130. 131. 133. 137. 201, 206, 286, 3(K), 405 Royal Inniskilling Fusiliers, I St Battalion, 152, 154, 203, 204, 207, 209, 211, 214, 245, 246, 253, 269, 3of., 422 Royal Irish Fusiliers (Prin- cess Victoria's), ist Battal- ion, 73, 76, 78. 94, 96, 102,411 Royal Irish Regiment, ist Battalion, 207, 392, 402, 425 Royal Irish Rifles, 2d Battal- ion, 73, 76, 91, 96, 174, 195, 214, 225, 331 Royal Munster Fusiliers, ist Battalion, 53, 402, 403 Royal Scots, ist Battalion, 112, 148, 152, 164, 165, 174, 269, 309, 392, 4txj, 425 Royal Scots Fusiliers, 2d Bat- talion, 152 Royal Sussex Regiment, ist Battalion, 367, 369, 380, 389, 406 Royal Welsh Fusiliers, ist Battalion, 405 Royston, Colonial Command- er, 187 Ruidam, 370 Rundle, General, 341, 342, 343. 345. 367. 370, 373. 392, 402 Rustenburg, 16, 349, 384, 407, 412, 416, 417 Sr. John's ambulance, 453 Salisbury, Lord, 47, 312 Sampson, Mr. (reformer), 35, 84 Sandford, of the Rhodesian Force, 354 Sandspruit, 70, 76 Sand River, 3f»(), 4(k) Sand River Convention, i:, '3. 14. 17 Sauna's Post, 324, 329, 337, 388, 4"9 vScandinavian Corps, 138 Schalk Burger, Mr., 36 Scliiel, Colonel, 83, 88, 90 Schotield, Lieutenant, 161 Sehreiber, Lieutenant, 160 Schreiner, Mr. Theodore, 43, 59. 258 Schutte, Commander, 19S Scots Guards, ist Battalion, 114, 122, 124, 135, 137, 152, 203, 392 Scott, Captain Percy, loi Scott, Commandant of Police at Vryburg, his fate, no Scott-Turner, Major, 260, 2(12 Scottish Borderers (King's Own), ist Battalion, 154, 322, 367, 412 Seaforth Highlanders, 2d Battalion, 129, 130, 13S, 266, 286, 406 Sekwani, 357 Selati Railway Company, 26 Senekal, 382, 392 Seymour, Major, 366, 400 Shepstone, Sir Theophiius, 14. 15 Sherston, Colonel, death of. 77. 226 Shoemann, General, 204, 206 Shropshire Light Infantry, (King's) 2d Battalion, 284, 286, 345. 367, 400, 411, 415, 417, 429 Signal Hill, 97 476 THE GREAT BOER WAR M Sikukuni, 14, 15 Sim. Colonel, 225 vSitwell, Colonel, 226, 247 vSkigter's Nek, 7 vSIater, Lieutenant, 429 Slingersfontein, 205, 207, 209 SniaUleel, 368,369 vSmith-Dorrien, General, 2S4, 285, 289, 290, 343, 345, 386, 400, 417 Smithfield, 346 Smithfield Commando, 149 Smith's Nek, 79 Snyman, Commandant, 353, 354, 391 Somersetshire Light Infan- try (Prince Albert's) 2d Battalion, 214, 221, 244 Soudan, 307 South African Horse, 153, 214, 215, 3S3 South African Police, 353 South African Republic, see Transvaal P.epublic South Australian Contingent, 62, 206, 335 South Lancashire Regiment, ist Battalion, 175, 214, 220, 244, 251 South Wales Borderers, 2d Battalion, 321, 367, 400 Spence, Colonel, 415 Spens, Colonel, 400 Spicheren, allusion to, 123 Spion Kop, 213-229, 414, allu- sion to, 422, 448 Spitzberg, 425 Spragge, Colonel, 395 Spreckley, Colonel, 358, 429 Springfield, 175, 215 Springfontein, 309 Springs, 407, 416 Spytfontein, 128 Standerton, 16, 53, 70, 3S4, 420, 432 Standerton Commando, 420 Stangar, 53 Stellaland, 19 Stellenbosch, 3 Stephenson, General, 208, 282, 2S5, 379 Sterkstroom, 143, 174, 201, 3'>7 Steyn, President, 56, 66, 299, 302, 306, 323, 370, 374, 382, 3S5, 417, 418 Steynsburg, 202 Stoneman, Colonel, 182, 254 Stormberg, 201, 294, 307, 409 ; battle of, described, 141, 149 Strathcona's Horse, 419 Stubbs, Major, 209 SuiTolk Regiment, ist Bat- talion, 204 Sunday River, 82 Surprise Hill, 189 Surrey Regiment, East, see East Surrey Regiment Sussex Regiment, see Royal Sussex Regiment Swart Kopjes, 423 Swartz Kop, 231 Swaziland Commando, 72 Symonds, General Sir Wil- liam Penn, 55, 72, 77, 93, 371 Table Mountain, 188 Tait, of the Black Watch, 267 Talana Hill, 70, 75, 78, 81, 247, 371 Talavera, allusion to, 82, 146 Tasmanian Contingent, 62, 203, 209, 335 Taunton, I\Iajor, i8o Taylor, Major, 32S Tcl-el-Kebir, alhision to, 139 "Terrible," H. M. S., 163 Thabanchu, 322, 343, 344, 366 Thackera}', Colonel, 165, 226, 247 Theron, Commandant Sard, 415. 432 Thorneycroft, Colonel, 221, 226, 227 INDEX Ihorneycroffs Mounted In- 'P,!''"^7' '52, 2 4, 220 Ihorold, Colonel. 248 1 inta Inyoni, 91 rintwa Pass, 72 Tobin, Colonel, 219 loronto Company, 172 Towse, Captain, 345 Tracy. Ilanbury, 51 .j. Transvaal Republic, n" n 13. 17, 19, 20 10 .:. ■'' ' Tricha?d's''Drift-!*"2r6" Irommel, 392 Trottei, Captain, 320 Tucker, General, 27S, 299 321. 336 ' ^9- Tucker, Mr., 37O Tugela River, 294 Turner, Lieutenant, 410 Iwyfelaar, 420 477 Utrecht, 373 Utrecht Commando, 72 V Vaalkraxz, 230-23S Vaal River, 333. 374, 37. Van Peenen's Pass, 72, 406, Van Wyk's Hill, 3S3 Vantv. Drift, 74 Ventersburg, 394 Venterdorf, 407, 417 Vereeniging. 66 Verner, Colonel Willoughbv 113, irS ^ ■^' Vernon, of the Mafeking De- fence Force, 354 Vet River, 2S7, 36S Vice, a London volunteer 307 Victorian Contingent, 62 -x-x-^ Victorian Mounted RificK^ 173. 211 Viljoei, Commandant, 432 \iljoen's Drift, 374 ^^ Villebois-Mareuil, General "e, 333 \^^}hQx<, (Huguenot family) , 3 V ilhers. Commandant ' de \,/'f; ^'A394, 415 V iakfontein, 419 Volksrust. 53, 65, 70, 3S4 Vrede, 374 Vredefort, 405 Vredefort Road, 374 Vryburg, no, 362 Vryheid. 53, 72 V^ryheid Commando. 221 V ryyan, Colonel, 350 w w^'sr^'^"-^- '78,192,193. 195 U akkerstroom, 16, 70 ^ u ales, Prince of, 9 Walford, Colonel 353 Ward, Colonel, 182,254,449 vvarm baths, 430 ^ Warren. General Sir Charles /75, 213, 235, 312. 414, ^15 • Warrenton, 333 ^ ^ Warwickshire Regiment (Royal), 2d Battalion, 17:; 214 276. 366, 3S0 u aschbank, 107 Waschbank Spruit, 82 Uaterloo, allusion to, kjq ^\ aterval. 2S7, 3S0, 423 "^ Waterval-Bovcn, 385 Waterval Drift, 269. 277 Watervalonder, 423 ' Watson, Colonel, 204. 205 \Vauchope, General, 129 u avell. General, 322 Webb, Trooper, 354 VVeenen, 175 Wegdraai, 277 Weil. Benjamin, 350 W elgelgen, 369 Wellington, allusion to, 123 152, 226, 373 478 THE GREAT BOER WAR Welsh Regiment, ist Battal- ion, 152, 276, 286, 300, 366, 380 Welverdiend, 417 Wepener, 310, 330, 336, 337, 340 Wessels, Commandant, 260 West Australian Contingent, 62, 335, 368, 390 West Kent Regiment (Queen's Own Royal), 2d Battalion, 392 West Riding Regiment (Duke of Wellington's), ist bat- talion, 276, 281, 286 West Surrey Regiment (Queen's), 2d Battalion, 152, 158, 186, 214, 242 White, General Sir George, 55, 72, 73. 74, 82, 86, 91, 94, 96, 99, loi, 150, 177-199, 254. 3", 339 White, Major, 428 Wilford, Colonel, 92, 226 Wilkinson, of the Australian Horse, 369 Williams, Captain, 351 Willow Grange, 150, 186 Wilson, General, 451 Wiltshire Regiment (Duke of Edinburgh's), 2d Battal- ion, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 392, 402, 428 Winburg, 345, 347, 427 Winburg Commando, 332 Winchester, Lord, 137 Wolverans, Commandant, 293 Wolveskraal Drift, 283 Wood, of the North Lanca- shires, in Woodgate, General, 221, 222 Worcestershire Regiment, ist Battalion. 341 ; 2d Battal- ion, 207, 209, 392, 402, 428 Wynberg, 3 Wynne, General, 231, 243 York and Lancaster Regi- ment, ist Battalio:', 175, 214, 251 Yorkshire Light Infantry (King's Own), ist Battal- ion, 275; 2d Battalion, in, 134, 276, 286, 395, 402, 403 Yorkshire Regiment (Prince of Wales's Own West), 2d battalion, 112, 116, 125, 152, 158, 186, 214, 242, 366, 380, 392 Yorkshire Regiment (Prin- cess of Wales's Own), ist battalion, 175, 205, 206, 207, 286, 290, 291, 300, 366, 380, 392 Young, Gunner, 161 Younger, Captain, 410 Yule, Colonel, 81, 91 Zeerust, 349, 304, 4T2, 416 Zootpansberg, 11 ■],$(> Zululand, 19, 52 Zulus, 14, 15, 360 a Lanca- 221, 222 ment, ist i Battal- 402, 428 I. 243 ER ReGI- o-^. 175, Infantry ; Battal- ion, III, 402, 403 (Prince l^est), 2d 125, 152, 366, 380, t (Prin- wn), I St 206, 207, 166, 380, , 416