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Freemasons' Hall, Buade Street. til A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A YOUNG GENTLEMAN AND A DIVINE. Gent. — Having frequently met, in the most refined ERRATA. Page 9 — line 5 — for "rationalist' read " ratiociiiantin.' line 15 — for "antecedents" read "antecedent." line 17 — for "antecedents" read "antecedent." line 21 — for "exceeds" read "exceed." line 22— for "concede" read "conceive," I'iige 38— line 10— for " or it is" rend '• or is it." 01 the human soul, when not restrained, within their due limits, can exceed her powers. Speculative and practical Atheism are the result of false philoso- phy or the immediate consequences of pride and folly ; as it is written that ** the fool said in his heart, there is no God, they became corrupt and abomina- ble," surely, because having sought after corruption they have imbibed its infection ; and '* they became abominable,'* because they were inimical to God himself, to the prince, or ruling powers sanctioned by the order of God, and to the peace, stability, order and harmony of civil society. Wherefore, it becomes the duty of every true philosopher, of every member of the community, to expose the folly and madness 4 1 \. 1- 4l S A DIALOGUE BETWEEN A YOUNG GENTLEMAN AND A DIVINE. Gent. — Having frequently met, in the most refined societies, a certain class of Gentlemen, who, both in principle and practice, deny the existence of a supreme being : and who, notwithstanding, are remarkable for much talent and deep philosophical research ; I beg, Sir, you will condescend to instruct me by such proofs and arguments as will enable me, at least, to defend my own principles against such practical and refined infidelity. Div. — My dear Sir, 'tis a melancholy reflection, *tis nevertheless an intuitive truth, that the passions of the human soul, when not restrained, within their due limits, can exceed her powers. Speculative and practical Atheism are the result of false philos j- phy or the immediate consequences of pride and folly ; as it is written that ** the fool said in his heart, there is no God, they became corrupt and abomina- ble," surely, because having sought after corruption they have imbibed its infection ; and " they became abominable," because they were inimical to God himself, to the prince, or ruling powers sanctioned by the order of God, and to the peace, stability, order and harmony of civil society. Wherefore, it becomes the duty of every true philosopher, of every member of the community, to expose the folly and madness i» of those, whose perverted principles, under the spe- cious title of refined philosophy, would lay the axe at the root of civil liberty and confound the world's harmony. To prove by a chain of metaphysical demonstra- tions, the existence of a supreme being or of God, to those who are become fools by their own wisdom, would be an abuse of reason, and a loss of time and labor. Because in Atheism there is nothing positive ; no man can be an Atheist in his heart — the specula- tive Atheist dare not reason ; concrete or abstract terms with him, have a paramount signification ; he must speak the language of the passions for the indul- gence of which he pleads ; and forcing himself to be- lieve that there is no God to punish his guilt, because he would have it so, he forces himself to deny the clearest positive proofs to the contrary, because he would not have them so. Gent, — I have frequently and sadly experienced the truth of your remarks, but you will admit, that the powers of oratory and the charms of eloquence have much force in swaying the passions and wining a prepossession in their favor ; nay, the sophistical ingenuity of the philosopher has, but too frequently given falsehood a fair colour, and set truth at defi- ance : chiefly when the appeal is made to the vulgar, or to persons of shallow conceptions — wherefore, not content to reason from my own information, on a subject of such depth and magnitude, I considered it expedient and necessary to consult persons more deeply versed in metaphysical disquisitions. 5 Div. — 'Tis highly commenaable to make prudence the basis of every virtuous inquiry ; not to depend, too much on our own knowledge ; wisely to examine the end to be obtained and to know ourselves, are axioms of prudence ; not to acknowledge a known truth, such as two and two make four, or that a circle is not a square figure — to permit our reason to be governed by our passions, or swayed by the prejudices of a bad education, by partiality or precipitation, is the extreme of folly and the parent of every vice. Men possessed of such feelings and nourishing such extravagant and unwarrantable sentiments, are not fit members for any society, and should cautiously.be avoided ; not to consider the end for which man was created — not to acknowledge the wisdom, the good- ness, the omnipotence, and the justice of the Creator, is unpardonable infidelity ; because there is an increate all-wise, eternal and incomprehensible being, to whom man owes his existence, who rewards tlie good and punishes the wicked and whom we call God. The limited judgement of man not permitting him to fathom the ocean of the divinity of his Creator, is better able to describe than define what he conceives by the term. Moral proofs of the existence of God. All nations, both ancient and modern, unanimously admit the existence of a supreme being, therefore, &c. proved. — Seneca, Epis. 117. " You can infer that there are Gods, because it is a fixed opinion in the hearts of all, nor has there been any nation so ** lawless and immoral as not to admit the existence of <( (C '{ <; (( i« the Gods." " There is no nation," said Tully, "so rude or barbarous, which, though they were igno- rant, what God they should have, still knew they should have some God.'' The Mexicans, Peruvians, Brazilians, Savages of the North America and others, agree with the ancients in that belief. You will say, that many nations have admitted a plurality of Gods, but to admit polytheism is equivalent to a denial of the existence of God — therefore, &c. I distinguish the minor, to admit polytheism is equivalent to a denial of the existence of God ; considered as respecting man's salvation, I grant it, respecting the acknow- ledgement of some supreme being, I deny. The existence of God is proved from the law of nature. All nations acknowledge that certain actions are good, and certain evil, that virtue and vice are oppo- site to each other ; this is a universal law, not coming from man, but from God — therefore, &c. From Physics. If a Creator of matter be admitted, the existence of God must necessarily follow — but a Creator of matter cannot be denied without an absurdity, because matter did not create itself, nor was it formed by chance — therefore, &c. ** Creer la mat^ire, ce n'est point la prendre oiielle n'etait pas, c'est lui donner I'^tre qu'elle n'avait pas ; quand nous produisons une pensde ou un mouvement, nous ne les prenons point, mais nous les mettons ou ils n'etaient pas, Tessence du pou- voir actif et de faire exister, ce qui n'existoit pas. Lorsque mon ame remue mon bras, elle lui donne it tt it tt tt tt <« 80 une situation ou une quality qu*elle n'a pas." — D. Borgier, Traitd de la Relig. Arguments from the formation of the human body, SfC. Man was formed in the womb of his mothct , but by whom? was it by himself, or by his mother, orby chance, or by God? but he cannot be said to have formed himself, neither was he formed by his mother, nor by chance — he was therefore formed by God — proved. He was not formed by himself, because existence is prior to action — not by the mother, because even against her will it sometimes occurs that the child is formed in the womb — neither by chance, which would be an absurdity — he was therefore formed by God — there- fore God exists. There exit:*8 an eternal, independent and necessary being, but an eternal, necessary and independent being, is God, or one who exists from the necessity of his own essence — therefore, God exists. Demonstration — Either there exists an eternal being, or all beings which do exist w ere at one time in a state of nonentity, but the latter is revolting to common sense. Therefore there exists an eternal being — therefore God exists. ** L'^tre par lui-m^me est le plus ^tre de tous les ** ^tres : on ne pent rien lui ajouter : il est done dans la supreme perfection, carl'^tre et la perfec- tion ne sont qu'une mSme chose, et ne sauraient ** convenir au ndant." — ^Fen^lon. From the laws of motion. Whatever is put in motion is moved by another, either, therefore, it is put in motion by an immovea- (( <( 8 , ! ble mover, or by u power which is itself moved by another ; in order, therefore, timt a procession may not be given ad infmiiimif we nmst come to the prime mover, who moves and is moved by none, and that prime mover is Cod — therefore Cod exists. The existence of an all-wise being, is invincibly proved by the fuhihnent of the prophecies — by the miracles performed — by the harmony, conservation and incxplicahle organization of the visible world. Folly and the desire of gratifying the passions must yield to ihe above arguments. They are sulliciently conclusive against the stu])idity of the Academics, the absurdities of the Manicheans and l^j[)icureanB, the impiety of Spinosa and the madness of John Berkley and the immaterialists who doubt of their own existence, or whether they arc the children of their mothers. Such are the sad extremes to which pride and folly are wont to lead men. Gent. — I readily admit the strength and truth of your demonstrations, which cannot be questioned by any man of sense or understanding: are there not, however, some demonstrative truths, concern- ing which, even the learned have not agreed ? Is it not therefore reasonable, in such cases, to suspend our judgement and hold in doubt, at least, the things we cannot comprehend ? Div. — Man is undoubtedly a mystery to himself; he cannot, moreover, by the strictest analysis decom- pose all the essential parts of matter, to shew them in their first elements: the hvnerbolical curve incessantly approaches its asymtotes, though it cannot touch them, as is seen by Mathematical f) demonstrations. Metapysicans do not perfectly agree amongst themselves respecting the manner the soul of man is united to his hody. To deny, there- fore, the knowledge of a supreme heing, of ourselves, of matter, &c. &c. — heeause there is something respecting each which we do not comi)rehend, would be the extreme of folly and madness ; this conclusion is alone sufficient to expose the absurdity of im- materialism and scepticism. In a moral point of view, 'tis but reasonable to suspend our assent to a proposi- tion until we discover some positive truth, on which we can safely build, and from which we can draw just conclusions ; for example to the proposition, 2x2=4 I readily give my assent; but if told that 2X4x^>X8r=:'20 I suspend for a moment my assent to that proposition, until by the quantities which I have known, I discover an agreement or disagreement, with those which I had not known. Tis the province of the Sceptic and Sciolist, who doubt of their own existence, to doubt of a self- evident proposition, or of those evident demonstra- tions ; a philosophical doubt, perfectly excludes Scepticism, but can only be referred to speculative opinions. That there exists fiom eternity a supreme being, whom we call God, is proved from reason and revelation ; this forms the first article of the Christian's creed, lie is no Christian or Philosopher who can call this truth in question ; but should rather be considered the common enemy of mankind, who pleads for the indulgence of his sensual appetite, at the expence of reason, religion and morality.'^ 10 Gent. — From your mode of reasoning, which cannot be invalidated by the subtilties or sophistry of the Atheist ; I feel sufficiently convinced, that an omnipotent, independent and primary cause, does undoubtedly exist. The truth of which, I have constantly endeavoured to defend against the false reasoning of our modern philosophers, who, as you observed, are wont to make the gratification of their sensual appetite, their sole rule of action. I now beg to be informed concerning the properties, or what are generally called the attributes of that all- wise and eternal cause, whom we call God. Div. — By a divine attribute is understood, in a strict sense, that which flows from the divine essence, and is determined thereby, or a perfection purely simple, simpliciter simplex of God, absolutely and necessarily predicable by a mode of adjacent form. They are divided into absolute, as the simplicity, eternity, &c. &c. of a God, and relative ; into affir- mative and negative. Amongst the divine attributes are principally numbered, unity, simplicity, infinity, eternity, immensity and immutability. Gent. — Is it not laid dow^n as an axiom that, in divine things, all are the same ? Div. — That axiom is expressed as follows : — Omnia in divinis sunt eadcu uhi not ohstat relationis realis oppositio — the sense of which is that all the divine attributes are reallv identified with the divine essence, and really identified with each other ; except those which are relative ad intra, between which there is an opposition of relation, such as the paternity and filiation, these are identified with the divine essence, 11 and with the other attributes, but really distinct between themseb*e which distinction is not real according to the mujor or strictest sense of the term, nor is it a formal or model distinction, but may be called virtual or of refined reason, rationis rationalis cum fundamento in re. Gent — Since God is one, I cannot clearly conceive how unity can be reconciled with a plurality of persons. Biv. — The immensity of God does not exclude his ubiquity ; neither does a unity of essence exclude a plurality of persons. Gent, — Do not unity and trinity, in the same entity, involve a contradiction ? Div. — I distinguish the antecedents ; unity and trinity ; taken or considered in the same sense, respect- ing the same thing ; I grant the antecedents, in the same thing taken diversely, I deny the antecedent ' respecting tLe tri -unity and uni-trinity of God ; Unity is considered to refer to the divine essence, and trinity to the divine person, which, though it exceeds the powers of the human intellect to concede, is in no sense contrary to reason : all the arguments to the contrary are solvable. St. Augustin in his first book against Maximinian, said, ** the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost are *' one, on account of the same individual nature ;" and book 2d. Ch. 7. he said, " hold with the Catholic faith, that the Father is not he who is the Son, nor the Son he who is the Father, but that the Father is God, and the Son is God, yet both together are not two Gods, but one God." 15 'J (( (( (( { ( « I I ti t 12 Thus the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Ghost is God ; yet there are not three Gods, hut one God in the persons of the same individual nature and substance. Gent. — What is understood by a divine procession ? Div.—A divine procession, or processio ad intra in cliviniSf is a production or emanation of one from another, so a river is said to proceed from its source. Two of which processions are in God. First by the intellect by which the Son proceeds from the Father, the second from the will by which the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Father and the Son. This divine truth, on which our salvation depends, cannot be called in question, as having been revealed to man by the author of truth. The Sabellions, the Arians, the Macedonians, the Socinians, the Trinitarians, the Mahometans, are principally those who have im- pugned this sacred doctrine. Gent. — Are there not certain ways or rules given by which we can be assured of the truth of a propo- sition ? Div. — A certitude is distinguished in three ways, viz : of the object, of the motive, and of the subject. A certitude of the object is the necessity or immuta- bihty of the thing in itself which is called intrinsic. A certitude of the motive is the force or prevalence of an argument which moves us to give our assent. A certitude of the subject is the firm adhesion of the mind to some truth, wherefore called a certitude of adhesion. There are certain degrees of certitude, such as moral, physical and metaphysical. Evidence given from the testimony of men, is said to be s li the 13 morally certain — because according to a prudent judgement it cannot be false. — Thus I am morally certain there is such a City as New Ycrk, though I have never been there. A physical certitude is that which, according to the common law of nature, cannot be false. Thus I am physically certain that the sun will rise over the horizon on to-morrow. A metaphysical certitude is that which depends on the extraordinary and absolute power of God and cannot be false. Such is the certitude of our faith, which depends upon the truth of divine Revelation. These three species of certitude, viz : physical, metaphysical and moral, which exclude every doubt, equally depend upon necessary and immutable prin- ciples — and in that respect are equal ; truth is simple and admits of no degrees of comparison. They have their different terras, from the manner in which they are employed. Some as metaphysical respecting the first principles or essence of things ; others as physical as respecting the laws of nature — more as moral, which respect the moral laws by which we are wont to be governed. Gent. — Are not the terms of certain propositions, when sophistically thrown into a syllogistic form capable of embarrassing the honest research of the inquirer and turning him from the truth. Div. — Tis no hard matter to deceive, by syllogistic forms, those who are not well versed in dialectics, but the terms of all propositions must be invariably the same. The subject, the predicate and the copula, are the terms of a proposition — ex. gr. God is just. In this proposition, God is the subject, just is the 14 i: I predicate or attribute and is the copula. In all ratiocination, three things are principally to be dis- tinguished, viz : the antecedent, the consequent, and consequence — ex. gra. every virtue is commendable, but diligence is a virtue, therefore, diligence is com- mendable. In the above syllogistic form, the two former propositions are called the antecedent, the word, therefore, which is the connection between the antecedent and the consequence, is called the conse- quent ; the last proposition or the result of the former is called the consequence. A syllogism made up of three propositions has three terms, viz : the great extreme, the less extreme, and the middle term. In the above syllogism, the great extreme is the attribute of the conclusion, sil. commendable , the less extreme, is the subject of the conclusion, sil. diligence, the word virtue, is the middle term. The propositions of a syllogism are called the major, the minor and the conclusion ; propositions are true in a formal sense when concrete names, whether substantive or adjective, are made the predicates to concrete sub- stantives ; God is just, God is a spirit, also, when attributes, in the abstract, are made the predicates of concrete substantives ; thus God is justice, God is wisdom ; these are ordinarily true in an identical or material sense. Hence it can be concluded that the following proposition is undoubtedly false, viz : God understands by the intellect, but the intellect and the will in God are the same, then God understands by the will. Here the terms intellect and will, are taken equivocally ; in the major, the term intellect is taken I Ill all be dis- it, and ndable, s com- lie two it, the een the 1 conse- of the n made z : the e term, is the the less ligence, isitions lor and formal itive or te sub- when cates of God is tical or hat the 5 : God and the mds by e taken s taken \ 15 formally, and in the minor materially or identically, and in the conclusion, formally. But from one of the premises taken only in an identical sense, a formal conclusion cannot be drawn ; one of the premises should contain the conclusion, and the other specify the thing contained. Gent. — Which are the sources from whence, as from principles, all theological arguments are drawn ? Div. — ^They are as follows: 1. The Holy Scrip- tures ; 2. Tradition and miracles ; 3. The authority of the Sovereign Pontiffs ; 4. The authority of councils ; 5. The constant usage and practice of the church ; 6. The authority of the Holy Fathers ; 7. The authority of universities and canonists ; 8. Natural reason ; 9. The authority of Philosophers and Civilians ; 10. The authority of sacred and profane history, and of chronology. Gent. — What kind of conclusion is deduced from the authority of the Sovereign Pontiffs ? Div. — ^No more weight is to be given to what the Sovereign Pontiff declares, as a private doctor, than to the decision of any other private doctor ; but when the Sovereign Pontiff, at the head of a council, or (as we say) ex cathedra^ decides on matters of faith or morals, then I say, notwithstanding what the Gal- licans or other moderns can say to the contrary, that his decisions are certain and infallible. Gent. — How are we to consider propositions with regard to their general utility ? Div. — Propositions respecting their use, are differently considered ; when a proposition is used to express or explan the nature of a thing, 'tis then 1) 5 16 called a definition — when to divide a whole into its parts, 'tis called a division — when it expresses a mani- fest truth, *tis an axiom — when taken to contain any general truth, 'tis called a principal — when it serves to demonstrate other propositions, 'tis called a lemma — when it declares some property of an object, as that a triangle is equal to two rectangles, 'tis called a theorem —when it expresses some operation concerning some- thing to be done as a triangle being given, 'tis requir- ed to described another equal to it, 'tis then called a problem — when it evidently follows from a proposition before demonstrated, 'tis called a corollary^ or it subjoins a further explanation to another proposition, and is called a scholium. Gent. — I have reason to acknowledge myself in- debted to your generosity, for the developement of such a fund of useful knowledge, to which I have been heretofore, for the greater part, a stranger ; I would now be informed how it can be proved, that the prescience of God is not an argument against his goodness, in giving man a free will which he foresaw he would abuse ; what God has foreseen to happen, must necessarily happen, and the foreknowledge of God is, therefore incompatible with the liberty of man ? Div. — ^The prescience of God is his knowledge of future events — future is two fold, necessary and con- tingent ; an indifferent cause is two fold, natural and free, some are contingent from their nature, such as wind, rain, &c. some free, as those which proceed from a free will ; passive indifference is peculiar to inanimate beings ; active indifference is reasonable . 'tis a privilege of self determination, the foundation i I ito its mani- n any serves lemma is that heorem some- equir- alled a osition or it )sition, elf in- lent of ve been would lat the ast his foresaw lappen, ;dge of f man? edge of nd con- ral and such as proceed jliar to Dnable . ndation i 17 of liberty 1 1 .ill intellectual beings; this power of seh determination is the free gift of God to man, which, were he not to enjoy, what reward could he merit ? by what laws could his trangressions be punished ? but it is supposed that what God saw was to happen must necessarily happen, hence, &c. ; 'tis by no means because God saw the event that it happens or will happen, but because it was to happen he foresaw it. Cicero, in his second book de divinitate, in order to assert the freedom of man, denied the prescience of God ; on the contrary, John Huss, in order to main- tain the prescience of God, denied the liberty of man ; I now answer that argument by distinguishing the antecedent ; then I say, what God foresaw, was' to happen necessarily by an absolute necessity, and of consequence, I deny the antecedent — what God fore- saw was to happen by a hypothetical necessity, I grant. The prescience of God is then intrinsic of our free will, and as the bare knowledge of future events is naturally posierioi* by the futurition of the thing foreseen ; for things are supposed future before they are seen by the prescience which is of vision ; therefore they are seen because they are future, but they are not future, or to happen because they are seen : malevolence and goodness, power and mercy, are attributes which exclude each other, it would be impossible that such a being could exist ; but says the Deist, " if God be good, how can he permit moral " evil." All the works of God declare his goodness : this I know, 'tis infidelity in man not to acknowledge his goodness ; but why he has permitted moral evil I do not pretend to know. But here the Deist, in 18 charging the deity with malevolence, makes a voluntary sacrifice of what he does know, and what he might still know, in order to seek after that which is not given to man to know, and which, is not neces- sary for him to know. Nothing can be more absurd than to assert that a being sovereignly good, is obliged to avert all evil : evil consists in some defect and can be no positive existing being, 'tis but the negative of order or goodness, and like the terra nothing, has no properties. To oblige God to create beings without any essential defects, would be a creation of beings essentially perfect, which is impossible : to create man and endow him with a free will or power of self-deter- mination, though he were to abuse it, is perfectly reconcilable with the divine goodness. The abuse of this liberty proves its excellence, nothing that is bad can be abused, nor the abuse of that which is good make it bad in itself; but the Deist wishes to be informed why he is not an angel, why he is not equal in power to the Almighty, why he cannot indulge the sensual appetite and make it his rule of action w^ithout the fear of incurring the displeasure of his maker ; why, he asks, has he permitted moral evil ? The reasoning of St. Augustin on this subject is clear and conclusive ;" if it be asked, why God permitted the man to be tempted, whose consent to the tempter he foresaw ; truly I cannot sound the depth of his counsel, and acknowledge it far beyond my strength ; there may, perhaps, be some more hidden cause, which is reserved for beUer and more holy men, but yet as far as he gives me to (( (( it tt 1 1 f I 1 19 *^ know or say, it does not appear to nie that man *' would be deserving of great praise if he lived well, *' because no one would excite him to live ill." — De Gen. ad lit. lib. 11. c. 4, &c. — When, therefore, the just profit by the unjust, and the pious by the impi- ous, it is said in vain, God would not create those whose wickedness he foresaw ? Why should he not create them when he foresaw that they would improve the good. " But if God willed it, they also would be good. How much better has God disposed, that they should be what they wish to be. Yes, but un profitably ; but evil, they are not so with impunity, and in that they are useful to others ; though he foresaw that through their own faults they would be evil, he did not desist from creating them, deputing men to the advantage of those " whom he had created as a people, who could advance in good, but by the co-operation of the bad ; if they were not at all, they would be useful to nothing. Is it a small good that they exist who are useful to God's people, of which people, whoever does not wish to be, he does no more than that he himself should not be of them." Such is the sense of mankind of the present day respecting man's freedom, those only excepted, who, desirous to be called philosophers, have established a wild scepti- cism, which is as opposite to philosophy as light to darkness ; they will tell you that men's actions are determined by fate, &c. &c. Such reasoning surpass- es folly ; fate is merely imaginary — a child of fancy ; it can convey no idea to the mind — all that can be determined of it is the sound ; the planets, say they, c 3 (( <( (I (I {< it it n C( (( (( (( (( I 20 have their influence ; in this the moon is remarkable. Such are the reveries of our modern Sciolists. Who can doubt the influence of the moon, not only on the human body but also on all sublunary things? — but, mighty Sciolists, be so kind as to determine the portion of that influence which can deprive man of his free will or liberty of action. If you do not feel yourselves adequate to that task, cease, I pray, to outrage men's judgments, and shock common sense by your ridicu- lous absurdities. From the foregoing conclusions, which cannot be invalidated by any mode of argumentation, nor by the scepticism of our would-be philosophers, 'tis evident that ail reasoning is lost on the practical Atheist, who feigns to deny the existence of his creator ; and on the Deist, who denies his superintending power. They are inimical to the estabhshed order of things, and consequently to the peace and order of civil society. Gent. — How is the divinity of Christ proved against the Arians, the Socinians, &c ? Div. — ^The Divinity of Christ, the son of God, is sufficiently attested by St. John in his Gospel, ch. 1. Ver. 1. against the Socinian and his hundred objec- tions, and against all those who impugn that sacred doctrine. No possible argument can invalidate the truth of what St. John has there given down. *' in the beginning was the word, and the word was with God, and the \'ord was God ; all things were made by him," &c. Gh. 1. v. 1. 'Tis also proved by what I have htietoiore Jeraonstrated concerning the existence of God, wherein it t\a.s been shewn tha*, the three divine persons are of the same nature and (( it (( 21 *• h substance ; hence 'tis manifest that divinity cannot be attributed to one of the persons and denied to the other, without implying a contnuliction, since it has been pre. cd that the three divine pciHOPs have the same essence, and their attributes identified. Thus, what is once clearly proved to uc true, cannot obtain a higher place in the scale of certitudp. by a thousand additional proofs to the same effect. The Socinian makes it a ride to object whatever he finds impervious to big reason , in this he has rejected reason itself. 6'cn/ — Did not the Eutichians teach that after the Son of God, the divine and human natures became identified so as to form but one nature, as water when changed into wine. Div. — Eutiches, who governed a monastery near Constantinople was not a man of profound learning j he was not a dialectician ; he imagined, like Meslorius, that by admitting two natures in Jesus Christ, two persons should be admitted by a necessary consequence ; he must have been ignorant that the terra Christ is a concrete noun, signifying a person and not a nature ; but concrete, nouns cannot be multi- plied, except their supposites be multiplied ; and the supposites being multiplied, the substantial form should be multipUed ; thus we cannot say two Christ, &c. though in the Trinity there be three supposites or persons ; we cannot say three Gods for the same reason ; because the three persons are identified by their essence, as one substantial form. The errors of Eutiches sprung from a false conception of the words of St. John, and the wori was made flesh, — St John, 1 . The true meaning of which we find given by St. 22 i I Paul, 1 1 Phil. Who being in the form of God, made himself as of no account, assuming the form of a servant. Here 'tis sufficiently clear, that being in the form of God, he did not divest himself of his divinity, by assuming the form of a servant. The Apostle concisely proves the union of the divine and human natures in Christ. The doctrine of the incarnation is most solidly and clearly proved from the letter of St. Leop. to Flavian, of which the following is an extract : " The divine and human natures remaining each entire, were united to one person, in order that the same mediator could die, being otherwise immortal and imperishable ; one nature is not altered by the other ; the same who is true God is true man ; the word and the flesh, have the oppera- tions which are proper to each. The Scripture equally proves the truth of the two natures. He is God, since it is said in the beginning was the word and the word was God. He is man, since it is said the word was made flesh and dwelt amongst us," &c. Suffice it then, to remark here, that the errors of Eutiches mainly sprung from a false interpretation of the sacred text, which is yet the cause of numberless sects and extravagant opinions of modern innovators, who disturb the religious harmony of the Christian family at the present day. Luther taught that the humanity of Christ was of the divine nature, to which he consequently attributed immensity and ubiquity. '* Wc believe, said he," in his sermon on the Lord's supper,** that Christ, according to his humanity, is placed above all creatures, and fills all things"; hence he concludes that Christ is really in the sacrament : such a paradox is worthy of (( (C I »g i. n <( (( i< (( (( 23 the author, whose reforming spirit could neither be governed by reason, nor confined within the limits of prudence or of commondecency. "If," says he," the body of Christ be in ail places, well I shall devour and guttle it in all taverns, from all plates, bottles and glasses." He then answers to the tacit objec- tiop. " Hear you hog, you fanatical dog, you silly " ass, though the body of Christ be in all places you " shall not devour nor guttle it." He gives for reason, though the body of Christ be in all places, yet it cannot be received in all places, and concludes ; now I remit you to your hog-sty or to your dung-hill." Christ, as man, was not present at the death of Lazarus since he said, John. II. Lazarus is dead, and I rejoice on your account, that you may believe I was not there. Such, however, are the paradoxes and anomalies of the impudent and immoral Islebian, the patriarch of our modern reformers. Calvin in his first book of Inst. ch. 17. said, " whence I pray, the stench in the carcase, which is both putrified and opened by the heat of the sun, all see it caused by the rays of the sun, yet no man says that the rays themselves are fetid on that *' account." By the above solicism, the folly and blasphemy of John Calvin, of reforming memory, is demonstrated. What comparision, I beg to know can there be between the sun, a heap of inert matter, and the omnipotent and intelligent cause by which it is put in motion ? Still he would insinuate, not only that God concurs with man to commit evil, but irresistibly compels him thereto. In his second book of Inst, is found the following blasphemous (( i< (( 11 124 tt tt language. ** I here omit that universal motion of " God, from which all creatures have that they ** subsist, and the efficacy of doing any thing ; I speak of that special action only, which appears in each wicked sect ; hence we see that it is not " absurd to attribute the same wicked act to God, to " Satan, and to Man/' Here God is made the sole cause of the act. Satan and man are only his agents. Such doctrine is an insult to sense and reason, and a blasphemy against the God of Heaven. St. Augustin thought it less impious to deny Divine Providence than to make God the author of evil. " Aut divinam " providentiam non usque ad hcoc ima portendi, aul ** mala omnia dei voluntate committi utrumque impium " sedmajus posterius." — B. 1. on order Ch. 1st. That man," said Eusebius, of Csesarea, "is to be accounted impious, and of all men the most wicked, who thinks that by the creator of the universe, some are impelled to adultery, others to " rapine, and others to other vices ; whence it would ** follow ; that these are not sins, or that the creator " is the cause of sin ; hence not the man but the creator himself will be the sinner, than which doctrine nothing more wicked can be imagined." *• But" said Calvin, '' all the sins of the faithful are venial, not because they do not deserve death, but *' because, through the mercy of God there is no *' condemnation in those who are in Jesus Christ ; *' because they are not imputed." Here Calvin, not content with blaspheming against the majesty of God, begins to attack christain morality ; no sin, the most abominable, but canbe venial in Calvin's saintswhiistin w that with a 41 noise, a^iu aic now no more ; but as for the things themselves, which are signified by these sounds, I did not meet with them by any of the senses of my body, nor even saw them, but in my own mind ; and I laid up in my memory, not their images, but themselves, which, how or whence they came into me, let them tell that can. We find then, that to learn such things as these, (of which we don't take in the images through the avenues of the senses, but with- out any images, see them within us as they are in themselves) is nothing else but to bring as it were together by thinking on them, and to take notice by the application of one's mind to them, of such things as were before indeed in the memory, but without union or order, that so being now laid up, as it were at hand in the same memory, where before they lay scattered and neglected, they may the more easily occur to our attention, to which they are now grown to be familiar. Gent. — While I admire the depth of his researches, and the extraordinary piety of that great man, who is justly stiled a saint of God, and one of the most illustrious doctors of his Church, I cannot but be indignant at the folly and impiety of our modern sceptics, who, understanding so little of themselves, would presumptuously fathom the ocean of the divinity, making every thing subject to the empire of what they call reason, and which is virtually no more than the impulse of their lawless passions ; pray Sir, what is to be said of the nature of our ideas, or their efficient cause ? Div. — 'Twas the opinion of N. Malebranche, who F 42 was born at Paris, on the 6th of August, 1638, and whose sentiments claim much respect, in consequence of his piety and extraordinary Uterary acquirements, that our ideas of bodies were certain intuitions of the mind, but not its modifications, as representing bodies ; wherefore, he said, we do not see the bodies themselves or in themselves, but in God, in the divine essence, which, as it created the bodies, it contains in a spiritual manner, their essence or extension, which on that account, he calls intelligible extension. — Mai. hb. 3. de inqi C. 7. " Je croi^," said he, Rech. de la ver. lib 3. 2 part, Ch. 1. *' que tout le monde tonibe d'accord, que nous n'appercevons pas les objets qui sont hors de nous, par eux memes, nous voyons le soleil, les etoiles et une infinite d'objets hors de nous, et il n'est pas vraisemblable, que I'ame sorte du corps et qu'elle aille pour ainsi dire se promener dans les cieux pour y contempler tons ces objets ; elle ne les voit done point par eux meme ; et I'objet immediat de notre esprit, lorsqu'il voit le soleil, par example, ce n'est pas le soleil, mais quelque chose qui est *' immediatement uni a notre ame, et ce c'est que j'appelle idee. . . . Un autre raison qui pent faire penser que nous voyons tous les etres, a cause que Dieu veut, que ce qui est en lui, qui les represente, nous soit decouvert.'* This system, though obnox- ious to weighty difficulties, shews the piety of the author and hvi wonderful sublimity of thought. It was strenaously opposed by A. Arnauld, in his trea- tise on true and false ideas. " Mon ame," said he, est capable de voir et voit en efl'et, ce que Dieu a voulu qu'elle vit, or Dieu I'ayant joint a mon (( (( >,'( (( (C (( (( t( t( (( <( cc t these ) act on Dable of the an- itamped ;m into ch acts, th men, nfantile t state, of their led age, acts in I powers 49 according to the exigencies of the body, and its relative position (I mean whether placed among persons from whom it may by communication or not, receive these impressions — suppose among savages) manifests or develops those ideas, with which it has been impressed, so as to communicate to the person, (who is composed of body and soul,) a sense of good and a sense of evil, a sense of justice and injustice ; and the idea of a Creator or Sovereign cause, even if he were to have no communication with any other mortal — this is what I conceive by an innate idea ; by this exposition, the najesty, the goodness, and the providence of God are made manifest ; this con- ception of an innate idea agrees with our conceptions of the essence of the soul and its union with the body, and shews from this innate desire of happiness, that a future state is attainable. Whatever may or can be said of the truth of either opinion, (concerning which I do not feel able to determine) 'tis a positive fact, that there never existed a rational being in any clime or country, free from the influence of prejudice or pas- sion, but acknowledged in his heart the existence of a supreme being. — Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui domine. Gent — Does not the system of the learned Male- branche seem preferable to that of Arnauld or others, on the subject of ideas in general ? Div. — 'Tis my opinion that Malebranche in his system, went too far, and by soaring out of his sphere, gave his subject too much refinement ; Mr. Arnauld on the other hand, by not going far enough, left the matter in greater obscurity. The system which 50 according to my conception of the matter, is more consonant to reason, to religion and truth, would be the medium between the extremes to which both these great men were insensibly carried. Gent — What is understood by what are called the habits of the human soul ? Div. — A habit is the power or ability in man, of doing any thing by frequent repetition ; there are many species of habits, some supernatural and beyond the powers of human nature — those are not acquired by labor, or by exercise, or by repeated acts compar^ ed, but infused by God ; such are the acts of faith, hope, and charity ; others are natural, and acquired by reiterated acts, and are therefore called acquired. A natural habit is either corporal or spiritual ; the former is that which renders the bodily faculty more apt to practice certain actions, such as the habit of singing, or playing on musical instruments ; the latter is that which assists the spiritual faculty. The spiritual habits belong to the mind, either inasmuch as it has knowledge or affection ; the former are referred to the intellect, whose province is knowledge, and are therefore called spiritual; the latter belong to the will, whose province is to desire what is good, to love, &c. and are called moral. Gent. — In what does the nature of those habits consist ? Div.— On that head philosophers are of opinion, that corporeal habits are happily explained by the free motion of the animal spirits, flowing in on certain parts of the body, for the more frequently they are thrown into those parts, the more easily they make 51 s more ould be :h both lied the nan, of ere are beyond icquired jompar^ if faith, jired by -ed. A ! former e apt to dnging, • is that piritual s it has ;rred to md are to the ood, to habits )pinion, by the certain hey are y make a way for themselves, in which they more quickly flow afterwards, the more easily are the motions of the same parts renewed to action. 'Tis no easy task to define the nature of the spiritual habits, r.either are the opinions of the learned uniform on the sub- ject. Most modern philosophers affirm that those spiritual habits arise, or are placed in certain corporeal affections, viz : in certain impressions made on the brain, (the use of which organ is to give off nine pairs of nerves, and the spinal marrow, from which thirty- one pairs more proceed, through whose means the various senses are performed, and muscu- lar motion excited,) in the free concurrence of the animal spirits, in an easy and expeditious flexion of the nerves and muscles, and by removing those obsta- cles which impede the exercise of the spiritual faculty. 1st — They say w^e can have no spiritual habits except when the brain has a certain disposition, viz : a certain solidity joined with a certain flexibility ; and for that reason it is that children have not these habits, on account of the softer and less elastic constitution of the organs. 2d — The habits of the mind are increased and strengthened in proportion as the impressions of the brain become more open or distinct, when the animal spirits freely flow through those impressions made upon the brain. The habits of every substance are nothing else than the substance itself affected by a certain mode ; but 'tis evidently absurd to affirm that the habits of the mind exist in the body, or the habits of one substance reside in another of quite a different nature and sub- stance. To make the habits of the mind be consti- G 2 i 52 tuted in the body would be virtually to identify the substance of the mind with that of the body, than which nothing more extravagant could be imagined. Again — let us suppose that tvo men lose their senses at the same time, one of whom lived in the habitual state of grace, or love of God, the other in a habitual state of sin ; let us suppose in both, that all these impressions of the brain are obliterated, so that both die in that state. According to the system of those philosophers, he who lived in the love and fear of God would not be saved, nor would the other be condemned ; which indeed, is not only contrary to the principles of christian philosophy, but also against christian faith, to which it is impious that any system of philosophy would be preferred. Gent. — What are we to understand by indifferent acts ? is indifference reconcilable with our freedom, or that willingness in which there is no coercion ? Div. — There are two kinds of indifference, the one passive, viz : while the will remains suspended from every act, this passive indifference does not belong to the essence of liberty, but is peculiar to all inanimate beings ; the other kind is active indifference , or the power of self-determination, and is the essence of liberty in man, and in all intellectual beings ; by this the will has the power to act and not to act ; man thereby has the dominion of himself, and is perfect master of his actions. This active indifference is then perfectly reconciiiable with man's freedom, which, or as it is called free will, is specifically a power or fa- culty of the will to act and not to act. Gent. — What kind of necessity is opposed to the free will, or that active indifference vou mention ? tify the I than lagined. senses labitual labitual ill these lat both )f those fear of ther be trary to against system different reedom, ion? the one led from elong to [animate , or the jence of by this :t; man perfect e is then hich, or er or fa- ;d to the tion ? 53 Div. — Absolute necessity excludes liberty of indif- ference. — consequent and hypothetical necessity do not; neither is it excluded by the necessity or coaction of a law or precept ; the reason is because that necessity which is not absolute, is extrinsic of the will or liberty, nor does it affect the inferior manner of acting freely. No motives can then impel a man irresistably to act, however powerful ; they can at the most, but induce him to act or deter him from acting ; neither can external coaction destroy his liberty. Man is there- fore in his actions perfectly free, which freedom is clearly reconcilable with the prescience of God, with gratuitous predestination, and predefinitioh with the last practical judgment, and with the impeccability of Christ the Saints. This freedom which is the gift of tho N^reator, man cannot lose by his trans- gressions against the rule of reason, by which his actions should be guided, being the eternal law of God ; and as for the observance of the law, eternal happiness will be his reward — so for the transgressions thereof, he is as justly punished. Gent. — ^What, pray, is meant by the axiom, bonum est ex Integra causae malurriy veroj ex singulis defec- tibus ? Div. — It means that the defect of one of the requi- sites to goodness is sufficient to constitute an act which is morally bad. Gent, — ^What disposition of the will is then neces- sary to a good act ? Div — 'Tis required indeed, that the honesty of the virtue be the motive, which principally would induce a person to action, or that good be the G2 54 «nd as well as the inducement for which the act is done, A direct inclination which virtually continues, may suffice for the goodness of the act ; hence an involuntary distraction at the time of prayer, does not deprive the ac* of its virtue, but an indirect or interpretative will inclination is sufficient to deprive an act of its virt* , because the will should be in every manner averse to evil, i. e. io every sinful act. Though we may will an evil act directly and in itself, still 'tis never on account of its evil, that the evil is willed or performed, which is the meaning of the axiom " — nemo iniendens malum operatur," Gent. — ^You have just now said, ** though we may " will an evil act'* as may imply a species of per- mission, I beg to know whether it be permitted at any time to will evil ? Div. — Even if good were to follow, *tis never per- mitted to do evil ; the meaning I intended to convey by that expression, was that which the axiom itself expresses, viz : that evil is never done for its own sake. Gent. — Though it may not be expressedly permit- ted, I should think it cannot be criminal, when the cause of God, the good of our neighbour, or the good of religion be in question, to tell an inoffensive lie, or to do some act which may not be formally against the rule of reason. Div. — There can be no deviation from the truth, which will not be found opposed to the sanctity of Al- mighty God, who is the author of truth and truth itself. There can therefore, be no reason or motive however holy or well intended, sufficient to excuse a lie, act is tinues, nee an r, does irec'c or deprive be in ill act. a itself, J evil is e axiom we may of per- itted at rer per- convey n itself its own permit- hen the or the iFensive brmally 3 truth, y of Al- ,h itself, lowever ; a lie, 55 even if it were to save one's ovm life, because to live by the sacrifice of truth, would be properly not life, but a spiritual death ; I do not say, however, but the circumstances or the smallness of the matter might, when considered, excuse the act from being mortal or a deadly sin, but I say, that under no con~ sideration, can a wilful deviation from the truth be excused from the guilt of sin, and that it is often no easy matter to determine when it can be said to be only venial. Gent. — ^What do you understand by the axiom, in '* evil acts a direct and indirect will are equivalent?" Div. — ^The meF;ning is, that they are equivalent, inasmuch as that an act be sinful, but not equally so when compared with another act. Hence an act sinful in itself, or which has accompanying it, that which constitutes a sin, if not directly voluntary cannot be considered of equal guilt or as great a sin as that which is directly voluntary. Gent. — Is there then a certain or fixed rule by which we can discover a sinful act, from that which is not so? Div. — The decalogue is the broad rule given by Almighty God to man, by which, according to the powers with which he is endowed, man's actions should be measured ; I say according to the powers with which he has been endowed, because if a man be born blind, 'twill not be imputed to him as a crime if his knowledge be not from reading ; but having the use of all the other ]^ 'vers, such as intellect, will memory, &c. &c. 'twill be criminal in him if he turn not tuese powers, both of mind and body, to 56 that use and end for which he has received them from his creator, viz : to love God and to serve him. From St. Augustin we have the following- rule, by which any sinful act can be easily determined : which he called, dictum vel factum vel concupitum contra legem dei eternam. A saying or expression or an action or a «J ire against the eternal law of God. Gent. — ^Which are the conditions required, that an act may be said to be voluntary in another, or that the effect be voluntary in the cause ? Div. — ^Three following : — 1st. That the effect by some maiiuer w^ould follow from that cause, either directly or indirectly. 2d. That the agent hath fore- seen, or could and ought to foresee and apprehend that such an effect would probably happen from that cause. 3d. That the cause was founded on no just reason. But in order that the effect be not only voluntary, but also culpable, 'tis required in that case, that the agent would be under some obligation to prevent the future effect. Gent. — ^What is the meaning of the following axiom ? one act may have two effects, one of which may be solely in the intention of the agent, but the other by no means intended. Div. — Tis thus explained : when the reason of giving the cause with a good effect, in these circum- stances, prevails against the reason for preventing the bad effect, one can act or give the cause, while he intends that the good effect only would follow, and not the bad effect. Thus a soldier may lawfully, and ought to stand at his post, though from his perilous situation he is in danger of death. i i •eceived to serve (Uowinp- [•mined : icupiium pression lI law of that an or that ffect by e, either ath fore- )prehend :om that no just lot only hat case, ation to r axiom ? may be her by no eason of 1 circum- reventing se, while How, and uUy, and s perilous I 57 Gent. — Is it not an axiom, that an eflfect only voluntary in the cause, is not more voluntary than the cause itself ? Div. — What I understand by that axiom is, that whilst the cause can be considered only a venial evil, in consequence of the indeliberation of the agent, or the imperfection of th^; inclination ; then the effect only voluntary in that cause, can be only a venial, which, with full deliberation, could not be excused from being a mortal sin ; thus, if from the negligence of a servant, through defect of more deliberation, and which indeliberation (the circumstances being considered) is only venial, the house would be consum- ed by fire ; this act of th^ servant cannot be consi- dered mortal, I say, for the want of sufficient deliberation, and the indeliberation being venial. Gent. — ^What is understood by a human act ? Div. — 'Tis an act which proceeds from the delibe- rate will of a person, or which is directed by the judgment of his reason ; deliberation is however of two kinds, formal and interpretative ; 'tis formal when the mind, T^ith a sufficient light of reason to distin- guish between moral good and evil, actually judges or deliberates on any action. 'Tis interpretative when the mind so enlightened, could and ought to use deliberation. To the sense of a human act, either kind of deliberation is sufficient ; and so that which proceeds from vincible ignorance or inadvertence, can be called a human act ; if there be neither kind of deliberation attending it, it is not a human act. Thus the first movements of the mind, or what are called motus primo primi, which are without any deli- 58 beratioii, and by which mutions are excited in the body, are not human acts. Hence the acts of children before they arrive at an age to use their reason, a\id the acts of those who have lost their reason, are not human acts, properly speaking. Thus what are strictly called humap, are different from the acts of a person considered as man indeterminately to the former but not to the latter, the deliberation of reason is required. Gent, — To merit or demerit, what kind of liberty is necessary ? does liberty from coaction suffice ? Div. — Liberty of indifference and from consequent necessity, are absolutely requisite to merit or demerit. Gent. — Does not St. Augustia in many places, d ay that liberty of indifference is required ? nay, in his book to Julian, Ch. 35. he admits the necessity of sin ! Div. — No external power can force man's free will, or that active indifference which he received from his Creator — force, indeed can restrain the body from action, but the will remains free ; absolute necessity destroys the freedom of action, because it is opposed to it— they are ideas which exclude each other. I do not recollect to have met in the writings of St. Au- gustin, any passage, jvhich, if properly understood^ can convey the above meaning, I freely admit, that from a want of truly comprehending the style, the depth and conciseness of his reasoning, many things have been imputed to him, as doctrine which he never taught. From the following passage which is found in his third book on free will, Ch. 18. 'tis manifest he clearly asserts, that the liberty of active indifierence is necessary to a formal sin, or rather to sin formally : fl9 m the lildien n, a\id ire not Eit are ts of a former Ei8on is liberty J? (equent emerit. places, lay, in 3sity of 3e will, om his y from ;cessity ipposed . I do k. Au- irstood^ it, that de, the things e never \ found ifest he fference rraallv : it tt tt tt << C( CI «< (< If «< Hoe brevissimnm tene ;** said he, " qurecimqxte ista causa est voluntatis, si ei nan potest resisti, sine peccato ei ceditur, . . . quis enim peccat in eo, quod nuUo modo caveri potest ? peccatur autem, caveri igitur potest. Et lib. de duahus animahus, Ch. 1 1 . peccatum est voluntas consequendi vel retinendi quod justitia vetat, et unde liberum est abstinere, . . . nemi' nem vituperatione suppliciove dignum qui id non faciat quod facere non potest. . . . nonne ista cantant et in montibus pastor es, etin theatrispoetee, et indocti in cir cutis , et docti in bibliothecis. Et. Cap. 12. *' dicere peccati reum teneri quemquam quinonfacit, " quod facere non potest summce iniquitatis est et ** insania" Hence I conclude that impotence, im- possibility, or absolute or antecedent necessity, can excuse from a new and formal sin, because they exclude the liberty of indifference, which to sin formally, is very necessary. Qent. — What is understood by a passion of the mind ? Biv. — 'Tis an act of the sensitive appetite, pursuing good 01 avoiding evil of a sensible kind, being direct- ed by the fantasy, and causing a certain change in the body, on that account the acts of the sensitive appe- tite are called passions, Qent. — Mow many are the passions of the mind ? Div. — They are eleven in number, viz : six in the concupicible appetite, and iSve in the iracible. The following are those of the concupicible appetite, viz : love and hatred, concupiscence or desire and flight, joy and sorrow. The five following belong to H2 h ^0 the irascible appetite, viz : hope and despair, fear, boldness and anger ; love and hatred are simply con- cerning some sensible good and evil abstractedly, i. e. Avhether present or absent. Desire and flight respect good or evil as absent. Joy and sorrow are concern- ing some present good or evil ; hope is concerning a good, loved, arduous, absent and possible ; despaif respects an absent good, apprehended as impossible, or too difficult to be obtained. Fear and boldness are concerning some great and impending evil, being not yet present. According to St Thomas, quest. 23. art. 3. anger has no opposite passion, but arises from a great or arduous and present evil, which it seeks to repel. St. Augustin defines all the passions by love, because love is the origin of ail the other passions, because whoever hates evil flies from it, and loves the good, which is opposed to it. Gent, — I found it some where asserted, that all the works even of just men in a state of fallen nature, are so many sins, on account of the vice of latent pride and concupiscence, by which all their acts are infected ; though they are not imputed to those hav ing faith, but only to the unfaithful. Div. — I before remarked that this was the doctrine of Luther, on which he held a public Thesis : but that paradox of reforming note, we find justly con- demned by the holy council of Trent, Sess. 6. Can. 7. 25. the contrary to that strange doctrine is of faith, and is proved from different passages in the sacred scripture. Job, Ch. I. v. 22. in omnibus his non peceavit Job. In all these things Job sinned, not, &c. I CI p, fear, ly con- ly, i. e. respect )ncern- ^erning despnii' ossible, Less are ing not jst. 23. es from eeks to jy love, 3ssions, d loves all the nature, latent icts are 36 hav loctrine IS: but ly con- 6. Can. e is of ; in the i his non lot, &c. videant opera vestra oona, that they may see your good works, &c. St. Mat. Ch. 5. v. 16. what can be said from the prophet Isaias, Ch. 64. v. 6. has no refer- ence to this question ; the prophet tliere speaks only of certain Jewish sacrifices, oblations and other legal observances In like manner, is misunderstood the word omnes or all from St. Paul to the Romans, Ch. 3. V. 12. it does not literally signify all as the paradoxical reformers would have it, 'tis given to signify many. In like manner in his epistle to the Philippians, he has, *• omnes qua sua sunt querunt" where undoubtedly by the word all he does not comprehend himself, nor the rest of the apostles. Gent. — From whence have human acts their degree of goodness or of mal propence ? Div. — There are three principles of morality. — 1st. That respecting the object. — 2d. That which regards the end, and 3d. That which respects the circum- stance. By the object is understood, the thing or the person, concerning which the act is ; thus, the object of theft is the property of another, man of homicide, and any thing holy of sacrilege. Gent. — What is here understood by the end ? Div. — Respecting the end, 'tis necessary to remark that 'tis not the end of the act that is understood, but the end the agent proposes in the manner of acting ; 'tis specifically from the end the agent proposes, the morality of the act depends or its immorality ; this therefore is a circumstance. The pure love of God and our own eternal happiness should be the end proposed in all our actions — we were created for that « i 62 end. From what I have here remarked, H can he easily conceived, that all human acts take their spe- cies of goodness or of malice from the object, the end, and the circumstances, and it follows, that those sins are distinct in species, whose object or circumstances are specificallv distinct ; but the object and circum- stances should be considered specifically distinct, when they are repugnant to right reason, and the eternal law diversely. Qent, — How is this diverse repugnance or specific distinction known ? Div. — ^By these rules. — 1st. The sins which are repugnant to different virtues, are specifically distinct ; for example, theft and fornication, the former is repugnant to justice, and the latter to chastity ; because as every virtue has an appropriate and pecu- liar goodness, the opposite vice must have a specific and proper malice. — 21y. These sins are specifically different between themselves, which are repugnant to the same virtue after a different manner — one by excess, the other by defect ; thus presumption and despair, though differing in species, are opposed to the same virtue, viz: to hope ; avarice and prodigal- ity are equally opposed to liberality. — 31y. These sins which are repugnant to the same virtue after the same- manner, are still specifically distinct between them* selves, if they be repugnant to the same virtue diversely. Thus, theft and rapine, detraction and contumely, are specifically different, though they are all after the same manner* opposed to the virtue of justice, viz : by d^iect. — 41y. These sins are specifi- can be eir spe- he end, ose sins LStances circum- listinct, nd the specific ich are istinct ; 'mer is lastity ; d pecu- specific cifically nant to one by on and osed to rodigal- ese sins he same* n them* virtue on and :hey are irtue of specifi- ed cally distinguished, which are opposed to thoa^ different laws and precepts, given from a formal and different motive; because these laws and precepts have for their end — the honesty of the virtue different ; so the sins opposed to them have a malice in species different. By the same rule we can know when the circumstances are of a different species, or change their species. Thus in the scandalous theft of a holy thing, the circumstances of the sacred thing, and of scandal, are mutually and specifically different, and change the theft to the reason of a different species. The numerical distinction of sinful acts, is taken from the plurality of the acts and of the objecu, for which we have tw^o rules ; the first is, that many acts of the same species of evil which do not coalesce i[.< the same sinful act, can constitute only as many sini in number as there are acts. The second is, that one act having many objects of the same species not uniting in one object, contain as many sins, solely distinct in number, as there are objects. Thus a person, who, by a single explosion of a bombard^ has killed three men, is guilty of three sins of homi- cide, distinct in number. Gent. — Is it not almost impossible to live up to the refinement of those rules which are laid down by christian Divines, for the governmen*; of our rehgioug and moral conduct ? who has observed these rules ? Div. — Christian Divines or theologians do no more than simplify or explain the law of God, (which all men are indispensably obliged to oosei've,) by point- ing out such acts as are conformable or repugnant to 64 -- that eternal rule of reason. In every rank and station of life, there have been men who found it neither impossible nor difficult to observe these divine ordinances, from the conviction, that on it alone depend man's comfort and independence here below, and his eternal felicity hereafter. THB END. gink and found it se divine it alone re below,