IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-S) // './ V #J ^ A 1.0 145 I.I ■28 |50 ""^* It lio 2.5 III 12.0 1.8 1.25 u 1.6 < 6" ► V] <^ /i ^>. i?: 7 -f^ Photographic Sciences Corporation 33 WEST MAIN STREET V.>:?iTBR,N.Y. 14560 (/I6) 872-4503 '"^y^ MP. CIHM/ICMH Microfiche Series. CtHIVI/ICMH Collection de microfiches. Canadian Institute for Historical Microreproductions / Institut canadien de microreproductions historiques Technical and Bibliographic Notes/Notes techniques et bibliographiques The Institute has attempted to obtain the best original copy available for filming. Features of this copy which may be bibliographically unique, which may alter any of the images in the reproduction, or which may significantly change the usual method of filming, are checked below. n D n n D n Coloured covers/ Couverture de couleur I I Covers drmaged/ Couverture endommagie Covers restored and/or laminated/ Couverture restaurde et/ou pellicul^e r~n Cover title missing/ Le titro de couverture manque I I Coloured maps/ Cartes giographiques en couleur Coloured ink (i.e. other than blue or black)/ Encre de couleur (i.e. autre que bleue ou noire) I I Coloured plates a>id/or illustrations/ Planches et/ou illustrations en couleur Bound with other material/ ReliA avec d'autres documents Tight binding may cause shadows or distortion along interior margin/ La re liure serrie peut causer de I'ombre ou de la distortion le long de la marge int^rieure Blank leaves added during restoration may appear within the text. Whenever possible, these have been omitted from filming/ II se peut que certaines pages blanches ajout6es lors d'une restauration apparaissent dans le texte, mais, lorsque cela 6tah possible, ces pages n'ont pas 6t6 filmdes. Additional comments:/ Commentaires suppl^mentaires; L'Institut a microfilm^ le meilleur exemplaire qu'il lui a dtd possible de se procurer. Les details de cet exemplaire qui sont peut-dtre uniques du point de vue bibliographique, qui peuvent modifier une image reproduite, ou qui peuvent exiger une modification dans la mithode normale de filmage sont indiquds ci-dessous. □ Coloured pages/ Pages de couleur n Pages damaged/ Pages endommagies I I Pages restored and/or laminated/ V D Pages restaurdes et/ou pelliculdes Pages discoloured, stained or foxed/ Pages ddcolordes, tachetdes ou piquies Pages detached/ Pages ddtachdes Showthrough/ Transparence I I Quality of print varies/ Quality inigale de I'impression Includes supplementary material/ Comprend du materiel suppl^mentaire Only edition available/ Seule Edition disponible Pages wholly or partially obscured by errata slips, tissues, etc., have been refilmed to ensure the best possible image/ Les pages totalement ou partiellement obscurcies par un feuillet d'errata, une pelure, etc., ont 6t6 film6es d nouveau de facon 6, obtenir la meilleure image possible. This item is filmed at the reduction ratio checked below/ Ce document est filmi au taux de reduction indiqui ci-dessous. 10X 14X 18X 22X 26X 30X 7 12X 16X 20X 24X 28X 32X tails i du odifier une mage rata a lelure. 3 32X The copy filmed here has been reproduced thanks to the generosity of: Library of the Public Archives of Canada The images appearing here are the bast quality possible considering the condition and legibility of the original copy and in keeping with the filming contract specifications. Original copies in printed paper covb/s are filmed beginning with the front cover and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, or the back cover when appropriate. All other original copies are filmed beginning on the first page with a printed or illustrated impres- sion, and ending on the last page with a printed or illustrated impression. The last recorded frame on each microfiche shall contain the symbol -^ (meaning "CON- TINUED"), or the symbol V (meaning "END"), whichever applies. IVIaps, plates, charts, etc., may be filmed at different reduction ratios. Those too large to be entirely included in one exposure are filmed beginning in the upper left hand corner, left to right and top to bottom, as many frames as required. The following diagrams illustrate the method: 1 2 3 L'exemplaire film6 fut reproduit grflce A la g6n6rosit6 de: La bibliothdque des Archives publiques du Canada Les images suivantes ont 6t6 reproduites avec le plus grand soin, compte tenu de la condition et de la nettetd de l'exemplaire film6, et en conformity avec les conditions du contrat de fiimage. Les exemplaires originaux dont la couverture en papier est imprim6e sent film6s en commen^ant par le premier plat et en terminant soit par la dernidre page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustratior:, soit par le second plat, selon le cas. Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sent fiimds er. commenpant par la premiere page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'illustratior: et en terminant par la derniAre page qui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la dernidre image de cheque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols —► sigrJfie "A SUIVRE ", le symbole V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre filmds d des taux de reduction diffdrents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clichi, il est fiimd d partir de Tangle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 4 5 6 • X 1, ■•;ii w' ■ ^; I fS-Si • , '^'^ -, 4 'JfT*' f . '^Z , \ t; ;:*• ^-^ fi'-^" '*■ M' M f^. :h'ikr-i^^M'^4n\j' . .. u . ^f «.i».*^ T:,i:^ t, , i't -1. »*>:* i . REAS O N S Id SUPPORT of the WAK'mGERMJNr, InANSWERto CONSIDERATIONS ^4P '' O N T H £ ktr Prefcnt G E R MA W W A R. i L I^ D N: jprinted for G. W o o d f a l t, the Corner of Cr«VV Court, Charifig-Cro/s, M.DCC.LXI. •tSk Jh XJ ' H O .' *■,*.;■„»*«; 3;l?l' 5T"/ *V 414k ^1 . O 'i nij: « 'N*'*,- '';^' ... - - li f r f (V) •^ ADVERTISEMENT- TTAFINQ been lately in the ^ ^ country to fpend the hoUditys with my neighbours there ^ I found a total change had prevailed in the Jy^ Jlem of their politicks^ during my ab* fence. I left them a few months be^ fore pafjionate admirers and zealous friends of the king of Pruffia, and of prince Ferdinand : but in the frji vift which I received from theparjon ofourpari/hy who had been one of the moji zealous among them^ he asked me whether I had not read^ and how I liked the Confiderations on the pre- fent German war ? / anfwcredy that / > I (vi) / had read them^ and did not like^ them. He replied by repeating the king ofPtufftd^s 'tmrds in the author^! advertijement i^ and concluded wth the quotation from Tully, contained in the la ft page of that pamphlet, ap^ plying it as the author does* it . >■ . lanjfmred^ the king &f^t\sf^^was our enemy voken he gave us the ^&d (idvice for our conduSi then^ which the author recommends to us no^Uf to falloijo $ and that the Acbenian mif' carriage in a naval expedition againjl, Sicily, ^mhen the defeat of their hop^^^ lefs and dijpirited troops was a con^ jequence of the deJlruBiqn of their feet /which conveyed them thither y could not be applied to a war upon the G«r« man continent. He had rea^d Thti-* cydidcs, and did not much mfft upon that infance. ,^^i^ ^A' \ , ffowever^ >t ?i It > 7 ( vii ) However^ *we *widely differed in tnany other farticuhrs i and as njoe coutd not then finijh the controverj^y tvoe agreed to poflpone it for the pre* jenP^ and thoroughly debate the Jub" jeSi at a club ther, in the author's words, " the great intent *' of war be^ by viSiory to conquer an enemy's ** country^* or to defend a friend's, p. 73, 74. Near foar parts in ^vq of the allied army being natives of the country where the war is carried on^ inured to the climate and ha> bituated to its food, their |ofs by fickne(s has been incpnfiderable, compared with that fuftained by our enemies, throughout cam- paigns lengthened beyond the meafure of military operations in former times. Long and pai^f^l marches to the place of a£tion, and unprovided retreats from it in difaftrous events ;hro* a lefs known and unfriendly country, are ciicumftances all operating to our advantage ; from v hich the arn^ies of frame have fuffered in^ni^ely more in deaths and defenion, than from the fword of their ^nemy: cannon and bayonets haye beea 'iii^ ^ \ bvnilei:^ /<■ 11 i I'll (4) Ifermlfefs implements, comfiaired td othtf* means of deftrudion, with which provi- dence in this qiniFrel h^s fought on the iidei of the invaded. ,' But fuch loffes afe, it feiertis, of no aVail 10 irs, and cauft no prejudice to France : fbr, important as this lives of our fclldw- fulyje6ls are to Britain, our author fets thofe oi FrcTickmen&t 2L h^ T&te indeed j as n8at nothing as words can ftafte them 5 p, 76* fti the prefent cocrrfe of the war France' cin lofe nothing by a defeat. Except only in the number cf the killed and wounded, ** which in the common courfe of battles may be fet at about the double of that of the conquerors, what other lofs have our enemies to fuftain ?'* Magazines, artillery and baggage are fmall items that have been here omitted in this account. Yet by fuch Ibffss thofe very enemies have, in difiercnt periods of their hiftory, been driven out of Germany ; &nA the fame fate, p. 24. attend- ing almoft invariably, in numberlefs in* ilr^nces, their unjufl: attempts upon other countries, prove to convidion, if perfidious ambition could be convinced, that France^ flronger at land (within her own domi- nions) than England or any other power in Europe, p. 3, lofts that fuperiority when fhe ventures far from home, beyond the influ- ence of her infinite refources, p. 67. And thus C( << cc fC cc re (,5): thus clrcumftanced, {he in the year 1673 b0came inferior to the efforts of: a lew ftnall provinces, half undone by her inhun^an de^ii vaAatione, and oppofed, deferted, and hC"* trayed by unnatural and infatuated allies, i . ■ • -r bThe iffue of that invafibn in the laft ccn* tury, and of the kingdom of Bohemia in the prefent, are imlances, which oppofed to the refiitance made by Fmnce againft the two grand alliances, reduce, the author's propofitron in />. 3.10 what I have ventured to ilate it 'y and demonftrate that the infe- rence he would draw frona that ftroggle a- gainft the powers of Europe^ p> 59. is in no meafure applicable to the preient contcft^ /». 74. '^.!^- 'The fuccefles which have already attended the allied army in Germany^ and the lo^ fuftaincd by the French in their invaiion of it, however they ace depreciated by the au- thor's reprefeniation of them, will \fi the hif^ory of thefe times,, whatever the final event may be, add one inftance more of the infuffieiency of the power of France^ to over- run at will weak but diAant dates ; while the fcanty numbers of our allies have at the utmoft extent been only iocuca&d by twenty thouiiind Britijh troops. r ■ ■••.*■ »..•'■■.-'" TW T \m »> The I ■ig i I ! (M t The weaker thofc ftates are reprefented, and the lefs important to the invader, p, ^3, 24. the ftronger the proof will be, that the pride of power has its bounds, and innocence and weaknefs a fecurity againft it, beyond the reaph of flretched and flrained jimbition. . :^% •=t*U The author complains, p, 79. that the diliinguifiing art of this war has hitherto (onfiM in fhf raffing 1 riffling skirmi/hes into battles and vi^ories ; and that there are *who knew that they could not make their court in any n^thodfo effeiiually^as by magnifying the vi£iories of our German army^ and aggra- vating the lojfe^ of the French. The battle at Minden was then a triffling skirmifh! and indeed fo it appears to be by the au- thor's account of it, p, 78, 129. Nay, had our horfe charged the French, and tram- pled down three or Jour tho^fand Saxon and French foot, the advantage would have been trifHing : '* for no fubftantial benefit would refult to England from it." p. 79. why then would it doubtlefs have been a very good thing? p. 78. ** The killing of men is not the *? end of war/'p, 73. ** The only lofs would ** have been of men." p 79^ " But France ^* cannot be hurt by the mere lofs of men, V which were it five times greater, it could jre^r 1 w len |be lid ice [id 1 " prefently fupply by draughts from its mi* " litia, or replace when it pleafcd with re** ** cruits in Germany!* Why then was not the French army prefently recruited ? and why did it remain during the reft of th6 campaign expofed to all the difadvantages of a war of defence only ? f.ji, 1 n * The French militia confifts of about fifty thoufand men, employed in garrifoning their interior fortifications, and in aflifting to de- fend their coafts. How the lofs at Minden, had it amounted to forty thoufand men^ p, 79. could have been prefently fupplied from fuch a flock, fcarcely fufHcient for the other important fervices to which they were deflined, may be very evident to the writer of the pamphlet, as well as the facility of filling up fuch a void at pleafure with re- cruits in Germany ; but it is apparent that neither fecmed pradicable to the French mi- niflry. And the fpecimen which our author has given of his knowledge in the French revenue, of which he confeSes ** he knows ** nothing," p. 68. and his very imperfect and unfair dating a certain gentleman's ar- gument, in the laft feflion of parliament, joined to his real or affedted ignorance of the produce of our fmking fund, and the unac- countable inaccuracies in his cdculations thro' f. 69 and 70, render his opinions upon rr^;:; ' ) \)l .^Dua';^ \.^:i tl7'j V^ -— . the J the ways and means of both nations fo^i' •what problematical. ^ But " infinite rcfources," .^. 67. '* hauftiUe numbers of men," p, 79. " M,\U " lions to Q>are/' p,. 123. are bold affer- tions; which, had aiTertion the force of fads, would defeat every inference that can bedrawn from bai^krupccy and beggacy at iiome, and defeat and di^onour abroad. .. ■ ■ ■., .. ... " -ft ^r'^he audbor takes no notice of the J0& ^vftained by the French: previous to the bai^ iDf "Crevelt, Thefe .were ail the conieqi^ences uii sSkmfitri^ngf P* 7^* ^s not to. be ^wor- _ ^fay of -mention in his. impartial Co^^rr^^ . ifiwts. He eftimates the defeat at iif/W ** divert <{ •i ■ At- ' Hi ( i8) ** divert us from their iflands by employing ** our attention in Germany^* The conqueifc of Hanover is therefore not the objedt of France, And however BrU tain may rate that electorate, even as " her " greateft flake,"/. 36. yet the entire and quiet pofleffion of it, would, far from ad- vancing the affairs of France^ put a period tp her only hope ofexhatifting and wearing us out. * Has {he not meant in every adion in which her trpops have been engaged with the Allies during this war, to drive them out of Germany i or oblige them to lay down their arms ? and in more than one of thefe nflions, had fortune declared on her lide, would not cither of thefe events have been the neceffary confequence of her fuccefs ? Have her minifters been fcrupulous during this war, in their orders to her generals, of any one of thofe means which have rendered her infamous to the prefent and all future ages, by her devaftations of the United Provinces, and her more than Pagan barba- rities in the Palatinate f Are any traces of the author's policy to be found in Bellijle'% letters to Contades ? and when flie had failed in one year by the valour of cur troops and the condudt of our generals, did (he not At- tempt in every fucceeding year lo^overpower them ( 19 ; thf m with numbers ? Has not her obftinatc perfeverance in eftabli{hing winter-quarters in Hejfe and Gottingen at the end of this campaign, been with a view of darting in the beginning of the next nearer to the end of her labours, her lofles, her expence, and her difgrace. ^ It is not true, that France is at Icfs ex» pence than we are in Germany : The French army came from a greater diftance, than near four parts in i^ve c ^ the allied army did, p[er magazines and hofpitals coft her mope ; for her contradlors purchafe upon credit, and their reimburfements are flow and pre- carious : Their contortions are therefore greater, - The rate at which her troops are paid, is lower than that of the few Britifi forces which form a part of the allied army ; but the French troops have other allowances which at leaft even that difference. And the f);ate is an immenie lofer, which exercifes a fparing ceconomy in thefe articles : Men mufl; eat, and be clothed and covered 3 an4 if fcantily provided, (ick men coft more and do. lefs fervice than the healthy. Tho French are more numerous than the allies in Qermanyy therefore, as above; explained, mor« ^xpenfive. France fubfidizes more powers VA aj+^ t !l i ill \ i '' ' I i ( ^' \ than "Wc do, aad in 'ali probable conjc8au|j(| at a :nxi(ich higher priie.']; Uu r-i X>i'"n But J to put aia end t9 fappQ^tions-^i£ France' meant to lengthen out the war ix^ Cnerm/iny, why was the treaty of Ciofier-^^ fevtn concluded ? Why did not Rkblieu rc* tire, rather than oblige the allies to lay down their'atriisr And if it' be faid, for every thing extravagant maybe laid, that a breach of the treaty was jforefeen, why were not iho fraub better prepared for that event ? and >vhy afterwards d>liged to retire, unfufpeding and iiirprifed, with a greater lofs^ altho' no one cbniiderable blow was Aruck^ than whal jignafed any vidory gained hyi the armies of Europe in the Grand Alliance ! When thefc fadls are reconciled to the au- thor's fyftem, I fhall ask whettier there be an Inftance in the hiftory oif the world, of a power fuffering lofs heaped upon loiTes, and! difgrace upon difhonour for four years to- gether, merely with a view to exbauft the advcrfe power by expence ? And if this pro^ poiition be not fuifficiently ilrong^ lee anof iher circumftance bai added-^luch policy has beien afcriibed ta a rbankrupt-peoplie ^dbing at a much greater expence of money and of men^ ,againll a nation in full credit. ivS^)6i\ ^ '" ' " ' ' ' X' '.b ^9 j^i..'^ . u I That 1 ' ! A I r^'' (ix) ' That Pratjce has often, f, 9, fomented quarrels between ber neighbours, and infi- tl}oi»£y joined, and perAdioufly deierted one fide, in order to weaken bpth, is certain. -3ttt then (he remained an unlofing fpe^tator, and did not ftake her whole upon the ifTiie pf the conftid):. This policy has been rc«» ferved for the author of the confiderations, "■'■ B&t if the only view of France has been |d exhauft Britain by a war in Germany^ while we, are fo blindly obftinate as to mean ifip def«nGe by an armed force, why has fhc tiol attained that end without any expcnce to hetfelf of blood or of treaiurc? The au- thor has pointed out the means in />. jy^ 89, and^they are fo obvious, that had the defigns pf :Fra>2ce been confined to his plan, they coold not have efcaped her minifters. V. Why have not the French troops been kept ft home ? P. 77. <* Will the French reve- ^ud ^ at all lefTened, or the (^ate brought fomuth nearer to bankruptcy, for their hav- ing no army to pay out of their own country?" ** But England's expence muft go on. Our «nemiiBS will not tell us, that they do not in- tend to go into Germany ; they certainly will go, if we attempt to leffen our expence, and withdraw a great part of our troops. Whetie then is the end of our labour ?" And Ill HI i;i Pi: ilihl ijii!! Ill W ( 22 ) again p, 89. " Why then fliould France fuo for peace, when at worft they have only to dand flill, and keep their money at home, and their troops upon their frontiers, hold- ing the appearance of marching into Gerr many? and our ruin is completed: for we. piufl be at ftili the fame expence ; and after having got fix and thirty millions in debt, mufl igo on to eight and forty.'* . Why then has not France compleated our ruin by thtfe means ? keeping her money at homey and her troops upon her frontiers h Were her viev^rs only to exhaufl us by length- ening out a war in Germany, why not attain that defirable end by means infinitely more cligil^le ? Were the comparative means and expence of both nations flill more in favour. o£ France than they are flated in p, 69, 70, had France millions to fpare, while England was incurring an additional debt of eight and forty milliona, yet fure it would be worthy the attention of even that inexhaufiiblei power, to fave her treafure from being fcjuan-, dered in Germany, and let " England's ^x-; 1* pence ^0 on."- rjf »» The contrary meafure of wanton. anc^ uncalled for extravagance, had France no other purpofe to ferve than what our author fuppofes as the animating fpring of all her actions, would prove her defperation in one < 23 ) period of the prefent war/>. 126, heightened into phrenzy in this ; or as the pamphlet terms it in us, />. 81. "a miftaken zeal of " the nation, and an eagernefs to fight an " (Englijhman) any where/* There are certainly no fymptoms of fach enthufiaftic valour and hatred in xht French nation, and her miniftry has not even this poor excufe for their condud, which he admits to ours. However clear in its motives and end the French errand into Germany appears to our author, a difcovery of the inducements which lead us thither has cod him much logical pains and difquifition, even from p, 1 16 to 126. where, by the help of many accurate diilindions, he arrives at the know- ledge of what " every one muft have remem-t *•* bered,"^. 126. and what no one ever difputed, " that the army of obfervation was ** an army of defence, not of diverfion/* And as he does not like he word diver^on^ we will allow, that thetreaty of the fixtecnth oi January '1756, was a treaty meant for defence only. .^ . , But there are it feems other lefs expenfive means with which we may ferve our allies. And ** the pointing out what appears to our " author the moft efFedtual method offe- •• curing Hanover from the prefent and fu- '* ture attacks of our enemies, makes one ; ^! " principal end ofliis confiderations.** p, ^K His mt thod is no doubt plain^ eafy, and in- fallible in its efFed : for it is no more than this — " let them (the Hanoverians) alone*^ /.2 c. " they have nothing to do but fubmit." ibia. An excellent and fare expedient id previent an attack. But then they will be entitled to an in« demnification from us, and the author in- tends then! an ample one indeed — nothing lefs than the ^^ French iflahds"/. 45, 46. ** not ufelefs conquefts oh the MiffiJJippi^ ^* but by feizing the French iflands, and *« holding their Av,hole JVeji-India ti^Q iii ** depofite for Htf«o*u^r." 130. Guadaloupe and Mariegalante muft then go to their old mailers. And fhould Marti nico with her five Millions Sterling per Ann, and the French part of Hijpaniola be conquered by us, they inuft alfo be reftorcd for Hanover, Nay id p, 5a. the indemnity is to be extended to our friends ftill farther, by conquefts to be gained on the French coafts^ and in the Eaft as well as the Wejl' Indies » Th- Poffibly a quefiion might arife at the cori- clufion of a peace, were a ceffion of any of our confiderable conquefls upon this ac- count to be an article of the trcaty,whetherit would not have been better to have defended thedomiiiiions of our allies againft the French dir' n »• I* •- H •„ ■ t (25) or at lead to have obliged their armies to earn them at the expence of much blood and treafure, than to invite them by a faith- lefs defertion of our friends to a quiet and unoppofed polTeffion of territories, after to be pjrchafed back by us at fo high a rate. Should we now leave the Coutinent, French politcnefs would affuredly yield to fuch a courteous invitation ot the French army into Hanover^ " and would, without much in* treaty^ fuffer it to ftay there more than a ^ twelvemonth round," p. 129, in fure expec- tation of an indemnity of at leaft fifty times the value of the electorate *. Thofe who have made their court by running the na- tion into a greater expence for the German war, than it had the leaft idea of," />. 45, would certainly not " make their excufe to the people," ibid» by fuch a conclufion , of it. And the minifter?, who (hould dar^ to fet their hands to fuch a flipulation, would juftly expiate that trcafon with iheir h^ads. , V^:.» f - «■. Th^ alternative which therefore the pami phlet propofes, as the only expedient left in any change of our meafures^^ i^ the ftrongeft juftification of them^ ^ f m- U tfl:^] ' • In /. 1 29, and in many others, Hanover wouM be of no value at all to France. Indeed in/. i2a» he compatfs it about half the worth of Martinico ; valued at five millions per a(tnuri;, P. 56 and 82. i\ ' i ■*■, M\ mt}- ■i I But podibly no indemnification would bo peceffary. P. 13. " We (hould leave the frenpk to thernfelvcs, to harrafs Germany as much as they pleafe, and make themfelves as odious as we can defire,** as. the only chance we have of forming and accelerating an union in Germany againft them. This Ihould be done^ p. 16. *' until the Germans (hd\\ fcQ their own intereft." ** Leave the Frenck to themfelves, they will doubtlefs do as much mifchief as they can ; but in time they may make themfelves generally hated, and the Cermans wife enough to agree.'* P. 30, " But, in general, the French are a fair enemy, and neither they nor we have exercifed any unneceffary cruelties to each others fubjeds. Nor could the country therefore have any fufferings to fear beyond the allowed ufage of war, upon an Englifk account. Nor would a French dxmy ftay there in all probability more than one campaign, if we would but keep out of it, and take from the French court all hope of drawing over an Englijh army to meet them there.**' P. 24. " The French, *tis true, would poC ; fefs themfelves of the revenues of the coun-'- try ; and all the taxes, which the people now pay to their fovercign, would be paid to France** Ibid, " A French army in the poumry would themfelves probably find a' > \ a?) Ufe for all the money they cotild there. raife Many pages arc employed to juftify the intended rtf^/ctf/d^ftruaion of the moft fruit- ful proviaccs by one commander, p. 25. (See Bellijle*^ letters, p, 70.) and to extenuate and etcufe the excefTes and extortions prac* tifed in that cledoratc by another. P. 28. Great pains are alfo taken to quiet compani- onate minds, and reconcile the alarmed Sa-^ noverian to a return of the fame guefls, by Inflatices of their inoffenfive march thro* Germany during the courfe of the laft war, P. 301 And by their humanity during this, in permitting, while they were mafters of Hanover^ the fun to p.ine and the rivers to Ji(nt>i for the ufe of its inhabitants* P. 27. Happy for many of them they did, who defpoiled of their all had perhaps no drink but the running ftream, and no roof but the canopy of heaven* Until the author can reconcile the fea- tures of two pictures drawn to reprefent the fame object, but oppofitc and unlike as chriilian charity is, p. 26, to unprovoked and favage barbarifm ; as the tendernefs of a rightful and natural fovercign, />. 24, 33, coUedting tight taxes for government and defence, to the depredations of an invader, who renders himfelf univerjaliy odious by ,,. E 2 •/ V doing i .7 (28) doing as much 'mifchief as he can^ and wan- tonly harrajjing an unrcfifting people j un- til our minifters can determine from our author's aflcrtions whether France be the an- gry lion feeking whom (he may devour, or the lamb of innocence and peace breathing love and benevolence on mankind; until fome certainly can be obtained of cheaper terms than our author iniifls on for reflitu- tlon at a peace ; until better reafons are given to convince us that France fuflfcrs nothing and would fuffer nothing for ten years to come, by marching and maintaining an army much more numerous than ours, at a greater diflance from home than near four parts in five of the allied, in a country that can- not fubiift them, and with immenfe annual loiTes that mud be annually repaired ; the na-* tion will ohfiinately and unanimoufly, our i. author and poffibly a few mifled by him ex- cepted, perfevere in approving and fupport- ing meafures, which exhaufl the laft re- fources of a power already cut off from that main fupply, which even in our author's opinion enables France to march an army into Germany, p, ^"^^ .*v> ^. • ■f ■>! ; V lit i i I t ' ' V^hat remains to be done to pcrfedl this great work, already almoft compleated, can- not fail of fuccels ; and Martinico with her millions muft be ours, while France is fo employed and fo wafted in Germany^ as not ^' to < *9) ; . to be able to fit out a few frigates, p, jyi fome of which muil have cfcaped, thro* un- avoidable accidents at fea, the vigilance of even a Britijh fquadron, to fupply an ifland which produces no one neceflary for fub- iirtence or defericei ¥ ■ It will be no objection to thefe meafures that while we purfue the great objed of this war 5 while every one part of our fyftem fupports another, all co-operating to the completion of the whole, we preferve invi- olate the faith of the public, prophanely fported with, and fophidically quibbled away by an ill-rea Toning author ; p. 44 and 46, to p. 54 ; That we protedl allies, at- tacked merely becaufe they are our friends, flaking their whole upon their confidence in us ; to whom defi^at wculd be deftrudtion, and whofe deftrudlion would involve the protedant religion, the liberties of Europe, the trade, wealth, and freedom of thefe countries. But in our author's opinion the afiidance we give Hanover aggravates her evils ; and a druggie for her defence is the completion of her mifcries. He founds this do(ftrine upon the follow- ing principle. P. 25. " A fmall flate in- vaded by the armies of one infinitely greater than ,f,:*..-jA.'i'"e ,;','j-^*<« If ■V. ill it { iikiff is doiibtlefs under a great misforttintfi all refiflaoce is ufelefs, and it has nothing to do but to fubmit. But there is a way of' doubling this misfortune ; and that is/ by having another great flate, almoft «qoal to the invader, undertake the defence of it If the country fubmit, it has but one army to maintain ; and may in the beginning yield upon terms v^hich are tolerable : Bat if it be ^lefended, it has then two arn^ies in it^ and is fure to be opprefTed by the Ji both.-^ An army is a many-headed monfter, that muft be fed 5 and the defending aroiy ought to have as many mouths as the attacking ; and each will get but all they can firom the poor inhabitants/' As this paragraph contains all the fub- fiance and marrow of others in, ^. 26, 27, 30^ 55, >>7, calculated to apply thefe dow- trines to the prefent flate of Hanover^ I have tranfcribed the whole. Yet the miie- ries he defcribes in a country thus invaded and defended, are fcniewhat foftened in the cafe of our allies, by having the revenues of England and France poured into them . P. 15. and in p, 100, Hanover would become a morfel more delicious to the King of Prujpay for our having fpent there fo many milUons in defence of it. The inflances given in^. 30 and 31, alfo |.rove to thofe who think 'ike the author, if there be any * fuch. £ifi'U f! fuch, that a contefted invafion ought not to be confidcred in " fo very terrible a light/' But I confefs that a fmall tlate invaded by a fuperior army b under a very great mif- fortune indeed 5 riot to be compenrated witfi the money fpent by the co:?itendnig powers, nor with the beiie^t of letting out its troops to one of them. The author therefore/. 31. forms a very falfe and irividious eftir^ate of the lofT^s of Hejfe^ and of the ntotivcs that a^uated jts landgrave, by the fum received from us for the hire oJF his troops. The lives of foldiers are thrown into this eftimate ^s nothing. Were they French foldiers, fuch an omiflion would need lio excjfe in thp author's political arithmetick, > Were his principle founded, the Prince oi Orange in 1672, defer ved the fate of the DeWitSy for the madncfs of hisrefiftance; And Gtifiavus AdolphuSy in his attempt for freeing Germany, (hould have met in his re-» lief of Stralfundy with that death which concluded his heroick atchivements at Lut" zen. It is true, fortune profpered their en* deavours 5 but the fortuitous event of things is no excufe for the rafhnefs of enterprizes, fbrmed and executed againft every probabi- lity of fuccefs and infinite odds on the iide of the vanquiflxed. il Yet (32) Pii h Yet many of the Grecian heroes had no better excule for their refiftance of a power infinitely fbperior to the ftates which they defended and foccoured. Thofe who failed andperiflied, fliare an equal glory with thofe who fucceeded ; and Leontdas at T^her^ > pylay and ^tlttaJes at filaratifofi^ are re- corded with the fame graife by ignorant and unintormed anajifts Had bur great deliverer been puffed back and fuffocaicd jn the laft canal of ffoUandy his well-timed end would have faved his (nemory fron^ the re- proach of muhiplicd tranfgreflions agairi '- our author's precepts : He landed a Dutd^ army here, which had not as qiany mouths^ ^.25. as King 'James ^ forces on Salijbury-. Pkiriy but contributed wiih them to feed upqn ^oot En^Ia?^4, • -::)W ' ' ' If a<^ions like thefe d^ferve applaufe ; if lawful Princes degenerating into tyrants may and ought to be oppofed j if it be the duty of every honed Man to join in th^ defign, altho' he perifh in the execution 5 (hall paffive obedience and non-refiftance to ;;, foreign invader be preached up, as a mea- fure of prudence, to injured, unoffending, and independent iiates 1 And fhall a power, bound by every tye, political and moral, to, their afTifiance, be branded with hard rc- fledlions for declaring iifdf in their caufc ? K ^ t ed ' er Lft id ■4 (3. 107, before a iingle buckler was raifed again d the Roman eagle. But no fuch au- gud afTenvb^y attended the leaders of any of thofe dates when invaded by armies infinitely fuperior to theirs ; they ,diould then have fubmitted without reddaqpe, knowing that f* all refidancc was ufelefs, and that they tad nQi;|&ing to do but fubmit." They tiiould have waited until the i?i?«/z«i had rendered Ujen^relvcs uni^nfally odious^, and then the world' would have lunited againft them. Bat altho* Rofne^^' g?ew to a degree of dreng^h, 'much greater than that of any pther power," yet the d^tes of the world did not mutually affid each other when they, were attacked by her. P. 4. " This uni- verfal maxim of politicks" did not operflce during many ages. Some nations who ven- tured to depart from it, ^flerted their free- dom againd thofe tyrants of mankind 3 and ,C^>i w ^\ r r I (34) the Aates which hafely fubmitted, became ' provinces and flaves to Rome. Had the bnited provinces a£ted in 1672 upon the au- thor's principle, the houfe oi Auflria would indeed not haye aflifted tbeoi after^ nor an ^i^gUfi parliament have compelled the trca- (^h^ou& and paultry penlioner of France t(i re-aflbme the roll and policy of an EngNJb Kifig. But thefe were events improbable at the Srft outfet, and by confequence do not juftify it. And altho' a ftate defpairing of it- ieif J f'» over be deferted by its neighbours inii hi s, yet better it is that it fhould be ifo forlorn, left Jt ftiould other ^yjfe " have inore than one army t(» maintain/' ^ \/'^ ■ ■ ■ ' ' ' '■■"" '■* _^' Had Fr^»r^ poured in forces tp ftpppi't ihe laft rebellion in Smiand, fiiperior to the ftrcngth of thie loyal Clanns^in thi|t part o( the united kingdom) or had t(?»/a«j landed histrbops in Inland, England jthdbld not have &nt a mah to their affiftaiice. And the nearer and deafer thefe paft^ of ourfelf are to us, than a foreign territory, the ftrong- er this principle (hould adt, even in pro- portion as oui* tendernefs for them fhouid be greater. V ^ J This excellettt argument, in its application tb fltf/20V^r receives infinite itrength, and becomes abfolutely conclufive from the au- thor's analytical dtfculfion, beginning in p. , - JOG. Ill - ( 3&> 100, of that great queflion upon continental connt^ioiis, which in his words *< has been fo long agitated," and '* has now been d6- Cerftiin^d :" *' all parties happily agree, that it {Britain) wuft have its continental cbn- iiedlioias/* But " this is the firft time thefe tertfis have been heard of in political debate; and this great queilion-^never was a queftion before," p. ioi. ' . V' ' JW. *' The terms underftood in their moil general fenfe feem to be too general to be ever agitated at all ; becaufe it is impoP> iible for any man to fay, that there may not Hfiie fome certain occaflons and circa mftances of altalrs" (he might have iaid, it is impof- iible to fay that fuch have not arifen) <^ which may unavoidably force us to havs |b«?e con^ejftioii with the continent." .Many fuch have arifen, in which the terms of that ^at qtieftion i;?v« been agitated ineomnn.* rably oftener and more flrenuou0y fihce th& aid^ of iettleimsnt than before. No one quei- llion has been fo much- agitatisd ; nor waa It determioed then, ndr mpEe happily iiettled now, but in confequence of long and re-? peated debates, in which others had the me* rit of that jdifcoverjr, whiidh oar author wobld aiHime to himfelf, thftt England (hould ia-« ticench herfelf within hcrfdf, and have no concecn with the coatiiient in Eurofe, Here 0ur author is an eT^nt plagiary. f>^iucm Fa. ^ Bu& ! pr i y \'AA '■'■'> jlj ( J6) ;:>|.' i But in ^. 103, he launches forth into a difcovery which no man has a right to dif- put« with him. <* An equal conne6tion with all the nations of Europe is to all the operating cffefts of it in war and peace, the yery fame thing as the having no connedtiotl with any of them." Or, in other words, to have treaties of commerce in time of peace, for fuch treaties furely are conne6K)ns, with all the nations of Europe^ in which we fliould be confidered as the mod favoured ; or to have none at all, is the very far thing. And a neutrality in war, i. e. an etj ^1 con- ncdtion of friendihip with all the nations of Europe all in war, is the very fame thing as a connedbion of enmity," p, 103. /. e, a de- clared war againft them all. This fmoke- ball of a pompous phrafe, ^.105. as lately happened at Woolwich, burfls and recoils upon the artift who contrived it. And the author's argument in this inflance, as in num- berlefs others throughout his book, perfe. 70. If we carry on trade during war, exceeding whatever has been known in peace, we muft pay for its protedtion. Ibid, If the value of any purchafes we have made, in their prcfcnt and future confequences, be not equal to the price paid for them, we have in thefe articles made an unthrifty bargain. But they are concluiive upon no other operations of the war J and France would I believe be chari- table enough to take them off our hands. Our author prefcnts us with one fide of onr account only : He ftates the cofts, but links the profits. Quadaloupe, Senegal^ and aur acquilitions in the Ea^- Indies, do not appear, in his confidcrations, to have en- riched this kingdom with a iingle (hilling. ,.* 9 . The I u" ' ( 41 ) ' The revenue of Martinico would be trufy immenfe, " four or five millions fterling,** />. 82. A million more or lefs is a trifling ob- jcd. But had it been ours, I much doubt whether it would not greatly fall ; far below the author's moft moderate calculation : For then it would not ferve to render the German war more deftrudlive, by retarding the acqui- (ition of fo valuable a prize. The weight of millions borrowed by us receives f* j alleviation, p, 69, from the low- . nefsof our intereft compared with what France pays ; altho' the annuity be the only charge felt by the debtor : This circumftance was ■ bciide the author's purpofe, and would tend to lefTen the immenfe advantage fhe has ovei us in the fuperiority of her means^ and the fmallnefs of her expencc. Every gain with an enemy's lofs is gciie- '" rally conceived a? a double benefit, and upon ' this principle every fhip taken by Hawke and " Bofcawen has been reckoned as two to the Britip navy. But how great was our error ? I every lofs is a faving to France^ and every mifcr knows that every faving is a gain. ^ She has favcd the expence of a fleet, amount- ing with us to five millions fix hundred thoti- fand pounds. P. 70. and with a diflfertnce ■ of that whole fum, from this fingle article, ^ihe is better able than we are to cany en a ^*»*' war »» ( 43 ) war in Germany^ expending there fome [tare millionSy which grow from loflcs, and true-/ tify in defeats. P. 69. ** Her (landing revenue of twelve millions" proceeding in a great proportion from commerce, remains and would remain for ten ytars longer, p, 129, undiminilhed, in the decline of trade and manufadture ; nay ftrangc to think, it probably goes on aug- menting, — for of ihefe twelve millions, feven were lubjedl to any deficiencies in the other five ; yet there are now no deficiencies, and no decreafe of either. For, p. 69. ihefc fcven millions with two borrowed make the French fund for carrying on the var. That this fund is a clear and neat receipt is apparent, for the author places it in contrail, />. 70, with fifteen millions of ours, difpofablc mo- ney ; twelve of thefe were borrowed, and a million and a half he fuppofes taken out of the fii. king fund, which with the land and malt-tax he computes at four millions. P. 69, The product of thefe two taxes he there- fore dates at no more than twa millions and a half, allowing two hundred and fifty thoufand pounds for deficiencies^ a full and ample allowance upon that head. What has become of another million included in thefe fums, p, 69, and omitted in />. 70, where tb^y i re reduced from fixteen to fifteen mil- Q 9l . Uonjs^ ^^; i "•''•''' ■:;'!! ( 44 ) ' lions; is not eafy to %, nor worth cnqairingr after.^ A nation thus miraculoufly circumftanccd, afcove the reach of all fublunafy daufcs, may fay with the devil in Miltoriy Evil be ibm mv good: and this fliould be the motto off the French banners, particularly in thcii* march into Germany^ where fuffering andi damned herfelf, France means that otherd fliould luffer, altho* it be not in her power to make their miferics equal to her own. But before I conclude thefe rems.rks upon the monyed abilities oi France y we muft not pafs by unnoticed the juftnefs and confift- ency of o«^r author's inference in^. 123, ** Our enemies certainly have fome millions to fpare, elle they need not fpcnd them irt Germany,'* How admirably well introduced isthis affertion by what precedes it in^. 122 F " It (France) does not fend its army to iir -' i'ade the German CQmm\omJrom choice, bug^ ] nece^ty j becaufe they cannot get to Eng^ land, and have no other ground to meet ni p on/* They therefore need not do what wa§ fieceflary to be done j and expence upon a! nccefilirj work is a proof Oi fuperfluity. • But p. j:/, " what is this Germany to Bri^ . tain ? Of what value h Hanover to us? are queftions which often recur throughout the pamphlet. pamj^ct. Were I to anfwcr,-^« muehy a-nd of as great value as thejr are to Francu The author wou'ld reply— they are of no va- ke to either. And in the fenfe of prefent and immediate profit, his ailertion is true. But it is equally true in numberlefs other in- fiances of wars engaged in^ wifely for the purpofes of both parties, with an immenfe expence to each. The war in Canada may podibly be included in. the number ; and the X2Lkmg oi Montr eal^ for which the author is fo thankful, if rated by what it will pro- duce to Britain^ or what it produced to- France^ would ht fufHcient to ren* der the conteft more equal by ftrengthening her own arms with thofe of Ruffia^ who without pecuniary fupplies, however well diipofed, neither would nor could march to ' her afilftance. She therefore offered fuch advantages to France y and gave an immediate pledge of her fincerity, which induced the court of Verfailles to become her ally againft the King oi PruJJk, and to enable JRMffia and Sweden Xp join in tlie fame caufe. V^ . . " *■ A war in Germany, and a French invaGon infeparable from it, were therefore the neccf- fary confequences of every projed enter- tained by the houfe of Auflria : of that in whlchihe would have had us become her ac- complice, and of that which when refufed by us, fhe has (ince attempted in concert with her hereditary enemy and the irreconcileable foe to Great^Britain, She therefore brought x\it French ii:\fo Germany -, and the miferies 'T< A. ( 49 > t>t that unhappy countr^ ^rp falfely Imputed to us, who by the treaty of WeJlmin((er'dQ^\ vifcfi the only poflible means of preventing them ; and by our jglostrpus refiftancc in con- junction with our heroic ally, have down to this period ilopt the completion of a fcheme more formidable to the Proteftaht relfeiori," the liberties of Europe, and the fafety, mde-* pcndance, and prolperfty of this kingdom, than could have been executed by the houfe QiAuftria, when her power was mod dread- ed, or . by Lewis XIV, when he' afpired at univerfal monarchy. In this fcheme the two great powers of Aujlria and Bourbon have unfortunately engaged another, the greateft power of the North, to fecond their deiigns. The king of Prujjia is fo fitua;ted as to be a check upon the aggrandifement of Ruffia^ where alone any. new acquisition would be an addition of real ftrength to that vaft empire, and the only power that can thwart her aiithoritative influence over other neighbours, whom poffibly fhe does not now mean to fubdue. Other caufes have co- operated, of a more private nature, to indif. pofe ihtRuJ/ian monarch towards him. Such caufes will operate, becaufe monarchs have human paflions and frailties — and nations are governed by theth'. * ^/iV^^ The views and interefts of Aujlria and France arc not the farre, nay they are V, ' H vriddy V." ill 'I; I »*!: lipipi' u ii ■ liil tiridely feparate ; fb feparatCj as not to in* terfere in indances of th^ greateft importance to each. From this qircumftance they em- brace more objedl$, and the danger becomes niore ur^iverfal ; while their vicinity is fuch as to admit a mutual affiftance equally necef- wry to both. '■■ r - ■ *'lt 18 of little avail to the King of Prw^tf, . that Pfance may have an intereft in his pre- fer yat&on. if that intereft be light in the ba- lance when oppofed to other advantages/ which mu(^ be purcbafed by an acquiefcence in his ruin ; or by doing flill more, and be- coming the aftivc inflrument^ as was intended at jRw^tfr£», of his total defeat. ^'''; i %■. ■ ' - " '■ '^^* The hopes of advantage, for gratitude is put of the quedion, which the houfe ofAu" firia ipay ftill conceive £rom the prefervation of Great-Britain^ yield in like manner to the attainment of another objcd more im- mediate^ and in her conception, no matter whether thro' pafllon or reafon, more im- portant to her, Silejia produces incompa- rably a greater revenue than Newport^ 0- ftend^ and the country of Luxemburgb 5 nay poffibly more than, the whole yf«- Jlrian Netherlands clear from the expences they create, Silefia is in our author's opi- nion, p, 65, " to the Au/irian family fo great an objedl in itfelf, and fo very necef- • ' fary ( sO Taiy tothe defence of the reft of their Turkijb itontier, that they never really will give it lip." Can fo much be faid for the impor- Unce of a large diftridt upon the F/emtfif doafty wkhfomething more thrown into the /bargain? Atiftria may think a breach with the Ottoman Pofte more likely to happen ithan with Ferfailies^ and if it (hould happen, smore dangerous. Vienna is fafe from France^ :and our author proves in feveral pares of his Lwork, that the French never can have any idefign upot^ Germany, Bi^t not to go fo far -as Turkey for an argument, has not Auflria '. Xeen, vtrhile her fears and attention were di- •reJdted towards France^ a power grown up 'in Germany^ which having wrefted one oi iher beft provinces from her in the laft war^ iias.(hevira itfelf an over-match for her fingle ibrce in this ? Can (he tremble at the clouds ihat may. gather 2XFtrfaiUeSy when (he has Jieard the thunder of Berlin rolling towards ^he gates of her capital ? It is in human na«> iure to be more alarmed at nearer 3^- }^ "» not to be found in the expenditure of millions, and the lofs of thoufands of her men, facriiiced to a chimerical and abfurd project of exbaudi^g, not of beating, a more wealthy and fuccefl*- fui enemy. The promifcd land muft there- fore be fiiuated Ibmewhereelfe: (he muft pafs through a fea of blood to poflefs it. Ha^ nover is htr road to the Flemijh coaft and to LuxemBurgh j It is her road to Holland^ where (he will find nothing to oppof& her. The Dutch arc now neuter, a part of their barrier was demolllied during the laft war. Even the honeft and wife among her people are lilent thro' fear. They fee the approaches of French power, and the breaches it has already maae upon their fecurity, as they do thcfe partial inundations, which increaiing every year, prcfage a total deftrudtion. They exped their ruin from Germany^ but they kusj>N not how to prevent it. Others there are who would enjoy the deluge, and draw a private advantage firom public defolacion. But the g^reater number hope, uijjt w <*r!d ■HI I I li (S4) 0nd are eafy and refigned in this hope, that '^Frafife vr'iliMomtnaind, not dcfttoy them; vibe 'will encompafs them with her power, ..but iiayfc thetn.for her ihtereft ; their numc- :j'tcnjs veffels, nombeplefs Teamen, and ineic-' . ^h^ti^^iUe rmval flores wiH he all at her diC- ~q>om;J Aod.thus/upplled, and thus poflfiilidd ,^f ih? feaxoaft from Hol.'ifnd to Bnyonfte^ ^^^nxms&otiT^i 5fir/^/;? which even now, oar ^lluthor thinks ihould not be flighted, will .fcVrearalhofb threatening afpedt;; or without ^Kreatening will be more* formidable. Th us ^^^jiafio^er,: nvny be the road to En^lan4> -'jif.ru'JiLni Oil. •. x.'';iKno-:c sa 1 1 ii'"- r^f/u If at ilaoufld be aiked why the conqueft of T'^J^no^en, founintportant as it is reprelented, ' oihlouid^be made a condition by the houfe of '..^ijiufi^h for her ceffions ita :Frt/Hf^>-— the aA- t^'YMfer is 'pbviious'; bccauife the conqueft of JJSimi^r.l^. ffrance, and the deflru6i:ion bf iheKi6gdf Pr«^a hyl^^J^ria and Rujid^ f twoeid :rc!ndcr the £mj>r^is Qu^en miftrefs fin Oermanj^. tHhc author has pointed out, ^A 33> '42i» nfes to ^ich Hanover may fee c^plifed*-T— it may be given to Wirtembisrg^ qr itq^tfX, *f the prptcftant power be broken ; and the jPaiiitinaU affords 2Ln inftance exadtly (imUaii. ^The Fra^« territories parcelled out, and Hantyixer tfufted to fafe hands, the houfe of ,jh/iria^msLy then icvert to her old/fyfteni, i**5^ when when Gufiavus Ado^>hus wrought tlw wort-' derfttl dfeliverancc of proteftant vkStimS' marked out for iacrifice by tyranny and en«- thu(iatin. j:L* ■>o Will RuJJia, no proteftant, interpofe in their favour ? Dantzick and Pruffia arf to her of greater moment than the political falvation of all the followers of Luther and* Calvin^ throughout the whole extent of Germany, Neither papift nor proteftant-^, 19, (he will remain an unconcerned fpe^J tor o[ the cataftrophe, when her part is com«* pleated and her roll finiihed. "^ " Will France interfere ? and become agaia the defender of the- proteftant ^ith in 0 while England inferior to her in many rc- fpedts, has afTumed the empire of th^^ ocean. ■ ■ ■ : T '. . .1 i ■ f There can be no abfolute fecurity for thd^- duration of mortal fyftenis. Paffions, thofe' hurricanes of the mind, may overturn the moflfolid and befl conilrudied edifices. A Lewis XIV, or a Charles V. may arife in 1 fome future age, with the fame frantic am- bition that aduated thofe their predecefTors. But human contrivance can form no better, plan for duration than folidity of power 5 and the beft fecurity of a lading amity among princes, arifes from a diver fity of uninterfering views, and fuch an equality of force as would render a breach between them perilous to the, aggreflbr. Such an equality our author in-i forms us, p, 17, would fubfift between France with her prefent pofTcflions, and the Empire, if thoroughly united under one directing head. I am aware that France would in time grow more powerful by trade, than the houfe of Auftria could by conquefls. But were fhe miftrefs of the wealth of the uni-- vcrfe, it would not be for her intereft to. cQnquer in Grrw^wv. .,a xjj u^ivjiu^ji^: 07'- SjqQi£^l;s' ij:»-i5;;:^.-..j -i^-t vd ""^j'^''^ \ t ft 'V (57) \ This hypothefis in Its utmofl extent may appear wild and extravagant to many, ana poiHbly is fo. But ioes it appear fuch to the £mpre(s Queen ? for this is the only queilion which conecrns Britain, France would certainly find her advantage in it, whofe prefent cqndud in any other fuppofi- tion would be abfurdly mad, ruining herr felf in Germany to flrengthen her only rival upon land, and to weal^en and undo the on- ly ally (he could truft 1:0 againft her. If we muft fuppofe cither of the monarchs fitter for Bed/am than a throne, Lewis or Tbere/a, can we hefitate in our preference ? A wo- man fared with injuries and lulling for re- venge, who feels with indignation that while her anceftors were contending againfl France in a conflidl by which neither was a gainer, a fubordinate Prince, in the eyes of ; pride her fubjedt and vafTal, rofe to a height which mated her power, and with a facri- legious hand tore from her diadem one of its brightefl and moil precious jewels. I fay a woman thus agitated, may when de- nied by her friends the means of vengeance, be tranfported by a double refentmciit to throw herfelf even into the arms of an old enemy, now more compliant with her call and co-opeiAting with her paflions : fo pro- bably was this »inion produced. By the treaty oiVerfaiUes «ach power renounced I * that ■f :i i m If Hi ■M 'i|i ■:|1 ri 'J i I w that old fyftem which had for iges been the fource of enmity between their houfes. '''*rhe fincerity of their profeffions was proved by actions that could not be equivo- cal ; a mutual implicit confidence was de-* monftrated by their fpurning away every other means of fupport, and the league was lan6^"ified and confirmed by a facrifice on each fide worthy the importance of the oc- cafion 5 two monarchs, their friends and al- lies were feverally devoted to deflrudtion. V^ ^ Does the hiftory of thofe times which im- mediately preceded the treaty of Weflphalia down to the fignature of the treaty of Ver^ failles^ contain any ftronger proofs of the fyflem then purfiied by the two contending powers, than what has pafTed fince affords of a total change in that fyftem ? If one fet of meafures invariably followed during one pe- riod proveb the intention of the purfuit, an abfolute reverfe of thefe in another demon- ftrates the intention altered, p. 8, 9, 12. Yet the whole of our ?iuthoi's argument, and his flrongeft objed:ions to oiir condud, are derived from the old French and Auf^rian fyftem ; from a fyftem which no longer ex- ifls at the courts of Vienna or Verfailles, ard which by confequence cannot be a rule for our adtions with vt(^^^^ to either of them. •■ ■^••■'"^ i'-^ -■ ■^-V-v^ :r. ■;.:-■? 4-rAU ( 59 i 9 , ( If fads fuch as w^ have feen, do not prove the purport of hidden confpiracies againft faith and luftice j; if ihe writtcn.do- cumentmuft be produced, to redder defen- live rneafures necelTary ; then indeed Greats Britain hzd fewer motives for aflembling an army in Germany fi?iTid can only, pkiad in her excufe for fuck -dn expence .of treafure and of men, theregafd due tother faith of treaties, to the confidence of her.aHies, and to her own intereft in^obviatingtheneceflity of an equivalent at the conclufionof the war,, which, were our author to dictate the treaty, would ftrip her of all her moft im- portant acquifitioris during the courffe;of it. But if a confederacy againft alt that is V?lu- able to men and to chriftians, be as clear as adion can indicate defign ; and uniform co- operation, not refolveable into any other Ciiufe, can demonftrate concert and mutual obligations, then an allied army in Germany be'came neceflary to defeat ihofe dcfigns, and alone can, if any thing can, fever the. con- federacy, by rendering its terms impradti- cable, and loofe Aujiria from her compad: with Trance. But whatever the event may be, Britain and her allies have done as be- came free, brave, and religious men : They have reliil:ed the extirpation of freedom and religion, bv the only means witii which Gor^ w i ,M Cod a»d iiAtttfe We armed them for their* . A- ,i 4. ^ , ytfaii* uqhappjr Ssxmit^ vin^e^JKMl fi^talmii^ niiikiesof an iivniuba vilidciaod^necdGa:}^ bjinbewcak perfidy pi ^ir oijsin PHnce $ ' yeti ^le iirotf ttiltt^ Mile :a|ttit nbesidefem&d;: i> Akho! #ifr tBjrma^ tlie o^^ &te of aftia^ ftived. ) cebpk $ akfao* df hren and compelled l^^/M&orr^rf aim their weapons at the breaftl^^ thttitlrei^reii, to avoid the.death tljae oa^i^ts ibem bdond ; j^. 22. yec ^ ve^ imifl lb imdy ew^ witb the de« ^o^ldif; ^ our oapivcd friends togg^ ataPifati^iaF; r MINI S, ki, ;1 i ['111 1 M A^^?-,'-.'*"-"""?