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L'exempia'ro film6 fut reproduit grSce d la g^ndrosit^ de I'dtablissement prdteur suivant : La bibliothdque des Archives publiques du Canada Les cartes ou les planches trop grandes pour dtre reproduites en un seul cliche sont fiim^es d partir de Tangle sup^rieure gauche, de gauche d droite et de haut en bas, en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Le diagramme suivant illustre la m^thode : 1 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 F L f ■ ; Tf UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO STUDIES History, Second Series, Vol. 1. pp. 77-155 Edited by Professor George A\. Wronc). 'm^ '( ■ Va*' '0:::\,H'' . ,v:^:-v-^x ;;■■->'■' ■' ?-kvr "- ^■i -^^ s PRELl/niNARY STAGES OP THE PEACE or A.niENS, BY ri. A\. BOW/nAN. '•■^''=^>^ :,;-: i 'v \\.V"t-T^J 11 ■: •^. >'•< >"v'. ;//•!.' '1 '^^"iiv. ■^■::-> THE UNIVERSITY LIBRARY : PUBLISHED BY THE LIBRARIAN, 1899. Qq!^'' ,H» ■^«^-ipif ^1 COMmTTEE OF MANAGEMENT: ChaiTTn,an : James Lottdon, M.A., LED,, President of the r University. pROFEssoB W. J, Alexander, M. A,, PLD. ' Principal J. GALBfiAiTp,M.A. Professor A. H. Bet?^?h, M.A., LL.D. Professor E. Ramsav Wright, M. A., B.Sc. Professor George M. Wrong, M.A. Qeneral Editor : H. H. Lakgton, B.A., Libiaiian of the University. ^1 f '-! PRELIMINARY STAGES OF THE PEACE 01' AMIENS THE DIJ'LOMATIC RELATIONS OF (fREA.T BR TAIN AND FRANCE FROM THE FALL OF THE DIRECTORY TO THE DEATH OF EMPEROR PAUL OF RUSSIA, NOVEMBER 1799-MARCH 180L BY H. M. BOWMAN, B.A. ['7] OS i 91 PREFACE. I i This essay was first submitted in English to the Philosophical Faculty of the University of Leipsic as a doctoral dissertation, but the Faculty felt unable wholly to suspend its regulation that such dissertations should be submitted in German. On condition however that the entire thesis should appear in English the Faculty con- sented to accept a portion of it — the i" luction and first chapter — in German as sufficient for the purpor of the examination. This portion accordingly has appeared in German (under the title " Die englisch-franzdsische Friedensverhandlung,Dec. 1799 — Jan. 1800 ") and I now avail myself of the opportunity to publish the whole in the History Series of University of Toronto Studies. It is with diffidence that a writer lays his first effort, however unpretentious, before the public, and to this feeling I am not insensible, but in the present instance no choice is left me in the matter. The subject may seem not altogether untimely. It treats of the relations of France and Great Britain when the French were in temporary possession of Egypt at the opening of this Century. The issue then raised in the Levant soon fell into abey- ance and lay dormant for some eighty years, but it has been revived in our own day by the British occupation of Egypt, and the entire question has taken a great step toward solution by events still fresh in the memory of all. I wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to Professor Marcks and Dr. Salomon of Leipsic for a kindly interest in my work and welfare at that University ; to Mr. Hubert Hall of the Public Record Office, London, for his courtesy and assistance while I was [3] [79] [80] 4 collecting matorial in the British juchives; and to Professor Wrong and Mr. H. H, Langton of the University of Toronto for assistance in preparing the essay iir.ally for the press. I should however be guilty of an injustice, did I merely include in this general category Professor Buchholz of Leipsic, at whose instance I attempted this essay. In it us well as in all my work he has taken a lively and judicious interest, withholding neither praise nor censure, where he felt them deserved. I know not vrhether I was wortiiy of the one, but I sought to profit by the other, and I trust that he will remem- ber me as a faithful and a willing pupil. H. M. B. ) ; Univeksity of Toronto, Dfxtmber, 1899. CONTENTS. Intkoduction. The NegotMtions at Fails and Lilln, 1796 and 1797. PAGE § 1. Great Britain and France in the wars of the French Revolution 9 § 2 The Negotiations at Paris and Lille, 1796 and 1797 10 •^ 3. Bonaparte and the rupture at Lille 14 Chai'Tkr T. Bonaparte'i Overlnn <>f Peace, Decemher 1799-Jannary 1800. ^ 1. Effect in Great Britain of the rupture at Lille 10 § 2. Bonaparte's expedition to Egypt ; his return. The Consulate 17 § 3. Bonaparte's overture of peace, December 1799 18 § 4. The general situation with regard to peace. Bonaparte's need of peace i;) § 5. The course of the overture, (-treat Britain rejects it. Grounds of the rejection 2;i !^ 6. The sincerity of the overture : examination of this (juestion liiy CuAPrKK II. The Ahortire Attempt at a JS'aral Trvce (Otd General Negotiation August to Octfjber, ISQii. % 1. The progress of the war to the battle of Marengo 43 § 2. The Austro-British Alliance. Opening of negotiations with France at Vienna. Bonaparte proposes a naval truce in London 45 § 3. Bonaparte's object in a naval truce : to save Malta. The three stages in the negotiation for the truce 48 § 4. The first stage of the negotiation, August 24th-Septembcr 5th. Great Britain evades the proposed truce. France adheres to her proposal. Great Britain yields 49 § 6. The second stage of the negotiation, September 6th-September 26th. Efforts to arrange the terms of a naval truce 53 § 6, The third stage of the negotiation, October Gth-October 9th. Bona- parte withdraws from the negotiation on the fall oi' Malta 5» [6] 81 ^ [82] 6 Chapter II J. <}rcat Britain and France from October 1800 to the death of Emperor Paul of Russia, March 1801. § 1. The position of Franco in October 1801. Austria and the battle of ' ''''^ Hohenlinden ... § 2. Bonaparte's secret overture of peace in London, December 1800. Grenville's reply g„ § 8. Great Britain threatened by Russia and the Armed Neutrality. Bona- parte reverses his policy toward Great Britain 04 §4. Pitt's attitude toward peace. Hi.s resignation, February 1801. Adding- ton's overture at Paris. Bonaparte's evasive answer GH § 5. The death of the Tsar, and the dissolution of the Armed Neutrality. The significance of Paul's death in the career of Bonaparte. . . 70 § 6. Conclusion : the Peace of Amiens 7I ApJ'ENDICES. A . Great Britain and the French royalists 74 B. Corre.sp..ndence x elating to Bonaparte's secret overture to Great Britain in December 1800 -7(5 C. The reply of the French Government to Hawkesbury's overture in March 1801 ^^ 61 62 64 66 70 71 74 7(5 79 ABBREVIATIONS, ETC. (1) Con: i\ra/>.— UorrespondHnce de Napoleon I. (2) Pari, ffw^— Parliamentary History of (heat Britain (Hansard.) (3) P. R. O.— Public Record Office. (4) Papers oj this Negotwtlon {in 2nd Chapter,)— The Papers on the Negotia- tion with Franco, submitted to Parliament on the 13th November, 1800, and printed in Fad. Hist. vol. 35, col. 540 et seq. They are numbered consecutively from 1 to 47. (5) Citations from vol. 30 of Bonaparte's Correspondence refer to the page of the volume ; in other volumes tlie reference is to the number of the letter, not to the page. (6) Citations frop Stanhope's Life of Pitt are from the edition of 1879 ; those from Bignon, Histoirt' de Francr jnsqu'a la paix de Tilsit, are from the Brussels edition, 1836. [7] [83] [85] INTRODUCTION. NEGOTIATIONS AT PARIS AND LILLE, .796 and 1797. In the period of the French Revohition the enmity which fii. Oreat had subsisted for centuries between France and Great Britain IScrin'th, developed .m unprecedented intensity. The end of the seven- ^^''^ "^ *^"^ teenth century found France in a state of weakness and Revohition. disintegration, caused by the wars of Louis XIV; the eighteenth century was marked by a steady decline of her power botli in and out of Europe. With this decline of France was associated closely the rise of Great Britain, whose enormous colonial expansion in the eighteenth century was secured chiefly at the cost of France. The role cnce played by the Latter passed delinitely to her rival in 17G3, and not even the loss, serious in itself, of the American colonies under- mined the predominance of Great Britain. Commercially, the lost British colonies were still dependent upon the mother country; Britain's trade with India was steadily increasing; she threatened to monopolize even the markets of Europe. The Revolution in France first disturbed this situation. In spite of Liie excesses attending it, the Revolution effected a national rejuvenescence, and with fresh strength and energy France renewed the old struggle with Great Britain. The position which the monarchy had lost, the Jacobins and Bonaparte sought to recover. The conflict arising from this situatitm lasted upwards of twenty years, and was marked by various abortive attempts at pacification. In 1796 and 17f)7 unsuccessful negotiations I » 1 J ■^ §2. ri tiations ai Paris and Lille, 179« and 1797. [86] 10 were opened at Paris and Lille. The Peace of Atniens in 1802 was itself in reality but a truce. I purpose here cursorily to review the preliminary efforts at Paris and Lille, and to dis- cuss fully the circumstances which led to the later formal peace. ******* lem-go On the 8th of December, 1795, a message from King Georire III informed the Lordy and Commons at Westminster that the crisis in Paris l had resulted in a government with which he was prepared to conclude a general peace whenever It could be effected on just and suitable terms.^ Such a declaration, in itself nothing remarkable among warring nations, had its significance in this contest. Hitherto Great Britain had refused to recognize the work of the Revolution in France ; now she accepted the newly established Directory as the de facto government of the Republic, and declared her readiness to negotiate with it. Peace had become a possibility Little more than this can however be said. The way to negotiation was opened, but the efforts of Great Britain to obtain peace still remained long without result, and thi!5 ill success was partially due to her own attitude. Her overture of March, 1796, directed to the French Minister at Berne, invited discourtesy on the part of the French by the systematic substitution of " France " for " Government of France," even in places where the first was a ridiculous expression and the second the only proper one.'^ The French reply bhmtly questioned Great Britain's sincerity and so the negotiations ended. As early as September of the same year Great Britain took steps to renew them, but her advances, although in this instance courteous in expression and correct 'Crisis of the l.'Uh Veridomiuire (5 October, 1795) leading to the inatallation (if the Directory on the .^th Brumaire, IV (2H October, 1795). ■I'nrl. Hist., Vol. 32, ool. .')()9, ■' Note from Wickhani to Barthelenii, 8 March, 1796, and from Barthelem , J Wickhani, 2(i March, 179G, /'art. Ili.st., Vol. 32, cols. 1407-1408. J 11 [8T] in form, met at first with a rude rebuff' which Pitt, in order to atbain his object, had simply to inrriore.* In the end, neojotin- tions were opened at Paris in October, 1790 ; they termin- ated on the 20th of the foIlowinjT December in an order of the ^)irectory to the British Plenipotentiary, Lord Malmesbury, to quit Paris and France forthwith. Little blame can be attached either to Great Britain or to France for the ill success of these negotiations. The obstacle to a settlement was the situation in the Austrian Nether- lands, and upon this question the diff'erence between the two governments was irreconcilable. In the course of the war the possessions of the Emperor in the Netherlands had been over- run by the French, who had claimed and organized these provinces as an integral part of the Republic. For centuries, however, it had been a cardinal point in England's policy to prevent the absorption of this commercial and industrial centre by France. Great Britain was, moreover, at the time bound to Austria by an alliance guaranteeing the integrity of the Austrian dominions, and the Emperor, while willing enough in general to exchange his distant possessions for a compensation in territory nearer his hereditary states, was at the moment opposed to a negotiation between France and Great Britain, and found an easy means to prevent it b}' insisting on the literal fulfilment of the guarantee.^ In this matter, then. Great Britain had no choice. Her obligations and her own interests alike required her to separate the Netherlands from France. The French, liowever, were in secure possession, and were determined to remain, and Great ♦Letter from GrenviUc to Jarlsberg, 6 September, 1796; note from Gren- ville to the Directory, 6 September, 1796; letter from Jarlsberg to Grenville, 2.S September, 1796 ; letter from Koeiiemanu to Jarlsberg, 19 September, 1796; letter fnmi (Jrenville to the Minister of Foreign Aftiiirs at Paris, 24 September, 1796; f«W. nut., Vol. 32, eols. 1409-1411. '• Kxtraet from a (lespat(!h from Kileii; British Ambassador at Vienna, to Malmesbury, 22 November, 1796, enelosed in a despatch from Malme.sbury to 'Maline.sl)iu V, DIariis. dr., Ill, .S69 and 51(5 ; letter from Malmesbury to Canning, 29 Aug., 1797, ihld., Ill, 517 ; letter from Malme.sbury to Pitt, 18 Sept., 1797, ihiiL, III, 570. »«Treaty of Leoben, (IS April, 17!»7), Arti(le4, l)e01ere(i, Rt^niii/ if, .■< Tr, 510, and (4 Oct., 1797) .^95, and letter from Malmesl)ury to Canning, 29 Aug., 1797, iliiiL, III, 517. [90] 14 namely, Trinidad, the Cape, and Ceylon. A settlement upon these terms deserved and seemed to he well within reach of success, but in the end the alternative of peace or war was not decided at Lille. The entire question was involved in the party struggle progressing at Paris, which after months of intrigue ended in the crisis of the 18th of Fructidor (4th of September, 1797). With the aid of Bojiaparte the revolution- ary party prevailed in this crisis, and their victory meant a rupture at Lille. A change of personnel in the French plenipotentiaries was the first indication at Lille of the altered spirit prevailing in Paris. The end was soon reached.^^ Malmesbury at his first conference with the newplenipotentiariesonthe 16th of Septem- ber was called upon to say whether his powers enabled him to restore the conquests made by Great Britain duringthewar with- out exception — those from France as well as those from the allies of France. The constitution and treaties of the Republic, it was avowed, required that this should be the basis of the negotiation. A similar claim had been made in July, but was promptly rejected by Malmesbury, and France had since tacitly and by implication abandoned it. Malmesbury now rejected it again, but he was at once summoned, in case his powers did not cover the required basis, to depart to his Court within twenty- four hours ill order to secure others which did. The affront to Great Britain involved in this demand ranks perhaps with the gravest ever offered to an enemy as yet unsubdued. The purpose evidently was to end the negotiation. Still Malmes- bury requested another interview, and at this last conference on the I7th of September he strove, with a due regard for the dignity of his office and for the honour of the country which he represented, to alter the resolution taken by the French plenipotentiaries. The effort was vain. "For the dosing incidents of this negotiation see the deapatoh from Malmes- bury to Grenville, 17 Sept., 1797 ; Malmesbury, Diaries, <{-<■., Ill, 561 ; the same despatch is printed also in Pari. Hist., vol. 33, col. 949. '"^■f^h.. 15 [91] The rupture of this netjcotiation and Bonaparte's share in the S3. Ronapfirip '■ " ' _ ^ aiul tiie nip- crisis which led to it, tof^ether form an event of prime import- tme at Lill.- ance. Bonaparte at this moment became the great exponent of tendencies which were rife in France at the time and had governed her policy for centuries. Henceforth he makes the struggle with Great Britain liis life-work. As early as August, 1797, a casual utterance of Bonaparte's shows how thoroughly he was imbued with the idea that the " destruction of England " was the natural and necessary aim of France. i^ Later in the same year he traces clearly the lines of this policy. " Austria," he writes, in substance, in his defence of the Treaty of Campo-Formio,lf' " is fallen, nor was she ever a danger to us. Our real enemy is England. Tae French Republic must either destroy the English Monarchy or expect to be destroyed by it. Let us devote ourselves to our navy and overthrow England. That done, Europe will be at our feet." From the task which Bonaparte here set himself, he never really swerved. Hereafter, wherever he is — in Egyptian deserts or on the plains of Lombardy, in Spain, in Germany, or even in remotest Russia, there lies behind the special object of the moment an unvarying resolve, to reach and destroy his insular opponent. While these tendencies were decisive in the counsels of France, peace could not be hoped for. In the closing days at Lille, Malmesbury and even the plenipotentiaries with whom he had to deal were in reality but helpless spectators, while France, mder the influence of a traditional policy which here concentrated itself in the person of her greatest leader, was entering upon a new phase of the struggle with her hereditary foe. »* Corr. Nap., Ill, 210.3, 16 August, 1797. " Corr. Nap., Ill, 2307, 18 October, 1797. [92j CHAPTER I. BONAPARTH'S OVKRTURES OF PEACK, DFXEMBER, 1799, AND JANUARV, 1800. §1. Kffect ill The rupture of the ne<:jotiation at Lille involved Great Jf (l„.,.nptu,.j, Britain in huniiliatiou abroad but brouj^ht her advantage at at LiIiL-. home. It convinced the English people that the hope of con- ciliation which they had cherislied was vain and that their national existence was at stake in the war with France. The Frencli Directory could have done the ( Jovernuient of Great Biitain no better seivice.^^ Pitt was now established in a position never again called in question. The strength .^bL-h his ministry drew from the impolitic diplomacy of the Directory at Lille became appaient on the opening of Parliament in Noveiiiber. The address of Thanks in reply to the Speech from th? Throne was adopted in the Lords and Connnons without division,^'' and later a joint address upon the unsuccessful negotiations was adopted in both Houses, also without dissent.^^ In the debates upon these addresses the leaders of the regular Opposition did not appear in either House.l^ In the Lords, of non-supporters of the Government. Lord Lansdowne alone spoke upon the Address of Thanks and the tenor of his speech was as much 'liii: ^'Letter from (Jrenville to his brother, the Marijuis of Buckingham, 20 September, 1797, Huekiiigham, Mfmoirs 0/ Court ami Citldnets of (rcorrje III., II., t383 : (On the rupture at Lille) " I really think in the manner of doing the thing, the Direetoi-y have done cverytiiing they could to play our game." '" Debates in the Loi'ds and Connnons on the Address of Thanks, 2 Novem- ber, 1797, Pari. Hist., vol. 3:^, cols. 857 and 886. ** Debate on negotiation with France, in the Lortls, 8 Novend)er, in the Commons, 10 November, 1797 ; Par/. If is/., vol. 33, cols. 979 and 987. ** Except the Duke of Norfolk, who, as hereditary Karl Marshal, could not ab.sent himself from the opening of Parliament. See debate in question, ParL .'fist., vol. 33, col. 880. [1(>] 17 [93] despair as disapproval.^^ He was not a member of the regular Opposition, led by Fox in the Commons : tliey, convinced of Pitt's sincerity in the negotiation ,21 and unable to excuse the conduct of France, absented themsalves from the debates. The ministers in consetjuence found themselves strangely forced into the role of these absent opponents in seeking to moderate the attitude of over-zealous supporters who advocated relent- less warfare upon republican government in France. Earl Fitz William in the Lords and Earl Temple in the Connnons were emphaticall}'^ warned by Grenville and Pitt 2- that the form of government prevailing in France was in itself no con- cern of Great Britain ; the ministry preferred indeed the restoration of monarchy, but the survival of the Republic would be no hindrance to peace on suitable terms. This atti- tude is convincing evidence of the improved position of the ministry. Fox in fact gave up the struggle ; with him, absence from the House became habitual : his party, alread}' weak in numbers, was demoralized afresh, and his influence broken. The election of 1798 returned the old majority in favour of Pitt and his colleagues. Internal unity enabled Great Britain the better to overcome §2. Bona- the dangers of her isolated position after the treaty of peace pace's expe- between France and Austria at Campo-Formio. Bonaparte Egypt ; hi* had effected this peace in order personally to conduct an inva- consulate, sion of England ; on investigation, however, he found the plan impracticable,^^ and relinquishing it he promptly sailed ''" See debate in question, Pur/. Hist., vol. .33, cols. S7'2 t(j 879. ^* Debate in the Commons on the Assessed Taxes Bill, 4 January, 1798, Pari. Hint., vol. 33, where both Sheridan (col. 1197) and Fox (col. !2i)2) admit the sincerity of Pitt in the negotiation at Lille. "^Grenville in debate in the Lords on the A(hlress of Thanks, 2 November, 1797, Pari. Hint., vol 33, col. 871, and Pitt in debate in the Commons on the negotiations with France, 10 November, 1797, 1'arl. i/iV., vol,S3,cols. 1000-1001. *=» Bonaparte to the Executive Directory, 23 Feb., 1798, Corr. Nap., Ill, 2419 : " L'expi'dition d'Angleterre ne parait done etre possible que I'ann^e prochaine ; et alors il est probable que les embarras qui surviendront sur le fiontinent s'y opposeront. Le vrai moment de se preparer k cette expedition est perdu pent -etre pour toujours.'" [9i] 18 SS. Bona- parte''? ovi^r- tures of ;>eace, Dcfein to E^ypt, in 1798, with a view to OHtal)liH]\in<^ hiinsolf firinly in that country, and ultimately threatening the po.sition of Great Britain in India. This hope was also dashed by the destruction of the French fleet at Aboukir, and only as a refugee did Bonaparte return to France in 1799, He was, however, welcomed eagerly. In his absence Suvoroff, with the forces of the Second Coalition, had expelled the Republi- can armies from Italy in the campaign of 1799, and France was facing the danger of an invasion. Her internal disorder contributed to a widespread desire of peace, and instinctively the people recognized in Bonaparte the one who could best secure it for them. Within a month of his landing at Frejus the crisis of the 18th of Brumaire (9th of November, 1799) placed him in control of the government of France. The rump of the Five Hundred in formally committing the provisional administration of France and the reorganization ber, 1*799. of her government to Bonaparte and his fellow consul.s24 laid upon them the specific duty of negotiating an ' honourable peace.' That Bonaparte suffered himself to be influenced by this legislative body, which had just been violently dissolved and never again came into existence, it is impossible to con- ceive. Nevertheless the resolution adopted by it is remark- able, inasmuch as it is the concrete expression of a feeling which had assisted Bonaparte to power. France desired peace, and Bonaparte was expected to obtain it ; little as he might regard the directions of his fallen predecessors, he paid strict attention to the wishes of the nation itself. It was therefore natural that one of Bonaparte's first official acts was designed to meet, at least in appearance, the universal desire of his countrymen for peace. On the very day of his formal entrance upon oflSce as First Consul, he prepared overtures of peace to be despatched to London and Vienna.25 »*0n the night of the 18th of Brumaire, (9 Nov., 1799). See Sybel, Gbs- ehich/e rler Revoliitionszeit , V, 569. *• Bonaparte to the King of Great Britain, &c., and Bonaparte to the Emperor, both letters of 25 Dec, 1799, Corr, Nap., VI, 4445 and 4446. 19 [95] Boimparti'S re.il object in tli('S(3 overtures is a debatable <|uestion. The common view is that they were but diplomatic feints intended to represent tht.' First (^'onsul before Europe, cspeci.'illy before France, as tlte champion of peace, Ids opponents meanwhile bearinj^ the odium of a campaign which he himself expected and even desired. 2rougiit no innnediate peril to his government, but in the Mediterranean it was creuting a situation wliich would permanently ..pple his world-policy. As to its object, that policy cojitinued unchanged. Bonaparte's purpo.sc was still to overcome Great Britain, although for the second time he HOW saw himself forced to alter the means whereby he hoped to effect this. The attempt to attack her by way of Egypt hase, VIII (2G Dec, 1799), Pnrl. Hixt., vol. 34, col. 1197. The date given in the l\u-l. /list., ;'> Nivfl.so, Vlfl, agrees with the originals (London, P. R. 0., Frnnrc, vol. G12), Imt this date— o NivAso, VIII— is ti ) 26th Dee., 1799, not the 25th, as given in the Pari. fJinf. Bona- parte's letter is an exact copy of the dmff in Con: Xap., VI, 4445 (4 Nivflse, VIII, 25 Dec., 1799). [100] 24 European monarchies this course, thouj^h unusual, was not inadmissible — Bonaparte's contemponvry overture to Austria was also addressed to the Emperor'^' — but a like step in London was more than an ordinary departure from custom. The decision even of questions of foreign policy, which in continental m.onarchies is peculiarly the province of the sovereign, rests in Great Britain not with the King, but with the Cabinet. Bonaparte in actiiig contrary to this principle violated British constitutional usage. One can scarcely sup- pose that he did this in ignorance :^^ he did it rather with a deliberate purpose, which is tolerably clear from the over- ture itself. This consisted of philanthropic platitu, London, P. R. O. , France, vol. 612.) '* The first attempt is of course the Peace of Canipo Formio. *" A general peace through separate ii"'^otiations, as will appear hy Bona- parte's second letter in these overtures ,iot tlirougii a (Jongiess of the belli- gerent powers, such as (ireat Britain desired. *' Letter from Pitt to Addington, 4 Jan.. 1800, Life nml Cnrr. of Lord Sidmoulh, I, 248. *^ Sybel, Hi srhiclili , ihii/. Although these letters have been published sinc^e 1 862, it is not strange that their connection with this (piestion has not been noted. Pitt mentions indited that he ha" lionapirte to Kleber, 22 August, 1799, Corr. Nap., V, 4374. In this letter Bonaparte directs Kleber, if driven to it, to negotiate with Turkey for the surrender of Kgypt, but, under one pretext or another, to delay evacuation for the time being. See page 21, supra. •^^The "Intercepted Letters from Egypt." See Sybei, Ge,schirhte dir Rei)o/ufio7i..szc.if., V, 548-549. Also in the debate in the Lords, 28 January, 1800, Par/. Hist., vol. 34, (irenvillc, cols. 1210 and 1218; and in the debate in the Commons, 3 February, 1800, ihidem, Pitt, cols. 1338, 1339 and 1340; Dundas, cols. 1247, 1248; Canning, col. 1277, and Whitbread, a member of the Opposition, col. 1255, ef se.q., " Every topic that can revile, and every art that can blacken, has l)een resorted to, for purposes of political slander ; and I am very sorry to see that the Intercepted Correspondence from Egypt^ strengthened, and embellished with notes, and perhaps, too, garbled, has made its appearance with a view to prejudice the country against the chief consul, and thereby to set at a distance every hope of a negotiation for peace." •» See the passage quoted from the letter from Pitt to Addington, 4 January, 1800, on p. 30 above. In Parliament the Opposition charged the (Jovern- ment with making the restoration of the Bourbons an indispensable condition if not of peace at least of immediate negotiation ; still one of the Opposition leaders. Lord Holland (Debate in the Lords, 28 January, Pari. Hist., vol 34, col. 1237), noted also the character of the reply as a manifesto to France, " On our part the note of the Ministers was a manifesto to the Royalists, and framed for tliat purpose." :i3 [109] disc' aimed — Greiivillt! attempted to strengthen tlie royaliat cause in France by indicating Bonaparte to the great maHS of luke-warrn and inditl'erent republicans as the hist barrier between them and the coveted peac<^5 ^^ Pitt liad looked upon Grenville's answer as closing the corre- spondence with France,^2 l^ut this hope was disappointed. In a note of the 14th of January, addressed on this occasion to the proper minister, Talleyrand renewed the offer which Great Britain had so bluntly refused.*''^ Those who see in the over- ture only a diplomatic manoeuvre must answer the (piestion why Bonaparte, by reopening the matter which presumably Great Britain havith manifest civility. He did not, indeed, out of civility, forget that this as well as his first overture must pass review before France. Grenville's asser- tion that Great Britain was on her defence in the contest implied that France was the aggressor, and half of Talleyrand's lengthy answer is devoted lo a skilful effort to refute the charge. But even this apology is comparatively courteous. "' See debate in the Coniinons, S Ffbriuuy, J*arl. [liM., vol. 34, ccjIs. 1269 to 1272, whore Cauiuag avows tlie relation between the liritisli (Jovei'iinieiit and the royalists, and expresses lii.s hope and belief that tlie majority of Frenehmen, disgusted with the disordei' and tyranny jirevailing under the Republie, would take no ofl'enee at the suggestion of a Hourljon restoration in (irenville's note. •'^ Stanhope, lAftt of Pitt, II, 342. •=• Note from Talleyrand to ')-Fotniio, Ics canijvvgnos d' Kgj'pte, la jdiiitu'e du IS bruniairo, r opinion unanime du peui)l<' pour 1" ("lover ;\ la suprome inagistratun!, 1' avaiont sans doute place bien hant ; niais un traite de paix q^i eut deroge ;> celiii de Canipo-Formio et eut aiunde toutcs ses creations d'ltalie cut fletri les imagina- tions et lui eut ot6 ce ({ui lui t'tait neccs.sairc pour terminer la revolution, etablir un systetne di-Hnitif et permanent ; il lo sentait. 11 attendait avec impatience la reponse du Cabinet de Londres. Cettc reponse le remplit d'une secrete satisfaction. Plus les <;ienville et les Cliatham se complaisaicnt a out- rager la n'volution et ;i inontrer ce niepris (jui est 1' aj)anage lierwliLaire d(^ I" oligarchie, plus ils servaietit les interets secrets de Napoleon, (pii dit son ministre ; 'Cette reponse ne pouvait pas nous etre plus favorable.' " It is quite conceivable that I'onaparte in any case used these words b(!fore his min- ister, for they express a ipialitied truth. Whetiier or no lie di'siied the lejec- tion of his oiler, the manner in which (Jreat Britain rejected it was certainly an advantage to him. Pitt and (irenvillo 'insulted' the Revolution in order to influence public opinion in Creat Britain and to encourage the royalists in France, but this policy inevitably gathered the republicans to Bonaparte's support. ''''Corr. Xap., VI, 4474. Lucien Bonaparte was named Minister of tlio Interior on tiic 2.5 December, 1799. The v ds ((uoted are the opening pas- sage of a lengthy note of advice to the new Minister on the management ot the commune.x of France. [114] 88 which, thouffh undated, appears by its contents to belong to that time, contains this sentence : " Were war not necessary for nie, I should inaugurate a new era of prosperity for France in the comrmmes." Secondly, in a letter to Talleyrand of the 13th of January, 1800, he says concerning the evacuation of Flushing :73 "Were it the case that in return for this object we could secure from Holland twelve millions before the end of April, eighteen before the end of next September, and from ten to fifteen millions during the year IX.^-* I think that in our present position this negotiation would be of equal importance with that wluch we njay open with the Court of London or of Vienna." Thirdly, there are Bonaparte's instruc- tions of the 14th of January, 1800, to General Brune,75 the newly appointed commander of the " Army of the West." This last — the most important evidence — we shall consider first. The Army of the West consisted of the troops massed by Bonaparte against the re-opening of hostilities with the royalist insurgents in the northwestern Departments and in La V^endee. The armistice with them expired on the 2l8t of January, and in these instructions of the 14th General Brune, who was then at the point of leaving Paris to take conunand of the Government troops in the expected struggle with the insurgents, was charged to execute a preliminary movement in close connection with the second overture to Great Britain. Bonaparte writes: "The Army of the West is composed of more than 00,000 men under arms. You vifill actively pursue the brigands and seek to bring this war to an early finish ; on its termination now depends the peace of Europe. . . . The arinistice concluded between General Hedouville and the Chouans lasts only to the 1st of Pluviose [21st January]. '»(7orr. Nap., VI, 4519, 13 Jan., 1800. Article 13 of the Treaty of tlm Hague (1() May, 1705), gave Franco an exciuaive right of garrison in Flushing, " in peace and in war, till other airangenients !»(> made between the two nations" — DeCIerc(i, litcurll (let Trait^s arte's appoint- ment as Minister of the Interior on the 25th of December, 1799, and evidently it has been placed where it is now found, only because it must have been written within a reasonable interval after that date. This does not however fix its exact Page 33, note 63 above. 41 [1171 date, which may just as well have lieen in the (md ol" the follow- ing January. As to Bonaparte's sincerity in desiring peace nothing is proven by the note either for or against. It has indeed been cited as evidence that Bonaparte desired war at this time -J^ but with ecjual justice and with greater probability one may maintain the reverse — that Bonaparte wishes to repre- sent the war as an unwelcome, unavoidable necessity. We must romcmber to whom his words arc addressed. If Lueien Bonaparte was the Consul's brother, he was also a prominent statesman of France ; under th(^ Directory he liad been Presi- dent of the Five Hundred, and he was now a Minister of State. In a semi-official note to this di<>nitarv, are we to tind an unblusliing and unncce.sx(iry confession that the greatest need of France is to be sacrificed to the personal ambition of her ruler ? Bonaparte's thir»l utterance on this question — in the note to Talleyrand — is as easy of explanation as that just considered. Apparently it slights the importance of the negotiations at London ami Vienna, but closer examination will weaken and even reverse this impression. The utterance occurs in one of three siunhir notes written by !*>onaparte in succession to the same person and treating in turn of the relations of France with Holland, with Hamburg, and with Portugal.^!* Each of the not(^s is concerned with monies to be exacted of thes*- foreign communities in ordei- to relieve the financial ditticulties of France, and in each there is an estimate, similar to this in the case of Holland, of the effect the amounts thus obtained will iiave in the approaching crisis. Four or six millions extorted from Hamburg by threatening her with Prussian occupation might be worth a successful campaign. Were Portugal to purchase peace for eight or nine millions, the ^"Sybel, Gesr/iirhtc (kr /{trohi/ioiisziit, V, 088, Note. '"> Corr. Nap., VI, ^TtU, t.'rJO, ami 4r)21, all wiitLen tf) 'rallcyrand 011 Uil- 13 January, 1800. By the concludiiig words of the last (4.j21) all were written on the evening of the 13 January. 1118] 42 indemnity wouM incrtiasc French chiinccs in Italy thirty in the hundred and would almost ensure the reconquest of that country. It* Holland will pay a considerable sum for the evacuation of Flushing, the nej^otiation with her would be us important as that with Great Britain or Austria. These notes M'ere written under the influence of Grenville's first reply. At tlie time Bonaparte was facing the jmujability of war not only with (ireat Britain but — should the hitter's influence prevail at Vienna and St. Petersburg — with Austria and Russia as well, and his resources for the contest were so meagre that in these very days the French Treasury could only with difficulty raise 600,000 francs for Moreau's needy army upon the Rhine.^O Exactions, which under other circumstances might appear insignificant, when viewed in the light of these facts gain all the weight that Bonaparte claims for them. The arrangement with Holland — the most important of the three — he considers of equal importance with the negotiations for peace. A nego- tiation which shall secure him the sinews of war, he holds as of equal importance loith a negotiation 'which may relieve him of its necessity. This is no more than a truism. My ar-gument is finished. I shall only refer to a point which in itself decides nothing, but, if placed in its proper con- nection, strongly corroborates the view I maintain. Grenville's answei- to Bonaparte's second overture reached Calais the 21st of Januar}'. On the 25th Bonaparte ordered the formation of the ' Army of the Reserve ' which was to invade Italy. This measure was a turning-point in Bonaparte's policy for the year, for with him it marked the opening of the campaign. The order, which was intended to be a close secret, might have been issued at any moment ; given as it was, directly on the arrival of Great Britain's final refusal to negotiate, its connection with the latter seems evident, and likewise the conclusion to be cape and carry aid to Malta and Egypt was spoilt by the refusal of Spain to co-operate 8" and his later attempts to relieve Malta by systematic blockade- running,86 though incessant, were vain. The supplies of the garrison diminisiied steadily, and in Egypt the hopes which sprang from the French victory at Heliopolis in March, 1800, disappeared with the assassination of Kleber in the follow- ing June. The officer next in rank, General Menou, was unfit for supreme command, and the French position, which Kleber himself had despaired of maintaining, became more than hopeless under his incapable successor. But Bonaparte could find consolation at 1; mie for the^^e disappointments abroad. By the end of February General Brune had subdued or scattered the royalist insurgents in western France. It had been in conjunction with thc^e and with Russian troops \rintering in Jersey that Pitt had hoped to invade France, but at the same time with Brune's success over the insurgents Russia withdrew her support. Angered beyond measure at the insult which an Austrian officer had offered the Russian flag at Ancona the Tsar definitely recalled his troops from Germany in January, 1800, and when Great Britain continued to iseek an alliance with Austria, he with- drew his forces from England also. Thus abandoned, Great "* Corr. JVap., Vi, 4429, 19 Dec, 1799; ihldem, 4495, 4 Jan., 1800: 4538, 18 Jan., 1800 ; and 4670, 14 March, 1800. •"> Corr. Nap., VI, 4612, and 4613, 22 Fob., 1800; ihidem, 4618, 24 Fob., 1800; 4625, 28 Feb., 1800; 4636, 4 March, 1800; 4647, 7 March, 1800; 4675, 17 March, 1800; and 4688, 4689, 4691, and 4692, 20 March, 1800. «« Corr. Nap., VI, 4637, 4 March, 1800; ibidem, 47(X), 28 Marr-h. 1800; 4775 and 4776, 11 May, 1800; 4928, 19 June, 1800; 5034, 28 July, 1800; and 508 4, 5 Sept., 1800. MIBS 46 [121] Britain ami Austria drew closer to each other. Their com- bined resources apart from Russia were still superior to those of France, but Bonaparte could set against his disparity in point of strength the advantage of his tiery energy over the sluggishness of his opponents. Great Britain's belated efforts to co-operate with Austria on the continent earned only ridi- cule even at home,'^^ aiid Bonaparte, after a short and decisive campaign, reconquered Italy at Marengo on the I4th of June. As recently as in the previous January Great Britain had refused to consider peace, but this decision was taken in the confidence, justified by events, that Austria would like, wise evade negotiation. If Austria, voluntarily or as a result of disasters such as Mf.rengo, resorted to negotiation with Franco, Great Britain desired to join in it, for only by negotia- tion in common with Austria could she affect the fate of tiie Netherlands, ^^ which was her chief concern on the continei.t Hence she oflTered Austria a considerable subsidy in return for a pledge from the Emperor to enter into no peace apart from Great Britain. It chanced that the negotiation of this arrange- ment by the British Ambassador at Vienna, Lord Minto, cul- minated in a projct which was sanctioned by the Emperor and despatched to London for approval on the 19th of June.^^ On the morrow the news of Marengo arrived at Vienna, and §2. The Aiiii- tro-Hritish alliance. Opening of negotiations with France at Vienna. Bonaparte propo.sos a nav.il tniro in I./on(lon. "^ Letter from Cornwallis to Ross, 17 Sept., 1800, Corr. of Lord Corn wallii, III, 291 : " Would to Cod we had peace on almost any terras, for it is evident we cannot make war.'' Also letter from (^'ornwalli.s to Ross, Nov., IHOO, ihidc.m, III, 800 : " Wliat a disgraceful anil wli;it an expensive cani})aign have we made. 22,000 men, a large proportion not soldiers, floating around the greater part of Europe, the scorn and laugliing-stock of friends and foes." Corn\rallis, altliough (as Lord [.lieutenant of Ireland) connected with Pitt's Administration, was much dissatisfied witli most of its members. **As they had been in the possession of the Emperor at the openmg of the war and were now in the occupation of Franco, the disposition of them would bo regulated in a separate negotiation between Austria and France without regard to the interests of (Jreat Britain, and in a later separate negotiation between Great Britain an! France the question would have no status. Letter from Thugut to CoUorodo, 19 June, 1800 Vfi.rMiitfk'he liriefe Thuguts (edited by Vivenot), II, 227. [122] 40 on the same day Thugut and Minto converted the pvojet of th(^ 19th into the definitive treaty of alliance of the 20th of June.90 In London the tirst report of Marengo arrived on the 24t]iof June, 91 and Grenville who was then in ignorance of the occurrences of the 19th and 2()th at Vienna, feared that Austria would separate her interests from Great Britain and enter into a separate negotiation with France. ^^2 But the projet of the 19th of June arrived in London on the 4th of July '•'•^ and was followed by the definitive treaty of the 20th. The latter was ratified at once, and under its terms Grenville directed Minto to urge the prosecution of the war if feasible, or, in the- contrary case, to claim admission for Great Britain to any negotiation opened between Austria and France.^'* An Austro- French negotiation was then already on foot. The armistice of Alexandria, in which Austria recognized her defeat at M& ^ongo, had been signed by Bonaparte with a view to an immediate Austrian peace ; and Thugut, though averse to negotiation, for the moment was unable to refuse it. When Bonaparte offered Austria a general armistice in the theatrical letter ^^ which he wrote to the Emperor professedly from the field of MarengO; the Emperor accepted the offer but insisted that the negotiation to follow should respect his obligations to Great Britain, and be conducted with a view to a general *" I cannot demonstrate a connection between the arrival of the news of Marengo and the signature of the treaty, although it seems that such must have existed. •* Letters from Lord Grenville and Thomas (irenville to the Marquis of Buckingham, of 24 June, 1800, Buckingham, Memoirs of Court and CabineLH of George III, III, 83 and 85. •'Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 27 June, 1800, London, P.R.O., Austria, vol. 59. •'Despatch .rom Grenville to Minto, 4 July, 1800, London, 1'. R.O. , Austria, vol. 59. »* Despatch from Grenville to Minto, 17 July, 1800, (No. 1 of this date), London, P. R.O., Austria, vol. 59. »» Corr. Nap., VI., 4914, 16 June, 1800. It appears that, although dated at Marengo, for the sake of effect, it was written some days later at Milan. 47 [12.S] peace. Count St Julicn. tlie Austrian olKctr vvlio Imd oirricd Bonaparte's letter to \'icnna, was entrusted with this icply, ^^ and, althoutjli liis mission was merely to deliver it and to re- ceive the French answer, Bonaparte and 'rallcyiaud induced him to sign preliminaries oT a sepaiate p<'iice with Austria. The violation of her pkdtj^c to ( Jreat Britain, which Ausfria was thus invited to commit, Bonaparte attempted to palliate by an assurance, which the Emperor was empowered to use at Lon- don, that France would nejjotiate peaet' with (Jreat Britain after making peace with Austria.^7 But the letter containing this assurance was nev(T delivered. Its bearer, Honapartes aide-de-camp Duroc, who accompanied St. .lulien from Paris, was stopped at the Austrian h(!adquarters, while St. Jnlien, on proceeding to Vienna, was disgraced and his work di.sowned. Thugut replied to Talleyrand 'J^ insisting afresh tjn a general peace and transmitting an offer from Minto on behalf of Great Britain ^^ to co-operate in a general negotiation. Duroc received this answer at the Au^itrian head(|uarters on the 15th of August and carried it forthwith to Paris. On the 24th, Transport-commissioner Otto in London offered Lord Grenville a general negotiation in return for a naval truce, corre.sponding to the land-armistice in CJermany. ^^^ (),, the same day, without awaiting the answer to this overture, without so much as hinting, in the note to Vienna, that the ••The Emperor to Bonaparti-, 5 July, 1800, Vfr/ran/ir/ie Briefr Thvipils. IT, 2.39. •* Bonaparte to the Emperor, •_'<• .Inly, 1800, Cnrr. Nap., VT, 5038. •"Note from Thugut to Talleyrand, II Aug., 1800, VertrauHrh>' Rrieff, Thuguts, II, 2,57. Also in Pari. Hist., vol. 35, col. 584, Appendix A. ••Note from Minto to Thugut, 9 Aug., 1800, Vertravlirhe Brie/c Thv- guts, II, 477. Also in Par/. Hist., vol. 35, col. 585, Appendix B. '** Letter and note from Otto to (Jren villa, both of 24 Aug., 1800, Paper-* oj this Negotiation, nos. 1 and 2. Throughout thi.s chapter the citation "Papers of this Negotiation" refers to the papers submitted to Parliament. 13 Nov., 1800, Pari. Hist., vol. 35, cols. 640 et seq. They number consecu- tively from 1 to 47. [124] 48 overture had been made, Boiiapurt* onnced tlie Austrian truce. 101 8.1. Bona- Bonaparte's object in a naval truce was to save Malta. ma^Vdval ' '^^^•'^ point has l)e(!n recognized in a general way, but not with truce : in clearne.sH ; historians have seen in the proposal an effort to save Malta. ... Tho throt- better the French position in Malta and Egypt, but it has iiej^)tiuti()ti '^scaped notice that on Malta's fall Bonaparte suddenly lost for the tru.:u. ^j^jj i„t,(»rest iu a naval truce with (ireat Britain and abandoned the negotiation of it when the terms oF .such a truce were at the point of being successfully arranged.l02 The failure of the negotiation is usually ascribed to a difi'erence concerning Egypt Nevertheless Egypt was minor importance to Bonapiirt*' in couiparisoji with M Great Britain could eventually expel the French from both, b -the point has been mentioned in the previous chapter — cm the expulsion of >«> Note froni 'rallcynuKj to Tlmgiit, '24 Ani,'., 18()(», Vtrtranlkhe. Briefe. ThiKjnts, II, 'JCid. Without iiu'iitioning tin- l''i'eiith overture in London 'I'alloy- rand states that the Kniperor, by requiring:; tlio admission of (ireat Britain to tho negotiation witliout first reciuiriiig lier to cnnccde an armistice with France, had made tlie re ujiening of hostilities inevitable; and the note concludes as follows: " t^ue (revenement.s vont done naitrc encore; comhien de nouvelles victimes ininiolt'es a TAngleteiie ; si les nations du continent ne posent les ar'ines (|U. Papers of this AVf/o- liulivn, no. 15. 11*) Letter from (Jrenville to Evan Nepeaii, 4 Sept., 1800, Papcr.i of thin yajotintion, no. 16. 117 Translation of a jiroji-f in M. Otto's, 4 Sept. 1800. Piiperx of thin Ni'(jotiation, no. 18. 4 53 [129] remove all indacement on her part to accept the French pio- posals.il^ Up to this point Great Fhitain had evaded the question >i'). Thcscconfl P , 1 (• 1 . • 1 I. 1 1 ''•^'^Me of the of a naval truce : here, tor the hrst time, she raced tlie nogotiation, proposition seriously. Grenville's reply of the 5th was an l^^^L' '.laii^ implied assent to the proposal, and on the 7th he definitely '*''^"''*'*,''"*^''' ^ _ . . taiige the committed Great Britain to a naval truce in some form, bv terms of a submitting a counter jjrojef^^'^ to Otto's projet of the 4th of ' ' Septembei'. The projet and counter projet are in sharp con- tradiction to each other. In order to judge intelligently between them one must recall the principle underlying all armistices, whicli forbids a combatant to secure, by the terms of the truce, such advantages as at the time of signature he neither possessed nor could reasonably liope to secure. The principle cannot be applied with the same exactness at sea as on land, for the sea cannot, like territory, pass into the undis- puted occupation of either belligerent. Still, at tliis time Great Britain dominated the sea. She held Brest and Malta and the ports of Egypt under close blockade ; to maintain the relative position of herself and France as belligerents she must require these blockades to continue unbroken, while the interest of France, on the contrary, was to evade as far as possible this correct principle in the truce. In this direction Otto's projet went to an extreme. It removed every con- ceivable restriction upon the conveyance of reinforcements and stores to Egypt and Malta ; it claimed the liberty to change the stations of the French fleets at will ; and it sought to extend the benefits of the truce to the French allies without suggesting a like favour for those of Great Britain. Under this arrangement Bonaparte could transfer the French and Spanish fleets from Brest to Toulon ; thus, in a sense, he 118 Note from tironville to Otto, A Sept., IHfMt. Ptipern oj tJiis Netjo- tiatiovs no. 19. 119 Counter /)/'qyV/ in l^ord Orenville's, 7 Sept.. IM(MI. I'lipcrK of ihix Nfijo- ticUion, no. 25, [180] 54 would undo the work of Nelson at Aboukir and re-open tlie entire question of the control of the Mediterranean. Bonaparte's purpose in such claims can only have been to secure a margin in his demands, within which he would recede much or little, according as resistance to them in London was great or small. Grcnville rejected them bodily. His counter projpt forV>ade all movement of French vessels of war during the armistice, and restricted the importation of store-i at Malta and Alexandria^^o to the single item of provi- sions, according to the amount actually consumed by the gar- risons. Otto was unable to accept this offer ; he referred it to liis Government.121 It chanced that the decision on this question was taken at Paris at the same time with a kindred decision on the Austrian truce. This truce had been denounced at the Aus- trian headquarters on the 29th of August and expired on the 10th of September.122 But at tliis crisis the Emperor left his capital to take command of his army in person, and at his request Moreau, professedly on his own responsibility — he claimed to be under orders to renew the contest on the 10th, unless the Emperoi ratitied the preliminaries signed by St. Julien — suspended hostilities during a fresh reference of the matter to Paris.l23 "Phe reply from Paris was a demand tnat the Emperor, in return for an extension of the truce, should surrender his fortresses within the French lines in Ger- many, Ulm, Philipsburg, and Ingolstadt. On the 20th of 120 The offer to admit proviHions at Egyptian ports was made merely to place them logically in tlie same category with Malta. It conferred no real advantage on the French at these ports, where supplies could be easily drawn from tlie interior of Egypt. 121 Letter from Otto to Grenville, 8 Sept., 1800. Paper.s of thin Nego- /in/inn, tio. 26. 122 Despatch from Minto to Grenville, 2 Sept., 1800. London, 1'. R. 0., Aii'itria, vol. (50. 123 Despatch from Minto to (h-enville, 12 Sept., 1800. London, P. R. ()., A ii^fria, vol. 60. >isaK-=i. -!■■ 55 [131] September he submitted to these terms in the convention of Hohenlinden. Meanwhile Otto was instructed to oH'er Gran- ville a choice between separate negotiation with a naval truce on Grenville's tei-ms 07' a general negotiation with a naval truce according to the French projet. Since the peculiar advantages involved in the latter had been claimed by France as a compen- sation for the extension of the continental truce, this offer is manifestly out of harmony with the demand enforced from the Emperor. In fact Bonaparte knew that at this moment the fate of Malta hung in the balance :124 and fearing that it had actually fallen, in wliich case a naval truce would be of little value to him, he sacrificed consistency in order to secure in these (lerman fortresses a tangible compensation for the very object still put forward in London as ground for claiming a naval truce. Otto submitted this offer to Grenville on the 16th of September,^25 ^t the same time requesting an opportunity to explain it in person. Explanation it certainly needed, for the choice which it professed to give between a general and separate negotiation was an empty one. Great Britain had conceded a naval truce, even on he own terms, with the sole object of obtaining a general negotiation, and her pledge to the Emperor to negotiate only in conniion with him had been public since July. Hence Grenville answered on the 20th,^26 with some vexation, that since the French Government knew that Great Britain would not separate her interests from Austria, the proposed alternative amounted to nothing more than the renewal of a demand already rejected ; while with regard to any explanations which Otto might desire to offer, he might submit them in writing, if he were authorized to make new proposals consistent with the terms of the British 12*r;om Nap., VI, 477o, 11 May, 18(M». 125 Lotteraiul note from Otto to (itonvillo, hotli of 16 Sept., ISOO. Papom of fhiff Neijotintioii, iios. 27 aiul 28. >26 Letter ami note from Grenville to Otto, hotli of 20 Sept., ISIK). f' of this Negotiation, nos. 29 and 30. [132] 56 counter projet, and if they then appeared to form sufficient ground for discussion, a proper person would be appointed to meet him. Otto submitted a fresh projet on the 2Lst.i27 In it he advanced a new claim, tliat British troops should not be landed in Italy during the armistice ; but in other respects he made large concessions. The unhindered navigation claimed in his first projet for all ve.ssels of war was restricted in this to frigates, corvettes, and other smaller craft, the move- ment of double and triple-decked ships of the line being wholly forbidden : and the importation of reinforcements and stores, which also had been unrestrained in the first projH, was here confined, in the case of Malta, to prowsions at the rate of ten tliousand rations per day ,^28 j^ that of Egypt, to six frigates, which should be allowed to sail to Alexandria from Toulon and return thitlier without inspection at any part of the voyage. Wide as these terms w^ere of Grenville's counter projet, they were such an approach to it that he at once appointed his under-secretary, Hammond, to interview Otto on the points of difference still open between the Governments. It is a question to what extent Grenville's bluntness at this point of the negotiation was due to Talleyrand's tirade agamst England in his note to Thugut of the 24th of August. This note had been communicated to London in the intervf 1, and the circumstances which it revealed regarding the denunciation of the Austrian truce were an occasion of con- troversy between Otto and Grenville, carried on independently of the negotiation proper.i29 Jn the latter Great Britain made 127 Projef in M. Otto's, 21 Sept., 1800. Papen of this Nfjfofiafion, No. 32. 128 DouhtlesH with a view, if po.saible, to anticipate the capituhitioii of Malta, the projef required also that the liritish officer who bore the news of these arrangements to the Mediterranean should pass by the direct route through France to Toulon, instead of by Gibraltar. 129 Besides the note from (Jrenville to Otto, 20 Sept., cited above, see letter and note from Otto to (trenville, 21 and 23 Sept. [I Vendeniiaire IX 23 Sept.], and the latter's replj', 2/) Sept., f'npprs n/tliis Xcjofirr/ioii, nos. 30, 31, 33, and 38. 67 [133] no concession beyond her previous oHer. Grenville's instruct- ions to HammonfU^o for the interview with Otto discuSiS at length the points at issue, but in the end simply insist on the terms of the counter projet. Some of these differences, dis- tinctly of minor importance, had been a source of friction throughout the negotiation, but in themselvevS were no real barrier to its success. Amongst them was the question of the lights of the allies on either side to take part in the truce. France wished to include her own arbitrarily, while Great Britain, disinclined to a like attack on the independence of hers, contended for voluntary accession of both. The rea* differences between the Governments related to Malta and Egyy)t, and to the degree of liberty to be allowed France in sending reinforcements and .stores to these points and to her isolated colonics lieyond sea. Otto still claimed the privilege of provisioning Malta at the rate of ten thousand rations per day, an amount much in excess of the actual consumption, which Great Britain insisted should be the basis of the arrange- ment. The garrison numbered some three thousand men ; hence, even allowing for a certain number of non-combatants who, it was asserted, were also present, ten thousand lations per day would supply immediate needs and permit a rapiy what article of the (iernian arniiHtice Ulni or Ingol.stadt are to receive in covered waggons as many troops, as much provisions, and a.s great a ([uantity of every species of arms, ammunitions, and stf)res, as might be conveyed to Egypt in six Fiench frigates." France professed to a.ssimi- late Alexandria to Ulm and Ingolstadt. 134 Letter from Hammond to Grenville, '25 Sept., 1800, Papern of thin Neffotiation, no. 39. 135 Hammond, in letter to (Jrenville, 25 Sept.. just cited: "Otto . . briefly remarked that the quantity of rations was not to i)e exactly appor- tioned to the precise returns of the garrison, but tliat a certain number of rations in proportion to tiieir respective ra. ks was to be allowed to the (Jeneral and Staff OHiceis."' 59 [1H5] them for consiclei-utioii, and in a resume sul'inittod on the 2()thi36 ),,. proposed that Malta be supplied at the rate of ten thousand rations per day only for the first month, during which interval conntiissioners of the two Governments could fix the matter •/. Ills/, vol. .3,1, (irenville (col. 1194) : " His loi'd.ship [i.e., Orcnville] next vindicated the language of his cor- respondoiipt,' witli the Frcncii goveninicnt from the cliai-ge of a.^|)erity, and con- tended that Ronaparte never .siiowcd a desire for peace, except on grounds on whicli ho know it could not lie accepted. Thus when he know that we were o/igagod l)y treaty with tiio Kmporor, ho proposed a sej)arate peace ; afterwards he proposed a naval armistice, as the preliminary ; and when he found we were likely to agree to it, he broke oft' the negotiation." |(il I [VAH\ 02 British eointnerce on the coastH of wcstci-n Europe. Great Britain in turn bad j^uaranteed the intej^rity of Portuf^uese teriitory, and Bonajiarte, seizing the opportunity to reach Gnat Britain throur engagements to her allies and with her own naval interests, she would discuss the matter at Vienna and bring it to a point where a oeneral confjress, if convened at all, wouM be a mere formality. Auckland embodiel this answer in a letter to Perregaux, which the latter laid before the French Government. Bona- parte took no notice of it.i^^ \ sufficient explanation of this might perhaps be found in the circumstance that Grenville in his reply had again suggested a general peace — a proposal ,. . , which was without hope of accev:.^ace at Paris; but there poiuy toward ^ ^ ' (rreat Britain, vvas an additional and weightier reason for Bonaparte's silence. . .^-, J51 Tiii.s fooling was not an idlo Kuspicmn. Soo tlio interesting pas.sage in Bonaparte's Bnllotin of tiio Arinv, IS Juno ISOO, Corr. Xap , VI, 492/ : " La Belgiijuo fora partio du territoiro du grand ])euple. La Batavie et I'Kspagne ronnies d" intorots et de pa.s.sion.**, redoubleront d' efforts oontre lea tyrans dos inors, et l' Anglais, oxilo six niois de Tannee sur .son ile, devra attendre que I'Klho soit debairasso do ses glaoos pour avoir dea nouvelles dii eontiiiont. L'Anglotorro doviendra. par son arrogance, sa v^nalite, aa cor- ruption, rop})rol)ro ot lo nii'pris du Franvais, oonnne de rAutrichien et du Russe." Also Bonaparte's letter to the Emperor of Russia, 27 Veh., 1801, Corr. Nap., VII, r)417 ; "Si \'()tr(> Majesto tient la main a ce que los Anglais ne fassent aucuii conunorco a\eo les piiissaiices du nord, si In corps do M. (Lo Sprongi»orten so porto dans le Haiiovro pour no niottre aucune espece de doute i\ la ferinotur.- do TElho ot du Wosor, un corps d'ohservation que j' ai envoy^ a Bordeaux for(,!ant lo I'ortugal a former ses ports a I'Angle- tcrro, et ceux de Naples el do la Sioilo leur I'tant ogalement fermea, les Anglais n'auront auouno comnnuiication avec Y Kvn-ope." 152 Letters from Aucklaml to fTrenville, o .Fan., and 3 Feb., 1801 ; from Per- regaux to Auckland, KJ Jan., 1801. Appendix B, II, III, IV, pp. 76-78 in/ra. 8 3. (Jreat Britain t hroatened l>y Russia and tlio Armed Noii- t rality. lionaparte reverses his 66 [141] When he received the reply he no longer desired peace with Great Britain. Bonaparte, we have seen, had sought a tempor- ary peace with Great Britain in order to reopen the contest when once he felt able to cope with her at sea, but at this moment a movement in the states of northern and eastern Europe suddenly threatened Britain's maritime supremacy. In the previous winter the Tsar Paul had abandoned his alliance with both Austria and Great Britain in disgust and anger : subsequently when Great Britain refused to give up Malta,!^^ which Paul claimed as Grand Master of the Knights of St. John,i54 he determined finally to take action against her. Encouraged by Bonaparte,^^^ he created the Armed Neutrality of the North, a league composed of Russia, Prussia and the Scandinavian powers, w'th the object of con)pelling Great Britain to relax the rights of blockade and of search, then exercised by her in a very extreme form to the great annoy- ance of neutrals. As Great Britain was determined to continue her practice in these matters, war wath the Armed Neutrality 153 I.e., after the French garrison in Malta capitulated to Great Britain in September, 1800. 154 F .ul's election to the office was illegal and the Order itself was in fact defunct, but Great Britain, when still in alliance with Paul, had shown a dis- position to recognize his claim. Naturully she ceased to do so, after he had given up his alliance with her and manifested an inclination to become her enemy. Bonaparte on the contrary, when his own hold upon Malta was on the very verge of extinction, by a clever stroke of policy, offered to surrender the fortress to Paul, as Grand Master of the Order. On this oflfer see the note from Talleyrand to Panin, 26 Aug., 1800, Tratschevski, Ru^ssia and France, I, 3, (Paper No. 2.) 155 Corr, Nap., VI, 5208, 7 Dec, 1800, a note to bo sent to allied and friendly powers : . . . " le Gouvernement fran<,ais, ajant principalenient k coeur de s'opposer k I'envahissoment des mers et ile concourir avec les autres puissances neutres i fairo respecter leurs ])avillons, et apprt^ciant le z^le vraii.ientpatriotiquede rEmpereur de Russie pour la cause coniinuiie de toutes les puissances continentale.s, ne traitera de la paix avec I'Aiigljterre qu'autant que ees principes sacrt^s seraient reconnus, et (|ue les pavilions rusae, danois, suedois, ameriuain, prussien, seraient respectes sur mer, comma les armes de ces puissances lo sont sur le continent, et qu'ilserait reconnu par I'Angleterre que le mer appartient {\ toutes les nations." 5 [142] 66 § 4. Pitt's attitude to- wards peace. His resigna- tion, Febru- ary, 1801. Addiiigtou'a overtures at Paris. Bona jiirte's eva- «ive answer. li was inevitable. Paul drew near to Bonaparte.^se jjnd the latter was pleased bf'.yond measure at an alliance which brought the Scandinavian and Russian navies into line a<;ainst Great Britain, and thus opened a prospect to him of attacking her at once with some chance of successA-^^ On the faith of this chanoe in the maritime situation Bonaparte dropped the negotiation opened tlirough Perregaux in December and suddenly flung himself into a naval campaign of far-reaching extent.^'^^ While Great Britain was engaged with her new enemies in the Baltic, Bonaparte hoped to reassf rt himself in the Mediter- ranean, whither his heet at this time escaped from Brest.^^* He proposed a descent upon Ireland, and he planned an attack on tlie British colonies in the Indies and on the Portuguese in Brazil. In short he felt already able to open the contest with Great Britain which previously he had intended to begin o'lly after years of preparation. While b^rance thus reversed her policy, that of Great Britain had of late been steadily moving towards peace. At the close of the negotiation of a naval truce in October, it seemed un- likely that Austria could long resist Bonaparte, and Pitt, who anticipated the early submission of his ally, was disposed to open a separate negotiation with France, as soon as the latter l>'>6 Letter from Emperor Paul to Bonaparte, 18.30 Dec, 1800, Tratschevski, Riima and France, I, 27, (Paper No. 11.) 157 Letter from Bonaparte to bis brotber .Josepb, French plenipotentiary at Ijuncvillo, 21 .Ian., 1801, Cnrr. Xap., VI, 531.') : " Hier est arrive de Russie un courrier . . . ; il m'a apporte une lettre extremement amicale de la propre main de rEinperem- .... La Russie est dans des dispositions tros-hostiles (iontre rAngleterro. II vous est facile de sentir rinterct que nous avouB k ne : brusquer, car la paix avt^ I'Empereur [i.e., (lermanj nest rien en com- puraison d'une alliance qm maitriseral'Angleterre etnous conservera I'^gypte." 158 Corr. Nnp., VI, 5327, 27 Jan., 1801. 159 Tbo fleet escaped on tlic 23rd of January through a violent storm which drove the British blockaders temporarily from the coast. See the letter from Thomas CJrenville to the Marquis of Buckingliam, 5 I'eb., 1801, Buck- ingham, Miinoir!< of Court and Cahinet.s of Georye III, III, 146 ; also Coir. Ifnp., VII, 53.36, 4 Feb., 1801. T 67 [uaj forced Austria into a separate peace i^o 'phe chief hindrance to a settlement, Pitt felt, was the presence of the French in Egypt.l*'^ Another obstacle to peace was the disagreement as to its desirability among the members of his own Cabinet.1^2 But when Austria signed her separate peace with France at Luneville on the 9th of February, 180J, the second of these difficulties v/as solved, and the other was well on its way to solution. In the interval the Abercromby expedition, which finally expelled the French from Egypt in the following sum- mer, had been organized and was in the Levant ; and the obstacle to peace within Pitt's Cabinet had disappeared. In the beginning of February Pitt had resigned on the question of the Catholic tests, and his friend and successor, Addington, 160 Letter from Pitt to Addir jton, 8 Oct., 1800, Li)\. and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth, I, 263: "The negotiation for an armistice is at an end .... An opening is left which will remove all ditficulty or awkwardness in setting on foot a negotiation, if Austria makes a separate peace, wliich I rather ex- pect. And I am inclined to think in that event, if we are firm, and our domestic difliculties do not increase, we may secure creditahle aiul adequate terms. But as long as Austria does not withdraw and submit to a separate peace and France refuses joint negotiation, we caiuiot yield to that pretension by making it our act to separate ourselves from our ally." 161 Letter of Pitt to Addington, 29 Sept., 1800, Life and Corr. of Lord Sidmouth, I, 262. 163 See the statement on this point submitted by Dundas to Pitt, 22 Sept. , 1800, Stanhope, Life of Pitt, II, 367 : " Some of us think that the only solid hope of peace lies in the restoiation of thf Bourbons. Some, without going so far, think tliat there should be no peace with a Revolutionary Government, and that the present Government of France is such. Some are for negotiating witli the present Government of France, but only in conjunction witli the Emperor of (iermauy. Some are foi' negotiating on our own foundation singly, with a just sense of our dignity and honour, and of the conquests we have made outside of Europe " . . . . Dundas after observing that these diflTerenceB are not theoretical, but practical, presenting themselves in every discussion eitiier on the prosecution of the war or tljc prospect of peace, concludes the statement thus: " It is earnestly hoped that Mr. Pitt will take these obser- vations into his most serious consideration before it is too late." Lord Stanhope adds the opinion : " From tliis statement it certainly appears that Pitt might find it reijuisite to make some changes in tiie Cabinet, before he could hope to renew the negotiatitm with effect." The question has occurred to me wliether tiiis opposititiii of an inthiential seoticjii of the Cabinet to Pitt's views Before taking this step Hawkesbury had sounded the Govern- ment at Paris as to whether negotiations would be acceptable at the moment.i^^'' The answer of course was favourable, but in reality negotiation at the time was not in the interests of France, and at Paris there was no intention of entering into th(» matter seriously. France, in consequence of her recent victories and of the newly-won friendship of the Tsar, was now in a position of exceptional strength on the continent and was even making headway against Great Britain. She had dictated terms of peace to Austria at Luneville. In Italy her armies had occupied the Kingdom of Naples and closed its ports to Great Britain. 1^8 A similar movement was on foot against Portugabi^'*^ and Sardinia on seeking peace was required, as a preliminary of negotiation, to open her ports to French, and to close them to British vessels.l^o Prussia finally, yielding to Russian pressure, was on the point of occupying '*' Diariei* and Corr. of George Rose, I, 291. '«■« Malmesbury, Duirie.s mid Corr., IV, 75 (20 Oct., 1802). i«s Stanhope, Llfi of PIff, III, 27. •«fi Notes from Hawkesbury to Otto, 20 and 21 March, 1801, London, P. R. O., Frarici; vol. 622. '"' Sybel, Oeiichichtc der Rcvolutionxzcit, V, 684. i«« Corr. Nap., VII, :AY^, 25 Feb., 1801 ; ibid., 5430, 2 March, 1801. i«3Corr. Nap., VII, .5417, 27 Feb., 1801; ibid., 5562, 13 May, 1801; Sybel, Oeschichte der Revolutionirzeit, V, 688-689. "0 Corr. Nap., VII, 5468, 18 March, 1801. I' 60 fl45] 1801 ; Hanoverl7i and excluding Great Britain from HaniVjurg, Bremen and the entire North German coast. Great Britain's isolation was complete, and even at sea her prospects for the moment were not of the b(^st. Parker and Nelson with a powerful fleet were on their waj'- to the Baltic to attack the Northern powers, but this fleet would be operating in enemies' waters without a base of supplies, and a reverse, if it did not destroy, would seriously impair Britain's commanding position at sea. Hence Bonaparte, just as Pitt in a similar position had rejected ne^'otiation in January-, 1800, now felt it to be in the interest of France to continue a struggle which off'ercd prospects of speedy success. Still the French (Government did not reject negotiation outright : in response to Hawkesbury's official overture of the 21st of March, it requested passports for a French courier who should bear its reply to London/" ''2 By this means Bonaparte eoidd inform Otto of hic< ival attitude towards negotiation without revealing it to Great Britain; 173 moreover a delay of six days was gaint^d, the answer to the overture being presented to Hawkesbury only after this double communication between Paris and London, on the 2nd of April. i"-* In presenting it Otto desired a pledge of secrecy on the negotiation, which Hawkesbury gave with- out difl5culty,i7f> The negotiation at London, if it became '^' Note from Bonaparto to the Emperor ot Hu.ssia, 27 Fob., 1801, Corr. Nap., VII, .')417 ; liiiilkni, I^rnu>isni uiul Frmikreich, II, 34, Note 2. '^'- Notes from Otto to Hawkesbui-y and fi'om Hawkealmry d' Otto. 27 March, 1801, Lontlon, P. R. ().. France, vol. 622. '""At tin's period govei'iiments tampered s\-stematically witli tlipioniatic correspondence forwarded by the ordinary mails. See e.f/. , Honnpaite's direc- tions to his aide-de-camp, Duioc, Cnrr. Xaji.. V'll, ^y'^4^^. 24 April, ISOl : " Vous ecrirez par tons les courriers, soit dv IJerlin, soitde I'l'tershourg, comnie .si vos lettrea devaient etre lues par rKnijiereur et tons ses ministrea, et par le roi de Pruase et tons sea ministies.'' "* Note from Otto to Hawkesbury, 2 April, ISOO, Appendix i' ivjrn. ''•'"' iSybel, (rfxrhich/r ilrr R( vnhitwnxzi'U, V, 084. The secret was in ffict already known, r.f/., to the Pnissiaii Minister at Paris, Lucchesini, who how- ever was an adept at discover' iig what otln'r ])eoplc did not wish him to know ; see Bericht Lucchesinis, 2 Ajiril, 1801, Bailii-u, Fraixxoi iiitd Fmnkreich, II, 36. In London Lord Malmosbury had heard of the lu^gotiation, prior however to Hawkesbury's pledge; .sec Malmcsbury, I>lariotli sincerel}' desirous of peace. The best way to avoid this in the present instance would be by direct and confidential conununication. If through some cliannel sufficicnily authentic; to be relied on (but not such as to commit tiie two governments by oHicial steps, wliich, if unsuccessful, we are always obliged to make public) we could be apprized of the ideas enter- tained at Paris, as to the terms of peace, it would enable us to judge whether negotiation can at tliis moment be successfully pursued. And if those ideas, so stated to us, were not inconsistent with our good faith, to our allies, nor with our naval interests, to which the continental aggrandizement of France obliges us to look with increased attention, we should hv. ready (could sufficient con- fidence be placed in us for the purpose) to discuss these ideas at Vienna, and to endeavoiu' to biing the whole to such a point that the nomination of minis- ters to a congress, whether it afterward took place or not, would be a mere formality. I think we aic not unreasonable in desiring to receive this confidential overture, instead of our beginning to make it ; because we could not take such a step without committing ourselves, botii with the country here and with our allies — while no such difficult}' exists at Paris, And I am very certain that, although this may not be the only road to peace, it is the surest and the moa: expeditious. Right Hon. Lord Auckland. G. IL — Letter from Auckland to Grenville, 5th January, 1801, London, P. R. O., France, vol. 614. (Original.) Private. Palace Yard, January 5th, 1801. My dear Lord, — . . . Second— Mr. Nettement (a friend of Perre, gaux's) came to me on Saturday, He did not appear to have any suspicion of 11B- re 77 [15:5] tlio ((intcntR of IVrrej^nux's Icttcf tf) mv ; l>nl Im^ told nio tlmt Pnrrogaiix luul friMinc'iit luid friendly lU'ctiss to Hoimpurte, mid is one of the vSeiiatoiH, and in that oapaoity is Huro to receive his letters unopened. I did not hesitate there- fore to write fully ... In auHwei- to tlie paragiiii)li from Perrt^gau.x, after a very few words of general introduction, 1 tr;uis(ril)e(l, l)ut witiiout allusion to your name, the whole of your letter. Upon the whole, it his intinuition had an}' meaning, I am sure that we havnt line of the King's Ministers to maintain the strictest and most scrupulous honour toward Austria, and to have her entire concuri'ence so long as the alliance might last. It is likely enough that the overwhelming of Austria may have induowl Bonaparte to suspend all attempts towards a seftarate pacification with us. But I infer liom Mr. Perregaux s reply, that his fii'st letter certainly was an overture the result of which he was expected to report and has reported to Bonaparte. It further appears that he considers the su!)ject as open to farther communii;ation though in that case he would decline being the bearer in person. To this I should add that Mr. Nettement (the friend of Mr. Perregaux) on Sunday left a note at my house to say, "Qu'il a I'honneur de pr^venir Lord Auckland que son depart pour Paris aura lieu au commencement do la semaine prochaine, et qu'il prendra ses ordrcs." Under these circumstances your Lordship, in your bettor judgment, and with the knowledge of collateral points unknown to me, will decide whether any further notice should be taken . . . Auckland. On reading the above I think it beat to annex che original notes from Perregaux and Nettement. 01 rre. n of i « 1 ; . s % [154] 78 IV. — Letter from Perregaux to Auckland, 16th January 1801 (enclosed in letter from Auckland to Grenville, 3rd Feb- ruary) London, P- R. 0., France, vol. 014. (Original.) My Lord,- The 16th January, 1801. -Your kind letter of the 2nd of this montli reached me the 10th I took an opportunity to mention your letter and lay its contents where it could be appreciated ; I have had no tidings of m}- communication hince. My occupation and .situation hind me here, though my health and head call for diversion, and howsoever u.teful and agreeable a trip would be to me,, I (w> must renounce to it. J. F. Perregaux. (a) The italicised words ' me' and ' I' are underlined in the originals, hut it appears likely that the underlining was done by Auckland, not by Periogaux. ■i?i«r'"W!>«in 'I 79 [155] Appendix C. -The reply of the French Government to Hawkes- hury's overture in March, 1801. Note from Otto, delivered at the Foreign Office, 2nd April, 1801, London, P. R. O., France, vol. 622. (Original.) Le soussigne a communique a son Oouvernement la note de Son Kxcellence Mylord Hawkesbury du 21 Mara. Lo Premier Consul per.si.ste dans «on amour constant pour la paix et le 6ou.s8.gne est specialement charge ,le faire connoitre la vive satisfaction, nu, le Premier Consul a eprouvee en voyant que ie Cabinet Brita.mi.iuo se montroit dispose a mettre un terme au fleau qui desuie I'Europe depuis huit anuoes La campagne commence; les flottes r.'o «a Majeste Britannioue paroissent pre es a porter la guerre au sein de la Baltique. Les pui.ssances*contine„talc8 sent en disposition d attaquer le Portugal et le Hanovre Comment au milieu -ic tons ces apprets de guerre et de ces nouveaux motifs d exasperation esperer quelque heureux resultat d' une ne" '"'"'' '' '"" ^'■""'"•- ^""^^ '-g--tion par une sus- pension d ho.stil,tes en convenant des articles d' une treve geacrale, ou si les obsta,cle8 a une suspen.sion d' armes maritime paroi.s.sent plus des a lever que ceux qui s' opposent an retabiissement meme de la paix, ne seroit-il pas au moins convenable de s entendre prealablement sur les bases ,le celle-ci ' Le .soussigne a les Pleinpouvoirs et les instructions nece.ssaire. pour donner de^irer ""''^''''"'•'' '"' explications ulterieures que Son Excellence pourra Le Premier (Jonsul regardera comme le plus beau jour celui, o,', le commerce de ..urope pourra jouir sans inquietude de la prosperitc, resultat infaiUiblo ae la paix des mers. Hereford Street, 12 germinal an 9, 2 avril ~l80lT ~~ Otto.