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 II 
 
 Art. IX.— 1. The Case of the United 
 States, to be laid be/ore the Tribunal of 
 Arbitration to be convened at Geneva. 
 
 2. Case presented on the part of the Go- 
 vernment of Her Britannic Majesty to the 
 Tribunal of Arbitration constituted under 
 Art. 1 of the Treaty concluded at Wash- 
 ington on the 8lh of May, ISTl, between 
 Her Britannic Majesty and the United 
 States of America. 
 
 The American Case, drawn up for the infor- 
 mation of the Geneva tribunal, starts with 
 the assumption that, in the course of many 
 transactions with Great Britain, the United 
 States have displayed a very moderate and 
 conciliatory spirit; that American rights, 
 which might have been pressed, have often 
 been given up; that the settlement of the 
 boundary of the State of Maine was one 
 example of American moderation, and that 
 the settlement of the Oregon boundary in 
 1846 was another. It is worth while to 
 quote the passage in which these views are 
 expressed. The Case sets out by declaring 
 that from no people had the people of 
 America a belter right to expect a just 
 
 S' idgraent than from the people of Great 
 ritain, and it goes on to enumerate some 
 considerations in support of this state- 
 ment : — 
 
 'Id 1812 they were forced into war with 
 Great Britain by the claim of that power to 
 impress seamen on the high seas from vessels 
 of the United States. After three years the 
 war ceased, and the claim has never since been 
 practically enforced. In 1818 they met Bri- 
 tish negotiators more than half way in arrang- 
 ing disputed points about the North Americsn 
 Fisheries. In 1827, having added to their oww 
 right of discovery the French and Spanish 
 titles to the Pacific coast, they voluntarily 
 agreed to a joint occupation of a disputed por- 
 tion of this territory rather than resort to the 
 last arbitrament of nations. In 1838, when a 
 serious rebellion prevailed in Canada, the con- 
 gress of the United States, at the request of 
 Great Britain, passed an Act authorizing the 
 Government to exercise exceptional powers * 
 maintain the national neutrality. In 1842 tne 
 Government of the United States met a British 
 envoy in a spirit of conciliation, and adjusted 
 by agreement the disputed boundary between 
 Maine and the British possessions. In 1846 
 they accepted the proposal of Great Britain, 
 made at their own suggestion, to adopt the 49th 
 parallel as a compromise line between the two 
 Columbias, and to give to Great Britain the 
 whole of Vancouver 8 Island.' 
 
 This passage, in all probability, represents 
 fairly enough the view of Anglo-American 
 diplomacy, popular in the United States. 
 Nevertheless almost every statement thus 
 put forward is untrue, while some convey an 
 idea diametrically the reverse of the trut^i. 
 
2S'2 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 ■ April' 
 
 Unhappily the years from 1815 to 1860 are 
 the dark ages of politics. Their events are 
 too old to be remembered — too fresh to be 
 recorded in history. But for this, the au- 
 thors of the Case could hardly have been 
 misled by erroneous impressions so far as to 
 venture on the assertions quoted above. As 
 they have thus ventured, however, and as 
 nothing can be more desirable than that the 
 British Nation should at this crisis correctly 
 appreciate the lessons of our past diplomatic 
 relations with America, wo propose to invade 
 the obscurity of the last ."ifty or sixty years, 
 and to exhibit the real nature of those half- 
 forgotten transactions, on account of which 
 the United States now claim from us a 
 grateful acknowledgment of their gene- 
 rosity. 
 
 It is worth while to notice that even with 
 regard to the war of 1812 — into the causes 
 of which it would be beside our present pur- 
 pose to enter — the language of the Case is 
 inaccurate, and the implied charge against 
 this country unfair. The American people 
 were not 'forced into war' in 1812 by the 
 claim of England to impress seamen on the 
 high seas from vessels of the United States. 
 We claimed the right to search American 
 merchantmen for deserters from the British 
 navy, and never advanced any claim in refer- 
 ence to impressment; and though some 
 British naval officers were overbearing and 
 i^gressive, their worst acts were promptly 
 disavowed and made the subject of apolo- 
 gies.* 
 
 The Orders in Council, which had origin- 
 ally given rise to the disputes between this 
 country and the Americans, were repealed 
 by us before Congress declared war in 1812 ; 
 and the United States, in going to war, pre- 
 sented the odd spectacle of a nation attack- 
 ing another to exhale feelings of anger, the 
 principal justification of which had passed 
 away. 
 
 But passing over this episode in our rela- 
 tions with America, we venture to assert that 
 from the treaty of Ghent to the present day 
 all important disputes between the two coun- 
 tries have ended, not only in settlements 
 favourable to the United States, but in the 
 actual surrender by Great Britain of advan- 
 tages to which she has established sound and 
 equitable claims. Such claims she has 
 several times abandoned, in the hope of se- 
 curing the friendship of America or for the 
 sake of averting imminent danger of war. 
 
 Let us examine first the story of the 
 
 • It was shown In the * Quarterly Review' for 
 July, 1833, that Great Britain never impretted an 
 American, kn<noing him to be such. 
 
 Maine boundary.* The treaty of Paris of 
 1783, recognising the independence of the 
 United States, defined a boundary between 
 British and American territory from the At- 
 lantic to the Kocky Mountains. At that 
 time, it is well to remember, no claim was 
 advanced on behalf of the new republic for 
 any territory west of the Rocky Mountains. 
 The 'ine was appointed to run as fol- 
 lows : — 
 
 'From the north-west angle of Nova Scotia 
 viz., that angle which is formed bj a lino 
 drawn due north from the sources of St. Croix 
 River to the highlands; along the said high- 
 lands which divide those rivers that empty 
 themselves into the River St. Lawrence, from 
 those which fall into the Atlantic Ocean to the 
 north-westernmost head of Connecticut River ; 
 thence along the middle of that river to the 
 4fith degree of north latitude; from thence, 
 by a line drawn due west on the said latitude, 
 until it strikes the River Irroquois, &c., &c.' 
 
 The boundary is then traced through the 
 great lakes, but we need not follow it so far 
 west at present. The eastern boundary is 
 further defined in these words : — 
 
 'East, by a line to be drawn along the mid- 
 dle of the River St Croix, from its mouth in 
 the Bay of Fundy to its source, and from its 
 source directly north to the aforesaid highlands, 
 which divide the Rivers that fall into the At- 
 lantic from those which fall into the River St 
 Lawrence, &c., &c.' 
 
 Thirty years after these confused and un- 
 grammatical sentences were written, when 
 British and American plenipotentiaries were 
 again assembled, this time at Ghent, in 1814, 
 to adjust terms of peace at the close of the 
 war, the country lying about the sources of 
 the St Croix River was already a disputed 
 territory. As far back as 1702 the settlers 
 in Maine, exploring the country between the 
 Bay of Fundy and the St Lawrence, a region 
 that was but imperfectly known at the time 
 the treaty of 1783 was concluded, had ad- 
 vanced the claim that afterwards became the 
 subject of the celebrated boundary dispute. 
 They asserted that the highlands mentioned 
 in the treaty were" to be found far away in 
 the north — north of the sources of the St. 
 John River. A glance at a map will render 
 easily intelligible the geogi-aphical references 
 we are compelled to make. If ^*>e boundary 
 
 * To avoid the repeated quotation of authori- 
 ties in tlie text we may refer the reader for all 
 facts in tlie next few papfes to the great debate 
 in the House of CommonB on the Ashburton 
 Treaty that took place on the 2lBt of March, 
 1843, and to Mr. G. W. FeatherBtonhaugU's 
 ' Obgervations upon the Treaty of Wasliingion, 
 signed 9th AukubI, 1842.' Also to an article 
 whicli appeared in the ' Quarterly Review,' for 
 March, 1843. 
 
 1872. 
 
 had been 
 would hav 
 the whole 
 Bay of Fu 
 seemed to 
 sion. The 
 admit the 
 country in 
 to be pre 
 disregarde 
 permanent 
 made prio 
 ferences a1 
 ; of this fa 
 Commissit 
 through 
 principle < 
 without a 
 , letter of t 
 ; Commissic 
 ; had no at 
 ing to thi 
 keynote w 
 Govemme 
 putes. T 
 ': the territ 
 Maine wa 
 - territory 
 5 all, was c 
 1 Commissi' 
 ■ vance, tha 
 ' down unc 
 theless the 
 upon the 
 : land was 
 5 theirs, anc 
 \ any porti 
 \ • cession.' 
 \ ferior cu 
 though cc 
 { w&s ours, 
 ; and thus 
 ment to 
 sumption 
 The G 
 ' settlemen 
 was arran 
 mission s 
 boundary 
 the treat 
 grecmcnt 
 rival rep' 
 tion. 1) 
 set of th 
 • lered as 
 ; Croix Ri 
 '! western i 
 J ward. 1 
 ' tion, an<] 
 of the B 
 the Bubj 
 given in 
 
 vot. 
 
■ April* 
 
 y of Paris of 
 idence of the 
 dary between 
 from the At- 
 ns. At that 
 no claim was 
 ' republic for 
 :y Mountains, 
 run as fol- 
 
 NoTO Scotia 
 led by a lino 
 es of St. Croix 
 he said high- 
 
 8 that empty 
 iwrence, from 
 ! Ocean to the 
 ecticut River ; 
 t river to the 
 from thence, 
 said latitude, 
 
 is, &c., &c.' 
 
 through the 
 How it so far 
 boundary is 
 
 long the mid- 
 its mouth in 
 and from its 
 lid highlands, 
 1 into ths At- 
 tho River St 
 
 ised and un- 
 mtten, when 
 ntiaries were 
 ent, in 1814, 
 close of the 
 le sources of 
 y a disputed 
 I the settlers 
 between the 
 nee, a region 
 ; at the time 
 Jed, had ad- 
 I became the 
 ary dispute. 
 I mentioned 
 far away in 
 s of the St. 
 will render 
 il references 
 •e boundary 
 
 a of Buthori- 
 eader for all 
 (treat debate 
 
 9 Askburton 
 
 it of March, ; 
 DtonhauffU's 
 'Vasliinffton, 
 a an article 
 RevlBW,' for 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concession to t/ie United States. 
 
 283 
 
 had been traced along these highlands it 
 would have given the United States almost 
 the whole of the country lying between the 
 Bay of Fundy, of which the treaty certainly 
 seemed to contemplate a more equal divi- 
 sion. The British Government refused to 
 admit the justice of the claim, but while the 
 country in dispute was thinly peopled, it is 
 to be presumed the question was carelessly 
 disregarded. At all events no attempt at its 
 permanent settlement scoma to have been 
 made prior to the year 1814, when the con- 
 ferences at Ghent began. Taking advantage 
 of this favourable opportunity the British 
 Commissioners proposed to settle a boundary 
 through the disputed territory upon the 
 principle of mutual advantage and security, 
 without attempting to interpret the strict 
 letter of the treaty of 1783, The American 
 Commissioners, however, replied that they 
 had no authority to ' cede' territory belong- 
 ing to the United States, thus striking the 
 keynote which has guided the United States 
 Government ever since in all territorial dis- 
 putes. The English theorj' to the etFect that 
 the territory claimed by the settlers of 
 Maine was really British teiritory, and not 
 territory belonging to the United States at 
 all, was calmly ignored^ by the American 
 Commissioners. It will be seen, as we ad- 
 vance, that the American claim utterly broke 
 down under close exa.nination ; but never- 
 theless the Americans insisted from the first 
 upon the doctrine that their claim to any 
 land was a primA facie proof that it was 
 theirs, and that the subsequent surrender of 
 any poition of it to Great Britain was a 
 'cession.' With belter logic, but with in- 
 ferior cunning, the British Government, 
 though convinced that the disputed territory 
 was ours, treated it as disputed territory, 
 and thus permitted the American Govern- 
 ment to obtitin the full advantage of the as- 
 sumption with which it unwarrantably started. 
 The Ghent negotiations for an absolute 
 settlement of the boundary having failed, it 
 was arranged in the treaty that a joint-com- 
 mission should be appointed to search for a 
 boundary in accordance with the terras of 
 the treaty of 1783. In the event of disa- 
 greement between the Commissioners, their 
 rival reports were to be referred to arbitra- 
 tion. Disagreements arose at the very out- 
 set of the survey. The Commissioners dif- 
 (cred ae) to which was the head of the St. 
 Croix River. Our Commissioners claimed a 
 western arm ; the Americans one to the east- 
 ward. The difficulty was referred to arbitra- 
 tion, and decided against us. In the course 
 of the survey many other disputes beca^ne 
 the subject of arbitrations. These were all 
 given in our favour, and thus bore testimony 
 vot. cxzzn. L — 10 
 
 to the fair spirit by which the British repre- 
 sentatives were animated. Under these cir- 
 cumstances it is impossible to treat as of no 
 importance the fact that the one case where 
 they were declared to be wrong, was the one 
 case in which the arbitrator was an American 
 citizen. The decision was afterwards describ- 
 ed in the House of Commons as having been 
 clearly unjust, but the British Government 
 never demurred to its validity. 
 
 The importance of this dispute was entire- 
 ly overwhelmed by that of a more serious 
 disagreement which subsequently arose. 
 The English Commissioners discovered a 
 range of highlands which answered to a de- 
 scription of the treaty, in latitude 46° 40'. 
 But the American Commissioners objected. 
 They claimed that the due north line should 
 be carried on to about latitude 48°, and that 
 the boundary should then bo carried west- 
 ward along a range of highlands close to the 
 River St. Lawrence. This point was consi- 
 dered of sufficient moment to be made the 
 subject of reference to a foreign sovereign, 
 an<l by a special convention signed in 1827 
 it was referred together with two other points 
 of disagreement to the King of the Nether- 
 lands. 
 
 ITie two minor points are worth notice. 
 The questions were, — which was the north- 
 western head of the Connecticut River ? and 
 which was the 45th parallel of latitude? In 
 reference to this last question, our readem 
 may be at a loss to imagine how a scienti ic 
 fact could be disputed. The explanation is 
 amusing, and at the same time indicative of 
 the spirit in which the American Govern- 
 ment managed its diplomacy. In 1818 Eng- 
 lish and American astronomers had been ap- 
 pointed to lay down the 45th parallel along 
 that part of the boundary which it was re- 
 quired to define. And they laid it down to 
 their own mutual satisfaction. English and 
 American representatives agreed with one 
 another for this once. But it turned out 
 that an old intercolonial boundary which wan 
 supposed to have been traced along the 46th 
 parallel was inaccurately laid down. The 
 true line lay half a mile or a mile further 
 south. This discovery disconcerted the 
 American Government, which had regarded 
 the little strip of territory between the two 
 lines as its own, and had, indeed, begun to 
 erect a fortification on the shores of Lake 
 Champlun, on land which astronomers now 
 declared to be British ground. The 
 American Government therefore set to work 
 to discover a plea on which the verdict of the 
 stars could be impugned. Their diligence 
 was rewarded. They and that if parallehi 
 of latitude were det' .lined by geocentric 
 measurement, the pa^ llel of 45 degrees, in 
 
 163411 
 
«84 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 consequence of the oblato formation of the 
 earth, would bo pushed back again towards 
 the north. They therefore declared in 
 favour of geocentric measurement. To do 
 them justice they grew ashamed of this 
 argument by the time the case went before 
 the King of the Netherlands, and developed 
 another theory, but botl» the minor questions 
 referred to in the convention of 1827 were 
 decided in our favour. 
 
 In reference to the principal question, the 
 ' King declared that no definite decision could 
 be given — that neither the highlands claimed 
 by Great Britain nor the highlands claimed 
 by the United States corresponded with the 
 description given in the treaty. Further 
 examination of the country, as we shall 
 
 {►resently see, led to the discovery of 
 acts which, if they had been before 
 the King of the Netherlands, in 1827, might 
 probably have induced him to give a plain 
 decision in our favour, but his actual verdict 
 was that a compromise line ought to be 
 adopted, and he traced a compromise line 
 which ho considered to be fair. No sooner 
 
 ' was this decision published than the Ameri- 
 can Minister at the Hague, Mr. Prebble, a 
 citizen of Maine, protested against it. lie 
 said the King had no right under the terms 
 of the conference to compromise the dispute. 
 The English Government regretted the 
 compromise, and considered it extremely 
 unfavourable to us, but bowed loyally to the 
 arbitration, and prepared to carry it out. 
 The American Government, on the other 
 hand, demurred, and after some delay, in 
 1829, finally rejected and repudiated the 
 arbitration. After some attempts of a 
 rather Quixotic character to induce the 
 
 • American Government in the general inte- 
 rests of good faith to reconsider its reso- 
 lution, the English Government gave up the 
 point a year or two later, and consented to 
 regard the arbitration as null and void. 
 
 By degrees, as geographical information 
 relating to the territory in dispute accumulat- 
 ed in the hands of the British Government, 
 our case became enormously strengthened. 
 Id 1839 we sent out two surveyors, Colonel 
 Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh, to ex- 
 amine the country. Their report, and 
 another procured in 1841, determined various 
 facts. The point at which the American 
 Commissioners had declared that the due 
 north line ought to stop and the boundary 
 be diverted to the west, turned out not to 
 be in a range of highlands at all, but in a 
 marshy plain. The highlands selected to 
 »uit American views of what the boundary 
 ought to have been, had to be sought some 
 distance to the westward. Secondly, these 
 highlands did not divide rivers flowing into 
 
 the St. Lawrence from rivers flowing into 
 the Atlantic, unless it were assumed that 
 the St. John was a river flowing into the 
 Atlantic. Now the King of the Nether- 
 lands, in his arbitration had, at all events, 
 confirmed our opinion concerning the true 
 character to be attributed to the River St. 
 John. It flows into the Bay of Fundy, and 
 for the purposes of the treaty of 1783, the 
 Bay of Fundy is not a part of the Atlantic 
 Ocean. So we always contended, and so 
 the King of the Netherlands declared. The 
 common sense of that view will appear to 
 anyone who examines the map. The St. 
 John stretches across the whole country ly- 
 ing between the Atlantic and the St. Law- 
 rence. It is the only river which does this, 
 whereas there are many shorter streams 
 flowing from the central highlands into the 
 St. Lawrence on the north, and into the At- 
 lantic on the south. Moreover, even as the 
 boundary was proposed by the Americans, 
 the lower course of the St. John must still 
 have lain within British territory. Accord- 
 ing to the interpretation which this govern- 
 ment clearly proved to be tair and reasona- 
 ble, no part of the St. John would ever have 
 belonged to the United States at all. The 
 river should have been left out of the calcu- 
 lations of the commissioners altogether ; and 
 it certainly was not an Atlantic river under 
 the terms of the treaty. This was our con- 
 tention, and this was the view distinctly 
 confirmed by the King of the Netherlands. 
 The utter worthlessness of the American 
 claim in reference to the northern range of 
 highlands will now be apparent. The high- 
 lands we claimed, on the other hand, were 
 proved by the examination made by Colonel 
 Mudge and Mr. Featherstonhaugh to be, in 
 fact, all that the treaty required them to be. 
 They were struck by the due north line, 
 and they were continucus from that line to 
 the head waters of the Connecticut, a merit 
 not possessed by the northern range, which 
 soon sank into the plain as it was followed 
 to the westward, leaving; the boundary to be 
 carried across a level country for twenty-five 
 miles. Finally, our highlands did indisputa- 
 bly divide streams flowing into the St. Law- 
 rence from streams flow ing into the Atlantic 
 Ocean. 
 
 We are thus precise in explaining the 
 points that were renWy at issue in the 
 boundary dispute, because the interest of 
 t}>ese negotiations, regarded from our pre- 
 sent point of view, ciiiitres in the spirit 
 shown by the American Government, and 
 this cannot rightly be appreciated unless the 
 merits of the controversy are understood. 
 
 It will be seen that w lien Lord Ashburton 
 was appointed by Sir Eobert Peel iii 1842 
 
 1372. 
 
April, 11372. 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 2Br, 
 
 to proceed as British plenipotentiary to 
 Warhington, and settle various outstanding 
 difficulties with the American Government, 
 the dispute concerning the Maine boundary 
 was one in which any government tena- 
 cious of its rights, and occupying our posi- 
 tion, would have refused to yield. Our claim 
 was not one through which we grasped at a 
 neutral territory. The dispute, to describe 
 it accurately, was one in which the American 
 Government claimed territory that was ours 
 by virtue of the spirit of the treaty, by 
 virtue of the letter of the treaty, as that 
 letter was una* rstood by ourselves, and by 
 a neutral arbiter, and also by actual occu- 
 pation ; for though Maine settlers had 
 pushed their way far north, the country 
 lying about the Madawaska Itiver, one of 
 the tributaries of the St. John, had long 
 been in permanent occupation of a com- 
 munity, partly British, partly French Cana- 
 dian, which viewed with extreme appre- 
 hension and displeasure the prospect of being 
 transferred to the Government of the Unit- 
 ed States. The American claim was a mani- 
 fest encroachment The line of highlands 
 they wished to make the boundary failed in 
 all paiticulars to fullil the description of the 
 treaty. No Government, therefore, occupy- 
 ing the position in reference to this dispute 
 in which the American Government stood, 
 could have continued to assert its claims with- 
 out being animated by a stronger determina- 
 tion to obtain the object of its desire than 
 to effect a just settlement of the question at 
 issue. 
 
 But the practical conclusion to which the 
 British Government came on giving their 
 instructions to Lord Ashburton evidently 
 was, that it was not worth while to assert 
 our rights at the cost of a war with the 
 United States. The excitement in America 
 was very great. The people of Maine open- 
 ly declared that they would fight for the 
 northern boundary if they did not obtain a 
 favourable settlentent. Public opinion in 
 this country, where the question at stake 
 was too intricate to be properly understood, 
 would not have sanctioned a war with Ame- 
 rica for the sake of a boundary dispute on 
 the frontiers of Canada. The consequence 
 was that Lord Ashburton, finding the alter- 
 natives before him were war, or the surren- 
 der of our territorial rights, chose to make 
 tiie surrender. lie agreed to a compromise 
 line not diverging very much from that sug- 
 gested thirteen years previously by the King 
 of the Netherlands. Wo are not by any 
 means apologising for his diplomacy ; and it 
 is quite possible that by a little better man 
 agoment he might have secured somewhat 
 more favourable terms, even while atill avoid- 
 
 ing that rupture of our ostensibly amicable 
 relations with America which the British Gov- 
 ernment was so anxious to avert. Lord Ash- 
 burton was an amateur diplomatist, whom 
 Mr. Daniel Webster, the American Secretary 
 of State, circumvented in many ways. The 
 treaty which he concluded was an ignomi- 
 nious treaty, not inaccurately described in the 
 political controversies of the time as a ' ca- 
 pitulation.' But it was defended by Sir Ro- 
 bert Peel, on the ground that a few hundred 
 thousand, a few million acres of territory 
 were of no consequence compared with se- 
 curing the friendship of the United States. 
 It may be open to discussion whether a great 
 nation can ever give way before an unright- 
 eous demand, and practically in deference to 
 menace, without incurring some ultimate 
 penalty ; but without going into that ques- 
 tion just now, we may here be content to 
 take note of the broad facts Jhat ii> the 
 Maine boundary dispute the English claim 
 was substantiated in the negotiations ; that 
 the Americans showed themselves resolved 
 to precipitate hostilities if their claim was 
 not conceded ; and that to avoid going to 
 war, the British Government yielded what it 
 had clearly shown to be its just rights. 
 
 One episode connected with the Ashbur- 
 ton negotiations may be noticed here for the 
 light it helps to throw on the principles of 
 American diplomacy. Thirty years ago it 
 was the subject of much excited controver- 
 sy. We allude to the famous map scandal, 
 the facts of which were as follows : — after 
 the treaty negotiated by Lord Ashburton and 
 Mr. Webster had been signed, and during 
 the debate which took place in the Ameri- 
 can Senate prior to the ratification, Mr. 
 Rives, a member of that body, arguing in 
 favour of the ratification, made a very re- 
 markable statement. He wantcl the Senate 
 not to reject the treaty on the ground that 
 it did not give the American Government 
 all it had claimed, because, if the Maine 
 boundary question went to another arbitra- 
 tion, it was possible that f urtlier researche » 
 in the archives of Europe might bring to. 
 light some embarrassing document likely to. 
 throw new doubts on the validity of the 
 American claim. Indeed, ho said such a do- 
 cument had already been discovered. Mr. 
 Jared Sparks, a Boston historian, while pur- 
 suing historical researches in the archives of 
 the Foreign Office at Paris, had discovered a 
 letter from Benjamin Franklin — one of the 
 American negotiators of the treaty of 1783 
 — to the Count de Vergennes referring to a 
 map on which ho had marked the bound- 
 ary just settled by the treaty, with 'a strong 
 red line.' A map which corresponded to the 
 references in the letter was also found by 
 
23G 
 
 Concession to th^ Vnited States. 
 
 Apri), 
 
 Mr. Jarcd Sparks among the beautifully ar- 
 ran{];ed paperB of the department in which 
 he had discovered the letter, and on the map 
 he beheld — with surprise and consternation 
 as an American citizen — a strong red line 
 marking the boundary exactly as claimed by 
 the British Government. This discovery he 
 communicated to the American Department 
 of State, and the knowledge of these facts — 
 the private and secret knowledge of these 
 facts — was in possession of Mr. Daniel Web- 
 ster during his negotiations with Lord Ash- 
 burton. Efforts were made subsequently to 
 show that no positive evidence identified the 
 map found as the map referred to in the let- 
 ter to the Count de Vergennes, but of this 
 no one concerned seems to have had any 
 moral doubt. Secondly, it was contended 
 by Sir Robert Peel, who did his best to 
 defend the hanour of Mr. Webst 3r, that, tak- 
 ing all the facts aa they were alleged, Mr. 
 Webster was not bound to produce testi- 
 mony adverse to his own case. Finally, that 
 Lord Ashburton also had a map — one pre- 
 served in the Library of George IIL if we 
 understand Sir Robert Peel's explanation 
 rightly — on which the boundary was marked 
 as claimed by the Americans, and that he 
 refrained from putting this map in evidence 
 during the negotiations. The two reserva- 
 tions however were not parallel. The map 
 of which Lord Ashburton had cognizance 
 was a map of no special authority. How a 
 boundary line came to be marked upon it 
 nobody seems to have known. In the 
 Foreign Office, meanwhile,* there was a map 
 showing the boundary according to the 
 British claim. Lord Ashburton was un- 
 doubtedly justified in discarding his map as 
 of no substantial importance. How far Mr. 
 Webster was equally justified on his side is 
 a subject about which different opinions will 
 be formed. The authority of the map 
 brought to his knowledge was certainly 
 very great ; all but overwhelming. That 
 map was, at the very least, to quote the 
 language of Senator Rives, an embarrassing 
 document. It seems clear that Mr. Webster, 
 representing the American Government in 
 the negotiations with Lord Ashburton, 
 must, at any rate, have thrown overboard all 
 thoughts of procuring a just settlement of 
 the dispute. He struggled to obtain, not 
 that to which he thought he had a right, but 
 all he thought it possible to procure by 
 defeating the rights of others. 
 
 Besides disposing of the Maine Boundary 
 
 Question, Lord Ashburton's treaty settled a 
 ispute that had arisen in connexion with 
 our efforts for the suppression of the slave 
 
 * Lord PalmerBton's speech. 
 
 trade. Although the negotiations connectcil 
 with our territorial difficulties in Oregon 
 will claim attention directly as constituting « 
 natural sequel to tho.ie on tne Maine bounda- 
 ry, it is worth while to notice that, even in 
 reference to this minor dispute, growing out 
 of the African slave trade, the usual rule 
 which has governed our diplomacy with the 
 United States was observed. Tlie position 
 we took up at the outset of the difficulty 
 was simple and reasonable ; our claims were 
 substantiated by convincing despatches, and 
 in the end, we gave way through fear of the 
 consequences that might ensue if we refused. 
 By the treaty of Ghent the American Go- 
 vernment had subscribed to a promise that 
 they would use their best endeavours to pro- 
 mote the entire abolition of the slave trade. 
 The British Government, in order that 
 the collective strength of humane nations 
 might be employed against the trade to the 
 best advantage, endeavoured to persuade all 
 the powers to adopt a mutual right of search. 
 In 1824 a treaty to this effect was drawn up 
 by British and American plenipotentiaries, 
 but it was never ratified, owing to a desire 
 on the part of the United States Govern- 
 ment to vary the geographical limits to 
 which it referred. Our Government protesfr 
 ed against the principle of varying a treaty 
 on its ratification, and the negotiations fell 
 through. In 1831 and 1833 we concluded 
 treaties giving us a mutual right of search, 
 with France. But the disposition of the 
 American Government changed. It is not 
 necessary to trace the explanation. The state 
 of ihe question in 1 842 was that the British 
 Government had been pressing the United 
 States to accept the right of search in vain. 
 Meanwhile peculiar difficulties had arisen on 
 the African coast. Without a mutual right 
 of search with America we could not inter- 
 fere with American slavers, and we never 
 claimed to do this. But it constantly hap- 
 pened that, in endeavouring to elude pursuit, 
 slavers of other nationalities hoisted the Ame- 
 rican flag. What our naval officers contend- 
 ed was that, whatever flag might be hoisted, 
 they had at least a right to board vessels 
 and ascertain that they really belonged to the 
 nationality whose ensign they employed. 
 Of course the American Government had 
 nothing to say to any treatment wo might 
 bestow on foreign vessels hoisting the Ameri- 
 can flag fraudulently ; but they advanced a 
 claim that must, if recognised, have paralysed 
 the action of our anti-slave trade squadron. 
 TTiey declared that, under no circumstances, 
 must American vessels be even visited and 
 asked their nationality by British naval offi* 
 cere. The mere act of inquiry they professcil 
 to regiird as an outrage. It was manifest 
 
 1872 
 
 that, if thi 
 gtructivo c 
 (juonces wc 
 humane en 
 our officer."! 
 ces to visit 
 that they c^ 
 doubtful V 
 hIic might 1 
 pointed on 
 the Amcri( 
 Lord Palir 
 it clear th 
 ill any way 
 od States 
 to conced 
 With quie 
 in one des 
 
 *The 
 the ' Am 
 
April, 
 
 0118 connccttil 
 
 IS iti Oregon 
 
 fionstitutinp it 
 
 lainc bounda- 
 
 that, even in 
 
 f^rowing out 
 
 he usual rule 
 
 iiacy with the 
 
 Tlic position 
 
 the difficultj 
 
 ■ir claims were 
 
 nspatches, and 
 
 gh fear of the 
 
 if we refused, 
 
 American Go- 
 
 promise that 
 
 avours to pro- 
 
 le slave trade. 
 
 order that 
 
 imane nations 
 
 e trade to the 
 
 persuade all 
 ight of search, 
 was drawn up 
 nipotentiarics, 
 ig to a desire 
 itates Govem- 
 ical limits to : 
 nment protest- : 
 Tying a treaty 
 tgotiations fell 
 we concluded : 
 ^ht of search, 
 osition of the 
 ed. It is not 
 ion. The state 
 lat the British 
 ig the United 
 search in vain. 
 
 had arisen on 
 
 1 mutual right 
 Duld not inter- 
 ind we never 
 onstantly hap- 
 
 elude pursuit, 
 istcd the Amc- 
 Rccrs contend- 
 ;ht be hoisted, 
 board vessels 
 ;Ionged to the 
 ay employed, 
 i^ernment had 
 ent wo might 
 ngthe Ameri 
 ey advanced a 
 lave paralysed 
 ade squadron, 
 nrcumstances, 
 sn visited and 
 ;ish naval offi* 
 hey professed 
 was manifest j 
 
 1872 
 
 Concession to the United Statea. 
 
 287 
 
 that, if this extravagant and wantonly ob- 
 structive claim were admitted, the conse- 
 quences would be fatal to the success of our 
 humane enterprise on the African coast. If 
 aur officers were bound under no circumstan- 
 ces to visit an American vessel it was clear 
 that they could not venture to go on board any 
 doubtful vessel with the American flag, lest 
 tthc might be American. This was repeatedly 
 pointed out in despatclies to Mr. Stevenson, 
 the American Minister in London ; and both 
 [iord Palmerston and Lord Aberdeen made 
 it clear that we did not claim to interfere 
 in any way with those rights which the Unit- 
 ed States Government reserved in refusing 
 to concede the mutual right of search.* 
 With quiet irony Lord Palmerston observed 
 in one despatch ; — 
 
 'The cruisers employed by her Majesty's 
 Government for the suppression of the slave 
 trade must ascertain by inspection of the w. 
 pers the nationality of vessels met with by 
 them under circumstances which justify a 
 Kuspicion that such vessels are engaged in the 
 .slave trade, in order that if such vessels are 
 found to belong to a country which has con- 
 ceded to Great Britain the mutual right of 
 search, they may be searched accordingly, and 
 that if they be found to belong to a country 
 which, like the United States, has not conceded 
 that mutual right, they may be allowed to pass 
 on free and unexamined, and so consummate 
 their intended iniquity.' 
 
 It can scarcely bo said that the American 
 minister during any part of this negotiation 
 advanced any argument to justify the un- 
 friendly and obstructive attitude that the 
 United States Government had taken up. 
 Indeed it would have been impossible for 
 him to show that the simple right of visit or 
 inquiry which we claimed, not in our own 
 interests, but in those of humanity, was 
 cither injurious or insulting to American 
 commerce. It was no new right which. we 
 sought to enforce ; we merely wished to fol- 
 low an established custom, the application of 
 which to American vessels subjected them 
 to no inconvenience or annoyance worth 
 speaking of, while it was absolutely essen- 
 tial to the efficient police of the seas. As 
 we said in reference to the Maine boundary 
 question, so wo may say again in reference 
 to this difficulty concerning the right of visit, 
 the circumstances under which we were placed 
 wore such that any government, tenacious of 
 its rights and occupying the position in which 
 wo were placed, would have refused to yield. 
 On the other hand, the circumstances under 
 which the American Government was placed 
 were such that any government, moderately 
 
 * The correspondence is partly republished in 
 the ' Annual Uegister.' 
 
 forbearing in disposition, would certainly 
 have given way in a similar situation. But 
 the actual course of events was this : — By, 
 the treaty of 1842 the British Government 
 bowed to the exorbitant claims of the Go- 
 vernment of the United States, and consent- 
 ed that the American merchant marine 
 should be invested with a quasi-sacrcd cha- 
 racter, belonging, according to Lord Aber- 
 deen, to the vessels of no other nationality. 
 In return for this somewhat ignominious 
 concession the American Government under- 
 took to station a force of its own on the Afri- 
 can coast, so that vessels with un American 
 flag might be overhauled by American men- 
 of-war. This inadequate arrangement was 
 held for the sake of peace to be a satisfac- 
 tory compromise of the dispute. 
 
 Lord Ashburton effected no settlement of 
 the Oregon question. Our difficulty with, 
 the United States concerning the limits of 
 British and American jurisdiction in the west, 
 proved, however, no less threatening to the 
 peace of the two countries than the ques- 
 tions aflfecting the boundary at its eastern 
 extremity. The tcnitorial claims of the 
 United States to country west of the liocky 
 Mountains seem first to have been put for- 
 ward at the conferences which took place in 
 London subsequent to the Treaty of Ghent.* 
 If we go back to the time of the treaty of 
 1783, It will be found that the United 
 States sought no empire beyond the Rocky 
 Mountains. But in 1818 enlarged views 
 had already dawned upon the minds of 
 American statesmen. Feeling their way by 
 degrees, the American representatives in 
 London, at the date we mention, proposed 
 that England and America should come to 
 an underptanding concerning the territory 
 west of the Roclcy Mountains. The United 
 States, they said, * did not assert a perfect 
 right' to any of that territory, an admission 
 which they could hardly have avoided mak- 
 ing at the tune, but one which it is worth 
 while to remember in connexion with the 
 subsequent progress of the negotiations. To 
 meet the views of the United States, Eng- 
 land agreed to a convention, signed in Octo- 
 ber, 1818, recognising a joint occupancy. 
 The convention laid down this understand- 
 ing:— 
 
 'The country to the west of the Rocky 
 Mountains claimed by either party, with its 
 bays, harbours, navigation of rivers, &c., shall 
 be free and open for ten years to the two pow- 
 ers, it being well understood that this agree- 
 ment shall not prejudice any claim of either 
 party, or of any other power or state to any 
 
 * The Oreis^n question is discussed at length 
 in the ' Quarterly Review ' for March, 1848. 
 
2M 
 
 Coneetaion to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 pkrt of the uid country, the only object of the 
 parties beinff to prevent disputes and differen- 
 •ces among themselves.' 
 
 Nine years afterwards, in 1827, this con- 
 vention, which had then almost expired, was 
 indefinitely renewed, with a clause to the 
 ■effect that it (should be terminable by one 
 year's notice from either side. It is greatly 
 to bo deplored that the British Government 
 did not foresee at an earlier period the desira- 
 bility of marking out beyond dispute the 
 limits of its own territorial jurisdiction in 
 the west But in 1827 it was already too 
 late. By that time America had made up 
 her mind concerning the boundary she meant 
 to have. It was proposed by the American 
 Government that the line should be carried 
 along the 49th parallel of latitude to the 
 sea. Great Britain objected, on the ground 
 that British subjects had a perfect right to 
 colonise down to the 42nd parallel. But 
 the United States conceived the idea that 
 they had acquired claims of viist extent over 
 territory west of the Rocky Mountains, 
 through treaties with the republic of Mexi- 
 co, then newly emancipated from Spanish 
 control. We may more conveniently ex- 
 amine the valne of these claims in connexion 
 with some others subsequently alvanced. 
 For the moment let us be content to take 
 cognizance of the offers made on each side. 
 During the negotiations carried on, — by Mr. 
 Gallatin on behalf of the United States, — 
 pirior to the renewal of the joint convention, 
 the rival claims roughly assumed the shape 
 in which they continued to confront one an- 
 other up to the conclusion of the final treaty 
 in 1 846. The British Government expressed 
 its readiness to accept the 49th parallel as 
 t^e boundary along the greater part of the 
 line. But from Mie point at which that 
 parallel should strike the Columbia River, 
 Great Britain required that the boundary 
 should follow the course of that river to the 
 Pacific. The United States insisted that the 
 49th parallel should be the boundary all the 
 way to the sea. At one time the United 
 States offered us the navigation of the Co- 
 lumbia River, but afterwards this offer was 
 withdrawn. 
 
 It should be borne in mind that although 
 the dispute was thus narrowed to a conflict 
 of claims for the country lying between the 
 Columbia River, the Pacific coast, and the 
 49th parallel of latitude, the rights of the 
 English Government, which wre consented to 
 waive, would have given this country an 
 -equally good case had we claimed a very 
 much more favourable boundary. If Great 
 Britain had not carelessly— or generously as 
 the case may be — entered into the joint-oc- 
 cupancy convention, it might have establish- 
 
 ed an admirable right to all western territory 
 north of Mexico. As it was, the joint-occu- 
 pancv convention certainly conferred rights 
 on the United States. But those rights 
 could only extend to a claim for the just and 
 equitable division of the great western re- 
 gions. Such a division would probably 
 have carried the boundary lino several de- 
 grees farther south than the 40th parallel. 
 
 Tlie refusal of the British (jovcrnment U^ 
 give up the terri'.oi-y north of the Columbia 
 River rendered Mr. Gallatin's negotiations 
 abortive, and, for want of a better settle- 
 ment, the joint-occupancy convention was, 
 as we have seen, renewed. The Oregon 
 question, however, had not been formally 
 established. The more America pondereli 
 over the controversy, the more essential to 
 her happiness became the territory between 
 the Columbia River and the 49tn parallel. 
 When President Polk came into office in 
 1846, he declared himself embarrassed by 
 the offers made by bis predecessors, or he 
 would have ' gone for the whole of Oregon,' 
 that is to say for the whole territory where 
 England had originally enjoyed an exclu- 
 sive right, where she had consented to ad- 
 roit the tinited States to joint privileges 
 of colonisation, and where the United States 
 now endeavoured to show that she had no 
 right whatever. In April, 1846, the Senate 
 passed a resolution calling upon the Presi- 
 dent to give notice, under the convention of 
 1827, that America desired to terminate the 
 joint occupation. This resolution was passed, 
 after excited debates calculated to add 
 weight to the menace it involved. Nume- 
 rous indications showed that the American 
 people were resolved to attempt the seizure 
 of the territory they desired by force, if they 
 could not obtain it by diplomacy. It was 
 growing manifest that once more the British 
 Government was to be placed in a position 
 in which it would have an opportunity of 
 showing how much it preferred the friend- 
 ship of the United States, to a few hundred 
 thousand — a few million acres of territory. 
 
 In the course of a diplomatic correspon- 
 dence of some length, which passed in 1845, 
 between Messrs. Calhoun and Buchanan on 
 behalf of America, and Mr. afterwards Sir 
 Richard Pakenham, the British Minister at 
 Washington, on behalf of Great Britain, the 
 rival arguments of the Oregon question are 
 set forth in detail. The claim of the United 
 States was ranged under three heads : — 
 
 1st. The rights of Spain conveyed to the 
 United States by the Florida treaty. 
 
 2nd. The rights of France purchased with 
 Louisiana. 
 
 3rd. The rights acquired by the United 
 States by settlement and discovery. 
 
 agn . 
 ries in 
 Spanish 
 sailing al 
 
 : 
 
April, 
 
 am territory 
 joint-occti- 
 erred rights 
 ho80 rights 
 the just and 
 western re- 
 d probably 
 several dc- 
 1 parallel, 
 vernment to 
 e Columbia 
 negotiations 
 etter settle- 
 ention was, 
 'he Oregon 
 n formally 
 n pondered 
 essential to 
 jry between 
 )th parallel, 
 to office in 
 arrasscd by 
 ssors, or he 
 of Oregon,' 
 ritory where 
 1 an exclu- 
 inted to ad- 
 t privileges 
 nited States 
 she had no 
 , the Senate 
 h the Presi- 
 mvention of 
 srminate the 
 
 I was passed, 
 ed to add 
 ed. Numc- 
 e American 
 the seizure 
 
 jrcc, if they 
 
 ey. It was 
 
 the British 
 
 II a position 
 (ortunity of 
 the friend- 
 ;w hundred 
 
 territory, 
 correspon- 
 ed in 1846, 
 tichanan on 
 jrwards Sir 
 Minister at 
 Britain, the 
 uestion are 
 the United 
 ads: — 
 >yed to the 
 ty. 
 based with 
 
 he United 
 
 y- 
 
 I6li. 
 
 Concetaion to the United Slater. 
 
 lit 
 
 reallv 
 
 non- 
 
 Thc . rights of Spain were 
 existent, except in the imagination of 
 American diplomatists. Sir Francis Drake 
 was the earliest navigator on the coast 
 in dispute. In 1679 he discovered the 
 land in lat. 48°, coasted down to about 
 38°, and went through the form of tak- 
 ing possession of the country in the name 
 of his sovereipfn. For a long time the 
 region was called by the name ho gave 
 it, New Albion. No very early Spanish 
 navigator went so far north as Drake, and 
 vague as the British claims on New Albion 
 mav have been in the last century, they were 
 un(ioubtcdly acknowledged to exist. In 
 1774 a Spanish naval expedition from Mexico 
 touched at San Diego, in California, and 
 then stood out at sea, giving a wide berth to 
 all country that could possibly bo considered 
 New Albion, afterwards touching the land 
 agal. "to the north of Drake's discove- 
 ries in lat. 53° 50'. In 1776 mother 
 Spanish expedition, under a Dr. Ilcceta, 
 sailing along the coast, observed, about lat. 
 46°, a great bay, the head of which could 
 not be seen, but which Heceta believed, 
 from the evidence of its currents and eddies, 
 to be the mouth of some great river or pass- 
 age to another sea. This bay must have 
 been the mouth of the Columbia River, and 
 the United States diplomatists, to lose no 
 advantage open to them, grounded one of 
 their claims to the valley of the Columbia 
 River, settled though it was by British sub- 
 jects, on the theory that lleceta had discover- 
 ed the mouth of the stream, that Spain had 
 thus obtained territorial rights over the 
 country it watered, and that these rights had 
 been ceded to the United States by the 
 treaty of Florida. The exquisite beauty of 
 this claim is still further enhanced by the 
 fact that the treaty of Florida itself was 
 never ratified by Spain, which Power dis- 
 tinctly rejected the convention. It was 
 taken as ratified by the United States, in 
 spite of this little informality, and eventually 
 it received such legal sanction as was possi- 
 ble under the circumstances from the revolt- 
 ed republic of Mexico. 
 
 Spain never promulgated Heceta's dis- 
 coveries as the basis of any tenitorial claim, 
 apparently respecting the British rights to 
 New Albion. But England was animated 
 by no jealous policy in reference to the Pa- 
 cific coasts of America, and when a difficulty 
 arose in 1789, between British and Spanish 
 subjects in Nootka Sound, the British Gov- 
 eranrnt merely exacted a convention ac- 
 knowledging that the coast north of the ex- 
 isting Spanish settlements was free and open 
 for the purposes of colonisation to the sub- 
 jects of both countries. It might have been 
 
 supposed that this Nootka Sound convention 
 would have laid at rest for ever all idea of 
 exclusive Spanish sovereignty north of San 
 Francisco, and even American writers find 
 it, like Franklin's map in the Maine contro- 
 versy, ' an embarrassing document.' But they, 
 endeavour to get over it in this way.* 
 Wars between States cancel their mutual 
 treaties. Great Britain was at war with 
 Spain in 1796, therefore the validity of the 
 ^Iootka Sound convention expired. It in 
 triumphantly pointed out that it was not re-, 
 newcd by the treaty of Mad: id. It happens, 
 however, that the Nootka Sound treaty was. 
 one of ai ..• of treaties explicitly revivcdi 
 in 1815, but i^. tpendently of all such tech-, 
 nical points. iS importance in the Oregoa 
 controversy consists in this, — that it was an 
 ackno" I igmcif of a atato of facts, not ti 
 treaty calling nny no\ relations between the 
 parties signinp it into existence. 
 
 What l)i'< b;i .1 called the French claim to 
 Oregon, onta'ncd by the Americans through, 
 the purchase of Louisiana, is almost too ex- 
 travagant to be worth examination. Louiai-; 
 ana never thought of cbiming, nor did 
 Franco or Spain ever claim fur her 'the 
 slightest colour of right to any portion of 
 the western side of the North American 
 continent.'! The claims of the United 
 States, by settlement and discovery, are a 
 little more complicated, but they will bo 
 found on examination to break down no lcs« 
 thoroughly. 
 
 Vancouver, the most industrious explorer 
 of the coasts in the neighbourhood of tho 
 island that bears his name, landed, in 1792, 
 on the shores of the great bay called Adr 
 miralty Inlet, and took formal possession of 
 the country in the name of the King of 
 England, reviving the name New Albion. 
 Accounts of this proceeding were publish od 
 without exciting any comment either from 
 Spain or the United States, in 1801. Mean- 
 while, in the same year, an American, Cap- 
 tain Gray, of Boston, in a vessel called the 
 • Columbia,' discovered the river now known 
 by that name. It is alleged that he proceeded 
 up the stream first ten miles, when be took 
 in fresh water, and then fifteen miles further, 
 when he found he had taken a wrong chan- 
 nel anu had to return. There are some odd 
 circumstances connected with Captain Gray'a 
 adventures. That there was such a person 
 is certainly vouched for by Vancouver, who 
 did receive from him information of the ex' 
 istence of the river. But all the details of 
 the discovery rest on the authority of an 
 
 * Qreenliow. 
 
 f ' Quarterly Review,' March, 1846. 
 
 f 
 
290 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 alleged extract froni Captain Gray's log, first 
 produced in a note to a report on the Oregon 
 question drawn up by a committee of tbe 
 House of Representatives in 1826. This 
 log had never before been heard of, and has 
 aince unaccountably disappeared* The case 
 is one calculated to excite suspicion even as 
 it stands, but a singular circumstance re- 
 mains to be recorded. Captain Gray, ac- 
 cording to the mysterious extract, took in 
 fresh water from the river when he had 
 •ailed up it for ten miles. It is a fact that 
 the water of the Columbia River is salt for 
 ■ twenty miles up its course. However, 
 brushmg all these doubts aside, and giving 
 the Americans credit for everything alleged 
 to have been done by Gray, it remains im- 
 possible to defeat the British claims on the 
 Columbia by reliance on his exploits, for 
 Vancouver's narrative shows that an English 
 vessel, the ' Jenny ' Captain Baker, entered 
 the river in the early part of the same year 
 that it was visited by Gray. There is no 
 evidence to show whether Captain Baker or 
 Captain Gray was the first discoverer. In 
 any case the commander of the ' Chatham,' 
 Vancouver's tender, Lieut. Broughton, was 
 the lirst white man who fairly worked his 
 way up the stream for any distance. Sent 
 by Vancouver to examine the river, he as- 
 cended it for eighty-four miles from its 
 true mouth, which he places higher up the 
 bay than Captain Gray, and formally took 
 
 Eossession in the name of the King of £ng- 
 md. Vancouver declares, judging from 
 this survey, that 'Captain Gray never was 
 within five le.igues of the entrance of the 
 river. 
 
 The American claim to the valley of the 
 Columbia by right of discovery is thus 
 .«hown to be as weak technically, as it would 
 tie weak morally, if Captain Gray's exploit 
 staod alone. For the theory that the Power 
 whose flag is identified with the discovery 
 of the mouth of a river, can on that account 
 claim exclusive dominion over the whole 
 country which iL drains, is so extravagant as 
 to be refuted by its own mere expression in 
 plain language. But the United States did 
 not rely, in arguing it« claim, on the disco- 
 veries of Captain Gray alone. Tliey appeal 
 to the inland discoveries of Captains Lewis 
 and Clarke, who were sent in 1804 to ex- 
 plore, on behalf of the United States, the 
 upper valley of the Missouri. These tra- 
 vellers struck one of the tributaries of the 
 Columbia during the latter part of their 
 journey, and passed down the river to the 
 sea, wintering on the south bank in 1 805-6. 
 American diplomatists lay great stress on 
 
 * Qreenliow. 
 
 this, but again minute research shows the 
 hollowness of their claim. The upper 
 branches of the Columbia had been explored, 
 previous to the arrival of Lewis and Clarke, 
 by Mr. David Thomson, surveyor and as- 
 tronomer of the British North- West Com- 
 pany. If it were just, as the Americans 
 contend when basing their claims on the dis- 
 coveries of Lewis, CTark, and Gray, that the 
 first explorers of a river give their country 
 exclusive territorial rights over the region it 
 waters, then the United States are shut out 
 from attributing any importance whatever 
 to the travels of Lewis and Clark, for Thom- 
 son preceded those travellers. Finally, the 
 route followed by Lewis and Clark lay 
 wholly within the territory that Great Britain 
 was willing to resign to the United States. 
 They entered the Columbia by tributaries on 
 its left bank and south of the 49th parallel. 
 All along that portion of the river which 
 they traversed Great Britain was willing to 
 let the river itself be the boundary-line. 
 
 In 1811 a settlement, called Astoria, was 
 established at the mouth of the Columbia 
 river. An American claim, based on this 
 circumstance, may be disposed of in a few 
 words. Astoria was a free trading station 
 — not a colony — set up by nine partners, 
 calling themselves the Pacific Fur Company, 
 of whom three were American and six 
 Scotch. When the war of 1812 broke out, 
 the whole settlement was hastily sold to the 
 North West Company for 58,000 dollars. 
 When the British sloop ' Racoon ' arrived 
 to take it from the enemy, it was found to 
 bo already British, At the conferences of 
 Ghent tbe Americans claimed to have it de- 
 livered back to them. Great Britain pointed 
 out that it had been bought and paid for ; 
 still the United States claimed the sove- 
 reignty. With almost fantastic generosity 
 the British Government agreed that, pending 
 negotiations for settling the territorial do- 
 minion, the United States flag should be 
 re-established at Astoria in the status quo 
 ante helium. This was done, but Astoria 
 did not pay. The place was deserted, and 
 had ceased to exist before the negotiations 
 of 1846. Finally, Astoria was on the south 
 side of the river, and within the territory 
 that Great Britain was willing to leave in the 
 hands of the United States. Our readers 
 may find it difScult to believe that sober 
 American statesmen could found on the his- 
 tory of Astoria a claim to the whole valley 
 of the Columbia River ; but such is the fact 
 nevertheless. We merely refrain from giving 
 extracts from despatches in illustration of the 
 point, to avoid overloading this narrative. 
 
 It may, perhaps, bo observed, that all 
 purely technical claims of the kind we have 
 
 ! 
 
April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 201 
 
 here been discussing, arc really unimportant 
 when the sovereignty of a newly-settled 
 country har. to be decided ; and it may be 
 imagined that the territory which was in 
 dispute during the Oregon negotiations was 
 already overrun with American ' pioneers,' 
 and valuable to the United States on that 
 account. But so far was this from being 
 the case, that the settlements of the whole 
 country in dispute were British. Even if 
 the British proposal had been accepted, it 
 would have been necessary to break up some 
 British settlements south of the Columbia, 
 while there were no American settlements to 
 be disturbed on the north side. On the 
 other hand the American proposal required 
 this country to give up a quantity of settle- 
 ments, including Fort Vancouver, the depdt 
 of the Hudson's Bay Company ; to resign 
 the use of eleven rivers, and to give up all 
 the good harbours of Admiralty Inlet, be- 
 sides the agricultural district round Puget 
 Sound. Yet this was a proposal that 
 Buchanan described as one showmg ' a sin- 
 cere and anxious desire to cultivate the most 
 friendly relations between the two countries, 
 and to manifest to the world that the 
 United States is actuated by a spirit of 
 moderation.' 
 
 As, in dealing with the Maine boundary 
 question, we refrained from a tedious recital 
 of the negotiations carried on by Lord Ash- 
 burton, so wo need not now follow the de- 
 tails of the diplomacy which was crowned in 
 1 846 with the surrender by Great Britain of 
 all the territory in dispute ; of the Columbia 
 River, of the harbours in Admiralty Inlet, 
 and of all the other possessions just enume- 
 rated. There is no mystery involved in the 
 surrender. From the tone of the debates in 
 Congress, British statesmen once more per- 
 ceived that if they wanted to enjoy the con- 
 tinued f'iendship of the United States, the 
 only WAy to secure that blessing v/as to pay 
 for it. They paid for it by giving up a large 
 tract of the moMt valuable country on the 
 Pacific c^ast, a tract which was ours by right 
 of anci(3nt claims, by right'of prior disco- 
 very, prior survey, and prior occupation, and 
 by the fictual right of settlement and posses- 
 sion under the authority of treaties as well. 
 Mr. Uichard Pakenham was invested with 
 full powers as a plenipotentiary, to conclude 
 a treaty and set the Oregon controversy at 
 rest ; and, as his choice lay practically be- 
 tween the surrender of the territory the 
 Americans required, and war, the surrender 
 was duly made and the treaty of 1 846 con- 
 cluded. 
 
 This was the treaty out of which the San 
 Juan controversy arose. With a modera- 
 tion that American statesmen look back upon 
 
 with pride, the United States consented, 
 when at last this country submitted to the 
 boundary along the 40th parallel, by which 
 she was shut out from the whole valley of 
 the Columbia, that the line should be de- 
 flected when it reached the sea-coast, so as 
 not to cut off, as it would have done other- 
 wise, a fragment from the end of Vancou- 
 ver's Island. When we contemplate the 
 American moderation involved in this deflec- 
 tion of the boundary, from the point of view 
 of 1 846, and remember what we gave up on 
 that occasion, we are perhaps less disposed 
 than Americans themselves to admire the 
 self-denial shown in the surrender to us of 
 •the whole of Vancouver's Island.' The 
 authors of the recently published American 
 Case refer to the manner in which the 
 United States agreed in 1846 'to give to 
 Great Britain the whole of Vancouver's 
 Island,' as if the whole continent had origi- 
 nally belonged to the United States, and as 
 if the possession of Vancouver's Island by 
 Great Britain was entirely due to United 
 States' generosity. In reality, we have to 
 thank the people of the United States for 
 Vancouver's Island no more than for Van 
 Dieman's Land or Australia. But to return 
 to facts. The treaty of 1846 defined the 
 boundary on the west coast as follows: — 
 ' The line shall be continued westward along 
 the said 49th parallel of north latitude to 
 the middle of the channel which separates 
 the continent from Vancouver's Island, and 
 thence southerly through the middle of the 
 said channel and of Fuca's Straits to the 
 Pacific Ocean.' Unfortunately the space in- 
 tervening between Vancouver's Island and 
 the continent is studded with small islands, 
 whose existence the negotiators of the treaty 
 of 1846 ignored. The consequence is, that 
 no one channel can be selected as the chan- 
 nel which separates the continent from Van- 
 couver's Island. According to an American 
 mnp, drawn from surveys taken under the 
 authority of the United States Congress by 
 Colonel, afterwards General J. C. Fremont, 
 the boundary-line was shown running down 
 the channel on the cast side of the island of 
 San Juan, known as Ropario Straits. But in 
 1856, when, after a long delay, for which the 
 American Government is responsible, joint 
 commissioners were appointed to mark out 
 the boundary which had never before been 
 officially determined, the American Com- 
 missioner, Mr. Archibald Campbell, insisted 
 that the lino ought to run down the Canal 
 do Ilaro, on the western side of San Juan, 
 giving that island to the United States. In 
 making this claim he was only following up 
 an aggressive movement be^un some years 
 before by the legislature of Oregon Territory^ 
 
 
292 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 which passed an act affecting to include the 
 Haro Archipelago, to which the island of 
 San Juan belongs, in one of the counties of 
 the Territory. In 1854 the legislature, of 
 Washington Territory, by that time detached 
 from Oregon, passed a similar act, in ac- 
 cordance with which the property of the 
 Hudson's Bay Company on the island of 
 San Juan was in 1855 assessed by the civil 
 authorities of Washington Territory. The 
 Company naturally refused to pay taxes to a 
 foreign government on account of property 
 which bad always been regarded as, and 
 which they still believed to be, situated on 
 British ground. The property in question 
 was then formally advertised and sold by 
 the American authorities, and it was the 
 o£9cial correspondence relating to this trans- 
 action that at last prompted Congress to 
 appoint a boundary commissioner. 
 
 It seems to be the policy of the American 
 Government never to recede from a claim 
 once put forward in its name, no matter by 
 whom or under what circumstances. Mr. 
 Campbell proved a persevering exponent of 
 this policy. In the course of a long corre- 
 spondence with Captain Prevost, the British 
 Commissioner, he never swerved from his 
 contention that the Canal de Haro was the 
 channel which best carried out the language 
 and intentions of the treaty. Captain Pre- 
 vost, on the contrary, became more and more 
 convinced that the boundary-line, to be 
 fairly drawn, must be carried down the Ro- 
 sario Strait. Under these circumstances it 
 became wholly impossible for the joint-com- 
 mission to conclude its task, and its mem- 
 bers ultimately reported themselves to their 
 respective Governments as hopelessly at va- 
 riance. 
 
 Before explaining the merits of their con- 
 troversy it is desirable to say a few words on 
 the importance of tho point at issue. Some 
 people may imagine that the possession of a 
 small islet on the Pacific coast is an advan- 
 tage for which it cannot be worth our while 
 to contend. Viscount Milton, however, who 
 has studied the subject with great care, de- 
 clares : — ' On a just and equitable solution of 
 the so-called San Juan Water-Boundary 
 question depends the future, not only of 
 British Columbia, but also of the entire Bri- 
 tish possessions in North America.' He 
 goes on to explain that Victoria, the capital 
 of British Columbia, is situated at the south- 
 eastern extremity of Vancouver's Island, and 
 its approach, in a military sense, absolutely 
 commanded by the Island of San Juan. 
 Rosario Strait ts commanded by islands al- 
 ready in possession of the United States. 
 With San Juan in their hands, they could 
 shut UB out also from the use of the Canal de 
 
 Haro, and, practically, from all communica- 
 tion by sea with our colonies on the main- 
 land, as the northern passage vi& Queen 
 Charlotte's Sound, is narrow, intricate, and 
 perilous in the extreme. These considera- 
 tions have earned for the island of San Juan 
 the title of ' the Cronstadt of the Pacific' 
 
 We now come to the arguments in support 
 of the British and American claims. We find 
 the British position fortified, to begin with, 
 by a memorandum drawn up by Sir Richard 
 Pakenham, the British plenipotentiary who 
 negotiated the very treaty whose signification 
 is now the question in dispute. He declares 
 that the treaty was arranged without any re- 
 ference having been made by the American 
 Government to the islands in the channel be- 
 tween the continent and Vancouver's Island. 
 True, it subsequently appeared that Mr. 
 McLane, United States Minister in London, 
 writing to Mr. Buchanan, the American Se- 
 cretary of State, and negotiator of the treaty, 
 said that the line about to be proposed by 
 Her Majesty's Government would ' probably 
 be substantially to divide the territory by the 
 extension of the line on the parallel of 49 de- 
 grees to the sea ; that is to say, to the arm 
 of the sea called Birch's Bay, thence by the 
 Canal de Haro and Straits of Fuca to the 
 ocean.' The Americans attribute great im- 
 portance to this despatch ; but what use did 
 they make of it at the time it was written, 
 at the time when the hydrographical know- 
 ledge of the region under partition was con- 
 fessedly imperfect, and the accurate defini- 
 tion of the boundary was much to be desired ? 
 ' It is certain,' says Sir Richard Pakenham, 
 ' that Mr. Buchanan signed the treaty with 
 Mr. McLane's despatch before him, and yet 
 that he made no mention whatever of the 
 Canal de Haro as that through which the 
 line of boundary would run, as understood 
 by the United States Government.' We 
 quote this passage, not to show that Mr. 
 Buchanan was designedly entrapping Mr. 
 Pakenham to accept words having a signifi- 
 cation to which he would not have given his 
 assent if he had understood it, but merely as 
 evidence that the United States Government 
 contemplated nothing more in 1 846 than the 
 establishment of a fair boundary, on the 
 basis of obtaining all the mainland south of 
 the 49th parallel, while we reserved all Van- 
 couver's Island. It is only by virtue of the 
 contention now set up by the United States 
 that Mr. Buchanan can be accused of having 
 stooped to overreach the British plenipoten- 
 tiary. If ho understood the hydrogi-aphy of 
 Fuca Straits, he cheated Mr Pakenham. If 
 he acted fairly to Mr. Pakenham, he had no 
 fixed impression as to the direction the 
 boundary-line would take among the islands, 
 
 
1 
 
 April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concession to the United States, 
 
 293 
 
 dividing the Canal de Haro from Rosario 
 Strait. Proceeding on this hypothesis, it 
 will be manifest that the treaty ought to be 
 interpreted as prescribing a fair division of 
 the islands which stud the channel to which 
 it refers. A plea has been set up on behalf 
 of America to the effect that the object of 
 deflectinff the boundary-line was merely to 
 prevent it from cutting off a fragment of 
 Vancouver's Island ; therefore that we ought 
 not to claim anythmg whatever beyond that 
 one solid piece of land. But, first of all, this 
 plea is manifestly inequitable. We reserved 
 Vancouver's Island, and, in doing this, it is 
 manifest that we also reserved those imme- 
 diately adjacent insular appendages without 
 which its possession would have been an ele- 
 ment of weakness rather than of strength. 
 Secondly, there is not a word in the treaty to 
 support the idea that its language ought to be 
 interpreted as giving us nothing but the one 
 compact island specifically named. On the 
 contrary, the language would be just as capa- 
 ble of bearing an exactly opposite interpreta- 
 tion, according to which we might claim that 
 the United States ought to have nothing but 
 the mainland all along Fuca Straits, leaving 
 every islet, however near the mainland, in 
 our possession. 
 
 A fair division of the minor islands, made 
 without reference to the treaty, and merely 
 on the basis of an understanding that Eng- 
 land was to have Vancouver's Island, and 
 America the mainland, would assuredly give 
 US the Island of San Juan. That island, and 
 many others in its immediate vicinity, are 
 geologically fragments of Vancouver's Island, 
 and not of the mainland. The island, whose 
 mere value as so much territory is hardly 
 worth consideration in this dispute, is useless 
 to the United States, except for the purposes 
 of oflFensive military operations against the 
 British dominions. To us, as Lord Milton 
 has pointed out, it is of priceless importance 
 for the proper defence of our own territory, 
 while altogether unavailable for hostile ope- 
 rations against the United States. It is diffi- 
 cult to imagine a stronger equitable claim on 
 the island tlian these considerations give us. 
 We can only want the island for our own 
 protection, and could not use it for agg es- 
 sive purposes. The United States can ow'y 
 want the island as a point (Tappui for ag- 
 gressive purposes, and could not render it 
 serviceable for their own defence. 
 
 The correspondence that took place be- 
 tween Captain Prevost and Mr. Archibald 
 Campbell during their attempt to agree upon 
 a bou ry, concerns itself mainly with the 
 technical arguments on each side, and affords, 
 together with the instructions issued by each 
 Government to its own representative, a com- 
 
 Elete epitome of these arguments. On be- 
 alf of England it is maintained that, when 
 the treaty was concluded in 1840, only one 
 navigable channel was known to exist, viz., 
 that known Iff the name of Rosario Strait. 
 The Canal de Haro is alleged to be a chan- 
 nel only fit for steamers, and in endeavour- 
 ing to show that it is in alt respects as navi- 
 gable a channel as Rosario Strait, Mr. Camp- 
 bell seems driven to quote from an American 
 hydrographical report dated as late as 1 855, 
 on which it is not improbable that the exist- 
 ence of the San Juan question as an interna- 
 tional difficulty had some influence. In 
 dealing with another technical point he was 
 not ashamed to use the argument embodied 
 in the following passage : — ' Rosario Strait is 
 a navigable channel, but it does not separate 
 the continent from Vancouver's Island. In 
 no part of its course does it touch upon the 
 shore of either. It separates the islands of 
 Lummi, Sinclair's, Cypress, Guemes, and 
 Fidalgo on the east ; from Orcas, Blakeley, 
 Decatur, and Lopez islands on the west ; but 
 in no respect does it separate the continent 
 from Vancouver's Island, and cannot there- 
 fore, in my opinion, be claimed, in accord- 
 ance with the language of the treaty, as the 
 channel therein referred to.' 
 
 Thus, if there had been one main channel 
 twenty miles wide connecting the Gulf of 
 Georgia with the Straits of Fuca, still if each 
 shore were fringed with islands, Mr. Camp- 
 bell's argument would have made it necessary 
 to take the boundary-line inside them, within 
 a half-mile or so either of the mainland or of 
 Vancouver's Island, in order that it might 
 pass through a channel washing one or other 
 of the territories named in the treaty. It is 
 impossible to read the passage we have quoted 
 from Mr. Campbell's despatch without feel 
 ing that the argument it involves must have 
 been invented to accommodate the facts, and 
 would never have been heard of under a 
 somewhat different conformation of the re- 
 gions in dispute. 
 
 It would be tedious to follow the two 
 commissioners through all their prolonged 
 and fruitless diplomacy, but we may hero 
 record the fact that Captain Prevost, after 
 vainly exhausting his arguments in endea- 
 vouring to convince Mr. Campbell that the 
 Rosario Strait was the channel of the treaty, 
 and after finding his own conviction to that 
 effect entirely unshaken by the counter-argu- 
 ments brought forward on the other side, 
 proposed a compromise. He suggested that 
 the whole intervening space between the 
 mainland and Vancouver's Island . aould be 
 treated, in laying down the boundary, as if it 
 were one channel, and that the line should 
 bo taken as nearly along the middle of the 
 
 I »:. 
 
204 
 
 Coneesaion to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 1872. 
 
 whole Rpaco as the position of the minor 
 islands would allow. This proposal, this very 
 liberal proposal, which had the effect of of- 
 fering the United States many islands to 
 which they had no fair right, was declined 
 curtly by Sir. Campbell, who wrote that he 
 must decline ' any proposition which would 
 require me to sacrifice any portion of the 
 territory which I believe the treaty gives to 
 the United States.* It will be seen that Mr. 
 Campbell had profited by the lessons of the 
 Maine and Oregon controversies, and com- 
 prehended the doctrine that all territory 
 which at any time, or b}' any accident, any 
 citizens of the United States had seized or 
 claimed as subject to the sovereignty of the 
 republic, was from that moment to be re- 
 garded as United States territory, the resto- 
 ration of any part of which to its legitimate 
 ownei-s was to be treated as a cession. 
 
 The first settlement of the island of San 
 Juan was effected by the Hudson's Bay Com- 
 pany, the island having been ' always consi- 
 dered to be and treated as within the juris- 
 diction of the Governor < f Vancouver's 
 Island.'* But about the year 1859 a few 
 American squatters made their appearance, 
 and their arrival was generally regarded as 
 foreshadowing some ultimate designs. In 
 June, 1859, a dispute arose between one of 
 the squatters and the agents of the Hudson's 
 Bay Company. The squatter shot a hog 
 belonging to the Company. General Har- 
 ney, the United States officer in command 
 of troops in Washington Territory, availed 
 himself of the quarrel which arose out of 
 this trifling incident to send a company of 
 American troops to San Juan ' to afford ade- 
 quate protection to American citizens, in 
 tneir rights as such.' This £.ggrcssive step 
 was taken altogether without reference to 
 the Governor of Vancouver's Island. The 
 Hudson's Bay agent remonstrated with Cap- 
 tain Pickett, the officer in charge, and 
 warned him that the island was the property 
 of the Hudson's Bay Company. This warn- 
 ing induced him to send for the ' Massachu- 
 setts,' an American man-of-war in the neigh- 
 bourhood. Governor Douglas, of Vancou- 
 ver' in Island, hearing of these events, at once 
 went to San Juan. Captain Pickett informed 
 him that he was acting under orders — that 
 he would prevent any inferior British force 
 from landing, fight any equal force, and pro- 
 tost against the landing of any force superior 
 to his own. We need not trace the corre- 
 spondence that ensued between Captain Pic- 
 kett and the British authorities. The tact 
 and great self-control of Governor Doughis 
 averted any actual outbreak of hostilities. 
 
 ♦ Lord Milton, p. 252. 
 
 Eventually he landed in a different part of 
 the island from that occupied by the Ameri- 
 cans a small force equal to that under Cap- 
 tain Pickett's orders, and thus established 
 the joint occupation that has endured ever 
 since. In accordance with the provisions of 
 the treaty of Washington, the sovereignty of 
 the island has been referred for arbitration to 
 the German Emperor, and the cases prepared 
 on each side have been for some time in his 
 hands. It is very desirable that no decision 
 should be given in this matter while the ar- 
 bitration referred to the tribunal at Geneva 
 is threatened with miscarriage. Should the 
 Emperor give a decision in our favour, there 
 would be every reason to fear that its recep- 
 tion by the Government of the United States 
 would depend upon the fate of the arbitra- 
 tion at Geneva. Judging by the principles 
 on which American diplomacy is regulated, 
 it is but too probable that in the event of a 
 collapse of the treaty, as far as it relates to 
 the ' Alabama,' the United States would re- 
 pudiate an arbitration in the San Juan case 
 that failed to grant them the sovereignty of 
 the island. On the other hand, the British 
 Government would probably accept a deci- 
 sion unfavourable to itself, whatever might 
 be the fate of the treaty. We stand, there- 
 fore, in the position of having everything to 
 lose and nothing to gain by letting the Ber- 
 lin arbitration proceed. If our Government 
 have not taken steps to suspend it while the 
 issue of the negotiations relating to the 
 ' Alabama' arbitration is doubtful, they have 
 shamefully imperiled interests it was their 
 duty to guard. 
 
 The fate of San Juan, however, has excit- 
 ed but little public interest during the last 
 few months. The incidents that have inter- 
 rupted the progress of the arbitration at Ge- 
 neva have thrown all other subjects of inter- 
 national speculation into the shade. Time 
 has at last exposed, what circumstances for 
 a while disguised, the tiue character of the 
 Washington treaty. Our consent to that un- 
 fortunate instrument was obtained by the 
 American Government in one of those pro- 
 pitious moments in which it has always been 
 their good fortune to conclude their treaties 
 with this country. An eager desire to se- 
 cure the friendship of the United States, at 
 almost any material sacrifice, had iuspireJ 
 Mr. Gladstone's Government with the iueaof 
 settling the ' Alabama' difficulty by giving up 
 almost every question in dispute. Demands 
 which successive Governments, both Conser- 
 vative and Liberal, had ever since their first 
 presentation persistently resisted as wholly 
 unreasonable — which in some cases they had 
 almost resented as insulting — ho resolved to 
 grant. The Washington Government was 
 
 more 
 
m 
 
 5-^^, 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concession to tfie United States. 
 
 29;1 
 
 thus enabled to obtain the signature of 
 Great Britain to a treaty which it almost dic- 
 tated, and of which some of the most im- 
 portant passages were certainly framed in its 
 own language. The precedents of histoir 
 were followed out with melancholy exacti- 
 tude. Over a long course of negotiation 
 the diplomatists of Great Britain proved the 
 justice of their case. But the more they 
 strengthened their position by argument, the 
 more the United States endeavoured to 
 strengthen theirs by increasing the extrava- 
 gance of their demands. Finally, at a mo- 
 ment when the contention of the United 
 States was more unreasonable than at any 
 previous period, Mr. Gladstone acceded to 
 almost every claim that the Americans had 
 made, and that this country had resisted in 
 a long diplomatic battle, extending over 
 nine years. American statesmen, at any 
 rate, appreciate the lessons of history. They 
 know that, however extravagant have been 
 the demands made in former times by their 
 Government on Great Britain, a period has 
 always been reached when this country has 
 been either frightened or wearied into ac- 
 quiescence. It is not surprising that they 
 relied, in dealing with the ' Alabama' ques- 
 tion, on the recurrence of events in their old 
 order. 
 
 Recent criticisms on the Washington 
 treaty have been chiefly directed to the pas- 
 sages which bear on the vast indirect claims 
 now advanced by the American Government. 
 But the truth is, that even if the indirect 
 claims had never been heard of, the treaty, 
 regarded merely as a settlement of the ' Ala- 
 bama' claims pure and simple, would still 
 have involved an ignoble surrender on our 
 part to unwarrantable pretensions on the part 
 of America. This w'U be seen clearly enough 
 if we cast back a glance at the long negotia- 
 tions which the treaty of Washington was de- 
 signed to close. Those negotiations extend- 
 ed over four distinct periods. The claims 
 were first presented by Mr. C. F. Adams to 
 Lord Russell in 1862. A long correspon- 
 dence was devoted to their discussion in that 
 year, but Lord Russell and Lord Clarendon, 
 after Lord I'almerston's death, steadfastly 
 disclaimed responsibility for the acts of the 
 • Alabama.' They refused to entertain the 
 idea that arbitration on this subject was pos- 
 sible. Lord Russell expressed" his readiness 
 to agree to the appointment of a mixed com- 
 mission to settle minor claims, but ho refused 
 to permit the introduction of those relating 
 to the depredations of the * Alabama.' With 
 the correspondence that passed between Mr. 
 Adams and Lord Clarenaon in the winter of 
 1865, the first period of the negotiations 
 may be said to have closed. 
 
 When Lord Derby's government came 
 into powei in 1866, negotiations were com- 
 menced afresh. The American claims were 
 laid before Lord Stanley, and in a despatch 
 written in November, an offer was made to 
 the American Government which advanced 
 considerably beyond that made by Lord 
 Russell. Lord Stanley now expressed the 
 readiness of the British Government to ar- 
 bitrate upon the ' Alabama' claims, if the two 
 governments could agree upon the questions 
 to be referred for arbitration. Mr. Seward, 
 however, now contended that the arbitration 
 should include a reference of the question 
 whether this country was justified in recog- 
 nising the belligerent character of the Con- 
 federate States. Lord Stanley absolutely re- 
 fused to make this question the subject of 
 any arbitration whatever, and the negotia- 
 tions again fell to the ground. 
 
 A third series was undertaken on the arri- 
 val in this country of Mr. Reverdy Johnson. 
 It extended over the change of government 
 in 1868, and was concluded under the auspi- 
 ces of Lord Clarendon. This time the Bri- 
 tish Government advanced beyond its pre- 
 vious concessions, and agreed, not indeed 
 openly to arbitrate concerniag the recogni- 
 tion of belligerent rights, but to arrange for 
 the arbitration of the ♦ Alabama' claims on 
 the basis of a tacit understanding that al- 
 though we could not refe. the question of 
 belligerent rights to the arbitrators, the 
 American Government might nevertheless 
 still re8er\'e their opinion that our conduct in 
 that matter had been unjustifiable.* Tlie 
 American Senate, however, refused to accept 
 the convention signed on the basis of this 
 and other concessions by Lord Clarendon, 
 and the third period of the negotiations was 
 closed by the refusal of Lord Clarendon to 
 re-open the subject with Mr. Reverdy John- 
 son under these circumstances. The fourth 
 period dates from the appointment of the 
 Joint High Commission. 
 
 The aopointment of that commission was 
 in itself an exceedingly imprudent measure. 
 It is true that the commission — as a commis- 
 sion on the ' Alabama ' claims — was not ac- 
 
 • See despatch from Lord Stanley to Mr. 
 Thornton of Oct. 21, 1808 :— ' In this conversntion 
 little was said as to the point ou which the for- 
 mer neffotiations broke oiF, namely, the claim 
 made by the United States Government to raise 
 before the arbitmtor tlie question of the alleged 
 premature recognition by Her Majesty's Uovern- 
 inent of the Confederates as belligerents. I stat- 
 ed to Mr. Reverdy Johnson that we could not 
 on that point depart from tlie position which we 
 had taken up ; but I saw no impossibility in so 
 framing the reference as that by mutual consent, 
 either tacit or express, the difference might bo 
 avoided.' 
 
 ^y 
 
 : ."V ' 
 
296 
 
 ConcMsion to the United States. 
 
 April, 
 
 tually proposed by the British Qovernment, 
 but the proposal which was made by the 
 British Oovernment for a commission to set- 
 tle the fisheries dispute was practically an 
 invitation to Mr. Fish to propose the refer- 
 ence of the ' Alabama ' claims to the same 
 body of diplomatists. Thns it may be as- 
 serted with substantial truth that Mr. Glad- 
 stone's Government is responsible for having 
 re-opened the ' Alabama ' controversy. The 
 folly of such a course of action was extreme. 
 The Government thus displayed an anxiety to 
 conciliate the favour of the United States, 
 that was certain to re-act on the American 
 Government in such a way as to produce 
 claims of a more extortionate kind than any 
 previously put forward. As Lord Derby 
 justly observed in the debate in the House 
 of Lords on the 22nd of March last : ' A 
 mission so sent out, with such unusual pomp 
 and ceremony, was bound, under the penalty 
 of making itself ridiculous, to conclude a 
 treaty of some sort. It could not come 
 back re infectd, and obviously, when the 
 other party to the negoiiation is aware of 
 that fact, you are not likely to make an ad- 
 vantageous bargain. So we have gone on 
 from concession to concession.' Moreover, 
 it might have been remembered that the re- 
 jection of the Reverdy Johnson treaty had 
 been accompanied by the development of 
 Mr. Sumner s views in the famous speech 
 that first imputed to England a liability to 
 pay the cost of some years of the civil war. 
 True, this was the theory of a comparatively 
 irresponsible though, on account of his con- 
 nexion with an important committee of the 
 Senate, an influential politician, but the 
 Government here ought to have been awake 
 to the danger that the new claim might 
 sooner or later be taken up by the United 
 States Government. The encroaching spirit, 
 which that Government had already shown, 
 should have taught British statesmen of com- 
 mon prudence that our only policy in refer- 
 ence to the * Alabama ' claims was to stand 
 on the defensive, prepared to make conces- 
 sions up to the advanced limits already de- 
 fined, but to go no further. Unluckily, how- 
 ever. Lord Granville, — or Mr. Gladstone, 
 whom we suspect to have been the author of 
 the idea, — fancied a time had come at which 
 it would be possible to negotiate a treaty 
 with the Americans which Wvuld please them 
 without absolutely empowering them to sell 
 up the British empire. To almost anything 
 short of this he appears to have been ready 
 to agree. During the Washington confer- 
 ences Lord Granville stood behind the com- 
 missioners, ordering them by telegraph to 
 concede and to submit, whenever they show- 
 ed signs of resisting some demand rather 
 
 more startling than usual. From first to last 
 their proceedings seem to have been little 
 more than a registration of the terms on 
 which the American Government was willing 
 to receive the submission of this country. 
 If the Government of Mr. Gladstone had 
 cared to maintain any decent show of insist- 
 ing that the negotiations should be conduct- 
 ed on a system of reciprocity, they would 
 have firmly persevered in requiring that ar- 
 rangements should be made for obtaining an 
 arbitration on our claims in respect of Fen- 
 ian raids on Canada. Whatever complaints 
 the Americans can make against us, for hav- 
 ing shown unfriendly negligence in letting 
 the ' Alabama ' escape, we might bring com- 
 plaints against them of an unfriendliness ten- 
 fold greater, shown in repeatedly permitting 
 the organisation within their ten'itory of 
 regular military expeditions designed to 
 make war upon the Queen's dominions. But 
 the Fenian raid claims were given up by our 
 Government for no better reason than be- 
 cause the American people were said to be 
 resolved never to listen to these claims. The 
 American people seem to be regarded by Mr. 
 Gladstone's Government with mingled emo- 
 tions of fear, and anxiety to please, which 
 combine to render its claims tremulous in 
 their diffidence ; its concessions servile in 
 their eagerness. 
 
 The commissioners, urged forward by the 
 Foreign Office, hastened when the conferences 
 opened to accumulate their peace offerings 
 in a heap at the feet of the American nego- 
 tiators. At the outset of their proceedings, 
 they imparted a wholly new character to the 
 treaty under preparation, by inserting, in ac- 
 cordance witii Lord Granville's instructions, 
 an apology for the escape of the ' Ala- 
 bama.' Of course the theory of the treaty 
 was that a future arbitration had to 
 decide whether that escape carried with 
 it any reproach' to this country or not ; 
 but without the apology, say the de- 
 fenders of the treaty, the American people 
 would never have accepted it. It is odd 
 thlit this excuse should be considered suffi- 
 cient, because the treaty which we are thus 
 supposed to have purchased by means of the 
 apology, is in itself a concession — an enor- 
 mous concession to the United States. We 
 derive no advantage from it ourselves — none, 
 at ail events worth speaking of — except the 
 hope that the United States may, under its 
 influence, ultimately surrender an unjust 
 claim against us. However, the apology 
 was destined to bo soon eclipsed by the 
 three rules. American theories concerning 
 the ' Alabama ' had by this time matured so 
 far that the United States Government was 
 no longer content to submit the ' Alabama ' 
 
1872. 
 
 Concession to the United States. 
 
 297 
 
 claims to a free and unfettered arbitration. 
 It insisted that artificial rules should be laid 
 down for the guidance of the arbitrators, so 
 that it should be rendered almost certain that 
 under these rules, drawn up to suit the cir- 
 cumstances, England should be found liable 
 to pay damages. The British Commission- 
 ers were startled by such an extravagant de- 
 mt.jd, and at first refused to entertain it. 
 But subsequently, under the influence of tele- 
 grams from home, they agreed to the ex 
 post facto rules. The arrangement exactly 
 fell in with the views of the British Govern- 
 ment It might, perhaps, have shrunk from 
 calling on Parliament to pay heavy damages 
 voluntarily, in a matter where our culpabili- 
 ty had never been acknowledged. But in 
 its mania for truckling to the United States, 
 it joyfully acceded to an agreement by which 
 the defence of the country before a tribunal 
 of arbitration would be embarrassed by ar- 
 tificial difiiculties, and rendered unlikely to 
 succeed. In an age when the use of strong 
 language was more prevalent than at present, 
 it would probably have been asserted that a 
 country thus treated by its Government had 
 been betrayed. 
 
 The treaty signed by Lord Ashburton in 
 1 842, as we have already said, was described 
 in the political controversies of its day as a 
 capitulation. Surely the circumstances we 
 have recalled in reference to the recent 
 treaty, are enough to sli< that this treaty 
 was no less a capitulatiou. In all our diplo- 
 macy with the United States, wo seem to 
 have been destined to capitulate in the end. 
 
 The three rules under which the treaty 
 consents that the liability of Great Britain 
 shall be decided are awkwardly drawn up, 
 but their general significance is that » neutral 
 Government is bound ' to use du^i diligence' 
 to prevent the complete or partial prepara- 
 tion within its jurisdiction, of any vessels 
 destined for hostile employment against any 
 power with which it is at peace. Also to 
 deny belligerents the use of its ports or 
 waters, * for the purpose of the renewal or 
 augmentation of military supplies or arms, 
 or the recruitment of men. Under these 
 rules, and on the assumption that their in- 
 fringement renders a neutral liable to pay 
 damages, we should undoubtedly have been 
 liable to pay damages to the Confederate 
 States, if they had achieved their indepen- 
 dence ; for r^en were recruited for the ser- 
 vice of the federal armies at Queenstown 
 (see Lord liusseirs despatches to Mr. Adams), 
 and the United States made constant use of 
 our ports and waters for obtaining ' renewals 
 and augmentations ' of military supplies and 
 arms. But it is worth while to observe that 
 under these rules, if reasonable allowance is 
 
 made for the occasion, d failure, even of ' due 
 diligence ' in enforcing the law, there is good 
 ground for believing that the British Govern- 
 ment would be able to defend itself before a 
 tribunal of arbitration in respect of any claim 
 for damages brought by the United States. 
 Even in reference to the simplest of tlie di- 
 rect claims advanced by that power, it will 
 be found difiicult, after an examination of 
 the facts, to understand how a fair tribunal 
 could decide that our conduct towards the 
 successful belligerent during the American 
 Civil War was such as to render us justly 
 amenable to penalties. The anxieties of the 
 present moment have a good deal oversha- 
 dowed the incidents which have been sup- 
 posed to connect this country with the pro- 
 ceedings of the Southern cruisers, but if only 
 for the sake of correctly appreciating the 
 spirit in which the new claim for consequen- 
 tial damages has been advanced, we should 
 keep in view the fundamental arguments on 
 which that superstructure has been raised. 
 
 The British Case supplies us with an able 
 narrative of these incidents. Beside the 
 Amer'can Case our own pleadings may ap- 
 pear weak to a hasty reader. They contain 
 none of that exaggeration, forensic ingenuity, 
 and misleading rhetoric by which the Ameri- 
 can Case is distinguished. This last may be 
 compared to the speech of the counsel for 
 the plaintifi' in a breach of promise trial ; the 
 British Case, to the explanation which a cool 
 statesman, conscious of being in the right, 
 might give in Parliament in justification of 
 some measure that had been unreasonably 
 attacked. The British Case, however, is 
 strong and satisfactory, tven when taken as 
 a defence against the fiery indictment of the 
 Americans. 
 
 We have not space for a close analysis of 
 the unfair reasoning — the simulation and 
 dissimulation — of the American Case. But 
 the long chapters relating to ' the unfriendly 
 course pursued by Great Britain,' ' the duties 
 which Great Britain as a neutral should have 
 observed towards the United States,' and the 
 acts ' wherein Great Britain failed to perform 
 its duties as a neutral,' which are especially 
 disfigured by these characteristics, are the 
 less deserving of close criticism as being im- 
 properly conceived in principle. The friend- 
 liness or unfriendliness of Great Britain, her 
 performance of neutral duties other than 
 those connected with the Southern cruisers, 
 are matters with which the Geneva tribunal 
 cannot properly concern itself. In discussing 
 them at unreasonable length, the authors of 
 the American case violate the spirit of the 
 Washington treaty. In the British Case 
 general questions are only discussed so far .is 
 may be absolutely necessary in explaining 
 
 
 
 
 W-'vl 
 
 .«.. 
 
 
 f.;;5 
 
298 
 
 Concession to the United State?, 
 
 April, 
 
 the policy pursued by Great Britain towards 
 the cruisers. And the general principles 
 thus laid down in the British Case concern- 
 ing neutral duties as they affect the claims 
 under arbitration, though not so concisely 
 expressed as they might be, are nevertheless 
 80 well conceived that we are induced to 
 quote them : — 
 
 '1. It is tho duty of a neutral Government 
 in all matters relatmg to the war to act impar- 
 tially towards the belligerent powers, to con- 
 cede to one what it concedes to the other ; to 
 refuse to one what it refuses to the other. 
 
 ' 2. This duty, inasmuch as it flows directly 
 from the conception of neutrality, attends the 
 relation of neutrality wherever it exists, and is 
 not affected by considerations arising from the 
 
 Eolitical relation which before tho war the 
 elligerents may have sustained to one another. 
 ' 8. Maritime war being carried on by hos- 
 tilities on the high (teas, and through the in- 
 strumentality (ordinarily) of vessels commis- 
 sioned by public authority, a neutral power is 
 bound to recognise, in matters relating to the 
 war commissions issued by ea ch belligerent, 
 and captures made by each, to the same ex- 
 tent, and under the same conditions as it re- 
 cognises commissions issued and captures 
 made by the other. 
 
 ' 4. Where either belligerent is a community 
 or body of persons not recognised by the neu- 
 tral power as constituting a sovereign state, 
 commissions issued by such belligerents are 
 recognised as acts emanating, not, indeed, from 
 a sovereign Government, but from a person or 
 persons exercising de facto, in relation to the 
 war, the powers of a sovereign Government' 
 
 ' With this exordium the British case pro- 
 ceeds to record the leading facts of the great 
 Soutliern struggle for independence. When 
 the American Case deals with history, much 
 circumlocution is employed to keep up the 
 theory that from first to last the people of 
 the Confederacy were ' insui^cnts ; ' that 
 the war throughout was an ' insurrection ; ' 
 that the members of the Southern Govern- 
 ment were ' persons calling themselves ' by 
 this or that official title. In the British 
 Case, on the other hand, transactions are de- 
 scribed by their right names. The historical 
 narrative, for instance, opens with the state- 
 ment : — ' In the year 1861 a civil war broke 
 out in the United States.' It is astonishing 
 how different an aspect is at once imparted 
 to the policy of Great Britain by the use in 
 this manner of honest phraseology in de- 
 scribing events, from that which it is made 
 to wear when examined under the false 
 light thrown upon it by the distorted lan- 
 guage of the American writers. 
 
 As soon as the war began, the Southern 
 leaders, finding their own ports blockaded 
 by a naval force with which they were quite 
 unable to cope, sought abroad for the means 
 
 of creating a navy. The identity of ther 
 own language with ours, and commercial 
 ties, naturally attracted their agents to this 
 country. The American firm of Fraser, 
 Trenholm, and Co., was established at Liver- 
 pool. Tlio American Case makes it a sub- 
 ject of bitter complaint against us that the 
 firm was to all intents and purposes a branch 
 of ' tho insurgent treasuiy.' The complaint 
 is childish. Could the British Government 
 have bunted out, banished, or imprisoned 
 private merchants trading within its territo- 
 ry because they did business with people 
 with whom the United States were at war ? 
 The truth is, that the arrangements made by 
 the Confederates for supplying money in 
 England for any purposes connected with 
 their interests during the war would have 
 gone far to excuse the British Government, 
 if it had been much less successful than on 
 the whole it was, in guarding its neutrality. 
 For after all, in spite of the exertions the 
 Confederates made to circumvent our neu- 
 trality, and in spite of the weak ineffective 
 character of the old Foreign Enlistment Act, 
 which was the only weapon the British 
 Government could employ against them, the 
 only vessel which so far escaped the vigi- 
 lance of this Government as to leave a 
 British port prepared to become a Southeni 
 cruiser without going into a Southern port, 
 and without undergoing seizure and trial, 
 was the ' Alabama' herself. The American 
 Case says : — 
 
 'The cruisers for whose acts the United 
 States ask this tribunal to hold Great Britain 
 responsible are (stating them in tho order in 
 which their cruises began), the "Sumter," 
 the " Nashville," the " Florida," and her ten- 
 ders ; the " Clarence," the " Tacony," and the 
 "Archer ;" the "Alabama," and her tender 
 the " Tuscaloosa ;" the " Retribution," the 
 "Georgia," the "Tallahassee," the "Chicka- 
 mauga," and the " Shenandoah." ' 
 
 Some of these vessels arc now heard of 
 for the first time as tho subject of c'aims 
 against the British Government ; and tho 
 British Case, dealing only with those vessels 
 in reference to which claims had been ad- 
 vanced during the ' Alabama ' correspon- 
 dence, does not contain a complete account 
 of all the ships now named. But it does 
 contain a complete account of the four prin- 
 cipal cruisers, and the history of the others 
 may be gathered sufficiently for our present 
 purpose from the American Case itself. 
 First, let us notice the more important vessels. 
 • Of the four vessels in respect of which 
 alone,' says the British Case, ' the United 
 States have up to this time made claims 
 against Great Britain,' two, the * Georgia ' 
 and the 'Shenandoah,' were built as mer- 
 
 !■' 
 
F^ni 
 
 April, 
 
 of thOT 
 
 mmercial 
 ts to thift 
 f Fraser, 
 at Liver- 
 it a siib- 
 that the 
 a branch 
 complaint 
 (vernment 
 nprisoned 
 t8 territo- 
 ;h people 
 at war ? 
 9 made by 
 money in 
 cted with 
 ould have 
 vemment, 
 al than on 
 neutrality, 
 rtioiis the 
 t our neu- 
 incffective 
 ^ment Act, 
 le British 
 them, the 
 the vigi- 
 o leave a 
 % Southeni 
 ;hem port, 
 and trial, 
 American 
 
 the United 
 reat Britain 
 ho order in 
 
 " Sumter," 
 nd her ten- 
 y," and the 
 
 her tender 
 iition," the 
 e " Chicka- 
 
 w heard of 
 t of c'aims 
 
 ; and the 
 hose vessels 
 d been ad- 
 
 correspon- 
 ete account 
 3ut it does 
 e four prin- 
 ■ the others 
 our present 
 Dase itself, 
 tant vessels, 
 st of which 
 the United 
 lado claims 
 ! ' Georgia ' 
 lilt as mer- 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concetsion to the United States, 
 
 299 
 
 ;■■>• ■';■ 
 
 chant ships. The ' Shenandoah ' was ac- 
 tually employed as a merchant ship, and 
 bought abroad for the Confederate Govern- 
 ment. The 'Georgia,' was built at Dum- 
 barton, was cleared for a port in the West 
 Indies, and though she was at once taken to 
 French waters and there equipped for war, 
 80 well was the secret of her intended cha- 
 racter kept, that the United States agents in 
 this country could obtain no evidence against 
 her till too late for use. The first commu- 
 cation made by Mr. Adams to Lord Russell 
 on the subject of this vessel was made six 
 days after she sailed. How can it be argued, 
 therefore, that the British Government is 
 responsible for her depredations, on the 
 ground that it was guilty of negligence in 
 letting her escape ? In the case of the * Flo- 
 rida,' that vessel after leaving this country 
 was seized in the dominions of the Queen 
 abroad, and was brought to trial, but at this 
 time she was not a man-of-war at all. She 
 was released by the court because no proof 
 was forthcoming that she was even intended 
 to become a man-of-war. The American 
 Case describes her trial as a farce ; but whe- 
 ther the prosecution was or was not con- 
 ducted, by the Colonial authorities engaged, 
 in a lukewarm spirit, at all events the ship 
 entered a Confederate port, and there for 
 the first time was fitted out for war. 
 
 The vessels made the subject of claims 
 now for the first time were mostly blockade 
 runners, or vessels which were unequivocally 
 fitted out in Confederate ports, and in re- 
 ference to which the theory that England is 
 responsible for these depredations rests whol- 
 ly on the hospitality they are alleged to have 
 received in British ports. In reference to 
 this hospitality, the charge of the United 
 States is met by the reply that in the exer- 
 cise of a strict neutrality we treated Southern 
 and Northern vessels exactly alike. That, 
 of course, is our offence in the estimation of 
 the American people. We ought to have 
 shown hospitality to the Federal ships alone, 
 and to have assisted them in capturing 
 Southern cruisers as pirates. But such theo- 
 ries, although unhappily they cannot be 
 overlooked, and cannot therefore be describ- 
 ed as beneath notice, are certainly beneath 
 serious attention. 
 
 The general deduction, therefore, from a 
 survey of the facts relating to the cruisers is 
 this, — The only offence committed by Great 
 Britain was that in qftie solitary instance dur- 
 ing four years she failed in guarding her 
 neutrality. Just before the ' Ai&bama ' slip- 
 ped unexpectedly away, Mr. Adams, who up 
 to that time had merely been enabled to sub- 
 mit vague niinours and unsubstantial evi- 
 dence against her, did certainly forward to 
 
 VOL. cxxjcii. L — 20 
 
 the British Government evidence which, 
 when examined by the law officers, was found 
 to be sniBcient to justify her detention. But 
 the legal opinion came just a day too late. 
 The ship had flown. In many other cases 
 the British Government acted with great 
 promptitude, and almost with illegal zeal for 
 the benefit of the United States. The Bri- 
 tish Case shows : — 
 
 ' That, besides the " Florida " and the " Ala- 
 bama," many other ships were believed and as- 
 serted by Mr. Adams to be fitting out in British 
 ports, for the purpose of carrying on war 
 against the United States, and were made the 
 subject of representations to Her Majesty's 
 Government 
 
 ' That in every case, without exception, the 
 allegations of Mr. Adams were promptly and 
 carefully investigated ; that in the greater 
 number of cases Mr. Adams proved to be mis- 
 taken, the suspected ships being merely mer- 
 chant ships, built and fitted out with a view to 
 a special employment, and not for war ; that in 
 all cases as to which reasonable evidence could 
 be obtained, the suspected vessels were seized, 
 and proceedings instituted for the condemna- 
 tion of them ; that four were thus seized — the 
 " Alexandra, the two rams, and the " Canton," 
 or "Pampero" — and were prevented from 
 being used for belligerent purposes, and one of 
 them (the " Alexandra ") having been seized in 
 England and restored by the verdict of a jury, 
 was afterwards seized again in a British colo- 
 ny.' 
 
 In fact, whatever may have been the sym- 
 pathies of private individuals in this country 
 during the war, it is certain that the British 
 Government pushed to the verge of partizan- 
 ship with the North, its determination to 
 prevent the South from making use, for war- 
 like operations, of the maritime resources of 
 Great Britain. And yet because in one in- 
 stance its vigilance broke down, because one 
 vessel out of a great number that the South- 
 ern Government was struggling to obtain got 
 away in spite of us, the American Govern- 
 ment is not ashamed to importune us for 
 damages, and to come before the world 
 claiming that wc ought equitably to reim- 
 burse it for the expenses of a large part of 
 the war ! The old story is repeated. The 
 more we yield to America the more is expect- 
 ed of us. By constantly courting that pow- 
 er, we encourage it in behaving towards us 
 with an arrogance which grows more and 
 more difficult to endure. JEach concession 
 on our part provokes a fresh demand, and 
 every sacrifice we make has the effect of 
 augmenting instead of diminishing the sum 
 total of sacrifice claimed at our hands. 
 
 The penalty wo incur for having yielded 
 to the United States Government, so far as to 
 have consented that the original ' Alabama ' 
 claims should be referred to arbitration, is 
 
 t-- 
 
 ^::? 
 
 m 
 
 l-:^. 
 
■w 
 
 800 
 
 Concetsion to the Unitea States. 
 
 April, 
 
 that we are now called upon to meet fresh 
 claims which may amount to some hundreds 
 of millions sterling. Much discussion has 
 been devoted to the question whether the 
 indirect claims now advanced were under- 
 stood by the American Commissioners at 
 the time the treaty was signed to be includ- 
 ed in that instruntent. We need not travel 
 over this discussion, nor follow those writers 
 who have busied themselves, in the interests 
 of peace, in trying to show to the United 
 States honourable paths along which they 
 might retreat from their present untenable 
 position. Efforts have been made in this 
 way to prove that the treaty itself was the 
 ' amicable settlement ' mentioned in one of 
 the protocols as calculated, it it could be ar- 
 ranged, to bar all further prosecution of the 
 indirect claims. But in this matter we must 
 adopt the American view. It is evident 
 that the American Commissioners, when they 
 spoke of an amicable settlement, contemplat- 
 ed an arrangement by which Great Britain 
 should, without even taking her case to 
 arbitration, have accepted the worst conse- 
 quences that an arbitration could have in- 
 flicted upon her. With what intention the 
 American Commissioners made this proposal 
 it is difficult to understand. It assumed 
 cither that Great Britain had previously for 
 years been dishonestly refusing the American 
 people compensation which it knew to be 
 their due, or that it had finally sunk so low 
 that it might be induced through fear to 
 submit to a claim it knew to be unjust 
 Certainly it would appear that American 
 statesmen do not refrain from making pro- 
 posals to this country from any dread of 
 rousing its indignation, if the policy suggest- 
 ed be ignominious. But it would be waste 
 of time to discuss at length the intentions 
 which actuated the American negotiators 
 during the conferences at Washington. The 
 American Case formally calls upon l' o arbi- 
 trators to declare that this country ought 
 equitably to reimburse the United States for 
 the expenses entailed upon them by the pro- 
 longation of the war after the battle of Get- 
 tysburg. Whatever was intended by the 
 negotiators of the treaty, the intention of the 
 authors of the Case — that is to say, of the 
 American Government — is perfectly clear. 
 It is to obtain, if possible, a decision, that we 
 are equitably bound to pay the consequen- 
 tial damages ; and if any sane Englishman 
 imagines, that having obtained such a deci- 
 sion, the American Government would be 
 content to leave it a dead letter without add- 
 ing up the claims and producing a definite 
 sum total in dollars, he must certainly have 
 studied American policy, if at all, to very 
 little purpose. The theory that the indirect 
 
 claims mean nothing, that they are really in- 
 troduced for the sake of their moral etfoot, 
 is almost unworthy of examination. If it 
 were sound, we should be none the less ena- 
 bled to object to devices for producing a 
 moral eftect on the minds of the arbitrators, 
 by means of pleadings irrelevant to the ques- 
 tion at issue, but the argument is altogether 
 delusive. If the arbitrators admitted what 
 the American Case asks them to admit, that 
 wo ought in equity to pay certain charges 
 not yet estimated, they could not, in the dis- 
 charge of their appointed functions, do 
 otherwise than proceed to assess those char- 
 ges, or refer them for assessment to another 
 tribunal. 
 
 The claim for the indirect damages lies be- 
 fore us; and this country will deserve the worst 
 consequences that can befall it if it consents 
 to any course of action which is based upon 
 the belief that the claim can be in any way 
 ignored. In making that cUim the Ameri- 
 can Government has clearly overstepped the 
 rights conferred upon it by the treaty. Whe- 
 ther Mr. Gladstone is justified in declaring 
 that the treaty is not ambiguous, or whether 
 its clumsily constructed sentences are am- 
 biguous, one thing is certain, even Mr. Glad- 
 stone's Government, in advising the Queen 
 to ratify the treaty, was incapable of intend- 
 ing to submit to arbitration the question 
 whether Great Britain ought to pay half the 
 cost of the American war. Starting from 
 this indisputable position, we venture to say 
 it is absurd to contend that a great nation 
 can be entrapped by adroit diplomatists into 
 signing away, without intending to do so, 
 sums that would involve national disgrace. 
 The reference of the indirect claims is not 
 sanctioned under the treaty, because this 
 country never consciously consented to any 
 such reference, and because treaties cannot 
 be applied to purposes of unforeseen extor- 
 tion like acceptances in the hands of a 
 money lender. They are nothing if tlioy 
 are not the record of a mutual agreement 
 between the states in whose names they are 
 signed. 
 
 On the part of the United States it is 
 contended that the court of arlitration at 
 Geneva is the proper tribunal to determine 
 whether the indirect claims are admissible 
 under the treaty. But to refute this view it 
 is only necessary to apply the principle on 
 which it is based to an imaginary case. 
 Suppose the American Government had 
 gone to the Geneva tribunal declaring that 
 the only compensation it would really accept 
 would be the deposition of the Queen, and 
 the entrance of this country into the Ame- 
 rican Union as a new state. Any person of 
 sane mind will see, not only that such a 
 
'"n'.,i* 
 
 1872. 
 
 Concettion to the United States. 
 
 301 
 
 claim wonid be inadmiMible under the treaty, 
 bnt that we could not possibly allow the tri- 
 bunal to arbitrate concerning ita admissibi- 
 lity. Under no circumstances could we 
 consent to stand the risk of an arbitration, 
 however sM^^ht, in a matter of so much im- 
 portance. There is but one theory that can 
 explain in a rational manner the nature and 
 functions of a court of arbitration. Two 
 disputants narrow their differences by nego- 
 tiation to a specific issue, or a series of spe- 
 cific issues. Tiicy agree to refer those issues 
 — those, not any others — to a third party. 
 The jurisdiction thus conferred on the third 
 party is essentially a jurisdiction ad hoe. 
 The arbitrators have no more authority to 
 determine a now dispute arising subsequent- 
 ly to their appointment — whether it con- 
 cerns the limits of their jurisdiction or a 
 wholly independent matter — than to deter- 
 mine any old dispute standing apart from 
 those they were appointed to consider. 
 Their authority was only called into exis- 
 tence by mutual agreement; it can only 
 continue in existence by mutual agreement. 
 To conceive an effectual decision by arbitra- 
 tors we must begin by conceiving two suitors 
 ready to receive that decision ; pledged to 
 one another, agreeing with one another, that 
 in reference to the matter before the arbitra- 
 tors they would abide by that decision. 
 
 As we write negotiations are in progress, 
 the character of which is concealed from us, 
 and the issue of which it is impossible to 
 foresee. All that we know of them is that 
 they have begun badly. "When at last the 
 Government was roused by the press and 
 the country from a lethargy which it has yet 
 to explain, and when it grew aware that some- 
 thing had to be done in consequence of the 
 unfair manoeuvre that the United States had 
 attempted, Lord Granville, on the 3rd of 
 February, sent a despatch to General Schenck, 
 which was described in the Queen's Speech 
 ' friendly communication,' and the con- 
 
 as a 
 
 as 
 
 tents of which were understood to be 
 nearly colourless as the circumstances would 
 allow. Timid to the verge of servility at a 
 time when honour and policy would have 
 alike dictated some boldness and precision 
 of tone, the Government seems to have done 
 nothing more than feebly suggest that the 
 United States was asking too much in ask- 
 ing us to give the arbitrators at Geneva 
 power to treat us as a conquered nation. 
 As a matter of course the United States 
 Government mainiained the position it had 
 already assumed. Lord Granville's despatch 
 practically encouraged that Government to 
 persevere in the course on which it had 
 entered. We do not say that he could 
 easily have persuaded it to draw back. The 
 
 lessons of fifty years arc not to be unlearned 
 in a day. We have displayed towards the 
 United States such miserable weakness and 
 servility in the past, that now — or whenever 
 we may nltinitetely be compelled to change 
 our tone with them, as sooner or later it is 
 inevitable that we must — we may have to 
 face some disagreeable contingencies before 
 convincing them that we arc in earnest. 
 But very ordinary sagacity should have 
 shown the Government that indecisive re- 
 monstrances, however sweetened with suga- 
 ry phrases, were absurdly out of place when 
 we had to deal with sucn an extraordinary 
 aggressioii as that attempted by the Ameri- 
 can Government. The course before us was 
 to say plainly that, in signing the Washing- 
 ton treaty, we meant to concede the most 
 liberal terms we could agree to, compatibly 
 with the maintenance of our own honour, but 
 that we never contemplated the discussion 
 before arbitrators, nor. imagined that the 
 American Government contemplated ad- 
 vancing, demands of so extravagant a nature 
 as those they have put forward. Those de- 
 mands, we should have explained, consti- 
 tuted so serious an infringement of the un- 
 derstanding embodied in the treaty, that we 
 could only regard the proceedings before 
 the arbitrators as suspended until the Ameri- 
 can Government might choose to conform 
 to the stipulations therein laid down. An 
 explanation of this kind would have requir- 
 ed no reply of an argumentative character. 
 We should have known at once whether to 
 regard the arbitration as still pending, or 
 the treaty of Washington as null and void 
 by reason of the irremediable infringement 
 of its provisions by America.* 
 
 What, on the other hand, is the painful 
 position in which we are placed by the fee- 
 ble and inadequate diplomacy of the Gov- 
 ernment ? We are drifting on, in spite of 
 
 * The advice wliicli Lord Weetbury gave to 
 the Government upon this point in the debate 
 in the House of Lords on Mnrcli 22nd is so ex- 
 cellent that it deserves to be recorded here: — 
 • What I beg the Government to do is to take a 
 firm stand upon the truth of what was under- 
 stood on both sides at the time, and not to be 
 beguiled into a question concerning the con- 
 struction of a treaty, for it is idle to discuss the 
 construction of a document which you contend 
 does not contain your real sentiments, and does 
 not Ully with the belief and understanding 
 which you were induced by the other side to en- 
 tertain. Insist that no question as to the con 
 struction of the treaty on this matter shall go to 
 the arbitrators ; for there is something superior 
 to language — the question what was intende<l 
 by us, and what was represented to us to be in- 
 tended by them. Hare that point raised and 
 decided before you begin quibbling aa to the in- 
 terpretation of the language.' 
 
 m. 
 
 Iv-.,, 
 
 I ", 
 
 
 
 
 % ■ ■ 
 
 H 
 
302 
 
 Conctasion to the United States. 
 
 April, 1872. 
 
 Lord Derby's warnings, f''om ono concession 
 to another. Our attitude, which at this mo- 
 ment should have been bold, honourable, 
 and intelligible, is equivocal and all but ig- 
 nominious. Sooner or later,- at a loss fa- 
 vourable opportunity than that which we 
 have allowed to let slip, we must spoak out 
 courageously, or submit to concessions that 
 will earn for us the contempt of the civil- 
 ized world. The momentary success of the 
 Government in persuading credulous admir- 
 ers that the danger by which wo were men- 
 aced is passing away, is duo merely to a poli- 
 cy of procrastination that has temporarily 
 averted an evil day. Deaf to the warnings 
 of the past, the Cabinet seems still to cling 
 to the Dclief that our difficulties with the 
 United States can yet be surmounted by 
 
 means of a policy of conciliation ; and indeed 
 whether it is still possible that ultimate 
 measures of common sense, involving the 
 abandonment of this foolish and feeble poli- 
 cy, may avert the dangers by which wo are 
 at present encompassed, is a question to 
 which, without knowing as yet how far the 
 Government has already committed us, wo 
 should shrink from giving a reply. But 
 taking a broad view of the relations that 
 have subsisted between this country and the 
 United States for the last fifty years, we 
 must confess that politicians, who still look 
 hopefully to a future depending on the con- 
 tinued infiuence of conciliation in our further 
 negotiations with that Power, display a con- 
 fidence which no experience will teach, and 
 which borders on downright folly. 
 
 v>l 
 
1872. 
 
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