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Un des symboles suivants spparaftra sur la darnlAre image de cheque microfiche, salon la cas: la symbols — ^ signifie "A SUIVRE". le symbols ▼ signifie "FIN". Les cartas, planches, tableaux, etc.. peuvent Atre filmis i des taux de reduction diffArents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour Atre reproduit en un seul clich*. 11 est filmA A partir de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche A drolte. et de haut en bas. en prenant le nombre d'images nAcessaire. Las diagrammes suivants lllustrent la mAthoda. 1 2 3 32 X 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 ! V M =1= u -• >■■* I I .. ,^^ u.i(».auBKAjtV '.. ; 'MENTAL AMD MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. B\ A CANADIAN CLERGYMAN. !■ TORON-n): PRLyTED BY C. BLACKETT ROBINSON, 5 JORDAN STREET. 1882. % ) t i CENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. f ^■- ii 1^1 .^ < ..1^.^.*. j.^j ' ■am •^•--■%n)K. ] ( 1\ f , MENTAL AVD MOEAL PHILOSOPHY. BY A CANADIAN CLERGYMAN. V2 TORONTO: PRINTED BY 0. BLAOKETT ROBINSON, 6 JORDAN STREET. 1882. 128127 PREFACE. Ik prewnting to the reading public this little work, and the one on "Knowledge by Perception and Reaaoning," which ia intended to accompany it, we are not aware that any apology ia either due or neceuary. They are got up in the form of Tracta, for the aimple reaaon that we were unable to publiah them in any other,— aeconded by the conaideration that if not found worth reading in thia form, they would not be worth publiahing in a more exponaive one. Their method of preaenUtion to the public, then, ia modeat enough. In regard to the matter of both Tracta, -aa it waa evolved from the atudy of the human mind itaelf, rather than from the mere aervile study of the text-booka on the Bubject,— it ia probable that some of the principles maintained, as well as their methods of treatment, will be found to differ from those of other works on the same subject. Though we have read other worka freely, we have a persuaaion that the human mind itself, ever at hand, is the best of all text-books on this subject ; and we have atudied it closely ; yet we are far from pretending to infallible accuracy in our knowledge of all that this text-book teaches. Be this as it may— as all students of a subject wish to know one another's opinions —we submit the results of our study to their examination with all cheerfulness. We are aware that there is very much in both the matter and its treatment which is imperfect ; but having now on our hands a pastoral charge that requires very much of our time and attention, we have concluded to consign both Tracts in their present state to the public. The Trao» on " Knowledge by Perception and Reasoning," which is intended to accompany ths < .;e, is really the elder of the two by several years. It was, at one time, our intention to make aome alterations in its matter and method ; but with some few additions in the form of notes, etc., it goes to the public in its original shape. As to the style in which both Tracta are written, aU that has been chiefly cared for has been just to convey clear ideas respecting the subjects which we have discussed. In conclusion, we commit both to the public, in the hope that they may be useful, asking no other favour than just a careful and candid reading of their contents. ALEX. NIOOL. Ayton, 188t, —-•-mm&m- * 1 « Si Si Ti St Si Tl Ba In Ml INDEX. VAOB Briaf Skatoh of PlMi of the Work 1 SECTION I. OoMciuuinMi with It* ModlBoAtloni 1 Active Coneoioiuneie 1 Latent Conioiouineti 2 Definitioni and Explttiwtioni .......,.*..".....!... 3 Attention , a Conception g Memory , _ a InuiKination 4 Conititution of the Human Mind ........ 6 Objective Phyeical Seniation .....*..'.'..!...!.... 6 Subjective Phyiioal SeuMtion [, .,.'" 5 Perception .'!!.....! 8 Knowledge ' g Inception— ReMoning and Imagination 9 Subjective Senses or Feelingi n Synoptical Sketch of Subjective Feolingi ].....'.".'.'.'..'.! 14 Excitement of Subjective Feelingi 16 Subjective Seniea in Activity 15 Their Abatement, etc [[[[ iq Subjective Feelings arising from a Physical Source 16 Subjective Senses of Second Division I7 Table A.— Subjective Feelings of Taete-Excitement, Activity, Subsidence 20, 21 Subjective Feelings of the Heart Ig Means whereby Excited I9 In a State of Activity 22 Their Abatement, etc 22 Table B.— Synoptical Table of some of the Subjective Feelings of the Heart, with their Characteristics to f^^g 22 Subjective Feelings of the Conscience 23 Means whereby Excited 23 In a State of Activity 25 Their Abatement, etc. 26 Table 0.— Subjective Feelings of Coneoience, Reotoral, and pertaining to Positive and Negative Duty, as preceding, attending, and following it to face 26 Subjective Feelings of the Will 27 Subjective Feelings of the Intellect 27 The Will 28 Introductory Analysis „ . . 28 Retrospect 37 Instinct! .37 Habit 3g Memory 39 /-- .c4» ■%! 1\ VIU. f I 43 44 SECTION II. Sfanplert Analysis of Man's Mental and Moral Powers . ''*" S^r:;^!^^'' ''""^"^ »"■•-»-•••••■..•::.•.•.■.■;..•;;.•::.•:.••.•;:;.■:.•.•■:: « Uses of the Six Classes of Subjective Fwli^ ** Synoptical Sketch of the Character. Possible Powiw;;; M^des'and UsVs'^f 'the Wili If Acts and states of the Mind ^ Things Unthinkable or Inoonceivabi^' oVntr^VtoriMVetc'. ^ Things TUtkable as Knowable, etc \_^^ ** Origin of Ideas or Conceptions *^ Extent and Perfection of our Knowledge *••• ^* Conscience 63 .... 66 60 62 •••••• •••■ \ ^^ifT^OShi^^^?^^^' PAoa 40 40 41 41 42 le Intellect ... 43 44 )he Subjective 44 44 eWUl 45 ™ 46 46 46 46 47 48 onduy Ideas 48 60 M&n'a Intel- 62 1 and Moral 63 66 MENTAL AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY. BRIEF SKETCH OF THE PLAN OF THIS WORK. Recognising the prevailing popular division of the mental and moral powers of man onr m The wS -bh^; The Heart (mcluding Taste, the Heart proper, and Oonsoienoe) and Sfi'n 7. « V • ^ f'^*"°f„>H*i' generally agrees with the foUowing propositions -(1) generldTu^o^'X'roTtl^^^^^^^^^^^ -'«'* «*^ "^ '°'^«' ^°* P~»"'"y *•>« ^^^^ "• '<>' i«„ w * f """""f"' °' *^« functions of the InteUeot, commencing the work, and comprehend- wg ktent consciousness, conception, perception, inception, reasoning, iiiSS kn?J '^rJX^L^^.VrXeT'''''' '"' '""^ "'^'^"*^^*' '^^""« of ^'ssurlSce). "a^d'oZr ti,o«^/*n''*°-""°j*'' *he Heart (comprehending Taste, the Heart proper, and the Consoienoel then folowm order, and may be regarded as fully discussed under thi three he^s of thi Subjective Feehnga of Taste, of the Heart, and of the Oonsoienoe The functions of the Will, also composed of subjective feeUngs (though of a different chttaoter), together with the subjective energy, foUow in due order, their discussion tS nating near the close of the first section of the work ^oouobiou »ermi. In the second section of the work, these functions pertaining to the various denartmentu are agam taken up and set forth stiU more concisely and olearlyfboth in respect toS^own ' o5r:SilIei£eo^Ssc'h^.^t:""^' *° '''' '''"''''"' ^'^^ -->-*-«"- ^los'es wUh^Xts SECTION I. Cotuciousness with its Modificatiotu, Consciousness U that state of the mind, in which it is awake and active Oonscionsness manifests itself in two phases :— (1) actively thronoh tho «**-«♦.„ j ff l*'""^'^'"^'' ""' r""'^ ""'. *^« »"*''^^-' '"i* iiih immiiSe pot;t k?SoW JnTt' In other words, we may be conscious in two degrees, the active and the latent. Active Cotuciousnets. Every mrnd awake is'oontinually thinking ; and thinkins. or active aAmminn.no.. «- • i the^tuming of the attention upona'ny of Sf concepS"ns7harh"*£%rSrate^ AU the objects of thought present themselves either from the memory or from the oni ward or inward field of perception; and their action on the mind, so Zinnied is tt« ~,?=I of continued fluctuations or modifications of feeling, some pleasant anSeo'tw'sebu? together making up the sum of sentient existence. o'oerwise, Dnt irin Jil.?«MV^'* "?" exercises a power over these conceptions or objects of thought modi fying the old ones, or framing new combinations from them, lookina at all In th5, ,. • phases, as well as forming fresh resolutions respectingthem * "" *^''*' ^•"°°' mov^" *'"" '" ****°* **'''*'**"* "" "*^'"° *"' *'"' •»»««>«i«>°. *J»ioh is kept oontinuaUy on the Our minds ar« so constituted that we can turn the fuU light of the attenUoa on only one r^' hi H n •^ ) Latent Cotucioutne»$ .«--• 11 ^°^^* **' ■"*>'• eonsoiousneas ia *« thr«ll,* i^ *°* latently oonsoioas shudow te^'^fo "th*:? "^ •^^^^^ ""he samVtm^*^'^ltetl^^ on wS^hl may wees, etc., that surround it. I do not sDefliali^^^^ " latently oonsoions of all the hilln may 'hadoy^nthrltX'f^LZ'^^'l'^^ '•^?" *° their latentlv oo„„w. s. or the lips. - -"-ij- con^oiouB of them the momeSTh;; p^TtTthe'?^' ' It : still this field Blements in it ; and rail. Bat themo- >fi or they sink into between the active sonsoioasnesa. >• latent oonsoiong- ention, it may also of comprehending^ * some object of «nd others. For with the object of >. and also of him •n any of the twX^ latently oonsoious engages my atten- iotnre ; and all of :e the baokground the actively oon- ins shadow. •i on which I may M of all the hiUs, ■« of the country, Ml with whom ho 7 stopping at the > from the object Qal stopping, ar& Img him. oe of work, but ly oonscions that his work all the itly conscious of his spirit, while ion first to learn h it themselves,^ I musician may,, iment, sing the )rk, as wo say, oment a hitch F the attention, )o, in precisely tention, or are lormediam of ad from which loll and readi- Bir stereotyped ight new com- 'ns cast thoir S8S to the pen 8 To the latent consciousness all the suggestive, associative, and hiventive powers of the mind are mfinitely indebted. This latent power, strong and active, and under the control of the will, cannot faU to Rive Its possessor great facility in dealing with ideas, whether as an artist or a schohu-, a poet or an mventor, a politician or a pulpit orator. In perfect obedience to the will, it gives great readiness and presence of mind, flashing up rapidly the right idea at the right time ; and no doubt its power and facility are increased by those operations of the mind, that call it into frequent and vigorous exercise. Volition, backed by strong feeling, has ever great suggestive and controlling power over the latently conscious ideas that lie in the shadow behind them. In short, all the operations of a day, that are not the direct results of our conscious attention, are the product of this latent power ; and we are regulated in the performance of every act that requires onr attention, by all the knowledge and the experience that stand immediately by in the shadow. Lastly, it must be remembered that latent consciousness is altogether a distinct thing from memo^. For though we may be latently conscious of things stored away in memory yet we may be latently conscious of many things that have never reached the memorv. Thus In looking at a castle in a landscape which I have never seen before, though my active atten- tion has never been turned from the castle towards its surroundings at all, I am latently conscious of these surroundings nevertheless ; and if there is any peculiarity in any of them or any movement, it at once arrests my active attention. * In passing through a country which I have never seen before, I am latently oonscions of many things that never engage my attention actively. Anything peculiar, however, which tdus passes through the latent consciousness, is sure at once to attract active attention to it. J.he chief difference between Active consciousness and Latent consciousness is, that in the first case, the consciousness of things is so concentrated or great, that it reaches the degree of active attention ; while, in the second case, the consciousness of things is so dif- fused or small, that it does not reach the degree of active attention. Active consciousness is possible to only one thing ; latent consciousness, even with active consciousness at the same moment, u possible to many things.* DEFINITIONS AND EXPLANATIONS. Attention. — Definition* and Explanations. Attention is that faculty which the mind possesses of concentrating its active thinking or perceptive powers upon an object of thought ; in other words, of bringing them to a focus upon it. It IS just the eye of the mind, through which it must look in order to know or become sensibly conscious of any thing. Attention can be directed to only one thing at a time ; if attention is directed, in one act, to more things than one, it must be diffusively to them as one aggregate; if special attention IS to be given to the individuals of an aggregate, it must be by successive acts, surveying separately every individual of the aggregate. Briefly, we can think of only one thing in me act of the attention. The wider the field of attention in one act, the more diffused is the attention; the narrower the field,the more connontrated is the attention ; but the field is alwaj B a unity. Conceptions. — Definition and Explanations. A Conception is just what we think a thing to be— a kind of mental photograph of external phenomena. We cannot take up matter into the mind and carry it about with us ; but we can make a mental transcript or copy of it, and then carry it about with us 'for ever. But this mental transcript differs from other transcripts, in that the mind never recognizes it apart • The lAtent oonsoious power is thus the complement and the helpmate of the Active conscloYis power; the latter works in the light, the former In the shadow, and both operate togethw tahai- mony. The Active consciousness posaeMes powers of control over the Latent consolong sphere, and oan bring the Ught of the attentfon to bear on things within it ; and things in the Latent oonsoious sphere aie also able, to a certain extent, to arrest the attention of the Active oonsoioasneas, or. other- wise, to affect the mind. The one, the Active consoionsness, is just the fuU light of the attention : the other, tue Latent oonselonsness, is just that obsoure twilight that revdnls nothing definite or dlstin- iraishable, but at the same time enough to influence our mental operations, or prompt us to turn our full attention towards it. V J. T A**^" '*"'* ™y "!'. "^ ' •' t**™ "Latent oonsoiousness " to denote this phase of mind may be objected to by some as not 1 . i^ altogether the beat term to employ. It is difficult, however to get a term more suitable ; and . e . ;itUe danger of any ambiguity, or of being misunderstood, through my employment of it. ^ i\ ?*fWW««>«W?Wi« h 'I, S;n:»the:'^drwr/r^^^^^^^^^ concepUons o, pictures of true to it. A oonoeption, thought of ag a mental^dpa if u "' **'*'° **"""» '«>"> «»*"e, and rect, and we are assured that it is correct A Known Coning" °°°°?P"°?. when it is' cor- (1) conception, jmd (2) subjective assurrnoe. TH«T^fr.w^^^^^^^ h' I ■ ' ?!' .= o^MicoBou lu n ; as ■• jonn (18) strikiuff JamAii " B.,t tu "^ '» uoou, assurance may also be expressed in a verb whiih at the same tim« i. a^ a '^^}'\<^°^ »' the propositiw M, " John strikes James." > • John strS James ' wn„M k ° ,'i««°"P'>^« ?f the oonoaption^ the assuranoe. The assurative force Xh is Zitinrin...t -v-* ""J"?*?*'"" alone, without An Unknown Oonoeption. of oourre7°so"e Xch we h.™ If"^^' ? '°"°'* '" " ^t'^ke--" correct. *^ ' °* ^""^ ^e have no subjective assurance of being neTer^ara™e ^p'^erdS^^^^^^^ ''''^'^''^^^ in a proportion, consequently should "-« ui nruiua may oe usea to describe anothart vn,, .«o„ ■ r—"" v. lu a pruposuion any sentence the subject, and put all elw iX S'df^^s and 'thf""* '^",*'' """^^ =°y*^^8 ^ ^^ to all intents and purposes be the same iS tri Z it ™ ♦f^^ *IT^?' oonoeption affirmed, will made, provided the twophilosophioalXi»/nts aoorrecroJir^^^^^ ^''"Z '^''* '^^^«^°" ""^^ be expressed within it. «"«i»eniiB. a correct oonoeption and assuranoe, be properly Memory — Definition. and f^r:(m:''irz:'^ti&i^t zr:z 1v"K^«' .iv^-^ •»««"• ^--p'-- our pleasure at any time.' ' "** ^''^^ """^ *"» brought before the attention at Imagination.~Definitiont and Explanations. new^rfofrwlS^LSVoVJi^^^ *» -.-Ptively create t either words, it is the power of inventina idsM nntSi^ • f-^® ^^'^^^ *° **»« "»n^- In other aregeneral; and thelatte^irth^one r^ost/S^n^^^^^^ in the mind. These deflnito^ power of inceiving either new thouSt"o??ew combinalnf ni''S?"'"«^. •" J""' '"«'^'' the truth or error which these thoughts may represent *^°"«''*' ^e^Peotive of the As these definitions are much too ceneral anJ "in,i««.,.t„ * ^ve a technical definition of imagLatfon and ?o whfch 1 ^h»?r.'/h* ^?'^ °' *^^« ^••»'»' ^« mental phenomena in the subsequent pages '^**®" "* ""^ treatment of tionrnTctt-aSjJS^En'*^^^^^^^^ . is^that power of the mind by which I ori^t^'l^^Xlsl^X^ tt^^^^t ciplef oru'rSlf ratS.*tTarnS^^^ «' »-« o^ *«»« "impler prin- ^!!:!!i^^l^i!!^!!i^^^^^«;«^^ " "• ^'^'^ °'°«' convenient i{.not'd^nt?ctlMrt7n\coiwar'we'Zt^^ the past; and the imaginattonhe feeUnas et^hlv- l»*e°"y consoiouB of thi pS? Ja w^l a«S ntt,oi'o°f ^pKr^^ r "»«' *" to o'^ate it In the mind without actual perception. See Defl' .(^■ ■/"- ..mrM itions or piotores of wn from nature, and •tion, when it ia oor- ts thus of two parts, >bioal definition, ▼e of a mental idea, whioh, the affirma- Baponding with the a is used, assurance Be of the propositicui I of the oonoaption ; tion alone, without ound in " strikes." I assurance of being insequently should 3d in expressing it ; on is what is oiJled ; the subjeot being b is affirmed of it. a proposition (any KO anything in the ption affirmed, will U division may be iranoe, be properly itself, oonoeptious e the attention at 9ly create t either mind. In other These definitions t just means the Tespectire of the c of this kind, we our treatment of >riginate conoep- In other words, not know to be be simpler prin- most oonrenient emory. Memory sent as well as of oonsciousness as x> the mind as to a in the memory latent oonaoious- K in suggestion, eption. SeeDefl- r THE CONSTITUTION OF THE HUMAN itflND. ««n JfVI? M ~°''*",'>*<^ *^»* T^en an ol>i8«t is brought within the scope of any of the five senses, a vivid mental presentation or appearance from it, through the operation of our ner- ^w«r7^* w "*"!? >".°°°i"°«t'o° ^"h the mind, is flashed up within reaoh of the perceptive ^ZiL «««» ' ♦?'"' "PPt''"'"*'^ an objective physical sensation -objective, because it ocou- not Wn^ •/• '"*'''''.*° tljf perceptive powers as the object whioh it presents ; and physical, th« n!^nr * " Pl»y"«a>. bnt because it comes from a physical source. The sensation and SdfheZtriW Vr """"• ^^'""^^^ tJ^' .*°"n«' °«°npie8 the place of tM perceiv^, sensluoi nXt« k°' *^' Peweiver. MOl coexist together ; and we can be conscious of the rf.Kit I !? *^® ?°* °' P«"eption. External ob eots, in an act of perception, thus inva- tToL^n^o^* themselves to the attention on a bed of sense, or as objects o? impressTonsTn the bosom of a picture. Sensation is ust that lap of colour, lap of sound, or of touch which on th^lf nnr '*''^ri°' '•'"'*'°?' °'' "« '"'^'^'^ '"""^^^ "««"• •" the act of s'eefng hearinreS' t„ th« « '•^°' ***^ perceptive powers. This kind of sensation occupies thlsame rf ation to the peroemng inind as the object which it introduces to the attention. It is, o7it belongs ™ther th^^ofTeUnl • ' ' "' °' ^^""^" *°' *^* ^"'""""'' " *" *° °^^'^ ^"^^^ m-nKl'J'^;":-^® ""^ *''®'' ^"^^y •^^^''^ "Objective Physical Sensation" as that vivid mental presentation or appearance of or from things which, through the operation of the ner Jower"**"'"' ° "^ ^^^ *°''"^' '" °°°J°''«''°n ^»th the mind, flashes up before the perceptive There is, however, another phase of sensation intimately associated with this vihinh Pl?v.3*S *"• di?*^,R'^''bed from it, and whioh we caU, for want of a better nrme, •'Sbirct^ve Physical Sensation," because, though not physical, it is from a physical source :ta iS/ S'thT^lh'^«'«. "^ °''^'°!.°* "«*;*/ '\' objective sensation which presents it has mre to d*o m« n«^L ^ ?* *^,*° ""^^ "y^^J-. ^.'^ *° °^ *"* "'^ **>« "ense-bed of colour, but it rives me neither pain, pleasure, nor sub ective sense of any kind. This sense-bed of «,lour K objective physical sensation. The moment, however, that I touch a rough? hotTo"th^ flashes up before my attention the objective sensation rough-hot-ness. X.h on M^<;;ntS^ KT" f ""r"!^" '^""'t^T °1P""- T**" ^»"«' ^^^ of sensation ksCct^te^wUhZself the subjeot. rather than with the ob ect ; for it is the objective physical sensation perKd that produces this subjective physical sensation in mysilf, the ^rceiver. The oni EJ in" tt! »„f*T °* '''T' '^i *!>« °ther of effect ; but both are perceived, at the sa^e moment ^ the act of perception, the object in the first kind of sensation flashina no in ne™niV«!f S n^n\*S' '''""'^ °' i""^ second kind of sensation. Thus, I jusSivLoVb hSess with pain, all as one mental conception. Dejinitim.—We may now define Subjective Physical Sensation as that peculiar sensatorv or emotive state of the mind which is produced ii the perception of particnKwects^ objective physical sensations ; and whioh is always perceiv^ ooexistentirwith these oKts' very dKnUhinl^'^^ '""' ''°"'"°" "^ Perception, though intimately associated, aie D«/?nttum.— Perception may be briefly defined as that act of the mind by which direolina sen3"^;'t''Tr'- *'""5?'' *^« «*t?'»*i°n. to Presentations of outward things bythepSS ll^!!!i 1° *•*** """"f^^y pertaining to itself, a correct conception of that presented f^ created, with assurance that it is correct. preseniea is frnm"-K''° **°™« '? °^<* that the thing perceived does not mean the outward obiect iK ««!?■' ^ '°?y*0''eb a rough, hard object outside of me with my fingerS; thethinff that I perceive m this case is the sensation of rough-hardness, not the rouah hwd thint S t'^^ti?^ ""I^'^" °?""r- .^f "• ^ '''^^ *^« ^8°" o^ a man Sre me,' I Kot pfeten^ that my perception actually touches the man ontoide of me, but only the fiaure in thl n^«« tation or sensation of colomr, which fiashes up before my attentk^n. So far then *^t^: object pwoeived is conoemed, there can be no aibiguity. f he figtW^tSly pMoeiv;!?. the ^' neL?vS'i„"?vf*"°° ^.>^' '"^•^ ' '^^ *''««*°" *^« °^J«°* that we mean StKelcuSy perceived m the sensation or presentation in the mind ; and being actually perceived th«rl can be no question that a correct conception of it is fomed. It is correct and we ar« fn constatnted that w« cannot help being assured that it is correct, iy ' "* '° Every man in the act of perception is convinced that h« iwnwu... «- ^vi— i r-- a =^= appearance in a pre«mtetion ; -aiso,-that his conception of'ihat i^dJ^d^lTpp^^'c^ ^ S ^ stage^oWs't;^^.^'''*^'^'* ^^^'^'^ ^•"*"°° ^ be discussed more ftUly at a more advwiced '1 y « If '^^^lei^f^^t^Zl^^U^^^^^ Pe-Ptlon 1-. in f.c, th.one The perceptive powers of the S .« ^ii ? V'i'^ peroeired fa aelf-evident. outside phenomena, an dTo ?o iSerSi «t. Ld sUtf« ofM."" ^'^'^~i ^'^^' «' ^"0»-*o made oonsoious of all that is transpiriM^ th« oni^^ ' m^ ""'i"* ""''• The mind is thus ^thm Uself. whether in doing.Tf^ror wLbinj'"'^' '""'^^' '^'^ ''>''° °' ^^ "»*» " going oa external obAr^mteTiLtoVa^tftL^^^^^^^ ^a,se presentations of to be oorreet ; and we can never be led astray bTthrm ^^tl"**^ **" '"^ "^"^ ^^ «»«"y P~v«i than they do.. To a mind glancing at the subject fluS;finS 7»f *''T2 **»<«" '° imply more thmg uncertain or deceitful in thamethod of preLntffa S^^^^k'" «^i*PP«" *» ^'"«"»«- of objective physical sensation, but th s uncerCv wfi? fn!f t "v^^S ' ^'^""K^ *!»« ^^diu"" amination. tor instance, in the sensa LHf sS wTv ^5 ^ be dispelled on a closer ex- outside of me, while I know it to be reX witfi m^^^ Tn \r « ° ?^^r^ "^'''^ "Pf"*" *» be tended to cheat me here, she would ne^r have «^n „.i \ ^^ Awt place, if nature had in- ingly outside appearances were really wUhinme^ and ^!«! S^°!S *" ^°<"' *'^''* »^««« «««m. appearances is not to present themselvMaSd^heir wh«^! k'* ^V *''* "*' °«« o' *l»e«« «ense objects outside of me and their wherlfhn^fi, their whereabouts to my attention, but only the tively as a medium, they j'ust shereno'SSrof h«- -T'''''* """^ obtruding themselves obstruo- Taking the sensation of sight Tltm»t^ffj^' *° '^^^^^^ '»»»* they exist, presentation which appears beffi the miLd 'refleot^ve7-i"',''^*' ''""''^ '^ S^^""'. ^^' look and see a reflected object appearing to be sLbwCa «. P"""!^^ ?«• * ""''«"• '^^••'"in ^e the mirror before our face, but the obiflnt , Jo^^ 7 " ®'*®.- ^^^ °hje°t actually seen is In room or outside. The peifoot mi^„r U°i,r?®^'''f ^ ''*'*° '« somewhere else, either hi the what i;t should be as a Jerfec mXm o reAeS^' VJ'^''" °°'*''''° *' ''" ' "^^ *^"^' perfect mirrors, wherein we see reflected obi J^tsand'thpt'^^T'^^'"""' *''«''' "^^ "»«'ely cannot be otherwise in order to do their parSular wlu « ""^ ^^^ '^"^ "« «" " that thev "l^f^^if.inust be perfect reflectors. XrSethev obtJld^^tlf" " " ™.'.'^*"°'' '^'^'^ *» P«'f«>t Pletely hide what they are intended to reflect La^tlv f^it **>«'. °^° identity, so as to oom- out the use bM assistance of mediumr perLS ^; k„„ J',*'''"f l?*^^ *^« '»*"' *J>»* ^th- be an impossibiJity. To see a mount«-n,^a S or a S« .^"^^^ °^ be outside world would these objects alternately, and mit it intn iw. k •' ' .' '"*° ^o"!'* bave to take each of aU will agree, were it e/^^XS^Voiw be a tTesomTlS'^T*'"' '^"^ ' ^^ "^"d: "*This Perception without a medium Vould be eouhfalZ t \\^^oub proce^ by th^^idenl/S? re"LZ'^°rn'd'nror^r r. 1 ^*«""^ «»-«« -^^ ---^ be proved in a bed of oolour, I perceive an object SaDnea^T^tw^''^ m the sensation of sight, outside of me. That it is reaUy outsit omHZfir-iVl'^k''f '? IP'"'^' "^"^ loall hand towards it. My hand and it are botS in the same Ze ^^ *^°**°* t^*"* I <"»» P«t my Bight" 1 Krr rit tS^a^7m'rilLVLT?iT ?, «° ^^^^ '»^« ^-'-n^ of m darkness I then put forth my ha^d and touch it I «i" ™ ^l" ''^''" *° '"'^« *bat colour sensation of resistance coming by touch shews me th^t 1 1 ™^ ?*?1 «° "«*^»* " ! »«><» the not a mere colour appearance only, but subsTantial^at I "' "f-^"*' «'«»«''««»• Then, it is conjectural something never in my expeSe f alZ.iJTIiT-^' *? ^ '"'ow it, and not a pies certain relations of position to rS to nth- v ^**"'*^!^"' °' * '"«« «'««. »nd oocu- The appearance has also square sides' f^d«ni ^1^1' '*°"'' /^' ' "l'"' oonflrm by touch sides, all alike. It is a c\be in aj^^ancl B^tofch'?"'?^ \l ^'"'^'^ *»»»* i* has "fx Mtiong I rece ve from it convince mTthatTt; so to fact ' tIT* **" ,*^"/"'' •*°- *b3 sen- By the sensation of resistance in touch I perceive iUsh*^ t'^^ *I°°. '?•* ''^'P *»»« o"«»ide. ner, and findtog no vacuity. I know that it i« J-fui f™' ,.'.?^P '* *" through to like man- weigh it; from the sense of resS^ce to lif tto«1flnS'^*t t •**"• J *?^« " ^^J hands Z ance is that which I perceive in Ton Xr-T a/ i/ '* ''Ty- ?*"« brilliant fracture appear- -^^^I^Kje^:^ one -i^^ept-to ^S- ZSiS?^-^^ ■'*)*t.:iil Q is, in faot, the ooe iK-eTident. fields of Vision— to The mind is thus all that is going ou se preaentatioas of lay be easily proved thorn to imply more appear to be some- iroagh the medium lied on a closer ex- vhioh appears to be if nature had in- w that these seem- Qse of these sense ation, but only the liemBeives obstruo- hey exist. les in general, the mirror, wherein we actually seen is in else, either in the It all ; and this in ', then, are merely tre so is that thev m> and all perfect 'ity, 80 as to oom- le faot, that with- tside world would e to take eaoh of 1> is mind. This, at up in • house h the sun, moon, '_ My mind looks inks only of one ' easily be proved by them, nnless msation of sight, aoe, which I call tt I oan pat my the testimony of have that colour inst it ; and the »oe.. Then, it is w it, and not a I siae, and ooou- Qfirm by toaoh. that it has six J, etc., tha Ben- hip the outside, gh in like man- my hands and bracture appear- oh it givea me, eoessary. The — itiiig tugcjucr tned them into Bh th^ came. Kn^^i!!!?" °' i.^'u"'"'**? '"**" '" •= "»'"y » P'«»»" o' MMoning; only, in this ease, by iSjiS^Sm' ^'^ "" °°' '^"""' '"" *^" memory, but acquired immediately TBv«i?*'m!.l' lu" "T" "^'ISJ ?" **** qualities of an object at onoe, although some of them pelatirT eto * ""^ '^'"' "'"' '""' "*"• ' ^°* °°^^ tonoh,-hardnes8, tern- on« nK^f^T"* °/ 'OMoning mixing up with the perceptions necessary to the knowledge of W?„ ™- AJt\ •' 'o™®*""*" ▼wy great. It is emphatically important, at all times, to *n!^i^^^»u 1° e^ry separate act of perception, the conception created is exactly what Knt?™„»». ^u®"'**""*; ***** "• *•» oonoeive of the appearance precisely as it is reflected. r«t«1« tK.r these simple conceptions are obtained, reasoning is generally necessary to sepa- na« fhl tlT" "*° r.t** ''*'"°K^ *" ourselves and what belongs to the external object, to oom- th« V„« J!!-"°**°^ *'!,**'® "?" ^^°** ^^^^ *'•« testimony of the others, and to conjoin in one all iTLt Tfii***"' *"■ ^^T *'*°* interpreted as a truthful transcript of the outside whole. It Zn^t^.t "^««»"y to suppose that the sense object is an exact likeness of the external one It ifn^tl ♦ *l .11*" "**'* »«i vision is but mere colour, not matter, like the outside one. i«m f,„i! ^ . , 1*.°*® "^J*"" *'*°'^« •" the relation of an effect on our sensitive organ- t?.« «f!^=? ^^u™^ °^^*'" "^^"^^ " *he <»«8e. But every effect reflects the properties of W «k^!!»'tu **»»«" pre-eminently the case in physical sensation. Thus, in touching a not nai« t/7 ', "^^^^ti."" P} heat swathed in pain. The object is in a hot state, but it is thB ?fi^la rri . *^^ "*** *^»* the object is pain, I gc beyond the teatimonv of ^LhU^LrS ■ *u® <«"»oept»on of it is that it is an object in that warm state ceJunn o'Produo.ng the sensations heat and pain. The conceptions obtained thus by per- 8«rt« an^! fi ohtamed by the testimony of one sense alone, but of aU. The one sense as- nrl«a5 .1 ? ' the evidence of the others; for the senses never contradict one another or leaa us astray, unless we assume them to say more than they actually do. Thus, in touch it hv ttf,^ -F' *^T'* V°^'^ °^i^'^^- '^^'^ «ei^«e of sight shows me that the object resists iLi«t!m„« ft" "^"^^ ?°*f becoming flat against it ; at the same moment I have a sensation of St ?»f A "? •"""'' '"^]°^ ^ ^^^^ afterwards know as the sensation of resistance. Any ODject afterwards giving me that sensation I know to be unyielding or hard. it «.„ fi^'„''^ eight, I perceive an objective appearance of a certain size and form. I apply to mo L ^*j"*^' *°1''7.*°.'^°^ ascertain that its evidence corresponds to that of sight, teaching «moirat,„^';'°?' . "•*? **??,* material soUd. Afterwards, I know all objects of such visual sLm^t^r^ he material sohds. So also in regard to the sense of hearing. I hear a sound r!^«? i^ proceeding from a person in front of me. By the concurrent testimony of the m« h!\T» ""T !?'' with reasoning, I know that the sound is merely an effect, produced in wav I h„«J""'il^Vr °* *^? -''• °^ ^^'"^ **^« '"'"»'« ^«'°e is the cause. Also, in the same nitLi^^ '*rl;u 8°»«id, effect m my mind represents in the act of the man who is the K,™«„Ttf" u^u"' ^\ "^""^^ *^®' ^' ^ "^^^ tl»*t the senses are just the reflecting fmlnS? ♦ ^ ^¥°^ I" **"* •"»«* eome to know the objects in the outside world and form L^nnit„ ♦tf*^"'^*.**' ^^^'^: ^^ *° *" *•»" ?'"««■"• t'loiKli there would be a great deal of «W^.T™«^ A°^^^A reiteration of the process would invariably lead to ellipses and the snoriesj methods. And as constant, correct practice invariably tends to correct habit, throuirh r;t tw T* P°^"" 7^** " o*"®'^ acquired perceptions, which are illustrated by the if, ',„rfu "^^ ^*®.*° °''J®°* "• * '»«<* o^ eoloi""' ^e never think of it being else than mat- »er, just beoauM experience teaches us that all such appearances are material. « .„i. *°^"^,~ perception, aU that experience has invariably educed in the past from par- Ut«™iwTn r?;u'"' '''''*f """ *° *^« "»"•* ^ *•*« ™°°»«''t 0' perception, though not in oWMi!^^ lu u^/ ■ -*l."°ee conception. As the use of the senses is generally acquired S,t u f-^^i'f f'^^^^i' gmded, no doubt, in their meaning by what is called rational instmct; «in.«t . H*° '^PT*^** *''' 'ehabiUty of the method pursued by this instinct wiU bear the lo^f.J '^l-^^^ V " ''^***°- ^° a^^o experience gives important aid in promoting acquired perceptions, because it corrects false reasoning and perception. mi„i*v.*! J°?,P**'.*"V *''®°' ^*** reference to perception by sense presentations, to bear in ' mmdthe following unportant facts :-That though the coaaeption created in ei^ separate ^Id^rt^f ^ " ^*i7 ^}^i *** the sense presentation, yet in forming a conception of the «fl!!.t •» § presented by it the mind invariably goes beyond the sense presentations which «t»ff l*° °u^l *'* eoneeption of the outside thing, not out of a conjunction of the sense presenw-^tions which come from it, but out of a conjunction of facts obtained from them by prooeases of reaiomng confirmed by experience. The sense presentations are infallible and transparent mediums ; so the mind forms its concention of ontHid« thin™ nnrro«iiw and •qmotty tiito^ugh these mediams, and nevei makes the mistake of taking the conception of the medium to be that of the thmg which it refiects. In these paragraphs we hare devoted some oare in illustrating and ezphuning perception ^ *, » I.: .■*f \ throngh the madjam of th. . h«re .bout lnt.iS"p=;roD^V« ♦n fl.""'- B«t'o^""^nT"}o^"L?*?'?f,»^~P"«« «d .re ino«p.ble orei"*" °' "*' ""«"» •'•'~"y without the ^Um/uon S"/' "'' '*** »»"'J' Be/ore takioR up the aiiJ,i«„* . n ""wnrenuon of . .anae medium, oonoeive it, but I do not knfw i/^f?"***"""*"* in m? mind Iha^***?* * °'«" ?"»«'« conception wd the a^^iX T,. "^^''^ '^^°»' " ^°^ (J at bom« "" **•" """'"nee in 18 no asenrance expressed w^u .* * •^°> »* home " expreisi. ™«if 'I "P'"""** both the oeption and the asEw but » ? T^' '^ " ^'"t- "S ^iTe/' ^„*''" oonoeption ; there «.erted in the phr.sT ' *""* •'°^'' ^'""g " i- merely a^noentVo^""^' ^^^ *^« «>"- Loflko ,!««„_- ,.„ . . -^ " oouMption : assuranoe ia not idel^r./ :.""?'«• " John i reduced to unity with "irfa^^" « ""^ •«*'«»»y conSST^Joh! ..?»."*^". «°P»«UoBoph^ 1 ween it and Uui oat«r '•« perception, that ia, i« nternal ptrcpUona r internal peroaplioni ?ot introdaoing mora reota behind them in »«»Wng. and that they n of » 8«nae medium^ » diaooae Knowledge, • ^*1> asBorance that 9- An inoorreot eon- 'Ma oorreot oonoep. n, for example, form e but a mere picture »w correct. loan . but nnless I have- ooneaponda to this >8 this aasnrance in expreeees both the » conception .• there ■esBeg both the oon- '• Msnranoe ia not Bagreement of two »Dd nnsatisfactory »hn " would be one '• np a conception »re actually in it • five. Far better. WBuranoe the dis- flrewood " is the age form. This ig adgment" in the- .two ideas ; •• and her unphUosophi- f»e idea, has to be (ear— a misnomer >• more correctly It really ia), ac- >uon made up of' ' "John sawing '>ioh we obtain »e should never iMd or implied, of • judgment ed to modify or "••led a subject w we make the >dge is derived' 'by reasoning.."' oonceptiona as » entirely new > ooneeptions. into a n^i^SKluw^""'''-^*'''*""' *'^* ^^ °"°°» "'^"'y °' «»°bine old conceptions StZlf InSonrrma^tA^^ its Conception by actual mental vision of the StVbyfisoTO ShTren^^^ ',^/ »^"°°? °' "'""^ mental vision of the mU'orVagVe^ IS utter* dTeg^d^i^tLm""' °'' """"""""^ ^' ""« ''^i-* «'«""« ^ ^'^^ cepti?nTofnX~:S°°'tb1t*?sTevZ'.r'if"'l*° *^*' mind must be either known con- '^L^\^i:^;:^r\&y^nf'^L7:'.^''"''' °°"^* conceptions, and which we are It» Powers.— Vf 9 cannot obtain knowledge by it. Its Powen.—We can obtain knowledge by it. ori«In"«%^Cmat^3.^^f°,?i'SnS^ *»»« P°^"' "' purely self- .Xom£nlngtheraM;Vffl2?& Powers o/'mod&ying crated Mfc Beawninr contained in known ooncepuons-ln other words, if It Vnot 11 w 10 ?e'uS&'*'°"^^^^ - h... cm, to .how in the oonoepHonrHaot T fol^**.""^ oono«p»ion. i« oo ?eoT we iri\^"!Si' '."•» "• ^» "• not only j. AanrJLt ' '«'m«d in »ooord«no« with ihl-. ', *'• •••"'""d that erervthinir miwt be created «■ nnfl.^i "*P*'**« onKina oonoeDtionH t^ k' "**»•"»« th" •I«o would be !• « u . . . . 1 1 |>9roeived in my first loolr .f ,> *i. * -x 5. F..1 obutort b, «.„.i,„ ,„„ i >»'•'• m iL. '"* " "• "« ■' — "-d ttd ( iomnd, h.rd-nf«„ b.T="*' ««" "W 1". i.i MR ..^ %■ 9, w« har* only to ahow *»ltit«orr«ot. IlUari- " 'o'««d, b« MparaMT « oorreot ; and aa we are ' '•■'"«* »h«teTerythinK "'• ■»^*»«»«. in reaaoning, • «h»» it ia correct ; and oted before, that a con- e original oonoeption, ai "Id of it if created as •use tbia alio would be new oonoeption at all, it tiona. The oonoeption, '•"If of Waterloo ; and Then forming a oon- > two remembrances or ogton. '«• • hat ; and (8) that guinea ; and from this my own, I inoeive and d then from the newly ontinue to inoeive till 'e may compare three ■ creating a oonoeption wn hoofs; {8)an»m. •wish law : therefore, orm than is oonform- »er in the acquisition orms in the process ; cample : — zista. > gives the touch of d gives the touch of ihree facts— mce is material, t i* wu round and before my face. et the sensation of take the latter, how- oe is a round, hard her sight or touch tained by aU thin ffore my (ace is a 11 This process, however, is facilitated as our parceptive faaoltiaa becoma mora aduoated and aoquired ; and experience it over at hand to correct our mistakes. It is evident, then, that all knowledge must be obtained by either perception or reason- ing, and from no other waroas. Then, aa all knowledge obuined by reanoning is derived from known oonoeptiona or (acts already existing in the mind, the primary source of all know- ledge IS pure perception, either externd or internal. The only alternative than of acquiring knowledge, IS to be able either to actually perceive the object itself or to evolve the fact ineeptiveiy from the known conoaptions containing it already existing in the mind— that is, 4 ^i'f J* u""!* P'"*"**** "' perception and reasoning are so fully set forth in the subsequent part of this book, that it is needless here to enlarge more on the subject, except to point out some differences in our views from those of others who have written on the same subject. home maintain for example, that the fact that two straight lines cannot enclose space, is obtainea in the absence of actual visual perception by an act of primary judgment. We ansert, on the contrary, that we obtain it by an act of reasoning. We tako (l) the conception of one straight hne ; and (2) the conception of another straight line, and putting them men- taUy in all possible relations to ore another, inceive (8) in conclusion, that two straight lines cannot encloge space. We regard, then, what is called an act of judgment to be merely an act of reasoning, except in those cases where the term judgment' is misapplied to what ia properly a perception. Mansel holds that conceptivn (what we caU inception or knowledge by reasoning), apart from perception, is possible only under the form of symbolical or verbal represeuUtion ; that 18, we cannot reason from purely ideal conceptions unrepresented by words, etc. Ihis we hold to be altogether incorrect. It is the purely ideal conception that keeps the ropresentative words right, and not the representative words that keep the pure conception right. lUe mind always looks beyond the words to the idea or conception itself, else the garbage of words would continually ead astray. As illustrative of this, mark the following. ThTsun gives light ; feathers are light : therefore the sun gives feathers Some philosophers insist that knowledge is possible only by relativity or comparison- tuat is, in order to know an object you must know it in relation or in comparison with other objects. We do not admit this, without some qualification, to be true. We affirm that a thing may be known both in and by itself, and also in relation or in comparison with others. Ihey are two different kmds of knowledge ; the first kind simple and confined to the object alone which we wish to know ; the second, mutual and extending to the object with which it IS to be compared. In regard to knowledge generally, if we know a thing itself, we need to know none of its surroundmgs. The surroundings are no part of the thing itself, but only knoww' e of theXn *""* ' '^^ *^®"*°"' *^® knowledge of its suiToundings is no part of the I A " T® T"^' ^<"^o^«'.. to know a thing in the relation of comparison with others, the know- ledge which we acquire in this way is more definite only in the sense of mutual relation to the thing compared with it—not more definite in the sense of real absolute knowledge than that which we obtain of a thing independently of all comparison with other things. , ♦^!*r*/i\°.4*^"',**^y know a thing without comparison with others at aU is evident from the fact that in all comparison, two things being thought of, the mind has first to pos- sess a known conception of each before it can mentaUy actuaUy compare. The objects, or points in them, must first be perceived and known before they can be placed alongside one another in the mind m the act of comparison. Real actual knowledge of the objects must tnereloro exist in the mind before comparison is possible; and the knowledge arising from comparison differs in its chai acter from the former only in being that of mutual comparative relation. It is m no sense more real. Subjective Setuation, or Feeling ; in other wordt. Subjective Setuet, or Feelings. We have already spoken freely of the nature of objective physical sensatioa-that par- ticutor mental affection due to the nervous organization in connection with the five senses : slgni, touch, etc.— by which presentations of outward things flash up objectively in and before the mind as things to be perceived, but not as affecting the internal state of the mind or of l.iii^T'"*^ ""^^*°' ',*"*"• ^® ^'■y'' "^^^ '"*«'«y "'«"«•* to ""Other kind of sensation, called subjective physical sensation, which is absolutely distinct from objective physical senl sation, bemg felt or perceived as a stote of the perceiving mind itself, arid not as a mere picture or presentation exterior to it. This latter kind of sensation is bu« a branch of that fa'id of sensation of which we now intend mainly to speak, and which mav in a Mn«ral maim-' D3 causa suDjeoiive 8eii»»iiou or feeling, because it is always perceived as a state of the per- ceiving subject itself. Subjective physical sensation, therefore, is but one ohus of the sub- jective senses or feehngs, diflermg from the other classes chiefly in having a physical source. ■ammmm.^. <,» ! 4 J ' 'III' "if mil ) t 19 ^—j-"^* "" Itnow' *h*» whan vM n> I "x.gni.hea from lu o^ nL:!.?" "«'»•"» '*- \^ feallj Inherent io them hn» k "'" ''^ o*" beautiful nni k! ' .. ' *''«y •«•• of that theBubjeotlveUneeof b««u V r* """^ '" i»*» noh In thet !li!'*' ''"■•"• of beauty 1, momen of percepUon tKf ".'■'l"'''*''on in our mindn »f il„ ^ ohar.oter that they aroiJ! Take al8o the oaee of a'beaSi il'^«"*'''»''''' ''»" one another '"'' P*"'"" »"'' I* i» in the preoedinff m . •»>mal»te the sense of the and in order to peroelvr «„! ^**'"'?'^ '" **•« mind of the D«ri!f .! ^'i"'' qnalitiee that the outward object thTe trit^'^W^tT" "''*' "'•»•• ^^^XtlVt ^ "l •<"l"".it'on ; exciting objeot is thus likTthe liaht IhU!' "" "•^'^ P«'«*ive the aubCiv^ "'"* P,*'""'" '*•• of the perceptive act wll ° *^? °*''"'> ■Prings np auE^!!? '• ff"'"' condemnatory in There are only two wars in „».* u - " '" ^'^ <»i«tingui8l,^d ^o;!W;i^^^:^^.e;ffiK^-^ ., b.aron.e.or aUoo^X'tidwi^^^ "°"^' oeption .^ its'C ?orSation tl •"""??" "efore tiHiS^'; j," tfc W" "' ^~P«°° »hat subjective .en«,.. '°"°*"°°' being entirely new, PosseesJ. a 'i^^'J "»«•"<» "the con- TS remembrance of an ex«.t,„» ^* '*''•' "^er ^he £ o: ^^".V!?ft !f-f. -? '-ermrot%Se,'°^^^^^ "'^ ^ *-« — * eubjec "h* , , iJ^::'^ **•>• ?ften arouse, a desire to revutri;:"' '**' »«t»°ee. the rStol' >" vi li only I oonaectioQ with - "SSSisj ^SJ^ > P«ro«p»,„n i« alwMi "fh. or or huDg.,or «0B or r»pn|,i„n, in ;hro«»wing rwUtJoni. tioni of fw, di.ii^ n of hMt by loach, or «.Ful«ion in the thing ««n. bnl i. » he objective h«il ig > the peroelver j bnt 'ely pesoeived. being I isrno moment uie- >jeolive nenMtiou or mind, ■nbjootwelT, mere bed of colour It they are of th«» ' «enie of beauty ia r that they arouRe perception. At the i by it in the mind uteide picture luad WoDd the mere ■or inoeptively ita Mural aur oonatitution I or inception of My to iUustrate n the charnoMr y diatinguial, jd b* sronaed or J. which ezoitea ibd, r inception that ^nd aa the con- power over the onae a aabjeo- )i the reoolleo- • aenae or feel- up in remem- ion of a pain ma of it only Qaection with Ihat ia, we can never 18 know'lr:e^rby'*rro"nr "' * ■"'^""" -"" "'--•>"- ledge or perception of certain fSbu'taSea So n'ote or°™«ora^ ?"'' .k"'* ,"'' "° ^^' '"»°^- rent power, ft pa«.e. away. le^vSig noSng beSSd were it not'7hat"t'hi'l'"' T" ^t'' taken notice of it and kept traces of it s nhi Jiti,! =1„ ' • . ? .. *^" P< '"^^-eption has Man 18 a creature of intellect, feeling or heart, and voUtion without the or know- id ia pure at would brave or ves nor ;L%f;«^^^^^^^^ or cond. ,un. nr k«3l,^2 ^*Jf?'^ *?»L'"ibA»°"^Ben.e. a. shown elMwhere. i. .„ -'«=--* - — ^^7" irj.?'">?»«'°' knowiedge: But'ir toe^'a^^fseie^^^ioSi/n^iWn*^!; *»''t»«>°«. aMiIr^ioruli'^b? tt-rtKt"^7nt^U^c?.'" *«-"-*" ^^'"""^^^^^^^ !r h II ) 14 powers, that the moral or »sthSUue o?theVhSg h ierceWeSl''^^'"*' "°"' oresTiSfc Sym>pt«ca« SUt^n of the Subjective Senses or Feelings ?oK;,fT^f°."Tj ''*°- (observe tLrt Jhrio^ °Hi»rt "T"' f "°"^ relation s-as love PopcMR Distinction. Animal Subjective feelings from a physical source. 1 2 Hkaht. EmotionaL Sense feelings. Appetite i I feelings. | Subjective feelings, moral, or from a mental or internal source, L, _ 2 3 Taste ssthetic feelings. WiLt. Volitional. Hkad. Cognitive. Divisible into. Heart propensi- ties or (affections. Conscience j Will r^to°L I ?'?°".»?n*. I Assurance')^ rectoral , mdeeision, or doubt, f Conception, obligation. | etc., etc. ' ' NoTE_H„h4«„« ""uganon. I etc., etc. convSee^-"^-"- o-*^. ^^'^ other element o. wil, u omUtea Lm the above Tah.e for X-^^^S'£l'^ZrT,oZ%tZfrZV:L •^T -***- °' *•>« »ind.theydiffer the brutes Those of the wiU and i^tS nart^fct ft??' '^'"'"«' ''« ^ave in oommM. wS pleasure, desire or aversion. ^*°'' P"**^* °' "»"« «' "o emotion, have no paiT w ings: S. t^a^^Sr'oLrdeSroV'S^^^^^^ i° the natur. of their prompt positive or negative obligation. Thera^e i in Vl ^ f"*'^ ' '*~''« ''^"•'e <>' " onghtness" of but their function is to point out ouTdnfv „nl^T*' *" '^^ »» *ho8e of desire SraveMion true rectoral part of our natn«, °"^ ^^y-not what we would like or dinUkT Th^t'^^^u' senses of the Lart ar^Lt" nH' ^1 '^*'°! ""K*!* *<> be our moral ie^^'T^^t^K'!-!!.^^^ e..oise most influence overlh^wiilTn - ^^^S^ ff' ^I&^"SS! feeling, and makes itself an animal may take in I a man oan take ; but )ne oa«e and not in the ings that make a moral ively in the moment of itory or of bea^ty, the ved together; and we nat It is beautiful ; be- nse. The outward act either moral or msthe. ve moral or estimative igs. iguish his oognitive or w the " Heart " and ises. (1) The snbjeo- oed in the peroeptive D. hunger, thirbt, etc. d from its own essen- rork, and there called 3otive physical sensa- th the five senses, as It, sexual connection, nished as moral, are »nty, harmony, etc. ; or affections which il relations— as love. Tide meaning in the which seek pacifica- tion or disapproval ; cognition or Eaow- Hrad. Cognitive. Divisible into. ■bt. } Conception. lie above Table for I mind, they differ 'e in common with h have no pain or » of their prompt^ t "oughtness," of lesire or aversion, '«• They' are the ...... j,^.,jy^ or aversion, and ( Taste have less 16 :t^fon"iSL"t5;roi°th5ten^^^^^^^^ ''^'i >-5 «r.-- -^--e. or their excitement or gratification ^ * * °° *^' ""*''"** Vhyaieal senses for ^^^ All subjective senses or feeliiigs may be classified as Permanent. Periodical, or Occa- (1) aXSSm^nl^Tarstot^^^^^^^^ ?T«^ three stages :- Permanent subjective senses mav r1«„ h-LJt^ t ' stage of subsidence or abatement. The Excitement of Subjective Semes or Feelings. prodSd'^;^t^X^t;^rTn^^^^^^^^^^^^ -- or feelings are fact that every exciting object must pofseas sStable cL»«t«,« Tr ""^ ""e^'ion to the object in threatening relations »'""«'» '"'e , or, m order to awaken fear, it must be an is produced. It is nwessary to add however that «om«.,K- k *' «»*'J«<'ti'e sense or feeling certain extent 1^ a oonceptin vSly iW^S tseTdefiion^ "Z"'- "^f^ \' "?l'*«<^ *« » assurance with^t that constitutes aotuarkKdKe ThTlVL^''^t^''^Tlj'^}'°''*- *^« imagination, to form a conception of colours oTforms in mv nlT ^ •^ ""^it' ^^^^^ ^''''""y »' *"'*Th"cr?'^j^ " Y' f •^'^ '''^^^'^^' exdrrm7th™ouon:fb:aity'^ "^"■•""^ howe"vJrtt\^rr:;,3"ect;e^Z^^^^ -y add, of imagination. exciiea to a limited extent, by the conceptions Subjective Senses in a State of Activity. morerlrst=!a^a^tt?edtrh*SlL^^^^^^^^^ or negative obligation, and as benevolent ormZ^S^Z^'uZ'Tu^^'^!^ "^ P*'""^^ Some sub ective senses are also, in their verv natnr« khn i„i^ ^^ « P"? ?*•*" persons. fear the opposite of courage, pride the opposite S SuSty "^P°"*" °' ""'"° °»^"'' ' "• with,^rpr^tre*;;xrnt''in^:?s^^^^^^^ revenge. '^ ajiKer. lor example, is associated thus with /^^®ri?P"'^'^® Bubjective senses or feeUngs are. /ol mu °' ™®™ P*'" *" pleasure, ^ y) X hose of desire or aversion, "'•r .1 »<»., g,...a„,i» ta .h. 1.11., ,v ; .. »ii .hi. °R-™nlar,M,iaSi»V'i" ; / H„w !"• ^"'^^^o'. to "ote that nearly au'fS„fnic,*'°° "* *°*« °' """oe- tation prompts me to do dirent AuV IT^^r ?' '^° °8 «^«n this. A subieotiv« aJl^V, ^reoayor^::;^^:T\^.\?^^^- or negative obUgatIon:'a ° i-^^^ifto uie 10 ao aire 5i?^°l »''*-- "iif^"-^^ « 18 well to note here, in ^n««-«-t: -j.^ .. ^ m oonipensative duty " —- ' W injury ; that is. it seeks paoifio"a''tro"n ^6a8' "^'^'ed on gratMoation or S care ""'Ff ^^^^' ^'^^"^^^'"^^^^^^ —1,°' '^« -"^« oause care, and at greater length, the various oCTof t^e ^eSve LZ s^^^^fifLr « S«6;.c«„« «.„,«, or Fe.«„,. arising fr^ a Physical Source. Bensatio^ St ttitrseir; JnTh^ Jett?^'° 7^"°'^ '''^ ""i-tive physical nervous orgini^atlonTd thi miLd Des^ov Hf "''*'?*'* **» *»•« "°°''«°«on between the sense ceases. It the nerve ofTouoh ib des\ZS^*Xef thlT' *'r^*P°"'*'°8 ««^^^^^^ he Bubjective sense of pain which it produces is f^t' ^^Z ^'^tu **''J**"'^* '«°''« <>* »>e«t nor the organs of appetite, and the subjSe Bensee of b^n^.^M^^ ?'"''*"''« °°°°«'«Wwith the »«"« to «i«turb or give pleasure/ °^ ^°°«*'' *'^»"*' """al connection, forever distnt^Jia^tVr t°ie'r!tl*r^^^^^^^^^ the nerves of .«„..,„. -y divide them. (X) iito the ocoa.lo7ai,tL;Varyi^„?^;o^4 ^ iharaoter or relation m iharaoter or relation as as exoite nly gratitude, the receiver, and myself or relation, in order to ion. >f these two ways ; for the two are different in 3tg of malioe. 3 gratified responsively ft not), are each of them ively. The latter form my brother, may exoite ought to pat him in unoatlon responsively eek paoifloation either A subjective sense of so, it prompts mi to bjeotive sense of .: '{. iharacter or relatioa of ition of compensative me, exoitet in ma the Ise BMks paoiaoaiion » paoilcation respon- it seeks pacification ifioation of subjective •cessary to excite the 'g or pacifying them, h the sense may be on, to perception or mind characters or rtainty or assurance »r, spoken of before, tive sense, may often beautiful landscape. pacification, except ^tifioation or paoifi- the exciting cause. ) discuss with more the human mind. tree. i> objective physical smce, that it seems ection between the liing nerve, and the ie of heat, nor the onnecting with the lonnection, forever irves of anna>ii/v;; themselves. We ot sight, hearing. occasional BtimtUative^lVtatio^n: of IL^^^^^^^^^^^ ''"* — -^^ - »^e object^:SnttirnS%lces"r B^^^^^ subjective sense apart from the abunSnt?y^manUe'?"' '" *'' '^"''*°' ^ *^" "^"P*""- '^ *»»« «»«« "'«rred to here. i. arising from a physical source, are maX th^se of Sn or „w-nt! ?v.*^ subjective senses, of desire or aversion. Thev are^ ub^iIv ««^LS kS Pleasure ; the periodical, chiefly or removal of the excitingTause ^ ^ ^^ perception, and subside by gratiflcaUoi subj^ive"si:t"ofTnreVcf "'''"^ "^ '"''"''' ^° ''"^ '^ ^^^^ "-»--« ""''"'li-te to the We subjoin a few subjective senses of each class. Pmo&cai.-The feelings in hunger, thirst, drowsiness, etc. SiOyective Semes of the Second Division. classes, being almost the only Wnd whfch fi^Htio,! Lf^ ? *"* "" Jb" respect than other (see definitioi) can excite or gS The Plea u^^^^^^ ^^ **»« imagination the pleasures of the ima^nat^ TW are nrrmtSlv tv^^^ o?»ptswr*^«^''"^«-^°^"'-- the o^t^^dXoTe^tri'nSraf^^^^^^ duces namely, beauty. In like manner, the no'e of a mLir^o alwtvs LKf /h" t"™" 8B3thetic ear, commingled with the responsive strains of thr^niUn IT,! -^l- ^V^^ ^^° strike the ear. but the melody in which thev Ethroh«ffm?h "^ ^^"'' ^^^ ""t^" appreciative mind is correspondiuKlv disaereeable ThV«,TL/„ t^ excited by them m the Th. m«,l«l ^ „.|,z. ,U1 the oolou,. Md d.o.M, th.1 enter Into ft, onteld. piotnr. -iML%l I"! t^~ \ 18 bathed in aU the harmoni of exoUed sense TW« hill ^^ ""^- '^^°"' """^ °°'°""' ^""^ '""'MtZ ?aS^""V" *'? °^i«" ^-'"bu^^ ''"'' " ""^''''^ theh1.'irnr^ift- a^^J^^^^^^^^^^^^^ ISf IS? h^a^ V^^^^^^^^^ ^r"^*^ eUW . excellently or other^fse. as jrKatT^ttX^"? rSlhra^te^a sense^XX'olnieve;8t'&^*^^^^^^ ^''"•^' /-«"-?!«. "^ the appreciative which should Mouse U where it eStV Tn !l^ """^ "^ ^V^" °"'™"^ '«"°'' ""^d °«1°"". generaUy at once kills it^ power of exciting the /sthetii feeTinJs ***' °* ""*'°°'' Su6;ec«tw i!'e«J%, 0/ this ClasB are Occasional in their Occurrence. inst^ce!,^a*fc ll h" mo^y/ThVire'^t ZrlS^H ^i^-^t'^We emotion ; as. for exciting objects being generally th4/r°the'^^^^^ ^'""^ or aversion ; the stronA Jhen the /xc^tant iaVpX "^in ^e'^r ens^sT^^^^ f-Z ^ "xhTf^S^ r;itt!tr:tr«TLt^^^^^^^^ roi^m-Letrr^rbe^'- '^^^' - --ion^K raTaXl-rornierpK^S^^^^^^^ of the exciting object in exciting chLaoter or rektions a^^^^^ fZJ^^^' m *^/ <'°'»«'>"'"»ce Bively. by its change into non-elcitingchLactero^^^^^^^^^^^ ' disagreeable do so respon- mayS^aXttoTaL^r;ttrht;fS^^^^^ impulse is both gratified and abated ^ appease." we mean that the activS. wUh S«*iihet!:?'"«' ''^ ""^ ^"^'"^^^^ '^•««'-* °1«- «« --«'i-- -Bociated. in If there is a general accuracy in the Table, we do not aim at perfeotness. Subjective Feelingt of the " Heart " I 1 shapes and ooloura ; but le forma and colours, but bjective sense is nothing lie mind. d has wisely constituted formed outward objects repel these appreciative nple, of the appreciative itward forms and colours, would only be a suitable 8 green, red, yellow, etc., r arrangement of things aeli to the outside object, le the one thing excites le subjective derehsh of izcites the corresponding must have marked the active senses of this kind. )t as well as the novelist, I but to watch the play of mes of grandeur or snb- ve no reality in nature, to excite this class of 3d with the possibility of iotitious conception used [ibstratum of the known, leir historical character ; I no stage of existence, Occurrence. lerable emotion ; as, for lesire or aversion ; the or aversion is usually he "heart." The feel- ire or aversion. Their on persons. They are e feelings of conscience, imultaneously ; as, for oment. They appease itly, in the continuance {reeable do so respon- k the impulse or feeling iae," we mean that the f the subjective feelings aparison. aetimes associated, in itness. iih our social relations hAV ATA varjr afwAH»1» 'St of them are either impulses are usually 19 Mean* Whereby the Subjective Feelings of the "Heart" are excited of perception or knowledge, to fuUv arouse thflnTa-tt^ol^T- "™?'»*">n ^y repeated acts ThVmind thus acquires famSaTSf rrrperft?^toowlXe of Sfem tT/' *^«?<»«bip, etc. tion, in which the object in exciting character or r^lftTi^f-/n" In every act of peroep- whole conception is bathed in Ke subfective feel£^^ *f *^' ?^^' *^« that mind. This characteristic of the SSveeSs L^^^ »wakenmg in that it seems almost unnecessary to relterite it here frequently pomted out. We need hardly say here, what must be evident to aU, that so lone as the f««im„ i. * the reperception or remembrance of the exciting conception alwevs briLtiiWnSfT?^ '"*1' flooded by the sentiment which it has aroused '""'"^P"*"'' ^^^^^ """88 it before the mmd, The So%ffie"rhllKtm'S"dlngSVS^Srm^^ ''^''''\^'^ P""/ - 1^" We. farer the subjective feeling of f?aT in this faL then tCUolT' ?h-^' °li°? °',*^« '"7- from the mmd itself Both the robber and the feeling are distinctTrperSd but th« nJi^' subjective statMo^ksTt tkV^ui;^' objLYvT^reZTat^or *'' '""''' ^•"^^"^' ^' "" '"^ M: \ 90 TABLE A.-.SYNOPTICAL TABLE OP A PEW OF THB SUBJEOTIVB o Bbatjtt. Permanent or Ocoasional... In nature the opposite of... Of Desire or Aversion .§-^ i Pleas&nt, painful or Indif- ferent. Emotion, strong or weak .... Desire or Aversion, ener- getic or feeble. Benevolent or Malevolent in its desire or Impulse. Associated in activity with what other feelings ? Benders what other f eeUngs sensitive or excitable ? Bfade sensitive itself by vhat other feelings ? How OTOnsed or excited by obleots of character or relation ? Is excitant or object a per- son or thing ? Win the Imagination of ob- ject in exciting character or relations ezoita it, or needs It the presentation of actual faow f Occasional . Ugllnees Desire Pleasant Habmont. Moderate Desire moderate.. licaning to Benevo- lence. Admiration, Love, Es- teem. Towards a person, Love, Esteem, Ad- miration. Occasional.,. Discordanoe., Desire Pleasant AOKIBATION. Occasional . Strong Desire often energetic. Leaning to Benevo- lence. Admiration, Love, all the tender. All the tender feelings. Desire Pleasant.. Often strong Desire moderate... Leaning to Benevo- lence By objects, in oharao ter of natural or moral beauty. Either Ima«[lnatlon will a lit- tle; presentations of actual fact most. How modified while in a state o* activity? Is the exciting character or relation of the object the ••me as the gratifying or different ' How many ways of gratifi- cation? What are they —direct, responsive, or both? Is it gratified to appease- ment or still active ? Power of impulse aa a mo- tive on the Will. Increased by contrast, decreased by with- drawal of exeitont. The saiQe By sounds, eta, la character of melody. Sounds or things nni- ally. Actual presentation most ; Imagination a little. E steem , Love, Beanty. Towards a person. Love, Esteem, etc. By Beauty, Honnony, etc. By presentations, in oharaoier of excel- lence. dither. Modified by oontnat, etc. One ; direct gratifica- tion. To appeasement.. The same.. One ; direct gratifica- tion. Actual preeantatton, most: imagination a Uttle. ~~-'**™' Modified by contrast, repetition or with- drawal The come To appeasement.. Moral quality . Moderate.. Pure. Often strong... Modw»te One; direct gratifica- tion. To appeasement.. Pure. Pure. OP THH SUBJECTIVE AOUIRATION. Oocaslonal Desire Pleasant Often strong letlo. lavo- Desire moderate. Leaning to Beneyo- lenoe I, aU Ings. in Ddy. un- Hon tton Esteem.Love, Beauty. Towards a person, Jjove, Esteem, etc. By Beauty, Hannony, eto. By presentations, in ohajraoter of excel- lence. ditber. ««t, Actual presentation, most; imaoinatlon a Utiie. Uodifled by contrast, repetition or wlth- drawaL The came ca- One; direct gratifica- tion. To appeasement.. MMarata.. Puw. 31 TBELINGS OP TASTE. WITH THEIR 0HAEA0TEBISTIC8. SuBiinnTT. Occasional , Desire Pleasant.. Often strong.. WONDBB. Occasional.. TTOLINBBS. Desire Pleasant., Desire moderate Desire rariable Awe, Holemnity, Ztererenoe. Awe, Solemnity, BeTerence. Xy Awe, Beverence. By presentations in oharaeter of gran- deur. A thing usually. Aetna! presentation, moat. Vodifled by contrast Variable.. Awe, Solemnity, Fear. Solemnity, Fear, etc. Occasional , Beauty Aversion..... Painful By awe, eto . ^niesame.. By presentations of novel character or relation. Either Variable Aversion variable.. Leaning to malevo- lence. Dislikejmpatienoe, etc. Dislike, Impatience By Disrespect, eto. DiSCOnDlKOE. Occasional,. Harmony.... Aversion Painful By objects in char- acter of deformi- ty, etc. Either Moderate Aversion variable.. Leaning to malevo- lence. Dislike, Impatience Dislike, Impatience LUDIOPOUBNESB. Actual presenta- Actual presenta- tion, tion, most. The same.. One; direct gratifl cation. tTo appeasement.. Moderate.. Tuie. One: direct gratifi- cation To appeasement.. Moderate or vari' able. By sounds, etc., in character of harshness. Sounds or things Persons, usually. Occasional. Desire. Pleasant VoriaWe. Desire often strong.^ Disrespect, etc. Disrespect, etc. By objects in gTO> tesque relatioos, eto. Modified by con- trast, etc. Different., One;responBive gratification. Pure.. To appeasement.. Actual Presenta- tion, most. Modified b y con- trast. Different.. One;responsive gratification. To appeasement.... Variable.. Pure.. Variable.. Imagination will do much. Increased or modi- fled by contrast, eto. Pnre. ... The same. One; direct grati- fication. To appeasement. Often strong. PtlKO •Jj& M: 1 r I! : l: tr IS- "" W^^^^^^^^^ b.«,eat de..e or ave.,„„. and b^stanre \pBuLKTerg°o^ot",°ru\^^^^ *° """T °' »«« aversion. For a young lady. T -«• -^ enough ; but yet the impulse of desire attenZ? i^„ f «oitant, in this case also, is pleasing me. The impulse or aveS of the senl ^^Jf '^" ^°°^'?^8« *l>»t a person has i JK^'t'" "l*"°°« °' vindiction or revenue felf'til""*^ ^ S'^tifled byplaters, in which the sub- eonS""" the relationTor cha;acter! ^idc^i^y^^^rih^"* *^°".?^ *^« imagination cZ conceptions of these relations, or charaoten whfcf hvLi^ • ""'' 'K°^ P'<^°°« fictitious reducing to verities; and there yeriUes tfcwn'o«i»7*J^ ""''°'°»' ''« '^'^d oat the means of . sfamo^ates the feeling, flashes u?S^fo„'he^m^nd atM'- '"• ^^* i°»a8in«tion thusTwhile ~v«„« J?™ '^°*^'°°' ''^^^ "asoro^ntrivls^orliJze T^" J""""*"" fictitious rela. revenge, his imagination conceives of Wuin ml^iffr f * 3^?"' '' * P^^on " animated by At last a method is conceived of J whSh^LS^n^^ ^ "^"^ ^^ "^«°8« °»»y ^ g»ttflei « gratified by making the fancy of hfs mindT°eritv !««„' "^"^ °' ''^^^« ' •°'* ^^^^7 Many subjective feelimrs of tbi« «>^= / ? Tu Ir'" experience. ' marked tendency to ^sS^ withori^J^J^'' °f "*>' '° """""^ ^th others, have a assoMates with contempt; ^rwith SiSion "d*«*!S* ^' °*^''"= '»' instanc^rJI^r^ &"XrpruW' °f t'y iSirSeto.' ''*^'^'- "^"^ «""«•' "-»««: l»ate aowmpanying Synoptl^'Table (LlrlweBt'^^^^^^^ °' 'I'i^' "« •^^^d *« the these feelmm. tn *i,- * . :•"" ^awe «0 we have not sought to reduce analyticaUv w ,1 imm T« it desire or aversloD, and [8 of mere averiion. For y the amiable qualities of >r the Bake of that alone, 1. This would be direct Ise may lead him to seek 8e Btate. This would be kled himself to me, may his ease also, is pleasing me to change this rela- 'ersion. • manner by relations of bat a person has injured gratified by placing the impulse of the feeling, li of pain. The gratify. Pleasure — the change of 1 also show that reapon- tbate on gratifloation— relations. When, how- lot mean that they are I of this class ; and yet. ' may not be capable of ' gratifying relations to oasional ; only some of res, as very properly to it be called permanent. woman who afterwards have its occasions of ooasional, as compared more eranesoent. a state of activity and imagination renders in «rs, in which the sub- 1 the imagination can- can produce flctitious Ind out the means of lagination thus, while Bertain fictitious rela- person is animated by mge may be gratified. Uzing ; and he finally with othtos, have a : for instance, acorn xoites revenge; hate gs, are added in the reduce analytically kte some compoundB> 'khltt nr'll hm nt ~ _ — »» *.- .jitvtv MMd to be eoataiiMd i\ 41 For 'inet 1. QUJ TABLE B.— STNOPTIOAIi TABLE OP SOME OF TUE aUBJEOTIVB PBBLINGB OF Tl Idf I to I to I*OVK Uatukd Fkab CnORAOE HdHHDR Hope Anoku. Oratitudk.. amiiition.. ., PRIllK Humility CL'IIIOSITY... Joy Ohikf Ukvkhknck., ORABAOTEa or PHiaiiioi m a 8tat» of ExciniMirr. Permanent or oocaHiuuol. Id nature the opposite of OcoaHional or iwruiuuent. Oocaainnat or pertuunent Oooasionol Occaaionft] or pennaneut. OooaBiono] Ovcafllunal or pennaneut. Ocoaatonal Occasional Occasional or permanent Occasional or permanent. OccaBinnal or permanent. Occasional Ocooaional.. Occasional.. Occasional... Hatred ... Love Courage.. Feur Of Desire or Aversion, Deapatr... Vexation OccaBloual I'ATiENCK Occasional or I permanent. AVARICE 'Occaeiona] or Sympathy Anxiety JEALOI'SY Anta«,oni8m... Iin'ATlE.VCE.... ftAIETV Contf.mpt Km-ENGE KSTKEM . Pity Dependence .. Contentment.., Occanional or permanent. I permanent. Occasional Occasional. Occasional... Occasional. . Occasional.. Occasional... Occasional .. Occasional.,. Occasional... Occasional. Ocoasiniifti, HnmUity.. Pride Desire Aversion... Aversion, . Arersion.. Deatre Desire Desire Desire.. Impatience... . Benevolence . Aversion . Desire Aversion,. Desire. Desire Desire Aversion,. Desire Desire Aversion.. Desire Desire Desire Pleasant, pain- ful, or indif- ferent. emotion — strong weak. I Pleasant Strong,. Painful Painful Pleasant Painful Pleasant Painful Pleasant IndlfTerent,. Variable Variable Variable Pleasant Painful Pleasant Painful Indifferent.., Painful Pleasant Painful Painful Variable Painful Pleasant Painful Variable Pleasant Variable Pleasant Pleasant strong Strong Moderate Strong Moderate Strong Moderate Variable Variable Variable Moderate Strong Strong Moderate Moderate Weak Often strong.. Moderate Moderate Strong Moderate Moderate Moderate Moderate Often strong.. Feeble Moderate aiodcrato Moderate Desire or Avenlon. Benflvolsnt or Malevo- energetioorfoebls.! *"' " "■ '**■*" °' I inipuiBe. Desire energetic ^Benevolent Aversion energetic . Malevolent Aversion energetic... Leuuing to Malevolence. I Aversion energetic leaning to Malevolence, Aversion energetic. .;Malevolent,. Desire motlerate Desire variable Desire often Btrong, OJiten strong,. tienovolent . ■" • -• ^Leaning to Benevolence, Aversion ouergetlc...; Desire often feeble, , Leaning to Benevolence. Aversion moderate Leaning to Malevolence. Desire energetic jLeaning to Malevolence. Desire moderate Leaning to Benevolence. Desire moderate Aversion strong... Desire moderate,.. Desire moderate.,. Malevolent.., Leaning to Benevolence. Aversion moderate, ;Mal6voltnt Desire variable Malevolent Desire moderate Dentvolent Desire moderate Benevolent . Associated In activity with what other feelings. Beauty, Admiration, Ea- teem, etc. UitUness, Disrespect, Con- tempt, etc. Horror, Despair, Hatred, etc. Hope, Anger, Trust, An- tagonism, etc. Hatred, Fear, Despair, etc. Trust, Courage, etc Pride, Veiatton, C o n - tempt, Uevenge. Love, Sliteem, Trust, etc.. Pride, Eagerness, Avarice, Hope, etc. Ambition. Avarice, Anger, etc. Reverence, Gratitude. De- pendence, etc, GagemesB, Hope. Impa- tlenoe, etc. Courage, Oratltude, Love, Hope. Fear, Impatience. Despair Awe, Solemnity, Humll< ity, etc. Pride, Anger, Fear, etc Hope. Humility, etc... Ambition, Pride. V tion, etc. Pity, Love, Grief Grief, Anger, Fear Love, Anger, Bevenge Hatred, Courage, Anger.. Hatred, Anger, Vexation, etc. Hope, Courage, Joy Anger. Pride, etc Anger, Jealousy Vexation, Love Sympathy, Love, eta.. Love, Hope, Courage,... Hope, Courage, Trust. . Renders what other feel-;w-;i- „„..»,„„ u,„,, . in^s sensitive or ^«lt-^Ma4e "JJ^tJ- j|;elj/yj t9W Benevolence, Jealousy, Sympatliy, etc. Contempt, Auger, Impa- tience, etc. Hatred, Impatience, Re- venge, etc. Hore, Trust, Antagonism, tore, etc. Hatred , Anger,Impatlenoe, etc. Courage, Patience, etc. Antagonism, Revenge, etc. Benevolence, Love, Es- teem, etc Impatience, Pride, etc Anger, Vexation, Revenge, etc. Fear, Patlen ce, etc Impatience, Vexation, etc. Gratitupe, Love, etc Impatience, Despair, Horror. Solemnity, Humility, etc, Anger, Impatience, etc., .. Gratitude, Contentment... Impatience, Anger Pity. Benevolence Impatience, Anger Anger, Revenge Courage, Hope, etc Anger, Antagoniam, etc, ... Contentment, Joy, etc Hatred, Impatience Impatience, Soom Love, ^ouuialtlveness, etc. Benevolence, etc uratltude. Love Gratitude, Joy ity, etc. Lnger. Ant etc. Feai DekX'nir, etc Trus* }( J-, Gaiety, etc Pride, Vexation, etc. , . How Bxomo. h i* excited or aroused bv objeots of <«haraoter or relation r Is the exciting object a per- son or thing '/ Trust, Hope, Dependence, etc. Avarice, Hope, etc Avarice, Ambition, etc Gratitude, Dependence, Reverence. Hope, Avarice, etc Beauty, Admiration, Ei B ' objects of beautiful and amiable teem, etc. j ;haractBr. Uglloess, Pride, Antagon-B objects of disagreeable character, eto, ism, etc. Antagot.;am,Awe,Soletna-'G objeots in character, or relations of ity, etc. i error or dread. Anger. Antagonism, Hoiie, D objectsln relations of encouragement. etc. B objeots in relations that shock ur nodlfy. £ objeotk fu relations of encourage- sent, btc. B objects of vsxKtluus or antagonistic barooter. E objects in character or relations of enevolence, etc. B objects in character or relations of enuwn, etc, B objecta in relations, stimulative of r contrary to self-reipeot B objecta in relations of oontnut with orselves. objects In relations of novelty or lystery, objects in giatlfylng relations Hope, Trust, etc Fear. Love, Distrust, etc. Fear, Esteem. Love, etc Pride, Jealousy, Ambition, etc. Love, Hope, etc objeots in relations of bereavement, ;c. B objoots In elevated character, etc Bi Pride, Ambition Love, Esteem Fear, etc [iove* Avarice Anger, Impatience Hatred, Pride, Fear, ete. Hope, Courage, etc Anger, Priie, etc Anger, Vexation Beauty, Admiration, etc. Love, Esteem, etc Hope, etc Hope, Trust, flto objeotB in relations of dlsappoint- lent, etc. Bipbjects in relations of hope or comfort. ^bleot8 of relation, aa acquisition of I od by others. B; objects in relations of provocf tion, I D. B; objects in disagreeable cbaracter or I latious. B) ibjecte of cheerful character or rel>- t ins. B; ibjects of hateful character, etc... Bi bjects in relations of Injury, etc.... B; ibjeota of excellent otaaraoter B; bjeots In relations of distress, eto.. By bjecta in relations of benencence, eto. B; bjects in relations of happiness, oom. ft t, etc. same Table. Our object by lUi A person A perfOB Either ither Eitner Either A person A person,.... A thing A person. ... Things Either Either. Persons Persons Either Thinp Things Persons Either Either Persons Things, eto. Either Persons Persons Persona Persons Persons {£] Wl Ac Ac l: El Ex Ex Ex Ex Ex i Ex Ex Ex Ex El Ex Ar Ex Ar Ar Ex Ex Ex Ex El Either .. El able is not so much to supply a full list of the elamnifa V aUBJEOTIVB FBBLINQ8 OF THE "HEABT," WITH TUEIH cnARAOTBRIBTlCS. How Gicrru). * oicited or uouMd bv obJeoU if '^baraoter or relation ? Ii th6 txdtlng (jbjeot a per- ■on or thmg 'f loti ol beautiful and amlalile iter its of dlsagrteable charaoter, eto. 3ti In ofaaraoter, or relation! of or ilread. tiln relatloDi if encouragement flte in relations tbat ibook ur ict» iu rolstlons of enooorage- btO. !t8 Of vaxi.tiuui or anfeagonlrtio ter. ot« In obaracter or relatione of jlence, etc. ct8 In character or relatione of a, eto- otB In relations, stimulative of trary to self-respect. ;t8 In relations of contrast with res. cts in relations of novelty or tu In ftiatifying relations Its In relatlona of bereavement, its tn elevated cbaraoter, etc eta in relations of disappoint- etc. its in relations of hope or corofort. !te in attractive charootor or re- :tB in relations of Buffering )ta in relations of tmoertalnty, etc. its of relation, aa acqalsition of y others. cti in relations of provoortlon, cts in disagreeable cbaraoter or :te of cheerful character or rela- :tB of hateful character, eto... ;ts in relatione of injury, etc... its of excellent character its in relations of distress, etc. Its in relations of benellcenoe, etc. !tB in relations of happiness, oom< tc. A person A person Either nther Gitner Either A person A person A thing A person. Things Either Either Persona Persons Either Thinga Things Persons Either Either Persons Thinga, etc.. Either Persons....... Persons Persons Persons Persona Either Excited ohlc&y by facta Excited by facta or imagination.. Excited mostly by facta Excited moatly by facta How MOPIFIID. Will the imagination of the object in ex- D„_ ,, ,,. .»«.«^u olUng character or relations excite it; " °Tl.;^ fn" . ""^ or needs it the preseuUtlou of actual '""Mlle'l *hUe In ao- Actual prrsentation will do so most ; Im- agination little. Aetna! nrosentatiou will do so ronsfc ; Im- ariiuallou little. Imagi.iation will do much ; but actual prcRentation of the fact graatly more. Actual fautH will do most; Imagination will help. Actual fitots ^111 do most : Iniagloatiop Wil'. ftcMlflt. Aotnal (acts will do most ; Imagination much. Excited chiefly by faoia Uvity.' Is the exciting obaracter or relation of Cue object the sume an tho gratifying, or different ? Excltedchlefly by facta; also by Imag- ination. - Excited chiefly by facta Excited chiefly by facta. Excited chiefly by facta Bxoited chiefly by faoia Excited mostly by facta Excited mostly by facta Aroused chiefly by facta Excited chiefly by facta Aroused mostly by facta Aroused mostly by facta Excited chiefly by facta Excited chiefly by facta Excited mainly by facta Excited by facts Excited by facts Bxoited by facts.. ,^ Excited by facts .idE Excited by faots and Inaginatlon,. By ooDtrait, suspense, etc, i)y contraat. repetition, etc. By repetitloQ, etc By repotlttoaieto.. By c(intrflBt,atc Byrepetltiou,eto... By repetition, etc... By oontrut,etc ByreiietltioQ.eto.,. By reiietition, * ^^^^^^^H^ ^|i i . ■1^ i H' \ H^ ^1 .>8- Sul^eeUve Feeling* of the Conscience. It ifi well to rnmnrk at the oiilKet that Home iubjeotive (edingK of oonioienoe have in their gennral oliarooter, a very olose retemblanou to thi)He of the "Heart." All are uot itrlotly feelings of " onght iieai," a oUri to which wu Rhnll Hpeoialty refer, but all oonoern themteive* with duty or obliKatiou, and they are tluu (•utitlnd to bo olaHMud among the feHlings of oon- Boienoe. Than, the approbativeneHH, ehame, ropentanoo, eto,, attending a good or bad act, are inHtancee of thin kind. There i» no d«partment of the human mind which has all ita subjective feelings prtmisely nniform ; othiirwiHu, tho various functions of that dopartment could not be carried on without eitraneouM help. It may hnwevnr be affirmed that generally the subjective feelings of conscience differ v.ldely in their ohiiraoter from those of tlie Heart, or of more desire or averiiou. Instead o( a subjective impulse, attracting n» to, or re pelling us from, certain things which we lov« or hate, they oome in the nature of ' ' ought-ness,'' obligation or command. Though differing in the character of thuir impnlso, thoy are Just as real in our nature as the sensations of h()»t and pain, while they po«BOSH an anthoritativa power far beyond these. They are impulses of such a nature that when complied with, it is more correct to say " they are paoifled " than that " they are gratified ; " and the word panifioation is the one which, in reference to them, we adopt in preference to the word gratifioatio '. Every feeling of this class has a referunou to duty ; and it is c. <)ar that the subjective feelings of conscience were intended by our (jreator to be the suprrm rectoral or governing subjective senses of man's nature. Every other subjective feeling was tu find its gratification within the scope which the rectoral or the higher ones permitted. And even now, in man's state of depravity or moral derangement, it is evident that the pnbjection of nil other feelings to the legitimate sway of these, would lift a man into a state of happinoHS barely conceivable to the human mind, which is now the prey of the misrule and the anarchy pro- duced by the usurpation of supremo power by principles or feelings which properly should have been subordinate. The reason why this class are called feelinga of positive and negative obligation, is be- cause all duty resolves itself in that way. They prompt as, (1) as to what we should do ; and (2) as to what we should not do. It may justly be said that this class of feelings contains the very essence of all morality ; oonformity with their impulse is " good," violation of it is " evil." They claim authority over everv other class of subjective senses, a olaim which, even in the grossest states of barbarism and heathen ignorance, they do not wholly relax. If their behests are disobeyed, they do not neglect to punish the offender with the laah of their own subjective condemnation and remorse, as well as with the jar and discord of the subjective feelings of other classes. If, on the contrary, their promptings are complied with, they reward richly with their own approval and with the large gleanings from other harvest fields of feelings. They mfnutely concern themselves with all the social relations of oar being, and extend their authority into every possible ramification of life. The oonsoienoti has correctly, we think, been called Qod's vicegerent. The sabjeotive senses of conscience are just the precepts of God's Law written by Himself, not with pen or graving-tool, but with His creative ^ger, in sentences of living, palpitating, sabjeotive sense on the clean sheet of human consciAsness. Excitement of the Subjective Feelingi of Contcience. I am so constituted that the moment I know of myself doing a certain malioions act, there arises within my mind a subjective feeling ol " ought-not-ness " that I should do so. The perception, inception, or knowledge of myself in this malioioas relation, creates in my mind invofnntarilf at the same moment a subjective feeling of " ought-not-ness," which en- swathes the whole conception of myself in this wicked relation. Were the act to be done by another person, my subjective feeling towards him would be precisely similar. It is not, in this case, a mere feeling of like or dislike, desire ur aversion, that influences me, that merely attracts or repels me, but an authoritative and inflexible sense of " ought- not-ness" that I should do so. The impulses of all feelings of mere desire or aversion, though powerful enough, may be made to yield to one another, or their claims be entirely set aside. Their impulse is the stimulus of petition. But the impulse of this sabjeotive " ought-ness " or" ooght-not-ness " if one of authoritative and inflexible command, that will neither submit to be set aside nor gi re precedence to any other. Again, I hear that one neighborr has vilely slandered the oharaoter of another, and that i\ 3 41 iin 24 f/««Jf **"'• v^"°^ ««»»« oan neyer be created hv hX^^ S^^l^ J^ ?"' °* ourselves as our jeotive^senseB but never create them by habit; for habit can regulate such sub. possible ?or::rs„l;r«iL'u1hVC^^^^^^^ Pr social relation iiobTect'";?^'!f'"!'^ ''^t^'* same manner The excht^"'! ''<"»,.o'her subjective sense"! at th« ^aL"* particular character or relation which o„ hl^* ooncep .on must always contain n*'?' ??"'A« o' ^"ot a nature as to arouse a su&tfvr""'*'^ P"^""*- Whatever con' "ganl to any act. The mere flo itious ^ncentL ft*"'* "^" °' " onghtneas." etc!S arouje, to a certain extent a JSnSflCiS'mv^"'''*- ""*"*" '« Ws monJ^^Su It IS, however, by the nreBentatirm^/ '*f"°8.>° my conscience against the act correct and as the only corrMtrXofSut; L"l *'''' '^"A'?'" «''"'«■ are clearly given us as a LIS" v^'arof =£2S!r; 3r"^"-.-5.-„Kr.'';; -£ the angels and an rational or m3cr°aLTeJn„^l*.^^^^^^ in common with that of In listening in •> .i._ ai..^ . . e -ri^.m.. nr in this malioions rela- ulse of which ig that he onr nature that we may t less can we root them aart of ourselves as our can regulate such sub- aoter or social relation >ther subjective senses, )n must always contain ed by the mind arouses If a person manifests t he should be a difler- ual may steal from me the moment that the lid swathe themselves dnoe. Whatever con- ughtness " or " ought- character or relation ; ' thus aroused, always (y. by putting the ex- eelings of conscience, ition and pacification noe to the subjective 8. We do not always •oughtness," etc., in of a right or wrong of the conscience in ing sentiment of our ir subjective feelings t as a verity, or as to on of these feelings, for his money, will Inst the act. lubjeotive feelings of tion or pacification; ienoe, in connection etc. dearly given us as a rise in the mind, in provision made for lation. In reply to his whole nature is ing on whom he is lus, is to destroy or astern thataokaow- reward or punish- mmon with that of is also noteworthy ot duty, are of a re possible, giving •unishment subjeo- the subjective feel- erience clear of all OS, that introduce oisnce are excited, join the following se of a man treat- is relation arouses 86 in my mind a subjective condemnatory feeling or a sense of ■* onght-not-qess," that he should liave done so. The man stands before me, in the conception so created respecting him, swathed with the condemnatory subjective sentiment whicL he with his act has aroused ; and I call his act unjust. If we compare his act with one of a still more flagrant character, the latter excites in us a still stronger condemnatory feeling, and we say the latter is more unjust still. If anyone asks us why this condemnatory feeling is excited within us at such a pre- sentation, we can only answer that we cannot tell. It is just a law of our nature to regard thus appreciatively everything that transpires around us, and we cannot help it. We thus call every thing nr act unjust that excites this condemnatory subjective feeling within us. By comparing a number of oases (that is, a number of objects of exciting character or relation) which excite this condemnatory subjective feeling within us, and, analyzing them, we are able to form a clear intellectual conception of the elements of injustice, as they exist in the external objects; and having thus formed a distinct idea of injustice in the mind, we are able to tell at once what is just or unjust, without even a single appeal to the anbjeotive feeling itself. In precisely the same way that we form the idea of injustiae we form the conception of a just act, from the acquittive subjective sense which it arouses within our minds on cognition ; so also of good or evil in outward things, from the approbative or disapprobative subjective sense, aroused within us, by the perception or inception of such things. This principle ap- plies, in like manner, with reference to all the other subjective feelings of conscience. The subjective feeling is thus the primary source of onr conception of injustice, or of any other of these ideas, arising within the sphere of conscience, the " Heart," etc. ; and it is thus in the mind of man the first and only guide to the formation of an intellectual standard as to the moral qualities of outward things or acts. Every man thus carries in his mind two rules or standards, which he may apply at any time : (1) the subjective feeling itself ; and (2) the merely intellectual one, that applies to the outward thing, or act, as possessing such character or relation as is known from past ex- perience to excite the subjective feeling. "Bightness" and "wrongness," as subjective ieelings or senses, are no part of the outside physical elements constituting an act. Rightness or wrongness, as intellectually seen in the outward act, is just the peculiar relation which it sustains to a moral agent. This peculiar relation, intellectually seen, arouses the apprecia- tive subjective sense, acquittive or condemnatory, that apprehends its moral quality ; for we f>eroeive no moral quality in the act till the sense is aroused. It is evident, then, that there must be a certain excellence, or the contrary, in these out- 'Ward moral relations, when they arouse these appreciative subjective senses in perception. We trust what we have said in the foregoing remarks will sufficiently show the manner in which all subjective feelings of conscience are excited, and, also, how cold intellectual concep- tions of the moral character, or moral relation of the outside objects are formed, apart from the subjective feelings which are their primary sonroe. Subjective Feelingt of Corueienee in Activity. As shown elsewhere, this class of feelings, like all others, admit of pacification directly or hy responsion. We call their method of appeasement pacification, instead of gratification, for the reason, that in general their mode of appeasement really partakes more of the nature of pacification than of gratification. As these subjective senses concern themselves with duty, and are more of the nature of authoritative command than of desire or aversion, whenever an exciting object is put into the relation or character to which their impulse prompts, their method of appeasement in general is correctly described as pacificatory. As an example of direct pacification, we come to know of an act of disinterested kindness heing done by one man to another. A subjective sense of approbativeness is aroused within us by the knowledge of it. This man's act being in itself good, of course gratifies or pacifi- oates the impulse of the approbative sentiment which it has kindled ; and the impulse tends to no other mode of pacification. This, then, would be a case of direct pacification. If, how- ever, this act of his cost him considerable self-sacrifice, it possibly may arouse within us sub- jectively a sense of " ought-ness " that he should be rewarded. This would be a clear case of responsion. Both modes of pacification among this class of feelings are common enough ; but, as already mentioned elsewhere, all of this class of feelings that are aroused by the violation of duly. S6$k p&cification bv i>uttins the sxcitics obiect into ths T'sl^tinns t^r r.hjirsLriAr d -v^**). pensative duty. For instance, t&e knowledge that a man (with whom I am dealing) is my neighbour, ought to excite in me the subjective feeling that I ought not to iif|ure him. The impulse within me here is non-injury to my neighbour; and if the relation which it suggests 'N t ■»( 1 1 96 SilT?o«pi;"i\J\»^^ Klo hf "" W""" •^^•'•»' performance of duty. But if I « » owe of Lty violated? and the yioUt?ono^f"th'^ 'njnry (which wiU not undo'^^^. then thi, Mnse or feeling, that I oaght to ^Ikehtmr^^Ir^- ^k^' «°»"»°"y woites in me a subjective 1 18 pac fled wheifl put hto into the rel^io^wWoh".''^ ■*" »"' °^ compensative justice Vand there arises within me a subjective sen!! ^i?ii^^." suggests. If I faU even in doing this ness... that I should be ^nXd H^lhe oonSof t?."'^ '?".r* ""^ •"'°'»>'" of ^Tgh - ln«« ■"Pi*'""""* '«l°««d of him, while mvo,JnJ^! °«8hboar toward me been more JU8t.ce made requisite, the subjective feriinge«lte7hftL^T^^^ bim ^^s less than simple are e^^LX^ofrplTtlSS^^^^^ subjective ,en.e or feeling, and th«T T- ""bjective feeUngs if conscience ^th^^nnT^'r °"V» ^^Hed retributive jlrtioe. mora. -t«es,jhiTtapXr7pe^ero?:;;«? f^' '"^ ""«*<>»>« - weU-trained the term occasional. Maiy of them areSZJii^ 4^"'*'"'^ " """^ applicable to them than etc. ., whUe others are onf o^^X^^yZ^'^Slr^^^Z^^^ "itrdl^tfS; --«' 1\ Their Suhtidenee or Abatement, Of ^e;r LttV^aWrte'r^^^ -«- - P^— *. moa* object ,n o pacificatory relations Sr c^afoot* ' *^® *""' »»e«g-by putting the exciting general clS:'15'?JS;S^{S'«''«»'jective feelings of conscience maybe divided into two ±*iS« *? the viiSo' SJ*"J U.'&?:i£S"«« "' •'oty «r itB^^ewa^d ■ and Sf thS fffl ^''''l'»°"»i««*e«?Mivirion "'"'»""'« compensation. These classee might wiU beqmeted only by our puttij the eKcitEbfeoH^^^k-"* " •""'"iteMve order that ... ^J>en, again, as members ofthe first S «n?^f. .« 0»e pacifying character or relation. l^o!,7 T'"."' »<«l«ittivene., anTcSivMew fJ^^Tif K***^ '*"'^' ''^ »>"« »»>« sX r'°?«'«"':.a»«o. approbativeness and SnrobX^tlS tt. ''y*''e perception of right or W**"^" ' °' ^"^ """^ •'"• '^"•PProwM'eneM, the tubjeotive senses appropriate can ha^d?ytn;?tt«reStKt'S^^^^^ of this class, but we oipatory subjective sense, such as f^ro?a^n£i ^•'"'*^ " sMmulatives to duty, the Anti reward, etc. They all Uf't ^ixVZ^A^^U'':£^Z:\:'fT'''^'^'- e^Pecfat/venis of or evU consequences of a certain courw of^^uct *** '^''*^' ""^ P"^* ««* "»e good right acTldot:'the^'a1,jSt/ve";;iiSS'^:^,f i^^^^^ -""»• within himself. «,d the ness of reward, all briiSto wS e3n2 an ii^fntf^' ""V'PP'ob'tiveness. or expMtativ^ , If, however, aU meSibere of theTst dsS^ JST ?• '"H ^ ^^^^ *» "«•« » rewari neglected tiU the chance teperform it *s bom o^bi^'""'^!*?«.*° "»« '^«>t "t. and it is SiTt""' )S^ «*'*"» «'er to &<« sah^e^KldW, SfZT:^' iV^,""*' 'I'e lubjoot i. no yrt their urgent demands." If direct comnei««tl«,f^.^ within his mmd still clamour loudly nwke it ; if wrong is done, theyurgo^Tto ^^ IJ^^f*)*' hey importunately mge Urn to Sy hK± «T^'"'»"7e "SXtio" A^SStSsUM* "M^-^ey ^si.1 nL«?' °<'?"*>andmg, urging, threatening; but il^tJ^l !Sl »>w brain are still heard pcMation IS gone b^ond reoall. these and Xi sSbiS'vf^^nn^K.'''"^"^"^/" ^^^ com- eame class, light fiercer fires or ratW «t^!r v 'u " , "^htnasses " within him of the compensationT and nothSS^he ciS do wS iS!;;\h/f' *""• .'^^^ <«em.nd lX£l S\hr^l-*".^*'*P'^''^«"^^<>'*he^in>p^Ui& Jhey^cre.te within Wm of the subjective tenses of ill^eaart ™tlin«l !?. j ^ ponienment He becomes the nrav voices with a|«lect. "*-«'«»'. remorse, or despair, because he has treated their ki^dS _l!!!:Z!±lfJf!^'^<>^ "i ^ Simple example. -ou^ht-not-nee.. u -^u^H^^^^iiis;;;;?;;^^ rmanoe of duty. But if I h will not undo), then this ezoitea in me a subjective Bompeng»tiYe jastioe ; and f I fail even in doing this, red by another of " ought- 3ur toward me been more him was less than simple Igo of his conduct would at excited by my own act itive lenae or feeling, and called retributive justice. duty, seek paoifloation in religious or welltrained e applicable to them than he senses of right, wrong, lorae, despair, eto. otive or permanent, most —by putting the exciting pay be divided into two Its reward ; and (2) those a. These classes might Itive feelings of " onght- jjeotive " onght-nessea " ly marking --it our duty, ttonty, and »toey demand authoritative order that ng character or relation. > duty, we have the sttb- 9 perception of right or otive senses appropriate *n of this class, but we ives to duty, the Anti- nent, expectativeness of uid point out the good itbin himself, and the veness, or expectative- Q is itself a reward, the right act, and it is ), the subject is not yet I aroused by a violation id still clamour loudly tttusately urge him to It neglectad, they insist IS brain are still heard >rtnnity of diiwt com- es " within him of the y demand retributive ly create within him He becomes the prey M treated their kinder dd a simple example. live side of an aot. TVE DUfei, her feel- n, . jr excit- **he two ways of f^ moral quality? Afpbased. POWBB. ondem- B differ in quality, Well-|B. 88, in-'Bi I, eto !b[ etc of re- Is it pocifled to appease ment or does the feeling still remain active? Qenerally active.. In special cases to appease- mont, though etlH active. To appeasement... What power as an impulse or motive on the WiU? Variable Pure, To appeasement.... To appeasement... To appeasement.... To appeasement.... leitlve— I, WeU B,D!s«p- to. Well 3, etc eto etc etc Iveness, if pun- eta I n. To appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement,. To appeasement.. ^ pure in quality. %iIerinquaUiy, Equality a Bi q Ill q li To appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement.. feelings Great power.. Great power.. Great power.. Variable Variable Moderate Great power . Great power . Great power , Great power .. Great power,. Great power .. Great power . Variable . Variable . Variable . Variable . Variable . i Variable . QUALITT. Uoral quality. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pare. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Impure. TABLE C— SUBJECTIVE FEELINGS OF CONSCIEKCE, BECTOBAL, AND PEBTAINING TO POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE DUTY, AS PBEOEDING. ATTENDING, A Chabacter op Fbbzjkos IK A Btitb of Excitbmbmt. Occasional or Per- manent. In nature the oppo- PositiTe or site of \ Negative painful or **'S,®**°°' fn differ, i^^r* °' ent '^"^ Impnlse, energetic or feeble, Benevolent or male vnlent in bearing of impulse. Associated in activity vitb what other feelings. Renders what other feel- T>„„rt--„-. npnnHivn impM ings sensitive or excit-;"-®""^-"^ sensuive, itaeu able? by what other feelings ? How is it excited or a objects of characte tion? I. TH0B3 REI*ATINO TO DUTY AMD ITB BBWABD. 1. A sense or feeling that there is a God A senseof Besponsibility to Qod A sense of Acquittlveness towards certain actionf>, which we call jURt. A sense of Condemn atlvenesB towards certain actions, which we call unjust, Do. high degree. P^^ .-. rn od . degree . Oc, high degree. Per.ujod.degi'ee. Oc. high degree. Per. mod. deKr'O. Oc. hiah dagreo Per. mod. degree. A sense of Approbativeness towards certain actions, which we call Co. hinh degrer Rood. A sense of Dlsapprobativeness towards certain actions, which we call evil. A sense of Well-desert towards the doer of what ie just and good ■2. Seusesofoughtness to do those thinss which we call just or good. Senses of oughtnotness to do those things which we call unjust or evil. Taking these two last classes of senses, separating them, end patting them, for the sake of brevity, in groaps, we have :— I (a) All those senses of oughtness, which are reepectivel> em- Sloyed in prompting us to Love, to Adore, to Wo'R'iip, to bey, to Cultivate just and good feelings towaril. \ioa. d.aegree. Oo. high degree. Per. mod. degree. Condemnatlveress. . Acquiitiveness Oisspprobati venoRR . Approbativeness lU-desert Oughtuesses.. Negative.. Expectiveuess of reward or acquittal.. Oc high degree, Fer.mod. dwg^ee. Ou. high degree. Per. uir>d. degree. II. Those nBLATiNo to the Violation op Duty akd its Dibibov and Ketbibutive Compensation. 1. Direct Compensation. SsDBeof oughtness to make compensation if still possible [Occasional or Per manent. 2. Retributive Compensation. I Senseof Gnilt jOccaalonal Expect, of reward Appre. of puniBh- ment. Sense of Shame Sense of Xll-desert Sense of Remorse Sense of Despair Sense of Expectativerass of punlsbment .. Occasional Occasional . Oeoasional . Oooasional . Oeoasional ■ Hope .. Pleasant. Variable Pleasant.... Painfnl Pleasant... Painful Pleasant.., 1 Onghtnotnt^ses Positive... i Onghtnesses Negatire ., Oughtnotnessei. ■ iPositive ... Fainfol.... Pleasant. Pleasant. Painful.. Variable.. Variable.. Variable., Variable.. Variable- Variable.. Variable . Painful.... Pleasant . Pleasant., Painful Painful Painful Painfnl Painful Painful Variable,. Variable .. Variable.. Variable.. Variable. Variable- Variable . Variable . Variable.. Variable . Strong Strong Strong Energotio... Energetic.. Energetic, Energetic.., Energetic... Energetic lEnergetic. Benevolent.. Malevolent... Benevolent.. Malevolent .. Benevolent... I Energetic. Energetic... Energetic... Energetic. Benevolent.. Benevolent... Benevolent... Benevolent... Energetic. Energetic Energetic. . iBenevolent.. Reiponiibility, eta Feeling that there is a God, etc. Responsibility, Approba- tiveness, etc. Ill-desert, Dlsapprobatlve- nesB, etc. Well-desert, Hope, Acquit- UvenesB, etc, Condemnativeness, 111- desert, etc. Approbativeness, Hope, Acquittlveness, etc. This class associated with all feelings exercised to- wards God. This class associated with all feelings exercised to- wards God. This class associated with all feelings exercised to- wards man. This clsss associated with all feelings exercised tO' wards man. Besponsibility, etc., Acquittlveness, condem- nativeness, etc. Approbativeness, W e 11 - desert, etc. DisapprobativenesB. I H - desert, etc. Well-desert, Hope, etc Ill-desert, Shame, etc Expectativeness of re word, etc. . By tbeoughtnessos.etc. l^y fpoling that there is a (iod.etc. H> the oughtueEses.etc.,., Dy the ougbtnotnesses, etc. By the oughtnePEes, etc.... By the ougbtnotnesses, etc. Uy approbativeness, etc... Feelings of c painful kind. Shame, etc. 01s SB renders Hensitive— By feeling that there is a ApprobativeneHB, Well- God, etc. desert, etc. CondemnativeneBB,Di8Bp-|By feeling that there Is a probativeuess, etc. ' God, etc. Approbativeness, Well ■ By feeling that there is a desert. God, Responsibility, etc Condemnativeness, etc... By feeling that there is a God, Besponsibility, etc. Feelings of kind. a pleasantjHope, Joy, etc... Responsibility, etc.. . Acquittlveness, eto.. Quilt. Remorse, etc Quilt Remorse, etc Responsibility, eto. Shame, Remorse, eto.... Guilt Remorse, eto Shame, Remorse, etc.... ni-desert, Despair, etc.. Remorse, Shame, eto.... Ramorae, Despair, eto .. Shame, Remorse, eto... Remorse, Despair, etc.. Remorse, Despair, tto Despair, Expectaliveness, etc. ExpectatlvenesB of pim- ishment, eto. Remorse, Despair, etc. Responsibility, etc.... Guilt etc Responsibility, eto... Guilt, Shame, etc Guilt, Remorse, etc.. lUdesert, eto By objects In relatio sign dependence, et By objects in relatio peutlence, etc. By objects in relatio] tice. etc. By objects in relatic 'justice, etc. By objects in relation: 'doing. By objects in relatioi doing, etc. By objects in relation doing, eto. By objecte in relatior tive duty towards G By objects in relation tive duty cowards G By objects in relation tive duty towards m By objects in relationi tive duty towards m By objects in relatioi lected duty. By objects in relation attended to. By objects in relations By objects In relations By objects in relations By objects in relatioi dome. By objects in relatioi doing. By objects in relation nope. By objects in relation neglected. NoTB.— The remarks^ made in note at the bottom of the Table of the subjective fselings of the Heart, more or loss apply to the subjeoti DUTY. AS PRECEDING. ATTENDING, AND POIXOWING IT. TABLE NOT TO BE SUPPOSED TO CONTAIN ALL THE SUBJECTIVE FEEtlNGB 0^ CONSCIENCE. '.Rendered Bensitive itself I by what otber feelings ? ... By the oughtneBsos.etc . i:- hy fpoling that there is a (tod, etc. 1- By the oughtueEses, etc.... I- Oy the oughtnotueBBOB, etc, . Uy thooughtaepses, etc.... ,. Hy the oiigbtnotneHBes, etc. ) - By approbativeness, etc By feeling that there is a Ood, etc. By feeling that there ia a Qod, etc. By feeling that there Is a Qod, Responfcibility, etc, By feeling that there is a God, BespoDBibllity, etc. BesponBibility,eto.. Acquittlvenesfl, etc. BesponBibllity, eto.. BesponsiblUty, eto.. Guilt, eto Beaponslbillty, etc.. Guilt, Bhamo, eto... Guilt, RemorfiO, eto. Ill-desert, etc How KXCITBS. How ill it excited or aroused by objecta of character or rela- tion? By objects in relatiooB of de- sign depenJence, etc. By objects in relations of de- pendeDce, etc. By objects in relations of jus- tice, etc. By objects in relations of In- 'justice.eto. By objects in relations of good- 'doing. By objects in relations of evil- doing, eto. By objects in relations of well- doing, eto. By objects in relatiors of posi- tive duty towards Ood. By objpcts in relations of nega- tive duty towards Qod. By objects in relations of posi- tive duty towards man. By objects in relations of nega- tive duty towards mao. By objects in relations of neg- looted duty. By objects in relations of duty attended to. By objects in relations of Injury, By ohjeots In relationB of Injury. By objects in relationB of injury. By GbJBcts in relationb of evil- doinr. By objeots in relations of evil- doing. By objects in relations without By objeots in relations of duty noglectod. Either Persons Persons chiefly. Persons chiefly... Persons chiefly. Persons ohlefly. Persons Is the excitinn object person or thing ? FenonB chiefly.. Personsohiefly.. PerBons chiefly.. Persons chiefly.. Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Either Will the Imagination of the object In exciting character or relation excite it, or neeilH it the iireaentation of actual fact? How is its strength moHlfled while In ac- tivity ? ImnfTication will a little : preaentation of facta c.iieflv. Excited chiefly by fiicta. Excited chiefly by facts Excited chiefly by fiictB Excited chiefly by facts Excited chiefly by fnctn Excited chiefly by factu Exolted chiefly by facta ; by imagina- tion a little. Excited chiefly by factH; by imagina- tion a little. Bxcited chiefly by fuctB; by imaglaa- tion a little. Excited chiefly by fact« : by Imagina- tion a litUe. Excited by facta chiefly ; also by imag- ination much. Excited by facts chiefly ; also by imag- ination much. Excited chiefly by facts.. Excited by foots Excited by facta Excited by facts Exalted by facts Excited chiefly by facta. Exoited chiefly by facts UODIFIZD. PAClvntD. Ia the exciting character or How many ways of paolflca- relation the same as the tlon ; what are they — pacificatory or different ? j direct or responsive ? Are tbe two ways of! like moral (luality? ' By repetition Increased, etc. By repetition of excitant locreapeil. etc By repotition, etc By repetition increased, etc. By repetition, contrast,. By repetition, contrast, etc, linoroaaed by repetition, eto. Increased by repetition eto. Increased by repetition, etc. [nereaaed by repetition, etc. Increased by repetition, Increased by repetition. Increased by repetition, •te. Increased hy repetition, eto. Often two: direct and re- sponsive. Often thesame Often difTcTent Often the same Different Ono ; reaponBive Thesame jOne; direct Different jOne; roBponslTe. Thesame One; direot Often differ in qnality. In special cuaea to appekiso- ' Tnout.th.)UBh still active. Tu uppeaaiiuent Thesame. Different. .. The some... One ; direct .. One; responsiTe.. One; dinot Different.. One; responsive.. Different The same or different.. Modified by contra Bt. Modified by etc. Modlflod by Uodifled by etc. Modified by eto. Modified by etc. repetition, repetition, repetition, repetition, repetition, repetition. Different.. Different . Different.. Different .. Different.. Different .. Different.. One; responsive Either direct or respooBive. One or twd ; reiponeiTe . . One ortwo ; responiive, . One; responalTe. One; responsfv* One; responsive One; reiponsive One; responsive U it poclfled to appease- ment or does the feeling HtUlremaiu active? Whpt power as an impulse or motive on the Will? .Generally active.. To appsasement... To appeasement . Tc appeasement.. To appeasement.. To appeasement... To appeaaement. . I :To appeaaement.. ..jTo appeasement.. i Often diSn in quaUty. DiOet In qgalit; ... To sppauement... To appeasement... To appoisement... To appeasement.. Power. QDU.ITX. Moral qnality. ;To appeasement Either pure In qnaUty. To appeasement j. Variable Qreat ppwer... Great power.. Grea.t power.. Variable Variable Moderate Great power ... Great power ... Great power .. Great power Great power .. Great power .. Qreai power .. Variable .. Variable .. Variable . Variable . Variable . Variable . Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Fnre. Pure. Fnre. Pure. Pure. Pure. Pure. Impure. ge o< the Heart, more or leu apply to tbe aubjective leellngi of tbii Table. Thoii«h defective, these Tables ate a step in the right direetlon. God demands my obedience, and I have a snbjeotive gense of "oughtne8<^" that I shonli} render it. This lense of the First Class has been aroused within me by the Divine command. I cannot divest myself of its impalse, and it will not be pacified until I comply with its be- hest and put myielf in pacifying relations. But my own relation to the Divine command would not alone arouse this subjective sense of " oughtness " within me ; it would be excited in precisely the same manner at the thought of any other creature disobeying God. Then while I am in this state other subjective senses of the First Glass may act upon me. The thought of failure on my part arousex a strong condemnatory feeling against such a course — or the thought of compliance, a deep sentiment of approbativeness in favour of it. Also, a subjective apprehensiveness of punishment, springing out of the same excitant, may warn me of the fearful consequences. However, this great mental conflict, kept up, it may be, on the one side, by subjective senses of the conscience, and on the other by some strongly insubordinate subjective feeling of the " Heart," may terminate in favour of the latter, and I disobey. In- stantly my own conduct arouses within me a strong subjective disapprobativeness against myself — a sense of ill-desert, or even that of remorse or despair, so forcibly described by the Apostle Paul, when speaking of the reprobate, " to whom there remaineth no more hope, but a fearful looking for of jadgment." It may be said of subjective senses of the conscience, in common with all others, that lome of their number have a greater or less tendency to associate in excitement with certain others, ,or even to produce it. This is so clear that we need scarcely cite examples. The work of the Imagination (see Def.) in the excitement or pacification of subjective senses of the conscience, is in general precisely similar to the service it performs in connec- tion with Bubjective senses of the " Heart." Its merely fictitious conceptions never produce deep feeling or pacify it. Yet their power is strong enough to make us susceptible of the existence and bent of such feelings, or to sug- gest relations of pacification which, by reason, we seek means of reducing to verities. Though, incapable of arousing much feeling, yet in virtue of the power and readiness of the imagina- tion in creating fictitious conceptions of objects in either exciting or pacifying character or relations, in both ways it does an important service. For other particulars respecting the subjective feelings or senses of conscience, we refer the reader to the accompanying Table. (See Table C.) The Subjective Senses or Feelings of the Will, These senses differ in character eonsiderably from those which we have been discussing in the preceding pages, in the fact that though states of the mind, they are entirely devoid of emotion, and cannot be said to possess either desire or aversion, pain or pleasure, impulse of obligation, or, indeed, impulse of any kind. Their relation to the other subjective feelings is Buob, that all other feelings seek the gratification or pacification of their impulse through them. And though these feelings in their own nature are immobile or stolid, they are all excited to action through the medium of others. In diseuBsing the other sabjeotive senses or feelings, we spoke of the two relations which they sustain to outward things (that is, to conceptions of outward things), viz., the rela- tion of excitement and the relation of gratification or pacification. The Bubjective feelings of the Will sustain relations to outward things parallel to the other feelings, in this respect ; bat of course, from the nature of the feeUngn themselves, somewhat different. They have their exciting relation and their resolving or oonsentative relation. The last relation we call " resolving " or <* oonsentative," because, though the feeling, being different in its nature, cannot gratify or paoificate, by a conception of a certain character or relation, it can be " resolvative " or "oonsentative" to it. The subjective feelings of the Will, then, hive their relation of excitement and their relation of resolve or consent. The more important of these subjective feelings or senses of the Will— for the list is ▼eiy brief— are indecision, consent, and non-consent. But the sabjeotive energy put forth is not one of them, being not a sabjeotive state of the riind at all, but an act (physical or otherwise) wbioh is a mere result of the subjective state of consent, and which will be dls- eassed under the head of Will. The subjective feelings of the Will are just such as they require to be, conservative of their states, cool or devoid of feeling or desire, and will only exdta to action by the preaeLa*tion of the strongest motive. As the action of these sabjeotive senses will be discussed under the head of Will, no more need be said odnoeming tnem at present. Tlte StUjjeciive Sense* or Feelings of the Intellect, The sabjeetive senses of the Inteliest— that is, of knowledge which is obtained by per- oq>Uon or inception — are doabt and assuranoe, whioh, like those of the Will, are mental states, 3 ♦I m; bat * Th. will ^'" *■"'• «»« to Uu nito "lb. «.i»OTi »oSJ^^'2™'ii,*S?j"' 5"" SS&„.5^°«S',5»:?''°^."'»*« •«iori«iio« (mh\riu! £?' " '°""M Ilk ««iiti>i nowS^Lrt .i" P"**!"!!, )• haid under the stronj .HmKf .omf '^1*'>^'' »~ «»«'««««, pnaident, is head f*r of aotion, but in »"•* ol all, it is yet ^P«ly disciplined, ea before oonsent is 3o readily accorded ■wmnlus of others teciaion is a prevail. > subjective impnlq^e e with two opposing course of conduct; ijle the balance re- iecision is the one Inenceof one class wt in their favour ; but in this wher^ lenoe. iWe with refemnoe •abjeetive state of 39 e.:uilibrium ; (2) that of non-consent, when the will is in opposition ; and (8) that of consent, when the will is propitious. It is evident, therefore, that no act of the will oan ever take place till the subjeotive feel- ing of oonsent or resolution is aroused in the ego or subject. This is just the same as saying, in other words, that no subjective energy will either begin to act, or cease, except by a sub- jective resolution. There are then just two stages or changes that occur in the will before an act is carried into effect :— (1) There is the resolution or consent to the act ; (2) there is the subieotive execution which carries the act into effect. The first, the resolution, or oonsent, is a subjec- tive state or feeling, in reference to a certain conception ; the second is a subjective aot, carrying Into effect the conception to which the resolution or cotigent has been yielded, which it doe* either by putting forth subjective energy or by withdrawing it. The subjective reso- tion or consent and the subjective execution (or energy put forth) might indeed be regarded as together constituting an act. The subjective resolnvion or consent originates the act, and the subjective executicm (or energy put forth) accomplishes it ; the former is the cause, the latter is the effect. The second, the subjective aot, can never take place without the first, the subjective resolution or consent, in conjunction with it. The first, the subjective resolution or oonsent, may often occur without being attended by the subjective act ; for we may con- sent or resolve to an act at the moment of doing it ; or we may resolve only to do it at some futui'e time. Before explaining the difference between the case in which the subjective resolution is attended by the subjective act, and that in which it is not, it is necessary to observe that all subjective energy is so completely under the control of the subjective sense or feeling, that we have only to resolve that energy shall go forth, and it proceeds at once to work out our con- ception ; or, if we resolve that it shall be withdrawn, it instantly returns to rest. It works out the conception if it is a factor in the conception or object of resolution ; if not, it remains inert. The manner in which the subjeotive energy responds to the subjec- tive sense or resolution, is entirely spontaneous. We are conscious only of resolving that it shall go forth, and immediately we feel the movement, and the drain upon our subjective energies commence* without any further interference on our pari Bach of us is endowed with this repository of energy or power ; and the key to it is simply the subjeotive feeling of resolution or consent. " I resolve," is the simple sluice that opens the reservoir, shuts it, or makes it flow as wo please. It is evident, then, that in every case in which subjective energy is an agent, it must be a factor in the eonoeption where- unto we oonsent. The difference, then, between the ease in which we resolve or consent to do an act in future, and the case in whieh we conjoin the resolution and the act together, is this : in the first case, the consent does not actually include or eover the subjective energy, though it oovera the promise of it. The subjeotive energy itself is not a factor in the eonoeption resolved on, although the promise of it is. The " I will " to the subjective enei«y has never been pronounced. It is simply a resolution that it shall be pronounced in the future. In the seeood ease, namely, that in which the subjeotive aot and the subjective resolution are conjoined, tiie subjective energy, and not the mere promise of it, is at once a factor in the conception, and is covered by the resolution ; so that the Bgo or subject oan say, "I re- solve to put forth energy at this moment to do this aot." The result is, that without fur- ther interference on his part, the subjective energies immediate^ come into operation. It is also most noticeable here, that not only will the subjective energy neither begin to ■fit nor cease esoept by a aubjeotive resolution which covers it, but it will neither begin to act nor cease at any other moment than that in which the subjective resolution covers it. It commences work with a resolution, or it ceases work with a resolution ; but mark, that it never commences to do either except just at the moment of resolution. For instance, if I resolve to put forth energy at this moment, it will respond to me at this moment ; but if at thia moment I resolve only that I shall put forth energy to-morrow, no energy will respond to me to-moRow, untoaa I shall resolve it again to-monow at the very mom«it when I want it. From thia fact, taken in cooneotion with the preceding ones, it follows that in the second case, namely, that in which the subjeotive reeolntion is oonjoined with the snl^tive act, the ego or sobjeot, in his snbieotive resolution, ak onee coven or includes the subjective energy in Uie conception which he wishes to cany into effect, knowing that it will immediately respond, Wi::=:i it csriszsiy dsss. In the first case, that in which a subjective resolution occurs without being attended by ^e aubjeotive aot, the ego, or subject, in taet, simply subjectively reaolves at one moment that he will subjectively resolve again, at some future moment, to put forth energy to do ^—^^ I ! I , ao S„t.; .o°».k."!r.'™,',°.iS °ro S:;; ;'"°'^' •»""■•• "-i""-- -lun. « h. » I, tfon within ii. He never W 01 to-morrow ; beoMee the 8ubjeoti-.e resolution of iorrow-th.t ii. to the one feot hy the auhjeotive sot, imediste and certain ; and «, the regolation included I included reiolution, are being done, it i« because len, »he ■objeotlTe reeolution "». The aabjeotlve reao- ly eaid to deeoribe about henomena. The lubieo- l operation* ; and It ia a nd ihall act In a certain a regard to the poweri of •ly and spontaneonaly in of thoie powers of mind then alike reiponaive to e resolution to it* eon- I the will and it* opera- now proceed to diaoosa worda, the meaaa and •nbjeetiv act. Ersry I every piece of maohin- It ia not, however, the 3 between man and the Wind compolalvf ioroe ease, the force ia not solution or ohoioc, bat ly act andaeek its ap. The Ego ia itlU fi^ « 18 the motive most w'aae ; for if he were tnd this would render ire. ' to act in aeeordanoe >t u the reanlt of hia resolve in aooordanoe «• of motivea when I aeeordanoe with the I strong motive with to a weaker class— iflnence him most, dent of motivea. >toryor padfioatnnr We, ii foUowB, tW raWe or agreeable to him.* But the peculiaritioa of what ia desirable or agreeable in the anbjeot constitute what is called bis diuposition ; therefore, the subject is always ttve to resolve in aoourdaiicu with his disposition. It is plain, therefore, from the foregoing, that every rational being subjectively resolves from, and through, the impulse of motives. The subjective (eeling of consent, apparently the most sovtroign of all subjeotive ieulings, is yet the servant of all— we had almost said the most abject slave of all, at least of the dominant majority. The control of all our subjective energies rests in subjeotive resolution ; and the control of all our subjeotive resolutions rents ill the subjeotive feelings or motives which constitute the primary sources of volition in man's nature; and were these sources withdrawn, all resolution and voluntary energy would be at a standstill. Tho primary force which hurries the schoolboy whistling along the street— that makes the rafirohsnt jump behind his counter in quick response to the calls of customers, or that drags the farmer ploddmgly over his harvest field, is a motive or subjective feeling. He may not be able always to tell you exactly what is the motive or feeling ; and he may answer in a general way, that he does so because he loves to do it, or because it is his duty, etc. ; but he is never surprised by your question, which supposes him to act so from the influence of some motive. Bo much, then, for the fact that all snbiective resolution is the result of motives. Let ua now look more particularly at the character of motives. What are they 7 Our answer here is, that all motives are simply reducible to those subjective feelings of the Conscience, Heart, Taste, etfl., which we discussed at length in an earlier part of this work. It is vain, therefore', to look f>.> ' a motive outside of them. We have spoken very freely, in the earlier pages, about the action of these subjective senses, their methods of excitement, their impulses, while in a state of activity, upon the resolution or will, towards their appropriate gratiflcation or paci- fication. It it now our duty, in discussing the will, to look at subjeotive resomtion more im- mediately in relation to these subjective senses. In discussing these subjective senses, we showed that most of them are attended, while in a state of activity, with certain impulses towards their appropriate gratification or pacification. We now call special attention to the fact, that the impulses of these subjective senses, in a state of activity, constitute what we call motivea or springs of »c.ion. It is they, and they alone, that influence the subjective resolution or consent in all its decisions. In fact, thert, ia no other conceivable power by which the anbieotive reaolntion of a crea- ture can be influenced rationally. They first act upon the subjeotive leaolution, then the subjective reaolntion or feeling aota upon the aubjeetive energy, which accomplishes (he deed which ia to gratify them. There are in all three forces in volition, and they are the first. People say falsely " that a man in certain cases resolves from habit." Habit ia like inertia in matter ; it la only a tendency to continue in states. It can never change ita atate frona one of rest to motion, or from one of motion to rest. It cannot set the resolution in motion any more than it can arrest its progress. Habit gives a tendency to run in old channels, if the impetus ia communicated ; but .].U.» „ nlto.. ,„"1,S. exd«M>£ objart, he pwoeives the eaiw»toiLlenlim«„^.iK- "•""""' *° '^^'i^'i »>« lookrlt the •ntenoa., i( nwd iu Ui« ,eii»e of mMnby it polj the obJMi sh oh«raot«r or relation at f It « only two raethodi of referring to the eioitiug or i«tanoe, on one pernon en- Jntance to commit snioide, • i» 1» the aubjeotive lenie Ihe uotive of their friend'e »dy." This would not be 8t Of oharaeter or relation »noe to shoot himself in It was " that his death Bharaoter or relation that tt of pain. " !•» ie the tme motive ; for re feeling of resolution or res, and also explain the Uves sustain to the tro» fht to be applied ii this : ml oauee, yet, if there rase to rouse the snbjeo- Jbjeot of gratifying ohar- f the subJeotlTe feeling. 'Old be no distinot pres- They are all, then, in a end seeondly, the two e, the subjeotiTe motiTe ition or consent aots on •et of the will. « is one another, and also to Ions and the snbjeotiT& iiioh is the tme motive, en, second, there is the stinguish as the Objeo- Mds which properly the Dsent, for its appropri. ig character or relation, stive feeling— in other Mtion. i these pages Mrefidly,. kre often one and the •» esoites.a anbjeotive »* (or gratifloatory) and •roper, is observable in >ry of these objective •t any moment really in himself, so that he ling. The Ego in the irouses the subjeotive ( Ego, ♦hen under the )r relation, whieh the whioh he looks at the ■I a subjective feeling, 9 looks at the gra^hr. • used 1q the sense of ing object, he perceives the enswathing sentiment of his own mind as a subjective feeling, with tension pressing forcibly towards the object in the charuoter or relation in which he is looking ftt it. It follows, then, that though we may perceive, or be Mensible of the subjective feeling in a state of tension when we look at the objective excitant, it iH only when we look at the objec- tive gratifloatory that we are able to perceive, and feel, or estimate (ally, the force or tension of the subjective fouling towardi its natural outlet, namely, the objective Kratifloatory motive. We indeed call thia muSive the objective motive proper, because it in only at the moment when we look at it that the resolution or couHnut stands coniciously between the subjective impulse and its gratilication, and the Ego is able fully to feel the strength of the stream towards it. It will then be apparent Irom the foregoing that in every process of the will in which subjective resolution or conient has to be aroused to perform a subjective act, these objec- tive or outside motives perform a very important service in connection with the subjective motive proper — in other words, the subjective feeling. (1) As the subjective feeliug or impulse is really the true motive, or, at least, the one which acts directly on the Ego and excite the subjective reHolution or consent, it will be apparent from what has been said, that in ler to be able to feel or estimate its force at any moment on the subjective resolution, we must look at the objective motive proper— that is, at the object of gratifying character or relation. (2) But it the subjective feeling or impulse shonld not happen to be in a state of activity, we miiy iirst require to rouse it by looking at the motive eioitant— that ia, at the object of exciting character or relation ; then by the use of the objeotire motive proper, we shall be able to estimate accurately the amount of gratitioation arising from the indulgence of that subjective feeling. In all those cases, however, in which the exciting and the gratifying relations are one and the same, the perception or thinking of the same objective motive answers both the pu/pose of exciting as well as of estimating the strength of the subjective motive. While discussing the subject)- fneliugs of the conscience, heart, etc. — in clier words, subjective motives— in the ti«, iu . , s of this work, we very fully referred to an a illustrated the exciting and gratifyin ationh .xisting between them and objective motives or oonoen- tions. '^ The subjeotivo rf Holutions of the will, comprehending resolution or consent, non-consent, and irresolution oriudooisiou, are precisely subjective feelings or states of the Ego like thorn, only devoid of impulse. And we must now call attention to the (act thai all tliese subjective feelings oi the will, thoush devoid of impulse, sustain the same two kiiidn of relation, as the subjective motive or feeling itself suotains to its exciting or Kratifyiug objective motive or conception. Tliey have an exciting relation and also anoth. , relation ex autlv parallel to the gratiflcatory o. pacificatory of other subjective feelings, which, (or want or ix butter name, we call the resolviug relation. We cannot call the latter relation either gratiiying or pacificatory, becau-o th( ntBling is devoid of impulse; it is purely resolviug. The subjective feelings of the will, 1 iiK of A different nature, cannot gratify or paciflcate liy an obji-ct of particular character or rein o» ,, but they can resolve or consent to an object of particular character or relations. In other words, these subjective feelings of the will must always liuve something of particular character or relations to excite them ; and when tliey are in u state o( activity there must always be something of particular character or flations which they resolve; resolving or resolution in the ease o( these feelings, from the diflerenco in their nature, takes the place of gratification or paciiicatiou. All subjective feelings of the will, therefore, have their two relations exactly like other ittbjective (eeliugs— (1) their exciting relation ; (2) their resolving relation. In the relation o( excitement, a subjective feeling of the will s> itains the same relation to the exciting subjective motive or (eeling acting on it at the moment through the medium of an objective conception or motive, as the subjective motive or feeling itself sustains to its exciting conception or motive ; and in the relation of resolving, a subjective feeling of the will sustains the same relation to the subjective energy in carrying into effect the gratification of the subjective motive through the medium of the objective conception or motive (conceived of at the moment), as the subjective motive or feeling itself in its gratifying relation (through the medium of the gratiflcatory conception or motive) sustains to the subjective resoli, on. The subjective feelings, or states oi non-conseut and irresolution, which, along with resolution or consent, make up the subjective foelings of the will, all alike possess their relations of excitation and resolving, although they represent different states of mind; Uius, the resolve of non.COnoAnt t'^W&r<^a ita nnrrAannn/1an( aiiKiAnfivA o^f ia #«nSt wS Ihf ^t1fl«!tv f^ "" l*?"!*"' i' J""* **»"' **"« ^80 put forth energy to om^ toto^ff^t S^tiK^^o^e^ititoSS:" '*^« " •"*'«~' *^-«^ "»» -«^- of^S^XoK .1. ^ v' "V •""* ^'^fF* opposing motives are concerned with an act. the excitinu rehition of the subjeotire resoluton or consent are the impulses of the strongest XHf MbSve feehngs or motives, acting on the Ego at the moment, through the TJdiuT/f the SiJI grattflcatory conceptions or motives, against the impulse, of a weaker okss wting on fie S in the same way, whose gratification must be surrendered by the subjective wt^iJh ^tifl!« i*^n/*r" °l»"i,'«'d the "solving relation of the subjective resolutio"T "n Jnt wS hw thus been aroused in the Ego, is just that the Ego pit forth energy to c«S"nto Iflwt S^ tp^atiflcation of the stronger class of subjective fMli^gs or motivesVtb^onS^the mSmno? theur objective gratifloatory conceptions or motives so agreeing." "^ ""* "* Observe that in the preceding oases we have always to tiiink of the obieativa eonnontUn jnr motive m order to fed (that is. perceive) the subjective feZ^or motiS t^alsTiS^SJ^ ,•„ . ?!!15***Piu* "5,T«o»ll attention to the truth, that there are in aU five factors or eanse. in a process of the wiU :-the objective motive excitant, which is a cwncenti^ Son.^ tZ subjective feelmg or motive proper into a state of activity ; the objecUw mSti^'j~«^« motives or conwpVonrfof Sa^ bnuging each (that is, the conception of each) objective gratifioatorv motive hefor«tJ,««.^-i in the Ob ect, character or rehttions which gratify riMvelv eaoTof the ™w^^ ?"** or motivesin the Ego (bringing in also the^Kt^fe'^otlS « ince^Sons^xdJ^fS^ •ame way if anv of the subjective feelings or motives are dormwtT-^C the E^ f«li?- ^.^:T:^S; t^pngh their medium the strong desire or ave^on of the s^SeSiv. fwU^To? motives within himself, and estimating therefrom the gratification which th.yWid^VafhM mo«v.r.^t-^cuS.?Siiiyt1S^wm=?SJ^^ I ainlytoit. Theexoiting the same. in whioh tke subjeotlTe nergy) aota. BB a part of the resolving t, and it (the Bnbjeotive here, that all Bubjeotive moment, or a resolution bat in the first ease the nary and only snbjeotire diate resolving relations }n inolnded within the itly the same that the [>p08ing it, the esoiting le subjeotiye feeling or 9 objective gratifioatary Intion or consent whioh ergy to carry into effect edium of the objective the exciting relation of est class of subjective tediam of the objective slass acting on the Ego stive act which gratifies t or consent, which has to cany into effect the brongh the medium of le objective eonoeptlon lotive; so also in regu- wtion of the subjective y oonoeption or motive 1 five factors or causes [>noeption, arouses the e motive gratiflcatory, «tivity; the subjective acts on the subjective which all these factors ttificatory oonoeption; or motive proper, and which human volition illy these principles in )s, with ndtae opposing inder the stimulating tate of irresolution or loeptions for the act, >tive before the mind he subjeotive feelings ptions excitant in the that the Ego feeling subjective feelings or i they would give, has brevity and slmpUolty • ^««»-j — — .,j sfi an catory and paolfloatorr (•neral term to imply 36 arouiied within him the subjeotive feeling of resolution or consent to put fdrth then, or there- after, the requisite subjeotive energy or act to secure it, that is, their gratification. If the resolution is to do the act at once, the subjeotive energy goes forth at once to do it. If the resolution inqludes merely a resolution to do it at some other time, then the subjective energy will go forth to do it when the second resolutian is made. See foot note on Pacifica- tion, page 34. In a case in whioh one clans of motives for an act are opposed by another class against the act :— The subject or Ego, under the stimulating influence of a powerful motive or motives, but starting in a subjective ^tate of irresolution or non-consent, makes a survey of all the outward objective motives or conceptions for or against the act, bringing each (that is, the conception of each) objective gratiflcatory motive before the mind in the object, character, or relations which gratify respectively each of the subjective feelings or motives in the Ego (bringing in also the objective motives or conceptions excitant, in the same way, if any of the subjeotive feelings or motives are dormant) ; so that the Ego, feeling or perceiving through their medium the strong desire or aversion of the subjeotive feelings or motives within him> self, may estimate therefrom the amount of gratification which each class would yield. In this manner, after mentally measuring and summing up the amount of gratification, pacifica- tion, etc., accruing to the subject or Ego on both sides, in favour of the act or against it, the subjective feeling of resolution or consent rises in the Ego to the strongest, namely, to put forth the subjective energy or act requisite to secure the gratification of the strongest ; and the energy goes forth then, or thereafter, on precisely the same terms as specified in the preceding case. By once going through this process, or by a repetition of it, the subject or Ego is in most oases able to arouse in himself a distinct subjective feeling of resolution or consent for or against any particular act. It sometimes happens, however, that there is a kind of dead-look in the balance, from opposing motives either individually or in the aggregate appearing to be equally strong, and the lubjeot's being unable to obtain a subjective feeUng of resolution or consent over which ones he would yield. In thix nase a preponderating influence in favour of some of the sides may very usually be secured in weakening the force of some of the subjeotive feelings or motives on one of the sides, by familiarizing the mind with the loss of their gratifl- catory objects or conceptions, or in strengthening their force by looking at their exoiting or gratifioatory objects or oonceptions more frequently, until the subject is able to obtain or arouse in himself the subjective feeling of resolution or consent, over one and all on some one of the sides, in favour of those of the other. The enswathing subjective feeling of consent will always rise in the Ego to the strongest. There are only two conceivable ways of modifying the impulses to an act: either (1) by stimulating a greater or less degree of impulse in the Bubjeotive feelings or motives proper, by giving the outward excitant or gratifioatory concep- tions a greater or less degree of stimulating oharaoter ; or (2) by making a change in man's moral nature or ooiistitution. In most of these oases illustrative of the processes, etc., of volition, as referred to in foot note, page 84, we have used the general term gratifying or gratiflcatory motive to imply alike both pacifloatory or gratifioatory motives, as they act alike in the will, and as there is no need to add to the complicity of these statements by the addition of more words than make the sense sufficiently clear. It must appear evident, from what has been often said in the preceding pages, that as gratifioatory or pacificatory objective conceptions are those which are chiefiy used in a prooess of volition; exoiting objective conceptions will boused only when the subjeotive feelings or motives proper are dormant, or when the exoiting and gratifioatory or pacificatory objective conceptions are one and the same. Let us now add two or three examples illustrative, in a general way, of the prooess of volition which we have been describing.^ A man travelling from home and feeling hungry, seeing an apple lying on the highway may pick it up and eat it. Here the objective gratifioatory motive is the apple lost on the road, which he may eat ; and the subjeotive motive proper is hunger, and there being no motive of an opposite oharaoter present to restrain the man, the subjective feeling of resolu- tion or consent is at once aroused within him, to put forth energy, piok it up, and eat it. But suppose the apple to hang in a farmer's orchard by the highway, the subjective feeling of hu%(er, aoted on by ue thought of eating the gratifioatory object on the tree, urges him to pick it from the tree and eat it ; but an opposing subjective feeung of consoience, aroused by the thought of such conduct, comes with a sense of the " ought-not-ness," or of the ill-desert consoience feeling commands or threatens, and the subjeotive resolution fluctuates between them, till at last it rises in the Ego in favont of conscience. Again, a man in Qreat Britiin may receive a letter from a friend in Amerioa advising him to immigrate, promlnng him thereby a great improyement in hi. eiroumrtanfteg. Im- provement of oiroumstanoeB. arousing within him its appropriate eubjeotiye feeling or feelinw 18 a strong motive to him to emigrate. Under the impulse of great desire he if anS to emigrate but is stUl in a state of irresolution or indecision. He thinks 5 «U the mXes in favour of emigration, a splendid climate, a better house, a bettor farm, a better hX' etc to each of which his subjective feeUngs respond very oordiaUy. A subjectiw resoluMon or consent arises withrn him to aU these ; but on the other hand, he shaU have to Jeave Wa parents, his fnends, the land of his fathers, etc., behind : these are motiveraieaUng to ^s - r v^ M V*^ T*,''*^ 1"""°* ^^ gratified, he tries to obtain a feeling of consent over such as he should have to lose, by comparing them with snob as he should Acquire. He sncc^d" Tr inSrin"* P T"? *^f «"o with others. He is still in a stato of subjeXe fa^esoEn i? T°°; ?,9'"."'.'^8 tl'e effort, however, from day to day, weakening the force of some motives by famihanzing himself with the thought ol their low, strengthening ttie force of laW«^^*^"«V°'r^*'".'"°'"* frequently, he finds the number of those over which he is unable to obtain a feehng of consent in favour of those with which they are compared! gradu! aUy becommg fewer or weaker, untU at last he is able to arouse in himself the feff of consent over them all in favour of those which induce him to go to America; and Knse quence, he proceeds to regniate his subjective acts in accordance with his sn&iVe resoSn „„ We need not multiply illustrations of thU kind, as every person's experience makes Sm f«S«orwt,frw '^'"*lf""'?^*' iUustrative of this than with the underlying princiJesS ToUtion, which wo have been at some pains to explain J o e «•>»«"» "» «.f««l" *i*" accessary to remark, that as there are just three subjective states of the wiU in TCferenoe to any particular act, namely, resolution or consent, non-consent, and irresolStio^ f»nV.l!X°°'.*^*''*r °''^? *^"' conceivable movements of the will:-{l) a movement from a subjective state of irresolution, 6-^ -> - ttroo«8s of voUtion may fae carried on entirel'y by ourselves, orit ^ay"b^"oarri'5"OTVuhin'!jB fcy the agency o another person, who seeks to persuade us to a pLticnZ^llne^f conduct We are aU familiar with the rhetoric of the lawyer as he strives to obtain TfavoSr^We "Si -^^^B^BBP 1 hia oiroumstanAeti. Im- l>jeotive feeling or feelings, It desire he is anxiona to litiks df all the motives in 'ann, a better liying, etc. , A subjective resolution or le shall have to leave his motives appealing to his n the feeling of consent, sling of consent over suoh lid acquire. He succeeds of subjective irresolution Jcening the force of some bwngthening the force of of those over which he is hey are compared, gradn- in himself the feeling of ) America ; and in conse- his subjective resolution, t's experience makes him ) underlying principles of active states of the will in consent, and irresolution II: — (1) a movement from DC of resolution, in other : from one of irresolution, f consent, or from one of ner in which these three only one mode of opera- ding pages, and so fully ad exactly in accordance ven. But we go farther only one mode, but also ihat movement which we im time to time, the Ego e state of irr^olntion or r consent to ti>ir gratifi- oan act on the subjective bis movement. As they I truth will be plain from pposite, and non-consent from a snbjeiitive feeling lame class, it is virtually motives, %q one of non- i a subjective feeling of od general one, namely, )no of cousent ; in other ferr«d to, is also virtual!/ ouse a subjective feeling e impulse of motives is f non-consent to one of the subjective feeling of le movement in tlfc pro- been at special pains to ..»—.» ..7f,.P,ij^ trllttt tlitr be carri'kl on within us rtioular line of conduct, tain a favonrable verdict 87 Tom his jury, or the pulpit eSorts of the clergyman to stir up his people to good works. A •plendid example of this outside agency is Jndah pleading with Joseph for the release of his brother Benjamin, as recorded in Qenesis. We dose by giving an analysis or explanation of some few words ased in connection with iheWUl:— "Choice," for instance, is another name for subjective resolation or consent. We «hoose in favour of a motive when we subjectively resolve in favour of it. " Rejection," in precisely the same way, may also be called another name for Non- consent. " Purpose " or " Intention," thought of as a subjective state, is just subjective resolution, thoroughly aroused and resolved, to an act. A plan, purpose or intention, thought of as an object, is just an objective conception to which the subjective resolution has been accorded. " Besignation " is the subjective consent associated with patience, a subjective feeling of the heart. "Besolntion" is just a different term for Consent; both mean the same subjective feeling. The same facts may be asserted of Irresolution and Indecision. Retrospect. At thin "tage of the work it is necessary to remark that we have now very folly discussed the v^ri'ib , dwers of the mind as specified at the commencement of this work. At starting, we 1 ^e following popular division of the intellectual and moral powers of men, viz. <1) T' - or Intellect ; (2) The Heart (including Taste, Heart and Conscience) ; and (3) The V • 1j division being based on the three following propositions: (1) Man is a knowing creature ; (2) Man is a feeling creature ; (3) Man is a voluntary creature.* The functions of the Intellect, comprehending latent consciousness, conception, per- ception, inception, reasoning, imagination, knowledge (equal to a correct conception with the subjective feeling of assurance), and other like powers, were all fully discussed and explained in the first department of this work, the discussion terminating with page 11. The functions of the Heart (comprehending Taste, the Heart, and the Conscience) were also fully disposed of under the respective heads of the subjective feelings of Taste, of the Heart and of the Conscience, so that the treatment of these functions may be regarded as completed under these heads. They are purely subjective feelings, and their operation in relation to outward motives or conceptions, and also their action as impulses or motives in themselves on the subjective resolution or will towards gratification or pacification being very fully explained, little more remained to be said of them; their action however in these respects, in other words, as motives, is still more elaborately diBCUBsed nnder the head of Will. The functions of the Will, a no less important department of the human mind, have also been very fully treated. Composed also of subjective feelings, viz., consent, non-oonsent, and indecision, the operations of these feelings in regard to motives, and also with respect to the -subjective energy or action, have been made the subject of minute and careful esaminntion. While we are not done yet with either of the foregoing subjects, there are certain phases or powers of the human mind to which we may in the first place very profitably direct our Attention, Instinct). All instincts are supposed to be certain innate tendencies or controlling principles exist- ing in the Ego, which exercise a certain influence over his thoughts and actions. All instincts ma;* be divided into two classes, the Conscious and Unconscious. i^he Conscious instincts are those controlling principles of our nature which we can per- ceive, feel, or be conscious of while they act upon us. They are just those subjective feelings of the Heart, Conscience, etc., in other words, subjective motives of which we have already treated so fully in various places. The term " Conscious instincts " is then but another name for these subjective feelings. We know of no other conscious instincts than these, and wc txight just as well have omitted saying anything at all about conscious or any other kind of instincts, were it not that the term instincts is often applied to subjective feelings in works of this class. Theso instincts also might have as well been called sentient as conscious, seeing they are subjective senses. ■*• While making the above division of man's satoUectnai and moral potrors. -svo did not overluok a still more simple elementary division of the same powers, viz., that of subjective conception and Butjjeotive feeling, to which two elements mostly all those powers may be reduced, and to which we ahall again have oocaslon to lefer at a further stage of this work. The above division, however, we have reckoned the most suitable for the treatment of the subjects which we have undertaken. h\i Bupply UB with thT best Moof if tW^ wi«i.2^°'?* "P*"*"'"'- « «a"'«»y watched, will any BubiMtive fMUn? «itw^^ v i^ "'* f ! J"** oonscionsly influenoed by habit or by (1) Consoioua instincts are merely another name for snbieotiye feelinm or motivA. . (2) And unoonscioas instincts of the first class are not entitled to be fallPdTn f^; .♦ ii S££TSS=s:»SSiH (8) UncoMciouB instincts of the second class are certainly not motives or pnr,n„a „r action m any sense, any more than the facility of the fingers to fold o'er uJe nZ isBLf that folds them, or the tendency of the feet to walk with thfl to« V^^^a ?^ , ® .^^ S™h„« •""/?/•'[• • ^i ''"'''^'""'' '"^'^ <""" are bSTacmS^sS te^ende th^T tK give boUi a facihty m domg a thing and alao a proneness to do it ""o^"""" . **>" ", they Habit, >nr nature which are nn- ■oions of. For instanoe, nnlesB under temptation obey the snbjeotiye feel- olaas tempting them to tt work; but we think it terson is not ooiiBeioaely his blind facility or ten- ns to do some things bo ' therefore be a certain f carefully watched, will aoilities in onrselves in flneneed by habit or by the nature of effort ia e same facilities or ten- ood or evil are soaroely- i who are habitually in- two things : (1) to the rough the Latent Con- istitntion, by which we ore is very good reason T subjective feelings or lat we said on Latent eader, he will have no We say then that the ' motives acting on the say that they are just loral nature, which fit those things for which or instanoe, in man's m than to bend them tward ; it is easier to .8 it is in the pbysioal, )o constituted that it lan that for which he im to speak the truth >he same reason it is rhtforward than to be ration of thes") innate e instincts, oonsoioue ch have been already gs or motives, called motives at all, nless we call them so- ting insensibly on us d of action must be their being removed ue therefore no new selves consciously to- otives or springs of ;he palm is the force krd is the force that inoies ; that is, they moral constitntioii^ things than others. These tendencies or facilities are natural, because they arise out of the iKpecial adaptation of hie nature to certain mode] of thought and action, for which he was intended. But a facility or tendency that is not strictly natural may be acquired in either of these things. We find by the repeated practice of modes of thought or action, not strictly those for which we may have innate facilities or tendencies, that it is possible, nevertheless, to acquire great facilitiee and tendencies in them : just as the athlete or gymnast, by the repeated straining of his Umba in peculiar shapes and performances, is able at last to acquire considerable facility in doing so. This acquired facility or tendency is called habit, and it enters largely into eU our modes of thought and action. It is both a facility and a tendency, like the unooi^scious instincts of the second class, giving both facility in doing an act and proneness to doing it, only it differs from them in not being strictly innate, but acquired. Habit will give greater facility and tendency where innate facility and tendency previously exist, and create a certain amount of facility and tendency where none innate may exist previously. Habit extends its power largely over the subjective feelings, as well as over the intellect and the will. As the opera- tions of both tho intellect and the will become easier by repetition, so also does the excite- ment, etc., of the subjective feelings by much exercise ; yea, so much so ia this the case, that desires and appreciative gratifications, of which heretofore we have almost deemed ourselves incapable, have come to be sensibly felt through its influence. We must, howavar, beware of imagining that habit can create a subjective feeling. Habit will give facility and tendency in a faculty if it exists, but it never creates a faculty. Habit will give facility it the use of the hand, but it never croates the hand. In conclusion, then, we may say that habit is the facility In modes of thought or action, or tendencies to them, which the mind acquires by practice ; in other words, it is that power of the mind by which it accommodates itself to circumstances aud works with facility under them. Memory, Memory is that power of the mind by which it is able to retain its conception of things and recall them at pleasure to conscious thought. All our knowledge of things thus stored away in the memory seems to be latently present in our consciousness, even when we are not specially thinking of them ; and it se^ms to be also through this latently conscious power that we are able when we like to recall them to conscious thought ; in other wordii, to bring them out of the shadow into clear light for inspection. It is doubtful if a conception once lodged in the memory is ever absolutely Inst, but the power of recUling it to the attention at pleasure may be lost, of which fact every one's dtiily experience furnishes ample proof. This power of recalling conceptions from the memory usually or mainly depends on the foUowing things : — 1. On Habit, the result of repetition, and which gives us facility or tendency in flashing up the desired thought or conception. 2. On the amount of subjective feeling, as excitant or gratiflcatory, caused by the concep- tion at the time of its first lodgment in the memory. This is so important an element in things to be remembered that we regard it as the one great essential to easy recollection. Conceptions which generate no subjective feeling of interest, pain, ploasnre, etc., are to all minds difiScult to recall. For this reason all conceptions involving objects of peculiar combination, character or relations, as contiguity, contrast, oppo- sition, similarity, etc., awaken subjective feelings of interest, etc., and are easily remembered. All snob characters and relations as awaken tba subjective senoes of beauty, admiration, love, fear latred, indignation, avarice, pride, approbation or disapproval, condemnation or acquittal, etc., are usually very easy of recollection. The more powerful the subjective feeling which may be caused by the conception at the time of ita lodgment in the memory, the more easily is the conception afterwards remembered. 8. On the amount of time whroh a thing has been before the attention at the time of its lodgment in the memory. For this reason outward physical acts, such as the work or tr'-is- actions of a day, are generally easily remembered. They are not mere transitory conceptions flitting across the mind like a flash of lightning, but, from the circumstances in which they preseat themseiives, are necessarily before the attention for a considerable time. 4. On the intensity of attention given to the thing at the time of its deposition in the memory. For this reason whatever has been observed with laxity of attention is seldom remembered without great effort, and things requiring considerable concentration of thought at the time of tueir cDSdrvanoe are atterwards gdueraiiy louiiu uiOi'e eauy ul reooueutiou. 6. On association with things which from other causes are easily remembered. Things may thus be associated ^Igether either in the same conception or in the mind at the same moment by tactual snceession.— See article on Tactual Succession of Thought, page 40. All M 40 S&? S wS5f ^7 IZ"^* like picture. , we ownil fa.t«. the attenUon ,pon the «t«^ n» Xjtf »• "" olwef intereat dependi, withouv; oIbo being oonMions to » certain twe -m *W« .T*''?'?^' wrrounding,. From thi. eanM the^Uection o( . piSar iZ Ti£lZ of TlrSln^?rn "^ *" * ""^ """"^^ *"'"'"^ a-BoJLted-with the the ohier "* "***" influencing cauaee in the power of memory, bat these we deem to be devoted °^°Su it TI ^"^ ^ aeserted ihat the Latent Oonwious Power, to wWch we «,!«! ♦ u^ *^v^* eoinmeuoement of this work, is that kind of mental twilioht by tu2S'rela«Ko\\'e^^iL^V*'"»^" '^t F**' ^/^^ «**"^ ''^"y ^^ memo ".ae well as eve./ the^Sd it th« aV,^r °* subjective eUte and environments of the Ego, insensibly acte on to'eTo suddenlv^nrn^rri;"!/'"? *^? ''*"^*»'"' °' ''*'*«»> i* *' ^"n* ^o*" »!»«« *« ««"« ai^cCstSr ftSlt?«Xe{i:? S^ctTor^em^il- *° "^^* ^"^ *'"'» ">« ^''-^ SECTION 11. Hi\ rr, * )? ■?!: if r* { Simplett Analytis of Man's Mental and Moral Powers. aeteS wftlV^* <'?''?«i°"« ""in-i. 'educed to their simplest constitueDts, nay be char- Se^rconsSird^r^r"'^ °' *^-« -^« "^ -^ *"« '^«p«*=« c^ArarinreS feeUn^*orat;Sce^:fc*^Vd'S^^^^^^^^^^ '»"-<»'^ -^*^ ^^^ -"i-*- grati?Jn?th'S,'^^^°ri:r motTe!^ "'^■"'*^'' '"'^ ''"^ ^''^ conceptions exciting or j««t JA!^*" ^®"'* ^7*^ *^® subjective feeUng of resolution, etc., as acted on by other sub- the Ego^s'f8'foUow?!- **"" «l«°»«'>t'^ principles work and influence one another through «i„«^?.? Presentations, etc., act on conception and assurance in the Ero (or Knowledeel wS5t£ o? ?h?wK'tb«^r °' ^^.''^' Or«eience, etc., in the Ego. whicWon s^ve resomnon or the Will m the F b;o, which acts on sut jective energy in the Ero Ail act on the Ego througii the medium of conception. Thus a thouBht Drasantfld to thfl mmd begms with the inteUect, passes on to the heart.^nd terminates 3he will Po$$ible,Modes of Thought, Tactual and Non-tactval. 4a thi*.3°^"i' ^"** V** *°* °^ *'"'^8 *•>« attentioi: on to a conception ; in other words it "n<^;tir;''o;remo'',^; "' * '"""^"^'^ '^''°'^" " *^'"' *">* '^°"'« '^^^^ '- I«'~Sioa' or thourf.rTfcij^^t!"'! is consciously coveied by the attention in one act of perception ff t]hev!r« . Jfii ft • "*' "^ ^}^ conception are large, the attention is diffused and general ; If they are smaU, it is more condensed and particular. ts""""! , «nvfl^;^'i ?^I^»!S>V°° **; ticking occupies a certain period of duration, and the attention in Je3 eoneeption has always a bright or brightening, and a fading period-that is, two «n« *•, ^tiJo^KJit f» percepUon the attention can only consciously cover one conception in r^tioni CtTthl^iilt °° *r <'??«?«»''<' <««» ever be thought together in one act.^aU U° oeptions must be thought singly and in snccession. thenon t«^n«f "w«*^^^-^i''° '"'**'?/' "' *l^king conceptions in snccession, the tactual and l,«^n^'^ t 1 ; .^ethmk conceptions in non-tactual succession, when the first oonccpUon has completely faded from the attention r consciousness before the second connception8 from which they are taken, and that in imagi- nation we may inceive the contents of the new conception either aa contained or not contained in the conceptions from which they are taken, provided the latter are not known conceptions. 6._ It follows from this, that in imagination we may inceive from one or more conceptions, while in reasoning we must inceive from two or more, but never from only one ; because to inceive as contained in only one would produce no modification of thought. Therefore all reasoning must be done by tactual thought ; and imagination (when it inceivea at all from other conceptions) by non-tactual from one conception, and tactual from two or more. Process of Thought in Originating New Oonceptions from Contents of Others. Proceaa of thought, tactual or non-tactual, in originating new conceptiona from the con- tenta of others ; in other words, the process of originating new conceptions, taotnally or non- tactually, in reaaoning and imagination. 1. From one conception, Non-tactually, we imagine aa followa: — Bringing the contenta of the one conception before the conscious vision or attention of the mind, we inceive a new conception (modification) out of them — that ia, we inceive a new arrangement of theae contenta. 2. From two or more conceptions, Taotnally, we either imagine or reason aa follows : — Bringing the contents of the first conception, fading, and the contenta of the second, bright or brightening, at the aame moment, both under the conscious vision or attention of the mind, we inceive from both their contents a new conception which will contain either whole or in part the contents of both the first and the second. Then thinking in the aame way the con- tenta of thia newly-formed conception, fading, and the contents of a third conception, bright or hnghtening, wo inceive in like manner a new c noeption out of the contenta of both. * We think taotnally Whenever thore is the adln&tment of the jparta of one oonoentlon in nr with Ui086 of luioSiuit cuuucpiiuu wiiu wiiicii ii is oomparad. The resaitant is a ttiiru conception. ConsiB- qnential thought is not tactual thought. Oonsequential thought is the case of onn oonoeptioo merely reaulting from another antecedent to it, in the same way as a seuae presentation is antecedent to the opnoeption made by it. A case of tactual thought oocnra whenever two conceptions are compared; the ranlt is the formation of a third. The first two aro thought taotuaUy, the third oonsequentially. w • 48 orilSall M weSSS;. ""'*''" ''" '"^ '"*«^** • "•" «>«»~Ption from m mwiy th- «tll! i!*?l*^ *^t.*!!^*"t* ""fio^'ion O' oonjunotion of two oonoeptioni (one Wing .nd liSieSme^ h/t^i:^^^ij:f>^!*".*''' ~'"^'"" ^*'.*°° "' •»»«»««° «" ^'^o mind ft the th^n«S^ ?^^' .H ^* *" '"* **» "•"^'* * °"^ oonoeptlon out of their united oontents : for ^««Sn 7 '*'*\^'* have one oonoeption in the mind, unle.* we are .bie to bring another con- S?»£ f*'''^" •"."i?**"' ""^^ ** "»• ""« "O"**"". ^^ "J^-'OW have no means of 8 with the eyes at the one object, if the conception so made r^ fn ?^e S^t'v,"*h-' kV* "*' """"J^* it' "?!• 1*" "»« °»'J«"' *^«" '»Sw »^ nothing i!.™!^ •» ^v ^u.^ T^"^ compare the other object looked at. It would only be tryingto TcSmn "•'''"' ' "'^•- "^" '*S^ » ^"^"^ *~"» «»« <"»« o»>i««t to the other won^i make all comparison, connection, or modification of conceptions impossible ^^r,nly- """I'^lie". In conclusion, that whfle the mmd is capable only of thinking SSsZe«^„*X*°l^ Buocesdon (one at a time), yet by the po^er of the\ttention iS ™!:.? t!5 1?* *° "J^?.** ^^" V^' moment the first conception, fadhig, and the second t^^^'lT" '"^^* or brightening, it j able to add indefinitely to the n3r of our con^. S^::i.'r^a^'wl5"SSS'. ''°" *^" -^"^ " ^^'^ '^^- ^' •«"^*~''"'^ »«>--- "' Synoptical SkeUh of Conceptiont. «iatL^i.r'i!"l'*" '"""v °* u^f"l*/*i°°" *-'" «»npoMd of objects of certain character or relation, which also may be subdivided into minute parts. ■•«»«» ^2^ T?;irt!ljJ.Tw 4^**' of conceptions are (1) Known (that is. correct with assoranee) ; and (2) Unknown (that is, correct without assurance, or inoorfect with or without assurance) «tt-««Jr*# ?u ^ POW'ble order m which conceptions can come into the conscious vision or attention of the mmd is smgly (one at a time), and in socoession • attentiot"of*it«Tn'!l\T*/n pTi!''*''* ">?y «»«» P'^ont themselves to the conscious vision or or ?2» A?tt«^« ^ii' 1^' <^^ ^*"'*! ^ '"«'*' conceptions, non-tactual at the same moment, or (i) As two, in tactual succession at the same moment. a«od",vi'^ ^II* P"'""* processes in the mind by which they come into the conscious vision or attention, either as remembered or as originated for the first time, are as foUows :-(l) Known and unknown conceptions alike, as old, may come from memory by remembrance. 2 Known oonoeptions. as new (a) may come by perception; that is. either by the percept on of the «tr« Lr \ P"«f\'^*''"'- °i "'«™'^ objects, o by the internal pioepti^ of the feelings! f««itfr ; "k-" ?^ *^« ."'•"'I "«« '; (*) or thej may come by reasoning, that is, by the moept'on of objects or thmgs as unitedly contained in two or more known conceptions. (3) Unto m oonceptions. as new. may come by imagination; that is, they may come by inoep ion; (a) from the contents of no other conceptions known or unknown f or (6) by moep ion from the contents of other unknown oonceptions, whether inceived as uitedly ion- temea m two ot more of them, or as not unitedly contained in them ; or (c) by inception from^^e contents of known conceptions, if not inceived as unitedly contained k two or more «„« !v fi!°'^-^A '*"*??i^8 propositions it is evident tiiat all oonceptions come into the atten- «?^j^„w- *•: f ?*"' ^y the process of memory ; and as new, by the processes of perception and mception, the latter of wWeh is equal to reMoning and imagination. *!.„„ L'* *^"° evident that the only processes by which we originate new modifications ot thought or oonceptions, from the contents of conceptions already in the mind, are reasonins and imagination; the only great instance in these processes which is not a modification on^ted from old conceptions, being that case of the imagination, in which we inceive a conception from the contents of no other conception. --J "^'.^ **** •possible uses or purposes which ooneeptions, chiefly known ones, serve in or under the oonseionB viainn c a^'^enti"!! "* tbs <"S~'i -r- -- '~" __'■< < >»< ^ •• _ -■ between the Ego and the objective" world, setf'knd '' ^t MlfT Wthey^reprownt b^°S • Bemember always, that by oonsolous vision we mean the attention, not a sense presentation. the three originids from noeption from m many jeptioni (one facling and tion of tbe mind at the eir united content! ; for lie to bring another eon- have no means of oom- or of uniting something I with another that is a of another in the mind T lissing r How should it een the contents of two 1 of the one oonoeption, the eomparison of two the conception so made there would be nothing i would only be tnring to o the other would make apable only of thinking war of the attention in , fading, and the seoond number of our concep- in-tactual succession its of certain aharaoter or )t with assoranoe) ; and rithout asBuranoe). the conscious vision or the oonsoioua vision or tl at the same moment, the conscious vision or as follows :— (1) Known uembrance. (2) Known the perception of the roeption of the feelings, loniag, that is, by the nown conceptions. (3) is, they may cume by r unknown ; or (6) by loeived as unitedly con- m ;_or (ef by inception ntained m two or more IB come into the atten- proeesses of perception 1. I new modifications of le mind, are reasoning is not a modification in which we inoeive a own ones, serve in or L mi tM V. ; ^ucyoro sue sicoism bey represent both in a Miise prMentatiott. 48 iiwiory ; (8) they are the medium of knowledge, the form in which it is composed, the materials with which the intellect works ; (4) they are the medium of exciting subjective feel- ings or motives into activity ; (6) they are the medium through which the subjective feelings or motivea in activity seek their gratification ; (6) they are the medium through which the subjective feelings or motives arouse the subjective feeling of resolution or consent in the Will ; (7) and they are the medium through which the subjective resolution acts on the sub- jective energy ; that is, the resolution seeks ;o verify them as gratifloatoty, and also to direct Its energies by conceptions, formed as a pUn, to this end. Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Pouible Powert, or Modtt and Vut of the Intellect. 1. The Intellect is that department of man's nature which has the powers of conception and cognition, which is conception with assurance, in other words, knowledge. 3. It possesses the power of thinking conceptions in only two modes, that is, it may either perceive, inceive, or remember them ; (1) in non-tactual succession with only one con- oeption consciously before the attention at the same moment, or (2) in tactual succession with two conceptions in the mind at the same moment ; that is, with one conception consciously nnfaded from the attention, while at the same moment another has beeA brought consciously before it, as in the caaa of the comparison of two objects by which we are able to perceive wherein they are alike or different, or the inception of a new conception from the contents of two or more other conceptions already in the mind. By this tactual mode of thought the mind has power to inoeive a new conception from the contents of as many old conceptions as we may choose to put into it, but in doing so it is never able to inoeive from the contents of more than two conceptions at the same moment.* 3. The Intellect possesses the power of either recalling (remembering) old conceptions already in the mind, or of originating or creating new conceptions in the following modes. Classifying these modes of the mind :.s non-tactusl or tactual, its only possible powers are as follows : — (I) By the non-tactual mode of thought (a) it may recall or remember old con- ceptions from memory ; (6) or it may originate or create them by the perception — of objective sense presentations from outward things— or of the mind's own feelings, states, acts, etc. ; (c) or it may originate or create them by inoeiving them from the contents of on^ one conception, or, independent of all foreign help, from the contents of no other conceptions at all. (2) But by the tactual mode of thought only, it can originate or create conceptions by inoeiving them from the contents of two or more other conceptions, either as contained in these conceptions or as not contained in them. Classifying these possible powers or modes of thought on the principle which we have adopted elsewhere, and which is more convenient, (1) We can re-think or recall an old con- ception from memory. (2) We can originate or create a new conception, (o) by perception ; (6) by reasoning, that is, by inoeiving it as unitedly contained in two or more known con- ceptions ; (c^ or by imagination, that is, by any other mode of inception. Perception and inception (the latter of which includes both reasoning and imagination) are the only possible modes of creating a conception. A conception to be created or origin- ated has to be one not hitherto in the mind. 4. The Intellect also possesses the power of Knowing, that is, of creating a correct con- ception with the subjective feeling of assurance that it is correct, in the following only possible modes:— n) By the non-tactual mode of thought, it can know only by perception. (2) By the tactual mode of thought, it can know only by reasoning. (3) By Imagination, 'ey always arise in the eubjeot and enswathe.the obieotive nrasBnliftinn. or nnn eept^ons which ^oite or gratify them / and it is only at the moSTn wh ch thl exoi?.^^; ^t^IZ^^.r^'^'"' are brought before the attenU (whSbJ JerTeXnLoep^^^^^^^ Z «# - :L: ". ^ •'*® enjoyable power of these subjaotive senses or feelings that we are canable fi T ?' rfi °^P'«""«. desire or aversion, good or Ul-desert, mi°iry or hippiness r,«,«f; I li ^^ 1''^ IpPulBiye power of these subjective senses oi feZLLung a. motives L^Ssed "'^"'' "•*'" "' '"^''"' •" *•*" ^'"' '^'" "'"l"""" 0' o^onseut toln act is ti,.t »i.f ' ^l^^}^^ subjective power of resolution or consent as a subjective sense or feeUnc that the subjective energy is regulated in the act as required. ""leciive sense or leeung, li I' r? A* '! °y *'^ ■^ realizing power of the subjective feolinit of assnrannn ».rnna^ «n^ attached m the Intellect to a conciption, that the things pertanfng to oSves and thJ out J^eworld are recognized as verities and exercise their Fogitimat? iXVnce over oi thole Vie* of the Six CloMes of Subjective Senset or Feelings. Th! fwJ"';!,* ''°'*A'v'^?T^*''*',^'°*"» *°d P'°''*« ""'tetic enjoyment. The Wh tw."!,*^^ ^n^'^' i*'*""" .««<* P'?""** ^^o'"' ""d miral enjoyment. The subii^tTv^'iL f*^" Conscience. Jscern duty and stimulate to the performance of it. . JJ ^a subjective feehngs of Conscience are Qod's law written in letters of conscious s ense/and la t^ Jme'JIo.^.''"''^*''"''' '<'*"^« '^"^ immediately subside, stlU It l«ives It. conception or impression fcellngsbelongto tSelntelleSt and thS WUL Conscience." Of oour«e, Sie other .ubj«)tlv« r of peroeiTing ot know- ise preientationi, inolad- igs whiob momanUrily I of Ikying them pMt in inbjeotlre feeling* in the mid be nieroly a bundle or the outside world to > regulate thein while in g aroused, felt, or por- both oonsoiousneu and the ooDception, which , ir subjective feelings. feelings their appropri- sr it shows their appro- be subjective resolution tion, or that will afford e gratification or paoifi- r so as to scimre it. ir form, yet equally oo»- s in the outaiJe natural - feeUngs themselves to at is holy and good. of the Subjective Senses lent beings, presentations or con- I which the exciting or jroeption, inception, or ubjective feelings, elings that we are able I for instance the beau- gs that we are capable lery or happiness, iugs acting as motives r consent to an act is eotive sense or feeling, «suranoe, aroused and ourselves and the out- luenoe over our whole >m a physical source, >f two kind^, as stated nent. enjoyment, the performance of it. oonsoioua sense, and >nceptlon or Impression Uect, Heart, and Will, it »•_. «•«.»*. *■->'•■ '*'¥T?n \ft BtiiL' Bads of " The subjective vine In this case a more se, the other subieotive 48 are legible enough even now, in our depraved itftte, to ihow an honaat reader the true road to holiness and happiness.* The filth, those uf the Intellect give conceptions power over the other subjective senses or feelings. And the sixth, those of the Will, give the other subjective senses or feelings power over the subjective energy. Synoptical Sketch of the Character, Possible Powers, or Modes and Uses of the Will, 1. The Will is that department of our nature which intervenes between the aubjective feelings or motives and their appropriate gratification or pit ilioation. 2. Its powers are, (1) its three yubjeotive states or feelings, resolution or consent, non- consent, and indecision ; and (3) the subjective energy 8. Of its three subjective states or feelings, the only one that has power over the sub- jective energy is resolution or consent. 4. The only mode in which subjective resolution or consent to an act can be aroused, is through the impulse of subjective feelings or motives, acting through the medium of con- ceptions. (1) It may bo aroused by one strong motive with none opponing it ; or (2) it may be aroused by the strongest class of motives when two classes of motives oppose one another. 6. The subjective resolution or consent, when aroused, can always act on the subjective energy when it covers it, but even when aroused it can aot on the subje'i.ive energy in the moment only that it covers it ; consequently, (1) when we resolve or consent to do an aot at this moment, the subjective resolution covers it at this moment ; (2) if we resolve or consent to do an aot at some future time, tlie subjective resolution covers not the subjective energy itself, but only another resolution which will cover the subjective energy at that future time. 6. The subjective energy always acts in accordance with the subjective resolution, and has power to regulate the mental and physical acts and sometimes states of the subject, and also to a certain extent tlie affairs of the outside world. 7. The Ego is never free to resolve, iclependent of motives or con' ury to the strongest motive ; but he is always free to resolve lu accordance with the strongest motive or those most agreeable to him. The Ego is always free to aot, do or use the subjective energy as he resolves ; but he is never free to act, do, or use the subjective energy but in accordance with his resolves ; in other words, the Ego is always free to resolve and to act as he pleases, but never free to do other- wise — that is, he is never free to be bound. 1. Were it not that the subjective energy which possesses power to control our physical and mental fauulties, and also to a certain extent the affairs of the outside world, ia thus hinged on to the subjective resolution, the Ego would be powerless to secure the gratification or pacification of his subjective feelings or impulses however he might resolve. 2. By the intervpntion of the subjective resolutior )etween the subjective motive and the subjective energy, the same faculty that ia influeuoed by the subjective motives has the power of gratifying or pacifying them. 8. \Vithout the intervention of the subjective resolution between the subjective motive and the subjective energy, the subjective motives would bo mutually destructive of the grati- fication or pacification of each other, or of the greatest amount of gratification and happiness to the Ego, because the motive that happened to be in the consciousness at the moment would control the subjective energy to the neglect "' all others out of the oonsoiouaness. By the intervention of the subjective resolution or con lent every subjective motive or feeling is provided with a bar, before which one a,ad all may ^lead and secure a conscious hearing ere anything is done that affects their general interests. 4. Through the medium of the subjective resolution, consent is given to those motives that promise the greatest amount of happiness. 6. And through the medium of the subjective e'lergy means are put forth to secure it. Synoptical Skttch of the Mutual Relations of tlie Intellectual and Moral Powers. 1. All of these powers are faculties of tbe one Ego ; the Ego thinks, the Ego feels, the Ego wills ; and it is in the Ego that all of these faculties act on one another. 2. Man's nature as a conscious, thinking, in other words, as a perceiving, reasoning, imagming and remembering being, lies in his intellect. * The second, thiid and fourtb classes make np the " Heart" in the threi' old division of man' g mental and moral nature. biuj/righirs"'rr"h!:^rr a di.Hkl«g lo.i„g. h.Mng. good o, ^ 4. Man . n.ture ., . „„tive .ppreoi.Uug. r..oIring, «ting or ^orgeilo bcihg. 11m In hi. modified in aooordanoo with thote o« coneci.noe. "^ "'*'''• "' ''•'^ The subjective feeUngg of Consoienee cannot be modjfled without rn outr.« in „.„ »-. MISOELLANEOUS. ^ct» and 5tat<« of the Mind. »b^« «..„, V. p,„.^^.-s S^T^-S:- j;ai,r ■j'^.i-;^- TAin^* UnthinkabU or Inconceivable, Contradictoriei, etc. •B ofVaiX*d'S?owh:i^7pt;*'^^ "'"" ** *" *'-''°"*"« *« '»"- • -o-o-PMon of it. A oontradiotion of thought is an attempt to fom a oonoeption one narl of -i.,.». j- , or annibilatoB anotter part. It is an attempt to think a t^ to be " w wd i, " «H t^.' iSd ^i^nVri^s re *sr ?ir* '^^'^ *» ">« •-« ---»• « -- witS-a'ss their'nl&oMsTlK^h'et*^^^^^^^^^ 1. Nothing in the nnivewe, that can present itself to the human mind in anv in.i,n» i« the form of a conception, is unthinkable or inconeeirable from itTnat^ nn?.« ?t^^" ^ oontradiotion-that is, one part of its oonoepttonTan(»K "r deii™^a^«^^^ "i""" * D r ?;fhriiid?n"L£a^is'* i^n-TiIS r~^-^^" -- ^ itTrii^ecfe^"^ c^p«in%^uX".sSi.JS to r^^sSvSjtVi^ i^^t;:^^^^''' »« *« "«««* '»«» i* K ooneet, which would tSw'fl?^ Purtheriore, there is nothing in the universe, that can present itself to the human mir,A in any m«.ner m the form of a conception, that ever, in it. Sature. oonilli^ . oonZSucSS , •^H r, loTiDR, b«ting, food or hii nabjeotiTa (Mlingt of !• 44. lergetio beiiig, Um in hii riont objMta which they I light to the (aoulties of le intelleot by their lub- tlon or approTal, «to., to oxoite or gratify them, bringing their impulses It an Mtire, energising ne place among the anb- ofUae they are infleiible «Mily oapable of being a outrage to our nature, are! the rights and the >ineas in ourtelTes. InteUeet, lo that it may alio by it* aeaiitanoe alao by the intelleot it ; but if a welUordered domination girea to all ineaa of the whole, lide world, etc., paaa in I the form of thought), tide of Bubjeotiye aenan npnlHOB, preaaea on the I, beiiin iidted upon by aminatea, in the heart > energetic aotion. ijeotive «tat« or a anb- lenaea or feelings are " objeotlTB anbjeotive etc. m a eonoeption of it, part of whioh deniea and so " and not to a man with a mouth two oanaei : (1) from Dd in any manner in I, nnleai it contains a ig another part, anp- lonoeptlon cannot be »Ie eonoeption. Par leiTability we require lid enonmbar ii witi. to the human mind ins a oontradiotion ; 47 in other words, that ever ia and Is not at the same moment, thai rtvar poiseaaei an atti ' nte and does not posieaa it at the same inatant, ao that in forming a oorreot conception of it we require to think a oontradiotion. Therefore nothing in the universe, that can present itself to the human mind in any manner in the form of a eonoeption, ia unthinkable or inoonoeivablti from its nature, and all oontradlotiona of thought or oonoeption beiug unthinkable as weU as Inoorreol, are mere violations of thought. 9. Nothing in the nniverae, that can present itself in any manner to the human mind in the form of a oonoeption, is unthinkable or inoonofiviible from its extent, except in so far aa its limits may extend beyond or without the oonoeiving capacity of the human Intelleot— an, for example, the inflnite oxteuds beyond the capacity of the finite. The hiiiT)»n intelleot can think even infinity itself correctly so far h^ it goes, but Us capacity is limited, and it can tb'--,. »i. finite portion of infinity, just as a veaael can hold bult its own oai «oity of the wat rw of th. ^ lean. We can then even think infinitude itself, and without a oontradiotion, or, y w« must (^ so in limited portions. Thus as Ood is inflnite in all His attributes, whiohever jf ! wne attri 'tes can be presented to the human mind in the form of a conception contains .o c xitMiwl is, and is conoeivable and thinkable enough to the degree in whioh the finite ot-:"!- (Mve pr . ers of the creature have caught its conception, and as far aa they contain lt.» Tl .; way, however, of attempting to think infinity, that involvM a oontradiotion and rend oonoeption imposaible. Infinity haa no limita, it ia a Umitleas whole ; when we try, therefore, to tliink it an n. whole with limits, the oonoeption involves a oontradiotion, and it ia unthinkable. The very atempt to grasp it all into the finite mind gives it limits. For the very same reason, to think of things existiuK aa nowhere in spaoe or duration involves a contradiction and ia unthinkable, becauHe the mere eonoeption of exlstenoe itself, means to be in both apace and duration. We might also add here that we cannot even negatively modify or change « oonoeption that haa been created by aocnrate perception or correct reasoning without introduoing a con- tradiotion, either in the oonoeption itself or between it and other oonoeptionH, and rendering either itaelf or the others at the aame moment both inoonoeivable and unbelievable. Let ua now remind the reader that with things (whioh persons may suppoHe to be in the universe) that cannot be preaented to the human mind In any manner in the form of a oon- oeption, we have nothing to do. Buppoae auoh things to exist, they are out of human con- aolousness, and they can never enter it, beoause it Is unfitted to receive them. Such things would be things inconceivable or unthinkable in the strictly true aenae. It ia of things that can or do present themselves tu the human mind in any manner in the form of oonoeption that we speak, and to which we devote this article on things nnthlnk- able or inconceivable, contradictories, etc. The human capacity of oonoeption is of coarse limit«d, but the very fact tlist a thing is presentable at all to our mind ia tLe form of a oonoeption shows that the human mind is oapable of dealing with it, and dealing with It aright In regard to things Inconceivable or unthinkable in general, it ia always well to remember the following facts : — 1. That what is inoonoeivable to us purely from the llmliation of our powers of oonoep. tion, and not from its containing a oontradiotion of thought, ia never attended with a oonaoions sense of " it must not," or " it cannot bo so ; " and we feel free to believe it, though we do not feel able to conoeive it. 2. That what is inconceivable to ua from its oontainlng a oontradiotion of thought, is always attended with a oonsoious sense of " it must not," or " it cannot be so ; " and -i feel neither able to oonoelve it nor to believe it without violating some cognitive prinoipits o* oar nature. 3. The inoonoeivable ui>m limitation arises then from limitation or defect in the oonoep- tive powers of the mind. The inoonoeivable from contradiction arises from defect in the oonoeption formed. 4. The oonoeption formed under limitation may be perfectly oorreot so far aa it goes ■ if attempted beyond the limit of our conceptive powers it would be incorrect. The oonoeption formed with a oontradiotion is never correct. Thingi Thinkable or Conceivable a» KnowabU, etc, 1. Everything that is thinkable or conceivable hy the hnmiiu mind is also oapable of being known by the human mind, provided we have the means of ascertaining by perception or reasoning that the conception we have formed of the thing is oorreot. Beoause, if a thins , Ai.:-..i..ki« • Of ftitributM of God that cannot b« pmented to th* hmnan mind in the fonn of a oonceotion of oonne, w« know nothiiig, »nd haro nothing to do with such. V^ • wHoepwon, r ^ft»s I 48 of asoertaining by perception or reasoning that this oonoeption is correct, then we have a correct conception with assuranoe that it is correct— thus we have all the elements of know- ledge. 2. Everything nnthinkable or inconceivable by the hnman mind is not capable of being known by the human mind, beoanae, without adding further proof, no oonoeption of such thing is possible, therefore no knowledge is possible. 3. Every attempted conception of a thing, unthinkable or inconceivable from its involving a contradiction, we do know to be incorrect, because we know that for a thtog to be and not to be in the same sense is impossible, and therefore the contradictory conception of it so attempted to be formed is also false. 4. An attempted conception of a thing nnthinkable or inconceivable from limitation of our conoeptive powers, wiU not be corr wt, because the thing is beyond our conoeptive powers. Origin of Idea* or Conceptiotu. 1. We suppose the mind of an infant at a certain period to be without ideas. How do ideas or conceptions originate as the child advances into conscious thinking power? 2. Of our primary ideas or conceptions :— (1) A large proportion are originated from the mind itself by internal perception of its own subjective states, feelings, acts, etc. (2) And the rest of our primary ideas are originated by external perception of outward things through the five senses. 3. _ Of our secondary, or modificatory ideas, originated by inception, all are originated by reasoning or imagination from the primary ideas or conceptions which have been derived by perception from the mind itself or from the oatside world. (1) Those originated by reason- ing coming from the known and distinct primaries ; (2) and those originated by imagination coming from vague and unknown primaries.* 4. Though the imagination has power to invent and originate new modifications of ideas, it is doubtful whether it has power to invent in the strictest sense a primary idea or concep- tion, that is, to cieate it without oouceptive material ab-eady in the mind, as, for instance, to conceive of a colour that the minU has never before seen in existence. 6. From the above it follows that all our ideas or conceptions are derived from the mind itself and from the outside world. Methods in which some of the more important Fundamental, Primary and Secondary Ideas or Conceptions are formed. Some writers on this subject appear to us to err in limiting our powers of conception too much, others in widening them to too great an extent ; yet, on the whole, we think that the greater source of error and the one most prolific of doubt is the too narrow limitation. Adherence here to true principles is of the greatest importance, for if once we get truth and error mixed together the error vitiates and renders uncertain even the truth with which it is alloyed. Mansel, as we understand him, affirms that both space and time in themselves are not objects of sensible intuition, but are distinctly conceivable only in conjunction with objects related to them. Now, in the first place, we do most certainly hold that the conception of anything (or even of nothing) as existing ox.', of or apart from both space and time is absolutely Impossible, for such a conc^tition would involve a contradiction of thought, because the very idea of existence means to be in both space and time. It follows then that, whenever we think of objects as ^T'sting or being at all, we think of them as existing in both time and space, t But, in the secoiiJ place, though we can by no means think of objects oat of or apart from both time and space, it by no means follows that the perceptive consciousness of either time or space apart from objects is impossible. We maintain that we can be directly con- scious of either. Every man is directly conscious of the " Now " whenever he thinks of it. That Now is time ; and when from memory he thinks of the " News " that are past, either as associfi d with objects or as not associated with them, he is conscious of some " Nows " being near and of others more remote. In a similar manner he can think of the future ; the " N<«?s " that he is conscious of at the present and in the past he can conceive of as being in the future. All these " Nows " of the present, past and future, put together, are adequate in theme ' es to give a general notion of time. So also in regard to space : every one with his eyes open (or even shut) is conscious of the " Here " and the " There " that are before him. Some "ThereB" are near, others are remote. He is eonsoious enough of Uie unity and • Of course nnxUfloatious may In like manner be originated from the secondaries themselves. \ Time and duration nre to be nndorstood here as meaning the same thing. \' rreot, then we hare a the elements of knoW' 9 not capable of being 10 conception of anch tble from its involving a thing to be and not rj conception of it so >Ie from limitation of >nr conoeptive powers. thont ideas. How do dng power? e originated from the lots, etc. (2) And the rd things through the all are originated by have been derived by originated by reason- Lnated by imagination nodifications of ideas, imary idea or conoep- id, as, for instance, to srived from the mind and Secondary Ideas rers of conception too >le, we think tb«t the 30 narrow limitation, noe we get truth and ruth with which it is in themselves are not ijanction with objects noeption of anything id time is absolutely thought, because the then that, whenever ting in both time and >bjeots oat of or apart >nBoiou8ness of either e can be directly con- lever be thinks of it. hat are past, either as f some " Nows " being k. of the future ; the >noeive of as being in 9ther, are adequate in e : every one with his " that are before him. igh of the unity and idturies themielves. 49 differences Unking all these " Heres " and '* Therea " together ; and whether occupied by (tbjeets or simply vaoant, all these " Heres " and " Theres," together oonstitnting space, are tangible enough m themselves to the perceptive powers. But while we may receive a notion of time and space by either of the preceding methods, we are by no means confined to these sources for the idea or conception of either. The idens of both time and space lie at the very threshold of consciousness. The very formation of a, conception is impossible without them. Every conception formed conceives of either some- thing or nothing to be or exist, but neither somethixig nor nothing can be or exist except in time and space, for its very being or existing is an intrusion into both. " To be," even during a flash of lightning, is ui intrusion into both time and spaoe for that period. Even nothing (the negative of something) must be somewhere and at some tim« as well as something, if it be or exist at aU. The ideas or conceptions of both time and sp ^ e then oan be flashed up in the mind from various sources. While speaking of the origin of our ideas of time and spaoe, we may also add that it furnishes examples of how, we may know certain things to be infinite. We know both time and spaoe to be infinite. In proof of this, we would remark that we know both time and spaoe to be of such a nature Uiat they cannot be annihilated. We do not refer merely to experience as furnishing this evidence, although experience certainly does furnish proof. Both duration and space have always been in the past and are now; and we know that nothing within the range of our experience oan possibly iiihilate them in the future. But the evidence to which we now call attention arises out of the very nature of time and spaoe themselves as revealed to us. Take time first aa an example : — Time or duration is pure oontinnanoe. Now, if duration or continuance were to oease to be or exist, its negative non-duration or non-continuance would at once begin to be or exist in its plaoe ; but if even non-duration or non-continuance were to be or exist but for a moment, it would become continuance. The very fact of noa-oontinnanoe or non-duration being or existing at idl transmutes it into continuance, because to be is continuance. There would thus be duration or continuance before non-continnanoe began to be, continuance while it continued to be, and continuance again after it had ceased to be. There are just two alternatives, continuance or non-continuance ; if either of them cease to be, the other must begin to be, and both alike are continuance ; thus continuance or duration cannot be destroyed. Time must therefore be infinite, for it is impossible without a contradiction of thought to conceive it possible to annihilate it. In precisely the same manner we may prove space to be infinite, for, suppose space to be limited or bounded, that something or nothing which bounds it must be or exist ; but that something or nothing to be ir exist must be or exist somewhere ; that somewhere ie spaoe. We can never without a contradiction of thought thrust a somewhere out of spaoe. The above are examples of how we may know both time and spece as well as other things to be infinite. In a manner similar to the foregoing we oan know that power exists, and that every effect must have a cause. Power is energy. When we see energy in action, we know therefore that energy must exist. So also when we see a changa take plaoe in an object which we know does not possess self-ability of change, then we know that it must derive that change from the abiUty of some- thing external to it. Every effect must therefore have-a cause, and if a cause be not inherent it must be external. So also we know that every effect must have an adequate cause, and that the properties cognizable in the effect must exist in the cause; that whatever exists muft possess attributes and modes ; that states, properties, functions, etc., cannot exist exsept they inhere in substance or subsistence ; and that design in the effect must invariably have a designer in the cause, NoTB.— Some philoBophers of a certain school ignore the exietenoe of causation and power, and snbstitute in place of them a something which they unwittingly lavest with the same properties. This something they call the antecedent, etc. Cause and effect they call "Antecedent" and " Sequent." They deny either cause, or power, or effect. They Ray in meaning, if not In so many words, " Postulate certain antecedents end certain sequent! will follow." Now we know that a change ouinot follow in any object nnless the ability to change it exists either in the oblect itself or in something else which effects the change in it from the outside. It we are told th&t the change is due to " Antecedence and Seqaenee," we reply, that " Antecedence " is a nonentity (non-substanoel, and " Sequence " is a nonentity ; but as " AbilitieB " to produce changes or effects cannot inhere in nonentities (that is, be properties of them), therefore they must inhere in the entities or objeots which thus produce effects in one another. The term " Causes " or " Powers " is sometimes applied to the " Abilitiss " thesiseivfis. &nd sometimes to the obiecte in which they inhere, of which thsv £?s **rc*^er- tles ; but surely no sensible person can afford toregard as mere iny ths ^ther the '* AbUitles '^them- selves, or the objects in which they Inhere. We believe that this denial of the existence of power, cause, etc., arises par^ from contradiction of thought, and partly from a mistrust of the cognitive powers of the mind. The apostles of such doctrine doubt everything and believe nothing except that 6 i i' m 60 SlrlS^ ^?Jt^}'}^\. Theypnt-Sftdduoee even the Sadduoeea, far they beUeve neither In a world ft to?S,LiS.*»5^ ^* harmonlring the world by » relm of belle/ and oonTlotlonrthey^onld redu^ rjsf;ifflg,rag??j".MsiMoi}?^^^^ The child probably jraoeiTee his first action of Taoaufly from the apparent vaonities of Bpaoe around hun, from locomotion, moyement of the hand, etc. He might form his notion of BoUdity from many sources ; for instance, from shaving a stick with his knife or eating into an apple. He might form his notion of fluidity and its rektion to solids from water, ice. etc. ; of shape or conformation by sight and touch; of nature of essence or substance by essential or inherent attributes. We believe that aU such ideas or conceptions in the mind of the child aie of slow growth, and are being repeatedly corrected by experience in ahildhood. Extent atui Perfection of our Knowledge. Some minds have apparently difSoulty in believing that even the limited knowledge wo possess IS m any way reUable or perfect. They seem to entertain the opinion that all our con- ceptions are conceptions of things as they merely appear to us, not of things as they really, absolutely, and essentially are in their own nature. These people doubt everything and believe nothing. jo For our part, we believe that aa objective truth is a verity and is one, so also subjective truth IB a Verity and la ^ unity, or at least is intended to be so, throughout the universe. To conceive a Oiiog assuredly to be, not what it may appear to be, but what it really and absolutely is, la perfect knowledge. If a thing is conceived of as it reaUy and absolutely is, the conception formed of it will be the same in the minds of aU inteUigenoes alike, whether angels or men. Ib our knowledge then real and absolute, perfect bo far as it goes i We maintain, that though very limited m its compass and completeness, it is perfect so far as it (roes. In evidence of this we caU attention to the foUowing facts :— A thing is conceived of as it reaUy rad absolutely 18 when we conceive of it according to its inherent and essential attributes that is, those that are real. A thing is conceived of only aa it may appear to ub when we con- ceive of It according to its merely accidental and extraneouB attributes, that is, those that are only apparent. The question then is, have we always power to know the inherent, essential, or real attributes of thmgs, and do we always form our conceptions of things according to these attributes r The foUowing propositiouB will distinctiy answer these questions in the affirmative : — 1. In perception and reasoning, through which all assured conceptions originate in the mind, we have power always to know, in other words, to distinguish the attributes of a thing that ue merely accidental, extraneous, or apparent, and the attributes that are inherent, essential or real. This, by perception and reasoning, mixed or otherwise, we can do even in the most oomphcated oases. Thus when I perceive with the Bense of si(?ht an objective appearance before me, I know that light is no real attribute of thai jot though it is reflected from it, because the object is not self-luminous. I know that at object is not a mere phantasmal appearance in my own mind, because I get the touch jf resistant matter from It by my band outside of me. I know that pain is no real attribute of that object, be- cause, though the touch of it is cold enough to pain me, I am conscious of pain being a sub- jective state of myself, I know that solidity is an inherent attaribute of that object, because It resists my t( h— in other words, gives the touch of solidity. I know that object to be brass because sight, luaoh, hearing, etc., give the visual appearance, hardness, resonance, and other essential attributes of that metal.* Then, as we are able to distinguish the inherent and real properties of matter, bo Also by means precisely similar, we can distinguish the essential and real physical, intellectual and moral characteristics of the human beings, etc., around us. We have just as free access to their inherent mental qualities, states and acts, as we have to the essential states and proper- ties of non-organized matter. The subjective feelings or states of the mind reveal themselves on the surface by their impulses. The intellectual faculties unfailingly indicate their character and power in abundantly * Xn the above manner we are able easily to trace and to know the inherent the smanMitl u:nri <-!,<> real of material tiVinoi in all their modes of exUtenoe, and aSo toXt^iuS thSwfaSS -rtktJveJ u merely apparent. tKub soUdity itaelf in one lenae mav be o»ll«d iTS^ T"^2!-7ft..t!?^i! given facts .,«.., .,..» «o »uo« v«*y uaaay^tiiai it u an mherent attrlbate ot that matter to be soUd at one en temperatture. and to be fluid at anothoi i and it is alao very easy for ua to dlsWnralrfi uSJ2 ts from ;;.v«rythi>« In their methods of presentation, that Tome m^ ^ to rSwdTM ffluSorT i III .-m illeve neither In a world tion, they wonld rednoe Intelleotual and moral would msh to the chaos apparent vaonitlea of aight form his notion is knife or eating into from water, ice, etc. ; inbatance by essential 9 in the mind of the e in ihildhood. limited knowledge we nion that all onr con- things as they really, onbt everything and ne, BO also sabjective >ut the aniverse. )nt what it really and uUy and absolately is, Eenoes alike, whether ' We maintain, that I far as it Koes. In loeived of as it really essential attribtites, r to ns when we oon- lat is, those that are it, essential, or real i according to these 9 questions in the ons originate in the tttribntes of a thing 9 that are inherent, e, we can do even in f fii^ht an objective Jot thongh it is at object is not a oi resistant matter te of that object, be- of pain being a sub- that object, beoacse at object to be brass, resonance, and other if matter, ao also, by ical, intellectual and ust as free access to al states and proper- ad reveal themselves Mwerin abundantly the essential, uid the •herefrom whatever is ter t-■'£ S°* """* *' * creature is also fitted by these senses or feelings to revere, to adore, to •c- 'irorship, to trust, to feel a sense of responsibility or oblifvtion to a Being immeasurablv greater than himself " ^ ^ The existence of God is, therefore, as necessary to his nature as the existence of his fellow-men. The feelings and faculties that need God, are just as real in his nature as the feelings and faculties that need man. What man would be without a fellow- creature to esteem or love T He would be without a God to revere and adore,— a creature endowed with faculties that were eternally to lie idle,— a creature with desires that were never to be.gratified. 1. But as we cannot love, esteem, or form friendship with a man of whose existence wo know nothing ; so no more can we revere, adore, or obey a God that has never been revealed to us. It was, therefore, necessary that God should be revealed to us as well as man ; so * ^? "'*■* o' faculties pertaining to each might be put fully into exercise. This fact leads us to expect such a revelation of God at man's creation, as the book of Genesis records. Man's nature would have been an enigma without it. 2- Then, that all the subjective feelings of the Heart and Conscience, either those that pertain to God or those that pertain to man, might have full scope and development, it was necessary, in order to give this, that God, as well as man, should present suitable phases of character, and also present Himself in suitable relations to us. (1) Thus in regard to the senses or feelings of the Heart :— The presentation of God's eharatiter as holy, just, and good, Is required to excite my feelingi) of veneration, adoration, etc., just as the presentation of what I value in the character of my fellow-man is needed to arouse my sentiment of esteem. The presentation of God in the relation of my Creator and Preserver, is just as necessary to awaken in me the sentiments of creature trust and depend- ence, as acts of kindliness on the part of a fellow-man to «,rouse in a»e the sentiment of fnendship. (2) So also In regard to the subjective senses or feelii i;8 of (Jt .icnce :— If relations of teust and obligation had never been established between .an and his fellows, it would have been impossible to give scope and exercise to the subjective set jes o? jbhgntion which pertain to fellow-men. For this end it was necessary that the race should all spring from the same ji« Some minds seem to imagine that knowledge, as a faot oonoeived of and believed, must be a different tUng in one order of creatures from that In another. How son this be so ? If a thine Is ^rtjatlt l»,«ien the conception of that thing as it Is must bo ths same in all minds allkn. li«t to ?h« osxoBi la TTOioa saoa mlaa li. uapaule of oouoeiviug of it. To know a thmg as it is. even toa limited extent, Is absolute knowledge Just to the extent In which it includes faofcVhls is the knowledge that human beings understand. Knowledge that we do not understand should be caUed by a dUTerent experience of all other d abaolute oono^lJilMbn t, th«) faet iR oonfllmed > be broken yeaterday, I yesterday, I prove to ody wul be orooked or idon now as oonoeived 1 of heaven and earth igel in heaven as well ood, wise, or prndent, 1 be a ship on the sea, volitional, will always lind of men, of angels, oert of Man's Intellee- 3to., together with the ble and oorresponding m Booial relations of a. Witiiout suitable d, tortured void. He animals, and all the lature requires. ID revere, to adore, to Being immeasurably the existence of his in his nature as the a fellow- creature to eatnre endowed with never to be.gratified. F whose existence we never been revealed I as well as man ; so roise. ktion, as the book of loe, either those that development, it was It suitable phases of resentation of God's Bneration, adoration, >w-man is needed to n of my Creator and e trust and depend- ne the sentiment of ice : — If relations of jIIows, it would have Ration which pertain ting from the same t belteved. must be a I be BO ? If a thing Is ilndB allks, Inst to thn t is. even to a limited Is the knowledge that I called by a different ^^ •*"i family, be of the same brotherhood, smd be formed alike in the iuage of Gpd. As the senses of obligation are varied, it is neoosaary that the relations which give them activity should also be varied and suitable, which they are. And it is so also with reference to those subjective senses of the Consoienoe which pertain to God :— It was necessary that Grod should reveal Himself in the relations of Creator, Pre- server, and Sovereign Lord, to impart the proper stimulus to the corresponding subjective aenseB of dependence and subjection in the creature, — that some divine command or injunction dionld be given to impart distinct activity to the subjective sense of individual obligation, — that both promise and threatening should be held oat as stimulative of the anticipatory senses, namely, expectancy of reward or expectancy of punishment, and tnat a prohibitory test of obedience should be demanded, that the individual might fully recognize his own distinct moral agency, and have the proper degree Ox quickening to his sense of responsibility. Such a revelation of God would have many sides ; and it would be absolutely necessary in order to afford the corresponding and suitable stimulus and pacification, not only to those senses of conscience which pertain to Ood, but to them all. 8. Though snch external relations as the foregoing are perhaps most eminently necessary on the part of the subjective senses or feelings, they are, nevertheless, absolutely needful on the part of the intellect ''nd the will. (1) Take away from man's intellect the revelat<>-n of Ov>d alone, and man finds himself endowed with powers of conception far beyond tbr ^inits of his field of vision. He is as a man shnt up within prison walls, to whom his jailor has givun a telescope of far-reaching power, without any opportunity of using it. Finding no God within the rauQv, "■* his experience, he e^noeives of one according U, his fancy. The position of a man without God would be exactly similar to that of a man without a fellow-man, who wouM be to himself a mystery, and who would invent men of the creatures or objects around him, and invest them with men's attributes. It is thus that the heathen invent gods of the creatuies or objects that excite their fear or veneration, and invest them with attributes of divinity. (3) So also with reference to the will ; finding no supreme will in the nniverse, aronnd which his own may revolve as the planets around the sun, all a man's actions are but the erratic wanderings of a planet without its gravitating centre. As the absence of a revelation of God would leave the subjective feelings of Conscience out of balance, so also it would cause the subjective resolution or consent of the will to become but as the helpless plaything of a disorganized and unregulated rabble, and be absolutely destructive of the end for which man was created. 4. With the preceding suitable relations, all man's intelleotnal and moral nature can be in harmony with itself. The Intellect, the Heart, the Conscience, the Will, can exercise each its functions properly ; without suitable relations neither of them can do so. In the case of those nations that have no knowledge of the true God, the subjective senses that pertain to Him are exercised on idol substitutes, which the oonceptive intellect has endowed with the neoetsary attributes, and which the Will obeys or disobeys capriciously, as suits best the whim of the moment. To me there seems no evidence more impressively corroborative of the testimony of the first chapters of Genesis, than that afforded by the approach to them bam this side of intelleo- tnal and moral philosophy. The Effect* of Man'* Fall in Eden, a» they are at Preeent Found in our Intellectual and Moral Nature. That a causality, mutation, fall, or something equivalent to it, has occurred to distui}) the order and harmony of our intellectao.! and moral nature, is abundantly eviden. from the presence of moral evil, from the antagonism prevailing in man's own nature in the subjective feelings of conscience always demanding t; hat the other pn '<; of our nature concede to be only their just requirement, while we are conscious of being u .; iMe fully to meet their rei'Ti'. - ments in practice. The same truth is evident also from the fact that a better and more harmonious ord; nl things is not only quit^ conceivable as possible, but that in many cases it is attainable to a certain degree by persons living in our midst. It is only in degree, however, that we find any approach now to the perfect standard which the subjective senses of the Conscience demand. Christ however is an example of the attainment of that perfect standard; and supposing Christ had never K?ed-. Hi" wHttnn history (granting it oonld have been written) is unanswer- able proof of such perfect attainment being possible to man's mental and moral constitution. Th^re is nothing of the nature of a jar in the mind of Christ ; every part acts in harmony with the others, and yet that life on the human side of it is perfectly human and natnraL ii H: 'ff^ - In 'Ml! ^^: 4^ the true rXTdShfye had' T^LJ" V '^!^'r '~"?«'' "', *''« Con«iienoe, which «« feelinga oMhe Heirt have Lair^nL ' ""^ *5^ constant vie ie^ 'on. and the anbiootSvc indulgent. The ^hdrJwal of dS^a^" """^"^ Btiengtbei^ed bypenn^.^u. ,r over- of ti^' .l'!'";nL?^^5:t?^ Tr"' "?' "'^ J?.'"'^''' ""« "«« ^ '»»« ineurbordi^ation ii>a«'B vOiU J bdnl ,v'-dL^, * fr'!,^ ^"If" •"'^•'' •* " *" ' '» «*«• '«"° »»»« constitution of piiMo^ , fjAinL , ™iT ^u^wu*" ^ '" harmony wi h itself and with its moral and iki 'T^^.;", ««t^h?f. TX'^A^' *• *' *'»!^8'«»*<'«' ""nonnt ,n gratification to the feeUngs of Stiv. ie • intr^S^ inS th«"S !f^t ^k" ?J Conscieno- . nothing therefore but a "^oon' them T>,„ k1^ 1- »"» tne mind could be the means oi - ovoking antaKonism between f^h^KS of tbeV«trf •-,''?. "P'/^^-^I^K tl^" falsely in a Vmtter iS S ?he subje^rve natMfl »L ™ ? *""* Conscience were alike concerned, , ould present man's outward SoieLe A !^n™n«U 'h-^fi. "^r*'^* 'l''""^? °' "'^ «*»'*• '^-^^ »' l»"nnony with those of WsrkdetTZt ^lb^i^!^'/°"• """'*• H^*""' introduced into the mi^ds of our fi» intmbordSiationnn'fh! ^ TS" '/ Tf '"'«*'' ^^P*"* '° *>« "'"n. capable of producing that tod a^Stog ^"* **' *••* '*^""«' °* *•"« "^ *" t''""^ 0* Conscience, which we wonld'll*^!''^^ °' *'l® "*• .''^^f'^''' in « case diversely affecting the Heart and Conscience Te HeJ^ thfu Ji"' '^t«««nism between them, and to corrupt aJd etrenX* the S« of o^er tS ft Hra?t^:!nf ^"^^'°^' fr°i^? legmm^U^ authority of those of OonSoe broSerdisoriSr fndlaSs nesf isT n^«7^"/* T^'^J.'-J^' »°**'°"*y °' Conscience once drawn^anH m-„ fii* '*'"«*"'«88 is at once mtrodnced, divine influences and favour with- Si^rhavTbeen ?he r„Cr Si whlh tr^'- '^^' •'""" " P'>a°'«>PW«*l standpoint, must the abn™ tv./*.!*^!, * .? ?• V°o^'"*''* ^''^ disorder in our nature was introduced. Add to no means of i^ „„?*''*' ^t"' ^?*'" '""' ""} °°« »»»« *"»»> »' ^hich our first SentshaS assertw*?,! .^ ™ question, it was preceded by a command and a statement from God assS^od'sTw ??;{. '^'^ **}•* linHf '"'''J^'''* '««"°8'' °* '•»«!' Conscience r^JresentS 3 t?onTttev^olat^th« u^vT^ , ^^' ?f"»?nt therefore that they yielded to Sitan's temjta Wn!« ,^^^n -u ""^Jf *i^« ia^'s o' their Conscience, disbelieved and disobeyed God and th^n weTav^^th^oSv'ihi^re « '^ '?,!" T'" °\ *"•"•« ""^^ "l-'^^^^'' swned hS anarchy whTh I- fi^^- ^ *^.''* will adequately explain the origin of the disorder and ritt^Brb^ifthTo^^; o"n?thit w^u ^or'"'' '"'" '•^^ '''^'°^°^'^°^ ^^-^^p^-*- "' case wonH^i!^M/'y'T"'^/u' '''i^ '*?'«* '^-^'^ '""^ »<»«"ng the necessities of man's ^d antW^' i" *" ^'}T '^t '"'»'i«'ti'« feelings of ConBoience to their legitimate Tower and authorrty ; and second, to subordinate and purify .he subjective feeling oMhe C cheme in which it found 10 in whioh it found 66 Ab everything whioh is done by God can only be but right and perfect, so every thing and every actor in this plan of redemption legitimately and fully upholds and satisfies all the subjective feelings of the Conscience as well as those of the Heart ; while the result of the plan is to correct, purify, and bring into legitimate order all that is wrong in man's moral and mental nature. Had the plan failed in either of these things it had been inadequate. Still further as to the mode in whioh all this restoration can be effected, part of the means employed must operate through man's consoiousnees. and part operate outside of it. With regard to the first part of the means, as it is not possible to reach the subjective senses or feelings, where the evil mainly lies, in any other way than through the medium of conception; and as a conception, to have the desired subjective result, must not only be correct but be attended with assurance or faith : it follows that the remedial scheme, in so far as it works on man through his own consciousness, must approach him through the intellect in the form of a conception attended with assuranoe of faith; and this is just the method of the Qospel, viz., " Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shait be saved." Then the nature of the conception itself must be suitable. As man cannot otherwise help 01- deliver himself, the conception demands of him only jiimple acceptance of, and trust in, Christ for salvation, which the external means, God's Holy Spirit acting on him at the same moment, enables him to yield. Then harmony being thus established between the mind and ite chief outward environ- ment (just at the point where it was first interrupted), the restoration is begun ; and as began by conceptive truth acting through the consciousness on the subjective feelings, etc., and by the Holy Spirit b iing outside of it ; so in like manner, by these means, it must be carried on in stimulation through the consoiousneBB and renovation from outside of it. The subjective feelings as motives, the intellect, and the will, acting under new forces and new circumstances of course need exercise, and grow thereby, just aa the diseased functions of a sickly invalid restore and invigorate under the influence of wholesome physical exercise. 0, what profound philosophy is under the words of Scripture, "Father, sanetifythem through Thy truth:" "Faith without works is dead." • J t^ r «ma, Conscienee, That the feelings or senses of Conscience are aa much a fact in our nature as those of the Heart, nothing but the sheerest ignorance of himself will give a man hardihood to' deny. The fool who treats Conscience as a mere imaginary ghost or myth, will find, like Voltaire, that Conscience carries too sharp a whip and strikes too heavy a blow to be set down as an idle creation of childhood. That I have a sense of " oughtness," of right or wrong, of good or of ill desert, is just as certain as that I have a sense of love, of friendship, or of esteem. If I can ignore the existence of the subjective feelings of Conscience, I can ignore the fact of my having feelings of any kind, or even a faculty of knowledge. We have already said that the subjective feelings of Conscience are the Law of God written in man's soul in letters of living subjective sense ; that they are the clear and unfailing guide to duty ; and that they differ in their nature from all other subjective feelings, being inflexible and imperative in their demands, at the same time allowing large scope within their fixed limits for the play of all the other social and enjoyable feelings— in fact furnishing a guide to them. Thus Conscience itself is the law of Love, allowing a certain compensative freedom under mutual engagements, but punishing the transgressor of its code with terrible retribution, and that, too, with a rod of its own manufacture, and from whioh there is no escape. That the perfect obedience whioh the subjective feelings of Conscience require is no bare conjectural hypothesis unattainable in practice, and that it involves nothing impossible to the intellectual and moral constitution of man, is evident from the example of perfect obedience furnished by Christ. We see in His history the full play of all the other social and moral subjective feelings, without a single instance in all His career of any that were contrary to, or fell under the requirements of, a perfectly- developed Conscience ; and yet He was a perfectly natural man. '' We say, then, that the subjective feelings of Conscience, where perfectly developed and legible, are a sure and infallible guide. That in our present depraved state they are not perfectly developed and legible, is not denied ; and yet if such a Conscience as we have were implicitly followed, we do not know that we should fall into much sin. Nevertheless, since this law has in some measure been obliterated in man's nature, God has been pleased to give revivified in the light of the Decalogue, should regulate all other feelings and facnlliSB of our nature, (1) by meting out justly all our obligations to others as well as to ourselves, and (2) conferring on ourselves and on others the highest amount of happiness. 06 In oonolniion, while we proolaim the adeqoMy of the Conuienoe u a tfiiide to duty, we mast not be rappoied aa maintaining that the mere light of Consoienoe, withont any other rerelation from Qod, ia all that ii neoeaaary to enable a man both to see his duty and to do it. Man matt be made aoqnainted with the Beings that ennron him, as well as with their ohaf- aoter and relations, before the Oonsoioncii con give any definite decree respecting them. How shall we worship a God of whom we know nothing, unless, like the heathen, " we worship we know not what?" We must therefore know something of the Qod we are to worship and obey, as well as of the man we are to love and care for. Oonaoienoe can never be a substitate for snoh a revelation aa we need, and which is conceded in Scripture. 'W isoianoe aa « gnide to duty, we ConioienM, without any other th to 866 his duty and to do it. lim, as well as with their ohaf- decree respecting them. How I the heathen, " we worship we od we are to worship and obey, ) can never be a substitnte for re.