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" Operibus prsescripsit Deus antequara lifteris ; viribus prf^dicavit antequam viris: prsemisit tibl naturam magistrair., submissuru-s et prophetiam; quo facilius credas prophetiae, disclpulus natura'; qiu* statim admittas, quum audieris quod ubique jam videris." Tertullian, De Resurrcrl. Curnla, 12. LONDON: FRANCIS & JOHN RIVINGTON, SI. I'Ml/s CilLIUIl V.VHI), ANI/ \V\TrKI,0(; fl, V( i: 1850. 6^/>\/£ A^< O ^0 LONDON : GILBERT AND RIVINGTON, PRINTERS, ST. John's square. On the On the J On the I On the b Statemer gonist On the E That the from 01 CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. On the Utility of the Study of Natural Theology CHAPTER III. On the best Mode of Proof of the Being of God 1 CHAPTER II. On the Natural Theology of the Greeks and Romans . 10 32 51 CHAPTER IV. On the best Mode of using the Argument from Design . 4.3 CHAPTER V. Statement of the Argument from Design, with the Anta- gonist Theories and their Refutations CHAPTER VI. On the Evidence of Design throughout Creation CHAPTER VII. That the Design evident throughout Creation proceeds from one only Being jj- 93 1- ;y in gs he it se ^e ie ce 0- IV CONTENTS. CHAPTER VIII. rA CHAPTER XIII. On a Future State l«l CHAPTER XIV. On the Immortality of the Soul 190 CHAPTER XV. On the Benevolence of God towards Mankind in parti- cular ; and on a particular Providence 20;i CHAPTER XVI. On the Freedom of the Will 218 CHAPTER XVII. On the Means we possess of Ascertaining the Will of God. 232 ■ I 4 » I ELEMENTS or NATURAL THEOLOGY, CHAFl'KR I. ON THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. Theology is the science or doctrine concern- ing God. It is divided into Natural Theology and Revealed Theology : by the former we mean such knowledge of God, and of the things which regard Him, as we might gain by the right use of our natural powers (although it may be true that we cannot point out any who have fully obtained this knowledge by these means) ; by the latter we mean such knowledge of these subjects, as we have attained by the revelations which He has been pleased to make to mankind. A distinction is to be drawn between Theo- logy and Religion. Theology is, as we have stated, the doctrine or science concerning God. B ox THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY But all our knowledge respecting Him, as re- specting every thing whatever, ought to have an end — a practical object ; and that end in this case is Religion. Religion is the recogni- tion and practical application of the truths which Theology teaches ; the believing and act- ing out of those truths in our character and conduct. Now Religion cannot exist at all without some knowledge of the truths which Theology teaches. It may not be a regular, well-digested, systematic knowledge ; but it must be some knowledge. For all religion is built upon faith: and faith implies the belief of something ; and that something, to be the foundation of religion, must be some theological truth. Persons may not be aware that they believe theological truths; they may never have considered whether they believe any truths or not: but still they do believe them, otherwise they have no religion. For there is no true religion which does not bring the heart of man to God in prayer and adoration: and "he that cometh to God must believe that he is, and that he is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him.'^ These two points, that God exists, and that He rewards those who diligently seek Him, are two doc- trines of Natural Theology ; and without them there can be no religion. These and kindred truths, however, we, as Christians, are all taught from our childhood ; OF NATI'UAL THEOLOGY. 3 und \vc find them ackn(nvlo(l«re{l by the great body of persons amonirst \vh()n\ we Hve; and therefore it may not at tirst sight appear evident why we should make them special subjects of inquiry and study. It may tliercfore l)e proper briefly to enter into the reasons for the study of Natural Theology. Religious truth finds man already predis- posed against the ends of it, at least by the corruption of his nature, and in many cases, by the inveterate ignorance and superstition of ages. There are, moreover, many who have chosen habits of evil, and liave a strong repug- nance to being controlled or amended. They therefore resist religious truth, and speak against it, and appear to take a pleasure In either assailing or undermining the faith of others; especially when they find it stand in the way of their own views or wishes. Now the svstem of Christian doctrine in which we are instructed, together with the sacred books which are the inspired record of it, presuppose natural reli- gion, and take its truths for granted. The Holy Scriptures, in particular, state, illustrate, and enforce the unity and supremacy and various attributes of the Creator : but they do not attempt to prove them ; and his existence and providence they entirely take for granted : they suppose them capable of sufficient evi- dence to the mind of man by the exercise of his natural powers. B 2 ON THE UTILITY OF TIIK STUDY This has, however, been denied by Mr. Ellis, (the author of '* The Kno\vled;j;c of Divine Thiiij.':s from Revelation, not from Reason or Nature,") who attempts to j)rove that no part of our knowlcd're of Divine? things is derived by man from reason or the observations of nature. It should be observed, however, that ho, and others of his period, were arguing against the Deists, who imagined that we could establish the whole system of necessary truth, both theological and moral, and that with absolute correctness, by reason alone^ without revelation ; and that they are not arguing so much against believervS, who held that natural religion is the substratum of revelation. It was, therefore, only indirectly, and in ])ushing their arguments to extremes, that they came to question the possibility of some truth being ascertainable by natural reason. This Ellis does chiefly upon the ground of the passage, Rom. X. 17, in which St. Paul, speaking of the Divine intention that the Gentiles should come to the knowledge of the Gospel, and the consequent necessity of preaching to them, says, " Faith Cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God :" which he understands to assert, that no person can believe religious truth with- out having it communicated to him ; and that the only way in which man can have it com- municated to him is by Divine revelation. It appears evident that this is to press the words , rA*-»^' ■ f'-ti H ^ ^»» -^ OF NATURAL Til KOLOf! Y. J of the Apostle beyond tlieir proper ineaiiiiij^, and to chaiijrc a partieidar assertion into a general j)rineiplc. St. Paul is here spcakini; of faith in the Gospel ; and his words cannot he fairly quoted as applying to any thing else. Moreover, there is another passage in this same Epistle (eh. i. 19, 20,) in which, aecortling to the obvious meaning of the words, St. Paul teaches that natural reason ?ni(/ht lead men to the knowledge of God, and that tiiey were inexcusable if it did not so lead them. In that well-known passage, the Apostle alHrms that "the invisible things of (jod, his eternal power and Godhead, arc clearly seen from the creation of the world, being understood by tlie things that arc seen :" and this he asserts in order to show, that " that which may be known of God" was manifested to the Gentiles, " so that they arc without excuse." St. Paul here is referring to facts ; and, as we shall see afterwards, the facts were, that by the Gentiles, both Greeks and Romans, the existence of God and his providence were "understood by the things which were seen ;" and the reason why they were not fully acknowledged by those who thus imderstood them was, that they did not choose to oppose and desert the established idolatry. Ellis endeavours, indeed, to set aside this text, by saying that it refers, not to the existence, but to the attributes of God. But this is very short-sighted reasoning ; for in what way could i in I " t SK * »». » ir ' . osr • (] ON THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY man infer, or has man ever inferred the exist- ence of God, unless by the working of his attributes ? What did man understand by his existence, except that there is a Being, pos- sessed of eternal ])owcr and eternal Godhead, as distinguished from the partial and temporary power and supernatural existence (Godhead) of other beings and creatures, which men have supposed to be gods ? For, with few and trifling exceptions, men have always acknowledged some Godhead ; but the difficulty has always been, first to prevjiil ui)on them to contemplate the evidence of One eternal power and Godhead; and, after they have come to understand it, to induce them to act up to their conviction. And thence some in all ages have endeavoured to weaken the force of this evidence, or have set themselves to deny the fact of the very existence of this power and Godhead. When therefore, from whatever causes, the fundamental doctrines of all religion are as- sailed, it becomes necessary to have recourse to the means of establislnng those doctrines which are supposed capable of satisfying the mind, anterior to revelation ; namely, observa- tion and reflection. True it is, that after the traditions derived from the original progenitors of the human race had become darkened, and men were left more entirely to their own under- standings, we have no evidence that any man, without the aid of revelation, did arrive at a OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 7 correct knowledge of God. Equally true is it, that only those who have been favoured with Divine revelation, have been able to appreciate duly the phenomena of nature and providence, and to reason correctly from them. But still, where the human understanding itself has not become utterly debased and degraded, there has been enough to convince the body of man- kind that there is some moral Power governing the world ; and to lead individuals to the con- clision, that that Power is the Author of the pnsent state of things, and superior in nature to all other things. And, in the case of those wlo do actually receive Divine revelation, mm's intellectual vision has been so cleared, and his judgment and reason so strengthened, thit, wherever the arguments of believers have reiched. Atheism has been constrained to shrink and retire, or assume some other form. It is tierefore important that the minds of the young siould be instructed in the evidences and doc- tines of Natural Theology, that they may not b at a loss for suitable arguments to repel and slence gain say ers. Nor are there wanting other grounds to aithorize such a course. The young Christian, \iiose mind is of an active and speculative turn, wll be apt at times to look back and search iito the principles and hidden sources of things; aid, if he is left to himself, his speculations nay lead him into depths in which painful yw.ji.Jitl.1 iliimn II .I'Ht' 8 p mt m ^m j tw m i r y mw i ^ **' ON THE UTILITY OF THE STUDY doubt and fear may agitate his soul, as to the grounds and foundations of all religious truth. His case, however, is not new: others before him, and some with stronger and better balanced minds than most men possess, have fallen upDn the same or similar doubts and inquiries ; and, by the blessing of God, have, by the use of their natural reasoning powers, either cleared up their doubts and removed their difficulties, or have found abundant reason to satisfy them to remain with some doubts and difficulties still unremoved. Under such circumstances, it must be of incalculable benefit to be furnishjd with the arguments and conclusions whith have been the refuge and safeguard of othffs in circumstances exactly similar. There is yet another reason which would De valid (at least as to the direct portions of tie argument), even if the others had no existence. Revelation itself (as I have already said) pre supposes natural religion, and avails itself d* its lights. Not only so, but it prompts to somj of the duties which are parts of natural religioi^ and founded upon its evidence. It teaches u to contemplate the great Workmaster in hi works, and thus to deepen and strengthen ou* impressions of Him. It leads us to see anl feel Him in every thing ; that so all things mar discourse to us of Him, and in and through is his intelligent creatures, things unintelligeit may praise, and bk^s, and magnify Him. Witt- OF NATURAL THEOLOGY. 9 out any reference, therefore, to direct unbelief, but simply with a view to strengthen our faith, making it more habitual, and grafting it into our very nature, it is right for us to be able to trace the Divine Artificer and Preserver in every thing which He has made. And the same must be said of the course of his natural providence. It is possible to regard it as a mere system of events, brought about by secondary causes. But revelation takes for granted that it is something more than this ; that there is one Sovereign Director of all the affairs of tliis world, great and small. And to have our minds fully imbued with the evidence of this truth, such as enlightened reason furnishes, has a tendency to deepen its impres- sion, and to render it more habitually influ- ential. Similar remarks may be applied to the natural evidences of God^s moral government, and of a future state, and the immortality of the soul. For, at least to those who think much, it deepens the impression of tliese facts, to perceive how widely spread their evidence is, and how it meets us continually when we should never have expected it, — even without the direct evidence for them furnished by Divine revelation. For these last-mentioned ends, if there were no other, it woidd be our duty (o instruct our youth in this science. , I I ¥■ By' '¥ CHAPTER II. ox THE NATURAL THEOLOGY OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. The first object in Natural Theology must be to prove that God exists ; that every thing de- rives its origin from one First Cause, and that Cause, an intelligent, self-existent Being, the Upholder and Governor of all things. It will assist us materially in understanding the nature of this subject, if we make an historical survey of the state of Natural Theology amongst the Greeks and Romans, anterior to the coming of Christ. According to the belief of the mass of the people, there were a number of supernatural beings, whom they denominated gods, of whom some were descendants of more ancient gods, some were the heavenly bodies, some were deified mortals. It is evident that the first origin of their gods was utterly unaccounted for; and that, amongst those whom they de- nominated gods, not one answered to our idea of the Supreme Eternal Being, the Author and 'H i ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY, &C. 11 Ruler of all things. They did, indeed, regard one as supreme, namely Jupiter; but they did not regard him as having possessed an eternal supremacy, but as having obtained it by de- posing his parent Saturn. But along with this mythology, and appa- rently independent of it, there was a dim, indistinct idea of some power, as God or Deity, different from all the other deities. I do not allude at present to the ideas entertained by philosophers, to which I shall advert after- wards ; but to the language of common life, in which the expressions to Otlov, 6 Otog, and deus in the singular, are of not infrequent occurrence. Thus Herodotus (iii. 40) repre- sents Amasis as writing to Polycratcs, and saying, " I am not gratified at thy great suc- cesses^ knowing that the deity is jealous" {to Oelov kTricTTajnivM tog tcrrt (^Qovcpoi;) ; and again (vii. 10), he represents Artabanus as dis- suading Darius from invading the Scythians by similar considerations : " Thou seest that the deity (6 Otog) strikes with lightning the larger animals^ and does not suflf'er them to be vain-glorious; but the smaller ones do not annoy him : for the deity loves to cut down all lofty things. x\nd so, upon the same principle, a large army is destroyed by a small one, when the deity, being jealous of them, strikes them with panic or with lightning : . . . . I'pi I % Oi — VK"^I> 12 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY ^' (!' for the deity permits no other bcinf^ to lift himself up, besides himself." So again, if it rains or thunders, it is the deity who is the agent (ii. 13, iii. 119, iv. 79, and vii. 10, above quoted). I have quoted from Herodotus, because his style is eminently colloquial and popular, and his tone of mind the reverse of philosophical ; on which account, he seems a most suitable witness to the popular mind of his day. It is well known that similar phraseology occurs in the tragic poets of Greece ; but I do not quote them, because it may be said that they were all, more or less, tinctured wdth philosophy. Having, therefore, quoted from one of the earliest Greek writers, I will pass over the intermediate period, and descend to the time of TertuUian ; when w^e shall find the same habit still prevailing, not amongst Jews or Christians, but amongst the heathen common people of Roman Africa. The collection which this w riter has made [de Anima, § 2) of phrases and expressions recognising the existence, per- sonality, and providence of God, is curious and instructive. " What God has given ; If God will; God is good; God does good; God bless you; God sees every thing; I commend to God ; God will recompense ; God will judge be- tween us :" — these are all expressions recorded by this writer as in use amongst the pagans, OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 13 and constituting the involuntary testimony of the soul to the being, unity, and providence of God. Whether, however, those who employed this phraseology really believed in one Supreme Eternal God, is very questionable. It appears probable that they used the term god as we do the term man, as an aggregate name for a whole class of beings ; that they conceived a uniform nature and disposition to pertain to them all ; and that just as man, as a class, acts in such and such a way, or has such and such dis- positions, so likewise does deity. It will be ditficult, at first, to familiarize ourselves with this view of the matter; but I am strongly inclined to think that reflection and observation will show that it offers a complete solution of the difficulty we feel, when we find men stre- nuously contending for polytheism, and refusing to believe in one only self-existent personal Deity, and yet habitually employing language such as TertuUian has preserved to us. From the common people we w41l now pass to the philosophers. We have no account of the grounds of the belief of any, anterior to Socrates. Pythagoras, indeed, we are told, held that God is an all-pervading mind, the ruler of all things, one, eterftal, permanent, im- movable, resembling Himself, and unlike all other beings ; and that every human soul is a portion of God (Cic. de Nat. Deor. i. 11; Phi- Ili>»l 14 ox THE NATURAL TIIKOLOr.Y I f) ! lolaus de Mundi Opific. p. 21). This evidently is not religious truth, but only a portion of the natural history of the universe; and we have no record of the grounds upon which it was adopted. It is equally evident that it is pure Pantheism ; that the personal unity and moral government of God form no part of the system. It is, as I have said, with Socrates, that we first begin to see the grounds of belief, and to recognise at the same time a moral Deity. His views and opinions are learnt with most certainty from the Memorabilia of Xenophon, in which he introduces him as discussing vari- ous points with his auditors. It is true that Plato, likewise, introduces Socrates into his own dialogues ; but we cannot on that account con- clude, that the opinions he puts into the mouth of Socrates were actually enunciated by him. Probably they were for the most part such as he held: but the dialogues are evidently not constructed for the direct purpose of giving the opinions of the speakers, but simply of dis- cussing the subject in hand in all its bearings ; and the speakers are chosen whose views most nearly agreed with those to be expressed on any side. The object of Xenophon was dif- ferent ; viz. to record the actual opinions of Socrates, and to make as close an approxima- tion as possible to his manner of enunciating them ; and, although we cannot conclude that Socrates used every expression there attributed OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. li i to him, wc may place great reliance upon the testimony ^iven to his doctrines. The evidence to be brought forward on the subject will be derived chiefly from the first and fourth books of the Memorabilia, In the former of these (c. iv.) Xenophon records a conversation which he as ?rts that he himself heard between Socrates and a young man named Aristodcmus, whom he understood to neglect and deride religion altogether. In the latter (c. iii.) he records a similar conversation with Euthydemus, at which he alleges that he was present, on the subject of Divine pro- vidence. From these conversations we learn that he attributed to all the gods intelligence, pro- vidence over all things, omniscience, omnipo- tence, and benevolence ; but, at the same time, he believed in one God, distinct from the other gods, whom he regarded as the Being who arranges and holds together the whole world, in whom are all good and noble things, who is the Maker of mankind and the wisdom which pervades all things. He, moreover, attributes to Him, in a special manner, the eye which can see all things, and the understanding which can care for all things, and affirms that He supplies our needs quicker than thought. From the same source we learn the argu- ments upon which he depended to prove the existence and providence of the gods. And I 16 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY here we must observe, that all his arguments apply to these supposed gods in a body, equally with the one God, the Maker of men. He argued their existence positively from the evidences of design in the structure of man, and in particular from the desire of progeny, and the corresponding love of offspring; and 7ieyutivehj, from the incredibility of the sup- position, that, whilst the material frame of a single class of beings, such as mankind, is directed by mind, the material frame of the universe should be left undirected bv mind. He supported the view, that the gods ex- ercise a providential care of the universe for the benefit of mankind, by the following con- siderations : — 1. that certain peculiarities in the physical structure and constitution of man- kind prove that such care has been exercised; 2. that the Deity has given man an excellent soul, by which he alone perceives the existence of gods, provides for his own sustenance, and wards off or remedies evils, and labours to obtain instruction, and remembers it when ob- tained; 3. that the gods have given him a body suited to his soul ; 4. that they have carefully provided for all his wants; 5. that they have given him, by means of omens, &c.j the knowledge of future events ; 6. that they have implanted in the very nature of man a belief in their power to benefit and hurt him ; 7. that communities and the wisest of men >i OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 17 show, by the reverence they pay the jj^ods, their behef in their providence; and histly, that those who serve the jjfods are sure to have their behef in their providential care augmented by experience. He tliercf'ore taught his hearers to reverence the gods ; partly from gratitude for benefits received, [)artly througli fear of h)sing their future favours. This reverence was to be shown by cherishing the feehng of gratitude, by acts of devotion according to the Laws ; by consulting tliem, by obeying their directions, by praying to them for success in their under- takings, and by asking their forgiveness when we have done any thing likely to offend them. The obedience, however, which Socrates would inculcate, is not to any general laws of the gods, but merely to their direction, given by oracle, omen, or in any other specific manner; and although he reckons disobedience to pa- rents a thing with which the gods were likely to be offended, it w^as not because it was any part of our duty to them to obey our parents, but because thev would conclude us to be ungrateful, and therefore withhold their favours for the future. Plato, the great disciple of Socrates, was of a much less practical turn of mind than his master; or else, as Justin Martyr suggests, was alarmed by his violent death, and there- fore did not so clearly reveal his own sen- ' ! i I ]! ■) 18 ox THE NATURAL THEOLOCY timcnts. They arc to be gained, however, In a considerable degree from his Tinia^us Jind Philccbus ; and in a slighter degree from his Politics, Thcaitetus, Symposium, and Phiudo. Tlie TimiJcus is a discussion on the origin of all things, and the Philccbus on the nature of the real good of man. From these we learn, ac- cording to Plato, that Juj)iter is the author, in some sense, both of the other gods and of the universe, and all that it contains, and that he possesses a governing soul and governing mind ; that the universe is a living, intelligent being, and a god, and contains all other living beings in it, both mortal and immortal; that the heavenly bodies are gods ; that the mortal por- tion of created things was made by the inferior gods by the command of Jupiter, and that he infused into some of them the immortal portion. He taught, however, that Jupiter the Creator was not the First Cause ; that the First Cause is of the nature of mind, spiritual, and without beginning; that the Creator, in reducing all things from order to disorder, made every thing after a self-existent model, rendering the uni- verse a perceptible image of the spiritual Deity : that it is difficult to discover the Maker of all things, and impossible to make him known to all men. Of this system there are but few points which Plato endeavours to establish by proof. I OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 19 vcr, in IS and )in his HltL'do. 1 of all of the rn, ac- iior, in of the hat he nnind; being, beings it the al por- nferior that mortal creator Cause without ng all T thing e uni- Deity : of all \vn to points proof. ; . ■ These are, chiefly, 1. that the world must have had a beginning, because it is visible and tan- gible, and possessed of form; 2. that there must be a First Cause ; for sometlung must always have existed, otherwise nothing could have begun to exist, and every thing which begins to exist, must have a previously exist- ing Cause ; therefore, there must be some Cause which never began to exist ; 3. that the First Cause must be self-existent by the force of the terms ; 4. that the First Cause is intellectual or spiritual ; because mind is the only cause of motion, whether to itself or to matter. It is evident from this, that his proofs are entirely metaphysical. He taught likewise in regard to Deity gene- rally, that it is good, and the Author of good only; that it is perfectly just ; that it cannot deceive ; that it alone is always the same ; that it has one form and is indivisible, and con- sequently immortal. It is evident from this sketch how little practical his theology was, and how remote from the apprehension of ordinary men. The disciples of Plato appear to have had a more distinct and positive doctrine than their master. (Cic. Qucest, Acad, i. 7.) They held that the universe is occupied by an intelligent nature, possessed of perfect reason, and eternal ; that this nature is the soul of the world, and is variously denominated, god, providence, neces- c2 Mfp ■i ". i' . ' l '' "". '!l " ! mj- i ! »i . mm . tf' 20 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY sity, and chance. This, it is clear, is a scarcely disguised Pantheism. Respecting the views of Aristotle, one of his immediate successors, although his writings are voluminous, we know but little in relation to this particular subject. He has, indeed, a treatise, commonly called his Metaphysics, whose object is to discover the First Cause of all things. In this treatise he arrives by cau- tious steps at the conclusion, that the neces- sary qualifications of a First Cause are the same as the ordinary attributes of Deity ; namely, the most excellent kind of life, and that without intermission or cessation : and that the most excellent kind of life is the operation of the intellect. {Metaphys. xi. 7.) But whether he believed in a Personal Deity, and a Providential and Moral Governor of the world, scarcely appears. Indeed, from his Ethics, it would almost appear that he denied a moral character to the gods; for he con- ceives that the highest kind of life is the intel- lectual, and that that is the life of the gods (Ethic. Nicom. x. 7) : and he conceives the neces- sity for moral virtues to arise solely from our condition in this state of existence (ch. 8). His testimony, therefore, only goes to the point, that there was an established notion of deitv as distinct from humanitv, and that the First Cause in his opinion was of the nature of deitv. ] 1 I i I I OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. '^1 carcely of his igs are tion to eed, a )hysicSy luse of >y cau- iieces- re the Deity ; e, and : and is the xi. 7.) Deity, of the n his ienied con- intel- gods neces- n our h. 8). 3 the ion of it the are of I I We do not encounter another positive doc- trine, until wc come to Zeno and the Stoics ; and we have no earlier or more trustworthy account of their tenets than that given by Cicero, in the second book of his Treatise, On the Nature of the Gods. Their notions are evidently derived from those of Socrates, of which in some respects they are are an exact transcript. They believed, however, in the divinity of the universe, which they conceived to be an intelligent, reasoning Being, and of a globular form. They believed the soul of the world to be fire ; and that it is a voluntary, deliberative, creative agent, possessed of de- sires and impulses ; that it is employed in rendering the universe permanent, in supply- ing the wants of every part of it, and in con- sulting its order and beauty ; that this soul of the universe is identical with providence, and is itself virtuous, wise, and perfect. They con- ceived that the divinity of the universe ex- tended to the heavenly bodies, to the various beneficent agencies of nature, moral and phy- sical, and to great men who were deified after death ; that they were all voluntary, intelligent agents, and (so far as we can understand) being formed into a society, took each his part in the providential administration of the world ; which is not merely general, but extends to individual persons, although not to every part ticular circumstance. ,— ■ ••■^'yv^nr.wkl.M ■> S-5CS "jujgi i jyjjamja 22 ON THE NATURAL. THEOLOGY I M I I 'II They appear, moreover, to have believed in two other governing powers, namely, nature and fate. By nature they understood that moving, regulating power, which causes every thing to act and grow in its own proper manner; but whether this proceeds from the soul of the universe, or whether it regulates deity as well as humanity and other lower natures, does not distinctly appear. By fate they understood the whole chain of causes (Plutarch, de Plat, Philos. i. 27, 28,) governing the general movements and action of the universe, and of all its parts : but they seem to have thought that these causes did not depend upon one primary cause, but upon an eternal sequence or chain of causes ; and whether the deified universe was subject to fate or not, does not appear. They thought, however, that the gods knew the effects of existing causes with sufficient certainty to predict events. It would appear, then, that their system, as compared with that of Socrates, was retrograde. They arrived at the notion of a power pervad- ing the whole universe, but they identified it with the universe itself; and they did not arrive at the one supreme God in whom he believed : in short, they were Pantheists. The arguments by which they supported their system, are a singular mixture of truth and error. They proved the existence of the gods in I I OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 23 eved in nature 5d that s every nanner; I of the as well oes not ood the P/iilos. ements 1 parts : causes se^ but causes ; subject lought, ects of nty to em, as )grade. lervad- fied it arrive ieved : ported truth )ds in general, from the evidences of intelligence in the creative and governing ])owers of nature, and the regularity of the heavenly motions ; from the fulfilment of oracular predictions, from the benefits they confer, and the terri- ble examples of power they have exhibited ; and from their havinn: manifested themselves on various occasions. They proved that they are intelligent, from the regularity of the works and motions of all nature, particularly those of the heavenlv bodies : and from the circumstance that man, their creature, is possessed of reason. They proved that the universe is an intelli- gent, living creature, by arguments of the fol- lowing description, which are in fact those of Zeno. 1. That which exercises reason must be superior to that which does not ; nothing is superior to the universe, therefore the universe is a reasoning being. 2. That which has thought cannot be a part of that which is destitute of thought; but pcM Is of the universe think, therefore the uni- verse thinks. 3. Tiiat which is void of life and reason can- not produce a rational, living being; but the universe does produce such beings, therefore the universe is such itself. These arguments all assume that nothing is superior to the material universe, and that it comprises all being. ■ l- . 'iiM ■ ■WW WWi \ I I 'h'^ 24 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY Their argument to prove the universe perfect was, that there is a continual ascending series of beings upon the universe, increasing gradu- ally in perfection ; and that as there is nothing above the universe to hinder it from being perfect, therefore it must be so : and, if perfect, it must be wise and virtuous. But they believed these latter qualities to exist in the gods gene- rally, as being the creators of man, and con- sequently possessing in themselves whatever excellencies they have imparted to him. These, then, were the opinions,and the grounds of opinion, of those amongst the heathen Greeks and Romans, who may be regarded as in some sense or other believing in the unity of God : but there were two philosophical sects who did not ascend above the prevailing poly- theism ; viz. the Academy, and the followers of Epicurus. Both these parties were content to take the established belief upon authority, viz. that of their forefathers ; which they main- tained was quite sufficient for the purpose ; but after this agreement they diverged widely from each other. The Epicurean opinion may also be learned, sufficiently for our present purpose, from the first book of the treatise of Cicero, already cited. lie agreed with those we have pre- viously mentioned, in teaching a definite system of opinion in regard to the gods. Whilst he denied that thev had anv concern OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. or. perfect series gradu- lothing being )erfect, elieved 5 gene- d con- latever rounds eathen ded as i unity 1 sects poly, ^ers of intent loritv, main- ; but from rned, fi the ready pre- inite ods. ■icern 1 I with this world, or with the material universe, either as creators or as governors, and main- tained that its origin and its present state were equally fortuitous ; he yet taught that the gods were beings having a positive existence, gifted with supreme felicity, and deriving an unal- loyed pleasure from being the passive recipients of ideas or images from all material things, and from the contemplation of their own vm- changeable condition. He attributed to them human form, indeed ; but he conceived them to be perceivable only by the eye of the mind. He tauji'ht that thev neither conferred benefits nor inflicted punishments upon mankind ; but still he maintained that they were to be wor- shipped for their own inherent excellency. The Academic rejected the Epicurean theory, because he rejected every philosophical system whatever. He thought human reason entirely unequal to establishing the being of gods, because he thought it a subject inca[)able of absolute proof. For this reason he deprecated all argument on the subject, and thought such reasonings as those of the philosophers calcu- lated only to engender doubt. He, for his part, was contented with the authority of his fore- fathers, and desired nothing beyond. (Cic. Nat. Deor. lib. iii. 2 — 1.) It will be seen that all these different sects agreed in the existence of some beings superior to men, and acquainted with the concerns of ' Mg y j I I ' ' T 26 ,1 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY men ; and that they agreed in representing them as perfect in benevolence and intelli- gence : but they differed in the grounds of their belief. The Epicureans and Academicians rested on authority ; a ground to which there is nothing to object, if it had not been main- tained to the exclusion of all other ground. Tt would be idle to deny that the authority of our forefathers is a strong reason for belief. They must have had some cause for it ; and in this case it might well be said that, for aught we know, they may have had evidence of what they believed, which has been denied to their successors. We know that many generations of Jews must have believed in Moses on mere tradition ; and yet the facts they received were true. We know that in all ages there have been Christian communities who were perfectly illiterate, and received Christianity simply because they had learnt it : and yet we know that it had the most abundant evidence to those who first believed it, and handed it down to their descendants. There is therefore no reason, a priori, why the knowledge of superior super- natural beings should not have possessed abundant evidence to an early generation, who yet w^ere unable to transmit that evidence to their posterity. The appeal to authority would therefore have been perfectly legitimate, if it had not been exclusive. It is true that many things false may be transmitted by tradition ; i (V OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 27 senting intelli- of their fnicians h there 1 main- ground, ority of belief, and in [• aught of what to their erations 3n mere ed were re have erfectly simply know ;o those own to reason, super- ssessed )n, who ence to r would :e, if it t many idition ; f but still the argument holds good, until the opinions or practices are shaken by some stronger argument. The other philosophers, therefore, did not reject the argument from tradition, but they did not rest upon it; the more es])ecially as they endeavoured to attain portions of truth, to which tradition did not testify, and under- stood portions of the popular creed in a sense very different from that in which it had come down to them. We shall have future opj)ortunities of exa- mining some of their opinions and modes of reasoning more in detail; at present we will enter more briefly into their leading arguments, and state those portions of their conclusions, in which they appear, with our present know- ledge, to have attained more or less of truth. The Stoics argued, from the general preva- lence of the belief in gods, the fact of their existence. This argument, until set aside by other evidence, is evidently worthy of attention, because there must be some reason for the general prevalence of opinions ; and until the contrary is shown, we are right to presume that this reason is their actual truth. Socrates set the first recorded example of arguing from the evidence of design in nature, that all material things are the works of some intelligent being ; from the connexion between all material things, that there is one pervading ,1 -^ AJH*~il »'- >mmmmmt smmmmmmm i 28 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY intelligence ; and from the intellifjence and virtue of the human soul, that its author is in- telligent and virtuous. It is evident that this reasoning is good, although the Stoics and Plato conceived the universe to be an intelli- gent being, and that these arguments proved it. The lloman Stoics observed, or at least sup- posed that they observed, that national rever- ence for the gods was rewarded, and national neglect of them punished ; nor is there any sufficient reason for doubting the correctness of their observation. Some persons may be disposed to doubt, whether the true God would permit polytheism to have such evidence in its support ; but it must be remembered that the thing supported was, not belief in polytheism as such, in opposition to a purer faith ; but the belief in a supernatural providence exercised by what was regarded as god, in opposition to total unbelief in providential government : and it may well be believed, that our heavenly Father would support faith in opposition to unbelief, even though scarcely any rose to the knowledge of one Universal Governor. It is remarkable that the truth of divination, or at least of omens, which are one class of divination, was relied upon by Socrates, as well as the reality of warnings to guard against dangers, wdiich was a portion of the prophecies to which the Roman Stoics appealed. This is a subject with which it is difficult to deal ; be- ,. ,M« ^mw^^* »■ *** * lation, LSS of well ;ainst pedes Ihis is be- OF THE CREEKS AND ROMANS. 29 cause there can be no doubt that much, both of prophecy and of divination, was pure impos- ture. Yet we must be careful how we reject them altogether ; most impostures rest upon some portion of truth. Socrates, in ])articular, appealed with confidence, and with every ap- pearance of sincerity, to the warnin^]; which he habitually received from a spirit (diufiMv) con- versing with his mind ; and such warnings would undoubtedly serve to keep up the idea of some invisible control and direction of hu- man affairs. There seems, therefore, no reason why they may not have been really permitted and afforded, especially to individuals and com- munities, who were just and pious according to their lights, as Socrates was, and as the Roman people were on the whole for many gene- rations. The statements respecting the appearances of gods are so few in number, that they need not detain us. It is no doubt certain, that such appearances were believed by the whole people ; even by those who lived at the time, and many of whom were present : but a super- stitious age is always credulous. We turn, therefore, from the arguments of the ancients, to the portions of truth they appear to have elicited. There appears to have been a general belief in the Socratic school, that one of the invisible supernatural beings was superior to the rest; ■mMMr* Mm .'50 ON THE NATURAL THEOLOGY If ' I i! and that he was the Fashioner of all material thinf^s, cither directly or indirectly, and the Author of the whole being of man. But this truth was clouded, in the minds of most, by the notion that this Being was identical with heat, was clothed with a form, or intimately united with all matter ; that he was not its author or creator, and that he was the author of other spirits only, inasmuch as they were emanations from him. There appears to have been a general agree- ment in a Divine Providence, and in its being retributory ; but they do not appear to have seen that the supreme and universal control of all things rested in one governing mind, or that that mind has chiefly in view the moral well-being of mankind. They appear to have well understood that there must have been one Cause of the universal harmonv of nature, and that that Cause must be intelligent ; but they do not appear to have seen that it must be one Being. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, seem to have seen that there must be one First Cause of life and motion ; that that Cause must be intelli- gent, reasoning, without beginning and without change or end : but they do not appear to have seen that this First Cause must be the Author of all being, the Creator and Fashioner of all things, the Author of the harmony of nature, and the universal Providence. atcrial id the at this bv the li heat, united thor or f other aations L agree- s being ;o have control lind, or moral h1 that liversal e must to have have 1 of life intelli- vvithout to have Author IV of all nature, OF THE GREEKS AND ROMANS. 31 The Epicureans alone seem to have asserted the absolute incorporcality of Deity ; but they still believed in polytheism, and thought that gods were clothed in human form. The Socratic school asserted the general and particular providence of Deity in the atHiirs of men, and for their benefit : but the Stoics still affirmed, that this providence did not descend to minutiae The Academics saw, that if there be a particular providence, it must descend to minutljc, but they, therefore, denied it alto- gether. The Socratic school saw that Deity must be pure and holy in itself, and the author of [)urity and virtue in man; but they did not therefore see that man must seek from Deity his ^urther improvements in moral excellence. The Stoic school, the Peripatetic and older Academic schools, were right in believing that there must be some certain truth, but wrong in binding their followers to their own systems as whole, and allowing no further inquiry. The more recent Academy was right in refusing to be bound by mere human systems, and in searching for truth in every quarter, but wrong in denying certainty of moral truth, and in reasoning as though they disbelieved many truths which they actually received. But their plan of searching for truth every where was useful in preparing men's minds for the recep- tion of Christianity. -W^BH ■eta i !' I ' i CHAPTER in. ON TlIK IlKST MODE OF PKOOF OF THE JiEINCJ OF GOD. • It will be seen from this historical sketch, that from the very first record of any discussion of the evidences of Natural Theology, there were different kinds of proof adduced. The first was necessarily that from authority ov prescription ; and I have already given reasons for asserting that such an argument possesses an undoubted weight and cogency, until dis- turbed or set aside by some stronger ^.gument. That it mav'be set aside is evident; because the forms of opinion handed down by authority vary in every country. The next argument, therefore, in order, will be prevalent opinion. This is sometimes stated as universal opinion ; and in that form it is met (as by the Academics of Cicero's time), by the objection, that there is no universal persuasion of the being of God ; that in fact some nations have no notion at all upon the subject. It may be questioned whether we have sufficient data OF TIIR nFIXO OF fJOI). 3;5 : HEixr. ch, that ssion of :rc were iithority reasons ossesses itil dis- ^ument. luse the ithority ler, will s stated t is met by the suasion nations It may nt data [ for determining: that any specified nation has no idea of supernatural spiritual l)ein^s : for it does not apj)ear by any means certain tiiat we have sufficient ac(juaintaue(! witli the lanj^ua^es and habits of tliought and feeling of the Ks(pii- maux (for instance) and the Caifres, to determine wheth.er we have an accurate Mndcrstaiulin<»' of what they say. But, on the other hand, it is cer- tain, that we have no suihcient evidence of the universal prevalence of any such belief; and therefore if any tliinf^ really de[)ended on that wordj we must resign the argument as inconclu- sive. But when we find an opinion or feeling generaUij prevalent, — when we find it most fully entertained when man arrives at his greatest excellence, and more and more strengthened by time and inquiry ; then this general and permanent prevalence of any such opinion or feeling, is a strong argument in favour of its truth. For (in addition to what has been urged in the previous chapter), it is fair to argue, that an opinion so received is either so well-founded upon reason (whether we know or can api)re- ciate the reasons or not), that it unavoidably approves itself to the reason of most men ; or that It has been handed down generally from some one original and central source of infor- mation, from which it has been dispersed throughout the world; or that there has been some one primary cause or ground of opinion and feeling, which has acted on the majority s^iiM 1 t [ ' j t' '* 34 ox THE BEST MODE OF PROOF of mankind all along, and determined the human mind to that opinion and feeling. In either of these cases, we must believe the opi- nion or feeling to be correct and well-founded ; because if it is not, nothing else is : no ground of opinion can be higher than either of these three. These two grounds of opinion, then, autho- rity Lnd general prevalence, will carry us some steps on our road in the evidences of Natural Theology. The first, in every case with which we are positively acquainted, will teach man that there is some spiritual influence, some being or beings superior to man, and exercising an influence over his conduct; and that this being or beings, can know his actions without being visible to him, and can do him good or evil at pleasure. This, however, is but a step; and general opinion will carry him further. It will teach him that these beings are in some sense one ; i. e. either that they have one uniform cha- racter and act uniformly in concert; or that there is one of them who is superior to all, and governs all the rest : and, judging by popular language, the latter would appear to be the case. Indeed, in some extremely ancient nations, such as the aborigines of North America, the supremacy of one Great Spirit is clearly held. But it must be confessed, that in most nations not directed by levelation, the F ned the ing. In the opi- bunded; ► ground of these I, autho- us some Natural h which ch man e, some ercising hat this without good or general 1 teach ie one; n cha- 3r that ill, and popular be the uicient North pirit is :hat in n, the I OF THE BEING OF GOD. 35 \f actual belief Fcarcely reaches so far as this ; and that the supposed inferior spiritual beings occupy so large a portion of the mental field of vision, that the one supreme is well-nigh for- gotten. It is true that we ourselves are not in that predicament, with us both authority and gene- ral opinion go much further. They not only decide the existence of one supreme God, — not merely superior in authority to all others, but actually alone of a higher nature than all ; — but they also decide that He alone is perfect, and the First Cause and origin of all other beings ; and that He is the moral Governor of the universe, and a rewarder of them that diligently seek Him. We have, therefore, but little in- ducement to doubt, much less to deny, that which all around us admit. But we have already shown the necessity of proofs upon this subject ; and, even supposing our proofs were, up to this point, ever so com- plete, they do not go to the full extent of show- ing that there is one God, the Creator and Go- vernor of all things. It becomes requisite, therefore, that we should have actual proofs of his existence, sufficient to render definite and clear, that which is as yet, regarded in that point of view, indefinite and obscure. For this pur- pose men have had recourse to two additional kinds of proof; one more abstract, the othor more practical. D 2 irfirllirn :>l^¥!l'!t'llfwi!»^i|B^^ »., ' i 36 ON THE BEST MODE OF I'ROOF The first (which is that of Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics) begins with noticing, that certain things or beings exist in a certain state; and that most of them have been brought into tlieir present state from a state previously ex- isting, and will again change to another state ; that their composition is continually under- going modification, and that some appear to be continually, as individual beings, brought into existence. They notice that some things or beings appear to be the causes of the being or state of others, and that we are naturally led, by an involuntary process of the mind, to look for the causes of whatever w^e see or know; that therefore causes are really so. They notice, that the idea that we are to go on to infinity discovering causes of subsequent things is unsatisfactory to the mind ; that it is evident that there must always have been some existing being or beings, otherwise nothing could ever have existed ; that every thing which begins to exist must have had a previously ex- isting cause ; that therefore there must have been some cause which never began to exist, — in short, a First Cause. They observe that some existing beings are incapable of voluntary motion, and that others are capable of it, and of impressing motion upon those which are by nature inert. That which is incapable of volun- tary motion they call matter ; and they think it reasonable to believe, that the cause of motion i ♦ IF OF THE BEING OF GOD. 37 \ristotle, ng, that lin state; ight into Misly ex- cr state ; T under- ear to be gilt into Kings or being or rally led, , to look r know; They ' go on )sequent lat it is en some nothing g which usly ex- st have exist, — ve that luntary it, and I are by volun- y think motion to matter must, in all cases, have come from that portion of being which has the power of voluntary motion. But they observe that the beings capable of voluntary motion, at least those whom they can see, are compound ; i. e. that they are themselves composed of matter and of something different in its properties from matter, and which appears to put matter in motion. This something is called mind. It would therefore appear, that mind is probably that which brought matter into its existing state, and is the cause of its continual changes. But, in the case of the compound beings which actually come under their observation, men for instance, it is observed that they are sometimes moved against their will, and that they are even affected by matter, although the latter be incapable of voluntary motion. They therefore conceive that there must be some moving power which moves other substances, and is not moved itself; and that this moving power must be similar in its nature and mode of operation to mind, if not identical with it. But, to carry on the motions which are ever proceeding, whether on the earth's surface or amongst the heavenly bodies, there must be some permanent moving power. Now, man cannot be this moving power, although his governing influence is mind, because men are continually perishing. There must, then, be some being, whose very life is action ; so that jmm .-gg g J, ^ :l ■ i [ '. \ . X 38 ON THE BEST MODE OF PROOF it may itself always act and cause motion to all other things : and the only thing whose life is action, is that which desires and thinks, i. e. mind. It seems, therefore, that the First Cause of all life and motion, must be of the nature of mind ; and, consequently, that there is a mind which never had a beginning, and will never perish : which is self-existent, and the cause of all other existence. This is a sketch of the kind of argument contained in the l^imceus of Plato, and in the Metaphysics of Aristotle. The Stoics adopted a similar argument. Taking for granted the doctrine of causes, they argued that, as man is possessed of life and reason, the cause of his existence must be possessed of life and reason, otherwise the effect would be superior to the cause ; but they did not ascend to the idea that this cause must be pure mind. The argument for a First Cause, above stated, is sometimes called an argument a priori ; as though it proved the existence of God by pure argument, antecedently to facts. But Lord Brougham has well shown, [Discourse on Natural Theology, Part i. § 4,) more particu- larly in reference to the form of it adopted by Dr. Clarke in his treatise On the Being and Attributes of God, that it is really an argument a posterio7'iy only resting on a more limited number of facts than the more popular argu- ments. I y if )F OF THE nEING OF OOD. 39 ion to all se life is nks, i. €. st Cause njlture of s a mind ill never cause of irgument d in the adopted nted the IS man is 3e of his 1 reason, ir to the dea that e stated, Hori; as by pure it Lord urse on particu- pted by ing and •gument limited ir argu- There are other arguments of a similar descrip- tion. For instance ; every thing we see appears to be made for the use of some other thing higher than itself, and of these the highest species is man. It seems reasonable that there should be an ascending series, until we come to some being who exists for himself and not for any other: and if there be such a being, he must have all perfection in himself; because all things exist for him. This argument resembles one advanced by the Stoics to prove the perfection of the uni- verse, which they identified with God. Moreover, there seems to be throughout nature an ascending series of being. Whether there be any unorganized being may be doubted; but, at all events, some beings are less perfectly organized than others. Minerals and earths are incapable of propagation and multiplication in the same manner as vegeta- bles; but they are comprehended with men and other animals, as well as vegetables, in the scale of organized substances. Vegetables, again, are incapable of voluntary motion ; but they rank with animals as possessed of life, and capable of nutrition and propagation. Brute animals, if possessed of reason at all, are not capable of the uses and improvements of it of which men are capable. In general, they are incapable of speech; and those which do attain it, are extremely limited in their power 40 ox THE BEST MODE OF PROOF P of excrcisinj^ it. They arc all totally incapable of writing books, of executing paintings^ of managing farms, of constructing machines: they know nothing of virtue and vice. But they are classed with men, as possessed of similar bodies, as being united in pairs, as having a life connected with the blood. All these are ascending classes; and the numerical limits of the class narrow as they ascend. Why, then, should there not be a race of beings possessed of the same mind and soul as man, but without his body, and not liable to his imperfections? That there must be something superior to man, appears evident from the fact, that there are many existing things which the reason and other powers of man cannot accomplish. (Cic. Nat. Deor. ii. 6.) Supposing such, and capable of governing matter and other souls, many exist- ing phenomena are accounted for, and the prin- ciple of ascending series is ke[)t up. These beings may have a derived life, as man has ; but, unless we are to go on to infinity, we re- quire some being or beings self-existent, having no beginning nor any end. And as, in ascend- ing to the higher classes, we narrow the num- bers contained in each class, it is probable that we shall at last arrive at some one Being, who has an existence different in some respect from all other beings. This is the Stoical argument^ recounted by ^ i OF THE BEING OF GOD. 4] ncapable :ings, of achines : }e. But essed of pairs, as and the as they ot be a le mind dv, and it there appears e many d other !ic. Nat. jable of y exist- le prin- These m has ; we re- having ascend- e num- 3le that ig, who ct from ited by nstcad of universe, as ^ Cicero [Nat. Deor. ii. 12) ; only that ried out to its legitimate results, i resting in the deification of th theirs did. The existence of such a being seems neces- sary on other accounts ; for how is harmony to be preserved amongst all beings? We know that even amongst men it requires govern- ment ; and unity of action is seldom secured, unless there is one head. Even a herd of oxen, or a hive of bees, has a head. Every family has a head. The solar system has one governing body. By analogy, the universe ought to have a head; and that head, to exercise efficient control over all other things, must be self-existent, free from evil of every kind, having all power and all knowledge, with- out beginning and without end. Some such principle seems to be involved in the question, " Shall not the Judge of all the earth do right?" as though there must be a judge of all the earth; and assuming that in order to be this judge, he must be himself perfect. It will be seen that every one of these argu- ments rests upon some assumption, which will be more or less evident to different minds; and, standing by themselves, these arguments certainly could not be expected to convince an unbeliever. That they arc not self-evident appears from these remarkable facts; — that ^' 42 ()\ TlIK nr.ST MODK OK IMIOOK # y \ \ som(M)f tluMu iv(|\iiro(l the movst iniimtc nirta- physical cxaniiuation of pivliminary matter, bct'orc tlicv conviiu'od in any dririTo those who ailvanoed tlioin; — that sev(M'al of the arp;u- mcnts we have aihhieetl only \vd those wlio originated tlieni a portion of the way to their just and h\uitiniate conehisions, or led them to conelnsions aetnally ineorrect; — that these are the arguments of the most eminent and cul- tivated men in various sueeeeding ages, during which these subjects were sifted ; — that not a single individual apjiears to have reached so near to any intelligible, consistent truth as Socrates ; — and, that all these men, without exception, rendered their worship and homage, not to the great First Cause, but to the host of inferior supernatural beings, whom they sup- posed to be subordinate to the First Cause, and to be the actual governors of this lower world. Without attempting, therefore, to decide what human reason can attain without revelation, WT have, at least, ample evidence hc»v short a distance it did reach, by its own unaided efforts, in ascertaining the first great fact m the his- tory of the \uiiyerse. It will appear likewise, I think, that these arguments, even when correctly drawn out, are of too abstract a nature, and assume too much, to be very convincing to the greater portion of men ; and hence men have sought for some L )K OK THE IJKINO OF OOP. 13 ite iiH'ta- mattcr, ec those the ar^u- lOHc who to their thcMu to hcsc are and cul- R, (lurinjr lat not a ichcd so truth as without homage, e host of loy sup- t Cause, is lower arfrumcnts which shall be more level to the apprehensions of ordinary men ; and which, by assuniing notliing which the understanding does not intuitively acknowledge, shall carry conviction even to the unwilling, Sucii an argument is that for the evidences of adaptation and design, observable through- out nature. It is best known in the present day by the popular work of Paley; but the argument is not a new one. It is recorded as having been employed by Socrates : it is drawn out at considerable length by Cicero, as an argument of the Stoics : and it is alluded to by St. l*aul, as at once the readiest and the most convincing, — in that passage (Ileb. xi.) where he speaks of our learning the eternal power aiul (lodhead of the Creator, from the visible works of his hands. ide what velation, short a 1 efforts, the his- at these out, are much, )rtion of )r some CHAPTER IV. OX THE BEST MODE OF USING THE ARGU- MENT FROM DESICN. The argument from design is not recorded to have been suggested, until brought forward by Socrates ; and yet it seems altogether incre- dible, that it should not have occurred to any person previously to him. As, however, his j i 44 ox THE BEST MODE OF fSIXG use of it is the earliest recorded, it will be interesting to see in what form it then ap- peared ; es[)ecially as thousands of persons, I doubt not, are not aware of its havinj^ been employed, until drawn out in the admirable work of Paley. According to Xcnophon, the discussion arose from his learning that one of his auditors, Aristodemus by name, neither sacrificed to the gods, nor used divination ; but ridiculed tliose who did so. " Tell me (said he), Aristodemus, arc there any persons whom you admire for their ability? He said, Certainly, there are. And he said, Tell us their names? Well: in Epic poetry, I most admire Homer; in sacred lyrics, Mela- nippides ; in tragedy, Sophocles ; in sculpture, Polyclitus; and in painting, Zeuxis. S. Do those who make figures without sense or motion, or those who make livinu: creatures endowed with sense and motion, appear to you most worthy of admiration? A, By Jupiter, those who make living creatures, by far; for such things are not made by chance, but by deshju. S. And if the object and intention of some things cannot be guessed at, and other things are evidently made for some useful purpose, which do you judge works of chance, and which ■works of desii^n ? A. It seems reasonable to consider those which have some useful end to be works of desin-n. S. Then does He who y THE AIIGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 45 originally made men, aecm to you to have given V .em all their senses for any useful pur- pose, or not? For instance, their eyes, hy which they sec visible objects ; and their ears, by which they hear things audible? Indeed, what woidd liave been the advantage of smell, if noses had not been given them? And what j)crccption would they have had of sweets and bitters, and of all the pleasures of the palate, if they had not been gifted with tongues which could distinguish them? In addition to this, does it not a})jjear to you a work of fore- thought, that, the feyc being weak, it has been fenced in tlie cyeUds, which open when it has to be used, and close in sleep? and, in order that even the wind might not injure it, the eyelashes act the part of a sieve? and that the eyebrows partition off the part above the eyes, so that the i)erspiration from the head may not injure them? and that the hearing admits all sounds, and is never filled too full? and that the front teeth of all animals are adapted for cutting the food, and the jaw teeth for receiving it from them, and grinding it down ? and that the mouth, by which animals admit what they relish, is placed near the eyes and nose? and that the excrements being unpleasant, the passages which carry them off are turned in such a direction as to convey them as far as possible from the organs of sense ? Are you in doubt, whether these things, effected with so T .•'.tiiitii-'i P -M Ulii 46 ON THE BEST MODE OF USIXvT much forethought, arc effects of chanci or of design? A, No; by Jupiter. On the cuu- trary, looking at the subject in this point of view, these things appear hke the contrivance of some wise and beneficent Artificer." This, then, is the earliest recorded statement of the argument : and it is evident that Socrates has here mingled together the proof of two points ; that the human body is the work of an inteUigent agent, and that it is the work of a beneficent agent. These points he has not distinguislied one from the other; or rather, perhaps, he has thrown in the second without giving any notice of his intention so to do. And the reason is evident. His object is a particular one, viz. to convince an individual ; and he knew intuitively how to produce his practical effect upon the mind of the person he was addressing, without stopping to go through all the steps of an argument. Our object, on the other hand, is to convince all minds; and, therefore, we divide the several portions of the argument, and establish them one after the other, that no one may fail of being convinced. The existence of design being proved in any one existing being, may be reasonably inferred respecting all others of a similar character; and, at all events, the person who sees that he himself has been the work of a wise and bene- ficent Artificer, may reasonably be expected to ' TIIR ARGUMENT FROM DESinN. 47 C2 or of he con- point of trivance atemcnt Socrates of two work of work of has not rather, without ' to do. 3ct is a ividual ; ucc his person to go Our nee all several h them fail of in any iferred racter ; hat he bene- ;ted to desire to know more of him. But it has been long iigo remarked (Cic. Nat. Dcor. ii. 88), that men appear insensible to the facts ; and hence writers have employed themselves in going into details, in order to show that the principle of design j)ervades all nature. This Cicero has done (ii. 39 — 53) ; and it has been accom- plished in a much more systematic and logical manner by modern writers, and by none better than by Paley. It must, however, be ob- served, in regard to this popular writer, that, whilst he has done such ample justice to this branch of the subject of Natural Theology, he has left others equally important entirely un- touched. Socrates has been followed by most other writers, in drawing the first illustration from our own bodily system: but it has been strongly urged by Lord Brougham, in his Discourse on Natural Theology (Part i. § 1), that we ought to employ the phenomena of the mind equally with those of the body ; and that they afford as decisive proofs of design as do the phenomena of matter. And he has censured Paley and other writers for acting as though they had been materialists, in deriving their argument solely from material objects. Whether or not the phenomena of the mind afford as decisive proofs of design as those of matter, will be seen presently ; but the reason why popular writers have not drawn their proofs from the human iv'T ff > I I i h y\ 18 ON rilE JiliST MODE OF USIXG mind may be found, without resortinj^ to the supposition that those writers w^ere insensible of their force. The object of such writers was not speculative, but practical ; viz. to check a tendency to unbelief, or to foster faith, in the minds of the mass of the people. No one can be unaware that it is the small minority of men, who are capable of abstract reasoning: and Lord Brougliam himself sees that, if we are to arj^ue from the nature of the mind, we must " arrest and examine our thouglits," nd have the power of "turning those thoughts into courses not natural to them, and of watch- ing tlie results." Persons must be able to dis- tinguish and appreciate the faculties and opera- tions of reasoning, of attention, of curiosity, of memory, of habit, and of the various passions and affections, before they can perceive that they are means to certain ends, and thence be convinced that they afford evidence of design and construction, and therefore of an intelligent maker. This circumstance, therefore, that such observations and arguments (however correct and however conclusive to the philosophical inquirer); would not be intelligible to the ordi- nary reader, is the one sufficient reason why they would not be adduced in works intended to convince the generality of mankind. Even the most philosophical of the ancients, I mean Aristotle, the clearest and most logical reasoner Greece ever saw, and to whom Rome affords no G THE ARGT'MEXT FROM DESIGN. 19 ig to the asensible iters was check a hj in the I one can lority of asoning: at, if we nind, we its/' nd thoughts ►f watch- le to dis- d opera- |osity, of passions ive that icnce be design elligent at such correct ophical le ordi- )n why itended Even I mean 3asoner )rds no approach, saw that arguments, like all other means of accomplishing ends, are only relatively effectual ; and that what ought abstractedly to carry most weighty may rcUitively, from the peculiarity of our circumstances or tone of mind, ha^ e the least influence upon us. But the argument from the phenomena of the mind is not only less available for ordinary purposes than that from the phenomena of external nature ; it is also less convincing. Lord Brougham assumes, that " the structure of the mind affords evidences of the most skil- ful contrivance ;" or at most, his argument is to this effect: "Certain effects are produced by an agency calculated to produce them. Aware that, if we desired to produce them, and had the power to employ this agcnc}^, we should resort to it for accomplishing our pur- pose, we infer, both tl.at some being exists capable of creating tliis agency, and that he employs it for this end." But in this argument the very point necessary to be proved is as- sumed ; viz. that the mind is " calculated " to produce these eff'ects ; that there is evidence of construction and adaptation in it. Now with regard to material substances, we argue from our own experience of our own designs and con- structions, or those of others wliicli we know to be such, that the works of nature are construc- tions designed for certain ends. But with the mind it is very different. We have no expe- \l ' i 50 ON THE BEST MODE OF USING ■;^ ;< ' rience whatever of the construction of any such instrument, and therefore cannot judge whether it affords any proofs of design or not. We therefore cannot employ it, as the ground of an independent argument, to prove the existence of an intelligent designer. Our popular writers, therefore, have acted wisely in reasoning only from things which come under the observation of the senses. But that is no reason why such works, fruiu their very object imperfect, should continue to fur- nish the only instruction to our youth. Paley, the most popular of them, confines himself almost entirely to the proof of the being of a God, and of some of his attributes, together with the removal of some prominent difficulties; so that, as a system of Natural Theology, his work is manifestly imperfect. On the other handy it is redundantly copious in the proofs and illustrations of the principal point; and more recent English writers (I mean particu- larly the authors of the Bridge water Treatises), have added to this redundancy. As aids to devotion, by leading the mind into the habit of contemplating in detail many diversified in- stances of the wisdom, skill, and goodness of the Creator, their works, as well as his, are very valuable ; and Dr. Whewell has given the whole argument for the being and unity of God, a higher character than most previous writers, and added that for his moral govern- fl I ^ any such ; whether lot. We ind of an existence Lve acted ^s which ses. But uiu their e to fur- . Paley, 5 himself eing of a together Acuities ; logy, his he other \e proofs int; and particu- reatises), aids to habit of ified in- dness of his, are iven the unity of previous govern- TIIE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGX. 51 ment ; but still even he leaves a considerable portion of the ground entirely untouched. To fill up, therefore, a system of Natural Theology, it will be requisite not only (with Whewell) to consider God as a moral Governor, but also to add a class of arguments he has not adduced ; and besides this, to consider the evi- dence for a future state, and rewards and punishments in that state, as well as fur the immortality of the soul. These subjects en- gaged the attention of the heathen philosophers, and have been well treated by Bishop Butler, especially in his Analogy ; and much of my matter will therefore be derived from both these sources. I make no pretension to originality, but only desire to render the treatment of the subject complete for its own proper ends, and then to pave the way for the better con si(^ ra- tion of the evidences of revealed religion, and of the philosophy of morals, by whomsoever treated of ■' CHAPTER V. STATEMENT OF THE ARGUMENT FROM DE- SIGN, WITH THE ANTAGONIST THEORIES AND THEIR REFUTATIONS. To prove the existence of God, Paley looks abroad upon external nature, and perceives in E hape the 5j as they clescope, in every telescope listances, ar vision ?s of the an those the tele- ' various >tructedj ation it adjust- ice suf- een the )erceiv- instru- s much )u ?top 1 one a escope, e hole, 3 small tiiature picture of the objects out of doors which come witfiin the ranj^e of the telescope. Just in the same manner, ii'you take the eye of a slaughtered bullock, and insert it in the place of the tele- scope, you will find a miniature picture of ex- ternal objects on a membrane at the back of the eye, called the retina. The eye does not perceive objects any more than the telescope : it is merely the instrument by which the mind is enabled to perceive them. To show more j^erfcctly the real character of the eye, and its perfection as an instrument ; the more ordinary telescopes have this imper- fection, that li^ht, in passing through their lenses, is partially se})arated into different colours, thereby tinging the object, and espe- cially the edge of it, with colours foreign to it. To correct this incjnvenience had long been desired ; and at len":th it occurred to a saga- cious optician to incjuire how the difficulty was surmounted in the eye, how it was that the eye did not tinge objects with false colours. His observation taught him, that in the eye the evil was avoided by a combination of lenses having different efiects upon light as it passed through them ; so that the imperfection caused by one might be corrected by another. Our artist adopted the idea, and corrected the defect in telescopes by making his glasses of different materials, so that one might correct another. Is it possible that this method, which cost the 58 STATEMENT OF THE : optician so much thought and management, should exist in the eye without either? The eye exhibits several additional examples of means adopted in its construction to attain certain ends or obviate certain inconveniences. The whole human body is full of such con- trivances and adaptations. Nay, till animated bodies, all vegetables, the whole planetary system are full of them ; as may be seen more at length in the elements of Paley, and still more fully in the Bridgewater Treatises. And the contri- vances of nature surpass those of art in the complexity, the subtilty, and the curious struc- ture of the mechanism ; and still more in their number and variety. And again we say, that contrivance must have had a contriver ; design must have had a designer. But those who are unwilling to admit the force of this argument evade it in various ways. First they say. We have no evidence that things were made at all ; since no human being ever saw them in the course of construction, and we are not aware of any means by which they could be made. These are precisely the objections attributed by Xenophon to Aristo- demus, and by Cicero to the Epicureans. (Xen. Mem, I. iv. 9. Cic. Nat, Deor, ii. 8.) The answer given by Socrates to the first is, that it might be as well objected that all our own acts are purely accidental, because we do not see lagcmcnt, examples I to attain leniences, uch con- animated ry system at length lore fully he contri- rt in the )us struc- 'e in their say, that r; design dmit the various nee that an being auction, )y which isely the Aristo- s. (Xen. ^.) The s, that it awn acts not see ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 59 the soul which designs or intends them. It is true that we have intuitive evidence of the con- nexion between our own intuition and the acts we do ; and that is not the case with regard to the acts of others. But our intuitive know- ledge with regard to ourselves enables us to judge with regard to the acts of others, whether they are designed or accidental; and that equally whether we sec the agents or not : and there- fore (to go back to the case of the watch) what should we think of the folly of the person who should say that he did not believe that it was the work of any person, because he had never seen such a thing constructed. And so it is not a rational reply to the argument we have stated, to say that we never saw an eye made ; or even that we cannot conceive any means whereby it could be made. In regard to works of human art, it only exalts our opinion of the skill of the artist or mechanic, if we perceive that he has accomplished ends, respecting which we can form no idea whatever how they could be accomplished ; and it will be so with any person who has not been pre-occupied by evil prejudice in regard to the works of nature. Again, unbelievers sometimes complain of the imperfection, inaccuracy, liability to dis- order, or occasional irregularities of animal bodies and other works of nature ; and would argue that their occurrence is repugnant to the idea of an intelligent Creator. This is a very (;o STATKMRNT OF THE I': curly objection. But (to jro hack to the watch), suppose it sonietiincs went wronp;, or even never went exactly ri^xht, yet the piu'pose of the machinery, the ohject intended to be attained, arc so cvi(k>nt, that we coidd never doubt that it had an intelHueut maker, whether we couUl account lor its detects or not. And so, in reji!;ard to tlie works of nature, whether they are perfect or imj)erfcct, still such evident marks of desij^n pervade the whole, that we can have no doubt that each of them derives its existence from some bein^ of skill beyond any thing we can conceive. Again, men have raised cavils from the cir- cumstance that there are things, the use or benefit of which we cannot specify, or concern- ing which we cannot say whether they have any use or not, and w hich they therefore choose to characterize as useless. But how void of reason such objections are we may distinctly see, by considering how few of us have any distinct idea of the use of the various parts of a watch, or of any other piece of machinery. Another atheistic way of replying to the proofs of design draw^n from nature, is to say, that all we see must necessarily have had some form ; and that in all the possible combinations of material forms there is no assignable reason why it might not be the present form ; that, in short, the present form is purely accidental. But would it be a rational way of accounting M m lu AIiaUMKNT FIIOM nKSir.N. fil le watch), veil never c of the attiiined, oubt that wc couhl in rejijard re perfect of desif^n no doubt nee from L^ we can L the cir- 3 use or concern- ley have 'e choose void of istinctlv ave any parts of lery. to the i to say, d some nations reason that, in idental. unting for the existence of a watch, to say th.'it it was only one of the possible c()nd)inati<)ns of mate- rial forms? That whatever was found in the ])laceof the wateli nnist have had some internal configuration or another, and that it happened to be this com[)lex machinery? We see the absurdity of the answer in this case; and the absurdity is still greater in the case of the eye, the car, or any other complete natural object we mav examine. So when infidels sav that "every orp-anized body we see is only one out of all the possible varieties and combinations of being, which the lapse of infinite ages has brou8 STATEMENT OF THE the combination or adaptation. If that cannot be clone, the theory rests on no foundation whatever ; and if the contrary can be shown to be the case, so far as human observation can reach, the theory becomes not only baseless, but deserving the reprobation of every intelli- gent inquirer after truth. Now not only can it not be shown that there is any such foun- dation for this theory, which is, in fact, the old Stoic theory of an " innate eternal ne- cessity ;" but in order completely to refute it, an able writer of the present day (the Rev. G. Crabbe, in his " Outline of a System of Natural Theology^') establishes two facts, 1. that the present order of nature on our globe had a beginning, from a state which, in itself, could not have produced that order; 2. that the adaptations in nature arise (so far as natural causes are concerned) from such as (so far as we can trace them) are completely independent of each other. If these two facts be established, this theory is entirely subverted : for, if the present order of things had a begin- ning, in a state of things not naturally com- petent to produce it, it could not have arisen from pre-existing natural causes ; and if the causes of existing phenomena were naturally independent, they must have been brought to co-operate by some external intelligent agent. — I subjoin an abridgment of his argument on both heads. ARr.TTMF.XT FROM DESIGN. 69 t cannot indation hown to ion can jaseless, J intelli- )nly can ;h foun- act, the 'nal ne- ) refute ay (the System facts, on our lich, in order ; (so far such as ipletely vo facts iverted : 1 begin- y com- \ arisen if the iturally ight to agent, lent on I. That the order of nature on this ])lanet had a beginning, in a state of things not com- petent to produce it, is presumed from the fact that its present form, that of an oblate sj)heroid, is just such as would be produced by its having, at one time, revolved on its axis in a fluid or semi-fluid state; and could not have been produced by known physical causes in any other way. If, then, this fluid state was oncv^ the condition of the globe, the race of terrestrial animals and vegetables must have commenced since that period, because they could not have existed when the globe was in the state in question ; and cannot be supposed to have sprung from that state of the globe by the mere force of natural agency, because it has never been shown that there is any thing in a fluid or semi-fluid mass of matter, competent by itself to produce the phenomena we at pre- sent see on the face of the globe. Again, Professor Buckland, in his Bridge- water Treatise, has established the same con- clusion by the following series of facts : — " I. Many different kinds of substances, some in the form of unstratified rocks, some in the form of strata, the deposits of water, envelope this globe, or form its crusts ; and being inclined in various angles to the hori- zon, successively appear on the surface of the earth. " 2. In their natural positions or order, the , r "0 STATEMENT OF THE r. \ i Ml unstratifled rocks lie the lowest, or form the internal crusts of the earth ; the watery depo- sits, in their natural order, lie upon the former. Of these strata there are twenty-eight well- defined divisions, classed as four scries ; those which lie immediately upon the crystalline, or unstratifled n r s. . i filled the priiiary series; the next the tn iis i! m ; the next the secondary; and the upper tii lerl ■ "v. " 3. In the unstratitied rocks there are no animal or vegetable remains of any descrip- tion ; nor are any found in the primary series, or first deposits of water. In the transition series, we first discern fossils of some of the lower grades of animals only; some peculiar and extinct species of plant'^ and fishes, a few hundred species of shells, and ma ly zoophytes. In the secondary series, other kinds of vegeta- bles and other animals are found, with nume- rous extinct reptiles ; in the middle of this series begin also to appear the most ancient remains of mammalia; viz. two marsupian animals. The tertiary series is divided into four classes, or periods, of which the lowest contain only three and a half, the next eighteen, the next fifty-two, and the highest, ninety-five per cent, of the existing species. " Each decisive stratum has some fossils peculiar to itself, and there are none of the ex- isting species of organic creatures [i.e. animals or vegetables) in any but the tertiary series. !) ARGUMENT FROM DESION. 71 jrm the ry depo- : former, ht weil- 5 ; those lUine, or y series ; jon clary ; ) are no descrip- y serievS, -ansition e of the peculiar Sj a few ophytes. vegeta- H nume- of this ancient irsupian ed into lowest ighteen^ ety-five 1 fossils the ex- animals ries. " 4. If these twenty-eight divisions be num- bered m the a^ce.iding order, a higher numbered stratum ia never found under a lower num- bered stratum ; nor ure the unstratified, or crystalline rocks. ( ver found above these depo- sits of Water, except when certain portions of the former have been introduced between the clefts or fissures of the latter. * * * * " I have stated that underneath all tb se fossiliferous strata lie the primary strata . o, having the traces of a single organic bein^. Now these strata, extending to the dep ..f many hundred feet, are also the deposits of water. But if any animals or vegetables were created when these primary strata were de- posited, it is perfectly unaccountable that, extending more or less continuously round the globe, they should not contain a single speci- men of organic remains. If no such creatures were then in existence, our position is verified ; there was a beginning of organic existence. " There appears to the writer, moreover, an important inference from the beginning in the order of the matter of this globe. If there have been a beginning of +he present state and system, the laws or {)owers of terrestrial nature must also have had a beginning; for, if the same laws and power which now actuate it had always existed, it is impossible they should not have carried on the same routine from all eter- 72 STATEMENT OF THE J i nity, as they exhibit now; for as by the atheistic hyi)othesis matter is eternal, and matter and its laws constitute the whole of nature, if the laws of matter luid been also eternal, no possible reason can be assigned, either for their former quiescence, or for a ditferent action of those powers at the present period. " I do not mean that nature might not have exhibited infinite variety ; but it is the beginning and variations of those diversities at different epochs, which is so entirely inconsistent with any atheistic hypothesis. Either of these two facts, a beginning of the present order of nature, or an alteration from some former state, is a sufficient proof that the present laws of nature were imparted by a supernatural cause. '* It is evident, likewise, that the differences have been gradational or progressive, from a state when there were no organized beings to the present highly-organized and orderly sys- tem. The comparatively simple state in which we first trace organization, till the climax of organic formation, man, — and the correspond- ing progress of the crust of the earth, from a mere confused and molten mass to the present state, so highly adapted to organic life ; these are alone sufficient proofs of this gradation ; and that gradation of a beginning of the pre- sent course of nature : and both are proofs of a beginning of nature^s laws, and consequently of the existence of a supernatural power who imparted them. I >' ! L\ ARCStJMENT FROM DESIfJX. 73 thcistic or and , if the possible former f those it have ginning ifferent it with jse two nature, te, is a nature erences from a ings to •ly sys- i which max of ispond- from a present ; these iation ; le pre- oofs of [uently er who " To tliis objection to any atheistic hypotlio- sis, it may, perhaps, be re[)licd, Hhat nature's A' ^h to )h constitution i one state of matter out of another. This we deny. There are no natural causes but must spring from matter and matter's powers or laws ; and we know no law or power in matter which has .iny otlier action than one that is uniform vndcr the same circ am stances. If, in- deed, we could detect in any law of nature a progressing and not a uniform power ;~that is, if any known law, acting by itself upon matter, ever exhibited gradation of etFect under the same circumstances, instead of uniformity, then there might be some plea to ascribe progressive action to the combination of laws : but we witness nothing but uniformity in all her laws. Gravity always acts at the same rate under the same conditions ; crystallization always exhi- bits the same figures on the same substance ; chemical affinity always associates the same substances; parents always produce the same species. None of these laws are subject to alteration ; nor could they alter, under any cir- cumstances, that they themselves created : and it is perfectly unphilosophical to ascribe to the united powers a different action from that which they manifest singly, and for which there is not a shadow of evidence." The position, therefore, is fully established, that the present order of things on our globe I i'i !tl i 74 STATEMENT OF THE had a bep^inninj^ from a state which, in itself, could not have produced that order. II. liut Mr. Crabbe f^oes further than this. lie produces evidence, both negative and ])Osi- tive, to sustain the following position ; that there are various phenomena in nature, asso- ciated in one place, which, if produced by physical causes, were produced by causes which are naturally comi)lctely independent of each other ; and which, therefore, could not have been brought to act together without the guidance of an external and intelligent power. 1. His negative evidence lies in the refuta- tion of several theories, which are supposed to indicate how mere physical causes may, from the simplest forms of matter, have evolved the present highly-organized system. a. The theory of La Place is built upon certain astronomical observations, which are due to the improved state of modern instru- ments. It has been discovered, or supposed to be discovered, that phosphorescent or self-lumi- nous matter exists, disseminated through ex- tensive regions of space ; in the first place, dispersed in patches in different parts of the sky. In some of these patches the matter is feebly condensed round one or more faint nuclei ; in others, these nuclei were brighter in proportion. When, by condensation, the atmosphere of each nucleus becomes separated from the others, the result is multiple nebulous I i i n ARGIJMKNT FROM DESIGN. 75 in itself, ban this, [ind j)osi- ion ; that ire, asso- luced by ses which t of each lave been guidance e rcfuta- posed to ay, from )lved the ilt upon hich are 1 instru- iposed to elf-Iumi- ugh ex- it place, :s of the natter is )re faint brighter ion, the eparated lebulous stars, formed by brilliant nuclei very near each other, and each surrounded by an atmosphere. Sometimes the nebulous matter condensing in a uniform state, has produced nebidous sys- tems, which are called planetary. Fiujdly, a still greater condensation forms all these nebu- lous systems into stars. Now La Place builds upon these phenomena the hypothesis, that the solar system was formed from one of these nebulous stars, revolving on its axis, gradually cooling, and in that process detaching portions of its external zone of vapour, which formed the planets, with their satellites and rings. The theory is a very inge- nious one, and accounts for most of the pheno- mena of the solar system ; but it has this radi- cal defect, that the state of things from which the theory starts is not accounted for. Dr. Whewell [Bridgeivater Treatise, ch. vii.) very justly says: "Let us suppose nebulosity dif- fused throughout all space, so that its course of running into patches is not yet begun ; how are we to suppose it distributed? Is it equally diffused in every part ? Clearly not : for if it were, what is. ould cause it to form into masses so various in size, form, and arrangement? Why should not the nebulous matter be equally diffused throughout space, and continue for ever in a state of equable diffusion ; as it must do from the absence of all cause, to determine the time and manner of its separation?" wf' II H Mi »•., ' 1 !•■ i I •■I I f 1 ■ i f I lit 111 i- m 70 STATEMENT OF THE Again; "Wliy should this nebulous matter grow cooler ; as, by the hypothesis of La Place, it does to produce solidity?" Again; "How came the parent vapour to be neither too fluid nor too tenacious ; to contract neither too quickly nor two slowly, for the successive for- mation of the several planetary bodies?" I will add, that La Place supposes (like Epicurus) an existing tendency to gravitation, an existing centrifugal force, existing laws of motion ; and, we may ask, What gave to this phosphorescent matter these tendencies, and placed them under these laws ? Now these are primary questions ; but the secondary ones are innumerable : and these primary questions are manifestly incapable of solution upon any hypothesis which leaves out an intelligent First Cause. b. It is really instructive to observe how im- possible it is to arrive at any consistent or intel- ligible theory of creation which has this omis- sion. I therefore proceed to another form of the atomic theory, stated in the Bridyeumter Treatise of Dr. Prout. It proposes to account for the ditferent states of the same substance, — the gaseous, the fluid, and the solid, by supposing them to be produced by the electric and mag- netic poles of the axes of supposed ultimate or [primary particles of these substances : that is, by the number of ways in which, under the magnetism and electricity, the 'r> ,1 I \ ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 77 IS matter La Place, i; it II ow too fluid ither too ssive for- ses (like avitation, ; laws of e to this ;ies, and but the id these pable of aves out how iiTi- or intel- is omis- m of the Treatise for the Je,— the pposing d mag- dtiinate s : that der the ty, the various axes of ultimate particles would com- bine, cohere, or separate from each other. The same principle, under essential difiercnces of structure in the original particle, is said to be capable of accounting for the chemical athni- ties, and even for the different elementarv sub- stances. But this hypothesis begins by supposing the existence of particles of some definite size, however small ; — of the electric and magnetic forces or fluids, with certain definite properties, and of specific differences in the structure of the original particles. And how are we to account for this determinate state of things, out of all possible states, if we acknowledge nothiu"; hioiher or earlier than matter? c. We shall come to the same re:iult, if we take up the theory that organized beings are formed spontaneously from unorganized matter. Dean ±j.'"kland [Bridfjewater Treatise, ch. xvii. § 2) has given abundant evidence to show, that organized beings exist in an undeveloped state throughout the atmosphere, and throughout all fluids ; and that they require various concur- rences of circumstances to develope them, as is notoriously the case with regard to seeds, and the eggs of birds and insects : and it there- fore appears, that all existing phenomena may be explained without having recourse at all to the theory of spontaneous generation. Some, however, who advocate this theory, fl 78 STATEMENT OF THE suppose that it is capable of being applied to explain the existence of all the larger animals? and even of man himself: since, as they argue, if any organized being may be generated spon- taneously, there seems no sufficient reason why all animals may not be generated in the same manner. This, it is evident, is only another form of the Stoic theory of an eternal chain of causes and effects. The reply is, that the formation of any one animal or vegetable, by causes purely natural, requires the co-operation of three independent principles ; — the elementary materials, the che- mical powers, and the mechanical powers. We have then to explain, how these three elements came originally to co-operate, so as to form such infinite varieties of organized beings ; and, moreover, how it is that they do not now con- tinue 13 co-operate to produce new results of the same description. If we believe in a creator, we may believe that he may lay a train, whereby, to a limited extent, certain inde- pendent principles shall be brought together, and produce, apparently, spontaneous forma- tions of some very low grades of organized beings : but all experience is against the pro- bability that such formations ever took place in regard to creatures of very complex mechan- ism ; and even in regard to those v/hich do not appear totally improbable, we are constrained to suppose an intelligent director to arrange ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 79 r)pHed to animals? ;y argue, ed spon- son why :he same another chain of any one natural, jpendent the che- ers. We elements to form gs ; and, ow con- ?sults of v^e in a ' a train, 1 inde- ogether, forma- 'ganized the pro- k place ncchan- i do not strained arrange the train by which certain independent causes may occasionally produce this apparently spon- taneous organization. d. Still there is a theory, that of Lamarke, which attempts to explain how all creatures whatever may have been evolved, gradually and spontaneously, from one extremely simple type. It cannot be denied that the gradations from one state of animal life to another are in many cases very minute ; that the species branch off occasionally from one common type, some pre- serving one characteristic and some another; that the human embryo springs from a condi- tion apparently devoid of all organization, and begins its organized existence in a condition and with a structure resembling that of fishes, passes to that of reptiles, acquires some of the attributes of the bird and the quadruped, and changes its structure gradually to suit the con- dition in which it is finally to appear on its birth. These facts are unquestiorable; (see Roget's Bi'idf/ewater Treatise, vol. ii. p. G26, &c. ;) and they would, to a certain extent, agree with such a theory ; but they do not require it. Supposing the present gradation of ani- mals to be formed by secondary causes, under the operation of general laws laid down by an intelligent creator, — these affinities woidd naturally occur : but there are other facts, entirely opposed to the theory of spontaneous evolution of species. 80 STATEMENT OF THE In order to the correctness of this theory, there must be a gradation without material chasms, and there must be an uninterrupted connc:.ion or derivation between the grades. It is not my intention to go into a detailed proof of the absence of the first of these necessary conditions. It is sufficient that the observa- tion of the most experienced geologists, ex- pressed by Dean Buckland, (ch. xiv. § 13,) is totally adverse to it. " It appears,^' he states, "that the character of fossil fishes does not change insensibly from one formation to another ; but these clianges take place ab- ruptly at certain definite periods, in the succes- sion of strata." There is a chasm between the shells and corals of the earlier transition series of rocks, and the land vegetables, luxuriant pines, and })erfect fishes of the carboniferous series ; and between the fossils of the transi- tion series and those of the secondarv series : the latter containing the first specimens of the turtles, ichthyosauri, plesiosauri, diadelphian, and pterodactyli ; which complex forms make their appearance abruptly, without a fossil of an intervening or transitionary structure. Again ; there is an abrupt hiatus in structure and organization between these of the secondary, tiiul the new forms of the tertiary series, which (ns D'\ H'lckland s^^hows) are more simple than their pr; d -{'essois: a direct contradiction of the tl.'Oiy of gradur'l evolution. I theory, material errupted ades. It ed proof ecessary obscrva- ists, ex- § 13,) is le states, loes not tion to lace ab- ! succes- veen the jn series uxuriant )iiilerous 3 transi- y series : s of the lelphian, is make sil of an Again ; ire and jondary, 5, which pie than n of the w fftf ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 81 The supposition of uninterrupted connexion or derivation is likewise disproved by these facts, which gcoU)gy has estabHshed ; that there have been several entire disruptions of the crust of the globe since the first organic creatures; that in each of these disruptions certain species become suddenly extinct, and have no successors of any kind ; and that, on the other hand, certain genera, instead of gradually develo})ing into new ones, continue unchanged through tlie whole of these disrup- tions. Indeed, the two single existing facts, 1. That most genera and species always remain sepa- rate, and cannot be brought to breed into each other ; and 2. That in the largest classes of animated beings, there are invariably males and females, in certain proportion, and with invariable characteristics : these two facts are completely destructive of the theory of grada- tional evolution of species. There are other and fuller details of proc into which I do not enter, conceiving these to be abundantly convincing. 2. Mr. Crabbc having thus disposed ol le negative argument, by bringing together the refutation of opposing theories, comes to the direct proof, that the physical causes of existing phenomena were originally independent of each other, and consequently could not have bee i 'T;.'y rT71 81 STATEMENT OF TriR dcncc), tin's is u perfectly independent corre- spondenee. Secondly, that our earth has an atmosphere. The atmosphere is necessary to the existence of all animal life, as a means of breathing : and yet the lungs, by which we breathe, are a ma- chine, which not only resists, but d(;composes the air; and it is utterly inconceivable that the air should cause an organization constructed on a principle of resistance or decomposition of itself. Thirdly, the existence of water and its fluidity. The existence of water is entirely indepen- dent of any known natural cause: and although necessary to animal life, it was never suspected of causing the structure of a lion or an elej)hant. But 'nery living creature would perish without it. Tiic independence of the two is too pal- pable to require any comment. But this substance could not preserve these creatures, were it not in a fluid state ; which again arises from the peculiar distance of the earth from the sun. The position of this earth, a little nearer or more remote from the sun, would have effectually precluded the fluid state of water. But there could be no possible con- nexion of origin between the cause of our pecu- liar planetary position, and the cause of water ; so as to make tin precise distance of the earth the cause of the existence of water, or the cause of the natural limits of the fluidity of water: I « ft # ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 85 nt corro- osplierc. oxiHtonce in^ : and Eire a ma- composes 3 that the rurted on )sition of s fluidity, indepen- althovigh suspected elc})hant. h without > too pal- crve these te ; which ice of the ■his earth, the sun, fluid state 5sible con- our pecu- of water ; ■ the earth the cause of water : 4^ I I still less could the position of the earth, or the fluidity of water, be the cause of the existence of liviuij: creatures. Fourthly, tlie inclination of the axis of the earth to its orbit, and its parallelism to itself, by means of which, independently of the revo- lution on its axis, the portion of its surface presented to the sun is continually chanu'lui^. There is no assi<:;nable reason why tlie earth might not always haye ])resented the same half to the sun, as the moon does to us ; or why the axis was not perpendicular to its orbit, or in the plane of it. Had either of these circum- stances occurred, most of the existing race of animals and vegetables must, if produced, soon have })erished. But the peculiar position of the earth's axis, so far from causnig, could not even modify the existing race of creatures, so as to fit them for continued existence in the present position of the globe. The utmost powers of climate, and heat, and cold, over the constitution of the animal frame, are clearly ascertained. They can darken the complexion, or alter the integuments ; but they cannot mo- dify a single internal portion of an annual structure. Fifthly, the connexion of the moon with our planet. The benefit this satellite confers is threefold: it gives light, and that just sufHcient for a time of general repose ; it preserves the ocean from I i. 80 STATEMENT OF THE putrefaction, and tlnis prevents it from becom- ing; (Icstnictivc of animal life ; and it keeps it in a fluid and wholesome condition, and thus in a state fitted for navigation. Granting; that the moon itself is a consecpience of known natural causes, those causes were perfectly luiconnected with the existence of rnan, and his \ise of the tides; of our necessity for sleep, and our con- venience in a nocturnal lamp. Sixthly, the adaptation of organic creatures to the annual and diurnal revolutions of the earth, in their times of fruitfulness and decay, and of their periodical rest. To show that there is no necessary connexion between these things, many flowers blow in early spring, and some in winter, instead of following the ordinary course ; many vegeta- bles lose their leaves in summer instead of in autumn ; and to show that sleep is not caused by darkness alone, many animals sleep in the day, and some through half a year; and man sleeps once in every twenty-four hours, even in the glare of the polar sun. (2.) There are instances in which the condi- tions of elementary or unorganized substances are essential to the continuance and perfection of organic existence : and yet they neither pro- duced organic creatures, nor each other; nor is there the slightest evidence that they have sprung from a common natural cause. First, — heat, independent of the sun and i^\ ARGTJMRNT FROM l)F<:SinX. m bccom- kccps it in . thus in a ^ that the v^n natural connected use of the d our con- : creatures 3ns of the and decay, connexion s blow in instead of ly vegeta- stead of in lot caused eep in the and man rs, even in the condi- ubstances perfection either pro- ler; nor is they have sun and .■''a of hirht, is essential to the continuance of organic life. But a homoircnoous substance, indcpciulent of the laws of gravity, such as heat is, and which intluonces all substances according to the natiu'c of the sid)staure itself, can in no sense be called the constructing cause of a variety of mechanism, subject to the laws of gravity, much less did they j)roduce heat. Secondly, the relative (piantity and disposi- tion of the land and the ocean. No ultimate physical cause can be assigned for the existing proportion ; but if the water had prevailed in a much greater proportion than at present, and the existing laws of evapo- ration and electricity had continued, the mois- ture of the whole globe would have been so augmented, that multitude? of existing genera and species covdd never have had a being. On the other hand, if the land had prevailed inordinately, the ocean would not have sup- ])lied water enough for the springs and rivers, and organic life would have failed from that cause ; the elfects of which state of things are partially seen in the deserts of Africa. Again the peculiar disposition of land and water, is another independent and very impor- tant concurrence. It is true that we can assiirn the proximate physical causes for tliis disposi- tion ; viz. the agency of air, heat, and water, which, by breaking up the crust of the earth at ,.^„^. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // i.O I.I 1.25 1^ l^ 1^ 2.0 iim 1.4 V] ^ o 7] / >^ PhotDgraphic Sciences Corporation 2? WESTMAINStREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 , 88 STATEMENT OF THE different periods, have produced the present condition of it. But can it be supposed for a moment, that ten or twelve violent subversions of the crust of the earth could have each con- tributed in a progressive ratio, to bring the earth into a condition so entirely suitable to the organic creatures existing upon it, by mere chance, and without design ? If these causes had not been under direction, water and land might have existed over the whole globe in the form of an uninhabitable swamp, or of a vast continent spotted with millions of lakes. In the former case, where would have been the whole race of land-animals and vegetables? And even in the latter case, how could that trade and commerce, which is so promoted by the present arrangement of ocean, seas, and rivers, have been carried on ? Where would have been the civilization which these have contributed to generate? Nor can it be sup- posed for a moment, that it was either the pro- portion of land and water, or the disposition of it, which either caused or modified the exist- ing terrestrial vegetables or animals; yet this proportion is necessary to their existence, and the disposition the most beneficial that could be imagined. Thirdly ; tlie phenomena of rain (not only fluid water, but water in the form of rain,) is another indispensable necessary to all terrestrial organic existence. Without rain almost all ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 89 I vegetables would perish, and almost all races of land animals would soon become extinct; yet no one supposes that water in that par- ticular form caused the existence of these creatures. Moreover, in the production of rain itself, there is a series of independent concur- rences : — 1. The evaporation of water, and in sufficient quantity to form clouds at the ordinary tem- perature of the atmosphere; 2. the peculiar nature of the atmosphere to suspend water in a state of vaj)our ; 3. the agency of electricity, an irriponderable substance, in producing rain ; 4. the tendency of vapour to form into clouds, and thus to be carried about where wanted, and again to condense in the form of drops ; 5. the phenomenon of wind, by which the vapour is raised and the clouds are carried about; G. the existence of mountains, pro- duced by volcanic agency, and contributing to the descent of rain ; 7. the internal structure of the crust of the earth, by which the rain when fallen is absorbed, and then collected in springs, so as to form heads of rivers; 8. the furrowing of the surface of the earth, by the agency of violent waters, into millions of channels, for the fertilizing of the earth and the reconveyance of the water to the ocean. All these concurrences are independent of each other, and neither of them can either in p << f 'i 1^ 90 STATEMENT OP THE itself, or in its causes, have constructed the organic beings to whose welfare it ministers. These proofs are abundantly sufficient to establish the fact of the natural independence of those concurrent causes, which produce the adaptations which we observe throughout nature : but Mr. Crabbe has entered into the subject much more fully than is necessary for the establishment of his position ; and those who desire to see how unlimited is the collec- tion of facts which can be brought to bear upon this point, are referred to the fourth chapter of his work, from which the previous argument is abridged. The inference, then, from all these instances appears inevitable, that there must have been from the beginning some intelligent cause or causes of all existing beings, to produce the co-operation of causes so complex, and so en- tirely independent of each other, or of any common natural cause. The only possible opening for evasion of this conclusion now left is, to admit that there are independent causes, and that they do con- cur to the production of new . effects, but to assert that these causes exist from eternitv, and concur from a fitness in themselves to produce such correspondencies. This evasion is however met by the facts which we have already established in this chapter, — 1. tliat the operation of the present i ^3 • ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 91 laws of nature is uniform ; 2. that this operation had a beginning, and that in regard to portions of those laws, the commencement of their ope- ration was at various epochs. To suppose laws not in operation, whilst the matter upon which they tend to work was in existence, is a contra- diction. To suppose a certain set of laws to have existed from eternity, and that these laws should devclope other laws successively, and that the developed laws should again not de- velope other laws, but be uniform and unchang- ing in their operation, is again a contradiction. And vet these are the contradictions which must be accepted, if we suppose that the present order of things was caused by a set of independent, co-eternal, unintelligent laws, or properties of matter. Moreover, to resume Mr. Crabbe's reasoning, we meet this evasion by other facts ; facts which would of themselves authorize us in saying, that matter could never manifest such phenomena undirected by intelligence. For what must the objector necessarily main- tain respecting the origin of the present order of nature ? He must, on his principles, maintain that during the chaotic state, nebular or fused, to one of which we can with certainty trace all the materials of the crust of this globe to a depth surpassing human measurement, the par- ticles of matter were surcharged with all the properties and relations with which they have 92 STATEMENT OF THE I I since been found; that, although the matter was either a burning gas or a molten mineral, yet the particles did not lose one single property which they have since manifested in combina- tion ; not even the particles now composing the finest down of a feather being deprived of their nature as parts of a feather. It must be maintained, that these particles might possess not only the properties by which they might . (if adjacent) unite chemically ; but also the capabilities of all the mechanical unions in which they have since been found in organic and inorganic structures. But this was not enough. To have consti- tuted the various detached substances which those particles of molten fluid have since formed, it was necessary that particles of dis- similar nature should, by some means, be brought together; and that, just in such quan- tities and in such places as was required by the relation of each separate structure to the whole great scheme. These particles must then have had self-organizing and self-collocating proper- ties, such as nothing in nature at present pos- sesses. The laws or properties then by which these particles resolved themselves into various genera and species, animal, vegetable, and mineral, must have been entirely different from the present laws or properties of matter ; and, con- sequently (as nothing of the kind is proceeding ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN. 93 nions m at present), those original laws are either sus- pended or annulled. But laws which can be suspended or become extinct cannot have pos- sessed an eternal existence. Nor could the present laws of nature have wrought all these clianges, because they all act uniformly under the same circumstances : and as, by the atheistic hypothesis, the laws w^ould make all the circumstances, they could not have been changed by the circumstances which they themselves had made. We are, therefore, driven back on all hands to the natural conclusion, to which we were long ago brought, that the present state of existing beings has been brought about by supernatural intelligence, giving laws to matter, and superintending the operation of those laws. CHAPTER VI. ON THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN THROUGHOUT CREATION. It being now fully established that the adapta- tions and correspondencies in nature, are such as cannot be accounted for in any other suppo- sition than the natural and obvious one, so many ages ago stated by Socrates, viz. that they proceeded from design ; I proceed to show 94 ON THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN that tliesc cvkIlticcs of dcsifrn |K'rvJido all nature ; or, in otlicr words, that they extend to all objects whose [)h('iioinena we have been able to examine. This statement, it will be rcmendjered, is not new. It was in.ade bv Socrates; it was maintained by the Stoics and Peripatetics ; it is entered into at considerable lenj^th by Cicero. (iVtf/. Dear. ii. •>!) — 04.) My business will be simply to render tin; proof more complete than it has yet appeared in any single treatise with which 1 am ac- quainted. It is natural to extend our field of observa- tion by consideriii'T our own structure. Take then the hand. (See Kidd's Bridijitivdtcr Trea- tise, ch. iii., and the eloquent and forcible ex- tracts from Galen, there quoted.) We find one of its most frequent uses is to grasp some object, or to hold it fast. It is necessary, for this pur- pose, that it should have the power of closing itself and compressing the object ; and that power we know it has ; and examination shows a peculiar mechanism of joints to enable it to bend, and of tendons to cause it to bend. But as it is likewise necessary that it should relax its hold, it has additionally an opposite set of tendons for that purpose. There are many objects of which it could not retain its hold, if its surface were smooth and hard, like that of bone or horn : but its hard substructure is covered over with flesh, which yields to pres- i' TiinoraiioiT creation. 95 sure, and yet is suflficiciitly elastic to close round the object it holds. Its divided struc- ture, broken up into finrought 3reathe mbina- md so d and radual, to our bodily frame, that the natural expression of our feelings must be in the words of the Holy Psalmist, " I am fearfully and wonderfully made." From men we carry our attention to other creatures ; and first to quadrupeds, of whom let us consider the horse, and the adaptation of his structure to his own wants and to the use of men. He has no hands to convey his food to his mouth, and is constrained to employ his lip. But how beautifully flexible is that organ ! How rapid is its motion ! Into what infinite variety of form does it mould itself! With what accuracy can it pick up so small a thing as a single grain of oats. And how is this accomplished ? The member itself is composed entirely of muscular fibre, interlacing and crossing, so as to pull in every conceivable direction. Nor can we say that the organ acquires this dexterity by long practice ; for, as soon as he begins to eat, we may observe the same thing. Again, it is necessary for him to lie down to rest himself; and we find in him, as in most other quadrupeds, a special provision made for that purpose, as well as for that of rising rapidly upon any alarm. For the hind leg is made to bend in a different way from the corre- sponding member in the human body. Ob- serve him again, eating in the field. How accu- rately are the length of his head and neck H 98 ON THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN proportioned to that of his Icj^s, to enable him to stooj) and crop the herba t the earth, he can aflRrm with certainty what you will next [irrive at, if you should choose to dig through it. Now this regularity and order in itself proves design. Let us, however, recur to our stones, and take the conglomerjite, which is composed of fragments of other stones. There nuist there- fore have been a time, when those various descriptions of stone were broken up and min- gled together, and then cemented together into a new kind of stone. Consequently a stone of this species proves, that even before it was composed there existed other stones which had not remained untouched in their existing con- dition. We will examine a second. We find in it perhaps a shell, or a back bone of a fish, or a leaf of fern, turned into stone. Some of these shall resemble those which live and grow at the present day ; others will differ more or less from any at present known to exist. If we inquire further, we learn that specimens of this kind are innumerable, and that some of them contain whole skeletons of animals, of species believed to be extinct. This again proves past doubt that, hard as the stone now is, it must once have been soft, to enclose these animal and vegetable substances. And these sub- stances themselves, in their exact regularity, and the undoubted proof that they once lived and grew like those we now witness, aft'ord the 112 ON THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN ¥. ' ) [I^n same evidences of dcsif^n, which wc have ah'cady seen in those now existinj^ in the world. But let us leave these and take the granite, which contains no fossils and no fragments of other stone. It is not, however, a perfectly simple substance, but consists of three sub- stances more simple ; viz. quartz, felspar, and mica. Now it is extremely remarkjible, that by a series of accidents the chemists of the present day have discovered, that these are likewise compound substances, and have even been taught the process by which they may be made. The conclusion is undeniable, that granite is not the result of accident, but has been produced by a contriving mind, combin- ing its elementary materials in certain propor- tions and by certain chemical means. We will now quit the substance of the earth and its inhabitants, and ascend into the atmos- phere which surrounds it ; the most important use of which is, that it is the breath of life. It was long supposed to be an uncompounded fluid ; but chemistry at length discovered that it is composed of three descriptions of air, which are technically called gases ; oxygen, ni- trogen, and carbonic acid gas. The latter exists in so small a proportion in the atmosphere, that to us it is of very little importance, unless in- directly : but (as we have seen) to plants it is what the whole atmosphere is to us. The nitrogen, on the other hand, is not only in sxe^ mmmram THROlTfJllOUT CIIKATION. \\'\ 1 1 ready ranite, cuts of rfc'ctly J 8ub- r, and , that )f the ic arc even may , that t has Tibin- opor- earth tmos- irtaiit . It nded that air, , ni- xists that 3 in- it is The f in itself positively ])oisonous, but exists in such a quantity in t ic atmosphere, that if the propor- tion of it were materially increased, it would render every act of breathinji; a sufferinjj;, and ensure death to us, with fjjreater or less rapi- dity, accordinf^ to the ])roporti()n which it bore to the whole bulk of the atmosphere. The third of the components of the atmosphere, viz. the oxygen p;as, is the vital part ; that which, by being admitted into the lungs, and becoming mixed with the blood, restores to it that nutri- tive quality, which it had lost in circulating through the system. It may be inquired. If the nitrogen gas be so pernicious, why should any portion of it enter into the atmosphere? The reply is this: — Oxygen, it is true, is vital air ; but there is such a thing as exciting the vital powers too much. If the quantity of oxygen gas in the atmosphere were materially increased, our ner- vous system would be so excited, and the tension of the muscles become so increased, that we should live in a continual fever. Our sight and hearing would be distressingly acute, and we should wear out our whole frame with over exertion, and become old men before we had reached the years we now reckon our prime. The use of the nitrogen then is, to temper and moderate the effects of the oxygen ; and the two are mingled in such proportions, that life and health are sustained in that mode- I 114 ON THE EVIDENCE OF DESIGN rate degree, which is most for our happiness, and ensures to us such a duration of existence, as gives time for the discharge of the duties which the Creator has appointed for us. Can there be any doubt that a fhiid, so admirably calculated to answer its ends, was devised and commingled by an all-wise Being? The earth and its appendages furnish an in- exhaustible fund for observations of the same kind : but it is desirable to show that the evi- dences of intclUgence extend every where; and, therefore, we will pass on to the system or com- bination of w^orlds, of which we know that they form a part. Every one is now aware that the earth moves round the sun, or rather a point which lies within the extent of the body of the sun ; and that the length of the year and the variations of the seasons, are regulated by that motion. We have then a vast ball revolving round a central point. Now supposing we had to accomplish such a motion, how should we efiect it ? Some- thino; of the kind is done in slino-inii; a stone. In giving it a circular motion before discharging it, it is evident that there are two forces at work ; one which impels the stone onwards in its course, the other which prevents it from going more than a certain distance from the centre of the circle in which it moves. And it is evident that the force which impels it onward could not convey it in a circle; because the w THROUOIIOUT CREATION. 115 they moment the other force is rerrjoved, it flics off in a Hne nearly at rigiit angles with the radius of the circle ; and it is equally evident that the force which keeps it near the centre, would draw it nearer to the centre, were it not for the contrary force drawing it away. The two requisites, then, for moving in a circle are, — a force im})elling the body onwards, and a force drawing it towards the centre. They are commonly called the centrifugal and centripetal forces ; but the former denomina- tion is clearly incorrect; for it is evidently nothing but a force impelling the body in a straight line. For the present let us look at the latter. In the sling the centripetal force is the string: but in the motion of the earth round the sun it is accomplished by that invi- sible power called the attraction of gravitation, by virtue of which all bodies universally have a tendency towards each other, in a proportion compounded of the relative size of the bodies, and the distance from each other. In order, however, that this motion should be in a circle, it is requisite that the impelling force should be exactly balanced against the gravitating force; and that the impulse should be in a direction at right angles to the radius of the circle in which the body is to move. These conditions then have been considered in constructing the vast machine cnllcd the solar system, of which this world, with all its men, I 2 n^^-.-r.T^r- P>WL P!l»l ■.•■^t" 116 ON THE EVIDENCE OF DE8IGN I ^i and beasts, and birds, and fishes, and reptiles, and insects, with all its minerals, and rocks, and atmosphere, are but a part, and a small part. The motion of the earth itself is only one element of the problem. There is the motion of the moon round the earth, and that of the fourteen planets, with the moons or satellites of three of them, and the ring of one. There is likewise the elliptical motion of the comets, of the laws of which we have but an indistinct conception. Here again we have the same evidence of a contriving mind, which we have found in the smallest insects. So strongly indeed were the ancient Greeks impressed with the evidence which regular motion affords of intelligence residing some- where, that they not only (as we have said) conceived each star of the solar system to be an intelligent being, but imagined the whole system to be a society of such beings, volun- tarily combining to form an orderly whole. But this vast system of worlds, called the solar system, is only a small portion of the universe. There are the fixed stars, of which 3000 are visible to the naked eye. The tele- scope has discovered, and is continually disco- vering, multitudes more ; so many, that in some parts of the sky, the moon alone will hide 2000 from view ; and still as we improve our telescopes, we discover more. Nor is this vast field without its evidence of design. Some of b ' THROUGHOUT CREATION. 117 these stars, which to the naked eye are single, are found to be double, performing regular revolutions round each other : others are found to be centres of systems like our sun ; and systems of revolving stars require, as we have seen, a creating intelligence. And thus we perceive that, into whatever field of nature we extend our researches, we can go no where without discovering evidence of some intelli- gent being employed in devising the various portions of the vast machine. CHAPTER VII. THAT THE DESIGN EVIDENT THROUGHOUT CREATION PROCEEDS FROM ONLY ONE BEING. In the course of our inquiries we have been brought to the conclusion, that we have through- out the universe traces of some intelligent con- triver or contrivers. As Christians, we of course know that there is but One ; but our mere evi- dence from nature, whilst it must have im- pressed upon the mind more and more the feeling of the oneness of the creating power, has not actually been shown to prove it. So far as our argument has yet carried us, it is quite possible that all the various portions of "-T:;=-^:-"rt: ir: 118 DESIGN THROUGHOUT CREATION 1. 1 ^ ,i the universe may have been designed by a mul- titude of intelligent beings; just as all the houses, and ships, and articles of furniture, and implements, and tools, and machines, have been designed by thousands of mankind. If, therefore, we could proceed no further than this, we should still be far from proving from the works of nature (as the Scriptures teach us we can prove) the existence of one God ; for, in the very idea of God, we require a first and final cause of all we see. In order, therefore, that we may be able to evince that there is such a being, we must be able to connect together the scattered indications of design, and we must be able to show that one chain passes through the whole. We must prove that they are all parts of one great plan, proceeding from one master mind. In order to establish this point, let us go back to the solar system. We have seen that the fourteen planets move round the sun. Now this connexion of all these bodies with the sun, and their dependence upon him, of course con- nects them with each other ; and thus proves, that the whole system, so far as it is a piece of machinery, was contrived by one governing mind. There is, however, a remarkable set of facts in connexion with this subject, which places the argument in a point of view so irresistibly convincing, that the statement cannot be com- a mul- ill the 'Cj and have d. If, : than [^ from ach us 1 ; for, •st and re fore, s such gether s must I rough are all m one us go n that Now e sun, e con- roves, ece of rning facts places stibly com- PROCEEDS FROM ONE BEIN(i. 119 plete without them. (See Paley, XXII. iii. 2, and Whcwcll's Bridyewater Treatise, Book II., ch. 3.) If each planet were to revolve round the sun without being affected by the other planets, there would be a complete regularity in its motion ; and this regularity might continue for ever. But it is discovered (as I have already stated) that the law of gravitation is universal. The planets, therefore, do not execute their movements unaflxicted by each other: each of these is acted u{)on by the attraction of all the rest ; and this produces a derangement of the regularity of their motion. All the planets in- deed are very small, compared with the sun ; and, therefore, the derangement they can all together produce upon any one will be ex- tremely small in the course of one revolution. But this gives no security that it may not be- come very large in the course of many revolu- tions ; the cause is perpetually acting, and it has the whole extent of time to act in. Is it not then quite conceivable, that in the lapse of ages the derangements of the motions of the planets may accumulate ; the orbits may change their form ; their mutual distances may be much increased, or much diminished ? Is it not pos- sible that these changes may go on without limit, and end in the complete subversion of the system ? If, for instance, the result of this mutual gravitation should be that the earth's #- i 1 i: 120 DESIGN THROUGHOUT CREATION orbit should become less and less circular, its course might lead it by degrees to interfere with the motions of some other planet. Or if it were to cause the moon to approach nearer and nearer to the earth, it might finally fall to the earth's surface. In either case the result must be an awful catastroj)he. We should have " years of unequal length, and seasons of capricious temperature ; planets and moons of portentous size and aspect, glaring and disap- pearing at uncertain intervals ; tides like de- luges, sweeping over Avhole continents; and perhaps the collision of two planets, and the consequent destruction of all organization on both of them/' On a common examination of the solar system, it is not at all clear that there is not a tendency to this ultimate disarrangement. Changes are continually taking place in the motions of the heavenly bodies, and have been taking place since the first dawn of science. The earth's orbit has been becoming more and more round, from the earliest observations to our own times. The moon has been moving quicker and quicker from the time of the first recorded eclipses. Will these and similar changes go on without limit or reaction ? If so, we tend by natural causes to a termination and breaking up of the present state of things ; if not, by what adjustment or compensation are we secured from such a tendency ? t I, y '•'""*'■"'"*"* 1'f"* PROCEEDS FROM ONE BEING. 121 ion :s; Ion I h y The answer to these questions is far from easy; and it belongs to mathematics to give a complete reply. (See La Place, Expos, da Systhne du Alonde, p. 441.) But the question has undergone a regular and close mathema- tical investigation, and it has been proved, by a process completely satisfactory, that we have nothing whatever to fear. The orbits of all the planets deviate from regularity to a certain extent ; they continue to deviate more and more until they reach a certain point, and then they begin to return ; they reach a maximum height of deviation and then diminish. The periods which this restoration requires are enormous; reaching to thousands of years, and, in some instances, even millions: and hence it is that some of these apparent de- rangements have been going on ever since the beginning of the history of the w^orld. But, if the world shall endure sufficiently long, the restoration will be in the sequel as complete as the derangement : and meanwhile, the disturb- ance never attains a sufficient amount seriously to alter the adaptations of the system. There exists, therefore, in the solar system, a provision for the permanent regularity of its motions, arising out of the dependence of every one of the globes which compose it upon every other : which proves still more com- pletely, the unity of design in the system ; and 122 DESIGN THROUGHOUT CREATION' consequently the unity of the mind which at first devised and created it. If we go beyond our system, amon^^st the fixed stars, we ascertain that, wherever we can discover motion at all, the same rules of motion are adopted; and thence, by an inevi- table inference, we conclude that the same mind devised them which devised the more limited system of w hich we ourselves form a part. But it might have so happened (so far as natural reason could enable us to judge a priori), that our Creator may have devised the magnificent and grand in the universe, and others the smaller details. This indeed was in a degree the theory of Plato, who taught that the inferior parts of creation were performed by the gods, in subordination to the supreme InteUigence. (See Chap. II. p. 10.) Let us, therefore, examine what evidence we have that the same mind appears throughout. It is well known that the changes of the seasons and the alternate succession of day and night are caused by the motion of the earth, either around the sun or on its own axis. It is likewise well known that the constitutions of man, of animals, of birds, of insects, and of plants, are connected more or less with the interchange of day and night, and of the seasons. For instance, night is the period of rest for man, and for most animals and birds : r PROCEEDS FROM ONE BEING. 123 that the day the axis. Itions id of the the )d of irds: I w and if with some that is not the case, it is with equal regularity the time of motion. The owl and the bat as rcguhirly come abroad by night and withdraw by day, as the other creatures come abroad by d.iy and rest by night. Plants again disengage oxygen gas by day, and carbonic acid gas by night; whilst some of them mark the change more strongly, by closing their flowers in the evening and re-opening them in the morning. Connecting these facts with the circumstance that day and night are caused by the alternate presenting to the action of the sun, and withdrawal from it of the various portions of the earth's surface, we perceive an intimate connexion between every thing which lives and grows upon the earth with the sun, the centre of the system. Here then is another link in the chain. Let us now contemplate the relations which things on the earth bear to each other. We have already noticed how exactly the wings of birds and the fins of fish, are suited to the elements in which they move. Put the bird into the Avater, or bring the fish into the air, and (with a few remarkable exceptions) their organs of motion are useless. If we compare the greater part of animals together, we shall find that their structure bears a mutual resem- blance, (see Paley's chapter on Comparative Anatomy,) which shows a comparison in the mind of the Designer, and a variation of one I I I 12t DESION THROUGHOUT CREATION* idea to suit different circumstances. Man, quadrupeds, and birds, all liave four lunbs each ; and the bony structure of all (as we liave already noticed, Chap. VI.) is extremely alike ; but varied in relative proportions, and variously clothed, to suit tlie modes of lift; to which dif- ferent classes of creatures are subject. Thus the bat is a mouse, furnished with wings in- stead of fore legs ; the long slender bones, which serve to expand the wings answering exactly to the toes of the fore feet of the mouse; and the claws actually remaining at their ex- tremities, but applied to the use of supporting the bat during his hours of rest, by enabling him to suspend himself against walls, &c. by means of them. And the mention of the bat leads to the remark, that the gradation from one scale to another in creation is very remarkable. From man we do not pass at once to quadrupeds proper, but first to the orang-outang or chim- panzee (whose structure is almost like our own), and thence to apes and monkeys. From quadrupeds we pass off in various directions to birds and fishes. For instance, there is a quadruped in New Holland which has the beak of a duck, and forms a link between quadru- peds and fowl. The whole tribe of lizards forms a link between quadrupeds and reptiles on the one hana, and quadrupeds and fish on the other ; the land lizards connecting the Otiiia >*■• nummmi^mmm^».^^0^^ PROCEEDS FROM ONE REINO. Ii25 former, and the water lizards the latter. So af^ain, seals arc a link between quadrupeds and whales ; and whales themselves, in bringin*; forth their young alive, and in giving them suck, makes the transition more gradual from quadru})eds to other fish. Lobsters and crabs and other crustaceous fish, form a link between fish and insects ; for, like insects, the osseous part of their structure is external, whilst their flesh resembles tiiat of fish. Oysters, polypes, and s[)onges, adhering to the ground and having no power of locomotion, — and yet hav- ing more or less of voluntary motion and of animal fluids, — connect together fish and plants. The sensitive plant and the pitcher pknt of Upper Canada connect plants and animals : for their nutriment is composed in part of animal substance (feeding on flies) ; and the latter shrinks from the touch. One of the most remarkable signs of this mutual connexion is the resemblance in one branch of creation to another in external form. For instance, the flowers of the orchis tribe frequently resemble some insect, as the bee or fly ; and, aj^ain, there is an insect in Southern Africa and a caterpillar in Western Canada, either of which is scarcely distinguishable from a leaf. Take again the structure of the stomachs of animals in regard to, their food; and you have ^«WL.,«l>iK,^^kf M 120 iiKsinx TiinnTfjiiouT creation' it I nnotlicr romirxioii bctwrcii animals, plants, and insects: tor tlir stomachs ot' sonic animals will (lijxcst only vcijctahlc substance, and those o f oth icrs only nisccts and annual matter whilst some are constructed with a yiew to both. Consider, airain, the manner in whi(!h [)lants are nourished, by cjuTyniL:; up mineral substances from the earth, and ind)ibinj^ other ])ortions from the atmosphere, and you connect tofjether minerals and air; and that mineral snbstances are carried into the plant is shown by the tact, that the outer coat of straw, and sometimes of a «ri'Jiin of wheat, is as perfectly flint as any ilint-stone vou can dii!* out of a bed of clialk. The more minutely, therefon^ wc extend our incpiiries, the more clearly we ])erceiye that there is a connexion throuijihout nature, — no one thing stands by itself. Every f'^'ug is related or adapted to some other thing; and this relation and ada])tation is carried on from the stones in the bowels of the earth, and the scarcely perceptible insects throughout all vegetable and animated nature, — by the air we breathe, and the light by which we see, — up to the ])lanets and stars, and by them to the utmost verge of the universe. Nay, is there not one thino* in nature which is connected with them all? Is there not the intelligent spirit of man, united to an animal i»ii()(m:ki)s KiioM ONi: nKi.vr;. 127 and from the all ir we ip to the Ihich the tmal • striirturc, aiul capable of perreivinjr, coniein- platiiifj;, and rcasonin;:;, ii[)()n whatever exists throu^liout the universe? C'an \\\vvv, remain, tlu'refore, a shadow of a doubt, not only that there are traees of intelli- genei; every where, but that every where we pcreeive the operation of onk jj:overnin<^ In- tellij^enee, viewing all his work together, and adapt in«i:; every portion of it, more or less directly, to every other portion? This doctrines ot the unity of God is, more- over, in one way or another, recognised even by ])agans. Thus IMiilolaus \ already cited, quotes I'ytha- goras, as saying, " Ciod is the director and ruler of all things, One, always existing, i)er- manent, immovable, like to Himself and dif- fering from others." And although we learn from Cicero, confirmed by Justin Martyr, [Cohort, ud Grtecos, 18,) that Pythagoras taught Pantheism, yet these words arc direct in their testimony to the unity of Deity. Socrates again, although he believed in a multitude of gods, recognised one as distinct from the others, and as alone the Being who arranges and holds together the whole world (Xcn. Mem. IV. iii. 13), and the wisdom that pervades all things. (I. iv. 17.) Plato believed in one First Cause ^ 'EvTi ycip, (l>t]JF1NITE OD. hich we nd con- js which ^ssary to isolated m every tion has ^vere led he acts, in par- ishment definite in the globes ot each laws of le same U those lineral, from Dr. r OX THE OPERATION, &C. 131 which the mind is led to form into classes. We can as little doubt that the facts, that ostrich eggs never produce geese, nor the seed of the carrot the plant we call mustard ; but that the egg of the ostrich and the seed of the carrot invariably produce bodies resembling the pa- rent, are the results of general lav/ s ; as the fact that a printing-prc'='F produces books, and does not produce woollen cloth, is the result of general laws. We may extend the same observation through- out nature. Events are brought about, not by insulated interpositions of Divine power, exerted in each particular case, but by the establish- ment of general laws. God, therefore, is the Author of the universe as it at present exists, and itsGovernorand Preserver likewise; through the laws He has given to its parts, the proper- ties which He has impressed upon its constitu- ent elements — through taem He shapes, moves, sustains, and guides, the visible creation. This mode of operation requires, perhaps, some attention on our part to understand it with proper clearness. One reason of this is, that it is a mode of operation altogether dif- ferent from our own. Man can construct exqui- site machines, can call in vast powers, can form extensive combinations, in order to bring about results which he has in view : but in all this he is only taking advantage of laws of nature k3^ 132 ON THE OPERATION II I which already exist ; ho is applying to his use properties which matter already possesses : nor can he bv anv etl'ort do more. Tie can csta- blish no new law of nature, which is not a result of cxistinj^ ones. lie can invest matter with no new ])ro])erties, which are not modificfitions of its present attributes. His ic^reatest advances of skill and power are, when he calls to his aid forces which before existed unemployed ; or, when he discovers so much of the habits of some of the elements as to be able to bend them to his purpose. He navigates the ele- ments by the assistance of the waves, which he can neither raise nor still. And even if we su})pose him able (at some future day) to con- trol the course of these, it can only be by studying their characters, — by learning more thoroughly the already subsisting laws of air, heat, and moisture. He cannot give the mi- nutest portion of the atmosphere new rela- tions, a new course of expansion, new laws of motion. But the Divine operations, on the contrary, include something much higher. They take in the establishment of the laws of the elements as well as the combination of those laws, and the determination of the distribution and quan- tity of the materials upon which they shall produce their effect. We conceive that the Supreme Power has ordained that the air shall his use >cs : nor an csta- a result ter with fi cations idvances his aid ycd ; or, labits of to bend the eie- s, which 'cn if we to con- ^ be by ig more of air, the mi- jw rela- laws of ontrar}^, take in ements iws, and d quan- y shall hat the air shall OF GENERAL LAWS, KW be rarefied by heat, and water turned into vapour by it, — no less than that lie has com- bined air and water so as to sprinkle the earth with showers ; and determined the (piantity of air, and heat, and moisture, so tliat the showers shall be as beneficial as they are. And this leads us to a view of some of the attributes of God, as they are called, the habi- tual projjerties (if 1 may so speak) of his nature. In all our investigations throughout nature, we find traces of one governinj^ and guidinf>; mind. That mind shows an intimate acquaintance with the materials of every kind with which it has to work, so as to know in what way it may be ap[)lied to every conceiv- able purpose ; not oidy that, but as actually impressing upon matter its properties, it shows a knowledge of all conceivable properties with which it can be impressed. Now of this know- ledge we find no limit. Wherever nature is, there is that knowledge ; and, therefore, we con- clude that God's knowledge is unlimited, — that He is omniscient. So again, we find not only knowledge of all the possible resources of creation, but the most exquisite skill in the use of those resources, in the adaptation of them to the end intended to be answered. Instances of this skill are furnished in abundance in the Natural Theo- logy of Paley, and in the Bridyewater Trea- tises, particularly those of W he well, Kidd, and dW , iiSn-'f . ■ \ i n Hi ■■ i J' ' i ■ in i;u. ON rilK OWKIIAIMON Uofrot. \rw skill in (ho adaptJition of means to (muIs, ami in Iho disccM'nmcnt of thr ends to he aimed at. is what \\c rail irisdoin : and that wisdom wo oan traoo ovory whoro ; in tho smallest insoot, imporooptihlo to tho naked ev(\ and in tho arraniiiomonts ot' the vast system of worlds, of whioh we are a minntc ])ortion. AVe oonelndo, therefore, that the Heinjj!: o( whoso skill we oan tind no limit, must be possossotl of inJi/Hfc trisifotn. So airain the utmost knowled«:;o and the most unlimited wis(h>m woidd be unavjiiling, were there not a poirvr o^ usini!; nature and applyinj:: it to the ends intended ; were there not, in short, an unlimited conunand of the resoinves of the universe; and even wore there not a power of augmentin<^ these resourees at pleasure, l^ut, so far as our observation reaehes, we find no limit to the power of God. We tind Him not only having an unlimited eommand of the resoiu'ees of nature already existing, but even impressing laws and proper- ties upon nature. We conelude, therefore, that his power is unlimited, that He is omni" potent. The idea, however, of these properties as pertaining to Ucity was not left to be obtained by tlie results of modern inquiry. So sensibly \r it impressed upon creation, that the ancient Greeks of every theistic school attributed those qualities, or at least the attributes of omnis- t; OF CIENKUAL I.AVV8. 135 lion of i of the irisdom : lie IT ; in 10 naked he vast niiinite hat the lit, ninst luul the iivaiHng, ure and re there of the re there soin'ces 'rvation of God. diniited ah'cady proper- crefore, omni- tics as )tained cnsibly uicient those 3mnis- eienee and onmipotenec; to tlie ^o(Ih in pien*;- ral ; not however as Hnpposinp; thai each of them indepen(hMitly ])osseHH(!d tht'se attributes; hut that they p(!rtained to their nature, and were possessed by them as a society. (See (-hap. II.) CMAITKU IX. THAT (JOn IN A SI'IUIT, AND THAT Fl K IS TlIK AUTHOR OF TIIF KXISTKXCK OF MATTKIl. Wk liave hitlierto contemplated God as the former and fashioner of matter, as impressing hiws upon it, and using and adapting it in every way to his ])urposcs ; but w(" have not distinctly considered Ilim as the Autlior of the existence of every thing. T\u^ (piestion then ariscvs, Is God the Author of that matter which He has so wrought and fashioned? And that leads to another question, viz. What is lie in Himself? Is his nature different from that matter upon which He has wrought? Before we answer these (piestion s, let us rc- cal to our remembrance wliat we mean by matter, and let us consider what evidence wc have that there is something besides matter. Matter, then, is that which has length, breadth, and thickness ; which can be compressed and extended ; which is light and heavy ; which has no power of motion in itself, and never does \'M\ COX) IS A Sl'lKir, AM) AUTllOIl u w nunc (so far as wo can trace) except wlicn im- pelled by some otlier ])ONver. N o\v uliat IS thert* besides matter? We know that we our- selves, our inward self, are something dillerent tVom matter. \Vc are conscious that wc per- ceive, and relleet, and reason, — that we invent, -that we feel I nul irrie uid contrive, and (hscovcr I di lonc I i; d( an( I r sion e have abundant proof nu it some of (he an W creatures around us j)'jt.sess some oi' these (pialities (tor example, the doii:, elei)liant, bee, and ant) ; and that other portions of nature (as j)laiits and minerals) possess no such (piali- ties. We know that the thinkinj^ portion can- not be seen or heard ; that it is not capable of being measured or wei«2:hed ; it has no length, breadth, thickness, or gravity. It may be con- nected with substances which j)osscss these qualities; but it is itself distinct from them, and apj)ears caj^able of acting without them. Here, then, is another existence besides matter; and that existence, that substance, we call spirit. Wc know, further, that our spirit animates, and impels, and guides the matter of which our body is composed ; that something similar happens even to brute animals ; and that when the spirit is separated from the body by death, the matter of the body can no longer move. AVe know that spirit can move the bodv and matter in general, and modifv and change them by its own will and art ; but that (Ml nil- hat is •(' onr- illcrt'iit rt3 |)cr- invcMit, 1 hope I <»;i'i('f. of the these it, bee, nature I quaU- m can- abU^ of eiigth, le eoii- these them, them. latter ; call spirit :ter of Ithiiig and body inger the and that J OK TIIK i: XI STANCE OF MATTKll. l'J7 if body does aet on spirit, it is not by its own will and aet, but in sneh a inann(;r as to show that when a portion of matter acts npon any individual mind, it is only under the; inlluenee ol' general laws, impressed npon mattt^r itself by sonu; unseen controlling intelligence. We have, moreover, strong evidence in the case of dreams, that the mind is capable of being very active, when the body is reduced as nearly as possible to a state of inac^tivity. Moreover we have (!videnee, that the (creator does resemble the intellectual part of ourselves, in the contrivance visible throughout nature, which is analogous to the operations of our own minds; and in the fact, that (like our own minds) He openites upon matter without mak- ing Himself visible to the bodily senses: and \vc have no evidence whatever, that lie is, like ourselves, compound ; i. e. composed of matter and spirit. We therefore conclude that God is, in his nature, a pure s[)irit. Some writers, as Lord Jirougham (in his Discourse upon Natural Theolofjy, Part I. § 4) and Mr. Crabbc (Part I. ch. v. § 2), have entered into the question, whether v/e can prove the existence of supreme spirit without pre- mising the human mind to be spirit : and others, as Locke (Book IV. ch. iii. § 6), followed by Crabbe, whether it is necessary to assert the absolute spirituality of the human mind. These WTitcrs assert, and no doubt justly in a certain I 'I 138 GOD IS A SPIRIT, AND AUTHOR # »l sense, that we .'ihould be limiting; the omnipo- tence of the Creator, if we denied liis power to communicate to matter the power of thought. But, after all, what do we know of matter, ex- cept by its properties? No one has shown better than Locke, that general terms do not represent actual essences, but only aggregation of qualities. And so, with regard to spirit, it is merely a general term to describe a distinct aggregation of qualities. To assert, therefore, that matter may have the properties of spirit, is strictly a contradiction in terms. We know nothing of either except by their qualities. We believe intuitively that these qualities are at- tached to individual beings, and that the indi- vidual man is more closely connected with the spiritual qualities than with the material. This belief on our part is altogether involuntary. (See Brougham, Note 4.) And with regard to the question, whether we could prove the existence of a supreme spirit without premising the human mind to be spirit, the case is simply this : — We discern many effects produced throughout nature by causes, or by one cause, similar in operation to our own minds; and we conclude, upon further examination, that all these effects origi- nate in one Being. We therefore conclude, that there is one Supreme Being, the Author of all nature, whose mode of operation and whose qualities resemble those of our own minds. It OF THE EXISTENCE OF MATTER. 139 nnipo- vvcr to ought, er, ex- shown Jo not jf^ation it, it is listinct irefore, spirit, J know s. We are at- e indi- ith the This ntary. ler we spirit :o be liscern [re by •ation upon lorigi- \, that ►fall hose It is, therefore, certain, that it was in point of fact, by analogy from the operations of our own minds, that the First Cause was at first con- cluded to be intellectual. And even Crabbe, who contends that we are sure (previously to all inquiry as to the precise nature of our own minds) that a supreme intelligence alone could have caused the phenomena of nature, says, " In calling that cause spirit, we give a name to something above matter, and distinct from matter;" and subjoins, "It is not necessary that w^e should know any thing positive of the nature of that cause, but that it contrives," This, however, is one of the very points of resemblance to the human mind, from which, from the time of Socrates downward, men have argued that the First Cause is of the nature of mind : nor can it be shown that they would ever have had any notion at all of a First Cause, as different from matter, except by analogy from qualities possessed by the human mind, which show it to be " above matter and wholly distinct from matter." It is true that we, having already this notion, can view it apart from ourselves, and argue respecting matter and its Author, without reference to ourselves ; but that is only because we have an habitual notion of spirit and matter, and are not con- strained to be constantly referring to the source from which we derived this notion. There remains the question. Whether He who 140 HOD IS A SI'IlllT, AM) AUTHOR lasliionccl and arnin^rt'd all matter into its |)rc- sent shajK', was the Author of matter itself. To this iiuiuiry Natural Theolo^ry cannot return so distinct and positive an answer, as to our former incjuiries. ^\c know nothing? of matter, in the abstract, as a real existence. We know not whether there is one substance, out of which all material substances are made. All we know of matter is in the individual sub- stances we find subsisting, aiul the elements into which chemistry has resolved them. But those elements are still so manv, that we can form no conclusion whatever, whether there is or is not one substance, out of which they are all made. All the evidence, therefore, which we possess for the existence of any of them, rests in the qualities they exhibit; in the])owers they possess of acting upon other substances or beings, or being acted on by them. The feeling of the Platonic school u[)on this point was so strong, that they actually denominated the various bodily substances by the name of TTOforijrfCj which in Latin is qualitater, the word from which our word quality is derived. (Cic. Quoist. Acad, I. G.) Now all these qualities, of whatever kind, are means pre[)ared to accomplish given ends, or at least adapted so as to produce them. Wherefore the whole of the evidence we have for the exist- ence of matter, resolves itself into the evidence of design or adaptation throughout all material OF TIIR RXISTRNCF OF MATTFR. Ill The point Inated tne of 1 word (Cic. are or at lefore 'xist- lence erial substnnccs; and ;ill these, as such, must neces- sarily have sprunj^ from the mind of tliat j^reat IkMn^r, ^vh() desij:;ned and a(laj)ted them. The resnlt then is, that all the phenomena of matter, every mode in which matter makes itself known to us, owes its existence to Him; that in this sense He is the Author of matter, as l)einf^ the Author of all its phenomena. And thence it is a fair conclusion, that, if any such universal sub- stance exists, it likewise nnist owe its origin to Him. This, however, is a conclusion which none of the aiuMcnt philosoj)liers reached. Some of them, as the Platonists (Cic. Qn. Ac. I. G), thought it impossible that a spirit should exist without a body to operate with ; and thence concluded that matter is the body of the soul of the world ; and all without exception re- garded matter as equally eternal with its great fashioner and governor. They maintained it as an indubitable truth, that it is im})ossible to brin"; anv thing; into existence out of nothin"*. The conclusion at which we have arrived, however, still more clearly follows, from a con- sideration of the origin of our own being. We have seen that there must have been a time when the first human bcinp; or beings began to exist ; and, therefore, there must have been a time beyond which we cannot trace the existence of a single human spirit. Indeed we have no evidence whatever for the existence of the mind of any one of us, beyond the time 142 OOD IS A SPIRIT. nit when we were born into the world. There is indeed a probability, from the rescmblanne in character, as well as in person, between parents and ancestors, and their children or descend- ants, that the mind of the child is in some inconceivabh manner derived from the parent, as we know the body is. But there is no proof that this is the case ; and the phenomena may be accounted for by supposing that the bodily constitution is capable of moulding the mind to such and such a character. At all events we have not the slightest evidence, that a single human spirit existed in any form or mode of existence before the formation of the first man ; and if any such did exist, as its powers and faculties are of the same nature as those which subsist in God Himself, it must either have owed its existence to Tlim (as Socrates and his followers concluded it did), or have been itself eternal, i. e. self-exist- ent, which is the very idea we have of God Him- self. Moreover, the very circumstance that every human spirit which ever existed was, by its union with a material body, subject to God, completely negatives the idea that any human spirit can be self-existent. It therefore follows that every human spirit derives its origin from Him. If, therefore, every human spirit must have its origin from God, it appears to follow, that as all material substance is acted on by spirit, and is consequently inferior to it, matter like- wise mu^:t derive its origin from Him. CHAPTER X. lave Ithat )irit, like- that the government of god is a moral government; on the justice, equity, and goodness of god; and on the ori- gin of evil. We have now established, even by natural reason, that there is a great Being, who ex- isted prior to all other existence, material or spiritual, who is certainly the former and fashioner both of spirit and matter, and who (we have the strongest reason to believe) is their Author and Cause; who is undoubtedly the Author and Cause of all their various deve- lopments and combinations, so far as they have come to our knowledge ; who likewise fashioned and constructed the universe, and all its parts and inhabitants, and gave them the ])roperties they at pre-^jnt possess. We have seen that this great Being gives evidence of knowledge, wisdom, and power so unlimited, that we may well pronounce them infinite ; and as from the nature of the case. He could never have begun to exist, so we conclude that He will never cease to exist. But the great fundamental truths of natural religion are, not only that there is a Gor^, but It * i\\ i'>' m ! i 144 THAT THE GOVERNMSNT OF GOD also that " lie is a rewarder of them that dili- gently seek him." Before, however, the unbeliever can be led to seek II im at all, or the doubting Christian to seek Him effectually, he must become ac- quainted with his moral attributes, such as his goodness, justice, and holiness; find with his moral connexion with us and claim to our obedience. For this purpose let us again turn our atten- tion to ourselves, and we shall see " that the Creator and Preserver of the universe is also the Governor and Judge of men ; that the Author of the laws of nature is also the Author of the law of duty ; that He who regulates corporeal things by properties of attraction and affinity, is the same Being that regulates the actions and conditions of men by the infiuence of the feeling of responsibility, the perception of right and wrong, the dread of evil, the hope of hap- piness, the love of good." Let us consider the manner in which all the parts of the universe, the corporeal and intel- 1' ctual, the animal and moral, are connected togetlier; and we shall find that we cannot separate in our thoughts the Author of the one from the Author of the other. Paley has well described (ch. x. § 5) the organs by which voice is produced in ourselves and in other creatures; the curious structure of the windpipe in particular, and that of the ■^i. IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 14; dili- tongiie. But all this curious structure would be of no avail without something to work it ; and that something is the air. jMoreover, though living in an atmosphere capable of pro- ducing and transmitting articulate sounds, and though provided with organs fitted to articu- late, man would never attain to the use of lan- guage, if he were not endued with another set of faculties. The powers of memory, of abstrac- tion, generahzation, and classitication, of reason and judgment; the tendencies which occasion the inflections and combinations of words, are all necessary to the formation and use of lan- guage. These, therefore, are parts of the same scheme, of which the bodily faculties, by which we are enabled to speak, are another part. The mind of man, with all its intellectual endow- ments, is the work of the same Artifice , by whose hands his bodily frame was fashioned. He is " the Author of those wonderful powers of thinking and judging, discovering and infer- ring, by which we are able to reason concerning the world in which we are placed, and which aid us in lifting up our thoughts to the source of our being Himself.'^ Again, we were employed in considering the artificial structure of the human eve. That organ could have no operation without light. But how small a portion does the mere percep- tion of light constitute of the advantages de- rived from the combination of sight and light ! 146 THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD We possess ulterior faculties, by which sight becomes a source of happiness and good to man. "The sense of beauty, the love of art, the pleasure arising from the contemplation of nature, arc all dependent on the eye. The sense of beauty both animates and refines our domestic tendencies. The love of art is a pow- erful instrument in raising us above the mere cravings and satisfactions of animal nature. The expansion of mind which rises in us at the sight of the starry heavens, the cloudcapt moun- tain, the boundless ocean, seems intended to direct our thoughts by an indefinite, but most impressive feeling, to the infinite Author of all." Again, we have noticed the manner in which plants are nourished by various properties in * the earth and in the air. But this whole sub- ject is connected with man ; and with man in a state of society. Under his hand the earth, by cultivation, not only supplies a sufiiciency for the wants of the individual and his family, but also produces a quantity exceeding the wants of the cultivator. Now cultivation leads by degrees to property in land ; and the produc- tion of a surplus by those who choose to culti- vate it, leads to inequalities of property and of rank. By this means some are enabled to em- ploy themselves in other ways, beside the culti- vation of the soil ; and the accumulation of property beyond the wants of the individual, leads to mental cultivation ard improvement. ) D IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 147 h sight ;ood to of art^ ition of . The les our a pow- le mere nature. s at the ; moun- ided to nt most of all.'^ 1 which ties in e sub- an in a rth, by icy for ly, but wants ,ds by roduc- culti- and of o em- culti- on of idual, ment, '■ to arts and accomplishments, and to all the arrangements and refinements of civilized so- ciety. These are all developments of the con- stitution of the earth, as connected with plants and with man ; but they would all remain idle possibilities, if the nature of man had not a corresponding direction. If man had not a social and political tendency, a disposition to congregate and co-operate, to distribute pos- sessions and offices amongst the members of the community, to invent arts and recreations, to make, and obey, and enforce laws, the earth would in vain be ready to respond to the care of the husbandman. " Must we not then be- lieve, that He who created the soil, also inspired man with those social desires and feelings, which produce cities and states, laws and insti- tutions, arts and civilization ? and that the ap- parently inert mass of the earth is a part of the same scheme as those faculties and powers with which man's moral and intellectual progress is most concerned?'' Still further : the Author of the structure of animals is also the Author of their instincts ; and these instincts often assume, in a remark- able manner, the character of affections. " The love of offspring, of home, of companions, are often displayed by animals in a way that strikes the most indifferent observer:" and yet those affections are just as much instincts as those by which they seek their food, and provide for II I ' S! fill we 1 MS THAT THE (iOVKRNMKNT OK (iOF) til ic rontiiui.'ition oi llw sprcirs. INor, arriun, csui \V(^ iMiniiiiuN llial \hc slnuMurc of allrctions in il. lis 1 \nnniu.s piiUN^cHls irom Jiiiy oinrr soiu'ct th tliaii th( Aull U)Y O r 111 10 rorrospoiulinir a illVrt ions in man, coninuMiMl as tlirv aiv \\\\\\ liis Ixxlilv iVaino in a maniuM" so anaK)j:;()iis. And who ran ])la('r in sc^paraio |)r()vinros {\\v alloction of i'alli(M* and mollicr, of brotluM's and sisters? or il 1( )[' liis li li 'Ian, Ii tnsjoin man s io\c oi nis nonu% ins rian, ins tribe, ]\is rountrv, tVom tlic atVoction \\v hilars to his family? Thus the Autlior of onr corporeal tVame, is also tlie Author of onr eapaeity of kindness and resentment; of onr love ami onr wish to be loved ; o( the desire of esteem, of knowhuljie. of societv, of honour; of all those conditions, in short, of onr moral beinix, which are occasioned by onr being placed together in detinite relations amongst each other. Hnt t'nrther still, when we consider man in his 7'(/af}()us to his felU)w-mcn, then comes in the idea of dn/u. \Vc are all sensible that others owe something to ns, in consc(piencc of those relations: and we must, consetpicntly, own that wc owe something to others; that there is such a thing as cqifi/i/ between man and man. And wc are continually led (without any previous intuition of our own, and by an involuntary and iniavoidablo process of our minds) to form judgments concerning the actions of others, and concerning our own actions, as right and wrong; or what we ou2:ht or oui>:ht not to di> or feel in * I) lin, cm lions iti CO tlian ions in bodilv « v\\o ran lion of (M's? or [an, his )oars to )rporcal u'ity of nul onr (HMn, of 11 those , wliich thcr in man in fuics in others If those n that IS such And revious [ry and form •s, and rong; Ifeel in \ IS A MOIlAr, (JOVI'.IIN'MKNT. 1 1!) ^ regard to others. I do not say that that judg- ment is infallihle ; hut simj>ly that we have sueh a faeultv, sueh a tendenev of mind. And when we a[)|)ly that ju(!:M .! .iLtaMfc" ; 1 \< l[ •'J 152 THAT THE nOVKRN'MENT OF GOD clearness, that man derived from his Maker a moral charaetcr. Thus the Stoics inquired, Whence could man obtain prudcnce.faith, virtue, tkc, excej)t from the j^ods? It is true that they made no distinct reference to conscience ; but they clejirly believed in tlie al)stract notion of right and wronii; (whicli is the founchition of conscience) as derived from the Author or Au- thors of man's being. (Cic. Nat. Deor. II. 32.) "Such, then, is the Deity to wliom the researches of Natural Theology point. With the material world we ciuinot stop. If a supe- rior intelligence have ordered and adjusted the succession of seasons and the structure of the plants of the field, we must allow far more than this would seem to imply; we must admit still hiii'her wisdom for the creation of the beasts of the field with their faculties ; and higher wisdom and more transcendent attri- butes for the creation of man. And when we reach this point, we find tha^ it is not know- ledge only, not power onl}^, not foresight and wisdom alone, which we must attribute to the Maker of the world, but that we must con- sider liim as the Author of a reverence for mortil purity and i ectitude. And if the Author of such emotions in us, how can we conceive of Him otherwise, than that these qualities of purity and rectitude are parts of his own nature;" that He is not only wise and great, — incomparably beyond om* highest conceptions, i t» \ WiiWiwan -r ji«iw»iMi^:M« *-A- IS A MORAL r.OVERXMKNT. 153 — but also that lie is jmre and /whj ; that lie is strictly y'/. ' of the rapid acquisition of knowledge is quite sufficient to account for all the facts. And as there is no evidence that these inequalities of condition are of the nature of records and punishments for acts committed in a previous life, so likewise, it is equally certain that they do not always meet with any compensation in the course of their existence in this world. And hence, and from many other such ine- qualities, wise men have inferred the proba- bility of another state of existence subse- quent to this, in which these inequalities shall be made up for: but we need a Divine revelation to convert this probability into cer- tainty. So, again, there are abundant reasons in the works of nature, to infer that the Creator is benevolent. To use the formula of Paley : "In a vast plurality of instances in which contri- vance is perceived, the design of the contri- vance is beneficial; and the Deity has super- added pleasure to animal sensations, beyond what w^as necessary for any other purpose; or when the purpose (so far as it was neces- sary) might have been effected by the opera- tion of pain." And to adopt his illustration : "The young of all animals" in particular "ap- pear to receive pleasure simply from the exer- cise of their limbs and bodily faculties, without reference to any end to be attained, or any use to be answered by the exertion." So it may &■«!«*«*«!*> j*«*-j%*5ftt*at,« 156 THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD lh be said, that a man in the vigour of life is im- pelled to exertion, whether of body or of mind, by the ])leasure he finds in exertion; often without any direct reference to any end to be attained ; still more frequently when the end to be attained is nothing but the accomplish- ment of new results, or the acquisition of in- creased knowledge, without any reference whatever to their utility. The Stoics, following Socrates, strongly sup- ported the benevolence of the deity, (or deities, as they supposed,) but principally in regard to man. This they argued, partly from the structure of his body, which is so admirably adapted to the mode of life designed for him ; partly from the endowments of his mind, amongst which they principally specified the power of reason, as well as that of knowing deity and our relation to deity and to m iikind; partly again from the observation that all natural things are so constructed as to conduce to the benefit of man. (Xenophon, Mem. Socr, I. iv. Cic. A^at. Deor, II. 5 1— (M.) It was not, however, given to natural reason to discover that this benevolence is not confined to man, but extends to all the works of the Creator. No doubt there are exceptions and diffi- culties ; and these the unbelievers of all ages have pointed out. (See Cic. Nat. Deor, III. 26— 3G.) In the cases of venomous animals and noxious insects, there is an appearance of * •^ ' ) n. :^ IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 157 IS im- 'mind, often to be le end nplish- of in- ference ly sup- deities, ^ard to tn the nirably him ; mind, kI the owing ikind; lat all induce Socr, IS not, ;cover man, )r. diffi- ages III. tmals Ice of * contrivance directed to the infliction of pain ; and so with regard to the fact that many ani- mals, not excepting man, procure their sub- sistence by preying on each other; or even destroy each other without any apparent object. With regard to the noxious animals, however, it may be observed, that the contriv- ance is conducive to the good of the animal itself, either for self-defence, or for the subdu- ing and killing of its prey; and that these powers are s})aringly given ; viz. only to one or two species in a whole genus : so that only a fe\v are actually venomous, whilst the whole tribe is guarded by the property possessed by those few. And so with regard to insects, — they are generally noxious either in the j)ursuit of sustenance, or for the propagation of their species; so that the direct object of the con- trivance is good, and the pain occasioned by it merely incidental. And the fact that we have not yet discovered any good to be derived from the pain they inflict, does not prove that no such good does result from i*^. With regard to the destruction cf animals bv each other, we mav observe that, as all animals are intended to die, it does not appear that any mode of death exists much easier than that of being destroyed by each other. Either disease or gradual decay would, in all probability, pro- duce much more pain, or at least suffering. There is another consideration ; viz. that it 158 THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD seems desirable, for the sake of keeping the world always full, and allowing the propor- tion of different animals to be modified accord- ing to circumstances, to cause animals gene- rally to produce more than the actual occasion requires; so that there may always be a sipply ready to fill up any casual deficiency. But, if that be done, there must likewise be a provi- sion for removing such portion of that super- fluity as may not be actually required ; and no method appears so easy and unexceptionable as that of appointing one species of animals to keep down the superfluous produce of another. (See Paley, ch. 26.) There is another consideration. We know that pain, applied to ourselves, may be actually beneficial in a moral point of view. It is sur- prising that, in all the discussions of Cicero's time, of the question whether pain is an evil or not, no party appears to have maintained that it is a positive benefit. The Stoics might have been expected especially to maintain this posi- tion ; as they above others professed to culti- vate a lofty and heroic spirit, which despised the ills of life. It might have been expected that they should perceive that pain calls forth that spirit, and strengthens it by affording materials to work upon. But it was not so. Their fortitude rested, as they said, upon a simple indifference to pain ; upon accustoming themselves not to perceive it. Still it is clear, t: IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 159 r the opor- ;cord- gene- ;asion ipply 5ut, if provi- super- nd no enable lals to lother. know itually is sur- icero's ;vil or that have posi- Iculti- pised lected [forth l^'ding )t so. ►n a Iming jlear. 1 . that, upon principles freely recognised by the ancient heathen philosophers, we may contend, that to many, pain is a positive moral benefit ; and that being the case, we have no reason to complain of any particular method in which the Creator may choose to administer pain. Moreover, the cases we sometimes witness, in which animals appear to cause wanton pain to each other (for example, the cat playing with the mouse before killing him), may be intended to exhibit to our eyes, in the inferior creatures, examples of evil qualities, in order to teach us to dislike tho^e evil qualities (just as we are taught to admire diligence and prudence in the ant and bee) ; whilst at the same time the circumstance, that these creatures are not in a state of moral responsibility, prevents those actions from being morally evil in them which would be so in ourselves. These appear to be the chief exceptions to the rule of universal benevo'ence in the Divine contrivances. There remain, however, other difficulties. We have been constrained to ad- mit, that, although it cannot be proved that pain is ever an object of direct contrivance with the Divine Being, yet it is incidentally attached to that which is contrived : and as the whole constitution of nature is in fact, whether directly or indirectly, an emanation from God, we may ask, how it is that pain exists any where in creation ? Then, besides bodily pain. IGO THAT THE GOVEttXMEXT OF GOD >r there is likewise a larger [)ortion of mental distress and anxiety entailed upon mankind, which at first sight may ajipear contrary to the benevolence of the Creator. There are several solutions of this difficultv. First, pain in some instances acts as a warning, to guard against some greater evil. Fire causes pain as we approach it nearly, and thus pre- vents our destroying ourselves inadvertently. Certain painful diseases attach to certain trans- gressions of the law of prudence or conscience ; and we know that these do in fact act as warn- ings to prevent men from committing these transgressions, or as corrections to wean them from them ; not in all cases, but in such a number of cases as to make it highly probable that this is one of their ends, if not a principal end. The same may be said of the various kinds of mental pain, which often accompany or follow similar transgressions. The suffering of pain and sorrow likewise calls forth virtues of various kinds ; such as fortitude and pa- tience in those who suffer, and compassion and exertion for their alleviation on the part of those who witness their sufferings. And the former class of virtues are observed to form a higher description of character, and are capa- ble of doing much more for the benefit of man- kind, than is ever done by those who are not so disciplined ; whilst the compassionate vir- tues cause in their operation degrees of plea- IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 161 Sure, both in those who exercise them and in those who ar^ the objects of them, much higher and more durable than the pleasures arising from joy. They likewise bind men together in a degree which is not produced by any other cause, and thus conduce to the general benefit and happiness of mankind. Thus they bring a present reward in many cases : and if in the case of the sufferer this does not compensate for the pain and grief sustained (which hi many cases it apparently does not), still there is the possibiUty that there may be a future state, in which a full recompense may be made for the evil sustained in this; and, if so, the goodness of God is fully justified. Still, it will no doubt be observed, that there are great multitudes who do not appear to derive any benefit from grief and pain, — who are not thereby trained to virtue, — who are not even thereby restrained from transgres- sions against prudence and conscience. Not only so, but it may even be inquired, Why should there be any such transgressions? Is it not at least a defect of goodness to create beings even capable of bringing evil upon themselves? To these inquiries I am not aware that any reply absolutely satisfactory can be given. The difficulty has engaged the attention of thinking men from a very early period: but anterior to Christianity no satisfactory elucida- M •^, ( ■»: I 162 THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF GOD tion of the subject appeared. The ancient Greek and Roman philosophers for the most part regarded matter as the cause of imper- fection and evil, and they regarded matter as self-existent. The ancient Persians considered light and darkness as created by the Supreme Being, and the latter as the cause of all evil : in this they were followed by the Marcionites and Manichees. The Gnostics endeavoured to account for it, by supposing the Supreme Being to have produced some spiritual beings, giving them the power of generating others ; and imagined that after some generations, im- perfection arose, and consequent evil. These, it is clear, are all assumptions, without any ground in reason. The obscurity of the subject arises in part, if not entirely, from the limited nature of our faculties, and the limited range of our observa- tion. We know that the Almighty does, in point of fact, work by general laws, and that these laws sometimes appear to thwart and cross each other. Thus the irregularities and changes in the earth's orbit are the result of general laws : and if we had not ascertained that in the course of time they will be cured by the operation of the same laws, we might be disposed to impugn the Divine wisdom. And so the apparent evils and imperfections at present existing may be the result of general laws, with which we are unacquainted ; and of i . ancient le most imper- atter as isidered upreme ill evil: cionites ured to lupreme beings, others ; )ns, im- These, lut any n part, of our bserva- oes, in that rt and es and suit of rtained cured might isdom. actions eneral nd of IS A MORAL GOVERNMENT. 1G3 r which, possibly, we could form no distinct con- ception, if they were made known to us. There is besides this the consideration, that the present scheme of Divine government may be only a part of a vast plan carried on through- out a period of time inconceivable to us ; and if so, we cannot expect by seeing only a part to understand even the bearing of that part upon the whole. And we may be sure that we should look with very different eyes upon the part, if we could but see and comprehend the whole. How perplexed must a child often be at the conduct even of the best of parents ! How often must that conduct appear to him the reverse of wise or kind ! And yet we see the child, when arrived at the condition of a father himself, so thoroughly satisfied, that he pursues the self-same plans towards his chil- dren^ which had once appeared to him so un- kind and unwise. These answers, however, rather account for our ignorance, than remove any portion of the difficulty, except, indeed, that which is really most important, viz. the impediment thrown in the way of our feeling towards our Creator as we ought to feel, and as it is for our happiness to feel. But a further reply may be made, which appears to remove a considerable portion of the speculative difficulty. We know that the condition in which we are placed is one in which we possess a liberty M 2 ^.jJ^L -^j»fci !■»* 1G4 THAT IIIR GOVERNMENT OF GOD of moral action ; not an absolute and entire liberty, but yet such a one Jis leaves us the consciousness that 've are responsible for our conduct. If, hov/ever, we had been so con- stituted, that we crulv^ not commit any trans- gression of t; i r :^ i rt prudence or conscience, we must ei^^hc fur. possessed such an entire knowledge of a. the ^lotest consequences of our minutest feelings and actions, and such a power of regulating them, as would, in reality, have constituted us gods ; or we must have been restrained altogether from liberty of moral action, and consequently have been mere machines. If the former be the case contemplated, then there \'Ould be no grada- tion of being whatever; and ihat may (for aught we know) be impossible ; i. e. it may be impossible for a created being to be absolutely perfect, as the Creator is perfect. If, then, there are to be imperfect beings, they must be either endued with liberty of moral action, or be mere machines. We have no experience to show us what would be the condition of a being of intellectual powers and affections like our own, but incapable of acting unwisely or viciously ; incapable likewise of feeling either pity or gratitude, or of exciting those feelings in others; incapable of the mercy and com- passion of God, of the redemption of Christ, and of the everlasting rewards held out in the next world to triumphant virtue. This is the } tf i D IS A MORAL GOVEIIXMENT. 1G.J 1 entire us the for our so con- y trans- science, 1 entire mces of such a reality, st have n'ty of e been le case grada- ay (for may be ;olutely then, lust be ion, or mce to 1 of a ns like ely or either belings com- !hrist, in the is the I r very vicv taken by St. Ircnanis, perhaps the earlJ st known writer \,iw lias noticed the sub- ject. If that harl been our condition, " good could no* have atibrded pleasure to the mind, nor would the revelation of God have been valued, nor virtue have been an object of de- sire For what enjoyment of good could there be in those who did not take p' »-*' for it? or what reward to those who had no^ contended for it?" {Adv. Hceres. IV. xxx^ 'i. .•..) Is there, indeed, a Christian man, who we ;d exchange his present condition of liber ^' find hope, with all its awful responsibilities, lor the condition of a creature, who could not, indeed, suffer pain or misery in consequence of trans- gression, but would be debarred from all the best and happiest feelings of our present na- ture, and from all the glorious hopes held out to us for eternity? Natural reason, it is true, does not teach us these feelings or hopes ; but it may teach us, that if these feelings are real, and these hopes w^ill be realized, the condition of creatures capable of them must be much preferable to that of those who have them not ; and, consequently, that it may not only be consistent with the Divine goodness, but the highest instance of it, to endue a portion of his creatures with various degrees of imper- fection and moral responsibility, even at the risk that a majority of them might use their liberty to their own destruction and permanent unhappiness. CHAPTER XL ON THE GEXERAL PERSUASION OF MAN- KIND THAT THERE IS AN INVISIBLE PRO- VIDENCE. It does not need proof at the present day, because it is generally admitted as a fact, that mankind agree, and always have agreed to acknowledge some invisible object of worship. This worship may be directed towards images, as amongst the ancient Greeks and Romans, and modern Hindoos; or towards shapeless stones and pillars, as amongst the ancient Phoenicians ; or towards fire, or the sun, as amongst the ancient Persians; the object of worship may be acknowledged to be malevo- lent, as amongst the inhabitants of Ceylon; he may be embodied in human form, as in Thibet; the objects of worship may be many or few: but still there is every where some invisible being or beings supposed to exercise an influence upon human affairs, and to be in the habit of, at least, punishing those, who act in a manner displeasing to them. A few phi- losophers may have doubted this influence; but the mass of mankind have always believed it; not only this, but there have been many countries in which one supreme Governor was , PERSUASION OF MANKIND, &C. 167 MAN- E PRO- nt day, ct, that eed to orship. mages, omans, apeless mcient un, as ect of lalevo- eylon ; as in many some ercise be in 10 act V phi- ence; ieved many r was I acknowledged. To say nothing of the Chris- tian and Mahometan nations of the present day, who cover the whole of Europe, two-thirds of Asia, the North and South of Africa and much of the interior, and two-thirds of Ame- rica; one supreme God was acknowledged by the ancient Greeks and Romans, by the ancient Persians and Egyptians, and by nine-tenths of the original inhabitants of America. They might not, and did not, recognise in Ilim all that we acknowledge; for they did not unite in one Being the Creator, the moral Governor, the future Judge ; but they did acknowledge an invisible government, distributing rewards and punishments, and one supreme invisible Being. Now there appear to be only three rational ways of accounting for this persuasion. The first is, that there is sufficient evidence from observation and experience, to warrant man- kind in adopting the idea as the result of their individual reasoning ; the second, that He who first made mankind, revealed the fact to the first of the human race, from whom it has been transmitted through successive generations to the present day ; the third, that (without re- vealing it) He has impressed on mankind in general a tendency and disposition to receive this truth when stated to them, or to see the existing evidence for it. Whichever of these tiSMiiMi^^mwMi&iSmM. T ins PERSUASION OF MANKIND I be the true hypothesis, or possibly two, or the whole, still the fact will be established, that there is an invisible moral Governor. For if the evidence be such as to have convinced the majority of mankind in all ages and countries, such a strength of evidence could not rest upon any thing but the truth of the fact ; and if the Creator has either revealed the fact, or impressed on mankind a tendency to receive it, it follows, of course, that it must be true. It has, however, been objected, that this consent is not universal ; and therefore that we cannot argue from it. In reply we may grant, that if any parties have laid stress upon the word universal, as though the whole of the argument rested upon it, of course, so far as that assertion is invalidated, the argument is overthrown. But it does not appear to be sufficiently proved, that there is a nation v/hich owns no invisible power influencing human affairs. Travellers who have spent a short time amongst some extremely barbarous nations (as some of the inhabitants of the frozen regions of North America), have reported such things of them ; but it may reasonably be question- ed, whether these travellers had sufficiently mastered the language of those tribes, or be- come sufficiently acquainted with their habits of thought, to ascertain the truth with any \ OF AN INVISIULE PROVinENCE. ino certainty. But supposinf^ the fact to be, that there arc a few tribes in remote corners of the globe, who have totally lost all notion of supe- rior spiritual beings, or even have never ac- quired it, this can only weaken an ar«^ument which should rest upon the nitlversal consent of mankind ; but it would very slightly impair that from their yenerul consent in all ages and countries. We are influenced by a much less general consent than this, to adopt certain principles of social conduct, certain maxims of prudential and economical management, by which our habitual conduct in human affairs is governed. In short, it is a fact, that there is a very general consent upon this point ; and the existence of this fact has to be accounted for. We think the best method of accounting for it, is to suppose it true ; and we think no other rational solution has been suggested. Some have attempted to account for it, by ascribing it to the effect of men's fears ; and that they have created by the force of imagina- tion the supc ' ior power, under the influence of undefined feai , which needed something to rest upon. But this, even supposing it a rea- sonable account in itself, only removes the difficulty by a single step. Supposing fear to account for the persuasion of the existence of an avenging power, how are we to account for the existence of the fear itself? It appears much more probable, that the fear of vengeance itagirj'X" ' ";~7-p! ,. --^^-''' 170 PERSUASION OF MANKIND :■* •' should have arisen from a previous beUef in the existence of a holy, just, and all-powerful Being, than that a fear of which we can give no account, an indefinite causeless fear, should have given birth to an all but universal per- suasion of the existence of some such power or powers. Moreover, fear accounts for orly half the phenomena. The invisible being, or beings, in whom men have agreed to believe, are not merely objects of fear, they are sup- posed to confer benefits upon those who pay them due reverence : and thence thev are ad- dressed with prayers and offerings, not only deprecatory or expiatory, but also simply imploring benefits, such as health, children, success, and the like. They are therefore sup- posed to possess, at least, some share of bene- volence. Now fear may possibly produce the persuasion of an avenging power, but not of a benevolent power. The hypothesis, therefore, fails of the very office of an hypothesis, and of the only thing which can recommend it to the attention of intelligent persons, viz. to account for all the phenomena. Another favourite hypothesis with unbe- lievers is to ascribe the belief in deities to mere state polic}^, to a desire to have something more effectual to prevent resistance to authority than punishment. And they have some shadow of reason for this notion in the relation of history, that unmaking of Rome (for example) ^'; ilief in Dwerful in give should al per- power )r orly ing, or believe, :e sup- ho pay are ad- ot only simply lildren, re sup- bene- ce the ot of a refore, and of to the count unbe- raere ithing lority liadow Ion of nple) \^: OF AN INVISIBLE PROVIDENCE. 171 introduced or established the religious system, which afterwards took such hold upon that city ; and in the fact, that in the ancient poli- tics, the magistrate was frequently, or perhaps generally, a priest, or capable of acting as priest; and that there have been persons in high stations, professing privately a disbelief of the popular religion, but yet conceiving it wise to keep up that religion, on account of the greater ease with which men might be governed, who retained the practice of that religion. But there are two great difficulties attending this hypothesis : the first, that we find kings and rulers not only keeping up the outward practices of the popular religion, but also acting in such a way as to show they believed it. Thus, amongst the Greeks and Romans, we constantly find cases of chiefs '^'^ing hindered from their enterprises by what they supposed to be indications of the dis- pleasure of their gods, so long as they retained a general regard for virtue and integrity, and had not become corrupted by wealth, and pros- perity, and ambition. Not only so, but we find this belief in retributive unseen powers, prevalent even before any formal institution, and even before the existence of regular com- munities. Romulus acknowledged ij;ods before Numa. The Greeks, in the earliest periods of their history, and even the Pelasgi, who pre- ceded them, when as yet there scarcely existed 1 , OF AN INVISIBLE PROVIDENCE. 173 evidence to render it probable. But this is not the whole of what has to be accounted for. We have to ffive some sufficient reason whv the whole of the descendants of these men, in all their dispersions and in all their genera- tions, differing in the modes of external w()rshi[), have yet agreed that there is some invisible object of worship, some avenging and retribu- tive power. What could possibly induce all men, every where, to acquiesce in so unwel- come a figment of the imagination? There is another objection to our argument, which appears at first sight very plausible, viz. that it is extremely conclusive in favour of polytheism and idolatry, but that it yields no support to the faith in one God. The truth however is; that polytheism and idolatry, apart from some mode of belief in one supreme Governor, have at no time been universal, or nearly so. In the earliest his- torical records with which we are acquainted, we find various tribes of the East incidentally mentioned, amongst whom the belief in one God prevailed. More recently, in the few centuries which precede the Christian era, although, no doubt, polytheism prevailed over the whole of Europe, and a considerable part of Asia, yet even with it there was evidently a recognition of one superintending ])ower, isupe- rior to the other deities ; whilst in Chaldea and Persia there was no such gross })olytheisn). I I h "^i! H i •f 174 PERSUASION OF MANKIND, &C. Not only this, but in idolatrous Greece and Rome, the most thoughtful and intelligent in one way or another recognised the existence of ore sovereign power. Moreover, it would appear probable, that these nations had at one time acknowledged one only God; their most ancient documents evidently being built upon such a belief. And this ancient belief so far retained its hold amidst the prevailing poly- theism, that it tinged the popular language, after it had ceased to influence the external modes of worship. Thus Tertullian (as already cited, ch. 2,) testifies that in his time the most ignorant of the heathen had expressions such as — God forbid, God grant, and the like, con- stantly in their mouths. Such expressions show that whatever may have been the current be- lief or disbelief, there was a time when belief in one sovereign Providence did generally pre- vail. And the general prevalence of such a belief must very greatly strengthen the im- pression, that the deductions to which our own independent reasonings have led us arc cor- rect. It may be accounted for fully, on the supposition of their correctness ; and it cannot be accounted for in any other way. L*;*^' e and ent in stence would at one • most upon so far poly- guage, eternal ilready I most 5 such I, con- i show t he- belief pre- luch a im- own cor- the innot k CHAPTER XII. THE DIRECT EVIDENCE FOR THE FACT OF god's moral GOVERNMENT. We have, if possible, still stronger ground for believing that the Creator of the world is also its moral governor, in the fact, which I proceed to establish, that we can trace his agency as such. If we acknowledge one God, the Creator and Upholder of all things, we must acknowledge that the whole machinery of natural causes works by his energy and under his guidance; and consequently, as we cannot suppose Him ignorant of the results of his arrangement that the whole sequence and connexion f events are arranged by Him. He has left much liberty to his rational creatures; but still if we can any where discover that the connc .n of cause and effect subsists between events, and that the connexion is regulated by certain laws, we must acknowledge these laws and their results to be the work of the Creator. — (See Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. 1, 2.) Now, it must be acknovvledged, that in any ¥h .^.j ; 17G DIRECT EVIDENCE * %■ settled communityj as a general rule, " the prudential management of ourselves and our affairs produces tranquillity, satisfaction, and many temporal advantages ; whilst rashness, profligate negligence, and wilful folly, bring after them many inconveniences and suffer- ings.'^ It must likewise be acknowledged, that prudence and indiscretion are moral qualities, partaking at least of the nature of virtue and vice. Here then is an instance of moral go- vernment. We find, likewise, in the natural course of things, and without any direct intimation of the will of the Creator, the laws and customs of society positively punish many vicious ac- tions j sometimes by direct enactments, some- times by the general discountenance of society towards those who are guilty of them ; and that there is also -'a fear and apprehension of those punisluiients in the event of discovery, in those whose conduct renders them liable to thcmo'^ Conversel}', good actions are some- times rewarded by direct authority ; more fre- quently by the general esteem and countenance of society. This, then, is another proof; for this disposition or tendency in mankind must have been implanted by the Creator. It does, indeed, sometimes happen, that good actions are punished, as in the case of religious per- secution ; but then they are not punished Ul OF GODS MORAL GOVERNMENT. 177 , "the nd our n, and shness, , bring suffer- ;d, that lalities, lie and ral go- urse of tion of ustoms Dus ac- some- Isociety ; and ion of f every, ble to some- Ire fre- nance >f; for must does, tions pcr- iished I as good, but as being sui)[)osed to be inju- rious. Again, through the operation of general laws, which of course emanate from the Author of all, " virtue, as such, is actually rewarded, and vice, as such, actually j)unished." It is noto- rious that through the simple oj)eration of our faculties and powers, ^^ the natural attendants of innocence and virtue are inward security and peace, and a disposition and readiness to enjoy the ordinary gratifications of life ; whilst, on the other hand, misconduct is attended with unea- siness of the mind;" (quite distin'^f from a mere sense of loss or harm;) and \ hen the misconduct is great, the uneasiness is fre- quently such as to produce positive misery, and to incapacitate the person for enjoyments of any kind. Moreover, "all good men are disposed to befriend good men as such, and to discountenance the vicious as such." '" Public honours and advantages arc often, in fact, the consequence of eminent justice, patriotism, and the like, considered as virtues ; and death itself, but more frequently infamy and external incon- venience, the consequence of opposite conduct, considered as vices." In families again, "■ chil- dren and servants are punished for falsehood, injustice, &c., and rewarded for the contrary," regarded as evil or good in themselves. It ap- pears, then, that the Creator has not only given man a moral nature, but that He has likewise N 178 DIRECT EVIDENCE I 'f placed us in a condition in which the natural operation of the character of men so influences others, that we favour and reward virtue, and punish and discountenance vice, on account of their inherent qualities ; nor can it be shown that there is in any one a natural disposition to do the reverse, although individuals, in course of time, may acquire such a disposition. Finally, there appear in these operations of our moral character a tendency to increase in- stead of diminish. Vice would be much more frequently punished than it actually is at pre- sent, did it not escape notice : whilst the power of an individual or class of men over ^another individual or class has an evident tendency to increase^ in proportion as it discountenances evil; and that power which supports virtue does evidently more and more prevail over that which supports vice. It must be acknowledged, indeed, that this assertion does not hold true in every individual case, and sometimes not in a whole generation ; but is evidently so in the long run, and in the course of a considerable period. Nay, so strong is this tendency, that virtue has in many cases gained a gradual power for the person exercising it, without his inten- tion, and with an overwhelming proportion of power arrayed against him : so strong is the force of that mora, character with which the Creator has endued tis. All these remarks may be made in the gene- } OF GOD S MORAL GOVERNMENT. 179 natural luences ue, and ount of shown sition to course tions of case in- ih more at pre- c power another encj to enances virtue /er that ledged, Id true not in in the derable y, that power inten- tion of is the ich the e gene- > t ral, and will be confirmed by the experience of individuals. But we may bring instances on a large scale, to show that some moral principle is at work in the government of the world. When the Persians invaded the Greeks, the Athenians, standing forth in defence of their common country, grew up into a poweiful naval force, and for a while used the power they obtained beneficially, for the advantage of the whole Grecian confederacy. So long as they continued to act in this manner, their power and wealth increased. But when the possession of power caused them to become ambitious and rapacious, so that they op- pressed and plundered their allies, — the Lace- demonians w^ere raised up to keep them in check; and at length subdued them so totally, that they destroyed their fortifications, and imposed on them a form of government most abhorrent to their feelings. So again, when subsequently the Lacedemonians themselves became intoxicated with power, and imitated the oppression of the Athenians, they were checked and ultimately ruined by the Thebans. Then again the Romans, whilst they preserved their simplicity of character and generosity of spirit, and regard for religion (as they under- stood it), increased in power and influence over surrounding nations, and were free and inde- pendent at home. But when success rendered them luxurious, rapacious, and oppressive, then N 2 ; f 180 nillECT EVIPEXCEj &C. civil strifes prevailed to such an extent, that individuals, by pandering to the passions of contending parties, were able to enslave the Romans themselves, and deprive them of al- most every vestige of liberty. We are able to appeal to these instances, because we ha|)pen to have the histories of these nations in sufficiently minute detail; and where we possess the history of other nations in the same detail, we shall find that this national reward and punishment is the rule of the Divine Providence. We have, indeed, the history of one other nation, that of Israel, in nearly equal detail ; but as that history is mixed up with a Divine revelation, and we are concerned at present w ith that portion of Theo- logy which is discoverable without revelation, I omit to dwell upon it. Otherwise, when we consider that a great change of national cha- racter on their part, in opposition to their own wishes and feelings, was the result of a belief in the earlier facts of that history, we must see that they are better established than the facts of any other history. But for the reason adduced, and because it is doubtful whether it may not be injurious to our own faith and reverence to examine that history as though it were the w^ork of uninspired writers, I do not adduce it in evidence. The observations, then, \\hich we have al- ready made, establish the fact that there is in i . 4 t 1 t, that ons of lvc the of al- itanccs. if these where , in the ational of the d, the ael, in uory is we are ' Theo- dation, len we il cha- r own belief must an the eason lether 1 and ugh it lo not vc al- ■3 is in > i ox A Fl'TlTHE STATE. 181 reality a moral providence exercised over the concerns of the workl, and that it is exercised by the Creator. cHAPTJvR xrn. ox A FUTURE STATE. We have seen in the previous chapters abun- dant reason to beheve that the worhl is go- verned on a i)rinciple of rewards and punish- ments; that such and such conduct will by itself lead to ha})piness, and that an opposite line of conduct will, by the operation of natuial causes, be productive of unhappiness. These rewards and punishments appear, to a certain extent, to be apportioned according to certain moral rules ; and both from these rewards and punishments, and still more from the conduct of men towards each other, and from their feelings in regard to the conduct of others towards them, we get an idea of absolute jus- tice ; i. e. of the distribution of good and evil in exact accordance with merit and demerit. But, although we have such an idea, we no where observe it fully realized. In the Divine government of the world, we occasionally 'vit- ness instances in which men who act in direct contrariety, not only to kindness but also to justice, — who break through all those laws I IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) % V^ :/j 1.0 I.I 1.25 lie ■"IS 2.0 1.8 U ill 1.6 III V] VI ^;j &. 7 ^^^ Photographic Sciences Corporation m 4 \ V \\ 4 9) \ ... <> 33 WEST MAIN STREET WEBSTER, N.Y. 14580 (716) 872-4503 '^^ % ^ '^ '<^#^^ ^ ^ / ^0 " ^» »!■•■"■* . '*'S"' ' I I I I I I 1.1 182 ON A FUTURE STATE. which nature teaches, and continue to do so to the end of their lives, and yet are prosperous. The ordinary results of such conduct do not reach them, and they die apparently without having ever incurred them. On the other hand, we occasionally see that a high degree of virtue exposes a man through life to all sorts of privation and sufferings and not only so, but that he is not favoured with that inward peace and tranquillity which are the ordinary attendants of virtue and piety. These ine- qualities occur so frequently, as to have attracted attention in all ages of the world ; and thence, thoughtful men have been led to conclude, that the state of things in which we now live is an imperfect one ; that it is part of a great scheme of which we only see a portion ; and that there exists some future state of being, in which the indications of moral government we see here will be more fully carried out, and the absolute justice of God will be clearly exhibited. For that God is just; i.e, that He rewards and punishes according to merit and demerit. He has shown us in his providence : and as He who made us has also given us an idea of abso- lute justice, with a feeling of approbation for it, it is reasonable to suppose that He both possesses that quality Himself, and that He really acts according to it ; and as nevertheless He has not provided in this present world any method of realizing it, it seems almost neces- ON A FUTURE STATE. 183 lo SO to jperous. do not without e other egree of all sorts )nly so, inward )rdinary 3se ine- ttracted thence, de, that ve is an scheme it there lich the ee here bsolute 1. For ds and rit, He as He )f abso- ion for both lat He 'theless rid any neces- sarily to follow that He intends to provide some future state of existence, in which this idea shall be fully carried out in practice. There is another similar consideration which deserves our attention. We derive from various sources the idea of equity ; and one application of this idea is, that we should not place a person in an unfavourable position, without affording him some counterbalancing advantage. Now every person is conscious to himself that, in endeavouring to follow the moral rule sug- gested by God's providential government, he is drawn back, partly by a natural inclination to the contrary, partly by evil example, and other temptations. This is a condition in itself unfavourable ; and there are many in- stances in which there is nothing in human life to counterbalance these unfortunate ten- dencies and this unhappy weakness. We must acknowledge that the being born w^ith such dispositions, and liable to such disadvantages, was not (so far as we know) in consequence of any thing done in a former state ; and that, were it not for these tendencies, many a man would have been much less vicious than he is, and consequently much happier in this world ; to say nothing of another. Not only so, but many persons who have struggled on into virtue, in spite of this evil nature, would have found their pursuit of it much easier but for that ; nay, they would to all appearance have 184 ON A FUTURE STATE. M attained to higher virtue: at all events, their lives would have been more tranquil and happy. The only way, then, apparent to reason, of rendering this state of things consonant to Divine equity, is that there should be some future state of existence, in which these disad- vantages will meet with adequate compen- sation. The mind of man, it may be further observed, has a tendency to connect itself with futurity. Thus men plant trees, of which they know they shall not live to eat ; and make dispositions of their property, which they cannot see realized : they compose literary works, and execute works of art, with the express hope of acquiring post- humous fame. Nay, men have been found who willingly laid down their lives for the benefit of their country, — thus tearing them- selves away from that which they strove to serve, and by the very act depriving themselves (if this existence be all) of the power of enjoy- ing the good they have done. These things rather indicate a tendency or instinct than a belief; and yet, as Cicero has well reasoned {Tusc, Qu. i. 14, 15), they lead to the conclu- sion that the soul is taught to look for an existence bevond this life. These considerations, then, lead the thought- ful mind to hope that there may be some state after this. But then the question arises, what external probability exists that there will be ON A FUTURE STATE. 185 \, their happy. \ox\, of ant to ; some disad- )mpen- served, iturJty. w they ions of alized : J works g post- found or the them- ove to iselves enjoy- things han a isoned onclu- br an )ught- state what ill be \ I any such state. (See Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. 1.) Now, if we trace our existence in this world, we shall see that it has been in some respects altogether progressive. In the womb we were (to all appearance) endued with a mere anima- tion ; an existence scarcely higher than that of a sponge or an oyster. The change from this to infancy, in which we were to begin to obtain ideas, through the intervention of the senses, and the action of the mind, and to become capable of will, of passions, and affections, was a very great change. Yet provision was made, in the structure of the infant in the womb, for functions which he could never exercise when there, and could exercise only in a state which was then future. So again childhood, physi- cally, intellectually, and morally, is a prepara- tion for mature age. There are peculiarities of organic structure, totally useless to the child, but provided beforehand with reference to ma- turity : and in childhood the intellect and moral habits are both trained up with a view to the performance of duties to which the person cannot be called during childhood. And this progressive change of intellectual and moral functions, and previous adaptation for them, goes on into old age, and in most persons is only terminated by death ; for it is only the few who live so long as to fall into second childhood : and even with regard to them, this \ 186 ON A FUTURE STATE. condition must be regarded simply as the com- mencement of death; which with them is an extremely gradual process, as compared with the majority of cases. As, therefore, our whole state in this life is progressive, especially so far as the moral being is concerned, it seems highly probable that when we appear to depart from life, it is for the purpose of proceeding to some other state of being, in which the faculties we have here acquired may be brought into some higher exercise. This probability is strengthened by the ana- logy of natural facts. Several kinds of insects undergo a change of form, and of their manner of existence; and in each previous state of being, preparation is made for the next. For instance, the pupa or chrysalis of insects can be distinctly traced in the worm or caterpillar which preceded it ; and would be a sure sign that the caterpillar state was not a permanent one, even if we had no knowledge of any such change. So again the butterfly is contained within the chrysalis; and the knowledge of that fact leads to the same conclusion. In the butterfly itself, however, there is nothing to indicate a continuance of being in another form : no other form concealed under that which appears ; no training in improved habits of any kind, nor in any habits which cannot be fully exercised in the present state. And so the butterfly dies, without providing a suc- Jj ON A FUTURE STATE. 187 e com- i is an d with !• whole J so far highly •t from o some ties we ) some le ana- insects nanner tate of . For ts can Tpillar 'e sign lanent 5^ such tained \%r' * , i 198 ON THE IMMORTALITY ground ; and it may be instructive to mark his arguments, and see how much more clear and practical they are than those of Plato ; although he does not pretend to the same demonstrative proof as that writer. He derives his first argument from the sacred- ness attached to places of sepulture, which is of very remote antiquity, and which shows a belief in the permanent interest the dead per- son has in his remains. The notions concern- ing deified men and women ; the natural and universal care which persons feel and exercise respecting what will take place in this world after they have quitted it; the readiness of some men to die for their country ; the dis- position men show to perpetuate their names by poetry and works of art ; — all are so many indications that men beheve that the soul con- tinues to exist after death. To this he adds, the universal consent of mankind in the actual belief in such continued existence, which he thinks is as effectual an argument for the im- mortality of the soul as for the existence of gods. After these arguments of his own, he subjoins that of Plato, from the self-motive power of the soul, which we have already given. He then proceeds to dwell upon the wonderful powers of the human mind, and argues, that they prove it to be of the same nature as deity, and, therefore, eternal. His I.' t OF THE SOUL. 199 lark his ear and Ithough istrative ; sacred- vhich is shows a iad per- 3oncern- iral and exercise is world iness of the dis- r names 50 many Dul con- le adds, le actual lich he the im- ence of own, he f-motive already pon the id, and le same d. His last argument is also that of Plato, from the uncompounded nature of the soul, which we have already seen. These opinions and arguments will suffi- ciently explain the views of the most learned of the Greeks and Romans. Nor was this opinion confined to the learned. The accounts which Homer and Virgil give of the regions of the dead, exhibit the popular view of the sub- ject: some believing simply in the indefinite existence of the soul ; others believing addition- ally in transmigration. Nor was this belief confined to the Greeks and Romans. Theo- pompus (as quoted by Diogenes Laertius in the preface to his Lives of the Philosophers) testifies, that the Magi taught that men would come to life again and become immortal. He- rodotus (ii. 131) testifies, that the Egyptians believed in the immortality of the soul, and its perpetual transmigration ; and he is equally positive in stating (iv. 94, 95), that the Getae held the former of these opinions. Indeed, so strong and general was this persuasion amongst the heathen nations of antiquity, that we find none denying it but the Epicureans and Stoics, together with some Academics. The former denied the immortality of the soul, because they denied its immateriality; being, as they said, wholly unable to conceive how the soul could possibly operate without the body : although, as Cicero has w^ell observed [Tffsc. 'f I it I •I 200 ON THE IMMORTALITY Qufpst. i. 22), that it is equally difficult to con- ceive how the soul is capable of sense and perception in and by the body. The two latter denied the immortality of the soul, because they conceived that every thing which feels must be capable of grief and pain ; and that whatever experiences pain must be mortal. (Cic. Tusc. Queest. i. 32, and Nat, Deor. iii. 13, 14.) Notwithstanding this, they granted that the soul survives the body for some indefinite time; and, in so doing, granted that it pos- sesses an existence not dependent on the body. It appears, likewise, that Dicaearchus wrote a treatise on the mortality of the soul. These exceptions are so comparatively trifling, that they detract in no important degree from the general persuasion of its immortality. We come, therefore, to the argument which I have employed before. Since this persuasion is so general, however mixed up with error and absurdity of various kinds, what account can we give of it, if we do not attribute it to the fact that the persuasion is true ? The conclusions then to which we are led are these : — that there is one self-existent Being, the Author of all other existence, and, in par- ticular, of this world in which we live : that the Divine Being exercises a moral providence over mankind, in which there are manifest traces of benevolence and justice, and in which the in- tention (where manifest) is uniformly benevo- OP THE SOUL. 201 to con- nsc and vo latter because ch feels nd that mortal. iii. 13, ed that definite it pos- e body, wrote a These g, that om the which suasion or and nt can to the re led Being, 1 par- at the e over ces of le in- nevo- I T lent and just : that there are, however, many irregularities in this moral providence, which are capable of an easy explanation, if it is intended that this life should be a state of preparation for another, and that this future life should be a state of retribution : that there is the highest degree of probability, indepen- dently of these considerations, that our present state is not to be the termination of our exist- ence, but only a preparation for another and a higher state ; not only this, but that the intel- lectual and moral portion of our nature will exist for ever, and will be continually capable of advancement and improvement. These conclusions, however, it must be granted, are not without their difficulties ; but so are the whole of our practical principles, even of a temporal nature. It is seldom the case, that even in the ordinary prudential management of our affairs, the grounds of our conduct are so clear as not to admit of doubt or difficulty. The question, whether we shall choose this or that employment or profession, whether for ourselves or for our children, is beset with doubt as to its results : and the ordinary business of a tradesman, if narrowly examined, is equally involved in uncertainty as to its ultimate advantages. And yet persons do not hesitate to choose employments for life, or to embark in trade and commerce. The circumstance, therefore, that there are doubts I ' 202 ON THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL. : H or objections hanging about the arguments we have employed, or the conclusions at which we have arrived, does not take away the fact, that we have the very highest degree of pro- bability in favour of those conclusions, amount- ing, indeed, to moral certainty ; and that of precisely the same kind as that by which we govern ourselves, without hesitation, in the ordinary concerns of life. It is, moreover, to be considered, that we are placed by our Creator in this condition ; with all these facts around us, and forming (so to speak) a part of our very being; that we con- clude the Creator to be good and just, and to desire our happiness; that we see that He governs us by a moral providence, rewarding us when we act according to reason and pru- dence, and punishing us when we act in oppo- sition to them. The natural conclusion then is, that, for our own happiness, w^e are bound to govern ourselves by the high probabilities in favour of a future state and immortality : the more especially as we see, that even supposing there were no state of conscious existence after this, virtue is in general the most productive of happiness, even during the present state of existence. SOUL. lents we t which he fact, of pro- imount- that of hich we in the i we are i; with ; (so to *ve con- and to lat He arding pru- oppo- n then bound Dilities y: the posing e after tive of ate of CHAPTER XV. ON THE HENEVOLENCE OF GOD TOWARDS MANKIND IN PARTICULAR; AND ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDE.\XE. We have already seen grounds for believing that the Supreme Being is benevolent in his very nature, and that his benevolence is shown towards his creatures ; we have likewise seen that He exercises a moral providence over man- kind. It is my present purpose to advance a step further, and to show that this benevolence is exercised towards mankind in particular, and that his moral providence is one of the instances of it. It is remarkable that this view of the Almighty Being is taken by Socrates, the earliest of those philosophers whose opinions on the subject are recorded ; and that he sug- gests most (if not all) of the topics to which we must have recourse for the proof of our position. The only drawback is, that he con- ceived this benevolent care of man to extend to the various false gods whom his nation wor- shipped : but this was because he conceived them to be in part the agents of the Creator in the formation and government of mankind. 201 ON THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD (See Xcnophon, Memorah. I. iv. 11. IG; IV. iii. 3—12.) The special favour of God to man is shown in some degree by the peculiarities of his phy- sical structure. On these I sliall not dwell at length, confining myself for the most part to those suggested by Socrates. The first of these is the erect ])osture given to man, which enables him to see around him without effort during the whole of his waking hours ; and in particidar fits him for the con- templation and enjoyment of the beauties of the heavens, both by day and by night. Man differs from most animals in having hands ; and from all in possessing such as are capable of constructing for him all the implements, utensils, furniture, instruments, machines, and structures suited to the ever-increasing and varying exi- gencies of civilized life. The power of articu- late speech and of writing are likewise great blessings : for by means of them we carry on that varied intercourse of society which adds so greatly to the happiness of our existence. By their use we manage all the complicated relations of society ; by them we can commu- nicate our knowledge to each other, and trea- sure it up from age to age. Other creatures have, it is true, a certain power of communi- cating to each other facts in which they are interested ; and they ceHainly do transmit knowledge by hereditary descent : for tribes of 6; IV. shown is phy- t dwell st part c given (1(1 him tvaking le con- tics of Man s; and iblc of cnsils, ctures exi- rticu- great ry on adds lence. latcd irau- Itrea- ures luni- are 3mit ks of ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 205 birds, for instance, which by nature do not dread man, learn the instinct of dreading him in countries in which they come in frequent contact with him. But these powers bear no comparison with the corresponding powers as possessed by man. The sense of beauty and the perception of music are also powers, which, so far as we can ol)serve, are peculiar to man ; especially the first: and how much do both tend to refine our domestic relations, and to add to the innocent enjoyments of existence ! But if man is favoured in his body, how much more in his mind ! Brute animals are enabled by instinct to provide for the various exigencies of a limited existence : but that of man is infinitely varied, and its variety adds no little to its hapi)iness : and it is his reason which qualifies him to make provision for this varied existence. So again, animals have means of defence against a number of the most ordi- nary dangers of life, and remedies for the evils most likely to occur to them : but they have no ultimate defence against man ; who, if he do but bend his mind perseveringly to the i)ur- pose, can prevail against and vanquish any creature which has hitherto become known to him : whilst he, on the other hand, has a defence against all dangers, and a remedy for all evils, excepting such as are brought upon him by natures invisible to him. There is no person whose mind has been 20G ON THE DEXEVOLENCE OF GOD; . .1 cultivated in ever so small a dofrrcc, so as to teach and enable him to ae{|uirc knowledge for himself, who does not find that tins power adds greatly to his enjoyment : and this power of acquirinji; knowledge rests in the mind. The Academicians of Cicero's time, it is true, ob- jected that this power was eqnally capable of being applied to pernicious uses ; and that, in short, its beneficial tendency rested entirely with the person who possessed it : and thence they concluded, that the possession of this power was no proof of any care of the gods for mankind. But they did not advert to the further fact, that the knowledge which is perni- cious is that which is used without reference in its use to the will of the Creator ; whilst that which is employed with that reference is uni- formly of a beneficial tendency. All that is proved then by the objection is, that knowledge is like liberty of action ; viz. cnpablc of abuse. It is a power which is beneficial, when used for the ends intended by Him who gave it; and is therefore unquestionably an instance of his good-will to the recipients of it. But the great distinction of man above all inferior creatures is the power of ap[)rehending the existence and attributes of God, and his relation to him, — and of perceiving and appre- ciating the evidence of these all-important facts : and this rests altogether in his mind and soul. To this must be added his con- ON A PAUTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 207 ■) as to dge for cr adds »\ver of . The lie, ob- able of that, in L'ntirely thence of this ic gods t to the 3 perni- •ence in st that is uni- that is iwledge abuse, used we it; Ince of )ve all ending bd his ippre- lortant mind con- science, which furnishes him with a criterion of that wliich is morally right or wrong, — pleasing to llim who made him, truly and ulti- mately beneficial to himself, or the reverse. This again rests in the mind ; .and still further enhances its value, and the obligations of man to its Author. From what man is in himself we pass on to that which is done for him, exterior to himself. We learn from the study of nature that the whole fabric of the system of worlds in which we are placed conduces to our benefit. The wholesome interchange of day and night is brought about by the relation of our world to the sun, the centre of our system : and much of the comfort and pleasure of night is due to our attendant planet, and to the light which comes to us from the countless worlds by which we are surrounded. The tides of the sea, the progress of vegetation, and the conse- quent growth of the fruits of the earth, and many other things essential to our well-being, depend equally upon the connexion of our earth with the solar system; the whole of which is therefore evidently arranged with a view to us. Again, by far the larger portion of the contents of the surface of our globe, — the plants, animals, and minerals, — together with the atmosphere which surrounds it, — have been especially constituted and arranged with an eye to our sustenance, convenience, or wel- \l , < t ' i -I m 208 ON THE BENEVOLENCE OP GOD; fare. (Cic. N'at. Deor. ii. 60. G3.) More than this ; in a large proportion of the instances in which any contrivance can bo discerned in things connected with mankind, there is an evident design, on the part of the Creator, to render our physical condition as comfortable as possible. Nay, positive inventions are to be found abundantly, especially in the beautiful forms and odours of natural objects, which appear to have no other end but to afford plea- sure to mankind. (Cic. Nat. Deor. ii. 63.) Nor is our moral condition exempt from indi- cations of the Divine benevolence, although in that department the evidence is more obscure. It cannot however be denied, that the ten- dency of man's reason and conscience, if duly followed up, is such as would promote his real happiness and improvement, whether as an individual or as a class of beings ; and that the institution of society, and the moral discipline arising therefrom, is, in a series of ages, such as promote the improvement of the individuals who compose it, and to add to their happiness. On the other hand, it must be granted, that men possess impulses which do, in point of fact, produce habitual effects subversive of the happiness both of individuals and of society. Yet it may be observed that these evil effects are but the excesses of these impulses ; that we are not necessarily bound to carry them to ex- cess; that experience teaches us that, when ' D ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 209 )re than ances in rned in e is an ^ator, to ifortable ire to be )eautiful , which rd plea- 5-) )m indi- ough in Dbscure. he ten- if duly lis real as an lat the cipline such ^iduals )iness. d, that int of of the ciety. fleets at we o ex- when I indulged moderately, they are directly condu- cive to ultimate happiness, and in many cases bring in a large share of present pleasure; — that reason and conscience are portions of our nature, equally with those impulses, and are calculated, and evidently intended, to regidate them, and have the power of so doing ; that the carrying them to excess at all arises from the fact that we are not mere machines, but voluntary agents; that it is evident that we derive both a kind and a degree of pleasure from being voluntary agents which we should be unwilling to resign ; and that we are there- by capable of attaining excellence, both indi- vidually and collectively, which, witliout this freedom of the will, would be iniattainable. It must be added, that we are placed by the Author of our nature in society ; and that, as we have already seen, the tendenjcy and effect of our relations to each other is, to check much of the evil in individuals, and to develop many excellencies, for which, without society, there would be no opportunity whatever. Indeed, so evident to the old Stoics was the moral tendency of the institution of society, that they made almost every moral excellence to arise out of the relations of man in society : and so satisfied were they that those tenden- cies were for the happiness and improvement of man, that they regarded society itself as a direct api)ointment of the gods with a view to p i I It' i 1 > I i li 210 ox THE RENEVOLENCE OF GOD; the improvement and happiness of mankind. Nay, so strongly were some of the ancients persuaded of the benefits of society, that they looked to civil government, which is its most complete development, as the great and only effective engine for the amelioration of the condition of human nature. Nor have the opinions of mankind rested here. There has been no nation, at all ad- vanced in civilization, which has not believed in direct interpositions of the Deity, for the purpose of upholding and vindicating his laws in the case of individuals, by rewarding the good with greater prosperity, but more espe- cially by direct acts of punishment upon the wicked. And such a persuasion, whether founded upon well-ascertained facts or not, at all events shows the existence of a belief in the Divine interposition for the advancement of human happiness. And this brings us to the question, whether these acts of providential interference are to be taken as evidence of what is called a par- ticular providence ; or, whether they are merely the method according to which certain general laws are regulated to work : whether in fact the Supreme Providence contemplates the indi- vidual or not in his treatment of mankind. It was the opinion of the Stoics that it did not contemplate every individual directly, and that it did not contemplate minute circumstances : D ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 211 nankind. ancients hat they its most md only of the i rested all ad- believed for the his laws ling the re espe- pon the whether not, at elief in ment of ^vhether are to a par- merely Igeneral lin fact le indi- id. It lid not id that tances : but they conceived that it did regard many individuals, and all the greater circumstances regarding them. (Cic. Nat, Deor. ii. 05, GO.) The Academics, on the other hand, contended, that as the only reason why monarchs did not attend to minutiffi, lay in the limited extent of their faculties, — if the gods, who were not thus limited, exercised any providential care of human affairs, — it must extend to every par- ticular. But they employed the concession of the Stoics to refute their doctrine of a divine providence, instead of employing their own argument to establish the truth. (Cic. Nat. Deor, iii. 37.) The opinion of those who deny a particular providence is for the most part that expressed by Pope, in the well-known lines — *' The universal cause Acts not by partial but by general laws." They appear to suppose that it would detract from the dignity of the Supreme Being, to think that He gives his attention to the welfare of individuals, and that it is presumption in the individual to suppose that He does so. The arguments by which the Stoics main- tained a particular providence w^ere sound. *' If," said they, " we think the guds consult the welfare of all men, then tlicy must consult that of the inhabitants of the known world ; if of the known world, then of its three quarters, p 2 212 ON THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD n W'li I ( ,i|i: Europe, Asia, and Africa ; if so, then they regard the parts of each, Home, Athens, &c. ; and, if so, it follows that they regard the in- dividual citizens." (Cic. Nat. Deor, ii. 66.) This was a perfectly sound argument: for if Divine Providence does care for the welfare of all men, it is simply limiting the power and functions of the Deity, to suppose that He does not care for the individual man, and for all that concerns them. It is well known that it is esteemed amongst military men one of the greatest qualifications of the greatest general of our own times, that he gave his attention to the minutest points which could either promote or interfere with his plans ; and that he owed much of success to the remarkable power which he possessed of combining attention to the general and broad features of a campaign with attention to the minutiae which enter into those greater features, and in fact constitute them. It is, therefore, evident, that impartial thinkers regard it as the highest perfection of a great mind to contemplate and provide for both; and it therefore follows, by an irresistible force of reason, that the infinite mind must contem- plate and provide for every thing both great and small. Indeed, as St. Ambrose has well said, (de Offc. i. 13,) "If it is no imputation and reproach to God, to suppose that He made the minutest things, much less is it a reproach to Him to govern them when made." " Si non id; ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 213 len they ?nsj &c. ; I the in- ii. 66.) t: for if 'clfare of iwer and He does 1 for all n that it le of the general ention to promote he owed er which to the iign with to those e them. hinkers a great both; le force ontem- great as well utation e made proach ISi non > est injuria et probrum Dei minutissimas qiias- que res fecisse, multo minus probrum illius factas regere." Those who suppose that it is a stooping from his dignity to attend to the minutest matters, do not consider that great and small are relative terms ; and that with an Infinite Being the difference in point of magni- tude between the whole world and the smallest atom must be comparatively nothing. It appears, then, that our most rational con- clusion is in favour of the most minute provi- dential government ; a government which does not overlook the smallest existing being, or the most trivial circumstance. But still the ques- tion remains, whether this providence is exer- cised by means of general laws, or not ; although not in the sense intended by unbelievers. This question is, however, one which reason scarcely helps us to answer. Bp. Butler points out [Analogy, Part II. ch. ii.) that we really do not know what classes of events arc governed by general laws, and what not ; that, for aught we know to the contrary, miracles themselves may be the development of some general law. It therefore seems to follow, that, for any thing that appears, there are no particulars whatever which may not be determined by some complex system of general laws. But as little do we know whether the Divine interference with general laws may not be frequent, and whether there is not the same personal superintendence P: \ ■ ? iii IS' i' U 214 ON THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD; of all events, as there is in the consummate general. Still, again, we are not able to say, whether the Supreme Governor may not habitually em- ploy subordinate intelligent agents, in the direc- tion of the ordinary affairs of men. Analogy would seem to be in favour of such a supposi- tion. He has given men themselves a control over the destiny of multitudes of inferior animals; or, at least, a power of interfering with their actions and habits, and giving them a complexion they would not otherwise have : and why should He not give some superior be- ings, intermediate between himself and us, some similar powers ? There have been scarcely any nations, who have not supposed that such beings existed ; and the chief error in regard to them seems to have lain in regarding them alone, and forgetting altogether the supreme Lord of all ; in looking solely at the secondary causes, and forgetting the First Cause. And even where that was not altogether the case, as with Socrates, the direct reference was to them, and the true God was practically passed over. But supposing these errors to be avoided, the polytheism of most Gentile nations, and the belief in various orders of spiritual beings in others, is no small presumption that inferior supernatural beings are employed by the Al- mighty Ruler in his providential administra- tion of the world. m; summate whether lally em- he direc- Analogy supposi- 1 control inferior terfering ng them se have : erior be- us, some |Cely any at such regard ig them upreme condary And le case, was to passed voided, is, and beings inferior he Al- nistra- ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 215 But in whatever way that providence is administered, we must conchidc that it docs reach individuals, and that it does reach the particular circumstances of their lives : that the Being, who, even according to Socrates (Mem. I. iv. 17), possesses the eye that can see all things, is aware of all possible circum- stances ; and that He whose understanding can care for all things {ibid.), docs not restrain his care from any particular which can affect the welfare of any of his rational creatures, or his own providential plans for their moral dis- cipline or improvement. To us, therefore, it is practically the same as though He interfered specially in every concern of our whole lives : nothing can be indifferent to Him, every thing we do must affect our relation to Him. There is another question which both So- crates and Cicero suggest ; viz. whether the providence of God may not be specially exer- cised in favour of particular individuals, or particular communities. Socrates, certainly, thought that he himself was favoured by a special spiritual guidance, which was exercised in deterring him from certain particular lines of conduct: and Cicero represents the Stoics as referring to a line of men, who occupy a distinguished place in Roman history, as having been special objects of Divine care. (Xen. Mem. I. i.; Cic. Nat. Deor. ii. GO.) Not only so, but he expresses his opinion that his 216 ox THE BENEVOLENCE OF GOD J i I own nation enjoyed for a long period the special favour of the gods, and that this favour was the source of their prosperity. And we can easily imagine cases in which it might please the Almighty Ruler to exercise this special providence. That there is some plan of divine providence is evident ; indeed, it is essential to intelHgent providence that there should be a plan. This may be either one original plan, embracing many subordinate details, and capable of in- finite variety of application ; or, a succession of plans, one evolved from another by succes- sive circumstances. According to either, there would be special ends to be accomplished, and special instruments required to accomplish those ends. It is, therefore, easily conceived, how one man may be better fitted than another to accomplish certain ends ; and, consequently, how a special providential agency may be brought into operation to bring forward that man, to endue him with peculiar powers, to shield him from dangers v/hich would otherwise have removed him from the scene of action. And similar remarks may apply to a nation. Or, again, it is equally conceivable, that it may please the Lord of all to select an instrument from many equally qualified, or equally unqua- lified, to put him under peculiar training or discipline, such as may qualify him for the work he is to do, and, at the same time, to give him opportunities and powers, and to shield / ON A PARTICULAR PROVIDENCE. 217 special nr was ve can please special divine itial to a plan. )racing [give iield / him from perils in the manner which I have already expressed. We know that wise men, who have it in their power, will act in such a manner; and the thing is equidly conceivahle of Him who is all-wise and all-powerful. — These, then, would be instances of a special providence. Again, it is evident from what has been previously said, that the government of the Creator is in part moral, and consists in part in rewarding and punishing for acts morally good and evil. Now it is true, that in many cases, perhaps in most, this may be accom- plished by means of general laws. But it is very conceivable that the Supreme Governor may see some cases in which the virtue is transcendently good, or the crime transcen- dently heinous ; and that the operation of gene- ral laws may be too tardy, or too unmarked, to signify adequately his approbation or dis- approbation ; or even that there may be in the operation of general laws no provision for such a case. It is, therefore, equally conceivable, that He who orders all things to produce their proper effects, may think proper so specially to direct the course of circumstances, as to mark the man of heroic virtue with special tokens of his favour, or to brand the atrocious criminal with some special marks of his displeasure. These cases, I say, are conceivable : and we may see an adequate motive for such a depar- 218 ON THE FREEDOM '; 'i" i ■ t ) turc from the ordinary course. For the minds of most men are apt to become so habituated to that wliieh ordinarily happens, as to cease to observe and remark it, unless their attention is from time to time specially drawn to it. And such extraordinary and special acts of i)rovi- dence would both serve to recal them to the fact, that there is a moral providence, and to dispose them to pay more serious attention to its more ordinary operations. CHAPTER XVI. ON THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL. The doctrine of a First Cause, intelligent, om- nipotent, omniscient, and exercising a universal providence, both natural and moral, has in all ages led to the inquiry, How far such a pro- vidence is compatible with freedom of action in mankind : the more especially as a portion of the proof of a divine providence to many minds rests upon their conviction that Almighty God has interfered to hinder men from accomplish- ing purposes upon which they were fully re- solved. It is difficult to come at the views of the earlier phibsophers upon this subject. Pytha- goras, we are told, recognised a fate; but it ' e minds bituated cease to nition is t. And >f i)rovi- 1 to the , and to ntion to nt, om- niversal Is in all a pro- ition in 'tion of minds |ty God iplish- lUy re- of the |Pytha- but it OF THE WILL. 211) does not appear that it amounted to more than this, — that whatever the Su])rcme Uiilcr lias de- creed must inevitably come to pass. Respect- ing Plato, it is dithcult to form an opinion from his extant writings : but Cicero (Qvd'st. Acad. i. 7) represents his followers as hokling that God, providence, and necessity, are one and the same power. This, however, may not amount to more than we have supposed attri- butable to Pyth.agoras. The actual opinions of Zeno are not to be learned with much more accuracy, although there are to be found writers who speak very positively as to his views : but his followers held various shades of opinion on the subject. These opinions cannot be any where so accurately lejirnt as in the Treatises of Cicero 07i Divination and on Fate, especially in the latter. The point of view from which they contemplated the subject is somewhat different from ours : but both the resemblances and the differences are curious. The point from which they started seems to have been the belief that the gods did actually convey to mankind the knowledge of future events. From this the Stoics argued as follows : If these events could be predicted with abso- lute certainty, there must have been causes existing at the time of the prediction, and known to the gods, capable of producing the events. Consequently there has always ex- isted a chain of causes, from all eternity, which k\ il M \i. 220 ON THE FREEDOM produce events successively ns tlicy happen. — This, then, was their notion of fate. When the school came to refuie more, or to state their views more accurately, the argu- ment assumed the foUowin*^ form : Every pro- position is, at the time it is made, either true or false : there is no medium. Now predictions arc i)ropositions, and therefore at the time they arc uttered, must be either true or false. Leaving false predictions out of the question, if a prediction be true, the causes which are to prove it, or make it true, must be in existence at the time at which it is made ; otherwise it could not be truly asserted at all : there would be no foundation to rest it upon. Conse- quently, every event has a chain of previous causes, which are sure to produce it. And as there is no limit to the anterior time at which an event may be predicted, there is* '^o limit to the previous chain of causes. There has there- fore existed from eternity a chain of causes, which have produced all past events, and will produce all future ones. This was the doctrine of Diodorus. The opponents of this view and of the Stoical system, altogether took up another principle of theirs, and by its aid proceeded to demolish their theory of fate. " You believe," they said, " that the action of the human mind, like all other motion besides gravitation, is produced by impulse from without ; by the impression ipcn. — ', or to argu- y pro- true or lictiona 3 time r false, lestion, are to istencc wise it would Conse- 'evious nd as which it to there- uses, d will trine toical )leof lolish said, le all iced (sion OF THE WILL. 221 - produced upon it by external objects throuj^h the senses. You must therefore allow, if you follow out your theory of late, that every act of the mind is caused by an eternal chain of causes ; and, consequently, that the action of the human will is never free, but is governed by inevitable destiny. Consequently there is no responsibility, and no distinction of virtue and vice." In order to avoid these conclusions, Chrysip- pus, another leadinj^ Stoic, distinguished between causes. " Some," he said, " are principal, and some proximate ; some eternal, and others not 80." He asserted that many things are possible, which will certainly not take place; and many things contingent, which will certainly take place, and may be predicted. Whilst, there- fore, he held that there is no event which is not brought about by an unbroken series of causes, he did not conceive every link in the chain to have been necessarily fixed in that chain by the previous series of causes, although it did, in jmnt of fact, arise from the previous series. He likewise thought that the human mird has some voluntary power to modify the series of events, although always set in motion from without. He illustrated his meaning in this way : " As a cylinder, although set in motion from without, will move in no other direction or manner than that which its form renders necessary; so the mind of man, although %-h^m liimmm ■rilMiMMJiawlatiMiMi 222 ox THE FREEDOM always set in motion by impressions made upon it, has the power of determining by its own will the direction in which it will move, and consequently the conclusions to which it will assent.'^ It is not necessary that we should stay to discuss this question further: but there are C.WO or three points connected with this subject which are entirely worthy of our attention. The first is, that all parties, without exception, asserted that the action of the mind, in assent- ing to any conclusion, is voluntary : that is, they agreed in maintaining the freedom of the hu- man will. Secondly, it does not appear that many, even of the Stoics, denied that some events are not necessarily determined by pre- vious causes, or seminally contained in them. Lastly, of the words fatum and dfiapiiuvt], used to express the series of causes, the first implies a sentence pro?iounced, and the second a lot assigned {fxiipto, to assign), by some personal being, and consequently opposes the notion of an eternal series of causes, and suits rather with the notion of one First Cause. But I have said that the Stoic doctrine of fate differs from any modern doctrine upon the subject held by believers in God ; and it differs in this very respect, that the modern doctrine assigns the fixino; of the series of events to God Himself, and supposes that He has from eternity fixed that series. It begins, OF THE WILL. 223 made by its move, lich it ;tay to re are subject ention. eption, assent- is, they he hil- ar that : some )y pre- them. , used mpHes a lot rsonal ion of rather line of upon md it lodern lies of It He legins, as the hcf-cthcn theory did, with the fact that God has foretold many events long before they happened, and that they happened as lie fore- told, — or with the universal and particular providence of God. In the former case it goes on to say, that it appears that God must fore- know all things ; and that as He foreknows them, it cannot but be that they must happen. It then, in the minds of some, proceeds to infer, that no event can be contingent; and consequently that no man can act otherwise than as God foresees He will act: and further, that as God foresees all things, and therefore deliberately permits them to take place. He may be regarded as deliberately predestining all the good and evil which has ever happened, or will ever happen. With others it commences with God's uni- versal and particular providence ; and infers, that, as the control of all events whatever are in his hand, and He must plan the whole series of events, from everlasting to everlasting, there- fore nothing can take place out of the order in which He has planned it; and the whole chain of events is bound in a necessity as immove- able and compulsory as any imagined by the Stoics. There are, however, many persons, who, asserting the first stages in this series of opi- nions, do not follow them to their conclusion ; believing, like the ancients, that the will is ^^^^M 221 ON THE FRKEDOM "'i V\' free, and therefore, that, however easily the conclusions may appear to follow from the premisses, there must be some flaw in the argu- ment, although they cannot detect it. The subject is one which has engaged the attention of philosophers and theologians from the earliest times to the present ; but perhaps it would not be too much to say, that it has never been treated more justly or more acutely than by Tucker, the author of the Light of Nature, ch. 26. It must, however, be borne in mind, that all writers whatever, excepting absolute Atheists or Pantheists, — even if believing in the absolute Divine predestination of all events, — hold firmly the doctrine of human responsibility : and, as that is the great practical question, it is of less importance whether the other diffi- culties be solved or not. Still, as, to many minds, any thing which casts even a portion of light upon this knotty question will be wel- come, I proceed to exhibit such views as have been suggested by the discussions of the author above mentioned. We will suppose a person much given to the indulgence of his appetite, but who perceives that this indulgence is undermining his health, and producing constant disquietude ; and he thereupon resolves to deny his appetite. No one doubts that such a resolution is an act of free will. Suppose, however, the same person I iily the )m the e argu- ^ed the ns from )crhaps b it has acutely ight of that all eists or bsolute —hold ibility : tion, it r diffi- many )ortion 36 wel- have author to the ceives lealth, d he No ct of erson OF THE WILL. 00-, to feel the restraint so irksome that he resolves to run all risks, and indulge himself as he likes. This again is undeniably an act of free will. But suppose this person to become the slave of another man, who forbids him to in- dulge his ap})etite, and threatens him witli the bastinado whenever he exceeds: he has evi- dently two question." before him, whether he will deny himself and remain free from punish- ment, or indulge himself and suffer the bas- tinado. Now, in making this choice, it is clear that there is nothing to hinder him from choos- ing either the one or the other ; and that, so far as this election is concerned, his will is free. But it is equally evident that he is not free to choose or not to choose. His appetite is a thing, which (at least at the time) he has no choice whether to have or not to have ; and his position under a master is likewise a thing in which he has no choice. But it may be that he has been so much in the habit of indulging himself, that, although he resolves to avoid the bastinado by denying himself, yet, when the time comes for acting, he is drawn on by imagination and appetite to indulge himself, all the time regretting his weakness, and wishing he had the power of resistance. Now we may say, even in this case, that the particular acts of reaching out his hand and taking his food are in fact volun- tary acts ; and that it required an act of the ■n'liiiimmiiiioiiiliian 22G ON THE FREEDOM will, or at all events a cessation of the act of resistance on the part of the will, and thus giving up the reins of appetite, before he con- summated the act of inordinate self-indulgence. There has, therefore, been in reality a new will, in regard to the particular act, which has nulli- fied the former act of will, made in an opposite sense. But we must concede that this act of the will differs from the former, inasmuch as it was sudden and not deliberate ; inasmuch as it was in opposition to reason and judgment, instead of being in agreement with them. Yet, as a mere act of will, it seems not to differ from the other; and the person who performs it is con- scious that it is his own act ; for his conscience involuntarily blames him for it. The case then is, not so much that the will is less free in this case than in the former one ; but that it comes to be directed by sense instead of reason and conscience : and reason and judgment are things to which he gives a permanent assent, whereas his assent to sense is only temporary. Still we feel that we are in some sense less free in the latter case than in the former : and therefore, without further entering into the metaphysical discussion, it may be well to show that this power of sense over reason is not an involuntary state, but one in which we have placed ourselves, by our own voluntary act. And this will appear, if we agree, as I think every reflecting person will agree, that sense iA le act of nd thus he con- ulgence. lew will, as nulli- opposite ct of the IS it was LS it was , instead et, as a Tom the t is con- nscience ase then in this t comes son and nt are assent, orary. Iise less r: and to the o show not an e have y act. think sense OF THE WILL. •)07 does not acquire this power over us, except as a consequence of previous acts of indulgence of a more wilful and deliberate character. When we have upon many occasions directly chosen to yield to sense instead of to reason and conscience, these acts establish a habit ; and by a law of our nature, in which we have no choice, but which is available for good as well as for evil, a formed habit exercises an in- fluence, so as that the will follows it in preference to any other motive. We thus perceive that we may be practically not free in regard to the performance of certain actions, and yet that this want of freedom has been produced by previous acts which were in every respect essen- tially free. So that even granting that the acts themselves were not in our power, — we are still responsible for them, because the i)revious acts which deprived us of our freedom were absolutely in our power. By this illustration, then, we have established two positions; that there are many cases in which the ultimate acts are in our power (for which acts we are therefore responsible), al- though the circumstances in which we are placed are not in our power: and that there may be acts (although it be not certain that there are such acts) not in our power, but for which we are responsible, because the acts which led to them, and which may have de- prived us of our freedom, were not in our power. Q 2 228 ox THE FREEDOM f ;f f V' I We will now go a step further. It is a well- known fact, that by observation or by intuition we acquire or possess a limited power of fore- seeing in what manner other persons will act under given circumstances, and that we can foretelj with tolerable accuracy, the line of con- duct they will take. Acting upon the posses- sion of that power, we may place before a person such motives as we foresee will lead him to act in the manner which we ourselves desire. And yet the choice which the person made was perfectly in his own power ; and his ultimate choice, to act in such and such a way, was in his own power. He was not compelled to be governed by the motives we placed before him. He might have resisted them. Or, if not, his want of power to resist them arose from some perfectly voluntary acts of his in time past. It is evident in this case that our knowledge of his character, and the placing before him such motives as we knew would act upon his mind, constituted as it was, did not by themselves constrain him to act as he did. Conceive, then, the case of Almighty God, — who has not a limited but an absolute know- ledge of all human character, and of all the motives and circumstances which can influence every human individual ; and we must see that he may bring about his own ends, perfectly and unerringly, without constraining the will of man to any act whatever. OF THE WILL. 229 a well- ituition A fore- .vill act we can of con- posses- efore a ill lead irselves person ind his a way, npelled I before Or, if arose his in at our [:>lacing Id act id not did. od, — Iknow- 11 the iuence |e that pfectly will To see this the more clearly, we will come a little closer to the subject. It is evident, from what has been said, that, as God has the ori- ginal arrangement of all causes, and has an absolute knowledge of the character of every individual, and indeed has had it in his power to direct the original constitution of every individual, and the causes which have tended to form his character, — it is in the power of Almighty God to make the character and con- duct of each person what He chooses, without interfering with the actual voluntariness of choice in the case of any individual action whatever. But how far a being so placed would be a responsible being, it is perhaps not in our power to determine ; but, for aught that appears, such a being might have a sense of responsibility, and be justly rewarded or punished. But we have no evidence whatever that Almighty God ever acts in such a manner. We have no evidence whatever that, whilst He has absolutely predestined certain events. He has not left others, and those the majority, absolutely and entirely contingent, and in the absolute and uncontrolled choice of his intelli- gent creatures. To use a familiar illustration, it is no uncommon thing for the chess-player to arrange a plan which he thinks he can carry into effect, and which he does carry into effect, let the next move of his adversary be whatever ■*m'ni •^fc-^ 230 ox THE FREEDOM m ■■■ it may. And we can thus conceive that Ho who knt. .vs all the possible combinations of future events, — may be able to determine certain ultimate results, whatever may be the conduct of voluntary agents in the course of the series of events which is to bring about these results. We have thus a Providence of the most minute character, but leaving respon- sible beings absolutely free to choose, whether to will or not to will, — and absolutely free to will in whatever way reason or inclination may lead us. But it is inquired. Does not the omniscient Being hold the tangled web in his hand ; and does He not see the line which will be taken by his creatures upon all occasions? If, then. He sees that they will take such and such a line of conduct, — that they will come to such and such a decision, or that they will decide not to decide at all, but to leave events to the chapter of accidents, — is it not a fact from all eternity, that such and such a series of choices will take place ? and if so, can any others take place? and if they cannot, has man then any freedom of choice? This, as we have seen, was the argument of the extreme Stoics, and of those of the Academic school who opposed the moderate ones, — only that they placed their supposed eternal series of causes in the stead of the First Cause. In this reasoning there is a confusion of OF TIIR WILL. 231 lat lie ons of ermine be the irse of about 3nce of espon- hether free to >n may iscient 1; and taken , then, uch a such le not o the 3m all oices take any seen, , and 30sed aced 1 the n of ideas, which will easily appear if wc recur to one of our previous illustrations. We are fami- liar with the fact that we can often foresee the conduct which another person will pursue under given circumstances : but does it ever occur to our minds to suppose that our fore- sight of his conduct has any connexion with the line he will ])ursue ? We smile immedi- ately at the absurdity. We know the temper of one of our children. We arc informed that in the course of the day he will have a certain choice placed before him. W^e foresee how he will choose. But does our foresight influence his choice or make it the less free? Or we know that his preceptor will punish him for his inattention, and we foresee that he will weep or be stubborn, as the case may be : but does our foresight affect his conduct in the slightest degree ? We know it does not. If then our foresight were not doubtful, but absolute, would that mere difference of degree form any link of connexion, in the nature of cause and effect, between our foresight and his will? It is evident it would not. And if that is the case with our foresight, what is there in the foresight of God to constitute a difference ? Can reason discover any difference in this respect? No: the two things are in them- selves absolutely without connexion. We may not be able fully to clear up the difficulty ; but we can see that foresight, by itself, in no way I I 232 ON ASCERTAINING interferes with, or affects the events which are its objects. Indeed, as we know that tlie ancients never hit upon tlie hypothesis, that the Divine fore- sight interferes with future events, we might almost suppose that they were too acute to supi)ose it possible ; did we not know that they attributed this foresight only to the inferior gods, who were not supposed to have any in- fluence upon the general course of events, but only to have a certain knowledge of all existing causes and of their mode of operation, and by that means to be capable of predicting. It is the confusion produced in our minds by our knowledge, that He who foresees and predicts has all things in his power as well as in his knowledge, — that has led us to attribute to foreknowledge a connexion with events, of which, simply as such, it is absolutely in- capable. CHAPTER XVII. ON THE MEANS WE POSSESS OF ASCERTAINING THE WILL OF GOD. The discussions into which we have entered in the previous portions of this work, sufficiently establish the fact that w^e are moral beings, accountable to the Creator and Governor of all • iiich arc s never ne fore- i might cute to Kit they inferior any in- its, but 3xisting and bv It is by our predicts in his ute to ts, of ly in- INING iterid liently ?ings, lof all THE WILL OF GOD. 233 things, and that we are bound to llim likewise by gratitucU; for benefits received at liis hands. It appears evident, likewise, that we Hve imder a system of moral rewards and punishments administered by llim; which system, it a[)pears probable, will be carried on into a future life, and may be carried on, if it so pleases llim, to all eternity. It thence appears that we have various motives for desiring to know what line of conduct is morally pleasing to Him; and it follows of course that we shoidd inquire what means we have of knowing his will. The first and earliest guide we have is, the opinion of others. So soon as we become capable of moral con- duct of any kind, our actions become controlled and our thoughts directed by the opinion of our parents ; and that being a direct arrangement of the Creator, we may feel assured that we arc intended to learn his will more or less from it* Moreover, whatever means each of us may have by nature of knowing his will, must of course become more available by exercise : and consequently those who ar-; both older than ourselves, and interested by aifection in study- ing our welfare, are likely both to have exer- cised their powers in discerning the will of the Creator, and to be disposed to impart to us for our benefit the results of their experience. Add to this that they have themselves received the results of similar experience from their l-fTx" 234 ON ASCERTAINING \\ ^\ ■ forcfiithors, and arc, therefore, the dopositorics of the accuinuhitcd or repeated exporicnce of past generations. They have besides this had the opportunity of comparing the impressions wliich they have received with the experience of those with whom they have conversed, and probably witli that of many thousands of others (at least indirectly) who may have committed to writing the results of their experience. Furthermore as we grew older, we obtain the same opportunity of becoming acquainted for ourselves with the opinions of experienced persons. We shall indeed find opinion very variable on many points : but yet experience warrants our asserting that the tendency of that opinion is uniformly in one direction, so far as it ex- tends. We may not be able to characterize that direction ; but we feel that it is tolerably uniform. It is true, likewise, that men do not act always according to the opinion they ex- press; and thus give ground for the supposi- tion that this expression of opinion is not sin- cere. But in most cases they will confess that it would be better, both for themselves and for others, if their conduct corresponded more accurately with their opinion. And we can ourselves perceive that, if they did so act, their conduct itself would form a consistent whole ; whilst, as the fact stands at present, it is incon- sistent with itself. .^ THE WILL OF GOD. J>35 sitories ence of lis had cssions crience 2d, and ' others imitted rience. lin the :cd for ienced ariable irrants pinion it ex- erize rably o not ex- )posi- sin- that d for more can their lole; con- A second, and moat important aid, is con- Hcience, Tliiit. aj^ain, exists in all men ; and therefore is conchided to be the work of the Creator. It is likewise true of this, that its dictates are not uniform. But still we may observe that its tendency is uniform, like that of opinion, only in a hij^her degree. It in fact always works in one direction ; viz. that of checking and controlling the operation of our passions and affections, and rendering it more agreeable to reason, and to that intuitive percej)tion of right and wrong of which we arc all sensible. A third aid is our own observation of the operation of different modes of conduct upon social happiness. We find ourselves, as the Stoics well insisted, placed in society by our Creator, and with a universal tendency towards society ; w hich we likewise conclude to be an arrangement of the Creator. Whatever, therefore, tends to pre- serve society is agreeable to his will ; wkatever tends to break it up is opposed to his will. In order, then, that society may be maintained, it btcomes necessary that men should control themselves; and, as all will not do so, some must be controlled by others. Some modes of conduct, if uniformly and universally pursued, would break up society, and so far as they are pursued do impair its comfort ; others conduce to its ends and add to its comfort. Our obser- vation of these will be found to lead us, with .iaptaaiiMfe^^i 236 ON ASCERTAINING lU\i I u I great uniformity, in the same direction as public opinion and conscience, and will often enable us to correct the errors of both. A fourth aid will be the observation of God's providential goveryiment. We shall find, as we have already noticed, that by the simple operation of natural causes, operating by fixed laws, certain modes of con- duel produce disease both of body and of mind ; that they interfere w^ith men's worldly comfort and prosperity ; that they cause them to be disrespected and disliked; that in time they produce permanent unhappiness to the individuals who pursue them. We shall ob- serve contrary lines of conduct producing or preserving bodily and mental vigour, adding to comfort and enjoyment, raising feelings of regard and honour in others, producing habits of internal peace and tranquillity. We shall sometimes observe, in remarkable cases, retri- bution for good or for evil following so speedily and difectly, — or coming out in so remarkable a manner after years of concealment, — that all men recognise it as coming from the hand of the Supreme Governor. It is true that this providential government will not be seen to be uniform, — will not be perceived in all cases: but it will be sufficiently uniform and manifest to show us the direction in which it leads, and the kind of conduct which is approved by Him who superintends all things. And to all these other means of knowing his IS public 1 enable of God's noticed, [ causes, of con- and of worldly 3e them in time to the ball ob- cing or dino; to of habits e shall retri- eedily rkable hat all and of t this ten to ;ases : inifest 5, and Him ig his ngs THE WILL OF GOD. 237 will, conscience, if constantly respected and obeyed, is found to be a very powerful aid. Its decisions are found to become more clear, more consistent, and more immediate in them- selves, and to render us more capable of ob- taining clear and consistent views from other sources ; more particularly from our own ob- servation upon the social effects of any par- ticular course of conduct, and upon God's providential government. These means of ascertaining the will of God we possess, independently of any direct reve- lation of his will. But when we know, as a matter of fact, that there have been professed revelations of his will given to mankind, — it surely becomes both our wisdom and our duty to examine the external evidence upon which those professed revelations rest, and to discover what there is in the revelations themselves which agrees or disagrees with that which natural reason has taught us to be probable in relation to God. There has always been an impression on the minds of men, that the deity they worshipped did occasionally reveal his will; as is manifest from the prevalence of oracles and other methods of consulting the gods in the ancient world. It seems agreeable to the good-will, which God has alwa}'s shown to mankind, that He should do so, if any ad- vantage could accrue to them from his so doing: and on that ground Socrates, followed by the Platonists and Stoics of old, thought chat the I ; ._-!S« wi&tasiS&Sio.-*. 238 ox ASCERTAINING ■^i; 1 L 1 1 1 I , l.\ gods they worshipped did make such revela- tions, at least occasionally. The various and conflicting claims of diverse and adverse reli- gious systems atford a reason for this interfer- ence. On these and other grounds a revelation possesses an external probability, anterior to evidence; and this probability adds to the reasons for investigating the evidence of such profe««sed revelations as offer themselves. We must not, however, suppose, that the apparent correspondence between the matter of these revelations, and the unassisted conclu- sions of natural reason, furnishes an unerring criterion of their truth : for we often see that conclusions, to which we are led u])on high grounds of probability, are proved by subse- quent experience not to be correct : and it must of course be acknowledged that it may be the express object of such revelation to correct the conclusions of unassistec. reason ; and, conse- quently, that there may be portions of Divine revelation expressly and intentionally at variance with our previous impressions. If, therefore, the wliole evidence in support of any professed revelation should prove sufficient to recommend it to our earnest attention, — it ought noc to stagger us, if we find some portions of it to be inconsistent with our previous conviction. On the contrary, natural reason itself would lead us to su})pose that it would be an object of revelation to correct our previous notions : and we should, consequently, upon purely natural THE WILL OF GOD. 239 I revela- ious and !rse reli- interfer- svelation terior to to the of such ;s. that the matter conclu- merring see that 3n high subse- it must be the ect the conse- Divine Li'iance refore, fessed mend oc to to be On lead ct of and tural grounds, be prepared to examine carefully into such Divine revelation, for the express purpose of correcting and enlarging those ideas as to the will of God, which we derive from natural reason. These are the conclusions to which we should be led, looking at Divine revelation from Avith- out. But we are not, blessed be God, permitted to do so in the course of things in which He has placed us. If we do so, it must be because something has broken into and changed that condition ; because the unbelief of others has constrained us, for their sakes and for our own, to see how we may prepare the way for faith, even without directly using the aids which faith furnishes. But this is not a position in which we should place ourselves voluntarily and with- out any call : for the consequences of so loing are unknown to us, and may be perilous in the highest degree ; and we must, therefore, be care- ful how we do so, except in the case of some urgent necessity ; and then only in imagination, and not in reality. And, when we have finished an inquiry of this description, we may well rejoice in God at the results at which we arrive; when we see that unbelief, when taken on her own grounds by him who already believes, is driven step by step from every refuge of lies ; how one false position after another is completely overturned by the simple action of divinely-enlightened I IV I I i 1 ; : 210 ON ASCERTAINING THE WILL OF GOD. reason ; how theory after theory is set aside by a closer investigation of the very natural facts upon which it reUes ; and how, consequently, the foundations of faith appear firmer and firmer the more accurately they are examined. We may, consequently, learn to be thankful to our Great Father for the use of that gift of natural reason which by many is abused to their destruction. It is not to be conceived that any portion of our natural constitution can be evil in itself, but only in its abuse. The use of reason, therefore, is not to be disparaged; but its legitimate use is to be diligently sought for. And such a legitimate use we may rest assured we have found, when the results are such as have been described ; and be thankful that we liave found it. But when we likewise reflect how dimly and imperfectly men arrived at truth by the use of unaided reason, — that of all the heathens who arrived the nearest to it was Socrates, who professed himself to be en- lightened and guided by supernatural aid, — we must surely be most thankful that God has cast our lot amongst those whom He has not left to themselves, but whose reason He has cleared and directed by his revealed Word and his enlightening Spirit. THE END. Gilbert & Kivinoton, Piinteis, St. John's Square, London. ^ SKPr EMBER, 1850. NEW BOOKS RECENTLY P U II L I S II E D uv Messrs. RIVINGTON, ST. Paul's church yard, and watf.rloo place. I. 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