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 li 
 
 THE KELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO 
 SOCIAL PROGRESS. 
 
 AN ADDRESS 
 
 DEUVERED BEFORE THE 
 
 Phitapliical Society of Waingta, 
 
 x)ECEi^BEK 4a?ia:, isso. 
 
 BY 
 
 SIMON NEWCOMB, 
 
 RETIRING PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIETY. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 JUDD & DETWEILER, PRINTERS. 
 
 1880. 
 
 i 
 
w 
 
 A 
 
 ^ 
 
 
 I 
 
a 
 
 THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO 
 SOCIAL PROGRESS. 
 
 A^ISr A^DDRESS 
 
 DELIVERED BEFORE THE 
 
 Piosopliical Society of ffasliiojton, 
 
 X)ECE3yfl:BEia 4a?!!, leeo. 
 
 BY 
 
 SIMON NEWCOMB, 
 It 
 
 RETIRING PRi;SlDKNT OF THE SOCIETY. 
 
 WASHINGTON: 
 
 JUDD A DETWEILER, PRINTERS. 
 
 1880. 
 

 am 
 OCT la tiw 
 
i 
 
 
 I 
 
 i 
 
 THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD TO SOCIAL 
 
 PROGRESS. 
 
 Among those subjects which are not always correctly appre- 
 hended, even by educated men, we may place that of the true 
 significance of scientific method, and the relations of such method 
 to practical affairs. This is especially apt to be the case in a 
 country like our own, where the points of contact between the 
 scientific world on the one hand, and the industrial and political 
 world on the other, are fewer than in other civilized countries. 
 The form which this misapprehension usuolly takes is that of a 
 failure to appreciate the character of scientific method, and es- 
 pecially its analogy to the methods of practical life. In the judg- 
 ment of the ordinary intelligent man there is a wide distinction 
 between theoretical and practical science. The latter he considers 
 as that science directly applicable to the building of railroads, the 
 construction of engines, the invention of new machinery, the con- 
 struction of maps, and other useful objects. The former he con- 
 siders analogous to those philosophic speculations in which men 
 have indulged in all ages without leading to any result which he 
 considers practical. That our knowledge of nature is increased 
 by its prosecution is a fact of which he is quite conscious, but 
 he considers it as terminating with a mere increase of knowledge, 
 and not as having in its method anything which a person devoted 
 to material interests can be expected to appreciate. 
 
 This view is strengthened by the spirit with which he sees 
 scientific investigation prosecuted. It is well understood on all 
 sides that when such investigations are pursued in a spirit really 
 recognized as scientific, no merely utilitarian object is had in view. 
 Indeed it is easy to see how the very fact of pursuing such an 
 object would detract from that thoroughness of examination which 
 is the first condition of a real advance. True science demands in '. 
 its every research a completeness far beyond what is apparently i 
 necessary for its practical applications. The precision with which ' 
 the astronomer seeks to measure the heavens, and the chemist to 
 determine the relations of the ultimate molecules of matter has 
 no limit, except that set by the imperfections of the instruments of 
 
mwmi 
 
 THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 
 research. There is no auch division recognized as that of useful 
 and useless knowledge. The ultimate aim is nothing less than that 
 of bringing all the phenomena of nature under laws as exact as 
 those which govern the planetary motions. 
 
 Now the pursuit of any high object in this spirit commands from 
 men of wide views that respect which is felt towards all exertion 
 having in view more elevated objects than the pursuit of gaiu. 
 Accordingly it is very natural to classify scientiste, and philos- 
 ophers with the men who in all ages have sought after learning 
 instead uf utility. But there is another aspect of the question 
 which will show the relations of scientific advance to the practical 
 affairs of life in a different light. I make bold to say that the 
 greatest want of the day, from a purely practical point of view, is 
 the more general introduction of the scientific method and the 
 scientific spirit into the discussion of those political and social pro- 
 blems which we encounter on our road to a higher plane of public 
 well being. Far from using methods too refined for practical pur- 
 poses, what most distinguishes scientific from other thought is the 
 introduction of the methods of practical life into the discussion of 
 abstract general problems. A single instance will illustrate the 
 lesson I wish to enforce. 
 
 The question of the tariff is, from a practical point of view, one 
 of the most important with which our legislators will have to deal 
 during the next few years. The widest diversity of opinion exists 
 as to the best policy to be pursued in collecting a revenue from 
 imports. Opposing interests contend against each other without 
 any common basis of fact or principle on which a conclusion can 
 be reached. The opinions of intelligent men differ almost as widely 
 as those of the men who are immediately interested. But all will 
 admit that public action in this direction should be dictated by 
 one guiding principle — that the greatest good of the community is 
 to be sought after. That policy is the bsst which will most pro- 
 mote this good. Nor is there any serious difference of opinioq as 
 to the nature of the good to be had in view ; it is in a word the 
 increase of the national wealth and prosperity. The question on 
 which opinions fundamentally differ is that of the effects of a higher 
 or lower rate of duty upon the interests of the public. If it were 
 possible to foresee, with an approach to certainty, what effect a given 
 tariff would have upon the producers and consumers of an article 
 taxed, and, indirectly, upon each member of the community in any 
 
TO SOOIAI, I'ROORBStt. 
 
 way intoreHted in the article, wu Hhoiild thtui have an exact datum 
 which we do not now pofwess for re»(;hing a concluHion. If nonie 
 superhuman authority, spcakiu)^ with the voice of infallibility, 
 could give uh thia information, it w evident that a great national 
 want would be supplied. No question in practical life is more im- 
 portant than this: How can this desirable knowledge of the econo- 
 mic effects of a tariff be obtained ? 
 
 The answer to this ijiiestion is clear and simple. The subject 
 must be studied in the sumo spirit, and, to a certain extent, by 
 the same methods which have been so successful in advancing our 
 knowledge of nature. Every one know>t that, within the last two 
 centuries, a method of studying the course of nature has been in- 
 troduced which has been so successful in enabling us to trace the 
 sequence of cause and effect as almost to revolutionise society. The 
 very fact that scientific method has been so successful here leads to 
 the belief that it might be equally successful in othei departments 
 of inquiry. 
 
 The same remarks will apply to the questions connected with 
 banking and currency ; the standard of value ; and, indeed, all 
 subjects which have a 'financial bearing. On every such question 
 we see wide 'differences of opinion without any common basis to rest 
 upon. 
 
 It may be said, in reply, that in these cases there are really no 
 grounds for forming an opinion, and that the contests which arise 
 over them are merely those between conflicting interests. But this 
 claim is not at all consonant with the form which we see the discus- 
 sion assume. Nearly every one has a decided opinion on these 
 several subjects ; whereas, if there were Ho data for forming an 
 opinion, it would be unreasonable to maintain any whatever. In- 
 deed, it is evident that there must b« truth somewhere, and the 
 only question that can be open is that of the mode of discovering 
 it. No man imbued with a scientific spirit can claim that such 
 truth is beyond the power of the human intellect. He may doubt 
 his own ability to grasp it, but cannot doubt that by pursuing the 
 proper method and adopting the best means the problem can be 
 solved. It is, in fact, difficult to show why some exact results could 
 not be as certainly reached in economic questions as in those of 
 physical science. It is true that if we pursue the inquiry far 
 enough we shall find more complex conditions to encounter, because 
 the future course of demand and supply enters as an uncertain 
 
 f 
 
THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 
 eleraeot. But a remarkable fact to be considered w that the difler- 
 ence of opinion to which we allude does not depend upon different 
 edtinaatea of the future, but upou different views of the most element- 
 ary and general principles of the subject. It is as if men were not 
 agreed whether air were elastic or whether the earth turns on its 
 axis. Why is it that while in all subjects of physical science we 
 find a general at^reenieut through a wide range of subjects, and doubt 
 commences only where certainty is not attained, yet when we turn 
 to economic subjects* we do not fiud the beginning of an agreement? 
 
 No two answers can be given. It is because the two classes of 
 subjects are investigated by different instruments and in a different 
 spirit. The physicist has an exact nomenclature ; uses methods of 
 research well adapted to the objects he has in view ; pursues his in- 
 vestigations without being attacked by those who wish for different 
 results; and, above all, pursues them only for the purpose of dis- 
 covering the truth. In economical questions the cane is entirely 
 different. Only in rare cases are they studied without at least the 
 suspicion that the student has a preconceived theory to support. If 
 results are attained which oppose any powerful interest, this interest 
 can hire a competing investigator to bring out a different result. 
 So far as the public can see, one man's result is as good as another's, 
 and thus the object is as far off as over. We may be sure that until 
 there is an intelligent and rational public, able to distinguish be- 
 tween the speculations of the charlatan and the researches of the 
 investigator, the present state of things will continue. What we 
 want is so wide a diffusion of scientific ideas that there shall be a 
 class of men engaged in studying economical problems for their own 
 sake, and an intelligent public able to judge what they are doing. 
 There must be an improvement in the objects at which they aim in 
 education, and it is now worth while to inquire what that improve- 
 ment is. 
 
 It is not mere instruction in any branch of technical science that 
 is wanted. No knowledge of chemistry, physics, or biology, how- 
 ever extensive, can give the learner much aid in forming a cor- 
 rect opinion of such a question as that of the currency. If we 
 should claim that political economy ought to be more extensively 
 studied, we would be met by the question, which of several conflict- 
 ing systems shall we teach ? What is wanted is not to teach this 
 system or that, but to give such a training that the student shall be 
 able to decide for himself which system is right. 
 
TO SOCIAL PKOORKflS. 
 
 ! 
 
 It seeiDH to me thaf the true educational want is ignored both bj 
 those who advocate a classical and those who advocate a scientific 
 education. What is really wautcd is to train the intellectual pow- 
 ers, and the question ought to be, what is the best method of doing 
 this? Perhaps it might be found that both of the conflicting 
 methods could be improved upon. The really distinctive features, 
 which we should desire to see introduced, are two in number : the 
 one the scientific spirit; the other the scientific discipline. Al- 
 though many details may be classified under each of these heads, 
 yet there is one of pre-emiuent importance on which we should 
 insist. 
 
 The 6ne feature of the scientific spirit which outweighs all others 
 in importance is the love of knowledge for its own sake. If by our 
 system of e<lucation we can iuculcatu this sentiment we shall do 
 what is, from a public point of view, worth more than any amount 
 of technical knowledge, because we shall lay the foundation of all 
 knowledge. So long as men study only what they think is going 
 to be useful their knowledge will be partial and insufficient. I 
 think it is to the constant inculcation of this fact by experience, 
 rather than to any reasoning, that is due the continued apprecia- 
 tion of a liberal education. Every business man knows that a 
 business-college training is of very little account in enabling one to 
 fight the battle of life, and that college bred men have a great ad- 
 vantage even in fields where mere education is a secondary matter. 
 We are accustomed to seeing ridicule thrown upon the questions 
 sometimes asked of candidates for the civil service because the 
 questions refer to subjects of which a knowledge is not essential. 
 The reply to all criticisms of this kind is that there is no one 
 quality which more certainly assures a man's usefulness to society 
 than the propensity to acquire useless knowledge. Most of our 
 citizens take a wide interest in public affairs, else our form of gov- 
 ernment would be a failure. But it is desirable that their study of 
 public measures should be more critical and take a wider range. 
 It is especially desirable that the conclusions to which they are led 
 should be unafiTected by partisan sympathies. The more strongly 
 the love of mere truth is inculcated in their nature the better this 
 end will be attained. 
 
 The scientific discipline to which I ask mainly to call your atten- 
 tion consists in training the scholar to the scientific use of language. 
 Although whole volumes may be written on the logic of scienee 
 
 M tl 
 
8 
 
 THE RELATION OP SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 
 there ia one general feature of its method which is of fundamental 
 significance. It is that every term which it uses and every propo- 
 sition which it enunciates has a precise meaning which can be 
 made evident by proper definitions. This general principle of 
 scientific language is much more easily inculcated by example than 
 subject to exact description ; but I shall ask leave to add one to 
 several attempts I have made to define it. If I should say that 
 when a statement is made in the language of science the speaker 
 knows what he means, and the hearer either knows it or can be 
 made to know it by proper definitions, and that this community of 
 understanding is frequently not reached in other departments of 
 thought, I might be understood as casting a slur on whole depart- 
 menta of inquiry. Without intending any such slur, I may still 
 say that language and statements are worthy of the name scientific 
 as they approach this standard ; and, moreover, that a great deal 
 is said and written which does not fulfill the requirement. The 
 fact that words lose their meaning when removed from the connec- 
 tions in which that meaning has been acquired and put to higher 
 uses, is one which, I think, is rarely recognized. There is nothing 
 in the history of philosophical inquiry more curious than the fre- 
 quency of interminable disputes on subjects where no agreement 
 can be reached because the opposing parties do not use words in 
 the same sense. That the history of science is not free from this 
 reproach is shown by the fact of the long dispute whether the 
 force of a moving body was proportional to the 'simple velocity 
 or to its square. Neither of the parties to the dispute thought it 
 worth while to define what they meant by the word "force," and it 
 was at length found that if a definition was agreed upon the seem- 
 ing difierence of opinion would vanish. Perhaps the most striking 
 feature of the case, and one peculiar to a scientific dispute, was that 
 the opposing parties did not difier in their solution of a single 
 mechanical problem. I say this is curious, because the very fact 
 of their agreeing upon every concrete question which could have 
 been presented, ought to have made it clear that some fallacy was 
 lacking in the discussion as to the measure of force. The good 
 effect of a scientific spirit is shown by the fact that this discussion 
 is almost unique in the history of science during the past two centu- 
 ries, and that scientific men themselves were able to see the fallacy 
 involved, and thus to bring the matter to a conclusion. 
 If we now turn to the discussions of philosophers, we shall find at 
 
 
 
! r 
 
 TO SOCIAL PROORESS. 
 
 least one yet more strikinf; example of the same kind. The ques- 
 tion of the freedom of the human will has, I believe, raged for cen- 
 turies. It cannot yet be said that any conclusion has been reached. 
 Indeed I have heard it admitted by men of high intellectual attain- 
 ments that the question was insoluble. Now a curious feature of 
 this dispute is that none of the combatants, at least on the aflSrma- 
 tive side, have made any serious attempt to define what should be 
 meant by the phrase freedom of the will, except by using such terms 
 as require definition equally with the word freedom itself. It can, 
 I conceive, be made quite clear that the assertion, " The will is 
 free," is one without meaning, until we analyze more fully the differ- 
 ent mieanings to be attached to the word free. Now this word has 
 a perfecdy well-defined signification in every day life. We say that 
 anything is free when it is not subject to external constraint. We 
 also know exactly what we mean when we say that a man is free to 
 do a certain act. We mean that if he chooses to do it there is no ex- 
 ternal constraint acting to prevent him. In all cases a relation of 
 two things is implied in the word, some active agent or power, and 
 the presence or absence of another constraining agent. Now, when 
 we inquire whether the will itself is free, irrespective of external 
 constraints, the word free no longer has a meaning, because one of 
 the elements implied in it is ignored. 
 
 To inquire whetiier the will itself is free is like inquiring whether 
 fire itself is consumed by the burning, or whether clothing is itself 
 clad. It is not, therefore, at all surprising that both parries have 
 been able to dispute without end, but it is a most astonishing 
 phenomenon of the human intellect that the dispute should go on 
 generation after generation without the parties finding out whether 
 there was really any difference of opinion between them on the 
 subject I venture to say that if there is any such difference, neither 
 party has ever analyzed the meaning of the words used sufficiently 
 fifftoshowit. Thedaily experience of every man, from his cradle 
 to his grave, shows that human acts are as much the subject of ex- 
 ternal causal influences as are the phenomena of nature. To dis- 
 pute tiiis would be little short of the ludicrous. All that the oppo- 
 nenti of freedom, as a class, have ever claimed, is the assertion of a 
 oaosal connection betwe«a the acts of the will, and influences inde- 
 pendent of the will True, propositions of this sort can be expressed 
 in a variety of ways connoting an endless number of more or less 
 objeotimuible ideas, bat this is the substance of ihe matter. 
 
 2 
 
10 
 
 THE RBLAtlOK OP SOIENtlFIO METHOD 
 
 To suppose that the advocates on the other side meant to take 
 issue on Uiis proposition would be to assume that they did not know 
 what they were saying. The conclusion forced upon us is that 
 though men spend their whole lives in the study of the most ele- 
 vated department of human thought it does not guard them against 
 the danger of using words without meaning. It would be a mark 
 of ignorance, rather than of penetration, to hastily denounce propo- 
 sitions on subjects we are not well acquainted with because we do 
 not understand their meaning. I do not mean to intimate that 
 philosophy itself is subject to this reproach. When we see a philo- 
 sophicd proposition, couched in terms we do not understand, the 
 most modest and charitable view is to assume that this arises from 
 our lack of knowledge. Nothing is easier than for the ignorant to 
 ridicule the propositions of the learned. And yet, with every re- 
 serve, I cannot but feel that the disputes to which I have alluded 
 prove the necessity of bringing scientific precision of language into 
 every demand of diought. If the discussion had been confined to 
 a few, and other philosophers had analyzed the subject, and showed 
 the fictitious character of the discussion, or had pointed out where 
 opinions really might differ, there would be nothing derogatory to 
 philosophers. But the most suggestive circumstance is that although 
 a large proportion of the philosophic writers in recent times have 
 devoted more or less attention to the subject, few, or none, have made 
 even this modest contribution. I speak with some little confidence 
 on this subject, because several years ago I wrote to one of the most 
 acute thinkers of the country, asking if he could find in philoso- 
 phical literature any terms or definitions expressive of the three 
 different senses in which not only the word freedom, but nearly all 
 words implying freedom were used. His search was in vain. 
 
 Nothing of this sort occurs in the practical affairs of life. AH 
 terms used in business, however general or abstract, have that well- 
 defined meaning which is the first requisite of the scientific lan- 
 guage. Now one important lesson which I wish to inc 1 (»te is that 
 the language of science in this respect corresponds to that of buri- 
 ness ; in that each and every term that is employed has a meaning 
 as well defined as the subject of discussion can admit of. It will be 
 an instructive exercise to inquire what this peculiarity of sdoitifie 
 and business language is. It can be shown that a certain re- 
 quirement should be fulfilled by all language intended fer the 
 disGoyery of truth, which is fiilfiUed only by the two ol a wM of 
 
 ' .■A i «M ' ^«MHl.l l» *Jfci. i 
 
 mmtondtaamm 
 
TO SOCIAL PROGRESS. 
 
 11 
 
 
 language which I have described. It is one of the most common 
 errors of discourse to assumt that any common expression which 
 we may use always conveys an idea, no matter what the subject of 
 discourse. The true state of the case can, perhaps, best be seen by 
 beginning at the foundation of things, and examining under what 
 conditions language can really convey ideas. 
 
 Suppose thrown among us a person of well-developed intellect, 
 but unacquainted with a single language or word that we use. It 
 is absolutely useless to talk to him, because nothing that we say 
 conveys any meaning to his mind. We can supply him no dic- 
 tionary, because by hypothesis he knows no language to which we 
 have access. Huw shall we proceed to communicate our ideas to 
 him? Clearly there is but one possible way, namely, through his 
 five senses. Outside of this means of bringing him in contact with 
 us we can have no communication with him. We, therefore, begin 
 by showing him sensible objects, and letting him understand that 
 certain words which we use correspond to those objects. After he 
 has thus acquired a small vocabulary, we make him understand 
 that other terms refer to relations between objects which he can per- 
 ceive by his senses. N'ext he learns, by induction, that there are 
 terms which apply nut to special objects, but to whole classes of 
 objects. G)ntinuing the same process, he learns that there are cer- 
 tain attributes of objects made known by the manner in which they 
 affect his senses, to which abstract terms are applied. Having 
 learned all this, we can teach him new words by combining words 
 without exhibiting objects already known. Using these words we 
 can proceed yet further, building up, as it were, a complete lan- 
 guage. But there is one limit at every step. Every term which 
 we make known to him must depend ultimately upon terms the 
 meaning of which he has learned from their connection with special 
 objects of sense. 
 
 To communicate to him a knowledge of words expressive of 
 mental states it is necessary to assume that his own mind is subject 
 to these states as well as our own, and that we can in some way in- 
 dicate them by our acts. That the former hypothesis is sufficiently 
 well established can be made evident so long as a consistency of 
 different words and ideas is maintained. If no such consistency of 
 meaning on his part were evident, it might indicate that the opera- 
 tions of his mind were so different from ours that no such commu- 
 nioation of ideas was possible. Uncertainty in this respect must 
 
 ■iinin*»iiiWiMi.MT-^ 
 
12 
 
 THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 
 ariae as soon as we go beyond those mental states whirh commani- 
 cate themselves to the senses of others. 
 
 We now see that in order to commanicate to our foreigner a 
 knowledge of language, we must follow rules similar to those ne- 
 cessary for the stability of a building. The foundation of the build- 
 ing must be well laid upon objects knowable by his five senses. Of 
 course the mind, as well as the external object, may be a fiictor in 
 determining the ideas which the words are intended to express ; but 
 this does not in any manner invalidate the conditions which we im- 
 pose. Whatever theory we may adopt of the relative part played 
 by the knowing subject, and the external object in the acquirement 
 of knowledge, it remains none the less true that no knowledge of 
 the meaning of a word can be acquired except through the senses, 
 and that the meaning is, therefore, limited by the senses. If we 
 transgress the rule of founding each meaning upon meanings below 
 it, and having the whole ultimately resting upon a sensuous founda- 
 tion, we at once branch off into sound without sense. We may 
 teach him the use of an extended vocabulary, to the terms of which 
 he may apply ideas of his own, more or less vague, but there will 
 be no way of deciding that he attaches the same meaning to these 
 terms that we do. 
 
 What we have shown true of an intelligent foreigner is neces- 
 sarily true of the growing man. We come into the world with- 
 out a knowledge of the meaning of words, and can acquire such 
 knowledge only by a process which we have found applicable to 
 the intelligent foreigner. But to confine ourselves within these 
 limits in the use of language requires a course of severe mental dis- 
 cipline. The transgression of the rule will naturally seem to the 
 undisciplined mind a mark of intellectual vigor rather than the re- 
 verse. In our system of education every temptation is held out to 
 the Ittumer to transgress the rule by the fluent use of language to 
 which it is doubtful if he himself attaches clear notions, and which 
 he can never be certain suggests to his hearer the ideas which he 
 intends. Indeed, we not infrequently see, even among practical 
 educators, expressions of positive antipathy to scientific precision of 
 language so obviously opposed to good sense that they can be 
 attributed only to a failure to comprehend the meaning of the lan- 
 guage which tiiey criticise. 
 
 Perhaps the most injurious effect in this direction arises firom 
 (lie natural tendency of the mind, when not subject to a scientific 
 
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 discipline, to think of words expressing sensible objects and their 
 relations as connoting certain supersensuous attributes. This is fre- 
 quently seen, in the repugnance of the metaphysical mind to receive 
 a scientific statement about a matter of fiust simply as a matter of 
 fact. This repugnance does not generally arise in respect to the 
 every day matters of life. When we say that the earUi is round 
 we state a truth which every one is willing to receive as final. If 
 without denying that the earfh was round, one should criticise the 
 statement on the ground that it was not necessarily round but 
 might be of some other form, we should simply smile at this use pf 
 language. But when we take a more general statement and assert 
 that the laws of nature are inexorable, and that all phenomona, 
 so far as we can show, occur in obedience to their requirements, we 
 are met with a sort of criticism with which all of us are familiar, 
 and which I am unable adequately to describe. No one duties 
 that as a matter of fact, and as far as his experience extends, these 
 laws do appear to be inexorable. I have never heard of any one 
 professing, during the present generation, to describe a natural 
 phenomenon, with the aVowed belief that it was not a product of 
 natural law ; yet we constantly hear the scientific view criticised on 
 the ground that events may occur without being subject to natural 
 law. The word " may," in this connection, is one to which we can 
 attach no meaning expressive of a sensuous relation. 
 
 This is, however, not the most frequent misuse of the word may. 
 In fact, the unscientific use of language to which I refer, is most 
 strongly shown in disquisitions on the freedom of the will. When 
 I say that it is perfectly certain that I will to-morrow perform a 
 certain act unless some cause external to my mind which I do not 
 now foresee occurs to prevent me, I make a statement which is final 
 so far as scientific ideas are concerned. But it will sometimes be 
 maintained that however certain it may be that I shall perform 
 this act, nevertheless I may act otherwise. All I can say to this is 
 that I do not understand the meaning of the statement. 
 
 The analogous conflict between the scientific use of language and 
 the use made by some philosophers, is found in connection with 
 the idea of causation. Fundamentally the word cause is used 
 in soientifio language in the same sense as in the language of com- 
 mon life. When we discuss with our neighbors the cause of a fit 
 of illness, of a fire, or of cold weather, not the slightest ambiguity 
 attaches to the use of the word, because whatever meaning may 
 
THE RELATION OF SCIENTIFIC METHOD 
 
 be g^ven to it is founded only on an accurate analysis of the ideas 
 involyed in it from driily use. No philosopher objects to the com- 
 mon meaning of the vrord, yet we frequently find men of eminence 
 in the intellectual >vorld who will not tolerate the scientific man 
 in using the word in this way. In every explanation which he 
 can give to its use they detect ambiguity. They insist that in 
 any proper use of the term the idea of power must be connoted. 
 But what meaning is here attached to the word power, and how 
 shall we first reduce it to a sensible form, and then apply its mean- 
 ing to the operations of nature? That this can be done, I by no 
 means deny. All I maintain is that if we shall do it, we must pass 
 without the domain of scientific statement. 
 
 Perhaps the greatest advantage in the use of symbolic and other 
 mathematical language in scientific investigation is that it cannot pos- 
 sibly be made to connote anything except what the speaker means. 
 It adheres to the subject matter of discourse with a tenacity which 
 no criticism can overcome. In consequence, whenever a science 
 is reduced to a mathematical form its conclusions are no longer 
 the subject of philosophical attack. To secure the same desirable 
 quality in all other sciratiSc language it is necessary to give it, so 
 fiir as possible, the same simplicity of signification which attaches 
 io mathematical symbols. Tliis is not easy, because we are obliged 
 to use words of ordinary language, and it is impossible to divest 
 them of whatever they may connote to ordinary bearers. 
 ' I have thus sought to make it clear that the language of science 
 corresponds to that of ordinary life, and especially of business life, 
 in confining its meaning to phenomena. An analogous statement 
 may be made of the method and objects of scientific investigation. 
 I think Professor CliflTord was very happy in defining science as 
 organiased common sense. The foundation of its widest general 
 creations is laid, not in any artificial theories, but in the natural 
 belieft and tendencies of the human mind. Its position against 
 those who deny these generalizations is quite analogous to that taken 
 by the Scottish school of philosophy against the skepticism of 
 Hume. 
 
 It may be asked, if the methods and language of science corres- 
 pond to those of practical life,— why is not the every day discipline 
 of that life as good as the discipline of science? The Ruswer is, 
 that the power of transferring the modes of, thought of common 
 life to subjects of a higher order of geuerality is a rare faculty 
 
 
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To SOCIAL PBOOltBSS. 
 
 16 
 
 which can be acquired only by scientific discipline. What we want 
 is that in public affairs men shall reason about questions of finance, 
 trade, national wealth, legislation and administration with the same 
 consciousness of the practical side that they reason about their own 
 interests. When this habit is once acquired and appreciated, the 
 scientific method will naturally be applied to the study of questions 
 of social policy. When a scientific interest is taken in such ques- 
 tions, their boundaries will be extended beyond the utilities imme- 
 diately involved, and then the last condition of unceasing progress 
 will be complied with. 
 
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