MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 FROM THE 
 
 CAPITULATION BY DE RAMEZAY, 
 
 ON THE ISth SEPTEMBER, 1759. 
 
 TO THE 
 
 EAISING OF THE SIEGE BY DE LEVIS, 
 
 BETWEEN THE 
 
 NIGHT OF THE 17ih AND THE MORNING OF THE 18th MAY, 17G0. 
 
 ^■ — ■ I > I ^^X"*- 
 
 BY DR. W, J. ANDERSON, 
 
 PRESIDENT OF THE LITERARY AND HltsTOPICAT, SOCIETY OF QUEBEC. I 
 
 X 
 
 I I ^m » ' 
 
 PRINTED BY MIDDLETON & DAWSON, AT THE '« GA/ETTE" 
 GENERAL PRINTING ESTABLISHMENT. 
 
 1870. 
 
 \ 
 

^HHarg #|erati0n0 at ^mkc, 
 
 FROM 
 
 SEPT. I8II1, 1159, TO MAY M, 1160. 
 
ilitarg operations at #irekt, 
 
 1759-1760. 
 
 In this paper, I propose to bring under Ihe notice of the 
 Society General Murray's despatch to Mr. Secretary Pitt, 
 dated May 25th, 1760, which has been casually referred ta 
 by Mr. LeMoine and other writers, but which, so far as I am 
 aware, has been only published in extenso by Hawkins in 
 his Picture of Quebec, which is now out of print, and very 
 difficult of access ; so much so, that I was not aware of the 
 existence of the despatch, till a few weeks ago, when a copy 
 irom the Archives of Nova Scotia was forwarded to me 
 from Halifax, through the kindness of Mr. T. B. Akins, 
 Commissioner of Records. 
 
 In connexion with this despatch, I shall present copies of 
 some oilier documents corroborative of it, together ..ith such 
 comments as appear to me to be naturally suggested by the 
 various acounts which we have received of the same atlairs. 
 
 Owing to the absence of the official despatches, and 
 numerous discrepancies, we have hitherto been scarcely in a 
 position to place itnplicit reliance on any of the narratives ; 
 but now the readers of Knox's journal will be pleased to find 
 a general coincidence between his statements and those of 
 the other writers I shall adduce, and Murray, whose 
 truthfulness, candour, and accuracy of detail cannot be 
 doubted, whatever we may think of his prudence in 
 hazarding a pitched battle outside of the fortifications on the 
 28lh April, 1760, with an enemy vastly superior in numbers. 
 
4 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT qCEB£C, 
 
 The campaign of 1759 may be said to have ciosed with 
 the capitulation of Quebec ; and as the British generals had 
 been successful in their advance on Lake Champlain, the 
 capture of Fort Niagara, and the removal of the French from 
 their post between Lake Erie and the Ohio, it appeared 
 probable that unless the French were reinforced from Europe, 
 their forces in Canada, estimated at 10,000 men, including 
 6,000 regulars, would, next campaign, have to surrender, 
 and the country be yielded toGrreat Britain ; but if a French 
 armament should appear in the St. Lawrence before a British, 
 there was a possibility that Quebec might be recaptured, — at 
 any rate, it was probable that the conquest might be 
 postponed for some time, if not altogether averted. To 
 understand the actual position, we require to take into 
 account not only the numbers, but the character and 
 condition of the forces on both sides, as well as the 
 state of the garrisons, and the feeling and aspirations of the 
 Canadians. 
 
 First, in reference to the French troops : — There can be no 
 doubt that the regulars were veterans who had seen much 
 service, and that they were officered by men of distinguished 
 ability. As to the militia, though in certain quarters it has 
 been attempted to throw discredit on them (based on alleged 
 expressions of Montcalm in the bitterness of death), we must 
 agree with Mr. LeMoine, that on almost all occasions they 
 proved themselves efficient and reliable, as we would expect 
 men to be who were undoubtedly animated by the strongest 
 feelings of atlaohment to their native land, their homes and 
 altars, and by a corresponding aversion to the English, whom 
 they very naturally looked upon as ruthless invaders. It is 
 true that Wolfe wrote to Lord Holderness, on Sept. 9lh, 1759, 
 that the force under Montcalm was "A numerous body of 
 armed men, for I cannot call it an army. If the Marquis had 
 shut himself up in the town of Quebec, it would have long 
 since been in our possession, because the defences are 
 inconsiderable and our artillery formidable." Yet we ought 
 
FROM SEPT. 18th, 1759, TO MAT IStk, 1760. & 
 
 to recollect that this body of armed men was similar in 
 character to the 3,600 who, two years before, on the 8th July, 
 1758, under the same commander, at Carillon (Ticonderoga), 
 had struggled successfully for six hours, and disastrously 
 repulsed a J3ritisli army under Abercromby, composed of 
 6,300 Regulars and 9,000 Provincials, — inllicting a great 
 defeat but no disgrace on adversaries who proved their valor 
 by the persistency of their attacks, or, in the language of 
 Garneau, by their " unexampled eilbrts," and by an admitted 
 loss of 1907 men — a loss sulliciently great, one would think, 
 but which Garneau says contemporary accounts estimated at 
 iioxnfour to Jive Ihousand men^ while tiie French lost only 377. 
 When we recollect also the severe repulse which the British 
 met with at Beauport Flats, on the 31st July, 1759, we are 
 inclined to attach great weiglit to what jNIontcalm wrote 
 from Carillon : — " OIi ! such troops as ours, my dear Doreil ; 
 I never saw their match !" — and are justified in thinking 
 that the troops in Canada after the capitulation of Quebec 
 were by no means to be despised. 
 
 Now, as to the fortress of Quebec, we can infer what 
 Wolfe's opinion was, from the expression of ihe letter just 
 quoted; what Montcalm thought of it we are equally 
 competent to judge from his exclamation, when he was 
 informed Wolfe's army was on the Plains of Abraham ,: 
 "They have at last got to the weak side of this wretched 
 garrison." The wretched garrison had been made more 
 wretched by the bombardment which had destroyed the 
 eastern jjart of the Lower Town, amounting to 535 houses. 
 
 Thirdly, as to the |)opulalion : — When Wolfe enlered the St. 
 Lawrence, he issued a proclamation, stating that he had not 
 come to make war on the hahilaiUs^ whom he recommended 
 to remain at their occupations, promising them protection 
 and the free exercisu of their religion ; yet, so hostile was 
 their feeling, that he found (as the French subsequently did 
 in Spain) an enemy behind every free and bank. This, as 
 we have already staled, was, perhaps, (juite natural, and is 
 
6 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 entitled to our respect ; and it was still more to be expected, 
 that, after the devastations which had been compulsarily 
 perpetrated by the British on the rural districts before the 
 capitulation, the feelings of the habitants should be still more 
 exacerbated, and, unless under the guns of the fortress, that 
 they should be actively hostile and aiding Levis by supplies 
 which were withheld from the British. 
 
 This, then, was the state of things in October, when Murray 
 was left in command : there was a wretched fortress, a 
 hostile population, an enemy numbering 10,000 combatants, 
 under an able and energetic commander, who now also held 
 command of the river, and was, moreover, encouraged by 
 the active sympathies of a friendly population ; Murray, on 
 the other hand, though he was left 7000 men, sustained by 
 the prestige of victory, knew from the feeling of the 
 population that he had no control over the country beyond 
 his entrenchments, and that he had to encounter a severity 
 of climate to which his soldiers were unaccustomed, and for 
 which, as subsequent events proved, they were very ill- 
 prepared. 
 
 On referring to the dcs|)atches written at the time, we find 
 Admiral Saunders wrote to Governor VV'hitmoro, at Cape 
 Breton : — " I have the sali.-^faction of informing you that we 
 have been in possession of Quebec ever since the 18lh instant ; 
 and as it is found practicable to keep possession of it^ I believe 
 you will not receive any troops from hence." 
 
 And Sir JcfTery Amherst wrote to Gov. Pownall on the 
 15lh Nov.: — "1 have this moment received a letter from 
 Brigadier-General Moncton, bearing date at Quebec, the 25th 
 Sept. I .St, acquainting me that from the strength of the army 
 under his command, he don't think there is a man more than 
 ought to stay at the place." He also wrote that there was still 
 some clothing at New York belonging to the regiment at 
 Quebec. 
 
FROM S4PT. 18th, 1759, TO MAY 18th, 17G0. 7 
 
 On the 4th March, 1760, Amherst again wrote to Governor 
 Lawreace, saying that ho had received intelligence from 
 Quebec, under date 26lh Jany., that the French fleet of sixteen 
 vessels came down the river and anchored in sight of the 
 town ; that seven had passed the garrison in the night, five 
 were cast away, and the rest had returned back up the river. 
 That Captain Miller, of the Sea-horse, with a lieutenant and 
 forty-four seamen, had gone on board one of the abandor ed 
 vessels, and that all were blown up, only two being saved. 
 That four frigates were wintering up the river, and some in 
 Graspe. He adds : — " This intelligence was brought by Lieut. 
 Montresor, who, with an officer and ten rangers, loft Quebec 
 on 26lh Jany., came by the Chaudiere and Amerascaegen 
 rivers, and got to Boston in thirty-one days ; he adds, when 
 he left Quebec, all was well there, that they had plenty of 
 fresh provisions, and that there was still a great deal left 
 when he came away ; and that Brigadier Murray had taken 
 post at St. Foy and Lorettc, whereby his wood-cutters were 
 perfectly secure, as were also his garrison, from a line of 
 block-houses he had caused to be erected on the outside of 
 his works ; in sbort, that he was in a perfect state of defence, 
 and prepared against everything the enemy might attempt; 
 indeed, nothing can be more unlikely than the enemy 
 attempting anything there ; but the repairs have made it a 
 formidable place for such a numerous garrison, and with the 
 chain of bloc':-housos, Quebec is now much more respectable 
 than ever it was. He also adds that six thousand Canadians 
 had taken the oaths and brought in their arms, and they 
 seemed much pleased with their change of masters ; that he 
 employed several of them, whom he paid, and that they did 
 their business cheerfully and well." 
 
 Amherst also wrote that he had despatched an express to 
 Lord Colville, requesting him to take the earliest opportunity 
 of preventing any succours from getting up to the enemy, but 
 also intercepting the frigates and vessels that had wintered 
 in the St. Lawrence and Gaspe, and thereby prevent M. 
 Vaudreuil having any communication with France. 
 
B MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QtJEBEC, 
 
 Mr. LnMoinp, in his preliminary remarks to the account of 
 the b;Utlo of St. Foy, in his Maple Leaves^ says: " There are 
 so many accounts of the St. Foy battle that it seems 
 superfluous to dwell at length on the subject. We have the 
 story of eye-wilnessps, s^uch as Mante, Knox, Fraser ; also of 
 Chevalier Johnston, a Scotchman, fighting in Canada for the 
 cause of France. We also have Smith's account, not over 
 correct, and Garneau's narrative, probably the most complete, 
 and collated from documents, many of which had never 
 seen the light before. He computes the English force at 
 7,714, exclusive of officers. The French force were more 
 numerous ; there were among them, 3,000 Montreal and 
 Three Rivers militia, and 400 savages ; the Quebec district 
 having been compelled by Greneral Murray to swear 
 allegiance to the English monarch." 
 
 Garneau is considered by the English to write from a 
 French-Canadian point of view, as strongly as Smith is 
 supposed by the French Canadians to write from the opposite. 
 We may get some light on the subject, not by referring to 
 other English writers, who from their unanimity may be 
 thought to be all animated with a feeling which obscured theit 
 correct vision, but from another Canadian historian, the Abbe 
 Ferland, who writes, page 596 : — " The English lost 500 men, 
 and the French 700, including many officers. We had not more 
 than 4,500 in the battle. The victory is due to the valor of the 
 troops and of the Canadians, and the conduct of the officers." 
 In a footnote the Abbe says this is fromZem' letter, still extant 
 in Paris. He further says, Murray marched out with 4000 
 men. Here is at once a difference of 3,714 (nearly one-half) 
 between Garneau and Ferland. We will state why a 
 preference should be given to Ferland. According to English 
 official statements, and also according to Fraser, there were 
 in Wolfe's expedition to Quebec 8,600 men, including 1,000 
 marines, 300 artillery, and 400 rangers. It can be established 
 that from the time of the arrival to the battle of the 13th Sept., 
 Wolfe's army ;\ad rutl under 1,000 put hors de combat, Garneau 
 
■rnoM SEPT. 18tH, 1759, to may 18th, 1700. 9 
 
 sSiVf, at the battle of Bcauport Flats alone, their loss was 500 
 killed and wounded, that of the French being inconsiderable. 
 The British admit a loss of 61 killed and 600 wounded in the 
 battle of the 13ih September: it may, therefore, without any 
 great stretch of belief, be admitted that the British force left 
 with Murray did not exceed 7,000 men ; Mante makes it 
 7,300 ; Lord Mahon, " above 6,000 men." 
 
 But it is better for us to stop here, and let Murray himself 
 irecite how it came to pass that an army which had been left 
 with him in October, 1759, in good health, and confident la 
 Iheir numbers and late success, and which continued to be 
 in fine condition down to the 26th Jany. following, was so 
 reduced by the 28th April, that he was able to march out of 
 Quebec, and take his position at the St. Foy Road, not with 
 4000 men, as stated by Ferland, but with 3000, as we will 
 by and by see, the whole force then available ; and we 
 will see whether, as Lord Mahon alleges, " it seems contrary 
 to common sense to choose to try the fortune of war in the 
 open field, instead of reserving the troops for the defence of a 
 fortified post," and that his conduct originated from being 
 *' flushed with victory, and emulous of the fame of Woife." 
 
 I shall now read Murray's letter: 
 
 " General Murray to Mr. Secretary Piit. 
 
 " Quebec, May 25lb, 1760. 
 
 " Sir, — Having acqualated General Amherst, three weeks ago, that Qaebec 
 was besieged by an army of 15,000 men, I think it necessary to do myaelf the 
 bonor of addressing directly to you the more agreeable nowa of tbe siege being 
 raised, leat, by your receiving the former intelligence before tbe latter, some 
 incoaveaieace might arise to Ilia Majesty's service. 
 
 " By the journal of my proceedings since I have had the command here, which 
 I have the honor to transmit to you, you will perceive the superiority we have 
 maintained over the enemy during the winter, and that all Lower Canada, from 
 the Poinie-aux-Tre'tiblen, was reduced, and had taken the oath of fidelity to the 
 King. You will, no doubt, bo pleasel to observe, that the enemy's attempts 
 upon our posts, and ours upon their?, all tended to the honor of His Majesty's 
 arms, as they were always bafiSed, and we wore constantly lucky. I wish 
 
 B 
 
10 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 I coald Bay as much within the walls ; the ezceaslTe coldues3 of the climate, and 
 constant living upon salt provision!?, without any vegetables, introduced the 
 Bcnrvy among the troops, which, getting tho better of every precaution of tha 
 ofBcer, and every remedy of the surgeon, became as universal as it was 
 inveterate ; in so much, that bcfurc the end of April 1,000 were dead, and 
 above 2,000 of what remained totally unfit for any cervice. 
 
 " In this situation, I received certain intelligence that the Chevalier de Levis 
 was assembling his army, which had been cantoned in the neighbourhood of 
 Montreal ; that he had completed his eight battalions and 40 companies of tho 
 troupes de colonie from the choice of the Montrealists ; had formed these 40 
 companies into four battalions ; and was determined to besiege us the moment 
 the St. Lawrence was open, of which he was entirely master, by means of four 
 King's frigates and other craft proper for this extraordinary river. 
 
 " As I had the honor to acquaint you formerly that Quebec could be looked 
 upon in no other light than that of a strong cantonment, and tha* any works I 
 should add to it would bo in that style, my plan of defence was, to take the 
 earliest opportunity of ent"enoh;ng myself upon the heights of Abraham, which 
 entirely command the ramparts of the place at the distance of 800 yards, and 
 might have been defended by our numb rs against a largo array. But the 
 Chevalier de Levis did not give me time to take the advantage of this situation. 
 The 23rd, 24tb, aud 25th of April, I attempted to execute the projected lines, for 
 which a provision of fascines, and of every necessary material, had been made j 
 but found it impracticable, as the earth was still covered with enow in many 
 places, and everywhere impregnably bound up by frost. 
 
 " The night of the 26th, I was informed the enemy had landed at Pointe-aux- 
 Trembles 10,000 men and 500 barbarians. The post we had taken at the 
 embouchure of the river Cap Rouge, (the most convenient place for 
 disembarking their artillery and stores, and for securing their retreat,) obliged 
 them to laud where they did, 20 miles higher up. 
 
 " The 27th, having broke down aU the bridges over the Cap Rouge, and 
 secured the landing-places at Sillery anil the Foulon, I marched with the 
 grenadiers, piquets, Auiherst's regiment, and two field-pieces, and took post 
 so advantageoi'.sly as to frustrate the ecLume tbey had laid, of cutting-off 
 our posts. 
 
 " They had begun to form from the defile they were obliged to pass, but 
 thought proper to retreat on recounoitering our position ; and about four this 
 afternoon, we marched back to town, having withdrawn all our posts, with the 
 loss of two men only, though they did everything in their power to harass 
 the rear. 
 
 " The enemy was greatly superior in number, it is true ; but, when I 
 considered that our little army was in tho habit of beating that enemy, and 
 bad a very fine train of field artillery; that shutting ourselves up at once 
 within the walls nas putting all upon the single chance of holding out for a 
 
FROM SEPT, 18th, 1759, TO MAY ISth, 1760. 11 
 
 considerable time a wretched fortification, (a chance which an action In the 
 field could hardly alter, at the same time that it gave an additional one, 
 perhaps a better,) I resolved to give them battle ; and if tb , e7ent was not 
 prosperous, to hold out to the last extremity, and then to retreat to 'he isle of 
 Orleans or Coudres with what was left of the garrison, to wait for 
 reinforcementB, 
 
 " This night, the necessary orders were given ; and half-an-hour after six next 
 morniDg, we marched with all the force I could muster, viz., 3,000 men, and 
 formed the army on the heights'in the following order :— Amberst's, Anstruther's, 
 2nd battalion of Royal Americans, and Webb's, composed the right brigade, 
 commanded by Col. Burton ; Kennedy's, Lascelles's, the Highlanders, and 
 Townshend's, the left brigade, commanded by Col. Fraser ; Otway's and the 
 third battalion of Royal Americana were the corps de reserve. Major Dalling's 
 corps of light infantry covered the right flank ; and Captain Hazzcn's company 
 of Rangers, with 100 volunteers, under the command of Captain Donald 
 Macdonald, a brave aad experienced officer, covered the left. The battalions 
 bad two field-pieces. 
 
 "While the line was fortning, I reconnoitered the enemy, and perceived their 
 van had taken possession of the rising ground, three-quarters of a mile in our 
 front, but that their army was upon the march, in one column, as far as I could 
 Bee. I thought this the lucky moment, and moved with the utmost order to 
 attack them before they had formed. We soon beat them from the heights they 
 had possessed, though they were well disputed ; and Major Dalling, who cannot 
 be too much commended for his behaviour this day, and for his services during 
 the winter, forced their corps of grenadiers from a house and wind-mill they 
 had taken hold of to cover their left flank. Here, he and several of his officers 
 were wounded. His men, however, pursued the fugitives to the corps which 
 were now formed to sustain them ; they halted and dispersed along the front 
 of the right, which prevented that wing from taking advanta<?e of the first 
 impression they had made on the enemy's left. They had, immediately, orders 
 given them to regain the flank ; but in attempting this, they were charged, 
 thrown into disorder, retired to the rear, and from the number of officers killed 
 and wounded, could never again be brought up during this action. Otway's 
 was instantly ordered to advance and sustain the right wing, whicli the enemy 
 in vain made two attempts to penetrate. On these occasions. Captain Ince, 
 with the grenadiers of Otway's, were distinguished. While this passed there, 
 the left was not idle : they had dispossessed the enemy of two redoubts, and 
 sustained with unparalleled firmness the bold united efforts of the enemy's 
 regulars, Indians and Canadians ; till at last, fairly fought down, and reduced 
 to a handful, though sustained by the third battalion of Royal Americans f'-om 
 the reserve, and Kennedy's from the centre, where we had nothing to iear, 
 they were obliged to yield to superior numbers and a fresh column of Rouasiilon, 
 which penetrated. 
 
 " The disorder of the left was soon communicated to the right ; but thet 
 whole retired in such a way that the enemy did not venture upcjn a brisk 
 
12 MILITARY OPIEHATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 pursuit. * We left moat of our cannon, as the roughnoss of the ground and the 
 wreaths of snow made it impossiblo to bring them off ; what could not b& 
 brought ofiT were nailed up. 
 
 '•Our killed and wounded amounted to one-third of those in tho field ; that 
 of the enemy, by their own confeBslou, exceeds 2500 men, which may be readily 
 conceired, as the action lasted an hour and three-quarters. 
 
 " Here I think it my duty to express my gratitude to the offlcera in; 
 general, and the satisfaction I had in the bravery of all the troops. 
 
 " On the night of the 28th, the enemy opened trenches against the town, and 
 at the same time we set to work within to fortify it, which we never hac» in our 
 power to attempt sooner, for the severity of this climate during the winter, and 
 the absolute necessity of executing work of more immediate importance last 
 autumn, before the frost set in. I wanted the assistance of Major Mackellar* 
 the chief engineer, dangerously wounded in the action ; his zeal tor and 
 knowledge in the service is well known ; bat the alacrity of the garrison made* 
 np for every defect. 
 
 •>4 ^ " My journal of the siege, which accompanies this, sets forth in full what was 
 
 done ; and I flatter myself the extraordinary performances of the handful of 
 brave men I had left, will please His Majesty as much as they surprised us, who 
 were eye-witnesses of them. 
 
 " Great praise is due to Commodore Swanlon, and the Captains Schombprg 
 and Deane : 1 have not words to expresd the readiness, vivacity, and valor they 
 shewed in attacking and destroying tho enemy's squadron. C&pt. Deane has 
 lost his ship ; but it was in a good cause, and be bad done honour to 
 bis country. 
 
 " The morning of the I7th May, I had intended a strong sortie, to bava 
 penetrated into the enemy's camp, which, from the information of the prisoners 
 I had taken, and the concurrent accounts of deserters, I conceived to b& 
 very practicable. 
 
 "For this purpose I had ordered the regiments of Amherst, Townshend^ 
 Lascelles, Anstruther, and Highlanders, with the Grenadiers and light infantry 
 under arms, but was informed by Lieutenant M'Alpin, of my battalion, (whom 
 I sent out to amuse the enemy with small sallies,) that their trenches were 
 abandoned. 
 
 "I instantly pushed out, at the head of these corps, not doubting but we 
 must have overtaken and forced their rear, and had ample revenge for the 28tli 
 of April ; but I was disappointed, tor they hud crossed the river Cap Rouge 
 before we could come up with them. However, we took several prisoners and 
 much baggage, which would otherwise have escaped. They loft their camp 
 standing; all their baggage, stores, magazines of provisions and ammunition ; 
 34 pieces of battering cannon, four of which are brass 12-pounder8 ; ten field- 
 pieces ; six mortars ; four petards ; a large quantity of Bcaling-ladders, and 
 
rROM SEPT. 18th, 1759, to may 18th, 1760. 13 
 
 entrencbing tools beyond number ; and have retired to their former asylum, 
 Jacques Carticr. From the iaformation of prisoner?, deserters, and spies, 
 provisions are very scarce ; ammunition does not abound, and ihe greatest part 
 of the Canadians have deserted them. At present, they do not exceed above 
 five thousand men. The minute I am joined with that part of my garrison 
 which was sent from hence last autumn, I shall endeavour to co-operate with 
 Mr. Amhera!, towards completing the reduction of the country ; though, if 
 rightly informed, he can hardly act by the lakes before the month of July ; of 
 which I am the more convinced, because, from tho intelligence forwarded to 
 him last February, of the enemy's designs, by Lieutenant Montrosor, be 
 would certainly have been upon them before now, had it been at all 
 practicable. 
 
 " Major Maitland, the bearer of those despatches, who has acted as adjutant- 
 general this last winter, is well acquainted with all our transactions here ; he 
 baa a thorough knowledge of the country, and can give you the best lights 
 with regard to the measures further to be taken relative to His Majesty's views 
 in Canada. 
 
 " I cannot finish this long letter without observing howtauch I think myself 
 obliged to the Lieutenant-Governor, Col. Burton : bis activity and zeal were 
 conspicuous during tho whole course of this severe winter campaign ; and I 
 flatter myself, sir, you will be pleased to lay his services before Ilis Majesty. 
 
 " P. S.— Since I have wrote the above, a nation of Indiana has surrendered, 
 and entered into tin alliance with us. 
 
 " I have the honour to bo, with great regard, Sir, yours, &c., 
 
 "Jas. Mcrbat." 
 
 I shall next invite your attention to the other documents 
 referred to in my introduction. The first of these, which 
 appeared in the London Magazine in 1760, furnishes details 
 of the proceedings of Commodore S wanton and Captains 
 Schomberg and Deane, to which General Murray so 
 thankfully refers in the despatch which has just been read. 
 It is as follows : 
 
 " Admiralty Office, June 27, 1760. 
 
 " Captain Schomberg arrived this morning, with despatches from Lord Colville 
 and Commodore Swanton. dated at Quebec, tho 24lh of May, giving an account 
 that on the 11th of that month, the latter arrived at tho isle of Bic, in tho river 
 of St. Lawrence, with the Vanguard and Diana, where he intended to wait for 
 such of his squadron as had separated from him in his passage from England ; 
 but having on the Mth received advice from Brigadier-General Murray that 
 the enemy had besieged Quebec, he got under sail with the utmost despatch, 
 and aaobored above Point Levi on the 15 tb, in the evening, where he 'found 
 
14 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 the Lowestoffe, one of hia squadron, which arrived a few days before, and whose 
 commander, Captain Deanc, immediately came o£f to him with a message from 
 the general, earnestly recommending the speedy removal of the French naval 
 force above the town, consisting of two frigates, two armed ships, and many 
 smaller vessels ; in consequence of which, he ordered Captain Schomberg, of the 
 Diana, and Captain Deanc, of the Lowentoffe, to slip their cables early the next 
 morning, and attack the enemy ; but they were no sooner in motion than the 
 enemy fled in the greatest hurry and disorder. The Pomena, one cf the 
 frigates, was driven on shore above Cape Diamond ; the Atlanta, tlie other 
 frigate, run ashore, and was burnt at Pointe-aux-Trembles, about tea leagues 
 above the town ; and most of the other ships and vessels were liliewise driven 
 ashore or effectually destroyed. 
 
 " The night following, the enemy raised the siege of Quebec very precipitately, 
 leaving tneir cannon, small arms, stores, &c., behind them. 
 
 r 
 
 " The Lowestoffe ran upon some unknown rocks, in pursuit of the enemy, and 
 was irrecoverably lost ; but the officers and men were saved. 
 
 " Lord Colville sailed from Halifax, with the squadron under his command, on 
 the 22nd of April, but did not arrive at Quebec till the 18th of May, having 
 been much retarded in his parsage by thick fogs, great quantities of ice, and 
 contrary winds."— (From London Magazine for 1760.) 
 
 I give, next, the statement contained in the Gentleman^s 
 Magcusiney 1760, vol. 30, which appears headed — 
 
 ♦' The French Account of the Transactions of their Army in Canada, under 
 the command of the Chevalier de Levis, from the 18th April to the 18lh 
 May, 1760. 
 
 " On the 17th of April, we left Montreal, under the command of M. Levis, with 
 the following battalions of regulars, Canadians, and Indians : 
 
 Men. 
 
 One battalion of the Queen's regiment 500 
 
 One ditto regiment of Bayard 500 
 
 One ditto Guienne 500 
 
 One ditto Languedoo 500 
 
 One ditto Laffarre 509 
 
 One ditto Roussillon 500 
 
 Two ditto Berry 1000 
 
 Two ditto Marines 1000 
 
 "In all, ten battalions ; but as they were defective, the whole is supposed to 
 have amounted to 4,500 regulars, besides 6,000 Canadians, of which 200 were 
 mounted, and formed a body of horse ; 250 Indians, of the Iroquois and other 
 nations. Our provisions, ammunition, and heaviest baggage, were carried 
 down in six frigates, from 44 to 26 guns, who had under their convoy a great 
 number of schooners, bateaox, and other small craft lor the army. We had nine 
 
FROM siPT. 18th, 1759, TO MAT 18th, 17G0. 15 
 
 ijays' march from Montreal to Cap Rouge, and on the tenth day atrlved on 
 the Plains of Abraham, three miles from Quebec, Eleven companlca of 
 grenadiers advanced, while the rest of the army were posted in the houses on 
 each side of the road leading from Cap Rouge to Quebec ; at about half a 
 league's distance, wo met an advanced party of the English, with whom we 
 h«d three or four different skirmishes, in their retreat to the town. The 28tb, 
 about nine in the morning, we perceived the body of the English garrison in 
 motion, beating the generate; at ten, were formed the regiments of Rotisaillon 
 and Laffarre in the centre ; the regiments of Gukane, Bayard's, and Queen's 
 oa the right ; and the regiments of Languedoc, Berry, and the grenadiers, on 
 the left. We formed a line three deep, and in the intervals of the regulars 
 were posted the Canadians. The battalions of Ifarines, with the Indians, were 
 advantageously posted in the entrance of a wood. The English advanced 
 with great rcsolu;ion, with their flcld-pieces in front, and their first impression 
 was such as oblig,ed our centre to give way ; but we soon recovered our 
 disorder, and continued returning the compliment of their fire. Our wings at 
 the same time advanced, and formed a semi-circle npon the enemy's flanks ; 
 whereupon they thought proper to return into the town, leaving us the field, theii^ 
 artillery, and above 2000 entrenching tools. la this action, M. Bon la Mare 
 commanded on the right, M. Dumas in the centre, and M, Levis on the left. 
 We opened ground that evening, and continued working till the 7th of T^fay, 
 when we began to batter the walls with twelve iron pieces of 12-pounders, which 
 continued till the arrival of the Vanguard, which M. Levis imagining to be 
 only the foremost of a large reinforcement, raised the siege, after nailing somo 
 of his battering cannon, and leaving the heaviest of his baggage behind, the 
 artillery taken from the English having been sent up the river in one of the 
 ships. I compute, in the action of the 28lh of April, our loss to be about 1800 
 killed and wounded. When wo left Montreal, it was in a weak state of 
 defence, not above ten pieces of indifferent cannon mounted on the walls. The 
 garrison consists of about 2000 men, mostly Canadians ; but there does not 
 appear to be any scarcity of provisions among thtiia,"— {From the Gentleman's 
 Magazine, 1760, vol. 30.) 
 
 Another document, furnished me by Mr. T. B. Akins, is 
 taken from a London magazine of the day, and headed 
 as follows : 
 
 " To supply in some measure the want of General Murray's Journal 
 mentioned in the Gazelle, which we were in hopes would have been commu- 
 nicated to the public, we shall present our readers with the following account 
 of the proceedings at Quebec, which is the most minute that hath yefr 
 appeared. — {English Magazine, 1760.) 
 
 " Letter from an Officer of the ' Royal American Regiment.' 
 
 " Quebec, May 24tb, 1760. 
 
 " Sib,— I believe a true account of our winter campaign will not be 
 uaaooeptable to the military gentlemen. Bat before I eater upon what baa 
 
i6 MILITARY OPEnATIONS AT QUEfeEC, 
 
 lately passed, it will bo neccMary to pivo an account of oar amy, anrl of the city 
 and forlificalions of Quelicc, at Ihe lime our fleet left us laPt year, with a true 
 Btato of t.ho French aiTjy, the number of Catui'lians or savages they had thea 
 ton foot ; and lastly, to point out the several advantages they had over us. 
 
 " Ten battalions, two companies of the artillery, one company of the 
 ilangers, all harassed by one of the most fatiguing and difficult campaigns, 
 inany of them afflicted with scurvy, in all 7,000 men, made up our army. 
 
 " The city of Quebec, that was to be our winter quarters, and our sole 
 dependence, was by uo means secure against a coup-dc-main. Six bastions, 
 with their curtains, that formed a chain from the scarf of Cap Diamant to that 
 tof St. Roc, was then our whole defence ; no foot-bank to the curtains, no 
 embrasures made, no covered way, nor any outworks ; and fiaally, the cannoQ 
 oa the flanks so bad that they were quite aseless. 
 
 " It would be impossible to describe the miserable state of tho city. Near 
 cne-third of the houses were reduced to ashes ; and what remained were so 
 ehattered by the cannon during our besieging it, that very few were fit to be 
 inhabited. 
 
 " The French army consisted of five battalions of old troops, thirty Companiea 
 of marines, two companies of light-horse, 1200 savages, and about 8,000 
 Canadians, being in all about 13,000 men, all in good health, and who had not 
 ilndergone a tenth part of the fatigue our troops had been exposed to. 
 
 " That army had undoubtedly many advantages over us : first, the men wero 
 healthy ; second, they were perfectly acquainted with tho country ; third, thoy 
 had fresh provisions in abundance, having under their dominion all the soutll 
 coast from Quebec downwards ; lastly, none of our motions could escape them, 
 by the uncommon situation of the town. 
 
 " Such was the army we had to contend with. It may, perhaps, be^thoughk 
 we have been blockaded all winter, but this was not the case ; wc staid within 
 the walls no longer than was necessary to repair our houses and render them 
 habitable, and to secure our ramparts against a coup-de-main. 
 
 " The repairing near 500 houses, building eight redoubts of wood out of the 
 city, making foot-banks along tho ramparts, openinsr embrasures, placing our 
 cannon, blocking-up all the avenues of the suburbs with a stockade, carrying 
 eleven months' provisions into the highest part of the city, and forming a 
 magazine of 4,000 fascines, were only tho forerunners of the toils and fatigues 
 that still were reserved for us. 
 
 «' The enemy's patrols all this time carried off our cattle, often under the 
 cannon of the place, though not always with impunity. As soon as we had 
 taken all the precautions human prudence could dictate for our owa 
 preBorvation, we took the field. Six hundred men marched out in two columns ; 
 the oae, of 200, weat to St. Foy ; the other, of 400, to Lorelte. We took post 
 
Vrom s*pt. 18th, 1759, to mat 18th, 1766. 17 
 
 at both places ; and as soon as they wero secured, a corps of 700 mon marched 
 to St, Aagustin, brought ofl the enemy'a advarioed guard, with many cattle, 
 and disarmed the inhabitants. 
 
 " These two posts were of the ereatest importance. First, they gare ns an 
 opportunity of watching the enemy's motions, while they covere^lours ; second, 
 they put under our dominion eleven parishes, which greatly contribated to 
 furnish us with fresh provisions during the winter, and whatever was necessary 
 for subsistence, and at the same time relieved the ga -Lson in the works they 
 were carrying on , lastly, by furni.shing us vvith wood, an article of the utmoafc 
 don.sequence, and which de.serves a particular confideralion. When the fleet 
 left us. we bad, at roost, firing for fifteen or ten dayn. Winter came on with 
 hasty strides ; the forest of Si. Fuii- was the nearest to the town ; we wautsd 
 near 16,00(1 cords of wood for the hospitals, guards and quarters, and we had 
 Rt that time but very little felled on (he Island of Orleans, the transporting 
 It was extremely slow and difWcult, as t;he river was then covered with lioating 
 iice. Very few days after wo bad secured the posts of Lorette artd St. Fois, we 
 lidt 200 fellers at work and made a sufficient number of hand-sledges. Towards 
 the latter end ot November, we began to distribute firing. The several 
 regiments sent out all the men off duty with these sledges, and they brought 
 *8 much wood to the garrison as they could drag, It is to bo observed that 
 this work was carried on during three months, at a season of tho year which, 
 for its 8e"erity, may be said to be unknown to European cliuiates. 
 
 '' Our affaira wearing then a good a!<pect, and finding ourselves secured 
 against sudden attack, a detachment of 200 men was sent beyond the St. 
 Lawrence; they disarmed the inhabitants, and made them take the oaths of 
 allegiance. This step made us masters of all the south coast, and supplied us 
 with great quantities of fresh provisions. 
 
 " Some time before the French army had taken up their winter quartern, 
 their advanced posts were at PoihU.-aHT-Trembks, St. Augusthr, and Le 
 Caloaire, the remainder of their army was between les Trois Rivieres and 
 Jacques Cartier. The French generals being informed that our garri.sou 
 diminished daily, by tho constant and unavoidable hardships we were exposed 
 to, resolved in carry the place by main force in the midst of winter. In pursuit 
 of that scheme, they made all the necessary preparations ; rackets or snow-shoes 
 were distributed to the soldiery, nnd great numbers of scaling-ladders wero 
 made ; they even exercised the men to fix and mount the scaling-ladders. 
 The attack was to have been made towards the middle of February ; and 
 Dotnithstaading all their precautious to cuuuoal their designs, by cutting off 
 all oommunications with Jacques Cartier, whici: hitherto had been open to tho 
 Canadians, wo were apprised of their intentions. The enemy, who had never 
 lost sight of theii pro.jeot, sent a delachmeut to Points. Levis, to take post there, 
 to collect together the inhabitants of the southern shore, and strengthen their 
 army therewith, and to form a magazine of provisioaa: the posts of Calraira 
 and St. Augustia wore also reiutorceii by some companioa of grenadiers. 
 
18 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 " The enemy had been about eight days in possession of Point Levy, busied 
 In heaping up a great quantity of flour, and Icilling 400 oxen for the subsistence 
 of their army during the expedition, when oar light infantry, with a detachment 
 of 200 men, dislodged them (we could not attempt it sooner, the river not 
 being frozen over). Their retreat being very precipitate, they lost but few 
 tnen ; one ofBder and eleven private men only were made prisoners ; but we 
 became masters of the greatest part of their provisions. We took post in iho 
 St Joseph Church until we had built two wooden redoubts, and mounted 
 cannon on one of them. 
 
 " A few days after, the enemy came with a greater force to recover the said 
 post ; but having timely notice of li, some battalions were ordered to march 
 over the ice to cut them off , others, with the light infantry, to attack them 
 while they were besieging the church. The enemy, finding themselves 
 surrounded on all sides, thought of a retreal, which was so precipitate, thAt, 
 notwithstanding our troops marched with all possible diligence, they overtook 
 only part of the rear. After this retreat, we finished our redoubts, felled many 
 trees, and secured our posts from the danger of any insult. The same 
 detachment that had attempted to force us, went some days after and took post 
 at St. Michel, below Point fjevy. Wo did not think proper to molest them, 
 considering the great distance they were from us. 
 
 ' It seemed now probable the French tad altered their views ; that they 
 would postpone any further attack to the spring, and then form a regular 
 siege ; at least, all their preparations seemed to indicate it. They began 
 rigging their ships, repairing their barques and boats, building galleys, casting 
 balls aud bombs, and making a prodigious quantity of fascines and gabions ; 
 in short, prepared everything that was necessary for a siege. Wo, on the other 
 hand, made a great number of fascines, paliisades, and stakes, to intrench 
 ourselves on the heights of Abraham, as soon as the season would permit. 
 
 " While these preparations were making on both sides, part of our light 
 Infantry, with a detachment from the army, went and surprised the enemy's 
 advanced posts at St. Augustin, Maison Bruise, and le Calvairo ; and not- 
 withstanding their aleitness in retreating, we took ninety prisoners, Some 
 time after, they hoped to take their ri'ven«e, by att'^mpting to carry ofTour 
 wood-cutters and rangers that covered Lorette and St. Foix , but they 
 were repulsed. 
 
 " Oar circumstances became daily more critical There was a great 
 probability the French army and ships would tall down the river as soon as it 
 opened, and (the ground being yet frozen) that wa would not have time to 
 complete our intvenchmenla. These considerations induced us to send the 
 light infantry to ( 'ap Rouge, with orders to fortify that post, as well to prevbnt 
 the enemy's landing tharo as to be nearer at hand to observe their motions. 
 The works had bardly b.'gan when the fiO!<t broise up : the enemy's ships fell 
 down and landed their army at SI. Augustin, and nuirohnd directly towards 
 Lorette, In order to surpriec that post, and cut off those of Uup Uouge aud St. 
 
FROM SEPT. 18th, 1759, TO MAY 18th, 17C0 19 
 
 Poix. We preveoted their euccees : the detachineat at I.oretie fell back on 
 8t. Foix, aad part ot ttie garrisou marched oat aad covered the relreat from 
 these posts, witQ the loss of two men only. 
 
 " The night between the 27th and 28th April, the whole French nrtny 
 was at Ht. Foix, and t'.eir advanced posts within muskfit-shot of the town Oa 
 the 28th, in the mornii x< our light inlaiitry and volunteers marched out. drove 
 off tho enemy's van, and obliged tht-m to lieep at a great distance. At nine, 
 our whole army marched out if the town, with twenty pieces of cannon, and 
 all nGC<^ssary tools and imple-nents to intrench ourbelves apon the heights of 
 Abraham, We had just reached the i;round, when we discovered the enemy'a 
 van on the small ominnncea ut the entrance of Sillery Wood, and their main 
 army marching along the road ot St. Foix. As fast as they advanced, they 
 took shelter in the wood, and formed there. This was deemed the decisive 
 moment to attack the enemy, in order to reap all tho advantage to \n'. expected 
 over an army not yet formed. In consequence of this resolution, uur men 
 advanced : eight battalions made up our first line, and two the seeund line ; 
 the light infantry and two companies of grenadiers covered oar right flank; 
 our volunteers, the ringers, and a detaclunent of 100 men. covered the i'ilt. 
 As iioon as we came within mucket-shot, our light-infantry attacked the enemy "b 
 grenadiers on the left, and repulsed them briskly; at the same instant, the 
 volunteers .md rangers attacked their right (which also gave way), and made 
 themselves masters of a redoubt the enemy had taken possession of; the 
 centre advanced posts fled without a blow. Wtiiist wo thus obliged the van to 
 fly, the body of the enemy's array advanced with great strides, and formed ia 
 columns ; as soon as formed, one of the columns came to sustain the grenadiers, 
 pursued by our light infantry : they directly wheeled round the rising grounds, 
 and took our right wing iu flank ; at the same time, another column, headed 
 by the Chevalier do Levis, wheeled round our Hank ; the battalions of the 
 eecond line immediately made a movement to tho right and lelt lo cover and 
 protect our tlanks. This was the critical moment: we wore in danger o( 
 having all the forces of C.mada to cope with, and our communication was cut 
 oil. These considerations obliged us to retreat, finding ourselves not strong 
 eaough to res-ist, and not having l)e!>o able to prevent their forming. We were 
 compelled to leave our cannon behind us, the wreaths of anow and liad roads 
 rendering it impofsible to bring ibcm otf. We had ;iOO men killed or taken 
 prisoners iu the action, and seven hundred wounded. The French lost, 
 according to their own confession, 2,600 men. 
 
 • 
 
 ' The French army consisted of ton ci>mplotc battalions (having been com- 
 pleted by picked men from llie Canadians), 400 savages and 7,1100 Cauadiaua ; 
 being, iu all, ia,000 men. Our army, before the battle, was 3,1 11 men. 
 
 "The French order of battle was ten companies of grenadiers, two of 
 volunteers, fOi) savages, for the van; eight tmttalions druwu up in four 
 oolumns, with some corps of Cannd>an» in the intervals, lor the main body ; 
 two battalions and some corps ul Canad>an» on the flank, tor the rear : and 
 lastly, 2,000 Canadian* lur >i reserve. Such was their order and intention! 
 if we had g'veu tbem time to lorui. 
 
20 Military operations at Quebec, 
 
 "The French opened their trenches In the night between the JSth and 29tb ; 
 their ships anchored at Fottlon, below their camp ; for several days they were 
 busy in landing their cannon, mortar!*, and other ammunition ; they worked 
 incessantly at perfecting their treuchey and ia raising batteries ; and on the 
 11th May, they opened three batteriet. of cannon and one bomb-batteiy. We 
 madtt the necessary dispositions to defend the plao to the last extremity -, we 
 planted cannon on every bastion, and even in tLo ourtains ;. we raised two 
 cavaliers, and made outworks. The enemy cannoraded us briskly the first day ; 
 but our artillery (which had already obliged them to change their attack) soon 
 eileaced them, and their fire ijlackened daily. Before they opened theiv 
 batteries, we had 132 pieces of cannon placed on oar ramparts, mostly dragged 
 there by the soldiofy. Notwithstanding this formidable artillery, we were so 
 circumstanced, that, bad a B'rench fleet appeared first ia the river, thfl placo 
 must inevitably have fallen, though we had resolved to make, and undoubtedly 
 would have made, the most vigorous and obstinato resistance. 
 
 " The ?th of May, one of our frigates anchored in the basin, and brought us 
 the joyful news of oar ships being in the river ; the LUb, in the evening, a 
 Bhip-of-the-ltne and a frigate auchored also opposite the town ; and early on 
 the I6th, our two trigat-'S set sail, ran above the town, and attacked the 
 French squadron, which immediately weighed anchor ; but they were so closely 
 followed, and so briskly attacked, that their whole flei^t, cousLfting ol six ships, 
 ran aground in different places ; their coramudoro was taken, and afterwards 
 destroyed. 
 
 " This was liko a thunderbolt to the French : they went off the same 
 evening, and raised the siege, with such precipitation, that they abandoned 
 thirty-four cannon, six mortars, all their field equipage, their provisions, and, 
 flnallr, an immense quoutitj of every implement necessary for the siego. Our 
 light infantry and grenadiers pursued th« enemy as far as Catp Rouge, and 
 took many prisoners. The remainder of their arm> is now at Jacques Cartier; 
 and what their further intentions are, cannot at proseut. be known to ub. 
 
 " By recapitulating all that hasboon mentioned, and adding that 1,000 men baine 
 died durin;"; the winter, and nesirly 2,000 bavo been alternately ia the hospital, 
 It will appear that 4,000, or thereabouts, have accomplished all the work, and 
 Busjtained incredible fatigues for eight mouths together, and at a season designed 
 In other countries for the relief and refrenhmeut at troops. Let it be further 
 observed, that it was impos^iblo to receive any pay during the whole winter ; 
 yet, nobody ever grumbled (a circuraBtance rery extraordinary among 
 comnum t<okliers.) Thus have we equalled, it not ^iirpasded, our fore-lathera 
 in many things." 
 
 In referemje to the battle of St. Foy, Gamciiu say.s : — "Tl>e 
 numbers of the two cotiteinling armies were nearly co-equal» 
 for De Levis left several detacliinents to protect his artillery, 
 
rROM SEPT. 18th, 1759, to may J8th, 1760. 2t 
 
 barges, and ihe bridge at Jacques Cartier^ in order to assure 
 himself a way of retreat, in case lie were worsted. The 
 cavalry took no part in the action." 
 
 As to the British ,— " Their loss was considerable, nearly a 
 fourth of their soldiers being killed or wounded. The French 
 experienced great loss, having been obliged to form rank 
 and remain long immoveable under the enemy's fire. A 
 brigadier, six colonels {chefs de baitaiflon), and ninety-seven 
 other officers, with a savage chief, were killed or wounded'. 
 After the action, which lasted three hours, the French took 
 post at the Buttes a Neveau, and established llieir camp 
 on the same plains where they had just so gloriously avenged 
 their defeat thereupon in the preceding year." He also tells 
 us: — " Within a comparative small !»pace, 2,500 had been 
 struck by bullets ; the patches of snow and icy puddles ou 
 the ground were reddened with the bloodshed that the frozen 
 ground refused to absorb ;" and " the transport of the wounded 
 to the General Hospital (almost close at hand) occupied 
 twenty-four hours ;" and he cites a religieme, to the effect, 
 that " the cries of the wounded and the groans of the dying, 
 with the lamentations of friends, were heart-rending. After 
 having dressed more than 500 patients, piaced on beds 
 obtained from the King's magazines, there still remained 
 others unprovided for. Our granges and oatile-sheds were 
 full of them. We had in our intirmaries 73 officers, of whom 
 33 died," &c., &o. 
 
 Lieutenant Fraser writes : — " We had very little chance of 
 beating an army four-times our number." To this Mr. 
 LeMoine has attached the following note : — '* The other 
 accounts make the French army anything but \four-times the 
 number^ of the English army. Ir. appears certain, however, 
 that Levis had the advantage of numbers, and Murray 
 of position, and a splendid park of artillery, some twenty odd 
 pieces, on a rising ground ; while Levis had but two guns, 
 and his troops were fatigued by their laborious trudge through 
 
■i MILITAKT OPEKATIOX8 AT QHEBEC, 
 
 the Bijou marsh and Sutde road, at a time of the year (28tifi 
 April) when the winter snow and rain had made the roads 
 nearly impas^^able." 
 
 We believe there is good ground for accepting Murray's 
 statement, thai he only marched out 3,000 men from the 
 enfeebled garrison, and that he lost 1,000 in the battle, for we 
 know that when he subsequently advanced on Montreal, and 
 when it was desirable that he should do so with as large a 
 force as possible, he could only muster 2,500 men, after 
 providing for garrisoning Quebec. De Levis's whole force wae^ 
 undoubtedly very much larger than Murray^s; but we know 
 that he did leave a portion, as Grarneau writes. We know, 
 also, that Murray brought on the action before Levis's 
 available force was all up ; but it is beytnid dispute that the 
 force actually engaged largely outnumbered the British ; and 
 Murray spoke nothing but the truth when he wrote that he 
 was ^'' fairly fought down and reduced to a handful," and 
 that he was " obliged to yield to superiority of numbers and 
 a fresh column of Roussillon." 
 
 Mr. LeMoine is quite correct in his statement that Murray 
 had the advantage of position, and an enormous superiority 
 in aiiillery ; and many believe, had he not given up these 
 advantages, the result might have been diiferent. Many in 
 the British army entertained the opinion to which Lieutenant 
 Fraser gave expression, that, " his passion lor glory getting 
 the better of his reason, he ordered the army to march out 
 and attack the enemy." " He is," says Fraser, " in many 
 respects possessed of several virtues, and particularly military 
 ones, except prudence^ and entirely free of mercenary motives ; 
 but as his conduct on this occasion is universally condemned 
 by all those who are not immediately dependent on him, 
 truth obliges me to stale matters as ( believe they really 
 stood, more especially as it is not said he advised with any 
 who had a right to bo consulted before such a step." 
 
 Lord Malion, writing nearly a century later, when it might 
 be supposed he could write dispassionately, says : — *' Our 
 
raoM s»PT. 18th, 1759, to mat I8th, 1760. dt 
 
 troops, amounting to about 6,000 men, and commanded by 
 Brigadier-Genoral Murray, had been left to maintain our new 
 conquest of Quebec, at the time the fleet sailed for England. 
 But as the fortifications of the town itself were not 
 considerable on the land side, and as all communication 
 with England was cut off by the ice in the lower St. 
 Lawrence, the French deemed the opportunity auspicious, 
 and resolved to attempt to recover their lost ground. Their 
 Governor, the Marquis de Vaudreuil, could still send forth, 
 from his head-quarters at Montreal, 5,000 regular soldiers, 
 and at least as many Canadian militia. These he intrusted 
 to the charge of the (Ihevalierde Levis, an officer of reputation, 
 with orders to advance on Quebec as soon as the approach 
 of sprmg might enable them to form a regular siege. The 
 disposable force of Murray was, on the other hand, much 
 reduced by sickness and by the necessity of leaving the 
 ramparts protected ; so that he could lead from the gates 
 little more than 3,000 men. With such inferiority of 
 number, it seemed contrary to the dictates of common sense 
 to choose .o try the fortune of war in the open field, instead 
 of reservng the troops — which, though weak, as an army, 
 was strong as a garrison, — for the defence of a fortified po.st. 
 But the English general was flushed with victory, and 
 emulous of the fame of Wolfe. On the 28th April, he marched 
 out of town, and found the enemy but a few miles distant, 
 at Sillery. The English commenced the attack with great 
 impetuosity, and obtained at first some advantage ; but the 
 superiority of numbers soon turned the scale against them : 
 they were worsted and driven back into Quebec, with nearly 
 1,000 killed or wounded. It was their boast, however, that 
 the loss of tha enemy in this action had been at least double 
 their own." 
 
 We have nov^ seen how widely conflicting are the accounts 
 of the battle of St. Foy. Wo cannot think that justice has 
 been done to either of the parties engaged. We believe that, 
 aa a battle, it was more severe, and its results nearly as 
 
1B4 MILITARY OPERATIONS AT iJTTtBEC, 
 
 tmporfant as the battle of the previous year ; but the death of 
 the two distinguished and chivalrous commanders attached 
 so much romance to that battle, that the world has beea 
 Carried away from the consideralion of the other important 
 features which it presents. But we can now look at both 
 dispassionately, and we are at once struck with the fadt that 
 the battle of the 13th September was decided in eight, or, at 
 fnost, fifteen minutes, with a loss to the victors of only 67 
 killed and 600 wounded, and to the vanquished, of 500 killed 
 aqd 600 wounded. 
 
 The battle of the 28th April -^as the most severely-contested 
 action of the whole war : it lasted, according to Murray, one 
 hour and three-quarters^ (according to Garn(3au, three hoursy) 
 with a loss to him of a third of his whole force^ and to Levis 
 of 2,600 men. 
 
 After having given the matter our best consideration, and 
 tlivesting ourselves of prejudice, as far as we can, we may 
 safely say that, of the victory of St. Foy the French might 
 well be proud, and the British have no reason to be ashamed^ 
 The monument of St. Foy is only a just tribute which their 
 teoraraon descendants have paid to the brave men who fought 
 and fell there^ and to their heroic commanders, Levis and 
 Murray ; but it has yet to be crowned ; so let us hope, as 
 Mr. LeMoine has quoted from the Montreal " Telegraph," 
 ** that before another century dawns, the fusion will be 
 complete, and as Briton, Roman, Saxon, Dane, and Norman 
 blended to form the English people, so all the races that find 
 in Canada a home may, by forbearance, mutual respect, strict 
 Justice, and an enlarged view of their nationality, bury in a 
 common grave the dead bones of their militant prejudices, 
 whether of faith or origin, and look smiling down on them 
 as a united Canadian nation, not ignoring but drawing 
 wisdom from past struggles and contentions, making past 
 war the mother of present and future peace." 
 
moM rutPT. 18th, 1759, to may 18th, 1760. 25 
 
 APPENDIX. 
 
 f. — THB DISCREPAJfriRS BETWEEN THE FREWCH AND BNOLl^M 
 
 WRITERS. 
 
 In his work, " De Montcalm in Canada^^'' par un ancicn 
 missiona/'re, published in Tourtiai in 1867, at page 193, P^re 
 Martin gives the following note on the discrepancies between 
 the various writers whom he had conisulled : 
 
 " It in difficult, at tho present day, to decide willi certainty aa to tlio numbers 
 of tt)e two armies which met on tho plains of Abraham ; ancient writers are 
 00 more iu accord than modern. Here are the estimates : 
 
 " French. Englhh. 
 
 '« L'Intendant Bigot 3,500 3 to 4,000 
 
 " Montreuil, Mnjor-General ? 4,500 
 
 •' DoveW, Commissaire 3,000 6,000 
 
 " Colonel Fra?er 6,000 4,000 
 
 "(Sullivan says the forces were equal, but that Wolfe's soldiers were 
 disciplined veterans, and that the half of Moutcahn's were militia and Indiana.) 
 
 " French. Englith. 
 
 "Hawkins 6,000 4,800 
 
 " Bancroft 5,000 5,000 
 
 *' Garneau 4,500 8,000 
 
 " Beatson 7,500 4,628 
 
 " Duasieux „.. 4,500 5,000 
 
 "The estimate given by Garneau, of the English, and by Colonel Beatson, 
 of the French, ar« evidently exaggerated." 
 
 li.— NDMBER3 OF THR UESPEOTtVE FORCES OF WOLFE AN'O MONTOALU 
 . ' AT THE COMMENCEMENT OV THE CAMPAIGN. 
 
 The late Mr. Thompson, who was for GO years super- 
 intendent of military works at Quebec, and who was a 
 participator in all the events connected with the conquest, as 
 a volunteer in Fraserh Jligldanders^ wrote a journal, yet 
 unpublished, but from which I make the following extracts : 
 
 " LooiSBouRO, May 3lst, 1759. — Brigadier MonotJO arrived with lour 
 battalions from Halifax and two battitlions from the Bay of Fundy. Our 
 whole force was now assembled, consisting of ten battalions, Ibree companies 
 
 D 
 
id MILITARV OPBRATIONS AT QtTEBKC, 
 
 of grenadiers from the garrison of Louisbourg, a (Jetachment of artilleiy, and 
 Ave companies ofrangors, the whole amoimtiogto eight thousand five hundred 
 and thirty-flve men lit for duty, officers inoludod. 
 
 " French Force. — The Quebec brigade, commanded by Colonpl de St. Ours, 
 on the right, 3,500 men ; the brigade of Three Rivera, commanded by \1. de 
 Berme, on the right, 000 men ; the conlre. to be composed of regular troops, 
 commanded by Senoz^rguos, 2,000 men ; the Montreal militia, on the left, 
 commanded by M. Prudhommo, 1,100 ; the brigade of the Island of Montreal, 
 commanded by M. TIerbin, 2.300 ; the cavalry, chiefly regularp, 350; light 
 troops, chiefly Canadians and Acadian!", 1,400; Indians, exclusive of the 
 scouting and scalping parties, 450 ; total, 12,000. This lorce waa ranged ia 
 order of battle from tho bridge of the river St. Charles to the falls of 
 Montmorency, to oppose Ihe landing of the IJrilish in that quarter. The 
 garrison of Quebec was defended by the militiii and a tew regulars, under 
 de Ramezay. 
 
 " Our lo«s of men, during the whole campaign, stood as follows :— 18 oflBcers 
 and 252 men killed ; total liilled, 270. 107 officers and 1,116 men wounded ; 
 total, 1,223. Total killed and wounded, 1,493." 
 
 Garnean, in his account of the " Battle of Beanport Flatis," 
 says the British loss was, on that occasion alone, 500 killed 
 and wounded. 
 
 III. THE BATTLE OF ST. FOY. 
 
 I believe that, with the exception of M. Garnean, all 
 writers admit that Levis's force exceeded that of Murray. 
 Garneau states that the English had 7,714 men, exclusive of 
 ofTicers, and that the French were co-equal. Il has been pointed 
 out that L'Abbe Ferland, who wrote subsequent to Grarneau, 
 and gives Levis as his authority, quoting his despatch still in 
 existence, says, Murray had 4,000 men and Levis not more 
 than 4,500 actually engaged. 
 
 I have translated from the statement attached to Vandreuil's 
 letter of 3rd May, 1760, still of record in the archives at 
 Paris, and a copy of which was procured for the Literary 
 and Historical Society, the following passage in reference to 
 the numbers with which Vandreuil says Levis lelt Montreal : 
 
 " On 20th April the troops left their qatirters (at Montreal). They consisted 
 of eight baltalion« o( troops of the line, and two battalions of '.'olonial troops, 
 lortiing together S brigades, and abonl 3 000 Canadians, all of the city of 
 Montreal ar.l its neighbourhood. Tiie (Irst formod a balt.tliori deatined as a 
 reserve, and the other was attached to the brigade of regular troops.*' 
 
FROM SKPT, 18th, 1759, TO MAT 18th, 1760, 
 
 27 
 
 IV. — REGIMENTS UNDER WOLFE. 
 
 It will be useful to compare with the statement already 
 
 given from Thompson's unpublished Journal, that given by 
 
 Lieut. Frasor, in his Journal, published by the Literary and 
 
 Historical Snciety : 
 
 " RPiihnents, Men. 
 
 " 15th, Amherat's 600 
 
 " 28tb, Bragg's 550 
 
 " 35lh, Otway 's 800 
 
 " 43ra, Kennedy '8 650 
 
 "47th, Lascelles' 500 
 
 "48th, Webb's 800 
 
 " 58th, Anstruther's 600 
 
 "60th, 2nd and 3rd battalions 1,000 
 
 " 63rd, Eraser's 1 100 
 
 " Grenadiers of 22nd, 40th, and 45th, from Louisbourg 300 
 
 " Artillery 300 
 
 " Rangers 400 
 
 " Light Infantry 200 
 
 •' Marines 1,000 
 
 " In gross, supposed, at most 8,600." 
 
 This force sailed from Louisbourg on the 4th of June, 1759. 
 The following extract is from his Journal of the 24th of 
 April, 1760 : 
 
 state of the Garrison of Quebec, April 2ith, 1760. 
 
 Colonels' Names. 
 
 -2 
 
 a 
 
 "So 
 
 Pi 
 
 a 
 
 • 
 
 M 
 u 
 
 "3 
 o 
 
 EH 
 
 0> 
 
 •ooo 
 
 Amherst's 
 
 15th. 
 28th, 
 35th, 
 43rd. 
 47th, 
 48lh. 
 58th. 
 
 60th. 
 
 63rd. 
 
 323 
 304 
 255 
 272 
 305 
 483 
 324 
 j227 
 ' 253 
 314 
 171 
 
 109 
 200 
 285 
 194 
 170 
 214 
 158 
 163 
 215 
 680 
 24 
 
 432 
 504 
 640 
 466 
 475 
 697 
 482 
 400 
 468 
 894 
 194 
 
 ?fi 
 
 Braee's 
 
 29 
 
 Otway 8 
 
 <»6 
 
 Kennedy's 
 
 13C 
 
 Lascelles' 
 
 64 
 
 Webb's 
 
 85 
 
 Anstruther's 
 
 10 
 
 Monkton's {2nd battalion) } 
 
 Laurence's (3rd battalion) J 
 
 Fraser's 
 
 61 
 
 58 
 106 
 
 Boyal Artillery 
 
 17 
 
 
 
 
 Totals , 
 
 
 y34i 
 
 2312 
 
 6653 
 
 6AZ 
 
 
 
 
^ MILITART OPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 
 
 It may be taken for granted that Eraser's statement 
 did not include the men at the two outposts of St. Foy and 
 Lorette, which originally consisted of 600 men, but which 
 by this time had been reduced by various casualties. 
 Murray's whole force, then, on the 24tli April, could have 
 exceeded but little 6,000, of whom 2,312 were sick, and 
 only 3,341 fit for duty. It is desirable to note, particularly in 
 connexion with a statement about to be given from Garneau, 
 that the 63rd regt. (78th Eraser's Highlanders), which Mr. 
 Thompson says were raised in Tain, Ross-shire, to the number 
 of upwards of 1,400 men, when they reached Louisbourg 
 from New York, where they had passed tlie winter, mustered 
 only 1,200, and were on the 24th April reduced to 894, 
 having Tost by death, since 18th September, no less than 106, 
 and having 580 sick in hospital. • 
 
 Knox, at pag-e 181, vol. 2nd, of his Journal, gives a return 
 shewing ihe strength of the garrison on 29th October to be 
 7,313, and the rank and file of the 78th regiment 978. He 
 also informs us, at page 267, that on the 1st March, " We are 
 reduced to 4,800 fighting men." At page 340, we have a 
 return shewing that on the 15th June, 1760, the garrison 
 consisted of 313 officers and non-commissioned officers, and 
 5,209 rank and file,— total, 5,522, of whom 2,299 were sick 
 and wounded. At page 344, we learn that the troops under 
 orders for embarkation, and who did embark on 13th July, 
 for service up the St. Lawrence to Montreal, numbered 
 2,451 men. 
 
 v. — GENERAL MURUAy's ORDER. 
 
 Note by Garneau, vol. S, pai^e2i8:—" SuWimt, les ordonnatices de paiement 
 poor leursoldeexpii^e le2d Avril, uu 4 joui'RuviiDt la 2de battaille d'Abrabam, 
 ordonnauce dout voici une oopie textuulle pour le 78 Regiment (MoDtagoard« 
 Eccossais.) 
 
 " J5y the Honorable James Mdbkat, Enq., Governor of Quebec, ifc, .' 
 
 " You are liereby required and directed, out of such monie. as shall ooms 
 Into your hands for tho subsistence of IIt« Majesty's forces under my command, 
 to puy or cause to be paid to LibuteaaDt Jamca liendersoo, Doputy-Paymaster 
 
FROM SEPT. 18th, 1759, TO MAY ISth, 1760, 29 
 
 of His Majesty's 78th Regiment of Foot, or his assigns, the Bum of two thousand 
 one bunJied and sixty-three pounds, nineteen and six-pence, Bterlinp, 
 being for subsistence of said regiment between the 24ih day of February and 
 the 2tth day of April, both days inclusive, as per acconnt annexed ; and for so 
 doing tiiis, with the acquittance of the said Lieutenant James Henderson, or 
 hia assigns, shall be to you a sufficient warrant and discharge. Given under 
 my band, at Quebec, this 27lh day of November, 17G0. 
 
 " (Signed,) Jas. Mdrbat. 
 
 " (Countersigned,) H. T. Cuamahk. 
 
 " To Robert Porter, Esq., Doputy-Postmaster-General. 
 
 56 Sergeants, @ Is. per diem '£ 2 IG 
 
 66 Corporals, @ 8d. '' 117 
 
 28 Drummers, @ 8d. " 18 
 
 1,195 I'nvalc'S, @ Cd. " 29 17 6 
 
 £35 9 6 
 
 " Total for 60 days £2,103 19 
 
 " Signed,) James Henderson, 
 " Lieut, and Depy.-l'aymaster, 78th Regt." 
 
 We have no doubt that Garneau cites this order (and 
 believed that he was correct in citing it) to prove that there 
 were at Quebec^ between the 24th day of February and 24th 
 April, 1335 officers and men of the 78th regiment, instead of 
 894, given by Fraser and others; but it proves, as I have 
 been informed by a gentleman conversant with such matters, 
 nothing more than that that was ihe strength of the regiment 
 during that period, whether at Quebec or elscivhere, and was 
 merely the usual order in favor of the paymaster, through 
 whom the men are paid, whether with the main body of the 
 regiment, at the depot, or on detached service. It will be 
 observed that the order bears date 27th November, six 
 months after it was due. 
 
 Mr. LeMoine, in referring to the dilFerent authorities, 
 gays : — " We have also Smith's account, not over-correct ; and 
 Garneau's narrative, probably the most complete, and collated 
 from documents, many of which had never seen the light 
 
80 MILITARY JPERATIONS AT QUEBEC, 1759-'60. 
 
 before." We have poinled out the great discrepancy bet waen 
 Garneau and Ferland, who had at least equal opportunities 
 of consulting all documents now in existence ; and it has 
 been shewn that there was a general accordance between 
 Ferland and British writers in this particular case. We are 
 very far from supposing that Garneau made a mis-statement 
 intentionally, but that he was led into error by drawing 
 wrong conclusions from the document which he adduced, 
 the nature of which he may be excused for not understanding ; 
 but, under the circumstances, we are justified in applying to 
 him the expression of Mr. LeMoine towards Smith, that in 
 this case he is not " over-correct.^^