p^. % /. -(5 vV^ r IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) 1.0 I.I |50 '""^ 2.5 2.2 1.8 \M ill U i 1.6 o 7 Photographic Sciences Corporation // 4i^ / &vi(i8<)irH('()iiii)'s. IJ .Mil Ui'lt'i lliilliiMiiri' Viiluntecr.-'. I(i -'('(imirs Militiii uml 1 tit'Ullk'K. Id Stuiisbury"» Urigadc — Uugau'ii i;5 Ciipt. liiiicli's Artilli.Ty. 17 Tlic liullihKiro ArtilliTy. Kogiment. [Hepinipnt. 14 Tlio Ciivnlry. IS Major I'iiikin'y's l!iltt'iiit>n. 11 Stansbury'B Dripade — Shutz's l.'i C'apt. Doii<;hty's Company. ^? Liuut.-co). Kninicr's BattiilinM. fMaAj HISTORY OF THE INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASIUIGTOi^, AM) OF THE EVENTS WlllCir vrrcn^rr^ a^-t^ y\ iiiK^U ILECEDED AND FOLLOWED. BY lOlU S. U^LLIAMS, « AH OF 1812. >f THE NKW YORK: "ARPER * nROTHERs. P U B L I S H E R ., ^' RANK I, IX SQlAlti;. 1857. mm§ Entered, accorcling to Act of Congress, in the y >ar 1857, by Harper & Brothers, In the Clerk's Office of tlie Soutiiern District of X^iW York. :3I ) .. ! IV DEDICATION. and aclvaiitagc to your fellow-citizens as chief magis- trate, and with that event you were personally con- nected, both as combatant on the ill-fated field and as a sufferer by the destruction of property in the city. Taking all these reasons into consideration, I think you will at least excuse your old companion in arms for publicly offering you this testimonial of his esteem and friendship. J. S. WiLLIAiAIS. Washingtox, Oct 1, 185G. I * ^ HSj PREFACE. The primary motive by -vvhicli the author of this work was actuated in getting together the materials from which it has been composed, was tlie hope of be- ing able to do something to remove the obloquy which, in his opinion, has been undeservedly cast upon the American troops engaged in the battle of Bladensburg. It is true that this obloquy, being shared among so many, was never very severely felt by any individual among them. This, indeed, is the reason why it was so easily thrown upon them in the first instance, and why it has been suffered so long to continue. It was not the business of any one of the crowd, more than of another, to expose the injustice of the imputation cast upon them ; and as " what is every body's busi- sess is nobody's business," the duty has never yet been discharged. If the troops, as a body, could have called for a court of inquiry into their conduct, and had counsel of ordinary ability to defend them, or if they could have had a voice in the selection of the committee appointed by Congress to investigate the causes of the capture of tiie City of Washington, there would probably have been no necessity for un- dertaking a work like the present, or, rather, the neces- sity would have been transferred to those high digni- taries of the nation whose complacency was not at all VI PREFACE. I! disturbed, nor intended to be disturbed, by the non- committal report made by the committee actually ap- pointed. It may be asked, Wliy, after the lapse of more than forty years, seek to disturb an arrangement which is admitted to be the most comfortable that could have been made — that is, the one 'which inflicted the least pain upon individuals ? The troops generally were little inconvenienced by the obloquy, and went about their business as unconcernedly as if nothing had hap- pened ; whereas, if public censure had been concen- trated upon a few powerful party leaders, their wrath and that of their partisans might have thrown the country into an uproar. It might seem Pharisaical to profess an abstract love of truth, and not imperatively necessary to con- tend for it as an essential ingredient in history. If works of fiction or parables are written for the purpose of moral instruction, and are found to answer that pur- pose, why should truth be considered an essential in- gredient in history ? or why should any more of such a precious ingredient be used than is necessary to give a flavor of probability ? But moral instruction is not the sole object of his- tory, which furnishes, or ought to furnish, valuable lessons in the art of government and art of war, and these lessons can not be so well learned from imagin- ary events as from a faithful statement of real occur- rences. National disasters, too, are often more preg- nant with instruction than national successes, and more may sometimes be learned from a defeat well studied than from half a dozen victories ; and in this »«. PREFACE. Vll T respect a correct narrative of the battle of Bladcns- burg, and of the events preceding and attending it, might be considered as higlily important and desirable. It fortunately happens that the means of compiling a correct narrative of this battle are unusually abund- ant — perhaps more so, owing to fortuitous circum- stances, than with respect to any similar event in his- tory. The event took place among a reading and in- quiring people. It was not only sutHciently extraor- dinary in itself to arouse the strongest curiosity as to its causes and details, but it was deeply wounding to the pride of the nation. A prompt investigation by Congress was a matter of course, and tliis in(|uiry had, at least, the effect of calling forth a mass of evidence, in the shape of statements and official reports from in- dividuals prominently connected with the event, which may be considered as having all the solemnity and credibility of testimony before a judicial tribunal, and ■which, however conflicting on some points, yet furnish the means, upon patient study and comparison, of arriv- ing at a correct knowledge of the material fiiots. This fund of information has since been increased by vari- ous publications, including narratives of British writ- ers. Probably, at this date, little of importance relat- ing to the subject remains to be revealed to the pubhc, except what may be contained in the manuscript pa- pers of jMr. Madison, now in possession of Colonel Pe- ter Force, of the City of Washington. Having been informed that these papers contained some very inter- esting matter in relation to the capture of the seat of government, we applied to Colonel Force for permis- sion to consult them, stating to him the deep interest ^vSml VIU PKEFACE. which we took in the subject. With his usual cour- tesy he coinpUed with our request, granting us access to the papers as often as we pleased, for the purpose of perusal and study, but declining to allow any por- tion of them to be transcribed. We gladly availed ouryelves of the privilege, and the information thus ob- tained will appear in its proper place in the following pages. To the sources of information above-mentioned, and to the author's own personal knowledge of events which he witnessed, he has been enabled to add recent statements from some of those whose position at the time of the capture of the scat of government, and whose high standing in the community at present, give a deep interest to the written connnunications Avith which they have favored him. Among these arc letters from the lion. Richard Rush, a member of ]\Ir. Madison's cabinet, and the venerable Major George Peter, of i\Iontgomery County, ^Maryland, commander of the District Light Coi*ps, which will be found in the Appendix. Other communications of a similar char- acter, which have been useful to us in preparing the work, are omitted, in order that the bulk of the volume might not be unnecessarily increased. We will here take occasion to remark, in justice both to the livint;' and the dead, tliat in anv reflections which we have been tempted to indulge in on the con- duct of Mr. ^Madison's administration, we have had no intention, and certainly not the slightest inclination, to include jMr. Rush, who was Attorney-general at the time, nor I\[r. Campbell, then Secretary of the Treas- ury. We arc well satisfied that neither of them, either ft m PREFACE. IX «, m from his position in the administration or from his personal character, was Hkely to be connected with any plans or movements which had not for their sole and exclusive object the welfare and honor of their country. It has been our purpose, in compiling a history of the campaign of AVashington, to resort as often as practicable to the language of the principal witnesses, and make such use of their testimony that, if the read- er is not satisfied Avith the views wliich' we have taken of the subject, he may substitute other views of his own for them, based upon the facts which we have presented, with an assurance that we have neither de- signedly omitted, nor presented in a deceptive manner, any information necessary for the formation of a cor- rect judgment. This will account for the nudtitude of extracts and quotations in the work. Different persons will draw a dilfcrcnt moral from the same story. The moral which we are disposed to draw from the history of the battle of Bladensburg is, not that Americans were too " pusillanimous*" to de- fend their seat of government, and that, therefore, it would be safer to hire an army of foreign mercenaries to defend it for us ; nor that militia troops are not to be depended upor and therefore a large standing army of regular troops is necessary ; but tiuit politicians of the fairest fame require watching, and will not hesitate to sacrifice or jeopard the interests and honor of their country in order to advance themselves or ruin a rival. We present in this book the grounds which we think justify us in deducing this moral : and, as we believe them sufficient, we have not hesitated to express our A 2 Si ;,l ilil ItJ' ;f;l iiii :!ii '%'. 'Ill H M X rilEFxVCE. opinion in plain terms, witliout respect to the rank or reputation of the eminent individuals implicated. We do not understand — thou^'h the Congressional Com- mittee of Investigation did — why truths which may benefit the public, and which the public have a right to know, should be suppressed, or cautiously and fear- fully hinted at, rather than boldly spoken, in order to spare any individual reputation or fame, if it were as " sacrosanct" as that of General Washington himself. Nor do we think that men who did not hesitate to ca- lumniate others in order to screen themselves have any claim, however exalted their position in history, to be treated with reverence or profound respect by any of those upon whom their unfounded imputations were cast. The reader will observe that we have made a dis- tinction between the author and the editor or compiler of this volume. The person who originated the idea or plan of the work, and who sought out and furnished the materials from which it has been compiled, may properly be termed the author of it. At his request, the literary execution of it was undertaken by a friend, now no more, whose progress in the work was much impeded by other more imperative calls upon his time, and who had not advanced farther than the seventh chapter of the present volume, when his death occa- sioned a suspension of the work. One of his sons, however, undertook the completion of the undertaking. This will account for the difference between the style of the first seven chapters of the work and that of the subsequent portion. Some change, also, which took place in the plan of the work, and tlie fact that the «*■ • » PEEFACE. ^j- first portion of it had not been revised by the writer, rendered it necessary to make alterations, which, it is feared, have rendered the whole production inferior, as a literary composition, to what it would have been liad the able pen which commenced it been permitted to contmue it to the end. Washington, August, 1856. ' * 1 »«W!«t* i;!f Vif v::; ■■'.i, *' -*i| ■li CONTENTS. CHAPTER I. Shadows of forthcoming Events.-Apparent Indme,-. uce of C<.„.ress ana the Administration to the Signs of the Times Pa^e lu CHAPTER II. The same subject continued CHAPTER III. The Administration 1,egins to awake.-Cabinet Meeting of the 1st t'l-ict ''■" ""^'''' ''^" ^^'^^^"^^•-Creation of a new xMilitary Dis- 4;; CHAPTER IV. ^'0"^!"'™°"'' '" ''' Cabinet. -Selection of a Commanding ' G() CHAPTER V. Difficulties in the ^yay of the Commanding General si CHAPTER VI. General Armstrong's Letter to the Editors of the Baltimore Patriot -Comments upon its extraordinary Disclosures 90 CHAPTER VII. Mr^Madison's private Opinion of the Conduct of the Secretary of 112 CHAPTER VIII. Landing of the British Troops at Benedic.t.-Uncertaintv as to their Destmat.on.-Xature and An.ount of the An.erican lA.rce.-Pla of Operation* dictated to the Commanding General vjI mmmfiMmiWi ■ r ' i i'i' XIV CONTENTS. CHAPTER IX. Results of the Recor.noitring Expedition under Mr. Monroe. — Ad- vance of the Enemy from Benedict. — General Winder marches to meet him, and retreats to the City Page 157 CHAPTER X. Cabinet Council at General "Winder's Head-quarters at the Eastern Branch Bridge. — The Secretary of War has no Advice or Plan to offer. — Tlie Secretary of State undertakes to arrange the Order of Battle 18-1: CHAPTER XI. The Order of Battle 205 CHAPTER XII. The Battle 221 CHAPTER XIII. Remarks on the Battle and Retreat 239 CHAPTER XIV. Proceedings of the Enemy in the City 254 CHAPTER XV. The Capitulation of Alexandria 282 'J APPENDIX. No. I. Narrative of General Winder, addressed to the Chair- man of the Committee of Investigation 301 No. II. Report of General Stansbury 331 No. III. Statement of General Walter Smith 343 No. IV. Colonel George Minor's Statement 355 No. V. From Major George Peter to Colonel J. S. Williams.... 357 No. VI. A Volunteer Corps from Virginia.. 3G^7 I3r INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. CHAPTEE I. Shadows of forthcominf;; Events. — Apparent Indifference of Congress and the Administration to the Signs of the Times. ]\IORE tlian fifteen months "before tlie actual invasion of the District of Cohimbia, the enemy had plainly in- dicated their design to maintain a sufficient force in the Chesapeake Bay to control its commerce. They had repeatedly landed marauding parties on hotli its shores ; the town of Havre de Grace on the western, and Frenchtown, Georgetown, and Fredericktown on the eastern shore of ^laryland, and Hampton and other places in Virginia, had all been attacked, pillaged, and burned ; many of their inhabitants had been killed, and many had been carried off to their ships of war as prisoners. ^laryland and Virginia, it is well known, both border on the District of Columbia, and the towns wdiich have been named as the scenes of the enemy's destructive operations may be said to be in the imme- diate neighborhood of the seat of government. These were indications deemed by almost every in- telligent and prudent citizen, except those directly ' rtSWBHft H W(^^W» i 16 INVASION AND CAPTL'IIE OF WASHINGTON. connected with the government, sufficiently strong to excite apprehensions that the enemy contemplated an attack also upon the City of Washington. On the 15th of July, 1813, a few days before the adjourn- ment of Congress, and while the House of Ilepresent- atives were sitting with closed doors upon a message from the President of the United States, which had heen suggested by the presence of the enemy in the Bay, General Philip Stuart, a member from ^Maryland, a veteran soldier, who bore the scars of numerous hon- orable wounds received in our Revolutionary battles, a fearless, calm, dispassionate observer of passing events, and one, therefore, not likely to sound the alarm when no cause for it existed, introduced a preamble and resolution in the following words : " Whereas the seat of government, from the unpre- pared and defenseless state of the District of Colum- bia, is in imminent danger, if an attack should be made thereon ; and whereas the fleet of the enemy is understood to be within a few hours' sail of the capi- tal ; and whereas the immense value of public prop- erty exposed to destruction, the great value of the public records, and other deeply interesting considera- tions, render it peculiarly important that any invasion of the metropolis should be met with vigor and success- fully repelled, whereupon ^^Hesolved, That, in the opinion of this House, a dis- tribution of such arms as are in the possession of the government within the District of Columbia should be immediately made, to be placed in the hands of all able-bodied men within the district willing to be em- bodied to perform military duty, and also in the hands < i i ACTION IN THE llOLSE. 17 of such iiicinbers of this House as may be wllUng to receive thern, to act against the enemy in any manner not incompatible with their pubhc duties.'"* The words of this resohition show that its mover, at least, expected an early invasion, and the preamble discloses the ground of that expectation — '■'• the fleet of the enemy in understood to be inlthhi a few howii' mil of the capital.''^ But it had been so from the pre- vious month of April. Other places in the vicinity of the capital had been invaded, and Washington had been undisturbed. This was the delusive ground of argument : the enemy did not follow \ip their success- ful inroads upon Havre de Grace and the other towns by an immediate attempt against the Federal City, and therefore it formed no part of their design to invade it at any time. It was admirable logic, it must be con- fessed. The first question raised upon the introduction of this preamble and resolution was whetlier the discus- sion of the subject required secrecy; and this "passed in the aflirmative." The next vote taken was to la;;' the matter "on the table," and this "was determined in the negative — yeas G4, nays 74." A motion to strike out the preamble was then made and carried, and the naked resolution was committed to the " Com- mittee on ]\Iilitary ^Vftairs." On the following day, before it was possible, in the nature of things, that any personal examination on the part of the conmiittee of the preparations for defence, even within the city itself, could have been accomplished, and much less tlie whole district and the numerous approaches to it, the * Annals of Conjrrcss, I3th Congress, in die. i 'Hmmm 'III ^ii 18 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. chairman of that committee made the t'olJo^\'ino• re- port : " The Committee on Military Aftairs, to whom was referred a resolution of yesterday having relation to the present movement of the enemy, report, " That they have examined into the state of prepa- ration, naval and military, made to receive the enemy, and are satislied that tlie preparations are, in every re- spect, adequate to the emergence, and that no meas- ures are necessary on the part of this House to make it more complete." That this committee, within the time that intervened between the close of one day's session and the open- ing of the next, couhi have made a personal inspection of the naval and military strength of the citj', is alto- gether beyond credibility. The report was, therefore, little less than an insult to the common sense of the House. The chairman, it may be, "examined'' the secretaries of the two departments of War and the Navy, and received assurances from those officers re- spectively that every preparation for defence had been made ; but ought this, under the circumstances, to have "satisfied" the committee? The reader will observe that there are here two opinions expressed, diametrically opposite in their na- ture, and both advanced with equal confidence and boldness in the face of the world by persons whose means and opportunities of obtaining correct informa- tion were alike ample and authoritative. The one as- serts that the seat of government, " from the unpre- pared and defenceless state of the District of Colum- bia, is in mimi?ie?it danger, if an attack should be f ■^ !) INSUFFICIENT PREPARATION. 19 I made thereon ;" the other, that the state of prepara- tion for defence "is, ifi every re^i^ecU ade(j^uate to the, emergence." It is impossible that any two persons of ordinary capacity should have differed so widely as to the ac- tual state of preparations in the district to defend the seat of government ; these discordant opinions, there- fore, must have been formed from the different light in which their respective entertainers viewed the proba- bility of "«^i attack.'"' On the supposition that the enemy did not contemplate an invasion of the District of Columbia, it was very natural to believe that no measures were necessary on the part of the House to render the preparations for defence "more complete." But the question for history is, were the means of de- fence, naval and military, such as to give a reasonable assurance that they would prove sufficient to repel the enemy "if an attack should be made?" xVnd history itself answers this question in the negative ; for, even after the lapse of more than a year from this time, during which some additions had been made to what were regarded as preparations for defense, the enemy did make an attack, which, unhappily, was not re- pelled. On the 20tli of the same month in which the pro- ceedings just mentioned took place, in the secret ses- sion of the House of Representatives, the President of the United States transmitted to Congress a message which, as it is short, and contains, as we think, a clew to the very extraordinary report of the Military Com- mittee, is here presented to the reader without abridg- ment. (!!■ ; '\ I !' iS! if I 20 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. " Confidential. — To the Senate and llou.sc of llep- rcscritatives of the United Stales: There behig siiHi- cient ground to infer that it is the purpose of tlie ene- my to combine with the bloclvade of our ports special license to neutral vessels, or to British vessels hi neu- tral disguise, whereby they may draw from our coun- try the precise khids and quantity of exports essential to their wants, whilst its general conuncrce remains obstructed ; keeping in view also the invidious discrim- ination between different ports of the United States ; and as such a system, if not counteracted, will have the effect of diminishing very materially the pressure of the war on the enemy, and encouraging a persever- ance in it, at the same time that it will leave the gen- eral commerce of the United States under all the press- ure the enemy can impose, thus subjecting the whole to British regulation, in subserviency to British mo- nopoly; I recommend to the consideration of Congress the expediency of an immediate and effectual prohibi- tion of exports, limited to a convenient day in tlieir next session, and removable in the mean time in the event of a cessation of the blockade of our ports. "James Madison. ''Washington, July 20, 1813." A comparison of the tenor of this message with the report of the Committee on Military Affairs, immediate- ly preceding it, would seem to render it manifest that both were the offspring of the same delusion. Both seem to have been dictated by the conviction that the enemy, though at that moment within a few hours' sail of the seat of government, had no intention what- I i DELUSION OF THE PRESIDENT. 21 ever, citlicr then or at any later periotl, of attempting an expedition against it. In Loth eases, indeed, the deluriivc and iinstatcsmanlike opinion seemed to have prevailed, that a Iiostilc invasion of the District of Co- lumbia, through the instrumentality of the British squadron in Chesapeake Bay, was not within the range of possibility. Otherwise, it is inconceivable on what grounds it could have been asserted, on the one hand, that the defences of the District wanted nothing to their completeness, or why, on the other hand, the at- tention of Congress should be called* only to the com- mercial evils which would be likely to result from the continued blockade of our ports. If it had been an ascertained, indisputable fact, about which there could be no difference of opinion, that the enemy meant to limit their operations in the Chesapeake to the regulation and control of the com- merce of which it was the channel, then, indeed, the measure recommended by the President might have been regarded as the most appropriate and suitable one to counteract the design ; but, to say the least, it may be doubted whether the mere assumption of such a fact, and that, too, against strongly-expressed views of a different character, could justify him in his silence as to other than commercial interests in equal want of protection, and which would be in equal jeopardy if assailed. It would certainly have been safer and. wiser, and more consonant with a due regard to the general welfare, to have taken into account the possibility, at least, that the enemy might have more extensive de- signs than those which were apparent to every body. It can not be considered extraordinary that Individ- :-% jv n 'a'g - I I . I i:: 22 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. uals should differ in opinion as to the prohability or im- probability of any occurrence yet in the womb of time, "but it is passing strange that men of equal discernment, having equal capacity to examine and inquire, and equal authority to draw information from the same sources, should come to opposite conclusions as to a simple question of fact — that is, whether there existed or did not exist in the District of Columbia any evidence of preparation to resist an invading enemy. If the Military Committee of tlic House of Kcpresentatives had said, in so many words, We have reason to believe that the enemy now in the Chesapeake Bay have not the remotest idea or intention of invading the District, and therefore we can not conceive that there exists any necessity for providing means of defence, tlieir report might have been regarded as kindly designed to relieve the House from all apprehension as to their own safe- ty ; but when, in speaking of "the state of preparation, naval and military," they make the unqualified asser- tion " that no measures are necessary on the part of the House to make it more complete," they can be understood in no other way than as meaning to say tliat they had found it, upon examination, to be al- ready complete. This understanding of it imposes upon us the necessity of inquiring into the correctness or incorrectness of this implied alHrmation. At the moment that this rci)ort was made, it was a fact notorious to every inliabitant of the District of Columbia, and which ouglit to have been equally so to Congress, tliat the only fortification, so called, on the Potomac lliver, from its embouchure into the Chesa- peake Bay up to the scat of government on its banks. ASTONISHING REMISSNESS. 23 a had not move than a brace of guns mounted, nor men enough to serve more if they had been mounted. It ■vvas a fortiiication in name only, not prepared to have repulsed even the smallest of the enemy's vessels, had an attempt been made to pass it. At the mouth of the Anacostia, or eastern branch of the Potomac, where there now stands an arsenal, surrounded by a neat embattled wall, there was then nothing but an unpro- tected magazine. From that point to the Xavy Yard there was not a gun of any description to present even a show of defence, while at the yard itself a few artifi- cers and laborers, and still fewer marines, constituted the sole means of protection. Such was "the state of preparation" on the ap- proaches to the seat of government by water. The defences on the land routes were in no respect "more complete." Throughout the whole boundary-line of the District of Columbia there was not a single point fortified ; not a redoubt, dike, or ditch ; not a solitary piece of artillery ; not a single battalion of regular sol- diers ; not one company of militia or volunteers prop- erly armed, equipped, and disciplined. The neglect to take advantage of the full ojiportu- nity allowed by the enemy, and, it may be added, of the long warning given ]jy them, to place the seat of government in a condition to have dcHcd the utmost force and skill of attack, is utterly incomprehensible 1 o plain common sense. There was not an inhabitant of the District, whether fixrmer, merchant, mechanic, or la- borer, who did not know tl)f;t the city was totally des- titute of defences, and wiio did not believe in the prob- ability of an invasion. The President and his muiisters, 'I' ' I :i : I 24 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHIXGTC:T. and their friends in Congress, alone entertained a differ- ent opinion, and, unfortunately, these were the author- ities in whom was vested, by the law and Constitution, the sole power of making the necessary preparations. We dwell upon the treatment which General Stu- art's resolutions received longer than it may he thought to deserve, hut avc do so because we believe that to that treatment may be traced all the misfortunes of the 24th of August, 1814. The necessity of resorting to any measures of preparation was not admitted by Congress or the administration, because, as already intimated, they did not believe that the enemy enter- tained the remotest design of attempting an invasion of the District of Columbia. By what process of rea- soning, or by what unknown facts tlieir minds were brought to this conviction, we do not pretend to know, and will not venture to guess. AVhether the Congress imbibed their belief from the President, or whetlier the latter trusted so implicitly to the prudence and judg- ment of the former as to deem it unnecessary to bring- to their notice what he took it for granted would not escape their foresiglit, is a question the discussion of which perhaps would be more curious than useful. It is enough to know that both the one and the other la- bored under a most unhappy delusion, or were guilty of gross negligence and indiiference. The House of Kepresentatives promptly acted upon tlic message of the President, and complied with his recommendations by passing a bill laying an embargo upon all shi})s and vessels in the ports and harbors of tlie United States : a measure wliich, if his Hmited view of tlic enemy's intentions had been correct, wouhl A THE EMBARGO. -25 the •i §. probably have been the most judicious that could have been devised to counteract tliem. The Senate, how- ever, entertained a different idea, and did not concur in the proposed embargo. So tar, then, as the protec- tion or defence of the District of Columbia was con- cerned, nothing was done during that session of Con- gress, which terminated on the 2d of August, 1813, three days after the Senate had announced their non- concurrence in the bill of the House of Representa- tives. The fact that within a few days after the next meet- ing of Congress, which took place on the Gth of De- cember, 1813, the President renewed with better suc- cess his recommendation of embargo, and again omit- ted all allusion to any other measure as being called for by the existing state of things, clearly shows that nothing had occurred during the four months of recess to change his view as to the exclusive purpose of the enemy in holding possession of Chesapeake Bay. Though parties of the troops from their ships of war had been daily committing depredations upon the neighboring shores of .Maryland and v'irginia, the ap- prehension that their inroads might, sooner or later, extend to the District of Columbia does not seem yet to have entered into his mind. lupon h his Ibargo ^rs of niited ivould B i r A) 26 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. ' I 1' i ': 1, ! t ; I CIIAPTi:!! II. The same subject continued. Scarcely had there been time allowed tor the em- bargo act of the 17th of December, 1813, to reach the more remote ports and harbors of the United States, before the chairman of the Committee of Foreio-n Re- o lations introduced a bill to repeal it. On tlie 3d of April, Mr. Calhoun presented a bill to that effect, taking that occasion to address the House in one of his hap- piest strains of eloquence and argument. The prin- cipal ground for the measure now proposed was, that the embargo and non-importation acts were utterly in- compatible with the avowed objects of the war, whicli had been declared for the purpose of defending and maintaining the principles of ''free trade and sailors' rights." The wrongs and outrages connnitted by the enemy were scarcely more abhorrent or destructive of this principle than was the operation of a system Wiiicli compelled our ships and vessels to lie and rot in port, while it deprived our seamen of their only means of subsistence. The same argument had been frequently before urged by tiic opponents of the restrictive system, when it was lirst jiroposed and adoi)ted ; and it now, of course, met with their hearty concurrence, while, at the same time, it furnished them a fair 0])portunity of exultation — which they did not fail to seize — at this acknowledged endorsement of their opinions. yXATE OF EUROPE. 27 ai id lors the of item rot only fore teni, lOW, c, at of this But, in addition to this all-sufficient reason for the proposed repeal of the embargo and non-importation acts, the distinguished statesman who introduced the bill urged another consideration, which had influenced his own opinions, and which, he thought, would be re- garded as a poweriid motive in the decision of the House. This was the entire change which had re- cently taken place in the circumstances of the Euro- pean belligerents. All Europe, which had been so lono; shut a2;ainst the commerce which constituted the vital breath of our enemy, was now open to them ; and our restrictive system, which, as auxiliary to that of other countries, pressed severely upon them, would, in the changed relations of those countries, press more heavily upon ourselves than upon Great I^ritairu It is with the statement of the fact upon which this last argument is founded that our subject has any thing to do. Here is proof that the change in the relative con- dition of the belligerent powers in Europe was known in this country so early as the Gth of April, 1814 — more than four months before the invasion and cap- ture of the City of AVashington ; and the statesman must have wilfully closed his eyes to passing occur- rences who did not see the cause of that change. No public man or politician of that day could be ex- cusable if he remained in ignorance of the fact that almost every arrival from Europe brought information of some new success of the allied armies, of which that of our enemy constituted one. The colossal power of France, which had, for twenty years, not merely withstood the attacks of all Europe, but had actually 1 1 I M I! I ! I , , 1 , I i 28 INVASION AND CAPTUKE OF WASHINGTON. waxed greater and greater by their results, was now seen to be tottering to i^s fall. Notwithstanding a few occasional slight reverses, the Allies were known to be every wliere gaining ground, and though a few enthusiasts still affected to believe in the invincibility of Napoleon, no one doubted that the war in Europe would soon be at an end. The great statesman was right in bringing forward this argument in support of his bill for the repeal of the embargo and non-impcrtation acts. So long as all Europe was shut against the products and manu- factures of England, and these acts remained in force, she would necessarily feel with greater severity the ef- fect of that seclrsion ; and so far they might be con- sidered good war measures on the part of the United States. But even this was thought doubtful by many wise politicians, inasmuch as it compelled Great Brit- ain, in her own defence, to f"eize upon all the channels of commerce in the United States, and thus secure to herself the opportunity of seducing our citizens to en- gage in an illicit trade with her— -an opportunity by which, as the President had informed Congress, she did n A fail to profit to the fullest extent. It was the only means she possessed of forcing a market, out of her own colonies, and if an inference may be drawn from the several acts passed by Congress to prohibit the use of British licenses or passes, and the conclu- sive ransoming of vessels and cargoes, it may be as- sumed that her actual blockades produced for her more than a compensation for the restrictive system. All Europe being again opened to her, the blockades wetv.; kept up only against the United States, and were the I I STRANGE UNCONCERN. 29 )C as- inorc All L-c the more rigorously eutbrcecl, as obedience to tlie order of their government, on the part of the officers intrusted with them, was rewarded by considerable pecuniary gains to the latter. But what is most of all remarkable and difficult of comprehension in this state of things is that neither the President, nor tlic enlightened and lar-seeing states- man at the head of the Connnittee of Foreign Kcla- tions, though well aware of the cliange in the cir- cumstances of Europe, seems to have thought of tlic possible eilect wliich that change might produce in the conduct of the war that Great Bi'itain was sep- arately wao'inn; aG;ainst the United States. Was the apprehension, which we have seeii was en- tertained by many observant and reflecting individu- als, that some of the British troops, left without em- ployment in Europe, would be forthwith sent to aid in a more vigorous prosecution of the war on this conti- nent, regarded as too chimerical to deserve the notice of statesmen '? Was there any thing unreasonable or far-fetched in such an anticipation ? It is true, the government of the United States had accepted the of- fered mediation of the Emperor of llussia, and had sent envoys extraordinary to Europe with commis- sions to treat of the terni.s of peace with those who might be appointed on the part of Great Britain, if she also should accept the mediation. But, though tlie President had reason to believe she would accept tliat mediation, she had not yet done so, and it is manifest, from his various messages to Congress on the subject of the war, that this consideration did not influence him to believe in the expediency of neglecting any means 1 I I il! I'. I I I 111 ■ii; III ii I .1! I 1 I 111 30 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. that might be tlecincd necessary for carrying it out with the same vigihince and energy as if no nego- tiations for peace had been thouglit of. In this, per- haps, it may be thought that lie did all which his duty re([uired him to do, and that the whole blame of not making the proper preparations to put the Distiict of Columbia in a complete state of defence ought properly to rest upon Congress. J5ut, on the otlicr hand, it may be said that the District of Columbia was more peculiarly under the guardianship of the President than any otlicr portion of the United States. Here was the seat of government, of wliich he was the head, and the condition of which, as it rccrardcd the cxistins; state of warfare, he must be supposed to have had bet- ter opportunities of forming a correct opinion of than the body of Congress. Tliey would, from these con- siderations, naturally wish to be informed by him that additional defences were deemed necessary before they instituted any legislatiA'c proceedings concerning them. As lie gave them no such information, they had a right, perhaps, to take it for granted that no inquiries on the subject, by them or their committees, Avould be expedient or proper. But, though the President had not only omitted to rcconnnend any s])ecial measures for the protection and defense of tlie District of Columbia, but had left Congress to infer from his message that the sole ob- ject of the enemy'.- ships of war in its vicinity was to regulate and control the conn)?erce of the cities and ports on the waters of the Chesapeake Bay, jct he had, during their session of the previous year, connnuni- cated to them various documents, proving beyond a -| 'I m ' til ill! T INROADS OF THE EXKMY. 31 ed to ■ - iction d left c ob- .1 as to i and ! had, » 4 luni- f [id a 4 l4 ([iiostio7i that the ships liad nuincrous troops on board ; that tlicsc troops liad landed, in larger or smaller par- tics, at various towns and villages in jMaryla and A'irginia ; had pillaged and destroyed large amounts of jjrivate property ; and had killed or earricd off as prisoners of war many, not only of the organized militia, but non-combatant citizens. The District of Columbia, it was well known to every body, was al- most as easily within their reach as the places actually invaded and made desolate, and, as the enemy well knew, vras (juite as defenceless. These facts were quite as well known to every member- of Congress as they were to the Pvesidcnt of tlie United States ; and yet the session Avas closed soon after the repeal of the embargo and non-importation acts without a single legislative enactment ha\ing in view the protection of the seat of government, unless a trifling augmentation of the marine corps, and the authority given to the President to appoint officers for the flotilla service may be construed as an exception. Now" let us observe the regular progress of events. On the 31st of 31arch, 1814, the allied armies entered Paris in triumph, and on the 6th of April, the very day on which the chairman of the Committee of For- eign delations reported his bill for the repeal of the cmljargo and non-importation acts, which had been so recently enacted by the Congress of the United States, Na])oleon abdicated the imperial throne which he had liimself created, and around which he had strewed so many dazzling glories. It rarely happens that " com- ing events" — such, at least, as this — do not " cast tlieir shadows l)efore tliem."' We have said that cv- 1 I 111 J" I i !!■! ill ! !l iij, i II! I ' ip: i li I 1 ,0 , . .1: ! i ill I! III, I IP f ; I' I . I! 'I ' 'I ll 32 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. cry arrival from Europe, for a month or more before the adjournment of Congress, brought with it rumors which affected the whole country, the govemment alone excepted, with apprehensions that the end of the war on the other side of the Atlantic M'ould be but the aggravation of it on tliis. Napoleon had made it the fashion in Europe to dash on through all obstacles to the capital of the enemy, and the presumption was not unnatural that the Britisli general here would endeav- or to imitate that fashion, particularly if re-enforcec' by a few of the conquerors v.dio had thus entered Paris. The President and his two veteran secretaries, of Revolutionary memoiy, liowever, still savf all this with calmness. Tliey would not believe it possible tliat what had happened to so many otJicr nations could happen to theirs. Lieutenant-colonel Cliach, with 500 recruits from North Carolina for the regular army, ar- rived in the City of Washington soon after tlie ad- journment of Congress, and remained encamped here for the purposes of drill and exercise for si\ weeks. Tiiey were still liere on the 7th of June, when the Pres- ident held a cabinet council, at whicli tlie Secretary of AVar reported that the whole force of the Fiftli ^Military District, of which the District of Columbia tlien formed a part, consisted of 2154 enlisted men, scattered over the District, and one company of marines at the bar- racks in the City of AYashington. At Fort Warbur- ton, in ^Maryland — now called I'ort A^'ashington — there was one small company of artillerymen. And these two last-mentioned companies constituted the whole " state of preparation" which a committee of Congress, sanctioned by the whole body, deemed it un- NEWS OF THE CHANGES IN EUROPE. 3.:. of 1 ^ yof tary med over bar- bur- ■' 11 — J Vnd 1 the f of •1 \m- '^ necessary to make "more complete" for the protection of the scat of government. On tlie 0th of Jutio, a French sloop of war, having on board a bearer of dispatches from the restored Bour- bon dynasty to the French minister at AVashinglon, arrived at New York. Though traveling at that day was not quite so rapid as at present, the distance from New York to 'Washington was not so great but that it was accompHshed by the mail-stages in four or live days at the most, so that the messenger, -vvitli liis dis- patclies, must ha^'c reached the seat of* government on the 13th or 14th of the same month. As the news he brought was not designed to be secret, not many hours elapsed after Ins arrival before it was known to the citizens of Washington. But it could hardly be called neics^ for the brig Ida, from llochclle, which had ar- rived at Boston on the 12th of May, brought informa- tion tliat the alUed a/mies had entered Paris on the 30tli of Marcli, and that proclamations had been every where issued in the name of Louis XVIII. ; and on the 15th of 31ay, the cartel Fair American had arrived at Sandy Ilook from Liverpool, tlie passengers on board of which had read in the London papers the official ac- count to the same purport. Both these arrivals, and the intelligence they brought, were announced in the papers of the District on the iSth of ^lay. But, un- fortunately, in addition to the news from France, let- ters from England held out the prospect that peace would certainly be concluded between the United States and Great Britain in the course of the sum- mer. Perhaps if this had not been so confidently expected, B 2 I I 1 'I If' if ' ' 1 hi '■ Kill ijii ' in iiii! ;|i il I I . I I 111 34 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. the other news niin-ht have fallen witli a more whole- some effect upon the cars of our President and his ad- visers. On the 18th of ]\[ay, then, it was known in Wash- ington that the Eni])eror of Kussia and the King of Prussia had entered Paris on the oOth of ]\Iarch witli 180,000 men ; that AVellington, with his Englisli and Portuguese army, was on his way thither, liaving tri- umphed over every obstacle in his marcli ; that Na- poleon was at I'ontainebleau, without an army, and completely at the mercy of the allied sovereigns. On the 13th or 14tli of June official dtsj^atches came to the French minister, whose duty it was — a duty which he, no doubt, for his own sake, lost no time in performing — immediately to communicate to the President that he was no longer the representative of imperial France, but of his most Christian majesty Louis XVIII. ; and yet, notwithstanding, and in the teeth of all this, it is asserted by General Armstrong and others that our government did not receive o^icial information of the general pacification in Europe until the 26th of June. This is little more than an unworthy play upon words. The information given by the French minister here was, if not in every respect official, as well founded and credible as that received from our minister then in Paris. The information, however, which our minister com- municated to the government was not confined to the simple fact that a general peace had been restored to Europe. It stated the actual embarkation of British troops for the United States, thus merely confirming what every body but those in power had long- antici- % M ,;iii INEXCUSABLE DILATOKINKSS. ?H) I, as our Jom- the to tisli fing tici- I I patctl. This was the official information which tliey hail tIier«^' I ■I :l m INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. commanded by experienced and enterprising ofticers, had been actually embarked on board of transports for the United States, and that their destination for tlic Chesapeake Bay was no secret, Ave shall be able to show from historical records of the time that the Pres- ident, at least, if none of his cabinet, had long before that expressed Iiis belief that the City of Washington would be one of the objects of the enemy's attack. In the " Report" by Colonel Richard ]\[. Johnson, chairman of the committee appointed, on his motion, to inquire into the causes of the capture of AVashing- ton, &c., -SVC find sunmiaries of the " proceedings of the cabinet"' at several meetings. That of the 7th of June, he says, ^'' had no j)artlcular rdat'ion to the de- fence ofanyjMvt of Military Dhtnct No. 5,'' of which the District of Columbia then constituted a part. " But soon after,'' he goes on to say, "certain intelli- gence being received of the success of the allies in tlio subjugation of France [we have shown that this intel- ligence was received and appeared in many of the jour- nals of the United States long hforc the 7th of June, to wit, on the 18th of May], the President believed that the enemy had the inclination and the power to increase his military and naval forces against the United States, and, in tliat event, he believed that a variety of considerations iroidd present this city as one of tlie prominent objects of attach. On the 2Gtli of June, dispatches were received from ]\Ir. Gallatin and ]\Ir. Bayard conjirniing the views of the Presi- dent, which led him to convene the heads of depart- ments on the 1st of July, when he 2>resented a jAaii of a force innnediatoly to be called into the field, jukI 1?' CABINET MEETING. 37 to the it a as nil it in csi- irt- '(Ol ii.l an additional force to be kept in readiness to march imthout delaii^ in cuisc of iiects^'ity. '-'■It seemed to be his object that some position sliould be taken on tlie Eastern Branch and Patnxcnt, witli two or three thou- sand men, and that an additional force of ten or twelve tJiousand militia and volunteers should be held vi read- i)iess in the neighhorimj atates^ including the militia of the District of Columbia, and that convenient depots of arms and military equipments should be established. The measures suggested were Jipproved by the heads of the departments, oi\ in other u'0'/\h\ it does not aj)- 2'>ear that anij dissent icris ej'pressed.''''^ My. Moiu'oe, the Secretary of State, in his letter to the chairmain of the connnittee, merely says, "The events in France having greatly augmented the dis- posable force of the enemy, and his disposition to cm- ploy it against the United States being made known, the safety of this metropolis was thought to require particular attention. "f It will be observed that 3Ir. 3Ionroe does not refer to any date when "the events in Fr.i'ice" became known to liimsclf or the President, or when "the safe- ty of this metropolis vas thouijht to require })articular attention;" but, from wliat immediately folloM's in his letter, we may suppose that he knew nothing of the effect produced upon the President by those events, or if he did, chose to say nothing of it until "on or about the first of July," when the heads of depart- ments were convened to liear his "plan." This is * ATiiPiicnu State Papers, cliap. v.. Military Airairs, vol. i., ]). .'.2-1. The words in Itnlks nrc so niarkeU l»y the editor of this volume, t Ibid., p. fl4U, =-*„ll i 1 I J' til! I !!|lii \$ II' lillii Illll' llkli li I .»! It*'' iltl' 38 INVASION AND CAPTURE 01' WASHINGTON. somewhat remarkable ^vhcn we reflect upon the close intimacy and mutual respect existing between these great men. Mr. A\^illiam Jones, Secretary of the Xavy, in his first letter to the chairman of the committee, is equally silent as to dates. The following is his language : " The serious apprehension of invasion and devasta- tion which succeeded the knowlcdG;c of those extraor- dinary events which liberated the powerful naval and military forces of the enemy from European hostilities, and the temper of the British nation, as displayed in the language of its journals and the conduct of its gov- ernment in relation to the pacific mission which it had invited, were deeply felt and frequently discussed in occasional conversations prior to the cabinet meeting on the first of July last, in which the probable points of attack were variously considered. ]My own impres- sions inclined to the opinion that there were some points more exposed, less dithcult of access, and more inviting to the enemy, upon the system of warfare he had adopted, than the metropolis ; the only important objects which it presented, according to my view, being the naval depot and public shipping. " I recollect, on one of the occasions, that the Pres- ident expressed very great solicitude for the safety of the metropolis, his belief that the enemy would attempt its invasion, and urged the expediency of immediate defensive ])re])arations, but nuist confess I was not cqmilly impressed with the ap]trehension of immediate danger, as well from flic reasons I have before assigned, as from the then existinix fact that the force of tiie en- cmy in tlic waters of the Cliesapeake was entirely na- "I Jl> SECRET RY OF THE NAVY. 39 cs- of 11 pt utc not ate cn- la- val, and apparently very satisfactorily engaged in eon- flagratiiig larm-lioiises, and depredating upon slaves and tobacco, on the shores of the Patuxcnt. In this sentiment 1 was not alone."* Without stopping to criticise the language of this letter, we may be permitted to remark, that the vari- ous conversations and frequent discussions said to have taken place between the I^'csident and individual mem- bers of his cabinet could hardly all have occurred between the 21st of June and the meeting of the 1st of July. Some of them, we have a right to conclude, took place before the arrival of the official dispatches ; and we are strengthened in this conclusion by the sec- ond letter of 3Ir. Jones to the chairman of the com- mittee. Jieforc we give the extract to which wc de- sire to call tlic attentif n of the reader, it will be proper to say that there is an obvious error in the date of the letter, as given in the volume from which it is copied. The first, from which the extract already given is quoted, is dated "Oct. 31st,*' and purports to be in reply to Colonel Johnson's " letter of the 24th uistant.'''' That from which the following extract is quoted is dated "• October 3, ' and pur^wrts to be in reply to the same gentleman's "letter of the 2Gth instant.''' It is probable they were both written on the same day — 31st of October— the figure 1, in the latter, being ac- cidentally omitted, it will be remembered tliat our object in quoting these letters from members of the cabinet is to sliow that the President was fully aware of the danger that threatened the scat of government, or at least professed to be so, long bclbre the heads of ♦ State Papers, %a anti\;. p. 540. I m m m 40 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. departments were called together to decide upon the expediency and sufficiency of the j^lan which he had devised, or seemed to have devised, for its defence. This is Mr. Jones's statement : *' In ohcdience to the general instructions and early solicitude of the President, in anticipation of the prob- able designs of the enemy to harass the country in this vicinity, and to attempt the invasion of this metrojm- lis, I directed, ?;i the 7}ionth of May last, three twelve- pounders to be mounted on field-carriages by the me- chanics of the navy-yard, and completely equipped and furnished for field service. To these the marines at headquarters were trained, under the command of Cap- tain ]\Iiller, and prepared to act either artillerist or in- fantry, as the service might require."* Nothing could be more explicit than this. Though Colonel Monroe, who bore so conspicuous a part in all the discussions and volunteer expeditions of the period, seemed to have known nothinn; of the President's so- licitude for the safety of the metropolis earlier than " on or about the first of July,"' ]\Ir. Jones was not only made aware of it, but received general instruc- tions in the month of May. We shall see, by-and-by, how this statement agrees with the after conduct of the President. The chairman of the committee of investigation, as wc have seen, reported that the cabinet meeting of the 7tli of June — after the President's expression of solicitude for the safety of the city, be it remembered — had no relation to the defence of any j^art of the military district in which it was situated. This is confirmed by Mr. ♦ State Papers, nt antea. ]>. r>7n. A y I THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL. 41 mi an 5eeii, ic — the ition it in Mr. rA i Hush, the attorney-general, who, in liis second letter to the chairman of the committee, in relation to the convocation of the heads of departments of the 7th of June, says, "'The meeting was called and the esti- mate of force submitted for jmrjwscs quiU distinct from the d fence of District No. 5."* But in his first letter he says "That, ill the month of June of the past summer, when the momentous changes in Europe had become revealed to us, I had the honor of holding, individu- ally, occasional interviews witli the President. In dwelling upon our public alfairs, he expressed his strouii' belief of the inau.s])icious results which these changes held out of every likelihood of superducing upon them ; that the entire liberation of ]3ritish mili- tary power from European conflicts created a corre- sponding probability that portions of it, unexpectedly formidaljle, would be thrown upon our shores. In one, at least, of the conversations, he also dwelt upon the probability of an attack upon Washington, ex- pressing his opinion on the grounds, among others, of its own weakness, and the eclat that would attend a successful inroad upon the capital beyond the intrinsic magnitude of the achievement. He S])okc of the im- mediate necessity of preparing for its defence. His impressions of the danger appeared to acquire new force from the 2()th of the month, upon which day di - patches were received from two of our ministers abroad, dated early in j\Iay.''*t If any of these occasional interviews which Mr. llusli Iiad with the President had occurred jrrevious * State Pniicrs, ul uutca, \). 542. f Ibid., p. .">U. 4 A : 'I w i« : lis I 42 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASIIIXOTON. to tlie 7tli of June, it would surpass belief that lie failed to impart his apprehensions and solicitude for the safety of the capital to the asrenibled heads of de- partments on that day. AVe are constrained to believe, then, that they must all liavc been held between the 7th and the 26th of that month, since, accordinp- to i\Ir. Rush, the President's nnpressions of the danger only appeared to acquire new force, and not to have been created by the dispatches received on the day last mentioned. It is singular, indeed, that ]\Ir. Jones should have been the only member of his cabinet to whom the President communicated his veri/ (jreat so- licitude for the safety of the metropolis so early as the Qiionth of 2 fay. It certainly was not because he mci; with a more sympathizing listener in ]\Ir. Jones than in cither of the other heads of departments, for the Sec- retary of. the Navy takes good care to repeat more than once that he did not participate in the President's ap- prehensions of an attack on Washington, though he promptly obeyed his instructions in preparing for its defence, so far as t/rree twehe-jwunders 'mounted on field-carriages, with Captain ]\liller to train his ma- rines to their exercise, could contribute to that object. Having given all that has been said by three mem- bers of the cabinet on the particular points of the Pres- ident's expectation of an attack on Washington, his acknowledgment of the insufficiency, the "weakness" of its defences, and of his silence on the subject at the meeting of the heads of departments on the 7th of June, a month after his conversation with and instruc- tions to the Secretary of the Navy, let us now sec what his Secretary of War says of that meeting. (lon- ,5^ 4 % " I !• THE SECRETARY OF WAR. 43 ," I oral Armstrong, in lii.s letter to the chairman of the committee, thus speaks of it : " Early in the month of June last, a call was made on the War Department for a general report of the nmnbers of regular troops and militia employed by the United States, and the distribution which had been made of them for the service of the present campaign. This statement was promptly rendered, and submitted by the President to the heads of departments. It is not recollected that any alteration of the provisions exhibited bv this document was either made or suo-- gestcd. A reference to it will show what was the force then deemed competent for tlic defence of ]\Iili- tary District No. 5, of which the City of AVashington Avas a part."* In a note to this passage. General Armstrong says, "This document is in the possession of the President. No copy of it was retained by me." But a copy of it, we take it for granted, is the paper marked No. 1, to be found among the documents that were submitted by the committee along with this report. It is called "A lieport of the Army, its strength and distribu- tion, previous to the 1st of July, 181 4. "f By this report it appears that there were in the whole " dis- tnrtiYo. 5" 2154 " elfeetives," of which 1083 were at Norfolk, 532 at Baltimore, 40 at Annapolis, 79 at Fort Washington, and 320, comprising the 36th regiment of intantry, in 8t. Clary's. In the District of Colum- bia ?iot one. and yet this force was deemed coinj)etent for the defence of 2fUltan/ Bhtrkt Xo. 5, of xrhlch the City of Washinyton loas a part — so deemed by all * State PajH'is, vt anti(u p. aOS. t Ibid., p. r»3.~>. J ! ; 71 V I ' I 44 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. the lieads of departments ; for it icas not recollected^ says General Armstrong, tliat any alteration of the 2)rovmons of this document loas either made or sag- (jested. Colonel Johnson and 3Ir. Rush Loth tell us, indeed, that this meeting of the 7th of June had no particular relation to the defence of any part of j\lili- itary District Xo. 5 ; hut it exhibited the distribution of the troops in the district, and showed clearly enough that the distribution was not such as to promise any etfective defence of the City of Washington, if it should be attacked, as the President believed it would be. And 07ie of the gentlemen present, at least, knew tliat tlie President so believed, or perhaps we ought rather to say, must have rocollccted that the President had so told him in the month of ]May. It was known to all that nothing had occurred in the mean time to weaken any of the grounds u^wn which llie President had rested that belief, but, on the contrary, much to con- hrm and strengtlien it. \-\ I I i' t i! I I 1 Si 1 CABINET MEETING. 45 CF..iTErv III. The Administration begins to awake. — Cabinet Meeting of the 1st of July. — rrojects of Defence. — Creation of a new Military Dis- trict. EousED at length to a sense of the necessity of showing a deep solicitude for the safety of the metrop- olis by some more public demonstration than his fre- quent interviews with the members of liis cabinet in- dividually, on the 30th of June the President invited them to meet him at his mansion on the follow ing day, the first of July, for consultation. The result of that consultation we shall present in the words, respective- ly, of the several members, of whom inquiries were made by the chairman of the committee of investiga- tion. We have already placed before the reader the brief summary of the proceedings of the cabinet on that day, as given in the report of the committee, and the next in order is the statement made by the Secre- tary of State. In his letter, marked " No. 2" in the list of documents presented to the House of Repre- sentatives, we find the following : " On or about the first of July last, the President convened the heads of departments and the attorney- general to consult them on the measures which it would be proper to adopt for the safety of this city and district. He appeared to have digested a plan of the force to be called immediately into the field ; the additional force to be kept under orders to march at a Ill !• I II ! : .1 If I' ! I ! ; I I ■ '■ i! ij;i III ll 46 INVASION AND CAPTUKE OF WASHINGTON. moment's notice ; its composition, and necessary equip- ment. It seemed to be liis object that some position should be taken between the Eastern Branch and the Patuxent with two or three thousand men, and that an additional force of ten or twelve thousand, includ- ing the militia of the District, should be in readiness in the neighboring states to march when called on ; the whole force to be put under the command of an officer of the regular army. " The measures siiggested by the President were approved by all the members of the administration. The Secretaries of War and Navy gave the informa- tion required of them incident to their respective de- partments. The former stated the regular force which lie could draw together at an early day, infantry and cavalry ; the amount of the militia of the District, and the states from which he should draw the remaining force in contemplation, and in wliat proportions. The latter stated the aid which he could afford from tlie of- ficers and seamen of the flotilla on the Patuxent and the marines at the navy-yard on the Eastern Branch. The result of the meeting promised prompt and efficacious measures for carrying these objects into execution. The command of this ^vhole force, w^itli that of the Dis- trict No. 5, was given to Brigadier-general Winder." If the reader will compare this statement with the summary to which we have just referred, to be found in the preceding chapter, he will see that the same singular mode of expression is used in both when speaking of the President's plan: ^'■Jle a])pearcd to have dlgeded a ijlan^'''' &c. ''''It seemed to he his ob- ject,'"' &c. h ! I .X i CABINET MEETING. 47 cquip- osition nd the id that includ- idiness ed on; L of an it were tration. itbrma- ive de- e which try and ict, and naining The the of- and the The vicious Icution. le Dis- Ider." th the found same Avhcn red to is ob- ■h There arc not wanting those wlio have attributed this phm of a force to 31r. 3lonroe himself. Every body knows that Mr. ■Madison made no pretensions to mihtary science, and it certainly is not improbable that, at a time when the whole country was looking with absorbing interest to the movements of the govern- ment, and when skill and experience in modes of war- fare were more than ever required, he would consult fctimc military friend before he would hazard his repu- tation by submitting to the animadversions of the heads of departments his own crude notions on a sub- ject which nobody expected him to understand. He had no friend on whose fidelity he could more coniid- ingly rely, no friend to whom he would more readily expose his ignorance, or who would be more willing to aid him at a time of need, than his Secretary of State. The surmise, therefore, was not unreasonable that ]\Ir. Monroe himself was the planner of the scheme which 2)romised to be so ejficadous if promptly carried into execution. Tlie statement of General Armstrong, marked No. 3, follows that of ]Mr. jMonroe. As our present object is confined to the exposition of what took place at the meeting of the cabinet on the 1st of July, we shall give only that portion of General Armstrong's letter which relates to the discussions then held. He says : "On tlie 1st of July a consultation of the heads of departments was had. The questions proposed for dis- cussion were two : "1st. By what means can the seat of government and Baltimore be defended, in case the enemy should make these cities objects of attack ? i i i f i I 1 r I ! i i I ! 111 f i i i • I , I 48 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. C( 2d. Sliciild he select the former, will his approach be made by way of the Potomac or by that of the Pa- tuxent ? *' On these questions I took the liberty of offering the following statements and opinions : *' 1st. That the principal defence to be relied upon for either place was militia ; that, besides the artil- lerists comprising the garrisons of Fort IM'IIenry and Washington, about one thousand regular troops only could be collected, viz., the thirty-sixth regiment, one battalion of the thirty-eighth, two troops of dragoons, two companies of the tenth — ordered from North Caro- lina, and l>elieved to be on their march — one company of the twelfth, and two companies of sea fcncibles ; that the number of militia called into service should be proportioned to the known or probable strength of the enemy, and be taken from the states of A^irginia, ]\Ia- ryland, and Pennsylvania ; that it is not believed the enemy will hazard a blow at either place with a force less than five thousand men ; that, to repel one of this extent, we should at least require double that number of militia ; that these should be assembled at some in- termediate point between Baltimore and the District of Columbia, leaving the sedentary or undrafted militia of both places an auxiliary force at the disposition of the commandmg general, and that arms and ammuni- tion were in depot and ready for this supply."' [Under this head the Secretary of the Navy stated that the removal or destruction of the flotilla would put at his disposition between six and eight hundred .seamen, and that the marines then in barracks exceeded one hundred.] 'I' IM :i I 1 TON. s approach of the Pa- of offering •died upon 5 the artil- Ilenry and troops only ^iment, one f dragoons, S'^orth Caro- le company I fencibles ; :e shoukl be 2ngth of the rginia, !Ma- beheved the th a force one of this at number at some in- District of :'tcd mihtia position of d ammuni- [avy stated tilla would it hundred s exceeded CAIMNE'J' MKETlNf}. 49 \vi *' 2d. That the navi^-ation of the Potomac is lonjr and sinuous, and if not doubtful, as to practical.iihty, by large sJiips, is at least uncertain in relation to the time its ascent may occupy ; while that of the Patux- cnt is short and safe, and may be calculated with sufli- cicnt precision for military purposes ; that, should the enemy ascend the former, his object is unmasked — he at once declares his destination, and of course leaves us at libcrtv to concentrate our whole force apjainst him ; that, on the other hand, should he ascend the l^ituxent (or South River), his object is uncertain — it may be the Hotilla, or Baltimore, or "Washington ; and that, as long as his point of attack is unknown, so long must our force remain divided ; tliat these con- siderations suggest tJic preference he will probably give +he Patuxent, but that this route is not without ob- jections ; that a separation from his tleet, and a land march of twenty miles through a country covered vrith woods, and offering at every step strong positions for defence, becomes inevitable ; that, if these circum- stances be turned to proper account against him, if he be not absolutely stopped, his march will be much re- tarded ; that this state of things, on which every wise general will calculate, renders necessary a provision train, or the establishment of small intermediate posts, to keep open his communication with his shipping; that the loss of these would make his situation peril- ous ; and that, should the main battle be given near AVashington, and he to him disastrous or even doubt- ful, his destruction is complete; that, after all, be- lieving he will not hazard the movement but with a C il II 1 1 i I i :■ '! I , ,1 III ' < 1 1 I I! ,1. t! !l I I II 50 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. very superior force, or one he thinks such, it is also believed tiiat he will prefer this route. *•• Conformably to these opinions, an order was taken to assemble a corps and form a camp at such point between the City of AVashington and Baltimore aa might be selected by the commanding general."* This comprises all tiiat is said in General Arm- strong's letter to the chairman of the committee as to the consultation of the 1st of Julv. It will be ob- served that the President's })lan of a force is not even mentioned. Mr. ]Monroe, in his letter, is entirely silent as to these detailed views of the Secretary of War. He gives him no credit for having so well foreshad- owed what the enemy would do, and described the method by which his marcli might be, if ''not abso- lutely stopped," at least " much retarded." He merely says, with regard to tiie part taken by the vSecrctary of War at the meetinc; tliat he stated "the re^rular forces which lie could have drawn together at an early day — infantry and cavalry, the amount of the militia of the district, and the states from which he should draw the remaining force in contemplation, and in what proportions." If General Armstrong had obtruded these opinions upon the cabinet imasked, tliey iiiight possibly have been misinterpreted as an objection to the measures ••' suggested" by the President ; but he tells us they were enlU^d out by " . 5 [No. 10], was ghen lo Briga- dier-general Winder." It is important to Lear in mind that ^Ir. Monroe is speaking of what took plaee at the meeting of the heads of departments " on or about the first of July." General Armstrong says, in his letter to tlie committee, in the lirst place, that his opinion was that "the sedentary or undrafted militia of Baltimore and the District of Columbia should be left " at the disposition of the commanding general ;" and, in the second place, in his Notices of the War of 1812, as just quoted, he says, after enumerating the troops intended to '■'' constitute a corps at all times disjiosahle, ynder the direction of the coinnianding general^'''' that they formed " an aggregate of three thousand Qomh^i^wX^ ;" and we shall see hereafter that c. v» this small portion of the force thought neces- s. ■} '^.is not for some time "disposable" by the com- manding' o;eneral. The next account of the cabinet meeting is that of the Secretary of the Navy. In his letter, marked " No. 4" in the documents already described, he says, " On the 30tli day of June, the members of the cabinet were invited to attend a meetinix at the Pres- idcnt's mansion on the following day at noon. " At or near the time appointed, the Secretaries of State, Treasury, War, and Navy, and the Attorney- general, assembled. "The President stated the object of the meeting to be the consideration of the nuMiacing aspect of things, in conse(picnce of the augmciited power of the enemy by the great ])olitical changes which liad taken place in Europe, and the disposition manifested by the gov- II I U ■:*! i<.' ^\ ilh :l : 1 •1 I Si i 1 1 .li t 1 1 1 1' 1 1 i ' ': !■ '- i t r .1 ! Ill' 54 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. ernment and people of Great Britain to prosecute the war Avitli the most vindictive and devastating spirit ; represented the motives and inducements which he conceived the enemy had to prefer tlie invasion of the capital rather than any other immediate enterprise ; and urged the necessity of speedy and efficient preparation for the defence of the District and capital ; inquired into the existing state of its military and naval de- fences, and the extent of the disposable force which it would be practicable to concentrate in the District. "The Secretary of War estimated the disposable regular force applicable to the intended purpose, to the best of my recollection, at about twelve hundred, in- cluding about two hundred cavalry at Carlisle, Penn- sylvania, who, I think he said, were not all mounted, but would probably be so in a short time. lie brought into view the volunteer corps of tlie city and District, the particulars of which I do not vccollect, and esti- mated the depot at Harper's Ferry, I tliink, to contain, at that time, about tliirty-six thousand stand of arms. " The Secretary of the Xavy enumerated tlie naval force within immediate reach as follows : The marines at headquarters about 120 The force attaclied to the flotilla under the com- mand of Commodore Barney, on the Patux- ent 500 "620 *' To the regular force, the President proposed to add ten thousand militia, ro be designated and hold in rcadlncs:^ in such neighboring districts as should be found most convenient, lie also suggested the pro- priety of depositing at a suitable place, contiguous to THE AITORNEY-GENERAL. 55 )()0 to ill be \vo- to '1 the metropolis, a supply of arms, ammunition, and camp equipage. " These propositions produced very little discussion. The propriety and expediency of the measures ap- peared to be admitted, though no formal question was taken, nor was any dissent expressed. " The meeting separated with the understanding, on my part, that the measures proposed were to be carried into effect, but what order took place thereon, other than in tlic Department of the Xavy, I know not."- 3Ir. liush, in his narrative, marked Xo. 5, says : "On the oOtli of June, the heads of departments were desired to meet at the President's house on the following day at 12 o'clock. " They accordingly assembled. All were present. I also, in pursuance of the President's re(|uest, at- tended. Our public affairs were brought into discus- sion : their altered and more menacing character ; the probable reluctance of the Xorthern powers of Europe to regard favorably, at such a moment of European Iiomnge to tlie British name, the just rights for which we were contending; tlie fierce aspect whicli British military j)Ower now had the means, and probably would not want the disposition to put on toward us; the parts of our country most vulnerable to immediate irruj)tion, as well as the general trials before us, were broui>;lit into view. The President mentioned what I had Jieard him individually express before relative to Washington, stating his impressions unequivocally to bo, tliat if it fell within tlic plans of the enemy to send ' Stare J^ijK'Ts, tit ankfu p- '>-iO. f i ll 1 ♦> Jl il 5() INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON, troops for operation upon tlio Atlantic frontiers tins season, lie thought the capital would be marked as tlio most inviting object of a speedy attack ; that it "svould be right forthwith to put in train measures of precau- tion and defence, lie then declared that to him it a})peared that a force of ten thousand men should be got in readiness for the city and District ; that it would be desirable to have as large a portion of it as practi- cable regular troops, but that, at the least, there should be r>. ll i M 1 l1 I it la WANT OF IIARJIONY IN THE CABINET. 61 ry that the people, particularly those who have daily opportunities of intercourse with the heads of depart- ments, should soo'i Ijecomc acquainted even with the most confidential proceedings of those in power. There is, therefore, good reason to believe that the impressions referred to had some foundation in truth. If so, it was certainly a most unfortunate state of things to exist at a time when Congress was not in session, to whom might properly have been referred the duty of provid- ing for the defence of the city, and when etfective ac- tion so much depended on the harmony and concert of the advisers of the chief magistrate. It would be absurd to suppose that the cabinet could be ignorant of what was known to the public at large ; nay, of what was from time to time announced in the National Intelligencer, the leading journal of the country, published at the seat of government, and enjoying the confidence of the administration, namely, that the British troops even then in the Chesapeake Bay amounted to from four to six thousand men. To these it would have been no more than reasonable to expect that some three or four thousand more would be added of the regiments known to have been de- tached from Wellington's veterans. It is not at all probable that, if the cabinet had been a "unit," it would have supposed it had done all that the ease re- quired, when, to meet these well-disciplined and expe- rienced soldiers of the enemy, it gave its approval of the plan of calling into immediate service, and placing at the disposition of the commanding general, a corps of "three thousand combatants,^'' composed, in great part, of newly-levied, undisciplined militia, who had m i It it ,|j: 'N I' t! lii; I I, |( .'1 r" V ll 62 INVASION AND CAPTURi: OF WASHINGTON. never seen a comhaU and of regulars recently enlisted ■who had never heard the guns of the enemy. This, it will be remembered, was the ic hole fur cc ])laccd, or, rather, to he placed at the immediate disposition of the commanding general. But the reasoning of the government was wrong. Their syllogism was this : The enemy have tried an attack on Norfolk ; they failed in it ; therefore they will not dare to approach Washington ; and to this fatal no7i sequitur did the administration trust to the very last moment. The enemy were as well aware of tlie unhappy infatuation which, like the inhalation of chloric ether, had soporated our government, as the citizens of Washington themselves were ; for British officers in disguise, md degenerate Americans in the pay of the British gov^ernment, frequented the hotels, and passed in and out of the city unquestioned. Be- sides, the newspapers of the District were received al- most as regularly on board the enemy's ships in the Bay as they were by daily subscribers in the city. All this was known, or certainly ought to have been known, to the members of tlie administration ; and they ought to have known, too, that the enemy would be disposed to prolit by the information thus obtained ; and yet they thought that "three thousand combat- ants" — and such combatants — were quite enough to be called into immediate service. Besides the "plan of force'' which was decided upon at this meeting of the 1st of July, a further meas- ure of "preparation," it seems, was adopted. This was the creation of a new military district, by dismem- bering the 5th, and constituting out of its dissevered \ H ^ TKNTII MILITARY DISTRICT. 63 parts a lOtli ^Military District, to be composed of tlic northern part of Virginia, the District of Columbia, and ]\Iaryland. We have no reason to believe that this measure had been recommended by the Secretary of War, unless we may construe the following passage in his letter to the committee of investi^-ation as assuminc; to himself the authorship of it : " The better to secure the seat of government, &c., from the attacks of the enemy, and to relieve the War Dejxiiimejit from details not making part of its regular duties, and incident to Dis- trict No. 5, as then constituted, a new /military district, comprising that portion of country lying between the Rappahannock and Potomac rivers, tlic Dis'i'ict of Columbia, and the State of ^Maryland, was created or- the 2d of July last, and placed under the command of Brigadier-general Winder, who had been spe :xt.,liy as- signed by the President to that service." The 5th Military District was then commanded by one of the bravest and most experienced generals in the service, Moses Porter, who had entered tin Revo- lutionary army as a common soldier, and had gradu- ally raised himself, by his own signal merits, through every intervening grade, from a private in the ranks to the high and distinguished post of brigadier general and commander of a military distr:. . His headquar- ters were then at Norfolk, from which place a simple order from the AVar Departmert v^ould have brought him to Washington in four <:r five days at the most. It could not have been apprehension for the safety of the former post thiit prevented this transfer, or, to speak in more military phrase, the order to change his B5BS t m, j 1* 1 64 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. headquarters, for it was known that the enemy had al- ready made an unsuccessful attack upon it before CJeneral Porter assumed the command, and while its fortiiications \^'ere comparatively weak. These had now, under his orders, and with the surpassing indus- try and skill of one of the Lest engineers in the army,* been made impregnable to any force which the enemy could send against it ; and this the enemy well knew ; so that the temporary, or even permanent command of the place might have been safely intrusted to either of the colonels who then respectively commanded Torts Norfolk and Nelson. The Secretary of War, it appears, was desirous of calling this veteran to the seat of government for the purpose of its defence, but his wishes were over- ruled. If, therefore, he cither originated or a])proved the dismemberment of the district, it was probably from motives very dilferelit from those assigned in the extract quoted above from his letter. It is diilicult to conceive how the scat of government would be less li- able to an attack by circumscribing the limits of the district in which it was situated; nor is it probable that General iVrmstrong, indolent as he was said to be, would openly shrink from any duties which his of- fice im})osed on him, Jiowcver onerous. Jiesidcs, if he could so far forget himself as to sue to be relieved from any of the responsibilities of the important sta- tion he occupied, lie could not be so ignorant as to F.U})pose that this could be effected by increasing the number of military districts, and thus multiplying the ♦ Captnin S. Tlmvcr, nftonvaril promoted to the rank of lieuten- ant colonel for these verv Hervit-es. 'i GENEKAL TORTEK. 65 detalh wliicli would necessarily require liia attention. Another strong reason for believing that this measure did not owe its adoption to the advice ot'the Secretary of War is that he had Lut a short time before said, in a communication to General Izard, that '"territorial limits of command arc found inco?iir/iic?it."''* If the Secretary of AVar did in truth propose the dismemberment of District No. 5, and the creation of ic new district No. 10, it must have been afk/' his advice to call drcneral Porter to the defence of the seat of govcrinnent had been disregarded, and after he dis- covered that there was stronger inlluencc than his own at work with the President in diycstuuj military schemes of preparation. Another general could not be appointed to an indejicnJent command within Dis- trict No. o without a gross insult to General Porter; and as the President had already determined to have anothci, and had, indeed, "specially assigned" him to the service, a commendable respect for his old fellow- soldier of the Kevolution may have induced the Sec- retary of War to save his feelings by suggesting the establishment of a new district. It would be decid- edly more civil to confnic him to nanowcr "territo- rial limits'' than to erect an imperhnn in imperio — to give to any olliccr an independent connnand within the legitimate sphere of his supremacy. This would naturally, and honorably for the secretary, explain tl.j sharc he had, if he had any, in the crealion of Dis'.iict No. 10. • Wilkinson's ^^cmo^rs, p. 7.13. >i I ini %i 1 1 Ik m i i i 1 'r «„ ,1 CO INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. CHAPTER IV. Want of Harmony in the Cabinet. — Selection of a Commanding (jcneral. In speaking of the force proj^ioscd for the defence of the District of Columbia, (icneral Armstrong gives tlie following summary from the report made by the Congressional committee of inquiry : "On the 2d of July," says the report, "the Tenth Military District was constituted, and the command given to General A\'indcr. On the 4t]i a requisition on tlic states for 93,500 men was issued ; on the 14tli the governors of Pennsylvania and Virginia acknowl- edge tiie receipt of tlie requisition, and promised promptitude. On the 10th the Governor of ^Maryland was served with a cojiy of the requisition, and took measures to comply with it. On tlic 12th Cicncral AVinder was authorized, in case of cither menaced or actual invasion^ to call into service the wliolc of the ^laryland quota ((5(100 men) ; and on the 18tli oOOO from Pennsylvania and 2(100 irom Virginia, m.aking an aggregate (the regular infantry and cavalry, nia- rines, tlotilla-men, and district militia included) of 6'/*i'- tecn t/ioHsand si,v hundred men. Such was the meas- ure of defence desimiatcd for ^lilitarv District No. 10, and such tlic measures taken by the War Department for assemblinir it up to the iSth of Julv, thirtv-six days before tlie enemy's a] j)roach to the capital."** * Notices of the War of 1812, v.)l. ii., p. 128-t). I , i DELAYS. The purpose for which General Armstrong gave this summary was to exonerate himself from one of the charges alleged against him, namely, that he had not used the promptitude which the occasion called for in giving eftect to the measures decided upon in the cab- inet. But even in this he is unfortunate ; for, accord- ing to his own showing, his requisition on the states for 93,000 men was issued on the 4t]i, and the Gov- ernor of ^Maryland, from whom the largest quota for the service designated was required, was not served ic'Uh a copy of it until the 10th of July. Here were six (hnjs! unnecessarily lost. ^^ hy was xiot a copy of the requisition sent to him on the day it was issued ? and why did he delay until " tiic 12th" to authorize General Winder, in case of "menaced or actual inva- sion," to call for this whole quota (6000 men)? The cabinet must have thought that invasion was menaced when it was convened on the 1st of July, or it would not have decided to trouble " the states" with so start- ling a call uj")on their farmers and })lanters to hold themselves in readiness to march at a moment's no- tice. Surely the ])ublic had some right to conq)lain of tardiness on llu> jiavt of tlic Secretary of War when lie sufirred eh ren deir facilities for the trans- mission of orders and the transportation of troops, were, to say the least, evidences of a much more culpa- ble indilTerencc to the safety of the seat of government 70 INVASION AND CAPTl'RK OF WASHINGTON. t I " I than that ascribed to the Secretary of War In liis supposed want of promptitude in fiirlherinq" the exe- cution of the phin of defence after it was decried upon in the cabinet. Nor can Ave fuirly ini})ute it as a fault to th(^ Secre- tary of Wnr, eireunistanced as we have everv reason to believe he was at the council board — his opinions dis- regarded, his advice set at naugiit, his selection of a connnantlinG: officer overruled — tiiat the chief rehance for tiie defence of the capital of tiie country was placed in militia drafts from a distance, to be called out at a moment's notice, witliout previous training:, and hav- ing no inducement to prompt them to willinn- service other than the general motive of patriotism, which it must be supposed was common to every citizen, rather than in the wdiole body of male inhabitants of the Dis- trict of Columbia, in whom, to the eonnnon interest of American citizens, were superadded the dearer and stronger promptings of domestic relations, the preser- vation of which was involved in the safety of the city. A proclamation T)y the President, even of so late a date as the 4tli of July, calling upon every citizen of the District capable of using a musket or rifle, would have rallied around him, within less than a week after its pro- nnilgation, a body, old and young, of at least live thou- sand men, who, in the month intervening belbrc the attack, might have been so instructed and disciplined in tlie use of ju-ms that, animated as they would have been by the inspiring hopes of saving wives, children, and homes, they would, with the assistance of a ihw regular troops, have sufficed to repel the invader. When we look at the enormous })aper army con- COMMANDER OF THE NEW DISTRICT. 1 in- jured up by the scrape of a pen on the 4th of July, the thirty-eighth anniversary of tiiat glorious day which had witnessed the pledge of " lives, fortunes, and sacred honor" to the nianitenanee of American in- dependence, and reflect upon the ridiculous handful to which it dwindled at the moment of need, we iind it difficult to resist a Lelief in fatalism. It seems liardly possible tliat any power less resistless than that .ascribed to the mythic Fates could have ruled the deliberations of the American cabinet on this moment- ous occasion. After })avinc!: crea*'d ^lilitarv District No. 10, and decided ujiou the several rpiotas of militia to be re- rpiired from the states of Pennsylvania, ^Marvland, and A'irginia resj)cctively, the next subject of discussion, we may suppose, was the selection of a military com- mander for the new district — though it micrht be infer- red from the lano-uasic of General Armstrono: that this had been predetermined by the President himself: so, at least, if we are to credit the statement of the other members of the cabinet, had been the pian of force to be called out ; and if he submitted the one subject aft- er his own mind had been made up upon it, there is no reason to doubt that he submitted the other in like manner. It was a point of even more importance than the selection of troops, whether regard be had to the quality or number of the latter. A commander of well-known and acknowledged experience and good fortune — for sometimes success is as nuich the result of the latter, in the eyes of the soldiers, as of skill or couran'c — would have brousiht with him to the execu- tion of his duties what the French call a predi(jt\ a 72 INVASION AND CAPTrilE OF WASIIINO'nW. i !'l i, prepossession iu his favor, whicli would have inspired the troops with a confidence perliaps suilicient to coun- terbahmce all the deficiencies in their organization. They would have obeyed the orders of such a leader with a trustful conviction that whatever he command- ed was right and necessary. They would have fought under him with the animating presentiment of victory ; and all who arc acquainted with human nature are aware that the stinmlus of such an anticipation rarely fails to bring about its own realization. We have some reluctance i]i assuming so positively what can not be rigorously proved, that there existed rivalries and jealousies in the high places of i. . nation at a time when harmony and friendly concert of action were of so much importance to the interests and honor of the country ; but human nature is, unfortunately, not changed by rank or station, and the same p'tty feuds and prejudices that govern the conduct of men toward each other in the humblest walks of life are found operating with equal force in the highest. If there had been no mutual jealousies between the two Revolutionary secretaries, it is not probable that any objection would have been made to the selection by the head of the AVar Department of Ciencral Porter to command the force destined for the defence of the scat of government ; for that the objection originated, either directly or indirectly, with the Secretary of State, was never doubted by any intelligent citizen of Washing- ton at the ])eriod referred to ; and it is as little to be doubted tiiat the jn-incipal ground of the objection was that the Secretary of War rccomuicnded the appoint- ment. PRESIDENTIAL ASPIRATIONS. 73 llT- uc larf 1 d. There was another consideration, perhaps, which 0])eratcd on the mind of the secretary with an influ- ence not less powerful than gallantry and patriotism, to induce him to take the conspicuous part he did in the agitated question of proper measures for defending the seat of government, and it was quite natural that it should have that effect. lie was regarded as a prom- inent candidate for the presidential succession ; the eyes of the whole people would be upon the dc]*cnders of AVashington ; a brilliant volunteer achievement, ac- complished without the orders acknowledged of the commanding general, would win for him the hearts of liis countrymen, and render his future elevation sure. This could not well be attempted under the bluff old soldier Moses Porter, or any other experienced general not indebted to him for his appointment. One of the most eminent men and profound states- men of the present age, in his admirable sketch of Lord Nortli, says of him, that "when ho. found he could no longer approve the policy which he wa , re- quired to pursue, and of course to defend, he was bound to quit the councils of his obstinate and unrea- sonable sovereign. Nor can there be a worse service, cither to the prince or his people; than enabling a mon- arch to rule in his own person, dictating the com- mands of his own violence or caprice through servants who disap})rove of his measures, and yet sutler tliem- selves to be made instruments for carrying them into execution. A bad kino; can (Vsirc notliinn' more than to be served by such persons, whose opinions he will as nuich disregard as tlicir inclinations, but whom he will always find his tools in doing the work of niis- D 74 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. cliief, because they become the more at the monarch's mercy in proportion as they have surrendered their principles and their will to his."* These remarks contain a truth equally as applica- ble under our republic as under the monarchy of Great Britain. AVhen a minister continues to hold his place after he finds that his opinions and his judg- ment are at variance with those of his chief on the particular concerns of his own department, he certainly gives fair ground for suspicion that he is actuated more by love of place or its emoluments than by love of country. When a man surrenders his principles and his conscience to the will of another, he disquali- fies himself for being the adviser of any body, much less of a chief magistrate, and becomes at once, as Lord Brougham most truly remarks, a fit tool for any mischievous work he may be ordered to execute. In the most Important of all the subjects upon which the Pre. ident saw fit to consult his heads of departments, we have seen that the advice of the Sec- retary of V/ar — the most competent, not only on ac- count of his large experience, but better acquaintance, which his position enabled him to form, with the offi- cers of the army, to give advice — was unheeded ; but he remained, nevertheless, to carry out the decision of others, and to subject himself to criminations which he might, by immediate resignation of liis office, have thrown upon those who more deserved them. None will deny, we presume, that there was no mil- ts^-* I f * Historical Sketches of Statesmen who flotirishctl in the Time of Geor;_'c III., tojiethor with Ilemurks on the French llevolution. By Henry Lord Brougham, T. R. S., vol. i., j). 53. I IMPOKTANXK OF THE NKW DISTIUCT. 75 •S^j 'Je itary commancl within the United States, considering all the circumstances, of higher importance, nor one involving more t'earlLil responsibilities than that ot vhe newly-created district. The eyes of the whole nation Avould naturally be in an especial manner fixed upon the individual appointed to it, since it embraced that in which every citizen of the republic felt or had an equal interest. In no other military district could the consequences of success or defeat be so widely spread or so deeply felt. It included wi.ldn its narrow lim- its the lederal City, the governmental archives, all that belonged to the people in common as a nation. "With these were closely linked the dearest sympathies of the patriot ; and every man who had the interest and lionor of his country at heart would watch with crit- ical and jealous vigilance every movement, every word of the commander to whose prudence, and prowess, and skill its defence was intrusted. Under these considerations, we repeat, there was no military district in the United States that so impera- tively recpiired a commander of acknowledged ability and tried experience — one in whom not only the people generally, but the troops of the District more especial- ly, could repose the most undouLling trust and confi- dence. These consideration^^ appear to have had but little weight with the administration. The best friends of tlic selected commander nuist have admitted that there was nothino; in his antecedent career to recom- mend him particularly to the preference of the execu- tive. AVe can not regard, as some have professed to do, the acceptance of the appointment as removing; any 76 INVASION AND CAPTIRK OF WASHINGTON. portion of the burden of responsibility from the shoul- ders of the President. There was, probably, not oii'" man in a million -vvho would, or who could properly, have refused to receive so distinguished a mark of ex- ecutive conlidence, so high and honorable a testimo- nial of merit. To one in the vigor of manhood, glow- ing with the aspirations and inijadses of an honorable and patriotic ambition, full of higli-mindcd and noble devotion to his country's service, and anxious to blot from the memory of his fellow-citizens the misfortune which had attended his last camj)aign in the North, the temptation of such an opportunity was too strong to Ije resisted. General Winder had but recently returned from a long Imprisonment in Canada, the consequence of his capture by the enemy during a night attack on our troops under General Chandler at Stony Creek on the od of June, 1813. General Dearborn, in his account of this aifiiir to the Secretary of War, called It a "strange fatality." CJeneral Chandler, however, who vras General Winder's senior, shared the same fate, and ]\Iajor-general Mor- gan Lewis, who succeeded Dearborn in the connnand, in a later communication to the War Department, seems to exonerate General Winder from all censure. He says, " A view of General Chandler's encampment will be sufficient to show that his disaster was owing to its arrangement, its centre being its weakest point ; and that, being discovered by the enemy in the even- ing, received the combined attack of his whole force, and his line was completely cut. It is said, though I can not vouch for its truth, that General Winder saw •i-t I I APPOINTMENT OF A COM^rANDER. 77 ^ il this and remonstrated against it.''* And Colonel Bain, in his official letter to the commanding general, spcalvs of it as " the unfortmiate capture of Brigadier-generals Chandler and Winder, who were taken in the action, unknown to any part of the army, and hurried hito the enemy's lines." General Armstrong, in his " Notices, "f referring to the errors of the campaign of Washington, says, "The error of Hrst occurrence in this campaign be- longs exclusively to the administration, and will be found in the selection made of a commanding general, not on the ground of distinguished professional service or knowledge, but simply on a presumption that, ' be- ing a native of Maryland, and a relative of the govern- or. Brigadier-general AVinder would be useful in miti- gating the opposition to the war, and in giving an in- creased etlicicncy to the national measures within the limits of the state;' an opinion which, tiiongh some- what plausible, was wholly unsustaincd by the event." A.nd he adds in a note, *' The person recommended by the Secretary of War for this appointment was J^rigadier-general ]\los('s Por- ter, then at Norfolk, whose whole life may be said to have been military. Entering the army of the Revo- lution a boy, he liad, by a uniform good conduct, risen tin-ough every rank, from that of a })rivatc to the com- mand of a brigiide. No objection to General Winder, excepting a icant uf military ej'jierienc(.\ cither was or could be made ; his patriotism and conrage h;id already been tested, and were generally acknowledged." * Annals of Congress, ut aidea, 1st ami 2(.l Sessions of Uth Con- gress, col 2372. t Vol. ii., p. 140. 78 INVASION AND CAPTCKE OF WASIIINOTON. General Armstrong could luinlly liavc Leon igno- rant of llie grounds upon which General Winder's ap- pointment was urged and determined in the cabinet; and we can not believe him capable of making a false statement in such positive, precise, and un(|ualitied terms. Vet, in spite of the experience wiiie.'i we have had oftlu; frailties of great men in more reeen^ times, it seems almost incredible that statesmen to wliom we look back with so mucli reverence as ^ladison and Mom-oe should have been governed, in a matter so im- portant to the nation, by a policy so shortsighted and trivial, indicating rather craft than the broad and com- prehensive wisdom for whicli history has iieretoforc given them credit. Surely the most effectual mode of "mitigating the opposition to the war'' w'ould have been to render the war successful and glorious ; and that would best have been accomplished by selecting able men for tlie conduct of military operations, with- out reference to their personal relations or party opin- ions, by encouraging capacity, no matter from what rank or class of life it sprung, and giving it the means of displayhig itself hi a way "which should .idvance tlic public interests. A brilliant victory would have stop- ped the clamor of thousands against the war ; an ap- pointment could conciliate but a few, and might create as much opposition in one quarter as it removed in another. ]\lr. Ingersoll, in his Historical Sketch of tlic "War of 1812,* states that General AVinder, '^ beino; a rel- ativo of Levin AVindcr, the Governor of Maryland, federal governor of a federal state, 31r. j\Iadison ond ♦ raycs IG-t. k» MR. MONROE S POLICY. 79 Mr. Monroe dcenied it politic to conciliate opposition by n})}»ointiiiL;' liini to that responsible and arduous connuand," etc. ]}ut the administration was not yet reduced to such straits as to l)C conipclled to con- ciliate opposition in tliis manner; and Mr. ]\Iadison, being now in tlie second and closing term of his pres- idency, could have had but little motive on liis own account to resort to such cx]jcdients. A more ])roLa- ble liypolliesis, theretbre, wovdd be that, (iencral Arm- stronij; havin-j; a better hold of the Democratic or Kc- publican party than ]\lr. Monroe, the latter was compel- led to rely more on po])ularity with the nation at large, and had already commenced tiiat task of "extermina- ting the monster party S})irit,*" upon the accomplish- ment of which he was afterward so warndy congratu- lated by (Jeneral Jackson. If this hypothesis be cor- rect, the disgrace of General Armstrong after the bat- tle of l^ladensburg, and ^Ir. ^Monroe's elevation to the presidency by an overwhelming national vote, ju^ove that the Secretary of State, so far as his own interests were concerned, had laid his plans very judiciously. Ikit such plans were not very conducive to tiie glory and wellare of the nation. With an administration and cabinet so constituted aiul occupied, one nulitary as])irant for the presidency 0})eiating successtuUy on the atfections of the chief magistrate, and another with partial success on his fears, the choice of a command- ing general, whose proceedings were to be subject to the innninliatc su])ervision and interference of both, wai? a matter of little im})ortance so far as the ]mblic was concerned. AVhoever miirht have been selected was a doomed man, unless he condjined the talents of v! h'. h ' 80 INVASION AND CAI'TUKK (JV WASHINGTON. all aljlc wiioral "with tliosc of an aLle intriirucr aiul courtier ; for cillior one of llicsc powerful rivals could have (lone niort; in an hour to perplex and laflle than the otlier could have done in a week to assist and fa- cilitate his plans. As to the propriety of (lenoral AYindcr's accepting tlie. command conferred on liim, circumstanced as he, ^\•as, wv. take the liberty of adding to the remarks we have already made on this suLject the explanation of one wlio appears to have known him intimately, and regarded him with high esteem. "The appointment was one," says the veteran we r^uote, " which, as he stood at tlie head of the general stall", lie could have consistently declined: and if he had possessed more experience he would have done so, because there was not a shadow ol defensive preparation, and the attack of the enemy might he daily expected ; hut profession- al ambition, zeal lor the service, and a thirst for fame v.ill always prevail over sober retlection ; indeed, it is rare to find a soldier of jjride and spirit, sueli as (Jen- eral AViiider is allowed to be, who Aveiglis and balances causes and eflects in the scales of discretion. Such phlegm docs not comport with the enterprise of the youthful chief; deliberation is the province of the vet- eran, who, content to do his duty, socks not adven- tures ; and yet I sjicak from sad conviction when I say the most cxjicrienced may sometimes be beguiled by fair prospects and ministerial pronused.'** * Wilkinson, vol. i., \k 7."51. fev DIFFICULTIES OF THE COMMANDER. 81 CHAPTER V. Difficulties in the way of the Commanding General. Let us now take a brief retrospect of the obstacles and difficulties aG;ainst which the new commander of tlie new niiUtary district was called upon to contend. General Wilkinson says, "General AVinder accepted the connnand without means, and without time to cre- ate them. He found the District without magazines of provisions or forage, without transport tools or im- plements, without a conmiissariat or efficient quarter- masters' department, without a !2;eneral staff, and, linally, without troops. ****** The requisition [on the several states, issued on the 4th of 'Tuly] was a mere matter of form, and incapable of producing the end it atVeetcd to embrace. In each state the militia was first to be organized and equipped in the manner prescribed by the rec^uisition, and yet in those states there existed no power to organize .,''l e(pii)) in such form, and, until special organ i '.at ion and .((ui[)meut had taken place, the call was not io takf })laoc : bui when tlie exigency arises, the general is to .-j'portion his call to tlie occasion : and, instead of beinu" author- ized to liavc at all times a proporliort of at least two thirds of tlie given num])er of militia trained to mili- tary duties in a cam)) of observation and exercise, to await the expected exigency, around which the re- mainder might rally, he is, when danger stares him in the face, to the utter neglect of the nwiny innx-vtant i) 2 •l I 'I i ; t i"l ■ I 1 1 ' I 1 i :t i ■ t ;*« i li, !i,i U '' i 1 82 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WlSfilXOTON. duties pressing on liini, obliged to devote Iiis time to the collection of and tbrniation of a Ijody of raw yeo- manry, and is himself trammeled with restrictions, and left with scarcely more discretion than the corporal of a picket guard.*'* " Winder's was an arduous perplexity : to arm and fortify a military district witliout magazines or troops, controlled by a cabinet of older soldiers thnn himself, wiioni it would be disrespectful in him to contradict, and almost insubordinate to overrule ; to lead undis- ciplined neighbors to battle, in whose martial prowess lie could not conlide, of whose blood he was huTnanely sparing, overlooked by several superiors, and distracted by a host of advisers, 'f " The appointment of a general, unless a proper mil- itary staff is furnished him, anil cilicient troo})s given him, is a very unnecessary ceremony. There were few regular troops within the power of the govern- ment; the most luimerous body which had recently been within or near the District, 500 men of the 10th infantry, under Lieutenant-colonel Clinch, a body of stout, active young men enlisted in North Carolina, which had been encamped near Washington for sever- al weeks, were marched away to the northern frontiers on the I'Uli of June, in the midst of the alarm of an expected attack. In strictness, two detachments of the 'Mjth and 38th infantry, and a small detachmeiit of artillery, amounting in the whole to JiJ^O men, were all that could be said to be at their disposal at the time that the 10th military district was created, nor * Wilkinson, vol. i., p. 7r>t-7r»(>. t Ingfi-soir^ Hi-tnr. Sketch i.f tlic Scronil Wnr, &c., p. 1(14, 10r>. COMPETENCY OF GENERAL WINDER. 83 a was this great deficiency remedied In any degree betbrc the troops were called Into action. No orders were is- sued by the War De})artment appointing an assistant adjutant-general, assistant inspector-general, or asslgn- iuf to duty in the District any topographical engineers; and it Is well known that General AVInder's greatest complaint was, that he had not the aid of this stal^', without v.hlch the proper organization, equipment, and efliciency of troops is impossible, and that his time was occupied by an oppressive mass of detail, when he should have been at liberty to devote it to duties of a very dIfVeroil characicr.'** How far General AMndcr proved himself competent to suggest the merns of improving the organization of his district — for to suggest was all that he had author- ity or power to do — will be seen by his first official let- ter to the Secretary of War. He was informed " with- in tlie few last days of June," probably inunediately after his arrival in Washington with General Vv'Ilkin- son on the 2Gth or 27th of that month, f that it was in contemplation to create another military district, and that the President intended to vest in him the connuand of it. He very soon afterward returned to l^altlmore, and 'about the 4lli or oth of July" he received a let- ter from the secretary requiring his presence again in Washington, and inclosing the order constituting thn lOthMihtary District. He does not mention whether this letter also inclosed his commission : but as ( Jenerai Willcinson says lie did not receive It until the Gth, it * A Skcti'ii of the Evonts which proicdctl the Caiitiirc of Wnsh- injiton In- tin- IJritish, on the 24tl) of August, 1K14, p. 8, 9. t Wilkinson, voh i.. ji. 7M. t i I ' il! iiiii I. ^ i l! 1 ^ i ! iM ; ) » I 1 iH '•■^ SI I 84 INVASION AND CAPTITKE OF WASIIINfJTON. may have been liaiided to lihn on this visit to A\'ashing- ton, in obedience to the secretary's orders. It was while in the city on this occasion that lie held the con- versation with that functionary alluded to in a letter which he wrote innnediately after his retiu'n to Balti- more. 'J.'he great importance of this document requires tliat it should be iiiven to our readers without abridg- ment ; and Ave iwo disposed to believe that it can not be perused with the attention it deserves without leav- ing upon the mind of the reader tJic conviction tliat if the suggestions contained in it had been promptly adoj'.ted, the result of the enemy's visit to Washington won! ' liave been very dilferent. It is as follows: '•naltimorc, July 0, ISU. •sSt-.. — Tlie objects of the connnand \vhich has lieen conf •• ' ', on me have consequently, since 1 received it, occupied my serious consideration. " The utmost ngular force which it is probable can, in the 2)rcsent state of allairs, be placed at my com- mand, including the force necessary for garrisoning the several forts, will not exceed 1000 men, and some weeks will necessarily elapse before the detachments from Virginia and Carlisle will reach my district. The detachments ^^f the .']Otli and 38th are, therefore, the only troops th;it I can exj)ect to liave in the mean time, and wlien those other detachments join, the ut- most force will l)e from 700 t SOu. ''In conversation with yri at "Washing. on, I un- derstood the idea at present entertained relative to the auxiliary militia force proposed for the District to be, that it shall l)e drafte^i , made, or none, at least, of wlilcli any record can Ibe found ; nor was any respect paid to its suggestions. The secretary and the general, it appears, differed widely as to the necessity of training militia beroro tlicy are brought into battle. General Armstroiig, it can not be denied, had had longer experience and bet- ter opportunities of observing the character of militia; and it was his opinion, founded upon numerous in- stiinccs in the iicvolutionary war, that they always acted with more energy and spirit if called to the licld of battle immediately after their arrival in camp, than when they had been previously drilled and disciplined for months. In the latter case, they have lost the jn-idc which raises them, in their own estimation, as citizens, above the enlisted soldiers ; have become liome-sick, careless, indillerent, slovenly, and spiritless ; while, if brought into action in the freshness of their home-feelings, in the })ride of their independence as citizens, they figlit as if their own individual rights wci-c at stukc in the battle, each emulating the other in the courage and manliness of his bearing. Now, whether this theory of the Secretary of War was philoso])hie, ciid founded on a more correct knowl- edge than others possess of human nature, or purely chimerical, it may serve to explain much of the appar- ent indilfcrence imputed to liim -when called upon by anxious and impatient citizens, and urged to adopt their views of the matter rather than his own. For ourselves, we do not hesitate to express our preference of t)ie views taken by the commanding general. AVc believe that no man can be a good soldier until he lias learned something of disci})linc and subordination. I riiOMPTNESS OF THE GOVERNOIl OF MAIiYLAND. 8D To learn these requires time; and the authority to briii'^' all the force allowed him into the tield should have been contemporaneous with the appointment of IJrigadier-gcneral A\'inder. But we are not disposed altogether to blame the Secretary of War that this was not done, llis opinions, wc have seen, had but little weight with the Presidtiit and his cabinet in other matters, and wo are not prepared to say they were adopted in tJiis. The Governor of ]\Iaryla;. it can not be doubted, did all that could have been ted' of hhn to insure prompt obedience on the pari of his militia oflicers. The general, at least, does not seem to have thought that any blame for delay or defective exercise of pow- er could be justly attached to his relative. In his let- ter to the Secretary of War of the 2.'5d of July, dated at Upper ^Marlborough, he says, " The governor has issued orders for calling out three thousand of the drafts under the requisition of the 4th of July, and at my suggestion has appointed Bladensburgli as the place of rendezvous.'"* From Piscataway he writes on the 27th, " The governor V6' cdxrtuuj hi msdf io collect a force at Annapolis ;" and in a second letter of the same date, from the same place, he says, "• The govern- or has been hi vain endeavoring to assemble the neigh- boring militia at Annapolis ; he had called on Freder- ick County, and some militia were coming in fn ^.l thence when I was last at Annai)olis. All t/i is force is, however, called out h>j the authority of the state, and is not itnder my command ; but they do, and will, co-operate toward the general defence." * State Tapers, ut antca, p. G 10. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // ^ .^^ f^ mp. :/. y. ^ 1.0 I.I I MS 110 1.3 m I u 1.6 %. # JK y W^'W '/ Photograpliic Sciences Corporation 13 WIST MAIN STRUT WfBSTER.N Y MSSO (716) (73-4303 L1>' iV \\ ^ <^ %>yi^. ^0 % ■^b ^ 90 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. r" 'I' M il^l .11 tji 1^ It is manifest that if tlic Governor of ^Maryland, clothed with all the power of the .state, was unable to colleet a small force from the neighhoring militia to protect the capital of the state itself, he would be much less able to compel obedience to his orders when call- ing out the militia for purposes in which they felt les3 immediate interest. All that he could consistently do was to order them out ; if they did not choose to obey his orders, the only penalty lie could inflict would be to bring officers and men to courts-martial, a process which could hardly have ])ecn accomplished in time to meet the wants of the commanding general. The fault was evidently in the militia system rather than the executive of the state. On the 13th of August, General Winder writes thus from Baltimore: "In consequence of the two regiments which were drafted from General Smith's division, under the requisition of April last, being ac- cepted as a part of the quota of ^Maryland under the requisition of the 4th of July last — of the impracticabil- ity, besides impropriety, of calling any portion of those drafted from the Eastern Shore, and the necessity of leaving all the men immediately upon the Bay and low down upon the rivers for local defence on the Western Shore, the remaining portion of the ^laryland drafts to be assembled at Bladensburgh, instead of being three thousand, will not nuich exceed as many hund- red. I shall require the governor to order out all the drafts that can possibly be spared from the three lower brigades on the Western Shore ; but, since the whole number drafted on the Western Shore, ex- clusive of those drawn from General Smith's division, it^ THE MARYLAND QUOTA. 91 ij, do not aTiiGimt to fifteen liundrecl, I nppreliend that, after all ahaJl he assembled under this second order from the Governor of ]\Iaryhind, they will not exceed one thousand men. The most convenient and imme- diate resource to supply this deticiency, which occurs to nie, will be to take the militia drawn out under the state authority, and now assembled at Annapolis, to the amount of one thousand men, into the service of the United States, and to call on the Governor of Penn- svlvania for one reo-imcnt. This would make the mi- litia force (independent of two reginients near this place) under my eonnnand between two and three thou- sand men, and would complete the views of the Presi- dent in the order connnunicated to me by you to call for not more than three, nor less 'than two thousand over and above the two regiments here. " The objects for which the militia were called to Annapolis were such as to make it proper that the force should be under the direction of the commander of the loth .Alilitary District. Home force ouirht and must be kept at Annapolis ; and if it should be deem- ed proper to authorize me to accept them, I should leave them there until some necessity occurred requir- ing them elsewhere, and the trouble and expense of advancins: a detachment there would be avoided. " 'J'hesc men are only called out for sixty days, which may, perhaps, be long enough, and will, at all events, afford suflicient time to ascertain wh(>ther a further force will be necessary. 1'hey are already in the field, e(iuipjM'd in all respects, and organi/cd. A saving of their equipments w 11 be gained by the United States, and all the time and trouble of calling a force in their place." I I in t :, t< n ' 92 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. Here wc sec that, only cleveii days before tlic enemy entered Washington, the commanding general had u>i- der his orders but little more than a thousand men, which force, provided the President would allow him to accept the services of the militia at Annapolis, would make his whole army, exclusive of the two l^altimore regiments, between tico and three thousand men! Ill his letter of 23d of July, from Upper ]Marlbor- ough, there occurs a passage which no reticcting read- er can peruse without a feeling of astorisliment and indignation at the culpable neglect or indiifercncc with which the arduous and unremitted labors of the com- manding general to perfect his arrangements for the defence of his district were treated by those in power. After telling the Secretary of War that he had ap- pointed ]>ladensburg as the place of rendezvous for the three thousand ^laryland drafts which the governor had issued orders for calling out, he says, " It will be necessary that arms, anmiunition, accoutrements, tents, and camp equipage be deposited there for them. I have no hiowledye where these articles are in store nearest that point, nor under whose charge they are. I must pray you to give the necessary orders for hav- ing the rct^uisite deposits made at that place." The general had then been actively engaged in the multifarious duties of his command for some eighteen or twenty days, and had not been inlbrmed where or in whose custody his n'' itary stores were to be found I The fact is well-nigh jdible, and yet, coming from the commanding general himself, wc arc constrained to believe it. Surely, as wc have elsewhere said, some fatality must have hung over every thing that related THE ACTIVITY OF CiEXERAL WINDER. 93 'I to the defence of the scat of government. We have seen that wlien General Winder accepted his appoint- ment, his district was destitute of every requisite to constitute a military command. Requisitions, it is true, had Leen simultaneously made upon the three nearest states for militia, hut these were merely to he held in readiness and placed conditionally under his control. lie had no staff, no stores, no truops ; he was left to the necessity of being his own commissary, his own secretary, his own vedette, and to he himself his own express-rider. It is only necessary to look at the dates and places of his letters to the War De- partment to see that Let ween the Dth and 27th of July, an interval of eighteen days, he was at lialti- niorc, Annapolis, Upper ]\Iarlborough, the Wood Yard, Nottingham, Piseataway, AVarhurton, Port Tobacco, and sometimes twice or thrice within that short period at the same place, besides being several times at Wash- ington, where, of course, it was unnecessary to write letters. If we take into consideration the various dis- tances between these places, and the state of the roads forty years ago, we shall be compelled to acknowledge that he could not have been at any one time twenty- four hours at rest. There is, perhaps, no instance to be found in history of a commanding general so disadvantageously situa- ted. Appointed to take command of an army of "ten or twelve thousand" men, who, he is told, are " held in readiness" to obey his orders, he enters upon his duties, and finds that he has not even a corporal's guard. In liis first attempt to exercise the power vested in him to call these rernhj men into service, ho w It ■i.A 'i'l 94 INVASION AND CAPTUEE OF WASHINGTON. finds himself tied down by conditions which render his power a nullity. It is like setting a man down to a Barmecide's feast — a table covered with empty dish- es — and, with a mockery of hospitality, inviting him to help himself. From the moment of General Winder's appointment to the command of the 10th District to the day the enemy entered tlie City of Washington, there is noth- ing to be found in the correspondence between him and the Secretary of War from which it can be infer- red that the latter did not treat him with the utmost courtesy and confidence. Nor is there any thing in the long and interesting " Narrative of General Win- der," addressed to the chairman of the committee of investigation, that can lead us to believe he desired to cast the slightest censure upon tlie secretary for any imputed want of respect or cordiality in their inter- course with each other. But after the disastrous is- sue of llie day, when irritated and goaded by the clam- ors of a disappointed and excited people, who resorted to every oft'ensive mode of showing tliat they attrib- uted to him the unsuccessful defence of the city, it can not be thought very surprising that the secretary be- gan to think it necessary, for his own reputation, that the blame sliould rest upon other shoulders. His re- tirement from the AVar De})artni(.'nt and from Wash- ington a few days after the unfortunate 24tli of Au- gust, and while the juncture of affairs, by liis own ac- knowledgment, was still critical, would, if left without some ^explanation, very naturally be taken as a tacit admission of the truth of the charc-cs which had been so openly made against him by the militia and citi- ^^ GENERAL ARMSTKOXG AND GENERAL WLNDER. 95 i:ens of the District. General Armstrong v.- is well aware oftiiis ; and, accordingly, on the 5th of Septem- ber, three days after his departure from Washington, there appeared in the Baltimore J\(triot a letter, ad- dressed by him to the editors, which, as it is the only notice that he condescended to take of the many se- vere criminations fulminated against him, we deem it proper to spread before the reader without curtail- ment. Justice to the memory of one of the distin- guished men of the Revolution demands this at our hands. The only liberty wo have taken with it, as it appeared in the Patriot, has been to italicize the par- ticular paragraph which led us to infer that the feel- higs of its author toward the commanding general ei- ther underwent a change after the official relation be- tween them had ceased to exist, or had previously been well dissembled. s\ i H i ^ 1 i ' 1 ! ■ , 1 1 ij 1* I k'r.s tor t!ie rcireat of the armv i;i tlie affair of the 24tli Hit., under circumstances not making retreat necessary or proper. "• 'J'liis i;!iarge has not for it.^ suj'port the shadow of Irulh. Th ;. cummaiidin'-- general will do me the jus- tii:c to ;sa\ iliat 1 L'iive him no Biicii onhr, ;ind tliat ho wa;:. io.id li \\\\de\ li.c iipprcsio!! tha! li.-' r tc,;t was ni:i(.l ■ (■■ ri;ei la. n I liCiievcii il lo lie ])rop. r. To the rri.i'i'iil I appeal wheiiier 1 did not jsoin! out the disorder and rctical oi' a p.irt of the iirst line soon ai'ter the action bejian, and slitcmatize it as base and infa- mous. " 2d. That, in despite of the remonstrances of Gen- eral Winder, and hy the interposition of my autliority, I had prevented him from defending the capital. " This charge contains in it a total perversion of the truth. When the head of the retiring column reached tlic capital, it was halted for a moment. Gen- eral Winder here took occasion to state to ]\Ir. ]Monroe and myself that he was not in condition to maintain another conflict, and that his force was broken down by fatigue and dispersion. Under this representation, we united in opinion that he should proceed to occupy the heights of Georgetown. " 3d. That I had withdrawn the covering party from the rear of Fort Washington, and had ordered Captain Dyson to blow up the fort without firing a gun. " This charge is utterly devoid of truth. The cov- ering party was withdrawn by an order from General Winder, and Captain Dyson's official report shows 100 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. I II ii that the orders under which he acted were derived from the same source, though, no doubt, mistaken or misrepresented. "4th. That by my orders the navy-yard had been burned. This, like its predecessor, is a positive false- hood. " Perceiving that no order was made for apprising Commodore Tingcy of the retreat of the army, I sent ]\lajor 13ell to communicate the fact, and to say that the navy-yard could no longer be covered. The com- modore was, of course, left to follow the suggestions of his own mind, or to obey the orders, if orders had been given, of the Navy Department. "5th. And, lastly, that means had not been taken to collect a force sufficient for the occasion. "As the subject of this charge may very soon be- come one of Congressional inquiry, I shall at present make b*ut a few remarks : "1st. T/iat no means xt^itJiin reach of the Wa?' Department had been omitted or withheld ; that a sepa^'ate military district^ embracing the seat of gov- ernment, had been created ; that an officer of high rank and character had been j^laced in charge of it ; that to him was given full authority to call for su^)- plies, and for a militia force o/" fifteen thousand men ; that to this force ivas added the 36^A regiment of the line, a battalion of the 38^/i, detachments of the 12th, of the artillery, and of the dragoons, the 7narine corjps, and the creios of the flotilla, under the special conn- Tnand of Commodore Barney, making a total of 16,300 ')nen. " General Winder's official report of the engagement f 1 1 i i i i 1 1 1 , - / i I -r^v GENERAL ARMSTRONG S STATEMENT. 101 of the 24tli ult. sliows liow iniicli of this* force had been assembled, and tlie causes why a greater portion of it had not been got together. These will be found to have been altogether extraneous from the govenunent, and entirely beyond its control ; and, " 2d. That from what is now known of the enemy's force, of the loss he sustained in the enterprise, of the marks of panic under which he retreated, &c., &c., it is obvious that if all the troops assembled at Bladcns- burg had been faithful to themselves and to their coun- try, the enemy would have been beaten and the capital saved. (Signed), JoiiN Armstrong. "Baltimore, Sept. 3, 1814." Either we have grossly erred in interpreting the im- port of General Armstrong's language, or the reader who will carefully peru'se that portion of his letter which we have taken the liberty to italicize must con- cur with us in the inference that it was written with a full consciousness of the unfavorable impression it would create upon the public mind against the com- manding geneial. AVe have certainly understood it as designed to convey the idea that General Winder had neither judiciously exercised the "full authority" vested in him, nor skilfully used the ample means placed under his control by the War Department. The "total of 16,300 men" makes a formidable and imposing show on paper, and "the public," to whose siipreme tribunal this letter was an avowed appeal, be- ing gravely informed that the commanding general had fall authority to call out this adequate force, could hardly avoid the inference that this officer had •1 : n I ;r.. I is II! il. li I! ; ' S: 102 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. failed in the proper execution of liis duty. It is true that in the next paragraph the writer refers to the offi- cial report of General AA'inder to show how much of this force had Ibcen assemhied, and the reasons why a greater portion of it had not been (/at together. But many of those to whom (General Armstrong's letter was addressed had probably never seen, or would have an opportunity of seeing General AVindcr's official re- port ; and the singular expression which he uses in re- ferring to the causes why a larger number of troops '* had not been got together'''' leads directly to the in- ference that something had been omitted on the part of somebody vdiich ouo;ht not to have been r:nittcd: and upon whom could the blame of this omission fall but upon the commandhig general? And tliis infer- ence is strengtlicncd by what is afterward said, name- ly, that the causes were " altogether extraneous from the government, and entirely beyond its control.*' By the government the writer must of course have meant the War Department, wliicli had been, or ought to have been, entirely under his own management, and the wisdom, jn-udence, and forethought of which he was tlieu particularly defending. From these considerations, little as we nre disposed to countenance the liigh-wrouglit excitement which lost all sense of piopriely and justk-e in Its assaults upon the integrity o)'( Jrneral Armstrong, we are com- ]iellcfl to believe tliat, in his fiinons letter to the pub- lie, he Inteufled ih.'t some, at le.asl. ol' the L'eneral in- diirnatlon shouhl be Iran.-tevri^d tVom liim.-elf to (ien- cral Winder for netileet or inefiieienev In matters in whicli that officer was certainly not justly chargeable with any fault whatever. n W iW liW i W THE GEORGETOWN COMMITTEE. 103 I I Tliorc is one remarkable statement in this letter ^vhicll wc feci it to be our duty to bring more partic- ularly to the notice of the reader, not only because we liappen to know that it was utterly unfounded, but be- cause, even had it been true, it was not a matter whicli it became General .Vrmstrong to introduce in an ap- peal to tliG public. We allude to the information which he savs he received from a source entitled to his coniidence, that "a connnittce of tlie inhabitants of Georgetown, of whom Alexander C. Hanson, editor of the Federal Itepublican, was one, had waited on the President, by deputation, and had obtained from him a proniise that [he] should no longer direct the mili- tary defences of the District.*' AVhatever may have been the source from which the writer of the letter de- rived his information, we take it upon us to say that it Avas untrue in every part of it. Xo such connnit- tce from Georgetown, witli or without ]Mr. Hanson, ever waited on the President for any such jmmose. Even the ^ I'dnrhint belief" which General Armstrong yielded to the statement shows that he was more ready to put fiith in the veracity of his informant than to believe the positive dcchu-ation of the i'resident. In- deed, it shows that he did not even allow him credit for the connnon share of astuteness which a very little experience gives to every politician. This v.'ill be niai '♦'"St upon tlic sliglitest review of the conversation, as detailed by General Armstrong himself, between him and the l*resid(>nt. "On the cvcnimj ^ii i\\Q, 29th uhimo, the Presitlent caJIed at my loibjlmis^^'' says the retired secretary, and after stating the "delicacy"' of the situalion in which he had been placed by the ex- i ill ' Hi. \>\, 11 :; ' h 1 i i 1 i 1 ill 1 I ! r ii iitl 104 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. citement existing among the militia of the District, told liim frankly "that (Ui ojjicer of that corps had given him notice that they would no longer ohey," &c., &c. No^r if " a committee of the inhabitants of Georgetown" had waited on him for that purpose, vras it not more reasonable to suppose tliat the President would have mentioned that circumstance as alfording him a much stronger justiilcation for pressing upon his secretary a compliance with his wishes than the plain fact that he had been moved to it by the information received from a single individual, "cm officer?'' Surely his visit at so unseasuuable an hour, at a boarding-house where the secretary lodged, and the very remarkable collorpiy Avhicli he there held with him, would have seemed less anomalous and more excusable if he had been impelled to it by the representations of a " depu- tation'' from a neighboring city than by a simple no- tice given to him by "an officer" of the militia, partic- ularly when that officer was not their commander. It is marvelous that this consideration did not suG:Q;est to General Armstrong the want of verisimilitude in the statement afterward made to him, however willlno- he mi<''ht have been to discredit the word of the chief O magistrate. It can only be explained on the sujiposi- tion that he saw at once how readily such a state- ment, whether true or false, could be turned to his ad- vantage in the appeal he was making to the pubhe, by divcrtino; their attention in some measure from too crit- ical an inquiry into his own conduct, and fixing it upon this evidence of culpable weakness in the Presi- dent. But he was no tyro in the art of addressing the people. '^ ■fc; y THE GEORGETOWN COMJIITTEE. 105 '^ ■••(€ I..1 I The " officer' alkuled to by ]\Ir. ]\ladisoii in the con- versation detailed by General Armstrong happened to be the author of tliis work. Beinii; at the time the' brigade major and inspector of the mihtia under the command of Brigadier-general Walter Smith, he was sent by that officer, accompanied by his aid-de-camp, T. L. M'Kenney, to communicate verbally to the Pres- ident the fact that his brigade had held a meeting, at whicii they had passed a formal and unanimous reso- lution that they would no longer serve under the orders or military administration of General Armstrong, whom they denounced in no measured terms as having been the willing cause of the destruction of the City of Washington. However ready the bearer of this ex- traordinary verbal message to the President was, in the excitement and mortification of the moment, to sympathize with his fellow-soldiers in their indignant denunciation of the Secretary of War, and to partici- pate fully in their desire to have him dismissed, the snows of forty winters since that time have cooled his passions and sobered his judgment in the matter. Whatever else it has been or may become his duty to say of the conduct of General Armstrong, in relation to tlie delencc of the District of Columbia, in the course of these pages, justice to the memory of a Rev- olutionary soldier demands the concession that his faults were not such as to justify the grave charge al- leged against him. Tiiat he had no sympathies in connnon with the people of the District, and would liave been gla"" to see the seat of government removed, he was not at all solicitous to conceal ; but tluit he would have been willing to tarnish the honor of his E2 %\ m tfi.. H HI ^^w ) i!! !i| III iiii lOG INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. country, and disgrace himself by a deliberate act of treachery to accomplish his wishes in that respect, there is notliing on record sufficient to authorize a be- lief. It has already been shown, and occasions will occur in the progress of this volume still farther to show, that he was culpable, either as the official organ of another or in the exercise of his own blinded judg- ment, of many errors of omission and commission in preparing for the defence of the seat of government ; but the strong influence of heated passions, the mad- ness of disappointed hopes no longer exists as an ex- cuse for attributing them to intentional design. The verbal information just spoken of was commu- nicated to the President on the morning of the 29th of August, and, as the letter of General Armstrong states, it was on the evening of the same day that he called at the lodgings of that gentleman, and held with him the conversation which is repeated with such cir- cumstantial minuteness in General Armstrong's ajopeal to the public. That the President was influenced to. make that visit, and to say what is reported to have been said by him, by the information received from the officer mentioned, would be hardly credible, were it not that he himself, according to General Armstrong, as- signed it as his motive for urging his temporary retire- ment from the War Department. We will not pre- tend to decide whetlicr in this the President acted with the dignity becoming his higli station — whether he per- mitted his fears to be too easily wrought upon by in- adequate causes, or whether he was glad to seize upon any pretext to get rid of a member of his cabinet in whom he was determined no longer to conflde ; but t \ w THE GEORGETOWN COMMITTEE. 107 lY- m Lit I I we do not hesitate to say that our republic lias had presidents from whom the otficer who bore such a ver- bal message would n-^t have obtained such prompt sat- istaction Ibi his constituents. The law of self-defence certainly authorizes a resort both to weapons and arguments, which, under ordinary circumstances, would be looked upon as unmanly and unjustifiable. In addition to the jJublic exposure of a conversation manifestly intended to be private. Gen- eral Armstrong introduces the nane of the "editor of the Federal llepublican"' as one of the advisers of the President. This was the " unkindest cut of all ;" for, unless the President were the weakest, the most for- giving of human beings, that " editor" was one of the last men in the community who could have moved him to the " promise*" of dismissing one of his cabinet. The " editor" was also a member of Congress, and no man knew better than (General Armstrong that he nev- er lost an opportunity, in cither capacity, of uttering the severest sarcasms against the President and his cabinet. Standing as they did toward each otlicr, it was quite as incredible that the one should volunteer his advice, as that the other should be governed by it in so important a matter as that which the letter dis- closes. But it suited the purposes of tlie writer to give a " reluctant belief" to the story ; and at a moment wheu the class of politicians to which the " editor of the Federal Republican'' belonged was in so small a minority, it must be confessed that the introduction of his name in such a connection was a stroke of policy worthy of the writer of the Xewburgh Addresses, and admirably devised to have its ctiect upon *' the public." i 1 1 108 INVASION AND CArTi;RE OF WASHINGTON. M ' P :' 1 t|1 li .' V %' Sill I lii < v\ I I iiii k. I Ml liii 'iii It would naturally lead a great many persons to believe that the ex-secrctarv had Ibeen the innocent victim of '•'•fedcraV pevsecutloa^ acting through the amiahle weakness and credulity of the chief magistrate ; and such, indeed, to a considerable extent, was the impres- sion it made. Whatever other faults " tlie public"' might be disposed to attribute to General Armstrong, they knew tiiat his j^oUtlcs were those of a staunch Republican — one of the overwhelming majority — while " Alexander C. Hanson" was quite as well known to be a fiery, fearless leader among the antipodes of the ruling party — one of that class of Federalists so violent in their opposition to the war. He was far- ther known to "the public" of Balthnore as having been, in times past, prominently connected with the fa- mous " Charles Street Garrison," wliicli first excited and then defied the great mob which left its bloody impress so deeply stamjjcd upon that city, as, for a time, even to give it another name. It may be readily imagined, then, that if there was one of that stamp of Federalists who bore a larger share than another of tlic hatred and malediction of the mass of the dominant party, it was this same "editor of the Federal Repub- lican." A pretext for the introduction of his name, therefore, into an appeal to the people, was readily seized by General Armstrong. He proved how well he knew "the public" to whom he was addressing himself, when he added, " on this fact all comment is unnecessary ;" and it proved, too, how little he cared upon whom his Parthian arrow, thus shot as he re- treated, should light. It is not our purpose to impugn the veracity of Gen- St THE GEOKGETOWN COMMITTEE. 109 1'^ |1- eral Armstrong himself in relation to this matter ; on the contrary, we are ready to admit not only that such a statement was made to him, hut that he believed it to he true. But, inasmuch as the character of the President of the United States was at stake on the question of its truth or falsehood, we think it must he conceded that, before he ventured to make the state- ment public, he owed it not less to his own self-respect than to the previous relation between himself and the chief magistrate to have ascertained the truth of it. lie must have been conscious that when he published the fact of his belief in the statement, however reluc- tantly he admitted that belief, the public would take it for granted that he had lost every lingering renniant of respect he entertained, or professed to entertain, for the man who had bestowed his office upon him, and that this would produce an impression more or less in- jurious to the reputation of the highest functionary of the government. It would be difficult for the most charitable reader to resist the conviction that such was the intention of the retirin<2: secretary'. Before we close our comments upon this very remarkable piece of his- tory — and v.'c trust that the intimate bearing of it upon the subject in hand will plead our excuse for dwelling upon it so long — we think it worthy of note that ^he appeal of General Armstrong to the public, containing the unfortunate statement referred to, was copied into the " Federal liepublican" of the 8th of Seiitember without a single lemark. Its editor did not say a word in contradiction of the story that he had been one of the ''deputation'' from Georgetown avIio waited upon the President to insist on his dismissal of tlie ^ 110 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. §• II ',''>; iDi Secretary of War. What his reasons were for remain- ing silent as to the truth or falsehood of a statement which he could not but have known would operate greatly to the discredit of the President, and in so far give the advantage to the retired Secretary of War, we can not so much as form a rational conjecture, unless it were that he regarded it as a matter of perfect indif- ference to him which of the two great men " the pub- lic" miglit choose to condemn. The columns of his paper bear witness that lie held them both in contempt, if such a sentiment can be compatible with the bitter- ness of vituperation which he continued to pour out against each as they came respectively under his no- tice ; and if the result of the statement should be the public reprobation of cither, it would be so far a tri- umph to his own influence. The National Intelli- gencer, however, the official paper of the administra- tion, did not suffer the extraordinary tale to pass very long without contradiction. On the 13th of Septem- ber there appeared in that journal the following short editorial paragraph : " 3Iany of our readers will be pleased to learn that General Armstrong was misin- formed as to the fact that ' Alexander C. Hanson, ed- itor of the Federal Republican,' was one of the depu- tation which he states to have waited on the President of the United States from Georgetown on the morning of the 29th ultimo, and, indeed, as to the fact that any deputation waited on the J^resident fro7)i Georgetow7i on that occasion." This contradiction the editors, no doubt, received from the lips of the President himself, with whom one of them had long been on terms of close intimacy, and it serves to confirm what has been f n i s THE GEORGETOWN COMMITTEE. Ill ah-eaJj said as to the part which General Smith's bri- gade-major and inspector had in the aflair. The words '■'-from Georgetown''' being italicized, as we have given them, in the National Intelligencer, would seem to just- ity the hiference that a deputation did in reality wait upon the President from some other place. But such an occurrence could hardly have been managed with so much secrecy as to keep it from the knowledge of the citizens of either of the two cities ; and as we nev- er heard of such a deputation, we take it for granted that the words italicized were not intended to lead to that inference. General Armstrong's own account of the conversation held between the President and him- self shows that the former urged the expediency of the secretary's retirino; for a time from the duties of the War Department solely upon the ground of the infor- mation communicated to him by an officer of the mi- litia. This paragraph in the National Intelligencer was also left without notice of any kind bv t^e person to whom it referred. I I i w ■ !!. ! ^i!l: iiil-: K 'I, 'I. I 112 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. CHAPTER YII. Mr. Madison's private Opinion of the Conduct of the Secretary of AViir. w the subject of this chapte th enter ujjc some reluctance, m tne nrst place, the ajoprehension that our readers may charge us with a deliberate at- tempt to test the extent of their patience by continuing to keep before them a subject upon which so much has already been said, and, in the second place, an indis- position to accumulate imputations upon the memory of one who can no longer hear or rebut them, had, by their joint influence, almost determined us at one time to strike out the last chapter altogether, that it might not impose on us the necessity of following it up by such an exhibition as we are now to make. We be- lieved we had done with General Armstrong's letter to the Baltimore Patriot ; but, after we had written our last comments upon it, we became aware, for the first time, by mere accident, that among the unpublished papers of Mr. Madison, in the possession of an old friend, there was a memorandum made by him (JMr. Madison) at the time of the conversation which he held with the Secretary of War on the occasion of his vis- iting him at his lodgings on the evening of the 29th of August. We believed it to be our duty immediate- ly to seek permission to see these papers, and, if pos- sible, to obtain a copy of them for insertion in this history. The former was granted to us without he^i- I MR. Madison's statement 113 lesi- tation,Lut the permission to copy them ui eMenso was politely but peremptorily declined, with the kind salvo, however, that wo miglit read thcni as often as we pleased, and make such memoranda from them as might serve to impress their contents upon our memory. Wc were entirely satisfied with the reasons assigned by our friend for thus limiting the permission given, and set about immediately to make the best use wc could of repeated visits to the precious 3ISS. AVc found in them much to elucidate what we had otherwise been unable to comprehend or to reconcile with the rela- tions which ouo-ht to have subsisted between the Pres- ident and his secretary, and we were gratified to find in them full confirmation of what we had already said as to the state of those relations at the time of the cabinet meeting on the 1st of July. It is due to the memory of ]Mr. Madison that his version of tlie inter- view with General Armstrong should be known as well as that of the latter ; and we feel such confidence in our recollection of the memorandum, that we have no hesitation in pledging ourselves to the correctness of the compend we now give ; not that we pretend to remember in every case the precise language of ]\Ir. Madison, but that we adhere accurately to the sub- stance, the meaning as he intended to be understood. There is little or no difference between the state- ments of ]\Ir. Madison and General Armstrong as lo the introductory portion of the conversation, except that the President mentioned the name of ]\[r. ]\lonroe (who had performed the duties of Secretary of War during the temporary absence of General Armstrong), and contrasted the alacrity with which the militia offi- ; 3 114 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. ! ! i r'Hi m ! 1 1 1 ccrs had obeyed all liis suggestions witli the spirit of resistance -which liad been nianitcsted bj them since the return of (jleneral Armstrong. It will be recollect- ed by some of our readers that the latter had been for some days at Fredericktown, the appointed place of rendezvous for tlic executive oflicers in the event of the occupation of the city by the enemy, from which place he liad just returned a few hours before the in- terview. It was probably this mention of 3Ir. 3Ionroe, as so acceptable to the militia, which excited General Armstrong to use the harsh terms he did in speaking of the citizens of the District — terms, however, which it does not appear that he used before Mr. ]\Iadison, but only in his letter to the public. His reply to the President's allusion to the excitement aji'ainst them both, was dignified and manly. He acknowledged that lie was fully aware of the bitter feelings against him- self, but he knew them to be founded on the most pal- pable falsehoods, and limited to the cities of Washing- ton and Georgetown ; that he was willing to give up his appointment by immediate resignation, or to retire from the scene by making a visit to his family in the State of New York. To this the President responded that a resignation under such circumstances was by no means desirable, as it might receive constructions which would not be agreeable either in a public or private view ; that a temporary retirement, as he sug- gested, tliough equally subject, in some respects, to unpleasant comments, was, upon the whole, less ob- jectionable than resignation, and would be a relief from existing embarrassments, without precluding any future course which miirht be thouii'Iit best. General p MR. MADISON S STATEMENT. 115 ArmstroTT^ repented that tlic charges against him "svcrc groundless, and limited in the excitement they had })roduced, and atlirmed th.at liis conduct in rehition to the defence of the eity had proved that tlierc had been no deliciciicy on his part. The President said he knew that some of the particuhir charges brought against him were destitute of foundation, and that, so far as the discontents were produced by them, they would, of course, be limited, both as to time and space ; that he suspected that the discontents sprung, in a great measure, from a rooted belief that he had not taken a sutHcicnt interest in the defence of the city, nor promoted the measures for it ; and that, consider- ing the heavy calamity that had fallen on the place and its inhabitants, it was natural that strong feelings should be excited on the spot ; and, as the place was the capital of the nation, the same feeling would ex- ist every where ; and he added that it would not be easy to satisfy the nation that the event was without blame somewhere, and he could not, in candor, say that all had been done that ouu'ht to liave been done, and at the 2)roper time. The secretary again returned to an exculpation of himself, and remarked that he had omitted no preparations whatever for the safety of tlic city which had h^en enjoined on him. To this the President replied that, regarding their conversation as a frank one, he could not admit the latter justifica- tion ; that it was the duty of the Secretary of War not only to crceffie jdans enjoined on hhn, and orders conwiittal to hiin, but to deAi;~e and prej)are such as would, in !;l3 own opinion, be necessary and proper; that tliio was an obvious and essential part of his i \ ^ 1 ' ■•■I]! tl I I'll ii (I ■ I III '"I..-! •ii;. 116 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. cliarge, and that, in what rehited to military plans and proceedings elsewhere, he had never been backward or scrupulous in taking such a course ; that he must well know that he had, on some occasions, taken a latitude in this respect not at all satisfactory. The President added that it was due to truth and to himself to say, that he — the Secretary of AVar — had never appeared to enter into a just view either of the danger to be ap- prehended to the city, or of the consequences of its falling into the hands of the enemy ; that he had nev- er proposed or suggested a single precaution or ar- rangement for its safety, every thing done on that sub- ject having been brought forward by the President ; and that the apparent difference of their views on that subject had led him — the President — to reduce his ar- ran2:ements to the minimum, in order to obtrude the less on a reluctant execution. The President also re- minded him that he had even fallen short of the prep- arations decided on in the cabinet, particularly in not having arms and equipments brought to convenient depots, some of the militia, when called for the defence, being obliged, before they could obey the call, to pro- cure those indispensable appurtenances of a soldier from Harper's Ferry. In conclusion, the President re- marked — as if willing to show that his visit had not been made in a spirit of unkindness — that it was not agreeable to speak as he had spoken, nor would he have done so on any less urgent occasion ; that he had selected (Jeneral .Vrmstrong for the office from a respect for his talents, and a conlidencc that he would exert them for the public good : that he had always treated him with friendship and conlidcnce ; and that, as his I: I GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 117 3xcrt atorl his puLlic career would in a little while be closed, his great wish, next to leaving his country in a state of peace and prosi^erity, was, that he might be able to preserve harmony and avoid changes in his political family ; and that, as the secretary well knew, he had for that reason acquiesced in many things to which no other consideration could have reconciled him. The reader will probably recollect the opinions and suggestions said by General Armstrong, in his letter to the cliairman of the committee of investigation, to have been offered by him in reply to questions sub- mitted by the President to the heads of departments at this convocation of the 1st of July. He may also recollect that no other member of the cabinet, all of whom had been called upon to answer the same inqui- ries of the conmiittcc, had in his statement mentioned, or even made the sliditest allusion to the fact, that the Secretary of War had offered any opinions or sugges- tions whatever to the meeting ; that not one of them spoke of the two questions put by the President, and to whicli General Armstrong said he replied. This silence of all General Armstron2:'s collea2;ues as to his having offered any opinions or made any suggestions on the subject they were called to discuss might jus- tify a surmise tliat he had probably mistaken his con- sciousness of what he ougiit to have said for what he actually did say. ]\Ir. ]\Ionroe, jMr. Jones, and IMr. Rush all limit his share in the discussion at tliat meet- ing to a bare statement of the forces that might most readily be brought together. This important memo- randum of Mr. ^Madison, the substance of whicli, at least, wc arc coniidcnt lias been correctly given, would I 118 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. not only confirm such a surmise, iufcrved from their silence, but it seems directly and positively to contra- dict every material statement made by General Arm- strong, not only in his letk'r to the eonnnittce, but in his previous attempt to exculpate liiniself before the public. It is here asserted by Mr. Mailisou not only that he ofUrcd no opinions at tiial niceLnq' <;f lliC c:,b inet, but that he had never, on any occasion. p;-oj o- -d or sua'ii'e.stcd a sinsj-'e ])!TC;;nii()n ov ar)-;niL!en!ent foi the safety of the city, and that he liad even f.iii it short of the ])rcpar.itions decided on In the ciib n ^. General Armstrong, on the contrary, after repealing to the committee the statements and opinions which he tells them were offered in reply to the President's (piestions, makes the farther assertion that, "■ confonn- abhj to these 02)inions, an order was taken to assemble a corps and form a camp at such point between the City of AVashington and Baltimore as might be se- lected by the commanding general." AVc shall not undertake to decide which of these discordant statements is most worthy of credit. That of General Armstrong, it is true, stands alone, unsup- ported by a single corroborative fact, w'hile that of Mr. ]\Iadison is indirectly confirmed by the silence of all the members of his cabinet whose letters arc men- tioned in tlic report of the Congressional eonnnittce. Yet it is an extravagant supposition that General Arm- strong would, within so short a time after the meeting of the cabinet referred to, address a false statement to a committee of Congress, the falsity of which could not fail to be observed, if not exposed, by his former col- leagues. MR. MADISON AND GENERAL ARMSTRONG. 119 jting lit to not I col- There is another portion of !Mr. ^laclison's statement which, were it not that all his luipublislicd papers will sooner or kter be incorporated with the history of his times, we should certainly refrain from speaking of here ; but it belongs essentially to the subject of Gen- eral Armstrong's fitness for the post he occupied, and seems necessary to the rightful understanding of what we had attributed to the weak and vacillating policy of 3lr. Madison in all that concerned the preparations for the defence of the scat of u'overnnient. Those wlio are at all acquainted with the history of the period of which we are now speaking can not but Ivnow tiiat the apjiointment of General ^irmstrong to the War De- partment occasioned no little surprise. Ilis peculiar temper and turn of mind were supposed to be entirely uncongenial with the oflicial and confidential relations in which he must necessarily stand with the President. He was known to be cold and repulsive in his manners, pertinacious and opinionated ; while Mr. ^Madison pos- sessed a suavity of temper, a courteous amenity of de- portment, which could not but stand in disiigreeable contrast with the impcriouG temperament of a subor- dinate older thai, himself. If at any time a difference of opinion should arise between them on a question of grave interest, it was feared that the President would be the first to yield. Such objections prevailed to so great an extent, that when the nomination of General Armstrong was sent to the Senate it was confirmed onb' by a bare majority. The President was fully aware of the character of the individual and of the ob- jections against him when he made the ajipointment ; but after the resignation of Mr. Eustis, strange as it 120 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. n K' i U I may seem in these altered times, when office is so ea- gerly sought alter, he experienced great difficulty in finding any one willing to accxjpt. Several citizens, who would liave been eminently acceptable to the pub- lic and to the army, had successively declined it, and the high post of Secretary of War was literally " going a begging."' In this extraordinary dilemma, some friends whom the President highly esteemed, and in whose judgment he had great reliance, urged upon him the appointment of General Armstrong. Knowing that lie possessed talents fully adequate to the station, and believing tliat his military knowledge and experience might be rendered eminently useful, by a conciliatory confidence and tlie judicious interposition of a control- ling power on his own part, he did not hesitate to sac- rifice his own objections to the strong recommenda- tions of his friends. lie was probably somewhat in- fluenced, too, by tlie hope tliat the peculiarities of temper ascribed to the individual would meet with nothing to call them forth in the new associations by whicli he would be surrounded, and that his own love of quiet and harmony would be reflected in the con- duct and deportment of those whom he distinguished by selecting them as his daily companions and coun- selors. It may be admitted that tliese considerations were sufficient to justify the President in the appointment of General Armstrong to the AVar Department, but we have seen from liis notes of the memorable interview just recorded that his generous anticipations and liopes were sadly disappointed. ( Jencral Armstrong had been but a short time at the head of the Department of Mli. MADlfeON AND GENERAL ARMSTKONG. 121 War before he began to think, as it appears, that he was phiccd there to command and control by his own monocratic will rather than to suggest or execute un- der tlie higher power of another, lie soon took the liberty of acting not only without consultation witli his chief, but in direct opposition to his expressed will. It is not every one who would excuse the President's forbearance in this instance, or admit the force of his reasons for it. If the disappointments he was doomed to experience in his relation with the Secretary of War had concerned himself alone, the patience he evinced under them miglit be admired as the commendable ex- ercise of a Christian virtue ; but, unfortunately, more important considerations than those that touched tlie personal feelings of the President were involved in the proper or improper discharge of the functions of the officer at the head of the War Department. That the country was at war, so far from its being a satisfacto- ry reason for bearing with the freaks of temper which certainly unfitted the incumbent of that department for the prompt and efficient discharge of his duties, rather than encounter again the difficulty of finding one willing and qualified to take it, might have been regarded by others than the President as a circum- stance beyond all others rendering the dismissal nec- essary. From the time at which the President was made aware of the state of aftairs in Europe — which, from a letter found among his papers, we are enabled to state was on the 20th of ^lay, while at his country-seat in Virginia — to the middle of July, he had abundant op- portunities of knowing that the Secretary of War did F f I Jil I 1 1* Hi ill SI % S. 'i t 122 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. not participate in his own apprehensions that the seat of government woukl become a favorite object of enter- prise to the enemy, and that he, in truth, treated all the suggestions made to him of the necessity of prep- arations for defence with indiftercnce, if not contempt- uous nea'lect. That the President was sincere in these appreliensions was certainly not doubted by any other member of his cabinet, for they all testify to his re- peated, and urgent, and anxious expressions of solici- tude, and of his opinion that immediate preparations ouQ-ht to be made. When he found that the Secreta- ry of AYar took no notice of his hints and suggestions, and that even after the cabinet meeting he did not at- tempt to carry into effect the decision to which they had come until peremptorily ordered to do so, duty to the country would seem to have required him, no mat- ter what personal or private considerations interposed objections to the course, to have made the change in the War Department so evidently demanded by his own statements of the case. It will not be thought, we trust, that we are dwell- ing too long or too minutely on the antecedents of this i xglorious day. In all preparatory measures, in the provision of means for defence, as well as in the sub- sequent appliance of those means, it behooves to seek for the causes of that discomfiture. From the result of our examination of the official records and reports, aided b} our own personal knowledge and recollection of the state of things at tlic period of which we are speaking, we have l^een forced to the conclusion, as the reader will have seen, that there was unrenr,ona- ble delay in the preparation of the means of uol'cnce, k > I'ii""' RECAPITULATION. 123 Is le h It r u that the means provided were inadequate, and that the oruanizatiou and arrangements of the forces called into service v/ere made without, and in some instan- ces against, the advice and concurrence of the com- manding general. These were faults which no histo- rian could honestly overlook, and the only question for him to decide was, To whom were they to he as- cribed ? Tlie answer could not he fairly given with- out implicating some portion of the executive depart- ment of the government. It may he thought by many persons, perhaps, that only one individual of that de- partment could be held officially responsible for the unfortunate consequences of these faults. It was the duty of the Secretary of War, according to the opinion of most persons, to have devised, proposed, and recom- mended such measures of preparation as his presumed knowledge and experience in military affairs might suggest to his mind as most expedient and proper. This is undoubtedly true as for as it goes ; but if his knowledge and experience taught him to believe that there was no danger of invasion, and therefore no ne- cessity for preparation against it, or if, for any other reason, he neglected to perform the duty appertaining to the head of the War Department, are we to seek no further for respon Ibility in a matter in which the whole nation was interested ? p 'If 1-- 124 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. CHAPTER VIII. Landing of tlie British Troops at Benedict. — Uncertainty as to their Destination. — Nature and Amount of the American Force. — Plan of Operations dictated to the Commanding General. The predatory warfare carried on Ly the British during the years 1813 and 1814 on the shores of the Chesapeake was somewhat in contrast with the "war of the Titans" which they were waging at the same time on the other side of the Atlantic. AYhile, in Eu- rope, military operations were conducted on a gigantic scale, and grand armies were disputing the possession of principalities, kingdoms, and empires, in our humble portion of the glohe the armed hosts of his Britannic majesty were employed in robbing hen-roosts and pig- styes. Their military skill, valor, and enterprise were signalized in such exploits as plundering and burning farm-houses ; robbing defenceless men, women, and children of the clothing on their backs ; in breaking open family vaults, searching for jewelry, and making prizes of fresh winding-sheets ; carousing in churches ; stripping old men naked, pricking them with bayonets, and slapping their faces in sport ; and, in order to in- spire horror and hatred, as well as contempt and de- testation, violating females in the presence of their fa- thers and husbands.* * For the evidence and details of these outrages, see, in American State rajjcrs, Military Attairs, vol. i.. j). 339-382, the report made to Congress, July 31, 1813, on the '* ^>i)irit and Manner in which the mm ts yi.il EKAR ADMIRAL COCKBURN. 125 1*71 The presiding genius of tliis species of warfare, which would have disgraced banditti, and which sav- ao-es would have recoiled from, wiis U ii Admujal Sir George Cockburn ; and he appears to have exer- cised his vocation eon a?non\ with a za 1 and energy which showed that he derived amusement as well as profit from his labors, and that he even enjoyed the in- famous notoriety which he speedily acquired in all the country washed by the waters of the Chesapeake. Cer- tainly, in this line of business, no man could have been a more valuable and faithful servant to his govern- ment, which proved its sagacity in the selection of him as much as it did subsequently in the choice of Sir Hudson Lowe as a jailer for Napoleon.* Cockburn WiU- is wa.Lrcd hy the Enemy." Sec, also, Xiles's Register, vol. vii., /tasshn. * Coi'kbuni was selected to convey Napoleon to St. Helena, n duty wliicli he discharoied with tolerable decencv, not insultin'j; the illus- trious captive more than once or twice during tlie passage. On one occasion he sarcastically remarked, in Napoleon's presence, that the latter had not "read Chesterfield;" from which it would seem that Cockburn regarded Idnisclt' as a disciple of that philosoplicr. NajK)- leon, however, after he had had the oi)j)ortunity to contrast Cock1)urn with Sir Hudson Lowe, spoke favorably of the admiral, and said of him to O'Meara, " lie is not a man of a bad heart ; on the contran,-, I believe him to be capalde of a generous action ; but he is rough, overbearing, vain, choleric, and capricious ; never consulting any body ; jealous of his authority ; caring little of the manner in which he exercises it, and sometimes violent without dignity." On anoth- er occasion, comparing Cockburn with Lowe, he said, "Cockburn was at least straightforward and sincere. He was a man — an English- man ; but, my God I as for this man (Lowe), nature intended him for a bad hangman." It seems, according to O'Meara, that Cockburn, on visiting Paris after his return from St. Helena, expressed there a poor opinion of Na])olcon's abilities, and said that, "on the score of talent, he was nn ordinary character ;" which being repeated by O'Meara to Napo- 4 I 126 INVASION AND CAPTUKE OF WASHINGTON. I I I I possessed a fertile and inventive genius, indeiatigaLle energy, a daring spirit of enterprise, with the least pos- sible modicum of decency or humanity ; and it appears that, like other distinguished characters who have been famous for house-breaking and highway robbery, he had a peculiar talent for disguising his person. He is known to have resided some time in Washington pre- vious to the projected attack upon the city, and after its capture he called upon his landlady, a respectable widow, with whom he had boarded, and found some difficulty in persuading her of his identity, so complete had been the disguise. From his own personal ob- servation, and from information communicated by spies, he obtained a minute and accurate knowledge of ihe topography of the surrounding country, the state of the defences and public resources, aiid the characters of public men. It was not fully known until after the battle of Bla- densburgh that the mode of warfare in which Cockburn took so much delight had received the ;^anction of the British government. But on the 18th of August, 1814, after tlie arrival of Vice Admiral Cochrane in the Patux- ent, he addressed a communication to ]\Ir. ]Monroe, then Secretary of State, in which he announced that, in re- taliation for the "wanton destruction'' committed by the American army in Upper Canada, and in order to compel reparation for it, he had been ordered " to de- stroy and lay waste such towns and districts upon the coast" as might be found assailable. The delivery of this comnumication was delayed un- Icoii, the latter quietly remarked that the 0])inion " ])aid a ])oor com- pliment to the discernment of the greatest part of the ^vorld." rfr< m j LANDING OF THE ENEMY >r KENET' T. 127 n* ni til after the capture of Washingto , oertai)i not 1 want of o})jiortuiiitics to transmit it, but lest tli- ccipt of it should induce redoubled and eftcetual < tions to save the seat of government from falling n.h the possession of an enemy who openly avowed such infamous principles and purposes. The pretext put forth in Admiral Cochrane's letter was ably refuted in the reply addressed to him by j\Ir. 31onrce, dated Sep- tember 6, 1814. The real motive, elsewhere avowed, for resorting ,o a "system of devastation" which was admitted to be " contrary to the usages of civilized warfare," was to render the war unpopular in that sec- lion of the country which was supposed to have been most in favor of it, and make it hateful to the people by bringing its horrors home to their hearths and fire- sides. The larc-e increase of British force which arrived in the Chesape.ike about the middle of August, 1814, left no shadow of doubt that an enterprise of somewhat greater magnitude was contemplated than the petty depredations hitiierto committed. On the morning of the 16th of August, twenty-two sail of enemy's ves- sels came in from sea, and proceeded up the Chesa- peake to join the force })reviously stationed at the mouth of the Patuxent. The whole force then ascend- ed that river, and on tlie lOtli commenced landing troops at the old village of Benedict, situated about forty miles southeast of Washington. The intelli- gence was promptly received in Washington, and the questions at once arose, What is the object of the enemy ? "Which is the contemplated point of at- tack? I I (I 'i ?t 1 I'l h| I t' iS't I' I I' I 128 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. Mr. jMonroe, in his letter to the committee of inves- tigation, says : " Calling on the President on the morning of the 18th of August, he informed me that the enemy had entered the Patuxent in considerahle force, and were landing at Benedict. I remarked that this city [ Wash- ington] was their object, lie concurred hi the opin- ion. I oflcred to proceed immediately to Benedict Avith a troop of horse to observe their force, report it, with my opinion of their objects, and, should they ad- vance on this city, to retire before them, communica- ting regularly their movements to the government. This proposal was acceded to. Captain Thornton, of Alexandria, was ordered to accompany me with a de- tachment of twenty-live or thirty of tlie dragoons of the District. I set out about one o'clock P.]\I. on the 19th, and arrived at ten next morning in sight of the enemy's squadron lying before Benedict, and con- tinued to be a spectator of their movements until after the action at Bladensburg on the 24th." The opinion of the President and Mr. Monroe ap- pears to have been a reasonable one ; for, in reply to a suggestion that the enemy's destination might be either Washington, or Annapolis, or Baltimore, it might be asked, Why should they land troops at Benedict, to give them a long march through a hostile country to either of the two last-mentioned places, when they could so easily transport them up the Chesapeake and debark them within a few miles of the place of attack? The land route from Benedict was tlie worst that they could have selected to Baltimore or Annapolis, and the best and shortest to Washington. DOUBTS AS TO THE POINT OF ATTACK. 120 r a Xevertlicless, the Secretary of War, wliosc o]iliiion was of tlic most importance, as well from his position at the liead of that department, which gave him the immediate control of the means relied on to repel the enemy, as from the superior military knowledge and acumen which he was supposed to possess, derided the notion that the British intended a visit to Washing- ton. In the statement made to the committee by Gen- eral \nn Ness, one of the most prominent citizens of Washington, he says : "At length, in August last,wdien the increased and re-enforced fleet, with the troops, ascended the Chesa- peake, and -were known from authentic information to have entered the Patuxent, I called on Secretary Arm- strong again, and expressed, as usual, my apprehen- sions, arising from want of means and preparations, adding that, from the known naval and reputed land force of the enemy, he probably meant to strike a se- rious blow. His reply was, ' Oh yes ; by G — d, they would not come with such a fleet without meaning to strike somewdiere, but they certainly will not come here. What the d — 1 will they do here V' etc. After remarking that I differed very much from him as to the probable interest they felt in destroying or captur- ing our seat of government, and that I believed a visit tc this place would, for several reasons, be a favorite object with them, ho observed, ' No, no ; Baltimore is the place, sir; that is of so much more consequence.' " In his Notices of the War of 1812,* General Arm- strong persists in the opinion that the "first and great object"' of the enemy in proceeding to Benedict was * Vol. ii., p. 125, 126. F2 t r 130 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. *'tlic punishment of Barney and tlic destruction of Iiis flotilla," and that the visit to AVashington was a cas- ual suggestion subsequently made by Cockburn to General lloss. (General Winder inehncd from the first to the belief that the enemy intended an attack on Annapolis, and the reasons which he states in his narrative for this impression are not wanting in force. lie says, " It brought him to a line port, where his ships could lie in safety ; it ailbrded abundant and comfort- able quarters for his men, magazines and store-houses for all his stores and munitions of every description ; was capable, \vith very little labor, of being made im- pregnable by land, and he commanded the water ; it was the nearest point of debarkation to the City of Washinirton without cntcrinc; a narrow river liable to great uncertainty in its navigation from adverse winds, and was at hand to Baltimore, equally threatening these two great points, and rendering it absolutely necessary to keep a force doubly sufhcient to resist him — one for the protection of Washington, the other for Baltimore. Tiic squadron whicli was ascending the Potomac, and had now passed the Kettle Bottoms, the only obstruction in the navigation of the river, might be only a feint, tlie more effectually to conceal their intentions against Annapolis ; or, what was more probable, was intended to unite with tlie land force, and co-0])eratG in a joint attack on Washington. It was, therelbrc, strongly believed that the land force was destined to proceed and take Fort "Washington in the rear.'' General W-inder's doubts as to the object and des- «^ t DOL'BTS AS TO THE POINT OF ATTACK. 131 tination of the enemy continued from the time of the debarkcation at Benedict on the 18th of August, until within three liours of the commencement of the battle at Bladensburg on the 24t]i. In his narrative, refer- ring to his own position at the Eastern Brancli Bridge, near the Xavy-yard, between nine and ten o'clock of the morning of the battle, he says, "My patrols and vedettes not having yet brought me any intelligence of a movement of the enemy [tVom his bivouac, about twelve miles from Washington], and being still doubtful whether he might not move upon Annapolis, Fort W'arburton [Fort Washington], or to- ward the bridcie ratiier than liladensbul-a:, I held tlic position near the bridge as that which, under all cir- cumstances, would enable mc best to act against the enemy in any alternative." This continual uncertainty, as may well be imag- ined, had a most disastrous cllect upon the military operations of this brief camjiaign of live days. All the force which could be assembled was considered in- sulhcient for the protection of one point, and yet it was deemed necessary to protect three; and three avenues of approach to the seat of guvermnent were to be guarded — that by Bladensburg, that by the Eastern Brancli Bridge, and an appronch, in conjunction with the naval force, from Fort A\ ashington. The grer^t practical problem to solve was how to dispose of a force deemed inadequate for the protection of a single one of these aj^proaches, so as to leave none of them unguarded; and the ju'oblcm was rendered more ditli- cult of solution by the t()j)Ogra])hy of the country ly- in^r between the Eastern Brancli of the Potomac and f .1 , 132 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF "WASHINGTON. the Patuxcnt River, wliich is generally well wooclccl, sparsely peopled, somewhat hilly, and intersected by numerous roads crossing each other, and leading to the different points which were supposed to be threatened, and which it was thought necessary to guard. Tlie roads, too, were then, during a hot, dry spell of mid- summer wcatiier, in the best condition for marching, excepting only the annoyance of dust. A point might, after careful calculation and deliberation, be se- lected on one of these roads, and preparations made to receive the enemy, and it would be suddenly discov- ered, when too late, that lie had turned into another road, one cither leading him a little circuitously to the point which he appeared to menace, or directly to some other point erpially in need of protection. That the (>nemy had taken care to be well informed of the topography of the country is evident from the dispatcli* of Admiral Cochrane to the Secretary of the Board of Admiralty, dated Tonnant, on the Patuxcnt, September 2, 1814, of which the following is an ex- tract : "My letters of the 11th of August will have ac- quainted their lordships of my waiting in the Chesa- peake for the arrival of licar Admiral ]\lalcolm with the expedition from Bernuida. " The rear admiral joined me on the 17th, and as I had gained information from Hear Admiral Coekbnrn, whom I found in the Potomac, that Commodore Bar- ney, with the Baltimore flotilla, had taken shelter at the head of the Patuxcnt, this afforded a pretext for ascending that river to attack him near its source, • Sco Niles's Register, vol. vii., Supplenieiit, j). Hij. f THE I':NEMy WELL INFORMED. 133 1 * above Pi'p" Point, while the ultimate destination of the combined ibrcc was Washington, should it be found that the attempt might be made with any prospect of success. To give tlieir lordships a more correct idea of the place of attack, I send a sketch of the country, upon which the movements of the navy and army are portrayed. By it their lordships will observe that the best approach to Washington is by Port Tobacco, upon tlie Potomac, and Benedict, upon the Patuxent, from both of which are direct and good roads to that city, and tlieir distances nearly alike. The roads from Benedict divide about live luiles inland ; the one by Piscataway and Bladensburg, the other following the course of the river, although at some distance from it, owing to the creeks that run up tlie country. This last pas.^es through the towns of Nottingham and ]\Iarlborough to Bladensburg, at which town the river called the Eastern Jkancli, that bounds Washington to the eastward, is fordable, and the distance is about five miles. There arc two bridges over this river at the city, but it is not to be expected that the enemy would leave them accessible to an invading army. " Previously to my entering the Patuxent, I de- tached Captain ({ordon, of his majesty's ship Sea- horse, witii that sliip and the ships and bombs named in the margin, up the Potomac to bombard Fort Wasli- ington (which is situated on the left baidv of that riv- er, about ten or twelve miles below the city), with a free com- i-oy )pening numicatlon ahovc, as well as to cover tlie retreat of the army, should its return by the lUadensburg road be found loo hazardous, from the accession of strengtii i !>< 134 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF ^yASHINGTON. '"!f I ;i the enemy might obtain from Baltimore ; it was also reasonable to expect that the militia from the coun- try to the northward and westward would flock in as soon as it should be known that their capital was threatened. *' Captain Sir Peter Parker, in the ]\Ienelaus, with some small vessels, was sent up the Chesapeake above Baltimore, to divert the attention of the enemy in that quarter, and I proceeded, with the remainder of the naval force and the troops, up this river, and landed the army upon the 19th and 20th at Benedict." From this it appears that the expedition to Wash- ington had been concerted and determined upon, and even provision made " to cover the retreat of the army, should its return by the Bladensburg road be found too hazardous,*' before Admiral Cochrane entered the Patuxent, and that the destruction of Barney's flotilla was merely the pretext for ascending that river, instead of being tbe "first and great object." No doubt tlie real purpose in ascending the Patuxent with so large a force was carefully concealed from the subordinates of the expedition as long as practicable, lest it should, by their indiscretion, become known to us. We shall now take a view of the means which Gen- eral AVinder possessed of repelling or operating against • the enemy, whose strength was as little known as his determination and purposes. The followino; is a statement, whicli we have endeav- ored to render as accurate as possible, of the greatest amount of force which, if the officers of the general government had done their duty, might have been con- centrated in good order and condition at Bladensburg •til Mill ACCOUNT OF THE AMERICAN FORCES. 135 or the City of Washington on the morning of the 24th of August. We have attempted a chissitication and brief description of the troops, and have noted the times at which the several corps were placed at the disposal of General Winder, or became available for the dci'ence of the seat of government. The detail is rather uninteresting in itself, but we ask the reader's attention to it now, in order to obviate the necessity of tedious interruptions or repetitions in the subscfj^uent course of our narrative. 1. We shall mention the District troops first, as they ought to have been, and in fact wej:c, the first to be confronted with the enemy. They comprised the militia and volunteer companies of Washington and Georgetown, formed into two regiments, the 1st com- manded by Colonel ]\Iagruder, the 2d by Colonel Will- iam Brent. The brigade was commanded by Gen- eral Walter Smith, of Georgetown, and included two companies of fight artillery, having each six six-pound- ers, and commanded rcsjiectivcly by ]\lajor George Peter, who had obtained a higli reputation as an officer of experience and ability in the regular service, and Captain l^enjaniin Burch, a soldier of tlic Revolution. It also included two companies, under Captains Dough- ty and vStull, called riflemen, but armed with muskets, the Secretary of War having, according to General Smith's statement, "declined or refused to furnish rifles.'** These troops were well disciplined, and com- ff * This fact is well remcmberecl by the author, for on its hciri}? made known, when Ca])tain Stall's conipany were about l)einj; nius- tcrcil into service, they at fir.-t iierenii)torily refused to mareh unless furnished with the proper arms. if -i A ij ■' 1 ! ( i ■■I 136 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. prised, officers and men, sonic of the most respecta- ble inhabitants of the District. Tlic brigade marched from Washington on the 20th of August, and on the following morning was found to muster about 1070 men. Another brigade of District militia, under the com- mand of General Robert Young, consisted of militia and volunteer companies from Alexandria and its vi- cinity. It included a company of cavalry, under Cap- tain Thornton, which acted as an escort to Colonel IMonroe, and a company of artillery, with two brass six-pounders and one brass four-pounder, commanded by Captain Marsteller. The brigade mustered about 500 men, and General Young, in his letter to the com- mittee, spei.ks in high terms of their efficiency. They were encamped and reported to General Winder on the 18tli of August. The only use made of them was to defend the approach to Fort Washington, and they were, consec[uently, not present at the battle of Bla- densburg. 2. The troops from the city of Baltimore and its vicinity consisted of two regiments of militia, one of 550 men, under Lieutenant-colonel Ragan (late cap- tain United States Hiiles), and another of 803 men, under Lieutenant-colonel Schutz. comprising the brig- ade commanded by General Stansbury ; the 5tli regi- ment under Lieutenant-colonel Joseph Stcrett, con- sisting of volunteers from the city of Baltimore ; two companies of volunteer artillery from the same city, under Captains IMycr and IMagruder, ^vitli six six- pounders ; and a battalion of volunteer riflemen from Baltimore, under the command of the celebrated Will- ACCOUNT OF THE A^[ERICAN FORCES. 137 iam Pinkney, previously attorney-general and minis- ter to England, and subsequently senator. The brigade commanded by General Stansbury ar- rived at Bladensburg from Baltimore on the evening of the 22d of August. Lieutenant-colonel Sterett's regiment, 500 strong, the artillery, 150, and the rifle battalion, 150, reached Bladensburg about sunset on the evening before the battle. Tiie whole force, amounting to about 2200, was placed by General Winder under the command of General Stansbury. 3. A'^arious detachments of ^Maryland militia, com- prising a portion of two regiments, 750 Strong, under the connnand of Colonel William D. Beall, an officer of the Revolution, and Colonel llood, which Iiad march- ed sixteen miles on the morning of the day of battle, and entered Bladensburg about thirty minutes before the enemy ; detachments of militia, under Lieutenant- colonel Kramer, consisting of 240 men ; and two bat- talions, under 3Iajors AVaring and Maynard, of 150 each. 4. A regiment of Virginia militia, under the com- mand of Colonel George ]\Iinor, consisting of about 600 infantry and 100 cavalry. These troops arrived in Washington on the evening of the 23d of August, but, owing to some mismanagement,* did not receive their complement of arms until the next day, too lato to be present at the battle. 5. The regular infantry, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel William Scott, consisting of de- tachments from the 3(jth and 38tli regiments, about 300 men, who were available from the commencement * w ec Colonel Minor's letter. Appendix. I im !l i 138 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. of the campaign, and a company of 80 from the 12th regiment, under tlie command of Captain ]\lorgan, who joined tlie army at the Old Fields on the evening of the 22d of August. 6. The sailors of Barney's flotilla, 400, and the ma- rines from Washington, 120 in number, with two eighteen-pounders and three twelve-pounders, joined General Winder at the Wood Yard on the morning of the 22d of Au2;ust. 7. The cavalry consisted of a squadron of United States dragoons, under the command of Lieutenant- colonel Laval, 125 in number, recruits on untrained horses, who arrived in Washington on the morning of the 20th of August ; and various companies of volun- teer cavalry from the District, j\Iaryland, and Virginia, under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman, i\Iajor Otlio IT. Williams, and ]\Iajor Charles Sterett Ridgley — altogether about 300 in number, who were available at an early period of the campaign. The whole would liave constituted a force of about 7000 men, of which 900, including the seamen, ma- rines, and Laval's cavalrv, were enlisted men. The cavalry amounted altogether to more than 400, a part of it very efficient. There were in all 2G pieces of ar- tillery, including 2 eighteen-pounders, 3 twelves, and 20 six-pounders. With such a force, notwithstanding the unpromis- ing aspect of a portion of it, a skilful and experienced commander, if left unshackled, might have effected something creditable to himself and to his country, even against an army as numerous and well appointed as that of the enemy wns supposed to be ; but in ad- THE COMMANDER HAMPERED. 139 dition to the perplexing uncertainty as to the enemy's destination and strength, it is particularly necessary to bear also in mind, in forming a judgment of the pre- liminary as ■"' .i as the closing operations of this cam- paign, that these operations lacked the great essential of all military movements, that of being governed by a single Avill or mind. The President of the United States is, by the highest law of the land, commander- in-chief of the army and navy, and President Madison was actually in the field and exercising command.* The Secretary of War is the channel of .communica- tion from the President to all ofiicers of the army, high or low, and any suggestion or request from him is equivalent to an order. Secretary Armstrong was also in the field, and in addition to the authority of his official position, he was considered by many, and certainly considered himself, to possess profound mili- tary science, as well as some military experience. Colonel j\Ionroe, the Secretary of State, from the out- set took an active interest and share in the practical operations of the campaign. General Winder was under the immediate personal supervision of these high functionaries, all much older men than himself, and he, instead of having the ^^;y'5^/^6' of a high military repu- tation to support him in case of difference of opinion, had yet a reputation to achieve. This difficulty in the situation of General Winder is referred to in expressive terms by General Wilkin- * " Tlie President of the United States was not only active during tlie enu^a;j;oinent wliieli took place with tiie enemy, but had been ex- ertini!; hiniscU" for two or three days jirevious, and has been person- ally active ev r since. Every one joins in attributing^ to him the greatest merit." — Xalional Intcltijcncer, August 30, 1811. 140 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. I • 1 * son, when i^ipoaklng of tlie position of General Winder's forces on the night of tlie 23d of August, lie says, "There can he no doubt that this was an injudi- cious disposition of the American forces ; but is Gen- eral Winder to be condemned for it ? I think not, because President ]Madison, by urging a concentration of his corps when so recently in camp at the Long Old Fields, had clearly indicated his determination to try tlie issue of a general action, and the general appears to have exerted every nerve to give effect to his plan ; and in circumstances at once perplexing and equivocal, no7ie but a soldier^ habituated to subordination.) can feel the influence of an intimation from a siqyerior, or interpret the force of his ojyinion.''' It is true that General Winder, in his narrative, makes no attempt to evade responsibility by throwing it upon his advisers or supervisors, and even indirect- ly assumes blame, which, from the testimony of others, does not appear to belong to him. And General Arm- strong, in his " Notices," labors to throw upon Gen- eral Winder the whole responsibility of the manage- ment of the campaign, with the exception of that part which he attributes to his fellow-member of the cabi- net, Colonel ^lonroe, whom he contemptuously terms a " busy and blundering tactician." Yet, even from so unfavorable a Avitness as General Armstrono;, enouQ-h can be gathered to show that General Winder was the commanding general in little more than name, and that his movements were influenced, if not actually dictated, by his supervisors, who were neither in liarmony among themselves, nor consistent any one with himself, and one of whom. General ^Vrmstrong, was not likely, from i \ \\ -^ GENERAL ARMSTRONG S ADVICE. 141 his self-willed and resentful disposition, to be over-zeal- ous in his eftbrts to produce a result which would jus- tify j\Ir. Madison's selection of General Winder instead of General Porter as the commanding general. In his statement to the committee of investigation, General Armstrong says : "On the — of August was received the iirst notice of the arrival of Admiral Cocln-anc in the Bay, and on the same day advices were brought that he was enter- ing; and ascendinii; the Patuxcnt. These facts were connnunicated to the general, and he was instructed to take a position near the enemy. On the 22d he was advised to hang on their rear and flank a heavy corps, while he opposed to them another hi their front. ]\Iy reasons for tlius advisino- him were tlu'ce : if Baltimore was the object of the enemy, this disposition interposed a corps between them and that city ; if they aimed at Washington, it menaced their communication with their fleet, and the security of their return, and was, there- fore, most likely to hold them in cheek ; and, lastly, it did not forbid a concentration of force in their front at a later period and by a forced march. On the even- ing of the 22d I repaired to the army, and found it at tlie Old Fields, six or eight miles distant from the en- emy. A part of the corps contemplated for the serv- ice mentioned in the preceding article had joined Gen- eral Winder, and of the other part (under General Stansburv) no correct account could be given. I took this occasion to urge the necessity of a speedy concen- tration of our force, and of the usefulness of pushing our pickets frequently and freely upon those of the en- emy, as the best means of circumscribing his supplies, f •M INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINCcTON. of gaining a knowledge of his strength (of Avhich the accounts Vvcre various), and of preventing a stolen march, wliich was to be suspected. I was glad to find the general entertained similar views, and that they were in a train of execution. In the afternoon of the 2od I returned to Washington." This statement of General Armstrong; shows that the commanding general was, in the outset, "instructed to lake a jjosition near the enemy." An instruction from a military superior is nothing more nor less than or- der, which no ofticer, unless in extreme circumstances, would hesitate to obey or venture to criticise. Then the Secretary of War remains a whole day in the iield or at the general's head-quarters, " advising" and "urg- ing the necessity" of certain specific movements. What was this but taking out of his hands the direction of the campaign ? But this was not all the advice or dictation which emanated from the same high quarter. In the Appen- dix to the second volume of his " Notices" General Armstrong publishes, in his own justification, what he styles " Colonel Allen M'Clane's Journal of the Cam- paign." Colonel M'Clane, it seems, acted as a volun- teer aid to General Winder, to whom he had been rec- ommended by General Armstrong, and the following is the entry in his journal for the 19th of August: ' 19th. Reports of yesterday confirmed, with the addition that the fleet had entered the Patuxent ; was preparing armed boats for going np the river and land- ing troops at Benedict. Accompanied General Winder to the War-office. The general asked the secretary's opinion of the enemy's object; the latter replied 'that GENEUAL AKMSTRONCr's ADVICi:. I 13 1 I the niinilDcrs, equipments, and movements of an enemy best iiulicatcd liis object ; of tliese, in the present case, we know loo litth; to speak with any degree of assur- ance. With the exception of hinding troops at Jiene- dict, ]iis great naval force, and the direction given to tlie movement, would indicate Baltimore ; but, whether it be Baltimore, the flotilla, or AVashington, our course is a plain one : assemble as large a force as wc can ; ])lace it speedily at Nottingham, or other point on the Patuxcnt ; clear the road between that and Benedict of horses and cattle ; break down bridges ; abbatis the route, when leading tiirough woods : SQlect strong- points for defence ; and, as soon as his movement be- gins, harass his front and Hanks by small attacks made by night and by day, while Stuart operates in the same way on his rear. A plan of this kind, strictly pursued, will soon enable you to judge of the enemy's strength, equipment, and objects. If the first be small and the second scanty, his objects can not be great nor many — probably confined to an attack on Barney's flo- tilla. If, on the other hand, he shows a respectable park of artillery, wuth baggage and provision train, his object may be Baltimore or Washington.' " The secretary's opinion of the "objects" of the en- emy was somewhat in the style of the Delphic oracle or of Captain Jack Bunsby : the value of it consisted in the immense difficulty of making any thing out of it. But, whatever the enemy's objects might be, the advice as to the course to be pursued was minute and particular. Tlie mode of proceeding was to be an of- fensive one. The general was to march in pursuit of the enemy, let the disparity of force be what it might, i 4 i'.:i!i -: ;■, '<'{ ^ 144 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. and " harass his front and flanks hy small attacks made hy niglit and hy day." But, hetween the 19th and 23d, tlie secretary's opin- ion of the ctiicacy of offensive operations aj^pears to have undergone a material change. In his journal for the 23d, Colonel M '•Chine says : *' 23d. At sunrise, the general and 31'CJane visited the President. The ordinary compliments passed, the Secretary of "War asked the general for such informa- tion as he had been able to procure Avith regard to the numbers and equipment of the enemy ; to which he re- plied that Mr. ^lonroe and Colonel Beall, with the same means of observation, made very different estimates — the former making them 7000 men, the latter but 4000 ; that they came without cannon, cavalry, baggage, or provision train ; that they had a few rocket-men, and a few (two or three) guns called grasshoppers, dragged by seamen ; that their whole force, naval and military, was yet at IMarlborough, plundering the tobacco ware- houses ; and from accounts received of the Potomac fleet, it was his opinion tliat they would not move till that fleet had approached I'ort AVashington, M'hen Iloss would move to the rear of the fort and co-operate in taking it. Without noticing this opinion, the secre- tary replied tliat 'the facts he had stated abundantly proved that hitherto Ross's movement had no object but that of covering and aiding the armed vessels des- tined to tlic attack of the flotilla ; and that, should he make a movement directed on AVashington, it will nec- essarily be a mere Cossack hurrah, a rapid march and hasty retreat, coming, as he does, wliolly un])repared for siege and investment. To meet an attack of this t i 1 GENERAL ARMSTRONG S ADVICE. 145 I ■I 4 kind, two modes of proceeding may be suggested, the one strictly offensive, the other decidedly defensive : the former will consist of multiplied attacks, made si- multaneously or in succession, on the front, flank, and rear of an enemy's march throughout its whole extent. Such was the well-known affair of Lexington, in the war of the llevolution, in which 1800 of the Brit is! i elite were so beaten, disheartened, and exhausted, that, had they not, at sunset, found armed vessels to pro- tect, and an intrenched camp to receive them, not ;i man would have escaped capture or death. To this plan, however, serious objections may be made, arising from the subdivision of force and nniltitude of com- manders it makes necessary. The second, or defens- ive plan, is entirely free from these or any other objec- tions of importance, and is precisely what, were I in your place, I would do. Assemble my force in his front, fall quietly back to the Capitol, giving only that degree of resistance that invites a pursuit. When ar- rived in its front, I would innncdiately put in battery my twenty pieces of artillery, give the direction and management of these to Barney and Peter, fill the U})- per part of the house and the adjacent buildings with infantry, regulars and militia, amounting to 5000 men, while my 300 cavalry held themselves in reserve for a cliarge the moment a recoil appeared in the British col- umns of attack. On the success of this plan against the best-executed coup de main I would pledge both life and reputation, and earnestly rcconnncnd it to your adoption.' Witli tliis advice of tlie secretary, so obvi- ously right of itself, and reju'csentcd so clearly and conclusively, the general ai)pearcd to be pleased." a 146 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. From this it appears that on the 19th, when the ene- my's numbers and equipments were unknown, but eon- sidered very formidable, the secretary advised an ad- vance against him, and small attacks, by night and by day, on Iiis front and Hanks ; and on the 23d, when it was ascertained that he was without cannon or caval- ry, and therefore more easily assailable, the secretary objected to nmlti2)lied attacks, on account of the sub- division of force and multitude of commanders wlilch would be necessary, and was ready to stake his life and reputation upon a Vvholiy dilferent plan. The plan advised by Cfcneral Armstrong on the 19th was similar to the course which (.iencral Wilkin- son says that lie would have adopted. lie was in Washington, under suspension, at the time of the ar- rival of the enemy in the Patuxcnt, and on receiving a note from Mr. ]\Ionroc in reference to the threateniuG; aspect of affairs, he addressed him a letter, stating that if his arrest could be suspended, and his sword restored for a short period, he would take the command of the militia, and save the city or forfeit his life, lie says :* *' This was an offer of dire responsibility at so late an hour ; but I preferred death to inaction at such a crisis, and did believe that by covering the roads in front of the enemy with Avorking-partics, to obstruct them by all practicable means, and at the same time falling on their rear by the new road to Zakiali Swamp, or that by St. Paul's Cliurcli, witli Peter's artillery, Stull's, Davidson's, and Doughty's riflemen and in- fantry, and fifty dragoons, while sinuiltaneous attacks were made on his front and left flank, at every exposed * ^Vilkillson, vol. i., j). 7G1. i .'»^ GENERAL WILKINSON 8 PLAN. 147 '; point and diflicult defile, by flyi'ig parties of four or iivc liiindrod infantry, so stationed ad to relieve eaeh oilier as the enemy advaneed — I repeat, it was then, and is still my opinion, that by suea attaeks, judieious- Iv eonduetcd and vigorously pushed, if tlie enemy had not retraced their r4ep.<, tliey would have crossed the ratii.\ci:t itt Xotlingham or Pi;;- Point, and returned to ihcir shippiii^^ ; or. if tJiey h.;d };er;-e\<'n.'d iii tiieir J';;ir«'h .i^raiu.-t ih' eqiiuil, ih :r bu,;;s mi !il ha\'>* breii dc!.7iroycd, a:;.! i.;e'u' ictn-at cut oii', (,r rew e/cd a sjoie of eariiaLi'C. To lia\e as.-urcd this i.--sue, it v.'.;s oidv ncces.-ary to post tlie P)allimore troops and tlie corps from Annapolis at some convenient point on tlie route between Queen Anne and the Governor's Bridge, with orders to push heavy parties of observation to the verge of the enemy's camp in ^larlborough, and to hohl themselves in readiness to harass their rear in what- ever direction they might march. And here it may be proper to remark tliat the niaxim, '//t' icAo divides /as force v:ill he beaten in detail^'' must be received with qualification, as the art of war depends on an infinity of unforeseen contingencies, and therefore is not reduc- ible to specific rules. It will apply to armies nearly on ail equality, which are mancruvring for advantages, but never to an inferior force, which, though competent to harass its adversary, dare not hazard a general en- gagement. But President j\[adison preferred to sig- naliv^e himself in a pitched battle, and, as he scorned the idea of taking any advantage of his antagonist, he permitted him an undisturbed march to the theatre of combat.*' There is, no doubt, much force in General Wilkin- f A 148 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. m i hi son's remark, that "tlic art of war depends upon an inrinity of unforeseen contingencies." It is easy to construct a theory of strategy or a body of miUtary maxims, and, like Captain Bobadil in the play, in- vent ingenious and infallible plans for annihilating an enemy. The Baron Jomini, with Avhose works Gen- eral Armstrong appears to have been much smitten, was tlie greatest of strategists in tlieory, yet the Km- jDcror Napoleon, one of the greatest of practical strate- gists, had but a poor opinion of Jomini's, or any otlier theory of war, no doubt I'or the reason assigned by General AVilkinson. The Count de Segur*' relates, that in the commencement of Napoleon's campaign in Russia, an envoy from the Czar presented himself at the l^'rcnch advanced posts with a flag of truce. In the course of conversation with him. Napoleon re- marked, " \ou all believe yourselves to understand the art of war because you have read Jomini; but if his book could have taught you any thing, do you think that I would have allowed it to be published ?" There is no treatise on strategy which can provide for all the circumstances of a general's position, and no one lias acknowledged this more fully and frankly than Jomini himself. There certainly is none which has imagined rules or maxims for a position so ex- traordinary as General Winder's. His situation, as General AVilkinson remarks, "was more than enough to have embarrassed an olH<^cr of forty campaigns, and it Avas his fortune to have served but two." Nevertheless, the art of war has been reduced to certain lixed rules, and there is such a science as * History of the Exitcdition to Kussia, book iv., chap. v. GUERRILLA WARFARE. 149 strategy, the principles of whicli are not to be despised because they are not infallible. And the plan of ,." ma IK [11 (tie IS h rrolmhlN with 18- Gcncr d veulent (jui chcr thmos, e The / s r theory. harassing the enemy recommended by General Arm- strong and General AVilkinson, though it made de- tachments necessary, so far from being against the principles of tlic art of war, was in perfect conformity with thern. Writers on the art of war recommend, and common sense dictates, that the weaker of two belligerents should, as a general rule, resort to a har- assing guerrilla warfare rather than to pitched battles, more particularly against an invading enemy.* But, admitting the correctness of this plan in the abstract, and admitting that General Winder had been permitted to adhere for a reasonable length of time to any plan of action, whether of his own or any one else's suggestion, he had not the means of pursuing the proposed course of hanging on the enemy's rear and Hank, and harassing him by nuiltiplicd attacks. Neither his men nor their officers were fitted for it. Such a plan of war requires experienced troops, or, at * This is the j)lan cm])hati('!illy dictated l>y Lloyd, wliom Jomini seeins disposed to ro;iard as the father of modorii stratc;j:y ; hut ho says tliat ii;j;ht troops arc iiidisjieusahje for tlie })uri)osf', "// n'lj a que fir troupes IvylrvA qui pitisscut roiijJir vet ohjvt ;" and they must bo well-trained liifht troops, not like some, of which he says, "AVA'.s* it ciiticreiiinit (ractin'te, et li'avn'ipnt rien da Ic'i/rr que le. noiii.** he would not have considered either raw militia or sailors pounders as fidlillin^ the necessarv conditi on. d I u uo^nni; says, " Les bons ])rincipes de la -luerre di'fonsive qn'au lieu de s'opjioser de front \i une arnic'e envaliint to the rtmiitv of obsei-vation after the battle tluiii niiv •! ESTIMATES OF THE ENEMY's FORCE. 159 says, in his statement, that when lie returned to Wash- ington on the evening of the 2;kl of August, lie found that "the enemy were pertinaciously represented to be at least 9000, and many were supposed to believe their number greater;"' but that he had examined, with all the address he could, several prisoners who had been taken by our cavalry, and they " could only enu- merate four regiments, and name but one general and one colonel actinix as brigadier ;"' and the doctor states o CD ' that he would have risked his life upon the enemy's "almost entire want of artillery and waht of cavalry.'' The opinion of Colonel licall ought to have had some weight, on account of his military experience; that of the doctor, founded on information obtained from ig- norant or iVightencd prisoners, was naturally little re- garded, and, at all events, did not act as an anodyne. other of our ufliccrs," and from his own observation, " corrohoratcd in the agjjtre^atc by the best intorniatiun" lie " couUl j^et from the surgeons, sergeants, and men left in hospital," he estimates the wholo number of the Rritisli at ;5">40. The following statement of the IJritish force laiuled was published in Xiles's Kegister. vol. vii., \). 11 : 21st liegiment KM);} men. •Ith do. 1st battalion 800 " 44th do. do iVAO " 85th do. do :r>0 '♦ Artillerists 90 " Marines under Admiral Coekburn I'lOO " Seamen do. do. 3'»0 " '»1'.'.'? men. A portion of the force was left at Marlborough, and jirobably else- where, Glei.'. the autliorof the Campaign at Washington, states the num- ber ut 1500; the Subaltern in Amoricu savs 4000. If' li i%t \\. ii Ii 160 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. In a statement* attributed to Major Thomas L. McKenncy, afterward Superintendent of Indian Af- fairs, who is referred to in Cleneral Winder's narrative as a volunteer aid to General Smith, it is said that on the night preceding the battle the intelligence received "went to confirm the belief that the enemy were 10,000 strong." The writer refers to "the most iin- jparalldtd dearth of correct information which exist- ed," and to its effects upon General Winder's move- ments, and says : "AVitli the troops myself from the connnencement of their march from W^ashington, from the nature of my office a good deal with (ieneral Winder, I consider myself as having possessed opportunities of judging of the quantity of praise or blame that should justly at- tach to him at least equal to those of any other officer not attached to his military family. ** If an assurance of unremitted zeal and activity will rescue him from any portion of blame, lie pos- sessed them to an extreme. If a constant use of the means he commanded to obtain correct information of the position, and numbers, and movements of the ene- my will rescue him, then is he blameless. lie used them ; but they were cither too timid to approach the enemy's lines, too indifferent, or both tlicse together, to furnish him with the information wauled, lie de- pended ui)Oii them, as he could not help doing, thougli their reports wer( ottnn contradictory. If a manifestly deep interest, night watching, and great personal ac- tivity and labor will restore whatever good opinions * Wo fnul this stiitcnu'iit in the I'ortici", a iiciiodioul niuguzine pubUnheil »t B;iltiii. Mt;? , ( I I ' SCANTY INFOKMATION. 161 lie may liave lost, then ought he to be reinstated in those good opinions. That his orders were given and recalled -with a suddenness that would sometimes sur- prise his troops, is certain, hut they were founded upon tlie information he received from his vedettes. In fine, his misfortune is attributable more to the de- scription of his command, its general rawness and un- fitness for such a fight as he saw awaited him from tried and veteran troops, tlian from any defect in his abilities as a general. He was hurried in among his troops, and his troops in upon him, at the eleventh hour, lie saw his forces, and he saw their quality. Their numbers not half equal to those he was destined to oppose ; for such was his information, and under this belief he acted." At 5 o'clock in the afternoon of the 2l^d of .Vugust, according to (jJeneral A\'inder*s narrative, the enemy's force "was very imperfectly known, the opinions and representations varying from four to twelve thousand;"' and nothiiiLi' occurred between that time and the battle to tln'ow any additional liglit U})oii the subject. This extraordinary dearth of information, and the utier barrenness of the numerous reconnoissances, con- thuied for more than three days, would be incredible but for tlie indisputable and cumulative evidence of the fact; and it is the more astonishing, because tho enemy, from tlie first, gave no indications of havi? g either artillery or cavalry, and therefore the vcd( ttes could have \cntuied nearer to him. Ft was most un- fortunate that correct information couUl not be, or was not obtained, as it wouhl have prevented the depress- ing effects which the exaggerated accounts must have 4 i f -rll M I 162 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. had upon the spirits of the men. A knowledge of the enemy's real strength, a reduction of one half its sup- posed number, would have been as inspiriting in its effects as a re-enforcement on our side to tlie same ex- tent. General Stansbury might have been willing to await at J^ladensburg tlie approach of lour thousand men, though he naturally hesitated to oppose an army of eight or ten thousand disciplined troops with a body of two tliousand inexperienced, fatigued, and dis- pirited militia-men. The absence of such important information is a suf- ficient proof that the enemy, in his progress, was not only not harassed or molested, but not watched, and therefore we must depend pretty much on their own reports for an account of their movements. According to the dispatches of Ross and Cockburn to their govcrnn^.ent,* the army landed at Benedict on the 19th of August without opposition, and on the next day connnenced its march toward Xottiiigham, a small town on the Patuxent, about fifteen miles north of Benedict. On the 21st, at noon, the army had pro- ceeded no farther than Lower Marlborough, nearly midway betwM:!en Benedict and Nottinsiham, where it halted for some hours, and where Cockburn, who had kept his boats and tenders as nearly as possible abreast of the army, anchored for the purpose of communicat- ing witii Ross. The army then resumed its march lo Nottingliam, and Cockburn jiroceeded on to the same place with the boats. "On approaching that town," says Cockburn, "a lew shots were exchanged between * Thesii dispatches will bo found in Xilcs's Kcgistcr, vol. vii., and also in the Apjicndix to vol. i. of Wilkinson's Mcniuirs. THE FLOTILLA BLOWN UP. 163 the leading boats and some of the enemy's cavalry, but the appearance of our army caused them to retire with precipitation." During tiie night of the 21st the enemy remained at Nottingham, and the boats and tenders were anchored off it ; and the next day, soon after daybreak, the whole moved forward again. So far the invaders were certainly proceeding very leisurely. In three days they had advanced not more than fifteen miles from the place of debarkation, had rested quietly each night, and had time to amuse them- selves during the day by plundering the country bor- dering on their line of march, and to regale themselves on the summer fruits and melons. On leaving Nottingham, tlie enemy's land and naval forces no longer continued to move parallel with each other. Cockburn, with his boats, proceeded up the river in search of l^arney's flotilla, whicii was then ly- ing near ]\Iount Pleasant, about nine miles from Not- tingham. On his way he landed some marines at Pig Point, where they found a large quantity of tobacco, whi(!h they afterward carried off. On nearing the ilo- tilla, he savs, the sloop bearino; Commodore Jiarnev's broad })eiinant was found to be on tire, and soon after- ward blew u]\ "I now saw clearly," he continues, "that they were all abandoned and on fire, with trains to their maf'-.izines ; and out of the seventeen vessels which composed tliis formidable flotilla, sixteen were 111 (|nu'k succession blown to atoms, and the seven- teentli (in which the iire had not taken) we cajifnred.*' The tlotill.i had in fact been abandoned the day before (the 21st) by Cummodore Barney, under orders from "i v.f :iii I iJ 4>l' i ;;i i,. 164 INVASION AND CAPTIJKE OF WASHINGTON. the Secrctaiy of the Navy, a few men being left in caeli barge to destroy tlieni on the appearance of the enemy in force, while the commodore proceeded with the main body of his men to join the army under Gen- eral Winder. In the mean time, Ross, on leaving Nottingham, had taken what is called the Chapel Road to Upper ]\Iarl- borough. This road diverges from the river, and, at a few miles distance from Nottingham, forks, one branch running northward to j\Iarlborough, and the other westward to Washington. At this fork or junc- tion, a movement or manoeuvre took place on Ross's part, which appears to have been a source of great em- barrassment to General W^inder, whose jn-oceedings, during Ross's march from Benedict, we sludl now take a view of. It has been seen that, according to General Arm- strong's statement, on the day that advice was received in W^ashington that the enemy was ascending the Pa- tuxent. General Winder was instructed "to take a po- sition near the enemy," and "on the 22d he was ad- vised to hang on their rear and flank a heavy corps, while he opposed to them another in their front." On the 19th of August, according to M'Clane's statement, published by Armstrong, the latter advised General Winder to 'dissemble as larcfd a force" as possible, and " place it speedily at Nottinghrm, or other point on the Patuxent." In order to appreciate tlie tendency of the course thus advised or eommandiid, it will be necessary to re- cur to the leading principles of the art of war. One of the fundamental maxims of the art is the proverbial PlllNClPLi:« OF STRATEGY. 16;j precept, " Divide and conquer"' — Divide ct imjjera — u maxim which applies in other matters as well as in war, and is older than any theory of strategy. The talent of a great captain, said Frederick, consists in inducing the enemy to divide his forces. Anotiier mil- itary maxim, the crowning principle of all theories of strategy, is, that the oLject of all strategic movements or mana^ivres should he "to operate a combined eftbrt with the greatest possible mass of force upon the de- cisive p lit."' *' AVliat is war ?"' cried Xapoleon. " .V trade of l)ar- barians, the whole art of which consists in being the strongest on a given point!*** It must also be Itorne in mind that there are two kinds of war : tlic one a war of sieges and pitched bat- tles, the other a sort of guerrilla warfare, or war of skir- mishes and "small attacks.*' The latter is the resort chiefly of a belligerent who is too weak to encounter his enemy in a pitched battle. It rerpiires a particu- lar kind of troops, hardy, active, and enterprising ; a subdivision of forces, and "a multitude of command- ers," who must be qualified each to advise himself, to judge of the advantages of time and position, and bo prompt and skilful in availing themselves of them. It is, of course, the kind of war least adapted to newly levied, undisciplined troops, and inexperienced com- manders, habituated only to the routine and comforts of a peaceful life. All the movements of the government prior to the canq)air's artillery, and StuU and 11 I J- f,] Mi:ii :i !, I ■I 170 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASTIINGTON. Davidson's companies, in all al)Out 800 o[ Jio l)est troops at his disposal, to proceed ininicdiateh to Not- tinfj-Jiam to meet the encinv, the rest of the force beiiisr directed to follow and support them. General Winder himself proceeded in advance of the first Lody, accom- panied by his staff and by Colonel ^lonroe, and upon arriving within half a mile of the phiee where, as wc have said, the road from Xotting-ham forks, tliey re- ceived intelligence that the enemy was moving in force toward the junction. They continued on for tiic pur- pose of gaining an observation until they came within view of the enemy's advance, or within three or four Iiundrcd yards of it.* At this time the detachment under Scott and Peter was about two miles distant from the junction, and it being considered impossible for them to reach it before the enemy, General Winder dispatched orders to them to retire, post themselves in the most advantageous position tliey could fmd, and wait for him. In the mean time, the troops under General Smith had arrived within tAvo miles oi' the ad- vance, and the whole American force, then within four or five miles of the enemy, consisted, including Bar- ney's seamen and the marines from the Washington navy-yard, with five pieces of heavy artillery, of about 2500 men. Eoss, on arriving at the junction, turned into the road to the Wood Yard as if to advance upon our troops, and proceeded some distance upon it ; and it must have been at this time that Mr. Monroe addressed the hurried dispatch to the President, advising him that the enemy was in full march for Washington, and * Dr. Catlett's statement. 1 ? RETREAT. 171 )ur it icd Lim lid General Winder retiring before him. Hut Hosh, after lialtiiiLT an hour or more on the road to the Wood Yard, altered the direetion of liis column, and turned into the road to ^Marlborough, thus renewing General Winder's uncertainty as to his purposes. In conse- quence, an order was given for the wliolc force to re- tire, on the same road by wliich tliey had advanced, to a place called tiie Long or Battalion Old Fields, about ei2;ht miles from Washincton. Tiiis movement in advance, theretbre, resulted in notiiiiiLi' but the fatici-ue and discouragement of the troops. It "svas judicious in General Winder to avoid an engaj2:ement, because his force Avas wholly insulli- cient. But that was known before the movement be- gan; and if it was wise to retire, it certainly was un- wise to have advanced. In reference to this retrograde movement Cieneral Wilkinson savs : " This was the lirst occasion which presented for a collision of arms, and ( Jcneral A\'inder was present with the American troops ; but, if a fault was then committed, he sliould not be held responsible, because he was attended by a minister of the cabinet [Mr. ]Mon- roe], an older soldier, by whose advice he was doubt- less influenced : nor is he to be blamed for fallinc: back on the approach of the enemy, because it was not his policy to indulge the l^ritish commander in a general action which he sought ; indeed, that was the last great error of President Madison. But General Win- der should, in my judgment, have ordered his main body, then commanded by General Smitli, of the Dis- trict of Columbia, which was under arms near the Wood Yard readv for combat, to have c:ained the I? •! 'i 172 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. heights on the left of Charles's Creek, and, as soon as the enemy had resinned th(,'ir march and passed Oden's, he should have followed them, and fallen on their rear at the time General 8iuitii engaged their front, or when their centre had passed the Creek ; bat the enemy gave liim a more favorable opportunity by turning to their right soon after they had passed Bishop Claggett's, in order to communicate with the flolillu at ]\lount Cal- vert, on a road so Hanked by hills and ravines that, by a viji'orous attack, their rear micj-ht have l)cen broken and cut up before they could have made front to sup- port It. Pent up in such narrow, dilHcult grounds, and pressed in front and rear, the eflect of CJencral Koss's discipline and numbers would have been impaired, and he must have been crippled before he could have ex- tricated himself, while the iVmerican corps, with the country 0})cn behind them, could have wiMidrawn at discretion, and, altliou2;h the cnemv miu'ht have c;ain- ed U})pcr ^Marlborough, it wouhl have terminated their advance. This is speculation, but, whatever may be its merits, 1 know.thc corps of Scott and I'ctcr pant- ed for action, and they siiouhl have been indulged; in such circumstances, blood judiciously expended excites emulation and inspires courage. "But (}eneral Winder fell back on his main body near the Wood Yard, from whence he retired to en- camp at the Long Old Fields, and, like all retrograde movements in the face of an enemy, this disheartened his men and oflicers.'' In indulging in tliese speculations, General "Wilkin- son does not seem to have recollected tiie anecdote with which, in another part of his book, he satirizes a •** (;i:ni:ral winders policy nisfrssEi). IT'? <•> )0(ly en- ado iK'd speculation of Secretary Armstrong " in his caLiiiet at a thousand miles' distance." '' 1 think,"' said the minister to Eugene, "you might have crossed the riv- er at this point,"' tracing the route on a map with his fiiTT-er. " Yes, my lord, it' your iinger had been a bridge." If Cleneral Winder could have known that the ene- my would turn to the right after passing Bishop Clag- gett's, and that he would then be certain to catch them in a delilc where they could be " pressed in front and rear," and cripi)led, not to say cat to pieces," before they could extricate themselves, it would have been inex- cusable in him not t(j avail himself of the opportuidty. But if, as Ciencral Wilkinson admits, it was not Cien- eral Winder's policy to indulge the British connnand- cr in a general action, it was not his policy to run the risk of being forced into a general action by following the enemy, and still less his policy to divide the small force under his connnand, in the vain hope of being able to make a successful sinudtaneous attack on the cnemv's front and rear. It is very true that an enemy on his mareli may be greatly harassed and eri])pled l)y smaller numbers. But this can be safely attempted oidy when the small- er nmnbers are suitable for the purpose, can be spared, and are not needed for ulterior operations. If (ieneral Winder had known the nunjbers and cfjuipnient of the cncmv, and been furnished, instead of volunteer city ri- flemen, armed with muskets, with three hundred West- ern ritlenuMi, accustomed to busli-tighting, as many well-trained and CAperieneed dragoc^ns, and Peter's ar- tillery, these alone might have enabU'd him, in such a s )«' f /I ttt% -»«M i 174 INVASION AND CAPTUKi: OF "WASHINGTON. country, to drive the British back to their shipping at Benedict. There would probably have been no need of any other army, lint he no more had these means than Prince Eugene had the bridge at the spot pointed, out by the minister. Still, it does not appear that, on this occasion, Gen- eral \\'indcr Avas determined to avoid a collision, or that he retreated from a pursuing enemy. It was nec- essary, in order to give his troops any chance of mak- ing a successful stand, that they sliould retire to a suitable position, and tlicy were not ordered to aban- don that position, and fall back still farther, until it was ascertained that the cncmv was not advancini>: to- ward them, but had taken the road to ]\larlborou'jh. o lioss arrived v.t ^MarlborouL'h about two o'clock in the afternoon of the -2d, and renuiined there until tho same hour the next da} , having, of course, abundant time to rest and refresh his troops, and being perfectly unmolested. Tiiey employed themselves in securing and sending off tobacco and other plunder. On tlio mornini-'* of the 2^5(1 Cockburn crossed from Pin: Point to 3Iarlborou!j;h, to meet and confer with Koss as to farther ojiorations, and they were not long, he says, in ngr(H'ing on the propriety of making an innnediate at- tejiipt on Wasliington. The marines, marine artillery, and scNiuKMi wiM'c l)r()Ught over from I'ig Point, and it was arranged that the marines siiould remain and keej) possession of Marlborongh, whih' the marine artillery and seamen aecompanieil the army. (Jeneral Winder, wlio h;id been aelivelv emploved witli the eaviilrv, near Marlborough, in observation of the enemy, retired, late in the afternoon of the 22d, to 'i DISORDER OF THE CAMP. 175 10 the Long Old Fields, where his troops were encamped. Soon atu-r his arrival, he was iulbnncd that the Pres- ident and heads ot'd('})artments had arrived at a house about a inilu in the rear of t lie camp, and he detached a ca})tain's guard to their quarters, but was himself too much overwhelmed with bu.siness to wait upon tlic President until next morning, lie says: " .Vltcr having waded through the intinitc applica- tions, consultations, and calls necessarily arising from a body of -500 men, not three days from their homes, without organization, or any practical knowledge of service on the part of their otlicers, and being obliged to listen to the ollicious but well-intended intbrmation and advice of tiie crowd, who, at such a time, would be full of both, I lav down to snatch a momcur of rest." (ieneral AVilkinson (juotes from an unnamed oflicor, who pa.^.-ed the night of the 22d at the Old Fields, the iuUowing account of the camp: " The camp was as open all night as a race-field, and the sailors and militia were as noisy as if at a fair; vou miciht hear the countersiiTa iifty vards when a sen- try challenged. 1 nuide U[) :; v mind that if Koss, whose camp I had reconnoitre i in t!ie evening, was a man of enterpri.-c, he ^^ou!d be upon us in the course of the night, and, being detTPibicd ti lie like a troop- er's horse, I slept with n>} shoes on."' The desperate frame of mind which would induce a man to sleep with his shoes on is not liivoiable to cool retlectioii ; but even Ciencral A\'ilkinson, writing coolly in iiis closet, alter rel'erring to the "■extraordinary m*'.- langc" encamped at the Old Fields, says that, " with this disorganized body, (^icneral AVindcr rashly kept 1 Iflf '.>» r 17G INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. lii.s position during the niglit, within eiglit miles of 4000 or 5000 veteran troops, who oiiglit to have niarch- ccl upon and routed him.*' Yet CJcncral Wilkinson would have had CJencral AVinder attack the same body of veteran troops with little more than halt' the num- ber of men which he had at the C)ld Fields. (Icucral Winder, it seems, was not adventurous cnougli hi the morning, and too rash at night, «''.nd vice vernd with CJencral ]{oss. A military critic is the Iiardest of all critics to satisfy. Perhaps (Jeucral Winder, with pa- trols out in every direction; and the enemy with none, cntertaincd by a false alarm from a sentinel, were formed in order of battle, and when dismissed, were ordered to hold themselves ready for their posts at a moment's warning. This was the second successive night that they had l^een needlessly deprived of their rest. Shortly after daybreak orders were jriven to strike the tents, load the bafrii'ajje-wai;- ons, and have all in readiness to move hi llie course of an hour. The troops were then got under ar?ns, and Avere reviewed by llie J^resident and suite. At I) o'clock A. ]M., it being ascertained that the enemy was still stationary, and gave no indications of a move in any direction from Alarlborougii, (icneral Winder formed the resolution to concentrate near ^larl- borough all the troops vvithin his r(>aeh. lie therefore sent ordrrs to ( Jeneral Stansliury, who, as we have seen, had arrived a* Uladcnsburg the iiight before, to march I f MOVEMENTS OF THE TUoOPS. 177 his Lriii'aclc, logcther \villi the troops under Licutcn- anl-coloiiel Stcrctt, if iIkt luul joined Jiiin, slowly toward .Marlborough, aud take a position in the road at a point seven miles from that plaec and four from the Old Fields. The same direetion was to he given to the troops arriving i'roni Annapolis under Licuten- ant-eolonel Beall, so soon as he eould be conmuini- eated with. A detaehnicnt Irom (ienenil Smith's Itriir- o ade, under ]\Iajor Peter, eomposcd of the same coni})a- nies as the detaehment of the preeeding day, was ordered to move in the direction of ^Mavlborough, re- connoitre the enemy, approach him as near as possi- ble without running too much risk, and annoy him whether lie should be stationary or in motion. General Winder himself, about noon, with a troop of LaNal's ca\alry, proceeded toward JUadensburg for the purpose of having an interview with Stansbury, but Avhen within four or tivc miles from that place, which is about ten miles from the Old Fields, was overtaken by ^lajor MeKenncy, with intelligenec that Major I'cter had skirmished with the enemv, who had driven him back, and Avas then halted within three miles of the C)ld Fields; that CJeneral Suiiih had, agreeably to orders, sent oft' the baggaae across the Eastern l>ranch, and his troops, togetlier with Com- modore Barney's men, were drawn up ready to receive the enemy, should he make an attack. Upon receiving this intelligence, (icneral Winder sent orders to General Stansbury to I'all back, take the best position he could with Sterett in front of Bhi- densburg, resist as long as possible if attacked, and, if driven from his position, to retreat toward the city. IT 2 'f , i n f i-il' j. if H i 1 1 H j 1 t 178 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. lie then retraced his steps to tlic Old Fields, wliicli he reached about 5 P.M., and, as he says, found Smith and Barney judiciously posted, awaiting the enemy. They continued in this position till near sundown, when it was determined to retire across the Eastern Branch Bridge. The reasons for this move are thus stated by General Winder : " 31y reason for not remaining at the Old Fields during the night was, that, if an attack should be made in the night, our own superiority, which lay in artil- lery, was lost, and the inexperience of the troops would subject them to certain, infallible, and irremediable disorder, and probably destruction, and theicby occa- sion the loss of a full half of the force which I could hope to oppose, under more favorable circumstances, to the enemy. "The reasons for retiring by the Eastern Branch bridge were the absolute security it gave to that pass, the greater facility of joining (iencral Young and aid- ing in the protection of Fort AVashington, the greater facility of pursuing the enemy should he recede and proceed to Annapolis, and the certainty that 1 could draw General Stansbury and Lieutenant-colonel Ster- ctt to me if the enemy advanced too rapidly for me to advance, and unite to support them." It a]it)ears that this retrograde movement, however judiciously resolved on, was somewhat precipitately executed. My. Jr' n J w, a respectable citizen of Washington, says, lu his statcmevt to the committee, "Although our ;i:,irch in the retreat was extremely rapid, yet orders were occasionally given to the ca])- tains of companies to hurry on their men. The march, ! . HARDSHIPS. 170 therefore, literally became a run of eight miles ; and the proprietv of this rapid movement, which unnecessarily fatigued and dispirited the men, nu\y be tested by tlic fact that the main body of tiie enemy bivouacked that niirht on the 3Ielwood estate, more than three miles distant from the ground we had left." General tSmith says that the troops, "much wea- ried and exhausted, encamped late at night'' witlnn the city and continues : " Thus t(M'niinated the four days of service of the troops of this District preceding tlie afl'air at IMadens- burg. Tlioy had been under arms, with but little in- termission, the whole of the time, botli niglit and day; had traveled, during their different marches in advance and retreat, a considerable tract of country, exposed to the burning heat of a sultry sun by day, and many of them to the cold dews of the night, uncovered. They had, in this period, drawn but two rations, the requisition therefor, in the first instance, being but partially complied with, and it being afterward al- most impossible to procure the means of transporta- tion, the wagons em])loyed by our quarter-master for that purpose being constantly impressed by the gov- ernment agents for the purpose of removing tiic pub- lic records, when the enemy's approach was known, and some of them thus seized while proceeding to take in provisions for the nriny. *' Those hardships and ])r' vat ions could not but bo severely distressing to men, tiic greater part of whom possessed and enjoyed at lionie the means of comfort- able living, and from their usual habits and pursuits in life but ill qualified to endure them. They, how- < i i'f \iy> i" t »' !; I l< i. I I 180 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. ever, submitted without murmuring, evincing by their patience, their zeal, and tlie promptitude with wliich they obeyed every order, a magnanimity highly hon- orable to their character. Great as was their merit in this respect, it was no less so in the spirit mani- fested whenever an order was given to march to meet tlic foe; and at the 'Long Old Fields,' where his at- tack was momently expected in overwhelming force, they displayed, in presence of many spectators, al- though scarce any of them had ever been in action, a firnmess, a resolution, and an intrepidity which, what- ever might have been the result, did honor to their country." The troops under General Stansbury, at Bladens- burg, on the night of the 23d and morning of the 24th, were in no better condition than those who had retired from the Old Fields. Stansbury represents them as "worn down with hunger and fatigue." They were under arms the whole night, with the exception of aboiit an hour, their only provision salt beef of an in- ferior (piality, and old and nmsty flour, and no time to cook that. Laval^ represents his cavalry as having been on con- stant duty, in reconnoitring, patrolling, and escorting, from the afternoon of the 21st until 11 at night of the 23d, when they reached the Eastern Branch Bridge, *' both men and horses hunfirv and harassed with fa- tigue," and remained in that condition until 10 o'clock the next morning. Tlicy then succeeded in procuring a stack of hay, and the men were in the act of fetch- ing it on their heads to feed their famished horses, * StHtonient to the comniittco. I K I ,,.1 i CONDITION OF INVADING TROOrS. 181 i wlien the trumpet sounded, and they were compelled to drop it and mount, a number of the horses being unable to proceed. Such was the sovry Ji nale of the strategic move- ments of the four days preceding the battle of Bladens- burg, the useful results being about the same as those of the exploit of the King of France, who, '•with twenty tliousand men, Marched up a lull, and tlu'ii niarched down aifain." The British writers, in their account of this cam- paign, enormously exaggerate the diliiculties and dan- gers which they encountered, in order, of com-se, to en- hance the glory of their achievement. But, up to the moment of the battle, they specify no dangers or difficul- ties, and, as we have seen, they could have encounter- ed none. They complain of the exhausting eftects of the intense heat upon men who had been enervated by long confinement on shipboard. There was, no doubt, some truth in this ; but, on the other hand, the release from such confinement tended to refresh and strength- en them, notwithstanding temporary suflering, and it is so stated by one of their writers.* He says that, to the army, " the prospect of a few days' sojourn upon their own clement was in the highest degree animat- ing and delightful,*' and he represents the men, after landing at Benedict, some ''lying at full Icn-^th upon the grass, basking in the beams of a sultry sun, and apparently made ha})py by the very feeling of the green sod under them. Others were running and leaping about, giving exercise to the limbs which had so long been cramped and confined on board ship." * Tlu> Suliidteni in Amorica. f ■<■ I ^i '^' V/i j ^ f h :^" H 182 INVASION AND CAPTl'RE OF WASHlA'GTaN. After tlie night spent at ^larl borough, he says," Fresh, and in excellent spirits, we rose next morning, and, having stood the usual time with our men, bt'L an to consider how we should most profitably and agreeably spend the day." They were abundantly suppl; :d with provisions. He says, " The attacks wliicli they from time to time made upon farm-}ards and pig-styes were, to a certain degree at least, allowable enough. It would have been unreasonable to expect tha! hungry soldiers, in an enemy's country, would sit down to di- gest their hunger, while flocks of poultry and herds of swine wore within their reach. And then,"" he con- tinues, "with respect to tobacco, that principal delica- cy of soldiers u])on active service, there was no reason- able cause for scarcity or complaint. .... To sum up all, the quarter-master arriving soon after the halt with stores of bread and rum, an additional allowance of both was served out, as well to the men as to the of- icers. Accordin'.!; to their own account, they rested all night bet\\e<"n Benedict and Nottingham, all night at Not- tingham, all night at Marlborough, and all night at their bivouac near the Long Old Fields, with nothing to disturb their repose or self-complacency at cither place ; so that, on the morning of the 24th, they ought to have been, and no doubt were, fresh, alert, and buoy- ant in spirit, while o'lr troops were just the reverse. Such were the ridiculous and mischievous results of the attempt to apply abstract, theoretic principles of warfiire, without considering the circumstances under which they were to be applied, and of attempting to guard half a dozen avenues of approach with a force REFLECTIONS. 183 » insufficient to guard one. Why not have made a choice of evils, it' necessary, and selected sonic one jjoint which, under all the circumstances, might prom- ise the most advantages, if they were but few, concen- trated the troojjs upon that, and, instead of harassing them with fruitless forced marches and countermarch- es, husbanded their strength, attended to their wants, and employed every moment to improve their eflicien- cy? Surely some posi' '>n miglit have been found within so limited a the-Hj-e of operations which the en- cmv, whatever his dcsii ■. would have been afraid to leave gathering streni;,.. on his rear or flanks, and which he would have been compelled to attack under disadvantages, or abandon his object. IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) // '%?.^ ^ "^^ ^°'m.'^ ^ *M. 1.0 !?:■ I.I 1.25 M lU Hi 1^ S Hi £: MS, 20 U III 1.6 Photographic Sciences Corporation 33 WEST MAIN STREET WIBSTBR.N.Y. MSSO (71«) 873-4303 f Commodore Tingey *s presence I am not certain. The conversation turned upon the route by which it was tliouglit most likely tlio enemy would make his approacli. It was interrupted by drasi'oons, who had been on scouts, coming in every few minutes with their reports. The preponderance of opinion, at i i m I'll ' I fli !!' 198 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. this period, I took to be, that he would he most likely to move ill a direction toward the Potomac, with a view to possess himselt' of Fort Warburtoii [Fort AVashing- ton] in the iirst instance. By this course he would secure the passage of his ships, then supposed to be in the river below, and thus their ulterior co-operation, whetlier in the attack or retreat of his land troops. This way of thinking induced, as I supposed, General Winder to retain a large portion of his force in the iieighborliood of the Eastern Branch Bridge, in prefer- ence to moving it on, unfhjr the existing state of intel- ligence, toward Bhidcnsburg. In anticipation of suc- cess to tlie enemy's attempts by water or land, or botli, some conversation was had as to the proper precau- tions for blowing up, or otherwise rendering useless, the vessels and public property at tlie navy-yard. After the la})se of probably an hour from tlie time I reached head-quarters, an express arrived from CJcner- al Stansbury, commanding the Baltimore troops at Bladcnsburg, rendering it at length certain that the British army was advancing in that direction. Gen- eral AVindcr immediately put his troops in motion, and marched off with them for Bladcnsburg. "When he had left the house, the Secretarv of War, in company with the Secretary of the Treasury, ar- rived there. The President mentioned to the former the information which lind just been received, at the Fame time asking him whether, as it was probable a battle would soon be broutiht on, he had any advice or plan to offer upon the occasion. lie replied that he had not. lie added that, as it was to be between regulars and militia, the latter would be beaten. All ■mr-t THE SECRETARY HAS NO PLAN. 199 M^ who were in the house then came out, the Secretary of War getting on his horse to go to Blaclenshurg." It appears, therefore, that General Armsti'ong went, or rather was carried, to Bhidensburg for the purpose of making exertions to falsify his own prediction as to the result. He had to choose between endeavorino: to save his reputation as n military man and liis credit as a prophet, and the latter was certainly the easier task of the two. In fact, at this critical moment, this *' disciple of Jomini,'' as General AVilkinson terms him, hitherto so full of strategic lore and replete with the finest military maxims, and who could, in theory or on paper, have won a battle against almost any odds, was cither like tlie bird that could sing and would not sing, or else, like some of Don Quixote's models of chivalry, had fallen into the power of a malignant en- chanter, and been suddenly bereft of all Iiis military knowledge and resources. lie had not *' any advice or plan to oiler." The oracle was dumb. A(;cording to the following account, which General AVilkinson says was communicated to him by "an officer of character, rank, and intelligence," Avho was present at CJcneral Winder's head-rpiartcrs on the morning of the 24th, the Secretary of War, at this juncture, so far from being in a condition to instruct others, was sorely in need of instruction himself. The narrator says : "During tlie morning of the 24t]i I was repeatedly in the tent of General Winder, near the lower bridge on the Eastern ^b-anch, where I found the President, the Secretaries of AVar and of the Navy, and the At- tornev-creneral assembled, to deliberate on the state of Hi " I 'Si •) .1 ' 2()0 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. tilings and aid the general with their counsel. Of this I Avas ignorant at the time; and ohserving no privacy in their deliberations, the interest I took in the public welfare promptetl me to obtrude some of my own ideas, more especially as a palpably erroneous opinion ap- peared to prevail that the enemy would approach by that bridge, and that the troops ought therefore to be detained where they were to defend it. I fclt anxious they should move to Bladensburg early, and unite with the militia which had arrived from Baltimore, because it would require a great deal of time to post the men advantageously, and to communicate the orders and in- structions how to act, according to the various chances and events of battle. It seemed mere folly to expect tlie enemy l)y the way of the bridge, where a dozen men, with half an hour's notice, by destroying it, might arrest tlieir progre,-?s. (General Armstrong suggested they might lay a bridge of pontoons ; I answered, it was impossible; to which he replied, with a sneer, that tiic word impossible was not to be found in tlie mili- tary vocabulary. TJic mere belief that an army, cer- tainly short of 7 or 8000 men, destitute, as we knew them to be, of horses to transport their artillery and baggage, could, notwithstanding, contrive to carry an equipage of pontoons sufficient for laying a bridge across a river nearly half a mile wide, demonstrated that General Armstrong's knowledge of pontoon bridg- es extended not much beyond the name. "The conversation at (Jeneral AVinder's quarters during the morning was rather desultory ; first one suggestion was made and commented on, and then an- other; no idea seemed to bo entertained that it was *-< THE SECRETAKY S ARGUMENTS. 201 *!» necessary to come Instantly to a decision how we should act, and to set immediately about it. When I mentioned the certai.ity of the enemy approaching by the route of Bladensburg in preference to the bridge, and the expediency of taking post there without fur- ther delay, I observed my opinion to produce some etfect on the mind of the President ; by the others it was not mucli regarded." There seems to be no lack of concurrent evidence to show that General Armstrong \\, <, notwithstanding his affectation of delicacy, not a very agreeable person to hold a discussion with, his arsenal of arguments con- sisting in too great part of oaths, sneers, and sardonic smiles. Any man w'ith the ordinary punctilio of a gentleman, who was subject to the authority of a su- perior so opinionated, rude, and disdainful, would nat- urally, independently of the dictates of military subor- dination, defer a collision of opinion with him as long as practicable, and more particularly as his assumption of military science and experience was hitherto little, if at all questioned. The officer whose statement we have just given was, perhaps, like other men who are in advance of their age and generation, too wise for the precise period of time when his wisdom was exhibited. His opinions as to the improbability of the enemy's being provided with pontoons, or attempting the passage of the East- ern Branch Bridge, showed good conmion sense as well as military tact. But probably he was not the only intelligent person then present at the general's head- quarters ; and if, as Mr. Rush states, the preponder- ant o})inion there was that the enemy would move in 12 P a*' I I 202 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. the first instance toward Fort "Washington, there must have been reasonable ground for the opinion, and there- fore for General Winder's not yet changing his posi- tion. Among other reasons which may have led to the preponderant opinion were the very natural inier- ence that the enemy's land and naval forces were in- tended to co-operate with each other, the fact that his army had not taken the direct route from JMarlborough to Bladensburg, and the fact that night signals by rockets had been exchanged between the army and the ships. So soon as it was ascertained that tlie enemy was on the route to Bladensburg, there ceased to be any delay at the bridge. But the grand cabinet council at the bridge, not- withstanding the admission of amateurs to its deliber- ations, proved, upon the whole, about as decided a fail- ure as any similar council since the days of the Abder- ites. At the close of it there was still as nnicli con- sternation and perplexity as if Ross had that morning dropped suddenly with his army from the clouds, in- stead of having been, as we are assured, watched at every step of his leisurely progress for four days. Ross, as we have seen, bivouacked on the night of the 23d at a place called j\Iclwood, about three miles from the Old Fields, and some ten or twelve miles from Washington. lie appears to have been astir very early on the morning of the 24th, for at four o'clock that morning* he passed the Old Fields. An advance of two miles farther brought him to a fork of the road, one branch of which runs northward thence to Bla- densburg, distant about ten miles, and the other west- * fJi'iu'i'iil Wilkin on. vol.!.. p. 775, I OUli TKOOPS ASSEMBLE AT BLADENSBURG. 203 (* ward to the Eastern Branch Bridge, distant seven or eight miles. Here he practiced the same ruse as at tlie fork of the road from Nottingham to Upper ]Marl- borough. He took the road leading to the Eastern Branch Bridge, and continued in it until his last col- umn had G;ot into it,''" then suddenly reversed his front and marched rapidly to Bladensburg. Intelliirence of this last movement was not received by General Winder until 10 A.M. or after, and he then ordered General Smith, with the whole of the troops under his command, to proceed to Bladensburg, and Commodore Barney, with the seamen and marines, was soon afterward ordered to proceed to the same place with all dispatch. ]Mr. jMonroc, who was at General Winder's quarters with the President when the inielligence was recei\ed that the enemy was on his way to Bladensburg, oftcred his services to proceed to that place and join General Stansbury, and both the President and General AVindcr expressing a wish that he would do so, he "lost not a moment in complying with their desiro,*' and between 11 and 12 o'clock joined CJeneral Stansbury, who had, in obedience to the reiterated order of General Winder, moved his troops back to the vicinity of Bladensburg. Mr. ]Monroe was soon followed by General Winder, then by the Secretary of War, and then by the Pres- ident and Attorney-general. When ]\Ir. ^lonroe arrived on the field, the enemy was about three miles distant from Bladensburg. jMr. llush states that, before the President and himself "could roach the town, the forces of the enemy had possession of it." * Sec, letter of Mr. liusli, close of chap. xiv. 204 INVASION AND CAFrURE OF WASHINGTON. The object of Mr. Monroe in joining General Stans- bury — that of assisting him to post his troops to the best advantage — does not seem to have been made known to that officer, who expresses no gratitude for any services rendered to him by ]\Ir. JMonroe on the occasion, but, as we shall sec, rather intimates that somebody, he does not know who, disarranged his order of battle without consulting him. This, if true, was doing him no trifling wrong ; for it is said by a military writer that "orders of battle are the sublime of war, and it is in their application that the talents and gen- ius of the general shine pre-eminent." r Ml } TOPOUKAl'IlY. 205 t CHAPTER XL The Order of Battle. The village of Bladensburg is about six miles north- east of Washington, from which city it is approached by a good turnpike-road, formerly the mail-road to Baltimore. North of this road is another old road, which, before the City of Washington was founded, was the route from Georgetown to Blopdcnsburg. These roads meet, at an angle of about forty-five degrees, some sixty or eighty yards from the river at Bladens- burg. From the junction the turnpike-road continues on to the river, not abutting, however, immediately at the bridge, but curving for a short distance to the south and east along the margin of the stream, and following a sort of causeway, which, at the time we speak of, was bordered on the west side by thickets o+' ^^..lall trees and bushes, and which led to the bridge. The bridge is somewhat less than thirty yards in length, and about four in breadth, and the stream, a few rods above or north of the bridge, is every where fordable. General Stansbury's troops, after his countermarch to Bladensburg, occupied the triangular field formed by the roads which we have mentioned, near their junction. In this field, on the Georgetown road, and about a hundred and fifty yards from the junction of the roads, there stood and still stands a large wooden barn or tobacco-house, and between the barn and the Washington turnpike there was and is an orchard, Ill -1 i '1- : "1 '} 1 ' , 1 1 ., ! g 206 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. wliicli commences at the barn and extends more than half way across the iicld, or about a hundred and twenty or thirty yards toward the turnpike. In front of the barn, looking toward the river, the ground has a gentle descent, and upon the brow of the declivity, near the Georgetown road, and some thirty or forty yards in advance of the barn, had been hastily con- stmcted a barbette battery of earthwork, intended for heavy ordnance. This battery was distant about three hundred and fifty yards from the bridge at Bladens- burg, nearly west of it, and commanded it by an ob- lique and not enfilading fire. In the battery were stationed the two companies of volunteer artillery from the city of Baltimore, com- manded by Captains Myer and Magruder, mustering together about one hundred and fifty men, with six six-pounders. The parapet being too high for these guns, and there being no time now to reduce it, the artillerymen were employed, with such tools as they could get, in cutting embrasures and masking them with brushwood, The battalion of riflemen, com- manded by Major Pinkney, was placed on the right of the battery, the men being distributed in such po- sitions among the bushes on the low ground, near the junction of the roads, as might best enable them to annoy the enemy on his approach, sliould he suc- ceed in crossing the bridge or fording the stream. Two companies of Stansbury's militiii, commanded by Captains Ducker and Gorsuch, acting as riflemen, but principally armed with muskets, were stationed in the rear of tlie left of the battery, near the barn, and pro- tected by it, to assist in defending any approach of tlie ciicmv bv tltc GeoTfretown rond. ORDEll OF BATTLE. 207 The 5th rogimcnt of Baltimore volunteers, com- manded by Lieutenant-colonel Sterett, had heen halted about iifty yards in the rear of the position now occu- pied by Major Pinkney's riflemen, and General Stans- bury says that it wa? his intention to have formed it with its left resting on the right of Pinkney's battal- ion and fronting the road, along ^vhich ran a fence; while Colonels Ra^-an and Schutz's rc2:iments were to be drawn up in echelon, their right resting on tlie left of Duckcr and Gorsuch's companies, and connnanding any approach by the Georgetown road. By this pro- posed disposition of Sterett's regiment? the troops from the city of Baltimore would have been stationed so as to support and give conlidence to each other; and as tliey were well disciplined and reliable troops, and some of them were necessarily to encounter tlie first shock of the contest, Stansbury's intended order was not the worst that could have been adopted, and at least had the merit of placing all parts of his lines within supporting distance of each other. But he states that, after the enemy came in sight, while he was engaged in giving some directions to the artillery, Schutz and Ragan's regiments were moved from where he had stationed them, marched up the rising ground in the rear of the orchard, and formed in order of battle about 500 yards, or more than a quar- ter of a mile, in the rear of the artillery and riflemen, their right, Schutz's regiment, resting on the Wash- ington turnpike. On riding up the hill to ascertain who had ordered this movement, he was informed that General Winder was on the ground. lie then imme- diately rode to the spot where General Winder was, tv: 'A ,i* H' 208 INVASION AND CAPTl'EE OF WASHINGTON. found him engaged in reconnoitring the enemy, and while conversing with him lie discovered that the 5th regiment was also moved from its position, marched up the hill, and formed on the left of the two other regiments, the whole being so placed that their situa- tion and numbers could be clearly seen by the enemy, within reach of his rockets, without any cover, and at such a distance from the artillery and riflemen as to be able to give the latter no support, leaving them to contend with the whole British force. " Whose plan this was," he says, " I know not ; it was not mine, nor did it meet with my approbation ; but, finding a superior officer on the ground, I concluded he had or- dered it, consequently did not interfere." ]\Iajor Pinkney, in his statement to the committee, also complains of this alteration, or "new order of battle,"' as he terms it. " The 5th regiment," he says, *' had now, to the great disparagement of my compa- nies and of the artillery, been made to retire to a hill several hundred yards in our rear, but visible, never- theless, to the enemy, where it could do little more than display its gallantry." Mr. i\Ionroe states that the removal of the 5tli Balti- more regiment, " at a late period," from the rear of the battery to the left of the line, was "a measure taken with reluctance and in haste ;" and after finish- ing his account of the final disposition of Stansbury's troops in order of battle, he says, " after General Stansbury had made this disposition," General Win- der arrived on the ground, and, " on taking a view of the order which had been formed, he approved of it. This was the more satisfactory, because it had then ORDER OF BATTLE. 209 ^\ Ijccomc impossible to make any essential change. *' This leaves it to be interretl tliat the whole arrange- ment was matle by General Stansbmy, or at least had his concurrence. General Armstrong, in his "Notices," adverts to this unlucky arrangement and its effects on the prog- ress and issue of the combat, and fc>ays that it is only in Lieutenant-colonel Sterctt's report that "we are made acquainted with this busy and blundering tac- tician, whom Stansbury does not know and whom Pink- ney would not name ;" and he then quotes Sterett's statement that " the 5t]i regiment was formed under the direction of Colonel Monroe on the left and in line with Stansbury's brigade." But he omits any refer- ence to the subsequent part of Lieutenant-colonel Ster- ett's statement, in which he says, " I ought to notice that the first line formed on the battle-ground was changed under the direction of Colonel ]Monroe. On this occasion he observed to me, '-AltJtourjh you see I am active^ you loill pleam hear in muid that this is not my plan,'' or words to this effect." There are discrepancies in these statements which it is impossible now to reconcile, and which are the more singular because the statements were prepared for the information of a committee of Congress but a fevr weeks after the battle. Lieutenant-colonel Sterett could hardly have dreamed or imagined the emphaf"j declaration made to him by Mr. Monroe at the X\mo. of changing the position of the 5th regiment ; ]\Ir. }.Ion- roe himself states that the change was made with re- luctance, yet he directed it, and docs not say that it had been suggested to him by any one else. i 1.1 t n f 4\' IP 210 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. AYe have dwelt particularly upon this matter, not only to ilJustrate the confusion existing at the time of forming the order of battle, owing to the near vicinity of the enemy and the number of persons exercising independent authority, but in justice to the troops of Stausbury's line, the only troops who can be said to have fled. For although it is true, as General Win- der states in his narrative, that "no advantage of po- sition is proof against groundless panic, and a total want of discipline, skill, and experience,'" still, ad- vantage of position must help in some degree to pre- vent a panic ; and if the troops arc wanting in skill, discipline, and experience, it is the more important to profit as nnich as possible by all advantages of position. [t was hardly reasonable to expect that raw militia- men would remain firm in the position in which Stans- bury's troops were placed, considering the force which they believed to be advancing against them, and the alarm created by the rockets, a species of weapon whol- ly unknown to them, and apparently of the most for- midable description. The orchard would have served as a cover to them, and, if permitted to remain in it, they might have been encouraged by the shelter which it afforded, by the steadiness 'which the troops in their front displayed under the advance of the enemy, and even by the excitement attending an opportunity of iunnediate action. General AVinder himself, it a})pears, had no time to remedy, and hardly to observe, any defects in the ar- rangement of Stansbury's troops, lie says that upon his arrival on the field he rode U}) to the battery, and continno?^ : >i ORDER OF BATTLE. 211 >•« "Upon iiiquiiy, I learned that General Stansbiny •was on a rising groniul npon the left of his line. I rotlc immediately tiiitlier, and found him and Colonel Monroe together. The latter gentleman informed me tJiat he had been aiding Cieneral Stansbiny to post his command, and wished mc to proceed to examine it with them, to sec how far I approved of it. Wc were just proceeding with this view, when some person rode up and stated that news had just been received of a sig- nal victory obtained by General Izard over the enemy, in Avhich one thousand of tiie enemy. Avcre slain and many prisoners taken. I ordered the news to be im- mediately eonnnunicated to the troops, for the purj)Osc of giving additional impulse to their sjiirits and cour- age. The column of the enemy at this moment ap- peared in view, about a mile distant, moving u]) the Eastern Branch, parallel to our position. From the left, where I was, I perceived that, if the position of the advanced artillery were forced, two or three pieces ujion the left of Stansbury would be necessary to scour an orchard wliieh lay between his line and his artille- ry, and for another rifle company to increase the sup- port of this artillery. These were promptly sent for- ward by General Smith and posted as hastily as pos- sible, and it was barely accomplished before I was obliged to give orders to the advanced artillery to open upon the enemy, who was descending the street toward the bridge. All further examination or movement was now im])ossil)le." '^riie artillery which (Jcneral AVindd* directed to be placed on the left of Stansbury's line was a part of Captain Ihircli's volunteer artillery from the City of ^' r i '«< 212 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. Wasliiiigton, with three six-pounders. The addition- al rifle company Lroiight np to support tlie Ijahiniorc artillery was Captain Doughty's company, called rifle- men, but armed with muskets. General Winder also directed one of jMajor Pinkney's rifle companies to he withdrawn from the right of thchattery and placed on the left of it. Two pieces of Bureli's artillery, with a part of his comjjany, were placed on the main road, near the riglit of Stan.sbury's line. And ]\Iajor Pinkney states that, at his instance, a militia company, armed with mus- kets, hut acting as riflemen, was placed on his riglit, near tlie main road, under cover of some Lushes and a fence. By a mistake, which he afterward jiublicly acknowledged, he represents this company as having been connnanded by Captain Doughty. This completes the arrangement of what has been called tiie first line, composed jn'incipally of the troops from the city of Baltimore and its vicinity. The cavahy, whose history we may as well dispose of at once, seem to have been considered as a part of the first line. ]\Ir. ]\Ionroc states that they " were placed to tlie left, somewhat in the rear of the line." Xo use was attempted to be made of them during the action. Th(>y were under separate and independent conunanders, and amounted altoa'ctlier to about 1580. The regular portion of them, under IJeutenant-eolonel Laval, a Frenchman and an oflicer of some experience, were less disciplined and efiieient than the volunteers. They were unabh^ to make a cliarge, the men, from fa- tigue and hunger, hardly able to sit tiieir horses, or the horses to move; and tluy were routed, according to '» ! ORDER OF iJATlLK. 213 Laval's account, not by the onciii}', but by our own troops, "crushed clown, horses and all,'' hi the tumult of the flight, one artillery company bursting through a crate and drivino- ri^'ht through them. The second line was composed, with the exception of the body of ^Maryland militia under the connnand of Colonel Bcall, of the troops -which CJcnoral Winder had with him at the Battalion Old Fields, and which had been hurriedly marched from the Eastern Branch Bridge between 11 and 12 o'clock in the mornina* of the battle. They had barely time, on arriving on the ground, to make a hasty selection of position. Connnodore Barney's men and the marines were halted on the turnpike about a mile Iron, the stream at Bladensburg. The two eighteen-poiuiders were planted in the road, forming the left of his line, and the three twelve-pounders immediately on the right of them, a portion of his seamen acting as artillerists, and the rest, with the marines, supporting them as infant- ry. In front of his position the road descends to a ravine, crossed by a small bridge about oOO yards dis- tant. North of the brid t t \ I ' ! THE ATTACK. 991 M *rf I. CHAPTER XII. The Battle. We shall not invoke cither the muse of History or the shade of Cervantes to assist us in cleseribing the battle of Bladensburg, but restrict ourselves, saving an occasional comment, to the prosaic statements of those M'ho shared in the fatigues and dangers of the day. As the eminent civilian, orator, senator, and diplo- mat, the lion. A\' illiam Pinkney, was the superior of- ficer of the advanced troops, and as he possessed great intelligence as well as cool bravery, and his station on the field was on an eminence where, he says, there was notliing to interrupt his view of the advancing enemy, we shall adopt his account of the commencement of the action. He says : '•The enemy, having reached Bladen sburg, descend- ed the hill, about 12 o'clock, in a very fine style, and soon showed his intention to force his way by the bridge. Assisted by some discliarges of rockets (which were afterward industriously continued), he made an effort to throw across the bridge a strong body of in- fantry, but he was driven back at the very commence- ment of it, with evident loss, by the artillery in the battery, which principally acted upon the street or road near the bridge, and he literally disappeared behind the houses. Tiie effort was not inunediately repeated, but the artillery continued to fire with a view, as it I f f I ( ■ \l 1 l> If 222 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. seemed, to interrupt the discharge of rockets, as in some degree it did, and otherwise to check the enemy's operations. "After a long pause, during wliich I conjectured (er- roneously, as I have since been told) that the enemy, less confident than before of the passage of the bridge, detached a corps of some strength to make its way by the ford in the old Baltimore road, a second attempt was made to cross the bridge, with increased numbers and greater celerity of movement. This, too, was en- countered by the artillery in the battery, but not with its former success, although it was served with great spirit, and. commanded by officers of acknowledged skill and courage. In consequence, a large column of the enemy, which was every moment re-enforced, either by the way of the bridge or by the ford immediately above it, was able to form on the Washington side, and to menace the battery and the inadequate force by which it was to be supported. While the enemy was yet at a distance, the company on our right (commanded by Captain Doughty) discharged their pieces and fled, al- though he appeared to do all in his power to restrain them, as I myself did." As Mr. Pinkney here shows a disposition to become personal in his remarks, and to speak ill of liis neigh- bors, we shall take leave of him. The company to which he refers as having been so eminently prompt in its movements was not commanded by Captain Doughty, as JMr. Pinkney afterward acknowledged in a communication to the National Intelliirencer, drawn out by a letter from Captain Doughty, backed by one from Walter Jones, Esq., of Washington. Captain I . it i THE ATTACK. 223 *6^» Doughty, as wc have stated, was in a different part of the Held, and did great service. ^,Vo have been unable, after much inquiry, to ascertain what compa- ny it was that was so eager to deliver its volley, fulfill its mission, and depart. "We were at first somewhat at a loss to understand ]\lr. Pinkncy's meaning in saying that the enemy ''^lit- erally disappeared behind the houses." There can not be much difference in an optical point of view be- tween a literal and an apparent disappearance ; and il" a thing is not to be seen, it is of little importance which species of invisibility it may lay claim to, liter- al or figurative. But the author of the " Subaltern in America," who states that he was with the advanced guard of the British on their approach to Bladensburg, thus explains the phenomenon of the " literal" disap- pearance of their troops : " The very first shot cost us three men — one killed, and the other two dreadfully wounded, and the second would have been, in all probability, not less fatal, had we not very wisely avoided it. AVe inclined at once to the right and left of the road, and, winding round the houses, made our way witliout any further loss as fur as tlie last range, when we were commanded to lie down and wait for the column. " In the mean while, the main body, being informed how matters stood \i. c, that Bladensburg was not oc- cupied by the American troops], resumed its march and approached the town. It was saluted, as we had been saluted, by a heavy and well-directed cannonade ; but, being warned by some of our people where the danger lay, it so tnr avoided it as to close up its ranks. Hi t \ J I'sr 224 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. I Ml and cfTcct all the arrangements necessary for the as- sault under cover of the green mound." The " 2;recn mound" referred to is Lowndes' Hill, wlichis seen on the right of BladensLurgin approach- ing the village hy the turnpike from Washington, and the literal disappearance and " long pause" of which Mr. Pinkney speaks were occasioned by the British troops taking refuge bcliind Lowndes' Hill and the houses of the village until they liad made their final arrangements for the assault and completed their toilet. General AVinder's position also gave him an unin- terrupted view of the Held of hat tie ; and as he must have Leen anxiously interested in the result, we nat- urally look witli curiosity to his account of what pass- ed. He says : " The lire of our ad^'anced artillery occasioned the enemy, who were advancing, and who were light troops, to leave the street, and they crept down under the cov- er of houses and trees in loose order, so as not to ex- pose them to risk iVom the shot. It was tliereforc only occasionally that an object presented at which the artillery could tire. " In this sort of suspension the enemy began to throw his rockets, and his light troops began to accu- mulate down in the lower parts of tlie town and near tlie bridge, but principally covered from view by tlie houses. Their ligiit troops, liowevrr, soon began to issue out and press across the creek, whicli was every where fordable, and in most cases lined witli bushes or trees, which were sufllcient, however, to conceal the movements of liglit troops who act in the manner of theirs, singly. Tlie advanced riflemen now began to i THE FIRST LINE BROKEN. 225 fire, and continued it for half a dozen rounds, wlien I observed them to run back to the skirts of the orchard on tlic left, where they became visible, tlie boughs of the orchard-trees concealing their original position, as also that of the artillery, from view. A retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original position to- ward the left brought them in view on the edge of the orchard. They halted there, and seemed for a moment returning to their position, but in a few minutes en- tirely broke and retired to the left of Stansbury's line. I immediately ordered the tiftli Baltimore regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel Sterctt, being the left of Stansbu- ry's line, to advance and sustain the artillery. They promptly commenced this movement ; but the rockets, •which had, for the first three or four, passed very high above the heads of the line, now received a more hori- zontal direction, and passed A-evy close above the heads of Shut/zs and Ilagan's regiments, composing the cen- tre and left [right] of Stansbury's line. ^V universal flight of tlicse two regiments was the consequence. This leaving the right of the iifth wholly unsupported, I ordered it to halt, rode swiftly across the field toward those who had so shamefully fled, and exerted my voice to the utmost to arrest them. Thev halted, be- gnu to collect, and seemed to be returning to their places. \\\ ill-founded reliance that their ofiicers would succeed in rallying them when I had thus suc- ceeded in sto]»ping the greatest part of them induced mc immediately to return to the iil'th, the situation of which was likely to become very critical, and that po- pition gave mc the best connnand of view. To my astonishment and mortification, however, when I had K 2 I 4i! ii f I' '«n i! 226 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. regained my position, I found tlic whole of these regi- ments (except a few of Ragan's, not more than forty, rallied by himself, and as many, perhaps, of Shutz's, rallied, 1 learn, by Captain Shower and Captain , whose name I do not recollect) Avere flying in the ut- most precipitation and disorder. " The advanced artillery had immediately followed the riflemen, and retired by the left of the flfth. I directed them to take post on a rising ground which I pointed out in the rear. The fifth, and the artillery on its left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, notwithstanding: the obstruction of the boua-hs of the orchard, which, being below, covered the enemy, would have been enabled to scour this approach and prevent his advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, showed themselves on the lower edge of the left of the orchard, and received the fire of this artillery and the fiftli, wliicli made them draw back. The cover to them was, however, so complete, that they were enabled to advance singly and take positions from which their lire annoyed the fiftli considerably, without citlier that reg- iment or the artillery being able to return tlic fire with any probability of eftcct. In this situation, I had act- ually given an order to tlie fifth and artillery to retire up the hill toward a wood more to the left and a little to the rear, for tlie purpose of drawing thcni farther from the orchard and out of reach of the enemy's firo while he was slieltcred by the orchard. An aversion, however, to rourc before the necessity became stron- ger, and the hope tliat the enemy would issue in a body from the left of the orchard and enable us to act upon him on terms of equality, and the fear that a ii ROUT. iU M < 1 n movement of retreat might, in raw troops, produce some confusion and lose us this chance, induced mc to countermand the order, and direct the artillery to lire into a wooden barn on the lower end of the orchard, behind which I supposed the enemy might be shelter- ed in considerable numbers. The tire of tlic enemy now began, however, to annoy the fifth still more in wounding several of them, and a strong column of the enemy having passed up the road as high as the right of the liftli, and beginning to deploy into the lield to take them in front, I directed the artillery to retire to the hill to which I had directed the Baltimore artillery to proceed, and halt, and ordered the fifth regiment also to retire. This corps, which had heretofore acted so firmly, evinced the usual incapacity of raw troops to make orderly movements in the face of the enemy, and their retreat in a very few moments became a flight of absolute and total disorder." This statement of General Winder shows very clear- ly the value of the orchard and barn as a military po- sition, the advantage which its possession gave to the enemy, and the difhculty whicli they probably would have experienced in driving back our troops if they had been sulVered to remain near and in it, as General Stansbury intended ; but a mere militia general could not be supposed to have any judgment or tact what- ever in military matters, or to be right even by acci- dent. Cicneral Stansbury says : "The artillery, under the command of Captains My- er and Magrudcr, and tlie riilemon, the wliole under the connuand of .Major Pinkney, behaved in the most iii 1i 'I I m i! mi •1" if 1 ; . i *1 1^ !■ ( ili lltl' "I \ I fitt ll,: ii:^ i. (; .r-J 228 INVASION AND CAITUKE OF WASIIINaXON. gallant manner (this gallant officer, in tlie course of tlic action, was severely wounded) ; but the superior force of the enemy, and the rapidity with which he moved, compelled them to retire. But one of tlie pieces was lost, and that was rendered harmless before it was abandoned. " The enemy took every advantage of the cover af- forded them by the trees of the orchard, and their light troops from thence kept up a galling iire on our line. On this party, when advanced nearer, tlie 5th regiment, under Colonel ^Sterett, opened a steady and well-di- rected fu'c, whicli was followed by the tire from the right, and ultimately from our centre, when the firing on both sides became general. After a few rounds the troops on the right began to break. I rode along the lines, and gave orders to the officers to cut down those who attempted to fly, and suffer no mnn to leave tlie lines. On arrivino* at the left of the centre reG:imeiit, I found Licntenant-colonel Shutz's nien giving way, rnd that brave officer, with [Major Kemp, (dded by my aid-de-camp, ]\[ajor Woodycar, exerting themselves in rallying and forming them again. Captain Cralloway's company, and part of Captains Randall's and Show- er's companies, were rallied and formed again, and be- haved aallaiitly. The rest of Colonels Shutz's and Racran's rcp-imcnts ficd in disorder, notwithstandincj the extraordinary exertions of their officers to prevent it. On the left, I soon after discovered a part of the otli regiment giving way, and that excellent officer, Lieutenant-colonel Stcrctt, witli those under him, most actively eniraged forming them again. Soon after, the retreat became general, and all attempts to rally them THE FIFTH KEGIMENT. 229 ; 5 and make a second stand were fruitless. With a body of United States cavalry, I endeavored to protect the rear and right of the retreating men, so as to prevent their falhng into the enemy's possession. "TIic men under my command were ,vorn down and nearly exhausted from long and forced marches, want of food, and watching. They had been, with very little intermission, under arms and marching from the time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to cook. They certainly were not in a situation to go into battle." Lieutenant-colonel Sterett, the commander of the 5th regiment, is very brief in his account of the action. At the conclusion of it he says : " The imposing front of the enemy was never dis- concerted by the lire of the artillery or riflemen, and tlie brigade of General Stansbury was seen to fly as soon as the action became serious. No second line or reserve appeared to advance or support us, and we were outflanked and defeated in as short a time as such an operation could well be performed." This statement of Colonel Sterett hardly docs justice to his own countrvmen and fellow-soldiers. All ac- counts show that the imposing front of the enemy was disconcerted by the artillery on his advance to the bridge — enough so to induce him to waive dignity for safety, and take refuG;c behind the houses and Lowndes' Hill. The British accounts alone arc not to be relied on, because some of them exaggerate the resistance in order to mnji-nifv their own valor in overcomin"; it. But on rom]iaring all accounts, American and British, I r I i r^ if 'X I ' |!!1' |li 230 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. it is evident that even Stansbuiy's brigade stood its ground long enough to show that, under different aus- pices, it woukl have performed its part welh Gleig, the writer of the " Campaign at Wasliington," states that the precipitate retreat upon it of our riflemen "threw it into disorder before it had fired a shot."' Stansbury says that before his brigade broke "the fir- ing on both sides became general," and that "after a few rounds the troojDS on the right began to break." Sterett says that Stansbury's brigade "was seen to fly as soon as the action became serious." Probably amona; tlic circumstances which induced the men to think that matters were taking a serious turn were these : the shower of rockets among them ; the hur- ried retreat of the riflemen upon them ; the galling fire from the orchard ; the continued advance of fresh troops of the enemy, amounting, as they had been informed, to eight or ten thousand veterans ; no knowledge that any reserved troops were in their rear; and the con- viction which every man of common sense among them must have felt, that, under these circumstances, to con- tinue longer on the field would expose tliem to the danger of being cut to pieces. It is difficult to un- derstand the motive for placing or keeping them in such a position. It was not a position to be defend- ed at all hazards and at any cost of life, in order to gain time. What was the time wanted for? The troops in the rear were not advancing, nor does it ap- pear that there was any design that they should ad- vance. Further continuance in such a position could be only for the purpose of testing the experiment whether a body of raw militia-men, in an open fickl, i i DURATION OF THE CONFLICT. 2,-31 and in pitched battle, could defeat four or five times their number of regular and veteran troops. It does not appear how long the action with the first line lasted. Lieutenant-colonel Stcrett's assertion that the line was "outflanked and defeated in as short a time as such an operation could well be performed," is alto- gether vague, and as he was a militia oflicer, probably never in action before, he could hardly have known the average time required, in general, to perform the oper- ation of outflankino; and defeatimi; an armv. ]Mr. John Law, whose statement we have already referred to, says that the Baltimore artillery tired about ten rounds before it retreated ; and the last discharges of the ar- tillery, which arc usually the most destructive, were in this case the least so, as none of the advanced artil- lery was furnished with any other than round shot ; and Mr. Pinkney states that the half-formed embrasures of the work in which the Baltimore artillery was placed rendered it " difficult, if not impracticable, to depress the guns in those embrasures (the ground of the battery being considerably elevated) so as to touch the enemy after his near approach."' Cockburn states in his official dispatch that our army, 8000 strong, was "dislodged as soon as reached" by a division of the British army " not amounting to more than 1500 men.*' Admitting — and the admis- sion is certainly a charitable one — that he does not mis- state the numbers on both sides, diminishing the one as much as he exaggerates the other, and that not more than 1500 of the British army had time to reach the field before the first line was defeated, still, in point of fact, those 1500 had to contend with not more than i! 1^ m 232 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF "SVASIIINGTON. 1* 1.1 f! 700 of our own troops. They were protected by the orchard and barn, and by distance, from the fire of the 5th regiment and Stansbury's brigade. The only part of the line, exclusive of the advanced troops, which could have done them any damage, was Burch's bat- tery of three pieces, and Captain Doughty's company, which was thrown forward, in crotchet form, on the left of Stansbury's line, and which opened an effective fire upon them while they were near the barn. The British accounts describe but one battle. There were, in fact, two, as distinct as if they had taken place on diftercnt days and with different armies. The second line of the American army was nearly a mile in the rear of the first, and there had been no communi- cation between them, no re-enforcement from one to the other, except that before the appearance of the enemy at Bladensburg Captain Doughty's company and Burch's company of artillery had been advanced from the sec- ond to the first line. Xonc of the troops of the first line, after its defeat, retreated to or rallied upon the second line, which was left, therefore, to encounter the full force of an enemy inspirited by its victory over the first line and outnumbering the second nearly two to one. The enemy proceeded to make a simultaneous attack on both flanks of the second line, as they had upon the first, their right wing led by Colonel Brooke, of the 44th regiment, continuing up the old Georgetown road in pursuit of the routed troops, and their left, under Colonel Thornton, advancing along the turnpike to the attack of Barney's battery. The reception which the commodore gave his visitors upon this occasion we 1 i N. ATTACK ON THE SECOND LINE. by the 3 of the fily part , which [I's bat- mpany, the left tive fire There L taken 1. The mile in nmuni- 3 to the emy at Jurch's le sec- le first )n the ter the Y over ly two attack )n the )f the I road under to illQ h the n we ' 1 shall leave him to relate in his own language, upon w^hich v.-e sliall afterward make a few comments. Aft- er speaking of the heat of the weather, the crippled condition of his men from the severe marches they had experienced the '^-^ys before, many of them being with- out slioes, and the hurried manner in which he had been compelled to take a position, he says : " At length the enemy made his appearance or the main road in force, and in front of my battery, and on seeino; us made a halt. I reserved our fire. In a few moments the enemy again advanced, when I ordered an eighteen -pounder to be fired, which completely cleared the road ; shortly after, a second and a third attempt was made by the enemy to come forward, but all were destroyed. They then crosbed over into an open field, and attempted to flank our right : he was there met by three twelve-pounders, the marines under Captain ]\Iiller, and my men acting as infantry, and again was totally cut up. By this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred posted on a height on my right, from whom I expected much support from their fine situation. " Tlie enemy from this period never appeared in force in front of us ; they pushed forward their shai-p- shooters, one of whom shot my horse under me, who fell dead between two of my guns. The enemy, who had been kept in check by our fire for nearly half r;i hour, now bcG;an to outflank us on the rinlit. ( )ur guns were turned that way. lie pushed up the hill about two or three hundred toward the corps of Amer- icans stationed as above described, who, to my great mortification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two, I I J! A 234 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF AVASHINGTON. and retired. In this situation wc had the whole army to contend with. Our ammunition was expended, and, unfortunately, the drivers of our ammunition wag- ons had gone off in the general panic." The commodore himself was severely wounded, and while lying in that condition on the ground, Ross and Cockburn came up to him, behaved to him " with the most marked attention, respect, and politeness," had a surgeon brought and his wound dressed immediately. He says : " Captain Wainwright, first captain to Ad- miral Cochrane, remained with me and behaved to me as if I were a brother. During the stay of the enemy at Bladensburg I received every marked attention pos- sible from the officers of the navy and army." But these polite attentions did not prevent the com- modore from afterward denouncing Ross for the mis- statements contained in his official dispatch. I^ a communication to the National Intelligencer in rela- tion to that disjDatch, the commodore says : " The general then goes on to state how his troops advanced, and by the irresistible attack of the bayonet the enemy got into confusion and fled. It would have been more to the honor of the general if he had told that his men never had it in their power to use the bayonet but once, and then declined it ; for, after ev- ery attempt was made by his men to advance on the main road, and were driven by the artillery under my command into the field, they were rallied and again led on by Colonel Thornton, who advanced to within fifty yards of our position, where he was met by the marines under Captains Miller and Sevier, with the flotilla men. Colonel Thornton fell dangerously wound- 1 )^» BARNEY AND ROSS. 235 ed. Captain Hamilton and Lieutenant Codd wore kill- ed. Lieutenant Stevely, of the 'King's Own,' also severely wounded. The veterans of the eighty-fifth and fourth, or ' King's Own,' gave way. So far from using the bayonet, they fled before our men, who pur- sued them, the sailors crying out to 'board' them. Nor did the enemy rally until they got into a ravine covered with woods, leaving their officers in our pow- er. Then our men returned to their station. General Ross, in person, was obliged to take command, but dared not lead them on in front, but pushed out on our flank. Our ammunition being expended, we were necessitated to retire." I'rom this statement of Commodore Barney himself, it appears that his men did not, as others have assert- ed, stand by their guns until several of them were bayoneted. lie, however, makes the most of the part played by the men under his command, which was suf- ficiently creditable to them to render it unnecessary to enhance their merit by the reflections and innuendoes to the disparagement of others contained in his asser- tion that " by this time not a vestige of the American army remained, except a body of five or six hundred posted" on his right, which body, to his " great mor- tification, made no resistance, giving a fire or two, and retiring." The truth is, that none of the troops on his right or left retired until they had been ordered to retreat by the general-in-ehief. From Commodore Barney's statements it woi.ld ap- pear that none of the troops of the second line per- formed any service except those under his command. But the light brigade of the enemy, in advancing II ^ i-' i I .!;i ■ I , ^f ^ I 23G INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. through the cleiilc near the bridge over tlie ravine, came within range of Peter's battery, whicli opened a cross fire upon tliem with considerable effect. After the first discharge from Barney's battery, the British eighty-fifth regiment was thrown out on its right with a view to carry the left flank of tliat battery ; and liav- ing advanced within range of IMagruder's regiment, met a reception which caused it to retrograde ; and cross- ing the road in open order, it united with the fourth, which had deployed on the left on the margin of the ravine, coming in conflict there with Kramer's com- mand, which, after a spirited resistance, fell back to the right of the line. Tlic Subaltern in America speaks jDarticularly of the severity of the fire from every part of the American line commandino; the defile until the right of the line was flanked. The loss sustained here by the British, as well from the murderous discliarge of grape from Barney's battery, which mowed down whole companies, as from the cross fire of Peter's bat- tery and the discharge of musketry, exceeded, accord- ing to the accounts of the British officers who were present, that of any battle in whicli they had ever been engaged, considering the numbers of the contending forces. In the mean time, the right wing of the British, un- der Colonel Brook, was approaching the left of Peter's battery, which, for want of sufficient support, must ijoon have been carried. At this crisis, General Win- der, who had been vainly endeavoring to arrest or direct the flight of his first line, arrived upon the gi'ound, and perceiving his right flank in the act of being turned, and his left nearly in the same predicament, gave or- RETREAT OF THE A:MER1CANS. 237 •) dcrs for the line to retreat. The manner in wiiich the order was executed by General Smith wo, shall state in his own words : " The order to retreat was executed by regiments and corps as they had been formed, and with as mucli order as the nature of the ease would permit. The lirst and second regiments halted and formed, after re- treating five or six hundred paces, but Avore again or- dered by General Winder to retire. At this moment I fell in with Orcncral Winder, and, after a short con- ference with him, was directed to move on, and collect the troops, and prepare to make a stand on the heights westward of the turnpike gate. This was done as fast as the troops came up. X front vva.^ again presented toward the enemy, consisting principa ly of the troops of this District, a part of those who h.'xl been attached to them in the action, and a Virginia rc^^'iment of about four hundred men, under Colonel jMiner, which met us at this place. While the line was yet forming, I received orders from General Winder to fall back to the Capitol, and there form for battle. I took the lib- erty of suggesting my impression of the preferable sit- uation we then occupied ; but, expecting that he might be joined there by some of his dispersed troops of the front line, he chose to make the stand there. Ap- proaching the Capitol, I halted the troops, and request- ed his orders as to the formation of the line. We found no auxiliaries there. He then conferred for a few moments with General Armstrong, who was a short distance from us, and then gave orders that the whole should retreat through Washington and Georgetown. It is impossible to do justice to the anguish evinced II -1" ii^\ 'if 238 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. bj the troops of Washington and Georgetown on tlie receiving of this order. The idea of leaving tlieir fom- ilies, their houses, and their homes at the mercy of an enraged enemy was insupportable. To preserve that order which was maintained during the retreat was now no longer practicable." We can add our own testipiony, as an eye-witness, to General Smith's statement of the effect which the final order to retreat had upon the troops under his command. Some shed tears, others uttered impreca- tions, and all evinced the utmost astonishment and in- dignation ; for it was impossible for them to compre- hend why troops who were willing to risk an encounter with the enemy should be denied the opporturdty. Tlie official dispatch of General Ross states that the number of his killed on the 24th w^as 56, and wound- ed 185, including officers and men, but his real loss was more than double that number. Dr. Catlett, Gen- eral Winder's staff-surgeon, who was permitted by the enemy to proceed to Bladensburg on the day after the battle to attend to some of our wounded, states that one of the British surgeons there informed him that they had that day buried about one hundred of their men on the field ; and, after the retreat of the British, fifty or sixty were found and buried by our own men. Tlicir wounded Catlett estimates a-t "three or four hundred, besides forty or fifty left in tliis city." The loss on our side was 20 killed and 51 wounded. UNMEIilTED CHARGES AGAINST THE TROOPS. 239 CHAPTER Xlir. Remarks on the Buttle and Ketreat. At the conclusion of his letter to the chairman of the coniinittce of investigation, General Smith, the com- mander of the District militia, says : "The troops of Washington and Georgetown have been assailed in the public prints and elsewlicre with calmnnies as unmerited as they are cruel and wanton. Tiiey have heard of them with indignant astonishment. Conscious that in no instance have they been want- ing in the duty they owed to their country or to them- selves, but, on the contrary, in obedience to the call of their government, have with alacrity obeyed its orders, and intrepidly fronted an enemy vastly their superior in force, and never yielded the ground to him but by orders emanating from superior authority, they can not restrain tlie feelings excited by such manifest, such unprovoked injustice." It is not difficult to account for tliis burden of cal- umny thrown upon the District troops. In tlie first place, a defeated party is always in t!ie wrong, and may be blamed with impunity by all the world. In the next place, there is always a multitude of intrepid spirits so overburdened with untried valor themselves that they arc wholly unable to sympathize with any want of it in others, and arc prodigiously indignant ut those who will not light for their country to the last >t»l u\ H w 240 INVASION AND CAPTUllE OF WASHINGTON. extremity against any conceivable odds, and even against orders. Thirdly, the defence of the city was peculiarly the business of the District troops ; they were — if we may venture to use language so unsuited to the dignity of history — "lighting on their own dunghill ;" and the fact that so many of them retreat- ed without giving or receiving a scratch was strong prima facie proof that they had " sliown tlie white feather." Even Stansbury's men, no doubt, excused themselves to their neighbors, after their return home, by saying, " How could we be expected to light when we were not supported by those cowardly District troops ?" But the most potent cause of all is, that the great functionaries of government, knowing that the blame of the capture of the city must rest either on them- selves or on the troops, were determined to throw it upon the latter, and their position and influence ena- bled them to do it so effectually, that the imputation cast from this high source has become lixcd in history and tradition "like a fly in amber." General Armstrong, in his letter to tlie chairman of the committee, speaking of " the disasters of the day," says, "Without all doubt the determining cause of these is to be found in tliat love of life which, in many of the corps, predominated over a love of country and of honor ;" tlic meaning of which paraphrase is, in plain Knglish, that the main cause of the defeat was the cowardice of tlie troops. The Court of Inquiry, of wliich General Scott was president, convened for tlie purpose of examining into and reporting upon the conduct of Cicncral Winder, I ATTEMPT TO SHIFT THE BLAME. 241 even was they uited own trcat- itrong white cused home, when istrict 5 great Uainc thcni- irow it ;c cna- iitation listory I an of day," iuse of many .ry and is, in ;at was )tt was iig into Vlnder, gave it as their unanimous opinion that no censure was attributable to him, but that, " on the contrary," he was " entitled to no little commendation." This, by implication, unexplained, threw all the blame upon the troops ; and the implication was strengthened by the remark of the court that all of the troops, "excepting 400, were militia." General Winder himself, in his narrative, when speaking of the defects in the order of battle, inti- mates, as wc have seen, that "■groundless panic" was the main cause of the defeat. lie refers to tiie "in- capacity of raw troops to make orderly movements in tlie lace of the enemy;" states that Colonel Ikall's detachment " lied," abandoning their " commanding position" to the enemy, and is sparing of any com- mendation except upon Barney's connuand, though none could testify better than himself to the patience under fatigue and privation, the readiness to encoun- ter danger, and the firnmess in its presence, displayed l)y the great majority of hi.s troops, militia as tliey were. There seems to have been a tacit understanding among all the leading men, and the friends of all the leading men, whose own conduct might by any possi- bility 1)0 called in (question, that it would be much more prudent to let the obloquy rest upon the troops than to undertake seriously to assail each other ; and tiierefore, without appointing any Congressional com- mittee, or any court of inquiry, to investigate the &pc- cific allegation of cowardice made against tlie troo})s, they were convicted of the charge by a sort of accla- mation, in which many were good-humored enougli to L 1 I i ♦ • I r' i I? r M '' 242 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. join themselves, and rally eacli other on the "Bladens- l)urg Races." Yet, as even this joke — encouraged for a serious purpose by some — has left a stigma, not only upon the character of the District troops, but upon that of the American people, and upon the efficiency of mi- litia troops generally, justice to all requires it to be stated that there is not a particle of evidence to convict any portion of the troops assembled at Bladensburg, Stansbury's brigade excepted, of want of courage, want of subordination, or want of any other soldierly quality. In all other cases the retreat of the troops was in con- sequence of orders from the commanding general, which it was sometimes found necessary to reiterate, from the reluctance of tiic troops to obey them. The repeated orders to retire given to the advanced troops between the ^Vood Yard and Nottingham were, according to j\Injor Peter's statement and to our own personal knowledge, very unwillingly obeyed. At the Old Fields, on the 23d of August, the troops showed no signs of unwillingness for tlie encounter, great as they sujjposed the numerical superiority of the enemy to be. At Bladensburg, it was witli the utmost re- luctance that General Smitli's troops obeyed the or- der to retreat. As he states, " The first and second regiments, after retreating five or six lumdred yards, halted and formed, but were again ordered by General Winder to retire." Willi respect to the regular troops under Lieuten- ant-colonel Scott, we have been informed by the Hon- orable William 1). l^Ierrick, of 3Iaryland, who was the adjutant of the connnand, that on the ajiproach of the right column of the enemy, after the dclbat of the first J COLONEL BEALL S OPINION. 243 H t rc- .3 \i ■'i '.';" T i line, Scott's command changed front in order to meet them, and received the fire of the British advance, which killed and wounded five or six of the men. While the troops were in the act of returning the fire. General Winder rode up to them and gave the order to retreat to Washington. On being asked hy Adju- tant Merrick, who was on horseback, whether the troops might not be allowed to return the fire of the enemy. General Winder demanded to know who commanded the regiment. The adjutant pointed to Lieutenant- colonel Scott, who was then on foot, his horse liaving been killed, when General Winder repeated the order, directing him to retire inmicdiately. The veteran Colonel Beall, whose command appears to such little advantage in the narrative of General Winder and report of Commodore Barney, in his brief and modest letter to the chairman of the committee makes no other excuse for his men than to state that they were fatigued and exhausted from their march of sixteen miles that morning before the battle, and that, according to his own impression, they did not give way "as early as is represented by some." In a letter published by General Wilkinson in his ^lemoirs,* Colonel Beall says : " I do not say some of my men did not retreat too soon, but what number they were I know not. The men Avho buried the dead of the en- emy say that near the ground I occupied sixteen were killed, and I think my loss was four. The adjutant of the first i-egimcnt of the Columbian Brigade says the flotilla-men and his regiment retreated to the city together,! and lie returned and met me at the turn- ♦ Vol. i., p. 785. t This is well remembered by the author. I*! r ij. i: Ih^ i I' ^u> 1) l fi >l t' '. II 244 INVASION AND CAPTUllE OF WASHINGTON. pike gate." General Wilkinson also publishes ex- tracts from two letters addressed to Colonel Beall a few weeks after the battle by John E. Howard, Esq., of jMaryland, a son of the hero of the Cowpens. In the lirst letter, Mr. Howard, after adverting to Commo- dore Barney's report, says, "I was the person who de- livered to you the order from General AVindcr to re- treat, to avoid being outflanked and cut oft'. I acted as an aid to the general." In the second letter he states, "I apprehended that the order I delivered to you was the first you had to retreat, and I perfectly recollect your reply, * Does General AVinder order mc to retreat before we have fired a shot, and the men in perfect order ?' and while repeating the order, the ene- my began to fire from the wood which was in front of your right wing." " I feel prompted to address you," says Mr. Howard, in his first letter, "from accidental- ly witnessing your conduct in the rear of the retreat- ing army, when you drew a line across the road, and rallied, and formed your men in regular order before they were permitted to march on." The most that can be expected of raw troops, or in- deed of any troops, is, that they will obey orders, and not retreat until ordered to do so. If they satisfy these requirements, all the blame attending their move- ments must fall elsewhere. It is preposterous to ex- pect that any troops, in their anxiety to fight, would mutinously disobey an order to retreat, and yet not a few of the " BJadcnsburg heroes" were on the point of doing this. On the other hand, there is no ground for attribu- ting any motive to General Winder in giving these or- J COURAGE OF GENERAL WINDER. 245 1» ■ 'J clers to retreat other tlian the humane one of prevent- ing' a useless sacrifice of the Uves of men who were not mere worthless, vagabond mercenaries, Lut gener- ally respectable citizens, many with families, wives, mothers, or sisters dependent on them, or anxiously waitino; their return from dancer. There is an abun- dance of concurrent and spontaneous testimony as to the personal gallantry, zeal, and energy which General Winder himself displayed in the field of battle. By cort. i\ he contest he mi^-^'^^ hc've hoped still to re- trieve a Vi^vOry, which woulu be the more creditable from its being unexpected, and achieved under despe- rate circumstances. A less scrupulous commander would not have hesitated to risk the lives of his men on such a chance. There can be no doubt, therefore, that his motives in ordering the retreat w^ere credita- ble to him, and no question can arise except as to the necessity or propriety of the retreat in a military point of view. Upon this subject General Wdkinson says: "Wlien (Jeneral Winder saw the first line so easily routed, without adverting to the primary cause, the ex- ample of the President, and believing the whole force of the enemy had been brought into action, it was nat- ural he should become solicitous for the safety of his rear ; yet I consider the order for retreat unfortunate, because of my confidence in the materials which com- posed what was called the second line ; ]\Iajor Peter's command, consisting of a company of well-trained ar- tillery, with StulTs and Davidson's eonipanios of in- fantry, would have breasted any equal mimljcr, no matter of what country or corps ; and if this detach- j! Si ;.! !^ .1 ill i, " II jli '!' urg could rest any where but on the people themselves, the troops, and subordinate oflieers. To assist in fix- ing this im})ression on the public mind, and 1o show the indiij-nation of the government at anv man who could, "on or about the 27tli of August, when the en- emy was approaching, run away,'' the otHccr who had run away with his connnand from Fort Washington — a post which the commanding general had pronounced not tenable — was tried by a court-martial and dismissed from the service : a sort of vicarious atonement, or sac- rilice on the altar of public opinion, to purge away the sins of those who were the lirst to instill a ])anlc into tlie peoph^ and troops, and to set the example of riui- niiig away " wlien ihe enemy was jipproaehing" l)la- densburg. ^^T- 254 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. J !port which that paper gave to the administration and the war. It was a hisrh compliment paid to the editors of that paper, though, no doubt, one which they would cheerfully have dis- pensed with. The following account of the attack of his majesty's forces upon the office of the National Intelligencer is derived from an authentic source : "When it became known that the British forces had landed at Benedict, on the Patuxent, with the prob- able design of advancing upon the scat of government, fifty miles distant, a levy en masse of the District mili- tia was ordered by the government, and tliis ncluded all the workmen employed in the office of the National Intelligencer newspaper. The sudden withdrawal of these men from their business would, of course, have caused tlie immediat*^ suspension of tlie paper, and cut off from the country the only source of regular infor- mation from Washington of the deeply-interesting events which impended. To prevent this evil, one of the editors of the paper (the other had been absent some weeks with his family on a visit to his parental home in the Soutli) stated the case to the Secretary of War, who immcdiateh directed that a sufficient n I 2G4 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. number of the workmen slioulcl be relicM; J iijm mili- taiy duty temporarily, and furloughed for i'>civ regidar occupation in the printing-office. Thus the paper con- tinued to be issued as usual, daily, up to the morning of the 24th of August, althougli the men were, during the whole time, very restive at being kept from their friends and comrades in the field, and only consented to continue at their duty by the reiterated promise of the proprietor that, as soon as it should be ascertained that the enemy were approaching the city, he and they would all leave the office, and go and join their respect- ive companies. " On the morning of the 24th the paper was got ready and put to press about 2 o clock, and the editor retired to his residence and went to bed. About 3 o'clock he was awakened by a messenger from the printing-office, and informed that the Post-office was shut up and abandoned, every thing removed, nobody there to receive the papers or attend to any thing, and the mails discontinued. Soon after daybreak the edi- tor rose and repaired to the office, where, having sum- moned tlie workmen, he informed them that, the mails having stopped and cut off conmumication beyond the city, it was useless to persevere in publishing the pa- per, therefore he should forthwith leave home to join his company (Davidson's infantry) on the eastern branch of the Potomac, and left them free to repair also to their companies, wdiich they did. The Intelli- gencer of that morning contained an article on the proba- ble intentions of the enemy, which closed with this pro- phetic sentence : ' In a few hours we believe the enemy's object will be developed and the issue determined.' 1 •I?? i . I OFFICE OF THE INTELLIGENCER PF.STJiOVEJ). 260 mili- o r con- Drniiig luring 1 their scntcd lisc of rtained id they •cspect- vas got e editor Vhout 3 L-om the tice was nobody ing, and the cdi- ng sum- ic mails ond the the pa- G to join eastern o repair e Intelli- iie proba- this pro- 3 enemy's lined.' '" The British forces entered Washington that even- ing, and bivouacked on the Capitol Hill. TJic next day, Adnural Cockburn, in hid progress tlu'ough the city (by the way of Pennsylvania Avenue, which was then the only regular or used street or road from one part of the city to the otlicr), halted in front of the of- fice of the National Intelligencer, attended by a body of sailors and soldiers. Tlic National Inlellifxcncer, then the conlidential journal of ]\Ir. ]\Iadison"s admin- istration, and a warm advocate of the war, vras con- ducted by two gentlemen, one of whom, the senior ed- itor, ]Mr. Gales, was a native of England, though re- moved to the United States with his parents in child- hood. " The zeal of the Intelligencer in support of the war, coupled with the fact that one of its editors was by birth an Englishman, had exasperated Admiral Cockburn violently against the journal and its propri- etor, and being unable to capture the obnoxious editor (who was still in North Carolina with his family), he determined to burn down the printing-office and its contents, which purpose, however, he was prevented from executing by the entreaties of the females of the contiguous houses, which would have been consumed with the office building (the men of the famihcs being absent with the troops). But the admiral vented his spleen on the printing materials and other property in the building. He had the library, of several hundred volumes, removed to the street (assisting himself in the work) and burned, threw all the tyjies and print- ing materials out of the upper windows, and broke and destroyed all the presses, thereby inflicting a loss on M * '1 [I I II i 1 ■ 1^ 1 f 1 ' 2GG INVASION AND (.'A 1 "11:^1': OF WASHINGTON. the proprietors of some thousands of dollars, and then .'par ted. ?5 It was the destruction of the puhUc buildings at Washington by the enemy which occasioned the in- dignant connncnts of the })rcss both mi Great Britain and on tlie Continent. Ijiit private p/opcrty also, to a largc amount, was destroyed, a fact wh:ch lioss very naturally omitted to state in his public dispatches. The National Intelligencer of August 31,1814, says : " When v;o remarked in our paper of yesterday that private properly had, in general, l)ecn scrupulously rc- Gpcctcd by the enemy during his late incursion, we spoke what we believed from a hasty survey, and per- liaps without sullicient inquiry. Greater respect was certainly paid to private property than has usually been exhibited by the enemy in his marauding parties. No houses were half as \wmi\\ jdundcrcd by the enemy as by the knavish wretches about the town who prof- ited by the general distress. Tliere were, however, several private buildings wantonly destroyed, and some of tliose persons who remained in the city were scan- dalously maltreated. Among the private buildings destroyed was the dwelling-house owned and occujiied by ]\lr. Kobert Sewnll (tbrmerly rented by ]\Ir. CJal- latiii), from behind which a gnn was tired at General Ross, which killed the horse he rode. The liouses built tor General Washington on the brow of Ca])itoI ilill, the large liotd belonging to Daniel (Jarroll, of Duddington, and otliers, and recently occupied by ^Ir. Tomlinson; the roj)e-walks of Tench Ringgold, Heath ^ Co., and John Chalmers, were destroyed by tire, without any j)ret(Mice being assigned therefor that we I now of."' I 1 1 -J" MUTILATION OF THE NAVAL MONUMENT. 267 ?upiccl \ •. (Jal- cncral I louses a >i|)itol "^Bd (,11, of J .y .Mr. m Heath m y lire, - * lat we 'I i i >■ i i 1 One of the least creditable acts committed by the enemy during his stay in the city was tiie mutilation of the monument which now stands opposite the wcFt front of the Capitol, and which had heen erected at tlic navy-yard by private subscriptions of officers of the navy, to commemorate their conn'ades who were killed in the war with Tripoli. There was nothing in this monument which could ofi'end the national pride of Englishmen, except so far as it brought to their recol- lection the gaUantry of our naval heroes. There could, therefore, have been no other than a malicious motive for the defacement of it. A correspondent of the Na- tional Intelligencer, writing shortly after the event, gives the following account of it : "This elegant monument of the liberality and gal- lantry of our naval heroes has been shamefully defaced by the hand of some barbarian. On the base, the Genius of America is represented by a female iigure pointing to an inscription and raising a view of the battle before Tripoli, instructing her chddrcn avIio are standing beside her. The pointing tinger and thumb have been cut olK llistorv — a female fisure, who is represented as recording the event — has been robbed of iier })en ; and a iigure of l\imc, who is represented as descending in a cloud, covering the deeds of her sons with the palm and crown of glory, has been robbed of the palm at the expense of the hand that held it. From every inquiry it is possible to make, there is no reason to doubt but that it was the dciliberate act of some of the liritish oilicer>', as several of ihem were seen to be on the base of the monument by the neigh- bors around the vard.'' tl ' ih M i 268 INVASION AND CAPTLIIE OF WASHINGTON. In the course of their operations the British met with a singular accident, the horrible consequences of which probably made them exceedingly cautious in their subsequent explorations through the city. At Ch'eenleaf's Point there was an arsenal, witli one or two otlier })ublic buildings, which, with their contents, had been partially destroyed by our own people before abandoning them. In the hope of saving tlie powder, a large (juantity of it, in kegs, was concealed in a dry well near the barracks. Vn the day after the capture of the city, a party of 200 British soldiers, with sev- eral officers, was sent down to the Point to complete the destruction of what might be found there : and one of these officers, in a letter wliich was publislied in a London ncwsi)aper,* gives the following account : '"One of the artillery-men most unfortunately drop- ped a liglited port-firc into the well, whicli, with a mngazine about twelve yards distant, full of shells, charged and primed, blew u}) Avith the most tremen- dous explosion I ever heard. One house was unroof- ed, and the walls of two others, which had been burnt an hour before, were shook down. Large pieces of earth, stones, bricks, shot, shells, etc., burst into the air, and, falling among us (who had nowhere to run, being on a narrow neck of land, with the sea [llivers Potomac and Eastern Branch) on three sides), killed about twelve men and woundc*! above thirty more, most of them in a dreadl'ul manner. I liad the good fortune to escape with whole skin and bones, ])ut some- what bruised. The groans of the ])cople almost bur- ied in the earth, or with leg;-« and arms broke, and the * Nik's's Register, vol. vii.. S»|ii'k'iiK'tit, p. !."»<). i THE BRITISH OFFICERS TAKE A COLLATION. 2C){) h met CCS of ous in r. At or two ts, had "bctbrc owtlcr, L a dry :aptiirc til sev- )mplctG uid one cd in a lit: [y drop- witli a shells, trcuicn- unrool- 'u hiirnt cecs of uto the to run, Kivers ), killed y more, he good it aomc- ost bur- and the /a sight of pieces of bodies lyiiig about, was a thousand times more distressing than the loss we met in the lield the day before." The loss of the British by this accident is l)elieved to be greater than is stated by the writer of the fore- going letter. On the day succeeding the occurrence, the author of this volume, as brigade ins})ector, visited the place, and witnessed the horrible spectacle of legs, arms, and heads protruding iVom tlie mounds of earth thrown up by the explosion, '^i'iu buildings destroy- ed were of little value. Among the boasted exploits of tiie British In the city was that of enjoying a feast in the President's house, at tlic exjiense of Mr. ]\[adison, before they set hrc to the buildincr. A letter from one ol' their mid- shipmen, published in a Tjondon paper,* says, "When the general entered ^h: ]\ladison*s house in the ca})i- tal, he found the table spread for dinner, and ail the fruits and wines in cool. The othcers reQ;aled them- selves with whatever they wanted, and then set lire to the house.'' Another aecoimt says that this alleged banquet was on a collation which ^Mr. ]\huii. on had directed to be prepared tor tin ; i-inci})al officers of gov- ernment and of the army, ■'.\h( i they should return from the expected victory it ])ladcn.-burg, which would have ji'iven the wines :>ii.}»le ^ime to <^ool. Bui, in point of fact, it Is believed tliat the iirlti sailor, may have been the more frank and generous of the two, notwith- standing his rudoness of manner. The maimer of the British retreat from the city, as it is described by the author of "The Subaltern in America," was as cautious, and stealthy, and precipi- tate as was natural for a retreating army under such circumstances. I Ic says ; * Vol \ii., Snj>f»lemcnf, \k \TtT. .it it THE ENEMY IJETIRE. 271 it In the mean while, the ofKccrs of the diiicrcnt cor})s had been direeted, in a whisper, to make ready lor falling hack as soon as darkness should set in. From the men, however, the thing was kept profoundly se- cret. They were given, indeed, to understand that ali important manceuvre would be effected befoi'e to-mor- row morning, but the hints tlirown out tended to in- duce an expectation of a I'lirther ad\'ancc rather than of a retreat. A similar rumor was permitted quietly to circulate among the inhabitants, witii the view, doubtless, of its making its way into the American camp ; while all persons were required, on pain of death, to keep witiiin doors from sunset to sunrise. This done, as many horses as could be got together were put in re(|uisition for the transport of the artille- ry ]']vcn the few wounded oliiccrs who had accom- panied the column were required to resign theirs, and mine, among the number, was taken away. J5ut the precaution was a very just and proper one. Not only were tJie guns, by thi.< means, rendered more portable, but the danger of a betrayal from a ncigli, or the trampling of liooves along the paved streets, was pro- vided against; and though individuals might jiud did sutler, their suilerings were not to be put into the scale against the [)ublir' good. *Vlt was about eight o'clock at night wlicn a stafll- officer, arriving ui)oji the ground, gave direction for the corps to form in marching order. JM-cparatory to this stop, large qtuuitilies of fresh fuel were hea})ed upon the iires, while from cvvry company a few men were selected who should remain beside them till the pick- ets willulnnv, and move from lime to time about, ■ -» li !f|1 i . I 1 t i •' i i : c Hi !ll; !'l 1 '{■ ' 1 '. I . If .1 1*72 INVASION AND CAFrURE OF WASUINGTON. as that their figures might be seen "by the light of the blaze. After this, the troops stole to the rear of the lires by twos and threes ; when iar enough removed to avoid observation, they took their places, and, in pro- found silence, began their march. Tlie night was very dark. Stars there were, indeed, in the sky, but, for some time after quitting the light of tlic bivouac, their influence was wholly unfelt. \Ve moved on, however, in good order. 2so man spoke above his breath, our very steps were planted lic'htly, and wc cleared the town without exciting observation.'' This mode of getting away frorx a conquest was deficient in mclodramaiic dignity, it is true, but it showed the old soldier; for Iloss, having acconq)lis]ied the object of IiIl expedit'on, had nothing further to de- sire than to retreat qiuckly and unmolestedly to the siiipping, and this he could not inive been so likely to do if he liad announced and signalized his dejiarture by a blowing of trumpets, beating of drums, and otiier noise, and "ponq) and circumstance of glorious war." l''rom the description of Surgeon (Jatlett, tlic appear- ance of the enemy on his retreat must have been rath- er forlorn than martial. He says: "They appeared to be preparing to move; had about forty miserable-looking horses lialtered up, ten or twelve carts and wagons, one ox-cart, one coachee, and several t'ts, v.hich the officers -n^ ere indiistrionslv assisting to tucklc up, and which were immediately sent on to 13" lensburo- to move off their wounded. A drove of sixty or seventy cuttle preceded this caval- cade. On our arrival at Bladensburg, the surgeons wore, ordorod to select all the wounded who could walk I i s » ' LOSS OF THE ENI:MY — THEY KE-EMBARK. 273 )poai'- rath- liad ), ten cllCG, )uslv atcly a. A :aval- geons \valk >V^ 7 Photograpliic Sciences Corporation 33 WIST MAIN STRKT WIBSTIR.N.Y. MSaO (716) •73-4S03 ;^^\ ^v \\ KS" , #,^ i/. fe ^ 1 I" ! m ' w lU ill I ui iHi 1 fH' 1^ ! ( ( ' 1 1 278 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. ascended tliat river. The enemy did not approach, however, and our men left their encampment that even- ing, marching back to Washington, which they re-en- tered by the bridge at the navy-yard in the course of the niglit. I returned with tlie President and the oth- crs of our party, getting back to AVashington by the Bhidensburg road an liour or two after midnight. " Your next supposition is that I was with the Presi- dent on the field at Bladensburg. In this you are also right. All indications showing that a battle was rap- idly coming on, I went early in the morning of the 24th to the President's to get the latest intelligence. Learning that he had gone to the navy-yard, I follow- ed, and found him there with the Secretary of the Xavy and several gentlemen, w^hosc names I did not know or can not now recall ; but I distinctly remember the pres- ence of Commodore Barney. "Accounts had come that the enemy was advancing in great forte, but whether to enter Washington by Bladensburg or by the bridge at the navy-yard was still unknown. All were anxiously waiting informa- tion from the scouts who were coming in in quick suc- cession. The road forked not far from each place, and he might take his choice of cither fork. In fact, to keep us longer in the dark, I understood that liis whole line, iirst taking the navy-yard fork, continued in it until the last colunm got into it. I'he army then sud- denly reversed its front, and marclied onward rapidly to Bladensburg. ]^arney, as I have said, was stand- ing on tlie ground at the navy-yard, not far from the bridge whicli brings you into AVashington. lie made very urgent applicntions to the Secretary of the Navy f STATEMENT OF MR. RUSH. 279 for permission to proceed to Bladensburg as fast as possible with his men and cannon, his opinion being that the attack woukl begin there. " The certainty of tliis at length becoming known, all went to Bladensburg. I accompanied the President and those already with him. When wc reached Bla- densburg the enemy was in sight, and the firing began almost innnediately afterward : their rockets Hew over us as wc sat on our hor.scs. The Baltimore volunteers and militia, who formed the front line, used their field- pieces — six-pounders, I think — firing only round shot, which struck down but few, however, and used their small arms with great spirit at first ; but most of it broke as the enemy came on in increasing numbers after they crossed the small bridge at Bladensburg, intending to rely upon their bayonets. "The Secretary of AVar and commandino: general were in close view of the front line, as was the Presi- dent, doing what they could to encourage the resist- ance. It soon became ineffectual, however, through- out the field, but was resumed by Barney with re- markable n-allantrv and vi<2;or. Notwithstandinc: his eagerness to be on the spot, and marching, as he said, "on a trot," he was unable to reach tiic battle-ground nearer than a couple of miles or thereabouts from Bla- densburg, up to which ])oint all resistance Iiad then been overcome, and the field was clear. But tiierc lie made a stand with his battery of heavy guns, .support- ed on his right by his seamen acting ns soldiers, and a detachment of marines under the gallant Cai)tain since Colonel^ ^liller, and on his left by some volun- ( teers of the District of Columbia. This force, the t'h I I n 280 INVASION AN]J CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. whole of wliicli was inconsiderable in number but stout in heart, waiting until the close approach of the British regulars, opened u^^on them such well-directed volleys of grape and musketry as to baffle their repeat- ed efforts to get forward, until, finally, overjoowered by numbers and surrounded on all sides — for they sent a force in his rear — Barney was compelled to yield, and fell into their hands while lying prostrate on the ground severely wounded. " I returned to the city with the President. ]\Ir. Monroe was also on the field doing all he could to prevent the disaster, and urging good counsel for wip- ing out the stain by another contest before the enemy could escape after his bold and too successful inroad. I was not soon enough or long enough on the field, and had not the opportunities otherwise of observing the precise movements of the troops composing the first line, or to become informed by whom or by whose orders changes of j)Osition were made as the enemy approached. This answers your inquiry under this head. "Your remaining inquiry presupposes that I was present on a subsequent day at the camp of General Walter Smith, on ' Windmill Hill,' in company witli the President, General j\Iason, and Major Carroll, wlien General Armstrong rode into the camp, and tlie inci- dents occurred whicli you mention. I have no recol- lection of having been there on that occasion, thougli I heard of what passed, seeing the President nearly every day ; but, not witnessing it, I could not attempt, at this remote period, to speak of it. "This closes as much as I have to impart under ber but 1 of the directed repeat- ered by Y sent a eld, and ; ground i STATEMENT OP MR. HUSH. 281 your letter. Accept the little it amounts to as mv willing contribution to your call, and with it my re- spectful and cordial salutations. "RiciiAiiD Rush. " Colonel J. S. "Williams, Washington." t. llx. lould to for wip- 3 enemy L inroad, he field, bscrving sing the y whose 3 enemy der this it I was General my with )11, when tlie inci- 10 recol- , though t nearly attempt, rt under 282 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINOTOX. CIIAPTEll XY. The Capitulation of Alexandria. It nnglit Iiave been supposed that the administra- tion would iind some difficulty in producing the im- pression that the success of the enemy, in his invasion, was owing chiefly to the pusillanimity of the troops or of the people. Pusillanimity will hardly Ibe admitted to be either a national characteristic, or one belonging to the people of Virginia and jNIaryland, and there wore but few natives of other states then residino; in the District of Columbia. Both before and after the battle of Bladensburg, at Craney Island and at Baltimore, the people of Virginia and jMaryland proved that they had lost none of the gallantry which distinguished them in the Revolutionary war. AVhy, then, should there have been such a remarkable exhibition of pusil- lanimity in the District, which was peculiarly under the guardiansliip of the general government, and the people of which were pre-eminently blessed in having immediately before their eyes such resplendent exam- ples of more than Roman fortitude, patriotism, and ut- ter disregard of selfish considerations ? But politicians in a free country are seldom deficient in that cunning knowledge of human nature, which, for a time, answers all the purposes of wisdom ; and the administration knew that popular favor, though capri- cious and apt to be misplaced, is thorough-going while it lasts, and, like woman's love, is blind to all faults in sT. THE ADMINISTKATION verSUS ALEXANDRIA. 283 linistra- the iin- ivasion, ■oops or dmitted longing ire were \ in the ,e battle Itimorc, [at they guishcd should )f pusil- '• under and the having : exam- and ut- leficient lich, for md tlie I capri- o' while uilts in the objects of its affections, can reconcile itself to any inconsistencies, swallow any absurdities, and pardon even gross ill usage of itself. They boldly reckoned, therefore, upon the aid of the popular party, so called, to support them in their determination to traduce the people themselves ; and when the men Avhosc own pu- sillanimity had been flagrant and notorious gravely advanced the charge against a portion of the people no more liable to it than any other portion, tlie accusation was accepted at once as an article of political faith, without any in(][uiry into the evidence by which it was supported. Tlie administration had a particular reason for as- sailing the people of iVlexandria, who might have been supposed sufliciently punished by their losses for any pusillanimity which they had exhibited. But the very extent of these losses, which gave them a claim upon the sympathy of the nation, made the administration anxious to arrest that sympathy, lest it should term- inate in censure of themselves. The property de- stroyed in Washington belonged chiefly to the public, so that individuals were very little injured by its de- struction, and the enemy was not at all benefited. lUit the citizens of Alexandria were individually suf- ferers to a large amount, and the enemy escaped with a valuable booty. Reasons of state, therefore, and the good of party required that the people of Alexandria should be vilified as the authors of their own suffer- ings, and the cause of the enemy's triumph and gain. On the 29th of August, the Secretary of the Navy addressed a letter to Commodore nodjxers, then in Baltimore, informing him that " the terms of capitula- 'f 1 )) m I 'I ■■! 284 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. tion for the town of Alexandria are so degrading and humiliating as to excite the indignation of all classes of people." A few days afterward appeared the Pres- ident's proclamation, in which he states that the people of Alexandria had "inconsiderately cast themselves upon the justice and generosity of the victor." Both the extract of the letter to Commodore Ilodo:ers and the proclamation -were published on the 10th of Sep- tember in Niles's Register, a paper friendly to the ad- ministration, the editor of which, in the course of his comments, observed that "tlie conduct of the Alexan- drians was base and pusillanimous, so as to excite rather the contempt tlian the pity of their country- men." This was just the impression that the admin- istration desired to create. The proclamation was astutely worded, so as to in- sinuate the charge instead of advancing it directly. It states that the enemy took advantage of the loss of a fort "more immediately guarding" the town of Alex- andria. More immediately than what? There is nothing in the paper to explain tliis jihraseology, which was, no doubt, purposely left indefinite, in order that ignorant readers miglit infer that Alexandria had a va- riety of important defences more or less distant, but that this particular fort was a Gibraltar in the imme- diate neighborliood of the town. General Wilkinson, who knew the place well, and was a competent judge of its strength, represents Fort AVashington, which is situated about six miles below Alexandria, on the Maryland side of the river, as being "a mere water battery of twelve or fifteen guns, bearing upon the channel in the ascent of the river, but useless DEFENX'ES Or ALEXANDKIA. 285 ng and classes c Prcs- ! people iiselves Both ors and of Scp- tlie ad- ; of his A.lexan- ) excite loimtiy- adrain- LS to in- ktly. It Dss of a f Alex- here is , which :ler tliat ad a va- ant, but imme- ell, and its Fort s below IS being bearing useless the moment a vessel had passed. This work was seated at the foot of a steep acclivity, from the summit of which the garrison could have been driven out by musketry ; but this height was protected by an octag- onal block-house, built of brick, and of two stories al- titude, which, being calculated against musketry only, could have been knocked down by a twelve-pounder."* This was its condition in July, 1813. On the 25th of July, 1814, just a month before the battle of Bla- dcnsburg, the officer in charge of the fort, as it appears from the documents appended to the report of the com^ mittee of investigation, reported to General A\'indcr "the defenceless situation'' of the post; and at the suggestion of the general, the War Department con- sulted an engineer on the subject, Vvdio reported that " the whole original design was bad, and it is there- fore impossible to make a perfect work of it by any alterations." Perfection being unattainable, and the word impossible forcing itself into the military vocab- ulary in spite of the sneers of the secretary, a despe- rate effort was made to come as near as practicable to perfection, and accordingly "a couple of hands were ordered" down to the fort to execute the necessary re- pairs, ao doubt they did all that two men could do under tli' circumstances. On the 19th of August, after the news of the landing at Benedict had been re- ceived in Washington, and the British squadron was known to be ascending the Potomac, General Winder addressed a letter to the Secretary of War, in which he suggested that vessels should be sunk in the Poto- mac at Fort Washington to obstruct the navigation, * Wilkins^on, vol. i., p. 735. 286 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. and that the garrison should be re-enforced, hut it does not appear that any attention was paid to either sug- gestion. On the 20th of August, according to the statement of the Secretary of the Navy, General Win- der expressed to him the opinion that Fort \yashington was not tenable. On the night of General Winder's retreat to the city, after the battle of Bladensburg, he sent directions, he says, to the officer commanding the fort, " in the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort by the enemy, to blow up the fort and retire across the river." Three days after receiving these directions, the officer in command, on the enemy's squadron appearing off tlie fort, called a council of war, and by their advice abandoned the fort, blowing up the magazine. The garrison, it appears from the official report, did not then exceed sixty men. Such was the mighty fortress '•'"more immediately guarding" the town of Alexandria. What other Gib- raltars of a similar description guarded it less immedi- ately we have not been able to learn. The "oldest inhabitant" has no recollection of any. From a memorial addressed to Congress by the cit- izens of Alexandria, called forth by the abuse lavished upon them by those who were anxious to conciliate the favor of the men in power, it appears that, so far back as May, 1813, the common council of the city had sent a deputation to the President to apprise him of the defenceless state of the town ; and the reply which they received was, that their representations would be properly attended to, but that it was " im- possible to extend protection to every assailable point of the country." Tlie truth of this remark was unde- ■ f tl NO ASSISTANCE AFFORDED TO ALKXANDKIA. 2S7 niable, but it Avas not altogether relevant, as there is a Avidc cliiference between the expediency and practica- bility of protecting all assailable points and protecting important points likely to be assailed. As may be supposed, no results followed from this application. Little or nothing was done toward the defence of the capital itself, and it is therefore not surprising that Alexandria was wholly neglected. The corporation of Alexandria, however, appropriated fiiteen hundred dollars out of their own funds to pay for mounting some cannon which were in the town, and which had been in the use of the militia while under the state government. The memorialists state also that "In the month of May, 1813, a deputation from Alexandria, Washington, and Georgetown had an in- terview with the Secretary of War relative to the de- fenceless situation of the District. The committee did urge that a more sufficient defence might be afforded for the District than then existed. It was particular- ly urged upon the secretary that the fortifications at Fort Washington, commonly known by the name of Fort Warburton, should be increased. In consequence of this representation, the government sent an engineer to examine the fort, who, on the 28th of May, 1813, reported to the War Department, as the result of his examination, that an additional number of heavy guns at Fort Warburton, and an additional fort in the neigh- hood, are both to be considered necessary. Notwith- standing the repeated solicitations of the citizens of Alexandria in the year 1813, nothing was done toward its defence except sending an engineer to examine the 288 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. If i .; ' I :l'1 fort. In silence did Alexandria submit to this neaiect of their safety until the month of July, 1814, when the common council again endeavored to procure an adequate defence. Gentlemen acting under the au- thority of the cor2)oration in the month of July waited upon the military commander of the 10th District with the view of ascertaining what measures of defence had been taken or were intended to be adoi)ted for the de- fence of the town of Alexandria and District. The general, who seemed to be anxious to do his duty as far as the means within his control would enable him, stated to those gentlemen the number of militia he ex- pected would join him, and which seemed to be all the defence he calculated upon. This w^as a species of defence which would certainly be of no use against an attack by water. It is too obvious that the town of Alexandria could not be defended in any other man- ner than by a proper fort or forts below it, with a com- petent garrison. The general commanding the 10th Military District visited Alexandria. The mode of defending it from a water attack was pointed out to him. To adopt it required money. This he was not furnished with. This difficulty, however, was removed by the offer of three of the banks in Alexandria to loan the government fifty thousand dollars for the purpose of erecting proper defences for the District, which loan was accepted, and the money paid to the government. No steps were taken toward securing the town from attack by water, but it was left to be defended at the fort by a garrison not exceeding eighty [sixty] men." But the people of Alexandria were not merely left without any assistance from the general government. * NARRATIVE OF THE CITY COUNX'IL. 289 neglect i, when 2ure an the au- r waited •ict with snce had the de- t. The duty as ble him, a he ex- le all the )ecies of jainst an town of ler nian- li a com- the 10th mode of d out to was not removed a to loan purpose lich loan 3rnment. wn from ;d at the jr] men." irely left ernraent. All tlic means upon which they might have calculated to make even a show of resistance were taken from them, for the purpose of aiding in the defence of the capital. The condition in which they were left, and the innncdiate causes of the capitulation, arc succinct- ly, and without exaggeration, set forth in tlic following extract from tlic narrative unanimously concurred in by the city council, and published by their order a few days after the appearance of the Trcsident's proclama- tion : " On the lOtli of August a levy en Quassc was made of the militia of the town and county of Alexandria, and on the 20th and 21st they were ordered to cross the Potomac, and stationed between Piscataway and Fort Warhurton. They took with them all the artil- lery which had been mounted at the expense of the corporation, except two twelve-pounders, whicli were left without ammunition, and nearly all the arms be- longing to the town. They left no men hut the ex- empts from age and other causes, and a few who had not reported themselves, or had found substitutes, and it is not believed that, after their departure, one hund- red effective armed men could have been mustered in town. The two iron twelve-pounders remained until the 25th, when, Alexandria being open to the enemy, then in full possession of Washington, they were re- moved at some distance from the town by orders re- ceived from General Young. "On the night of the 24tli the Alexandria militia were ordered to recross the Potomac ; they did so, and were marched through town, without halthig, into the country, and without givinp; information to the autlior- :\' i i :i >: 290 INVASION AND CAPTUUE OF WASHINGTON. r ' It i.MI I m ities or inhabitants of the place of their destination ; and on the evening of the 27th, when the fleet aj)- proached, the municipal authorities of the town knew not where they were. It has since appeared that they were t/ie?i stationed about nineteen miles from town, by the orders of General Winder. It is here proper to state, that General Winder, on tlic morning of the 24th, informed the members of the committee of vigi- lance, who waited on him, that he could send no part of the forces with him to Alexandria, but that he had ordered General Young to cross over to Alexandria, if practicable ; if not, to fall down the river. The com- mittee of vigilance, on receiving this information, sent boats over to the Maryland shore sufficient in number to bring over the whole of General Young's force at once ; but when the boats reached him, he had received orders from the Secretary of War to retain his position, as General Young, in a communication to the mayor, stated. " The committee of vigilance, despairing of obtain- ing any assistance from the general government, and having information of the rapid approach of the enemy toward the capital by land, and that their squadron was approaching Alexandria by water, deemed it their duty to recommend to the common council a resolu- tion to tlie following effect : ' That, in case tlie British vessels sliould pass the fort, or their forces approach the town by land, and there should be 7io sufficient force^ on our part, to oppose them with any reasona- ble prospect of success, they should appoint a commit- tee to carry a flag to the officer commanding the ene- my's force about to attack the town, and to procure (, Mill MOTIVES OF CAPITULATION. 291 lation ; 2et ap- 1 knew at tliey I town, proper : of the of vigi- no part he had dria, if le com- )n, sent number ibrce at •eceived osition, mayor, obtain- nt, and enemy piadron it their resohi- British iproaeh (Jjidcnt casona- :omm it- he one- procure the best terms for the safety of persons, houses, and property in their power. This recommendation was made on the day of the battle of Bladensburg, and on the same day was unanimously adopted by the com- mon council. " Tlie battle of Bladensburg having terminated in the defeat of our troops, and General Winder having been obliged to retreat from the capital toward Mont- gomery Court House, about fifteen miles to the west of it, the City of Washington was left in the entire possession of the enemy. The citizens of Alexandria saw nothing to impede the march of the British to their town ; saw nothing to restrain *tlicm from com- mitting the most brutal outrages upon the female por- tion of society, having neither arms nor men to make defence with. The President of the United States and the heads of the departments were absent, and it was not known wlierc they were to be found ; no military commander or officer of tlie general government was present to direct or advise." 'J'he British squadron reached Alexandria on the evening of the 28th of August. It consisted of two frigates, one of 38 and the other of /JG guns ; two rocket ships of 18 guns each ; two bomb siiips of 8 guns each, and a schooner of 2 guns. This force was arranged along tlic town, a few hundred yards from the wharves, so as to command the place from one ex- tremity to the other, the houses being so situated that tliey might have been laid in ashes in a few minutes. There was no possible means of defence or resistance ; for even if the old men, women, and children, who were left in the town, had wrought themselves up to ;: 'I' ii i'l [II, li! -f' uiij 292 INVASION AND CAPTUIIE OF WASHINGTON-. tliG pitcli of desperate valor whicli the admiiiistratiou had established in theory as the proper standard for the times, and resorted to pitchforks, pokers, tongs, and Ibrick-bats, all these would have availed nothing against a bombardment by a naval force. The asser- tion, therefore, that under these circumstances the in- habitants "cast themselves" ujDon the mercy of the victor is a deliberate misstatement, for those who ut- tered it knew well the facts of the case. The inhab- itants did not "cast themselves," but were cast upon the mercy of the victor, and not through any fault or neglect of their own, but of those by whom the impu- tation was originated. The only (question, therefore, is, whether they were inconsiderate in appealing to the clemency of the vic- tor. The mere fact of making terms with a victorious enemy can not be regarded as inconsiderate or disgrace- ful in itself, except by those chivalrous spirits whose unconquerable valor would prompt them to bury them- selves and all tliat was dear to them in one common grave ratlicr than give any token of defeat or surren- der. But this extreme valor, however it mav deserve applause, is not exacted by the common sense of man- kind. The folly or disgrace of a capitulation, there- fore, must depend upon the nature of the terms of it. The people of Alexandria well knew the character of the warfare wliich the British had been waging on the shores of the Chesapeake. The proclamation it- self adverts to the notorious excesses of the enemy. All that the authorities of Alexandria had in view by a capitulation was to avert from tlieir fellow-townsmen the outrages which had been connnitted elsewhere. i M 'hi MOTIVES OF CAPIirLATION. 2U3 The object of the leading men of the town was, not to protect tlie interests of the wealthier classes, for it was their property chiefly w^hich was surrendered by the capitulation, and their families had been or could be easily removed to a safe distance, but to save their poorer fellow-citizens, and their wives and daughters, from the consequences which would have ensued from exposing them to the lust and brutality of drunken seamen. It would, no doubt, better have suited the purposes of the administration if the scenes of IIam2)ton had been renewed at Alexandria, as the public indignation would then have been concentrated upon the enemy. But the capitulation had the effect of preventing this, and of saving the inhabitants of the town from wanton injury in person or property, while at the same time it gave tlie enemy no advantnges which he would not have enjoyed without it.* Some of the conditions of * " Tkrms of Capitt'LATION presented h\j the Commander of the liritish sijiKulron to die nut/tor ilics at Akjandria: "The town of Alexamlria (with the exception of ))u1ilir works) shall not be destroyed, unless hostilities are coninienced on the part of the Americans, nor shall the inhabitants he molested in any man- ner whatever, or their dwelling-houses entered, if the following arti- cles arc complied witli : " AuTici.K 1. All naval and ordnance stores (}»ublic and private) must be immediately given u]). '"Art. 2. Possession will be immediately taken of all the ship- ping, and their I'lirniturc must be sent on board by their owners with- out delay. " Art. 3. The vessels which have been stnik must be delivered up in the state they were in on tiie lltth of August, the day of tho scpuulrou passing the Kettle Bottoms. " Art. 4. Merchandise of every description must be instantly de- livered uji, and to prevent any irregularities that might be conuuitted f i: i ( i I i'-i' 294 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. it, which it was impracticable to comply with, were at once waived by the British commander, and the result was, according to the narrative of the council, that " the depredations of the enemy, with a few excep- tions, were confined to flour, cotton, and tobacco, which they carried off in some of the vessels then at the town. Only one vessel was burnt ; no private dwell- ing was visited or entered in a rude or hostile manner, nor were citizens personally exposed to insult." The censure bestowed on the authorities of Alex- andria for this capitulation was too manifestly and grossly unjust to meet the concurrence of General Armstrong, imbittcred as his feelings were against the people of the District, and liable as he was himself to more or less censure for the defenceless condition of the town. After a brief mention of the occurrence in his " Notices," etc., he says, " It will not be thought extraordinary that, in choosing between total and par- tial ruin, there should be little, if any hesitation on the in its embarkation, the merchants have it on their option to load the vessels generally employed for that purpose, when they will be towed off" by us. " Art. r>. All merchandise that has been removed from Alexan- dria since the 19th instant is to be included in tlie above articles, " AuT. G. Refreshments of every description to be supplied tho ships, and paid for at the market i)rice by bills on the British gov- ernment. " Art. 7. Officers will 1)e appointed to see that the articles Nos. 2, 3j 4, and 5 are strictly complied with, and any deviation or non- compliance on the part of the inhabitants of Alexandria, will render this treaty null and void. " James A. Gordon, "Captain of his majesty's ship Sea-Horse." Of these articles Nos. li and .1 were protested against by the au- thorities of Alexandria, and were not enforced. I OPERATIONS ON THE POTOMAC. 295 13 part of a defenceless town, the male population of which did not then exceed one hundred combatants.* After the capitulation of Alexandria, measures were adopted hy the government to hurry the departure of the enemy's squadron and annoy it on its passage down the river. A large body of seamen was brought from Baltimore, and placed under the command of Commodores Eodgers, Perry, and Porter, and Captain Creighton, of the Navy. Conniiodore Kodgcrs, with boats and fire vessels, attacked and annoyed the rear of the enemy's squadron. Commodore Porter, assist- ed by Captain Creighton and other naval officers, es- tablished a battery at " the White House, ''f on the right bank of the Potomac, and Commodore Perry another on tlie left bank, at a place called "Indian Head." They were both assisted by militia of the District and of Virginia, who behaved well enough to show that, under the lead of men in whom they had confidence, every reliance could be placed on them.- Commodore Porter, in his report to the Secretary of the Navy, says, " Tlie intrepidity of Captain Griffith, of the Alexandria artillery, his officers and men, merit t!ic highest eulogiums. They fought their six-pound- crs until their anmiunition was expended, and coolly retired with their guns, when ordered to do so, under a shower of the enemy's shot ;" and he further re- marks, " The militia who came under my immediate ♦ Vol. ii., p. 133. t Since tlie coiupletion of tliis work, the author has received an interestinjf ooniniunication from his friend, Joim S. Gailaher, Esq., late Third Auditor of the U. vS. Treasury, who served as a private in a company of Virjjinia volunteers durinj? the action at the ^Vhito House, it will ho found in the Appendix, No. VI. r f 1^1^ •il I mi > } A ;! It ! 1 1 ' 1 1 ; r i h ll '1 296 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON. notice, and were attached to my command, voluntarily or otlierwise, conducted tliemselves in a manner wliicli reflects on them and their country the highest honor. ]Many, before the battle, requested to he j^osted near me, and there was no instance where one offered to retire until I gave the order to retire. '^ Commodore Perry says of the militia under his com- mand at Indian Head : "The field-pieces (six-pounders) under the direction of that excellent officer, Mai'or Peter, of the George- town, and Captain Burch, of the Washington volun- teers, and Captain Lewis, of General Stuart's brigade, kejDt up a very spirited fire. These officers, together with Captains StuU and Davidson, and their brave men, behaved in the handsomest manner, and rendered all the assistance their limited means afforded. " The ammunition of the eighteen-poundcr and of several of the sixes being expended, and the fire of the enemy from two frigates, two sloops of war, two bombs, one rocket ship, and several smaller vessels, being very heavy, it was thought advisable by Gener- al Stuart, ]\Iajor Peter, and myself, to retire a short distance in the rear. This was done in good order, after sustaininfr their fire for more than an hour. Gen- cral Stuart and Colonel Beall were much exposed dur^ ing the whole time of the cannonading. It would be presumption in me to speak in commendation of these veterans ; I can not, however, avoid expressing my admiration of their conduct.'** The amount of damage done to the enemy on his * These reports will be found in Niles's Register, vul. vii., p. 33, iU, 35. DISCHARGE OF THE DISTRICT MILITIA. 2y7 his 4 i passage down the river coukl not be ascertained. Commodore Porter mentions in his report that some of the British ships Avere much crippled ; and a de- serter from the Emyalus frigate stated that on board that vessel five were killed and seven wounded on passing the batteries.* There can be no room for doubt that, had Fort Washington been properly garri- soned, and the channel obstructed, or suitable batteries erected a:; the proper time on the river, the British squadron would never have reached Alexandria. The District troops, under the command of General Smith, having remained encamped until the departure of the British from the Potomac, were mustered for discharge under the following brigade order : " Head-quarters, Camp Hill, Oct. 8th, 1814. '■'Brigade Order. "•It is with great satisfaction that the general an- nounces to the troops of the 1st Columbian Brigade his authority to grant their discharge from their pres- ent term of service. Called as they were into the service of their country at an eventful period, they manifested their patriotism by prompt obedience to the call, and, although of force far inferior, boldly threw themselves in front of an approaching powerful foe, checked his progress so far as rested within their lim- ited means, and yielded the way to him only by orders from superior authority. Such, also, was their con- duct in the perilous hour of conflict; and although the malio-nant tongue of envenomed slander has dared for a moment to asperse their fame, the foul calumny will * Nilos's Repister, vol. vii., p. 123. f \. i 11/ 1 \ < 13 ; ! 298 INVASION AND CAPTURE OF WASHINOTUN. Ibe exposed, and the head of the author v* vered with that disgrace he so well merits. " The enemy has not as yet left our shores. He has but retired, and may again assail us. But the government, desirous to grant such relief as it can conveniently authorize, the troops belonging to this District will, with the exception of officers now on a court-martial, be discharged this day. The alacrity witli Avhicli they have obeyed former orders, and their zeal while in service, are sure pledges that they will be always ready when their country calls. "By order, J.S.Williams, "Brigade-major and Inspector." f ill :I with . He ut the it can ;o this V on a lacrity d their ;y will tor." APPENDIX. Ill I III lit' It ; 4 li. APPENDIX. No. I. NARRATIVE OF GENERAL WINDER, ADDRESSED TO THE CHAIR- MAN OF THE COMMITTEE OF INVESTIGATION. O'Ncalc'?, Sept. 16, 1814. Sm^ — The readiest mode in which 1 can meet the inquiries which you have made, on behalf of the committee of which you are the chairman, will be to give a narrative of my agency as commander of the 10th Military District,*and to accompany it with the correspondence which I have had, by letter, with the general and state governments, and their respective officers, while in that command. Within the few last days of June, and before it was known that my exchange was perfect, although intelligence to that effect was momently expected, I was at the City of Washington, and the Sec- retary of War informed me that it was in contemplation to create another military district, to embrace the country from Rappahan- nock northward, to include the State of Maryland, and that the President intended to vest me with the command of it. On my return to Baltimore I addressed to the Secretary of War copies of the letters herewith transmitted, marked 1 A, 2 A. About the 4th or 5th of July 1 received a letter, a copy of which, marked 1 B, accompanies this, which inclosed an order constitut- ing the 10th Military District, a copy of which is annexed to the letter above referred to. In obedience to the requisition of the letter, I immediately went to Washington and waited on the Secretary of War. He stated to me that, in addition to the garrisons of the several forts within my district, and the detachments of the 36th and 38th infantry then at Benedict, it was contemplated to order a detachment of cavalry, then at Carlisle, under orders to be mounted, amounting to about one hundred and fifty, a company of the 12th, and from ;iu2 APPENDIX. ,1 I ! I IP '^ one to two companies of the lOtli regular infantry, which would be ordered to be collected from their several recruiting rendez- vous, and to march to tlie City of Washington, and that the whole regular force thus to be collected might amount to one thousand or twelve hundred, and that the balance of my command would be composed of militia ; that a requisition was about to be made upon certain states for upward of ninety thousand militia, intended for the del'encc of the maritime frontier of the country, and showed me a blank circular which had been printed, but not filled up, nor sent to the respective governors of the states. I took the liberty of suggesting to the Secretary of War at that time my idea of the propriety of calling immediately into the field at least a portion of the militia intended for my district, and en- camping them in the best position for protecting the probable points at which the enemy would strike if he should invade the district of my command. The secretary was of opinion that the most advantageous mode of using militia was upon the spur of the occasion, and to bring them to fight as soon as called out. I re- turned within a day or two to Baltimore to prepare myself for vis- iting the different parts of my district, and to explore it generally, and particularly those parts of it which might be considered as the approaches to the three principal points of it, to wit, Wash- ington, Baltimore, and Annapolis. My impressions of the necessity of having a respectable force immediately called into the field were strengthened instead of di- minished by subsequent reflection, and I, in consequence, on the 9th of July, addressed the letter to the Secretary of War, a copy of which is herewith sent, marked 3 A. Agreeably to the suggestion contained in that letter, I proceeded to Annapolis to visit the military posts there, and to be ready on the spot, when the governor should receive the requisition, and my- self such instructions as might be thought proper to be given me, to take the most immediate steps to accomplish them. The governor received the requisition, and immediately issued the necessary orders to have the quota required drafted. On the 12th of July the secretary addressed to me a letter (the copy of which is herewith marked 2 B), but which, being directed to Baltimore, did not reach me until after I had been to Upper Marlborough and again returned to Annapolis, where it followed APrExNDlX. 303 nie. I proceeded from Annapolis to Upper Marlborough, and on the 16th addressed two letters to the Secretary ol' War, of which copies are sent, marked 4 A, 5 A. The apprehension that the enemy would proceed up the Patux- cnt and attack the flotilla at Notthigham, in consequence of the re-enforceaient he had just received, gaining strength, I proceeded immediately to Nottingham, instead of going to the Wood Yard as I intended. During the IGth wc received no information of a move- ment of the enemy up the river ; but on the 17th, about 9 o'clock, Mr. Fitzluigh arrived express from the mouth of the Patuxent, and stated that about twenty barges, several frigates, and some small armed vessels were proceeding up the river. I, in conse- quence, wrote a letter to the Secretary of War, a copy of which is herewith sent, marked 6 A, and wrote a note to Brigadier-gen- eral West, of the Maryland militia, advising him to call out the militia of the county. I ordered the detachments of the 36th :md 38th to hasten from the head of South River, by forced marches, to Nottingham. Three companies of the city militia were promptly dispatched in consequence of my letter of the 17th. But by the time these lat- ter had reached the Wood Yard, and the regulars Marlborough, the enemy had entered Hunting Creek, on the Calvert side of the riv- er, had proceeded to Huntingtown, burned the tobacco warehouse, after having taken off the principal part of the tobacco, and v, ere retiring down the river. I halted the city militia at the Wood Yard, and the regulars at Marlborough. In answer to my letter of the 17th from Nottingham, I received the following answer from the Secretary of W^ar, marked 3 B. As soon, therefore, as I ascertained that the enemy had retired to the mouth of the Patuxent, I proceeded to Annapolis to make the req- uisition upon the governor, as directed by the Secretary of War, and thence to Baltimore, to lend my aid and power to draw out the force authorized there. While at Annapolis, I addressed to the Secretary of War the letter dated 20th of July, a copy of which is sent, marked 7 A, and at the same time made the requisition on the governor, herewith sent, marked 1 C. After remaining at Baltimore a day, and leaving orders to Brigadier-general Stansbury, who had been called on to command the militia to be assembled there, relative to their muster it «)' i 1H 111 ■li I !l 304 APPENDIX. and inspection, under the laws of Congress, I returned to Marlbor- ough to fix upon an encampment for the militia I had required from the governor, and to be more at hand to be informed of the enemy's movements. From Upper Marlborough, on the 23d of July, I wrote to the Secretary of War the accompanying letter, marked 8 A, and then proceeded to the Wood Yard, from whence, on the same day, I wrote to the Secretary of War the following letter, marked 9 A. The enemy still remaining inactive, or, rather, confining him- self to depredations upon the lower parts of the rivers Patux;ent and Potomac, I seized the opportunity of visiting Fort Washing- ton, and on the 25th required from Lieutenant Edwards, the com- manding officer, a representation of what he deemed necessary to complete the equipment of the fort, with its then works, and re- ceived from him a representation, which I inclosed in a letter to the Secretary of War on the 25th, of which copies are sent, mark- ed 10 A. A copy of his answer, marked 4 B, is herewith sent. Learning that some of the enemy's ships were proceeding up the Potomac, I proceeded down to Port Tobacco with a view of as- certaining more precisely his views, and of informing myself of the country, and on the 2Gth wrote the Secretary of War the fol- lowing letter, marked 11 A. Having ascertained the next morning that the enemy's ships had descended the river, I returned to Marlborough, and availed myself of the first opportunity I had to review and inspect the de- tachment of the 36th and 38th, and thence proceeded to Wash- ington City, where I established permanent headquarters of the District on tiie 1st of August. I availed myself of a day at this time to review and inspect the two brigades of District militia in Alexandria and this place, and reported the result to Major-gen- eral Van Ness, commanding the District militia, in the letter here- with, marked No. 1. The people of St. Mary's and Charles's had become extremely sore under the harassing service to which they had been subject- ed, and the devastation and plunder which the enemy had been 80 long committing on their shores ; and the remonstrances of Brigadier-general Stuart, commanding the militia there under the state authority, had become extremely importunate with both the Secrotriry of War and the President to receive aid and protection APPENDIX. 305 from the general government. The danger of throwing a force to llir down into that neck of land, which exposed them to the dan- ger of heing cut off, besides that they would be lost Ibr the defence of Washington, Baltimore, or Annapolis, had hitherto prevented me from pushing any part of my command so low down ; but the President, in conversation, told me that their situaticni rei^uired aid, and directed m-e to move the detachments of the 3Gth and 38th down to unite with and aid General Stuart. I accordingly or- dered Lieutenant-colonel Scott to move from Marlborough to Pis- cataway, and I proceeded directly down myself on the 3d. On the morning of the 4th of August I wrote the following letter from Port Tobacco. marked 13 A, to the Secretary of War, and, agree- ably to the intention therein expressed, proceeded twelve miles below to General Stuart's camp. 1 there Irarned beyond doubt that the enemy had returned down the i:;ver ; and, alter assuring the general of support if they again advanced up tlie river, I re- turned back agahi to the City of Washington, directing Lieutenant- colonel Scott, connnanding the regulars, to take up his encamp- ment at a very convenient place two miles from Piscataway, on the road to the Wood Yard and Marlborough. On my arrival at Washington,! found that the requisition made upon the Governor of Maryland lor three thousand men, to be as- sembled at Bladensburg, had brought to that {Aiico oidv one com- pany ; but I learned that other detaclnnents were about marciiiiig^ to ih?.t. place, and, in order that no delay might occur in organiz- ing and eipiijiping them, I order(!d Major Keyser, of the 38th reg- ular infantry, to proceed to Bladensburg, to nuister, inspect, and drill tlie detachments as they came in. I thence proceeded to Baltimore to ascertain more precisely the cfft'ct of the recjuisition made on Major-general Smith for two thousand iVom his division ; whc!i arrived, 1 found about one tliou- sand two hundred only assembled. I reviewed and inspecte 1 them, and gave Brigadier-general Stansbury orders to endoav; i-, by the most speedy means, to get in the delin(iuents nnd absentees. I liad just learned by a letter from tlie CJovernor of Maryland, and also from (Jenend Smith, that, upon CJeneral Smith's apjilica- (ion to the Secretary of War, h(^ liad detormint'il that the two thousand men now called to Baltimore, and w lueh had been detach- ed under a re(iuisition of the Secretary of War directly on Gen- L ?M APPENDIX. !! I I eral Smith of the 20th of April, were to be considered as part of the quota of Maryland under the requisition of the 4th of July. I had drawn a different conclusion, and had so informed both the governor and General Smith in the visits I made to Annapolis and Baltimore about the 20th of July, immediately after receiving the letter from the Secretary of War of the 17th July, above ex- hibited. In order to supply the deficit in my calculation upon this force, I addressed the letter of the 13th of August to die Secretary of War, of which a copy, marked 14 A, is here presented; pro- ceeded the same or the Ibllowing day to W^ashington by the way uf Annapolis, and on the 17th, at Washington, the day following my arrival, received the letter from the Secretary of War, of which a copy, marked 5 13, is sent. I should have stated that, two days after my return to the City of Washington, about the 6th of August, I received two letters from the Secretary of War, the one dated the 15th, the other the 17th of July, which, having been addressed to me at Baltimore, had followed me backward and forward from place to place, and, unfortunately, only reached me at this late period ; copies of these are herewith sent, marked 6 B and 7 B. I had, in the mean time, addressed the letter of the 6th of Au- gust to the Governor of Pennsylvania, a copy of which is sent, marked 1 D, and upon the 6th, on the receiving the letter of the Secretary of War of the 15th, I wrote another letter to the Gov- ernor of Pennsylvania, of which, from haste or much occupation, I did not take a copy, or have mislaid it; it substantially, however, informed him of the number of militia I was authorized to call from liim, requesting him to hasten their drafting and organization, and to transmit a list of the officers, from brigadiers down, who would command. Should tliis letter be deemed material, a copy can be obtained from the governor, and I have written to procure it. I addressed on the 16th also a similar letter to the Governor of Virginia. On the lOtii or 17th of August T received from the Secretary of State of Pennsylvania an answer, dated the 11th, of which a copy, marked 2 I), is herewith sent; and from the Adju- tant-general of Virginia the answer and inclosures herewith sent, marked E. On the morning of Thursday, the I8th, intelligence was received from the Ob.scrvatory on Point Jjook-out that on the morning of I IS part of 'July. I both the Vnnapolis receiving ibove ex- upon this secretary ed ; pro- the way ollowing of which the City letters )ther the iltimore, ice, and, of these 1 of Au- is sent, !r of the le Gov- upation, owever, all from ion, and :) would can be it. )vernor om the Ith, of I Adju- h sent, ccived ing of APPENDIX. 307 the 17th the enemy's fleet off that place had been re-enforced by a formidable squadron of ships and vessels of various sizes. I immediately made requisitions upon the Governors of Mary- land and Pennsylvania, and to various militia ofliccrs, coi)ics of which are herewith sent, marked as follows : to the Governor of Pennsylvania, 3 D ; to the Governor of Maryland, 2 C ; to Major- general Smith, of Baltimore, 1 F ; to Brigadier-general West, of Prince George's, Maryland, No. 18 ; to Major-general Van Ness, No. 4 ; to Brigadier-giMieral lluiigerford, Virginia, No. 14 ; to * Brigadier-general Douglas and Colonel Chilton, of Virginia, and Brigadier-generals Ringgold, JSwearingen, Barrack, and Foreman, of Maryland, No. 5. Besides the letters and correspondence here referred to partic- ularly, a mass of correspondence occurred with various persons relative to my command, and which, as ttir as 1 suppose they can have any influence on the investigation, are herewith sent. That with the Governor of Maryland will bo found in bundle C, and numbered, in addition to those already mentioned, from 3 C to lie, both inclusive. That with General Smith in bundle F ; and that with other persons, not before referred to, with the numbers before referred to, are cxhitjited from No. 1 to No. 53 inclusive. Much other correspondence necessary to be carried on, artd wliich occupied much time, took place, which, however, is not sent, as I deemed them not calculated to illustrate the inquiry, and only cal- culated uselessly to encumber and embarrass the inquiry. They will be furnished if thought requisite. I will state as nearly as possible the forces which were in the field under these various demands and re(iuisitions, the time of their assemijling, their condition, anci subsequent movements. The returns first made, when I came into command, gave me, Fort M* Henry, under the command of Major Armistead, non-commissioned officers, musicians, and privates, for duty 194 At Annapolis, in Forts Severn and Madison, under Lieu- tenant Fay 39 At Fort Washington, under Lieutenant Edwards 49 The detachments of the 3fitli and 3i^th, and a small detach- ment of artillery under Lieutenant-colonel Scott 330 'CA2 ::C8 APPENDIX. ' h iti ' These corps received no addition, but were gradually diminish- ing by the ordinary causes which always operate to tiiis effect. The two thousand Maryland militia who were ordered to assem- ble at Baltimore had been drai'ted in pursuance of a requisition made by the Secretary of War on General tSmith of the 20th of April, and as full time had been allowed to make the draft de- liberately, they were, as far as practicable, ready to come without delay ; notwithstanding. Brigadier-general Stansbury was unable to Ining to Bladensburg more than one thousand four hundred, in- cludiug officers, and arrived at Bladensburg on the evening of the 2CJd of August. From (rcneral Strieker's brigade in the city of Baltimore, which had been called out en masse, 1 required a regiment of infantry, the battalion of riflemen, and two companies of artillery — not deem- ing it practicable to reconcile the jjcoplc of Baltimore to march a greater number, and leave it without any force, and being strongly persuaded that the exigency would have drawn in time a greater force from the adjacent country. The detachment from Strieker's brigade, under Colonel Stcrett, arrived at Bladensburg in the night of the 23d of August, and the total amount was nine hundred and fifty-six. The detachment which had been stationed at Annapolis, under Colonel Hood, and which had been at the moment transferred i)y the Governor of Maryland to my command, arrived at the bridge at Bladensburg about fif'tecn minutes before the enemy appeared, and I suppose were from six to seven hundred strong. I have never had any return of it. The brigade of General Smith, consisting of the militia of the District of Columbia on this side the Potomac, were called out on Thursday, the 18th of August, on Friday were assembled, and on Saturday, the 20th, they crossed the Eastern Branch Bridge, and advanced about five miles toward the Wood Yard. They amounted, I suppose, to about twelve hundred ; a return was never had before they separated from my connnand, as there was not an interval of sufficient rest to have obtained one. CJenerul Young's brigade, from Alexandria, between five and six lunulred strong, crossed the Potomac Saturday or Sunday, th(j 19th or 20th, and took post near Piscataway. The call for three thousand militia, under the requisition of (ho I i i I AlM'ENUiX. ;](i9 lave Jrido-o, ■J 111 no 4th of July, had produced only two hundred and fifty men at the moment the enemy landed at Benedict. In addition to the causes herein heforementioned, the inefficacy of this call is to be attrib- uted to the incredulity of the people on the danger of invasion ; the perplexed, broken, and harassed state of the militia in St. Ma- ry's, Calvert, Charles's, Prince George's, and a part of Anne Arun- del counties, which had rendered it impossible to make the draft in some of them, or to call them from those exposed situations where they had been on duty two months, under the local calls for Maryland. Several other small detachments of Maryland militia, either as volunteers, or under the calls on the brigadiers, joined about the day before the action, whose numbers or commanding officers T did not know. They may have amounted to some four or five hundred. Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman, of the Maryland caviilry, under an order of the Governor of Maryland, with aljout eighty dragoons, arrived at the City of Washington on the 16th of August, on his way to join General Stuart, in the lower part of Charles or St. Mary's County. Under the permission I just then received to accept all the mi- litia then in the field under the State of Maryland, I inforn:ed Col- onel Tilghman that I had no doubt of the governor's sanction, for which I had applied, and recommended him to halt here. lie agreed not only to this, but, by the consent of General Stuart, who happened then to be in the city sick, agreed to take my orders. Lieutenant-colonel Laval, of the United States Light Dragoons, with a small Sijuadron of about one hundred and twenty, who had been mounted at Carlisle the preceding Monday, arrived at Mont- gomery Court House on the evening of the 10th of August, re- ported himself to the war office, and received orders to report to me. He moved on the next morning, and crossed the Eastern Branch. Captain Morgan, with a company of about eighty of the 12th United States Infantry, joined at the Long Old Fields on the evening of the 2'2d. Colonel Minor, from Virginia, arrived at the city on the evening of the 23d with about five hundred men, wholly unanm^d, :uid with- out equipments. I'nder the direction of Colonel Carberry. who 310 APPENDIX. Ill ;| I had been charged with thio subject, they received arms, ammuni- tion, &c., next morning, but not until after the action at Bladens- burg. No part of the 10th had yet arrived. There had been no adjutant or inspector general attached to my command from its commencement. IMajor Hite, Assistant Ad- jutant-general, joined me on the loth of August at Washington, and Major Smith, Assistant Inspector-general, on the 19th. This was the situation, condition, and amount of my force and command. It will be observed that this detail is continued up to the mo- ment of the battle of Bladensburg ; but, as the time at which the different corps respectively joined is stated, it will be readily seen what troops were concerned in the different movements which will now be detailed. The innumerably multiplied orders, letters, consultations, and de- mands which crowded upon me at the moment of such an alarm, can more easily be conceived than described, and occupied me nearly day and night from Thursday, the 18th of August, till Sun- day, the 2 1st, and had nearly broken down myself and assistants in preparing, dispensing, and attending to them. On Thursday evening Colonel Monroe proposed, if I would de- tach a troop of cavalry with him, to proceed in the most probable direction to find the enemy and reconnoitre him. Captain Thorn- ton's troop from Alexandria was detailed on this service, and on 1^'riday morning the colonel departed with them. At this time it was supposed the enemy intended [coming up] the Bay, as one of his ships was alread} in view from Annapolis, and his boats were sounding South Paver. It was Colonel Monroe's intention to have proceeded d'.ect to Annapolis ; but, before he had got without the city, lie received intelligence that the enemy had proceeded up the Patuxcnt, and were debarking at Benedict. He therefore bent his course to that place. By his first letter on Saturday, which reached the President that evening, he was unable to give any precise intelligence, except that the enemy were at Benedict in force. On Saturday, Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman, with his squadron of dragoons, was disnaiol-.d by way of the Wood Yard to fall down upon the enemy, to annoy, harass, and impede their march by APPENDIX. 11 I k s* I every possible means, to remove or destroy forage and provision from before the enemy, and gain intelligence. Captain Caldwell, with his troop of city cavalry, was dispatched with the same views toward Benedict by Piscataway, it being wholly uncertain what route the enemy would take if it was his intention to come to Washington. On Sunday I crossed the Eastern Branch, and joined Brigadier- general Smith at the Wood Yard, where Lieutenant-colonel Scott with the 36th and 38th, and Lieutenant-colonel Kramer with the militia from Bhulensburg, had arrived by previous orders. On the road to the Wood Yard I received a letter from Colonel Monroe, of which a copy is sent, marked — , and at about eight o'clock in the evening I received another letter from him, of which a copy is sent, marked — , and in a very short time after he arrived him- t elf, and immediately after Colonel Beall, who had seen a body of the enemy, which he estimated at four thousand (without suppos- ing he iiad seen the whole), enter Nottingham on Sunday evening. Colonel Monroe, being much exhausted, retired to rest. I gave Colonel Beall, on account of his experience, orders to proceed and join Colonel Hood on his march from Annapolis, and take com- mand of the detachment. I occupied the night in writing letters and orders to various officers and persons, and at daylight ordered a light detachment from General Smith's brigade under Major Peter, the regulars under Lieutenant-colonel Scott, and Laval's cavalry, to proceed inmiediately toward Nottingham to meet the enemy. I proceeded immediately in advance myself, accompanied by Colonel Monroe and the gentlemen of my staff. I had learned that Colonel Tilghman, with his cavalry, on the advance of the enemy, had fallen back upon Marlborough the evening before, and had, during the night, sent him an order *o proceed upon the road from Marlborough to Nottingham, and meet at the Chapel. Hav- ing got considerably in advance of Lieutenant-colonel Scott's and Major Peter's detachment, and also to obtain intelligence, I halted at^Ir. Oden's. within half a mile of the junction of the roads from I\IarlborouGfh and the Wood Yard to Nottingham, directing Laval to gain the Marlborough roud, post himself at the Chapel, and push forward patrols upon all the roads toward Nottingham, In less than half an hour, and before the detachments of Scott and Peter U I :]\2 APrENDIX. li;ul come up, intelligence was brought that the enemy was inoving on Ironi Nottingham in force toward the Cliapel. I immediately proceeded, with the gentlemen who were with me, to gain an ob- servation of the enemy, and came within view of the enemy's ad- vance about two miles below the Chapel. The observation was continued until the enemy reached the Chapel, and Scott and Peter being then near two miles distant from that point, and it being therefore impossible for them to reach the junction of the Marlbor- ough and Wood Yard road before the enemy, I sent orders for them to post themselves in the most advantageous position, and wait for mc with the body of the cavalry. I turned into the road to the Wood Yard, and detached a small party, under Adjutant- general Ilite, on the Marlborough road, to watch the enemy's movements on that road and give information. Upon arriving at Odcn's, himself or some other person of the neighborhood whom I knew, and on whom I could rely, inibrmed me that there was a more direct road, but not so much frequented, leading from Not- tingham to the Wood Yard, and joining that on which I then was, and two miles nearer the Wood Yard. A doubt at that time was not entertained by any body of the in- tention of the enemy to proceed direct to Washington, and the ad- vantage of dividing their force, and proceeding on two roads, run- ning so near each other to the same jjoint, so obvious, that I gave orders to Scott and Peter to retiir, and occupy the fast eligible position between the junction of that road and the one we were on and the Wood Yard ; dispatched a patrol of cavalry to observe that road, and give the earliest notice of any advance of the en- emy upon it. I still continued the observation of the enemy my- self, and he turned a part of his colunm imo the road to the Wood Yard, and penetrated a skirt of wood which hid the junction of the Marlborough and Wood Yard road from view, and there halted it, within a quarter of a mile of Odcn's house. I hesitated for some time whether to attribute his delay to a view which he may have had of Scott's and Peter's detachments, or to a design to conceal his movement toward Marlborough, the road to that place being concealed by woods from any point of observation w hich could be gained. It appeared afterward that his whole force halted there for an hour or upward, and thus continued in an uncertainty as to his APl'ENDIX. »> 1 o US moving mediately I in an ob- emy's ad- ation was and Peter d it being 3 IVIarlbor- orders for sition, and o the road Adjutant- D enemy's arriving at lood whom lere was a from Not- [ then was, M V of the in- md the ad- roads, run- that I gave rst eligible tve were on to observe of the en- cnemy my- 3 the Wood ction of the re halted it, Dd for some 3 may have to conceal place being ch could be here for an y as to his inteiuU-'J route. 1 had, in the moan time, rode l)ack and as.si.sted I'ctcr and .Scott to post their detachments in ;i iUvorablo position, from uhcncc I entertained a hope to have given the enemy a seri- ous check, '"'thout much risk to this detachment. Orders had been previoi, y sent to General ISmith to post his wh(»lc detach- ment in conjunction with Commodore Barney, who hrul by this tiine joined him 'rom Marlborough with about four hundred sail- ors and marines, and had taken also command of the marines un- der Captain xMiller, who had arrived from the city the night be- fore. I presumed, from the appearance of this force, it was about one hundred or one luuulred and twenty. As soon as I had sat- isfied myself as to the position and disposition of Scott's and Pe- ter's detachments, 1 advanced again toward the enemy to ascer- tain his i-ituation and intentions. It had now become certain that he had taken the road to jNlarlborougli, ancLColonel Monroe cross- ed over to that place to join Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman, and ob- serve his movements. I sent an order immediately to Scott and Peter to retire back to General Smith, and the latter to take post at the point where the roads from ^V^ashingt{)n City and the ^Vood Yard to Marlborough unite. This order was incorrectly delivered or misutiderstood, and he took post instead at the point where the roads from the "Wood Yard and Marllxu-ongh to the City of Washington unite. The mistake, howi'vcr, produced no inconvenience, but, on the contra- ry, was perhaps better than the position to which 1 had directed, because it threw my force more between Marlborough and Bla- densburg, and also in command of the road by which the enemy did finally advance, which the other position wouhl not have done. Its inconvenience was that it left open the road to Fort Washinu'-- ton, and rendered General Young's junction, if it should become proper to advance him, hazardous on that road. It further became necessary to retire still further back, and the only position where the troops could be tolerably accommodated, or posted to advant- age, was at Dunlap's, or, as it is generally called, the Long or Bat- talion Old Fi(dds. (General Smith was therefore ordered to retire to that point with the whole of the troops except the cavalry, liieutenant-colonel Tilghman and f';ipt:iin Herbert were cliargtMl with hovering upon llie enenjy on all the roads leading from Bladensburg, from the o ;U4 AITENDIX. %f north, and from Annapolis, to i\Iarlborough. With Laval's caval- ry I advanced to the nearest and most convenient positions be- tween the Wood Yard and Marlborough, and Ibund the enemy quietly halted at Marlborough. Tilghman's cavalry picked up one or two prisoners who had straggled beyond the enemy's pick- ets, and my examination of the; ,i confirmed me that the enemy did not contemplate leaving Marlborough that day. After remaining near Marlborougli in observation till toward the latter part of the afternoon, I returned to General Smith, where I arrived toward the close of the day. About dark 1 learned that the President and heads of departments had arrived at a house about a mile in the rear of the camp. 1 detached a captain's guard to his quarters, advanced the cavalry of Laval on the roads toward Marlborough, with orders to patrol as close upon the ene- my as possible during the course of the night ; and, after having waded through the iufmitc applications, consultations, and calls necessarily arising fio.n a body of two thousand five hundred men, not three days from vheir homes, witlrout organization or any practical knowledge of service on the part of their officers, and being obliged to listen to the officious but well-intended informa- tion and advice of the crowd, who, at such a time, would be full of both, I lay down to snatch a moment of rest. A causeless alarm from one of the sentinels placed the whole force liOfier arms about three o'clock in the morning. A short time after sunrise I rode over to the quarters of the President to in- form him and the Secretary of War of the state of things. Upon my return, rumors prevailed that the enemy had taken the road to Queen Anne, which was directly leading to Annapolis. I could not, however, suppose that Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman and Cap- tain Herbert would fail to advise me if the Aictwere so. The ru- mor, however, gained ground, and just at this time Mr. Luffbor- ough, of this city, with some fifteen or twenty mounted men, offer- ed himself ready to perform any duties on which I could employ them. I immediately dispatched him to ascertain the truth of this report, by penetrating to that road, and also to obtain whatever information he could relative to the enemy. About twelve o'clock he sent me decisive information that the enemy were not on the Annapolis road. T received constant intelligence that the enemy still remained in |i I APPENDIX. ?Ao al's caval- iitions be- lie caemy picked up my's pick- cuemy did toward the :h, where I turned that at a house a captain's n the roads ^n the ene- fter having i, and calls indred men, ion or any >friccrs, and ed informa- ould be full .1 the whole A short sidcnt to in- ngs. Upon the road to IS. 1 could in and Cap- The ru- ^Ir. Luffbor- mcn, oflfer- ould employ le truth of in whatever Ive o'clock not on the remained in I • parutoi s to a general and tlie information lo enemy intended no solved to endeavor to IMarlbornr and, ihci ii)re, felt no doubt »'vit, '•"'•. intended to take the i.. . , "o Ann: .ilis, an ^t^ivcmc upon ih .l road was only an advance party fur nbsci - iiH, and i movement; and as the morni advanci brought still confirmed the impr- ssion thiii movement ironi Upper Marlborough, I i' concentrate the force (which, I hoped, had now considerably ac- cumulated within my reach) down upon the enemy's lines nenr Marlborough. I accordingly ordered a light detachment to be sent forward by General Smith, under Major Peter ; and having also learned by Major Woodyear, of General Stansbury's stalT, that he had arrived the evening before at Bladensburg, I sent orders to him to advance toward Marlborough, and to take post at the point where the Old Fields to Quecii Anne crosses the road from JBladensburg to Marl- borough, which brought him within four miles of the Old Fields, and within from six to eight of the enemy. I was anxiously waiting to hear of Lieutenant-colonel IJeall's progress with the detachment for Annapolis, and of Lieutenant-colonel Sterett's from Baltimore. The President and heads of departments had been on the field since about eight o'clock. I communicated my views and inten- tions as above detailed, and informed them that I proposed my- self to pass over the road from Bladensburg to Marlborough, to meet General Stansbury, to make closer observations upon the road direct from the enemy to Bladensburg, and to establish more thor- oughly a concert between Stansbury and Smith's command ; to be also nearer to Beall, to give him also a direction toward the ene- my on the road leading into Marlborough from the north, if my intelligence should continue to justify it, and to draw down Lieu- tenant-colonel Sterett, with his force, as soon as I should ascertain where he was. I accordingly, with a troop of Laval's cavalry, proceeded about twelve o'clock. Upon arriving at the Bladensburg road, I halted, and pushed a patrol of cavalry down toward Marl- borough. In a few minutes after, three of Captain Plerbert's troop, who were observing down the same road, arrived with two prisoners, whom they had just seized in a very bold and dexterous manner. The information of these prisoners confirmed the impression that ' :!i ;>iG APPENDIX. i : I i'i* » ;i) if ill li tlio LMieiny did not iiilond to move from Miirlbormigli tliat day ; and, as it was now one o'clock, 1 ielt lillle doubt of it. Ai'ter ro niaiiiiiig home time Ibr iiitelliyciiee Irom the United States dra- goons tliat 1 liad sent down with orders to press down a.s closely as possible upon tlie eiuany, a sliglit firing was heard in the direc- tion of the enemy, which 1 concluded was from the enemy's picket upon this i)arty. A few minutes confirmed this conjcrtuie by the return of a dragoon with this intelligence. A more coiisiderable firing was then, however, heard, which 1 concluded to be a skir- mishing by Peter's detachment with the enemy, put upon the alert and advance by the firing at the dragoons. The firing soon after ceased, and after having sent for the pur- pose of ascertaining the fact, w ith directions to Ibllow with intel- ligence on toward IMadcnsInirg, in which direction I proceeded, with the expectation of meeting General .Stansbury, and with the intention to halt him until my intelligence should decide my fur- ther proceedings. I had proceeded within four or five miles of Bladcnsburg with- out meeting General Stansbury, when I was overtaken by Major M'Kcnney, a volunteer aid with General Smith, who informed mo that Peter had skirmished with the advancing enemy, who had driven him back on General Smith, and that the enemy had halt- ed within three miles of the Old Fields ; that, agreeably to my di- rection upon the probability of an attack, General Smith had sent off the baggage across the Eastern Branch, and that himself and Commodore Barney had drawn up the forces ready to receive the enemy, should he advance. On my way toward Bladensburg I had led orders with Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman's cavalry to continue their observation on the Bladensburg and Marlborough roads, and in ease the enemy should move on that road, to give General Stans- bury immediate notice and fall back on him. In proceeding to the Old Fields, I met Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman himself, and renewed these directions. Captain Herbert was also between General Stansbury and the enemy with the same instructions. When Major M'Kenncy gave me the intelligence of the advance of the enemy, I dispatched an aid to General Stansbury with di- rections to him to fall back and take the best position in advance of Bladensburg, and unite Lieutenant-colonel Sterctt with him should he arrive at Bladensburg, as I expected, that evening ; and should APPENDIX. .-,17 ioli tli;iL day ; it. Allcr 10 d Stales dra- wn ah> closely 1 111 the dircc- nciuys picket jci'tiMC by the i cdiisiderable to bo a skir- upou the alert nt for the pur- L)\v willi iiitel- i I proceeded, , and with the ecidc my fur- cnsburfT with- kea by Major inlbrmed me }my, who had emy had halt- ably to my di- mith had scut It himself and to receive the Icnsburg I had ry to continue igh roads, and General Stans- prococding to 1 himself, and also between istructions. of the advance sbury with di- in advance of ith him should g ; and should ho be attacked, to resist as long as possible, and if ol)Iig('d to re- tire, to retreat tow;ircl the city. 1 reached the Old Fields about five o'clock in the altenioon, and found General Smith and (Jommodore IJarney had judiciously posted their men in expectation of the enemy, and were expecting his approach. The head of the enemy's column was about three miles from our position, and five miles from l\larll)orough. Ho must have reached that point by or before three o'clock, and his halt there at that peri(j(l of the day, so short a distance from Marl- borough, and apparently only drawn out by my j'arties pressing upon him, and at a point from whence he could take the road to Bladensburg, to the Eastern Branch Bridge, or Fort Washington indill'ereutly, or it might be to cover his march upon Annapolis, to which place he had strong temptations to proceed. His force was very imperfectly known, the opinions and representations va- rying from four to twelve thousand ; the better opinion fixed it from five to seven thousand. If he supposed his force insufiicient to proceed to Washington, and further re-enforcements were ex- pected, which all information concurred to state, the natural con- clusion was that he would seek some place where he could in se- curity refresh his men, and place them in comfortable quarters near a convenient port for his ships, and whence, upon receiving re-en- forcements, he would be ready to act against the important points of the ct)untry. Having, therefore, already accomplished one great ol)jcct of the expedition — the destruction of Commodore Barnev's flotilla — if he was not in a condition to proceed further into the country, Annapolis olfered him a place in all respects such as he would desire. It brought him to a fine port, where his ships could lie in safety ; it afi'orded abundant and comfortable quarters for his men ; magazines and store-houses for all his stores and muni- tions of every description ; was capable, with very little lalior, of being rendered impregnable by land, and he commanded the wa- ter ; it was the nearest point of debarkation to the City of Wash- ington, without entering a narrow river liable to great uncertainty in its navigation from adverse winds, and was at hand to Balti- more ; equally threatening these two great points, and rendering it absolutely necessary to keep a force doul)ly sufiicient to resist him — one for the protection of Washington, the other for Baili- more. The squadron which was ascending tlie Potomac, and hud APPENDIX. now passed the Kettle Bottoms, the only obstruction in the nav- igation of the river, might be only a leint, the more effectually to conceal their intentions against Annapolis, or, what was more probable, was intended to unite with the land force and co-operate in a joint attack on Washington. It was therefore strongly be- lieved that tlie land force was destined to proceed and take Fort Washington in the rear, where it was wholly defenceless, while it was capable of offering very formidable resistance to the ascent of ships up the river, and, imperfect as it was, perhaps capable of repulsing them altogether. And it was therefore that I sent to General Young, when the force of General Smith fell back to the Old Fields, to take a position so as to protect Fort Washington, and avoid being taken in the rear by the enemy. If the object of the enemy was to proceed direct to W^ashington, the road by Bladensburg offered fewer obstructions than that over the Fiastern Branch Bridge, although it was six miles further ; and yet, if I had retired toward Bladensburg, I should have been re- moved so much further from annoying or impeding the enemy, if he proceeded to Fort Washington, and I should have left the road to Washington City, by the Eastern Branch Bridge, open to him, which, although I had, as I supposed, left a secure arrangement for its destruction, yet the importance of leaving that bridge as long as possible on account of its great value to us, and the danger that, in the multitude of business which was accumulated on everv person during such an alarm, confusion and disorder arising at such a moment, with such raw, undisciplined, inexperienced, and unknown officers and men, rendered it hazardous to trust this di- rect and imi)ortant pass unguarded. It was under all these circumstances that, after waiting for the enemy at the Old Fields till sundown, I determined to retire over the Eastern Branch Bridge, in which Conunodore Barney concur- red, and his force, with mine, pnK-eedcd accordingly. My reasons for not reiuaining attlu; Old Fields during the night was that, if an attack should lie made in the night, our own supe- riority, which lay in artillery, was lost, and the inexperience of the troops woidd subject them to certain, infallible, and irremrdialile disorder, and probably destruction, and thereby occasion the loss < f a full half of the force which I could hope to t)ppose, under more fa- vorable circumstances, to (he enemy. APPENDIX. 319 ion in tlie nav- loro elTectiKilly ,vhat was more and co-operate re strongly be- and take Fort iceless, while it ,0 the ascent of aps capable ol" that I sent to fell back to the rt Washington, to Washington, i than that over cs further ; and I have been re- the enemy, if ,ve left the road je, open to him, re arrangement f that bridge as , and the danger ulated on evew )rder arising at spcricnced, and to trust this di- waiting for the 'd to retire over Harney concur- rly. luring the night , our own supc- "cporience of the nd irremediabh^ ision the loss < f , under more fa- The reasons for retiring by the Eastern Brancl; Bridge were the absolute security it gave to that pass, the greater facility of joniing General Young and aiding in the protection of Fort Wash- ington, tho greater facility of pursuing the enemy should \w n^- cede and proceed to Annapolis, and the certainty that I could draw General Stansbury and Lieutenant-colonel Sterett to me if the en- emy advanced too rapidly for nic to advance, and unite to support them. Under ihc hai-assing and perplexing cmbarrassmenttj arising from having a mass of men suddcidy assembled, witliuut organization, discipliiu', or officers of any, the least, knowledge of service, ex- cept in the c;xse of Major Peter, or, if possessing it, unknown to me as such, and the wearied and exhausted state in which inces- sant application and exertion for nearly five uninterrupted days and nights bad left me, these views olfcred .themselves to my mind, and determined mc to fall back, on Tuesday evening, to the bridg(; instead of J51adensburg. Since the event has passed, and if a movement to Bladensburg, had it been made, would not liavc in- duced the enemy to pursue another course, it is easy to determine that a retreat to Bladensburg nught have been better ; but those who undertake to pass a judgment should place themselves back to the moment and situation I was in when 1 formed the resolu- tion, and it will be very ilillicult to fnul it an error; or if one, it is of that sort which is supported, when viewed in perspective, by stronger reasons than those which oj)pose it, and is only found to be an error by experience, which so often confounds all reason and calculation. Upon arriving at the bridge, about eight o*clock,T directed Gen- eral Smith to halt his men in the most convenient position near the bridge on this side, and I passed over and rode directly to the President's, and informed him of the tbtMi state of thin"s. I had expected I should proliably have l()und the Secretary of War and other heads of departments there; but they had respectively re- tired to th(-ir homes. I returned toward the liridgc, leaving at I\l'lvcowin\s hotel the lM)rrowed horse «)n which I rode. Moth those I had with me iieing exhausted and worn down, and as 1 knew no one who had a horse in a ditlerent .^il nation, 1 proeeede APPENDIX. I proi-ocdcd on to tlio briJire, vvlicro I found aI)Out thirty men witlx axes, for the purpose of eutting the bridge down, and no oth- er preparation for destroying it made. 1 proceeded again to tlie camp, detached a party of vohnitecrs to burn tlie upper bridge nt once, detached a party of rcguhir infantry across tlie bridge, ia advance toward the enemy about half a mile, to prevent bun from seizing it by surprise, and posted liurch's artillery to coumiand the pass of the bridge on this side. I learned at the bridge that some persons from the navy-yard had been to the bridge to take some steps for destroying it ; and knowing that this was the nearest, and the only place, indeed, from whence 1 could draw the powder, boats, and combustibles for the i)m'])0sc of rendering its destruction sure at any moment,! proceeded, accompanied by ]\lajor Cox,of George- town, to ascertain what preparations had been made. I arrived there about twelve or one o'clock, saw C'olonel Wharton, who rc- ll'rred me to Connnodorc Tiagey,to whom I then proceeded, and aroused him from bed. lie informed me that several casks of powder were ready in boats to be sent from the navy-yard to blow up the bridge when necessary, 1 begged him to increase the quantity of powder, to furnish a quantity of combustiljles, also, to be laid upon the bridge, that its destruction, when necessary, in one way or other might be ])Ut beyond doubt. Connnodorc Tingey undertook to have what I requested provided sent witiiout delay to the bridge. I returned to the bridge to sec that the diflerent detachments which I had stationed there were upon the alert, and understood the objects for which they were detached ; and I thcnco returned to the camp between three and four o'clock, uuich ex- hausted, and considerably hurt in the right arm and ankle from a severe fall which I had into a gully or ditch on my wav to the navy-yard. I snatched about an hour or two of sleep, rose, and proceeded to gather my attendants and horses, much exhausted and worn down by the incessant action of the three preceding days, and proceeded to establish my head-quarters at a liouse near the bridge. ]My patrols and vedettes not having yet iirought mo any intelli- gence of a movement of the enemy, and being still doubtful wheth- er he might not move upon Amiapolis, Fort Warburton, or toward the bridge rather than ]}Iadeiisburg, 1 held the iM)sition near the bridge as that which, under all circumstane'cs, woulil enable me APPENDIX. 321 mit thirty ition viijaiul no oili- ;d again to tlvc ppev bridge at tlic bridge, ia ;veiit liim from ) coixmiand tliG idgc that some 3 to take some ;ic nearest, and powder, boats, estruciiou burc *ox,ot'ticorge- de. I arrived larton, who rc- procecded, and ^•eral casks of y-yard to blow J increase the bles, also,to be ;cssary, in one u)dorc Tingey witliont dehiy t the different the aku't, and ; and I tlienco X'k, miicli cx- ivnldo from a ly way to the eep, rose, and ich exhausted roe preceding t a liouse near Tie any intclli- )nl)ll"nl whcth- ton,or toward ition near tlio !d enable mo 't 1 i best to act against the enemy in any alternative. I learned about tbi.s time, with considerable mortilication, that Cuncral .Slaiif-bury, tVom misunderstanding or some other cause, instead of holding a position during the night in advance of Bladensburg, had taken one about a mile in its rear, and that his men, from a causeless alarm, had been underarms the greater i)art of the night, and moved once or twice, and that he was at that moment on his march into the city. I instantly sent him an order to resume his position at Bla- densburg ; to post himself to the best advantage ; make the utmost resistance, and to rely upon my supporting him if the enemy should move npon that road. 1 had, at a very early hour in the morning, detached Cnpiain Graham, with his troop of A'irginia cavalry, to proceed by Bladensburg down upon the road toward tin; enemy, and insure, by that means, tnnely notice to General Stansbury and myselt', should the enemy turn that way. 'With this adilition to the cavalry already on those roads, it became impossible for the enemy to take any steps nnobserved. Achlitional cavalry patrols and vedettes were also detached upon all the roads across the bridge, to insure the certainty of intelligence, let the enemy move as he might. Colonel Minor had also arrived in the city the evening before, with five or six hundred militia from Virginia, but they were with- out arms, accoutrements, or amnmnition. I urged him to hasten his eiiuipment, which I learned was delayed by some difliculty in finding Colonel Carberry, charged with that business ; and lie had not received his arms, &c., when, about ten o'ckudi, I received intelligence that the enemy had turned the head of his column toward Bladensburg. Commodore Barney had, upon my sugges- tion, posted his artdlery to coamiand the bridge early in the morn- ing. As soon as I learned the enemy were moving toward Bladens- burg, I ordered General Smith, with the whole of the troops, to move immediately to that point. The necessary detention arising from orders to issue, interroga- tions and applications to be answered from all puints licMug past, I proceeded on to Bladensburg, leaving the President anil some of the heads of departments at my ([uarters, where they had bein for an hour or more. 1 arrived at the bridge at Bladensburg about twelve o'clock, where <) 2 h • I »'■ Mi I Ilii ;lt' 1 1' ' (ii APPENDIX. I found Lieutenant-colonel Beall had that moment passed with his command, having just arrived iVom Annapolis. 1 had passed the line of Stanbl)iiry".s brigade, formed in the field upon the left of the road, at about a quarter of a mile in the rear of the bridge ; and on the road, a short distance in the rear of Stansburys line, I met several gentlemen, and among the others, I think, ^'Ir. Francis Key, of Georgetown, who informed me that he had thought that the troops coming from the city could be most advantageously post- ed on the right and left of the road near that point. General Smith being present, Mr. Key undertook,! believe, being sent for that purpose, to show the positions proposed. I left General Smith to make a disposition of these troops, and proceeded to the bridge, where I found Lieutenant-colonel Beall, as before stated.* I in- quired whether he had any directions as to his position; he re- plied he had been shown a high hill upon the right of the road, ranging with the proposed second line. It being a conmianding position, and necessary to be occupied by some corps, 1 directed him to proceed agreeably to the instructions he had received. I then rode up to a battery which had been thrown up to command the street which entered Bladensburg from the side of the enemy and the bridge, where I found the Baltimore artillery posted, with the Baiiimore riflemen to support them. Upon inquiry, I learned that General Stansbury was on a rising ground upon the left of his line. I rode immediately thither, and found him and Colonel Monroe together. The latter gentleman informed me that he had been aiding General Stansbury to post his conunand, and wished me to proceed to examine it with them, to sec how far I approved of it. We were just proceeding with this view, when some per- son rode up and stated that the news had just been received of a signal victory obtained by General Izard over the enemy, in which one thousand of the enemy were .slain, and many prisoners taken. I ordered the news to be innnediately communicated to the troops, for the purpose of giving additional impulse to their spirits and * FAnco writiiij; tho iiliovc, I linvc soon floncral 8iiuth, who informs me tlmt Mr. Key Inul bi'iu cxaininiiii; llic (ground.-' willi liiiii,im(l that it was liis vicwri tluit Mr. Key liad bocn Htatinp. lie rame up at the moment Mr. Key had fjiveu nie the information. I liave been under the impression, till tlius rorrected, that it, was tlie riUfifje-tinn of Coliuul Monroe and (ieneral Stansbury that laid .-Uf^g(!sted that iiojition. The rirciiniHtHnce l8 immaterial except for the purpose of literal accuracv when nereHsiirv. APPENDIX. ; passod with liis I hud passed the 311 the left of the the bridire ; and iiry's Hne, I met ;ik, ^'Ir. P>anois lad thought tliat ntagcously post- point. General 3, being sent for : General Sniitli 'd to the bridge, stated.* I in- losition; he re- !Cht of the road, a eommandinnr a 3rps, I directed id received. I up to command e of the enemy ry posted, with [uiry, I learned pon the left of m and Colonel nc that he had id, juid wished far I approved lien some pcr- i received of a icmy, in which isoners taken, to the troops, ur spirits and )niis ino that Mr. IS his views that I'y liiid fjivou ino xtrrocted, that it at liad Fiiggcistcd lurjiosc of literal -i I courage. Tlic column of the enemy at this moment appeared in sight, moving up the Eastern Branch parallel to our position. From the left, where I was, I perceived that if the position of tlio advanced artillery were forced, two or three pieces upon the left of .Stansbi:ry would be necessary to scour an orchard which lay between his line and his artillery, and for another rifle company to increase tlie support of tliis artillery. These were promptly sent forward by General Smith, and post- ed as hastily as possible, and it was barely accomplished before I was obliged to give orders to the advanced artillery to open upon the encmv, who was descending the street toward the bridge. All farther examination or movement was now impossible, and the po- sition where I then was, immediately in the rear of the left of JStansbury's line, being the most advanced position from which I could have any commanding view, 1 remained there. The fire of our advanced artillery occasioned the enemy, who were advancing, and who were light troops, to leave the street, and they crept down under the cover of houses and trees, in loose order, so as not to expose them to risk from tiie shot ; it was therefore only occasionally that an object presented at which the artillery could fire. In this sort of suspension, the enemy began to throw his rockets, and his light troops began to accimiulatc down in the lower parts of the town and near the bridge, but principally covered from view by the houses. Their light troops, however, soon began to issue out and press across the creek, wliich was every where fordalile, and in most places lined willi bushes or trees, which were suffi- cient, however, to conceal the movements of light troops, who act, in the manner of theirs, singly. The advanced riflemen now be- gan to fire, and continued it for half a dozen rounds, when I observed them to run back to the skirts of tlie orchard on the left, where they became visil)le, the boughs of the orchard trees concealing their original position, as also thr )f the artillery from view. A retreat of twenty or thirty yards from their original position to- ward the left brought them in view on the edge of the orchard. They halted there, and seemed for a moment returning to their position; luit in a few minutes entirely broke, and retired to the left of .Stansl)ury's line. 1 immediately ordered the 5th Baltimore regiiiKut, TiieMteiianl-colone' Steret, being the left of St.uisburv's 324 AITENDIX. ill ' m i»i< line, to advance and sustain the artillery. Tlioy promptly com- menced this movement ; but the rockets, which had I'ur tlic first three or four passed very high above the heads of the line, now re- ceived a more horizontal direction, and passed very close above the heads of ►SluiV/Zs and Ragan's regiments, composing the centre and left of tStansbury's line. A universal lliglit of these regiments was the consequence. This leaving the right of the 5tli wholly unsupported, I ordered it to halt, rode swiftly across the field to- ward those who had so shamefully fled, and exerted my voice to the utmost to arrest them. They halted, began to collect, and seemed to be returning to their places. An ill-founded reliance that their officers would succeed in rallying them, when I had thus succeeded in stopping the greatest j)art of them, induced me innuediatcly to return to the 5lh, the situation of which was likely to become very critical, and that position gave me the best com- mand of view. To my astonishment and mortification, however, w hen I had regained my position, I found the whole of these regi- ments (except tliiity or forty of Ragan's, rallied by himself, and as many, perhaps, of Sliutz's, rallied, I learn, by Captain Shower and C':i[)tain , whose name 1 do not recollect) were Hying in the utmost precipitation and disorder. The advance 1 artillery had immediately followed the rillemen, and retired by the left of the 5th. 1 directed them to take post on a rising ground which I pointed out in the re;ir. The 5th, and the artillery on its left, still remained, and I hoped that their fire, notwithstanding the obstruction of the boughs ol'the orchard, which, being below, covered the enemy, would liave been enabled to scour this approach and prevent his advance. The enemy's light troops, by single men, showed themselves on the lower edge of the lelt of the orchard, and received the fire of this artillery and the 5th, which made them draw back. The cover to them was, however, so complete, that they were enabled to advance singly, and take positions from which their fire annoyed the 5th considerably, without eiliier that regiment or the artillery being able to return the fire with any probability of ell'ect. In this situati' n I had ac- tually given an order to the 5th and the artillery to retire up to the hill, toward a wood more to the letl and a little in the rear, for tho purpose of drawing them farther from the orchard, and out of reach of the (MKMuv's (irc^ wliil(> he was sheltered by the orchard. An Ari'i:Ni>ix. 325 promptly com- dd I'ur llic iirst 'c line, now rc- -'losc above the the centre and icso regiments lie 5tii wholly =s the field to- d my voice to collect, and inded reliance I, when I had n, induced me icli was likely the best com- ion, however, ol' these reiri- imself, and as Shower and ilying in the the riflemen, take j)ost on 'I'e 5th, and at their fire, hard, w hich, lied to scour light troops, 13 of the tell imd the 5th, S however, ly, and take insiderahl}^, le to return n I had ac- '■<" up to the car, for the >nt of reach li'ird. An I I" ■A' 1 'i 4 V aversion, however, to retire before the necessity became stronger, and the hope that the enemy would issue in a body from ihe left of the orchard and enable us to act uj)()n him on terms of eijuality, and the fear that a movement of retreat might in raw troops j)ro- duce some confusion and lose us this chance, induced nie instant- ly to countermand the order, and direct the artdlery to fire into a wooden barn on the lower end of the orchard, behind which I sup- posed the enemy might be sheltered in considerable numbers. The fire of the enemy now began, however, to annoy the 5tli still more in wounding several of them, and a strong column of the en- emy having passed up the road as high as the right of the 5th, and beginning to deploy into the field to take them in flank, I directed the artillery to retire to the hill to which 1 had directed the Bal- timore artillery to proceed and halt, and ordered the 8tli regiment also to retire. This corps, which had licretoibre acted so firmly, evinced tlie usual incapacity of raw troops to make orderly move- ments in the face of the enemy, and their retreat in a very few moments became a flight of absolute and total disorder. The direct line of retreat to the whole of this first line being to the hill on which I had directed the artillery to halt, and imme- diately in connection with the positions of General Smith's corps, which were not arrayed in line, but posted on advantageous posi- tions in connection with and sepporting each other, according as the nature of the ground admitted and required, I had not for a momcMit, dispersed and disordered as was the w hole of Stansbury's command, sup[)osed that their retreat would have taken a dilfereut direction. IJut it soon became apparent that the whole mass were throwing themselves off to the right on the retreat toward Mont- gomery Court House, and flying wide of this point ; the whole of the cavalry, probatjly from the pressure of the infantry that way, were also thrown wide of the line of retreat toward the right. After making every effort to turn the current more toward Gen- eral Smith's command and the city in vain, and finding that it was impossible to collect any fi)rcc to support the artillery, which I had directed to halt, and finding also that the enemy's light troops were extending themselves in that direction, and pressing the pursuit, I directed the artdlery to continue their retreat on the road they then were toward the Capitol, it being impossible for them to get acro.i-s to ihi^ turniiike road or unite wi ', Chmum-iI Smith's briixado. I •iHllil 32(5 APPENDIX. : ; iilt' '■(I- I r ■ 'W i ' ] ■ M i 1 I •!! The hope of again forming the first line at this point, and there renewing the retreat, or, at all events, of being able to rally them between the Capitol and that point and renewing the contest, in- duced me, at the moment I directed the 5th regiment to retreat, to request Mr. Riggs, of Georgetown, to proceed to the President. and inform him that we had been driven back, but that it was my hope and intention to form and rene\v' the contest between that place and the Capitol. As soon as I found it vain longer to endeavor to turn the tide of retreat toward the left, I turned toward the positions occupied by Lieutenant-colonel Beall, Conniiodorc Barney, and General Smith. ]}y this time the enemy had advanced up the road, had driven back Lieutenant-colonel Kramer's command, posted on the right of the road, and in advance of Commodore Barney, after having well maintained his position and much hurt the enemy, and also continued to fire during his retreat. lie had come under the destructive fire of Commodore Barney, which had turned him up the hill toward Lieutenant-colonel Beall, whose detachment gave one or two inefi'cctive fires and lied. Their position was known to me, was very conspicuous, and the extreme right. The enemy, therefore, had gained this ccnmianding position, and was passing our right flank ; his force pursuing on the lelt had also advanced to a line with oui* left, and there was nothing there to oppose him. To preserve Smith's command from being pressed in front by fresh troops of the enemy, who were coming on at the same time, while they were under the certainty of being assailed on both flanks and the rear by the enemy, who respectively gained them, in which circumstances their destruction or surrender would have been in- evitable, I sent (my horse being unable to move with the rapidity I wished) to General Smith to retreat. I am not acquainted with the relative position of the difierent corps composing his command, and can not, therefore, determine who of them engaged the enemy, nor could I sec how they acted ; but when I arrived in succession at his different corps, which I did as soon as practical)le, I do not recollect to have found any of them that were not in order, and retreating with as little confusion as could have been expected. When I reached the road I found Commodore Barney's men also retiring on the road, he having been overpowered by those who drove offlJrair,; n ininent about the time I sent the order to retreat. int, and there to rally them e contest, iii- iit to retreat, ho President at it was my between that turn the tide )ns occupied md General lie road, had losted on the larney, after enemy, and le under the ■ ned him up hmcnt gave was known rhe enemy, ivas passing io advanced appose him. ont by fresh time, \vhilc 1 flanks and a, in which ve been in- he rapidity xintcd with command, the enemy, succession e, I do not order, and expected. i men also those wlio to retreat. I ;-'3f APPENDIX. i 4 2 i'M 827 I still had no doubt but that Stansbury's corrimand and the cav- alry would have fallen down upon the Capitol by the roads which enter that part of the city from the north, and still solaced n»yself Willi the persiiasion that 1 should be able there to rally them upon the city and Georgetown troops, who were retiring in order, and make another eflert in advance of the Capitol to repulse the enemy. After accompanying the retreating army within two miles of the Capitol, I rode forward for the purpose of selecting a position, and endeavoring to colle^^t those who I supposed, from the rapidity of their flight, might have reached that point. A half a mile in advance of the Capitol I met Colonel Minor with his detachment, and directed him to form his men, wait until the retreating army passed, and protect them, if necessary. When I arrived at the Capitol I found not a man had passed that way, and, notwith- standing the commanding view which is -there afforded to the north, I could see no appcaranco of the troops. I dispatched an order to call in the cavalry to me there. In a few moments the Secretary of State and the Secretary of War joined inc, besides that they had been witnesses to the dis- persion of the troops and the exhaustion of those just halted by me. I stated the diminution of my force, and the extent jf the positions, which rendered it impossible to place the force I then had in such a position as to prevent tlie enemy from taking me on the flank as well as front, and that no reasonable hope could be entertained that we had any troops that could be relied on to make a re- sistance as desperate as necessary, in an isolated building which could not be supported by a sufficiency of troops without ; indeed, it would have taken nearly the whole of the troops to have sufii- ciently filled the two wings, which would have left the enemy mas- ters of every other part of the city, and given him the opportuni- ty, without risk, in twenty-four hours, to have starved ihem -nto a surrender. The same objection equally applied to the occupation of any part of the city. Both these gentlemen concurred that it would subject my force to certain capture or destruction ; and in its reduced and exhaust- ed condition, it was wise and proper to retire through Georgetown, and take post in the rear of it, on t'.e heights, to collect my force. I accordinfrly pursued this course, and halted at Tenleytown two miles from ( Jeorgctown, on the Frederick road. Here was evinced I 328 APPENDIX. in I 111 iillill' ^ ■" • WW I '1 Jl! I ono of the great defects of all undisciplined and unorganized troops ; no ellbrt could rouse oiRccrs and men to the exertion necessary to place themselves in such a state of comfort and security as is at- tainahle even under very disadvantageous circumstances. Such of them as could he lialted, instead of making those cHorts, gave themselves up to the uncontrolled feelings which fatigue, exhaus- tion, and privation produced, and many hundreds, in spite of all precautions and efforts, passed on and pursued their way, either toward home, or in search of refreshments and quarters. After waiting in this position until I supposed I collected all the force that could he gathered, I proceeded ahout five miles further on the river road, which leads a little wide to the left of Montgomery Court House, and in the morning gave orders for the whole to assemhle at Montgomery Court House. This position promised us shelter from the rain that began to fall an hour hefore day ; was the most probable place for the sup- ply of provisions, which the troops very much needed, and was a position from which wo could best interpose between the enemy and Baltimore, and to which place, at that time, nobody doubted he intended to go by Ian .1 I'rom Washington. In pursuance of this view, among the first acts after my arrival at Montgomery Court House was to direct a lett- r to General Strieker, who conunanded at Baltimore, informing him that it was my intention to gather my force together there, receive what re- enforcements I could, show myself to the enemy as strong as pos- sible, hang on his flank should he move to Baltimore, intimidate and harass him as nmch as possible in his movements, and en- deavor always to preserve the power of interposing between him and Baltimore ; directing him to re-establish the dispersed com- mand of Lieutenant-colonel Sterett, multiply his means as nmch as possible, stop all re-enforcements of militia from IMaryland, Pennsylvania, or elsewhere, and present himself to the enemy at the crossing of the Patapsco in as imposing a form as possible. This letter I sent by Captain Aisquith, whom I found at Mont- gomery with fifteen or twenty others, the only part of the Balti- more detachment which had not returned home. The first object was, in the absence of quarter-master and con- tractor, to make efforts to provide quarters and refreshments for mv men : a few provisions were found there belonging to the con- ^ • V APPENDIX. P,29 mized troops; necessary to irity us is at- mces. Such cfTorts, ^ave gue, cxliaus- i spite of all ■ ^vay, eitlicr •tcrs. After all the force s further on Montgomery ho whole to lat began to for the suj)- , and was a the enemy »dy doubted my arrival to General that it was e what re- >ng as pos- intimidate s, and en- tween him irsed com- i as much Maryland, enemy at possible. at Mont- the Balti- and con- monts for the con- 4 tractor, and a person temporarily appointed to issur-, and the most active men ol' the place called upon and authorized to get in pro- visions. The next object was to obtain a return of tbe diU'erent corps, which, iVom causes that can easily be understood among undisci- plined men and unskilful officers, proved abortive before we moved next day. The arrival of several detachments of re-enlbrcements, the reports of officers bringing on detachments, who wanted or- ders and instructions, and the multiplied complaints of men and of- ficers crowded together in small cpiarters, or entirely out of doors in a rainy, tempestuous day, the calculations and arrangements necessary for ulterior operations, and to meet the demands and wants of the great force which my calls were likely to produce, may be sup[)osed to have been as much as could be borne l)y the effi)rts and attention of one man, which Iw was obliged to encoun- ter for the want of a skilful, or even organizetl stall" of any kind. No r(>gular details for service of any kind could be performed, and all the duties of this description were necessarily performed by the voluntary zeal of those corps who could not be borne down or discouraged by difficulties. My efforts were devoted to en- deavor to prepare the detachment to move down toward the city, and hang upon and strike at the enemy whenever an opportunity occurred. The next morning, however, beibro a return of the corps could be had, and their situation known, I received intelli- gence that the enemy had moved from Washington the preceding night, and was in full march for Baltimore. I instantly put my conmiand under arms, multiplied and strengthened my patrols to gain intelligence, and advanced as rapidly as was practicable to Balthnurc. When the forces arrived at SnelFs Bridge, on tho upper branch of the Patuxent, I had concluded that, if the enemy Avas, as we had still reason to believe, proceeding to Baltimore, it would be mosf, advisable for mo to proceed directly thither, to lep i the whole force of my power, as commander of the district, to call out and bring into activity the resources of the place, aufl also because it was likely to become tho most important station of tho command. I accordingly left tho command with General Stans- bury, senior brigadier, and proceeded that niji-ht to Baltimore, On the road I met an express from Major-geiKn-il 8. Smith, who de- livered mo a letter, in which ho informed me that ho had been call- ■ f :*( 330 APPENDIX. i: M\ ed out into service, and had assurnod tlio command according to his rank ; and by the time I rcaithcd JJaltimore, I also learned that the enemy was proceeding to Mailborough, and not toward IJalthuore. If I liad had longer time, or to repeat the action oC Bladensburg, I could correct several errors, which might materially have af- fected the issue of that battle. The advanced force ought to have been nearer to the creek, along the edge of the low ground, where they would have been skirted with bushes, and have avoided the inconvenience of the cover which the orchard afforded the enemy. The edge of the low grounds on the right of the road ought to have been lined with musketry, nid a battery of cannon also plant- ed in the field on the right of th( 'ad, directly fronting the bridge ; and if Commodore Barney's hcav} atillery, with his more expert artillerists, had occupied the position which the advanced artiller- ists did, and these posts been obstinately defended, the enemy* would not have crossed the river at that point, but would have been obliged to have made a circuit around to his right, and have cross- ed above and at the upper end of the town ; or, if the whole force had been posted at the position of the second line, with all the ad- vantage which it afforded, and had acted uiJi tolerable courage and firmness, the event might have been different ; but no advant- age of position is proof against groundless panic, and a total want of discipline, skill, and experience. On the night of my retreat to the city, I sent Assistant-adjutant- gcneral Ilite down to General Young to inform him of the move- ment, and to direct him to take the best position to secure Fort Washington and his junction wdth me ; or, in case the enemy should interpose between him and me, to have his boats ready to transport his men across the river ; or, if he could not do that, to fall down the river and unite with General Stuart, and harass the enemy in the rear ; and, above all, to be alert, and keep a vigi- lant guard upon every avenue of approach, to prevent a surprise. I also sent by Major Hite directions to the commanding officer of Fort Washington to advance a guard up to the main road upon all the roads leading to the fort, and in the event of his being taken in the rear of the fort by the enemy, to blow up the fort and retire across the river. The distance of General Young, and the necessity of retaining APPENDIX. 331 I accorcHng to [ also learned ud not toward r Bladensburg, ially have af- ought to have ground, where e avoided the cd the enemy, road ought to ion also plant- \g the bridge ; 5 more expert meed artiller- d, the enemy* uld have been id have cross- e whole force ith all the ad- :able courage ut no advant- 1 a total want tant-adjutant- of the move- secure Fort e the enemy oats ready to ot do that, to t, and harass 1 keep a vigi- it a surprise, ing officer of road upon all being taken )rt and retire of retaining a position near the fort as long as the designs of the enemy re- mained uncertain, rendered it impossible to have tlie assistance of his force at Bladensburg. There was not a bridge on tlie road which the enemy pursued from his debarkation to Wasliington the destruction of which would have retarded his advance ten minutes. I believe, in fact, that the bridge at Bladcnsburg is the only one, and the facility with which that stream is every where fordable above the bridge, rendered useless the destroying it. Indeed, 1 believe that, had ar- tillery been posted as advantageously as it might have been, and well served, the bridge would have acted as a decoy to the enemy to lead him into danger, and have been useful to us. Those who have that happy intrepidity of assurance in their own capacity to see with certainty, in all cases, the means by which they could have avoided the errors of others, and by which past calamities might always have been averted, will fmd my con- demnation easy. Those who are disposed to measure dilficultics by the limits of human capacity, and who will impartially place tliemselves in my situation, will fmd it difficult to decide that any errors have been committed which might not have been equaled or surpassed by any other connnander, or that the calamities which have followed could have been averted or mitigated. No. II. REPORT OF GENERAL STANSBURY. Baltiirior<% November 15, 1814. By general orders from the War Department of the 20th of April, 1811, Major-genera! Smith was directed to draft from his division, and hold in readiness to march at a moment's warnincr, two thousand men, officers included. By Major-general Smith's division orders of the 29th of April, I was directed to furnish by draft from my brigade, as its quota, one thousand of this requisition, and hold them in readiness to march, at a moment's warning, to Baltimore for its defence. The Isi of May those orders were complied with, agreeably to a de- tail accompanying said orders. On the 15th of July Major-general Smith issued division or- 'ilnii ':i APPENDIX. dors requiring thn quota from my brigade, the 11th, and that from tlie 2d and Utli, to march and rendezvous at Baltimore. My or- ders were issued on the I'Jth ; the troops began lo assemble on the 24th, and were encamijed about one and a half mUes north- ward of the city, at a place called Camp Fairfield. On tlie 21st of July, by iNIajor-general Smith, I was directed to take chargp of this brigade, and commenced preparing for their reception. Early in August, General Winder, being vested with the command of the 10th jNIilitary District, superseded General Smith in the connnand. On Saturday, August the 20th, about 1 o'clock P.M., I received by express letter No. 1, directing me to move down with my whole force for Washington. By this morning's regimental reports, the force of my brigade, then in camp, appeared as follows : The first regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel llagan, officers in- cluded, 550 ; second regiment, under Lieutenant-colonel Shutz, of- ficers also included, fit for duty, 803. I immediately issued orders for wagons to be procured, provis- ions served out, tents struck, and every thing prepared to march that evening. But the dilhculty of obtaining wagons to transport tents and camp C(juipage prevented my moving more th:iu that part of the brigade this evening. The residue followed on the morning of the 21«t. The advance party encamped at the Stag tavern ; the rear three miles short of it, on the evening of the 21st. About 10 o'clock P.M. I received from CJencral Winder, by cxi)rcss, letter No. 2, dated the 21st, directing me to halt until further orders. August 22il, at 10 o'clock A.]\L, received from General Winder letter No. 3, dateil at the Wood Yard the 21st, 10 o'clock P. 1\L, directing me to advance with all speed to Bla- densi)urg. In consequence th(>rrof, the line of march was taken lip innnediat(>ly, and at 7 o'clock P.M. we arriveil ;it JJladens- burg. The first n'giment encaniped on th(^ hill southeast, thi^ sec- ond on the northwest of the town; and on Tinv'^dny mo: iiing, the 23d, joined tiu- first regiment on Lowiich s' llill,tuar Bladrnsburg. About 10 o'clock A.M. received from General Wind(>r letter N(». 'l,dat(!d at l[ead-(iunrters, Battalion Old Fields, August 22d, con- taining orders to march my brigade (with the troo|)s under Colo- nel Sterett, if they had joined me) slowly toward Marl!>oroug!j, ArrENDix. nd that from re. My or- assemblo on miles nortii- s directed to ing for their vested with ded General .,1 received th my whole my brigade, I, officers in- cl tShutz, of- iircd, provis- cd to inarch to transi)ort re than that iwed on the at tlie fStag [oftheilxt. Winder, hy ;o halt until ceived from rd the 'J 1st, )eed to JJhi- 1 was talven at ]}]adens- ast, the scc- noiiiing, tho iladrnsljurg. r hMtcr No. ist 'J-Jil, con- under Colo- larIhoron;;!i, and take a position on the road not far from that place, and thut ho would join me some time that day. The troops under tlio conmuind of LieuttMiant-colonel Stcrett had not joined me, nor was 1 certain at that time they would arrive. The brigade was instantly put in motion, and the march com- menced toward Marlborough, with a view of complying with Gen- eral Winder's orders. I iinnu^dinuly dispatched my aid-de-camp. Major Woodyear, to General W uuler, to connuunicate all the in- formation which he might require as to my force ; to receive par- ticular orders as to the position I should take in liie vicinity of Marll)orougli ; and to obtain a knowledge of the country, and of the situation of the enemy. After proceeding about one mile on the road to Marlljorough, I met Captiiiii Moses Tabbs riding ex- press to inform me that the enemy, with their whole force, had left Marlborougb, and were on their march toward me, distant about six miles. This information made me determine to avail myself of the high grounds I occupied in the morning, to which I innno- diatejy returned, and mule the necessary preparations to receive tho enemy. I directed Captain Tabbs to return and reconuoitro the encMuy, and give mc every information. About 1 o'clock P.M. lie returned, and informed nu; that the enemy, on leaving IMarlhorougb, had taken a dill'(?rent route. Soon after, my aid-de- camp, Major Woodyear, returned from General Winder, and in- formed me that the intelligence I had received of the movements of the enemy wtMC in part incorrect, and that (Jeneral Winder \vishc(l me to encamp on the direct road from Bladenshurg to Marlborough, at about seven miles distant from the latter place. 'J'he assistant adjutant-general, Maj(u- llite, accompanied Major Woodyear. By letter No. i I was first informed that Ltoutenant-colnnel Stcrett's detachment, consisting of the filth regiment, about fivo hundred strong ; Major I'iukney's rille battalion, about one hund- red and fit'ty ; and Captains Myer's and Magruder's companies of artillery, about oru' hundred and fifty, were attached to my com- mand. These troojfs had not joined m(\ but W(>re on tiielr march. 1 dis|)atched an express with this letter to liieutenant-coloiiel Ster- ctt as soon as received, recpiesting him to move on with all pos- sible expedition. About sunset en the ijad he arrived with liia command, and en- 3.;4 APrExNDIX. camped near my brigade. The fatigued situation of his troops in- duced me to liait ibr the night on the hill near Biadensburg, with the intention of moving toward Marlborough at reveille on the 21th. At about 8 o'clock P.^I., a militia captain, who resided near Biadensburg, came into camp, attended by one of my sen- tinels, and informed me he was from General Winder's camp at the Battalion Old Fields ; that General Winder was not in camp when he left it, and that it was apprehended he had been taken prisoner, as he had gone out to reconnoitre the enemy and had not returned ; that a detachment from the army had skirmished that day with the British ; and that Brigadier-general Smith, of the District of Columbia, had taken the command of the army, and would certainly join me in the course of the night. About 11 o'clock P.M., the Secretary of State, Colonel Monroe, with sev- eral gentlemen, came to my tent ; and, as well as I can recollect. Colonel Monroe observed that he was from Washington ; that he had been at, or heard from the camp of General Winder ; that there was an alarming silence with respect to General Winder, who had gone out to reconnoitre the enemy and had iKJt been heard of, and it was feared he was tnken ; that General Smith had, by persuasion, taken the command, anil that the^; w dd move toward and join me before morning, he expected, fron* '. ' attalion Old Fields, and advised vigilance to prevent surprise . .joon after the departure of Colonel Monroe, the advance pickets, on the road by which we expected the enemy, and which was the direct one from Marlboroogh, fired, and in a few UKunrnts my whole command were under arms and prepared lur action. Th(^ cavalry, under Colonel T Ighman, who had c(nne into town a little after dark for refreshments, were ordered down the Marlborough road, except Captain Herbert, with his troop, who was directed to push down the road toward the Battalion Old Fields imtil he should fall in with (Jcneral Winder's army, which I was confident would join me that night. The troops were inider arms until after 2 o'clock A.M. of the 24th, when, l)eing advised by ihe cavalry that tlu; enemy were not near, I ordered them to retire to their tents, but to be ready to turn out at a moment's warning ; and strong picket guards were placed on the road in every direction. Sujjposing my right and rear cov- ered by General Winder's fttrce, 1 fe'' no apprehensions of surprise APJ'ENDIX. 335 r his troops iii- lensburg, with evcille on tiie I, who resided ne of my sen- der's camp at s not in camp id been taken ly and had not virmished that Smith, of the tlie army, and it. About 11 roc, with sev- c;in recollect, gton ; that ho Winder; that [icral Winder, lot been heard Smith had, by move toward ' attalion Old oon after the n the road !)y rect one from ole command avalry, under liter dark for road, except () j)iish down ishoidd fall in t would join \M of the my were not ready to turn were placed ind rear cov- is of surprise n 4 there, and no expectation that the enemy, without first beating General Winder, could approach me either by the Battalion or river road. But about half after 2 o'clock A.M., Major Bates, Assistant Adjutant-general of Militia, came to me from Washing- ton with a message from General Winder informing me that Gen- eral Whider had retreated from Battalion Old Fields into the City of Washington across the bridge, which he had ordered to be burn- eil ; and that the general expected I would resist the enemy as long as possible should he move against me in luat direction. Tlius was my expectation of security from the Battalion and river roads cut olT, my right llauk and rear uncovered, and liable to be attacked and turned, without the possi!)iliiy of securing it in the position I then lay. I instantly sent for Lieutenant-colonel Sterett of the 5th, Major I'inkney of the rille corps, and Lieutenant-fitlonel Ragaii, Lieuten- ant-colonel Sluitz iieing present, officers in wlumi 1 placed th(^ high- est confidence, and stated to them the information and orders 1 h:ul just received from ( Jeneral Winder, and our situatictn with resjjcct to the enemy. They were unanimous in opinion that our situation on that hill could not be defended with the force then under my command, worn down by hunger and fatigue as they were, and that it was indispensal)ly necessary for the security of the army that \V(' should immcdiaicly retire across tiie bridge of Bladeiisburg, and take a position on the road between Bladeiisburg and the city whicii we could defend. Golonel Tilgiiman, of the cavalry, ob- served he thought wc had no time to lose. In this opinion I per- fectly coincided. Orders were instantly given to striki' tent.s and prepare to march, and in about thirty minutes, without noise or confusion, the whole were in motion, and about half past three o'clock in the morning passed the bridge at Bladt'iisburg leading to the f'ity of \\ ashingtuu. Securing ocr rear from suri)rise. w(! halted in the road until the approach of day, with a view of finding some place where water could be had, in order that the men might cook their provisions and rel'resh themselves lor a (cw monn'uts. The provisions consisted of salt beef of infi-rior quality, the flour old and musty. At daylight I moved on to the foot of a hill near a brick-yard, and there ordered tlie troops to refresh them.selves. This w;is aliout one and a half miles from Bladeiisburg. Early in the morning, I had dispatched Major Woodyear to o >■) p APPENDIX. i * 1. 1 I' \i i i ' ' ,it Washington to inform General Winder of my moveniciits and sit- uation, of the exhausted state of the troops, and the impracticabil- ity of their meeting the enemy, in their present liitigued state, vviih any prospect of success, unless re-enforced. I rode to the top of the hill to examine the country. On my descending it again, a note was presented to mo by an express from General Winder, dated at Washington (written, I presume, without a knowledge of my movements), directing me to oppose the enemy as long as I could should ho attempt a passage by the way of IJladensburg. This note I have mislaid. I called a council of war, consistincf of Lieutenant-colonel Slerett, Lieutenant-colonel Ragan, and Major Pinkncy. I laid the letter before them. Colonel ISterett observed that he marched from lialtimore with a determination to defend the city ; that his men, the day before, by a forced march from the IJuck tavern, or 8nowdcn's, reached Bladensburg without halting to couk ; that they had been under arms nearly the whole of the night, without any sleep or food ; that Major Pinkney's riflemen, and the two companies of artillery, were in the same situation ; and that they were so completely worn down and exhausted that he should consider it a sacrifice of both officers and men to seek the enemy at any considerable distance from General Winder's force, as no good could result therefrom. Major Pinkney and Col- onel Ragan expressed themselves to the same elTect, and, with Colonel ISterett, urged the propriety of moving farther on the road toward the city, with a view of taking a stand on some more fa- vorable ground for defence, with a better prospect of being joined l)y the forces under (reneral Winder, and expressed their willing- ness to give their opinions in writing. I could not but admit the corrcH'tness of their views, and ordered tlic wagons to move on slowly toward the citv< intending to follow on with the trctops. At this moment .Major Woodyear returned from W ashington, with positive orders from General Winder to give the enemy bat- tle at RladiMishurg, should he move that way, and that lie would join me if necessary. I immediately ordered the troops to rrtraco thoir stops to IJla- densburg, determined to maintain, if possible, the ground at all hazards. On arriving in the orchard near the mill, 1 directed the artillery to post theiuisclvea behind a sniull breastwork ef tlirt tliat lately ! I APPENDIX. aa; emcnts and sit- u iinpracticabil- futigued state, I rode to the top ending it again, k'neral Winder, a knowledge of ny as long as I )f IJladensburg. ir, consisting of gan, and Major Sterctt observed lation to defend march from the without halting he w hole of the kney*s riflemen, same situation ; I exhausted that nd men to sock ncral Winder's inkney and Col- flbct, and, with her on the road some more fa- of being j')incd d their willing- )t but admit the ns to move on the troops, m Washington, the enemy bat- that lie would ir steps to Ula- ground at all ed the artillery dirt that lately had been thrown up by Colonel Wadsworth. Tins battery com- niiuuled the pass into Bladensburg and the bridg(> southwesterly of the town. Our artillery consisted of six six-pounders; Major Puikney's battaUon of riflemen on their right, under cover of the town and bushes, also commanding the pass by the biidge ; two companies from Lieutenant-colonel Shutz's regiment, under the command of Captains Duckcr and Gorsuch, acting as riflemen, al- though principally armed with muskets, on the left of the artillery, near, and protected by, the barn, intended to defend the road lead- ing by the mill, on the left of the battery, into the field; Colonel JSterett's regiment was halted in the orchard, on the right and in the rear, and the regiments of Colonels Ragan and Slnitz were also halted in the orchard, in the rear and on the left flank, near the creek. My intentions were that they should remain here to re- fresh themselves as long as possible, and, -as soon as the enemy appeared, to form Colonel .Sterett's regiment (in whom 1 placed great confidence) on the right, their left resting on and support- ing the right of Major Pinkncy's riflemen, in view of the bridge and fronting the road, along which ran a fence, and act as occa- sion should require. Colonels Itagan's and Shutz's regiments were to be drawn up in echelon, their right resting on the left of Captains Duckcr's and Gorsuch's rifle companies, in order to pre- vent the enemy from pressing and turning our lell, hoping that General Winder would join inc before the battle would commence, and occupy the ground in my rear as a second line. About 11 o'clock A.M. I was informed by a dragoon from Lieutenant-colo- nel Beall that he was on the road from Annapolis to Bladensburg, with al)out eight hundred men, distant from me about five mile:-;, and wished to know the distance and situation of the enemy. 1 directed the dragoon to return and inform him that I had that mo- ment received inlbrmatuju that the British, with their whole force, were approaching Bladensburg by the river road, and that tlu-y were only three and a half miles distant, and advised the colom I to file off to his right and cross above Bladensburg, to fall into an old road which I understood led to our lell toward Washintrtoii, and lake a position on the high grounds north and northwest of Blad(Mi.sburg, which would completely protect my left by prevent- ing the enemy from outflanking us that way, and force their main body across the bridge, in the face of my artillery and riflemen on P I A 338 AiTENDlX. J' Hi :mI I :<'! i ll'.^ Mil! I'l; ii ii '!!( the main road, and expose them to the fire of the 5th regiment under Colonel Sterett, who would be protected by the fence. This advice it appeared Colonel Beall only took in part, I pre- sume from an anxious wish to place himself between the enemy and the city. He sent his baggage oiTto the right, and with his troops passed the bridge at Bladensburg about thirty minutes be- fore tlie enemy appeared on Mr. Lowndes' lull, and took his station on the hill, as I was informed, near the brick-kiln where we halt- ed in the morning, about one and a half miles in my rear, and on the left of the road leading to the city. About meridian the ene- my could clearly be seen making toward us by the river road. While I was giving some directions to the artillery, ^ )u. Lieutenant- colonels Ragan's and Shutz's regiments had oeen moved from the place where I had stationed them, and marched out of the orchard up the hill, and formed in order of battle about two hundred and fifty yards above the orchard, and upward of five hundred yards in the rear of the artillery and riflemen. Thus un- covered by the trees of the orchard, their situation and numbers were clearly seen by the enemy from Lowndes' Iliil, and the flanks of the artillery and riflemen unprotected, and laid liable to be turn- ed, our main body being placed too far off to render them any aid. On riding up the hill to know who had ordered this movement, I was informed that General Winder was on the ground. At this time I met with Brigadier-general Smith, of the District of Co- lumbia, and some conversation took place between us respecting the order of battle and seniority ; the particulars I do not recol- lect. I immediately rode to the mill, where I understood General Winder was, and found him reconnoitring the position of the ene- my. While in conversation with him, tlie 5th regiment was taken out of the orchard, marched up the hill, and stationed on the left of Colonel Shutz's regiment, that of Colonel Ragan being on the right, its right resting on the main road ; but, as 1 before observed, the whole at so great a distance from the artillery and riflemen that they had to contend with the whole British force, and so much exposed that it has been a cause of astonishment they preserved their ground so long, and ultimately succeeded in retreating. Whose plan this was I know not ; it was not mine, nor did it meet with my approbation ; but, finding a superior oflicor on the ground, I coneluded he had ordered it, consequently did not inter- AITENDIX. 339 le 5th regiment the fence. L in part, I pre- ,-eeii the enemy lit, und with his rty minutes be- took liis station where we lialt- tiiy rear, and on cridian the enc- 3 river road, rtillery, '^ )u. aents had occn m, and marched r of battle about J upward of flvo nen. Thus un- :)n and numbers 11, and the flanks iablc to be turn- er them any aid. his movement, I ound. At this District of Co- n us respecting I do not recol- crstood General ition of the ene- mcnt was taken oned on the left in being on the jcfore observed, ry and rillemcn CO, and so much they preserved in rijtreating. iiino, nor did it r odifcr on the y did not iuter- .1 M M fere. General Winder asked me where I meant to take my sta- tion. I answered, about the centre of my brigade. He said he would take his on the left of the 5th regiment. General Winder was extremely active in givmg directions and eneouiagnig il;e men. I took my station in the centre of Colonels Ragan's anu Shutz's regiments, but occasionally rode along the line, encour- aging the men, and giving orders to the officers. Major Wood- year 1 directed to keep with the left of Colonel Shutz's regiment, to cheer up the men and assist the officers. Major Randall rode with me. Soon after, the action commenced by the artillery and riflemen at the battery. The fire of the artillery had great effi}ct, "n-i r-v^dcntly produced confusion in the ranks of the enemy, who i. jk shelter behind a warehouse, from whence they fired rockets ; but a few well-directed shots drove them from this position. A flanking party, concealed by the banks and'bushes, pushed up the river to turn our left, wiiile a strong force attempted the bridge ; but the incessant and well-directed fire from our artillery and rifle- men at the battery occasioned evident confusion among their ranks, so much so that their officers could be seen actively engaged pre- venting their retreating, and pushing them on to the bridge ; and here I tliink the enemy suflered considerably. At length they suc- ceeded in passing the bridge in small parties at full speed, which formed after crossing. I had ordered forty horsemen with axes to cut away this bridge before the near approach of the enemy, and saw them with their axes. Why this order was not executed I never could learn. It is certain the enemy could have forded the stream above ,• but I considered it would, in some degree, im- pede their progress, and give our artillery and riflemen more timo and opportunity to act with effi^ct against them. The artillery, under the command of Captains IMyer and I\Ia- grudcr. and the riflemen, the whole under the command of Major Pinkney, behaved in the most gallant manner (this gallant officer in the course of the action was severely wounded), but the supe- rior force of the enemy, and ihf rapidity with which he moved, compelled them to retire ; but one of the pieces was lost, and this was rend(>re(l harmless befi)re it was abandoned. The enemy took cvrry advantage of the cover alTorded them by the trees of the orchard, and their light troops from thence kept up a galling fire upon our line. On this party, when advanced 340 APPENDIX. fci "I ;(■ i I!'::;- ' 'ii !'t nearer, the 5th regiment, under Colonel Sterctt, opened a steady and well-directed fire, which was followed by the fire from the right, and ultimately from our centre, when the firing on both sides became general. After a few rounds, the troops on the right be- gan to break. I rode along the line, and gave orders to the offi- cers to cut down those who attempted to fly, and suffer no man to leave the lines. On arriving at the left of the centre regiment, I found Lieutenant-colonel .Shutz's men giving way, and that brave officer, with Major Kemp, aided by my aid-dc-camp, Major Wood- year, exerting themselves in rallying and forming them again. Captain Callaway's company and part of Captains Shower's and Randall's companies were rallied and formed again, and behaved gallantly. The rest of Colonels Shutz's and Ragan's regiments fled in disorder, notwithstanding the extraordinary exertions of their officers to prevent it. On the left I soon after discovered a part of the 5th regiment giving way, and that excellent officer. Lieutenant-colonel Sterett, with those under him, most actively engaged forming them again. Soon after the retreat became general, and all attempts to rally them, and make a second stand, were fruitless. With a body of United States cavalry, I endeav- ored to protect the rear and right of the retreating men, so as to prevent their falling into the enemy's possession. The men under my command were worn down and nearly ex- hausted from long and forced marches, want of food, and watch- ing. They had been, with very little intermission, under arms and marching from the time of their departure from Baltimore, with but little sleep, bad provisions, and but little opportunity to cook. They certainly were not in a condition to go into battle ; but my orders were positive, and I was determined to obey them. Before and during the action, I did not see any of the force I was led to expect would support me. I understood since that they were on their way to my assistance, and I presume exertions were made to bring them up. Before and during the retreat I heard the thunder of Commo- dore Barney's artillery, but till then I did not know he was near. I believe there were few, if any other, troops in the field when the action commenced than the three regiments of infantry under Lieu- tenant-colonels Sterett, Ragan, and Shutz, Major Pinkney's battal- ion of riflemen, Captauis Myer's and Magruder's companies of ar- APPENDIX. 341 , opened a steady the fire from the •ing on botli sides 5 on the right be- Drders to the offi- suf!cr no man to !entre regiment, I ly, and that brave mp, Major Wood- ling them again, ins Shower's and 2:ain, and behaved agan's regiments ary exertions of ifter discovered a excellent officer, m, most actively ! retreat became G a second stand, avalry, I endeav- II g men, so as to 1 and nearly ex- food, and watch- 5ion, under arms from Baltimore, e opportunity to 3 go into battle ; ;d to obey them, ly of the force I stood since that esume exertions ider of Commo- )vv he was near, e field when the itry under Lieu- 'inkney's battal- ompanies of ar- t'Uery, amounting to about 2150 men, exclusive of two regiments ot cavalry, who did not act. C^eneral Winder, on the field of battle, displayed all possible zeal, activity, and personal bravery in encouraging tlie men to light, ai:d after they broke, in his exertions to rally them. I saw the President and some of the heads of departments ia the field, but did not perceive that any of them took any part in the arrangements made lor battle. Colonel Monroe, the then Sec- retary of State, appeared extremely active in his clTorts to aid the oflicers in the discharge of their duties, and exposed himself to much danger. To my aid-de-camp. Major Edward G. Woodyear, and my act- ing I3rigade-major, Major Beall Randall, I am much indebted for their unremitted exertions in encouraging the men l)efore and during the action, and the 7.eal displayed by them in their at- tempts to keep the ranks unbroken and to rally the men, in which they in some degree succeeded ; for the company of Captain Cralloway, and part of Shower's and Randall's were rallied, and were among the last troops who left the field, and did not retreat until directed ; some of them were killed, and several severely wounded. On arriving at the city, with part of Colonel Laval's United States cavalry covering the retreat, and collecting the rear of our scattered troops, I found General AViniler's command had passed through it toward Georgetown. I proceeded there, and then fol- lowed to a village a few miles beyond it, where I overtook him with troops collecting under his command, and some of those of my brigade. The army thence proceeded to Montgomery Court House on the 'J5th of August, where it was hourly re-enforced by those who fied from the field. As there had been no place assigned by the commanding gen- eral previous to the action to which the men should retreat in case of a defeat, many of those under my immediate command had fled from the field toward Baltimore. On the "Joth I dircctcul my aid, iNIajor Woodyear, to push on from Montgomery C^ourt House to that place, organize the drafted men, and bring them on to any point that General Winder should direct. On Friday, August 20, at about 10 o'clock A.M., we took up B I 34l APPENDIX. t • Jl i -I the line ^ rch from Montgomery Court House on the road leading to i. ..timore, witli llie L'nited States infantry under Lieu- tenant-colonel Scott ; Major Peter's carps of artillery ; General Smith's brigade of District troops ; the regiment of militia from Annapolis and Anne Arundel County, commanded by Lieutenant- colonels Beall and Hood ; some riflemen from Frederick, Allegha- ny, and other places ; a large body of cavalry, and part of my bri- gade of drafted militia — a force respectable as to numbers and ap- pearance ; and that night encamped about halfway between Mont- gomery Court House and Ellicott's upper mills. General Win- der, having received some information respecting the enemy in- dicating intentions of moving against Baltimore, concluded his presence there was indispensable. He set out for that place, leav- ing me in command of the army, with directions to follow him in the morning. Colonel Monroe was with us. During this night several expresses arrived from the City of Washington, by whom I was informed of the retreat of the ene- my, said to be in such haste and confusion that many of their sol- diers were straggling about in every direction ; that the main army, after rcachii.g Bladcnsburg, had taken the road to Marlbor- ough, leaving their wounded. I ordered the cavalry to follow them, harass their rear, and pick up the stragglers. Reports from Georgetown and the city reached me that the arms of many of the enemy had fallen into the hands of the blacks, and it was ap- prehended that they would take advantage of the absence of the men to insult the females, and complete the work of destruction commenced by the enemy ; and at the earnest solicitation of Brig- adier-general Smith and Major Peter, who expressed much anxie- ty respecting their families, and considering it all-important to prevent further injury to the city, I ordered the troops of the Dis- trict of Columbia to move thither for its prqtection. Having ascertained that the enemy had retreated to their ship- ping, I ordered the Prince George's troops down to Bladcnsburg, and those under the command of Lieutenant-colonels Beall and Hood to remain encampe-d on the ground then occupied until they had orders from General Winder ; and in the morning of the 27th, with the T^iitod States infantry, my brigade, and part of Colonel Laval's cavalry, marched for Baltimore in a very heavy rain. On my arrival there in the evening I waited on General Winder, and M APPENDIX. 343 ouse on the road mtry under Lieu- rtillcry ; General It of nulitia from 3(1 by Lieutenant- rcderick, AllejTlia- id part of my bri- numbers and ap- ly between Mont- . General Win- \g the enemy in- •c, concluded his r that place, leav- '< to follow him in Tom the City of treat of the ene- lany of their sol- ; that the main road to Marlbor- avalry to follow i. Reports from rms of many of s, and it was ap- 3 absence of the ■k of destruction icitation of Briji;-- sed much anxie- all-important to •oops of the Dis- ed to their ship- to Bladensburg, onels Beall and Hipied until they ling of the 27th, part of Colonel leavy rain. On ral Winder, and i detailed to him what I had done since he left me, with which he appeared well pleased. Belijre I conclude, I must observe that Major Pinkney, with most of his battalion, and part of the two companies of artillery, retired from their advanced position to the left of the 5th regi- ment, and with that regiment continued to behave with that gal- lantry which had distinguished them in tlie onset, and only retired when pressed by superior numbers, and then, as I am informed, by orders from the commanding general. Tobias E. Stansbury. Hon. IL M. Jolmson, Cliainnan, &c., (T.c. No. III. STATEMENT OF GENERAL WALTER SMITH. Siu, — In comphance with the request contained in your favor of the 28th ult., inclosing a copy of a resolution of the honorable the House of Representatives of the United States, appointing a eommittce to investigate the causes which led to the success of the enemy in his late enterprise against this city, I have the honor respectfully to submit for the consideration of the committee ihe following detailed report as connected with the inquiry, and em- bracing, as you wish, a view of the numbers, the movnments, the conduct, and disposition of the troops of Washington and George- town under my command, from the period they were called into service until the 2 1th of August, the disastrous day of battle at Bladensburg, together with such facts and circumstances relative to the subject as present themselves. Late at night on the 18th of August, T received orders to call out the whole of the brigade under my command, to rendezvous on the evening of the following day on the banks of the Tiber, in Washing- ton, and to report to General Winder. The troops assembled ac- cording to orders, but, being deficient in many essential supplies for actual service, were, after an inspection, dismissed until the ensu- ing morning, the 20th, when, every exertion on the part of the of- ficers being made to perfect their equipment, they moved oft' from the Capitol about 3 P.M., crossed the Eastern Branch, and halted four miles therefrom on the road leading to Nottingham. They ;;4-t APPEND ex. ) .'I t m I!,. I I fii; wove here ovf;rtaken by the bajorr^fag-e^whcn it was ascprttiined there was a great ileficicncy of necessary camp equipage, the puhlic storet* being exhausted ; many of the troops were compelled to lie out in the open field; and of the essential article of flints, u[)on a recpu- silion of one thousand, only two hundred could be iiad. .Cleans were inuiiediately adopted to supply the hitter defect from private resources; the formnr was never accomi)lished. On the follow- ing morning, tlic :;21st, the militia companies deficient in numbers were consolidated, and the supernumerary ofliccrs detached to bring up delinquents. The force on the ground amounted to about one thousand and seventy, comprised into two regiments, com- manded by (-olonels IMagruder and Brent, and consisting of the following description of troops : two companies of artillery, twelve six-pounders, and two hundred and ten men ; two companies of riflemen, nominally, but armed icilh muskets, the Secretary of War having declined or refused to furnish rifles, one hundred and sev- enty men ; one company of grenadiers, forty men ; and five com- panies of light infantry, about two hundred and fifty men : in all, about six hundred and seventy of volunteers, the residue common militia. Having here done all that could be done for the organ- ization of the troops, and to enable them to move with celerity, they were, according to previous orders from General Winder, put in motion, and after a hot and fatiguing march, encamped that evening after dusk near the Wood Yard. At this place I found the United States 3Gth regiment, Lieutenant-colonel Scott, about three hundred and fifty strong, and a squadron of cavalry under the command of Lieutenant-colonel Tilghman ; the latter soon after moved olT to reconnoitre on the different roads between the Wood Yard, Marlborough, and Nottingham. While the troops were occupying the ground, 1 received a message from General Winder, then at the Wood Yard, requesting an interview at his quarters ; after which I returned to camp at 9 o'clock, and again at his request joined him at 13, where Cohmel Monroe soon after arrived witli the intelligence of the arrival at Nottingham (distant about twelve miles) of the enemy in considerable f()rce, both by land and water. I received orders immediately to return to camp, and hold the troops in readiness to march at the shortest notice, and was instructed by General Winder to direct Lieutenant-colonel Scott, of the 36th United States regiment, to get his men immo- ^j Ari'ENDJX. ;;45 'CPrtiifrir^d tfir-ro .li" public; stori's k'd to Ho out ill 3, upou a f('nui- e liad. JMeans ct from private On tho. follow- ont iu tunnljcrs i-s (Ictaclicd to ouute;! to about :'g'inioiits, com- nsistiiig of tJic rtillcry, twelve companies of crctary of ^Var ndred atid sov- and five com- y men : in all, siduc common for the organ- with celerity, neral ^^"indcr, mcamped that place I found l Scott, about avahy under le latter soon between the le the troops rom General crview at his 3k, and agnin 00 soon after fham (distant i)rce, both by urn to camp, Driest notice, Miant-colonel men imme- diately under arms, and to march accordinjj to orders previously given him. 1 reached the camp about 2 o'clock A.M. ; the troop.s were roused, the tents struck, the bag-gage-watrous loaded, and the men gni nnmediately under arms, and so remained until sunrise the :J-Jil,\\heu (reneral NN'mder arrived and directed an advanced corps to be formed and march nnmediately, to consist of about three hundred men, artillerists and infantry. This was promptly done, and placed under the direction of Major Peter, consisting of his own artillery, Captain Davidson's light infantry, and Captain Stull's ride corps, armed irith inushcts. They moved immediate- ly on the road to Nottingham, and were soon after followed by the main body to support them. Major Peter, with the advance corps, moved on for fom* or five nules, when he fell in with Colonel La- ' all's cavalry, a j-art of Colonel Tilghman's, and the SOth United .States regin L-nt retiring. The troops were halted, and a posi- tion taken to "epel the enemy, now rapidly approaching. General V'inder In "e joined our troops, and soon after orders were given to fall back, whic! was done. The main body had meanwhile arrived at a posiMo" within two miles of the advance, where they found tlr m-.irinc corps, isler the command of Captain Miller, with five pie 'cs of heavy artillery, judiciously posted. This position not being deemed fiv^rable for the infantry, they were directed to rest on their arms, uhde I rode briskly forward to discover one more adapted to them ; but none presented, except for light troops, a body of which was thrown in advance into the woods, and the residue of the troops disposed of to act ac- cording to circumstances. Here we received advice, about 11 o'clock, of the advance of the enemy and of the retiring of our ad- vance troops, and, immediately after, orders from CJeneral Winder to send off the baggage from where it had been left in the morn- ing to the " Long Old Fields," and for the troops to retire slowly upon the same road. About this time successive heavy explo- sions from the direction of Marlborougli announced the destruction of Commodore Barney's flotilla, which was known to be in that vicinity, and also that this course would be adopted should the en- emy approach in such force by land and water as to render re- sistance unavailing. It was hence inferred that the enemy had ascended the Patuxent in force ; that a column of troops had co- operated by taking the road in that direction, which was soon aft- P2 1 t 1' >ll)l m 1(1 ' r#i It «*'1'li 'm> 1/ I' I, .■ 1 I 1 , ii ) i V ' 1 1 ' l' ' ^ ^ « ,n4G APPENDIX. erward confirmed ; and, with the advices suhsequcntly, that tho whole of their army had filed off on that road, and taken possession oi' Marlborough. Our troops halted, and assembled at the Ibrlc oi' the roads on this side of the Wood Yard, one of which leads to Marlborough, the oilier to this place. We here fell in with Com- modore Barney and his sailors, and, after a short rest, the whole moved on, and about 4 P.M. arrived at the Long Old Fields. Here, pursuant to directions from General Winder, I assumed the connnand of the assembled forces, those of Connnodore Biuncy excepted, consisting now of the following troops, viz. : District volunteers and militia, one thousand and sevt ty ; Lieutenant-col- onel Scott's 30th United States regiment, three hundred and fifty ; Lieutenant-colonel Kramer\s battalion of drafted nulitia, two hund- red and forty ; and Major Waring's battalion of Prince George's militia, about one hundred and fifty : total, about eighteen hund- red men. An encampment was formed for the night, and such positions taken as were best calculated to resist a night attack ; the cavalry being already stationed in advance on the dilferent roads leading to Marlborough, with orders to keep patrolling par- ties constantly upon the enemy's quarters, and to advise of all his movements. The troops, being greatly fatigued, sought in sleep that repose they so nmch wanted. In this they were disappointed. An alarm gun aroused them about '2 o'clock in the morning of the 23d. They were r arms, and were joined by another small detachment of Prince George's militia, \mder (he command of Major Mavnard, about one hundred and fifty. TIk? whole were held ready to move according to orders. About this time T received directions from General Winder to have formed an advance corjis, constructed as the one of the pr(>ceding day, and be prepared to move as his sidisequent orders shotdd desig- nate. Peter's, Davidson's, and StuU's companies were again se- APPENDIX. •> i" qucntly, that the taken possession 3d at tlie fork oi' f which leads to ell in with Com- t rest, the whole ung Old Fields, •r, I at^sumed the iraodorc Barney s, viz. : District Lieutcnant-col- nulred and fifty ; iulitia,two hund- Princc George's eighteen hund- night, and such a night attack ; on the (lilTcrent p patrolling par- advise of all his sought in sleep 're disappointed. ? morning of the cir encampment, :!ted attack ; but ! alarm, and the lemselvcs ready It General Win- 'apgage-wagons v(> in one hour. il)h^ e\pe(htion. wore joined by ilitia, under thr, and fifty. Th(i rs. Almut this to have formed pn^eeding day, s should desig- were again se- lected for this purpose, and formed accordingly. The President of the United States, accompanied by the Secretary of War and others of his oalfinet, now came upon the ground, and reviewed the trotips. Aoout 10 o'clock Cieneral A\ aider lett the camp, ac- companied by, and having under his command or direction, sev- eral troops of cavalry, intending to reconnoitre on the road lead- ing from Marlborough to Bladensburg, as well as to be situated in a position where he might more conveniently communicate with the troops expected from Baltimore, leaving directions that I should report to him at the Cross Roads, it being the intersection of a road proceeding from the Old Fields, and crossing the before-men- tioned road, about five miles distant. Ilis orders were that the advance troops should move forward m the direction of Marl- borough, reconnoitre the enemy, approach him as near as possible without running too much risk, and to annoy him either in his po- sition or in his movements by all the means in their power, and that I should remain with the main body at the Old Fields, and act according to the intelligence I should receive of the move- ments of the enemy. If they moved upon Bladensburg by the road before-mentioned, that 1 should approach them by the inter- secting road from the Old Fields, and attack tlicir lett flank, or if upon the road we now occupied, that we should make the best pos- sible dispositions in our power, and receive him there, unless cir- cumstances imperiously forbade ; otherwise to retire by a road in our rear to Bladensburg or to Washington, as at the time should seem most advisahlc. In conformity with this arrangement, Ma- jor Peter, with the advance corps and v.ith Captain Caldwell's cavalry, which had joined us, marched about 11 o'clock. About a quarter of a mile in front of our then camp the road forks, both leading to Marll)orough, one on the main stag<"-road, by which the distance was about eight miles, the other turning to the left, a more direct route, Init not so good a road, about six miles. This last-mentioned road was taken by our advancing troops. The com- mander was instructed to report every hour. The residue of our troops were dismissed to refresh. From this period until 2 o'clock several deserters and prisoivrs were brought into camp, and I v.as rngtiged in ex.\miiuiig them when intelligenco was received froiM Major Peter that the enemy had left Marlborough, ami were ad- vancing rapidly upon the road which we then occupied in great 'in ?AS APPENDIX. f if M ■ i' I: bur " If 'litilii < Ml force ; that, according to his estimation of their column, and the hest information he could obtain, their force was not less than six thousand men ; that he had had a skirmish with them, in which they had endeavored to outflank him, and tliat he was then retir- ing iK'iure them. A part of Colonel Laval's cavalry, having then juined us, were immedialely detached to cover tli(3 retreat, and the whole of our troops ordered under arms. Conferring with Com- modore Barney on the subject, I proposed making a stand in our then position, with which, with his characteristic gallantry, he promptly accpiiesced, professing his willingness to co-operate in any measures that might be deemed most advisable. The troops were immedintcly formed in order of battle, extending nearly a quarter of a r.ule on each side of tht; road; those of Commodore iJanu'y,wiih his heavy artillery, the marines under Captain Mil- ler, and the 3Gth United ^States regiment, being posted on the right of the road ; the District troops, and the residue of those attached to them, on the left — our advaiu-ed troops, as they arrived, taking their stations in the line, and the artillery, in which it was ascer- tained we were greatly their superior, and for which the ground was admirably adajited, so posted as to hav(> the best elVect; in- ilced, so hironi.'' did we deem our position in front that we were apprehensive that the enemy, upon viewing us, would forbear to assail us by daylight, or that, availing of his numbers, he would endeavor to outflank us. To gu:ivd against this last, parties of light tn)Ops and cavalry were detached to cover both flanks. We remained thus two or three hours calmly awaiting the approach of the enemy, our vedettes suec(>sively aiuunnu'ing his continued progress. Al)out 5 I*. M., General \Viniler, who had been apprised of the approach of the enemy, arrived in camp. He e.vamined the diflercnt positions, and approved of them ; but the day being now nearly spent, and it being ascertained that the enemy had not ar- rived witli n a distance in which he would now probably be able to make his attack while it lasted, and il being deemed unadvis- aiilo to rec(>iv(^ a night attack there, \\hen our advantage of artil- lery would be unavailing, he gave the ordiM-s to retire about sun- .'-et, and the whole of the troops, much wearied and exhausted, en- camped late in the ni'iht within this city. Thus terminated the four days of service of (he troop.s of this District preceding the airnir at Hladensburg. They had been nn- ArPKNDlX. 340 'olumn, and the ot loss than six ihem, in which was then retir- ry, having then retreat, and the rinir with (Joni- ; a stand in our e gallantry, he 3 co-operate in e. The troops Muiing nearly a of Commodore er Captain Mil- ited on the right f those attached arrived, taking h it was ascer- lich the ground hcst cflect; in- t that we were ould lorhear to l)(M-s, he would ast, parties of h Hanks. We the approach U his contiiuied leen apprised e evammed the day heiiig now ny had not ar- thahly he ahlo Mued imadvis- iiitage of artil- tir(^ aliout sun- exhausted, en- troops of this / had hern tin- m der arms, with hut little intermission, the whole ot the time, hoth night and day ; had traversed, during their ditferent marches in advance and retreat, a considerahle tract of country, exposed to the burnmg heat of a sultry sun by day, and many of them to the cold (h.'ws of the night, uncovered. They had, in this period, drawn hut two rations, the requisition th'Tcfor, in the first instance, hav- ing been hut parti;'.lly complied with, and it being afterward almost impossible to procure the means of transportation, the wagons em- ployed by our (piartermaster for that purpose being constantly im- pressed by the government agents for the purpose of removing the j)ublic records when the enemy's approach was known, and some of them thus seized while proceeding to take in provisions for the army. Those hardships and privations could not be but severely dis- tressing to men, the greater jKirt of whom possessed and enjoyed at home the means of comfortal)le living, and from their usual hab- its and pursuits in lif(! but ill (lualified to endure them. They, however, submitted without murmuring, evincing by their patience, their zeal, and the promptitude with which they obeyed every or- der, a magnanimity highly honorable to their character. CJreat as was their merit in this resjject, it was no less so in the spirit man- ifested whenever an order was given to inarch to meet the foe; and at the " Long Old Fields," where his attack was momently ex- pected in overwhelming force, they displayed, in presence of many spectators, although scarcely any of them had ever been in action, a firmness, a resolution, and an intrepidity which, whatever might have been the n.-sult, did honor to their country. On Wednesday morning, tlw; 'JJth of August, at II A.M., I re- ceived orders from (Jeneral W inder to iletach one piece of artil- lery and one company of infantry to repair to the Kastern IJranch Uridine, and there report to Colonel ^\'a^lsworth ; and to proceed with the residue (d'tlie troo[)s to IMadensburg, and take a position to support (tcneral JStansbury. 'J'his order was put in inunediale execution, and the troo[)s for Tiladeiisburg moved olV with ail the expedition of which they were capable. Having l)nt them in mo- tion, I passed on ahead, in order that I nnudit select my position against their arrival. I found (ieneral Stansbury posted on the west side of the Eastern llranch, his rii^ht resting on the main roat of the ground icending fields. Jed on the dis- insbury of my ting that, if Ills ny left, the na- renewal of the is time we re- urg, and I left red rapidly on, red with clouds jieutonaiit-col- d in a field on mmaiiding the in the roar of mmanding the '. one iiundrcd tending to the in the rear of lith a pnrt of Hting upon tlio ' to the road, Ith regiment; ^ptain David- , armed with ke possession g the ravine, manded coin- siderablc cx- Jcessarily re- tire if forced back ; but, after a short space of time, report was made to nin that broken grounds interrupted the approach to it vvitli artillery but l)y a circuiious route that would consume much time, and that, in case of retreat, the grotmd in the rear was such as might endanger the safety of the guns. It was mentioned, at the same time, that near to it was a commanding position for ar- tillery, and easy of access from and to the road. I yielded with reluctance to the ai)andonment of the position first ordered, but time did not admit of hesitation. Meanwhile I had posted Lieu- tenant-colonel Kramer, with his battalion of INIaryland drafted mi- litia, in the woods on the right of the road, and commanding the ravine which continued in that direction, with orders that, if forced, he should retire, by his right, through a body of woods in that di- rection, and rally and form with the troops stationed in the rear, on the extreme right. Upon examining the 'position taken by Major Peter's battery, it was found that the range of his guns was prin- cipally throuf^h that part of the field occupied by the 3r)th regi- ment. To remove one or the other became necessary, and the difficulty (»f the ground for moving artillery, and the exigency of the movement left no alternative. The 3Gth fell back about one hundred yards, losing, in some measure, the advantage of its ele- vated ground, and leaving the road. The pcsition of the 1st regi- ment District militia, frnin this circumstance, was also necessarily chanprcd. It fi'll back about the .same distance, its right ^^till rest- ing on the road, and now formed nearly in line with the 3fith. Of the '2d rerjinKMit District militia, *\\o pieces of artillery and one company of riflemen, armed with muskets, were, by directions of General Winder, sent on to the front; with these he llnnkcd the extreme left of the front line ; two pieces more of artillery were posted in the road near the bridge at liladensburg ; the residue of that regiment, about three liuiidred and fifty strong, under the command of Colonel Hrent, was lormed as a reserve a short dis- tance in the rear of Major Peter's battery, and so disposed as to act on the right, or left, or in front, as occasion might retpiire. Near them was posted, in the same manner. Major Waring's Prince ficorffc's battalion of militia, about one hundred and fifty. Colo- nel William D. Ijeall, with a regiment of troops from Anna[)olis, passed throurrji HIadensburg as our troops arrived, and took a po- sition on 1h« right of the road and nearly fronting it, at a distance > .i: ^ • ki i *' i'H 1 '. 1 ' :i52 APl'ENDIX. ot" about two hundred and fifty yards. Previous to tlio arrival of the troops on the ground, General Winder came up from the city, and, being made acquainted with the intended dispositions of the troofps, as well as tlie ground reserved for Commodore Barney and the marines, approved of and confirmed them. About half past twelve o'clock, and whdc the troops were yet taking their diflTerent positions, innumerable rockets, thrown from the heights at Bladensburg, announced the arrival of the enemy there ; and at this period Commodore Barney's sailors and ma- rines, in quick march, arrived, and took possession of the ground previously assigned them, his artillery being posted in and near the road upon its right, commanding the road and open field in front ; and his infantry, together with the marines under Captain Miller, extending to the right, thus occupying the interval uf ground be- tween Colonel Magruder's 1st regiment District militia and Colo- nel Beall's Maryland regiment. The firing of artillery in front soon commenced, and immediately after that of musketry, in quick and rapid succession. In a few minutes the whole right and cen- tre of the front line, with some small exceptions, were seen retir- ing in disorder and confusion. The firing still continued on the extreme left, but shortly after it also broke, and, although it retired in more order, yet none could be rallied so as to renew the action with eflect, and also soon entirely quitted the field. Meanwhile the left of the enemy, in heavy column, passed along the road crossing the ravine. They were here encountered by the troops of Colonel Kramer, po,sted in the woods on the edge of the ravine. These, after a short confiict, were compelled to re- tire, which they did principally under cover of the adjacent woods, and formed with the troops of Colonel Beall on the right. The enemy's column now displayed in the field on the right of the road. They here became exposed to the oblique fire of Major Peter's battery, which was kept up with great animation. Still pressing on to the front of our right, they came in contact with the heavy artillery of Commodore Barney, and of the troops posted there. Here the firing became tremendous. They were repulsed, again returned to the charge, succeeded in forcing the troops on the right, and finally carried the position of Commodore Barney. The dispersion of the front line caused a dangerous opening on our left, of which the enemy in that quarter promptly availed. J ' APPENDIX. 353 1 tho arrival ot' 1 iVom the city, pobitiuiis of tlio ore Barney and roops were yet s, thrown from ' of tlie enemy ailors and ma- i of the ground in and near the I field in front ; Captain Miller, ui' ground be- litia and Colo- tillcry in front ;ketry, in quick right and cen- ere seen retir- ntinued on the lOugh it retired lew the action I, passed along ncountered by )n the edge of mpelled to re- Ijaccnt woods, c right. Tho It of tho road. Major Peter's ►Still pressing ith the heavy posted there. Dpulsed, again roops on tho IJarney. IS opening on iptly availed. lie advanced ra})idly ; then, wlieeling on liis lei\, .soon gained, and M'as turning our left flank. To oppose this alarming movement, 1 directed Colonel lirent, with the '2d regiment of District nuhtia, to take a position sail more to the left ; and he was proceeding in the execution of this order, when orders came from General Win- der for the whole of the troops to retreat. The elTorts of the en- emy Imd hitherto l)een directed princii)ally against the right and left of our wliole line of battle. The troops of this District, and a part of those attached to them, occupying positions mostly in the cen- tre, and some of them dinicult of access, were eonse([uently but partially engaged, and this principally with light troops and skir- mishers, now pressing forward, supported by a column of infantry. 1 here beg leave to refer to the reports of Colonels Bri.'ut and Thompson, Xos. 1 and "i, showing the positions, and the part taken by their respective ccnnmands during the at^tion. The order to retreat was executed by regiments and corps, as they had been formed, and with as much order as the nature of the ground would jjermit. The first and second regiments halted and fi)rmed. after retreating five or six hundred paces, but were again ordered by (General Winder to retire. At this moment I lell in with General Winder, and, after a short conference with him, was directed to move on and collect the troops, and prepa.-c to make a stand on the heights westward of the turiii)ike gate. This was done as last as the troops came up. A front was again presented toward the enemy, consisting principally of the troops of this District, a part of those who had been attached to them in the action, and a A'irginia regiment of about four hundred men, under Colonel Minor, which met us at this place. While the lino was yet forming, I received orders from CJeneral AA'inder to fall back to ilie Capitol, and there form for !)attle. 1 took the liberty of suggesting my impression of the preferable situation we then occupied; but, expecting that he might be joined there by som : of the di-spcrscd troops of the front line, ho chose to make the st-^'id there. Approaching the Capitol, I halted the troops, and requested his orders as to the fi)rmation of the line. Wo found no auxilia- ries there. He then conferred for a few moments with General Armstiong. who was a short di.stance from us, and then gave or- ders that the whole should retreat through Washington ;ind Georgetown. It is impossible to do justice to the anguish evinced »!■: 354 APPENDIX. u » by the troops of Washington and Georgetown on the receiving of this order. The idea of leaving their families, their houses, and their honjes at the mercy of an enraged enemy was insupportable. To preserve that order which was maintained during the retreat was now no longer practicable. As they retired through Wash- ington and Georgetown, numbers were obtaining and taking leave to visit their homes, and then again rejoining ; and with ranks thus broken and scattered, they halted at night on the heights near Tcnleytown, and on the ensuing day assembled at Montgomery Court House. I have thus, sir, given a detailed, and what will, I apprehend, in many respects, be deemed too minute an account of the short tour of service of the District troops under my command which pre- ceded the capture of this capital. I fear its length may trespass toi. uch on the patience of your honorable committee. I thought it, however, due to the occasion, and conformable to the spirit and pui-port of your inquiries. I had another object. The troops of Washington and Georgetown have been assailed, in the public prints and elsewhere, with calumnies as unmerited as they are cruel and wanton. They have heard of them with indignant as- tonishment. Conscious that in no instance have they been want- ing in the duty they owed to their country or to themselves, but, on the contrary, in obedience to the call of their government, have with alacrity obeyed its orders, and intrepidly fronted an enemy vastly their superior in force, and never yielded the ground to him but by orders emanating from superior authority, they can not lestrain the feelings excited by such manifest, such unprovoked injustice. They have seen with satisfaction the resolution of Congress to inquire into this subject, and, persuaded of the justice and impartiality of your honorable committee, entertain a confident assurance that the result of your investigation will afford relief to their injured feelings. Connected with this subject, I beg leave to refer to a letter of General Winder, No. 3, in answer to an in- quiry made of him as to the general conduct of the brigade while under his command. I have the honor to be, etc., W. Smith, IJrigadier-general 1st Columbian brigade. Hon. R. M. Johnson. P.S, — I ought to have mentioned that parts of two companies APPENDIX. 355 n the receiving heir houses, and s insupportable, ring the retreat through Wash- md taking leave and with ranks the heights near at Montgomery , I apprehend, in Df the short tour land which pre- th may trespass ittee. I thought to the spirit and The troops of d, in the public ted as they are th indignant as- they been want- themselves, but, ivernment, have jnted an enemy [ the ground to [ty, they can not iich unprovoked e resolution of ed of the justice rtain a confident 1 afford relief to ect, I beg leave inswcr to an in- le brigade while unibian brigade, two companies of the United States 12th and 38th regiments were attached to the SGtii regiment, under Lieutciiunt-colonel Scott. Previous to the march to Bladensburg, eighty men of his command had been stationed near the Eastern liranch Bridge, and did not join until after the action. His force then was less than three hundred men. W. S. No. IV. COLONEL GEORGi: MINOR'S STATEMENT. In answer to the stvcral interrogatories made by Colonel R.M. Johnson, cliairman of the committee of inquiry into the causes of the destruction of the public buildings in the City of \\'ashington, as hereunto annexed, state as follows, viz. : On Friday, the 19th of August la.st, was jnformed (not officially) of the collecting of the enemy's forces in our waters, namely, the Potomac and Patuxcnt. Immediately issued orders for the ren-i- ment under my command to assemble at Wren's tavern on the Tuesday following, it being the nearest point of the county of Fairfax to the city ; and on Sunday, the 21st, received orders, tlirough Brigadier-general Douglas, to repair with a detachment of ninety men, that had been prcviou.sly placed in detail, to march at a moment's warning, to the aid of General Ilungcrford, whose head-quarters were in the counties of Westmoreland, King George, or Northumberland ; and to make one other requisition of one iuuidrcd and forty men, exclusive of officers, and order them to the aid of General Winder, City of Washington. And on Monday evening, the 22d, received a verbal message from the President, by Mr. John Graham, to hasten on the troops which had been or- dered from my regiment, whicli will more llilly appear by said Graham's letter to General Winder, to which I beg leave to refer the committee; and, after informing Mr. Graham the purport of the orders I had received, we both concluded it would be proper for him to return to Washington, and have the orders first alluded to countermanded, so as to justify me in marching with my whole force to the city, which consisted, as well as I can recollect, of six hundred infantry and about one hundred cavalry; and the said Graham returned to Wren's tavern on Tu':'sday evening, the 23d, with General Winder's orders, written on the same letter to which Il liii I ' !i I ■ i' 856 APPENDIX. I have referred the committee, on the receipt of which I took up my line of niarcii immediately, and arrived at the Capitol l)et\\eon sunset and dark, and immediately made my way to the President and reported my arrival, when he referred me to General Arm- strong, to whom I repaired, and informed him as to the strength of the troops, as well as to the want of arms, ammunition, etc., which made it as late as early candle-light, when I was informed hy that gentleman the arms, etc., could not be had that night, and directed me to report myself next morning to Colonel Carberry, who would furnish me with arms, etc., w'hich gentleman, from ear- ly next morning, I diligently sought for, until a late hour of the forenoon, without being able to find him, and then went in search of General Winder, whom I found near the Eastern Branch, when he gave an order to the armorer for the munitions wanting, with orders to return to the ('apitol, there to await further orders. On my arrival at the armory, found that department in the caro of a very young man, who dealt out the stores cautiously, which went greatly to consume time ; as, for instance, when flints were once counted by my officers, who showed every disposition to ex- pedite the furnishing the men, the young man had to count them over again before they could be obtained ; and at which place I met with Colonel Carberry, who introduced himself to me, and apologized for not bring found when I was in search of him, stat- ing he had left town the evening before, and had gone to his seat in the country. After getting the men equipped, I ordered them on to the Capitol, and waited myself to sign the receipts for the munitions furnished ; and, on my arrival, was informed by INIajor Hunter, who commanded in my absence, orders had been given to march to Bladensburg, when we took up our march for that place, and met the retreating army on this side the turnpike gate ; and was ordered by one of General Winder's aids to form the line of battle on a height near that place, and was soon after ordered by the general in person to throw back my regiment from that posi- tion into sections, and to wait until the retreating army had pass- ed, and cover their retreat; and immediately afler sent his aid to direct me to countermarch immediately, and come to the Capitol. After returning there, halted the troops to wait further orders, imtil {general Winder directed me to march them on, without tell- ing me where ; of course 1 marched with the other troops until I ArrKNDix. 357 which I took up Capitol hctweon to the PresicJt'Ut ) General Arm- to the strength nimunition, etc., I was intbrmcil d that night, and olonel Carherry, leman, from ear- late hour of the 1 went in search rn Branch, when IS wanting, with :her orders, ment in the caro autiously, which A'hen Hints were lisposition to ex- d to count them t which place I [.sell' to me, and 'cli of him, stat- gone to his seat , I ordered them receipts for the )rmed hy INIajor d heen given to li for that place, ipiko gate ; and brm the line of fter ordered hy from that posi- army had pass- sent his aid to to the Capitol, further orders, nn, without tell- r troops until I came to the Six Buildings, where I took the left-liaiul road, lead- ing to the foundry, and there occupied the nearest height to that place, and sent the adjutant to lind where the general had made his rallymg-poim, -md was informed at Tenleytown, wlirre I march- ed that evening, and found the troops movuig oil' to encamp at some convenient place on the river road, where I followed on un- til I saw two harns, where I made to, and rested for the night. Next morning sought for General Winder ; met him on the road leading from Tenleytown to where my troops lay, when he ordcr- t'd me to Montgomery Court House, and from thence to Baltimore. Given under my hand, City of Washington, 3()lh of Octoher, 1811. GkoRGE iMiNOK, Colonel-commandant GOth regiment Virginia militia. I No. V. rUOM MAJOli GEOUUE PLTEK To COI.ONKL ,). S. WILLIAMS. Montiinvpi'd, May 24, 1>54. Dear Sir, — Your communication of the 18th instant has been duly received. After the unfortunate aflair of Bladenshurg I was called upon hy Colonel R. IM. Johnson, appointed chairman of a committee of Congress to investigate the capture of Washinirton. I (h^clmed making any communication. Cabinet ministers, rival candidates for the presidency (Monroe and Armstrong), generals, iield-ollicers, captains, and subalterns, and citizens, had all made communications to the chairman and his committee, presentino- such a variety of views and statements connected with the opera- tions of the U. S. army, and the landing and advance of the British army under the command of General Ross, that I Iclt convinced it would be impossible for any committee to make such a report as would embrace a true statement of the military operations con- nected with the capture of Washington. I still most reluctantly make any statements ; and but for va- rious publications, doing great injustice to many portions of the army, and misstatements of facts, I would not be induced, at this late period, to present my recollections of the operations of that day to you. It is well-known to all connected with the army on that occa- 4 Hll '!' 358 APPENDIX. S' ■T' 1' il U ^i ^\ r^tf sion, that tbc « b "ncc was under my immediate command, which gave me an o: ^ Lunitv of knowing as much connected with the operations as Ui . oi'ier officer connected with the army. I was the/i>5/ to meet the enemy, and the last piece of artillery fired at the battle of Bladensburg was from my battery, after 1 had re- ceived an order, through you, from General JSmith to retreat. To enter into all the details and movements would be more than I can undertake by letter ; but if you can make it convenient to visit me, I would go more into general details, and relate many circumstances that are too voluminous for my letter-conununica- tion. It is not my intention to impute blame or censure to any one. A want of military experience was the groundwork of all the er- rors committed in the military operations of that day. Winder and Armstrong were both loudly condemned and charged with things that both, in my opinion, were innocent of. The great defect was the want oi military experience. From General Armstrong I re- ceived every equipment that was necessary to render my corps ef- ficient in every respect, while many complained of their inability to procure such arms and equipments as were necessary to render them efficient ; and I personally know that StuU's rifle corps were supplied with muskets instead of their proper arms.* No sooner was it announced that the enemy had arrived at Benedict, than I was sent for by the Secretary of War, and was offered the ap- pointment of colonel, and the command of volunteer corps in the District of Columbia. I w-as aware of the jealousy and heart- burning that it would create with the officers commanding militia regiments to have the volunteer companies of their several regi- ments taken from them at the moment that they expected to meet the enemy, and recommended things to be left as they were, and I would continue to command the artillery, and StuU and David- son's companies, which had been with me on more occasions than one. The first error committed was in detaining my artillery and oth- er troops, which were in a state of readiness for moving, two days from the City of Washington, until the body of the militia could be furnished with the necessary equipments to take the field. You * It is jicrsonally known to tho iiulhor tlmt rirtos were refused to this corps, wliich caused great excitement and iuJignatiou at the time. amand, which cled with the iiniiy. I was tillery fired at Iter 1 lud re- retreat. 1 be more than convenient to d relate many >r-conununica- rc to any one. V of all the er- . Winder and ;ed with things rcat defect was Lrmstrong I re- :r my corps ef- f their inability [ssary to render ifle corps were * No sooner encdict, than I offered the ap- er corps in the usy and heart- nanding militia ir several regi- pected to meet they were, and lull and David- occasions than tillery and oth- Dving, tw-o days militia could be the field. You 'used to this corps, APPENDIX. 3o0 % will recollect tlic nights of the '22d and 23.1. ]My detachment was kept under order to move toward Notliughain. The order to march was given alioul sunrise on the mornnig of tlie 22(1. llav- inir hailed for a few moments in adviince of the " Wood Yard," to enable the troops to get water to drink, Captain Edward G.Will- iams, of the cavalry, approached in great haste, and s\.id he " had been detached for the purpose of procuring axes to fell trees across the road to obstruct the advance of the enemy." In a moment my troops were in marching order. 1 proceeded but a short distance, when 1 met Colonel Tilghman or your brother. Lieutenant-colonel Olho II. Williams, commanding some two hundred cavalry, retir- ing to get on the road which led to Ranter's tavern, General Win- der being undir the impression that the enemy contemplated an attack upon Fort Washington. This was the great error connnit- ted by (ieneral Winder on that day. I was also advised to fall back, l)ut as my instructions were to advance until I met General Winder or the enemy, 1 continued on my course. A short time alterward I met Lieutenant-colonel Wm. Scott at the head of the regidar troops, also retiring. 1 told him what my orders were, and that I should continue to advance, lie very promptly said he " was a young officer of but little experience, and would most cheerfully co-operate in any movements that 1 made. I continued to advance until I came in sight of Oden's house, where 1 found the enemy posted. There I made a disposition to meet the enemy : tStull and Davidson upon the right, my six pieces of artillery in the centre, guns loaded, matches lighted, and Scott, with the regulars, upon the left. 1 had occupied this position but a short time, when General Winder arrived, complimented me for the position I occupied, but considered we were not in suffi- cient force to meet the enemy, and advised that we should fall back and occupy a new position. We did so. General Winder ac- companying us. We had hardly taken possession of the new po- sition, when we heard the reports of the explosion of Barney's flotilla. If General Winder, instead of detaching the cavalry, had employed this regiment under Colonel Tilghman, the regiment of infantry under Colonel Scott, my six pieces of artillery, and the two light companies of StuU and Davidson, and had marched and attacked their rear, I do not believe the enemy ever would have reached Washington. But the general had taken up the impres- I ■'i"! 'MO APPENDIX. I * i P B :« sion that the enemy first contemplated the capture of Fort VVash- iiigtou, to enable their fleet to pass up the Potomac, and the cap- ture of Washington was contemplated by the joint operations of the fleet and army. This I looked upon as the great error of the campaign; for the troops composing the army of (Jcneral Winder were better calculated to meet the enemy by detachments than in any gaicral engagement, the most of them being militia, concentrated on the sjjur of the occasion, with little or no military experiei ce. I was onlered to fall back and join the concentivtion of the ar.Tiy at " Long Old Fields." In returning, 1 saw where General Smith, in advance of the " Wood Yard," hod occupied a position, calculating upon the advance of the enemy by that route. On my arrival at " Long Old Fields," in addition to .Smith's brig- ade, I Ibund the flotilla-men under Commodore IJarney, with a batt(>ry of two eigliu en-i)oundfrs, and the marines under the com- mand of their gallant kuuler, (Japtain (late Colonel) Miller. You will recollect, during the nights of the 2'2d and i23(l, the constant alarms by guns being fired by the sentinels dtn-ing the night, til- ways the result of an army composed principally of raw militia. During the morning of the i-3d I\L-. Madison and his cabinet ar- rived in camp. About 8 or 9 o'clock 1 was sent for i)y (I(>ncial Winder. Th(^ President and cal)inet were with him, when he in- formed mc that there were such various accounts of the jjosition and movements of the enemy that it was impossible for him to de- cide liow to act ; that he wished I would take the detachment un- der my command, and proceed on the rente to Marlborough until 1 could ascertain correctly the situatioii of the British army. Hav- ing advanced within a short distance of Marlborough, in tlu' neigh- borhood of Magruder's Ikhisc, 1 discovered the advanced picket guard of the enemy, !md ascertained from Mr. Magrudcr or Mr, Tyler, who occupied the house, that some of tiic British ollicers had been with him a few moments before, and had informed bim that about the middle of the day they shoidd take up their line of march for the ('ity of Washington. 1 had forgotten (o mention that, in addition to my own detachment. con:li ollicers liii'l informed liiiii e u[) their line of gotten to mention iting of Stull and ig :ibout a dozen aiu'cd liieuleiiant n, and liieutenant 11 ,t, to advise of the approach of the enemy. Occupying the high hdl above INIa- gnider'.s house, from whence I could overlook much of the country toward iMarlborougli, 1 made the following tain Lulfborough, who commanded a company of " Orange- men" raised upon the spur of the occasion, arrived with a message from (Jeneral Winder, saying "my artillery was too important an arm of his army ; that ho wished me to send it to the rear ; and that, if an »»pportunity ollen^d, I might f(>ei the enemy with Stull's and Davidson's companies." I had hardly ordered the artillery to retire, when the Hritish oilicers. General Ross being one of them, ajipeared upon the summit of the hill 1 had letl. I ordered Cap- tain Stull to give those red-coat gentlemen a shot, intending only a platoon to have fired, when the whole company leveled and fired,* the ((iRcers retiring on the slope of the hill on the other siilc. At (hi.- moment the advance of the IJritish commenc'd firing upon .Stull's ('(Miipany. The company reloaded and fired, and fell back a short distance, when they advanced a second time in good order, fired another volley, and retired. By this time the enemy was advancing in large numbers. I imined lately sent orders lor two pieces of arti'lery to halt, and to form on a commanding piece of ground in the rear. I gave orders to Captain Davidson to occupy a brush fence upon my left, but which order was misunderstood, and Ik; continued to retire in good order. I was detained upon th(; ground a few moments to secure tlit; .s:ifety of Stull's onhsrly sergeant (Nicholls), who was sun-struck, and with dilficulty was saved from capture. I immediately joined the artillery, and by firing two or three discharges I caused tlu; main body of the IJrit- ish army to halt, while they sent out large flanking parties to the right and to the lell. Colonel Laval, of tl;o regulars, with two i.-oops of cavalry, joined me. I proposed to him ti. protect my (lanks,while I could keep the enemy at arm's length with my artil- • Hu.t this roniimny hciii nrmiul witli rifl.-s, tlioso ofnoow must have falk-ii, aiwl with it till' def.'nt (.f tliclr project. Q 362 APPENDIX. hiii' 1 n n "4! lery, for I found they were deficient in that arm. He excused himself by saying his horses were not trained, and that he eoukl do nothing to assist me. 1 had been promised by General Winder that, in case of meeting with the enemy, I should be re-enforced ; that he would order on the troops from Bladensburg, under the command of (rcncral Stansbury, to the scene of action. General Winder's correspondence with General .Stansbury will account for the non-arrival of the troops under his command. Why General Winder did not order General Snutirs brigade, with the marines and notilla-men, I can not account. 1 retired to the camp allcr a fatiguing day's march, and fountl the troops there drawn up to re- ceive the enemy. Genera! IJo.ss, who had occupied Centroville, sent back to Marlborough during the night, and dragged up, with his sailors, some two or three pieces of light artillery, the only guns he l)rought with him to Hladeusburg. Another error that my friend, General Winder, committed, was his forced march from " Long Old Field.s" to Washington, I'or nothing was to be apprehended on the part of the British attempting an attack on i\\o. city by tlie only bridge that then crossi^l the Eastern Branch. Ilis true course woultl have been to hav(^ broken uj) his army in iletiich- ments, and to have attacked the enemy in iVont and on both Hanks; his superior command in cavalry, in artiMery, and the grounds be- tween Bladensburg and Gcntrevill(> aHording the opportunity for the operation of tlu)se two important arms of his army. SmitlTs brigade, and the troops attached to that brigade, crossed the Mast- crn Braru'li Bridire during liu^ night of the 'J.'hI. Being much ex- liausted and fatig\ie(l, I had lain down in my tent, w u^n (Jeneral Winder caHed upon me, and laid also upon my p.i'let. The con- versation ensued, in which he referred to the failure of Stansbury (o join me, and the inofTiciency of the troops that he had to com- mand. I was so exhausted with the fatigues of the day that T fell asleep. When I awoke the general was gone. The m^xt morn- ing 1 received an order to cover the approach of the bridge wiJh twelve pieces of artillerv. comprising my own six and Captain iJurcb's artillery. Ilavinii completed the order, I waited upon (Jen- eral \\ inder lo tell jiini of the impossibility ol' any attempt on the part of the enemy to cross the bridge ; that no military man would attempt to cross such a stream with an army, having no artillery h APPENDIX. 36;i . He excused d that he eouhl L^cneral Winder he re-enforced; burg, under the ction. General will account lor Why Cieneral kith the marines iif cauip alter a drawn up to re- e, sent hack to with his sailors, e only guns he r that my friend, rch from " Long 1 apprehended on I ilie city hy tiie anch. His true army in dctach- (I on hotli tlanks; the gro\inds he- ^ opportunity for luiny. SmilhV roHsed the lOast- Bciiig much ex- t, w len General „i'!i't. The con- irc of Stansl)ury t h<> had to com- ic day that 1 fdl The next morn- ' the hridpe with six and Captain v;'ited upon Gen- y attempt on the ifnry man would iviuR no artillery to drive us from the occupation of the bridge. In a few moment: a messenger arrived, announcing that the enemy were on tin march to Bladcnsburg. I was ordered immediately to advance with the same detachment, and that the main body would follow imnunhately after. On my arrival on the ground which we occu- ])ied during the battle, a position was shown me by F. S. Key (acting aid lo General Smith), difficult of access, being isolated by numerous and large> ravines on one side and a stream on the other, as one of three positions I might occupy with my artillery. This being no position for light artillery, such as I commanded — for, if once placed there, it could not in any way be manceuvred so as to be of any service — I selected a commanding spot on the left of Barney as the second best situation for artillery to command the road, which was reserved for Barney's heavier pieces, having posted JStull and Davidson at the head of a wooded ravine on my left. The position of the various troops, perhaps, is better known to you than to me, arising from the duties pertaining to yon as brig- ade-major. But, from my recollection (and you can correct any errors), Colonel ('ramer's detaciiment was on the extreme right, between the marines and Eastern Branch ; Barney's artilk^ry and Miller's marines occupied the ground from tlie road to the woods where Cramer was posted; ('olonels Hood and Beall were upon the hill in the re:ir ^>i iiarncy and Miller; Colonel Magrnder's regiment was placed in support of the left flank of Barney's bat- tery ; Coloiu.'l Scott, with the regulars, ('olonel Brent, witii the 2d reginieiit of General Smith's brigade, and Major ^^'arren, \» ith •ii battalion of Marvl;'!)-' militia, in the rear of my guns; Stull and Dfidson at the head of the ravine, on the extreme lefi. The firiiig very soon commenced, after the troops had taken th ^ir posi ions, with Stansbury's brigad(>, which formed an advanced ind separate division of the forces under General Winder, where had been - - ncentratcd the conmiander-in-chief and the several heuris o.'' departments. The action with this line continued biit a short tinu\ wliet> 1 saw three or four detachments of the Balti- more voluntriis maintaining, with great odds, a conlliet with the enemy. They very soon had to yic Id, and from one of the wound- ed men who joined me, who said he belonged to Captain War- field's coinpanv, 1 learnt^d that it was Sterett's and Warfield's ■f' ! ;i()4 AI'PENDIX. '^ mill lij ! t I Mi rornpanies, with a detachment of riflemen, and perhaps others. By this time the enemy, in great force, had thrown themselves heliind a large irame barn, which stood between them and the po- sition occupied by my battery. I ordered six pieces of artillery, with round shot, to open upon the barn, whic'i drove them frnm tliat position. They then marched toward the bridge that crossed a small branch on the road, when, comnig within reach of Barney's [)ositioii, his heavy guns (eightecn-pounders) opened most fatally upon the advancing column of the enemy, my guns keeping up a cross-fire at the same instant, which forced them to retire down the branch toward the woods, when they came in contact with Colonel Cramer's detachment, and, having driven him from the woods, they again occupied the plain in front of Miller and Bar- ney, where they met wit.i the most formidable resistance they en- countered during the day. I thought then, and am still of the .-anio opinion, that if General Smith had ordered to the riirht, at lliat moment, a part of my battery, and the regulars under Col- onel Scott, the advance of the enemy would have been repulsed. The great loss of the enemy in this conflict was sustained princi- [)ally from Barney's and Miller's front-fire and the cross-fire of my artillery. There was a sufficient munber of troops in the rear of my guns, if brought into relief of Barney and Miller, to have re- pulsed the enemy, killed and crippled as they were at that mo- ment. I visited the wounded Briti-sh officers after my return to Wash- ington. Colonel Thornton, who commanded the British advance, spoke of its being the heaviest fire from artillery that he had ever , I was ordered to fi)rm the artille- ry ; and Smith's brigade, Ilood'.s and 13ealPs rejjiments, with many other troops, asrain i)resented a very nsspectable appearance. 1 w )crhaps others. \vn thomselven lem and the po- ces of artillery, rove them frniu I go that crossed ach of Barney's led most fatally uns keeping up 1 to retire down in contact with n him from thi> Miller and 15ar- istancc they en- am still of the to the ri>::ht, at lars under ("ol- ; been repulsed, sustained princi- 10 cross-fire of oo])s in the rear illcr, to have re- vere at that mo- return to Wash- British advance, that he had ever Major Browne, ("ft hohiiid, along The latter iii- artillery, hut, on d his men to lie ely after, he ro- had no recoUec- ■ed through you, form the artilie- iKMits, with many appearance. I APPENDIX. .thij oiiiititid U) mention tiial i brought from the lield lour ol Barney \s wounded men and one of the Baltiiaorc volunteers on my guns. rruMi tins last position we were ordered to move to tli>' (.'apitol. U the north gate, my artillery in advance, General Winder w:i.-. .11 conversation with me, when Colonel Monroo and Cieneral Arm- .slrong rodu up. The latter inquired of General Winder'* what lie inliMidcd to do." General Winder very promptly n.'plied '" tha; ihe Baltimore troops had gone olV in a diircrent direction from W ashington ; that Ikirney's guns were captured ; and that he vva: not ill a situation to meet the enemy, and that he should retire ti. the heigliis above Georgetown." Monroe and Armstrong botl; liowed and wheeled their horses, and the troops eonlinued llicii line of march to the neiirhl)orhuod of Tenleytown. I r('f< r to tin conversation there given, having Ixien present, and retaining a dis- tinct rccollcr.lion of what was said on that occasion. Gciiem' Vrmstrong, in his Memoirs relating to the War of 181:2, says he advised General Winder to occui)y the Cajjitol, with Barney's and l^eter's artillery; (Jolonel Monroe concurred with General Win- der in the retrograde movement. In justice, to Winder and Mon- roe, I do not lie.siuitc! to say that no suidi recommendation from tieneral Armstrong took place (jii that occasion. In justice in General Armstrong, I would say that every thing I required t«' render my corps efficient was furnished with cheert'idne.s.s mid (iromptne.ss ; and from the commencement nf the time he becanu Secretary of War to the close of the campaign at Hladensbiirg, he and Mr. Madison had shown gre;it anxiety to orgam/e the vol- unteers of the District of < "oluinbia, including artillery, cavalry, in laiitry, and rillenuMi under my command, and had actually, at oiii lime, made out the commissiuns. You know that my position in advance prevented me iVom knowing what arrangements and otliei matters relating to its movements were going on with the army. I can only speak of things that '^anu! within mij own knmvl'dgr. There are many things and occurrences which are too v(jluminoiis lor a letter communication. If your object is to write a histor\ of that campaign, lei mc entreat of you to d( justice to rendered upon that occasion to receivt it. Krom your letter i fear roil contemplate censure toward tho.'*e troops under li' command of Stansbiirv I had Imt little opportunity of ludirum of their ac- t 366 APPENDIX. , 1 I ii« lions, and therefore can not speak advisedly upon the subject. I know tliat llie wiiole cavalry force of the army, comprising five or bix hundred men, well mounted, was with that wing of the army, ;uid that they were never brought into action. The position se- icctcd to fight a battle was a most unfortunate one for the Amer- ican army ; a good situation ibr skirmishing, and for detachments; ;o have engaged in. 13ut the strong arm of General Winder's ;irniy was artillery and cavalry, both of which the enemy was de- ik'iciit in, and an open plain, of all others, ought to have been se- ■ected to have met the enemy, when artillery and cavalry could lave been usefully employed. I am laboring at this time under a painful indisposition, a' d lave gone much farther into detail than 1 intended. Such state- ".icnts as have come within your own knowledge, and you know to ue corrP(;t, you can adopt ; any thing you believe I have slated 10 be erroneous, reject. I believe that great injustice was done ;;oth to Winder and Armstrong. That both were anxious for the access of our arms, I have no doubt, and that the great errors uimnitted were owing to, perhaps, the conflicting views of the iieads of departments and the commander-in-chief. I do not pretend to r:peak of the operations of Stansbury's brig- ade, as but a part of it was in view from the position 1 occupied ; :aid although the most of those appeared to make no resistance, still there were several companies or detachments that maintained their ground most gallantly, until compelled to retreat by superior torce. This Ov'curred before I connnenccd the action, on the right wing. Nor do I pretend to speak of other troops that were en- gaged, such as Magruder, Reall, and Hood's regiments, as my own engagements were of such a nature as to preclude my seeing any of the operations except those of Barney and Miller, and the action of my own guns being all occupied at the same time upon I he principal body of the opposing troops. Again I must repeat that I have never been able to account for (General .Smith's not bringing into action the regular troops under Colonel Scott. Nor have 1 referred to the Vandal course pursued by the enemy : the destruction of the r;!pitol, President's house and public buildings, some few private buildings, and the destruction of Gales and Sea- ton's pres.s ;in(l type, while lh<^y spared the press and type of otli- ei"ii within the city. They had a right to destroy the navy-yar'l subject. 1 ising five or af the army, position se- r tlie Amer- dctaehnicntb al Winder's ciny was de- ave been se- avalry could position, 01 d Such state - you know to ^ have stated ce was done ixious for the great errors views of the nsbury's bng- n I occupied ; 10 resistance, lat maintained at by superior II, on the right that were en- ments, as my jde my seeing liller, and the me time upon I must repeat il ^Smith's not 1 Scott. Nor i> enemy : the blic buildings, I ales and Sea- d type of ot li- the navv-vnril APPENDIX. ;ui7 and ships of war, the small fort and laboratory at Greenleaf's Point, cannon, and every tiling of a naval and military character, ;ind yet they filled to destroy almost the only foundry (Foxairs) ;it that time engaged in the manufacture of cannon for the army ;iiid navy. Another great error committed ijy my friend, General Winder, was the removal of the troops in the rear of Georgetown, instead of occupying the situation directly north of the city, from whence he would have been enabled to have acted offensively against the enemy ; they, being without cavalry, could not have made any sudden inroad upon his army without being advised of it. Indeed, the organization and equipment of the enemy, totally without cavalry, and l)ut two or three pieces of artillery, rendered their situation alarminLily precarious after they connnenced their retreat from the City of Washington, provided the United iStates cavalry and other troops had been sufiicieotly near to have com- menced operations against them. I have already said so much, I must decline saying any thing more. V'ery respectfully yours, Gkorge Peteii. No. VI. A VOLUNTEER fORVS FROM VIUGINI.V. WiisliiiijjtoH, 5tli September, \b.'>6. Dear Colonel, — In compliance with your suggestion, I give vou a brief notice of some of the events coming under my person- al observation forly-two years ago, in connection with the opera- tions of the military of the District of Columl)ia. I write you on the anniversary of the battles at the White House and Indian Head, a day as nearly similar, in all respects, to the 5th of Sep- tember, INl 1, as it well could be. The company of volunteer riflemen to which I belonged (though then a mere lK)y of less than eighteen years) was commanded by Captain George W. Uumphnys, of Jefferson County, as gallant an officer ajul liberal gentleman as I have ever met with. On the ifternoon of the iWd of August, 1H14, a letter was received at f 'harlestovvn,by express, from Captain (afterward (Jeneral) Henrv St. George Tucker, advising that the British troops had been land- ed from the thtt at Nottingham, and were on their inarch to *i 368 APPENDIX. <; t'l ; ■ i « Wasliingtou. lie invoked him to raise volunteers without delay, and come to the rescue. Thomas Griggs, Jun., an eminent lavvrycr and influential and popular citizen, mounted a block, and read the letter to the eager crowd who had been waiting for news. A .-jhout, " To the rescue !" immediately went up after a brief address from Mr. Griggs ; the drum and file were sent through the streets to beat up volunteers, and before sunset a company of over fifty men was raised, although the county had then in service, at Nor- folk, two or three companies of militia. There was no time to furnish ourselves with uniforms; knapsacks were speedily pro- vided by the ladies of the town ; and each man was on the ground at roll-call the next morning On the 23d we marched to Harper's F'erry, eight miles distant, to procure arms and to increase our forces. Here we found a company of about fifty of the armorers and citizens enrolled under the command of the superintendent of the armory (Colonel Stubblcfield), and the two companies were consolidated into one, and furnisliod mostly with the short rifles then in the arsenal, a weapon at that time deemed sure and dead- ly in the hands of a good marksman. Early on the 24th of Au- gust we embarked upon two flour-boats down the Potomac, a stream then rugged and diflTunilt of navigation ; but wo were in charge of two or three of the Stridors, skilful boatmen and enter- prising men in every thing they undertook. A few hours after starting we landed to have a regular election of officers, and con- cluded that the superintendent of the armory and some of his most skilful workmen should return to carry on the manufacture of arms, a duty equally as important as fighting. The following of- ficers were then chosen : George W. Humphreys, captain ; Thom- as Griggs, James L. Hanson, Joseph Blackburn, and Samuel Rus- sell, lieutenants. We reached Seneca Creek on the evening of the 24th, hearing distinctly during the day the cannonading at the battle and the ex- plosion at the navy- yard. We saw the light from the burning public buildings, and were satisfied the enemy had possession of the city. This idea was confirmed to us in the morning by some- body from the seat of war, and we forthwith set out on our march to join General Winder at Rockville. During our march we en- countered that terrific storm so well remembered l)y the inhabit- ants of the District and by the survivors among the invaders. APPENDIX. 869 ithout delay, linent lawyer and read the or news. A brief address rh the streets of over fifty vice, at Nor- is no time to speedily pro- 3n the ground id to Harper's increase our the armorers srintendent of [iipanics were le short rifles ure and dead- 24th of Au- Potomac, a it we were in len and enter- iw hours after cers, and con- ne of his most lanufacture oi" 3 following of- iptain ; Thom- 1 Samuel Rus- ! 24 th, hearing tie and the cx- n the burning possession of rning by somc- L on our march march we en- ly the inhabit- invadcrs. Hearing that the enemy had gone to Baltimore, we set out in that direction, but soon received orders to join the forces at Wash- ington under General Walter Smith, of whose command we found you (permit me to say) the energetic, skilful, and popular brigade- major. On our entry into Georgetown (and I shall never forget tlie impressir.i ii'ade upon me by the firs'; magnificent view from the heights) we were handsomely entertained by that hospitable old-school gentleman, Washington Bowie, and welcomed by the citizens, our officers and some of the men being well-known to them. After spending a day or two at Grecnleaf's Point (the enemy tlien in possession of Alexandria), we were stationed, with the troops under General Smith, on Camp (now Observatory) Hill. From Camp Hill we were ordered to march, at 5 o'clock '^n the evening of Friday, the 2d of September, ta join Commodore Porter at the White House, below Mount Vernon, where that gallant of- ficer was busily engaged in erecting a temporary battery on a MufT, so as to conmiand the channel of the Potomac, running with- in loss than fifty yards of the Virginia shore. The enemy had been lying at anchor for several days after leaving Alexandria, waiting a fair wind to enable him to pass with his prizes, consisting of twenty-one vessels laden with flour ;ind other provisions. His fleet consisted of the frigates Sea-Horse and FiUryalus, and five or six bomb ships. The scene was new and exciting to one who had seen so little of " the pomp and cir- cumstance of war," and none of its realities. Our company con- tained many most expert riflemen — men who not only used, but constructed those deadly weapons with which we were armed ; and the corps, though there had been but little time for drill in the field, felt something more than the confidence of raw militia- men, and, I may say, were "eager for the fray." That they did some execution upon the decks of the enemy's vessels the offi- cial account of C'aptain Gordon bears testimony. Commodore Porter, in his dispatch to the Secretary of the Navy, dated the 7th September, 1814, giving an account of the aflair near the White House, describes with some minuteness the oper- ations of the cnorny. Among other things he says : "The two frigates anchoicd abreast [of the battery], the bombs, sloops, and smaller vessels nassed outside them, all pom-jng ir.ta i) 2 'MO APPENDIX. *! I J f, J I !i^ ': the battery and neighboring woods a tremendous fire of every de- scription of missiles. In the woods, on the left, a company of ri- flemen, from Jefferson County, Virginia, under Captain George \V. Humphreys, greati" distinguished themselves by a well-directed fire on the enemy '^ decks, as did a company of militia, under the command of Captain Janney, who was posted by me on the right. The first compat. - lost one man killed, and one sergeant and four privates wounded ; the latter, two privates killed." The private killed in Captain Humphrey's company was David Harris, of Shepherdstown, a nuj-t worthy young man, who left a mother and ot'ier relatives in tliat gallant town, celebrated for the quota of fightiii , men furnished in the Revolutionary era. Ser- geant David Humphreys (a merchant of Charlestown,and long an efficient magistrate) had his right arm shattered with a grape-shot, and it was found necessary to have it amputated. Hugh M'Don- ald was shot through tlie body with a grape-shot, but survived. William Phielding was wounded in the fleshy part of the thigh ; Thomas Stedman had one of his fingers injured, and Lieutenant Blackburn had his cheek grazed with a ball. There are now not fifteen survivors of the company within my recollection. In his n turn of killed and wounded (during twenty-three days' operation in the Potomac), Captain Gordon mentions seven killed and thirty-five wounded on board his ships — a much greater loss than we suffered, notwithstanding our imperfect defences. In commending Lieutenant King, of the Sea-IIorse, who got out of his sick-hammock to command while passing the batteries, Cap- tain Gordon states that the first two guns pointed by Lieutenant King disabled each a gun of the enemy. This is true. One of the guns was split to the touch-hole, and another had a wheel of the carriage shattered. The fire of grape and shells was inces- sant for more than two hours, while the riflemen of Captain Hum- phreys were down at the water's edge, aiming at the decks and rigging as long as a' man was to be seen on either. My dear sir, I have made this iiasty sketch much longer than I intended, but I was encouraged by you to hope that some of the incidents might be worth reciting. I am glad you have undertaken the task of vindicating the reputation of the troops engaged in the ill-fated field of Bladensburg. Better materials for gallant and efficient service than the vohmteers and militia of the District I I 'ii Al'PENmX. 371 if every de- ipany of ri- George W. ell-directed a, under the III the right, ant and four r was David , who left a •ated for the r era. Ser- and long an I grape-shot, ugh M'Don- ut survived. )f the thigh ; 1 Lieutenant are now not on. /^-three days' seven killed greater loss ices. , who got out ittcrics, Cap- y Lieutenant uc. One of d a wheel of Is was inces- laptain Ilum- 16 decks and longer than I t some of the re undertaken ngaged in the r gallant and the District T have never seen any where, and my opportunities have not heeii limited. Every impartial man, even of the enemy, will admit that the disaster was not to be attiil)uted to the troops. They were not only ready, but eager for a more active participation in the field than was allowed them. The incredulity of General ^..ii- strong, Secretary of War, as to the attempt of the British to make an attack upon Washington prevented the necessary precautions, and the disposition of the troops on the day of battle was any thing else than judicious. The actual commander was paraly/od by the presence of a superior who had taken none of the preliminary measures suggested by military experience. With great respect, your fnon', .Idtis :^. Gallaher, A private < ; *uprain Humphreys's Riflemen. Colonel John S. Williams, AVasliingto.i. TUF F.vn,