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N A R RAT I YE '^^P .• *►. •««",-• 'i:': X' ^^-^f^-"* .J' * t » > V i;4^. 1 '' ^;l 'M ^1' ■■;' '-3.. tieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, £^c t^ifmtmmt^ f PRICE THkEE SHILLINGS. 1 :,u 'ip 'f } I r 1^1 ■>*■■ "Jfj ■■1;;,\:' "'. ".r ~U' '^'..■^■^■M« ''1 ■■?••; (hi* M -> aMii-H hmM^^ '*rr. 'f'*?f '. . Jtii-. .%v.- .V- ^.U ^ ^J- n.t... ""m ^rt ( j2(' i * 2. ni^k. 4?? t.-Jv.^ \,^t> W J; • H B > ■• J! H .■-•Si Si-f- -•.,, .>^i-^ ■kHiMi --Ai^-- ■-"».«' ,f:t;v^i,ag^-*^»»1wV^><;5^te«>,' -VVfc^ -*. -J -a*- 4 •-■Wft****'^"'*"'-'^''**'."^'''*^ •*''^ ^ -44^-; i P": THE NARRATIVE O F Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, •^?i ' U-if *S .i""^- ,-»^ I N A COMMITTEE OF THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, ON THE 29''« OF APRIL, 1779, RE L ATI VE TO HIS CONDUCT, DURING HIS LATE COMMAND OF THE KING'S TROOPS IN NORTH AMERICA: TC WHICH ARE ADDED, SOME aSSERVATIONS UPON A PAMPHLET, ENTITLED, LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN. \ THE THIRD EDITION. LONDON: PRINTED BY H. BALDWIN, IN FLEET-STREET. lOLD BY R. BALDWIN, IN PATERNOSTER-ROW ; P. ELMSLEY, IN THE STRAND; AND ALMON AND DEBRET, IN PICCADILLY. MDCCLXXXI. 1^ ■ fi-& ^^ ..i^>.fJ.LtL':iJ^T:JtL>^ ^& ,^-^*. :f.:.a*. f ^-fl :H«* *^i^^'. »».•' 1 -L. fe-. '-y^i mmm ,f^^ 4 ••'^»»-4>aMMAMdKl >*' r*i'ji ^ •J. iJJWViWh'i.ifcr.--.^ THE NARRATIVE O F Lieut. Gen. Sir William Howe, ^c. IF the peculiarities of my fituation be confidered, I ihall not be thought prelumptuous in defiring the indulgence of the committee during the trefpafs I muft this day commit upon their patience. The repugnance of his Majefty's minifters (in this houfe at leaft) to declare any opinion concerning the tranf- adions of the American war during my command, although polfefled of all the neceflary, and only, documents, upon which a judgement could have been formed, impelled me to move, that my correfpondence with the Secretary of State for the American department, might be laid before you. The mod material parts of any condudt, the reafons upon which I aftcd, the plans which I fuggefted and executed, appear in that correfpondence ; and therefore to thofe who may have connedied the whole in a re- gular feries of dates and events, the detail into which I propofe to enter may feem unneccflary. But I cannot flatter myfelf that the papers have been confidered with fuch minute attention, nor can I prefume to fuppofe, that all the circumftances of the American war have been inverted with the partial view of clearing the condudl of the man who commanded the army. And, Sir, it is with that partial view I now rife — for I mean not to call in queiUon the juftice, nor the policy of that war. 3 I mean •-*-&; ^i^pIP ■■■ mtm [ 2 ] ^ I mean no^ to call in queftion the expediency of meafiircs which have been framed, relaxed, or perfevered in, by the councils at home. My object, at prefent, is confined to the explanation of my own ccndua. Many are the cenfures that have been paflcd upon me. The mifrcprefentations and falfe arguments of my enemies have made a deep impreflion upon minds too prompt to decide ; whihl an ignorance of the true ftate of fadts has left the unprejudiced in doubt. Thofe who alone could do me juftice, have been filent : and therefore to the judgement of this committee, and to the impartiality of my country at large, I at lad refort, flattering myfelf with the hope of an ample jullification. In the courfe of the great variety of bulinefs which fell to my lot, during fuch a wiiie and extenfive command, faults mull undoubtedly be per-^ jived, but none I hope which can be fufpedled to have arifen from want of zeal, or from inactivity. In all military tranfadtions, but more particularly in thofe of America, where the nature of the war, in all its points, is with- out example, the happiefl commander will he be who efcapes with the feweil blots. The fads to which I principally wilhto turn the attention of the committee, and which the papers upon your table bear witnefs to, are I/?. That I did not negleft to furnifh the minifler of the American department with every information, as well as with my ideas, relative to the condudt of the war from time to time. 2d. That I did not fail to give my opinions refpedting what appeared pradticable to be done, with the fuccours required, or cxpeded from Europe, and with the force at different times on the fpot. 3f that town, alth(»ii!.-;h it wa» in niv power, to ha\c carried the whole away. But though the General was of opinir.ii that thofe goods mi[;ht have been r.-movcd with the anny, it was merclv in the idea, conceived from report, that they might have been carried away, if the holds of the tranfports had been well (lowed ; for he acknowledged tliai we were in great wajit of /hipping, and that we took with us all tlie veflels that were lit to ^o to Ku. iirit.liLi<*fflhii mn — ^:isr. ,.,«5s:,'4^.'-r:r2T [ 4 ] H:illlflix, in preference to any other port. Concluding that the real'oiis tlierc giv ;n are fatisf'aitory, I do not troiililc tlic coni- n.ittee with any farther exphination, except that I think tlie army by going tliither, received great benefit, not only from necellary refrcHunents, bnt from the opportunity of being exert, ifed in line, a very material part of diicipline, in which we were de- fective until that time. I might alfo add, that the troops per- formed very elfcntial fervice at Hallifax, by conftrudting redoubt?, and other Itrong works, for the defence of the tov/n and dock, whicli could not have been executed by the garriion. My letters go on to fliow how the army was difpofed of previous to the landing upon Long-Iiland, while waiting for the arrival of the troops from Europe, and from the expedition againft South Carolina. That intermediate time, as I do not recolleft, amongil the multiplicity of anonymous publications againll me, any fault has been imputed, I pafs over, remarking only, that from the violent heat of the weather, little a^litivc fer- vice could have been done, and that fuch fervice would probably have been attended with much ficknefs to the troops. I beg leave here to fay, that although, to fave the time of the committee, I may omit to mention many tranfidions of the war, I Ihall be willing to folve all doubts which the members of this committee may entertain, with refped: to circumftances not touched upon, or not futficiently explained. I haften to the adlion at Bedford on Long-Ifland, the 27th of Augull, 1776, where a paragraph in my public letter of the 3d of September has been quoted againrt me as a violent charge. The paragraph is as follows. " Had the troops been per- " mitted to go on, it is my opinion they would have carried the " redoubts, but it was apparent the lines muft have been ours " at a cheap rate, by regular approaches, I would not rilk the " lofs that might have been fuftained in the alTault, and ordered " them back to a hollov/ way in the front of the works, out of " the reach of mufquetry." This paragraph, I am free to own, I added to give here the fame impreflion that I felt of the ardmir of the troops upon tliat occafion. But I am at a lofs to know from whence it has been fuppol'ed r K... f..>*a.j ^wWSJ«.'bV»» wm^mm [ 5 T fuppofed, that ccirrying the lines would have been followed by the defeat of the rebel army. The fadls are thefe : — The rebels had a body of men ported in front of the lines, to guard againft: an attack from Flat-Bu(h, and from the lov/er road upon their right. Thefe troops were defeated with confidcrable lofs. The remainder of the corps was ported behind the lines, the main army being then on York-Ifland ; fo that admitting the works to have been forced on the day of adion, the only ad- vantage we Ihould have gained would have been the dertrudion of a few more men, for the retreat of the greatert part would have been fee ured by the works conftrudcd upon the heights of Brooklyn, oppofite to New- York, and their embarkation covered by a number of floating batteries./ On the other hand, the moft cflential duty I had to obferve was, not wantonly to commit his majefty's troops, where the objed was inade(]uatc. I knew well that any confiderable lofs furtained by the army could not fpeedily, nor eafily, be repaired. I alfo knew that one great point towards gaining tiic conridence of an army (and a general without it is upon the mort dangerous ground) is never to expofe the troops, where, as I faid before, the objed is niadcquate. In this inftance, fiotn the certainty of being in poirellion of the lines; in a very few days by breaking ground, to have permitted the attack in queflion, would liave been inconfiderate, and even criminal. '1 he lofs of icoo, or perhaps 1500 Britilh troops, in carrying thofe lines, would have been but ill repaid by double that number of the enemy, could it have been fuppofed they would h:vc lujfcred in that pro- portion. The necclfary preparations, and eroding batteries, to facilit.itc; the landing upon the illand of New-York and battering tjie enemy's works at Horens-Hook, occupied us till the i ^th of September, when the poireflion of Nev.-Yurk was etFev^Lcd, as appears in my letter of the 2irt of September, 1776. From that time to the 12th of Odobcr we were employed in fortifying tiie heights from Macgowan's-Pafs to Noith River, about two miles from the ciicmy's mort advanced intrenchments, and in getting poirclIion of Pauhis-Mojk. Some time was alio necellariiy employed in enquiries refpeding the face of tlu* countrv ■■ifc4»^'lf?^»^»^-. — *• fW ■RRP 1^ [ 6 ] country to bo poni-fled, upon a fuppoiiiion that tlic enemy fliouki remove from King's-Brkige. There wjs a nccellity of entrench- ing upon the lieight I have mentioned, in order to covt r New- York in the abfence of the maiii army. My publick letters of the 23d, 24th, and 25th of September point out ali thefe par- ticuhirs. With regard to the knowledge of the country, fo necefHiry to be obtained previous to the movement from New-York, I bog leave to mention the difficulties we laboured under in that refptrdt throughout the war. The country is fo covered with wood, fwamps, and creeks, that it is not open in the leaft degree to be known, but Irom poll to pofl, or from accounts to be col- lected from the inhabitants entirely ignorant of military defcrip- tion. Thefe circunillances were therefore the cuufe of fome un- avoid.ible delay in our movements. I mufl here add, that I found the Americans not fo well dif- pofed to join ns, and to fcrve us as I had been taught to e.xped ; tiiat I tliought our farther progreis lor the prefent, precarious, and tiiat I faw no profpcdl of finilhing the war that campaign. Thefe fentiments I communicated to the Secretary of State in ijie letters lall mentioned. From the 12th of Odober, the day the army landed on Frog's- Neck, to the 2 ill of the fame month, we were employed in getting up rtores and provilions, in bringing over the dragoons, the fecond divilion of HefTians, the carriages and horles for triinfporting provilions, artillery, ammunition, and bsggage. Four or five d.iys had been unavoidably taken up in landing at Frog's-Neck, inllead of going at once to Pell's Point, whicii would have been an imprudent meafure, as it could not have been executed without much unnccellary rifk. On the 2Sth of Odober the engagement nt the Wliite-PIains took place. But it has been aflerted, tiiat, by my not attacking the lines on the day of aftion, I Itjlt an opportunity of deltroy- ing the rebel army; and it has been alio faid, that I n-iight have cut off the enemy's retreat by the C'roton-Bridge, Sir, an allawlt upon the enemy's right, which was oppolcd to liie Helllan truops was intended. The committee mu I ;;Vv' lue eretUt v/hen I alfure them, ">.^..>_ ifc v^ ••<»»*ir^:,m0>ifZt}tm.i.<}f- •Htr^'^-i&'i'^'iK ■ C 7 ] them, that I have political reafons, and no other, for declining to explain why that ailault was not made. Upon a minute en- quiry thofe realbns might, if neccfliuy, be brought out in evi- dence at the bar. If, however, tlie aliauit had been made, and the lines carried, the enemy would have got off without much lofs, and no way had we, that I could ever learn, of cutting off their retreat by the Croton Bridge. I cannot conceive the foundation of fuch an idea. By forcing the lines we fliould un- doubtedly have gained a more brilliant advantage, feme bagg.ge, a"d fome provifions j but we had no rtalon to fiippufc that the rebel ariin couUl have been Jifllroytd. The ground in their rear was fuch as they cculd widi, fcr fecuring llicir retreat, which indeed fccmed to be their principal objctt. And. Sir, I do not helitatc to confefs, that if I could by any manoeuvre remove an eneni}' from a very advan:ageous p-^fition, wiiliout hazarding tlie confequences of an att;i.l;, where the point to be carried was not •adequate to the lofs of nitn to be cxpedted from the cnterpiife, I fhould certuinly adopt that cautionary conJu^lt, in the hopes of meeting my adverfary upon more equal terms. But to proceed in my narrative, — My publick letter of the 30th of November relates the further proceedings of the army, until Lord C'ornwallis arrived at Brunfwick in the Jerleys, in which is included the taking of Fort Walhington, afterwards called Fort Knyphaufen. I need not trouble the comniittee with other particulars in that period : But I mull lay I Ihould have been highly blameable, had I ordered the noble lord to have fol- lowed the enemy beyond Brunlwick, when the whole of his corps had not joined him. I refer to my pul)Hck letter of the 20th of December for aiv account of the progrefs of that corps until the 14th of tijat month, when they went into cantonments, which 1 was hopeful they might have maintained. A'iy fnii intentions were to liave made Brunlwick the left, and Hlilabcth-Tcwn, or Newark, the right of tliofe cantonments j and rny reafon lor extending to Trenton was, that a conlidcrable number of the inhabitants came in with their arms, in obedience to the proelamatioti uf the ccm- milFioners vw the ^ctii cf Nov niber. I took upon :. e to rifK. Uut poll under, the command of a brave oflicer, wnh the lupport. ■ ■ uf [ 8 ] of Colonel Donop at Bordentown, five miles diftant, with d very ftrong corps. The two polls were occupied by nine battalions, the Hcfllan cavalry, and a party of the i6th regiment of light dragoons, amounting in the whole to upwards of 3000 njen, with lixteen field pieces. The light infiintry of the arnjy, a brigade of infantry, and fome dragoons, were ported at Prince- town, in the chain of cantonments, twelve miles from Trenton. But it has been objedted to me that I ought not to have intruded the important port of Trenton to the Heflian troops. Myanfwer to this, if clearly undcrflood, will I think be fatisfadory. Military men will certainly underftand it. The left. Sir, was the port of the F.fllans in the line, and had I changed it upon this occafion it muft have been confidcred as a difgrace, fince the fame fituation held in the cantonments as in the camp. And it probably would have created jealoufies between the Heflian and Britifli troops, which it was my duty carefully to prevent. Colonel Donop, who commanded the two ports, was perfedtly fitisfied with his fituation, and fo was Colonel Rhall. They both had timely information of the intended attack : The num- bers of the enemy, I was credibly informed, did not exceed sooo, and if Colonel Rhall had obeyed the orders I fent to him for the erecting of redoubts, I am confident his port would not have been taken. I would afk thofe who objedl to this part of the diftribution, where could the Heflian troops have been better employed than ill the defence of a port ? In the laft war they were eflcemcd not unequal to any troops in Prince Ferdinand's army, and I fhould do them much injurtice were I not to fiy they were in very high order in America. Two of thcfe very battalions hid ferved in Germany with great credit, and the whole brigade utnlcr Colonel Rhall's command had given a recent proof of their bravery at the attack of Fort Knyphaufen. The pofleF:on of Trenion was extremely dcfireable j could wc have preferved it we Ihould have covered the greatcll part of the country to the eartward of Prince-town, including the whole county of Monmouth, where I had reafon to think there were many loyal inhabitants. We fliould alfo have been fo near Phi- 3 ladelphia [ 9 ] ladelphia that we might poflibly have taken poflefllon of it in the courfe of the winter ; though I confefs I had feveral reafons for doubting the expediency of that meafure at that time. My principal objedl in fo great an extenfion of the cantonments was to afford protedli on to the inhabitants, that they might expe- rience the difference between his majefty's government, and that to which they were fubjedt from the rebel leaders. Foi, Sir, although fome perfons condemn me for having endeavoured to conciliate his majefty's rebellious fubjedts, by taking every means to prevent the deftrudtion of the country, inftead of irritating them by a contrary mode of proceeding, yet am I, from many reafons, fatisfied in my own mind that I a<^ed in that particular for the benefit of the king's fervice. Minifters themfelves, I am per- fuaded, did at one time entertain a fimilar dottrine, and from a circumftance not nownecefTary to dwell upon, it is certain that I (hould have had little reafon to hope for fupport from them, if I had been difpofed to ads of great feverity. Had it been afterwards judged good policy to turn the plan of the war into an indifcri- minate devaftation of that country, and had I been thought the proper inftrument for executing fuch a plan, mii.lfters, I prcfume, would have openly flood forth, and fent clear, explicit orders. Ambiguous mefTages, hints, whifpers acrofs the Atlantick, to be avowed, or difavowed at pleafure, would have been paltry fafeguards for the honour and condudt of a commander in chief. I now return to my narrative. — Previous to the lofs of Trenton I had detached General Clinton with 6000 men to take polTeflion of Rhode-Ifland, the fuccefs of which expedition is mentioned in my publick letter of the 20th of December 1776. This was one material point in the general plan of operations. And here I muft beg leave to call the attention of the committee to my feparate letter of the 30th of November, 1776, wherein is fet forth my firft plan for the next campaign, with the force requifite, in order, if pofTible, to finifh the war in one year. My propo- fitions were, that wc tliould have 10,000 men to adt on the lide of Rhode-Hland, and penetrate eaftwardinto the country towards Boflon, leaving 20C0 for the defence of Rhode-Klaad, 10,000 in the province of New- York, to move up the North River to Albany, 5000 for the defence of York-Ifland and its Dc- C j)cadcucies ■"^y*^ '.^^ '•py rentlcncies, 8000 to cover Jerfcy, and to keep General Wafli- iiigtcMi's army in check, by giving a jealoufy to Philadelphia, which as well as Virginia I propofcd to attack in autumn, provided the fuccefs of other operations fhould have admitted of fending thither an adequate force. South Carolina and Georgia 1 propofed as objedts for winter. But to carry this plan into execution I informed his Lordfliip, that ten fhips of the line, and a re-inforcement of i 5,000 rank and file would be abfolutely neceflary, befides an additional battalion of artillery. According to this calculation the army under my command would probably have confifted of 35,000 cffetSive men, to oppofe 50,000 voted by the congrefs for the next campaign, exclufive of the large bodies of militia, who were to be colledled on the shorted notice. I mentioned at the fame time the fpirit infufed into the people by their leaders from the ftrongeft affurances of procuring the aflifl:- tnce of foreign powers, and that it was faid Dr. Franklin was gone to France to follicit the aid of that court. This letter of the 30th of November was received by the Se- cretary of State on the 30th of December. On the 9th of March, 1777, I received his lordfhip's anfvver, dated the i4tb of January. This anfwer it is to be obferved was by no means decifive. The determination upon my plan was polliponed until the arrival of my next letter, when Major Balfour (one of my aides du camp, iind fhtn in England) was to be immediately defpatched. My requifition, as has been juft ftated, was for 15,000 rank and file in order to complete the army to 35,000 efFevflive men. The noble lord, in the letter I am now quoting, hopes that he fhall be able to augment the army under my conmiand to near 35,000, although he prop^les fending me only 7,800. This mifconceived calculation can no otherwile be accounted for, as I apprehend, than by his lordfliip's computing the (ick, and the prifoncrs with the rebels, as a part of the real effe(5tive ftrength of the army; and yet I cannot fee how fuch amiftake could have arifcn, as my requifition was fpccifick, for 15,000 men, rank and file. His lord(hip further declares, that it is beyond his power to furnilh me with the additional batt^ilion of artillery. if any thing could be an alleviation of my difappointment in thelc relpedts, it was the aflurance which accompanied it, that — " whatever degree of fupport the rebels had been taught to ** exped *— - -K..-*^' ^^TO-^- ■*■,*•-, K'^tpr'- wm mm i M ] *• cxped from foreign powers, his lordfliip had great rcafon to *• believe that Dr. Franklin would not be able to procure *' them any open afllftance." During the doubts I entertained, whether the large re-inforce- ment I had requRed would arrive in time for the execution of the extenfive plan mentioned in my letter of the 30th of No- vember, 1776, I had information, which I thought might be depended on, that the redudion of Pennfylvania was pradicable, even upon the fuppofition fhat the whole of my ftrength, fit for duty at the opening of the campaign, might not exceed 19,000" men. I therefore fuggefled, in my feparate letter of the 20th of December, 1776, a fecond plan, which was for a.retary of State, that we found it not to be pradicable without interfering ma- teri;:lly with thofe more important operations of the campaign which had been approved of by himfelf, and which were al- ready too much curtailed from a want of a land force. — The army fit for adlual duty at this time, cxclufive of about 2000 provincials, was 14,000 Ihort of the number I had ex- peded. But to refume the chain of my correfpondence. Finding by the Secretary of State's, letter of the 14th of Jan. 1777, received on the 9th of March following, that the re-inforcements vvere not to be expeded, I totally relinquiflied, in my fecret letter of the 2d of April, the idea of any oft'enfive operation, except that 10 the Southward, and a diverfion occafionally upon Hudfon's- River. [ 13 ] River. I informed the Secretary of State that the princijjal part of the plan formerly propofed could no longer be thought of j that the Jerfeysmult be abandoned, and Pennfylvania be invaded only by fea -, that in the former campaign my force was equal to the operations, but that in the enfuing one, from the feveral ports neceflary to be j..eferved, the ofFenfive army would be too weak for rapid fuccefs ; and that reftridtcdas I was from entering upon more extenfive operations, by the want of force, my hopes of terminating the war that year were vaniflied; that notwith- ftanding the whole rebel army, 50,000 men, voted in autumn, might not be raifed, the enemy would have a numerous militia in the field, in addition to their Handing force, and a good train of artillery. I at the fame time tranfmitted my diftribution of the army for the campaign, by which it is to be obferved, that my real elFcdtive force exclufive of 3000 provincials amounted only to 18,100 fSJ. The noble Lord's anfwerto this letter, dated the i8th of May, 1777, contains a repeated approbation of 'the expedition to Pennfylvania J but it is remarkable in other refpedls — He ftates his inability to furnifh me with the fupplies requeued, and is concerned to find tha't I do not imagine my force to be as fuitable to the operations of the enfuing campaign as I had confefled it was to thofe of the laft. Thefe expreflions. Sir, require obfer- vation — They feem eager to catch me in the confeirion that my force was fuitable to the operations of the lail campaign, and would from thence imply, that my force was equally fuitable to the operations of any other campaign. Now, Sir, even if I had not explained my idea upon the point (which however I clearly did) I think it might have been obvious to any man lefs acquainted than his lordfliip with military reafoning, that the force which had been fufficient to take poflefTion of New- York, and other ftrong holds of the enemy, could not, after the neceflliry divilions for preferving the variety of pofts wc had gained, be equally fuitable to the making of new conquers. For is it not felf-evident, that the power of an army mull diminifli in pro- portion to the dccreafe of their numbers ? And muft not their numbers for the field neceflarily decreafe, in proportion to the towns, {b) In ftiiting numbers prcfcnt, rank and file fit for duty is always mcajjt^ M*!' t 14 ] towns, pofts, or forts, tvhich we take, and are obliged to pre- ferve ? But his Lordfhip proceeds to lay, that his concern (on account of this imagination of mine) is in a great degree alle- viated by the intelligence which he daily receives, of the rebels finding the utmoft difficnlty in raifing an army to face his majefty's troops — From the fuppofed weakncfs of the enemy, and the good inclination of the inhabitants, he has every reafon to expe(ft that my fuccefs in Pennfylvania will enable mc to raife amongft them fuch a force, as may be fufficient for the interior defence of the province — He declines a parti, lar confideration of the advantages which may be expedted fron * fuccefsful exe- cution of my prefent plan, but is pleafed to inform me (in con- tradiiflion to my repeated reprefcntations and aflertions) that he is infpired with no fmall degree of hope, that this campaign will put an end to the unhappy conteft. Thus, Sir, all my pofitive affurances, arifing from a declared want of force, and from a plain ftate of fadts, are l»ere anfwered with a fingle argument of his own delufive hopes, built upon a fuppofition of the enemy's weaknefs : To what a dilemma is a commander reduced, when, after having repeatedly complained of his deficiency of flrength, the miniiler, from information coUedted here at home, or from hopes fuggefled by fears, oppofes his own conjedture (I cannot call it judgement) and tells nim, that decifive fuccefs is ftill expeded from him ? If the powers of this country, or the extent of his Lordfnp's influence, could not have raifedthe force required, that anfwer would have been fatisfadlory to me and no reflection upon himfelf. That anfwer would have re- lieved my mind from an apprehenfion I began to entertain, that my opinions were no longer of weight; and that of courfe the confidence fo neccfTary to the fupport, fatisfadion, and indeed, fecurity, of every man in a refponfible fituation, was with- drawn. If the noble Lord had tnought that my requifition for more troops was unneceflary, and that the force he had already furniOied was adequate, why did he not take the manly part of appointing fome other perfon to fulfil thofe fanguine expedla* tions, which frorn duty and conviction I had laboured to dif- CQuntenance ! In order to preferve, as well as I can, the hiftorical chro- nology, amidil fuch numerous events and quotations, I muft in 1 this limp I '5 ] this place remind the committee, that in my letter to the Secre- tary of State of the 2d of April 1777, I enclofed a copy of a confidential letter which I wrote on the 5th of the fame month fpontaneoufly to Sir Guy Carleton j I fay fpontaneoiifly, becayfe 1 had not at that time received any ofHciai information, concern- ing the plan of the northern expedition which I conceived was to take place that year. It may oerecolledled, that the fubftance of this letter was, that I fhould probably be in Pennfylvania at the time when the northern army would be ready to enter the province of New- York -, that little afllftance was to be cxpeftcd from me to facilitate their approach, as a want of fuHicient ftrength in my own army would probably not admit of my detaching a corps to adt up Hudfon's River in the be- ginning of the campaign. On the 5th of June I received a copy of the Secretary of State's letter to Sir Guy Carleton, dated the 26th of March 1777, wherein he communicates to him the plan of the northern expes- dition, and adds, ** that he will writ6 to Sir William Howe by " the firft packet." I muft obferve, that this copy of a letter to Sir Guy Carleton* though tranfmitted to me, was not accompanied with any in- ilruAioDS whatfoeyer J and that the letter intended to have been written to me by the firft packet, and which was probably to have contained ibme inftrudtions, was never fent. I now come to the fummcr of 1777, paffing over the expedi- tions in March and April to Peeks-Kill and Danbury. The progrefs of our army in Jerfey being alfp fully mentioned in my letters upon the table, I likewife pais over the various oc- currences there, previous to the embarkation at Staten-Ifland. But as I have been blamed for not marching, before I left Jerfey, to attack General Wafliington, ported at Middlebrook^ I muft beg leave to trouble the committee with a few words upoa that point. To have attacked General Wafhington in that ftrong poft I mull necelTarily have made a confiderable circuit of the country j and having no profpeca. of forcing him, I did not think it advdi'eabl& r I ^ ' [ i6 ] advifeable to lofe Co much time as mufthave been emplo)ieil upon that march, during the intenfc heat of the feafon. Excluilve of this confideration, our return muA have been through a very ditficult and exhaufled country, where there was no pofllbility of keeping up the communication with Brunfwick, from whence alone we could draw our provifions ; and the force with me at that time amounting only to about jiooo men, it would not admit of fuHicient detachments to prefervc the communication. The movement which I did make in two co- lumns was with a view of drawing on an adtion, if the enemy (hould have defcended from his poll, and been tempted towards the Delaware, in order to defend the paffage of the river, on a fuppofition that I intended to crofs it. But as the pofition of my firft column at Hilllhorough muft have induced that idea, and yet had not the defired effc6i, 1 determined to return to Brunfwick, and to follow the plan which had been approved by the minifler. Thefe reafons, together with thofe alligncd in my letter of the 5th of July, 1777, vi^ill I hope fufficiently ac- count for my not attacking General Wafhington upon that occa- iion. I muft alfo obferve, that even fo long, before as in my letter of the ad of April, I declared it was not my intention to undertake any offenfive operation in the Jerfeys, unlefs fome very advantageous opportunity (hould offer. But it has been afked, why I did not crofs the Delaware, and proceed by land to Philadelphia ? To this I anfwer, that, from a want of fuHicient means to pafs fo large a river, I judged the difficulties and the rilk too great, more efpecially as the enemy had a corps ready for the defence of it, excluilve of th.ir main army in my rear. I have already (hown, that finding the promifed re-inforce- ments were not to be expe.,M,t,a^.^.5^i|^'^i^»**^- - mm [ «9 ] III Pennfvlvania the profpcft was very different. The increafc of force which that country could afford to Wafhington was finall in comparifon to the other, and the defence of rhiladel^ phia was an objeA, which I juftly concluded would engage the whole of his attention. It was incumbent upon him to rifle a battle, to prefcrve that Capital And as my opinion has always been, that the defeat of the rebel regular army is the fureft road to peace, I invariably purfued the moft: probable means of forcing its Commander toadlion, under circumllanccs the leail: hazardous to the royal army j for even a victory, attended by a heavy lofs of men on our part, would have given a fatal check to the progrefs of the war, and might have proved irreparable. Thefc, Sir, were my inducements at the time, for carrying his Majefty's arms into the province of Pennfylvania in preference to thofe of New-England. /^<7y Had the re-inforcemcnts I required been granted. New Eng- land would have had a fliare in the general operations of the campaign while the main body afted to the fouthward. But with an army upon the fmaller fcale, that plan was impradicable, and I have already given my reafons why I could not carry the main army into thofe provinces, unlefs I had been really defirous of protradting the war for my private advantage, a motive which has been bafcly imputed to me by thofe who wifli to perpetrate the ruin both of my profeflional and my private character. The fccond fuggeftion is, that I ought to have gone up Hud- fon's-River, in order to facilitate the approach of the northern army to Albany. What would have been the confequences of fuch an expedition ? Before the obje its proper extent, the war in North America would now have wore a very diftcrent afpeift. I have heard it has been faid, that my civil commiflion was inconfiftent with my military command — and that my mind was more intent upon bringing about a peace by negociation, thaii by force ii*|)KF|tW|jl«.-*^A4..v.^ [ 3^ J force of arms. Sir, thinking it my firfl duty, 4 certainly Hioiild have preferred the former mode ot conciliation, and my brother and I for that purpofe did go to the utmoll verge of our very limited ccmmimon and inftrudlions. But our proceeding in the cliaradter of CommifTioners never for one moment fulpended our military operations. Wefoon faw that the leaders or the rebel- lion were determined, from intereft, if not from principle, to prevent a reconciliation with Great-Britain, and therefore our joint endeavours were invariably exerted in the profccution of the war, to as great an extent as the force in our hands would permit. Thcrcfledlion, that the civil and the military commifTion were incompatible, has, I know, been applied particularly to my con- dudt. I boldly aflert it to be iH-foundcd, as I am certain I never delayed to feize an opportunity of attacking the enemy, confift- ently with my duty of weighing the rilk of ruining the caufe I was engaged in by a confiderable lofs of troops : and indeed thofc who are acquainted with my commifi'ion and inftrudtions, as a Coinmilfioner of peace, mull know, that from the reitridtions they contained, it was next to an impoflibility, that my military tculd materially interfere with my civil duty. I have trefpafled, I fear, too long upon the patience of the Committee — The great importance of the fubjedt, and the detail of facts, I have been neccfliirily led into, will, I hope, plead my apology. I (liall trouble you with but a word more; in fup- port ol" the ineafurc of proceeding to Philadelphia. Before I came from thence, I had every reafon to be perfedtly fatisfied of the advantages that would have enfued from that operation, if the councils at home had thought the Port proper to be pre- ferved. The inhabitants in general of the province of Pennfyl- vania, thofe of the lower counties on Delaware, and thofe of the lower part of Jerfcy, were forward to return to their allegiance, and even to allifl oHeniively in compelling his Majcfly's revolted fubjedts to their duty. This favourable dilpofition, however did not appear immediately — An equivocal neutrality as all I at firll experienced ; our fuccelfes and apparent ability to retain our advantages, induced the inhabitants at laft to be lefs referved. isccrct intelligence, which, until that period, had been extremely didicult fi jn-4. [ 33 ] difHciilt to procure, was then fo good, and fo readily oba incd, that I couhl not but attribute it to the pofl'cfllon of Philadel- phia, which convinced the country of the fupcriority, and per- fuaded them of the cllabliflied power, of his Majerty's arms. The difficulties of the Congrels, in raifing fupplics, and in re- cruiting Mr. Wafhington's army, then indeed became real, and had the appearance of being unlurmountahlc. But the I'rcnch treaty, and our orders to evacuate Philadelphia, by wliich meafure the protedlion of his Majerty's forces was to be with- drawn from the province, made a fudden and melanciioly chan_);c in our affairs. The rebels were inspired with freih hopes j the friends of government were difmayed. — IJut it is not my inten- tion to animadvert upon orders fent from hence after my recall, nor upon the future profpedts of the war. — My view is merely to juliify my own conduct during the time I was honoured with the command (a). This Narrative has, I fear, been too prolix ; but the fubjcefl was fo complicated with matter, and the circumftances necellary to be brought into a clciir point of \ lew, were lb numerous, that brevity would not have been conlillent with perfpicuity. Had I laboured to make my Narrative fliort, it would have been obfcure. Senfible as I am of the great attention and indulgence with which the Comn.ittee has honoured me, I now hallen to the conclufion. The Secretary of State, as appears in his letters, has fignified in the mod flattering expreflions, his Majefty's approbation of every material part of my conduct, during the whole of my command. His Lorddiip's own pcrfonal applaufe is alfo very warmly conveyed throughout his correfpondence ; all his letters F however, (a) Mr. Jofeph Galloway, in his evidence to the Committee of the Houfe ot" Commons, pofitivcly afl'crts, that I advifeil him, and the other magidrates, to go over to Walhington and make their peace. Tlic truth is, as i'oon as it was known that orders were arrived for the evacuation of Philadelphia. Mr. Gallow.iy came to me on behalf of himfelf and the other magiltratts, and requelled my advice and. alTidance concerning the meafures to be adopted for their welfare. I allured him, that if they chofe to go with the King's army, they fhould be taken all poilible care of j but if they rather chofe to ftay behind with their property and families, 1 could have no objedtion to their enquiring previoudy whetJicr Walhington and., the Cungrcfs would grant them protedtion and fecurity. ■ ■*■ "e--»»in«B:*Kiv " rr*»JS;■;?^ ■ 11 ? [ 34 ] liowcvcr, may with piopriety be faid to have been private let- ters, until they were laid before this Houfe. The knowledge of the approbation they contained was confined within his Lord- lliip's bread: and mine. When calumny firft became bufy with my reputation, I could have wirtied his Lordfliip's lentiments more generally known ; — though it would not perhaps have become me to have obtruded upon the world thoi'e official de- clarations in my own favour. But I muft ever think it would have been an ingenuous, an honourable, and a liberal part in the noble Lord to have avov/ed, openly in parliament, the appro- bation, vvhith it is to be prefumed he was convinced I deferved, becaule he had advifed the King to beftow it. Such a conduifi: would have Hopped the current of ill-founc^^d accufation againft me. Such a condudt would have fecured to himfclf the confi- dence, and to his country the chearfal ferviccs, of future Ge- nerals. And now. Sir, having endeavoured to bring before you, by the moft impartial quotations, all the evidence that I thought neceflary to colled: from the papers on your table, I fliall only remiind you, that the Houfe has ordered the attendance of feveral of the moil refpedtable officers who ferved in America during my command. Their teftimony may confirm the truth of the fads I have advanced, and will undoubtediy explain and prove any other material circumftances, wl.ich you may think necelfary for your inveftigation. And, Sir, if the Houfe of Commons, or any other individual member, fhall have any charge or accufation to make againft me, I declare myfelf ready and willing to meet it. The Committee is open for the reception of any other papers, and for the exami- nation of any other witnefTes. My only wi(h is, that every pof- fible light may be thrown upon every part of my ccndudt. I move that Earl Cornwallis be called in. ■PfSIM wmmmmm OBSERVATIONS UPON" A PAMPHLET ENTITLED LETTERS TO A NOBLEMAN. Ji r ' 'i i \\ s. '\ rr *'. ' O B S E R V A T I O N S UPON A P A M P H L E T, a^r. THE Author of Letters to a Nobleman, upon whofe invidious aflertions I mean to make fome obi'er- vations, opens his pamphlet againfl me with a com- parifon between the prefent and the laft war in America. Without meaning to depreciate the great fervices of former Commanders, I mull take leave to fay, that the two wars, with refpedl to the ftate of the country of America, are in no degree fimilar. In the laft war, the difficulties arifing from the ftrength of the country were, for the moft part removed by the friendly difpofition of the inhabitants, who always exerted themfelves to facilitate the operations of the King's army, and to fupply theiu with every neceffary and accommodation. la the prefent war, thefc circumftances are reverfed ; and yet the author attempts to purfuade his reader, that " the ftrength ' Of ir.ipradlicability of America is loft in idea, when we com- * p; e h with the fcene of adion in the laft American war." £j--[ift the Bfitifli troops were always fuperior to the rebels in difciuiine, and frequently in numbers, he is unwilling to allow them any merit in the vidories they obtained 3 for he denies ^l^^iPHP " [ 38 ] denies that they had ftrength of country to contend agalnd. ** Th.it part of the middle colonies (fays he page 2d) which h«6 " been the fcenc of the late military operations, cannot, with *' the leafl: propriety, in the military fenfe of the words, " be Called uncommonly ftrong j and much lefs impra'eat dejign of the war. — The letters of the Ameruun Secretaries of State prove, that he was left to his own judgement in forming and exe- cuting his plans in every injlance, except one (d), which he unfor- tunately negletlcd, and by that negleSi facrtfced a Britijh army, and involved his country in a degree of difgrace it never before bad experienced. (J) Theft inJlruSiions, (the author fays) w/rir, to fupport the northern army, and to make a diver/ion in its favour on the New-England (oaJls.—Lord George Germain i Utter, ■^d march, 1777. I never complained of being confined by peremptory in- ftrudlions. My operations were weakened, and the great defiga of [a) A Return of the Rebel Strength in May, 1776, printed at New-Tori, was thus : T_ i^-__j_ _„ .i._ i_i. - ._i-. AIL — _ 9,000 Continental. {12,000 Ditto. 11,000 Militi.x. In Canada, on the lakes, and at Albany At New-York and Long-Ifland. In Jerfcy and Pennfylvania InVir ■ irginia North -Carolina iJouth-Carolina At Bofton >Iot then Rationed. 3,300 Jerfey brigade. 10,000 Flying Camp. 8,000 Continental. 1,000 Ditto. 4,000 Ditto. 2,000 Ditto, aojooo Militia. Tetal. 80,300 1^- ,>-*»«J*''-'— '''StK••-r.■iJiim}'•.'^.-i^i-~,■Kl'^^i^^^■i■ C 47 ] of the war was obftruiled, by a want of fufficicnt force, as I have explained at large in my Narrative. The author here quotes Lord George Germain's letter of the 3d of March, 1777, as con- taining inftrudtions tofupport the northern army, although in fadt it makes no mention whatfoever of that army, The only in- ftrudtions (if they can be fo called) which I ever received con- cerning the northern army, are contained in his Lordlhip's letter to me of the 18th of May 1777, which I did not receive till the i6thof Auguft, when I was up Chefapeak-Bay — the words are thefe ; " trufting however that whatever you may meditate, it •' will be executed in time for you to co-operate with the army •• ordered to proceed from Canada, and put itfelf under your *' command." — I have fpoken to this in my Narrative (page 24). In the letter of the 3d of March (referred to by the author) I am informed that it is his Majcily's opinio.:, that " a warm *' diverfion upon the coafts of MalVachufctt's-Bay and Ncw- " Hamplhire would not only ii^ipcde the levies Ibr the conti- " nental army, but tend mucli to the fccurity of our tratie," — and Lord Howe and I are ord.-red to " take this matter into our. *' ferious confideration, fo fat* as my intended jdan (the expe- " dition to Pcnnfylvania) wijl admit." — In my auiwer to Lord George Germain of the 3d of June following, I gave my reafons why that diverfion could not be made — Thib fubjcdl is difcufleJ in my Narrative (pa^c 12). And here I will only further obfcrve; that the diverfion propoicd, in Lord George's letter, does not profefs to have any reference to the northern army. Page 36.] The Commander in Chief ne-ocr began his operations till the month of June. Apart of that month, and the 'mhole of April and May, when the feafon is moderate, mojl proper for aBion^ and the roads are good, were ivant only wajud ; whi'e a variety of the mofi cogent motives pointed to an early and vigorous campaign. I have the opening of two campaigns to account for. On the 2d of July 1776 I landed at Staten-Ifland, from Halli-- fax. Our operations were not expeded to ccmmence before the arrival of the troops from England, or uf General Clinton's army from Charles-Town. General Clinton amvcd the xilof Augult. Thti ^■^ ^ "^^ ^m [ 4fi j The Guards and Ikfiians, with the cixiiip cqiiipnge, arrived t!ic 1 2th of Auguft. Nine (iays only were allotted to the refrelh- ment of the troops after the ^reat length of time they hud heci'j on board their tranfports, and for making all necelfary i rran^c- ments. We landed on Long-Ifland the 22d of Auguil This was the opening of the firfl: campaign, 1776, nor could it puf- libly have been opened fooner. The fecond campaign in ijjy is next to be accounted for.— Tlie expedition toPeck's-Kill took place fo nearly as tJie 22dof March. The expedition to Danbury on the 23d of April. The camp etiuipago for the army did not arrive till 'he 24th of May. Our operations in the Jerfeys began the 12th of June. My letters to the Secretary of State contain fufficient reafons why thefe opera- tions could not take place fooner. Page 37.] In thefe months (April and May) the reUl army was alioays reduced to its liieakejl Jiate. ' It ivas in the months of April and May that recruits for the rebel army were chiefly procured, luho never could join it before the month of June. They recruited, as all other armies do, in the winter j and their levies joined them early in fpring. In fummer their re- cruiting parties were in the neld. Page 38.] He knew that dry forage was much more hearty food fir his horfes than green ; that he might have carried the fame forage luitb him for a time, ivhicb fuftained htm in their quarters ; that the country was full of dry forage of every kind', and that he had ever obtained It when he flood in need of it, whether in the feld or in his quarters ffj. (f) Sir W. H — V Utter of th* 17 /A tfjan, 1778. Lord Cormuailis procures * from the country , forage /undent for the winter confumpiion,' We had not forage in quarters, nor could \ve have curried any quantity for eifential fcrvicc. His reference to my letter of 17th of January, 1778, is of a piece with the refl of his performance. The forage thereia fpokcQ I 49 3 fpokeiiofwas procured in the neighbourhood of PhiJadclphiM, at the beginning of the winter. Jxit though every means was exerted, we coiiVd not procure a fufficienr quantity of forage ; and we fliould have been much diftrctfied in th:t article, if Lord Howe had not conveyed to us a confiderable fuppty from Rhode- Ifland. But vfhat connedion is there h'J.vv'?en the ftate of forage at Piiiladclphia in the year 1778, and the opening of thecampaiga in Jcrfey in 1777 ? 1 he author is peculiarly expert in anachro- nifn, and has, in fomc inlbmces, not only tranlpofed dates, but combined the circi^mllances of different periods, for the fake of ftrengthening, or applymg them to, a p.uticular point of time. Of tl^; opening of the campaign 1777, I have already fpoken. It is not neteflary for me to fay much of 177S. — Very early in. April I received my orders to return home — The condudt, there- fore, of the campaign of 1778 was to reft upon my fucceflor. The army, however, was wot indolent or diJipcHed in that interval. — In the month of March I detached Colonel Mawhood to mafc,e a defcent on the coaft of Jerfey. He defeated the force collected againft him, and brou^;ht off a l.irge and f^rafonable fupply of forage, — Colonel Abercrombie was no lefs fuccefsful in furprifing, and entirely defeating, a corps of near a thoufmd of the rebels, who had taken poft about feventeen miles from Philadelphia. This fervicc was performed on the 4th of May ; and on the 7th of May Major Maitland, with Capt. Henry of the navy, pro- ceeded up the Delaware, to dellroy the rebel ihips and velfels between Philadelphia and Trenton, an enterprize very ably con- duced, and effedtually executed. — Sir Hewry Clinton arrived at Philadelphia on the 8th, and >■; the 24th of the fame month I refigned to him the commaiid oJ" the arnjy. Page 38.] He faw repeated attempts made by bodies of men to form themfelves in arms, and to ajjijl him in fupprejjing the Rebellion. The only attempt of this kind worth mentioning happened in North-Carolina, in the fpring of 1776, when it was abfolutely impofllble for me to give afliftance to the inUirre'.. ijn. The plan was concerted between a fettlemcnt of Highland emigrants, and H a bodv me^ l.JUl'f i^m m Iff ih ij \t h .(S { 50 1 a boi^y of Americans in that province, diHinguifhed by the name of Loyalifts. They engaged to obey the orders of Governor Martin, who propofed they fho^ld operate in favour of the troops from Europe under Earl Cornwallis. The Loyalifls' promifed 5000, the Highlanders 700, men. The former in- lifted upon their affembling immediately; the latter urged the expediency of waiting the arrival of the BritiQi troops, but yielded to the importunity of the Loyalifts, and repaired in arm» to the rendezvous, ftronger than the ftipulated complement. The Loyalifts, inftead of 5000, did not aftemble a twentieth part of that number, and two companies of thefe deferted, upon the near approach of the rebels. The Highlanders ftood their ground, and fought bravely, but being overpowered, v/ere defeated with confidcrable lofs, and forced to difperfe. Page 38.] He Jaw many of the inhabitants fined, imprifoned, andfuffer death itfelf on account of their loyalty fgj. (i) ^"^ Jf^illiof Hswe^t letters prove the truths I have endeavoured to fupport,— In that dated the %th of June, 1776, he fays, be landed his troops ta the great joy of a mofl faithful and loyal people.— 7 Aa/ he has great reafon to expeil a numerous body of the inhabitants to join the army from the provinces of New-York, the ftrfeys, and Cm- r.eliicut ; who, in this time of univerfal oppreffion, only wait for opportunities to give proofs of their loyalty aii<' ital for government. The letter, which the author here quotes as dated the 8th of June, is dated the 7th of July, 1776, from Staten-Ifland. The lew inhabitants of this place had been averfc from the violent nicarures adopted by their neighbours, and in conlequence ill- treated by the people of Jerfey. The arrival of the King's troops relieved them from future apprehenlionsj and they teftiiied their loyalty by ail the means in their power. They furniftied us with, t"re(h provifions, carriages, horfes, &c. at that time, therefore they merited the defcription I gave them in my letter. But it ihould be remembered, that it was only the people of Staten- Illand I fpoke of. The campaign not having begun, I could have no perfonal knowlege of the loyahy of the people of New- York, the Jerfeys, or Connedicut. At Sandy Hook I had met Governor Tryon, and fome other gentlemen, who had taken refuge on board lliip, and from them only could I receive infor- mation j»'/ "i t * r 51 ] mation of the difpofitJo'i of the people of thofe provinceo, — I'he event proved, that they were too fanguine in their cx- pedtations. Page 39.] ^s nnothcr proof of my opinion of the great loyalty of the Americans, he adds in a note the following quotation from my letter to the Secretary of State, dated 20th Dec. ij'j(>- * The chain of cantonments is rather too extenfive, but I was in- * duced to occupy Burlington, to cover the county of Monmouth, in * which there are many loyal inhabitants.' This letter was written before the affair of Trenton, and I could have no reafon to fufpeit the fidelity of thofe who came in to us from Monmouth; but I was foon undeceived. Many, very many, of thefe Loyalifts, were a fliort time afterwards taken in arms againft us, and others killed with my protections in their pockets. In the pockets of the killed, and prifoners, were alfo found certificates of thofe very men having lubfcribed a declaration of allegiance, in confequence of the Proclamation of the King's Commiffioners for a general indemnity. — Thefc are notorious fads. Page 39.] And yet, contrary to thefe proofs, he, with many of his General officers, affeSied to believe them, and havejince declared, that the people of that country were almojl unanimoujly difaffieSied to the Crown. Under this pretence we havefeen him decline to entriij} the faithful and loyal fubjeSls with arms, or to make ufe of the well-affeSled force in the colonies, to ajjifi i in reducing, or in defending, after reduced, either cities or proutnces. Various offers of raifing men were made to me, noi did I de- cline any of thofe offers that brought with them the leall p olpccft of fuccefs J but I muft add, that very few of them were fulfilled in. the extent propofed. Mr. Oliver Delancey, w^o was reputed to be the mofl likely man in New- York, to ir.duce the Loyalifts of that province II 2 to UJJUiM 1 r 5* J to join the King's troops, was appointed a Brigadier-General, and authorifed to raife three Battalions, to conlift of 1 500 pri- vates, placing at the head of each the moft refpedlable charadlers, recommended as fuch by himfelf, and by Governor Tryon. Every poffible effort was ufed by thofe gentlemen, not only in the diilridts poflefled by the King's troops, but by employing per- fons to go through the country, and invite the well-afFeiled to come in. Several of the officers (as I have fince been informed) anxious to complete their corps, fought for recruits, even amongft the prifoners, who were then very numerous, and ventured to hold out to them the temptations of pay, liberty, and pardon. Notwithftanding all thefe eiTorts and encouragements : notwith- ftanding the loyalty of the people, and the many thoufand flying over to the Britijh troops J or froteSlion (as afferted by the author) Brigadier-General Delancey, at the opening of the cam- paign 1777, inftead of 1,500, had only raifed 597. Mr. Coiirtland Skinner, who was acknowledged to poflefs con- fiderable intluence in the Jerfeys, where he had ferved the office of Attorney-General with great integrity and reputation, was alfo appointed a Brigadier-General, and authorifed to raife five Battalions, to confifl of 2,500 privates, under the command of gentlemen of the country, nominated by himfelf. The fame efforts were made as for the raifing of Delancey 's corps ; hut at the opening of the campaign 1777, Brigadier General Skinner's numbers amounted only to 517, towards his expefted five Battalions of 2,500. In November, 1777, Brigadier-General Delancey 's corps en- creafcd to C93, and Brigadier-General Skinner's to R59. — In. May, 1778 their progrefs was fo flow, that the firll had only advanced to 707, the latter to i Joi. Several other corps were offered to be raifed, and were accepted, in the winter of r776, making in the whole thirteen, to confift of 6,500 men, including the Brigades of Delancey and Skinner. But in May 1778, the whole number in all thefe thirteen corps amounted only to 7,609, little more than half the promil'ed complement, and of 1 thefe p > , ■';■ ' -.-.if [ 53 ] thefe (as I have before obferved) only a fma' proportion were Americans. Upon our taking polTeflion of Philadelphia, the fame, and indeed greater encouragements were held out to the people of Pennfylvania. — Mr. fVilllam Allen, a gent!, man who was lup- pofed to have great family influence in that province — Mr. Chalmers, much refpedlcd in the three Lower Counties on Dela- ware, and in Maryland — and Mr. Clifton, the chief of the Ro- man Catholic perfuafion, of whom there were faid to be many in Philadelphia, as well as in the rebel army, ferving againft their inclinations : Thefe gentlemen were appointed Cummandants of corps, to receive, and form for fervice, all the well-afFedted that could be obtained — And what was the fuccefs of thefe ef- forts ? In May, 1778, when I left America, Colonel Allen had raifed only 152 rank and file — Colonel Chalmers 336 — and Colonel Clifton i8oj which, together witli three Troops of light dragoons, confifting of 132 troopers, and 174 real 'volun- teers from Jerfey, under Colonel Vandyke, amounting in the whole to 974 men, conftituted all the force that could be col • ledled in Pennfylvania, after the moft indefatigable exertions, during eight months. Page 39.] When he pajfed through New ferfey, and dro"je th-3 panic Jir lick rebels 02it of that country, nojiep icas ttiken to embody and arm the friends of government, loho ijere ready mid r' 'I r 5^' ] iM.inyof my Prodnmntions containrd invitiitions to arms, aneadof Elk. I fhall lubjoinacopy of that declaration, whicli will prove how invidiauHy he ha? mif-quoted it. As to his fiiti;ge(lion, that the injundion, for the people to remain peaceably in their habitations, amounted to a prohibition againit their taking up arms in behalf of tiie Crown, and ren- dered it liangcroiu, if not unlawful for them to do fo, becaufo tiJlriSi obedience to tb.^ Axlaration "was the only condition upon -which 1 promt fed them his Miijejiys prote£iion ; this I think, is a quib- ble, which would never have entered the head of an FjigUjh Lawyer. As this Declaration was c alculatcd for the meridian of Pennfyl- vania, of the people of which province Mr. Galloway profeHcd an intiinate knowledge, I confulted him previoully upon it; I framed it agreeably to his iueas; when written, it had his full approbation. Mr. Galloway afliired me, that the inhabitants of rhat part of the country would come in to us. Soon after our landing, I complained to him of my dilappointment in that particular.— He returned for anfwcr, that the people were not fo well affedled in that part of the country as they were farther on j and that I Ihould find them more and more loyal, as I advanced towards the Capital of Pennfylvania. This information, however, proved equally falle. Throu'^h the whole march of the army, from the Head of Llk to Philadelphia, the male inhabitants, fit to bear arms (a very few excepted) had deferted their dwellings, and I had great realon to believe, were in arms againft us. The Quakers were the only people againft whom 1 entertained no fuipicion. iii D E C L A- 1^-' [ $1 ] DECLARATION. SIR WILLIAM HOWE, regretting the calamities, to which many of his Majefty's faithful fubjeds are ftill expofed, by the continuance of the rebellion, and nolefs dcfirous of pro- teifling the innocent, than determined to purfue with the rigours of war all thofe ; whom his Majefty's forces, in the courfe of their progrefs, may find in arms aguinlt the King, doth hereby afl'ura the peaceable inhabitants of the Province of Pennfylvania, the Lower Counties on Delaware, and the Counties of Mar- ' ;nd on the eaftern fhore of Chefapeak Bay, that, in order to remove any groundlefs apprehenfions, which may have been raifed, of their fuffering by depredations of the army under his command, he hath iffued the ftridleft orders to his troops, for the prefervation of regularity and good difcipline ; and has fignified, that the mod exemplary puniftiment fliall be inflided upon thofe, who fliall dare to plunder the property, or moleft the perfons, of any of his Majefty's well-difpofed fubjcds. Security and protedlion are likewife extended to all perfons, inhabitants of this Province, who, not guilty of having aflumed legillative or judicial authority, may have ailed illegally in fub- ordinate ftations, and, confcious of their mifcondufl:, been in- duced to leave their dwellings, provided fuch perfons do forth- with return, and remain peaceably at their ufual places of abode. Confidering moreover, that many officers and private men now actually in arms againft his Majefty, may be willing to relinquifli the part they have taken in this rebellion, and return to their due allegiance : Sir William Howe doth, cherefore, promife a free and general pardon to all fuch officers and private men, as fliall voluntarily come and furreiider theijifelves, to any detachment of his Majefty's Forces, before the day on which it fliall be notified, that the faid indulgence is to be difcontinued. Given under my Hand, at Head-Quarters of the Army, the 27th Day of Auguft, 1777. W. HOWE. m # ■ m % lit \%\ I Page 42.] I. I, V s, [ 58 I Page 42.] Thou funds came in ivhcrcvcr the army marcf.^ed, and took the oath, but the Royal Faith, pledged for their fafety, ivas Jbamefully •violated. 'The unhappy people, injiead of reveivinq the proteciion promifed, ivere plundered hy the foldiery. 'Thtir wives and daughters -were violently polluted by the lujlful brutality of the loweji of' mankind; and friends and foes indijcriminately met with the fame barbarian treatment. If the Britijl: General teas indolent and neglcSiful in putting a flop t'j ihtfe cruelties, the rebel commander and the new fates ivere not fj in oiivcrting them to their own benefit. Every pojible advantage ■icas taken of thefe enormities (h). Affidavits were taken of the plunder, and of every rape. 'They ivere publijhed in all their neivf- papers, fj irritate and enrage the people cgeiinji his Majejiy and the Brit ijh nation. ''The liritijh foldiers were reprefented as a race of men m^.re inhuman than favages. Hy thefe means, the minds of many icere turned againjl the Britifh government, and many in defperation joined the rebel army. 'The force nf the rebels was in- ercufd, the Brit ijh weakened, and the humanity and glory of Britons received a difgraceful tar nijh, which time can never efface. This is a rhanfody calculated, alternately to freeze and f re the blood of the inaignant reader, and niy huihanity, as well as my honour, is concerned in the refutation of its falfehood- It may be remembered that, when this conntty began to grow impatient under the long continuation of the American war, (with a fpeedy termination of which the people had been re- peatedly Hatteredj notwith/landing the contrary aflurances the Secretary of State was pofle/Ted of from me) the moil illiberal and unceafing attempts were made, to divert the puBIick odium from the Minifler to the General. One of the principal allega- tions againll him, and againft his Brother alfo, was, that they were too lenient, too cufcriminate towards the inhabitants of America. Severity, in its mod favagc extent, was held to bs the only means of quelling the rebellion. The fufTcrings, even of the innocent, vrere to operate in our favour, by Iciulering them weary of the contcfl, and by eliciting the multitude to llib- mifllon. Such was the language of thoi'c times. But Major General ■■IF wm I 57 ] Ceneral Orcy, in his evidence before the Houfe of Commons, dcjiofed, *' that he never faw any degree of lenity Ijiewn to the *' American ut what was highly proper, and much to the ** honour of the General and the Britj(h army." — The imputa- tion of improper lenity having t^xus loll; its weight, the charge is fuddenly rcverfcd. — Mcijor General Robert/on and Mr. G^//- /owj^ are brought to fay, that the inhabitants were plundered by the King's arn y, and (the enquiry in the Houfe of Common* being hallily clofed, fo as to exclude the i.uthcr ex.unination of witnelfeson my part, who could have counterbalanced the weight ofthefe and other allegatiQns)the author of letters to a nobleman is inftigated to allcdge, that no lenity at all was fliewn towards the people of America } but that on the contrary, every fpecies of cruelty, at which tlie human minds revolts, was countenanced and encouraged. General Robert/on fays, that the troops, as they pafled thruugh the Jerfeys, plundered the inhabitants -, but he alfo confeiVcs, that the commander in chief gave orders againjl it repeatedly -, and he might have aUded, that Earl Cornwall is, who com- manded the army when they pafled through the Jerfeys, ex- erted himfelf to prevent that, and every other irregularity. Even Mr. Galloway, who in his evidence ailerts that plunder was com' litted, acknowledges at the fame time, that upon a me- morial being prefented, relative to the plunder of a large quan- tity of Madeira wine (which was one of the moft: flagrant in- ftances) the matter was duly enquired into, and fettled. The author of letters to a nobleman well knows, that my general Orders, and my Proclamations, againfl: plundering, were inceflant i and in my cnnfcicnce I believe, there nqver was Icfs plundering, nor fewer enormities committe'' by any army, in the field, and where the inhabitants were in ai ns againfl: the troops, than by that a:my which I had the honour to conimand. With regard to the pollution of ivivjs and daughters by the lujlful brutality of the loiveji of mankind, I declare, that I do not recollett to have ever heard of mere than one rape imputed to the foldiery, and that was faid to have been committed in Chcfter county, in the province of New-York. The criminal was I 2 fec.med, !'/l 't [ 6o ] P.urcd; an enquiry immediately took place; but theaccufcr .efufcd to profecute. It may be true (as the author afTerts) that the Leaders of the rebellion circulated accounts of Britifh barbarity in their ncwl- pnpers. To irritate the Inhabitants againft the King's authority ami government was an invariable part of their lyftem. The newfpapcrs of Aonerica, like ihofe of other countries, arc tha vehicles of invention and calumny, in fupport of party. But if i'uch accounts had been founded in truth, complaints from the perfons, or families injured, would probably have reached me ; as they did not, I am pcri'uaded the accounts were falfe. That irregularities will Ibmetimes be committed by a numerous army cannot be denied, All I contend for is, that, circum- llanccs confidered, they were few, and not of an enormous nature ; that every means was ufed to prevent them $ and the delinquents, when convidled, always puniHied in proportion to the offence. P^S^ 43*] -^^'^ /nff^^'f^S °f ''^^ foldiers to plunder ^ and commit other outrages^ ivas a dangerous relaxation of difcipline. It ren^ dered them avaritious, negleSlful of their duty, and difobcdient to command. That the King's troops in America were relaxed in ulf^i^rline, negligent of their duty, and fyftematically difobedient to com- mand, are allegations perfectly new, and, I will add, fcandaloully falfe, refledling, without Ihadow of proof, upon the honour and condudt of all the officers who ferved with me in that army. Page 45.] Jf near 20,000 men, affijled by the BritiJ): feet tvers necejfary to carry on the operations in Pennfylvania, a country •which he acknowledges to he in general well affe^ed to government, he mujl certainly know, that one third of that number were not fujjicicnt to oppofe the united force of the fve mojl difafe£led of all the revoked colonies. He mifreprefents the numbers of the fouthcrn army, They an- ..ted to 13,799 rank and file, including the liritifli, foreign, and ; rovincial force. I have acknowledged, that / was informed the *-*■ ^'s "^ [ 6i ] the country of Pcnnfylvania was in general well affedcd. I received fuch information principally from Mr. Galloway^ who was a ftrong advocate for tne expedition into that province. Page 1^.] He could not have taken a more rffeSlual Jiep to fa- crifice ihe northern army, than that of carrying his 'whole force to the foutbiaard, ivi^hout leaving a corps fujficient to make a divcrjion in its favour. This is a very grofs mifreprefcntation. So flir from carrying my 'whole force to the fouthward, I left at New- York about 8,500 ranK and file, fit for duty. I do not include the fick and convalefcents of thofe corps, nor of the fouthern army, which together amounted to more than 3,000 men. With that force Mi* Henry Clinton did make adiverfionin favour of the northern army. But I (hall ever infift, and I am fupported by evidence in infifting, that the fouthern expedition, by drawing off General Wafliington and his whole force, was the ftrongcft diverfion that could have been made. This fubjedl is fully difcuffed in my Narrative to the Houfe of Commons (page 20) and Majtw General Grey's evidence is as follows : ^ ** Did not the expedition to Philadelphia prove a po\^4er.- " nil diverfion in favour of the northern army ? A. " I think a ftronger, or more folid diverfion could not " have been made, than that of drawing General Wafhing- " ton, and the whole continental army, near three hundred " miles off. ^ *' Whether the moft probable motive, to have obliged *' General Wafliington to conic to a general engagement, was ** not the prefervation of Philadelphia; I mean, was there tiny ** sther probable objedt that would have drawn General Wafti- ^* ington to an engagement ? A, " I do not think there was any one objccH', vv'liich would ** have tempted General Wafliington to rill; a geiteral action, fo •* much as the feat of loling the Capital of Pennfylvania." .'/,! '> 1 \f' If ^ w as %i -7" .' ( lii I'i I [ 62 ] ^ " Was there any probability of bringing the war in " America to a termination that campaign, without forcing; " General Walhington to an engagement ?" A. " Certainly not." ^ " Whether, if Mr. Wafhington had had his choice, with " refpeft to the diredlion of Sir William Howe's army, he would •' have wilhcd him to have gone up the Hudfon's river, or to " Philadelphia?" A. " With the force that Sir William Howe had undur his •* command I think, if General Wafliington had a wifli, it was •• for him to have gone up the North river." Page 46.] Why ivas fo higb-f(>trited an army taken from the fight of an enemy of not half its force y put on board a Jieet^ and expofed to all the accidents and dangers of the ocean, &c. My reafons for going by fea are fully fet forth in my Narrative (page 16). Page 46.] And why, when Philadelphia was his objeSi, after he had experienced the oppofition of the trade wind, did he obflinately perjiji in his circuitous route, 6cc. My reafons for going the circuitous route by Chefapeak-Bay are alfo given in my Narrative, and they are fully confirmed and juftified by the depofition of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond to the Houfe of Commons, which I have given in a fublcquent reivark. Page 47.] In the miljl of viSlory ihe ardour of his troops was fupprejfed. I fuppofe the author here alludes to my condud: near the Lines of Brooklyn, on the 27th of Auguft, J 776. As this was much fcrutinized in the Houfe of Commons, I fliall fairly infert the evidence upon the fubjeit. Examination h wipmmmmmmmmm tt «< (C <( C 63 ] Eitaminatton of Earl Cornvvallis. ^ " Did your Lordfliip fee the enemy's Lines at Brooklyn, during the aftion of the 27th of Auguft, 1776 ?" A. " I did not fee them on that day with any accuracy ; I was on the left with the fec.ond Battalion of grenadiers, and could form no judgement." O, " From the knowledge you had of thofe Lines after the adlion, would it have been a prudent meafure to have aflaulted thofe works, on that day ?" A. " I apprehend the latter part of that quefllon is matter of opinion j I never did hear it frggeiled by any one, that thofe Lines could have been carried by aflault." Third Days Examination of Ma]o^ General Robertson. 6). " From the circumftances of the purfuit of the 27th of " "au'tuA:, and the manner in which the rebels retreated, do you '• aoplehend the Lines of Broc klyn might have been ftormed ?" A. " There was a ridge of heiglits feparated us from the " rebels ; the rebels had pofTelfion of them, and it would have " been very difficult to have forced them -, General Howe, by *' making a march in the night, got the better of the difficulty j " we got near the rebel camp without their perceiving us. " General Howe put hitnfelf at the head of the troops, and " pulhcd in between the heights and the rebel Lines; by this " move we got 2000 prifoners. Some of the troops were gomg " to ftorm the Lines -, General Howe thought proper to order " them back." O. " Do you apprehend, m the manner in which the rebels '« Ikd to the Line;;, and inv.nich that part of our army purfued " them, that, if our troops had not been called back, they ♦' would have ftormed the Lines, and carried them ?" A. " I did not myfelf know the flrcngth of the Line?, nor do «' I belie^'e General Howe did at that time. I have heard fincc, «' that the Lines were weakly mannod ; and that Putnam, wlio " had- ' m i t '^ ■4£g»- } [ «4 ] had tlic command there of 7000 men, had detached all to tlic heights but -^oo ; but this was a circumftance known to nobody at the time, it was a circumftance General Howe could not poflibly know, and I did not myfelf, at that time, think, that ftorming them would have been a proper meafurc." i^. " Do you know whether Sir "William Howe took imme- diate care to follow the enemy, as foon as he was informed of their evacuating the Lines ?" y^. " Sir William Howe was always alert. Ifent my Aide- du-camp to head-quarters, to give notice that my Brigade was ready to march ; when he returned Sir William Howe was gone out, I apprehend, to head fome part of the army." ^ " On what do you found your opinion, that Sir William Howe could not be a judge of the force of the enemy's lines on the 27th of Auguft ?" yj. '* I mr.rched at the head of my brigade to a place near the enemy's Lines ; I went to the fituation where I thought I could fee them bcft from, without leaving my Brigade far j and I could not make any judgement of the Itrength of the enemy's Lines, from any place I could fee them : This made me wifh that the grenadier would not go on ; and pleafed to think that my ideas correfponded with Sir William Howe's. I imagined that the General called back the troops, becaufe he was unable to form a juft eftimate of the force of the Lines." Page 48.] At Brunfivick, 171 December, \jy6, Lord Corniiiallis 'u-as upon the heels of the enemy. — T^be deJiruSiion of a bridge over theRaritonfaved them — only for a few hours. — T! heir further fecurity liuis Giving to the orders received by that nobleman to halt at Brutifwick. The Rariton is fordable in that place, at every recefs of the tide; — oyui had the noble General been free to a6l at his own difcretiou, he might, and no doubt would, have purfued hit enfeebled ana panic-Jiruck enemy to the Delaware, over which they never could have paJJ'ed, without falling into his hands. <{ << It <( I M [ 65 3 in anAver to thefe affertions, I believe, it will be fufficlent to <)ppoie the evidence of Earl Cornwallis. ^ ** Would it have been prudent, 10 have purfued the " enemy from Brunfwic, with the part of your Lordfliip's corps, *• which firft reached that place ?" j1. " As my condud: in America forms no part of the prr- *• fent enquiry I certainly do not think myfelf, at prefent, ac- ** countable to this Houfe for any aftion of my own. I arA *' however, on the prefent occafion, free to fay, that I could not •' have purfued the enemy from Brunfwic, with any profpedt of material advantage, or, without greatly diftreffing the troopi: under my command." 4*. ** In what refpe»able body of troops, then pafling the north river, undt r '.v^aeral Lee." ^ Did you ftop at Brunfwic, from the ift to the 6th, in •* confequence of orders ?" yi. ** I under Aoed it to be the General's direftion, tliat I ** fbould halt at Brunfwic,. but had I feen, that I could have ** flruclc a material llroke, by moving forward, I certainly fliould ** have taken it upon me to have done it." Page 48.] At Brunficic the BriiiJJj army baited near a week, WafiiiigLon St tojijijiing of 1000 n/ifj, lay at Prince-'Toicn, Jl'ventccn Miles — and at Trenton on the Dela^care, fmnty-nine miles dijiaut, with all hk heavy cannon and baggage. The reafons for halting at Brunfwic are flated above by .Earl Co.nwallis. Washington's force, at this time, conrfifled of 6000 men, ex- clufive of Lee's corps of 4000.. General Wailiington loft no time, in croffing hi" artillery and baggage over the Delaware at Trenton, before we could move from Brunfwic. Healfo crofled part of his troops, keeping a corps en tlic eaft liJe to obierveour motions.. Page 49.] On the jth of December t the army marched from Brunfwic at four o'clock in the morning, and arrived at Prince- Tcwn in the afternoon about the fame hour. The troops of the left column were not in their cantonments, in the evening of the march to Prince-Town, until after dark, and thofe of the right column, not until fome hours after dark. Earl Cornwallis (that his march might be impeded as Jittlc as polTible) left his tents behind him. Page 49. J He waited at Prince-Toivn fcventeen hours, marched at nine o'clock on the. morning of the eighth, and arrived, at Trenton^ at four o'clock in the afternoon. 2 The I [ 67 ] The caufe of not marching earlier the following day was, that the enemy had broken down abridge, which could not be fconrr repaired, and rendered fit far the pafTuge of ^tillery, 6c;c. Page 50.] Every one expected, that be would pafs ■ that river (the Delaware J as it is fo eaftly praSlicable, and as it miiji have been followed by the greatejl advantages. To this alfo I (hall oppofe the evidence of' Earl C^rnwallis, viz. ' ^. ** Was tliere any movement made in the purfuit of the ** enemy to Trenton, w^ith a defign to crofs the Delaware at that " time?" A. " The night that the General arrived at Trenton, he dc- ** tached me, with a confiderable corps of troops, from Maiden- *' head to Coriel's-Ferry, where we had fpme hopes, from ** previous meafures taken by tlae General, that we Hiould have •" found boats to crofs the river. Our expedationa were difap- ■** pointed, and we found no beats.'' ^ " Whether the execution of that meafure (eroding the ** Delaware) was pra<^cable at that time?" A. " As the Delaware was not fordable, and we could get *' no boats, it was certainly impradticable, as I have faid." Page 51.] The General having rcfolved not fo crofs the Dela- ware, began to form his winter canto72ments. In this injlancc, he difcovcred no mare military judgement than he had J7.'>exon vigour in purfuing his enemy. He fcattered and extended th£m from Bur- lington to New-Tork, a fpace almoji ninety miles ', dividing his force into fmall dijiant parties, liable to be cat of by the enemy, one after another, with eafe. But this was not the mofi cenfurablc part of his conduSl : the frontier po/is, or tbofe near eft to the enemy were committed to the command offoreignerSf who could not under- ft and the language of the country. I have fpoken fully upon this fubjeiflin my Narrative; but as a farther juftilicatiou', I fiiall here add the tcfdniony of Eaii Cornwullis, viz, K 2 ^ " For ■■* I H M If \l f OS J. ^ " For the. rcafons then known to your Lordlliip, was " Sir William Howe jultiflable, in having taken Trenton into '* the chain of cantonments, and for pofting the Heflian troops, " with the 42d regiment, there, and at Bordcntown, under the *' command of Colonel Donop }" A. ** Tlys again is a queftion of- opinion, and does come " under the defcription of thofe, which I think myfelf not " bound to anfweru but, as I bcHcvc I was the perfon„ who firrft " fuggefted the idea to the General, of taking Trenton and Bor- " dentown in the chain of his cantonments, I think m^^fclf ia , " honou*" bound to anfwer it: ' ' ' '• The advantage that muft naturally arife, from holding fd lafge a part of the Jerfeys ^ the great encour^igement we met with from the inhabitants, three or four hundred of whom came in and took the oath every day, for at leafl: ten days ; the great advantage we fhould derive, from obtaining foragt: and proviiions, made me think itadvifeablc to rifk that extended cantonment. Human prudence could not forefee the fatal event of the furrender of Colonel Rhall's brigade. I appre- hended no danger, but the chance of having our quarters be.it up in the winter ; and the objedt, in my opinion, towards finifliing the war, was of greater confcquence, than two or three vidories. In regard to what the General mentions, of pofting the Hefilans on the left of the cantonments, I muft fay, I ever had, and ftill have, the high«ft opinion of thofe brave troops. The misfortune at Trenton was owing entirely to the imprudence and negligence of the commanding Otficer. On all other occafions, the troops ever have behaved, and, I dare fay, ever will behave, with the greateft courage and intre- pidity. The behaviour, on the attack of Fort Wafliington, of this very brigade of Colonel Rhall's, was the admiration of the whole army." *< ({ it •< <-< <( << << 4( tt «« l( r* «( << 1-^ To this I will add the teftimony of Sir George Ofborne, who being afked " if he ever heard Colonel Donop cxprefs his fenti- •* nients, relative to the port a.t Trenton, cither before or after " hii defeat r" anfwered. \h % «« In *t n «< tt ft (C (< <( [ 69 3 '• In the fituatlon I had the honour to be with the Hefliun troops, I lived in a degree of friendlhip with Colonel Donop, and very frequently, after the misfortune at Trenton, he ac- quainted me, that if Colonel Rhall had executed the orders he had delivered to him from Sir William Howe, which were to eredt redoubts at the port; at Trenton, that his opinion was, it would have been impofllble to have forced Colonel Rhall's brigade, bvifore he could have come to his afliftancc from Bordentown,'.' Page 95.] Which fviz. WiiJ}jingtons whole force J being al tUs time lefs than 4,000. Washington, after Lee's corps joined. him, .had never lefs than about 8,000. Page 61.] He did not open. the campaign. till the 12th ofjnnc, I have fpoken to this point above. . Page 61 .] On that day (\ zth of June) the Britijh General af- fcmbled his troops at Brunfvick. IVajliington was encamped on a hill above Sluibbh-Town, about nine miles from that place, on the north fde of the Raritout with fewer than 6000 iindifciplincd and badly appointed troops ; which, with a corps under Sullivan of 2000 men at Prince-Town, compoJ}d his whole force. From intelligence I then had, and which I have not lince had, any reafon to doubt, Wailiington had not lefs than io,oc6 in his camp, on the hill above Quibble Town. . Page 61.] His camp fat ^ibble-TownJ was far from being inacceffible or fortified. It was jlrong and defenfiblc in front, be- caufe it was guarded by the Rariton, and the hill was Jleep and dijficult of accefs : but in his rear , towards the mountains, or on his right, towards the Delaware, it was by m means impraSlicable of ajjanlt, Hia T :t i W ii^ u ii i ■ (1 [ 70 ] "Ilis ramp was to the full as inaccefllble in the rear, ss in tlie front; and an attack upon his right flank (from every account I tould get) would have been ftill more hazardous. Page 62.] T^le/t' clrcumjlances plainly informed IVaJhington, that Sir William Howe tlid not mean to crojs the Delaware, and that he ivas not anxious to bring on an aBion. General WaHiington was certainly induced to believe, that my intention was to attack him ; and had he not been perfectly fa- tisfied with the ftrength of his poft, he would not have remained io long in it. Page 6^.] Sir William Howe, with Jit Id, in Jight of his contemptible enemy. 17,000 men, vas in the I marched from Brunfwic with about 11,000 fighting men. It being neceilary to leave the ports of Amboy and Brunfwic in a proper ftate of defence, between 3 and 4,000 men were left for that purpofe. This circumftance is more particularly explained in my Narrative (page 15). Page 66.] The note (c). This note is a criticifm on the variation of my plans. My plans undoubtedly did vary, according to circumftances. The variation of circumftances, and the variation of my plans, are ftated in my Narrative ib fully, as to require no farther dif- cuflion. [Page 68 and 69.] The author here adopts the common place arguments agalnd the expedition up the Chefapeak. If what I have iaid in my Nar- rative upon that fubjed is not fatisfadory, the evidence of Sir Andrew Snape Hammond, is fo full, fo clear, and fo uncontro- vertible, that I fliould imagine the expediency of that route can MO longer admit of a doubt, in the mind of any impartial man. Martis .A. .««.&?.■■ ■Pi •^^^ •r 7' I Martis u die Mat'i, 1779, COMIvilTTEE to confidcr of the feveral papers, which were- prefented to the Houfe, by Mr. Dc Grey, upon the loth day ot March laft, purfuant to their Addrefs to his Majefty. Mr. FREDERICK MONTAGUE IN THE CHAIR. Sir Andrew Snape Hammond called in, and examined by Sir William and Lord Howe. Q:. ** Did you ferve in the fquadron, under the command of " Lord Howe, in North- America, in 1777?" A. " I did ; I commanded a detached fquadron on the coad « of Delaware and Virginia, for a year and a half, except at *• fome intervals prior to that period." Q:_ " Had you been employed in the command of a detach - " ment of frigates, to watch the motion of the rebels on tiie " Delaware, for feveral months antecedent to the arrival of the " Britilh fleet,^off of the entrance of that river, on the 20th of -July 1777?" ^ A. " I was employed on that fervice for feveral months before." Q^ " Of what number of Ships and veflels do you reckon " that fleet confifted; I meaa the Britifli fleet which arrived ofF *« the Delaware ?" . A. •' Of two hundred and fifty fail." Qi^ " Was the navigation of the Delaware very intricate and ♦' hazardous, efpecially from the fhoals and rapidity of the tides ?" A. " It certainly is ; .1 do not know any river fo difficult of " navigation." Qi, ** Was it more particularly fo, for the expeditious paf- ** fage of large fliips of war ?" A. ** Large fliips of war can only pafs certain places at par- <* ticular times of tides." " Q^ " What was your report to Lord Howe, on the 30th of July, . ** of the pofition of the enemy on the banks of the Delaware ?" A.- " T.he. H i llH '[ 72 ] A. •• The report which I rccolledled I made to Lord Howe on ' that day was, That I had received intelligence the day before ' that Ciencral VVaHiington had cro/Ted the Delaware, and wsi ' marching down to Wilmington from Philadelphia." (^ " What did you underftaiid to be the nature of the Penn- • I'ylvania fliore, with refpcdt to an eafy communication with the • interior parts of the country, up to Reedy.Ifland?" A. " The coaftof the Delaware from Cape Hinlopen >I1 th« ' way up to Reedy Ifland is marrtiy low land, v«ryfuli of cTtfcJcs, • and communicates to the Upland only by caufeways." Q^ " What was the nature of the Ihorc on the fame fide ' from F.jcdy Ifland to Newcadle ?" A. '* In fome places marfliy, in others fome tolerable landing • places." Q^ <« What extent of anchorage do you fuppofe the fleet ' would occupy in an}' part of the navigable channel of the De- *• laware from Rtedy Ifland up to Chellerf" A. " The main channel of the river is fo narrow till you pafs ' WilmingtOTi, Gr»r»ther till you pafs Newcaftle, that Iconclu ' it would require at leafl: four miles, if not more. Q^ " At what dillance muft the (hips and veflels lie from the • lliore in fuch anchorage ?" A. " Within gun fliot on both fides — within cannon fliot in ' all places, and within mufquct fliot in fome." (^ " How many miles an hour do the tides run in the Dela- ' ware ?" * A. " Between three and four." Q^ " What did you underftand to be the water-guard, which ' the rebels had provided, toobftrudtthe free navigation of the ' liver i I mean the whole force on the river ?" A. •' There were two frigates at Philadelphia, not complete as ' ro men — at Mud-Ifland, where the fort was, there was a ihip ' called the Province fliip, which mounted eighteen .'S pounders *• —the cc (I t( (( €f (( << <( <( (( r 73 J — the Delaware frigate of twenty-eight 12 pounders— two xebecks, mounting each two 24 pounders in their bow, two 18 pounders in their (lern, and four 9 pounders each in their waift — a brig mounting iixteen 6 pounders— two floating bat- teries, the one twelve 18 pounders, the o' ler of lo; thefe guns were moveable on either fide — thirteen row gallies, each carrying one gun, from 32 pounds to 18 — thirty-fix row boats, orhalf gallies, carrying a 6 pounder, or a 4 pounder — I believe that was all, except fire raus, of which there were twenty- five, or thirty— each compofed of five ftages chained together. " Q^ " Did it appear afterwards, that your report of that water guard was well founded ?" A. *' It did ; I faw them all myfelf." Q^ " Whether the proper boats of the fliips of war were of a conftrudlion and force, well adapted to oppofe their water guard on night fervice ?" A. '• Certainly not." « Qj^ ** Whether the fmall armed veflels of the fleet were ade- quate to that purpofe, the Cornwallis galley excepted ?" A. '* By no means." (( (( (< [^Examined by the other Members of the Co/nmittee.] Q^ " What is the nature of the fliore above Reedy Illand, and below Wilmington, with refpedl to the flatnefs of the country, and the eafe of covering a landing by the fliips ?" A. " I have before laid, that the fliore before Reedy Ifland and Newcaftle is marfhy in Tome places, and that there are landing places in parts of it — Above Nev/caftle, as far as Wil- mington Creek, it is an entire marfli." Q^ " Could the army have landed citlicr at Newcaflle, or upon any parts of the weflern (hore of the Delaware, between Newcaftle and Reedy Ifland ?" L A. " An I rtj ,■! «< << [ 74 ] A. *' An army can land any where, where there is no oppo- iitiun. '^ " Do you believe that the fitiiatlon of the rebels was TiK h, that they could have made fuch an oppofition as to pre- vent our troops landing, alBfted, as the troops could have been by the fleet, at the time of your report ?" A. *' That is a queftion impofliblefor me to anfwcr, unlcfs I knew the force that was likely tooppolc them." Q^ " What do you believe that force to have been ?" A. " The intelligence I received was, that General Wafliing- ton was in that country with his whole army." Q. •' In what part of the country?" A. " My intelligence mentioned Wilmington." Q. " Whether in the fituation of Wilmington, with refpcft to Newcaille, troops, poiled at Wilmington, could have been ufed to prevent a landing at Newcaftlc, or below Newcaftle ?" A. ** I conceive the rebel army would have marched to the fpot where the Britilli troops meant to land; I do not fuppofe the rebel army were meant to remain ported at Wilmington." Q^ " Whether you believe the rebel troops could have kept pofleflion of Newcaftle, if they had marched there ?" A. *' That queftion can only be anfwered by aland officer." Q^ *' Do you now believe that the rebel troops were at, or near, Wilmington ?" A. " By the works Ifawat Wilmington, I have reafon to think, that the rebel army were there at that time — the 30th of July." O,. *' Do you know that a great wcftern road leads from Newcaftle to the Head of the Elk ?" A. •* I have heard fo.^" Q. Do tSI [ 75 ] Qj^ ** Do you fee any reafon to have prevented the rebel " troops from marching to the Head of the Elk, in the fame *' manner as you fuppofe they might have marched to Newcaftle, *« from Wilmington ?" A. ** I have very little knowledge of the marching of armies.' Q^ ** How far is it fromNewcaftle to the head of the Elk ?'• A. *• It is called by the map feventeea miles." Q. " How far is it by fea from Cape Hinlopen to the Head " of the Elk ?" A. " About 35c milts." Q. '• Are there not many difficulties in the navigation to '* theHeadoftheElk?" A. ** There are fome difficulties, but the navigation of the «• Chefapeak is exceedingly eafy in general." Q^ •' What is the diftance between Rcedy-IllanJ and " Newcaftle?" A. ** Five or fix miles." Q. " Might not the fleet have lain below Reedy-Illand in ** Mety, within a fmall dillance of Reedy-Ifland ?" A. " There is no part of the Delaware, between the flioals, " where they could have lain, without being expofed to the '• fire rafts ." Q^ " Whether the fleet, on returning to the Delaware, were *' not ncceflarily expofedto the fire rafts ?" A. " When the fleet returned from the Chelapeak, tliey came «« in detachments, and we were in pollcflion of the lower «' Chevaux de Frize of the enemy." Q. " How far was the lower Chevaux de FrIze from Reedy- «« Illand ?" A . ** About eighteen or twenty miles." Qj_ " Might not the fleet have gone up In detachments on •• the 30th of July and the beginning of Auguil ?" L 2 A. " That iJSSS^S*!*-::^ .-S: ' 'I if ii 4« (< «( • < (C << << «( [ 76 ] ** That depends on the mode the Cortimanding Officer c ufes to tondudt them in." Q^ " When you made the report on board the Eagle, on the 30th of July, whether you mentioneii the intelligence refpeft- ing Wi^Tiington, as a reafon, to induce the Commander in Chief to proceed up the Delaware ?" A. " I had no other inducement than to do my duty, and to relate particularly to the Commanding officer every intelli- gence I had received." Q^ " Was there any other intelligence given at the fame time r A, '« I do not recoiled any." Q. '* What do you conceive to he the reafon, that t'^ e Com- mander ''n Chief went to Chefapeak, infteudof the Delaware?" A. " Asnopublick reafons were given to me, I hope the Houfewill not think me wanting in rcfpeft to them, if I J?- cline faying what the fubflance of the private communication was." Q^ '• What is the width of the river, oppodte to Newcaftkr" A. ** The width of the river, immediately oppolite Newcaftle, is about three miles." Q^ " What is the breadth of the navigable channel in tJi»i place ?" A. "' About two miles there, and below confiderably narrower. ' Q^ " What width in the narroweft parts below, betweep the Pickpat Hioals and Fort ?cnn r" A. " Not above half a mile from one flioal to another in the narroweft part," Q^ " How many days, from the 30th of July, does he fuppofc itwould have taken the fieet, to have come to anchor off of Reedy-Iiland, in a difpofition lit for landing the troops?" A. •♦ As I 77 1 A. " As It would depend entirely an the wind, it is irtipoffiblc " to anfwer that diredlly, but I fhould luppoie, not lels than ** four or five days." • (^ ** i^uppofc the wind fair?" A. " With a fair wind, in three or four days." Q:_ " With the whole fleet, fl-jips of war and tranfports ?" A. *' I have before faid, the fhips of war can pafs particular " moals only, at particular times of the tide." Q^ '* Do you apprehend that the enemy's water force would " have been the greatcft impediment to our landing troops above ** Reedy-Ifland?" A. " Yes, Ido; the row gallles, in particular, are con - " ftruded to go in very fhoal water— they would lay on tlie " flats of the river, where the ihips guns could not be brought ** to bear on them." (^ " Whether the fliips guns could not be brought to bear " on the bite of Newcaftlc?" ^ A. " Certainly they could." Q;_ " Does he know the river St. Lawrence, and how many ** knots it runs on the ebb tide?" A. '^ I never was there." Q:_ *' Have you not been informed by good accounts how ** many knots it runs ?" A. "I have heard the tide is rapid there, but I never knew ** with certainty at what rate," Q^ •* Do you underft^nd the river St. Lawrence runs as rapid ** as the Delaware?" A. ** lean fpeak with no certainty." Q^ " Do you know at what rate the Humber runs on ebb «• tide?" A. «' I do not." 3 Q:. " Do ^l! u J I' [ 7^ 1 Q^ " Do you know the Severn ?" A. " I do not?" Q^ " Will you fay that a tide, running three knots and an *' half in an hour, is a rapid tide." A. " I think it is a very rapid tide." Qj^ " Have you not heard that the St. Lawrence runs ten ** knots an hour ?" A. " I never did." Q^ " Whether the rapidity of the tide, and the breadth of the river, do not both of them make a great difference, in the danger from the effects of the fire rafts ? ' A. " I conceive the ftronger the tide runs, the danger from fire rafts is greater, if the channel is the flime." O^ " Whether the fire rafts would not have floated, over any part of that breadth of three miles, st high water, or at three quarters tide ? " A. " They certainly would float on every part of the river oppofite to Newcaflle ; but as they were diretltcd by the gil- lies, it is to be conceived, that they would only be \iieid in the channel." n (< (( i( Q^ " Having faid that the frigates could not come near enough " to fire at Nev.caftle-Bite ; if the landing of the troops had been " attempted within-iidc of the frigates^ and tlic frigates ranged '* round to protcd them, whethci- the enemies gullies would have *' ventured within fire of the frigates ?" A. " The enemy's water force was conftruftcd to fire in the " flream of the tide; the tide ran too rapid for the Oiips of war " to ride with fprings upon their cables. I hdd before found the " gallies very troublefome, and very little in my power annoy *' them; and .therefore do conceive, as they had mcrealed tlieir " force from the time I had been lafl up tlic river, they ccrtaiuly " would not have been idle on lb important an occafujii to •• themlelvcs." Q^ ' Did n [ 79 ] Q^ " Did the gallies ever venture v>ithin fair reach of your ** guns, fo as to engage ?" A ** Yes, v^ithin point blank fhot." Q^ *• Did they hold any engagement with you ?" A. " They had two engagements with me, the one five ** hours, and the other fix, on two different days." Q^ " When was that ?" A. *' The 7th and 8th of May, 1776?" Q^ «< Were they only gallies, or were there frigates with •* them?" A. " Only thirteen gallies, attended by fire-fhips." Q^ " What execution did they do on board your fhip ?" A. " They killed two men, wounded fix, damaged the "' mafi: v».ry materially, and rendered all the fails ufelefs." Q^ " Was that in the two days engagements of eleven hours ?" A. " Yes, I have fpoken to that time/' Q^ " What force had you then ?" A. " The Roebuck of 44 guns, Liverpool of 28 guns, and " two armed tenders." Q^ " Was th It the damage done on board all the vefl*els, or ** to your own o'lly ?" A. " What [ mentioned before, was only in the Roebuck." Q^ " What was the damage with rega-d to the other fliips ?" A. " The Liverpool fiiffered in her marts and fails, feveral «• men were wounded, but I do not recoiled: any were killed." Q. •' How many frigates had Lord Howe on the 30th of July ?" A. " To the heft of my recolledion, three. In the Di.'a- «♦ ware with the Roebuck, there were three more." Q^ «« How << f If fcit I 1 f << <( <( t< (C <( (< << (( <( «( • < << <( << [ «0 j . Q^ *' Ilowmany fifty gun lliips?" A. " I think two." Q^ " Do you know what damage you did to the gallies ?" A. " I never heard diflinftly, but I believe not a great deal-, they were luch Imall objects, it was very difficult to ftrikc them with cannon fiiot." Q^ " Could the gallies have effected their pyrpofe of cm- ploying the fire rafts with effe.:.*!'^ .■2^^*?#"*i' .^■y^ -*5*ifr^!^ Avi 'm I 87 ] " naturally have gone before the fleet -, and when they flopped, " in order to land the troops, the gallics would naturally liave ** tal;en their pofition." Q^ '* Then all the obftrudions, which you conceive might *' have been made, would have been from the gallics, and not ** from the fire fliips, or fire rafts— Is that your meaning ? A. '• The fire Ihips and fire rafts could not hive acted, under " the circumftances of a fair wind and flowing tiue." Q^ •* Is it your opinion, that any number of gallies off New- *' caftle, which you admit to be fo fleep to the fliorc, that a *• frigate could come to the wharf, and a fifty gun fliip almoftas *' near, coulci have given any ferious obflrudlion to the landing *' of an army at that place ?" A. " I never pretended tr. deny the pradicability of landing ** an army in the Delaware— I have only fpokc to the expediency Q;. " Do you know what depth cf water there is in the •* Narrows in the Delaware?" "v. -_ The Narrows is a flrait between two fhoals, in which *■ .ic,t is deep wacer, not lefs than fix or feven fathom, but it is * cXiremely narrow." O^ " What depth of water is there In the Flats above ?" A. ' On the Flats of Morris Lifton's, which are the worfl ** flats on the river, at high water there is only twenty-five feet, *• or twenty-fix — that is, quite at high water." Q^ " Do you know the V'orth or Hudfon's River.. A. " Xo farther than H. rftraw-Bay." Q^ *• Do you know the Kiu^'s Ferry, r" A. " No." CL " What depth of water is there at Morris Liflon's at low ' ** water? A. *' The tide fifes and I4I s about eight feet." Q;. *' Did -! I • m m mM "^mf IMAGE EVALUATION TEST TARGET (MT-3) A 1.0 f^^ i I.I 1^ t 124 2.5 2.2 M L8 1.25 1 1.4 1.6 ^ 6" — ► o fw m m / 7 Hiotographic Sdences Corporation 23 WES MAIN STREET WF:B.iTER,N.Y MS80 (/^6) 872-4S03 MP. C/j r r 88 ] Q^ " Did you underfland, that, on the 30th of July, the ** enemy had a corps of troops at Wilmington ?" A. '* I was fo informed." Q^ " Was you informed what was the communication from •' Newcaflle to the interior part of the country, to the head of " Elk?" A. *• It has the Chriftien River on its right, which runs up ** at leaft ten or twelve miles before it is fordable." Q^ " Is Newcaflle fituated on a peninfula ?" A. '* I am not very well acquainted with the lower parts of '* its fituation; it has George River on its left, but at fome •* diftance." Q^ << Whether, from the fuperiority of metal of the rebel '* veffels in the Delaware, they could not have Aationed them- " felves in fuch a manner, as to have annoyed any frigates, even " with the afliftance of a fifty-gun (hip, that might have been " defined to cover the landing of any body of troops, without " being hurt by thofe ihips with any probable elfeft ?" A. *' I think, if they had had time and opportunity to have ** placed them, they would have made the landing very difficult." Q. *' Do you know how far it is from Newcaflle to Cecil- " Court Houle ?" A. '* About feventeen miles." Q^ •* Whether, in the march from Newcaflle to Cecil- «• Court Houfe, it would have been neceflary to ford the " Chriftien, or any other river whatfoever ?" A. " I have no knowledge of the interior part of that ** country, but from the map." Q^ " In what part of the Delaware was the water force of ** the rebels, on the 30th of July ?" A. *' Part at Reedy-Ifland, and part at Mud-lfland." " Wlut I •■•^ i in»i N.- k'STi M*<»iii,.,.§t^1TfTZ^~f^l^lS~ [ 89 ] Q^ " What part was at Reedy-Ifland }" A. ** The brig g Mey, the fchooner galley, and feveral of ** the latteen gallies — and feveral of their row-boats." Q^ " What part was at Mud-Illand ?" A. " All the remaining rart of the force." Q^ *' What is the diftance from Mud-Ifland to Reedy- " llland?" A. " Twenty-five, or twenty-fix miles in the courfe of the '• river. Qj_ ** Howhigh in theDelawarecan afixty-fourgunfliipgor" A. " If there had been no obflrudlion in the river, a fixty- ** four gun fhip might be carried to Philadelphia at high ** water." Qj^ " Where does the firfl obftrudion begin in the river ?" A. •« At Billingfport." Qj_ " How far is Billingfport above Newcaille ?" A. ** Above twenty miles." Q^ *• Whether a fixty-four gun £hip can lafely lie a good '* way above Newcaftlc, at all times of tide ?" A. " A fixty-four gun fliip can at all times lie as high as «• Chefter." Q^ ** Muft not the fleet have anchored every night in their *' way up the Delaware?" A. " Certainly j it would not have been practicable to have <* kept under fail." Qj_ " Hl at many feamen were necefiary for manning the *• flat boats, for landing the army ?" A. " I do not recollcifl how many — but I know, when the *• flixt boats were manned, we had but very few men left on «♦ board tlie ftiips." N Q:, *' Whether I" f (( «< <( tt <( <( (( (( <( (( (( (( <( <( <( [ 90 ] Q^ ** Whether the feamen, for manning the flat boats, muft not be taken from the line of battle fhips ?" A . " That was the ufual method pradifed, in order to make the frigates ufeful." Q_^ " What number of boats were prepared for the landing ?" A. " To the beft of my recollection, fcventy-nine." Q^ *' Would not that have taken upwards of 800 feamen to have manned them properly ?" A. " They were ufually manned with twelve men, a cock- fvvain, and officer, each." Q^ " Whether when yau ftated, that the firft: obftrudlion in the Deliuvare was at Billingfport, you intended to h..ve it un- derftood, that no obftrii(flion might be given to th.: courfe of the fleet, oi tlie landing of the army, at any place of the fliore below Billingfport ?" A. " When I mentioned the firft obftruftion being at Billiiigfpoit, I meant only as to the Chevaux de frize, which the enemy had ftopped the channel with under water." (^ ** Did you mean to fay that an army at land, having no batteries erected on the land belov.- that Chevaux de frize, would have been an obftru(ftion to a fleet coming up the Dela- ware ?" A. ** If the fleet had proceeded up the river, they would have gone for many miles through a channel, where it was only a fhort gun fliot, in many places, from fide to lide — it is therefore not to be prefumed, that the enemy would have loft the opportunity of annoying the fleet, from every advantageous point." Q^ " Does this anfwer relate to the river above, or at and below Newcaftle ?" A. ** It relates principally to the parts above Newcaftle, but alfo to fome parts below." Qi ♦♦ Whether 'I i-3l9^nBB*"' \i (( (( <( tt tt €t tt tt tt tt tt tt tt tt tt *t tt tt «( [ 91 ] Q^ " Whether the fleet, in going up the Chefapeak-Bay, were not obliged to coft anchor every night, even though there was no obftrudtion from the enemy ?" A. *' They were — it is not poffible in fo narrow a navigation for the fleet to continue under fail during the night. Q. ** Whether, in confcqucnce of thofe difficulties in Chefapeak-Bay, the troops were not landed a month later, than they would have been at Newcaftle, if a landing could have been effected there ?" A. " I do not conceive, that a fleet, being obliged to anchor in the night, can be confidcrcd a difficulty — tlie army was certainly landed later about three weeks, than they might have been by going up the Delaware, but it happened to be a very uncommon and very unufual paflage. When the fleet left the mouth of the Delaware, the wind was northerly, and there was great reafon to expedl, that the fleet would have got to the head of Chefapeak Bay in lefs than a week. It hap- pened otherwife, on account of the fouth winds fetting in, which was attended with fuch uncommon hot weather, that, if the troops ha 1 been on Ihore at that time, they mull: have fufFered exceedingly." Q^ *' How far was the fleet r^dvanced from ihe mouth of the Delaware when they met the foutherly winds ?" A. " About ten leagues." Q^ ** What number of foldiers did each boat take for land- ing, befides the feamen to condudl it ?" A •' That depends on the diftance they have to go, and the opportunity they have for landing — in fmooth water, and to go a rfiort way, they might carry about forty-five men." Q^ " At how many turns, could the feventy-nine boats have landed the whole army ?" A. " That depends totally on the diftance they have to go j it is a matter of calculation. I do not know how many troops they had to land." N 2 Q^ " What ?' i-l ■■) \ it <( «( (( <( (( (< [ 92 ] Qi, " What way do you conceive a fleet of men of war and tranfports could make againft a tide of three and an half knots, witli an unfavourable wind j but fuch as would permit them to lie in their courfe, fuppofing moderate weather ?" A. •* The channel in the Delaware is fo extremely narrow amongfl: the fhoals, that unlefs the wind had been fair, the progrefs of the fleet mufthave been very flow indeed." Q^ " You will anfwer the fame quefl^ion j but fuppofing the wind to be a-head, or fo near a-head, that they would be obliged to make way by t irning or tacking ; ftill fuppofing moderate weather, and this too in the Delaware ?" A. " With the wind and tide contrary, the fleet could make no way at all, buc mufl: lie at anchor." Q^ *• Plave you not had much experience in the Delaware?" A. *' I was a long time there." Q^ ** How long did you ever know a fingle fliip detained, froni going up the river, in the months of Julyor Auguft, after (he got within the Capes ?'* A. ** About three days, between the Capes and Reedy-Ifland. I am fpcaking of a fingle ftiip, and not of a fleet." C^ *• Did not the tranfports furnifli feamen to man the boats for landing the troops ?" A. ** When the tranfports were in a fliate of fecurity, they frequently did, but not when they were to move; they were not then able from their complement of men." Q^ *• How many days did the wind (land to the fouthward, after you left the Delaware ?" A. " The wind was variable : there were frequent calms which delayed the fleet." Qj_ '* Was the wind in general, a north or fouth wind ?" A. *' In general foutherly." (^ " Was k\ ^ 7 mnHN ( *t *( tt [ 93 ] Q, '* Was not that a fair wind to carry the fleet to New- caftle ?" A. " If they had been in the Delaware, it certainly would." Q^ ** In how many tides would the fleet have gone to New- caftle from the Capes, with that wind ?" A. " It is impofllble to anfwer that queftion — it depends on circumftances — the fleet were very ill provided with pilots- there were only eight or nine pilots to 250 fail." Q^ ** As the winds and tides then were, all circumftances confidered, how foon do you think the fleet might have reached Newcaftle ?" A. " If I could beaflured the fleet would keep in the right channel, and no accident ai all would happen, I could then be able to anlWer the queftion." Q^ " Was not your fhip ftationed the foremoft towards Brookl)n Ferry, the 27th and 28th of Auguft, 1776 ?" A. " My ftiip was employed with the others on that fervice." Q^ " Was not your ftiip, or any other, fo ftationed, as to have the view of Brooklyn Ferry, fo open, as neceflarily to fee the boats pafs backwards and forwards, between Brooklyn and New- York ?" A. ** My fiiip was not, nor any other." Q^ " Whether, in paflingup the Chefapeak or Delaware, the ftiips and tranfports were not neceflarily obliged to keep very much together, in failing through narrow channels ?" A. " The tranfports were necefllarily obliged to keep clofe to the men of war, and alfo clofe to each other, in order to pre- vent getting a-groun~d, and the few pilots could only be diftri- buted to the men of war." Q^ " If, when the tranfports were in that confined fituation, •* by change of wind (the tide cealing) they fliould be obliged *' to anchoi, would it not be neceflary they Iliould fepamte ;jon- ** fiderably 4< (< C( «< 4< <( [ 94 ] •* fiderably from each other, to prevent their falling on board *' each other." A. " The fhips would certainly do fo, as much as they *• could." Qj_ " How long would it have taken the rebels, to have ** brought their water force at Mud-Ifland down to Recdy- «' Ifland?" A. •• In one ebb tide." Q^ " Hov long does the flood and ebb tide run in the •• Delaware ?" A. ** Ebb runs about feven hours, and flood about five." Q^ " Suppofing the wind, which was northerly v/hen the fleet quitted the mouth of the Delaware, had <;oiitiiiUtd in that quarter, how long would it have taken that fleet to have got up to Newcaftle ?" A. *• The fleet would not have got to Newcaftle in ten days ** with a north wind." Q^ ** How long could a great fhip get up from Reedy-Ifland ** to Newcaftle, before it is high water ?" A. " Suppofing the fliips to have been at anchor at Reedy- ** Ifland, I conceive, if the weather had been moderate, and *♦ they had met with no accident, they might have reached " Newcaftle an hour before high water." Q. " How many fliips could have anchored at Newcaftle *« where you have faid the water was fo deepclofe to the ftiorc ?" A. " I w^ not exadly know, but feveral might have anchored *' there." Q^ •' What proportion of the fleet of 250 fail ?" A. '* A very fmall part." Q^ ** Muft not the reft have anchored fome miles both above *« and below it ?" A. " Certainly ' Fit3^^v(»«« ' [ 100 ) ♦* Lieutenant-General Knyphau fen's corps could reach th& " heights, there was no furtner action on that fide. ** From the moft corredt accounts, I conclude the ftrength of *• the enemy's army, oppofed to Lieutenant-General Knyphaufen *' and Lord Cornwallis, was not Icfs than 15,000 men, a part of " which retired to Chefter, and remained tnere that night j but " the greater body did not ftop until they reached Philadelphia. •* Tneir lol's was confiderable in officers killed and wounded; " and they had about 300 men killed, 600 wounded, and near '• 400 made prifoners. '• The lofs on the fide of hi^ Majefty's troops, and the ord- *♦ nance, ammunition, and ftorer. taken from the enemy, wilF •* appear in the enclofed returns. « (( *• The army lay this night on the field of battle j and on the 1 2th, Major-General Grant, with the tft and 2d brigades, marched to Concord. Lord Cornwallis, with the light in- fantry and Britith grenadiers, joined him next day, and pro- ceeded to Afhtown, within five miles of Chefter. ** On the fame day (the 13th) the 71ft: regiment was detached to Wilmington, where the enemy had thrown up works, botk to the land and to the river, with feven pieces of cannon in the latter; but thefe works being evacuated. Major Mac Donell took pofleflion of the place without oppofition, and made Mr. M'Kinley, the new-appointed Prcfidcnt of thsLovver Counties on Delaware, his prifoner. •' On the 14th, Lieutenant- Colonel Loos, with the combined battalion of Rhall's brigade, efcorted the wounded and fick to Wilmington, whither the battalion of Mirbach was fent two days afterwards to join him. " The army moved in two columns towards Goflien on the «6th; and intelligence being received upon the march, that the enemy was advancing upon the Lancafter road and were within five miles of Gofhen, it was immediately determined to pufh forward the two columns, and attack them; Lord Corn- 5 " wallis >- / / i€ wallls to take his route by Goflien meeting-houfe, and Lieu- ** tenant-General Knyphaufen by the road to Downington. " The two divifions proceeded on their march, but a moft. ** violent fall of rain fetting in, and continuing the whole day ** and night without IntermifHon, made the intended attack im- '* pradticable. " The firft light infantry, at the head of Lord Cornwallis's " column, meeting with a part of the enemy's advanced guard ** about a mile beyond Goflien, defeated them, Idlhng twelve, ** and wounding more without the lofs of a man. •* Nearly at the fame time the chaflfeurs, in front of Lieute- " nant-General Knyphaufen's column,, fell in with another " party, of which tliey killed an officer and five men, and took. *' four officers prifoners, with the lofs of three men wounded. " The enemy, being thus apprifed of the approach of the '• army, marched with the utmoft precipitation the whole night ** of the i6th, and got in the morning to the Yellow Springs, *' having, as it is fince known, all their fmall ammunition da- ** maged by the exceflive rain. " In the morning of the 17th, Lord Corn wallis advanced tcr *' the Lancafttr Road, , and took port about two miles diftant ** from Lieutenant-General Knyphaufen. " The army joined in the Lancafter Road at the White *^ Horfe on the 18th, and marched toTrudufFrin, from whence ar ** detachment of light infantry was immediately fent to the Valley ** Forge upon Schuylkill, where the enemy had a variety of •* ftores, and a confiderable magazine of flour. The ift battalion: ** of light infantry, and the Britifli grenadiers, took poll there " next day and were joined on the 20th by the guards. " The enemy crofled the Schuylkill on the i8th above French ** Creek, and encamped upon the river, on each fide of Per- •• kyomy Creek, having detached troops to all the forts of Schuyl- ** kill with cannon at Swedes Fort, and the Forts below it. **' Upon intelligence th?t General Wayne was lying; in the ** woods, with a corps of J500 men and four pieces of cannon, ** about i v»>-, ft ** *t ** «( «( (( (( <( «« <( [ 104 ] tnifted to be made. Tbe worimen, CLJ^ed to'tbork in tvater ahd fift mud, laboured in vain. The work they performed in tie reflux of the tide, the influx vtafljed away. Thus a trionth was fljamefully wafted, and no progrefs made towards taking the fort. At length. Lord Cornwatlis fentfor the gentleman who had of- fered to repair tbe dykes, informed him that it mufl be done pre- vioufly to the ereSling of the batteries, and requefled he would undertake it. This he did with chearfulnefs j aud although the breaches were as large again as when hejirfl propofed the repairs the work wasfinijhed inflx days — The batteries were immediately ereSled without aifliculty, and opened on the loth." It has been before obferved, that orders were given to the Chief Engineer, upon the King's troops entering Philadelphia, to con- ilrudt redoubts, and to form the necefTary lines of communica- tion, for the better fecurity of that city j that on this work he was direded to employ the inhabitants, to be furniflied, at my particular requeft, by Mr. Galloway, for the relief of the fol- diery ; and that this aHiflance fell far ihort of that gen-tleman's alTurances. The neceflity of repairing the dykes on Province and Blackeley's iflands, before an effedtual progrefs could be made in eredting batteries againfl: Mud Ifland, was an objeft of ftill more confe- quence; and any offers to effed it, inAead of being rejedled, would have been gladly accepted. I am confident that none were made to me, and have the moft explicit authority for faying, that fuch offers having been made never arrived to the knowledge of thofe immediately intruded with the execution of the work. The conduft of it was under the direftion of Earl Cornwallis, until 1 moved to Philadelphia with the main army on the 19th of Ofto- ber J and thofe, who have a jufl opinion of his lordlhip's zeal to promote his Majefly's fervice by every pofTible means, will hardly fuppofe him to have been inattentive in this efTential point. Eleven dyke-men were, I find, fent to the engineer on the 22d of Oftober, and, I am very ready to grant, were of confi- derable fervice for the few days they afllfted. But it cannot be conceived that thefe men effedled inflx days, by their own labour, the Aopping of breaches that had encrcafed to be as large again under ..V; ^ .v^jr ■['' 'i;W ^; / •^ ^' > iindcr the efforts made to /top them by all the carpenters in the engineer's department, aflifted by thofe in the bridge-maftcr's and the military working parties for the day : neverthelefs, tlie Author roundly aflcrts, that in confcquence of their afliftance, the batteries •were immediately ere^ed without dijicultyt and opened oa the loth of November. The fadt is, that the military carpenters, and working parties before-mentioned, laboured moft inceflantly, from the 7th of Oc- tober, under a continued fire from Mud Ifland and batteries afloat, to repair the dykes ; that notwithftanding the great interruptions from heavy rains, and high frefhes in the Delaware, 19,800 yards of banking, excluflve of roads and bridges, were repaired, fo as to open four batteries on the 15th of Odrober : but thefe not proving effedlual, for want of heavier cannon, thete was a ne- ceflity of procuring them from the King's ftiips. The interval from the time the firft batteries opened, on the 15th of Odkober, to the arrival of the battering guns from the Eagle and Somerfet, vrz% not Jhamefully wajicd, but indefatigably fsmployed in continuing the extenfive lines (two miles and a half) — tranfporting materials for throwing two bridges acrofs the Schuylkill, and in the conftrudtion of two TCies des ponts." P^e 80.] Pojfejfed of thefe ideas. Colonel Stirling defiredto take poffeffion of Red- Bank', but it was not granted him. This is entirely a mifreprefentation. The affair of Red-Bank is dilcufTed in my Narrative j and the evidences of Earl Corn- wallis and Major-General Grey form a complete anfwer to every thing that can be faid upon the fubjed. Page 85.] Men nuho are perfe6lly acquainted with the ground of Wajliingtons camp (at White-Marjh) the eafy approach to it in its rear, the variety of good roads leading to it, either on the right 6r left, and the great advantages which the Briiijh troops would have commanded by a movement round the camp, were ajlonijhed at his return, without effeSiing any good purpofe, efpecially as it was well knowfi, that Wajhington's troops were in the great eji panic and confujion, and prepared night and day for fight, during the time the Britijh army lay in the neighbourhood, P I had '4. ■^■r ^-0'^ '■)!(*» ^Ff^wQ { f K il n •'••■; ^4 I I «o6 ] .„ I had the beft intelligence that the enemy's poft teas not aflailable in the rear t ana the truth of that intelligence was cor- roborated by feveral of our own officers, who went over the ground in tne fprin^ following. The intention of my march was to attack Waihington, had I found it advifeable when I came to the fpot, and not to remain in the field in that incle- ment feafon. — Merely to move him from that poft was no objcft. What does Major-General Grey fay in his evidence upon this fubjea? . ') Q^ " Do you think an attack on the enemy's army at Whitc- " Marfh would have been advifeable ? A. " I think an attack of the enemy, fo very ftrongly fituated as they were at White-Marfh» would have been highly im- prudent." << Pages 86, 87, 88, and 89, contain a defcription of Wajhtn^ton' s ^tuation at Valley-Forge in the winter of ij^j, and faring of 1778 — and an accufation againfi me for not having attacked him tn that ftuation. The author's plan of befieging the enemy at Valley-Forjge is in the highefl degree abfurd. Had I made a divifion of^the troops in the manner he propofes, I (hould have expofed them to be beaten in detail. I have in my Narrative given a reafon why I ought not to have rifked an attack with fo Imall a profpeA of fuccefs. Major-General Grey's evidence, however, may perhaps be deemed more decilive. Q^ ** Do you think it would have been advifeable to have " attacked the enemy at Valley-Forge in the winter, when the " army lay at Philadelphia ?" A. «* As affairs were then fituated in America, I think an •• attack on the enemy at Valley-Forge, fo ftrongly ported as «« they were, both by nature and art, would have been very un- juitifiable." I Q:. " Do *« ^ \S mmmt»mm J . ^ w ^=^%^ ,*''?'" [ 107 ] Q^ ** Do you recollefl: any inflance of Sir William Howe's " omitting any oppoitunity of attacking the enemy, when it ** could have been done with a reafonable profpedt of advantage, '* confidering all refpedive fituations and circumftances at the «* time?" A. *' All circumflances confidered, the choice of difficultiei " in carrying on a war in the ftrongeft country in the world, " with almofl an unanimous people to defend it, and the number ** of troops the Commander in Chief had to overcome thofe ** difficulties, I know of no inflance wherein Sir William Howe " ever omitted attacking the enemy, or of his not doing every thing that was poffible to be done, to promote his Majefty's ** fervice, and the honour of the Britifh arms." (( Page 90.] He omitted tofupport General Burgoyne, or even to make a diverfion on the coaft of Majfachufett's-Bay in his favour, though be knew fuch was his Majejly's pleafure. For an anfwer to this, fee my Narrative (pages 12 and 17). Page 90.] And he took care not tofuffer Sir Henry Clinton to perform thofe important fervices^ by not leaving himfufficient force, though the rebel army, at that time, conjijled of left than one third of his own effe^ive force. — Britijh force 17,000 veteran troops,— Rebel force 8,000 new raifed undifcipUned men. In my Narrative (page 23) I iiave flated, that I left at New- York under the command of Sir Henry Clinton *• about 8,500 ** men, exclufive of fick and convalefcents, and exclufive of a ** fmall body of militia upon Long-Ifland." In a return now before me, dated at New- York, ift of Odtober, 1777, I find he had at that time under his immediate command, exclufive of the €orps of artillery and light horfe— Infantry, rank and file, fit for duty Ditto on publick employ Ditto on command - - - Ditto fi«k « - - - P2 10,167 My . \ \-:^. tP 7 / ^../> ^^ '-- £cj^^ t^^ . rr ,1,- . ^. I 1^1 C 108 ] My inftrudlons to Sir Henry Clinton (page 22) prove that I did not lofe fight of ofFenfive operations up Hudlbn's river in the event of Washington's following me into Pennfylvania. The propriety of the expedition to Pennfylvania (although approved or by his Majefl-y's Secretary of State for the American department) was a long time the principal point of difcufHon in Parliament, and in the publick prints, I therefore Aated the fubjedl fully and fairly in my Narrative : And for a further eluci- dation, I refer the reader to the evidence fince 'Wen by Major- General Grey to the Houfe of Commons refpec ^g that expe- dition. . > . i . J.,.: ■■•■ Page 92.] He fupinely fuffered bimfelf to be furprifed dt German-Town. I have given a candid account of the circumdances relative to the attack made upon the King's troops at German-Town, in my Narrative (page 27) the accuracy of which I ftiall fup- port by an extradt from Sir George Olborne's evidence in the Houfe of Commons. I. Q^ " Do you recoUedl any orders you received the day before ** the adion at German-Town ?" ■'(' «( 4( << 4i <( ** (( tt 4( 4< A. ** On that day I was to the right of the infantry, with the grenadiers of his Majefty's guards. Sir William Howe came to the quarters I was in with his Aids-du-camp, a little before fun-fet, and gave me orders to move on in front, with the grenadiers, and light-infantry of tne guards, to Major Simcoe's port, about half a mile in front of the line of infantry; acquainting me at the fame time, that I mieht expedt the enemy at day-break next morning. I can therefore add, that the firing of the enemy, on the morning of the.at- tack of German Town, began exadtly, or near the time, that Sir William Howe acquainted me, the night before, it would do." _ _ I . Q^ ** Froni the evidence you have given, doyou appfehend, ** that Sir William Howe had certain intelligence, on the even- t* in^ •, ■ s •■ ■ l.'lt f( «« A. ** I believe I have been pretty accurate in my anfwcr to the firfi: queflion, in which I faid, that Sir William Howe ** came to the houle in which I was ported, and informed me, •' that the enemy would begin the attack in the morning exadtly ** at the hour at which they did." ' ' Q*^ *• Notwithftanding the declaration from the Commander ** in Chief of the army, do you conceive, that our army was ** furprifed at German-Town, or otherwife ?" A. ** What I fpeak in evidence can be merely in my own ** fituation, and I nope, it is not arrogance if I fay, that after ♦' the information I received from the Commander in Chief, I ** was not in any danger of being furprifed." Q^ *• Do you conceive that any other part of the army was furprifed ?" A. "I cannot anfwer to that from niy own knowledge, and. ** therefore, from the fitufttion in wKicK 'I am, I beg to decline *' that Queftion." Q^ " Was it the general opinion of the officers with whom •* you converfed after the aftion, that fome other part of the " army was furprifed, or not ?" ' A. " That queftion being exadlly the fame as the laft, only '• in other words, I can merely add, that the officers, with " whom I converfed, while I had the honour of ferving under ** Sir William Howe, were always well fatisfied with the care ** he had of his army." I have now gone through the whole Pamphlet, except the Appendix, which requires no particular obfervation, as it con- tains merely a falfe comparifon of the Britifh and rebel forces. Several other anonymous writers have made free with my repu- tation : but of their productions I take no notice, bccaufe their ^ afleriions, their reafoning, and their fcurrility, appear to have been -■■} 1 I "0 1 been aH colleded and methodifed, in the Letters to a Nobleman, My remarks upon that produtftion, have been confined princi- pally to fads : the falfe reafoning I have fometimes endeavoured toaeteAj the fcurrility, I have always pafled over in lilence. Contempt is the only fpecies of' reientment which the venal inflruments of calumny deferve j though fomething further may be due to their more infamous employers. Li WILLIAM HOWE. FINIS, S" ^im