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Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich6, ii est film6 6 partir de Tangle supdrieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas. en prenant le nombre d'images ndcessaire. Les diagrammes suivants illustrent la mdthode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 \ LETTEES riHiN THK INTRKPRBTATION Or THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIOS KXOWN AM THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT IIV The Honorable Mr. Justice T. J. J. LORANGER. FIRST LETTER. TRANSLATION. IT QUEBEC PRINTKM AT THK "MORNINO rllRONH'LB 07FI4;C. 1884. '■tVJ' rjL '. y 'j'w. ii'% Hjj* ■> .'f. '^' i. •■«-, "■'f^ ^; Y'^*'- -'^ 'y-.r.f^m'i;^! 1 , '>*'"'-"i?,'''*^-' *:i?--?'- Vs -» ' is. .wi.«.-a:'_i,..1w /!k;4-- T LETTEES rPON THE INTEUrUKTATInN uv Till'. FEDERAL CONSTITUTION KNOWN AS THE BRITISH NORTH AMERICA ACT, (1867,) BY * The Honorable Mr. Justice T. J. J. LOR ANGER. Si vis pacem, para bellum. FIRST LETTER. TRANSLATION. Q UE B E C : PRINTED AT THE ".MORNING CHRONICLE" OFPTCB 1884. PREFACE During the past century of British rule, the French race in Canada has been through] many political crises and has fought many constitutional battles. It has, however, come out triumphant, and averted the dangers which threatened it. The antagonism resulting from dift'erent institutions, tra- ditions, languages and religious beliefs — irresistible, when people of various origins dwell in the same territory — which influences them sometimes without their knowledge, and often against their will, has made the position of this race an exceptional one in the midst of the Anglo-Saxon population of the Confederation. The rivalry of races is the same as that which existed under former regimes, ])ut is on a larger scale. Though tempered by the good feeling existing between the pro- vinces and disguised by the apparent cordiality of their re- lations, it none the less exists, and, whenever special circum- stances give rise to a conflict between interest and friendly feeling, will certainly break out. That which occurred in the past may recur in the future. The multiplicity of poli- tical incidents and the complication of interests thereby oc- casioned, render it morally certain. French-Canadians should, under the new regime as they did under the old, see with jealous care to the maintenance — IV — of their national rights, the preservation of their political autonomy, combat and prevent any aggression that may disturb these guarantees. The anomaly of our situation has, with respect to us, even changed the signification of the terms of public law. Political Union, which, for other nations means increased force, natural development and concentration of authority, means, for us, feebleness, isolation and menace, and Legisla- tive Union, political absorption ! Before Confederation it was the absorption of the Latin element by the Anglo-Saxon element of two provinces, now it is by that of five. This union of the two x)rovinces, which, in 1791, was al- ready dreamed of, and which was proposed in 1822, was obtained in 1840, but, fortunately, subsequent events disap- pointed the sinister anticipations. The Unionists of 1822, with Chief Justice Sewell at their head, did not however look upon legislative union as the sole means of our destruction. Having failed in their efforts to obtain the measure, they were content to demand the confederation of all the English provinces, with one central government and provincial governments, whose powers would be reduced to those of mere muncipalities. The de- sired result would be the same. In concentrating all or near- ly all power in the central government, the influence of the French race — the majority in the Province of Quebec — Would be swamped, and by reducing to insignificance the provincial legislatures, this system would finally come to be distasteful, and to it would succeed the Legislative Union of all the confederate provinces. This is exactly what will happen to day if the idea of cen- tralization be successful. — V — The authors of the Confederation of 1867 ostensibly had other views. The resolutions of the Quebec conference were founded upon th«i principle of the strict equality of or equal authority between the Dominion and the provinces, without the subordination of the latter to the former, within the limits of their respactive powers. In the sphere of their local powers the authority of the provinces was to remain absolute, ns the federal power was to be within the limits of its general powers. It was on these conditions that the provin«e8, and especially the Trovinco of Quebec, consented to enter the Federal Union. This vii'W of the federal compact arises, as well from the discussion of the measure in Parliament and in the press, as from the draft settled at the Conference ; and, when exam- ined in its judicial character, the Federal Constitution can admit of no other interpretation. It is in this stMise also that, with hardly an exception, the judges of the courts of first instance and of appeal in Que- bec and Ontario have interpreted it ; but the Supreme Court, by a series of judgm(Mits, reversed this jurisprudence and established the preeminence of parliament over the le- gislatures, and reduced the latter to the role counselled by Chief Justice Sewell and Lord Durham, that of mere muni- cipal bodies It is especially in the case of Menety the Province of On- tario and the Government of Ottawa in which the Gov^ernment of Quebec intervened, that the centralizing and absorbing tendencies of the Supreme Court were disclosed. Its judg- ment was, however, taken in appeal to the Privy Council, which, in the term of last July, unanimously reversed it. At the time of the rendering of the judgment by the English Court, I published, in a series of articles inserted in the newspapers, an examination into the interpretation of — VI the federal compact, which, at the request of eeveral per- sons, I now republish in the present lett.»r, which will be followed by others. Shall I add that the Supreme Court does not seem to be alone in viewing the federal compact in a manner unfavor- able to the provinces, . and that the federal parliament has, on several occasions, encroached upon the provincial legis- latures and overstepped the sphere of its powers ? The license act of last session is, in my opinion, a btriking example. It was the extraordinary character of this act that called public attention to the danger of these encroachments, re- vealed their tendency to Legislative Union, and awakened public opinion in the Province of Quebec, until then uii- aroused — notwithstanding the lively interest which it should excite — upon this as upon several other questions. May I hope that the importance of the subject will com- municate a share of its interest to these pages in which it is endeavored to combat the theory of the Supreme Court and to defend provincial autonomy. The benefit of this autonomy does not alone concern a portion of the population of the Province of Quebec, in which the conflict of race has now ceased. All Lower-Cana- dians, as well as all the inhabitants of the other confederate provinces, have a common interest in opposing the exces- sive centralization of federal power, the lowering of their legislatures, and the gradual disappearance of their consti- tutions. It is, in truth, the cause of the provinces that I have un- dertaken to defend against an enemy which as yet appears only as a spot upon the horizon, but this spot may increase in size, may become a cloud, and the cloud may bring forth a tempest ! From out of this tempest may we never see arise Legislative Union ! — -vu— When I utter these words optimists — I should call them quietists — may tax me with giving rise to vain apprehcn- sions and creating imaginary alarm. All the better if I give a false alarm. The disappointment of passing for a false alarmist will, by no means, exceed my delight in finding myself mistaken ! But if the danger I fear really menaces us, I wish to be the sentinel on the alert, whoso challenge resounds through- out the national camp and warns the combatants to see to their arms. Si vis pacem, para bellum ! Quebec, 27th December, 1883. T. J. J. LORANGER. LETTERS UPON THE INTEUrilETATION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. FIRST LETTER. SUMMARY. — I. The Mercer case. II. Examination of the question respecting the conflict of powers raised between the Federal and Provincial Governments. III. Did the old provinces preserve their corporate identity under Cunfederution / IV. Did the} retain their former constitution ? V. Nature of tlic functions of Lieutenant Governors. VI. Privileges, powers and riglits of the Legislatures. VII. Interpretation of sections 91 and 02 of the Confedemtion Act. VIII. Summary of the pro^wsitions set forth in this letter. I. THE MERCER CASE. The French press of the Province, Avithout enlarging up- on the questions raised in the suit of Mercer and the Province of Ontario, decided in Ihe Privy Council, confined itself simply to noticing their importance from the stand point of provincial autonomy. Owing to special circumstances I have become particularly cognizant of these questions and think that I should supply this omission. The facts, as respects the chief question, are exceedingly simple. Andrew Mercer, a wealthy land ownier of Toronto, — 2 — died intestate in 18tl,without leaving heirs, Andrew F. Mer- cer, a son of the deceased, being unable to establish his legiti- macy. The Province of Ontario then took possession of the estate as having lawfully escheated to it. Afterwards being disturbed in its possession by the claimant, Andrew F.Mercer, it, in 1878, caused to be lodged in the Court of Chancery an information against the latter. To this information the defen- dant, supported by the Federal Government, which inter- vened to contest the claim of the Province of Ontario, filed an answer technically called a demurrer, on the ground that escheats did not, by the British North America Act, devolve upon the provinces, but had been transferred to the Fede- ral Government. This answer, having been overruled by Vice-Chancellor Proudfoot, an appeal was taken by both Mercer and the Federal Government to the Court of Appeals for Ontario, which, by the unanimous decision of four judges, confirmed the vice-chancellor's decision. Against this latter judgment an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, four judges out of six viz : Justices Henry, Fournier, Taschereau and Gwynne against Chief Justice Ritchie and .Justice Strong reversed the second decision. Thence an appeal was taken to Her Majesty's Privy Coun- cil which decided in favor ot the Province of Ontario ; four Lords of the Council, the Lord Chancellor, Sir Barnes Pea- cock, Sir Montague Smith, Sir Robert Collier and Sir Arthur Hobhouse, unanimously reversing the decision of the Supreme Court. A similar question raised before the Superior Court of Quebec, and afterwards carried into appeal, in the matter of the escheated succession of Edward Fraser, and decided in the first instance by the same Justice Taschereau in favor of the Dominion, was afterwards decided in favor of the pro- vinces in accordance with the judgment of Vice-Chancel- lor Proudfoot, the Ontario Court of Appeals and the Privy — 3 — Council, by the Court of Appeals of Quebec, composed of five judges. Thus, out of twenty judges who decided the question, four pronounced themselves in favor of the Federal Govern- ment and sixteen against it, forming a majority of twelve in favor of the provinces. If, to this number, we add the superior authority of the Privy Council, it is difficult to suppose that a jurisprudouce so sustained l>y the almost unanimous decision of the courts can «'ver be shaken. It may, on the contrary, be considered that this question is finally settled and safe from all judicial variation and the judgment, in my opinion, sets aside the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court, hitherto so unfavora])le to the provinces. If the pret«Mision raised by the Federal Government be- fore the courts, to the effect that the British North America Act had transferred property in escheats to the Federal Gov- ernment, to the ex<'lu3ion of the provinces, had remained tlie sole question, the litigation would have been only of local interest : but to this main question w^ere added certain incidental ones whose discussion gave to the case a consti- tutional importance and questioned the political autonomy of the provinces. In support of its chief reason the Government of Canada contended that the Sovereign, whose sole representative in the Dominion is the (iovernor (reneral, does not forrii part hi the Executive Council, or of the Legislatures of the Pro- vinces ; that the latter had no legal power of acquiring the right in question, a right which had naturally fallen to the Federal power, and, whatever might be the terms of the British North America Art, it was impossible for the Im- perial Parliament to have conferred successions in escheats upon the provinces, as these rights constituted Royal pre- rogative, ywrn regalia^ inalienable by public law, and which the Sovereign or his representatives alone could enjoy. — 4 — Thus, upon the main question was grafted an incident closely connected with it, which from a constitutional point of view was of gicator importance, and from a legal point identified itself with it. In fact, of what use would it be to allow the right of escheats to the provinces if they could not receive the fruits thereof ? For the provinces to recover in their suit, the courts should have decided the two following questions in their favor. 1st. By the federal compact, the royalty of escheats which they possessed before Confederation was confirmed to them and they have never since ceased to fully enjoy it, and 2ndly. The provincial executive, at whose head is the Lieutenant Governor, still represents the executive power of the mother country, as the lieutenant governors are, as w^ere the governors under the old regime, the reiiresentatives of Her Majesty. Thus, in deciding in favor of the provinces the question of escheats, the lords of the Privy Council also decided in their favor the question of the leg^l capacity of the lieutenant governors and acknowledged their quality of representatives of the Crown. To properly appreciate the bearing of this latter decision, we must consider the nature of the reasons urged by the Federal Government against it, which would necessarily be approved as a corollary, if the decision had been unfavorable to the provinces. These reasons, which are all based on the preconceived notion ^^*^t the provinces are only larger municipalities, withoi ..y sovereign power, as the Queen does not form part of the provincial governments and the lieutenant gov- ernors are not her representatives, were formulated before the court in the following propositions : — 5 — 1. The federal executive power is iu the person of the Sovereign of England, represented by the Governor Gene- ral, and Her Majesty is, as in England, the first branch of the legislative power. The Federal Parliament is composed of the Queen, the Senate and the Commons. It is not so with the provinces. The provincial executive power is not in the person of the Lieutenant Governor, as representing Her Majesty, who does not form part of the provincial legisla- tures of which she is not a branch. 2. These legislatures are not parliamentary bodies and exercise none of the prerogatives of the English Parlia- ment. They are civil rather than political, municipal rather than legislative bodies, properly so called. 3. The Lieutenant Governor is only a subordinate officer, deriving his functions ^-om the Governor General, who ap- points and remove" n. He does not hold his powers directly from the Queen, as he does not represent the Queen. He exercises no royal functions in virtue of his office and is only the chief executive officer of the province. 4. The legislative power of the provinces is only a dele- gated one, taken from the general powers of the Federal Parliament, and remains limited to the category of cases enumerated in section 92 of the Union Act. iK From this restriction arises the inferiority of the pro- vinces and their subordination to the Federal power, which, wnth respect to them, became a quasi sovereign power, and they have since been only secondary corporations, one of the counsel even called them quasi corporations, depend' ing from the central power. 6. All the powers not exclusively and specially attributed to the provinces by section 92 of the Union Act, belong to the Federal Government, which is the source of the Provincial Governments. — 6 — I have just stated that, by admitting that the right of | escheat, (which is a royal appanage, and forms part of th« royal prerogative) belonged to the Ontario Government,' the lords of the Privy Council, have, without its being nece.s- sary to specially mention it, by logical inference and of necessity rejected the first proposition of the Federal Gov- ernment that Lieutenant Governors are not Her Majesty's representatives. I will fully demonstrate this. To persons versed in the practice of the Courts and familiar with judicial logic, the value of inferential or in- ductive reasoning, which is called a posteriori ariyumont, admits of no doubt. As circumstantial evidence is in manv cases the most convincing, so reasoning by induction is as often the most conclusive. Thus A, son of B, deceased, in his quality of lawful heir sues C, to recover a debt due deceased, C pleads that the debt is not due to the estat<\ and adds that A is not heir to B. The judgment omits pronouncing upon the second defence, but decides against C the conclusions of the demand. Is it not evident that, in adjudging to him the debt, originally due to B, the judg- ment acknowledged A, as being in the rights of B, and considers him as his hiwful heir. To come to the present case and render the comparison more striking, let us suppose that th-^ Court of Chancery, upon the conclusions ol' Andrew F. Mercer, as lawful heir of Andrew Mercer, had declared unfounded the petition in escheat of both governm 3nts, and had granted the estate to him, without actually deciding upon the question of status, is it not evident that it would have, inferentially, by its decision on the main question, decided his legitimacy. Thus by adjudging the escheat, to the province of Ontario without pronouncing upon the reasons based upon its want of legal capacity, and its not representing the Crown, did not the Privy Council admit its legal quality V These prin- ! i — 1- ciples are so familiar to legal minds, that I would think i puerile to notice them, if certain papers had not opposed their application, and, from tin; silence of the Court n;- specting the second question, endeavored to show that the judgment pronounced by the Council was favorable to the pretensions of the autonomists. This argument is incon- testably without foundation and is insufficient to rebut the induction drawn from it by stating that the judgment pro- nounced as favorably upon the qualities of the provinces as if it had expressly so declared. The representative character of the provinces being thus recognized, let us establish the (consequences which as corollaries ot this recognition are imposed upon the dis- cussion of the other reasons of the Federal Grovernment, not, however, without having first recalled the arguments raised by the Provinces of Ontario and Quebec, before the Supreme Court and respecting their method of interpreting the Union Act, a method which I will call the provincial theory. This theory is the following : — » 1. In constituting themselves into a confederation, the provinces did not intend to renounce, and in fact never did renounce their autonomy. This autonomy with their rights, powers and i)rerogatives they expressly preserved for all that concerns their internal government ; by forming them- selves into a federal association, under political and legisla- tive aspects, they formed a central government, only for in- terprovincial objects, and, far from having created the pro- vincial powers, it is from these provincial powers that has arisen the federal government, to which the provinces have ceded a portion of their rights, property and revenues. 2. At the time of Confederation, all legislative and exe- cutive power, legal attributes, public property and revenues, — 8 — that are now the appanage of the central government and ■ of the provinces, belonged to the latter. The federal com- pact did not create a single new power. The part now belonging to the federal govemmont was taken from thft| jurisdiction of the provinces. 3. The powers, in particular, that are granted by section '. 91 to Parliament, formed part of the powers of the pro-; vinces, in common with those mentioned in sectioa 92, which remained within the jurisdiction of the provinces. These powers have been divided. Those conferred upon| the federal parliament were given to it, and those left to the provincial legislatures, they retained. 4. The same rule applies to the distribution of the pro- perty, all belonging to the provinces at the time of Con- 1 federation, and in which the federal government has no share, except what has been specially given to it. 5. The authority of the Lieutenant Governors, within the limits of their jurisdiction, is on an equality with the • authority of the Governor General. Both are, within their respective spheres, representatives of the Queen, the former in the provincial, the latter in the federal sphere. It is true that the Lieutenant Governor is appointed by the Governor General, but it is in the name of the Queen and as her agent or representative that the latter so appoints him. It is the Queen whom' they represent in their official duties, and in her name that they act. 6. The relations between the provinces and the Imperial Government remained, after the Union, what they were be- fore. The Sovereign forms part of the legislature of each pro- vince, by the intermediary of the Lieutenant Governor. It is in the name of the Queen that the Houses are called and prorogued. The sole change, in this respect, consists in the disallowance and disapproval of provincial acts, which is [ — 9 — le by the Governor General, but also as representing [er Majesty. 7. The provincial executive government resides in the )er8on of the Lieutenant Governor, as the representative )f the Sovereign. 8. It is the same with the concession of the revenue to the federal government as with public property. The public treasury belonging to the provinces was divided to make revenue for the federal government, the remainder was [eft with the provinces. In a word, in the provincial theory, it is the idea .of the equality of both governments which is dominant, whilst in [he federal theory it is the subordination of the provincial (o the federal element which prevails. Taking, as a basis of the argument, the principle that lieutenant Governors are the representatives of the Sove- reign for provincial purposes, we must now ascertain which )f the two theories, that of the federal government or that )f the provincial government is established by such recog- lition. In what capacity do the Lieutenant Governors represent [er Majesty, if not in her quality of a constitutional Sover- eign, in other words in the exercise of her royal preroga- jives. The executive power in Englind is in the person of le Sovereign who is also the first branch of the Legislature. Loyal prerogatives are therefore at once executive and legis- lative. Each of these powers is one and indivisible. It is [he executive power in its entirety that is exercised by the English Sovereigns, as it is of the legislative power in its itegrity that they form part. They perform all the acts |f the executive power and give their concurrence to all lose of the legislative power. Every executive act not 2 — 10 — performed by them is null, and no I -gislativo act is valid ■without their participation. These powers are thereibre indivisible and cannot be exercised in part. The nature of these powers exercised in the colonies is identically the same as in England. In fact the same powd- ers govern the mother country and its dependencies which are submitted to the same sovereignty. The same Sov- ereign reigns over the whole British Empire, and every- where the same power is exercised. How can this pow^er which is indivisible in London and Ottawa, be divisible in Quebec, Toronto or Halifax, or be more divisible in Que- bec, Toronto and Halifax than in Ottawa. The Sovereign could come and personally exercise the federal power in the Dominion and the local power in the provinces as he does in London, but by reason of the phy- sical impossibility of his simultaneous presence in the United Kingdom and in the colonies, they are exercised in the dependencies of the Empire by his representatives. In both public and private law there is a principle equally correct that the powers exercised by the representative are, unless limited, identically those of the person represented. So, the Union act not containing any restrictions, the Lieute- nant G-overnors as representatives of the Sovereign, exercise Royal power, one and indivisible, within the limits of the provincial jurisdiction, as the Governor General does within the limits of the federal jurisdiction, and, with the exception of the modifications necessarily imposed upon this power, owing to the conditions of dependence arising from the colo- nial relations to the mother country, they both exercise them all, and the possession of any of these powers neces- sarily brings M^th it the enjoyment of the others. Can it be otherwise with legislative power and executive power than it is with judicial power which is the third •-11 — act is valid arc therefore le colonies is lie same pow- leucies which he same Sov- e, and every- Ein this power 1, be divisible risible in Que- f exercise the power in the Dn of the phy- esence in the re exercised in ientatives. jnciple equally [esentative are, represented, .ns, the Lieute- Ireign, exercise limits of the lal does within the exception ►n this power, from the colo- both exercise [powers neces- lers. diviNion of public power ! "Was a judj^e ever known not to exercise all the powers of his jurisdiction ? Judginc^ between A and B and not judging between C and D, in pari maierid. Doci'^ling upon a sale without the power of decid- ing upon an exchange. Exercising jurisdiction in conten- tions proceedings and not in non-contentious proceedings. Can one be a judge in part, by halves, thirds or quarters. Is it not true, on the contrary, that justice is rendered in it8 entirety or not at all. One is judge in all or not at all. On the other hand how could the Sovereign appoint a jndge for isolated a"! i tiri; idea of the word Senate for the upper House had as yet not suggested itself to any one) and a House of Commons," says the sixth of these resolutions. The forty-first says : " The " gDvernments and parliaments of each province shall be " constructed in such manner " of each shall think fit." as the existing legislature It is only since a minister of justice drew the attention of the government of Quebec to the improper use, according to him, of the term " parliamentary elections ' employed in a provincial statute, that the question was raised, no longer as a technical question of phraseology, but as a fundamental question to create a distinction unfavorable to the provinces, between their legislative authority and that of the federal government. At first sight one would be inclined to believe that it requires a very malevolent spirit to thus fasten upon a word, improperly used perhaps, in order to draw from it an in- ference of such grave import as that which is sought to be established against the provinces and to prove their infer- iority with respect to the federal power. The reasoning of the federalists, however odd the form of the objection, is really that the Federal Union Act, having clothed the federal legislature with the name of Parliament and given power to the latter (sec. 18) to define its privi- leges, immunities, and powers, provided that they should not exceed those enjoyed and exercised by the House of Commons, having called the legislative bodies of the pro- vinces by the simple name of legislatures, and not having conferred upon the latter the same privilege of defining their immunities and powers, the Imperial Parliament, placed the provinces with respect to legislative power, in an inferior position to the Federal Parliament. The answer to the first point is simple. We have seen that in legislation, the name given to a legislative body has — 83 -- nothing to do with the privileges enjoyed by it, and in no way measures their extent. As to the second point, it is possible that the local legis- latures have been endowed with less power than the Federal Parliament, in so far as they do not enjoy all the privileges and immunities which usage has conferred upon the British Parliament, and which the latter has bestowed upon the Federal Parliament. But those powers that were exercised by the old legisla- tures and which were vainly contended against under the old system, in what, after all did they consist, if not in the freedom of the members from arrest in going from their homes to Parliament or on their return, and during the ses- sion, and in the power of imprisoning any person who inter- fered with their privileges ? It does not come within the scope of this work to dis- cuss the correctness of the opinion that the local legislatures do not possess the same powers as the Federal Parliament^ on both these matters, and to maintain that, by the common law, the legislatures have the right to imprison those in contempt of their authority, and that they could enact a law granting freedom from arrest to their members going to or returning from and during the session, for, from the fact that the legislatures have not uiese two powers equally with the Federal Parliament, what can result that could be injurious to the provinces within the admitted sphere of their attri- butes, and what superiority could be drawn therefrom in favor of the federal parliament from this inequality ? These immunities, if enjoyed by it to the exclusion of the provinces, are so enjoyed, not because it is called parliament, but be- cause they were conferred upon it by an Imperial constitu- tion, and would belong to it equally if it were called Diet or Congress. Once more, the name does not affect the sub- stance and is merely accidental and of no consequence ? We may then conclude, that if the constitutional act call- ed the federal legislature "parliament" and the legisla- tive bodies of the provinces simply " legislatures," this difference of name arises simply from the desire to avoid the repetition of the same word and the confusion that might thereby result ? Besides in respect of both form and substance, this difter- ence of name and inequality of powers cannot, upon the other points, give rise to any subordination of the provinces to the federal power. The federalists continu'^ their aigiuioiit and say: "the inferiority of the provin-^os avi treir i ordination to the federal government is further shown by il) . ?ht oi veto or disallowance which the Governor Greneral has over local acts* It is true that the Lieuienant Governor sanctions the pro- vincial laws, but it is, in the terms of section 90 in the name of the Governor General that he does it, and as to this sanc- tion, to the disallowance of these laws and the signification of good pleasure wdth respect to the bills reserved, the Lieutenant Governor is with respect to the Governor General in the same relation as the latter is to the Queen." Let us consider this argument which is more specious than sound, so as to show its inefficiency as a proof of the subordination of the legislatures with respeet to the federal government. Sovereignty alone can give rise to an absolute right to legislate for a dependent people. In this respect, Canada and the provinces composing one nation, subject to the same Imperial authority, cannot be mutually placed in the rela- tions of sovereignty and dependence. Consequently, there cannot be legislative subordination of the one towards the other. — 35 — Legislative dependence of one country towards another, a result of political supremacy, implies essentially, in favor of the sovereign country, not only the absolute power of legis- lating for the subject country but also of repealing the laws of its legislatures. It is thus that under the moral guar- antee of treaties and the reserve of their priviliges the English Parliament may, of right, exercise legislative supremacy over the colonies, whose legislative power is subject to it. Can it be stated that the Federal Parliament has either of these powers with respect to the provinces ? This subordination, it is thought, is found in the veto pos- sessed by the Grovernor General over provincial laws. This is an evident error, occasioned by ignorance or forgetful- ness of the fundamental i)rinciples acknowledged in mat- ters of legislation. The control which England, in theory, possesses over the colonies, and which would be exercised in legislating for them or in repealing their legislation, is an act of legisla- tive power, that is to say, of Parliament, whilst the veto or disallowance of the laws is an act of executive power, that is to say, of the Sovereign acting with the advice of his coun- cil, and it is the same for the disallowance by the Governor General of provincial laws. This disallowance which is only a prohibition from car- rying into execution a colonial law, w^hich might trench upon Imperial prerogatives or give rise to serious conflict between the rights of the empire and those of the colonies, has always been and is still considered in England, not as an act of legislative but of executive authority. For the same reason of avoiding encroachment by local legislation upon imperial interests and federal legislation, and conflicts between both legislations, and to facilitate this double supervision, which is better exercised upon the spot — 86 — 1^ m fill than ill England, the Federal Union Act placed this right of veto in the hands of the Governor General ; but it is not as a branch of the Parliament and as administering legislative authority that he exercises such right, but as representing the executive authority of the Confederation, and in the ex- ercise of this authority he acts upon the advice of his coun- cil, who are responsible for such, as for all other advice. If it is not as a branch of Parliament and in his quality as representing the legislative authority, that thie officer dis- allows provincial laws, this disallowance does not give rise, in his person, to a supremacy over provincial legisla- tion. A remarkable feature of the disallowance by the Gover- nor General and which proves that it is not in his own name, but in that of the Queen that he exercises such right, is that the federal laws assented to by him are themselves subject to the royal disallowance. . The Governor General assents to the federal laws in the name of the Queen, who, at pleasure, disallows them, in the same manner as was done under the old provincial system, under which the Governor or Lieutenant Governor, in the same name of the Queen, assented to or reserved the old pro- vincial laws. The relations of the provinces with the Sov- ereign were then had by the intermediary of their governors. By the Union Act, a second, the Federal Government, is placed between the provinces and the Sovereign. The Governor General is the head of this new government. As these provinces had become numerous and as direct com- munication between the Imperial Government and them would have caused confusion, the Union Act found it more simple to confide the whole to one intermediary, who is the Governor General. It was to this officer of the Imperial Government that was delegated the choice of provincial Governors and thd — «7 — disallowance of local laws, in the same manner as the as- senting to and reserving of federal laws had been entrusted to him. This latter assent is given by him in the name of Her Majesty, and can he act otherwise when he disallows or ratifies the provincial laws assented to or reserved by the Lieutenant Governor. On the other hand, it is in the name of the Governor General that the Lieutenant Governor gives this same sanction to provincial laws or it is for his good pleasure that he reserves them, but can it be doubted that here again he acts in his official capacity, as the represen- tative of Her Majesty, to whom all power of assent or of dis- allowance over the legislation of her colonies belongs ? That which completes the proof of the official agency of the Governor General when he disallows provincial laws, is that it is with the advice of his cabinet that he acts, and that this cabinet is responsible to the provinces, represented in the Federal Parliament by their members, for the advice which it gives on such point, just as it is responsible for all the other official acts of the Governor General. No inference therefore, drawn from the Federal Union Act, rebuts the assertion that the confederated provinces are identically the old provinces, with the exception, however, of the provinces of Quebec and Ontario, divided into two, as they were before the Union Act of 1840, under the con- stitutional act of 1791. I will now show that the Union Act itself, in express terms, establishes this proposition. The preamble states : " "Whereas the provinces of Canada, " Nova Scotia and New Brunswick have expressed their de- •• sire to be federally united into one Dominion." •' Section 3. " It shall be lawful for the Queen to de- " clare that the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and ^^zt-^ ll .11!: i^n^ ai " New Brunswick^ shall form and be one Dominion under " the name of Canada.'* Section 5. '* Canada shall be divided into four provinces " named Ontario, Quebec, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick.'' And the act continues thus to speak of the provinces, whose existence, as old provinces, it recognizes, without saying a word of the creation of new provinces. We have just seen that, notwithstanding what is said by the federalists, the legislatures are composed of the Queen, represented by the Lieutenant Grovernor, and, for Quebec, of the Legislative Council and Legislative Assembly ; that the executive power resides in the person of the Lieutenant Governor, as representing the Sovereign, and that the organ- ization of powers is the old provincial organization, notwith- standing the disallowance of the bills of the legislature by the Governor General and the appointment and removal of the Lieutenant Governors by that officer. This organization of powers would alone be sufficient to show that the constiiution of the provinces remained iden- tically the same, but the constitutional act goes further and completes this proof, by declaring (sec. 88) that " the con- '* stitution of each of the provinces of Nova Scotia and " New Brunswick shall continue as it exists at the Union." • If the intention of the Imperial Government was not to endow the provinces with their former constitution, why this special provision for the provinces of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, which were in the same position as On- tario and Quebec ? If these two latter provinces were not included in this provision, it was because, being divided under Confedera- tion, the constitution made for them when they were united would not fit into the federal system. — 89 — The Union Act, therefore, contains no provisions respect- ing the constitution of these two provinces, only because of this disunion and the inequality of their provincial repre- sentation ? The third paragraph of the preamble of the Union Act which states : " it is expedient, not only that the constitu- •• tion of the legislative authority in the Dominion be pro- " vided for, but also that the nature of the executive govern- " ment therein be declared " and which does not extend this provision to the provinces, corroborates this assertion. It was decided at the Quebec conference (art. 41) that : " the local government and legislature of each province shall be constructed in such manner as the existing legis- lature of each such province shall provide." On the 2nd of February, 18t>o, in the House of Assembly of the Province of Canada, at the opening of the debate upon the resolutions of the conference, attorney-general McDonald announced that, after the Confederation scheme was adopted, the gov- ernment proposed to lay before the House a measure for the organization of the local governments and, throughout the discussion, such future action of the legislature was con- stantly alluded to. This proposal was not carried out, but the resolution above cited was adopted by the House. "Whatever may have been the reason of this omission, it is none the less true that it was the well-understood inten- tion of the legislature itself to form the constitution of the provinces of Ontario and Quebec, and it is in the highest degree improbable, that the Imj^erial Parliament, which considered the resolutions of the conference, ratified by the legislature, as a compact entered into between the provin- ces, upon which the new system was to be based, a com- pact which it respected in all other points, would have. 11 1 ' -i i i !i VE i — 40-- wished to derogate from that one, that is to say, arrogate to itself the power of making a new constitution for the provinces. However, as the old legislatures, and especially that of the province of Canada, did not follow up the resolution of the conference ratified by the House, as has just been stated, leaving to them the duty of drawing up their provincial constitution under the Union, the Imperial Parliament thought it could not do better, in respecting the federal compact, than to continue the provinces in the enjoyment of their old constitutions, with power to amend the same, a i)ower contained in the resolutions of the conference and which section 91 of the Union Act has repeated. I have stated above that the powers of the provinces could not have been taken from them, except by the constitution or by an abandonment made by them, for it is one of the points of the doctrine hostile to local powers, that in entering into Confederation, the provinces returned to the Imperial government all the rights theretofore possessed by them, as well as all their property, so that a new distribution thereof might be made between them and the federal government. 1 his doctrine which exhibits the imagination of its in- ventors, does not, in an equal degree, show the solidity of their powers of reasoning, for not only do we not find one word in the resolutions of the conference, the parliamentary discussion, or the Union Act, which might be construed into such a voluntary renunciation of their autonomy by the provinces, but this supposition is contrary to all the political events, which preceded, accompanied and followed Confederation ; it is altogether improbable and we must say is repugnant to common sense. Why should the Province of Quebec, for example, have, on an inauspicious day, with utter want of thought, abandoned its rights the most sacred, guaranteed by treaties — 41 — and preserved by secular contests, and sacrificed its language, its institutions and its laws, to enter into an insane union, which, contracted under these conditions, would have been the cause of its national and political annihilation ? And why should the other provinces, any more than Quebec, have consented to lose their national existence and consum- mate this political suicide i This principle, that the provinces retained their old powers when they entered confederation and have con- tinued to be governed by their former constitutions, was judicially consecrated by the court of appeal in the Tan- neries atl'air ^. At least the majority of the court decided in that sense. Let us cite the opinions of chief justice Dorion and of the late judge Sanborn. DoRiuN, C. J. " AVe know that by the confederation act the legislatures of the several provincs are not merely ordi- nary corporations, in the ordinary seu^e of the word. They are, no doubt, corporations in one sense which derive their authority from superior authority to which they are bound, but not in that limited sense in which we usually take the word corporation. There is no dilference between the powers of the local aud Dominion legislatures within their own spheres. That is, the powers of the local legislature, within its own sphere, are co-oxtensive with the powers of the Dominion government within its own sphere. The one is not inferior to the other. I find that the powers of the old legislature of Canada are extended to the local legisla- tures of the different provinces. "We have a government modelled on the British Constitution. AVe have responsible government in all the provinces, and these powers are not introduced by legislators, but in conformity with usage. It *■ ,1 ' '1 • This affair, which took place in 1874 and which caused a great sensation at the time, is too well known to require a more explicit designation. 42 — \u I !K if is founded ou the consent and recognition of those prin- ciples which guide the British Constitution. I do not read that the intention of the new constitution was to begin an entirely new form of government, or to deprive the legis- lature of any of the powers which existed before, but to eflfect a division of them ; some of them are given to the local legislatures, but I lind none of them curtailed. ** In substituting the new legislation to the old, the new legislature has, in all those things which are special to the Province of Quebec, all the rights of the old legislature, and they must continue to remain in the Province of Quebec, as they existed under the old constitution." Sanborn, J. " The British North America Act, 1807, was enacted in response to the petition of the provinces of Canada, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, as stated in the preamble of the act, to be federally united into one Domin- ion under the Crown of the United Kingdom of G-reat Bri- tain and Ireland, with a constitution similar in principle to that of the United Kingdom. " The powers of legislation and representative govern- ment upon the principle of the British Constitution, or, as it has commonly been called, resi)onsif)le government, were not new to Caiiada. They had been conceded to Canada and exercised in their largest sense from the time of the Union Act of 18 10, and in a somewhat more restricted sense from the act of 1791 to 1840. The late Province of Lower Canada was constituted a separate province by the act of 1791, with a governor, a legislative council and a legisla- tive assembly, and it has never lost its identity. It had a separate body of laws, both as respects statute and coL-mon law ; in civil matters no powers that had been conceded were intended to be taken away by the British North America Act, 1867, and none, in fact, were taken away, as it is no • -43 — the wont of the British government to withdraw consti- tutional franchises, once conceded. " This act, accoi'ding to my understanding of it, dis- tributed powers, already existing, to be exercised within their prescribed limits, to different legislatures, constituting one central legislature and several subordinate ones, all upon the same model, without destroying the autonomy of the provinces, or breaking the continuity of the respective pro- vinces ; in a certain sense, the powers of the Federal Parlia- ment were derived from the provinces, subject, of course, to the whole being a colonial dependency of the British Crown. " The provinces of Quebec and Ontario are, by the sixth section of the act, declared to be the same that formerly comprised Upper and Lower Canada. This recognizes their previous existence prior to the Union Act of 1840. All through the act, these provinces are recognized as having a previous existence and a constitutional history, ^. ^'"^ !.::ri new fabric is based, Th«»ir laws remain unchanged and the constitution is preserved. The offices are the same in name and duties, except as to the office of Lieutenant Governor, who is placed in the same relation to the province of Quebec, that the Governor General sustained to the late Province of Canada. *' I think it would be a great mistake to ignore the past governmental powers conferred upon and exercised in the l^rovinee, now called Quebec, in determining the nature and privileges of the legislative assembly of this province. The remark is as common as it is erroneous, that the legis- latures of the provinces are merely large municipal cor- porations. It is true that every government is a corpora- tion, but every municipal corporation is not a government. Consider the powers given exclusively to provincial legis- latures. They have sole jurisdiction over :»ducation, pro- 1 ^1 — 44 — perty and civil rights, the adminibtration of justice and municipal institutions in the province, subjects which affect vitally the wellarrt of society. The very court, which enables us to determine the matter now under consideration, holds its existence by the will of the provincial legislature. " No such powers were ever conferred upon mere mu- nicipalities in their ordinary sense. They are subjects which in all nations are entrusted to the highest legislative power. Legislatures, make laws, municipal corporations make by- laws. If these legislative powers, confided to provincial legislatures are not to be exercised in all their amplitude with the incidents attaching to them, they can be exercised by no other sovereign powt^r, while our present constitu- tion exists." Let us now establish the position of the provinces, clothed with the fulness of political and civil rights proper to colonies forming an association or society subject to ap- proval by England, for the purpose of having their gene- ral interests managed by one power. AVe say association or society, for a confederation is essentially a society or union of several states or provinces, which submit to a general pow- er while each retains its own particular government, -and the rules proper to civil societies, in the absence of agree- 3iient as to some particular points, should regulate them. The general government can have only those powers which are conferii'd upon it l)y the confederated states. This government is essentially the creation of those states, as an ordinary partnership is the work of the partners. In the absence of contrary provisions, the particular gov- ernments are managed by the organic rules which constitut- ed them before forming the confederation, and preserve all the powers which belonged to them, if they do not delegate a part to the central government. In the case of the Cana- — 45 — (lian confederation, the provinces did not attribute to the federal government powers of a nature different from those that each before possessed. They delegated to it a portion only of their local powers to form a central power, that is to say, they allowed it the management of their affairs of a general character, but retained their own government for their local affairs. It was a concession of existing powers that was made to it and not a distribution of new powers. The powers of the central government came from the provinces, as those of an ordinary partnership come from the partners ; to invert the order and state that the powers of the provinces come from the central government, would be to reverse the natural order of tilings, place the effect where the cause should be, and have the cause governed by the effect. Such is the error of those who pretend that the i^owers of the provinces come from the federal government and are of its creation ; a fundamental and egregious error which has been the cause of all the false ideas that we have combated and of the inferior position attributed to the provinces ! We have said that if there is relative inferiority and su- periority between the federal government and the provincial governments, such inferiority is to be found with the federal government, and the superiority with the governments of the provinces. But it is not necessary to make this com- parison in order to establish their respective competence ; let us rather say that there is equality between them or rather a similarity of powers, and that each of the two powers is sovereign within its respective sphere. Blackstone says : " By sovereign power is meant the " making of laws, for wheresoever that power resides all " others must conform to and be directed by it, whatever " appearance the outward form and administration of the '• government may put on." i — 40 — According to this principle, whatevoi: may be the respec- tive importance of the powers conferred upon each of the governments in the exercise of their powers, each, having an independent authority not subject to revision by the other, is equal in competence. In the United States, the central power is less power- ful than that of the States ; it is from the States that Con- gress draws its authority, and all powers, not conferred by the constitution upon Congress, belong to the States. Ca- nadian federalists wish to lay down this principle of the constitution of the United States as special and exceptional, contrary to the principles of all other confederations and especially to that of the Canadian confederation. I main- tain, on the contrary, that this superiority of the States over Congress is a general principle and is derived from the nature of confederations themselves ; that the same principle prevails in the Helvetian and Germanic confederations and in all other jDOssible confederations ; that it is of the essence of the federal system, that the central government has only those powers which are conferred on it by the states and the latter retain the remainder, for the very simple reason, that the central government is the creation of the several govern- ments thai: have given it the form and the totality of powers which they deemed suitable, and no more. The application of these ideas renders all conflict impcs- sible, since each of the governments remains absolute mas- ter and independent of the other within its sphere of autho- rity, and assures, to the Canadian confederation, the triumph of legislative equality. VII. INTERPRETATION OF SECTIONS 91 AND 92 OF THE CONFEDERATION ACT. Starting from the preconceived idea that the provinces are subordinate to the federal parliament, an application of this t jeets assigned to each of the legislatures by the remainder of article 29 and by article 43. As these articles, dealing, as has just been statod, with particular powers, might have omitted a largo number, and as the working of the governments might be impeded by these omissions, the authors of the federal union act, who gave the finishing touch to the resolutions in England, felt that, to remedy this serious inconvenience, it was necessary to establish another line of demarcation and another rule of competence, by means of which they remedied this oniissioii by having those omitted cases entered in one or the other category of powers and, to attain this end, they ameiKled the resolutions in the manner shown by sections 91 and 92 abovo cited. Let us consider the effect of these amendments. Section 91 of the federal Union Act states '• that it shall be lawful *' for Parliament to make laws in relation to all matters not '* coming within the classes of subjeiire/y, which precedes them in paragraph 16 of section 92, has no value. . Wo have spoken of subjects that might be within the competence of both powers, on account of their double na- ture, general and local, in connection with the omitted cases in sections 91 and 92. In addition, there exists, for some of the subjects enumerated in those sections, a concurrent ju- risdiction arising out of the text itself. Thus, paragraph 3 of section 91 gives as within federal jurisdiction any " mode or system of taxation," and paragraph 2 of section 92 leaves to the provinces " direct taxation within '* the province in order to the raising of a revenue for provin- " cial purposes." Respecting direct taxation allowed to both powers, and in all cases in which their competence is manifest by law, there is no necessity for interpretation, and consequently no <^onht, the benefit whereof should be accorded to the pro- vinces against the federal power. Section 95 again gives to the provinces and to the Par- liament concurrent power to make laws in relation to agri- culture and immigration, to the former in each jirovince, and to the latter for all the provinces ; but it is enacted, that the law of the province shall, in case of repugnance to the federal law, yield to that law and have no effect. Here again it is evident that interpretation is not required, the superiority of the federal law being declared. Let us pass now to the powers of the provinces respecting public property. According to the organic principles of the confederation, there is a connection between the legislative powers and the — 59- right of property. The provinces entered into the federal compact with the entirety of their public property, as they entered into it with the entirety of their political rights and legislative powers. All public property, which was not granted to the federal government, remained with the pro- vinces. In addition to the property, which is disposed of between the federal government and the local government by the act itself, section 117 states, " the several provinces " shall retain all their respective public property, not other- " wise disposed of in this act," a provision that shows, that the provinces, in entering the Union, had not abandoned their rights of property, any more than they had abandoned their legislative powers, but that they had retained all that they had not resigned to the federal government. They also each have their separate budget, and section 126 enacts that the duties and revenues over which the respective legislatures of Canada " had, before the Union, power of ap- '* propriation, as are by this act reserved to the respective *' governments or legislatures of the provinces, and all duties " and revenues raised by them in accordance with the special " powers conferred upom them by this act, shall in each pro- " vince form one consolidated revenue fund to be appropriat- " ed for the public service of the province," and section 109, in addition to these provisions, adds " all lands, mines, minerals " and royalties, belonging to the several provinces of Canada, " Nova Scotia and Now Brunswick at the Union, and all sums " then due or payable for such lands, mines, minerals, or roy- " allies shall belong to the several provinces of Ontario, Que- *' bee, Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, in which the same " are situate or arise." It is objected, as was done by a judge in the question of an escheat between the Federal Attorney General and the Attorney General of Quebec, * tbat the provinces have not. * The case before the Superior Court at Kamouraska, respecting the vacant estate of Edward Fraacr. — 60 — as the federal power, a civil list, but this is an error. Out of the consolidated fund, established by section 126, a cer- tain sum is set apart to defray the civil expenditure of the province. It is true that the civil list is granted to the Sov- ereign in England for her personal expenses and that ours does not contain a similar grant, inasmuch as the province does not defray the salary of the representative of royalty ; but, if we do not grant supplies to the Sovereign, w^e pay the officers of the civil government, and it is from this appli- cation of the public funds that the civil list gets its name. Some French writers even think the English practice ano- malous, which calls a civil list the grant to a Sovereign who does not pay the civil expenses of his government, expenses that are paid by the State. As with the finances so wuth respect to legislation and government, the provinces then are, with the exception of the cases provided for, and which we have enumerated above, independent of the federal government, and, in the sphere of their property, rights and powers, they are on an equality with it. If it were not that the imperial sover- eignty overrides all our public organization we would say that they are sovereign in their sphere, as it is in its sphere. With respect to the connection between legislative power and the right of public property, it might be added, that the power and the duty being correlative, the federal parlia- ment should defray all the expenditure incurred for the subjects within its jurisdiction, and, in the sam manner as the provinces defray the expenditure for civil justice which is of their competence, the federal government should defray those incurred for the administration of criminal justice, which is within its competence. This subject however not being within the scope of this discussion, the sole object of this remark is to call public attention to the matter, which, if inopportune, is far from being without interest. f — 61 — Before makiug a summary of the propositions which in my opinion would determine the respective competence of the Federal Parliament and the legislatures, I must state, that it is solely from a legislative point of view that I have con- sidered the matter ; that I have treated it rather in its legal and constitutional aspects and as a question of judicial com- petence, than in its political aspects. I voluntarily admit that from this latter point of view, the federal government, moving in a larger sphere, having more imposing powers at its disposal, a larger and more extended representation, and at its head the Governor Gen- eral who exercises directly the authority of the Sovereign, not over one province only, but over the whole of British North America, with a real though limited control over the Lieu- tenant Governors, who are representatives of royalty, in a more modest and restricted sphere, I admit, I say, its pre-emi- nence over the provinces, which it controls in certain re- spects, in their external and formal relations, more perhaps than in real grandeur; but that is not the question, which is one respecting the interpretation and application of con- stitutional laws, which determine the powers of the pro- vinces as well as those of the federal government, and which regulate their juridical relations. VIII. SUMMARY OF THE PROPOSITIONS SET FORTH IN THIS LETTER. A summary of these propositions may be stated as fol- lows : — 1. The confederation of the British Provinces was the result of a compact entered into by the provinces and the Imperial Parliament, which, in enacting the British North America Act, simply ratified it. — C2 — 2. The proviuces entered into the federal Union, with their corporate identity, former constitutions, and all their legislative powers, part of which they ceded to the Federal Parliament, to exercise them in their common interest and for purposes of general utility, keeping the rest which they left to be exercised by their legislatures, acting in their pro- vincial sphere, according to their former constitutions, under certain modifications of form, established by the federal compact. 3. Far from having been conferred upon them by the federal government, the powers of the provinces not ceded to that government are the residue of their old powers, and far from having been created by it, the federal government was the result of their association and of their compact, and was created by them. 4. The Parliament has no legislative powers beyond those which were conferred upon it by the provinces, and which are recognized by section 91 of the British North America Act, which conferred upon it, only the powers therein men- tioned or those of a similar nature, ejusdem s^eneris. 5. In addition to the powers conferred upon the legis- latures by section 91 and section 92, their legislative juris- diction extends to all matters of a local or private nature, and all omitted cases fall within provincial jurisdiction, if they touch the local or private interests of one or some of the provinces only ; on the other hand, if they interest all the provinces, they belong to Parliament. < 6. In case it be doubtful whether any special matter touches all, or one, or a few provinces only, that is to say, if it be of general or local interest, such doubt must be decided in favor of the provinces, which preserved all their powers not ascribed to Parliament. — 63 — 7. In the reciprocal sphere of their authority thus re- cognized, there exists no superiority in fa\or of Parliament over the provinces, but, subject to Imperial sovereignty, these provinces are quasi-sovereign within their respective spheres, and there is absolute equality between them. 8. The British North America Act, was not, as the con- stitutional acts which preceded it, a law made by the Sov- ereign authority of England imposing a constitution upon its colonies. a. It contained a simple ratification by the Mother Coun- try of the agreement entered into by the provinces, which in confirming its provisions rendered them obligatory by giving them the authority of an Imperial act. b. Without attacking British sovereignty and without, in any way, hindering its exercise with respect to the Domin- ion, the appreciation of the relations between the federal government and the provinces, created by this agreement, thus made an Imperial statute, the distribution of the re- spective duties of the two bodies, and the interpretation of the statute, must be made as if the provinces had originally the right of their own private authority to enter into this agreement, and as if they had been sovereign powers. c. The Imperial Government, which alone had the right to contest this fiction, renounced the same by retroactively legalizing their acts by its ratification. This eighth and last proposition, which is the justifica- tion of those which precede it, and the foundation stone of my work, I will prove in a future letter, as well from the act itself, its comparison with the resolutions of the confer- ence, and the discussion before the Colonial and Imperial Parliaments, as from a narration of the events respecting Confederation which took place both in Canada and in England T. J. J. LORANOER.