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Un des symbnies suivants apparaftra sur la derniire image de cheque microfiche, seion ie cas: Ie symbols — ► signifie "A SUiVRE ", Ie symbols V signifie "FIN". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc., peuvent dtre fiimte d des taux de rMuction diffirents. Lorsque Ie document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul cliche, ii est film6 d partir de I'angle sup6rieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas. en prenant Ie nombre d'images n^cessaire. Les diagrammec suivants illustrent ia mithode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 GENERAL VIEW OFTHE PRESENT POLITICS and INTERESTS OfthcPRINCIPAL Powers of Europe j Particularly of Those at WAR; Wherein the Ntture of the P E A C E to be cxpeAed oh the Conclufion of the War, and the Condudb of thofe who chiefly contri- fjutpd to the Succcffes of FRANCE^ are impartially confidered, ^ In a Letter from the HAGUE^ to a Foreign Minister at LONDON. LONDON: Printed for W. W E B B, near St. Pouts* ( Price One Shilling, ) immm^nm^ \ ■ u I V ^■',^. I" . ' f f I ■ \ i '^ ^u r i i , •; . \ i- K \ •iff. / *•- Jl V *■' jr J * * /if V •' \ ►' * I, »- A . .'J J ■ ' •1 V-- L ..-1. ( • >.( I J J •! c ' A . V » % '•■ .. .''^ s. (3) GENERAL VIEW, ^c. SIR, Hague, Marth V , 1 747. YOU fuppofe, without Doubt, this Place to be the Theatre of News and Politics, as well now, as during the late gene- ral War, or you had not laid your Injundtions on me fo peremptorily as you do in your lad:, to give you my Thoughts on the prefent State of public Aifairs. But the Scene is quite alter'd here fince thofe happy Days, when the SucceiTes of the high Allies had cemented the rtridtcil: Union among them, tho* of different Religions and Intcrefts 5 and that fame Union contributed folely to their Succeffcs. It was then Opennefsin every Vifage one met with, and Franknefs in every Company one mix'd with, whereas at prefent, every Face you meet is fet for the Day, and you are fure to A 2 be i; if: f H I C 4) be deceived by moft, if not all thofe you frequent. I fear the World is grown worfe univerfally, but am fure it is obvioufly {o in this Country, where Diffidence feems to have been fubftituted, by general Confent,in the room of Confidence, and private Sclf-Intereft, inflead of that pub- lic-fpirited Intereft, which heretofore chiefly conduced to raifing this State to a Pitch of Greatnefs which ftruck all Europe with Awe and Amazement. In thofe Days it may be faid, that this Republic gave the Law to all Europe^ at prefent flic feems to receive it from all the Powers on the Continent. What can have caufed the fatal Tranfition ? I (han't take upon me to folvc a Queftion attended with fo great Difficulty, myfclf, but to fatisfy your Curiofity, fhall infcrt the Thoughts of one of the greateft Men of this Country on the Subjed, with whom I lately ccntraded an Intimacy. This extraordinary Perfon feems to have taken Atticui for his Model. He is efleemed by all that know him, and courted by the diflfcrent Parties of his Countrymen ; but like that reverend Romany he fleers a middle Courfc, adheres to no Party, tho* carefTed by all, chu- fing to lead a private Life, when he might fliinc in the Management of public AflFairs. I took the Liberty, one Day, to wifh he would reconcile himfelf to a more adivc Life, ^— * On a Suppofition, I prefume, faid he, prettily * * i ':% ^ i have emed >y the like ourfc, chu- night fFairs. ih he 5 Life, id he, >reuily ! i 1 4 (5) pretty haftily, that I (hould be of fome Ser- vice to my Country, in this Time of Difficuhy and Danger. As much as I love a retired, difengaged Life, continued he, I would quit it with Pleafurc, could I fee the leaft room for hoping that my fetting a Hand to the Helm, would contribute to fteering the Bark of State into the Port of Safety ; but Sir, in a Land fo divided as mine, among a People with fuch various Views, what Hopes could I entertain of me- liorating the Condition of my Country, fhould 1 mix with her Councils ? * It is the Fate of all popular Governments, fuch as ours, to be divided into Parties, but generally all Animofities fubfides, all Parties unite, on the View of common Danger. This indeed was our Cafe, 'till of late ; but I know not by what Infatuation our Parties, fince the War, feem to have taken deeper root, and to have grown to greater Con- iiftency than could be imagined of Bodies adling on different Principles ; as if the Suc- ccffcs of France, at their Threfhold, which {hould be the Caufe of their Union, had been that of their Independancy of each other/ On my obferving, that the more rxute the Difeafe feemed be, the greater Necedity there was for fome immediate Application, which, I thought, could come from no Hand more ikilful and fteady than his ownj he replied, • . *Sir, (6) • Sir, I thank you for your good Opinion of me, and I will not dilown to you my being vain enough to think 1 could remedy the grown and growing Evils of my Country, if I could render my Countrymen leis cor- rupt and felf-interefted : but as I deipair of the latter 1 dare not attempt the former. I might vainly hope, like a great and good Man in a nciglibouring Country, to be able by Precept and Example, to prevail, alter and amend j but alas ! like him I muft ex- pedl to be born down by Numbers, and to be carried down the contageous, fatal Tide, inilead of being able to ftcm it. Thus fhould I become anfwerable for all the Ills of an Adminiftration I was unable to reform, by feeming a Party to their Mifcondu(5t. No, Sir, The unfavourable Light in which that E — -Jh Nobleman appears at prefent, by affociating with Men, and adopting Mea- furcs he had publickly condemned, fhall be a Lcflbn for me not to rifque my Integrity, and Charad:er, as he has, to gratify any hidden, fickly Appetite I might have for Power.' Such Reafons, probably, might Atticus give of old, for not attempting to free his Country, at a time that it is conjedur'd, by many, he might, if he had join'd the Party oppofing the Invaders of the Freedom of Rome^ But without condemning either the Ro?}2an or Belgick Atticus, 1 will piocecd to give yoii I \ I I tor us his by rty ne^ ja?i ivc yoa I w ( 7) you the Remarks of the latter, on the prefcnt Divifions of his Countrymen, their Corruption and the Declenfion of their Power and political Courage. I chufe to give you this great Man's Tiioughts, on public Affairs, in his own Words, as near as 1 can recolledi, that they might not lofe any of that Strength and Clcarncfs With which he delivers himlelf on all Subjedts. * Confidering, faid he, the Succefs of the * Allies in the laft general War, there was * Reafon to hope, that France might be de- * tain'd within the Bounds of Moderation, at * leall for the prefent Century. And tho* * the Peace of Utrecht might have been nwre * conducive to the End propos'd, if Spain had * been detached from France^ yet fuch as it * was, it would have anfwcred the Views of ' the Powers concerned, efpecially of this State, * if on the Acccefiion of the prelent Royal Fi- * mily of England^ the EngliJJj or Hanoverian * Siatefmen then in the Management of Af- * fairs at London, had not taken it into their * Heads to fupply the Defeds of that Treaty, * as the Phrafe then was. * It might have been neceflary for the new * Family and New Miniftry to pretend * aniending a Treaty which they had taken fo ' great pains to ridicule and vilify j but it had ^ been well for us, and even for the Englijh, * if the Minifters of G^^r^^ I. had not fo infa- * tiable a Thirfl for Negociation and Treaty- [ making. The whole Syflem of grand : Alliance ; ■Hi in m ( 8) * Alliance was chang'd in the Beginning of * that Reign. The Court ofLonaon, all of a * fudden, was become fufpicious of all the * World but France, the only Power that * could give Caufe for Siifpicion to the Englijh * Nation. ' It will be hardly credited hereafter, that a * Princeof the Empire, one of the Members of * the grand Alliance, a Proteftant, and King of * E'igh/iJy Ihould grow jealous of the Houfe * of Auflridy and go into the clofeft Friend - < (hip with that of .Bourbon, Yet fuch * was the Policy, fuch the Condudl of the < Cabinet of London ^ after the Acceffion. * But the World is now no longer at a Lois * for the Motive to a Train of Politics which, ' in the Beginning appeared fo myftcrious * and repugnant to the Interefts of the Ma- * ritime Powers. H r was to be * aggrandized at the Expence of all other * Confiderations ; and France, that is the late * Duke o^ Orleans, who ruled France, fell in * with that Favourite View, as the certain * Means of diflblving the Union that had been * contradled between the Parties to the grand * Alliance. The politic Regent fucceeded ; * and hence fpring all thofe big Ills we feel < and complain of. * Need I trace more minutely the Mif» * condud: of the firft, and indeed fubfequent * Minifters of the Princes in Europe , who Vhad moft Reafon to guard againft the Snares * and If I 1 if (9) and Wiles of the common Enenny ? But Love of his native Soil ("ubduedall Rcflediofi in the Royal Breall:, hut what tended tofooth that Love ; and thus no Meafurc that did not tend to enlarge and enrich the E e was chcrilh'd, andpurfucd. I wifli I could fay> that the fiune Pailion, or, as fomc call it, Patriotifm, had been confin'd to that iirft: Reign only. ' The polite Regent was an early Obferver of this PafTioii, and his Title to the Crown of France, in Virtue of the TrGntyof Utrecht ^ furnillied him with a fpecious Pretence for impofing on the Credulity of his new Ally. The Power of England was to be employed in Support of the Regent's Title to the Crown, on the Deceafe of Lewis XV. then a Child ; and that of France was to be em- ployed not only in Support of the new Family in England^ but to render their Houfe equal, if not fuperior to any in the Empire. * Thus was that Train firft laid, by the adroit Frenchman^ which had afterwards taken fire in fo many different Shapes. Firft, in the Purchafe. of Bremen and Verden^ and next in making war upon Sweden, in order to force her to a Ratification of that Pur- chafe; afterwards in a Quarrel with the Czar, Peter L to obftrudt his Views on Mecklenburghy_ which was defign*d to be annex'd to H* r. Here again a new Scene open'd, which was never after clos'd, B * while !"■ IK II . ( 10 ) ^ while George I. lived, or rather 'till after the ^ Death of the Emperor Charles VI. * This prince, whether jealous of a new ^ growing Power in the Empire, or moved by * Motives of Equity, he not only thwarted * the Defigns. of the Eledor upon Mccklen- ' burgh, bat procraftinated the Invcftiture of ^ thenewAcquifitions. Hence fpruag that Dif- * truft and Coolnefs which ever after fubfilled * between the Imperial and Royal Houfes, *till * the late DiftrefTes of the Queen of Hungary * called forth the httnt Englijh Spirit, in Sup- * port of the Balance of Power. Yet, Sir, * how was this glorious Spirit, which if che- * rifhed and properly exerted, would have * rouzed all the Friends of Liberty to its Aid, ^ reflrained by new Projedls for aggrandizing * the favourite Eledorate ? but of this more * hereafter. * Charles VI. forefcelng the Dangers which * threatened the Balance of Power, by the un- * natural Union between the Courts of Z/oWo/z * and Parisy he availed himfelf of the Atnbi- * tion of the Queen o^ Spain^ and her Jealoufy ' of the Regent, and by a Stroke of ] olicy * never enough to be admired, detached the * younger Branch of the Houfe of Bonrhon * from the elder. But what was the Contiuc!:!: * of the 'Englij}) Court on this critical Occaiion? ' Juft the Reverfe of what it fliould have been. * Inflead of taking advantage of this happy and * refin'd Policy of the Court of Vienna^ that fion? been, y and that (ti) ol London moved Fleaven and Earth to be xq-^ vcnged o( Charles VI. for daring to take fo bold a Step without the Concurrence of^" England, or rather of H r. * In Confequencc of this avowed Refent- inent, was the memorable Treaty of Ham- ver, contraded in 1725 ; a Compact attended with an immenle Expence, much Perplexity^ and infinite Mifchie'f, as well to this State as to England, The late King of Prujia, who had been originally a Party lo that Treaty, foon perceived the mifchievous Ten- dency of it, and withdrew ; but our Dutch Statcfmen, tho* they faw no lefs clearly thaii his Pri{fftan Majefty, the impending Ruin, had not theRefolution. or Virtue, toa<5t as became them ; they were either* intimidated, or corrupted, and perhaps both ; the firft by France, Vvhich by her then Connexion with England, was in a Capacity to prefcribe ; and the latter by Enghmd, to which France very readily alligned the Province of fecret Dillribution. * The Breach was now fogreatly widened be- tween the Courts oi London, and Fienna^VLud Madrid, that it never fince had been clofed be- tween the iirll and the Lift, nor between the firfl and the fecond 'till after the Emperor's Death. But that Treaty of Hanover was pro- ductive of a mor fatal Mifchief, which was a Breach between the Courts oi' Lo?2don and Ber- lin j which 'till then had been, at in fome Policy B 2 I they w, m c c c < c < < * € €' € i C c < c c c < c € C € I C ( c € C ( 21 ) llK:y oiicrht, In the clofeft Bands of Friend- fhip niid Atiedion : oiher Incidents have fince contributed to cool the Royal Houfeof Pruf/ia to d D'jo;ree to be lamented by all true triends Oi Liberty, but it may be truly fa id, thiit the hrd jealous Mifunderftanding between thofe Royal Houfes took its rife from the Treaty of Hanover, It had fo little Connexion with the Intereft of Englandy and fo obvious a View to the Aggrandize- ment of the Electorate, ani adding to the Ihtereft of FraficCy that the Kinr of Pruffia niufl have had no Idea of the Independancy of the Empire and general Balance of Power, unlefs he had lever'd himfclf from the other Parties to that Treaty. * Here one would think are Evils enough fprlnging from the Eriors or Ambition of the Cabinet of London^ in the late Reign, but have we not feen more and greater ilTu- ing from the fame Source, fince thofe Days ot Error and Mil^^ike? Has that Cabinet changed its firfc Syftem ? Has the E c been lefs cheiilh'd, or its feparate Intereft lefs purfued ? Has not the real Interfts of the Maritime Powers been as much neg- kded lately as before ? and are the Mea- fures of that Cabinet, which afteds to take the Lead on all Occaiions, any otherwife al- tered than what arifes from Neceflity j or can Maxims be deemed altered, where only the Pofition changes fortuitoufly, but the View * nil! I \m ( J3 ) ^ ftill continues the fame, invariably the fame, * in regard to the Aggrandizement of foreign * Dominions ? < As the Cabinet o^SpaiHy ever (ince 1714, < has had one Point of Intereft conflantly in * view, fuch was the Settlement of the llTue * by the King's fecond Confbrt ; fo, fnice the * fame Period of Time alfo, had that of Lon^ * don one, and one only principal Intereft in * view, which was the Aggrandizement of a < little Dominion, which if enlarged, even * to the propofed Extent, could ferve no ' Purpofe except the gratifying a Prejudice, * which tho' it may be natural, yet muftever * be injurious, in the main, to thofe who in- * dulge it. * How great ard various the Confufions, * how expenfive and bloody the Contefts that ' have arofe in Confequence of the Syftem of * the Cabinet of Spahi I and has the Purfiiit ' of the fecond Syftem been attended with lefs * Expence or Perplexity ? I believe England * feels very fenfibly the Eifed^s of this unin- * terrupted Furfiiit j but fure I am, that this * Country of mine owes to it her prefent Di- * vifions. Corruption, Perplexity and Danger. ' You feem furprized. Sir, that I (hould * crofs the Sea for the Caufe of the prefent ' Diftradions of this Republic ; and indeed to * a Foreigner, as you are, fuch an Excurlion * would feem as unjuft as unnccefTary. But * all Dutchmen of Obfcivution fcruple not to * concur i' \x ^1, ll iil ,1.1 I : i I ( 14 ) ' concur, that our prcfent Calamities fpriiK*- ' from a Syltem adopted and invariably pur- * fued, as has been obicrv'd, l)y a neighbourin<>- ' Cabinet. ' Before the Middle of the Year 17 14, we * were one People, had but one View, and * one Intent ; but after that Period of Time, * we broke imperceptibly, and by degrees, * into Fad^ions and Parties, which grew up * by Time and the fecret Influence oi France * and England^ into that dangerous Confiflency * which I am ibrry to fay, is now perceptible * to all Europe. • The clofe Connexion between the Courts * of hondon and Ver failles^ ever fince the * Year 1714, 'till the prefent War^ neceffa- * rily threw this State into a Dependancy on * France; at firfl it may have been Complai- * fance only, and T believe no more was in- * tended j but wherever Fra?ice is admitted ' to perfuade, fhe will didate in time. The * Dutch became tame and pafTive, in Pro- ' portion to the Increale of French Influence * at London ; and fo habituated were they to * the Yoke, that they could not cafl it off, * even after the War had difTolved that In- * fluence. But who a're anfwerable for that ' PafTivenefs which has lately appeared in the * Condudl of Hollanders ? Who have intro- * duccd Venality and Corruption among us, ' Firfl to bend u^' to the Will of the conneded * Crowns, and next to that of a Stadtholder ? France i pring pur- 11 ring L, we , and rime, grees, ;W up ^rance [lency jptible Courts ;e the ^celTa- icy on mplai- as in- nitted The Pro- luence hey to it ofF, it In- Dr that in tha intro- )ng us, neded der ? ranee ('5) * Fra?ice adlcd all along a double Part by Englafid : With regard to aggrandizing jj^^^^^y (he not only co-operated with, but egged on the Court of Londo?7, and at the fame time created Jealoufies and Sufpicions of her at all the German Courts, efpecially that of Vienna. And with regard to the Stadtholder, at the fame time that Ihe feem- ingly co-operated with Eftgland in the Sup- port of the Prince of r, fhe fecretly raifed a Party, by Perfuafion and Corrup- tion, able to defeat all that either Family- Intereft, or the Perfuafion and Gold of E d could cffedt in that Prince's Fa- vour. — Would you believe, that the firfl Thoughts of beflowing the eldefl: Daugh- ter of E—r-o^^—d on the Prince of O e^ were infpired by the Court of France ^ at the fame time that (he fecretly alarmed the Dutch with the cfengerous Conlequence of the Alliance.' c - < ■ . . ■ ' And, Sir, has not France fuccecded in all her Schemes ? But who were tlie Dupes of her refined Politics ? And who are the nearefl becoming the Vidlim of her Ambi- tion ? Holland is that Vidim ripe for Im- molation. , Rent by Party and Divifions; frighted with the Idea of a Stadtholder on one hand, and Fr^wr/? Chains on the other ; enervated by the confliuit Expence fhe was perfuaded into by the Court of L ?t lince the Acceflion, particularly fince 1725 ; in i.1, :i ii I:. ( i6) in fuch a Situation, and over-run by Luxury and Corruption imported from a neighbour- ing Ifland, what could be expedled from Hollandy but Irrelblution, Timidity and Paflivenefs ? * The late War between France and the Houfe of Aujlria^ furnifhed England and Holland with a fpecious Pretext, and a glo- rious Opportunity of fhaking off French Influence, and returning to the Purfuit of the natural Intercfts of both Countries. But the over- pacific Difpofition of /F— -^, the Englijh Minifter, or the Influence of France^ loft us that Opportunity, which we can never more hope for. Had French Influence, and the Dread of a Stadtholder been Icfs then than they were, ftill muft the Dutch have adted the Part they did, as there vras no moving England to the Re- lief of their common and natural Ally. ' With regard to England and Holland^ it would certainly have hQtn found Policy to to have preferved the Houfe of Aujlria^ and to have fecured the Houfe of Lorrain the Pofleflion of their ancient Patrimony 5 but, perhaps, it might be otherwife with regard to H «-^r. But be that as it will, we may impute the prcfent foreboading Prof- ped: of public Affairs to the fatal Neutrality of the Maritime Powers at that critical Juncture. It /-.' -..•< which French tholder \ muft did, as he Re- lollandy Dlicy to 7'rt, and \ain the 5 but, regard [ill, we g Pfof- lutrality critical It ( 17 ) * It is true, that on the breaking out of the prefent War, the Cabinet of L^^^n fcemed to have changed Sentiments, and to have thrown off the dead Weight of French Influence, which had hung on all the Meafures of England ever fincc the AccefHon to that Time. But had this Change been as real, as it was believed all over Europe to have been forced and un- natural, and only a temporary Expedient of a new Minifler willing to explode the Meafures of the late, long, pafllve Admini- flration, in order to take deeper Root in his new Employment, it could not anfwcr the Purpofe in view, which was the reducing France to Reafon. The Dutch were no longer the iamc People ; and there were no Hopes that PruJJia^ the only Power in Germany that could be mod ufcful, could be detached from France^ or rather from her own Intcreft. And let me fay, that Et7g!and cresitcd, or helped to create that Intereft, which, I fear, will for ever keep Pru/fia in Friendrtiip with France, and at Enmity with the Houfe of Aujlria, While the fair Province of Silefia is annexed to the FruJJian Dominions, we muft nevet cxpcdt a cordial Union between the Courts of Vienna and Berlin ; nor between this laft and that of L 7i while Bremen and Ver^ den are annexed to H — r, and there re- mains any Traces of a ViCvV to Scculariza- ^^ '^^ C 'tioni^ h tions, or other Means of aggrandizing the Eledorate. PruJJIa, I fear, will as impa- * tiently bear an Increafc of Power at H^ — r, * as at Vienna, • . - . * But had not the Profpedt been fo unfa- * vourable on the Side of PruJJiay how could * it be expeded that the Dutch in their then * Situation, could be brought to co-operate * a^ainft France in the Manner propofed ? * An open Breach with the Houfe of Bourbon 'would have loft them all the vaft Benefits of * Trade, of which they had tafted fince the * War. Befides, a War would have opened * a fure Way for that Power of an Individual * among themfelves, which they had re- * folved fince the Death of King Williamy ' never to fufFcr. Add hereunto that there * were then, ^as flill, Parties among us able to * diftradt any Government, and thwart any * Meafures. You know, Sij*, that France^ * has her Partizans among us, and that * they are pacific as well as the Opponents ^ to a Stadtholder. Suppofing the £ -Jh * and e Parties, or rather the Party * for War fhould prevail for a Time, the * other would grow upon them, and fb clog * their Meafures as to render their Efforts ufe- * lefs to the Common Canfe. ,\\j • .,, - ., 4, ' As for the Patriot Squadron, fo called [ from its hidependency, and adhering to * neither of the two grand Parties mentioned 'above. I ani not clear, but if itmuftjoin ■ "'" . :/ ' * either 7 I ( 19 ) either, it would be the pacific. For however fome Foreigners may have exploded Mon-- fieur DeJVitt'% Politics and Plan of a per- petual Alliance with France, and by that^ Means acquiring the conflant Protedtionof that powerful Crown, the Sentiments of that great Statesman have been imbibed in thefe Provinces, and have made deeper Im- preflion than may be imagined by thofe who' are not thoroughly acquainted with the' Change in the Humour* and Genius of our People fince the lafl general Peace. * Nations vary ' from themfelves like Indi- viduals, which one may perceive, not only of the Ancients but Moderns. See the Change in the Nations around us; fee it in England y the natural Ally of this State. How altered that once, brave, faithful Peo- ple from wiiat the Engltp were a Century ago? The whole Earth is become much more venal and cx)rrupt ; biit I think the' fital Vices feem to have taken deeper Root ' in England than any where elfe : Wlience " can the Tranfuion happen? Fromlrreli-' gion, it is faid. But whence that very Ir- religion v/hich is complained to have oeca- fioned their prcfent Depravity ? Surel)'', ' not from the Nature of their Government, or Conftitution ; nor from the Effedis of the Revolution which was eifedted at the Ex- pence of Hc//^;z^.' — Here appeared to me io wide a Variation in his Account of the C 2 Revolution 1 h *■ I ; I* l^i Jfri;-. ( 20 ) " Revolution froui what I had ever heard, that I took the Liberty to interrupt him, Taying, Sir, I ever underftood that the Expcnce Hol- land was 4t to raife her Stadtholder to the Throne QiEnglandy had been reimburfcd by England, * You fix your Attention, it feems, £iid the ^ Patriot, to the immediate Expence that at- < tended the Prince's Expedition ; but I ex- * tend mine to the Confequences attending * that great and hazardous Undertaicing, * which, upon the good and wife Montieur * De Witfs Plan, ought not to have been < attempted. * I am not fo fkilled in the Af- * fairs of England as to know whether her * Trade has extended in proportion to her * Expences iince the Revolution ; but, fure I * am, that the Tt^dizoi Holland has been de- * dining ever fince. And let me fay, that * Trade is every thing to the Dutch, What- * ever contributes to its Declenfion muft be * odious to them ; nor can Extent of Terri- * tory, Addition of Barrier, or any other fuch * Advantage compenfate for the Lois of Trade, * We were taught, in the laft Age, to be * in love with Sieges and Battles in order to * gain that Phantom, called Glory^ and that * no lefs infubflantial Security, a diflant Bar- * rier ; but Experience confirms the Error of * thefe Notions. That Species of Glory ac- * quired by Arms, is by no Mejins the Bufi- * nefs of a trading Nation, and the prefent ^ War is an irrefragable Ptoof, that the * Friend fUip i ac- lufi- tfcnt the |(T>ip c < i < i < < < « # c c ( « € € € C c c c c ( ( 21 ) Fricndfllip and Protcdlion of To powerful a Neighbour as France is, are far better Secu- rities for the Freedom and Trade of Dutch" men than any Barrier. See with what Ra- pidity wc loft thofe boafted Securities, the Equivalent for the Blood fpilt and immcnfe Treafures expended fince the Revolution ; and for fuch a vaft Declenfion of Trade as nothing can recover but Peace, which can never be durable unleis on the Bafis of Dc ^/V/'sPlan. • •' -'• ^ ' * War, or Trafficking for Men, is die' principal Trade of Germany -, War is partly theBufinefsof -F;w/6V, and may occafionally be that, not of Ejigkndy who/e natural Li- tereft is Trade, but of the Englijh Court. ' I don't know but the grand Oppofition in W ^*s Adminiftration, would have prov'd fatal as well to the Court as Minifters, if the big Spirit then rais*d had not evapou ra- ted, by the burfting out of the War with Spain, Nor probably had Lord C— — / iefs Occafion for a French War, as well for his own as his M-— fs Security. The Spi- * rit of the Oppofition had been laid, but not extinguifhed, and might foon rekindle, if not diverted by fome greater Occupation " than a Spanijh War. , * But fee the Confequence of thcfe narrow felf-interefted Politics. England having p^^- ' cipitaied herfclf into thefe Wars with the different Branches of the Houfe of Bourbon^ ' perhaps to avoid domeftic Feuds, or with * Views 1,1 ( 22 ) * Views far more inj>lorioii?, hiisbcvvildci'dhcr- * felfin a Labyrimh flic won't find it caly to * extricate hcifclf. Sec the vaft: Incrcafe of * her Debts, tl ; Dccrcafe of her Commerce, * and the Iiicreafc of her Vices ; and what lias ' fhe got in Exchange P or is like to get, by * the immcnfe Treafure flic has doled away * of late Years, to fnpport the Houfe of An- 'Jiriay'And aggrandize that of Savoy ? ;.uj ^ . • England indeed has got Cape Breton for * herfelf, which would be of little Ufe * to her in Peace, could fhe keep it, * and loft us our Barrier, and the jlu- * ftriam the ISletherlands, And could any * happier Confequences be cxpedtcd after the * Advantages of Dettingen had not been vi- * goroufly purfuedj or the Offers of a juft and * honourable Peace had been rejected at //^?i^i/F * lam loth to difcufs thefe Matters more mi- < nutely, Refped holds my Tongue when my * Heart is full ; but I muft fay, that the pre- * fent impending Ruin of this State and others ' might have been prevented that memorable < Campaign, either in the Field or Cabinet, * if the true Intercfl; of England hsid folely in- < grofled the Attention of the Negociator at < Hanauzvid I'Fonns, * 1 was not the only Dutchman that had * forcfeen the ill Succefs of the War, from the < Errors of that Campaign : We forefaw the * War would thereby be brought home to our * own Doors ; but faw no Profpedl of divert- < ing the Ruin we forefaw,. by implicitly fal- \ . ' ling I hcr- ily to ife of icrcc, at has t, by away ' Aii" m for Ufe P it, All' i any er the en vi- ,ft and anaul :e mi- en my le pre- others orable ibinet, ^ly in- itor at It had )m the iw the to our divert- tly fal- ' ling ( 23 ) * ling into the Mcafures of the Autlior" o^ the * Mifchiefj yet tliis was expedtcd 'i us but * upon how weak Grounds let their Condudl' * fince proclaim, * It would fcem as if the Miniftry of JE— er. "•" ' ' But in Regard to England, I wonder the * Courts of Vienna and Turin don't fee that ' flic muft grow weary of her Burden at laft ; uu./ 'and TS^BS^^!^. wimmmm lit i 11 lib n !. ' (H) and that if once (he lays it down, it will be extremely difficult to perfuade her to take it up again. I think it was about 50 Mil- lions Sterling which England owed at the Commencement of this War j 'tis probable fhe won't find the Debt to amount to lefs than 100 Millions at the Expiration of it : a monftrous Weight on a Nation fubfifting chiefly by foreign Trade, which muft inevi- tably Bourifh or decline in Proportion to the Cheapnefs or Dearneis of Labour, and the Eafe or Oppreffion of the Induftrious. * The prefcnt Allies of England fliould have been wife enough not to have drain'd her too much at jnce, for fear (he (hould either prove a Jade hereof ier, or ride rufty when moft Speed was required. They fhould have managed her better, and put an End to the War and her Expence as (bon as poffible r The Houfc of Au/iria ought to have put an End to the War at Hanau ; and the King of Sardinia immediately after the late Battle of Placentia : but the Sub- lidies of England had Charms which fome could not withfland ; and perhaps Ambi- tion, the Bane of Princes, may have been no lels the Caufe tlian Avarice. * The Emprefs Queen continues the War becaufe (he won't part with any thing in Italy to a fecond Prince oi Spain ; and yet fhe will be oblig'd to it before fhe can have Peace. T he King of Sardinia would part '^^- ' V ' with II be take Mil- It the ibable o lefs of it: fifting inevi- tothc d the (hould irain'd (hould : rufty They }Ut an [oon Janau -, after Sub- fome .mbi- icnno War ling in Ind yet in have jd part with as to c c c < € € C < « c < < c i. € c < < c < c c iC c c c < with Savpna, and yet if he had ferioufly confulted the Intercft of his Family he never would have laid Siege to it. France on the Side of Provence has been faved partly by z Pafficn for that Port, which without doubt would be extremely convenient for the Houfe of Savoy ; but fliould it not be confix dered that the Detention of it muft inevita- bly be attended with cverlafting Broils and Confufions? - ^ ' • .-> » * Suppofe the Fate of the prefent War fhould determine the Pofleffion of Savona^ or Finals or both, to the Houfe of Savoy 5 will not the Genoefe endeavour to recover a Pofleffion torn from them, and without which their Capital would dwindle to Want and Poverty? Certainly they would 5 nor could they be blamed for drawing a conflant War upon Italy ^xA the Enemies of the Houle o£ Savoy, in hopes fome lucky Event might turn the Current of Power in their Favour. * But are not moft Men blinded by Intereft and Ambition ? Why was the War begun by the Minifters of the chief of the Allies, but with a View to the Aggrandifement of a favourite Dominion ? and yet it might have been feen without the Gift of Prophecy, that War would naturally train after it fuch Confequences as would neceflarily impede the Enlargement of Territory in view. How miftakcn are Mortals, fometimes, in their Purfuits of that which they let their Hearts D • moil ^'l It . ' :' i 'II I 1 i^ m (26) * iftoft on ! How vifibly does this Weakncfs * appear in the Conduct of my own Country- * men for more than half an Age ! They * precipitated their Country into two bloody « and burthcnfome Wars to fecurc their Li- * bertics and enlarge their Trade j but is not * the latter vifibly impaired and the fornr^er ren- * dcr*d more precarious by Purfuit of thofe * very Meafures which were then judged con- * ducive to thofe Ends ? Our Condition, I af- * fure you, is not mended in any Senfe by our * late Wars ; and if I miftake not, E?2gla?iJ * has no Reafon to exult. * I have often wondered how great Men * could fb egregioufly have miftaken the falfe * for the true Intereft of their Country lo * frequently as has been feen, even in our * own Days. But furely there muft have * been fome fecret Biafs which could have car- * ried them fo obvioufly out of the Way. * For Inftance, Where was the Wifdom ot a * late Convention for faving the King of * P— '^, ready to be fwallowed up by the * joint Power of the Courts of ^/V;;;?^, Peter/- * iurgh and Drefden ? That Prince was then, * as always he muft be, jealous of the Houfe * di Aujiria^ while he is in Pofleffion of one * of its faireft: Provinces ; and he was on no * very good Terms with the Houfe of H* r, * yet this 1 aft muft relieve that Prince juft * when he muft fink, or join againft France, * What Strain of Policv was here ? On what PL;n ig of the \eterf' then, [oufe )f one Ion no France. what Plun 'IF ( 27 ) Plan of Politics was the Convention con* eluded at H r about two Years ago, be- tween E *d and and P^-^-^a f * Had not the Czarina, the Queen of Hungary and the King of Poland been pre- vented by the abovefaid Convention, his PruJJian Majefty would have neither the Power, nor Stomach to prolong the War, or give, as he has done, efficacious, tho' feem- ingly indiied Aid to France : And behold the ConP^quenceof fheltering P ^from the Storm. As foon as ever it was blown over and the ftridl Union which threaten'd her was diflblv'd, (he fell upon Bohemia and Saxony, ^nd extorted the Treaty of Drefden. But this is not all neither. The Court oi Peter skurgh, I fear, has look'd on, ever lince, with more Indifference than before ; and that ofDreJden, 'tis thought, has throwa quite it felf into the Arms o^ France: Such are the Fruits of a Convention which might be intended for recovering the King of Pruffia, but which had quite other Effeds. * I may be fingular, but cannot help thinking that the Salvation of PruJJia, by that Convention, was the mod unwarranted Stroke of Policy that has been given fince the Death of Charles VI ; and, God knows, there have been many grofs Errors com- mitted in that Time. Riijfia cooled, SaX" ony loft, and PriiJJia not gained, but enabled to co-operate with the common Enemy,-** D 2 Heavens! r 5 "I I / (28) * Heavens ! what a Strain of Policy was that ! * Already have thefe Things happened ; but * how much greater Ills are like to happen * from the Confequences of that Chef-d'ouvre * of the Cabinet of L — -/? ? A new Storm is * gathering in the North, and a new Alliance * is talked of, which affuredly is not calcu- * lated for the Support of the Houfe of ^u- 'Jlria, or for reducing the Power of France. * And without Straining the Point beyond the * Ken of Probability, may not all thefe mighty * His be placed to the fole Account of thofe * who fat P— — tf at Liberty by the late Con- * vention at H'-^'-^r ? * You will naturally afk why we Dutch- ^ men did not interfere and prevent the Con- * clufion of a Treaty fo big with Danger ? * Why, Sir, in the firft place, it was near * concluded before we had the leaft Hint of * it 5 fo impenetrably was the Negociation * kept from all but the Court of Turin, who * alone has benefited by it, by the large Body * of Troops which the Emprefs was enabled * then to fend to Italy : And next, it would * have been too hazardous for us to have at- * tempted the thwarting fo powerful and ad- * venturous a Neighbour, of wh©m we have * no lefs, or rather more Reafon to be jealous ^ thsin of France, * I am furprized how the Englijh Minifters * could fuppofc us fo blind to our true Inte- J tcrcft^, as to think v^e wogld hazard the breaking 1 T ^1 ( 29 > ' breaking with Frajtccj without being fc- * cure againft the Power and Pretcnfions of < p^^^a. I am deceived, or Holland has * more to fear from the latfer than the for- * mer ; at leaft I will venture to fay, that * moft Dutchmen arc of this Opinion. On * this Suppofition then, would it be prudent * in them to make- an Enemy of the one, ^ without fccuring the Fricndihip of the * other ? ,' * In the prefent Situation of Affairs, France ^ is the only Power can fecure Holland^ not * only from the dreaded Oppreflions of Fo- ' reigners but Natives. Prujfia^ from with- * out, and the Power of a Stadtholder within, ' are only to be repelled by a Power fuperior * to both. But where, but in France^ (hall * that friendly Power be found, whofe Inte- * reft binds her to obftrudl Incroachments * either by P-^^a or a Stadtholder ? We are * jealous that E d has, ever fince the late * Alliance with the Houle of O e^ pro- * moted underhand the Intereft of that Fa- ' mily, therefore we cannot reafonably rely * on her friendly Aid in Oppofition to the * Eledion of a Stadtholder j and as little per- * haps in oppofing a Prince, whom the Cabi- * net of L n had fo lately enabled to * didate, and give Law to his Neigh- * hours. ^:'i Thus, Tlf ^'i J > 'it 'I t! L I ( 30 ) * ThuP, Sir, have I told you frtely my Thoughts concerning public Affairs. I wifti I may be miftaken as to the Event of the cnfuing Campaign, and the Succefs of the Conferences at Breda. But I can fee no Rea- (bn for hoping that the Allies will be fuperior to France in Numbers, or equal to her in Skill and Addiefs, tho* I have the highcfl Veneration for, and Opinion of the Royal Youth who is to command : Alas ! brave as he is, he is ftill but a Youth, and green in the Art of War. Befides, why fliull we flatter ourfelves, or endeavour to impofc on others ? If we were willing, we are not able to furniOi the Quota we have promiied to compleat the Army ; and, I fear, we want the Will no lefs than the Power of continuing the War, I am an Enemy to Double-dealing, and had I been in Power, would have roundly told the Engliflo Miniflers, who had fo often lately journcy'd hither to lure this State into the Meafures of E?2gla??(i, That their Condudl promifed not Succefs, and that it was neither the Inclinations of the Majority of our People, nor Intereft of the State, to break with the Houfe of Bourbon^ to the Ruin of the Remains of our Trade ; nor to irritate France by an open Breach, to the Danger of our Liberties. Such a free Declaration, probably, would have accellerated the Work of Peace, more than the War poflibly can in the floth- ful it a .. * (30 ful Manner it has hitherto been carried on by the Allies, in this Neighbourhood, . * Then as for the Queen of Hungary, wil- ling as Ihc may be to recover the Netherla?ids^ it is very likely fhe will be more intent on the Prefcrvation of Italy, and guarding againft any Defigns (he may apprehend from near Neighbours, or EfFedts fhe may dread from the impending Troubles in the North. Her firft Care will be Home, and the next Italy, which feems to require her utmoft Attention, fince the Mifcarriage of the De- fign upon PrOvence, and the Convulfion at Genoa, With fuch Cares then, can wc flatter ourfelves die will, or is able, to ful- fil her Engagements for enabling England to adt ofFenfively in the Netherlands ? • I confefs myfelf no lefs an Infidel in re- gard to the prefent Conferencesat Breda, What Increafe of Power or Succels has attended the Arms of the Enemies of France, finee the late Conferences at that Place, that fliould encourage one to expedt the Houfe of Bouf''^ bon, will yield focner, or bend lower now, than fhe did lafl Year ? In Italy ^ the Scene is vifibly altered in Favour of F-r^w^ and ^pain, fince the Mifcarriage of Count Brown, and the Revolt of the GenGeJc, if the Word, Revolt, may be applicabie to a free, inde- pendent People, flruggling for all that is dear to Man. If the French and Spaniards pufh into Italy from Fr'.«,xe, what fhall prevent their I I ».■ ;i ilk., (i; {•*■ I;; I ■I '' n M •i^'li ( 32 ) their fubjedting the King of Sardinia^ and difpoffcfling the Houfc of Aujiria^ of all its Dominions in Lombardy ? And fuch, proba- bly, will be the Cafe, unlefs the Empreis Queen fhould quite difarm herfelf at Home, to reinforce her Army in Italy, As fine a Country as Italy is, Bohemia and Moravia are more valuable to the PoffefTor olAuflriai therefore, unlefs the Queen will lie at the Mercy, and rely on the Bonne Foy of certain Neighbours, (he cannot be fuppofed to be able to prevent the Lofs of Italy ^ if France be hearty in its Redudlion. * On what part of the Theatre of War, fhall we caft our Eyes for a Profpcd of Suc- cefs, the infuing Campaign, on the Part of the houfe of Au/lria, or its Friends ? the Partizansof the Houfe of O*— ^, among us and the Englijb that refide here, affcdl to be uncommonly fanguine, in regard to the Wonders to be done againft France^ On the Side of the Netherlands, even before the French can take the Field. This fort of Language may be very well adapted to the Genius of Neighbouring I/landers, who generally are, and love to be luU'd, and fed with Chimaeras 5 nor may it be lefs ncceflary, in regard to their Statefmen, who are obligrd to throw out fuch Tubs to a People, who fhut or open their Purfes, as they are in or out of Humour^ at the the Condud of their Diredors, Bur, Sir, for my Part, tho* I am gus obc the the the of the who Ifed ( 33 ) am an Enemy to defpair, I am' no Cherlfher of Hope againft Conviction. I have btforc given you my Thoughts, as to the Non-abili- ty of the States, and the Emprefs Queen, tofurnifh their Quotas of Men j but fuppof- ing they could;- why fhould not France, be' as early in the Field as her Enemies ? has ihe not had all tho great Towns, and fertile Provinces of the Auftrian Netherlands, m her Hands, to quarter her Troops in, all the Winter? are not her Magazines full; and have we any reafon to think that her Military Cheft is empty. * I don't know how it happens, but the prefent Generation, feem to be all born the Children ot Credulity. They don't argue from Principles, fo much as from Prejudice, or AfFedlion; becaufc they wifh France reduced, llie muft be weak and impotent: the French walk all on Crutches and are in no Condition to keep Pace with their Neighs hours. Is not this reafoning, or rather babling againfl Reafon, againft Experience, againft Convidion : France, has, above two Cen- turies, extended her Modes and Language all over Europe -, I hope E — d docs not expedt the World will receive her Credulity, and Chima^ras as implicitly. * 1 admit that the Efforts for an early Campaign are greater than ufual this Spring. E ^, whether to footh her young Royal Hero's martial Difpolition, or to induce E France '1 J ^] ii |»1 1 1' (34) France to make greater Conccfllons ; or out of feme fccrct domcftic Confideration, has lately bpftled and expended far beyond her natural Strength, in order to an early and vigorous Campaign. But alas ! fhall we hope for Miracles? how have we delervcd that Providence (hould alter the ordinary Courfe of things in our Favour ? Shall we get through, in a Campaign, all thofe Bul- warks which took up ten when a Mar /bo- rough commanded our Armies? or flrall we leave them all behind us, as fome Vifionnries afFcdt to recommend, and penetrate into the Heart of France, in order to remove the Flame from our Bordeis into her BoweL ? vague and unadvifed Hopes! Happy, it in the enfuing Campaign, France will be quiet and content herlelf with what flie has alrea- dy got I I wifh (he may reft on the Defen- five only. But fhould fhe exert all her Skill and Power on this Side, and Ihould Foi lui.e fmile on that fuperior Force and Addrtfs r,s ufual, what may be the Confcquence to this State particularly, is eafier imagined than ex- prefs'd. * I think I am not timid by Nature, and yet I tremble when I rtfled on the Confe- ouences of an enfuing unfuccelsfulCampaign. Suppofe Luxevibiirgh taken, or Merjinck^ if the French be inclined to force the Republic to avow openly what may have bctn her private Sentiments of a long while j and fup- pofe and ^ ( 35 ) pofe the Army under the young Royal Lea- der fail'd in attempting the Relief of either of thofc Fortrefles, what are we to cxp «5l ? Mufl not the RepubHc yield j muft (he not wifely chufe the alternative of Prote^ion before intire Subjciftion ? or at bed muft fhe not yield implicitly to a Neutrality on the Terms of France^ and to fuch a Barrier as thaf Crown fliall be pleafed to chalk out ? One decifive Blow puts it out of the Power of the Republic to continue the War ; and without Holland what Figure can the Powers of Aufiria and Rngland make in the Netber^ lands, and 1 can't fee all round the World any Cor federates they can flatter thcmfelves withal? j^ujlria^ in her prcfent Situation, can form no View of Suc^efs. She is, and is like to be, unaided by any of the Powers ©f Germany^ who fecm all to wifli her De- clenfion. And what is no icfs unpromiiing, flie has worn out not only the Patience but I fear the Strength of Engiand\ a Strength, which, as I obferved before, ihould have been more fparingly and cautioudy manag'd by the Courts of Vienna and Turin^ if ever they expedted it fhould be employ'd in their Behalf on future Qccafions. But has France the hke Dangers to apprehend ? Is the Profped fo unfavourable {hculd (he meet with a Check this Summer? If (he lofes a Battle, can't fhe adt on the Defenfive the reft of the Campaign, having fo many For- E 2 trclTesi p I*' 4 \, li !' !' ( 36 ) trcfles to cover her Armies? Even may flid not repair her Loflcs before the End of the Campaign? Has flie no Reafon to hope for Sheher from the Prujjiafi Eagle, fliould For- tune frown upon her? or, in a Run of Ill- luck, might (lie not hope to acquire other Allies befides Pruffia in the Empire, and cxpedl Relief from the Alliance now form- ing in the North under her Aufpiccs ? * But, it may be urged, if France has fo flattering a Profpedt in View and fo reafon- ablc a Reliance on being fuccour'd fhould (he ftand in need of Support, why is fhe more forward in her Advances to Peace than even her Enemies? — Why indeed? not be- caufe fhe feeks Peace in earned, but becaufc fhe firds her Intercft in perfuading the World file does. Has flic not amufed the World with Peace all the while fhe was gathering Laurels and adding that very favourite Coun- try to her Dominions, which all the French Kings and Miniflers fince Henry IV, have un- weariedly and earneflly fet their Hearts on? * France has had a conflant Eye to the Aufirtan Netherlands for above 200 Years, and ipllt a Sea of human Gore to accom- plifh the defired Acquifition. And fhall wc weakly think fhe will part from this golden Apple, now fhe has it and no likelihood of her being difpofTefs'd, for fuch a Gew-gaw as Cape-Breton^ I pity thofe who do not fee the Drift of that Crown in fetting a high Value aluc ( 37 ) Value on that barren, northern Colony, wholly ufclels but in lime oF War, and little lefs fo even while it fublifts, if \\\tFrench adit witli any tolerable Wifdom and Refolution. * The more eager Franc.' appears for that PoiTellion, the more Tenacious will £«- gland be to keep it i which is jull: what an- Iwcrs the Purpofe of that crafty Court. The Englijh themfi'lves, by the infinite Value they fet on that Conqueft, in their Political Writings, have taught France to play the Game. But little do they know the Views or Ambition of that Crown, who imagine the Cabinent of Varfaillcs would exchange even Namuri'^ for Louif- burg^ while there was hopes of keeping the Former: the Reftitution of the latter, I doubt not, will be always the firft: Article France infiftson ^ and fliould this be conced- ed to her, even on her own Terms, flic won't be at any lofs for other Pretexts, to fpin out the Time, while fhe is fpreading and fecuring her Conquefls, and crcatiiig and augmenting the Difabilities of her Enemies. ^pain fhall come in for her Share, in the re- fin'd Juggle, and hold a back Hand to her adroit Neighbour, when he thinks it pro- per to fhift the Scene. * I agree that the Circumftances of both France and Spain, require Peace ; but all things confider'd, their Bufmefs is to pro- long the War, and when was it knowm --- ' that i ■ i ' ■ ,V( ' } '"1 ,1 ■I ( 38 ) that the Bmrbom negleded their true Inte- reft ? By the Continuance of the War, France may be clofely pinched j but it ap- pears to me, that the DilabiHtics of her Ene- mies will make a far quicker Progreflion. And thus, by a Demon ftration ahnoll equal to Mathematical, France muft fucceed in all her Views by the Continuance of the War, nor is the Profbcdt much lefs favoujable on the Side of Spain, There is fcarce a Doubt, that ample Provifion will be fccured for Don Philip in Italy ; and I will not anfwer, that Spain will not think herfelf in a Plight, be- fore a Peace, to infifl: on an exclufive T.ade in America^ and ample Security for the fame. Nor am I fure, that her Haughtinefs will not extend fo far, as to caft a fteady Eye on Pof^ fefiions whi<::h flie muft ever fee with Regret in the Hands of her prefent Enemy. * It is thought to be a Handing Maxim with France to drop her Allies if flie can do her own Bufinefs by a Peace. i»at fuppoling this to be true, Spain does not at all fall with the Defcription of fuch Allies as France was wont to abandon occafionally. The Fami- lies of France and Spain are of the fame Blood, and their Interefl is, and always muft, be infeparable. For which Reafon I was iiirprizcd that the Cabinet of London h^d re- lied fo confidendy on detaching the latter fronx the former, on the Demife of Phi- lip V. * But do re- tter hi" lut (39) * Bat fliould France weakly overlook the gendral Intereft of her Houfe for lome im- mediate temporary Advantage, I do not think that Spain is in an Humour to bear, or forgive, fo grols a Slight ; nor can I per- fuade myfelf that France'Vi'^ venture to make the Experiment. Spain^ indeed, may liftcij to Overtures made to her feparately, but her Connexion with France and her own Intereft, will always oblige her to adt in Concert with that Crown, however it may feem otherwife to thofe who are willing to be deluded. And fliould the p.efent King of Spain be of other Sentiments, he wouid hardly find a Miniftry to co-operate with him while there is fo re- mote a Profpedt of his having Iffue. * The Situation of Affairs at prefent ieems extremely critical ; and, in my Mind, much more fo than heretofore. The War is a cer- tain Calamity and Weight on all thofe that are involved in it, and yet it ieems to be their Intereft to continue it, but from very diffe- rent Motives. France will continue it with a View, that if ftie can weary out her Ene- mies, they will acquiefce with her Conqueds, and receive the Law at her Hands ; and they may continue it not fo much by ChwI. e as Ncceffuy. While the Emprefs Q^een can trade with the ready Money of England^ fne may think the War ip.ore eligible than Peace, as thinking to get by the former, more than flie can poifibly hope by the latter in her pre- lent M B r\ If' S ' I ( 40 ) fent Circumftanccs. But Englafid, with no View in the World to be Gainer bv the War, chules to continue it, rather than make a ruinous Peace, after putting herfelf to an im- menfe Expence in the Prolecution of various, I will not fay, vague Projeds, for reducing France. Her Statefmen know not how to ex- cufe a bad, a very bad Peace, fuch as may be expedted, to a Nation whom they had made believe, that every Campaign, and every Mil- lion, would be the laft. * Thus is the War continued, and like to be fo, on different Principles. The Conferences at Breda may be relumed from Tin /" t Time occafionally, and, perhaps occafioiiaiiy too, with a feeming Profpedt of Succefs ; but I can- not gain upon myfelf to exped that the Olive Tree will grow up in that Soil ; nor will I anfwer, but the Roar of Cannon before Mar- firick, or ibme other Dutch Fortrefs, may frighten away all o\x pacific Cooks before the End of next Month. If France once breaks Ground on the Territories of the Republic, we Dutchmen will haftily drop the gener. I for a particular Treaty, and leave thofe, fon. of Forms and Pundtilios, to determine whofe Minifters fhall be admitted to the Confe- rences. * How vifible is the Finenefle of one Par- ty of the Peace-hunters at Breda, and the weak, at leaft, unleafonable J^:ruples of others! But, the Court of one of the A\^k^^ ever lofe Ife- [ar- Ithe of (41) ever tenacious of Forms and Shadows, cannot refolve to alter her Condudt. France im- proves the Opportunity, and E — —Neither fees not the Hook, or is forced to fwallow it. She would be thought to defpife the Enemy, but Hands, I fear, in more Aws than her Friends would wi(h, or, perhaps (he herfelf imagines : The Dread of the late Progrefs of the young Pretender may ftill hang on certain Minds. Nor can we wonder if France could be fo ma- naged, as to afFedt a Coolnefs on the exiled Prince's Intereft, and a Difrelifh to the ma- king frefli Diflurbance in his Favour. * France^ by fuch AfFedlations, will im- perceptibly acquire Influence, which will ope- rate more or lefs in all Dealings between the two States. But I fhould much admire, that any fuch Dread of that Crown would create any Influence whatever, confidering the Vifibility of the Intentions of the Cabinet of Verfailles in regard to the Pictender. One would think the late Condudt of France to be two manifeft a Proof of her Difregard to that Interefl:, to leave the leafl: Doubt on the Minds of the Englijh Miniftry. For can it be fuppofe4, that if France thought it for her Intereft to place the Stuarts on the Throne of England, (he would not have aflifted towards the Succefs of an A ttempt which bid Co fair for fucceeding as this laft, had it bsen fup- poited early and efFedtually ? . I France I I Hi (42) • * France^ it is true, was much inferior to England in Naval Force 3 but let it not there- fore be faid, that it was utterly impradicable for her to have aided the young Pretender. As well as fhe could fteal out her Fleets for the South, Eaft, and Weft, (lie might fleer to the North likewife, had not the Fault lain in the Will. And if fhe wanted that Will, while her Conquefls were lefs certain, and more limited^ than at prefent, why fhall we fuppofe fhe will change her Syftem, when fhe flands not in need of an infular /lly? : i " A I y . ' I take all religious Confiderations to be lir out of the Queflion in this Cafe. Re- ligion has been often made a Cloak of here- tofore. But Moderns are no longer at a Lofs in regard to the true Meaning and Interefis of Princes. Jnterefl is the fole Motive of their Condud. But did not this Suppofition Ixjld true in general, I fancy no one would fix on the King of France as an apt Excepiion. We may conclude therefore, that France thinks it not her Intereft to change the Settle- ment of England, and confequently will ne- ver give it effed:ual Diilurbance, however fhe may feem to adl other wife for particular tem- porary Ends. For this Reafon, theic can be no Doubt that the Interefl: of the Preten- der would wot obflrud:, one fingle Moment j the Bufinefs of Peace if it reflcd, not only on the giving up that Interefl: fokmnly, but on a ••-'•* - Prohibition J (43) ' Prohibition to the Sons of taking up their Re- fidence in France, ' No, Sir, the Stuarts^ in no ways, im- pede the Peace ; their Interefh and Preten- fions are equally unconlulted by France^ the only Power that might be fuppofed to have them at Heart. \i the Work of Peace does not go forward, it is becaufc France is not in earnefl: about it \ becaufe flie does not think i it for her Intereft that War fhould ccafe ; and until flie does, it never can, however Spe- culifts may indulge themfelves with new Al- lies and Confederates. * Thefe fanguine Partizans have long plumed themfelves on powerful Succours from Rtijjia^ without confidering the Incapa«» cities of that Crown on one hand, and the Obftrudion given on the other, by the late Convention at H r between R ^and p. — //. Before that Treaty blunted the Edge of RuJJias Refentment of the Condudl of P-^—^a^ Ihe was willing, and far more able than at prefent, to aid in tlie taking down that young afpiring Monarch. But who does not fee her prefent Incapacity of alTifting the Emprefs Queen ? Sweden in Motion ; fhe and Denmark^ Saxony and Frujjla in a Confederacy again ft her, and the Condudl of the Turk fufpicious ; in fuch a Situation, what Grounds can the Champions for War affign for their Hopes of Succour from Rujjia^ ^- ■ V z ' If J 1^^ ^.v 1 1 ( 44 ) * If wc confider the genuine Situation of the Northen Emprefs, we cannot, without committing Violence on the Underftanding, view her in the Light of an Ally to be relied on for the humbling France. Not but that the Court of Peterjburgh would be glad of an Opportunity to march her Troops, and make Parade of her Power in Germany ^ and meddle in the Affairs of the Empire, where ihe long has had a Defue of having a Footing that (he might become a Member, and have a Vote in the Dyet. But the late and fre- quent Revolutions of that Empire, do ot permit the Czarma to embarque in foreign Qa^rrels, * A Government, like her*s, founded on Revolution-Principles, cannot be too wary and circumfpedt in the creating new Enemies Abroad, or affording Opportunities to fecret Enemies at Home. On the Footing of he- reditary Right, or Proximity of Blood, it is well known the prefent W^earer of the Rujfian Diadem ftands but in the fecond Rank. And however fond fome Nations may be, or feem to be of Novelty, there is a certain natural Attachment to Proximity of Blood, which every now and then will in- trude it felf, and be the Means of warping, or weaning, the Majority of a People from id Obedience, wher >uty they fuppofe them not to be rightfully due. If then the Czarina be confidered in this Light, we muft ^T :r • ' '■> fuppofe IS Ins 1 kt (45) (uppofe her blind to her own Intereft, fliould flic enter into any foreign Qiwrrel uncom- pelled, or march any conliderablc Body of Troops from Home. But was fhc in no Dread of domeftic Feuds, the prefent Mo- tions of Sweden and the Porte^ and the Power and Addrefs of Prujpa^ to fay nothing of France^ who probably fets all the Wheels of the hoftile Machine in Motion, might well excufe the Sovereign of Rujffla from marching a confiderable Corps of Troops at this Time to the Succour of the Houfe oiAu^ firia ; but far lefs excufeable are thofe who fondly build on Succour from a Princels un- der fuch obvious Difabilities. * Whither then fhall the Courts of Vienna^ "London and Turpn^ caft abroad their Views in feeking for new Confederates that might enable them to humble the Pride of the Houfe of Bourbon ? They cannot, in reaibn, rely on the Court of Pcterjburgh^ for the Reafons mentioned, and as little on Denmark^ while Prujjia and Saxony are fo clofely con- nected with Sweden^ as it is thought they are at prefent. But fuppofing Denmark had not been thus awed by the Vicinity of fuch powerful Allies, nor influenced by the Gold, Power, nor Addrefs oi France, of what Ufe would her Prince be, as a Confederate, unlefs to be an additional Burthen to Englandy who mail pay his Troops, and looth him with a Sub- iidy into the Bargain ? Such Confederates i::w-vi would I i : ( 46 ) VTOuld rather clogg, than quicken, the Pace of the Allies to Conqucll and Suc'cels. For as England, who already bears up, by the Force of her Treafures, the impotent Courts of F a and T— //, muft necefTarily fink under the additional Burthen of a new mo- neylefs Ally, the open Jundlion of Den- mark with the prefcnt Enemies of France^ would rather hurt themfclves than annoy her. * As much as it may be the Intereil of England X.0 aggrandize the Houle oiAiijlria^ as a Balance to that of Bourbon, I fear the other MembersoftheG^rw^;//^ Body, think it no lefs theirs to prevent the Soaring of an Eagle whofe Flights have been heretofore in- jurious as well to the colledtive Body in gene- ral, as to the particular Members of it. And for this Reafon, fo certain and felf- evident, I wondered England would undertake alone the Reduction of the Power of France, and Support of the Houfe of j^u/lria. Without the hearty Conpurrence of the Germanic Bo- dy, the Thing was morally impracticable ; and without being wilfully blind, it muft have been fecn, that that Concurrence could never be obtained while PniJJia, feconded by France, "WHS able to influence the other Powers of the Empire. ' After the late Con qu eft of Silejia, Eng^ land had but one of two Plans to purfue. The firft, and moft eligible, was to clap up a Peace between the two sreat Houfes at Vari- &' I anci ( 47 ) _ ance at any Hazard and Experxe ; which might he done at Hanau on reafonablc and honourable Terms. But fince that more falu- tary Plan was not chcrilhed, the only that re- mained was, to lower Frujjia in order to pull down Trance. For as Matters vere then, and fbill are ci rcum (lanced, thofe Powers mud ftand or fall together, while that of Aiijlria is in any Plight to give Umbrage to either.* The Treaty of Warjaw in 1745 happily put it in the Power of England to execute this fccond Plan 5 but by a Strain of. Policy, un- heard of among Statefmen, the Cabinet of L «, warded the Blow from PriiJJiay by that memorable Convention concluded at, H^ r the lame Year. - ^^ <-' ^^ ^;'A ' I could never hear of a colourable Rea- fon for the Obftrudlion which is faid to have been gived by E d to the Negociation at Hanau. Sure I am, it could not have been the Interefl of a trading Nation to obftrudt or retard the Work of Peace. England could have no View to gain by the Continuance of the War. But, perhaps, it was then other- wife with H r, as Charles VII. might havQ been unwilling to co-operate in any Enlarge-- ment of Territory, and there was a Profpecft of forcing him to it by the Continuance of the War. * The ArfTuments offered in Favcir of the Convention of H r were no Icfs vague and frivolous. By llich an additional Power at 'II m I" » : !■■ «: ( 48 ) as that of Rujia^ by fuch an Increare of the Confederates againft France^ the War, they fay, might be prolonged, and therefore it was politic to iave PruJJia, and reject the Succours of Ruffia in order to (horten the Clue to Feacc. Monf[rous! to th*nk that an Enemy fhall yield the fboner the more vigoroufly and powerfully he is attacked 1 I wonder Men are not aihamed of the glaring Abfurdity of their lame Excufes. Why will not they ra- ther fpeak out^ and own their Weaknefs and repent? t.\.i , * The Cabinet of i—« then, I conceive, had two Motives in preferving the King of Pruffia by the Convention of JFf— -r in 1745. The firft wasj to wean him from France^ and bind him to E d^ by Ties of Grati- tude J and the next, to fet the Court of Vi- enna j who was obliged to keep mofl of her Troops to obferve the Motions of that of fi^r- //«, at Liberty to preferve Italy ^ and fuccour the King of Sardinia^ then ready to be over- run by the combined Armies of France^ Spain and Naples. * As for the Policy of fecuring the Fricnd- fliip of modern Princes by Tyes of Gratitude, unlefs their Intereft co-operates, it will not pafs for current, I fear, but among the Green and Unfledged. And tho' the fuccouring Sar- dinia be a more colourable Plea, yet I believe it would be mors eligible to defer thofe Suc- cours, if the Detention promifed the Humi- liatioi> lii ( 49 ) ) liation of a Prince, who was, and is, and probably will coutinue France's beft Prop and Ally : Therefore, to wind up this Part of my Subjeft, I cannot help being of Opi- nion, that the fhorteft Road to the Heart of France^ in 1745, at leaft, was thro* 5(?r//«: but fince the E Jh Statefmen thought proper to take a quite different Rout, fuch a one, as in the general Opinion, could never lead to Security and a folid Peace, they ought not to wonder that we Dutch- men would endeavour to explore a new Path to Safety. • ' « " * I fhall be free enough with you, Sir, continued this fagacious Statefman, to own, that I now look on the Increafe of the PruJ- Jian Power, to be the beft and only Barrier Holland csin have ^g^'ind France-, and how paradoxical focver it may fecm, I look on France on the other hand, to be our befl Barrier againft PruJJia ; for at prefent, it is not very clear, which of the two, Holland has moft Reafon to dread, — - ■ " * Therefore, I take it to be our befl Policy, fhould the Chance of the War con- tinue in Favour of France^ to pay her and Friijjia equal Court ; to irritate neither, and to put every Art in Pradlice, for creating and fomenting conftant Jealoufy between them, without kindling an eternal Flame. Prujjiah atone of our Doors, or rather in- tcrmixt with us, by means of Eafl-Freez- ' Q ^ .. .,. landi :„:i.o^Vi:,;^iil m /■ n % ( 50 ) • Und J and Trance by her late Conquefts, is '. at the other: neither I bcHcve, will judge it Politic, to force in fingly upon us, and 1 can . much lefs fuppofe they will join in the At-* tempt. We may rcalbnably conclude then, that as neither can fee the other incroach up- on us, without interfering ; fo both will' be conflantly on the Watch, to prcferve us, free and independent. ^y hi ':*» ,*uo k , * Thus may we again be at leifurc to mind that, which chiefly employs the At- tention of our People : our Trade has been declining ever fince our late StadthoUicr taught us to be like himfelf, fond of the Glory of Arms. But by the Vicinity of two fuch great Powers, who never can agree about the DIvifion of our Bear*' 'kin, we fhall have nothing in View, but . ... princi- pal Object, and nothing to mind, but its Extenfion, i u; ^.-^.id - > v^i\»-.'x * If then, we can recover our Trade, avoid the f^xpence of Armies and Fartrcfics, in a great Meafuie j and that of Naval Ar- maments, except for the Protedtion of our Commerce, and prcfcrve Fieedom, by means of thefe two Powers, of different Religions, what fhall we have to do with the Broils and Contentions of either our Inlulur Neighbours or thole on the Continent'^ like a Ship, moor'd Fore and Aft, we fliall ride fafe at Anchor, in the Port ct Safety, unheeding, and unmoved at Tem- pers, rufBing other Nations. * The 18 It [II t- jn, P" ill ve (5' ) ' The different Religions of France and Prujjia will be no le(s our Security, than tlicir Jealouly of each other, and while wo tolerate all Religions among us, neither of thcle Powers, will think it either juft or proper, to endeavour the Obtrufion of hia own particular Syllcm upon us. i 'JD - • We may be morally fure, that Franci and Prujjia won't quarrel, while the Houie of Aujiria is in any Condition to give Urn* brage to the Latter : and we may be equally /ure^ they won't join in any Conqueft that jdon't afftd that Houfe immediately ^ much lefs is there any Room to apprehend they will join in fubjeding us to their Yoke. Both may have their Eyes upon us, but, I am miilaken, or France would wifh us her AU lies rather than hn Subjedts; and though Fruffia may be of a different Opinion, yet may we reckon on the Power and Jealoufy of the former for our Safety and Protedtion. * I have often envied the Happincfs of the EngliJJj on account of their Infular Si- tuation, which naturally fccluded them from the Broils of the Continent, if they had not obvioufly fwerv'd from their immediate In- tereft in the Purfuit of Foreign Qiiarrels. That Nation have done us infinite Injury iix our Trade, principally occalion'd by the na- tural Produds of their Country, their Situa- tion and the Safety of their Ports. But /hould our Condition mend by the Vicinity and Jealoufy of France and Frujia, on this G 2 Plan I *' 1' 'i:» ( 50 • Plan, we fhall foon recover thofe Commer- cial Advantages which they had gain'd of us before the prefent War. We were willing to forego thefe Benefits while we flood in need of England again ft Fra?ice. But Pntf- fidy for the future, bids faireft to be our prin- cipal Bulwark againft that Crown : And there is no doubt that France will be our e- tcrnal Bulwark againft Pruffia, So that hereafter we fhan't need involving ourfelves in Guaranties and Alliances as heretofore, nor fhall we need any Treaties even with £— -^ but fiich as regard Commerce and Navigation. - * f If the E — -f:) will perfift in their. vague Purfuits in queft of the Balance of Power^ . which has already ftood them fo very dear, that is no Reafon that we Dutch (hould, like ' them, lofe fight of our immediate Intcreft to grafp at a Shadow. * What is this Balance of Poivery which has coft them and us fo dear for the laft Century, but a Phantom of the Creation of diftemper*d Brains? If Influence be the beft Proof of Power, I don't fee but the Balance^ all along, has been on the Side of France^ tho' we and the EngliJJo were vain enough to think we had fix'd it. * But hovi'evcr the Beam might have ap- peared, for the Time paft, to have been direct- ed by the Maritime Powers, 'tis vifible to the World that France holds it all alone at pre- fent. And fliall we rank ou»felves among the ( 53 ) the ^lixofs who think to wreft it from her^ while her Influence is almofl univcrfal? Look round where one will, French Influence rifes in view in one Shape or other. It takes that of Dread in fome States, of Love in a few, and of Self-Interefl in many ; but here among us it is a Compofition of all three, * There are fome among us, who out of a Dread of the Power of France^ would be for obferving an exadl Neutrality, during the prefent Conteftsj others in reality, and thofe not a few, bear a natural Affection to the French Nation, and have no Prejudice to the Mode of French Government : but the Majority of our People are wholly biafs'd by Self-Interefl^ that moft forcible Tie on Man. By this therefore were we held in Sufpence while France was extending her Conquefts to our Doors, on a Suppofition that we fhould find our Account more in her Friend- (hip and Protedtion, as a near Neighbour, than in her Enmity at a Diftance. * France appears no longer, to thefe, that Monfter of Perfidy, Cruelty, and Ambition which (he had been pourtray'd with fo great Induftry in the Reign of Lewis XIV. But (hould her Ambition exceed our Conception of it, we are pretty fure (he has no Views to indulge it at our Expence, becaufe, not only that her real Intereft forbids it but that (he is fure PruJJia could and would oppofe her. « * Thus may we hope that our State will not only prefer vc its Freedom but recover its Trade, i m II H j;