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Laa eartM. planehaa, toMooux. oie. flbn4a A daa taua da rdduetlon loiaqua lo dooumont oat trap laproduit on un aaul eNeM. il aat fNniO A partk da Mlla aupdriaur goiioho, do pouefio A droiti ot mnmtt on boa. anjpranant lo dlibigjiio nicaaaalra. Laa diagrommaa tuivonta Muationt la natnooa*. _> - I ♦ I ^ '.1. -i , Ma ;." 'I m wM.- •Wi'l vs ^1 PAPERS FROM THE DEPARTMEN X- 'T* :'l'' -I Hi! '."■ itili 9te:i•■ ||!i§#:/"'^■■'«iPi;• or . Philosophy. -t'lliilifcjiii; ' ■ tVi^'-H'-' •■ ■'■■■■■ No. 2— The Idealism of Spinoza. BY J. Claris Murray, LL.D. >• f m tU| [Reprinted from the Philowphical RevieW, Vol. t;, No. 5.] » - ( Montreal,. 1896. •1 sm •f '■■■■■' KC:!:;;..;- Lilri'Sfj:.'!. . K ¥' 'My ^ m ■™ i™- .y-^j^^i^ -w ,-,»-* A. C\ REPRINT FKOM THE PHILOSOPHICAI REVIEW. Volume V, Numbers, boston:, imA.^ PUBLISHED BY GINN ST OTllPANY, ■ ■ ■ ■ -. ■ ■■ ■. ■ ;■ . ■ \ ji ':"'■■■■:." ■■; A- i£-»^J ll^ ii i fa oM ii ■■ i(-r i tri .^1?' S- k:■^ y' I i ■-i4 k !>»»: ^ JtiiiiJt^ • A ■•;«i A.-. n U, \ 'il Mi n ft 'H 'IB jN 1^ THE IDEALISM OF SPINOZA. *^ 'H'^ those acquainted with the literature of Spinozism it is A well known that there are e;ttremely divergent interjireta- ti6ns of the system. While some critics find in it a decided Idealism, for others it seems to represent the universe as merely a purposeless, and therefore ultimately unintelligible, evolution of the infinite substance, — ^a necessary modification of the attributes in which its essence is expressed. On this view, Spinoza appears to interpret the processes of nature rather by the laws of unintelligent causation than by those of purposive intelligence. The controversy between the antagonistic critics has run into minute details in th* interpretation of ^\m^'* writings. ^ In these details it seems to be at times fo^^ten that a philosophical system must be interpreted, not by com- paratively brief passages in its exposition isolated from the qualifications of their context, but by the essential drift of the exposition as a whole. The most indefatigable thinker is apt to flag at times fn the course of a lengthy exposition, and to drop into inconsistencies of detail, which mar the logical per- , fection of a system. This it is peculiarly necessary to remem- ber in the study of Spinoza's Ethics, as the work might have received important modifications before publication, if the author had, lived to edit it himself.^ Something may be gained towards the true interpretation of* Spinozism, if an attempt is made to construe the system as a whole in the light of what appears to be its essential drift. Now, whatever difficulties may be found in the interpretation of particular expressions,— and these will be noticed as we proceed, — it does seem as if 1 There are 9onie instances of superficial ini»nsistency even in langoagt), which Spinoza would surely have corrected. Thus, while his essential doctrine is that Kaqfeetus may be either an actio or a pasm (III, 58 and S9)t for the whole proc- ess of moral evolution is interpreted as supplanting passive emotions by those that are active, yet be occasionally makes a slip by using affectus as if it were equivalent to /am> (III, II, schoI.)b ■'i'i ; 474 T/fE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vol. V. there could be rtC consistent interpretation of Spinoza's great work, except as an exposition of the doctrine that the universe, under ill its .varied phases, is essentially an evolution of intel- ligence. . J J u. Thg°"»» 7* *"d schol. "" '; -" ) ..V S.i, ■v^ffcj'il .j-.ii^-j,"' '^iM ^ But not only does Spinoza feel that substance is an eippty concept, apart from the attributes that express its essential nature; even the attribute itSelf is recognized as an empty abstraction which, to become a reality, must be differentiated into concrete modes, just as, in Kant's doctrine, the categories are^empty forms of thought till they receive a content from sensible experience. Reality, therefore, for Spinoza, is not substance by itself, nor yet substance as defined by attributes, but substance as realized and manifested in the innumerable modes into which its attri- butes are 'modified.' And, therefore, though isolated expres- sions may seem to represent each series of modes as running in parallel lines, never coming into any real connection, yet the entire drift and significance of the Ethics forbid us from taking that view; otherwise, Spinoza's meaning cannot be grasped. Therie is, specially, no meaning in the conception -%- — - — — 1 Kri t ik der reinen VernunfU > 81. — _ #^ iA ■:l --at %^\^y# iTh. « CS\ i^^ « -& ^ j.v*^^j*aA J- j% J A~»«. t ,-4 * mmii II mm»m*m ■■tltlMHIllltl il I . ■i*!.ii ! -itxy- — > THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. [Vot. V. 476 Of til raodct being organically united ai if they formed one individual. » « u « » What, then, it the only poaiible connection ? Here the flrat impression might be that the concept of tubitance it the only connective principle, or at leait the only one explicitly recog- nizcd by Spinoia. But, running through his whole exposition, there it another principle which is assumed implicitly, at le^t, not only in the general outline, but often even in minute detaUs. — ass^med in laying the foundation, as well as In every • part of the superstructure. • A The fomdatioK of Spinoza's philosophy i% dettrmined by the method he has adopted. That method is geometrical ; and, therefore, like the geoineter, he is obliged to found on axioms, definitions, and postulates. It is not necessary to inquire into the general conditions of contemporary thought, or the special idiosyncrasies of Spinoza's mind, which may have led him to the adoption of this method. It is sufficient fo^ us that the method was adopted; and, in view of this fact, it becomes obvi- >-ous that our inten)retation of Spinoza must always keep m mind the necessities which the method imposed on his own exposition of his system. ^ The adoption of a method peculiar to any of the 8p»^..»^~ -- manner the demonstrative method of geometry assumes, not " ;.• V. -■•-i^»im^- ^0t m ,^ " No. 5] Tui WSAUSM OF SPINOZA. All only the vtlWlty of the proceM of demonitrttlon. but certain data to form the premitica or itarting-polnt of the proccia^ Here again, however, the taak of PhUo.ophy it to get beyond the presuppotUioni 9! science, -to find what right the mathe- matician ha. to a..ume the data with which he .tart., or to a«.ume that defnon.tration i.a concluaive method o| reaching truth Thi. Spinoza unfortunately overlooic.; and we find him, accordingly, trying, to .tart with definition, and axiom, and po.tulate.. after the fa.hion of a geometer, without any critical Inquiry into their origin or foundation. • , But doe. Spinoza make no effort to obviate thi. objection to hi. method ? On a superficial interpretation of hi. .y.tem. he make. none. On .uch an interpreta^on his data are .imply a.suSe4. like those of any special science, without any critique of their validity. But a critical examination of Spinoza s state- ment of his data makes such an interpretation impossible. These data are s^ted in such a manner that the critical vindh cation of theif authority is in general clearly indicated. The .tatements imply that the data are assumed on the ground of their being necessary to intelligibility; in other words, because without them - not only could there be no intelligible system of Philosophy, but there would be no intelligible universe, of which Philosophy could be called to give an account This is., specially clear with regard to the three fundamental definition, of substance, attribute, Jind mode. '^ Take first the definition of substance: "Id quod in sc e^t et per se concipitur ; hoc est id, cujus conceptus non mdigct ^ conceptualteriusrei,aquoformaridebeat." On the first blush,, as already stated. It looks as if this were merely the bare con- cept of being in the abstract, assumed without any myestiga- tiofi of its validity, ot even of its meaning. But a more careful . study of Spvno?a's language prdves at once that it goes a long way beyond that. Substance is defined to be. not merely that which is in itself, but also that which is .^iir«W by itseU ; and. tq make the meaning perfectly explicit, thi. latter prediaite is more fully expanded into - that of which the concept doc. not require the concept of anything else, by which it ha. to be ■*t. "^■ ■■/'...■ » » f vm ^ 478 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW, [V01..V. -^: A formed." Substance is, therefore, not an empirical idea taken up simply as something which happens to be found among the natural fqmiture of our minds. It is a necessary concept of reason. For it will be observed that substance is defined, not as a concept of any individual reason, nor even as a concept of human reason in general. It is to reason universally — to reason simply as reason — that the definition appeals. It draws attention to the fact that reason must conceive some- thing per se, just as we shall s^e presently, it must also con- ceive some things per aliud. Substance is thus a necessary concept of pure reason. Without it there could be no reason- able thinking at alL • "^ The same conclusionr is forced upon us by an examination of the definition of attribute. As already stated, Spinoza appears to realize that nifcre substance or being is an empty abstraction. To predicate being alone, is to -predicate nothing at all; to give predicative thought any content, you ipust at least predicate what\&. That is to say, substance must be defined by some predicate of a more determinate character than the bare fact of its being; else there is no definition of what it reqilly is. It is determined to be something, to be a reality; in other words, it is determined to be^ only in virtue of its attributes. And therefore attiibute is defined to be "that which intellect per- ceives in regird to a substance, as constituting its essence." Here, again, it might appear as if a concept were taken up, with- out critical Scrutiny, simply as an idea accidentally discovered in the mind. This appearance is mainly due to the fact already noticed, that Spinoza makes no attempt to explain the process by which intellect perceives attributes as constituting the essence of substance. But it is evident that he did not regard attribute as a fact given to intellect from some extra-intel- lectual source. For him, father, attribute is that without which substance or being is. incapable of being conceived by the intellect at all. It is, ithetefore, like substance itself, a necessaiy concept of pure "reason. All this applies, with equal clearness, to the definition of —mode, Attribute itself i s seen to be an u nre al abstraction; it :», "Tff jmu iiii n No. SO THE IDEAUSM OF SPINOZA. 479 does not become a reality till it assumes a concrete form,— a particular modification, as we should say.» Mode is defined in the first instance rather tautologically as ?Si affection ol sub- stance, and then more explicitly as that which exists, not in se, but in alio, and is also conctived per ajiud. The aiiud, in which mode is, might be taken to be substance; but, as it is also that by means of which m^ is conceived, it must be attribute, or (what is the same) substance* as expressed in some attribute. B. All through these definitions^theref ore, it is evident that their critical vindication is founded on their being necessary concepts oj intellect, insuperable conditions of intelligibility. But not only do the foundations of Spinoza's system thus assume the idealistic point of view; we are raised to the same point of view at almost every step in the erection of the superr Structure. This superstructure of course is an attempt to explain the whole process of nature— the process by which the infinite' attributes of substance are evolved into an infinite variety of modes. This process is, therefbre, an evolution of the concept of attribute and the concept of mode. I. Though the attributes of substance are said to be numer- ically infinite, yet there are only two of which we know and partjike, 7/iz., thought (cogitatio) and extension. Now these attributes, and all others of course as well, are apparently made coordinate by Spinoza. But the coordination is merely appar- ent. For all attributes are defined to be what they are in themselves by what intellect conceives them essentially to be. That is to say, they are defined by their relation to thought; and thus thought becomesr the supreme attribute or category, by relation to which all else must be interpreted. In fact, Spinoza himself seems anxious to avoid a representa- tion of the two attributes, as if they were absolutely discrete, or mutually independent. In the first place, he connects them, as we have seen, on the ground of ^ their belonging in common to one and the same substance; and he is at pains to expl^n 1 Spino^ himself uses modificoHo at times as an equivalent for modus. See, i-gt I. 7i schol. 2. > t . '^y\- . ^i^eS^^^S", r ..V t 480 THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. oimtiMu^iii^iltAi T [Vol. V. ension be con- , exten- be, are that there is no absurdity in supposing a substance to bossess •cveral different attributes (I, lo, schol.). But there is s nother connection between ttfe two attributes of thought and extension. Thought is conscious of itself, but it is conscious of ex as well. Inferentially we rftaiy add that thoug;ht must scious of all the attributes of substance. The modes of •ion, as well as of other attributes, whatever these may thus made modes of thought; and the whole infinitude )f attri- butes in all their infinite modes are ultimately interpieted in terms of the one attribute of thought. The connect ve con- cept, therefore, which gives unity of system to the infinite variety of nature, turns out to be not the bare abstra:tion of being or substance. That abstraction itself, as we have seen, is valid only as a necessary concept of reason; and it is by relation to rational thought that substance, with its infinite attributes, receives an intelligible unity. 11. But the same interpretation is forced upon us When we proceed to consider how Spinoza conceives the attrilmtes of thought and extension evolved into th? infinite variety of their modes. Here, again, it appears as if the two series of modes were made exactly cooofinate with one another. lut here a^in, too, the coordination is merely apparent. It is indeed, more than once explicitly stated by Spinoza. It forms, in fact, the distinct subject of a well-known special pro^sition : "Ordo et connexio idearum idem est aC ordo et connexio rerum "(II, 7). But the teaching of such statements must be interpreted in harmony with other doctrines that are essential factors of Spinoza's system. ( I ) For example, his doctrine of causality controls the whole conception of the process by which the modes of an attribute are evolved. According to this 'doctrine, every mode of an attribute is, in a certa^i sense, caused by antecedent modes of the same attribute " as its proximate causes," and these again by other modes antecedent to them, and so on, till the causd process finds its complete e3q>lanation in the nature of the divine attribute, which is «'the flMe cause" of all its modes (11, 7, schol.). Now, though Spinoza tak e s car e to explain »^#'*^ ^^ •^l^E^i^i, Wfc^Si^iMti^. ■ i^^x -it-iii itiWu-^ -^Tf's ^yimm pfff' ^f^KV 4-"^ --sr T "»^ i*»4if:gM;i No. 5.] r«ff IDEALISM OF SPINOZA! 481 / I that modes can, in this icnsc, be caused' only by modes of the same attribute, and never by concurrent modes of another attributte, yet this explanation receives its real significance from the peculiar position of the attribute of thought. For that bosition, as we have seen, implies that all attributes are ultin^tely interpretable in terms of thought; and this fact dete^ines Spinoaa's conception of causality. It makes the process of causation a process of thought. Nor is this a strained inference from a merely incidental remark in the course of Spino2a's exposition. It is his pwn avowed teach- ing when he takes up the subject deliberately for the purpose of explanation; and it is a teaching necessitated by the essen. tia^ drift of his whole system. Thus he explicitly defines caijse to be not merely a temporal antecedent, but a logical^ antecedent which in its very conception mvolves, and therefore, of necessity, evolves its effect as its logical consequent (I, ax. 4 ; I, i6i dem.). Accordingly ni/«V» is used as convertible with cat^a(\, II, second dem.); and, to make the doctrine unmis- talable, the nature of the causal sequence is illustrated by the lojfical sequence, by which from the very concept of triangle it follows that its three angles must be together equal to two ri^ht angles (I, 17, schol.).. From this of course it follows that all the processes of natural causation, in matter as well as in mind, are in their essence processes of thought ovolvihg its logical implications. (2) But there is another important qualification of the propo- si tion that " ordo et connexio idearum idem est ac ordo et con- nLio rerum." For, in spite of this, Spinoza explicitly points oit that the t\W) series sA modes are not simply concurrent, elch mode of one attribute being represented by a correspond- iifg mode of the otl»er. In the phenomena of mental life, he rkognizes, indeed, an association of^eas which corresponds to tie order of extemal nature ; but^e asserts that over and iove this there is a " concatenatio idearum," which does not correspond to that order at all. This concatenation of ideas «« is formed in accordance with the order of intellect in which tie mind perceives things by means of their first causes " il iiiliiiiMilHillilifiHiltHitilft'^-' "^^ ■-. . mmmm mm jjrt*j.,'Ht., mmmM^ •''i^aii'iiTHiii 4«*4 THE PHiLOaOi'HlCAL REVIEW. [Vol.. V. very definition or elscnce, everything, whether mental or bodily, posits itself ; there is nothing in it to negate or destroy it. The tendency, therefore, to continue in existence is the very essence of a thing (111,4-7). This tendency in the mind is called 'will* (voluntas)', in mind and body together, it is appetite ;^nd when appetite rises into consciousness of itself, it becomes desire {cupidiias). ' v It is not necessary to follow into detail the classification of emotions, growing out of this theory of their origin ; but there is one outgrowth that has a peculiar ethical significance. For it is^ evident th^t theN^undamental impulse or craving of the human mind njiust take adHtectfon indicated by Spinoza's theoiy of knowledge. According to that theory, the essential nature of ftiind is realized, hot in that succession of ideas which repre- sents merely the order of nature, but in that concatenation of ideas — that inductive and*- deductive science — which repre- sents the order of mind[>or intellect itself. Now, if the funda- mental tendency of everything is to maintain its own existence,^ then this tendency becomes in the human mind an impulse to attain^ not those inadequate ideas which are impost upon it by, the extrinsic order of external things, but those adequate ideas which are formed by the laws of its own intellectual order. For, as 3pinoza is careful to explain,' an idea is not made adequate by its agreement with its object. Such agree- ment is an extrinsic circumstance which has nothing to do with the essential character of the idea itself, and therefore the adequacy of t^e idea depends only on its own intrinsic chsurac- ter (II, def. 4). Consequently the mind posits its own reality, conserves its own .existence, only in so far as it attains to ade- quate ideas of things. Ifhis, in fact, forms the basis of Spinoza's theory of inijportality. For ideas, formed in accordance with a purely intellectual order, are not merely the counterparts of sensible things, but exist independently of these ; and, there- fore, in so f^ as the human muid forms general ideas, it lives a life that is not imperilled by the destruction of the body. This may, of course, be interpreted as not necessarily implying the -immortality of the individual person; but it is quite incom- .^r ■ •,: - 1 ♦ ■ . ■, ■ . ■ - - NosO r-Wi IDEAUSM OF SPINOZA. ^85 patible with Sensationalism or Nominalism. It has rather an appearance of affinity with mediaeval Realism, as giving an independent" reality to general i&eas, even though that may be their eternal existence. in the consciousttess of God. The full significance of all this is stil\ more clearly unfolded in its practical or ethical applications. To understand these, a few definitions require special notice. Among them is the definition of adequate and inadequate causes,— ^ a 'definition which, it will be observed, obtrudes very prominently the con- ception of causation as essentially a logical process. According to this definition, when an effect can be completely understood by means of a'cause, then the cause is adequate. Otherwise — that is, if the effect can be but partially comprehended by a given cause — the cduse is; inadequate. From this it follows that a man can be said td perform an action^ in the strict sense of the term, only when an event occurs of which he is the ade- quate cause; while he is subject to passion when anything occurs in his life of which he is only an inadequate cause (III, def. i.and 2). It is an obvious corollary of these definitions, that the mind is active only in so far as it forms adequate ideas^ of- things, but passive in so far as its ideas are inadeqi^ate (HI,* I). We can, ther^re, understand how will, the active power in man, is identified by Spinoza with intellect, th^ power of cognition (II, 49, cor.). But Spinoza's theory of knowledge leads to a further expli- cation of his meaning. Frpm that theory it follows that an adequate idea represents the third kind of knowledge; and con- sequently, not only does the knowledge of man in its highest form belong to an order of the intellect which is not determined by the order" of nature, but the voluntary actions of men are now seen to qlaim an equal freedom from the necessitation of natural causes. Of course man is, in a certain aspect, a part of nature; so that the events of his life are partly resultants of external causation (IV, 2). To that extent he is subject to passion (IV, 4, cor.). But in so far as his life is regulated by adequate knowledge, he is spontaneously active, obeying an order that is totally distinct from the order pf nature, it-is" •'? \ ^S^^^^^on 486 THE PHILOSOPHiCAL REVIEW.^ CVOL.V. quite true that passages may be cited from the Ethics which seem expUcitly enough to deny man vi0 real freedom, and to represent the phenomena of his mind as being necelsary modi- ficatibni of the divine attribute of thought in the same way as the pKenomena of his body are necessary modifications of the divioe attribute of extensi^. But whatever explanation these passages may receive, it yitill remains an essential feature of Spinoza's philosophy, th^l the modes of thought are not deter- mined by the modes of extension, and that the order of intellect is hot simply concurrent with, but radically different from, the order of nature. ;: It is surely, therefore, significant that in spite of all the apparent necessitarianism of his occasional teaching, Spinoza should find in the power of intellect a genuine freedom for man. The concluding part of the -ff/A^pJ bears the suggestive ^ title, De Potestatt IntelUctus sen de Libertate Humana. No wonder that this part has always formed, and will undoubt- edly continue to form, one of the chief fascinations of the work. Here the reader finds an almost exultant relief from the terrible oppression of the rigid mathematical Pantheism of the earlier parts, in which all mdividuality of existence and activity had vanished. Here, in fact, Spinoza follows Plato iii his ascent to those serene heights of mental life m whi^ gen- uine knowledge is illuminated with a moral splendor, by being identified* with genuine love ; while the fierce light of geomet- rical deihonstration, which seemed, to fuse all existences into $ violent mechanical union, becomes mellowed into a glorious haze in which the finite spirit feels as if all its harsh self-asser- tion faded away mto a mystical communioa of love with the Infinite Spirit, in whom all live, and move, and have their ■'■ ■■■.being._" ■■-■,■■■.' ., ' : - : ^ ' '.^^ For, as we have seen, knov^edge becomes adequate; only when its object is viewed "sub quadam aetemitatis specie," as a logical derivative from one of the attributes of God. Such fc knowledge is thus essentially a knowledge of God as He reveals H imself «" thfe inn umerable modes of His attributes. But this intellectual process of knowing God has also an emotional V. • »*V*f «*.(. *ff^ *^^*f' J ,' I' *'^W*" •"^Wff^jr '^ , ~ ? *♦ **■ ^l' '' ''■^***f'g'^'^ "^"V • No. 5] THE IDEALISM OF SPINOZA. 487 pltesc. For, according to the theory of Spinoza, all pleasure consists in an advance from a lesser to a greater perfection (III, n, schol.); and, as he identifies perfection with reality (IV, Preface), the soul of man is conceived as capable of pleas- ure only by attaining a higher realization of its essential nature. It is evident that such an advance to completer realization or. perfection must be made by every step towards that adequate knowledge which is always essentially a knowledge of God. Such an advance in knowledge is therefore by its very nature a joy. But when an object is <;onceiyed as the cause of joy, the joy takes the form of love for the object which is its cause (III, 13, schol); and, consequently, the joy derived from that knowledge of God which is the highest activity of intellectual life, becomes an intellectual love of God (V, 3«» with cor.). . The emotional state thus identified with the highest intellectual activity is the purest of all joys. It is blessedness {beatitudo)\ and blessedness is defined to be the joy that is reached wh6n ,^ the soul is not merely promoted to a greater perfection, but is , ; endowed with perfection ^self, or, in other words, attains a complete realization of its essential nature (V, 33, schol.). But the complete realization of its own nature is complete emancipation from all subjection to extraneous agencies; and therefore blessedness is freedom (V, 36, schol.). Spinoza would unhesitatingly say that it delivers men from the bond- age of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God. Man is thus, in fact, elevated into something more than the likeness of a filial relation to God. He is described as assimUated to God in language such as can be paralleled only in the excesses of the literature of Mysticism. Here again, indeed, one is perplexed by exp^ons which seem to imply an Agnosticism^hat excludes an^iritable comntWion between the human spirit and the divine. This perplexity is increased by a vacillation of language, in which intellect and will are denied to God (1, 17, schol.;!, 31; I, 3 2, cor. 2), whUe the human mind is spoken of as part of the infinite intellect of God (II, 1 1), and elsewhere intellect is ascribed to God, thougK with the qM ?lifirati on that it resembles the intellect of roan only in name f sM*ff:*' •l; h -,- "^V ' f.' '!■'")'- I- 48S THE PHILOSOPHICAL REVIEW. \ (II, 17, schol). But such expretiioni cannot alter the fact that the whole drift of Spinoza's ethical teaching assumes, as an essential principle, that man is capable of a real knowledge of God, and a real love of God based on that knowledge. This intellectual love of God is the radical impulse, (f^na/Mj), which man shares in 'common with all things, to conserve himself ; it is the spontaneous activity in which he posits his freedom from all enslaving or destructive agencies; it is the supreme virtue, in which alone blessedness can be found (V, 35). Spinoza, therefore, may well say in the noble proposition with which his great work closes, that "blessedness is not a reward . -^ ^' ♦■ ■■'•.i--i 11 ^S?WS^7 ■fi All Ml ,til WnirA-^Liilfc'i' :-\ ■nrr . . ^-* ^ It , •fir' s./ i 1 ■J-' ■ i ■ '''^^h — .^ V 1 ^^^IPB^^vi W^THIBM 1 • ' --*^ » , ,; , • / ■"'^'y. ' ■ > * • "i ■ ■ i • « ■ ■. ' . 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