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 1 
 
 2 
 
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i 
 
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 i» » 
 
THE 
 
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 E 
 
 ifif 
 
 OF THE 
 
 //£• J- J- / ^ A^ Forces, 
 
 . In the 
 
 P A Y of Great - Britain, 
 
 -■ Inipai-tially and Freely Examiiul; ■ ■ 
 
 ., '''if 
 
 : W I T H S O M E 
 
 REFLECTION'S on the prefcnt Coniunclurc 
 
 of AFFAIRS. 
 
 IN ANSWER 
 
 To a late Pamphlet, intltlcd, Conjidcratlons m th 
 ,. pcfcut' State of Affairs^ ^LQ. 
 
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 .«v'. '^'"' "'*■ ■ 
 
 LONDON: 
 
 V^'intod for R. Francklin, in RnUli-Strcet^ 
 
 ^ ,,^, Ccp^en^'Giirdah 1731. 
 
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 THE 
 
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 A 
 
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 O F THE 
 
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 <i 
 
 HESSIAN Forces, 
 
 In the PAY of 
 
 { 
 
 GREAT-BRITAIN, ef^. 
 
 H E R E 13 nothing more remark- 
 able in the Conduct of the ^Z- 
 ters againji their Country^ than re- 
 peating the fame 7 hings, and in- 
 iifting on the fame Points, after 
 They have been often confu- 
 ted and expos'd. There is, 
 perhaps, fome little Policy in this manner ot 
 Writing, which may prove of Advantage to their 
 Patroth It may fervc his Purpofc, fci want of 
 
 A a other 
 
( 4 ) 
 
 iiiTicr Expedients, -at a critical Point of Time* 
 it may divert the Attention of the Publick from 
 frcfh Inquiries, by engaging their thoughts on the 
 lame exploddlTopicks. It may give a Cue to his 
 (>rcatures what is expeded Irom them, and fur- 
 nifh them with Arguments, liich as They are, for 
 anfvvering thofc Expectations and llipporting Him 
 in hisMeafures. 
 
 This \\ inter hath been verv fruitful of ;;;/;///?<?- 
 r/V// Jpolo^ics. \\c ha\-e had Obfr'Tations on the 
 Writings of the Craftfman ^ a Sequel to the Ohferva" 
 tioris ; farther Objenuitions ^ Sedition and Dcfama" 
 tion difplafd • the Orijis ; a JJefence of the Mea-^ 
 fares of the prefent Adviinijiratlon ; and Conjiderati" 
 ons on the prefent State of Jffahs ^ befides the 
 weekly Artillery of thofe regular, flanding Troops, 
 the Authors ot the London Journal^ the Free Bri" 
 ton^ the yiying'PoJl^ and their auxiliary the Daily 
 Cotirant, 
 
 But as the chief Strefs, in Point of Argument^ 
 fcems to be laid on the Con/iderathns^ I Ihall con- 
 fine my Remarks to that Piece, though it contains 
 only a confident Repetition of Alfertions, which 
 hiivc been oiien proved fallc, and of Rcafonings 
 upon them, which have been as often refuted. Jt 
 is, in the main, only a Rc-publication of the Fm^ 
 qiiiry^ long fincc neglcfed and dcipifed, but nevv- 
 modeU'd indeed, in fomc Parts, according to the 
 Circumftances of the Times, and accommodated 
 to the prefent Scheme of Affairs. I fliall therefore 
 be very Ihort in my Obfcrvations on thefe Heads. 
 
 ^hat the Treaty of Vienna, fa) 5 our Author, 
 'itias the only Source and Foundation of all the 
 Trouhks^ that have diJiraSied Europe for fome I'ears 
 fiajf^ mujf he allowed by all ; though He knows very' 
 well that This hath long been a Point in Difputc, 
 \eiy Itrongly controverted • and He cannot be ig- 
 norant 
 
 / 
 
 i 
 
(O 
 
 r, 
 
 I 
 
 'All 
 
 noYant that, in the general Opinion of MankincT, 
 it hath been dctermin'd againil 'Vhofc, who ail- , 
 vanc'd it. Did He never read jGb?i Trofs let- 
 ters upon this Subjcdl ; or, does He think that no 
 Body elfe hath read them ? Other ReaJbns may 
 be there found for the Troubles of Europe, efpcci- 
 ally with Relation to Great Britain^ than the '1 rea- 
 ty o( Vie)uia \ but there is no End of repeating 
 the lame Things. I mull therefore reter the Rea- 
 der to thofc e Micelle tit Pieces • and Ihall only ob- 
 lervc, in general, that it is lar from being uUoivd 
 hy all that the Treaty of \~ienna '■dcas the only Sonrct 
 of all our Troubles^ as this Writer alierts ; or 
 that the Unioi of the tico Families^ which He men- 
 tions, was e\'er deHgn'd ^ tor all the Endeavours 
 of France^ Kughtid and Holland have not been 
 lincc able to prevail upon the Eu/peror to confent to 
 a Meafure^ which tends moll eiicdlually, in the pre- 
 fcnt Circumftanccs of the t-joo Families^ to /inite 
 them; I mean to produce a Re/a/ ion of their Do- 
 tal nions ; but not in the Houfc of Anflria^ as 
 He fuppofes ; lor I take Don Carlos to be a Branch 
 of the Houfe of Bourbon ; and therefore if the 
 Contingency^ which He mentions, Ihould happen, 
 and the Marriage^ with which We ha\e been 11) 
 often threaten'd, fhould take Place, theDominicMis 
 of Spain and the Empire might be united in that 
 Family, 
 
 The Ailertion of fecrct Fj:gagenicnt3^ in the 
 Treaty of Vienna^ to deprive us of jome of our 
 Pofftffions and moji valuable Privileges of Trade j 
 is likewife repeated by this Writer ; though the 
 Courle of fo many Years as have pafs'd fince the 
 Conclulion of that Treaty^ and c^en our Reconci- 
 liation with Spain have not yet brought any of 
 thofe Engagements to Light. — Did the Dclign of 
 the OJhnd Company proceed from the 7 fcaty of 
 ' • Vienna ; 
 
i ! 
 
 ( 6 ) 
 
 appear that the Demand, which Spain made, of 
 the Rcflitution of Gibraltar was a Confequence of 
 any Engagement in this Treaty? — Hath it not been 
 fully proved, on the contrary, that their Pretcnlions 
 to this Place, whether juft or not, were always found- 
 ed on a Letter, written by his late Majefty, now 
 publick ? — How docs it appear that the Emperor 
 ever concurred with the Court of Spain in any 
 Dclign to deprive us of that ineftimable Pojfefflon ; 
 or gave them any Afliilance, when They adtually 
 befieged it ? — Laflly, how does it appear that ei- 
 ther Spain or the Emperor had concerted any Pro- 
 jed, in Favour of the Pretender F — Did not his 
 Imperial Majefty difown any fuch Deiign in the 
 molt fblemn Manner ; and hath not the King of 
 Spain confirmed his Aflcveration, even fince their 
 JDiftiniony by a particular Claufe in the Treaty of 
 Seville^ in which that Charge is calM a Pretence 
 only? 
 
 In Ihort, the Treaty of Vienna^ according to 
 
 my Apprehenlion, hatn never yet been proved to 
 
 be any Thing more than an Accommodation of 
 
 Differences between thofe two Courts^ not in the 
 
 leall dangerous to //j, after they had thought Them- 
 
 fclves very ill uied by the Mediators^ on whom they 
 
 relyed. oending back the Infanta from France was 
 
 fuch an Indignity as the Court of Spain mull cer* 
 
 tainly refent; and though our Aithor is pleas'd to 
 
 aflert that the Condud of Great Britain gave 
 
 neither the Emperor nor Spain the leajl Pretence 
 
 for a Complaint ^ I mufl take the Liberty to con- 
 
 tradidl: Him, and can look upon fuch an Ailertion 
 
 in no other Light than as a fhamclefs Infult on 
 
 the common Senfc and Knowledge of Mankind; 
 
 for 
 
 I 
 
 A 
 

 ( 7 ) 
 
 for without infifting on the Refufal of the fok Mc^ 
 iiiatiotfy hath it not been otten urgM by thefi 
 Writers Thcmfclvcs that our Defeat cj the Spaiitjh 
 Fleet ill the Mediterraman lay Ibll at their Hearts ; 
 and hath it not been as often proved that the Con- 
 clulion ol a private Treaty at Madrid^ without the 
 Knowledge of the Emperor^ whilft He continued 
 under our MediatioUy gave Him fomc Reafon to 
 be oilcnded, and to call our Impartiality a little 
 in QuelHon? 
 
 As thcfe Reafbns have been repeated in all our 
 atwiverfary Pamphlets^ to juftity the Expediency 
 of the Treaty of Hafjonjer ; fo our Author is not 
 afhamed to (peak in the fame Manner concerning 
 the Acceffton of other States to this Treaty ; though 
 every Body knows that Holland acceded to it, un- 
 der very large Reflridlions ; (not to fay any Thing 
 of the PeacCy which was made for them with 
 the Jlgerines) and it cannot be forgot that one of 
 the Rcafons, urg'd by Count Horn to the States 
 of Sweden for their Acceffton^ was that the Treaty 
 of Hanover did mt lay them under fo many Ohli^ 
 gations as former Treaties ♦ though they had a Sub- 
 lidy oi Jifty thoiifand Pounds a Tear^ for three 
 TearSy both from England and France^ as a Con- 
 iideration for acceding to it. I fhall fay nothing of 
 the Convention of Denmark^ bccaufe it does not 
 appcarthatW^paid any Thing for it; and I am at a 
 Lofs to think what Reafon there can be lor any 
 new Convention with that Courts as We have been 
 lately inform'd there is, which may be the Occafion 
 of new Expenccs to this Nation ; but it is plain, 
 from this Account, that the formidable Union of 
 Spain and the Emperor gave thcfe two Courts no 
 Alarm. They took Occall n to make a Penny of 
 it, and were well paid for being ready to muffcr ^ 
 that is. They have hitherto received their jMoncy 
 ' Hng F^'^'fV)^' ^ » 
 
(8) 
 
 ■| 
 
 ii I 
 
 Let us now fee whether the Confcqucnccs of the 
 'Treaty ot' HafwvermW not juilify our Account of 
 thcfi Acccjfwjis, It was faid, at firlt, to be a dcfen/hc 
 "Treaty only ^ and, indeed, it contained no nffiij/he 
 Stipulations^ any more than the Treaty of Vienna, 
 liolland viouV\ not have cntcr'd into it, even under 
 the Limttattons^ upon whirhlLe acceded atlaft, if it 
 had been an offeujhe Treaty \^ and neither Holland 
 nor France did any 1 hing more, than prepare 
 'Ihenilclves againlt Jlttacks'^ but England hath 
 been charg'd with adling offen/tvely^ by lending two 
 Fleets ol Ships of War, one to the Wcji^lndies^ 
 and the other to the Mediterranean, The fornmr 
 of Thcfe blockVi up the Merchant Ships of Spain 
 in their Port and lay in the mod unwholfomc Cli- 
 mate in the Univerle till the Ships were almoft 
 deltro)'d, and fcarcc Men enough were left alive 
 to bring them back in that ruinous Condition. The 
 Confcquence of This was, that Spain interrupted 
 the Eritifh Commerce in all Parts, and plundered 
 <>ur Merchants without any Reprixals ^ for though 
 the 4o////V/tr^r fpeaks of Hojfilities bet''jjeen the Crown 
 6/ ' England ^/;.y/c/' Spain, I do not remember any 
 Hojlilitics that We have been guilty of towards Them^ 
 iincc the bhckinguptheir Galleons, TheWar between 
 Us and Spain Iccms to have been carried on in much 
 the fame JVIanncr with That, mentioned in Terence^ 
 
 ......... iiuiiijuam vi.li iiiifjuiu.i 
 
 iertJiinuc'ni cntnpj'-.'l.^m, ijujim hxi J'nhr iiite\' uosfuit. 
 l-'^f) vapulantlo, llle verberando, uf^ue ambo defejji fu)»ns. 
 
 In the mean Time, France and Holland were 
 permitted to carry on their Trade, without 
 Molcllation ^ as They fuflcr'd the Spani- 
 ards^ in Return, to befiegc Gibraltar^ withoqt 
 furnilhing any Quota of Men^ ShipSj or Money y 
 for the Defence of it; and indeed Englaady being 
 thus charg'd with beginning Hojlilities^ was in 
 
 h: 
 
v^ 
 
 V 
 
 
 .4 
 
 ( 9 ) 
 
 !i m'.inncr left wichuut any Ally ; engaged bv the 
 Trearv oi Hanrrocr to uiiill the othi.r cont)\hliiiT^ 
 Pjvtus^ in eaic I'hcy had been atcaekM; but not 
 inritled to their Aliiltance, when her own Poiicl- 
 Jions were attack'd j becaule llie llood charged with 
 
 bwing the y^X^feffor. How this Step was under-* 
 
 llood by Spatn^ appears from the Marquis de Poz" 
 zrjh/icnc'n '^- Letter to the Duke o{ Ntwcajile^ the 
 \[\o)i Jauti.ir)\ 1716*7 ; and furely, it could ne- 
 ver be imigia'd that any other Interpretation coi'id 
 be given to Ibch a Meai'ure ! 
 
 'I'he Coiijlkrtr having laid it down as an Axiom, 
 which mil ft he iiUcrjo'd by ally and fupported by «;;- 
 d()id:tcd kiidancfs in Fafls^ as He fpcaks in ano- 
 ther 1- lace, that the Treaty of Vie}] 11 a made Co//;;- 
 ter-jillyjiiccs neccllary on our Part, proceeds to 
 il^w that an Allyance with France was the mofll 
 proper y\llyance in this Cale. 
 
 He allows, indeed, that an JUyance with Hol- 
 land, 'wloj'c Interefts in rnofi Rcfpcfh is infeparable 
 from J'hat of England, 'ijuas certainly the mofl va-^ 
 tiiral and ob-cioiis on this Occajion ; bitty \i fcems, 
 the Coiiftitiition of that Rcpiiblick makes it ahnojt 
 tnipo[fit}lc to keep a Ntgotiation fecret there, — Now, 
 I cannot lee any Rcafon why a Negotiation may 
 not be kept as Iccrct there as in any other Court i 
 I conicfs, indeed, that when a Hegdiation isformM 
 into a Treaty y it cannot be kept fecret • becaufe it 
 niuft be brought before the States for their Con- 
 fent ^ and I Ihould be glad to know what good 
 Purpofe it can ibrvc to keep any 'Treaty fecret y after 
 it is once concluded. I am fure, fuch clandejline 
 Treaties have ferv'd many a had Purpofe in our own 
 ^'leniory. 
 
 
 Anoth-r 
 
■i I 
 
 li-. 
 
 Anotlicr RcaHm, given by 0:{r Author^ f()r not 
 frciiting wiih HolLiml^ upon this Occalion, is that 
 IVe art fcirthcr removd from any fiiddai Rcf^ntmeut'^ 
 ■cXr-A therefore it was thought the mojl advifeahle 
 Stcp^ for tJ e comvwn gvodo\ both Nations^ that Eng- 
 land Jkonld frjf fircu^^then her ft If by an AUyance 
 '■■jc'ith fonic other coufiderahk PoziJtrSy tvhofe Iiitereji 
 it is to check the Iniperial Poiver ; and as the Oppo^ 
 fit ion let-vccen the Emperor and l-'Vancc miiji he con^ 
 (fant in all [jiinBnres and Events^ an AUyance 
 '■.iith l^Vanec ivas certainly the moff natural AUyance 
 iLnglancl coiild ha've^ in this Cafe, 
 
 1 ha\'c put the Author's Argument in its full 
 vStrength, as He hath llatccl it, that He may have 
 no Reafbn to complain of Mifreprefcntation ^ and 
 J will leave the W orld to judge whether it can do 
 his Caiifc any Service ^ lor // jLngland is farther 
 reihcvd from the Effecls of any fiidden Refentnienty 
 why ihould Ihc be the firit to provide againll Dan- 
 ger, and to ilrengthcn Herfelf with any Allyances ? 
 V\ hy did n(U France lead the Way ; linec thc'Con- 
 fcqucnces of the Vienna Treaty were fo formida- 
 ble to that Crcxn ? Or what Danger could Wc ap- 
 prehend from that Treaty^ Avhen the Oppofttion of 
 1"^ Vance to the b'.mperor 'iVtis fo certain^ and the In- 
 tcrelt of Holland made it lb necellliry for Her to 
 court our Allyajice^ without any private ReJfriSfions^ 
 or preliminary Services r May it not likewife be 
 ask'd, ^vhcthcr there h nor as conffant a Jealoafy 
 andfecrct Rrcaljkip betiveen France and England^ 
 as betiveen France ami the I''.mpcror ? 
 
 1 he Confiderer feems to allow that France ah^ 
 
 firafledly hath no great Concern for the Rights and 
 
 Pofiffiojjs of Great-Britain ^ but then W'c arc told 
 
 that the Union of Spain and the Kmpcror, is:hicb 
 
 Ttiufi create the rreatefl Alarm and Unca/inefs to 
 
 r^rancc. 
 
 
 i^tf 
 
 '«. 
 
**■» 
 
 1 
 
 
 ( II ) 
 
 France, ivoiild keep her jjithfiil to her ¥jig.i^yments 
 in Point of hitcrc/i^ as long as that Union fibft/r.J, 
 
 ' If lo, was it our Intcreft to diliolvc tlhit if- 
 
 nioii ; or can We rely on the ludclity of Fiwic^^ 
 with the fame Confidence, after the Caufc of hex 
 Apprehcnlions, by the Dillblution oi' the Via:nj- 
 Treaty^ is reniov'd ? May not this Separation of 
 Spain and the Emperor be followed by a new Union 
 between France and Spain^ more formidable to Us 
 
 than •/'bat^ which We have diflblv'd ? Or, 
 
 may it not be ask'd, why We converted the iic/'en^ 
 ftn)e Treaty of Hanover, which was fo wifdy^ pro- 
 jected for the Peace of Europe, and the Inte/e/i of 
 Great-Britain, into the offenjive Treaty of Seville ? 
 For the Stipulation of Spanijh Troops^ in Contra- 
 vention to the ^ladruple A/lyancey is certainly an 
 offenjtve Stiptdatton^ whether it fhould be ever exe- 
 cuted or not ^ and We fee that it hath already 
 put Europe in Afiiis. 
 
 Yet t\{\s Separation of t-he two Courts^ Oi Vienna 
 and Madrid^ hath been extoU'd as the greatcft 
 Mailer-piece of Politicks that any Miniltcr ever 
 performed ^ though one would think it did not re- 
 quire any extraordinary Addrefs to diilblve 'AnUnion 
 between two Crowns, which hath been \o often 
 reprcfcntrd unnatural and nnaccoiintahle in the \c- 
 ry Foundation of it. Did not the Ejnpcrors M-*' 
 iiiftcrs fhevv more Dexterity in cultixating fach an 
 Union \ the fame Mmiflcrs^ who likcwile found 
 Means to detach the King of Pruliia from the Ha- 
 nover Allyance ^ though the Intrre/h of the two 
 Fa?nilies of Brandenburg and Aullria -ijcre incom» 
 fatible P But this Author ^ it teems, is of ano- 
 ther Opinion ; and We arc gi\^cn to underltani 
 that nobody but a Machiavd could have negotif 
 ated^ Spain into fach ;/ Temper ^ as to abandon //;- 
 
 B 2 tirelf 
 
^ 
 
 n 
 
 : li 
 
 ( i^ ) 
 
 tii'ely the Tmpcvia 1 Court ^ to quit her ^\7j} Expc^a*» 
 tions jroin thajce-^ and to enter into a Jiri3 Union 
 
 ivtth the Hanover jellies, ^'VYt ^^^^ what vaji 
 
 Jispec^jtious do you mean? The great Advantar 
 ges of the Vienna Treaty were ibrmcrly fuppolcd 
 to lye on the Side of the Emperor ; and if Spatn 
 hud any Espeflations of clliiblilhing the Succeliion 
 of Don Carlos by an Unicn with the Elviperor^ 
 They found Thcniich'es diiappointcd ^ lor as bc- 
 peficial as this AUyance was to Him, He would 
 never confent to that SucceJJion^ upon their Terms. 
 Nay, if We may believe the Couftdcrer^ Spain -was (6 
 far from having any reaibnablc Espe^hittovs of this 
 Nature, that one Dellgn of the Vienna Treaty was 
 to defeat the Succe(f:on of Don Carlo.s. As This 
 jis a very cytraordinary Argument, in Julfification 
 of the Treaty of Seville^ I will quote it at length. 
 ' — The ConduB of the Emperor, /';; endeavouring to 
 delay and difappoint the IntrcduHiou of neutral Gar- 
 vifons and the Succejjion of Don Carlos ; and the 
 .*Steps taken rjjith that View, /';; the Viln'na 
 Treaty, imthoat the Confent of England and 
 .France, contraBing Parties to the Qnidruplc Al- 
 liance, Jlifficiently jnjiified England and ^V.mce /';; 
 •snaking this Variation, ivithout the Confent of the 
 
 Emperor. Is it not very furprizing that -S^i//;; 
 
 fliculd pay fo dear f )r a Treaty^ which was cal- 
 culated to difappoint her moil favourite Vieiv ? — Is 
 it not very myfteripus that in a Treaty^ which was 
 projected with a Delign of uniting the tii'o Fa-^ 
 wilies b\ Marriages^ ;md laying the Foundation 
 of an tiniverfal Monarchy in Europe^ any Steps 
 Ihould be taken to defeat the Succefpon of a Prince^ 
 in vvhofe Perfon this fonnidalle Con)und;ion of 
 
 dominions was to take Place? If This wiis 
 
 pnc of the Pellgns of the Vienna Txcaty^ it mull: 
 
 
 !\'>'' 
 
It t: 
 
 
 ( 13 ) 
 
 :cd 
 
 indeed be confeflcd a very unaccountaUe j^UyafiCc ; 
 and the Merit of having dijfolvci it will be great- 
 ly diminilh'd. Neither can We wonder at the 
 Condud: of the Emperor in this Cafe-^ for how can 
 We think it ftrange that He Ihould endeavour to 
 defeat the Succefiion of Don Carlos^ by the In- 
 trodudion of Sfan'tp Troops into Italy ^ when Spain 
 hcrfclf had concurred in taking StepSy with that 
 
 Ficw^ in the Treaty of Yiznvwi'^ But the jiu" 
 
 thor mufl have certainly been half ailecp and nod- 
 ding over his Treaties^ when He let fuch Stuff tall 
 from his Pen. I Ihall therefore conllder this Affair 
 a little farther, as if no fuch egregious Bltwder ha4 
 been committee]. 
 
 At the Time of making the Hamver Treaty^ 
 the Eiiipcrors Condudl, with refpe<5t to the Suc- 
 cclfion of Don Carlos^ was not thought a fufficient 
 Rcafon for violating that Part of the Quadruple 
 Allyance^ which related to it. The Propofition 
 of 60CO Spaniards^ inftead of 6000 NeittralSy 
 feems to have been difapproved by England at the 
 Congrcfs of Soijjons ; and never reliih'd, till fome 
 fhorc Time before it was made a Stipulation of 
 the Seville Treaty ^ that is, fome Time before the 
 Meeting of Parliament^ laft Year. The Confent 
 of the Empire was obtained, and the Letters es-^ 
 peffatii'e delivered before the Differences between 
 the Empire and Spain were adjufted ; fo that the 
 Emperor had made all his Engagements good ; 
 and Spain ought to have calfd on the Neutral 
 Po'iverSj w^ho were to garrifon the Places, at their 
 own Expcnce, to perlonn their Engagements, as 
 well a« the Emperor, None of the Parties feem*d 
 to think that there had been any affcdted Delay 
 at Vienna in that Matter ; but though the ^ija-* 
 druple Treaty fiys that 6000 Neutrals arc to bo 
 
 in-* 
 
I'H 
 
 ( 14) 
 
 ^ntfoducM, it docs not fay ivhciK The Gonfcnt of 
 the Duke of T^ufcauy was fought ; whether ever 
 obtain'd, I know not ; but in the Year 1723, 
 {Ochb, 2^.) He protefted, by '2i folemri AH at 6/;?/- 
 hray^ againlt the Stipulations of the G)iiadrnpk 
 AllyatJCe^ relating to his Dominions ; which * A^ 
 "Was repeated and confirnfd the 26th of January 
 following. Spain never liked this 'Stipulation ; and 
 before and at the Gongrefs of Canihray deli red 
 6000 Spaniards ; but the French^ at that Time, 
 did not care to rifque an AccelTion of Power to 
 the Crown of Spain^ any more than the Englip. 
 Both apprehended the King o[ Spain^ at that lime, 
 to have a Deiign of fetting alide the Renunciations^ 
 founded on the Treaty oi Utrecht^ and of uniting 
 France and Spain. The Perfons in Power, in 
 France^ fince the Duke of Bonrbon^s Removal, 
 have been thought to wifli for fuch an Union • but 
 as the French King hath SonSj thofc Deligns mufl 
 be laid alide ^ and as France hath now no Reafbn 
 to fear fuch an Acceflion of Power as -Tafcany 
 would be to the Crown of Spain^ it is her Intcrclt 
 to promote the Introdud:ion of Spanijh Tioops ; 
 which may oblige the Emperor to keep a greater 
 Body of Forces than formerly in Italy ^ by which 
 Means France w^ill meet with lefs Oppofition, if 
 ever They attack Him in Germany ^ as Spain will 
 have a favourable Opportunity of enlarging their 
 Territories in Italy ; and This will be a Founda* 
 tion of Fricndlhip between thofe Crowns. 
 
 The Queen of Spain could not have defir'd the 
 Change from neutral to Spanijh Troops, but upon 
 the Hopes that her Son may be King of Spain • 
 
 
 '■ Ts.c^jf^t.. Tern. IV. r- ^\^' 
 
 ikt 
 
( 19 ) 
 
 F 
 
 the Prince of Aflnrias being very fickly and not 
 likely ta have Chiklrcn. 
 
 It is fiiid that France and i^;;^/^///^ are Guaran- 
 ties lor the Emperors Dominions in Italy againll 
 any Kncroachments, which Spain nvay attempt to 
 make upon them. 
 
 I anlWer, that the Purpofcs of the ^tadrupU 
 jillyancc woukl have been cffc6lually fccur'd by 
 neutral 'll'oops ; but it is extremely probable that 
 the Jntrodudtion of 6'/)t/;;/V/r^i will be follow'd by 
 Invalions on the Emperors Dominions ; tor though 
 the Introdudion of only 6000 Spaniards is Itipu- 
 lated, yet if They are put in Poiiclfion o( Legkwrny 
 They may admit as many more as They pleafe by 
 the Help of their Fleet, which is large enough for 
 that Purpofe, and will be as good as a Bridge be- 
 tween Italy and Spain, In this Gale, France wil! 
 not be very forward, to execute their Engage- 
 ments of Guaranty in the Emperors behalf; 
 and if England docs^ Ihe mull lofe her Trade to 
 Spain and to Leghorn. If France Ihould think fit 
 to quarrel with the Emperor^ fhe will encourage 
 Spain to invade his Italian Dominions ; and when 
 the Emperor complains of it, They will, without 
 much Difficulty (according to the modern Way of 
 interpreting the Obligations of Treaties) find out 
 fomc Adt or other of the Emperor^ w^hich They 
 will allcdge as a Reafon for his having forfeited a 
 Right re ±at Guaranty. But furely Princes fhoulj 
 endeavour to concert their 'Treaties in fuch a 
 Manner, that there may be Reafon to hope their 
 Guaranty iz'ill not he wanted^ and not fo as to be 
 almoit lure that it "jvill / — 1n this latter Cafe^ a 
 P ounclarion is laid for a War • and as it will be the 
 Intcrcll: both of France and England not to quarrel 
 too cai]]}^ with Spain, on Account of the Benefits 
 
M 
 
 ( i<5 ) 
 
 of trading with Them ; fo the Enipcror will not 
 truft \cry readily to their Guaranty, 
 
 The .^tiacirtipk AUyai/ce directed that when 
 Don Carlos was in Policflion, Spain fliould }ickl 
 up to Him Porto Lovgoue^ which is now in the 
 Hands of that Crown. The Realon of This was, 
 that They might have no Place to land Troops at, 
 to difturb him at their Pleafure. — T don't remember 
 that the Stville Treaty takes any Notice of This. 
 
 How can this Author fay, p. 40. that the Jn- 
 trodudion of Spauiards was ncceiiary for the c^cC" 
 tiial Security of that SitcccffJon ? "I he Treaty of 
 S'j'vilk it fclf exprellcs an Apprchcniion ot* Dan- 
 ger to that SucceiTion from Spanip Troops ^ and 
 iHpulatesthat when Do;/ Carlos is in quiet Poficliion, 
 ihofe 'Troops Ihall withdraw* that thereby it may 
 be fccure from all Events. The Provi lions, in the 
 .^ttadriipk AllyancCy againft the Introduction of 
 S'paniards^ arc founded on the fame Apprchen- 
 fion ^ and though the Treaty of S('::ille iliys that 
 They Ihall withdraw, when I)or^ Carles is in qnict 
 PopeffioD • yet who is to be judge when that Pof- 
 fejjlon may be fiid to hcqitict and free from Daj7->* 
 ger of being diJlarU'd ? Will not the King 01 Spain 
 take the Decilion of that QLieltioii upon himlclf, 
 and give his Troops Orders to keep Poilc-illon of 
 thofe Dominions, if He finds it his Intcrcll ? It 
 cannot furcly be doubted whether 6000 Hctitrats 
 are more proper for the effcdual Security of that 
 Succellion than 6oco Spaniards^ unlcfs upon the 
 Suppoiition that Don Carlos Ihould be King. of 
 Spain^ with which Crown the Poilcliion of thcfe 
 Dominions was made incompatible by the ^lijadra* 
 pie Allyance, NeutralTroops woukl oppole all At- 
 tempts from the E.nperor^ or from Spai/^ in Prejudice 
 ot this SacceJpQU j and Tune and E>^pcriej/:e ha^ e 
 
 iuUy 
 
 
 
 1 
 
(17) 
 
 fully Ihcwn that they may be more readily Intro 
 duc'd^ the Emperor h-AWiug long lince declared that 
 He is willing to confent to ti/eir hitrodncfto}]^ and 
 that he will not content to the Introdudion of 
 Spaniards, 
 
 But it the £wp^ro/s Condud: juftifics the Mea- 
 fures of the Se^oilk Allies, what have the States 
 of the Empire done to dclcrvc this Treatment ? 
 Why fliould the Parties to the Quadruple Allyame 
 engage, by the Treaty of Seville^ to introduce? 
 Spam/h Garrilbns into their Fieis, without their Con- 
 fent, when the fame Parties have declared that the 
 Domiuiotis in qucftion cannot be difpos'd of with'- 
 out their Cotifent • nay, have engaged Themfclves 
 in a Guaranty of this very Proviiion ? If the £;«- 
 per or contents to this Variatio/j^ as it is call'd, with- 
 out their Concurrence, He will involve Himfelf in 
 the Guilt ot violating the Oatb^ taken at his Elec- 
 tion, and be liable to be diverted of the hnperial 
 Dignity. The hnperial Mmijlers have declared 
 This in very ftrong Terms in a Paper ^ handed a- 
 bout at Rattsbon^ in anlwcr to another Paper^ faid 
 to have been written by Monfieur dc Chavig?iy^ the 
 Frefich Minifler there* and in that Paper 'fhey 
 aflcrt that, by a fccret Article of the IVeaty of 
 Madridy in 1721, between trance ^ Spain and £;;^» 
 landy the Introdudion oi Spanijh 1 roops was fli- 
 pulated. If 1 his is true, it is very aftonilhing ; 
 and I hope the Cotijiderer will allow that it might 
 give the Emperor iome little Pretence to complain of 
 our Conduo% whilll He looked upon us as his PViend, 
 and We were ading the Part of a Mediator, But 
 certain it is that, in the Year 1721, a defenfive 
 Treaty was made between thofe three Powers (be- 
 lides the Treaty of Commerce between Spain and 
 England) and the Number of Troops to be fur- 
 
 C niih'd 
 
 > , 
 
( i8) 
 
 I!! 
 
 ,! 
 I 
 
 » 
 
 ■J} 
 
 if 
 
 niih'd by each was fpccify'd. This Treaty was 
 carry'd on lb privately, that neither Count IVindif" 
 gratZy nor Baron Pentenrieder were able to pene- 
 trate into the Secret of it. This Tr^^^/y is printed in 
 Rouffety (Tom. 4. p. loi.) though a certain Gentk'^ 
 w^;; airertedthatthe Treaty of 1721 was only a 
 Treaty of CGvimercc^ at which the Emperor could 
 take no Offence. 
 
 It is faid exprefsly in that Papcr^ agreeably to 
 what was always faid by the Publick, hat the Plan 
 ' of the Quadruple Jllya^/ce was fettled by France 
 and England^ and by Them fent to Vienna ; and 
 that thefe two Powers offered Sicily to the Emperor^ 
 before Tlifcat/y and Parma were brought into Quc- 
 flion ; and indeed there are not any Words, in 
 the Quadruple Jllyatice^ which can lead one to 
 imagine that Sicily was the Equivalent given to the 
 Emperor for the Succclfions of T'ufcany and Parma. 
 
 If the prcfent Scheme of Negotiations is to bring 
 the Emperor into the Treaty of Seville^ in Caw 
 the States of the Empire will confent to the Intro- 
 dudion of Spamjh Troops, and to promife his En- 
 deavours to obtain their Confent, Affairs will be in 
 a worfe Situation than they were in at the Time of 
 the ^ladrupk Allyame ^ and if the Emperor fhould 
 be fecure againft any Danger from the TurkSy He 
 would certainly do whqrt lies in his Power to prevent 
 them from giving their Confent. 
 
 Thus itands our Cafe at prefent, and fuch are 
 the Confcquenccs of the happy Conclujion of tht 
 treaty of Seville ; which our Author calls, in feve- 
 ral i'iaces, a perfeB and ahfolate Peace with Spain \ 
 though He drops an Obfcrvation, in one Place, 
 that a War in Italy (which is the natural Conie- 
 quence of this Tr^aty^ unlcfs prevented by fomc 
 lucky Incident) muji affe£i the whole Confederacy on 
 
 each 
 
 w 
 
( I? ) 
 
 1^ 
 
 tach Side ; that is, involve all Europe in a War. 
 He tells us likewifc that, by this abfolute Peace 
 'With Spain, all our Rights^ Prhikges and Pojfef" 
 ftom are renewed and cofiJirm*d ^ reafofiable Stipula^ 
 tiotjs are made for Reparations of pafi Damages ; 
 and the ftrong^ Ohligations given for putting our 
 
 Trade on the Foot of former Treaties. Such grofs 
 
 Aflcrtions as Theie, the dull Crambe repetita of 
 every Court Scrihhiery require no Anfwer. They 
 
 defervc only our Contempt. 1 ihall thcrcibrc 
 
 pafs over all his trite Pancgyrick on prudent and 
 Jieady Meafures ; (which He afterwards calls, fome- 
 what more properly, an Appearance of Steadinefs 
 and Force ^ ) fuccefsful Negotiations ; unwilling^ 
 fiefs to put the Nation to an estraordinary Expencey 
 by any unneceffary Precautions : the happy Effe^fs of 
 the Treaty o/* Hanover ; and the happy Coficlujion of 
 the Treaty of Seville ! 1 will not, I i:^LY'i en- 
 deavour to rob any Perfons of the fecret Plcafurc 
 and Gratification, which fuch hiccnfe may give 
 them. 
 
 But as this whole Dedudlion of Arguments is 
 evidently made to recommend the Contmuance of 
 twelve Thoufand Heflian Troops in our Pay ; I will 
 confidcr that Affair, as it delerves, in a manner 
 ^^rtXy ferious and partly ludicrous • for though the 
 Cafe of thefe Troops is become a Point of very fo- 
 ber Confequcnce to Great-Britain • yet the Rea- 
 foning of this Author^ in their Behalf, is fo ridicu- 
 lous, that it is impoffiblc for the gravefl Man to 
 prcferve his Temper, and forbear burfting out, now 
 and then, into a Fit of Laughter. 
 
 In order to obviate the Clamours indujirioujly ralfcd 
 againfi the Heflian Troops^ which this Nation hathy 
 tf late Tearsy been obligd to maintainy (for I fhall 
 not enter into any Debate, at prefent, concerning 
 
 C a the 
 
 t 
 
(20) 
 
 the Numhe)' ef our Forces at hnvie ) He engages 
 to prove that They were firft taken into our Pay, 
 ancl Jincc continued, in Coiifcqaence of Treaties, 
 wade for the lutcrcfi of Grcat-Hritain, and the Pre" 
 fcrjdtion of the Peace and Eallance of Kuropc, in" 
 dependent of any other Iiitereji and Con/Ueratton 
 whatfoei'er. 
 
 li He had fucccedcd in this Undertaking^ it 
 would have faved nic the Trouble ol an) Reiwirks ; 
 but I think it demonftrablc rhat He hith not 
 brought one tolerable Argument to lupport his Pro- 
 portion. That the He (ft an Troops were taken in- 
 to our Pay, /// Confeqticncc of Treaties^ [ ihall not 
 deny, \\hcther thofe Treaties ivere made foldy 
 for the Iiitereji of Great Britain, and the Prefer" 
 nation of the Peace and Bal lance of Europe • ap- 
 pears in ibme Mcafure alrcad)' b)' the happy Ef-" 
 fe£fs ofthem^ and my preceding Obfervations. ]3ut 
 let us now examine a little more particularly how the 
 Jntereft of Great Britain^ as well as the Peace and 
 Ballance of Europe^ makes the (Continuation of this 
 great Expencc neceflary to us. 
 
 The Conjiderer tells us that immediately after 
 the Conclulion of the Treaty of Hanover^ the CoU" 
 fequences of the Vienna Treaty began to jheisu them" 
 felves op&}ily^ and obliged his late Majelly to ap- 
 ply to his Parliament for extraordinary Affiftance ; 
 ^hich 'Was agreed tOy faj s he, hy an Addrcfs of 
 the Hoafe of Commons ^ on the i^thof March^ 17 2d, 
 nvho deftred Him " not only to encreafe his Num- 
 *' ber oi Seamen^ but to concert fuch other Meafures, 
 *' as would beft conduce to the Security of the 
 *' Trade and Navigation of this Kingdom and 
 *' the Prefervation of the Peace of Europe • with 
 *^ AlFurances that They would eiicdlually make 
 " good ALL 5uc« ExpeNCiiS and Engage- 
 ments 
 
T 
 
 f 
 
 d 
 
 :h 
 
 ce 
 
 ^** 
 
 (ii ) 
 
 " MEKTS, as fliould be made for obtaining thofc 
 
 " great and defircablc Ends A moll ample 
 
 Vote of Credit indeed ! 1 hope it is not quoted 
 by Way ot* Precedent^ or to prepare the Nation 
 for one of the fame Natiin this Year. 
 
 At this Jiuicfure^ fays the Conjidcrer^ and in 
 Confcqtience of the Meafures^ concerted befweeu bis 
 Majefty and his Alhcs^ the late King agreed with 
 the Landgrave of Hcllc Caflcl for a Body of twelve 
 thou/and Heflians, to be ready to march for his 
 Majejly*s Service upon Demand, 
 
 We are told that France likewife incrcas'd their 
 Forces very conlidcrably, for the Sake of the 
 common Cattfe ; and that the Dutchj having acce- 
 ded to the 'Treaty of Hanover^ immediately fro* 
 ceeded to an Augmentation of their Troops • re* 
 quiring at the fame Ttme^ that England and 
 rVance would have their rcfpc^ive J^iiotas of 
 twelve thoufand Men in readinefs and at Hand ior 
 the Defence of the Rcpublick*, /// Cafe of an tm* 
 mediate Attack ; which They bad tnorc Reafon to 
 apprehend than any of the Allies, on Account of 
 their Situation^ with jRefpe^ to the Imperial Gar^ 
 rifons in the low Countries^ on one Side, and their 
 being expofedy on the other, to the Forces of the 
 King of Pruifia, who had been lately gained by the 
 Emperor From hence i t appears very plain- 
 ly that England need not have courted Holland in- 
 to an Allyance^ which was fb nccellary to her De" 
 fence againfi immediate Attctchs^ whillt England 
 was far removed irom the Danger \ and 1 hive 
 fhewn before that France was llill more concerned 
 in Point of particular inter efi^ to oppofc the L'> 
 %ns of the Vienna Treaty*^ though I hope ir will 
 prove at laft, that fhe had fame Regard to rb* 
 immou Caiife in the Augmentation of her i^'orcc:;; 
 
 but 
 
but it is certain, from this very State of the Cafe, 
 that England^ being thus remotely concem'd in the 
 Confequenccs of that Treaty might have hold a 
 flower Pace and involv'd her felt' in fewer Incon" 
 veniemes than Ihe hath felt, as well as procur'd 
 
 more Advantages than fhc hath gain'd- But 
 
 let us hear the Couftderer a little fa 'thcr. 
 
 This equitable Demandy fays He, on the Part of 
 the States could hardly have been anfwe/d by the 
 Kingy if He had rais'd no Troops but in England.— 
 Why ? — Becaufe the Dutch, it feems, are too well 
 acquainted with the Accidents of the Sea^ and the 
 JOt^.culties and Delays^ which attend the Tranfport" 
 ing great Bodies of Troops y to depend uponfuch Help 
 in a Cafey which if it happened at ally would be 
 fudden and too quick to be withjlood by flow Move' 
 
 ments. ^Therefore it is ncceflary to keep 
 
 twelve thoufand foreign Troops in conftant Readi- 
 nefs, at the Expence of Great'Britain^ to march 
 to their Affifbnce. 
 
 This is furely one of the moft frivolous Argu- 
 ments that was ever advanc'd in a Point of fuch 
 Confcqucnce. Will any Man, except this Authory 
 pretend to {-xy that the Accidents of the Seay and 
 the Difficulties of tranfporting Troops from England 
 to Holland, are a fufiicicnt Reafon for the Expence 
 of maintaining fuch a Body o{ foreign Troops ? 
 What Power could intercept them ? France was 
 an original Ally in the Treaty of Hanover ; and 
 furely Spain was not able to cope with the Fleets 
 of England and Holland / Nothing therefore but 
 the common Accidents of the Sea could interrupt our 
 Succours; and are We to avoid them, by fuch a 
 conftant Burthen of Expence as a Land Tax of fix 
 Pence in the Poundy and, what is ftill worfe, carried 
 9ut of the Kingdom ? But cve;i allowing That to 
 
 be 
 
( 15 ) 
 
 be true, agalnft the Evidence of common Senfc, 
 will it be laid that thefe Troops are the mofi pro* 
 perly plac'd for this Purpofe in cafe of Need f Can 
 We luppofe that the Landgrave of Heffe would 
 leave his own Dominions in a defcncclers Condi- 
 tion, in calc of any fudden Attempt from the K/- 
 ifitia Alliesj and march immediately to the Aflift- 
 ancc of Hollatjd ? — Or, even lUppoling Him fo ho- 
 nourably regardlcfs of his own Safety, as to run 
 any Hazards in the Execution of his Engagements \ 
 might not the March of thcfe "ftoops into i/o/- 
 latid be attended with many more 4ccidetjtSy Diffi- 
 culties and Delays^ than the Trar^ortation of Suc- 
 cours from E«^/^//i r* 
 
 But there is a'nother Gonfidcration, which ren- 
 ders this Argument Hill more ridiculous. The Cof/fi- 
 derer feems to allude to tJie Cafe of Embdeii^ when 
 He fpeaks of our Obligations to fupport Holland 
 againft the Attacks of the King of PruJ/ia ; where- 
 as the Troops oi Hejfe Cafjcl can never be employ'd 
 to affift the Dutch to protedi that Place againft the 
 Execution of a Decree of the Anlick Council, It 
 appears from the Papers in Rmijfet^ (Tom. 4.) that 
 the State'- of Holland dovit pn^tend to difpute the 
 Authority of that Court of J'u/ltce. 1 hey only 
 foUicitcd the Court of Vienna to fufpend the Exe^ 
 cu^ion of that Decree, in hopes that Matters might 
 be amicably made up between tl le Prince and the 
 States ofEaJi Friejland. They exhorted the Prince 
 to defift from the Rigour of that Decree in his Fa- 
 vour, and fay that 1 hey are inte refted in the Con- 
 fcquence of the Execution of it., as it maybe the 
 Expullion of their Garrifon, whi ch They have kept 
 there 120 Years, tofecure the Obfervation of Con- 
 ventions between the Prince 3.nd States ofEaJiFrief 
 land. They fay like wife that the Honey lent by their 
 
 Sub- 
 
 ■V I 
 
 I 
 
( 2.4) 
 
 Subjedbs to the States of Kaft Frieflaud WAX be in 
 Danger of being loft, it^ the Form of Government, 
 cftahlifh'd in that Country, Ihould be changed ; and 
 farther, They have always delired their Allies to 
 fupport their Inftances at the Court of Vienna for 
 the Mitigation of this Decree. They at length 
 
 ^^y {J^^b 9> ^7^^*) ^^'^^ They hope tht Allies 
 will conlider This as Cafus Foederis, They deiire 
 it may be canicd to the Congrefs, Count Zttizeti" 
 dorf^Qvixts it ^o be a Matter, that can be conlldcr- 
 td there, becaulj^* the Decree of the Attltck Council 
 regarded only the Adminiltration of Juftice in the 
 Empin-, When K^ticc was callM upon to back the 
 Inftances of the Stail'^ at Vienna^ fhe faid that^^ 
 would^ fro}/? Jffh'Sfion for their Intevefis ; insinuating 
 that llie was not oblig\t Let any one therefore 
 judge whether in a Matxer> thus circumftanc'd, and 
 thus thought of by one of the Allies of Hanover, a 
 Prince oj the Empire would run the Hazard of 
 being put to the Ban of the F^mpire for oppoling, 
 by his Troops, the Execution of a Decree oj a Court 
 
 of J u (lice oj the Empi-re. Sec Roujfetj Tom. 4. 
 
 p. 498, ^c. 
 
 Nor can t?jefe Troops^ or the Troops of Hanover 
 (vvhich are laid likevvifc to be conlidcrably augment- 
 ed upon the HanoF-oer ^Treaty) be cmploy'd, lor ihc 
 fame Realbn, to niake a T3ivcrlion in Germany^ by 
 attacking the Ew ferors hereditary Dominions^ or 
 cthcrwile ading orfenfively in the Empire^ without 
 offending againlt Ithe Laws of the Empire, The 
 ELdor of //woz^rr, and the Landgrave of //^ 
 Cm I (Tel are oV-iig'd, as Members ol the Gerinanick 
 Body^ to aliiit the . Emperor to proted the Rights 
 and Privileges of tl ic Empire^ when invaded by any 
 Attempts to inrrodu ce Troops into their Fiejs with- 
 out their Confentj which Confent the contradling 
 
 Parties 
 
(in 
 
 f 
 »„ 
 
 Parties to the Seville Treaty have declared, b}' the 
 Treaty of ^uachitpk Allyauce^ to be nccelFary ; 
 and unlcls there is Ibiiie other Treaty beiides That 
 lign*d by Lord Townjh'^nd and General Diemar (for 
 That refers only to tlie Cafe of the Hano'ver Trea- 
 ty) there can arife no Cafe upon the Seville -Treatyy 
 which will oblige thufc Troops to adt cither offen" 
 Jively or defenfively. 
 
 Oar Author proceeds in the following fagacious 
 
 Manner. — But here^ perhaps^ it will he askUd 
 
 what hath Great-Britain to do with this String of 
 foreign Troops ? What have We to apprehend jrom 
 the Forces of Pruliia, Mufcovy, or the Emperor ? 
 What Good can the Swedes^ the Danes, the Hef- 
 
 lians, or the Hanoverians do us ? Aye, what 
 
 indeed ? Our Author would do well to give a bet- 
 ter Anfwer to thefe Queries, But He goes on 
 
 with the fame judicious Obfervations. It was 
 
 our Euftmfs to lie by ; to wait ; and fee the Confc" 
 quences and Events of the Vienna Treaty, and to 
 take our Meafures accordingly^ at a proper Seafon. 
 
 «-No Doubt on*t, Mr. Conjtderet ; but you leem 
 
 to think that you have cut us quite down in what 
 follows. It would ht unfair therefore not to quote 
 
 it, ^ This iiideed^ fiy you, would hanie been a 
 
 prudent Step^ if the Terms of the Vienna Treaty, 
 and the Meafures taken^ and the Forces raised in 
 Confequence of it^ by the contraSfing Parties^ had 
 not been direflly levelled at the Intereji of Great- 
 Britain. This would be a voy plauftble Do^rine^ if 
 the PoffeffioHS of Gibraltar and Port-Mahon ; // the 
 Trade to Italy and Spain, to the Ealt and Weit-In- 
 dies, and the Baltick ; // the Ballance of Europe, 
 and the preient, happy Eftablifhment were becoms 
 indiffer«Ht Things to this Nation ; as indeed^ ove 
 ''muld thinky Tibey were^ efpccially the lalt, ly the 
 
 D 
 
 iHikh 
 
Cz6) 
 
 weekly Ueeutious Writings of fome Gentlemen^ who 
 would he thought to he Men of no little Confequence. 
 
 1 have but a ilngle Objedlion to all 
 
 this Vein of Ihrcwd Rcafoning ; which is, that 
 every one of the Points, mention d by the AuthoTy 
 remains to be prov'd, as I have obferv'd before ; 
 and if They cannot be proved, He plainly owns 
 the Folly of our Condud. As to the laji Pointy 
 I Ihall have Occafion to confidcr that Charge in a- 
 nother Place ; and will only obferve, at prefent, that 
 thofe Gentlemen^ to whom He alludes, cannot have 
 difcover'd a greater Indifference to the prefent^ hap^ 
 py EJlabliJhmenty in their weekly^ licentious Writings^ 
 than fome other Gentlemen have difcover*d, by their 
 extraordinary Meafures, to the Trade of this King* 
 dom and the Ballance of Europe • the former of 
 which is, I am afraid, too manifeflly negotiated 
 into French Hands, and the latter very much im- 
 paired, in its moll beneficial Branches, by fome 
 late wife Treaties. 
 
 Having given us thefe exquilitc Rcafons for 
 taking the HeJJlan Troops into our Pay, He pro- 
 duces a MuJleT'Roll of the Forces on both Sides, as 
 They Hood in the Year 1727 ; which I Ihall draw 
 up in oppofite Columns, or (to ufe the Autho/% 
 Words) in Battle Array j againll each other. 
 
 T© 
 
f" 
 
 (^7) 
 
 To Hatjovet Allyance, 
 
 Land Forces. 
 F.nglipy ■— 26,000. 
 French J — 160,000. 
 Dutchy — 50,000. 
 Hancfveriansy — 22,000. 
 Danesy — 24,000. 
 lieffianSy — 1 2,000. 
 S^iVedeSy — 10,000. 
 
 Sum total — 
 
 304,000. 
 
 To Vienna AJlyance. 
 
 Land Forces. 
 Imperial^ — • 227,000. 
 PruJ/tany — 70,000, 
 Spanijby — 60,000, 
 Mufco'vitey — 30,000, 
 
 Sum total — • 387,000, 
 Dedudt -^ j04,ooo» 
 
 I Xo Ballancc, - 83,000, 
 
 I wonder the Oujtderery when He was giving 
 •us a Lift of the confederate ForceSy (as He cx- 
 preiles it) on both Sides, fhould forget our great 
 Ally, the Duke of Wblfenbuttle ; who entered into 
 a Guaranty of all the Britijb Dominions ; and fti- 
 pulated, I think, to furnilh a Body of 5000 Men, 
 in Cafe of need ; but perhaps, He conlider'd the 
 fecret Articles of that Allyance; by which it is pro- 
 vided that thefe Troops are not to move out of 
 Germany in our Defence. — Let us therefore return 
 to the State of the tivo Allyances of Hanover and 
 Vienna, as They ftood in the Year 1727^ upon 
 which OUT Author makes the folio wing Remark —7![?«j 
 Matters Jiood in 1 727, when ahnoji all the Powers 
 of Europe wercy direSily or indireitlyy engaged and 
 ranged on the Side of the -Treaty of V^ienna 9f 
 Hanover. 
 
 I hope He will give me Leave to add my Opi- 
 nion that this 4jr^ngcment of the ^''orccs, in re- 
 
 D % gukr 
 
(28 ) 
 
 fe:! 
 
 If!!. 
 
 gular ButtaUa.^ on both Sides, fhcws the bufy Gc* 
 nius of feme Gentlemen^ who have taken great 
 Pains to arm all Europe^ at the Expcncc of their 
 own Country'^ and if They fhould be able to dif- 
 arm it again, at an equal Expcnce, what other 
 Merit will They have, than That of conjuring down 
 a Sfirit of their own railing? — But the Reader will 
 perceive that the Confidenr grows quite ludicrous^ 
 towards the latter End of his Performance; and 
 the Laugh would be jullly turn'd upon us, if We 
 fhould enter into a graije Confutation of his Ar- 
 guments. 
 
 He feems to infinuate, by this Lijl of the Forces 
 on both Sides^ that inftead of 1 2,000 Heffjans our 
 excelkf/t Ml infers ought to have demanded 83,000 ; 
 and that it is owing to their extreme Modera- 
 tion, that the deiireable Work o^ a Peace hath not 
 been yet accomplifhed ; for, according to the j^///(? 
 of T'hree^ if 12^000 Hejjians can procure us 2^. Peace 
 \n five TearSy 83,000 HeJJians would have done 
 it in about the feTetitb Part of that Time. 
 
 To fliew that the Hariffver Allies went on, Hand 
 in Hand together, He tells us that the Dutch not 
 only augmented their Land Forces^ but had Uke^ 
 wife made Preparations to fit out eighteen Men of 
 War, Nay, He might have added that They ac- 
 tually fhew'd out a Fleet, at Spit heady for icvcral 
 Months together; and though it might not, per- 
 haps, be vidluali'd and provided ^or any farther 
 Voyage'^ yet it mufl beconfcfs*dto be an Jppearav^e 
 of Steadinefs and Force^ at leart ; and ccnlidering 
 the great Advantages, which Fji gland hath reaped 
 from the Hanover Ailyance^ it may be put in Bal- 
 lance againfl: the feveral great Squadrons, which 
 Ihc hath been at the Expence offending to all Parts 
 of the World. 
 
 As 
 
ll 
 
 lI- 
 :h 
 
 ts 
 
 ( ^9 ) 
 
 As to the Frenchy the y^;«^ jiuthor tcll$ us that 
 They had got every Thing ready for taking tbp 
 Fie/cL The only Queftion was where -Theypouid 
 take the Field • and at lall a very wife T[ hought 
 jumpd into the Head of a certain Getitlemaji^ 'viz. 
 to whofe Advantage the fivents even of a fuccefsful 
 W ar might tnrn ^ which hath hitherto prevented 
 them Jirom taking the Field any where. 
 
 However, this equal Co-operation of the Hano' 
 ver Allies^ with our Hejpan Auxiliaries, made the 
 Emperor look about Him, and confcnt to a Plan of 
 Preliminaries ^ which would certainly haveproducM 
 an abfoltite Peace^ long before the Treaty of Seville 
 eficdlcd it; had not iSpain heen provok'd at thefe Steps ^ 
 taken without her Approbation, and entertained fome 
 fmall Hopes of Diflurhances in England, on Account 
 of the late King's Death, It may be ask'd, per- 
 haps, what Hopes, of this Nature, Spain could poi^ 
 iibly entertain upon his prefent Majelly's Accelfion 
 to the Throne with the general Acclamations of all 
 Parties? I anfvver, from the Change of the Mintjlry\ 
 which would have occafion'd Dijlurhances , no 
 Doubt, of the utmoll Gonfequcnce to all Europe^ 
 
 However, thefe feparate Negotiations with the 
 Emperor (which his Minijiers were artfully drawn 
 into) gave fuch Umbrage to ty^^/;/, that They like- 
 wife came into feparate Negotiations with us and 
 concluded that ahfolute Peace, caird the Treaty of 
 Seville, which gave the Emperor Umbrage, in his 
 Turn ; and This is the Foot, which We ftand up^ 
 on at prelent. 
 
 Here the Co;//?^tfrfr asks another wife Qucflion ; 
 or, which is much the (imie Thing, puts it into the 
 Mouth ot' an Adverfary, 
 
 But of what Ufe, lays He, can the Heflians he 
 for the ExecutiQn of the treaty of Seville ; and 
 
 parti' 
 
( ?o) 
 
 
 fartictdarh for the htroduBion of Spanifh Garri" 
 fons into Tufcany and Parma ? 
 
 In Anfwer to This, the Coiiftderer gives us many 
 weighty Arguments, to Ihew that thefi Troops 
 are of the utmoft Ufe, not only upon this Occa- 
 fion, but likewife upon all Occalions, that can pof- 
 fibly happen in Europe. 
 
 In order to fet this Matter in the clcareft Light, 
 I muft defire the Reader to recollcdt that it ap- 
 pears by the Account of the two Allyances^ a.s it 
 Hood when Spain and the Emperor were toge- 
 ther, that the Land Forces on the Vienna Side 
 over-ballanc'd Thofe of the Hanover Allies by 
 83,000 Men ; but the Forces of Spain^ ( viz, 
 60,000) being taken from one Side and plac'd to 
 the otker^ will make the Confederates of Hanover 
 more numerous than Thofe o^ Vienna by 37,000 ♦ 
 from whence it may be inferred, perhaps, that 
 there is not fo great a Neceflity of the 1 2000 
 HeJJi-'ns ; which would be true, if it were fix'd 
 on wnich Side the Hefjlans are to Idc ; but as it 
 is yet impoflible to know which of the two Pow- 
 ers ( Spain or the Emperor ) will be moll refradto- 
 ry ; and as Care muft be always taken of the 
 Ballance q( Europe ; it follows, according to this 
 Gentleman's incomparable Reafoning, that there 
 will always be a Necellity of keeping up the Hef 
 Jiansy whether the Emperor or Spain ftands out, 
 or both^ in order to maintain the Ballance of £«- 
 rope. 
 
 In fl irt^ I cannot compare the Author's Rea- 
 foning m this moil excellent Dillertation, to any 
 'Tiling, .at a ftrong Cbain^ conlifting of fevcral 
 Links; each of which, as it is infrangible in its 
 fclf, fo is it infcparable from any of the reft, 
 It is nccctliiry therefore to lay it out at its full 
 
 length, 
 
 r. 
 
( 31 ) 
 
 U' 
 
 al 
 ts 
 
 ill 
 
 i I I 
 
 Length, in order to form a true Judgment of it, 
 and then obfervc how the whole is conneftcd for 
 the Intereft of Great Britahi. 
 
 In dcmonftraring the Neceflity of keeping up 
 the HeJJians^ the Author proceeds in the follow- 
 ing Manner ; and the firft Joint of his Sorites^ or 
 Rafs Tally is a Pofiulattimy which nobody mull 
 deny, viz. 
 
 I. j>. 6. It mtiji he allowed hy all that the T^a- 
 ty of Vienna laid the Foundation of a formida- 
 ble Power in Europe ^ by the Union of the two Fa- 
 milies, of Spain and Jtiftria* 
 
 1, p, 8. The Vienna Treaty made the Coun- 
 ter- Allyance oi Hanover abfolutely neceflary. 
 
 3. />. 14. The Treaty of Hanover made itnc- 
 ceffiiry to take i a,ooo tiejjians into our Pay. 
 
 4. p. 15. That the Accidents of the Sea made 
 it necefTary to keep up the Heffians^iox the Protedtion 
 of Holland, 
 
 5. /). 27. The Jealoufy of the French and 
 Dutch of the Advantages to Great Britain^ by 
 the Afftento Trade^ made it neceflary to keep up 
 the ,Hej[/ians. 
 
 6. p, 28. The Peace not being yet concluded, 
 at the Congrefs of SoiJJonSy made it neceflary to 
 continue the Hejpans, 
 
 7. P. 29. If We had appeared at the Congrefs in 
 a naked Pojiwce^ by disbanding the HtJKanSy the 
 French would not have flood by us in Defence of 
 Gibraltar or Port^Mahon, Therefore it was necet* 
 fary to keep up the HeJftanSy that We might be in 
 a Rcadinefs to affifl France^ in order to make 
 France ready to affifl us. 
 
 8. p, 3 2. The Treaty of Seville could never 
 have been accomplifhcd without the HeJJiam ; and 
 therefore the Security of our Pojfejfions and ^cfull 
 
 Enjoyment 
 
( 3i ) 
 
 ^jjjoymefjt of our Commerce^ as well as the Separa-^ 
 tion of Spain from the Emperor are intircly owing 
 to the Heffians. 
 
 p. p. 34. As the Hejpafis were neceflary to 
 make the Emperor and Spain quarrel, fo they 
 are no Icfs neceflary to make them agree ; and 
 confcquently it is r. xefl^ry to keep up the Hefpans^ 
 till the Peace of Europe is abfolutely eoncluded. 
 
 1 1. />. 36. As there are now but fmall Hopes of 
 gaining the Emperor's Confent to the Introdudtion 
 of Spanip Troops, by Way of Negotiation ; and 
 as it is impoffible to do it by Force^ without the 
 Hejpans \ Spain hath a Right, by the Treaty of 
 Sevilky to demand the Helfians ; for why fhould 
 England expeSi to reap the Fruits offiiccefsful NegO' 
 nations^ without Expence? 
 
 12. P. 42. The Emperor having, at prcicnt, 
 a large Body of Forces in Italy.^ makes it necef- 
 fary to keep up the Heffians, 
 
 13. lb, France being both unable and unwilling 
 to make a Diverfion upon the Rhine or in Flanders^ 
 it is neceflary to keep up the Heffians^ for this 
 Purpofe like wife. 
 
 14. P 45. The Weaknefs of the Fjnperor is aa 
 good a Reafon as his Strength for keeping up the 
 HeJJtans, 
 
 15. P. 47. It is plain tlv.it the Htffians arc 
 not kept up, for the Sake of the King*s foi-eign 
 Dominions:^ and yet his Majcfty hath a Right ta. 
 demand the HeJfianSy for the Detcncc oi' thofe 
 Dominions, 
 
 15. P. 51, 52. The Diftrefs of Tl-ade^ the 
 Lofs of Gibraltar and Portmahon^ the Reparation 
 of Dunkirk^ the Violation of all cur T^^eaties^ the 
 total Subverlion of the Proteftant Eftablilhmcnt in 
 the Houfe ofHanovery and thro'-juing the whole World 
 
 int9 
 
 i 
 
 \ 
 
C5J) 
 
 > 
 
 itito Confttfioji^ will be the fiital Gonfcqucnccs of 
 ' disbanding the H'^ffiafjs, 
 
 From whence it follows that it is a moji abo^ 
 minabh PraSfice to talk of the Debts of the Na» 
 tioffy and fetiding Momy abroad to fay foreign 
 droops in a Point of fuch publick Utility — as the 
 HeJJiam. The Hejfians ! who are the Triarii of 
 Great Britain-^ her laft Refort in all Cafes, both 
 in Peace and War'^ both at Home and Abroad *y 
 howfoever allyd^ or whercfoever dijirefid! 
 
 But Wc mull now be a little fcrious again ; 
 for the Sttbjc6i reouires it, though not the Author 
 or his Manner of Reafoning. 
 
 Although this DeduSfion^ fays He, is gone into 
 ^ fi i^^^^ ^ Length ; yet it feems neccjfaryj before I 
 conclude^ to remove fome InJimiationSy indujlrioujly 
 fpread again ft the Heffian Troops • as if they were 
 mt hired^ or continued in our Pay^ for the Sake and 
 Intereji of Great Britain. 
 
 I think the Author Himfclf hath pretty plainly 
 confirmed the Truth of fuch lnftnuations\ but He 
 prudently lays theiii to the Charge oi the Enemies 
 of the GoFi^ernment ; (that is of the Miniflry^) who 
 are, in aManncr,defy'dto produce one Reafon orFaSf^ 
 during the Negotiations and TranfaBions offo many 
 J^earSy to fbcju the Probability offttch an Imputa- 
 tion ; and if the Author is rightly inform* d^ not one 
 Word had pafid for fome Tears^ before the Conclu" 
 /ton of the Treaty of Vienna, about Bremen and 
 
 Verhden. ^Though I am no Enemy of the Go* 
 
 *vernmenty I very much fufpedl the Truth of this 
 Information^ and think myfclf able to pro\e the 
 Falihood of it ; but as I have not Room to enter 
 into fuch a Dedudlion, at prefrnt, I iliall content 
 myfelf with prdcncing the Confuierer^ with a Paf^ 
 fagc out of the Works ot one of his Felloiv^La" 
 leurers in the Minijfry • by Kame Francis Waljtng" 
 
 E kamy 
 
^ 
 
 (54) 
 
 kaffty Elq; who, in Order to Ihcw the fupcrior 
 Fidelity of the • French to the Germans ^ gave us 
 the following judicious Intimation, in his Fre^ 
 firiton oi Thurfday Noi'ember the l6th y 1730 j 
 
 K^. 52 ; Fiad the antiem Proverb of German 
 
 Faith been ijifalhbky a certain great Prince had 
 granted an Investiture ^ which He once fo^ 
 lemnly promifed^ on a lery valuable Conlideratio/; \ 
 jjor would He have cspeBed a Million sterling, 
 
 as a rejrefiifig Fee, 1 do v. A quote this low 
 
 Fellow^ by Way of Authority^ but oiJy lor thp 
 Sake o^ Information ; for as contemptible a Writer 
 as He is in HimicUi He fometimcs blabs out Se^ 
 cretSy which arc intrullcd to Plim, in Confidence, 
 
 by his Pay^majler* I wilh therefore He would 
 
 let us know, who this certain Prince is j what hi" 
 vejiitiire He means ; what valuable Conftderation 
 was paid for it ; and from whom tfjat Prince hath 
 
 expcdled a Million Sterlings as a refrejhing Fee 
 
 1'he Refolution of thelc Qucftions might, perhaps, 
 clear up the Difpute, whether Sicily was granted 
 ^s an Equivalent to the Emperor for his Confcnt 
 to the Difpofition of the Italian Dominionsy in 
 Favour of Don Carlos, 
 
 The Votes of Parliajnent^ which the jiuthor 
 quotes in Juflification of the Hcjpavs^^nd. for the Sup- 
 port of his MajcHy's foreign DomifJionSy'ciYc very little 
 to the Purpofe ; becauic what is prudent at one 
 
 ffime may not be prudent at ^all 'Times, ? 
 
 Befidcs, I prefumc, this Aithor will not iqfift upon 
 a Vote of Parliament as an unanfwcrable Argument 
 in it feli for the Wifdom, or Reafonablenefs of 
 any Medfure. The Defeat of the Spaniih Fleet 
 in the Mediterranean^ if I miftakc not, was voted 
 by Parliament a wife and jtiji ABion ; and yet our 
 Mtnijiers feem to hay^ quit(? difiercnt Sentiments 
 of it, at prcfept? 
 
 / 
 
 i 
 
 ^ 
 
/ 
 
 ^ 
 
 (30 
 
 The Confidcrer puts the Dominions of Hamviv 
 Upon the fame Foot with all other Dominions in 
 Allyatice with us ; and from thence argues that 
 thry have an equal Right to our Protcdtion ; efpc- 
 ci.tily if they were attack'd out of Rcfeutnicnt for 
 bis Majelly's Condu(5t as King of Great Brit aw ^ 
 But, even fuppoling This to be the Cafe, arc they 
 not a Weight upon the Strength of England r Are 
 they not a conflant Pledge, as it were, in the Em» 
 perors Hands ; which may tempt Him, at any 
 Time, to inlift upon high Terms? Or would it be 
 in his Power to molefl us at all, if it were not for 
 tbefe Dominions ? 
 
 The AiithciT Ipeaks out at lull, and tells us very 
 plainly that though there is no formal Allyance be 
 tween Great }3ritain and Hanov^ • {the ^lality of 
 King and Eledtor refid'tng in the fame Perfon) yet 
 the Union between the two Governments^ and the 
 Obligations of mutual Defence and Guaranty are 
 as ffrongly and neceffmly imply' dj as the moji for" 
 vial T'reaties and Conventions could pojfibly make 
 them. 
 
 What Union of the tzvo Governments can the 
 Author pofRbly mean ? Though We have the Hap- 
 pijicfs of living under the fame Prince^ I thank 
 God, We do not live under the fame Form of Gc^ 
 vernment. Ours is limited'^ theirs is abfolute ; and 
 whilll this Difference fubfifls, there can be no 
 Union between them. But if the Obligations of 
 mutual Defence and Guaranty are as ftrongly and 
 fieceffarily imply* d as the mofi formal Treaties and 
 Conventions could pojjibly make thevi \ I Ihould be glad 
 to be informed what Effed: that excellent Provi- 
 fion in the Aoi of Settlement can ever have, which 
 was made to fecure us from the Danger and £x- 
 pence of Wars^ on Account of any Dominions^ twt 
 Ifekn^ing^ to the Impefial Crown ofthefe Kingdoms, 
 
ili 
 
 It ' 
 
 I' : 
 
 l; ';l 
 
 
 i "'i.. 
 
 ( 3<f ) 
 
 y%e Jingle ^leflion is (2^3 our A/tbor ftates It 
 Hirafclf ) wbethar the Contitmance of the Heflian 
 Troops^ in the Pay of Great Britain, be for the Ho^ 
 mur and Intereji oj the King and this Kingdom:^ 
 which, I hope, hath been fairly examined in the 
 preceding Pages. 
 
 The only Obfcrvation, that Ifhall make farther. 
 is, that though our Juthor deftres this Contrwerjy 
 may be confined to the true Merits of the ^teJUoUy 
 without any MfreprefentationSy yet He conclude* 
 with the bafcft Rcflcf^ion on thofe Genfkinen^ who 
 difier from Him in this Mcafure, as Pcrfons, who 
 are really grienjedy not that IVe have any Thing to 
 do with Hanover Dominions ; bttt that We ba'oi 
 any -Thing to do with the Eledor of Hanover. 
 
 'As infamous as the Defign of this Refledion is, 
 I will venture to fay there are multitudes of Perfons, 
 in this Kingdom, zcatoufly affcded to the Elector of 
 Hano^efy who heartily wiih that We had nothing to 
 do juith the Hanover Dominions; but, We muft ak^ 
 ways cxpedt thefc mean Arts from Men, who want 
 better Arguments ; for as no Bifhnp^ m King was 
 the Cant-Exprcllion of one Reign; it is now tuirn'd 
 into //o W- hy no Houfe oj Hanover \ '^^-•■ 
 
 But We truft in his Majcfly's Wifdom, that 
 He will not only fcparate the Royal QmraSlef' 
 from the Minijiery but likewife confider 'liimfelf 
 in a double Capacity y as King of Great Britain and 
 Elcdlor of Hanover, He will have the Goodnefs 
 to excufe the laudable Partiality of Engli&tmen to* 
 wards their own Country y and not make the Qtfe of 
 Twelve Thoufand Heffians (which They may appre-^ 
 hend to be an ufclcfs Burthen upon them) the only ^ 
 Criterion of Loyalty to his Perfon and AiTc&ion 
 to his Government, ^ >. x ... a^a^^^^ -v-u^-r.^ :. ^ 
 
 '■".K 
 
 ■;..v':^.r^ 
 
 --■If ■ . :; 
 
 ' ■ v. .' V 
 
 '^•■i'['*.miV.: 
 
 
 ■*v 
 
 A 
 
 / 
 
/