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Tous les autres exemplaires originaux sont filmis en commenqant par la premiere page qui comporte une empreinte d'impression ou d'iliustration et en terminant par la derniire page r|ui comporte une telle empreinte. Un des symboles suivants apparaitra sur la derniire image de chaque microfiche, selon le cas: le symbols — ► signifie "A SUIVRE". le symbols Y signifie "FIN ". Les cartes, planches, tableaux, etc.. peuvent dtre fiimis d des taux de reduction diffirents. Lorsque le document est trop grand pour dtre reproduit en un seul clich6. il est film6 A partir de I'angle supArieur gauche, de gauche d droite, et de haut en bas. en prenant le nombre d'images n6cessaire. Les diagrammes suivants iliustrent la m^thode. 1 2 3 1 2 3 4 5 6 . /^v p.--^ ■I^> *.. Z , / ^ /^ . ^. p.'-^ f in/ our f/oods : it co/istl tufts n i/rcat part of our trtnlc : — //// this (it lidtit we should, lose. Another illusion — Must y*'" '^;>)V(Mii a people in order to sell yotir i^uods to llieiii ! Is tlien^ that peopU; upon earth who do not buy t;()ods of you? Yon sell uoods to iiritiiin, don't you .' And do y(jn jvovtun lintain .' When ii colonist sends you sui^ar, does he <;ive it yon for nothinin' ! Does not he make you ^ive him value tor it .' — Give value lor it then, and yon will hav(; it still. When ho is his ov.ii master, will the sui;ar he cannot use, be less a burthen to him than it is now? Will ho be less in want of whatever it is he now buys with sui;ar I What you now s(dl to him, sup|)ose you were to sell it to him no longer, would you be the poorer? Is there nobody else that would buy it.' Is it worth nothing? — What is it to you to whom you sell your{j;oods? When do you know before hand w hetber it is John or Thonjas that will buy, or that will consume yom- !j,oods .'' and if yon did, what would you be the better ? — Are you then really afraid of not finding any thing- to produce that shall find purchasers ? Is it that what you can find to sell is worth nothing, and what you want to buy worth every thing ? If sucli be your danger, what is your colonist's ? What you want of him is luxury, what he wants of you is existence. Sup])ose lie gets the article, whatever it be, corn or any thing ; su|)pose he gets it for the moment from some other shop instead of yours. Is there a grain the more corn in the world to sell in consequence of this change of his, or a single mouth the less that wants corn and has money or money's worth to give for it ? By buying at that other shop, does not he empty that shop of so mucli corn, which some otiier customer, who would otherwise have got it at that shop, must now directly or indirectly get of you ? I will tell you a great and important, though too much neglected truth. Thade is the child of caimtal; In proportion to the quantity of capital a country has at its disposal, will, in every country, be the quantity of its trade. While you have no more capital employed in trade than you iiave, all the power on earth cannot give you more trade : while you have the capital you have, all the power upon earth cannot prevent your having the trade you have. It may take one shape or another shape ; it may give you more foreign goods to consume, or more home goods ; it may give you more of one sort of goods; or more of another ; but the quantity and value of the goods of all sorts it gives you, will always be the same, without any diti'erence which it is possible to ascertain or worth while to think about. — I am a merchant, I have a capital of £10,000 in trade : Suppose the whole Spanish West Indies laid open to me, could I carry on more trade with my £10,000 thai I do now ? Sup- pose the French West Indies shut against me ; woald my £10,000 be worth nothing ? If every foreign market were shut up against me without exception, even then would my £10,000 be worth nothing ? If there were no sugar to be bought, there is at any rate land to be improved. If a hundred pounds worth of sugar be more valuable than J tlinji a hundred pounds worth of corn, hutchrr'rt nient, wi' i> n' «.il, still com, butclu'i's meat, wine and oil an; not ahsoliit-ly \v;'.l.')Mt tlu'ir value. II" article ulUa' aitii'le, you wero driven out of every articl(! of y<>"»" li>i'ei|;n trade, the \v»)rst that eotdd happen to yt»u would ho the l)ein>^ reduced to lay out so nnich more than otherwise you would have laid out in the improvement of your land. The sujt- position is inia«^inary and impossible : hut if it wciri; true, is there any thinss hy aeciuent, increase tin; sum of tra«'( . Shut up an old market, you do not, unless l)y accident, or for the moment, dinunish the sum of trad(!. In what ease tlum is thci sum of trade increased by a new market I If the rate of clear profit upon the capital employed in the new trade is greater than it would have been in any old one, and not otherwise. But the existence of this extra profit is always taken for granted, never |)roved. It may indeed be; true; by accident; but ano- ther thiii<;' is taken for granted which is never true : it is, that the ■whole of the profit made upon the caj)ital, which, instead of being employed in some old trade is employed in this new one, is so much addition to the sum of national profit that would otherwise have been made : what is only transferred is considered as creuted. If after making 12 ()er cent. nj)on a capital of €10,000 in an old trade, a nuui made but 10 per cent, upon the same capital in a new trade, who docs not sec, that instead of gaining f 1 !?00 a year, lie, and through him the nation he belongs to, loses £200 by the change : and so it is, if instead of one such merchant there were a hundred. Instead of this £'200 a year loss, your comlfcs fie commerce and boards of trade set down to the national account £1000 a year gain : especially if it be to a very distant and little known jiart of the world, such as a southern whale-fishery, a revolted Spanish colony, or a Nootka Sound : and it is well if they do not set down the whole ca])ital of £10,000 as ga'a into the bargain. Oh, hut we give ourselves a monopoli/ of their produce, and so we get it cheaper than we should otherwise, and so we mahe them pay us for governing them. No^ you, indeed: not a penny: thr attempt is iniquitous, and the profit an illusion. The attempt, I say, is iniquitous : it is an aristocratical abomina- tion : it is a cluster of aristocratical abominations : it is iniquitous towards them ; but much more as among yourselves. Abomination the 1st. Liberty, property, and equality violated on the part of a large class of citizens (the colonists) by preventing them from carrying their goods to the markets which it is supposed would be most advantageous to them, and thence keeping from them so much as it is supposed they would otherwise acquire. Abomination 2d. One part of a nation, (the people of France), taxed to raise money to maintain by force the restraints so imposed upon another part of the nation, the colonists. Abomination 3d. The poor, who after all are unable to buy sugar,— H» J.iHWpiu,,.-.. IULII|W».«< 'WP!"» IM; H the poor in France,— taxed in order to pay the rich for eating it. Ne- cessaries abridged for tlie support of luxury. The burthen falls upon the rich and poor in common : the benefit is shared exclusively by the rich. The injustice is not such in appearance only: as it would be, if what is thus taken oi .neant to be taken from the colonists went to make revenue : it would then be only a mode of taxation. In France (it might then be said) people are taxed one way, in the colonies ano- ther : the only question would then be about the eligibility of the mode. But revenue is here out of the case: nothing goes to the nation in common, every thing goes to individuals : if it is a tax, it is a tax the produce of which is squandered away before collection ; it is a tax the proa ace of which, instead of being gathered into the trea- sury, is given away to sugar-eaters. But even as to sugar-eaters the profit, I say, is an illusion. For does the monopoly you give yourselves against the growers of sugar so much as keep the price of sugar lower than it would be otherwise ? — not a sixpence. Lower than the price at which the commoditv is kept by the average rate of profit on trade in general, no monopoly can reduce the price of this commodity any more than of any other, for any length of time : you may keep your subjects from selling their sugars elsewhere, but you cannot force them to raise it for you at a loss. Lower than this natural price, no monopoly can ever keep it: down to this price, natural competition cannot fail to reduce it, sooner or later, without monopoly. Customers remaining as they were, with- out increase of the numljer of traders there can be no reduction of price. Monopoly, that is, exclusion of customers, has certainly no tendency to produce increase of the number of traders : it may pinch the profits of those whom it first falls upon, but that is not the way to invite others. Monopoly accordingly, as far as it does any thing, produces mischief without remedy. High prices, on the other hand, the mischief against which monopoly is employed as a remedy, high prices, produced by competition among customers, cannot in any degree produce inconvenience, without laying a proportionate founda- tion for the cure. From high profits in trade comes influx of traders, from influx of traders competition among traders, from competition among traders reduction of prices, till the rate ot profit in the trade in question is brought down to the same level as in others. Were it possible for monopoly to keep prices lower than they would be otherwise, would it be possible for any body to tell how much lower, and how many sixpences a year were saved to sugar-eaters by so many millions imposed t pon the: people ? No, never : for since, where the monopoly subsists against the producers, there is nothing but the monopoly to prevent accession of, and competition among the producers, competition runs along with the monopoly, and to prove that any part of the effect is produced by the monopoly and not by the competition, is impossible. Oh, hut we have not done with them yet ? We give ourselves another monopoly — we give ourselves the monopoly of their custom, and so we 9 make them buy things dearer of vs than they would otherwise, besides buying things of us ivhich otherwise they would buy of other people, and so we make them pay us for governiv(j them. Mere illusion — In the articles which you can make better and cheaper than foreigners can, which you can furnish them with upon better terms than foreigners can, not a penny do you get in consequence of the mono- poly, more than you would without it. You prevent their buying their goods of any body but your oA^n people: true: but what does this signify? you do not force them to buy of any one or more of your own people to the exclusion of the rest. Youii .;vvn people then HAVE STILL THE FACULTY OF UNDERSELLING ONE ANOTHER WITHOUT STINT, AND THEY HAVE THE SAME INDUCEMENT TO EXEIinSE THAT FACULTY UNDER THE MONOPOLY AS THEY WOULD HAVE WITHOUT IT. It >; Still the Competition that sets the price. In this case as in the other, the monopoly is a chip in porridge. It is still the proportion of the profit of these branches of trade to the average rate of profit in trade that regulates this competi- tion : it is still the quantity of the capital whicli there is to be em- ployed in trade that regulates the average rate of profit in trade. In the instance of such articles as you can not make better or cheaper than foreigners can, in the instance of articles which you can not furnish them with on better terms than foreigners can, it is still the same illusion, though perhaps not quite so transparent. Not a penny does the nation get (I mean the total number of individuals concerned in productive industry of all kinds) not a penny does the nation get by this preference of bad articles to good ones, more than it would otherwise. In France, any more than any where else, people do not get more by the goods they produce than if there were no such monopoly: for if the rate of profit in the articles thus favoured were higher one moment, competition would pull it down the next. All that results from the monopoly you thus give yourselves of the custom of your colonies is, that goods of all sorts are somewhat worse for the money all over the world than they would be otherwise. People in France are engaged to produce, for the consumption of the French Colonies, goods in which they succeed not so well as England for example, instead of producing for their own consumption, or that of some other nation, goods in which they succeed better than England. People in England, on the other hand, being so far kept from pro- ducing the goods they could have succeeded best in, are in so far turned aside to the production of goods in which they do not succeed so well : and thus it is all the world over. The happiness of mankind is not much impaired perhaps by the difference between wearing goods of one pattern, and goods of another : but, though much is not lost perhaps to any body by the arrangement, what is certain is, that no- thing is gained by it to any body, and particularly to France. Will you beheve experience ? Turn to the United States. Before the separation, Britain had the monopoly of their trade : upon tlie separation of course she lost it. How much less is their trade with Britain now than then ? On the contrary, it is much greater. D 10 'i! ) \ ! All this while, is not the monopoly against the colonists, clogged with a counter-monDpoly ? To make amends to the colonists for their being excluded from other markets, are not the people in France forbid- den to take colony- produce from other colonies, though they could get it ever so much cheaper I If so, would not the benefit to France, if there were any, from the supposed gainful monopoly be outweighed by the burthen of that which is acknowledged to be burthensome? Yes — the benefit is imaginary, and it is clogged with a burthen which is real. Monopoly therefore and counter-monopoly taken together, sugar must come the dearer to sugar-eaters, instead of cheaper : to a certain degree for a constancy ; and nmch more occasionally, when the dearness occasioned by a failure of crops in the French Colonies, is, by the counter-monopoly against France, prevented from being re- lieved by imports from other colonies, where crops have been more favourable. If monopoly favoured cheapness, which it does not, it would favour it to the neglect of another object, steadiness of price, which is of more importance. It is not a man's not having sugar to eat that distresses him : Croesus, Apicius, Heliogabalus had no sugar to eat : what distresses a man, is his not being able to get what he has been used to, or not so much of it as he has been used to. The monopoly against the French Colonies, were it to contribute ever so much to the cheapness of the price, could contribute nothing to the steadiness of it : on the contrary, in consequence of the counter-monopoly it is clogged with, its tendency is to perpetuate the opposite inconvenience, variation. Any monopoly which France gives herself against her colonies, will not prevent any of those accidents in consequence of which sugar is produced in lesr abundance in those colonies than in others : and when it is scarce there, the monopoly against France will prevent France from getting from other places where it is to be had cheaper. How much dearer is sugar in countries which have no colonies than in those which have ? Let those inquire who think it worth the while. They will then see the utmost which in any supposition it would be possible for the body of sugar-eaters in France to lose. Not that this loss could amount to any thing like the above difference : for, in as far as those countries get their sugar from monopohzed Colonies, which must be through the medium of some monopohzing country, the_) get it loaded with the occasional dearth produced thus by the effects of the counter nonopoly above mentioned, and loaded more or less with constant import taxes, besides the expense of circuitous freight and multiplied merchant's profit. May not monopoly then force down prices ? Most certainly. Will it not then keep them down ? By no means. If I have goods I can make no use of, and there is but one man in the world that I can sell them to, sooner than not sell them, though they cost me a hundred pounds to make, I will sell them for sixpence. Thus monopoly will beat down prices. — But shall I go on making them and selling them nsome I 11 which IS, ! 11 at that rate ? Not if I am in my senses. Thus monopoly will not keep down prices. — Hence then comes all the error in favour of monopolies— from not attending to the difference between forcing down prices and keeping them down. When an article is dear, it is by no means a matter of indifference, whether it is made so by freedom or by force. Dearth which is natural, is a misfortune : dearth which is created, is a grievance. Suffering takes quite a different colour, when the sense of oppression is mixed with it. Even if the effect of a monopoly is nothing, its inefficiency as a remedy does not take away its malignity as a grievance. What then do you get by the monopolizing system take it alto- gether? You get the credit of this grievance : you get occasional dearth : you get the loss you are at by the armaments you keep up against smuggling : you get the expense of prosecution, and the waste and misery attendant upon fine and confiscation. Oh, hut the duties upon the Colony trade produce revenue to us. I dare say they do, and what then I Must you govern a country in Oivier to tax your trade with it I Is there that country that does not produce revenue to you I You tax your trade with Britain, don't you? and do you govern Britain J you tax British goods as high as smuggling will permit : could you tax them higher if they came from the Colonies i Would you if you could ? would you tux your own subjects higher than you would strangers ? 1 will shew you how you may get revenue out of them : I will shew you the way, and the only way in which, if you choose iniquity, you may make it profitable. Tax none of their produce, tax none of your imports from them ; of all such taxes every penny is paid by yourselves. Tax your exports to them : tax all your exports to them : tax them as high as smuggling will admit : of all such taxes every penny is paid by them. I will shew you how much more you could get in this way from them than from foreigners. You could not, .. ust be confessed, get, unless by accident, more per cent, on what they took from you, than on what foreigners took from you : for smuggling, which limits the rate per cent, you could thus levy upon foreigners, limits in like manner the rate per cent, you could levy upon your vassals. Remote countries like the colonies might indeed afford less facility for smug- gling out of France than contiguous countries, and so the expense of smuggling being the greater, the tax would admit of being set higher without having the productiveness of it destroyed by smuggling: but whatever latitude is thus given, is given you see not by alienship but by distance. You could not, I say, get more per cent, in this way from your vassals, as such, than if they were foreigners ; but what you could get from them, is that same rate of profit, with greater certainty as to the extent of it. Foreigners might quit your market at any time : and would quit it, if after the tax ihus levied upon them, they could not get the goods they want, upon as good terms from you as else- where. Your own vassals could not quit your market, except in as 12 i, •P i far ns smuggling would enable them, for by the supposition tliey have no other. Upon foreigners the tax is an experiment, and what you risk by the experiment is, the temporary distress to individuals pro- portioned to the decrease, whatever it be, of that branch of trade : for as to the absolute sum of trade, or to speak more distinctly, of national wealth, it suffers nothing, as yo»i have seen, beyond the amount of the relative and momentary decrease : so that the whole produce of this tax is so much clear gain to the revenue, for which nothing is paid or so much as risked, beyond the above-mentioned momentary and contingent distress to individual traders. Upon your own vassals there is nothing for experiment to ascertain : you have them in a jail, and you set what price you please on their existence ; only you must keep the door well locked, and if the jail be a large one, this may be no such easy matter. In Guadaloupe, Martinique, and St. Domingo, what coula the expense amount to t the prisoners all refractory, and making holes and beating down doors and walls, at every opportunity, with people on the outside to help them. — Let those calculate who may think it worth their while. In all this there are no figures — why { because nothing turns upon figures. Figures might show what the incomes of your colonists amount to ; and what the incomes of your colonists amount to is nothing to you, for they are their incomes and not yours. — Figures might shew the amount of your imports from your colonies ; and it makes nothing to the question, for they do not sell it you without being paid for it, and they would not be the less glad to be paid for it for being free. — Figures might shew the produce of your taxes on those imports ; and it makes nothing to the question, for you might get it equally whether the producers of those articles were dependent or independent, and it is your own people at home that pay it. Figures might shew, what you sold in the way of exports to your colonists in this and that shape : and it makes nothing to the ques- tion ; for consumption not sale is the final use of production, and if you did not sell it in that shape, you would sell it or consume it in another. Figures might shew you the amount of the taxes you levy on those exports: and nothing turns upon that amount; for if the price of the article will bear the amount of the tax without the help of such a monopoly as subjection only can ensure, you may get it from them when independent as well as from other foreigners, and if it will not, neither will they bear to see it raised so high, nor will you bear to raise it so high, as to pay the expense of a marine capable of blocking up all their ports, and defending so niu.iy vast and distant countries against the rival powers, with the inhabitants on their side. Oh, hut they are a great part of our power, — Say rather, the whole of your weakness. In your own natural body you are impregnable : in those unnatural excrescences you are vulnerable. Are you at- tacked AT HOME? NOT A MAN CAN YOU EVER GET FROM them: not a sixpence. Are they attacked? they draw UPON YOU for fleets AND ARMIES. If you were resolved to keep them, could you ? it may be worth 13 your consideration. Is it not matter of some doubt, even now when you have them to defend only against themselves : can there be a moment's doubt, when tiie power of Britain is thrown into the scale ? Five men of war, I think, or some such matter, you have ordered out to defend them against one another. Ask your minister of the marine, can he spare 50 more to defend them against their protectors ? Fifteen thousand are bound for Martinique to fight aristocrats : ask your war- minister whether Custine can spare 30,000 more of his best men to fight Britons. Do not feed yourselves with illusions. You cannot be every where : you cannot do every thing. Your resources, great as they are, have still their limits. The land is yours. But do ^ a think it possible for you to keep it so, and the sea likewise? — the land against every body, and at the same time the sea against Britain ? Look back a little. Could Spain, Holland, and America together save you from the 10th of April ? How will it be now ? America is neutral. Spain and Hol- land are against you. Send as many ships as you can, England alone can send double the number, and if that be not sufficient, treble. Oh, hut times art changed. I dare believe it. — What superior bravery can do will be done. But how little does that amount to on such an element? Can bravery keep a ship from sinking ? With skill any thing like equal, can any possible difference in point of bravery make up for the difterence between two and one ? Consider a httle : a ship is not a town, that you can bombard it with orators, and decrees for the encouragement of desertion, and declarations of the rights of men ; a ship is not a town, out of which the lukewarm can slip away, or into which a few friends can give you admittance. You are brave : but neither are English seamen remark- ably deficient in point of bravery. If you have your lights, they have their prejudices : they may find it not so easy as you may think to comprehend the doctrine of forced liberty : they may prefer a made constitution which gives tranquilhty, to an unmade one under which security is yet to come : they may question the right of the thousands who address you, to answer for the millions who are bid to abhor you : they may prefer the George whom they know, to a Frost whom they never heard of. Hear a paradox, it is a true one. Give up your colonies, they are yours : keep them, they are ours. This is what I most tremble at : excuse me — I am an Englishman — it touches me the most nearly. Oh, but the people of Bourdeaux. — Well — what of tbj people of Bourdeaux ? Are the passions of one town to set at uoaght the inte- rest of the whole nation ? Are justice, prjsperity, possibility to be fought with for their sake ? — Think more honourably of their pa- triotism. Address them, enlighten them, persuade them : and if you find a difficulty in bridling that speck on your own continent, think whether you will find it easier to master so many vast and distant islands, with Britain on their side. To YIELD TO JUSTICE IS WHAT MUST HAPPEN TO THE MIGH- TIEST AND PROUDEST NATIONS. DlSGRACE OR HONOUR FOL- 14 i: I i \ LOWS, ACCORDING TO THE MODE. BillTAlN YIELDED TO AmH- RicA r Britain yielded to Ireland. On which occasion WAS HER DIGNITY BEST PRESERVED t Sitting where you do, call it not couraye to drive on in the track of war and violence. There is nothing in such courage that is not compatible with the basest cowardice. The passions you gratify are your own passions : but the blood you shetl is the blood of your fellow-citi/ens. Who can say what it costs you at present to guard colonies ? Who can say what you might save by parting with them ? — I should be afraid to say it— almost the whole of your marine? — What do you keep a marine for but to guard colonies ? — Whom have you to fear but the English ? — and why, but for your colonies l To defend your trade, say you? — Do us justice, we are not pirates. We should not meddle with your merchantmen, if you had not a single frigate : we should not invade your coasts, if you had not a single fort. We have ambition and injustice enough, but it does not shew itself in that shape. Do we hurt the trade of Denmark, Sweden, Naples, any of the infe- rior powers? — Never: except they carry your trade for you, when you are at war with us for colonies. — What do I say ? If we ourselves have a marine, it is not for trade, it is for colonies : it is because some of us long to take your colonies, all of us fear your taking ours. Is consistency worth preserving ? Is your boasted conquest-abjuring decree, that decree which might indeed be boasted of if, it were kept ; is that most beneficent of all laws to be any thing better than waste paper? — I he letter, I fear, has been long broken: the spirit of it may be yet restored, and restored with added lustre. Set free your colonies, then every thing is as it should be. We incorporated Savoy and Avignon, you may say, because it was their wish to join us : we part with our distant brethren, because like us they choose to be governed by themselves. — Mutual convenience sanctioned our compliance with the wishes of our foreign neighbours : mutual inconvenience, the result of unnatural conjunction, mutual inconvenience as soon "s it was under- stood, made us follow and even anticipate the wishes of our distant fellow -citizens. — Reduction of the exjioises of defence was the induce- ment to our union with those whom we either bordered on or inclosed : the same advantage, but in a much superior degree, rewards us for the respect we show to the wishes and interests of the inhabitants of another hemisphere. — To neutral powers we give much cause for satisfaction, none for jealousy. Our acquirements are two small provinces : our sacrifices are, besides continental settlements in every quarter of the globe, a multitude of islands, the least of them capable of holding both our acquisitions. — Were such your language, every thing would be ex- plained, every thing set to rights. — While you take what suits you, keeping what does not suit you, you aspire openly to universal domi- nation : with fraternity on your lips, you declare war against mankind. Shake off your splendid incumbrances, the sins of your youth are atoned for, and your character for truth, probity, moderation, and philanthropy built on everlasting ground. tmwmNS'u Jf 15 In the event of a rupture with Spuin, you have designs, I think, in favour of her colonics. With what view?— To keep them? Say so boldly, and acknowledge yourselves worthy successors of Lewis XlV. To give them independence ? Why not give it, then, where it is already in your power to give it ? Will you put your constituents to an im- mense expense for the chance of giving liberty, and refuse it where you can give it for a certainty and for nothing ? — Compare the pictures — liberty without bloodshed on the one hand, bloodshed with only a chance for liberty on the other. Which is the best present ? Which of the two is most congenial to your taste ? Is it the bloody one ? — Go then to those colonists, go with liberty on your lips, and with fetters in your hands, go and hear them make this answer, — French- men, we believe you intend liberty for us strangers, when we have seen you give it to your own brethren. You who hold us so cheap ; who look down witli such con- temptuous pity on our corruption, on our prejudices, on our imj)erfect liberty; how long will you follow our example, and of all parts of it those which are least defensible ? Is it a secret to you any more than to ourselves, that ouu colonies cost us much, that THEY YIELD US NOTHING — THAT OUR GOVERNMENT MAKES US PAY THEM FOR SUFFERING IT TO GOVERN THEM — AND THAT ALL THE USE OR PURPOSE OF THIS COMPACT IS TO MAKE PLACES, AND WARS THAT BREED MORE PLACES? You who look down with so much disdain on our corruption, on our prejudices, on our imperfect liberty, how long will you submit to copy A SYSTEM, JN WHICH CORRUPTION AND PREJUDICE ARE IN LEAGUE TO DESTROY LIBERTY? — A COMPACT BETWEEN GOVERN- MENT AND ITS COLONIES, OF WHICH THE MOTHER COUNTRY IS THE SACRIFICE AND THE DUPE? You have seen hitherto only what is essential — Collateral advantages crowd in in numbers. Saving of the time of public men, simplification of government, preservation of internal harmony, propagation of liberty and good government over the earth. You are chosen by the people : you mean to be so ; you are chosen by the most numerous part, who nmst be the least learned of the people. This quality, with all its advantages and disadvantages, you, the children of the people, must expect more or less to partake of. Inform yourselves as you can, labour as you will, reduce your business as much as you will, you need not fear the finding it too light for you. — What a mountain of arguments and calculations must you have to struggle under, if you persevere in the system of colony- holding with its monopolies and counter-monopolies ! What a cover for tyranny and peculation ! — Give your commissaries insufficient power, they are laughed at : give them sufficient, your servants become dangerous to their masters. — All this plague you get rid of, by the simple expedient of letting go those whom you have no right to meddle with. Cleared of all this rubbish of mischievous and false science, your laws will be free to put on their best ornament : then and not till then you may see them simple as they ought to be, simple as "I m 16 tboH;o who sent you, simple as yourselvt s. Yes, citizens : your time, all the time you either have or can make, is the property of those who know you and whom you know : you have none to bestow upon those distant strangers. Great diflerences of opinion, and those attended with no little warmth, between the tolerators and proscribers of negro slavery: — emancipation throws all these heart-burnings and difticulties out of doors ; it is a middle term in which all parties may agree. Keep the sugar islands, it is impossible for you to do right : — let go the negroes, you have no sugar, and the reason for keeping these colonies is at end: — keep the negroes, you trample upon the declaration of rights, and act in the teeth of principle. — Scruples must have a term : how sugar is raised is what you need not trouble yourselves about, so long as you do not direct the raising it. Reform the world by example, you act generously and wisely : reform the world by force, you might as well reform the moon, and the design is fit only for lunatics. The good you do will not be confined to yourselves. It will extend to us : 1 do not mean to our ministry, who afiront you, but to the nation, which you most wish to find your friend. — No, there is no end to the good you may do to the world : there is no end to the power that you may exercise over it. By emancipating your own colonies, you may emancipate ours : by setting the example, you may open our eyes and force us to follow it. By reducing your own marine you may reduce our marine : by reducing our marine, you may reduce our taxes : by reducing our taxes, you may reduce our places : by reducing our places, you may reduce our corruptive influence. By emancipating our colonies, you may thus purify our parliament : you may purify our constitution. — You must not destroy it : excuse us, we are a slow people, and a little obstinate : we are used to it, and it answers our purpose. You shall not destroy it : but if purifying it in that slow way will satisfy you, we can't help your purifying it. A word is enough for your East India possessions. Affections apart, which are as yet unknown, whatever applies to the West Indies, appHes to the East with double force. The islands present no difficulty : the population there is French : they are ripe for self-govern- ment. There remains the continent : you know how things are changed there : — the power of Tippoo is no more. — Would the tree of liberty grow there if planted ? Would the declaration of rights translate into Sanscrit? Would Bramin, Chetree, Bice, Sooder, and Hallachore meet on equal ground ? If not, you may find some difficulty in giving them to themselves. You may find yourselves reduced by mere necessity to what we should call here a practical plan. If it is deter- mined they must have masters, you will then look out for the least bad ones that could take them : and after all that we have heard, I ques- tion whether you would find any less bad than our Enghsh company. If these merchants would give you any thing for the bargain, it would be so much clear gain to you : and not impossible but they might. You know better than to think of obtaining Ibr the quiet possession of these provinces any thing like what would be spent at the first w^ord 11 for the chance of taking them by force : the pleasure of rapine, bloodshed and devastation, is not to be set at so low a price : but something surely they would give you. Though to you the country is a burthen, it does not follow that to them it might not be a benefit. Though even the whole of their vast possessions were a burthen to them, the burthen, instead of being encreased, might be diminished by the addition : the expense of defence might be reduced : Pondi- cherry might be to them what Savoy is to you. But enough of suppositions and conjectures. — How you part with the poor people who are now your slaves, is after all a subordinate consideration : the essential thing is to get rid of them : You ought to do so if nobody would take them without being paid for it. What- ever be their rights, they have no such right as that of forcing you to govern them to your own prejudice. Oh, but you are a hireliny : You are a tool of your king, and of his East India company : they have employed you to tell us a fine story, and persuade us to strip ourselves of our colonies, not being able to rob us of them themselves. — yes : 1 am all that : I have not bread to eat, and no sooner is your decree come out, than I get £60,000 from the company, and a peerage from the king. — / am a hireling : — but will you then betray the interest of your constituents, because a man has been hired to shew it you I — It would be of use to England : — but are there no such things as common interests, and are you never to serve yourselves but upon condition of not serving- others at the same time i Is your love for your brethren so much weaker than your hatred of your neighbours ? — It would be of use to England. — But are England and king of England terms so perfectly synonymous, and do you of all men think so ? — The king's interest would be served by it : — but by knowing a man's interest, his true and lasting interest, are you always certain of his wishes? Is consummate wisdom among the attributes of his ministers ? Have they no passions to blind, have they no prejudices to mislead them? Are you so unable to comprehend your own interest, that it is only from the opinion of others that you can learn it, and those your enemies ? — The king of England is your enemy .'—but because he is so, will you put yourselves under his command ? Shall it be in the power of an enemy to make you do as he pleases, only by employing somebody to propose the contrary? — See what a man exposes himself to by listening to such impertinences !— / am hired : but are not advocates hired, as often as a question comes before a court of justice? and is justice on neither side, because men are paid on both sides ? — Legislators, suffer me to give you a warning — this is not the only occasion on which it may have its use. Those, if any such there be, who call attention off from the arguments that are offered to the motives of him who offers them, show how humble their conception is, either of the goodness of their cause, of the strength of their own powers, or of the solidity of your judgment, not to say of all three. If they practise upon you by suggestions so wide from reason, it is because they either fear or hope to find you incapable of being governed by it. E 18 m A word of recapitulation, and I have done. — You WILL, T SAY, GIVE UP YOUR COLONIES — BECAUSE YOU HAVE NO RIGHT TO GOVERN THEM, BECAUSE THEY HAD RATHER NOT BE GOVERNED BY YOU, BECAUSE IT IS AGAINST THEIR INTE- REST TO BR GOVERNED BY YOU, BECAUSE YOU GET NOTHING BY GOVERNING THEM, BECAUSE YOU CAN'T KEEP THEM, BECAUSE THE EXPENSE OP TRYING TO KEEP THEM WOULD BE RUINOUS, BECAUSE YOUR CONSTITUTION WOULD SUFFER BY YOUR KEEP- ING THEM, BECAUSE YOUR PRINCIPLES FORBID YOUR KEEPING THEM, AND BECAUSE YOU WOULD DO GOOD TO ALL THE WORLD BY PARTING WITH THEM. In ALL THIS IS THERE A SYLLABLE NOT TRUE ? — But though THREE-FOURTHS OP IT WERE FALSE, THE CONCLUSION WOULD BE STILL THE SAME. — RiSE, THEN, SUPERIOR TO PREJUDICE AND PASSION : THE OBJECT IS WORTH THE LABOUR. SUFFER NOT EVEN YOUR VIRTUES TO PREJU- DICE YOU AGAINST EACH OTHER: KEEP HONOUR WITHIN ITS BOUNDS ; NOR SPURN THE DECREES OF JUSTICE BECAUSE CON- FIRMED BY PRUDENCE. To conclude. — If hatred is your ruling passion, and THE gratification OF IT YOUR FIRST OBJECT, YOU WILL STILL GRASP YOUR COLONIES. If THE HAPPINESS OP MANKIND IS YOUR OBJECT, AND THE DECLARATION OF RIGHTS YOUR GUIDE, YOU WILL SET THEM FREE. — ThE SOONER THE BETTER: IT COSTS YOU BUT A WORD: AND BY THAT WORD YOU COVER YOURSELVES WITH THE PUREST GLORY ! Jeremy Bentham. THE END. VARCUANT, PRINTER, INORAM-COURT, FENCHURCH-STREET. ' -^ ILL, J NO NOT ' . NTE- S BY lUSE ous, EEP- PING RLD lBLB LSE, ' lEN, RTH M EJU- ITS }0N- \ND ILL IND OUR ER: VER ' * 1. ► : ■ *'■- . J, * '. , ' .-" ■: - f " , 5- i ' ""'.*- I . .f'%^ - ( 1 I 9^1