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CLARK MURRAY, PA0V£B80B OF XXXXAIi AXD MOBAL rHUOBOPBT, QCBBil't COLUOB, KHrCWIOir. I. SCOTTIflH PHILUSePHY. I propose to present in this Journal a series of articles on Sir Wil- liHm Hamilton and his philosophy. Whatever value one may ascribe to the work which Sir William has performed in the world, it cannot be doubted that he is the representative of a very extensive philosophical school at the present day, and that for some time it will be required by friends and foes alike, that that school shall be esti- mated as it is represented in his writings. The philosophy, of which Hamilton is the most distinguished exponent, he regards as being identical, in its fundamental positions, with that which is known in our histories of philosophy as the Scottitk School ; and it is conse- quentiy of importance, if it be not absolutely necessary, in order to the scientific comprehension of Hamilton's philosophy itself, that it should be studied in its relation to the national philosophy of his country, of which it is ostensibly an exposition and defence. I shall .1 ^•.lf^*»^^' ^ •IE WIILLIAM BAMtLTOM't rHILOfOPST. aeeordinglj cndM^our to givt, in the prewnt artiele, luch an outline of the Soottiih philosopher In ate history and its moat prominent characteristics^ as seems requisite for the explanation of Sir William Hamilton's speculationat and in doing so, I must of course limit mjself esolusivelj' to the most prominent of the problems on which these speculations touch. The earliest impulse to philosophical speculation is probably to be traced in Scotland, as in most other countries in modem Europe, to the general intellectual reviyal which mingled, at one time as cause, at another as effect, wiiifi the reformation of the church in the 16th century. A powerful influence must have been exerted in the earlit r part of the century by John Mair, especially through his opinions on civil and ecclesiastical polity ,* which he had probably thought out when, as a student at the University of Paris, he became acquainted with the claims of the Chillican church, and which, it is equally pro- bable^ gare a direction to the lives of hii pupils, Knox and Buchanan, as well as to the reform which they were the principal means of intro- ducing. But in those departments of philosophy, in which the Scot- tish school became afterwards famous, Mair attained no emancipation from the traditional forms of thocght whose trammels were beginning to be felt throughout Europe ; and accordingly when the last quarter of the century opened, it was still an axiom in St. Andrew's, Abmr- ditm e»i dieere errau9 Arittotelemt which could not be questioned without a riot,** and the denial of which by the Principal in the UniTcrsity of Glasgow, was sure to excite, in one of the r^ents, div* respectful manifestations of ill temper.f The Principal of that Uni- versity at the time was Andrew Melville. Melville had in earlier life attended the lectures of Ramus at the University of Paris, and itot only his immediate assault an the dominant Aristotelianism in the Universities of his native country, but his whole teaching, as fat as may be withered from the text books which he introduced,* seems but the natural issue of the stimulus which he had received from the great leader of the revolt against Aristotelian authority in France. The learning and eloquence and argumentative abili^,. with which Melville led his successful inroad upon the old routine of thonght in * For these, wf MoCrie's Lift of Knox. • jtutobtographif and Diary of Mr. Jamt$ Mtlttth^ pp. 12S-4. t Ibid , p. 67. •Ibid, p. 49. na WILLIAM HAMILTON'S rBIL080I*RT. an outline prominent \XT William Bune limit I on which >«Wy to be Europe, to le MS cause, in the 16th the earlii r }pinions on bought out aequainted qually pro- Buchanan, ns of intro- h the Scot- nancipation t beginning ast quarter ^•s, Jbsur- questioned il in the ;ents, dis-* that IJni- learlier life |s, and iu)t im in the I, as faff as ,* seems from the In France, th which lought in the Scoteh Uoiversities, originated a fresh educational power which had begun to attract even foreignersf to the then remote Unirersity of Glasgow ; aod a more intimate acquaintance with the period will onlj confirm the impression, that for Scotland a brilliant career in letters was being opened np,* such as her Southern sister bad then already commenced, and such as she herself entered upon at once, wbenever the cause was remored, which soon after this began to operate, and which rendered such a career impossible for ber until she had done a century of other work more essential to ber o'*n existence, and also, it is believed, to the progress of civilisation in the British islands. It is no part of my task in this place to interpret the development of ihe Scottish mind in the seventeenth century ; hut even Mr. Buckle explains the limitation of its range during that period, as arising, not from an inherent impotence, but partly from the compulsory im>' prisonment of external circumstances, partly from the voluntary con- centration of its powers on an unwearying revolt against political and ecclesiastical despotism. That such is the true explpnation of the narrow space within which the Scottish mind moved during the cen- tury in question, becomes apparent from the results which immedi- ately followed the Revolution of 1688. With the peaceful communi- cation, which by this means was opened, between the north and the south of Britain, began that influence of the two nations on each other, which, after a few years, rendered their legislative union pos- sible and which is now welding them into one. The literature of England thus, found its way into Scotland, and the literary language of London soon become that of Edinburgh also. The Scotch, able once more to breathe freely, began to look abroad on what other nations had been doing, while they were absorbed in their long struggle for existence and for what was dearer to them than existence itself. Even in theology a freer range of thought was ventured upon : so conservative a churchman as Wodrow did not shrink from acquaint- ing himself with the writings of Tindal and Collins, while he indicates the change which had come over the spirit of the Scottish) f Ibid., p 50. This woric, to which I hsre referred several times, contains s«ne> Talunble information regarding the condition of the Scottish Universities during' the latter part of tb« 16th century. The author was a nephew of Andrew Mel- ville, and was the first regent in Scotland who lectured on Aristotle's works,, aot from Latin translations, but from the original (p. 64.) • See D. Stewart's Di$urtatiofi, p. Qi, aote. «lft WILUAM HAMfLVail • F«t&«tOPBV. Kir]c by his aUna at "fhe notioM getting into the hrada of yocng preachers, that moml duties are preferable to positire, Ac."* Al- ready ill the earlier years «»f the century there «re not wanting indi- cations of the first beginning of tho!« efforts, which at a later period became more decided, to explain what bad been deemed the pecu- liarities of Christianity in accordance with the natural course of men- tal and material phenomena. In this reawakening of the nation to questions, which it had been precluded froi^ investigating by tbe circumstances of its histofy during the previous century, it was natural that the intensely theological bent which had been already given to it by these circumstances, should direct its efforts still. It may be owing to this, that, as has been noticed by Cousin.f tbe most eminent guides of the new intellectual movement were connected profesMohaUy with the national church and that the speculations of the Scottish school, especially in moral philosophy, have uniformly shewn the high moral influence of the old presby teriaoism, or, as llamilton has expressed it, have been uniformly opposed to all destructive systems.^ Meanwhile a change took place in the constitution of the Univer- sities, ' influence of which in the impulse given to science and philo / has never, so far as I am aware, been noticed. This was the inbutution and endowment of professorships, and the consequent abolition of the practice in accordance with which each regent carried his set of pupils through the studies of the entire ourriottluro in Arts. The change had in fact to some extent been adopted in the University of Glasgow more than a century before, namely in 1 576, under the Principslship of Andrew Melville, § and was subsequently continued, as well as extended ; || but its advantages were in a large measure annihilated by the oircumstsnce, that the salaries attached to the several professorships were on a graduated scale, and that %<>hen, any of the higher became vacant, the occupants of the less lucrative were .advanced.** It was not however till the year 1 708 that the old system -was abandoned in Edinburgh iff and the first appointment, under the •Wodrow'g Corre$pondenet, Vol. Ill , p. 470. fPhilotophie Ecottaite, pp. 18-19 (Sme. efl.) XLbeiure$ on iSetaphi/Bic*, Appendix B. (c.) ^Jutobiography and Diary of J. JUehilU, p. 64. \il{tid't Aceount of tht Untvenity of Glasgow ia Humilton's editton of his Works, p. 129. ••Ibid, p 730. f tBower'g Hintory of the Univtrtity of Edinburgh, VoL II., pp. 71-2. nl l| ■IE WnLCfAM HAMTtTOfl^e PBft6a6PBT. new Kjstem, to fhi ehsir of Moral Ffiilotophy did not take place till 1 729. to that of Logie aiid MetaplSysret not tilt the fbllowrag jrar. In Al>«rdeen the old system waa continued even in 1752, when Dr. Reid was elected Vtofeaor of PhUomphy and in discharge of its duties required to teach Mathematics and Fhjsics, as well as Logie and Ethics* The first f>roCMMor appointed under the new system to. the chair of - Logic and Metaphysics in Edinburgh was Dr. John Sterenson, to whom an honourable place should be asfttgned among the earlier origi« iniftors of the philosophical inquiry, which the introduction of that STRtem assisted in adraneing. It is not indeed for the contributions which his own speculations have given to the philosophy of Scotland, that he is here brought into prominence; but bis inftnence as a tencber in awakening and onrokling the philosophical spirit in others is spoken of by such pupils as Robertson and Stewart so highly, that cue cannot but wish to know more of him tban is contained in the slender notices which tbare come down to ns. In the same year in which Stevenson entered ufMNi bis labours in Edinburgh, a man of greater importance both for the results of his specn> lations, and for his influence as a philosophical teacher, commenced his career as professor of moral philosophy in the University of Glasgow. Francis Hotcheson is rightly regarded by nearly all historians of philosophy as the true originator of the Scottish School. Undoubt- edly his claim to this position is founded in a considerable measure on the influenee which he exerted in direetii^. inquiry towards mental phenomena in general ; but we shall afterwards see how largely the distinctive doctrine of the Scottish school is indebted to the most prominent doctrine of his system, — the theory of internal senses whose affections furnish the mind with ideas as peculiar and inde- composable as those with which we are furnished by the affections of the external or bodily senses.^ We are now to trace the course through which speculation was led to the position it assumed in the Scottish school. From the opening of intercourse with England, the Scotch professors seem to have kept their students abreast of the most recent English specula* 'Stewart's Acouunt of Reid ia HamUton's edition of Stewarts Works, Vol. X, p. 253. fThe fullest informatioB aboat Stevenson tfa&t I have met wftfa is in Bower's m»tory of the Univereity of Edinburgh, Vol. II., pp. 269- 2el. tSee Reid'i Intellectuat Power$, Essay YI., Chap. 2. nrn WILLIAM HAXILTOM's miLOMPBT. tibni. The writings of Hobbet aad of his immediste siiUigonistt csme too soon to prodnce any sppredable influenee in SeotUnd, or at least their influence was interrupted bj that of a work which has created a more prominent epoch in the history of philosophy. It is from Locke's Suuy eoneeming Human underttunding and the con- sequences to which its doctrines were reduced by others, that we must trace the most important philosophical systems which have since pre- vailed in France and Germany, as well as in Britain. During the earlier part of last century the doctrines of the Buay formed the basis of the principal philosophical teaching in the Scottish Univer- sities ; the abridgement by Bishop Wynne was a favourite text-book» and the Ehment$ of Logic by Professor William Dnncan of Aberdeen is also a mere summary of Locke.* But, in the transition from Locke to the speculations of Scotland, we may not omit a philosopher, who has not, indeed, received the same prominent position in our histories of philosophy, because his doctrines are only now exerting their just influence by beinic only now interpreted correctly, but who appears to me to have at once displayed keener philosophical insight, and attained more nearly the true theory of knowledge, as well as the true theory of existence. In Berkeley's New Theory of Finoitf which was published in 1709, if it be care- fully read, there will be found rising to explicit statement at times an implied theory of perception, not by sight alone, but by all the senses ; the theory, in fact, which was more fully explained in the Prineiplee of Human Knowledge (1710), and which received its most perfect form in the Three Dialoguee between Hglae and Philonou* (1713). The received interpretation of this theory, which became afterwards prevalent in the Scottish school, r^;ards it as a reduction of Locke's theory to partial scepticism — to scepticism concerning the reality of material things. I cannot but maintain, that few, who read the bishop's writings afresh in the light of more recent speculations, will rise from their perusal with any such interpretation of their drift. What the drift of his teaching is, it must require considerable time, in the face of such long-established misapprehension, to ex- plain ; stHl, in the few sentences which the brevity of this sketch al- lows me for such a purpose, I must endeavour to indicate, at least in general, the meaning I attach to his theory. To interpret the theory, especially in so far as the interpretation of timi as i( and hun * Veitob's Mtmoir of A Sttwart, p. 25, note. ■ift William aAiiiLTOK*! paiLOtortaT. it depends on the interpretation of the language in whieh il ia de- livered, we mutt go back upon Locke*a Euaff, which delermined the terminology and phraseology of pbilotophical writings for a long time, both in England and in France. The problem of Loeke*s work) as its title implies, is a seientific explanation of hnman understanding t and this problem is reduced to the question, What is the origin oi human understanding, or, in other words, of human knowledge? In the solution, which the B$my gives, of this problem, human know* ledge is explained as originated exclusively by the action of the phe- nomena which are presented to the mind from the period of birth onwards, none ot these phenomena being admitted to have had any prior existence involved in the nature of the mind. Now, the phe* nomena which are presented in human knowledge, and which, there- fore, form the immediate objects of ^the mind when it knows, Locke named ideas.* It will thus be seen how the problem of the Essay came to be expressed in the question, What is the origin of our ideas? and this became the form in which the problem of philosophy con- tinued to be studied in the school of Locke. It is not necessary here even to touch upon the detailed analysis of our ideas, into which the Euay enters with the view of vindicating its theory re- garding their origin ; but it is necessary to notice the fact, that ideas, or the immediate objects of knowledge, though, of course, exuting at idetUt are still regarded as only in some way revealing to us real exit' tenee whieh can never itself be known. Now, in the light of this philosophy and its phraseology, the doctrine of Berkeley must be re- cognised as bearing a very different significance from that which is usually ascribed to it. There are, at least, three points in his doc- trine, which I am confident that an examination of the Dialogue* be- tteeen, hylae and Pkitonou* will confirm at every page. 1. Berkeley maintained the common belief of men, that sensible things, that )8, the things which form the immediate objects of per- ception, really exist, and are not, as most of philosophers maintain, merely images of a real world, which we do not and cannot perceive. 2. But the question with Berkeley is strictly not whether sensible things really exist, or not ; but what is meant by saying that they exist really ? Now, according to the common doctrine of philoso- phers, which Berkeley combats, the real existence, which we ascribe Co the material universe, is predicable not of the things which we • Sm S»m^, DMk 11^ chap. 1, mo. I. SIM WILLIAM BAMILTOM's rSILOtOPHT. fcnofw bj the wniei, bat oaly of • mattml rabttane*. which th«se thingt reprrient, thoagh* in itaclf. iv can never be known bj the lenief or by any other meene. These thinge, bowerer, which we know by the seneei* bot which merely represent to ns real e:(istenee, were, ts we bare already seen, called t'diroe in the pk loeophy prera- iMit at Berkeley's tiniA^ ; yet, in spile of this unfortunate fact, iC ia not diiRealt to arrire at the conclnsion that, regairding the reality of his oppoaitioB to the thecry of representative perception, there is not & shadow of the doubt frooti which Sir 'William Hamilton acknow- ledges himself wnable to clear the lai^age of Reid< '* These ideas, as yua eatt them," his language repeatedly and explicitly imisle, *' these things which we see and tonch, you may call them by what« erer name yon pleascf are not mere images ; they are not the mere show of a world, but the real material world itself, and the only ma- terial world that really exists : for that unknown, Mid unknowable, and unthinkable world, of which yon say the world we know is but a phantasm — it is that world which is a phantasm i the reswk of yoor own fantastic speculations, with which you puxxle yonrseWes and your followers/' Berkeley, therefore, does not seek to explain the material world, which we knoW) by supposing the existence of an- other world, about which we know and can know nothing. S. What, then, is the explanation which Berkeley gives of the existence which we attribute to material things ? According to him, since a thing exists for us only inasmuch as we know ft, it» rery exis- tence, so far as we are concerned, eiMiisists in our kneiwledge of it. The existence of anything independent on me must, therefore, he concludes, be merely the ftiet that it is known by some other mind ; and, consequently, the material uotrerse, as it does not depend for its existence on human, finite mtnda, moit be known by an tTniversid' and Everlasting Mind. Berkeley bringo lis, naturally, to the speculations of the Scottish school, not merely because it was necessary to go back «p sophy. It is fortunate that Dugald Stewart has preserved to us, on the authority of his teacher. Professes Stevenson, the most valuable evidence we possess of the, extent to which the doctrines of Berkeley were studied, and studied sympftthisiogly, among his younger contem- ]>oraries in Scotland. The evidence, to which I refer, is the fact„ that a number of young men in Edinburgh had fofmed a club for the pur- •Ift WI1.lt AM HAMILTON 8 rffTLOSOPHT. f ' pnw of itadytng BcrkHey'i writings, thiit thfy hud corrr^ponfteil with him in or«lfr to obtain further rxphnntiont rfgnrding his theory, und that he hud spoken ol them as erinein^ a more intelli- gent eomprehrntion of his argument thnn he had met with nnywhero etre.* The only penon, whom Stewart mention! aa hating been • member of the club, is the Rer. ]>r. Waliacp, nho it weH-known at one of the earliett writers on the theory of popnlntion, and is still re« membered, in the chnrrh of his natitc country, for the wise applica- tion of his economical studies in the origination of the Scottish Min- istert^ Widows' and Orphans' Fund. While this wtis going on in the capital, traces more distinct may be discorered of the influence which the Irish bishop's writings were exerting in other parts of the coun- try. Two or three years before Hdtcheson had begtin his career as pro- fessor in Glasgow, a yonnger son in the family of the Huities (or Homes), of Ninewells, in Berwickshire, though scarcely orer sixteen years of age.f was schooling himself into hsbits of speculatire thought, by which he was to create a new era in the philosophy of Europe. After abandoning, from disinclination, the study of law, and trying, for a few months, a mercantile life in Bristol, he nlti- matety retired, for about three years, to Rheims, and afterwards to Lfi Fleche, in Anjou, with the view of devoting himself entirely to philo- sophical and literary pursuits. While he was still but twenty-six years of age, be returned to London, with the Treatise of Human J}fahtre ready to be put into the printer's hands. Though the doc- trines of the Treatise were afterwards recast and its author objects to their being judged in their earlier form,^ there can be no doubt it it in this form that they have acquired historical importance and are» therefore, to be considered at present. Moreover, I know none who have not felt disappointment on turning from the Treatise to its re* vision — none who have not found in the former* rather than in the latter, the power which has revolutionised the speculative opinions uf modern Europe. Hume starts with the same question, with which Locke's Stfay is mainly occupied, " What is the origin of ideas ? " § Hume's answer •Stewart's Dinrertation, pp. SBO-l (Hamilion'it e*liti«>ii). t Set* the L«, Thomas Rcid, who was a year older than Hume, bad been already two years a clergyman of the Scotch church in the parish of New Machar in Aberdeenshire. Descended on the father's side from a family, which for some generations had been distinguished in the literaturr and in the learned professiims, especially in the church, of Scotland ; on the mother's side, a nephew of David Gregory, the celebrated Savilian professor of Astronomy at Oxford and personal friend of Sir Isaac Newton, Keid continued to follow his ancestral scientific tastes with I I ■ - ■ • r~-r "1 ' - - • TieatUey Book T., Chap. ?, Sec. 0. flbld, Book I., Chap. 4 , Sec 2. UR INTILLIAM HAMILTON S FH8L080PHT. 13 the modrstT, with the reyerence for traditional modes of ttionght and life, which pne should expect in the character of a conscientious and Itenerolent country clergyman. This is not the place to attempt a mediation between the opposite extremes in the estimate of Reid, which have been maintained even in recent times by Uamiiton and Cousin on the one hand, by Ferrier and Buckie on tlie otiier. In his quiet obser- vation of Bi ?h phenomena as his range of inquiry brought within his reach, in bis unpretending classifications of such as he observed, in his timid groping after inferences which his ohserv/itions seemed to Icgiti- mate, there was no danger of falling intb those extravagancies in which the flights of genius are doomed to land, often, like that of Icarus, from the very height to which they rise; but he would probably hare accepted, as but a dubious compliment, the ascription to him of those sublime anticipations, which direct the labours of subsequent inquirers till they are established in literal accordance with the rules of scientific induction.* Dr. Reid, in a well known letter to Dr. Gregory, (20th August, 1790), acknowledges that the discovery of the fundamental and dis- tinctive principle of his philosophy was owing more to Berkeley and Hume than to himself-f From the evidence already adduced of the influence which Berkeley's writings had exerted in Scotland while Keid was still a young man, we are not surprised to learn, as we do from the philosopher himself,^ that he had at one time adopted the whole of the idealist's theory. According to the same acrouiit, it was not till the conclusions of Hume's Treaike, " which gave him more uneasiness than the want of a material world," were seen to follow inevitably from the principle on which idealism is huilt, that he was arrested to question whether that principle is not an unfounded hypothe8is.§ The principle referred to is that which Roid supposed to he the universal opinion of philosophers, that ** the only objects of thought are ii/ean or imaget in the mind ; " and he claims for himself nothing that is strictly his own in philosophy, except his having railed this hypothesis in question.* We shall have to consider im- mediately whether Reid was correct in selecting this as the fundamen- tal peculiarity of his philosophy ; but there will be seen to belittle - .—.^—— , .^ y , •See Intellectual Powere, Easay I., Clinp. 8. f Stewart's Jceount qf Reidf p. 22, a (tlamilton's edition of Roid'a Works.) } Works, p. 283. §See the above mentioned letter to Dr Gregory. 14 •IR WILLIAM BAMILTOM ■ PHTLOSOPHT. room for doubt, that he is mistaken in snpposing: the doctrine srIevteJ to be difltinctire of hii system even among those of which he intended his own to be a critique, or that, except in one anpect, it is distinguish- able from the doctrine of Berkeley, against which he belieredi it to contain a successful polemic. Tu explain, it must be obserred that the doctrine referred to may be regarded both as a theory of knowledge and as a theory of exis- tence. As a theory of knowledge, it maintains that the immediate objects of perception, are not mere '* ideas or images in the mind ** of objects that exist really or out of the mind, bu. these reslly existent objects themscWes. The Three Dialogvee of Berkeley, however, maintain exactly the same theory in the different language enforced by their differesl point of view. For the idealist denominates the immediate objects of perception by the term current among philoso. phers; the realist, by the term current among ordinary men, or in the language of common tenee. But the idealist himself acknow- ledges the revolt of natural feeling against his theory, arising from the awkwardness enforced by the technical language of philosophers, which obliged him to speak of the immediate objects of perception as itieat, and not as things ; * and the statement, that the immediate vb- jects of perception are not the mere images of an unknown existence, but exist really themselves, would undoubtedly have been accepted by both philosophers, as expressing their theory of knowledge in contradistinction from the theories which they opposed. Though the doctrine of Berkeley and that of Reid, considered as theories of knowledge, may thus be regarded as coincident, as theories of existence they appear, at first thought, to diverge in widely oppo- site directions ; but it is impossible, on second thought, to say how far this apparent divergence would have been found to be real, if the true meaning of Berkeley had been explained to Reid. For I can find no evidence that Reid had ever clearly proposed to himself the question, in answering which his doctrine seems to diverge from that of Berkeley. His polemic against Berkeley consists mainly in an ap. peal to the natural and necessary belief of mankind, that the objects which we perceive ex'st really — that they exist beyond the mind which perceives them ; but we have already seen that the credibility of that belief is asserted quite as unmis'.akably by Berkeley ~that he only refuses to accept it without a scientific explanation of its mean- • Beik«Icy'i Woika, Vol. I., p. 205. •IR WILLIAM Hamilton's ruiLosoraT. 15 ing. Hit explaniition, ns we hare further Keen, is that the belief in the real existence of the objects of perception is only the belief that they are really perceived, and that the belief in their i*xistence be- yond our minds, ie simply the belief that they are perceived by an* other mind, or by other minds : their existence, therefore, according to him, consists in the perception of them by vome mind ; and he is consequently content to speak of them as Meat, which hare no exis- tence but in a mind. It is difficult to explain the shock which this langunge created among Berkeley's antai;onists, except by supposing that they understood the preposition in as expressing some kind of relation in place ; it is more difficult to conceire what mental fact they understood it to denote, and most difficult of all to believe that they had paid any attention to' his otvn explanation, in accordance with which to exitt in a mind and to be known by a mind are conver- tible phrases * If this explanation had been noticed by Rcid, it is scarcely possible to believe that he could have placed himself in the unmitigated antagonism, which he assumed, towards Berkeley ; for the faith in a Primordial and Universal Mind involves the admission that nothing exists which is not also known, or, in other words, that everything exists in that Mind. Does the hostility between Berkeley and Reid thus resolve itself wholly into a difference about the mean- ing of words? There still remains. one point at which the two doc- trines seem to come into distinct collision ; for, while the Scottish philosopher regards the material oltjects presented to the senses as being the qualities of a substance which is not known by us,t but is, of course, known by the Omniscient, the Irish philosopher protests against the hypothesis of such an unknown substance, as not only unnecessary to explain the phenomena of knowledge, but as contra- dicting its essential conditions. I have already hinted the possibility of a doubt whether Reid has hit upon the realiv fundamental principle of his philosophy, when he elevates lo that position his discovery, that the theory of perception by means of idea'i is without any ground in fact. I believe the his* torian of philosophy must decide that such a principle should be recognised in Reid's antagonism, not to the " ideal theory," as he calls it, but to the empirical theory regarding the origin of knowledge. Whatever opinion may be formed of his opposition to the latter tlicory. • Woika, Vul. I. |>. 204. t iHttUtttt'"! I'vmit, Eaiay II., ehsp. i9. 16 •IR WILLIAM HAMILTON S rHILOSOPAT. ^ it u that which diitinguuhei bis place in the development of British speculation and gives his philosophy an importance it never could hnve derived from the principle which he regarded as its distinctive peculiarity. For as the growth of philosophical speculation unfolds into dearer prominence the real meaning of the problems which it has to solve, it will be found that the conclusions of philosophers regard- ing the principle involved iu the " ideal theory " must depend on their conclusions rpgardiiig the origin of our knowledge. There is not here space for an explanation and proof of the above statement ; but it may be sufficient in the present connection to notice the fact, that in disproving the "ideal theory*' Reid himself is obliged to adduce beliefs which he regards as originated by the very constitution ol our minds, and as therefore having an origin prior to experience. It is in this connection that the doctrine of Ilutcheson, with regard to internal senses, assumes historical importance as having possibly sug- gested the general name of common aente for tlie source of those beliefs which are common to all mankind and are considered capable of explanation only as original and compulsory issues of intelligence. Moreover the statement I have made regarding the actual fundamen- tal principle of lieid acquires additional confirmation, from the fact that the Scottish philosophy, of which he is regarded bs the chief rfpresentative, is, when named after its distinctive characteristic, usually designated the philoaophy of common senae. While a correct historical estimate of Reid's philosophy thus seems forced to raise into special prominence his assertion, for some of the elements which constitute human knowledge, of an existence indepen- dent on experience, it is scarcely possible to avoid surprise at the slender grasp with which he holds this principle and the unskilful manner in which he applies it in his explanation of the mental phenomena. This may indeed be partly accounted for by the fact, already mentioned, that he was ignorant of the prominence due to this doctrine of his system ; but it also arose from his never having clearly apprehended nny criterion, by which the a priori facts in con- sciousness could he readily recognised. For although Sir William Hamilton gives Reid the credit of having discovered such a criterion of these facts in their neeemty,* yet not only are Reid's reference? to this characteristic so incidental as to afford no ground for believing that he recognised it as the criterion, but his doctrine of first princi- ■ tieU'H Woikn, p. 'did a, noto ; and lActuru on Metaphysici Vol II, p. 35'J. II SIR WILLIAM HAMILTON 8 PHILOSOPHY. 17 pies is such as must have led him to deny that necessity is their differentiating attribute. A brief glance at this doctrine may not be useless in enabling us more correctly to interpret the philosophy of Reid. According to this doctrine,t fi^'^ principles are those which all reasoning in the last appeal implies, inasmuch as the inference of one truth from another cannot have proceeded without a beginning, but Dust have started from some truth or truths which are not themselves inferred from any prior truth. Such truths, as being prior to all others in human knowledge, are called y?r«^ principles ; and since they do not draw their evidence from others, must contain it in themselves. Sel/'evidence is therefore the distinctive characteristic of first prin- ciples. There is, however, a difference of opinion among men, as to what truths are self-evident, and accordingly it is necessary to inquire whether there is " no mark or criterion by which first principles that ftre truly such may be distinguished from those that assume the character without a just title." In answering the question which he thus proposes, we should certainly expect to find what Reid considered to be the criterion of first principles ; and yet, in the four propositions with their corollaries which form his answer, while there is an enume- ration of several tests, some of which are most inapplicable, there is no mention of the criterion which is now recognized. The only pas- sages in which this criterion is explicitly referred to, ns far as I can recollect and as far as Sir William Hamilton quotes, are at pp. 455, 459 and 521 in his edition of Reid's works, where, among other evi- dences, necessity is adduced as proving the non-empirical character of the two principles, that every beginning of existence must have a cause, and that intelligence in the cause may be inferred from the marks of it in the effect. In these passages undoubtedly Reid sees that a proposition, which we know to be true necessarily, and there- fore true in all places and at all times, cannot be obtained by an in- duction, however extensive, of our experiences ; but waiving the con- sideration that he here mis-states a subjective necessity of knowledge as the knowledge of an objective necessity, we must notice, what does not seem to be observed by Hamilton, that Reid's classification of first principles is sufficient tu shew that he would have refused to constitute necessity the criterion of them all. For he divides truths into the two classes of contingent and necessary, while he allocates to each of ^Intellectual Powert, Eesay Vl ., Chapters 4-7. 18 SIR WILLIAM Hamilton's philosophy. these a separate set of first principles."' Among the first principles of the latter, he enumerates the two which have just been mentioned ; and it is not because they are first principles, it is because they are not contingent, but necessary truths, that he regards them as tran* scending experience. With this doctrine of first principles, it is not to be wondered that Reid has been so unsuccessful in what ought to have been the most prominent excellence of his system. We have probably in this an explanation of the circumstance, that, although he recognises the importance of an accurate system of the facts which are primal in human knowledge, his detail of them, especially when compared with their exhibition in Kant's Critique, appears rather an enumeration at random than even an attempt at systematic classification. It is further remarkable, as possibly traceable to the same source, that, although the analysis of the idea of cause in the Treatise of Human Nature led him to the theory of its a priori character, he failed to see the conclusion which his own principles should have inferred from the analysis in the same work of the ideas of space and time. In Reid is included all that is distinctive of Scottish metaphysical philosophy previous to Hamilton. We have indeed contributions of various value frum others : in the writings of Dugald Stewart, the whole field traversed in the works of Reid, as well as numerous colla- teral departments of interest and importance, is illustrated with more elaborate fulness, with the elegance of a wider and more refined aes- thetic culture, with a superior command of the English language, and an infinitely superior erudition, if not with a more comprehensive grasp of principles, or any bolder originality in their application ; but we have no considerable addition to the substance, no new trait in the character of the philosophy. We are now better prepared for understanding the exact point at which Sir William Hamilton found the philosophy of his country and the nature of the task which was laid before him. In my next article I shall give an exposition of Sir William's own system ; and I shall thereafter proceed to estimate bis success in solving the problems which he took in hand. "Jntelleclual Powers, Essay Vl., Chapters 5-6. ri5